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# MAKING SENSE OF A WORLD OF CLICKS

## 1 INTRODUCTION

In a recent article O. Ulfbeck and A. Bohr  have pointed out certain features of quantum mechanics (QM) the significance of which has not been sufficiently appreciated. Foremost among these is the genuine fortuitousness of detector clicks, which are usually thought of as being caused (“triggered”) by the impact of a particle: “the individual fortuitous event, which quantum mechanics deals with, comes by itself, without any cause, and is entirely beyond theoretical analysis.” (Quotations without reference numbers are from Ref. 1.)

The idea that a detector click is “a totally lawless event” is not entirely unheard-of. In a letter to Max Born, Wolfgang Pauli spoke of the “appearance of a definite position $`x_0`$ during an observation…as a creation existing outside the laws of nature” . More recently the present author has argued that a value-indicating event such as the click of a detector is what philosophers call a causal primary—it occurs without a cause and is therefore fundamentally inexplicable .

According to Ulfbeck and Bohr, QM is exclusively concerned with distributions of clicks: “The wave function enters in the sole role of encoding the probability distributions of clicks.” This view is close to the “correlation interpretation” , a common ground that ought to be acceptable to everyone, inasmuch as within its minimal conceptual framework “no conflict of postulates takes place” . What divides the physics community is the attempt to go beyond the correlations and say something reasonable about the correlata and their relation to the correlations. I fully agree with Ulfbeck and Bohr that such an attempt ought to take due account of the genuine fortuitousness of the correlata. This constraint, however, leaves plenty of room for disagreement, as will become obvious in what follows.

## 2 WHY FORTUITOUS?

My first dissent concerns the reason why the correlata are uncaused. Ulfbeck and Bohr aim to establish the genuine fortuitousness of detector clicks by pointing to the immense complexity and consequent uniqueness of each “macroclick,” when this is seen in sufficiently high resolution: “the click involves such an immense number of degrees of freedom that two clicks are never identical…. Laws for clicks arise when the click…is seen with a lowered resolution…. With the lowered resolution, clicks can repeat thereby defining probability distributions that are within the domain of law.” What is actually addressed here is the measurability of probabilities in terms of relative frequencies. The probability of a unique event cannot be measured. QM, however, assigns probabilities regardless of whether they can be measured.

That the above argument is irrelevant to the genuine fortuitousness of detector clicks is also obvious from the authors’ independent insistence that the onset of a click, “from which the click evolves as a signal in the counter…, does not belong to a chain of causal events” and “is not the effect of something.” As I see it, the reason for this is that the probability that a variable $`Q`$ has the value $`v`$ is the product of two probabilities—the probability that any one of the possible values of $`Q`$ is indicated, and the probability that the indicated value is $`v`$ given that a value is indicated. QM is exclusively concerned with probabilities of the latter type. It does not assign a probability to the occurrence of a value-indicating event, nor does it specify sufficient conditions for such an event. If QM is a fundamental and universal theoretical framework, this means that the value-indicating events presupposed by QM are uncaused.

## 3 INDEFINITENESS

My second and perhaps chief dissent concerns the authors’ rejection of the terminology of indeterminate variables. There is no doubt that this terminology is potentially confusing, but given the obvious importance of the indefiniteness or relative positions for the existence of spatially extended material objects , what is needed is not a wholesale rejection but a conceptual clarification.

The proper way of dealing with indefinite values is to make counterfactual probability assignments . If we say that a variable has an “indefinite value,” what we mean is that it does not have a value (inasmuch as no value is indicated) but that it would have a value if one were indicated, and that positive probabilities are associated with at least two possible values. (While the reference to counterfactuality cannot be eliminated, it may be shifted from values that are only counterfactually indicated to values that are only counterfactually indefinite: If a certain measurement is performed on an ensemble of identically “prepared” systems and the results exhibit a positive dispersion, the value of the measured variable would be indefinite for each system if the measurement were not performed.)

If a variable sometimes does and sometimes does not have a value, a criterion is called for, and this is the existence of a value-indicating fact. In other words, the matrix variables of QM are extrinsic, in the sense that each possesses a value only if, and to the extent that, a value is indicated (by an actual event or state of affairs).

Ulfbeck and Bohr object to such statements as the following, which they find “difficult to fathom”: The spin-component of an electron has two possible values, yet it lacks an actual value; the neutron traverses the interferometer, yet it does not pass through a particular arm of the interferometer. Given the extrinsic nature of the matrix variables, the meaning of these statements ought to be clear. If something indicates the value of a particular spin component, it indicates either of two possible values, and the indicated value is possessed at the time of indication; if nothing indicates a value for a given time, no value is possessed at that time. By the same token, if the neutron’s passage through the interferometer can be inferred from the facts then the neutron did traverse the interferometer, and if nothing indicates the arm taken by the neutron then the neutron did not pass through a particular arm. If this last statement is still difficult to fathom, it is because we approach the quantum world with an inadequate concept of space (Secs. 5 and 7).

The authors for their part make statements that others may find difficult to fathom: “a matrix variable manifests itself on the spacetime scene, without entering this scene”; “the clicks can be classified as electron clicks, neutron clicks, etc., although there are no electrons and neutrons on the spacetime scene”; “\[s\]omething has happened to the source” yet “no events have taken place in the source.”

These statements, too, cease to be obscure when the extrinsic nature of matrix variables is taken into account. The authors make a sharp distinction between the matrix variables of the theory and what takes place in spacetime or is present on the spacetime scene. On the spacetime scene we have events such as the clicks, involving material objects such as counters, and “all physical phenomena including clicks are described in terms of variables that each has a value, at any time.” A matrix variable, on the other hand, does not have a value under any circumstance.” It never enters the spacetime scene, but it “can manifest itself (appear) with a value.”

The reason why this distinction is justified is that a fundamental physical theory which is essentially a probability algorithm presupposes (i) actual events to which probabilities can be assigned and (ii) actual events or states of affairs on the basis of which probabilities can be assigned. These events or states of affairs are described in terms of intrinsic variables—variables that possess values at all times. That a matrix variable never has a value and never enters the spacetime scene is a way of saying that it is not an intrinsic variable: It never has a value by itself. Correspondingly, that a matrix variable can manifest itself on the spacetime scene with this or that value is a way of saying that it is an extrinsic variable: It has a value only if, and to the extent that, a value is indicated.

Suppose that we perform a series of position measurements, and that every measurement yields exactly one result (that is, each time exactly one detector clicks). Then we are entitled to infer the existence of a persistent object, to think of the clicks given off by the detectors as indicating the successive positions of this object, to think of the behavior of the detectors as position measurements, and to think of the detectors as detectors. If instead each time exactly two detectors click (including the possibility that the same detector clicks twice), we are entitled to infer the existence of two objects (but not of two distinct individuals, unless distinguishing properties are also indicated). The upshot is that the number of “components” of a quantum system is as much an extrinsic variable of the system as the positions of its components.

Thus when Ulfbeck and Bohr state that there are no electrons and neutrons on the spacetime scene, I take it to mean that the number of electrons or neutrons present in a system is not an intrinsic variable: It never has a value by itself. It is not the case that electron clicks happen because there are self-existent electrons that occasionally enter electron counters and produce clicks; rather, electrons exist only because each electron click indicates the presence of an electron in a particular region at a particular time. The electron’s presence supervenes on the click. (“Supervenience” is a suitable philosophical term for the relation between extrinsic values and value-indicating facts. The extrinsic values supervene on the value-indicating facts.)

When Ulfbeck and Bohr state that the source (“defined in terms of a distribution of clicks observed, for example, at the boundary of the source”) “constitutes an object in space, with non-classical properties that can be established by the observation of distributions of clicks,” the properties they refer to are non-classical in that they are extrinsic. At first sight the authors’ statements that “\[s\]omething has happened to the source” yet “no events have taken place in the source” seem inconsistent. If due account is taken of the extrinsic nature of those properties, the apparent inconsistency disappears. As the authors themselves explain, “the events that tell us that something has happened to the source…do not take place in the source.” In other words, what happened to the source supervenes on a click that occurs at the boundary of the source. While it is correct that “nothing takes place in the source that could be a cause of the click in the counter,” saying that “no events have taken place in the source” is correct only in the sense that no intrinsic events have taken place there—no event has occurred by itself and triggered the counter. This does not rule out events in the source that supervene on the clicks at the boundary of the source.

## 4 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY

My third objection concerns the reality claims that go with the authors’ distinction between matrix variables and what is present or takes place on the spacetime scene. Central to their conceptual scheme is (i) “the identification of reality with the world of experience” and (ii) “the identification of experience with what takes place on the spacetime scene.” From these identifications it follows that a matrix variable, which “cannot enter the spacetime scene,” lacks reality. Ulfbeck and Bohr confirm this when they explain why they avoid expressions like “the world of matrix variables”: “it might convey the notion that something exists beyond the world of experience.” At the same time they affirm that “the matrix variables are physical quantities,” and that they are “variables in their own right.” These are conflicting claims. How can a physical quantity that is a variable in its own right not be real?

The authors state that “the locality permeating the quantal formalism is a symbolic one (which can be expressed in terms of fields that are associated with spacetime points but are not themselves on the spacetime scene since they derive from matrix variables).” What can be associated with a spacetime point without being present at that point? The obvious answer: the probability for something to happen or be present at that point. Denying reality to a matrix variable comes down to saying that the probability for something to happen or be present in a given region $`R`$ at a given time $`t`$ is not something that exists either in $`R`$ or at $`t`$. A matrix variable is unreal for the same reason that a possibility per se is not an actuality, and it can manifest itself on the spacetime scene for the same reason that something that is possible can be actual as well. There is no need to support these truisms with (inconsistent) reality claims, let alone to support these reality claims with metaphysical claims about experience and the spacetime scene.

By definition, empirical science deals with the world of experience. For this reason it cannot possibly tell us anything about what lies beyond the world of experience. Nor is experience (in the broadest sense of the term) amenable to empirical investigation since experience (in this sense) encompasses the world of experience and therefore does not take place within it. By confining reality to “the world of experience” Ulfbeck and Bohr make it clear that they refer to experience in this broadest sense, and this makes their reference to “experience” gratuitous and irrelevant.

Experience becomes accessible to scientific investigation in the attenuated sense of a relation between one part of the world of experience and another. Psychologists and neuroscientists have arrived at an impressive understanding of the relation between the “external” world—one part of the world of experience—and its representation in the mind or by the brain—another part of the world of experience,—even though the “final” step to subjectivity remains shrouded in mystery since it concerns the existence of experience in its broadest sense, rather than the relation between one part of the world of experience and another. There is thus considerable a posteriori evidence—at least within psychology—of the usefulness of the division of the world of experience into a physical part—the world “out there” including the scientifically known brain—and a phenomenal part—the world as we perceive it.

I believe that the distinction between the phenomenal world—the world as we perceive it—and the physical world—the world as we theoretically conceive it—is equally useful for elucidating the ontological import of QM. Niels Bohr wrote:

> It is my personal opinion that these \[interpretational\] difficulties are of such a nature that they hardly allow us to hope that we shall be able, within the world of the atom, to carry through a description in space and time that corresponds to our ordinary sensory perceptions.

Bohr did not say that a spatiotemporal description was impossible but only that such a description could not be modeled after our ordinary sensory perceptions. The distinction between the physical and phenomenal worlds allows us to distinguish between the spatiotemporal features of the phenomenal world, which correspond to our ordinary sensory perceptions, and the spatiotemporal features of the physical world, which don’t. And it may well be that the key to understanding QM lies in the unfamiliar spatiotemporal features of the quantum world—the physical world as described by QM. If so, Ulfbeck and Bohr could be blamed for delaying the progress of science just as Kant has been blamed for having delayed the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries by arguing that the validity of Euclidean geometry was a priori certain .

The milestones in the history of science can be characterized by the recognition that what was once unquestioningly accepted—e.g., Euclidean geometry, absolute simultaneity—actually lies within the compass of empirical falsifiabily. Ulfbeck and Bohr adhere to the Kantian doctrine that “\[s\]pace and time constitute a scene established for the ordering of experiences,” according to which spatiotemporal concepts have meaningful application only to what appears on the mental canvas woven out of space and time. In so doing they arbitrarily confine empirical reality to what is accessible to direct sensory experience, and render scientifically unassailable concepts of space and time that corresponds to our ordinary sensory perceptions. Thus, like Kant, they could be accused of delaying an adequate understanding of the spatiotemporal aspects of the physical world, and hence of QM.

## 5 PHYSICAL SPACE VS PHENOMENAL SPACE—I

Making sense of QM is not so much a question about the ontological status of density operators—they are just sophisticated probability measures—as a question about the ontological status of the space and time coordinates that appear as arguments of density operators in the position representation. The demonstration that these coordinates cannot refer to the self-existent and intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics requires nothing more elaborate than a two-slit experiment with electrons .

No electron is detected in the absence of the electron source in front of the slit plate, and no electron is detected behind the slit plate whenever the two slits are closed. This warrants the inference that each detected electron went through $`L\&R`$, the regions defined by the slits considered as one region. At the same time the existence of interference fringes implies that each electron went through $`L\&R`$ without going through a particular slit and, of course, without having been split into parts that went through different slits. (Like Ulfbeck and Bohr, I am concerned with the interpretation of standard QM unadulterated with, e.g., Bohmian trajectories  or nonlinear modifications of the “dynamics” .) But if space were something that existed by itself, independently of its material “content,” and if it were made up of distinct, separate regions, every material object would be affected by this. No material object could be present in $`L\&R`$ without either being wholly contained in one of the regions or having a part in each region.

Interference fringes have been observed using C60 molecules and a grating with 50-nm-wide slits and a 100-nm period . Do we need any further proof that (in the context of standard QM) $`L`$ and $`R`$ cannot be distinct, self-existent “parts of space,” and that, consequently, space cannot be a self-existent and intrinsically partitioned expanse?

Although we readily agree that red, or a smile, cannot exist without a red object or a smiling face, we just as readily believe that positions can exist without being properties of material objects. We are prepared to think of material objects as substances, and we are not prepared to think of their properties as substances—except for their positions. (A substance is anything that can exist without being the property of something else.) There are reasons for these disparate attitudes, but they are psychological and neurobiological. They concern the co-production, by the mind and the brain, of the phenomenal world. They do not apply to the quantum world, but they certainly make it hard to make sense of it .

What is ultimately responsible for the disparate ways in which we handle positional information and other sensory data is the process by which the mind/brain integrates into phenomenal objects such phenomenal variables as hue, lightness, shape, and motion. This integration is based on positional information . Phenomenal variables that occur in the same place are perceived as features of the same object, despite being neurally represented in separate feature maps. (A feature map is a layer of the neocortex in which cells map a particular phenomenal variable in such a way that adjacent cells generally correspond to adjacent locations in the visual field. In the macaque monkey as many as 32 distinct visual feature maps have been identified.) Thus while every phenomenal variable except location has at least one separate map, locations are present in all maps as the integrating factors. This unique role played by positional information in the process of feature integration is one of the reasons why we conceive of space as a pre-existent and intrinsically differentiated expanse. The neural process of feature integration, on which the creation of the phenomenal world is based, can only work if distinct locations somehow pre-exist. The creation of a physical object, on the other hand, is not a process that involves the integration of perceived features, so there is no reason to believe that physical space pre-exists as an intrinsically differentiated expanse. In fact, as the above analysis of an interference experiment has shown, this belief is inconsistent with QM.

In the physical world the so-called “parts of space” are not real and distinct per se. A spatial region has a contingent reality, in the sense that it may exist for one material object and not exist for another. This calls for a criterion, and the obvious criterion is this: A region $`V`$ is real for an object $`O`$ if and only if the proposition “$`O`$ is in $`V`$”—symbolically, $`OV`$—has a truth value. And the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a truth value is that one is indicated. But the truth or falsity of $`OV`$—can be indicated only if $`V`$ exists, and for this is must be realized (made real) by being a possessed position that can be consistently considered intrinsic. This takes us to the genuine core of the so-called measurement problem, whose solution requires a demonstration of the consistent coexistence of extrinsic and intrinsic variables.

## 6 SOLUTION OF THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM

There are objects whose indicated positions are so correlated that every one of them is consistent with every prediction that is based on previous indicated positions and a classical law of motion (except, of course, when the indicated positions serve to indicate unpredictable values). If I take this characterization as a definition of “macroscopic object,” I need to show that such objects exist. Note that this definition does not require that the probability of finding a macroscopic object where classically it could not be, is strictly 0. What it requires is that there be no position-indicating fact that is inconsistent with predictions based on a classical law of motion and earlier position-indicating facts.

The departure of an object $`O`$ from a classical trajectory can be indicated only if there are detectors whose position probability distributions are narrower than $`O`$’s. Such detectors do not exist for all objects. Some objects have the sharpest positions in existence. For these objects the probability of a position-indicating event that is inconsistent with a classical trajectory is necessarily very low. It is therefore certain that among these objects there will be macroscopic ones.

Since no object has an exact position, it might be argued that even for a macroscopic object $`M`$ there always exists a small enough region $`V`$ such that the proposition $`MV`$ lacks a truth value. But this is an error. Macroscopic objects have the sharpest positions in existence. There isn’t any object that has a sharper position. A fortiori, there isn’t any object for which $`V`$ is real. But a region exists only if it is real for at least one material object. It follows that there exists no region $`V`$ such that the proposition $`MV`$ lacks a truth value. Such a region may exist in our imagination, but it does not exist in the real world.

Now recall why positions are extrinsic: The proposition $`OV`$ may or may not have a truth value. One therefore needs a criterion for the existence of a truth value: A truth value must be indicated. But one doesn’t need a criterion for the existence of a truth value if for every existing region $`V`$ the proposition $`MV`$ has a truth value. Since macroscopic objects satisfy this condition, their positions can be consistently considered intrinsic. We can think of the positions of macroscopic objects (macroscopic positions, for short) as forming a system of causally connected properties that are effectively (that is, for all quantitative purposes rather than merely all practical ones) detached from the facts by which they are indicated. We can think of this system as a self-existent and self-contained causal nexus interspersed with transitions (of value-indicating positions) that are causally linked to the future but not to the past.

Since the beginning of time (in about 1926) it has been argued that QM is about experience, knowledge, or information , rather than about a free-standing reality capable of being described without reference to observers, their information, their interventions into “the course of Nature” , or their arbitrary decisions as to where to make the “shifty split” between “system” and “apparatus” . Why? Because it is such an easy way to establish the consistent coexistence of extrinsic and intrinsic variables. If the properties of the quantum world are extrinsic (that is, if they “dangle” from, or supervene on, something), and if the quantum world is coextensive with the physical world, then from what can they “dangle”? The obvious answer: from us, from what we perceive, or from what we know.

For this easy way out we pay a high price. By safeguarding against empirical refutation conceptions of space and time that are consistent with the phenomenal world but inconsistent with the physical world, we make sure that we won’t discover the spatiotemporal features of the quantum world. And by rooting the possible value-indicating events, to which QM assigns probabilities, in the world of sensory experience, we make sure that we can’t conceive of the quantum world as a strongly objective, free-standing reality that owes nothing to observers, information, or our interventions into the course of Nature.

## 7 PHYSICAL SPACE VS PHENOMENAL SPACE—II

Macroscopic positions are so abundantly and so sharply indicated that they are only counterfactually fuzzy. Their fuzziness never evinces itself, through uncaused transitions or in any other manner. It exists solely in relation to an imaginary spatial background that is more differentiated than the physical world. The space over which the position of a macroscopic object is “smeared out” is never probed. This space is undifferentiated; it contains no smaller regions. We may imagine smaller regions, but they have no counterparts in the physical world. The distinctions we make between them are distinctions that nature does not make.

It follows that the quantum world is only finitely differentiated spacewise, and that it ought to regarded as constructed from the top down, by a finite process of differentiation, rather than from the bottom up, on a self-existent and maximally differentiated spatial expanse. And much the same applies to the world’s temporal aspect. Time is not an independent observable; it has to be read off of deterministically evolving positions—the positions of macroscopic clocks. If these bear a residual fuzziness, so do all indicated times. The upshot: The quantum world is maximally differentiated neither spacewise nor timewise, and it is constructed from the top down with respect to both space and time.

To advance further, we must be clear about what it means when a particle is said to be “pointlike.” This is an expression of the fact that the particle lacks internal structure. Nothing in the formalism of QM refers to the shape of an object that lacks internal structure, and the empirical data cannot possibly do so. All that experiments can reveal in this regard is the absence of evidence of internal structure. The idea that a so-called “point particle” is an object that not only lacks internal relations but also has the shape of a point, is thus unwarranted both theoretically and experimentally. It is, besides, seriously misleading, inasmuch as the image of a pointlike object suggests the existence of an infinitesimal neighborhood in an intrinsically and maximally differentiated spatial expanse. To bring our intuitions in line with the spatiotemporal aspects of the quantum world, we need to conceive of all so-called “point particles” as formless objects. What lacks internal relations also lacks a shape.

It follows that the shapes of material objects resolve themselves into sets of (more or less fuzzy) spatial relations between formless objects, and that space itself is the totality of such relations—relative positions and relative orientations. It further follows that the corresponding relata do not exist in space. Space contains, in the proper, set-theoretic sense of “containment,” the forms of all things that have forms—for forms are sets of spatial relations—but it does not contain material objects over and above their forms; a fortiori it does not contain the formless constituents of matter. Instead, space exists between them; it is spanned by their relations.

The quantum world with its fuzzy spatial relations does not “fit” into the self-existent and maximally differentiated expanse of classical space; the possibility of thinking of the relata as points and embedding them in a single manifold exists only if all spatial relations are definite (“sharp”). A clear distinction should therefore be made between the existing (more or less fuzzy) spatial relations that constitute physical space, and the purely imaginary space that comes with each material object $`O`$ and contains the unpossessed exact positions relative to $`O`$. These imaginary spaces are delocalized relative to each other: The unpossessed exact positions relative to $`O`$ are fuzzy relative to any material object other than $`O`$.

The difference between the respective ways in which spatial distinctions are realized in the physical and phenomenal worlds could hardly be greater. In the physical world spatial distinctions are realized by means of (more or less fuzzy) spatial relations between formless objects. In the phenomenal world they are realized by means of boundaries. Visual representations arise by way of an analysis of the visual field that capitalizes on contrast information. Data arriving at the visual cortex from homogeneously colored and evenly lit regions of the visual field do not make it into conscious awareness. Such regions are filled in on the basis of contrast information across their boundaries . (This explains, among many other things, why the blind spot goes unperceived whenever it falls in such a region.) The way in which the brain processes visual information thus guarantees that the result—the phenomenal world—is a world of objects whose shapes are bounding surfaces. The parts of any phenomenal object accordingly are defined by the parts of the space it “occupies,” and these are defined by delimiting and separating surfaces. This too implies that the parts of space pre-exist somehow—otherwise they couldn’t define the parts of a phenomenal object,—and this is another reason why we tend to conceive of space (inconsistently with the quantum world) as a pre-existent and intrinsically differentiated expanse.

## 8 SUBSTANCE AND THE QUANTUM WORLD

There are other respects in which the physical world is built top-down rather than bottom-up. If all substances were intrinsically distinct, the world could be thought of as constructed from the bottom up, by aggregation. The same would be true in a deterministic world, since determinism allows us to associate a distinct substance with each possessed position.

For centuries philosophers have argued over the existence of intrinsically distinct substances. QM has settled the question for good: There are no intrinsically distinct substances. The concept of substance betokens existence; it never betokens individuality. Individuality is strictly a matter of properties. Given the extrinsic nature of properties, this means that a quantum system can be associated with distinct substances only to the extent that distinguishing properties are indicated. Since this extent is limited, the possibility of decomposing the quantum world into distinct substances is limited as well. Hence the quantum world ought to be regarded as constructed from the top down not only with regard to its spatial and temporal aspects but also with regard to its substantial aspect.

If we believe that QM is about regularities in sensory experience, we don’t need the concept of “substance.” But we need it if we want to think of the quantum world as a free-standing reality, inasmuch as it is the concept of “substance” that betokens independent existence. And we need to know how the quantum world relates to its substance. Since it would be absurd to substantialize a probability algorithm, substantiality can’t be attached to a state vector or a wave function, as Ulfbeck and Bohr correctly point out. Nor can it be attached to the points of a spacetime manifold, as the previous sections have shown. Nor can the substance of the quantum world be decomposed into a multiplicity of intrinsically distinct substances, as we just saw.

If the property of being here and the property of being there are simultaneously possessed, how many substances does that make? The correct answer is “one,” for the substance that betokens the reality of the property of being here also betokens the reality of the property of being there. QM does not permit us to interpose a multiplicity of distinct substances between the substance that betokens existence and the multiplicity of possessed positions. QM thus lends unstinting support to the constitutive idea of all monistic ontologies: Ultimately there is only one substance. As physicists we are not concerned with the intrinsic nature of this substance. (It arguably plays an important role in the emergence of consciousness). What is of interest to us is how it acquires the aspect of a spatiotemporal expanse teeming with quarks and leptons.

In broad outline the answer is simple enough: By entering into spatial relations with itself, this substance acquires at one stroke the aspect of a multiplicity of spatial relations, which constitute forms and space, and the aspect of a multiplicity of formless relata, which constitute matter. And if we allow the spatial relations to change, we have time as well, for change and time are co-implicates. (In a timeless world nothing can change, and a world in which nothing changes is a world without temporal relations; such a world is temporally undifferentiated and therefore timeless, just as a world without spatial relations is spatially undifferentiated and therefore spaceless.)

## 9 WHAT HAPPENS BETWEEN VALUE-INDICATING
FACTS?

What can be said about the interval between two times for which properties are indicated if no property is indicated for any intermediate time? To begin with, consider again a two-slit experiment in which all that is indicated is each electron’s place of departure in front of the slit plate and its place of arrival behind the slit plate. While the propositions $`eL`$ (“the electron went through $`L`$”) and $`eR`$ lack truth values, the corresponding histories contribute to the observed probability distribution. We therefore have reason to conclude that both histories happen, but indistinguishably, in the sense that the distinction we make between them is a distinction that nature does not make. The reason why we cannot assign separate truth values to $`eL`$ and $`eR`$ but only a single truth value to $`eL\&R`$ is that the conceptual difference between the two histories has no counterpart in the physical world.

The probability of detecting at a given time and location a particle having last been “seen” at another time and location, is determined by a “propagator” $`K(x_2,t_2;x_1,t_1)`$ that can be calculated by summing over all continuous paths leading from $`(x_1,t_1)`$ to $`(x_2,t_2)`$ . Hence nothing stands in the way of the claim that if the particle is present at these two spacetime locations, and if nothing indicates its intermediate whereabouts, then it does travel along all of those paths, subject to the understanding that the distinctions we make between these histories correspond to nothing in the physical world.

If the initial and final states of affairs include indistinguishable particles, there are further distinctions that nature does not make. The distinctions we make between histories that connect particular incoming particles with particular outgoing particles of the same type, which are based on the false notion that particles are intrinsically distinct substances, also correspond to nothing in the physical world. Such histories happen together, indistinguishably, in the sense spelled out above. Finally, if the possibility of pair events is taken into account, the histories that happen together, indistinguishably, are constrained only by conservation laws. In general it can be said that whenever QM requires the addition of amplitudes, the distinction we make between the corresponding histories do not exist in the physical world.

It is obvious that this interpretation crucially depends on the extrinsic nature of quantum variables. It is clearly impossible to construe a sum over histories leading from one state of affairs to another as something that happens “by itself,” rather than as something that supervenes on these states of affairs. It is not the case that an electron is detected by a detector because it followed all continuous paths leading from the source to the detector. Rather, the electron followed all these paths because it left the source and was detected by the detector, and because there are no matters of fact about its intermediate whereabouts.

Every value-indicating fact realizes the difference between a range of possible values, inasmuch as what is indicated is not only the possession of a particular value (the truth of one proposition) but also the non-possession of all other possible values (the falsity of $`n1`$ propositions, $`n`$ being the number of possible values). (Recall that our distinctions between alternatives correspond to something in the physical world if and only if truth values are indicated for the corresponding propositions.) Every value-indicating fact therefore reduces the set of histories that happen indistinguishably. Hence in a sense the world is built top-down also dynamically: from “everything at once” to something specific, by an elimination of alternatives. Every value-indicating fact reduces the set of histories that happen together, yet even the totality of value-indicating facts does not reduce it to a single history.

## 10 CONCLUSION

The metaphysical presuppositions of Ulfbeck and Bohr effectively safeguard against empirical refutation conceptions of space and time that are essentially classical. Claims by these authors to the effect that genuine fortuitousness “does not invoke notions taken over from classical physics,” and that matrix variables are “entirely liberated” from such notions, must therefore be taken with a grain of salt.

An alternative view of QM has been presented, which is liberated from such notions to an extent that permits conceiving of the quantum world as a free-standing reality. Central to this view is a conceptual clarification of the indefiniteness that is crucial for the stability of spatially extended material objects. This requires novel conceptions of space and time, and it implies a top-down structure for the quantum world: Rather than being built bottom-up, on a maximally differentiated spatiotemporal manifold, the quantum world arises from a limited spatiotemporal differentiation. A similar top-down structure characterizes its substantial and dynamical aspects.


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# A Role of Initial Conditions in Spin-Glass Aging Experiments

## I Introduction

Aging phenomena in spin glasses have been studied for almost twenty years.lun83  Despite considerable progress, some problems remain open. One of them is a problem of $`t/t_w`$ scaling of time dependent quantities.vin96  This issue is a touchstone of our understanding of spin-glass dynamics. Only when all departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling are accounted for, both theoretically and experimentally, can one say that the aging phenomena are well understood.

First experimental results on $`t/t_w`$ scaling of the thermoremanent magnetization (TRM) were obtained soon after the aging effects had been discovered. They demonstrated that there are small but systematic deviations from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the aging regime.oci85 ; alb87  It was shown that the TRM curves for different waiting times can be successfully superimposed if a power of the waiting time, $`t_w^\mu `$, with $`\mu <1`$, is used in the analysis instead of the actual $`t_w`$. This phenomenon is often referred to as “subaging”. The apparent age of the spin-glass state, determined from the scaling of the TRM curves, increases slower than the waiting time $`t_w`$. It was also shown oci85 ; alb87  that the quasiequilibrium decay at short observation times should be taken into account properly in order to achieve good scaling over a wide time range. However, full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the aging regime has never been derived from experimental data. Deviations of $`\mu `$ from unity are small, but persistent. The physical meaning of this scaling parameter remains unclear even though different interpretations have been proposed.bou94 ; rin00  All this suggests that there may be some additional reasons for the lack of scaling, which have not been taken into account yet.

On the theoretical side, the situation is more ambiguous. Phenomenological phase-space models,bou92 ; bou95  describing aging as thermally activated hopping over free-energy barriers, suggest full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the absence of finite-size effects. In the mean-field dynamics, however, two different cases are distinguished.bou97  Those mean-field models, where one level of replica-symmetry breaking is exact (like the spherical $`p`$-spin model), have only one time scale in the aging regime, and $`t/t_w`$ scaling is predicted.cug93  Models with continuous replica-symmetry breaking (like the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model), are characterized by an infinite number of time scales.cug94  If decay of the correlation function in the aging regime is viewed as a sequence of infinitesimal steps, then each step takes much longer than the previous one.cug99  Therefore, no $`t/t_w`$ scaling is expected in these models. It is suggestedbou97 ; cug99  that full $`t/t_w`$ scaling for all times in the aging regime would rule out the continuous replica-symmetry breaking scenario. Thus, a reliable experimental evidence of presence (or absence) of $`t/t_w`$ scaling may help determine validity of different theoretical pictures.

Numerical studies of spin-glass dynamics reveal an interesting fact. The short-range 3-dimensional Edwards-Anderson (EA) model exhibits good $`t/t_w`$ scaling,kis96 ; rit01  while there is no such scaling in the infinite-range Sherrington-Kirkpatrick (SK) model.mar98 ; tak97 ; rit94  However, validity of the EA model for description of real spin-glasses has been questioned. Recent simulations pic01  have shown no trace of rejuvenation effects, observed in temperature-change experiments.jon00  It was argued that either time scales, reached in simulations, are too short, or the Edwards-Anderson model is not a good model for real spin glasses.pic01  Further studies of both $`t/t_w`$ scaling and temperature-variation effects are needed to find out which model is better suited for theoretical description of spin-glass dynamics.

The present paper is devoted to a study of departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in spin-glass aging experiments. We hypothesize that one of possible reasons for the lack of such scaling is the influence of the cooling process. Our line of argument is the following. A typical spin-glass relaxation experiment includes cooling from above the glass temperature.nor87  Approach of the measurement temperature is necessarily slow with possible oscillations, because temperature has to be stabilized. Temperature-cycling experiments,ref87 ; led91 ; ham92  as well as aging experiments with different cooling rates,nor00  have shown that thermal history near the measurement temperature has a profound effect on the subsequent spin-glass behavior. Any aging experiment is, therefore, a temperature-variation experiment, and measured relaxation properties are determined by both cooling and waiting time effects. As the waiting time increases, the influence of the initial condition, set by the cooling process, diminishes. This may lead to a systematic deviation from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling, compatible with the experimentally observable behavior. In order to extract relaxation curves that exhibit good $`t/t_w`$ scaling, one has to average experimental results over different initial conditions.

The paper is organized as follows. The next Section discusses general properties of spin-glass relaxation and methods for analysis of $`t/t_w`$ scaling. In Sec. III.A, features of the cooling process and properties of the TRM decay for $`t_w=0`$ are studied. Sec. III.B discusses two different types of deviations from $`t/t_w`$ scaling. In Sec. III.C, properties of the TRM and the IRM are analyzed in detail. The effect of initial conditions on scaling properties of measured relaxation is discussed in Sec. III.D. The last Section summarizes our arguments.

## II  Theoretical background

### II.1  Linear response in spin glasses

In a typical TRM experiment, a spin-glass sample is cooled down from above the glass temperature $`T_g`$ to a measurement temperature $`T<T_g`$ in the presence of a small magnetic field $`h`$. It is then kept at the measurement temperature for some time $`t_w`$, which is called waiting time. After that, the field $`h`$ is cut to zero, and a decay of the thermoremanent magnetization (TRM) is measured as a function of observation time $`t`$, elapsed after the field change. This decay depends on the waiting time $`t_w`$ – a phenomenon called aging. The total age of the system is $`t+t_w`$. In a more complex IRM protocol, the sample is cooled down at zero magnetic field and kept for a waiting time $`t_{w1}`$. Then a small magnetic field is turned on, and, after an additional waiting time $`t_{w2}`$, is turned off again. A subsequent decay of the isothermal remanent magnetization (IRM) is observed. It depends on both waiting times.

In order to describe time evolution of the system, the autocorrelation function, $`C(t_1,t_2)`$, is introduced:

$$C(t_1,t_2)=(1/N)\underset{i=1}{\overset{N}{}}S_i(t_1)S_i(t_2).$$
(1)
It depends on two times, $`t_1`$ and $`t_2`$, measured from the end of the cooling process. Response of the system at time $`t_1`$ to an instantaneous field $`h`$, present at time $`t_2`$, is described by the response function:

$$R(t_1,t_2)=(1/N)\underset{i=1}{\overset{N}{}}\delta S_i(t_1)/\delta h(t_2).$$
(2)
In thermal equilibrium, both functions depend only on the time difference, $`t_1t_2`$, and they are related by the fluctuation-dissipation theorem. If the system is out of equilibrium, a generalization of this theorem is expected to hold:bou97

$$R(t_1,t_2)=\beta X[C]C(t_1,t_2)/t_2.$$
(3)
Here $`\beta =1/k_BT`$, and $`X[C]`$ is the fluctuation-dissipation ratio, which is equal to unity in equilibrium. It is suggested bou97  that, for long waiting times, $`X`$ depends on its time arguments only through the correlation function, i.e. $`X(t_1,t_2)=X[C(t_1,t_2)]`$.

Magnetic susceptibility, measured in spin-glass experiments, is the integrated response. If the field is present during the waiting time, $`t_w`$, the susceptibility, measured at the observation time, $`t`$, is given by the following expression:

$$\chi (t+t_w,t_w)=_0^{t_w}R(t+t_w,t^{})𝑑t^{}.$$
(4)
Using Eq. (3) for the response function and introducing a function $`Y[C]`$ through a relation $`\beta X[C]=dY/dC`$,bou95  one obtains the formula:

$$\chi (t+t_w,t_w)=Y[C(t+t_w,t_w)]Y[C(t+t_w,0)].$$
(5)
The first term on the right is identified with the $`t_w`$-dependent TRM susceptibility.bou95  The second term corresponds to the TRM decay after zero waiting time. To avoid confusion, we shall refer to it as ZTRM, and drop the second argument. The function on the left is the IRM susceptibility for $`t_{w1}=0`$ and $`t_{w2}=t_w`$. In what follows, the IRM will always denote the isothermal remanent magnetization with $`t_{w1}=0`$. It is characterized by the same waiting time, $`t_w`$, as the TRM. We shall also use a corresponding observation time instead of a total age as the first argument of each function. For the ZTRM, the total age is equal to the observation time. Thus, Eq. (5) can be rewritten in the following form:

$$\chi _{IRM}(t,t_w)=\chi _{TRM}(t,t_w)\chi _{ZTRM}(t+t_w).$$
(6)
The last formula expresses the well-known principle of superposition, which has been verified experimentally in the case of spin glasses.lun86

It follows from Eq. (6) that the TRM relaxation is a superposition of two decays. The IRM is a response, associated with the waiting time. The ZTRM is a response, related to the cooling process. However, the ZTRM itself cannot be treated as a linear response because of the changing temperature. This means that the thermal history cannot be taken into account by simple addition of the cooling time to the waiting time.

If memory of the initial state is strong, there will be no one-to-one correspondence between the $`t_w`$-dependent correlation and $`t_w`$-dependent linear response. The TRM depends on the correlation $`C(t+t_w,t_w)`$, but it includes response of the initial state. The IRM is a linear response, associated with the waiting time only, but it depends on the correlation with the initial state. Therefore, neither the TRM, nor the IRM can be called the ”true” $`t_w`$-dependent response.

The mean-field theory of aging phenomena relies on the assumption of weak long-term memory. According to this assumption, the system responds to its past in an averaged way, and its memory of any finite time interval in the past is weak.cug94  This implies that the lower integration limit, $`t^{}=0`$, in Eq. (4) can be replaced by any finite $`t^{}=t_0`$, as long as both $`t`$ and $`t_w`$ go to infinity.cug94  Thus, there should be no difference between the TRM and the IRM in the long-time limit. Within this asymptotic approach, the IRM is sometimes referred to as TRM. cug99 ; rit94

The linear response theory predicts that the measured susceptibility, Eq. (4), depends on the waiting time $`t_w`$. However, it gives no predictions regarding $`t/t_w`$ scaling. Eq. (6) suggests that the TRM and the IRM, though characterized by the same waiting time, cannot have the same scaling properties. This is because they differ by the ZTRM, which is a one-time quantity without a characteristic time scale. Two exceptional cases are possible. First, the ZTRM decays so rapidly, that the last term in Eq. (6) can be neglected for sufficiently large $`t_w`$. This case is usually considered in theoretical studies,vin96 ; bou95  which assume that memory of the initial condition is lost after very long waiting times, i.e. $`C(t+t_w,0)0`$ as $`t_w\mathrm{}`$.fra95  Second, the ZTRM changes so slowly, that $`\chi _{ZTRM}(t+t_w)`$ for long enough $`t_w`$ can be treated as a non-zero constant. This approach is similar to the treatment of the field-cooled susceptibility, which is also a one-time quantity. We show in Sec. III.B that neither of these two conditions holds in spin-glass experiments.

### II.2  Analysis of $`t/t_w`$ scaling

Spin-glass dynamics is characterized by at least two time scales. The microscopic attempt time, $`\tau _0`$, is associated with the quasiequilibrium decay at short observation times. The waiting time, $`t_w`$, determines properties of the nonequilibrium relaxation at long times. Both types of spin-glass behavior have to be taken into account when $`t/t_w`$ scaling of relaxation curves is analyzed.

Numerical studies of the off-equilibrium dynamics in the 3D Edwards-Anderson modelkis96  suggest that the autocorrelation function, $`C(t,t_w)`$, can be well approximated by a product of two functions:

$$C(t,t_w)t^\alpha \mathrm{\Phi }(t/t_w).$$
(7)
The waiting time independent factor $`t^\alpha `$ represents the slow (on the logarithmic scale) quasiequilibrium decay at $`tt_w`$. The function $`\mathrm{\Phi }(t/t_w)`$ (which is approximately constant for $`tt_w`$) describes the faster nonequilibrium relaxation at longer observation times. Of course, both $`\alpha `$ and $`\mathrm{\Phi }(x)`$ depend on temperature.

A similar multiplicative ansatz comment  has been successfully used for scaling experimental relaxation curves: oci85 ; alb87

$$\chi _{TRM}(t,t_w)t^\alpha F(t_e/t_w^\mu ).$$
(8)
Two features distinguish Eq. (8) from Eq. (7). First, an effective time $`t_e`$ (usually denoted by $`\lambda `$) is introduced. The age of the system increases with the observation time as $`t_w+t`$, and the time/age ratio decreases. In order to allow description of the relaxation by the same age $`t_w`$, the effective time should increase slower than the observation time $`t`$. This means that $`dt_e/t_w=dt/(t+t_w)`$ and $`t_e=t_w\mathrm{ln}(1+t/t_w)`$. Second, possible deviations from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the aging regime are taken into account by the parameter $`\mu `$. In this case, $`dt_e/t_w^\mu =dt/(t+t_w)^\mu `$, and the effective time is

$$t_e=t_w[(1+t/t_w)^{1\mu }1]/(1\mu ).$$
(9)
At short observation times, $`tt_w`$, the effective time is equivalent to the observation time: $`t_et`$.

The $`\mu `$-scaling approach is very useful for studying departures from $`t/t_w`$ scaling, no matter whether $`\mu `$ itself has a clear physical meaning or not. We use this method in the present paper and determine $`\mu `$ from juxtaposition of relaxation curves, plotted versus $`t_e/t_w^\mu `$.

A different method for separating the quasiequilibrium and aging regimes has also been successfully employed.vin96  It is inspired by dynamical solution of mean-field models. bou97 ; cug93 ; cug94  The following additive representation is considered: vin96

$$\chi _{TRM}(t,t_w)A(t/\tau _0)^\alpha +f(t_e/t_w^\mu ).$$
(10)
This approach yields better $`t/t_w`$ scaling ($`\mu `$ closer to unity) than the previously discussed method. oci85 ; alb87  It should be noted, however, that derivation of the last formulavin96  employs an assumption that $`C(t+t_w,0)=0`$. Therefore, Eq. (10) is exact only asymptotically (large $`t_w`$), when long-term memory is weak. Nevertheless, this method is justified, because it gives good results on experimental time scales.

## III Experimental results and analysis

The purpose of this paper is to study how different initial conditions affect aging phenomena in spin-glass experiments. By the initial condition we mean history of the spin-glass state before the waiting time begins. We do not attempt to prove existence or absence of full $`t/t_w`$ scaling. We try to understand, on the qualitative level, where observable departures from the full scaling in the aging regime come from.

All experiments were performed on a single crystal of Cu:Mn 1.5 at %, a typical Heisenberg spin glass with a glass temperature of about $`15.2K`$. The single crystal was used to avoid possible complications due to finite-size effects. Another advantage of this sample is its high de Almeida-Thouless (AT) critical line. zot01  For example, the AT field at $`T/T_g=0.87`$, the highest measurement temperature in our experiments, is about $`600Oe`$. This enables us to use a relatively large field change, $`\mathrm{\Delta }H=10Oe`$, and still work well within the linear response regime. A commercial Quantum Design SQUID magnetometer was used for all the measurements. This equipment has been optimized for precision and reproducibility, rather than speed. Thus, cooling is relatively slow, and this allows us to study cooling effects in detail.

### III.1  Cooling process and ZTRM

Spin-glass behavior is characterized by memory effects: properties of measured spin-glass relaxation depend on history of a sample below $`T_g`$. The cooling process is an integral part of this history. It has been shown that, in real spin glasses, details of the experimental protocol well above the measurement temperature, $`T`$, do not affect the measured relaxation.ref87  However, the thermal history in the immediate vicinity of the measurement temperature (say, $`\delta T<0.5K`$) has a strong impact on the observed spin-glass behavior. This fact suggests that the cooling and waiting time effects cannot be separated and should be studied simultaneously.

A typical cooling protocol is exhibited in the inset of Fig. 1. The temperature drops rapidly to well below the measurement temperature, than rises to $`T+\delta T`$, and slowly approaches $`T`$ from above. By definition, the experimental time starts when the measurement temperature, $`T`$, is finally reached.

The approach of the measurement temperature is shown in the main body of Fig. 1. For relatively high temperatures, $`\delta T0.1K`$. For the lowest temperature, however, $`\delta T0.3K`$. Comparison with results of temperature-cycling experimentsref87  suggests that the initial undercool is not very important, because of its large (several Kelvin) magnitude. The subsequent overshoot, however, may be expected to play a significant role in spin-glass dynamics, and cannot be neglected in our experiments. It should be noted that Fig. 1 exhibits the temperature curves for helium gas, used as a heat transfer agent within a sample chamber. The actual temperature of the spin-glass sample lags behind. This means that, in reality, the undercool is probably less pronounced, and the sample spends more time above the measurement temperature.

It is instructive to compare the cooling procedure in Fig. 1 with an experimental protocol including a positive temperature cycle.ref87  In this protocol, the sample is field-cooled to the measurement temperature, $`T`$, and kept for a long waiting time $`t_{w1}`$. Then it is heated up to $`T+\delta T`$ and annealed for a short time $`t_{w2}`$. After that, it is cooled down and kept at the initial temperature $`T`$ for additional time $`t_{w3}`$. Then the field is cut to zero, and the TRM relaxation is measured. It turns out that this relaxation follows a reference curve with $`t_w=t_{w3}`$ at short observation times, then breaks away and moves towards a reference curve with $`t_w=t_{w1}`$. Therefore, the spin-glass state initially exhibits memory of only those events that happened after the temperature cycle. But, as time progresses, it begins to recall its earlier history. Another relevant analogy is an experimental protocol with a negative temperature shift after initial waiting.led91  In both experiments, the relaxation curve after the temperature change cannot be merged with any of the reference curves measured at a constant temperature.

The main idea of this paper is that any spin-glass aging experiment is, at the same time, a temperature-cycling experiment. All effects, which manifest themselves in temperature-cycling experiments, also appear in aging experiments. Our reasoning is based on the hierarchical phase-space picture of spin-glass dynamics.ref87 ; led91  Let us consider a typical cooling process and imagine that the system spends some short time at temperature $`T+\delta T`$. Several metastable states, separated by free-energy barriers, become populated during that time. As temperature is lowered, these states split in a hierarchical fashion and produce new metastable states with new barriers. The old barriers grow steeply, and, for any value of temperature, there exist barriers, diverging at this temperature.ham92  Therefore, when the measurement temperature $`T`$ is finally reached, there is a large number of metastable states, separated by barriers of all heights. In other words, the cooling process creates an initial state with a broad spectrum of relaxation times. This situation corresponds to “existence of domains of all sizes within the initial condition” in the real-space picture.jon00

If a waiting time, $`t_w`$, follows the cooling, properties of the subsequent relaxation will be similar to those in the positive-temperature-cycle experiment. At short observation times, the relaxation will be governed by $`t_w`$. At longer observation times, it will break away and slow down, because the long-time metastable states with high barriers, created by the cooling process, will come into play. This effect will be more pronounced after shorter waiting times.

It is important to mention that the results of the temperature-variation experiments can be explained within the phenomenological real-space picture, if a strong separation of time and length scales is postulated.bou02  The experimental data,ham92  that suggest divergence of free-energy barriers at any temperature below $`T_g`$, can be reanalyzed in terms of barriers, which vanish at $`T_g`$, and remain finite at lower temperatures.bou02  The barriers, nevertheless, grow with decreasing temperature. This fact is sufficient for understanding results of the present paper.

Properties of the initial state, produced by the cooling process, can be studied by measuring a TRM decay for $`t_w=0`$, which we call ZTRM. The sample is cooled down in the presence of a small field, $`H=10Oe`$. When the temperature is stabilized, the field is cut to zero, and decay of the ZTRM is recorded.

Fig. 2 shows the logarithmic relaxation rates of this decay, corresponding to different temperatures. Each curve has a peak, and we call a position of this peak the “effective cooling time”, $`t_c^{eff}`$. Each magnetization curve is normalized by one at $`t=t_c^{eff}`$ before differentiation is performed. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that the peaks become much broader as temperature decreases. This means that the spectrum of relaxation times broadens as well, and it is not dominated by a single time scale.

Even though the effective cooling time, $`t_c^{eff}`$, corresponds to the maximum of the relaxation rate, it cannot be treated as a regular waiting time $`t_w`$. We have tried to scale each ZTRM curve with the relaxation curves for longer waiting times, using the $`\mu `$-scaling approach and taking $`t_c^{eff}`$ as the scaling parameter. No value of $`\mu `$ can give even approximate scaling, especially at short times. It turns out, however, that the ZTRM curve can be merged with the other TRM curves (using the same $`\mu `$ as used for the longer waiting times), if a much shorter characteristic time for the ZTRM is introduced. We call this time the “effective scaling time”, $`t_s^{eff}`$. It is several times shorter than the effective cooling time. The inset of Fig. 2 exhibits logarithms of $`t_c^{eff}`$ and $`t_s^{eff}`$ for different temperatures. The error bars for the logarithms are typically 0.1, but about 0.2 for the lowest temperature.

The fact that one can consider at least two characteristic times for the ZTRM agrees with what is expected from relaxation in the positive-temperature-cycle experiment. The spin-glass behavior at short observation times is governed by $`t_s^{eff}`$, which can be associated with ordinary aging effects during the slow approach of the measurement temperature. However, the long-time relaxation is strongly influenced by the metastable states, separated by high barriers, resulting from the temperature change. Thus, the relaxation rate peaks at $`t_c^{eff}`$, and not at $`t_s^{eff}`$. This argument can be generalized to include the TRM experiments with finite waiting times. The logarithmic relaxation rate has a peak at $`t_w^{eff}`$, the effective waiting time. It is well known that $`t_w^{eff}`$ for the TRM is greater than $`t_w`$.nor00  We believe that this shift in the maximum of the relaxation rate is caused by those long-time metastable states, which are created during the cooling process.

It is important to note that memory of the initial state depends not only on the cooling protocol, but also on the overall complexity of the free-energy landscape. This can be illustrated by measurements of the ZTRM in the presence of a high constant field. The minimum possible overlap, $`q_{min}(H)`$, between two states increases with increasing magnetic field, $`H`$.par83  Therefore, certain constraints on barrier heights are imposed by the field, leading to a faster relaxation. The experiment is performed in the following way. First, the sample is cooled down to the measurement temperature at the field $`H+\mathrm{\Delta }H`$. The field is changed to $`H`$, and the zero waiting time magnetization (ZTRM) is measured for some time. Second, the sample is warmed up to above $`T_g`$, and cooled down again, all in the presence of the same field $`H`$. The field-cooled magnetization (MFC) is measured for the same time. The difference of these two magnetizations is then fitted to a power law at long observation times: $`ZTRM(t,H,\mathrm{\Delta }H)MFC(t,H)t^{\lambda (H)}`$. The values of $`H`$ were varied from $`50Oe`$ to $`1000Oe`$. The field change was small, $`\mathrm{\Delta }H=10Oe`$, so that the response was always linear.

Fig. 3 exhibits the measured ZTRM and MFC decays for $`H=500Oe`$. One can see that time dependence of the MFC cannot be neglected at high fields. The inset shows the relaxation exponent $`\lambda (H)`$. The exponent appears to be a linear function of $`q_{min}H^{2/3}`$. This is not surprising, because its temperature dependence is also close to linear, and the AT critical line, $`T_gT_c(H)H^{2/3}`$, has a profound effect on spin-glass dynamics.zot01  The estimated value of $`\lambda (H)`$ near the AT line, which corresponds to $`H_{AT}1400Oe`$ at this temperature, is $`0.27\pm 0.03`$. It is interesting that this number compares well with the Monte Carlo result, $`\lambda 0.25`$, for the 3D EA model at zero magnetic field.kis96

The observed increase in $`\lambda (H)`$ suggests that energy barriers, created by the cooling process, are lower, if cooling is performed in the presence of a high field. This happens because the accessible phase space is limited by $`q_{min}(H)`$. The low-field initial state in our experiments appears to be more complex, i.e. characterized by higher barriers, than the initial state in Monte Carlo simulations.

### III.2  Subaging or superaging?

It was shown in Sec. II.A that the TRM relaxation can be decomposed into a sum of two decays: the IRM, which is a response of the system associated with the waiting time, $`t_w`$, and the ZTRM, which is a response of the initial state.

Fig. 4 displays the experimental TRM and ZTRM curves, and their difference, for $`T/T_g=0.87`$ and $`t_w=1000s`$. One can see that the response of the initial state dominates the measured TRM relaxation. This effect is particularly pronounced at low temperatures, where thermally activated processes are slow. Fig. 4 suggests that the ZTRM cannot be neglected, nor can it be regarded as a constant. Therefore, the TRM and IRM relaxation curves will have different scaling properties, and should be studied simultaneously.

In this paper, we consider a multiplicative representation for the measured relaxation curves, in analogy with Eqs. (7) and (8):

$$\chi _{TRM}=\varphi (t/t_w)\rho _{TRM}(t,t_w,t_c);$$
(11)
$$\chi _{IRM}=\varphi (t/t_w)\rho _{IRM}(t,t_w,t_c).$$
(12)
Here we made an assumption that both the TRM and the IRM are characterized by the same scaling part, $`\varphi (t/t_w)`$. This is certainly correct in the limit of very long waiting times, when the two functions are essentially equal. Analysis of experimental data, based on Eqs. (11) and (12), suggests that this approach works well on the real time scales.

Systematic departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling are described by the factors $`\rho _{TRM}`$ and $`\rho _{IRM}`$. If violations of $`t/t_w`$ scaling were only due to the quasiequilibrium behavior, these factors would depend only on the observation time, $`t`$. We assume, however, that there is an interplay between the cooling and waiting-time effects. Thus, we include the waiting time, $`t_w`$, and an additional argument $`t_c`$, which indicates dependence on the cooling process.

The correlation function, $`C(t+t_w,t_w)`$, defined by Eq. (1), is independent of $`t_w`$ at $`t=0`$. Numerical studies of the SK model demonstrate mar98 ; tak97  that the correlation curves for different waiting times, plotted versus $`t/t_w`$, cross at one point, corresponding to $`tt_w`$. This is not surprising, because transition from the quasiequilibrium to the aging regime occurs at $`tt_w`$, and the correlation at this point is near $`q_{EA}`$. If the linear response susceptibility depends on its time arguments only through the correlation function, i.e. $`\chi =\chi (C)`$, the susceptibility curves should also cross at one point. Experimental results do not exhibit this property. The TRM curves for long waiting times lie below the curves for short waiting times, when plotted vs. $`t/t_w`$. The IRM curves demonstrate the opposite behavior.

In the present paper, we normalize both the TRM and the IRM decays by one at $`t=t_w`$, and treat them as “normal” relaxation functions. This approach has several advantages. First, all departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling, reflected in the shapes of relaxation curves, can be observed clearly. Second, the shapes of TRM and IRM decays can be compared in detail, regardless of the fact that their magnitudes are different. Third, experimental results can be directly compared with results of numerical simulations. We believe that this approach is physically justified because the influence of the cooling process leads to systematic changes in the *shapes* of relaxation curves, as discussed in Sec. III.A. This method is different from the one, traditionally used to study $`t/t_w`$ scaling.vin96 ; oci85  It provides new insights into aging behavior of real spin glasses.

Fig. 5 exhibits the TRM and IRM relaxation curves, measured at $`T/T_g=0.87`$, for two waiting times, $`t_w=1000s`$ and $`t_w=6310s`$. The TRM data demonstrate the familiar subaging pattern: the relaxation, plotted versus $`t/t_w`$, is faster for the longer waiting time. The IRM results show a quite different behavior: the relaxation as a function of $`t/t_w`$ slows down as $`t_w`$ increases. This effect is called “superaging”. bou97

The phenomenon of superaging may seem rather unusual from an experimentalist’s point of view, because it has never been observed in TRM experiments. It turns out, however, that this is a predominant effect in Monte Carlo simulations. Fig. 4 in Marinari *et al.*,mar98  Fig. 4 in Takayama *et al.*,tak97  and Fig. 4 in Cugliandolo *et al.*rit94  clearly demonstrate the superaging behavior. In all these simulations of the SK model, the correlation function, $`C(t+t_w,t_w)`$, plotted versus $`t/t_w`$, decays slower for longer waiting times. In the case of the EA model, it is more difficult to distinguish between the subaging and superaging effects, because the correlation curves exhibit good $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the aging regime. However, the relaxation exponent $`\lambda (T,t_w)`$, defined as $`C(t+t_w,t_w)t^\lambda `$ for $`tt_w`$, decreases slightly with increasing $`t_w`$, according to Fig. 2 in Kisker *et al.*kis96  This fact suggests that the superaging behavior appears in the EA model as well.

Because the experimental TRM and IRM curves have the opposite scaling properties (subaging versus superaging), the functions $`\rho _{TRM}`$ and $`\rho _{IRM}`$, describing departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in Eqs. (11) and (12), may be expected to have inverse effects on the function $`\varphi (t/t_w)`$. Following this observation, we define two auxiliary functions, $`f`$ and $`g`$. The function $`f`$ is a geometric mean of $`\chi _{TRM}`$ and $`\chi _{IRM}`$, and the function $`g`$ describes departures from this mean:

$$f(t,t_w,t_c)=(\chi _{IRM}\chi _{TRM})^{1/2};$$
(13)
$$g(t,t_w,t_c)=(\chi _{IRM}/\chi _{TRM})^{1/2}.$$
(14)
With this definition of $`f`$, the scaling part, $`\varphi (t/t_w)`$, is left unchanged, while deviations from full scaling are averaged out, at least partially. Physically, the function $`f`$ represents an average over two different initial conditions. Of course, if both $`\chi _{TRM}`$ and $`\chi _{IRM}`$ are normalized by one at $`t=t_w`$, their geometric mean is close to the arithmetic mean. The IRM and TRM relaxation curves can be factorized as follows:

$$\chi _{IRM}=fg;\chi _{TRM}=f/g.$$
(15)
Fig. 6 exhibits the functions $`f`$ and $`g`$ for $`T/T_g=0.87`$. Both of them demonstrate the superaging behavior, but the function $`f`$ shows much better $`t/t_w`$ scaling. The function $`g`$ is responsible for the faster relaxation in the IRM experiments, and the slower relaxation in the TRM experiments.

### III.3  Comparison of TRM and IRM

In order to make the above arguments quantitative, we analyze the $`t/t_w`$ scaling of relaxation curves using the $`\mu `$-scaling approach, discussed in Sec. II.B. We optimize $`\mu `$ to achieve the best possible scaling over a wide range of observation times, with particular attention to the aging regime, $`t>t_w`$. Inclusion of the quasiequilibrium decay with the exponent $`\alpha `$ improves scaling at short times, but it does not help at longer times. In the present analysis, the quasiequilibrium behavior is not taken into account explicitly. This gives values of $`\mu `$ a little further from unity, but does not affect any conclusions about scaling in the aging regime.

Fig. 7 exhibits values of the parameter $`\mu `$ for the TRM, IRM, and their combinations.

In the case of the TRM, $`\mu `$ lies between 0.8 and 0.9 for relatively high temperatures, but drops visibly at low temperatures, $`T/T_g<0.4`$. Similar results have been obtained for various spin-glass samples.vin96 ; oci85 ; alb87  The error bars in our analysis are typically 0.02. At the lowest temperature, however, they are about 0.1 for the TRM, and about 0.05 for the IRM.

The values of $`\mu `$ for the IRM are greater than unity. They are near 1.1, but tend to increase at low temperatures. According to Fig. 7, there is a certain symmetry with respect to $`\mu =1`$ between the values of $`\mu `$ for the TRM and the IRM. We have also found that, in the case of the IRM, the parameter $`\mu `$ is very sensitive to any imperfections of the scaling analysis. For example, if the actual observation time is slightly longer, than the time $`t`$, used in the analysis, the corresponding value of $`\mu `$ will seem closer to unity. This issue is important when a superconducting magnet is used, because it takes some time to warm up the persistent switch, and then to cool it down again. The results for the TRM are less sensitive to these effects.

Fig. 7 also displays $`\mu `$ for the functions $`f`$ and $`g`$, given by Eqs. (13) and (14). The value of $`\mu `$ for the function $`f`$ is about 1.05, while for the function $`g`$ it is near 1.20. Thus, both the TRM and the IRM relaxations can be presented as products of two factors, according to Eq. (15). The rapidly changing $`f`$ exhibits fairly good $`t/t_w`$ scaling. The relatively slow $`g`$ describes departures from this scaling. This function becomes closer to a constant as $`t_w`$ increases, suggesting that both the TRM and the IRM curves scale better for longer waiting times. At low temperatures, however, the differences between $`f`$ and $`g`$ tend to diminish.

Fig. 8 exhibits values of logarithm of the effective waiting time, $`t_w^{eff}`$, for different relaxation functions. The relaxation curves were fitted using a 5-order polynomial fit, and then differentiated with respect to $`\mathrm{log}_{10}(t)`$. The effective waiting time, $`t_w^{eff}`$, corresponds to the maximum of this derivative. The error bars for $`\mathrm{log}_{10}(t_w^{eff})`$ are typically 0.05, but about 0.1 for the lowest temperature. It can be seen from Fig. 8, that $`t_w^{eff}>t_w`$ for the TRM, but $`t_w^{eff}<t_w`$ for the IRM. The values of the effective waiting time for the function $`f`$ are greater than $`t_w`$, but they all differ from $`t_w`$ by less than 3%. Therefore, the average of the TRM and the IRM gives better results for the effective waiting time as well.

Fig. 9 provides a further insight into the nature of these phenomena. It displays values of the relaxation exponent, $`\lambda (T,t_w)`$, defined through $`\chi (t,t_w)t^{\lambda (T,t_w)}`$ for $`tt_w`$. This definition is based on the fact that time dependence of spin-glass relaxation is essentially algebraic in the aging regime.bou92 ; bou95 ; kis96  The value of $`\lambda (T,t_w)`$ is determined from the slope of the linear fit to $`\mathrm{log}_{10}(\chi )`$ as a function of $`\mathrm{log}_{10}(t)`$. Because of time limitations in our experiments, the fitting was performed in the interval $`t/t_w=1.5\mathrm{}10`$ for $`t_w=1000s`$, and in the interval $`t/t_w=1.5\mathrm{}5`$ for $`t_w=6310s`$. In the case of the ZTRM, the effective cooling time, $`t_c^{eff}`$, was used instead of $`t_w`$. The algebraic approximation works well, and the error bars for the relaxation exponents are about 1%.

The first conclusion one can draw from Fig. 9 is that the zero waiting time decay, ZTRM, is the *slowest* relaxation measured in the aging regime. This result is in sharp contradiction with results of numerical simulations, which show that the zero waiting time decay is the *fastest* possible relaxation. The dotted (upper) line in Fig. 9 represents $`\lambda (T)`$ for $`t_w=0`$ from the Monte Carlo studies of the EA model by Kisker *et al.*kis96  Our experimental values of the $`\lambda (T)`$ for the ZTRM are about 3 times lower. We have also tried to estimate the relaxation exponent for the SK model, using numerical results of Marinari *et al.*mar98  and Takayama *et al.*tak97 , and fitting them in the interval $`t/t_w=1\mathrm{}100`$. In the first case, for $`T/T_g=0.5`$ and $`t_w=8mcs`$, we find $`\lambda (T,t_w)0.15`$. In the second case, for $`T/T_g=0.4`$ and $`t_w=16mcs`$, we determine $`\lambda (T,t_w)0.20`$. These numbers are similar to those for the EA model.

Fig. 9 demonstrates that the TRM decay at $`t>t_w`$ becomes faster as the waiting time increases, while the IRM relaxation becomes slower. The corresponding values of $`\lambda (T,t_w)`$ move towards each other and towards the dashed (lower) line, which represents numerical results for the EA model with $`t_w=1000mcs`$. kis96  One can see that the function $`f`$, the average of the TRM and the IRM, has relaxation exponents, which (at relatively high temperatures) are very close to those from the Monte Carlo simulations. These exponents decrease slightly with increasing $`t_w`$, as the numerical results do.

### III.4  A possible origin of $`\mu `$

We are now in a position to offer a tentative explanation for these phenomena. It is based on two observations. First, there is a certain degree of symmetry between the TRM and the IRM with respect to the “ideal” case, according to Figs. 7-9. Of course, this symmetry is not exact and depends on a particular realization of the cooling process. Second, when the waiting time, $`t_w`$, is very large, the TRM and IRM become essentially equal, according to Eq. (6). This situation corresponds to the weak long-term memory.cug94 ; bou97  These two observations suggest that the experimental TRM and IRM decays approximate the true spin-glass relaxation from the opposite sides.

Let us first consider a typical TRM experiment. When the cooling is over, a number of metastable states, separated by free-energy barriers of different heights, are already populated. We shall refer to them loosely as the initial state. The response of this state, the ZTRM, is slow and cannot be characterized by a single well-defined time scale. The initial state is not random: it has already evolved towards some equilibrium state, and this makes it energetically favorable. During the waiting time, evolution continues in the same direction. Thus, in the case of the TRM, aging and cooling effects work together. The spin-glass state appears to be older. The characteristic barrier is higher than $`\mathrm{\Delta }(T,t_w)=k_BT\mathrm{ln}(t_w/\tau _0)`$, the barrier, associated with the waiting time $`t_w`$.led91  The TRM decay is slower than the ideal $`t_w`$-dependent relaxation, which can be characterized by some exponent $`\lambda _0`$. As the waiting time increases, influence of the initial state diminishes. The relaxation, plotted versus $`t/t_w`$, becomes faster, and its dependence on $`t_w`$ – stronger. This leads to the subaging behavior. Therefore, for the TRM experiments, we would expect $`\mu <1`$, $`t_w^{eff}>t_w`$, and $`\lambda <\lambda _0`$.

Let us now discuss a typical IRM experiment. In this case, a small magnetic field is applied after the cooling process and before the waiting time. The initial state, created by the cooling, is again partially equilibrated. The subsequent field change makes it energetically unfavorable. This is a consequence of chaotic nature of the spin-glass state with respect to magnetic field. Even if the field change is very small, the new equilibrium state (reached at the end of the relaxation process) is very different from the old one.par83  The system can no longer evolve in the same direction. Moreover, it has to escape from the initial state. Therefore, in the case of the IRM, aging and cooling effects work against each other. During the same waiting time, $`t_w`$, the system will have to overcome barriers, produced by the cooling process, *and* explore a different part of the phase space, thus exhibiting aging. As a result, the spin-glass state looks younger. The characteristic barrier, corresponding to the waiting time, $`t_w`$, is now lower than $`\mathrm{\Delta }(T,t_w)`$ for the ideal aging. The IRM decay is faster than the ideal relaxation. However, memory of the initial state weakens as the waiting time increases. The IRM relaxation as a function of $`t/t_w`$ becomes slower and more dependent on $`t_w`$. This leads to the superaging behavior. Therefore, the IRM experiments should yield $`\mu >1`$, $`t_w^{eff}<t_w`$, and $`\lambda >\lambda _0`$.

If this explanation is reasonable, the observed difference in scaling properties of the TRM and the IRM is a result of the different initial conditions for aging. Departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling are present in the aging regime not because something goes wrong at long waiting times (e.g. the interrupted agingbou94 ), but because results for short waiting times are strongly affected by the initial state. An average over different initial conditions should improve $`t/t_w`$ scaling.

Presence of many metastable states, separated by high barriers, is a well-known problem in Monte Carlo simulations, involving thermolization of large samples. The system easily gets trapped in a metastable state and cannot efficiently explore the entire phase space to find the ground state.mar01  The cooling process in spin-glass experiments gives a similar result: the system is trapped before the waiting time begins. However, Monte Carlo studies of aging phenomena do not simulate the cooling protocol. The simulations are started directly at the measurement temperature from a random initial configuration, and results are averaged over different initial conditions. kis96 ; rit01 ; mar98 ; tak97 ; rit94  This may be the reason why the subaging behavior is not normally observed in numerical simulations. Moreover, the random initial configuration corresponds to zero net magnetization. This means that Monte Carlo studies are probably closer to the IRM, than to the TRM, experiments.rit94  The difference between the two is not very important, if memory of the initial state disappears quickly. This, however, is not the case in real experiments.

The factorization of the TRM and IRM relaxation curves, Eq. (15), allows us to illustrate a possible origin of $`\mu `$ in a simple way. The functions $`f`$ and $`g`$, Eqs. (13) and (14), can be approximated algebraically in the aging regime:

$$f(t/t_w^{\mu _1})^{\lambda _1};g(t/t_w^{\mu _2})^{\lambda _2}.$$
(16)
It follows from Eq. (15) that the relaxation exponent for the IRM is $`\lambda _1+\lambda _2`$, while the exponent for the TRM is $`\lambda _1\lambda _2`$. The corresponding values of $`\mu `$ depend on the ratio $`r=\lambda _2/\lambda _1`$:

$$\mu _{IRM}=(\mu _1+\mu _2r)/(1+r);$$
(17)
$$\mu _{TRM}=(\mu _1\mu _2r)/(1r).$$
(18)
The experimental values of $`\mu _1`$ and $`\mu _2`$ are exhibited in Fig. 7. The exponents $`\lambda _1`$ are displayed in Fig. 9, and the ratios $`r=\lambda _2/\lambda _1`$ – in the inset of Fig. 10.

The values of $`\mu `$ for the IRM and the TRM, determined from Eqs. (17) and (18), are shown in the main body of Fig. 10. They compare well with the experimental values of $`\mu `$, obtained from analysis of the actual relaxation curves. This comparison demonstrates how the function $`g`$, which exhibits strong superaging properties with $`\mu _21.2`$, leads to $`\mu 0.9`$ for the TRM, and $`\mu 1.1`$ for the IRM. The results in Fig. 10 were obtained using values of $`r`$ for $`t_w=1000s`$. The values of $`r`$ for $`t_w=6310s`$ give similar numbers. For the sake of simplicity, the observation time, $`t`$, is used in Eq. (16) instead of the $`\mu `$-dependent effective time, $`t_e`$, given by Eq. (9). The fact that Eqs. (17) and (18) yield values of $`\mu `$ close to the their actual values suggests that this approach is justified.

Appearance of the $`\mu `$-scaling can be explained in the following way. Imagine that there is a function that exhibits good $`t/t_w`$ scaling. Let us also assume that effect of initial conditions is described by another function, which does not scale well. This second function will necessarily display superaging behavior, approaching a constant as $`t_w`$ increases. Imagine also that both these functions can be approximated by power laws of time, which is often the case in spin-glass dynamics. If the first function is fast, and the second function is slow, the resulting decay will exhibit the $`\mu `$-scaling with $`\mu `$ not far from unity. Of course, this is only one of possible scenarios.

According to Eqs. (17) and (18), in order to achieve the best scaling of both the TRM and the IRM (with $`\mu `$ close to unity), one has to make the ratio $`r=\lambda _2/\lambda _1`$ as small as possible. The inset of Fig. 10 suggests that $`r`$ decreases with temperature and can be well approximated by a linear function of $`T/T_g`$. It also diminishes with increasing $`t_w`$. Thus, higher temperatures and longer waiting times should improve $`t/t_w`$ scaling of measured relaxation curves.

Eq. (18) also predicts that the quality of $`\mu `$-scaling of the TRM curves should become worse as $`r1`$ and $`\mu _1\mu _2`$, because of the uncertainty 0/0. This happens at low temperatures: the experimental values of $`\mu `$ for the TRM drop sharply and their error bars increase considerably. The physical reason for this is simple. The TRM relaxation at low temperatures is completely dominated by the ZTRM, which is very slow. The waiting time effects become almost indistinguishable, and the $`t/t_w`$ scaling does not make much sense anymore. In this case, the TRM is nearly constant, and both $`f`$ and $`g`$, Eqs. (13) and (14), are governed by the IRM. Therefore, the simple average of the TRM and IRM does not give much better scaling at low temperatures, as seen in Fig. 7.

These results can be interpreted in terms of an effective change in barrier heights. Let us consider the logarithmic relaxation rates: $`S_{TRM}=\chi _{TRM}/\mathrm{ln}(t)`$ and $`S_{IRM}=\chi _{IRM}/\mathrm{ln}(t)`$. As usually, we assume that both $`\chi _{TRM}`$ and $`\chi _{IRM}`$ are normalized by one at $`t=t_w`$ before differentiation is performed. A ratio of $`S_{TRM}`$ and $`S_{IRM}`$ can be regarded as a probability of overcoming a barrier:

$$d\chi _{TRM}/d\chi _{IRM}=\mathrm{exp}(\mathrm{\Delta }_0/k_BT).$$
(19)
This formula defines the effective barrier $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0(t,t_w)`$, describing the difference in relaxation rates for two different initial conditions.

Fig. 11 exhibits values of $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0/k_BT`$ at $`t=t_w`$, extracted from the experimental data according to Eq. (19). One can see that they grow steadily as temperature decreases. They are also comparable with differences between the values of $`\mathrm{ln}(t_w^{eff})`$ for the TRM and the IRM. Values of $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0(t_w,t_w)`$ are displayed in the inset of Fig. 11. They change only slightly over a wide range of temperatures, and decrease with increasing $`t_w`$. The error bars for $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$ are about 0.05.

It has been shown experimentally that a change in a barrier height, $`\delta \mathrm{\Delta }`$, under a temperature change, $`\delta T`$, is independent of temperature.ham92  The same appears to be true for $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$, which corresponds to an average change in barrier heights due to the change in initial conditions. This fact suggests that $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$ is a result of cooling. Both the TRM and the IRM are influenced by the cooling process, and it is mainly this influence, that leads to systematic deviations from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the aging regime. As the waiting time increases, $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$ diminishes, which means that memory of the initial state is gradually washed away by the aging process.

It has been already mentioned that evolution of the system during the waiting time $`t_w`$ can be characterized by the effective barrier $`\mathrm{\Delta }(T,t_w)=k_BT\mathrm{ln}(t_w/\tau _0)`$. The barriers are raised by $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{TRM}`$ for the TRM, and reduced by $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{IRM}`$ for the IRM. The average difference in barrier heights for these experimental protocols is $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0=\mathrm{\Delta }_{TRM}+\mathrm{\Delta }_{IRM}`$. Using Eq. (19), one can determine $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$ only. Fig. 8 suggests that $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{TRM}`$ and $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{IRM}`$ may be different, but have similar properties. Therefore, what is true for $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$, is likely to be true for $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{TRM}`$ and $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{IRM}`$ taken separately.

The characteristic barrier, $`\mathrm{\Delta }(T,t_w)`$, decreases with decreasing temperature, because it corresponds to thermally activated aging dynamics. The barrier $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$ is almost independent of temperature, presumably because it is related to the cooling process. Therefore, departures from full $`t/t_w`$ scaling should become more pronounced as temperature is lowered. Even if the cooling is fast, yielding small $`\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$, it will always be possible to find a sufficiently low measurement temperature, $`T`$, so that $`\mathrm{\Delta }(T,t_w)\mathrm{\Delta }_0`$, and the $`t/t_w`$ scaling is strongly violated. According to this argument, the sharp drop in $`\mu `$ for the TRM at low temperatures is a natural consequence of cooling effects.

Some of the measurements, discussed above, have been repeated at CEA Saclay. A SQUID susceptometer S600 by Cryogenics Ltd (UK) was used for this purpose. The cooling process, which is a unique characteristic of an apparatus, was somewhat different from the one exhibited in Fig. 1. The experimental data, however, are consistent with the results, reported in this paper.

## IV Conclusion

There are many different approaches to analysis of $`t/t_w`$ scaling in spin glasses. In this paper, one more method is proposed. It is based on the idea that the departures from $`t/t_w`$ scaling, observed experimentally in the aging regime, may reflect the influence of the cooling process. This means that the thermal history of the spin-glass state cannot be neglected in analysis of aging phenomena. The initial condition for aging is not random in spin-glass experiments, and has a profound effect on scaling properties of measured relaxation. It would be incorrect to say that the cooling effects are spurious. They are as important, as the aging phenomena. This is because they reflect the hierarchical nature of spin-glass dynamics,bou02  revealed by temperature-variation experiments.

The approach, used in this paper, is based on the detailed comparison of time scaling properties of the TRM and the IRM. We argue that, because of strong memory of the initial state, neither of these functions represents the true $`t_w`$-dependent relaxation. Even though they are characterized by the same waiting time, their $`t/t_w`$ scaling properties are remarkably different. We exploit this difference by taking an average of $`\chi _{TRM}`$ and $`\chi _{IRM}`$. This averaging over different initial conditions leads to systematic improvement in $`t/t_w`$ scaling. Factorization of measured relaxation functions allows us to explain scaling properties of both the TRM and the IRM in a unique way. Our results suggest that the observed deviations from $`t/t_w`$ scaling in the aging regime are largely due to cooling effects. The interrupted aging,bou94  which is another possible reason for the lack of scaling, may be expected to play a role at longer waiting times, especially in polycrystalline samples.

The conclusions, reached in this paper, are by no means final. Their verification requires experiments in which different cooling protocols in the immediate vicinity of the measurement temperature can be implemented. Another option is a rapid field quench from above the AT line. Monte Carlo studies, including simulations of the cooling process in addition to aging effects, may also be very helpful. The problem of $`t/t_w`$ scaling in spin-glass dynamics deserves further experimental and theoretical investigation.

NOTE. After this paper had been completed, we received a preprint by Berthier and Bouchaud,ber02  devoted to numerical studies of the Edwards-Anderson model in 3 and 4 dimensions. One of their conclusions is that “a finite cooling rate effect…leads to an apparent sub-aging behavior for the correlation function, instead of the super-aging that holds for an infinitely fast quench”. This is in agreement with the conclusion of the present paper that $`t/t_w`$ scaling properties strongly depend on the initial condition.

###### Acknowledgements.

We are most grateful to Professor J. A. Mydosh for providing us with the Cu:Mn single crystal sample, prepared in Kamerlingh Onnes Laboratory (Leiden, The Netherlands). We thank Dr. G. G. Kenning for interesting discussions and valuable suggestions.