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# ON THE INFLUENCE OF A NON-LOCAL ELECTRODYNAMICS IN THE IRREVERSIBLE MAGNETIZATION OF NON-MAGNETIC BOROCARBIDES

## I INTRODUCTION

Since early 1994, when the borocarbide family (RNi2B2C, where R = rare earth) was discovered a series of interesting results have been reported on these materials. The most remarkable feature is the coexistence of superconductivity and antiferromagnetism for R = Tm, Er, Ho and Dy. The high superconducting transition temperatures $`T_c`$ and the broad variation of the ratio $`T_N/T_c`$ (where $`T_N`$ is the Neel temperature, ranging from $`1.5`$ K to $`10`$ K) make this family particularly appropriate to explore that coexistence.

Interesting properties are also found in the non-magnetic borocarbides, R=Y,Lu. These materials exhibit a non-exponential temperature dependence and a non-linear field dependence of the electronic specific heat in the superconducting phase; an anomalous upper critical field $`H_{c2}`$ with an upward curvature near $`T_c`$ and a four-fold oscillation when the field is rotated within the basal plane; and a square flux line lattice (FLL) at high fields.

Although these properties were initially taken as evidence of a non conventional pairing mechanism, both the unconventional $`H_{c2}`$ and the square FLL can also be satisfactorily explained by assuming a non-local electrodynamics. Traditionally, nonlocality was expected to be relevant only in materials with a Ginzburg-Landau parameter $`\kappa =\lambda /\xi 1`$ and sufficiently clean to have an electronic mean free path $`\mathrm{}\xi `$. However, the large vortex cores make theoretical analysis very difficult in that case. The borocarbides, in contrast, have intermediate $`\kappa `$ values ($`1020`$) that make core effects much smaller. This allows the non-local effects to be introduced perturbatively either in the London model, as done by Kogan, Gurevich et al., or in the Ginzburg-Landau theory, as shown by de Wilde et al. and Park and Huse. In both cases, the result is a coupling of the supercurrents to the underlying crystal symmetry.

The first success of the Kogan-Gurevich nonlocal model was the explanation of the deviations of the reversible magnetization $`M`$ of Bi:2212 in the mixed state from the logarithmic dependence on magnetic field, $`Mln(H_{c2}/H)`$, predicted by the London model. Later on, Song et al. found similar deviations in YNi2B2C when $`𝐇c`$-axis, that could also be quantitatively accounted for by the model. Recently we have extended that study to all directions of $`𝐇`$ and showed that this generalization of the London theory provides a satisfactory complete description of the anisotropic $`M(H)`$ with a self-consistent set of parameters.

In the local London model anisotropy is introduced via a second rank mass tensor $`m_{ij}`$. In tetragonal materials such as borocarbides $`m_a=m_b`$, thus the properties should be isotropic in the basal plane. However, non-local corrections introduce a fourfold anisotropy as a function of the magnetic field orientation within the $`ab`$ plane, reflecting the square symmetry. This $`\pi /2`$ periodicity was indeed observed in $`M`$ in the mixed state of both YNi2B2C and LuNi2B2C.

Kogan’s model also predicted that two structural transitions in the FLL should occur in borocarbides for $`𝐇c`$, a first order reorientation transition between two rhombic lattices at a field $`H_1`$ and a second order transition from rhombic to square at $`H_2>H_1`$. Small angle neutron scattering (SANS) studies confirmed those predictions in YNi2B2C. A jump in the apical angle $`\beta `$ of the rhombic lattice, discontinuous within the resolution, occurs at $`H_11`$ to $`1.25kOe`$, and the lattice becomes square ($`\beta =90^{}`$) at $`H_21.25`$ to $`1.5kOe`$. According to a recent analysis by Knigavko et al., $`H_1`$ really consists of two second order transitions taking place in a very narrow field range.

Although the role of nonlocality on the $`\mathrm{𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚}`$ properties of the FLL is by now convincingly established, less is known about its effects on the $`\mathrm{𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚}`$ vortex response. Since nonmagnetic borocarbides exhibit a very low critical current $`J_c`$ for $`𝐇c`$, pinning correlation volumes were expected to be large, as indeed observed. Thus, the elastic properties of the FLL must play a key role in the pinning. As the shear modulus $`C_{66}`$ depends on $`\beta `$, and $`\beta `$ undergoes a discontinuous jump at $`H_1`$, it is bound to happen that $`C_{66}`$ and therefore the pinning properties change abruptly at this field. In other words, vortex pinning, which involves distortions from equilibrium vortex configurations, should be affected by the symmetry changes in the vortex lattice.

Recently we showed that, in YNi2B2C and for $`𝐇c`$, the reorientation transition at $`H_1`$ induces a kink in the pinning force density $`F_p(H)`$. We also observed anisotropies in $`F_p`$ both between the c-axis and the basal plane (out-of-plane anisotropy) and within the plane (in-plane anisotropy). We found that $`F_p`$ for $`𝐇c`$ is one order of magnitude larger than for $`𝐇c`$ and has a quite different field dependence. We argued that this surprising behavior is unlikely to arise either from pinning by magnetic impurities or from non-local effects, although we recognized that the evidence supporting those claims was not conclusive.

Here we report further studies of $`F_p`$ in non-magnetic borocarbides. We show that the kink in $`F_p(H)`$ is also visible in LuNi2B2C and coincides with the field $`H_1`$ for this compound, thus confirming that it is a signature of this nonlocality-induced transition. We find that $`H_1(T)`$ slightly decreases as $`T`$ increases, in contrast to $`H_2(T)`$. We also study the effect of Co-doping in Lu(Ni1-xCox)2B2C. We observe that $`H_1`$ decreases as the nonlocal effects are progressively suppressed by increasing $`x`$, in agreement with the $`T`$ dependence. All the LuNi2-xCoxB2C samples exhibit an enormous out-of-plane anisotropy. This unambiguously demonstrates that this anisotropy is due neither to the magnetic impurities (as those crystals have a density of impurities much smaller than the YNi2B2C crystal), nor to nonlocality (as it does not dissapear with increasing $`x`$). We also rule out the precence of surface barriers for $`𝐇c`$ by performing minor hysterisis loops.

## II EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS

We report magnetization measurements, performed with a Quantum Design SQUID magnetometer, on YNi2B2C (Y-0), and Lu(Ni1-xCox)2B2C with $`x=0`$ (Lu-0), $`x=1.5\%`$ (Lu-1.5) and $`x=3\%`$ (Lu-3) single crystals. The dimensions, $`T_c`$ and estimated $`\mathrm{}`$ for each sample are summarized in Table I. The Y-0 crystal is the same one that was previously investigated in Refs.. The normal state magnetization follows a Curie law that indicates the presence of a very dilute distribution of localized magnetic moments. It corresponds to a rare-earth impurity content of $`0.1`$ at. $`\%`$ relative to Y, probably due to contaminants in the Y starting material. The Lu(Ni1-xCox)2B2C crystals, grown as described elsewhere, show a much weaker Curie tail at low temperatures ($`T<100K`$) which might arise, for example, from a $`0.001\%`$ magnetic impurities of Gd in the Lu site. Isothermal magnetization loops in the superconducting mixed state were measured, and the critical current density $`J_c`$ was then calculated using the Bean’s critical state model.

## III RESULTS AND DISCUSIONS

### A Reorientation phase transition

Figure 1(a) shows the pinning force density $`F_p=\left|𝐉_𝐜\times 𝐁\right|`$ for the Y-0 sample as a function of the applied field for $`𝐇𝐜`$-axis at several $`T`$. We observe that at low fields $`F_p(H)`$ decreases strongly with increasing $`H`$, but above a field $`H^{}1.2kOe`$ the field dependence becomes much weaker. In a recent work we showed that this ”kink” in $`F_p(H)`$ at $`H^{}`$ is a signature of the reorientation phase transition in the FLL. We based this claim in several facts. First, the position of the kink for $`𝐇𝐜`$ coincides with the value of $`H_1`$. Second, $`H^{}`$ is rather insensitive to the field orientation, in agreement with the behavior of $`H_1`$ observed in SANS experiments. Finally, $`H_1/H_{c1}`$ is an increasing function of $`T`$, as predicted by Knigavko et al..

We now expand the previous study and analyze the behavior of the field $`H^{}`$ when the nonlocality is reduced. In the Kogan-Gurevich description the strength of the nonlocal perturbations is parametrized by a new characteristic distance, the nonlocality radius $`\rho (T,\mathrm{})`$: the weaker the nonlocality effects, the smaller $`\rho (T,\mathrm{})`$. This means that $`\rho (T,\mathrm{})`$ decreases with increasing $`T`$ or decreasing $`\mathrm{}`$. Thus, if this model is correct, an increase in $`T`$ or a decrease in $`\mathrm{}`$ should produce qualitatively similar effects on the nonlocality-induced transitions $`H_1`$ and $`H_2`$.

A typical way to reduce $`\mathrm{}`$ is to introduce impurities. It has been shown that the increase of $`x`$ in Lu(Ni1-xCox)2B2C crystals decreases $`\mathrm{}`$ without significantly increasing $`J_c`$. Recent results confirmed that the analogy between $`T`$ and $`\mathrm{}`$ is indeed valid in this material in the case of $`H_2`$. First, Gammel et al. showed that $`H_2`$ increases as $`\mathrm{}`$ is reduced by increasing $`x`$. Later on, Eskildsen et al. showed that $`H_2(T)`$ also rises as $`T`$ increases.

If $`H^{}`$ is indeed a signature of $`H_1`$, we should also find a correlation between its $`T`$ and $`\mathrm{}`$ dependencies. In Figure 2 we plot $`H^{}(T)`$, together with $`H_{c2}(T)`$. We observe that $`H^{}`$ is almost constant at low $`T`$ and, unlike the rhombic to square second order transition $`H_2(T)`$, it slightly decreases with $`T`$ at higher temperatures.

To determine the $`\mathrm{}`$ dependence of $`H^{}`$ we performed measurements on the Lu-0, Lu-1.5 and Lu-3 samples at $`T=5K`$ for $`𝐇𝐜`$ (estimates of $`\mathrm{}`$ are given in Table I). The results are shown in Figure 1(b), where we plotted $`F_p(H)`$. We observe that the kink in $`F_p`$ (indicated by the arrows) is still visible in the field range where the transition $`H_1`$ should appear, and that it shifts to lower fields with increasing $`x`$, in agreement with the $`T`$ dependence. In other words, the analogy between $`x`$ and $`T`$ is satisfied for $`H^{}`$, thus confirming that the kink arises from nonlocality.

Another interesting fact is that the Lu-0 sample has a larger $`F_p`$ than the Y-0 sample at the same $`T`$, even though it has a lower density of magnetic impurities. This indicates that the magnetic moments in the Y-0 are not the relevant pins for the flux lines when $`𝐇c`$.

### B Out-of-plane anisotropy

We now turn to the pinning properties for $`𝐇c`$. Figure 3(a) shows $`F_p`$ at $`T=3K`$ for the Y-0 sample for $`𝐇[100]`$, as a function of the reduced field $`h=H/H_{c2}`$. The $`𝐇[001]`$ data, already shown in fig. 1(a), is included for comparison. It is evident that the behavior for $`𝐇[100]`$ is very different from that observed for $`𝐇[001]`$. First we note that a broad maximum develops at intermediate fields $`h_{max}0.15`$. Second, $`F_p`$ is much larger than for $`𝐇c`$ over most of the field range. The maximum of this out-of-plane anisotropy, $`\mathrm{\Gamma }=F_p[100]/F_p[001]`$, is $`20`$ as shown in Figure 3(b). At higher $`T`$ the overall behavior and the $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ values are similar. Finally, for $`𝐇[110]`$ (not shown), we found that $`F_p`$ is slightly but systematically smaller ($`12\%`$) than for $`𝐇[100]`$.

Hereafter we will focus on the origin of the difference in $`F_p`$ between the $`c`$-axis and the $`ab`$-plane. As we pointed out in ref., the large out-of-plane $`F_p`$ anisotropy sharply contrasts with the very small ($`<10\%`$) mass anisotropy. Therefore, explanations based on the anisotropic scaling frequently used in high $`T_c`$ superconductors are ruled out.

As we mentioned above, the Y-0 crystal contains a small amount of magnetic impurities, which align preferentially along the ab-plane and thus are a potential source of the $`F_p`$ anisotropy. However, we had previously argued that this was unlikely. Indeed, since the alignment of these localized moments increases with $`H`$, pinning should become more directional as the field increases and thus $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ should increase monotonically with $`H`$. This is not in agreement with the data in Fig.3(b), where $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ first grows with $`h`$, maximizes at $`hh_{max}`$ and decreases again. In particular, $`F_p`$ is almost isotropic at the peak effect (see dotted line which corresponds to $`\mathrm{\Gamma }=1`$). Thus, although we were not able to totally rule out magnetic pinning on crystal Y-0, the data suggested that this was not the case.

Conclusive evidence that the localized magnetic moments are not responsible for the large $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ comes from the persistence of this effect in the samples Lu-0, Lu-1.5 and Lu-3, which have a magnetic impurity content two order of magnitude lower than the Y-0 crystal. In Figure 3(c) we show $`F_p(h)`$ for the Lu-1.5 for $`𝐇c`$ and $`𝐇c`$, at $`T=5K`$, and in Figure. 3(d) we plotted the corresponding $`\mathrm{\Gamma }(h)`$. We observe that the out-of-plane anisotropy is even larger than in the Y-0 sample. In contrast to the behavior observed in the Y-0, $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ in the Lu-1.5 increases monotonically with $`h`$ up to near the peak effect region, where it suddenly drops approaching to the isotropic limit. Measurements on the Lu-3 crystal at several $`T`$ show a similar behavior and exhibit a $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ larger than in the Y-0.

We had also previously argued that $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ in the Y-0 sample seems too large to be ascribed to nonlocality, which should appear as a perturbatively small effect. This conclusion is unambiguously confirmed by the presence of even larger $`\mathrm{\Gamma }`$ values in the doped samples Lu-1.5 and Lu-3, where nonlocal effects are strongly suppressed.

The existence of significant surface barriers for $`𝐇c`$, have also been ruled out by performing minor hysteresis loops with $`𝐇ab`$ at several $`T`$ and $`H`$. Examples for the Y-0 and Lu-1.5 samples are shown in Figure 4. If hysteresis were due to surface barriers no flux changes would occur in the bulk while $`H`$ is changing from one branch of the main loop to the other one, hence the data of the minor loop connecting the lower and upper branches would be Meissner-like straight lines. In contrast, in the case of bulk pinning, the lines connecting both branches are curved (parabolic in the simplest Bean model for an infinite slab) just as we observe in the insets of Figure 4(a) and (b).

Moreover, the $`F_p`$ calculated from these minor loops assuming only bulk pinning are in good agreement with those obtained from the main loops (Fig. 3). Indeed, according to the isotropic Bean model the critical state profile can be completely inverted if we change the external field in $`\mathrm{\Delta }H=2(4\pi \mathrm{\Delta }M)/g`$, where $`g=1t/3L`$, and $`t`$ and $`L`$ are the shortest and largest sample dimensions perpendicular to the field direction, respectively. From the inset of figure 4(a) we find that the width of the hysterisis loop is $`4\pi \mathrm{\Delta }M150G`$. For this sample $`g0.9`$, thus it is expected that the connecting line between the two branches of the loop, reaches the upper branch, when the field is decreased about $`\mathrm{\Delta }H330G`$. Inspection of figure 4(a) shows that $`\mathrm{\Delta }H500G`$, in reasonably good agreement given the simplicity of the model. The same analysis on the data of the inset of figure 4(b), leds to a similar conclusion.

## IV CONCLUSIONS

Non-magnetic borocarbides provide a very attractive ground to study the limit of very low pinning forces. The high quality of the crystals have the double benefit of producing large mean free paths, resulting in measurable non-local effects, and a very dilute distribution of vortex pinning centers. The combination of both factors allows the observation of the influence of nonlocality on vortex pinning. This is a rather unexplored field, and further studies, both experimental and theoretical, are needed. On the other hand, the origin of the large out-of-plane anisotropy in $`F_p`$ is unclear and deserves further investigation. We have conclusively ruled out explanations based on the mass anisotropy, pinning by magnetic impurities, non-local effects and surface barriers. A simple explanation for it could be the presence of some still unidentified anisotropic pinning centers, such as planar defects.

## V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Work partially supported by ANPCyT, Argentina, PICT 97 No.01120, and CONICET PIP 4207. A.V.S. would like to thank to CONICET for financial support. Research sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, managed by UT-Battelle, LLC.


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# Causality implies formal state collapse

## 1 Introduction

It has been said that quantum mechanics exhibits “spooky action-at-a-distance” through state “collapse” across a space-like separation. We show that collapse (whether considered spooky or not) is a formal feature of any complete, correct, and causal physical theory which incorporates current experimental practices. Thus said collapse is not a feature of quantum mechanics as such. This offers an interesting twist on the usual discussions in the case of standard quantum theory. Space-like quantum state collapse, to the extent that it is not interpreted as a change of epistemic probabilities, has always been considered a mysterious affair. It suggested to many people the existence of an action-at-a-distance and even that it could somehow be harnessed to carry superluminal signals. There have even been concrete proposals of superluminal communication devices based on this hope. From our perspective one can read the situation in a completely reverse fashion: that space-like quantum state-collapse has been empirically borne out by correlation experiments is not a suggestion that superluminal signals may be possible, but, being a necessary condition of their absence, is a suggestion of their impossibility. To our knowledge only Ryff and Monken have come near this point in showing that lack of collapse in certain “interaction-free” measurements would lead to superluminal signals. The formal aspects of collapse in the case of quantum mechanics have also been addressed by Macdonald.

We argue our point by considering a theory that is already successful in describing phenomena in a certain space-time region and see how it must accommodate a detector acting in another region. We have already used the artifice of a distant detector to show that under some of the usual assumptions about quantum mechanical states, particularly the collapse hypothesis, part of the linear structure of quantum mechanics follows from the impossibility of superluminal signals. We see here to what extent we can relax the assumptions of the cited article and still draw significant conclusions.

Classical theories fall under our province and so have the same feature, but since up to now any collapse was always viewed incontestably as readjustment of the knowledge we have of the system, it was never seen as “spooky” and generally not deemed a significant point to be discussed.

Standard quantum theory, which should be used as a reference, is highly successful and highly accurate. If it is to be superseded by a new theory, this one must make numerical predictions that are very close to those for which the standard theory has been upheld in the laboratory, and so, in a certain sense, must be very close to quantum theory. Our result thus does say something significant about our future views of physics.

By a causal theory we mean one without superluminal communication and without retrograde signals (signals to the causal past). Specifically we disallow correlations in measurement results in different regions of space-time to result in the unwanted signals. We say that collapse is a formal feature to mean that the formalism must necessarily allow for such a description. If the actual discourse of physicists using the theory would contain such language, and if so, consider collapse a physical process, is a matter up to interpretation, taste, social practice, and metaphysics. Seeing as how twentieth century physicists have generally created their ontology directly from the formalism, such language would be probable, assuming no radical shift of world view.

Our discussion is mostly metatheoretic, that is, concerned with the mathematical and logical structure of physical theories. Mathematically the results are trivial, based on a reading of what formally is the conditional probability formula. Part of the argument is methodological as appeals are made as what is currently accepted experimental practice.

Since the possibility of superluminal and retrograde signals is such a powerful metatheoretic device, it is desirable to know how prevalent these features are. Formalizing in a fairly primitive, but empirically significant fashion, the set of all possible theories, we point out that the subset of theories that have superluminal signals, and the subset of theories that have retrograde signals are both dense and open in the weak topology defined by a finite number of empirical observations. If the absence of these features is part of Nature, any future theory transcending standard quantum mechanics would be exceedingly hard to construct. A striking exemplification of this last point are the results that show that absence of superluminal signals implies much of the linear structure of standard quantum mechanics provided we maintain some of the usual quantum mechanical notions about physical states. This fact is the main reason that no one has up to now presented a consistent relativistic non-linear quantum mechanics (See however Svetlichny and Kent for initial attempts in this direction). Another consequence of the density of sets with these features is that any slight miscalculation in, or misunderstanding of, a causal theory could convince a person that she or he has stumbled upon a means of sending superluminal or retrograde signals. While quantum mechanics is still the prevailing theory we should continue to see more and more proposals to implement such signals using quantum mechanical collapse.

## 2 Empirical Statistical Theories

Physical theories, regardless of their conceptual and mathematical complexity or their metaphysical outlook on the world, must in the end describe and predict raw observational data. Different patterns in raw data would in principle require different theories to accommodate them, and a metatheoretic classification can be made on the basis of these patterns. Such a classification, being to a large extent indifferent to the theories’ mathematical and conceptual structures and to their metaphysical commitments, would have the greatest possible generality.

Any physical theory that proposes to predict the probabilities of experimental outcomes must at least admit preparation procedures that would allow one to perform experiments repeatedly “under the same conditions” and observation procedures that would allow one to claim that one is “performing the same experiment” under these conditions. Any realizable experiment can lead to only a finite number of results and so if $``$ is an observation procedure, we shall denote by $`\{ϵ_1,\mathrm{},ϵ_n\}`$ its possible outcomes (“pointer positions”). Given a preparation procedure $`𝒲`$ and an observation procedure $``$, the relative frequencies of outcome $`ϵ_j`$ in a long run is normally taken to approximate the probability $`P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)`$ of the result and which a scientific theory endeavors to calculate. Now both preparation and observation procedures are subject to some equivalence relations since it is generally accepted that different physical acts can prepare the “same state of affairs” and different apparatus can effect the “same measurements” on the said state of affairs. Without going into any specific analysis, such equivalence relations, which we denote by $``$, must at least be statistically consistent, that is

$`𝒲𝒲^{}`$ $``$ $`,P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)=P(𝒲^{},,ϵ_j)`$ (1)
$`^{}`$ $``$ $`\text{ a permutation }\pi \text{ of }\{1,\mathrm{},n\}\text{ such that}`$ (2)
$`𝒲,P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)=P(𝒲,^{},ϵ_{\pi (j)}^{}).`$
Now the right-hand of the implications (1) and (2) in themselves define equivalence relations that though implied by the one already postulated can be different. We call this possibly larger relation, statistical equivalence and denote it by $``$. The equivalence classes under $``$ are generally part of what is formalized in a particular theory. In practice one usually says that the preparation procedure creates a “physical state” which is subsequently “measured” by the observation procedure. Thus the equivalence classes of preparation procedures are often referred to as “states” and those of observation procedures as “observables”. Such language is in accord with the current physical intuition but is not at all necessary and we avoid it in general so as not to arouse ingrained semantic habits.

There must also be some sort of relativity theory that allows us to identify equivalent experiments performed in separate regions of space-time, and likewise some sort of causality hypothesis to allow independently performed experiments. This is necessary to gather statistics on a “run” of experiments.

We point out that while $``$ is a purely empirical relation, $``$ is a metaphysical concern. In quantum mechanics all three of the following prescriptions for creating a photon are $``$ equivalent: preparation $`𝒲_1`$ is to pass light from an incandescent source through a prism to pick out a given frequency; preparation $`𝒲_2`$ is to pass light of the same frequency as in preparation $`𝒲_1`$ (created in any way whatsoever) through a linear polarizer which is subject to random rotations from a horizontal to a vertical orientation; preparation $`𝒲_3`$ is to create a two-photon singlet state twice the energy of $`𝒲_1`$ and take one of the emerging photons as the prepared state. Now $`𝒲_1𝒲_2𝒲_3`$ and each, for computational purposes, is described by a $`2\times 2`$ density matrix $`\frac{1}{2}I`$. Now whereas $`𝒲_1𝒲_2`$ is likely to be maintained by most physicists, though some might contest it, there is some considerable disagreement about $`𝒲_1𝒲_3`$ (and $`𝒲_2𝒲_3`$). Some would say that $`𝒲_3`$ is not really a one-photon state but a two-photon state in which one is merely doing a limited kind of measurement (only looking at one, which is “unpolarized”). Others, however, feel that a beam of “unpolarized photons” is ontologically the same as a beam of photon of equally distributed random polarizations.

Part of the notion of preparation and observation procedures is that the observation procedure is not to be considered as part of the preparation procedure. Thus the usual causal understanding is that the preparation is not influenced by any observation, for otherwise it would not be possible to talk about well defined states of affairs that one observes, nor of controlled experiments in general.

Now one need not execute the observation procedure only in the instances that the preparation procedure is deemed successful. What does take place in practice is that one performs a long experimental run and only a posteriori analyzes those instances in which the preparation was deemed successful. This is most apparent for instance in high-energy physics. A simple model for what happens in practice would be to consider that there is some “gross” preparation procedure $`𝒲_0`$ and two observation procedures $`𝒟`$ with outcomes $`\{\delta _1,\mathrm{},\delta _p\}`$, and $``$ with outcomes $`\{ϵ_1,\mathrm{},ϵ_n\}`$. A long experimental run is executed and only the cases in which $`\delta _1`$ is realized are considered to be the cases in which the desired state of affairs has been created and for which the observations corresponding to $``$ are then subsequently analyzed. Data for which some other outcome $`\delta _i`$, $`i1`$ obtains, is simply ignored. This is what is done for instance in coincidence experiments. The procedure described above can be called an indirect preparation procedure. The normal attitude concerning it is that the compound procedure: “execute $`𝒲_0`$ then execute $`𝒟`$ and consider the operation successful if $`\delta _1`$ obtains”, is just as legitimate a procedure for creating a state of affairs as any other. One still executes $``$ and collects data even if $`\delta _1`$ did not occur merely for technological reasons, it would just be too difficult or impossible to set up the experiment in another way. Since by assumption the separate executions of the experiment in the long run do not interfere with each other, the fact that the instances of the desired state of affairs are imbedded in a larger set along with states of affairs of no interest is innocuous as mere data analysis weeds them out.

Observation procedures $``$ and $`𝒟`$ may pertain to separate space-time regions which can be arbitrarily related to each other. If $`𝒟`$ is time-like past to $``$ then one has the usual pre-conditioning in which all of the preparation acts occur time-like prior to the observation acts. This is in accord with the usual causal notions. For space-like separation though, which acts are prior and which are subsequent, depends on the reference frame. This is accepted procedure and space-like conditioning is common in coincidence experiments. One could even allow post-conditioning, that is conditioning a state to a future time-like measurement. Such practice, though perfectly legitimate, is not usually considered. The bias against post-conditioning stems basically from conventional views concerning causality. Thus one does not generally admit that future time-like events condition present ones in some, admittedly ill-formulated, physical sense, and so while the mathematical and procedural status of post-conditioning is quite legitimate and uncontestable, one generally feels that for future time-like situations it has no physical basis and so any data analysis performed in this matter is totally superfluous and would not lead to any new physical insights. Summing up one can say that current experimental practices allow indirect preparation procedures, for both past-time-like pre-conditioning and space-like conditioning (either pre- or post-), but do not allow future-time-like post-conditioning.

Now the theory presumably has a certain mathematical formalization and predictive power based on a logical deductive system. In particular it should have formalized the $``$ equivalence classes $`[𝒲]`$ and $`[]`$ of preparation and observation procedures and predict the values of the observed probabilities $`P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)`$ via statements of the form $`P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)=Q([𝒲],[],e_j)`$. Here $`e_j`$ is the mathematical object that corresponds to the outcome $`ϵ_j`$. It also in principle predicts some “laws of nature” which would be true predicates concerning the predicted probabilities $`Q([𝒲],[],e_j)`$. We say a theory is correct if all predicted predicates (theorems) are in fact true on empirical facts and we say a theory is complete if every predicate true on empirical facts is in fact predicted (is a theorem) of the theory. If a theory is incomplete, expanding its axiomatic basis by the empirical facts that are not instances of theorems would turn it complete unless this procedure turned the theory incorrect (some new theorems are now in fact false). In this later case the theory certainly must be abandoned. We call a theory successful if it is correct and complete. Merely adding some facts to the axiom basis is phenomenology of the crudest sort, but is a necessary step to assure the overall consistency of the theory. We use the terms “correct” and “complete” in the purely logical sense of an interpreted deductive theory, not to be confused with other usage found in the physical literature.

Given a preparation procedure $`𝒲`$, then for any observation procedure $``$ one has that $`_iP(𝒲,,ϵ_i)=1`$. Let $`w`$ be a map which to any $``$ and to any result $`ϵ_i`$ of $``$ assigns a non-negative real numbers $`w^{}(ϵ_i)`$. We say $`w`$ is a weight if $`_iw^{}(ϵ_i)`$ is independent of $``$, and we say the weight is normalized if this sum is one. Preparation procedures determine normalized weights through $`w_𝒲^{}(ϵ_i)=P(𝒲,,ϵ_i)`$. We call such weights physical. Obviously a physical weight satisfies $`^{}w_𝒲^{}(ϵ_i)=w_𝒲^{^{}}(\pi (ϵ_i))`$, and $`𝒲𝒲^{}w_𝒲^{}(ϵ_i)=w_𝒲^{}^{}(ϵ_i)`$.

## 3 Space-Time Extensions

Suppose now that we have a theory $`𝒯`$ in which the observation procedures all pertain to some bounded region of space-time $`𝒪`$. We assume this is a successful theory, that is, it is correct and complete. In contrast to the observation procedures, do not assume that the preparation procedures pertain to $`𝒪`$, or for that matter to any specific space-time region. For instance, one may be observing some global cosmological structure. Suppose now we have another space-time region $`𝒪^{}`$ and that pertaining to this region is an observation procedure consisting of a detector $`𝒟`$ with possible outcomes $`\{\delta _1,\mathrm{},\delta _p\}`$. We assume that we can run the detector in conjunction with any observation procedure $``$ in $`𝒪`$. This, under normal causality assumptions, would always be the case if the two regions are space-like separated, but here we take it as a hypothesis and do not a-priori assume any space-time relations between $`𝒪`$ and $`𝒪^{}`$. We shall denote by $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ the assumption that no signals can be sent from $`𝒪`$ to $`𝒪^{}`$ utilizing measurements in both regions and some preparation procedure.

As far as the user of theory $`𝒯`$ is concerned, when he confronts the task of incorporating detector $`𝒟`$, he is faced with “new phenomena” (“states” created by conditioning to outcomes of $`𝒟`$), “new instruments” (concurrent measurements of $``$ and $`𝒟`$), and a “greater world” $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$.

The possible results of such a new compound experiment would be set of pairs $`(ϵ_i,\delta _j)`$. We now ask what possible theories can there be of such compound procedures and what relation can these have to the original theory $`𝒯`$.

Let $`\widehat{𝒯}`$ be any extension of $`𝒯`$ incorporating the detector $`𝒟`$ and let $`\widehat{P}`$ be the probability function for $`\widehat{𝒯}`$, that is $`\widehat{P}(𝒲,,𝒟,ϵ_i,\delta _j)`$ is the joint probability of getting result $`(ϵ_i,\delta _j)`$ using preparation procedure $`𝒲`$ and observation procedure $`(,𝒟)`$. Our first result is:

$$𝒪^{}𝒪\underset{j}{}\widehat{P}(𝒲,,𝒟,ϵ_i,\delta _j)=P(𝒲,,ϵ_i)$$
(3)
for otherwise one can, by choosing to run the detector $`𝒟`$ or not, send a signal from region $`𝒪^{}`$ to region $`𝒪`$. Thus $`𝒪^{}𝒪`$ implies that the $`𝒪`$-marginal theory of $`\widehat{𝒯}`$ in which one sums over the results of $`𝒟`$ has to coincide with $`𝒯`$. Now one in principle also has an $`𝒪^{}`$-marginal theory $`𝒯^{}`$, though we have not postulated one. One can always formally consider it as a purely phenomenological one consisting of the same preparation procedures as $`𝒯`$, one observation procedure $`𝒟`$, the set of empirical facts given by probabilities $`P^{}(𝒲,𝒟,\delta _j)`$ of having outcome $`\delta _j`$ in the absence of any observation in $`𝒪`$ and a trivial deductive system having no deduction rules. From the point of view of the user of $`𝒯`$ such a theory in itself is of no use as his task is to incorporate the new reality into $`𝒯`$ itself. With this in mind we rewrite (3) for the reverse situation $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ in a way that does not mention the $`𝒪^{}`$-marginal theory. This is our second result:

$$𝒪𝒪^{}c_1\mathrm{}c_p\underset{i}{}\widehat{P}(𝒲,,𝒟,ϵ_i,\delta _j)=c_j$$
(4)
This holds since otherwise by changing to a different observation procedure $`^{}`$ one could send a signal from $`𝒪`$ to $`𝒪^{}`$. Here $`c_j`$ is the putative probability $`P^{}(𝒲,𝒟,\delta _j)`$.

We note that if (3) holds, then $`𝒯`$ can be maintained under ignorance of the results of $`𝒟`$. Regardless of (3) holding or not, theory $`\widehat{𝒯}`$ must meet various challenges under knowledge of the result of $`𝒟`$. Thus $``$ may no longer hold statistically. It may happen that there are preparation procedures $`𝒲𝒲^{}`$ for which there is an $``$ such that $`\widehat{P}(𝒲,𝒟,,ϵ_i,\delta _j)\widehat{P}(𝒲^{},,𝒟,ϵ_i,\delta _j)`$. Now $``$ is a metaphysical equivalence, so a change of world view would allow one to pass to more fine-grained equivalence classes and recover statistical equivalence. Formally one may simply partition by the new $``$, each equivalence class $`[𝒲]`$ in which the previous statistical equivalence is broken. It can also happen that there are observation procedures $`^{}`$ for which there is a $`𝒲`$ such that $`\widehat{P}(𝒲,,𝒟,ϵ_i,\delta _j)\widehat{P}(𝒲,^{},𝒟,ϵ_{\pi (i)},\delta _j)`$. In general one can always perform the same trick of passing to finer-grained equivalence classes by partitioning any equivalence class $`[]`$ which requires it, and adjusting our metaphysics to accompany this change. When (4) holds, there is however another way to view the situation. Assuming that $`c_j0`$ then the map

$$(,ϵ_i)w_{(𝒲,j)}^{}(i)=c_j^1\widehat{P}(𝒲,,𝒟,ϵ_i,\delta _j)$$
(5)
is a normalized weight in $`𝒯`$ which respects the new $``$ for preparation procedures and therefore has all the trappings of a physical weight. It is therefore either a physical weight, or one can incorporate “conditioned to outcome $`\delta _j`$” as a legitimate new instruction in preparation procedures enlarging thus the “state space” of $`𝒯`$.

This makes perfect sense for various reasons. The first is that $`c_j`$ is independent of $``$ and so one can indeed interpret indirect preparation procedure as a legitimate preparation for something to be measured since this very notion incorporates the idea of independence of preparation from the measurement. Secondly the number $`c_j`$ is the putative probability that result $`\delta _j`$ obtains in $`𝒟`$ so division by this number in (5) can be simply seen as normalizing the number of occurrences of $`ϵ_i`$ to the number of times that $`\delta _j`$ has occurred as in usual conditional probabilities. Thus formally one has

$$w_{(𝒲,j)}^{}(i)=w_{𝒲|j}^{}(i)$$
(6)
where $`𝒲|j`$ is the indirect preparation procedure alluded to. The “state space” is now enlarged to include the $`𝒲|j`$. This can now be viewed as a “conditioned state” and the theory can be said to have formal state conditioning, which we abbreviate it SC.

As far as the deductive system of $`𝒯`$ is concerned, under $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ we can enlarge the set of equivalence classes of preparation and observation procedures, and also enlarge the set of true empirical facts which we add to the axiomatic basis. If the new resulting theory is successful we say we have correctness stability which we abbreviate to CS.

The resulting successful theory now has formal state conditioning, and have thus proved that under $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ one has

$$\text{CS }\text{ SC}$$
(7)
If $`w_𝒲`$ is the physical weight corresponding to $`𝒲`$ then the map $`w_𝒲w_{(𝒲,j)}`$ where $`w_{(𝒲,j)}`$ is defined by (5) can be considered as indicative of a “state collapse” $`[𝒲][𝒲|j]`$ in analogy with the collapse hypothesis of standard quantum theory. Thus a form of state collapse is a consequence of $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ and CS.

Given the generality of our exposition, $`[𝒲|j]=[𝒲]`$ is a logical possibility. Though we may not want to consider “no collapse” as “collapse”, we cannot in general rule out that probabilities will not change under conditioning. Since any viable theory must necessarily be empirically close to quantum mechanics, change of probabilities must be as prevalent in it as in quantum mechanics, so “collapse” as a generic description is justifiable.

## 4 Space-Like Separation

Here we assume $`𝒪`$ and $`𝒪^{}`$ are space like separated. Under usual causality assumptions $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ and $`𝒪^{}𝒪`$ both hold. This precludes superluminal signals (SS) by use of the measurement process. Under $`\neg \text{SS}`$ we have the conclusions of both (3) and (4). Thus the space-like variant of (7) is:

$$\neg \text{SS}\text{ and CS }\text{ SC}.$$
(8)
Which can also be written as the disjunct:

$$\text{SC}\text{or}\text{SS}\text{or}\neg \text{CS}.$$
(9)
A rough paraphrase of this would be that theory $`\widehat{𝒯}`$ either admits formal space-like state conditioning or else there are superluminal signals or else it is wrong. Note that this is true for the space-like extension of any theory whatsoever and so is a complete classification.

Of course one does not in practice develop a theory for one space-time region $`𝒪`$ only to then try to extend it to include other regions. One generally proposes some universal theory $`𝒰`$ of which both $`𝒯`$ and $`\widehat{𝒯}`$ are to be restrictions. This means that any such proposal can be examined in the light of (9) which now refers to $`𝒰`$. Since presumably $`𝒰`$ is a successful theory we are then left with the disjunction SS or SC. Paraphrasing:

Any successful physical theory either allows superluminal signals or is formally a space-like state-collapse theory. In particular, a successful causal theory necessarily exhibits formal space-like state collapse.

## 5 Theories With Autonomous Evolving States

We now reexamine the above results for theories that admit the notion of autonomous evolving state. Given a preparation procedure $`𝒲`$ one assumes that at some instant $`t_𝒲`$ the procedure has run its course and has created a physical entity $`\sigma _𝒲(t_𝒲)`$ usually called an instantaneous physical state and which from then on behaves autonomously without reliance on the procedure that gave it birth. One has the notion of evolution in that for $`t>t_𝒲`$ one has the state $`\sigma _𝒲(t)`$ which can be prepared by the following prescription: execute $`𝒲`$ and wait $`tt_𝒲`$ units of time. We shall consider the evolution to be deterministic in that given $`\sigma _𝒲(t_𝒲)`$, then $`\sigma _𝒲(t)`$ is uniquely determined. For such a conception to be applicable to an observation procedure $``$, this too must have associated to it a time instant $`t_{}`$ at which the apparatus “engages” the state and then it is a postulate of such theories that the probabilities of outcomes depend only on the instantaneous physical state at instant $`t_{}`$. Obviously if $`𝒲𝒲^{}`$, then by the meaning of $``$ one should have for $`t>\mathrm{max}(t_𝒲,t_𝒲^{})`$ that $`\sigma _𝒲(t)=\sigma _𝒲^{}(t)`$. The probability functional $`P(𝒲,,ϵ_i)`$ can now be expressed entirely in terms of the instantaneous state $`P(\sigma (t_{}),,ϵ_i)`$ and one often conventionally drops all reference to preparation procedures and only deals with evolving autonomous physical states $`\sigma (t)`$.

We must emphasize that in these type of theories the states are considered as instantaneous. That is, the state description $`\sigma (t)`$ for $`tt_𝒲`$ describes the state at that instant and refers to its entire supposed spatial extent, which may be the full simultaneity hyperplane in the frame of the observer. This is manifestly a frame dependent description and of course raises the well know issues of compatibility with relativistic covariance. As with relativistic quantum mechanics, we must assume that divergence of state descriptions maintained by observers in different reference frames does not lead to divergence of predicted experimental probabilities. We shall assume this requirement is met in a successful theory.

Let us now examine a theory with instantaneous physical states $`𝒯`$ pertaining to a space-time region $`𝒪`$ and again as in section 3 assume we have a detector in a space-like separated region $`𝒪^{}`$ and that the extended theory $`\widehat{𝒯}`$ is also one with instantaneous physical states. To analyze what $`\neg \text{SS}`$ says in this case consider then a situation in which the detector $`𝒟`$ engages the instantaneous state $`\sigma (t)`$ at some instant and that the detector outcome is realized at an instant $`t_𝒟`$ before the apparatus of the observation procedure $``$ engages it at instant $`t_{}`$. By the premises of instantaneous state theories, conditioning to outcome $`\delta _j`$ of $`𝒟`$ must now define a new instantaneous state which comes into existence at an instant $`t_{\delta _j}`$ with $`t_𝒟t_{\delta _j}t_{}`$. To conclude anything further one must invoke more hypotheses. Under conventional causality hypotheses, the space-like separated apparatus used in $``$ cannot have any influence on what the description at $`𝒟`$ is and since one can run an appropriate such apparatus in such a way that $`t_{}`$ is arbitrarily close to $`t_𝒟`$, one must conclude that $`t_{\delta _j}=t_𝒟`$. In other words, absence of superluminal signals implies that $`\sigma (t)`$ undergoes an instantaneous “collapse” at $`t_𝒟`$ to a new instantaneous state $`\sigma _j(t_𝒟)`$ depending on the outcome $`\delta _j`$ of the detector. Summarizing:

Any successful causal theory describing autonomous evolving states, formally exhibits instantaneous space-like state-collapse.

As applied to quantum mechanics, instantaneous state-collapse is at times interpreted as “preparation-at-a-distance”, that is manipulation of objective reality at a space-like separated location. Our result is a formal consequence of causality (to some extent contrary to such an interpretation) and must not be taken as implying any sort of action-at-a-distance.

## 6 Time-Like Separation

There are two cases of time-like separation to consider, when $`𝒪^{}`$ is time-like past to $`𝒪`$, and when it is time-like future. In both cases, assuming the actual physical possibility of carrying out experiments $``$ and $`𝒟`$, one can carry over some of the arguments in section 3. The difference stems from the fact that while signals from the future to the past may be deemed pernicious those from the past to the future are not bothersome and are in fact welcome as pyramids, filing systems, and memories attest.

In the first case, if one precludes retrograde signals, one has (4) and we can carry over the arguments of 3 that follow that equation to conclude formal state collapse in successful causal theories in which the conditioning measurement $`𝒟`$ is time-like past to the observation procedure $``$. This of course is the usual familiar situation. In the second case we can no longer claim the conclusion of (4). So the sum in (4) can now depend on $``$ making it impossible to consider the resulting state of affairs as being the result of a conditioning of the initial one by $`𝒟`$, independently of what $``$ measurement one makes on it, precluding a state collapse interpretation. The state of affairs is somehow mutually co-conditioned by both $`𝒟`$ and $``$ and in general by any other measurement performed “in between”, that is in a region $`𝒪^{\prime \prime }`$ which is time-like future to $`𝒪`$ and time-like past to $`𝒪^{}`$. It escapes the usual paradigm of an experiment consisting of preparation and observation. Without any compelling argument that it offers new physical insights it can be generally ignored.

This situation occurs in fact in standard quantum mechanics. Assume one has initially prepared a Heisenberg quantum state described by a density matrix $`\rho _0`$ which is then subject to two successive measurements corresponding to self adjoint operators $`A`$ and $`B`$ each with discrete spectrum and corresponding finite spectral decomposition $`A=_i\lambda _iP_i`$ and $`B=_j\mu _jQ_j`$. According to the usual projection rule the joint probability of seeing outcomes $`(i,j)`$ for the two measurements is $`P(i,j)=\mathrm{Tr}(Q_jP_i\rho _0P_iQ_j)=\mathrm{Tr}(P_i\rho _0P_iQ_j)`$ from which we derive the conditional probabilities $`P(j|i)`$ and $`P(i|j)`$. The first one is the pre-conditioned probability which is $`\mathrm{Tr}(Q_j\rho _i)`$ where $`\rho _i=P_i\rho _0P_i/\mathrm{Tr}(P_i\rho _0)`$ is a new density matrix. Thus the state of affairs created by pre-conditioning is again expressible by a density matrix which depends only on $`\rho _0`$ and the projector $`P_i`$ and so in particular is independent of $`B`$, i.e. “observation” does not interfere with “preparation”. The second, post-conditioned, probability, $`P(i|j)=\mathrm{Tr}(P_i\rho _0P_iQ_j)/_k\mathrm{Tr}(P_k\rho _0P_kQ_j)`$ is quite different in general whenever $`A`$ and $`B`$ do not commute. One cannot write $`P(i|j)`$ as $`\mathrm{Tr}(P_i\rho _j)`$ for any density matrix $`\rho _j`$ determined solely by $`\rho _0`$ and the spectral projectors of $`B`$, as $`P(i|j)`$ in general also depends on the other compatible projectors $`P_k`$, $`ki`$ that are measured along with $`P_i`$.

Given the above, it is not clear whether there is any advantage in introducing post conditioned “states of affairs” among what we consider to be our physical states and incorporate them into our theory. However, the case for this in quantum mechanics was argued by Aharonov and collaborators who seem to claim that such new ensembles teach us something fundamental.

## 7 Structural Stability

Because any future fundamental theory must, on the level of raw experimental facts, be neighboring to standard quantum theory, one is naturally led to investigate the neighborhoods of standard quantum theory in the set of all theories, provided these notions can be appropriately formalized. We make a preliminary step in this direction and find that the set of theories with superluminal communication and the set of theories with retrograde signals are both dense open sets. This means that in any neighborhood of standard quantum mechanics there are radically different theories, and any modification of quantum mechanics, no matter how small, can, if extreme care is not taken, produce theories with superluminal and retrograde signals.

As before, consider a theory with some preparation procedures $`𝒲`$ and some observation procedures $``$ with outcomes $`(ϵ_1,\mathrm{},ϵ_n)`$. The physical content of the theory is contained in the sets of numbers $`P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)`$. The space of all possible theories that describe a certain fixed set of procedures for preparation and observations is the set of all possible such assignments. Since within the lifetime of any civilization, only a finite number of experiments can be performed, and each empirical probability can only be ascertained to a limited degree of accuracy, a statement of the empirical closeness of two theories $`P`$ and $`Q`$ would be of the form

$$|P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)Q(𝒲,,ϵ_j)|<ϵ$$
(10)
where $`ϵ>0`$ and $`𝒲`$ and $``$ run over some finite sets $`W`$ and $`E`$ respectively. For fixed $`P`$, $`W`$, $`E`$, and $`ϵ`$ the set of $`Q`$ that satisfies the above inequality is a neighborhood of $`P`$ in a topology that we call weak. Consider now a theory that can describe events in regions $`𝒪`$ and $`𝒪^{}`$, and consider observation procedures with outcome sets (our generic $`ϵ`$’s) being sets of pairs $`(\alpha _i,\delta _j);i=1,\mathrm{},n,j=1,\mathrm{},m`$ where $`\alpha _i`$ refers to outcomes observed in $`𝒪`$ and $`\delta _j`$ to outcomes observed in $`𝒪^{}`$. Now for $`𝒪𝒪^{}`$ to hold, it is necessary that

$$\underset{i}{}P(𝒲,,(\alpha _i,\delta _j))=\underset{\mathrm{}}{}P(𝒲,\stackrel{~}{},(\beta _{\mathrm{}},\stackrel{~}{\delta }_k))$$
(11)
for all $`\stackrel{~}{}`$ that coincide in their procedure with $``$ in region $`𝒪^{}`$ and where $`\delta _j`$ and $`\stackrel{~}{\delta }_k`$ correspond the same physically determined outcome in region $`𝒪^{}`$ for the two procedures. Intuitively speaking, this condition is a set of equalities, and equalities are easily broken by arbitrarily small perturbations, whereas strict inequalities are maintained for sufficiently small perturbations. One would thus expect that the set where a strict inequality holds to be dense and open. In terms of the assignments above, the only a-priori constraint is that $`P(𝒲,,ϵ_j)0`$ and $`_jP(𝒲,,ϵ_j)=1`$ which defines for each pair $`(𝒲,)`$ a simplex $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{(𝒲,)}`$. So the set of all theories is the product $`\text{𝕋}=_{(𝒲,)}\mathrm{\Delta }_{(𝒲,)}`$ and it’s clear that the weak topology is just the product topology of the usual topologies in the simplices. An equality (11) is held on a proper linear subvariety of the product $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{(𝒲,)}\times \mathrm{\Delta }_{(𝒲,\stackrel{~}{})}`$ and so in 𝕋 this defines a dense open set. Since the union of dense open sets is dense and open, any set of such equalities defines a set of theories whose compliment is dense and open.

Under the empirical notion of closeness, the set of theories with superluminal signals and the set of theories with retrograde signals are both open and dense.

Of course 𝕋 above is a very primitive description of the set of all theories. It doesn’t for instance take into account the $``$ equivalence relation, but to do so one simply goes over to the product over equivalence classes $`_{([𝒲],[])}\mathrm{\Delta }_{(𝒲,)}`$ and precisely the same considerations apply. The conclusion may fail to hold if one imposed some further a-priori relation on the probability assignments or considered stronger topologies but to motivate these would require completely new metatheoretic and philosophic considerations.

## 8 Acknowledgment

The author thanks Alan Macdonald and the referees for helpful comments. This work was partially supported by the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq).