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# Observations of Type Ia Supernovae, and Challenges for Cosmology

## 1 Observations of SNe Ia and the Accelerating Universe

Spectroscopic observations of nearby Type Ia supernovae (SNe Ia) reveal that they can be divided into several subclasses: the majority are the so-called “normal” or “Branch normal” SNe Ia (Branch, Fisher, & Nugent 1993), while the others are “peculiar” SNe Ia which can be further divided into SN 1991T-like or SN 1991bg-like objects (see Filippenko 1997, and references therein). Li et al. (2001a) discuss SN 1999aa-like objects as another potential subclass of the peculiar SNe Ia. The classification is based on the spectra of SNe Ia before or near maximum light: normal SNe Ia show conspicuous features of Si II, Ca II, and other intermediate-mass elements (IMEs; e.g., S II, O I); SN 1991T-like objects show unusually weak IME lines, yet prominent high-excitation features of Fe III; SN 1991bg-like objects have strong IME features, plus a broad Ti II absorption trough around 4100 Å and enhanced Si II/Ti II $`\lambda `$5800 absorptions. SN 1999aa-like objects are similar to the SN 1991T-like ones, but with significant Ca II H & K absorption lines.

Photometric observations of nearby SNe Ia also reveal a correlation between the peak luminosity and light-curve shape (LLCS correlation, hereafter). This was first convincingly demonstrated by Phillips (1993), and subsequently exploited by Hamuy et al. (1996a), Riess, Press, & Kirshner (1996), Perlmutter et al. (1997), and Phillips et al. (1999). The slower, broader light curves are intrinsically brighter at peak than the faster, narrower light curves. Various parameters have been proposed to quantify the “speed” of the light curve, such as $`\mathrm{\Delta }m_{15}(B)`$ (the decline in magnitudes between peak brightness and 15 days later in the $`B`$ band), $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$ (the difference in magnitudes between the peak brightness of a SN Ia and a nominal standard SN Ia), $`s`$ (“stretch factor,” the amount of stretch applied to the light curve (generally $`B`$ band) of a SN Ia to match those of a nominal standard SN Ia), and various empirical methods have been developed to calibrate the peak absolute magnitudes of SNe Ia (Phillips 1993; Hamuy et al. 1996a; Riess, Press, & Kirshner 1996; Perlmutter et al. 1997; Jha 2002; Wang et al. 2003). The multi-color light-curve shape (MLCS) method, for example, has demonstrated the ability to achieve a scatter in the calibrated absolute magnitudes of SNe Ia to $``$0.15 mag (Riess, Press, & Kirshner 1996).

By assuming that the observed correlation for nearby SNe Ia also applies to the objects at high redshift, utilizing the empirical calibration methods developed from nearby SNe Ia, and studying the Hubble diagram for SNe Ia at both low and high redshifts, the High-z SN Search Team (Schmidt et al. 1998) and the SN Cosmology Project (Perlmutter et al. 1997) have measured that high-redshift SNe Ia are fainter than expected, and interpreted this result as evidence that the expansion of the Universe is accelerating, due perhaps to a non-zero cosmological constant or some other forms of dark energy (e.g., Riess et al. 1998; Perlmutter et al. 1999; Tonry et al. 2003; Knop et al. 2003).

## 2 Challenges of the Accelerating Universe

The observational fact is that the SNe Ia at $`z0.5`$ are $``$0.28 mag dimmer ($``$14% farther) than expected in a Universe with $`\mathrm{\Omega }_M=0.3`$ and no cosmological constant. Besides the interpretation of a positive cosmological constant, other possible alternatives have been proposed as follows.

1. Luminosity evolution. Two important questions are (a) whether the high-redshift SNe Ia follow the same LLCS correlation for the nearby objects, and (b) whether the SNe Ia at $`z0.5`$ are intrinsically fainter than nearby SNe Ia by 0.28 mag after correction for the LLCS correlation.
2. Interstellar dust, which produces more extinction of the high-redshift SNe Ia and makes them look apparently fainter.
3. Selection bias: preferentially fainter SNe Ia are observed at high redshift.
4. Gravitational lensing: the inhomogeneous distribution of matter in the Universe deamplifies the observed brightness of most high-redshift SNe Ia.

Among these, ordinary dust is not considered a viable option, as it introduces too much reddening in the colors of SNe Ia at high redshift (Riess et al. 2000) and more dispersion in the distance measurements than is currently observed. “Grey” dust (Aguirre 1999a,b), which leaves little or no imprint on the spectral energy distribution of a SN Ia, could be more pernicious, but the amount of grey dust required to explain the faintness of high-redshift SNe Ia would also distort the cosmic microwave background, an effect which has not been seen. Moreover, it still introduces more distance dispersion than is currently observed. Tonry et al. (2003) also provided evidence that a systematic effect which goes as a power law of $`(1+z)`$, such as extinction by dust, is not likely to match the SN Ia data. No known selection bias favors detection of intrinsically fainter SNe Ia at high redshift. Malmquist bias may afflict the nearby SN Ia sample so preferentially brighter objects were observed, but the effect is shown to be small (Riess et al. 1998; Perlmutter et al. 1999). Moreover, the high-redshift SN Ia sample should be subject to the same bias to a greater extent, since most high-redshift SN searches are magnitude-limited. Gravitational lensing deamplification (Metcalf 1999; Barber 2000), typically $``$ 2% at $`z=0.5`$, is much smaller than the cosmological effect.

Luminosity evolution is arguably the most serious challenge to the cosmological interpretation of high-redshift SNe Ia. The cause of this is somewhat embarrassing: despite being the most luminous type of SN, SNe Ia have not been completely understood theoretically (see Leibundgut 2001 for a review), or have the progenitor system conclusively identified (see Livio 2000 for a review). Consequently, theory cannot provide conclusive guidance on whether or how SNe Ia and their progenitor systems evolve at different redshifts. Nevertheless, theorists have provided some insights into this question by studying the effects of metallicity and the C/O ratio of a white dwarf (WD), the agreed precursor to a SN Ia (e.g., von Hippel, Bothun, & Schommer 1997; Höflich, Wheeler, & Thielemann 1998; Umeda et al. 1999; Nomoto et al. 2003). Höflich, Wheeler, & Thielemann (1998) suggested that the effect of changing metallicity on the rest-frame visual and blue light curves is small, and as the C/O ratio of a WD becomes progressively lower at higher redshift, the luminosity of the resulting SN Ia becomes brighter for the same light-curve shape, an effect that is contrary to the cosmological result from SNe Ia. Umeda et al. (1999) and Nomoto et al. (2003) use the variation in the C/O ratio in the WD to explain the distribution of SN Ia brightness, but suggest that the diversity can be normalized by applying the LLCS correlation.

Answers to the question of whether SNe Ia evolve have also been sought from observations of them at different redshifts. The nearby sample is an excellent laboratory for studying possible luminosity evolution, since SNe Ia have been observed in a wide range of host-galaxy morphologies including ellipticals, spirals, irregulars, and dwarf galaxies. In fact, the range of metallicity, stellar age, and interstellar environments probed by the nearby SN Ia sample is much greater than the mean evolution in these properties for individual galaxies between $`z=0`$ and $`z=0.5`$. Some variation of the observed characteristics of SNe Ia has been noticed; for example, luminous events occur preferentially in metal-poor environments (Hamuy et al. 2000), and the luminosity of SNe Ia correlates with the projected distance from the host nucleus (Wang, Höflich, & Wheeler 1997). However, after correction for the LLCS correlation and extinction, the observed residuals from the Hubble flow do not correlate with host-galaxy morphology or the projected radial distances (Riess 2000; Sullivan et al. 2003). This suggests that the LLCS correlation applies to a wide range of stellar environments and is a strong argument against significant evolution to $`z=0.5`$ (Schmidt et al. 1998).

The empirical test of luminosity evolution at high redshift has been focused on getting high-quality spectra and light curves, and comparing them with those of nearby SNe Ia. The assumption of this test is that significant luminosity evolution would be accompanied by other visibly altered observables of the SNe. Comparison of high-quality spectra between nearby and high-redshift SN Ia have revealed remarkable similarity (Riess et al. 1998; Perlmutter et al. 1999; Coil et al. 2000; Tonry et al. 2003). Riess et al. (2000) also obtained the rest-frame $`I`$-band light curve of the high-redshift SN Ia 1999Q, which displayed the secondary maximum that is typical of normal nearby SNe Ia.

To date, there is no clear, direct evidence that suggests significant luminosity evolution for SNe Ia at different redshift. To rest the case of luminosity evolution, however, we need to fully understand the models of SNe Ia and how they evolve at different redshifts. Without a firm theoretical footing, we must conservatively demand that all observables of high-redshift SNe Ia be statistically consistent with their nearby counterparts.

In the following sections, we discuss in more detail some of the recent comparisons done on the observables and characteristics of SNe Ia at different redshifts, which mag suggest possible differences between high-redshift SNe Ia and their nearby counterparts.

### 2.1 Peculiarity Rate at Different Redshifts

The rate of “peculiar SNe Ia” in the nearby sample has been recently measured by Li et al. (2001a). They used a distance-limited sample of SNe Ia from the Lick Observatory Supernova Search (LOSS; Filippenko et al. 2001) and performed Monte Carlo simulations (Li, Filippenko, & Riess 2001) demonstrating that essentially all SNe Ia should have been discovered in the sample galaxies of LOSS. Within this unbiased sample they found a rate of $``$20% for the SN 1991T/1999aa-like objects and $``$16% for the SN 1991bg-like objects, for a total peculiarity rate of $``$36%.

However, in the now more than 100 spectroscopically classified SNe Ia at high redshift, there has not been a single unambiguously peculiar SN Ia reported. While the lack of SN 1991bg-like objects could be explained by their intrinsic faintness and low expected rate in magnitude-limited searches, the lack of SN 1991T/1999aa-like objects is puzzling.

Li et al. (2001a) offered several possible explanations for the difference between the peculiarity rate of SNe Ia at different redshifts: extinction toward the SN 1991T/1999aa-like objects, difficulty in identifying peculiarities in poor-quality spectra of the high-redshift SNe Ia, and most importantly, the “age bias”: the peculiarity of SN 1991T/1999aa-like objects can only be easily identified in early-time spectra. This same bias may also explain why the Calán/Tololo survey, a nearby magnitude-limited SN search, yielded no SN 1991T/1999aa-like objects among 29 SNe Ia (Hamuy et al. 1996b).

If, however, these observational biases are not to blame, the absence of peculiar SNe Ia at high redshift could result from an evolution of the population of progenitor systems: certain progenitor channels at high redshift may be lost due to a redshift-dependent variation in the mass, composition, and metallicity of SN Ia progenitors (e.g., Ruiz-Lapuente & Canal 1998; Livio 2000). It is thus an important challenge to observationally identify some peculiar SNe Ia at high redshifts, to definitively rule out luminosity evolution as the cause of the difference in the peculiarity rate of SNe Ia at different redshifts.

### 2.2 Risetime at Different Redshifts

The risetime is defined as the time interval between the explosion and the maximum brightness of a SN Ia. Precise knowledge of the SN Ia risetime, which is sensitive to the ejecta opacity and the distribution of 56Ni, provides constraints on models of SN Ia progenitors. A comparison of the risetime for high-redshift and nearby SNe Ia is thus a valuable test of luminosity evolution.

The risetime for the nearby SNe Ia was measured by Riess et al. (1999). They collected about 25 measurements of SNe Ia between 10 and 18 days before $`B`$ maximum, normalized them to a fiducial risetime curve, and measured a risetime of $`19.98\pm 0.15`$ days. A preliminary risetime for the high-redshift SNe Ia was measured by Goldhaber (1998) from the Supernova Cosmological Project (SCP) data as $`17.50\pm 0.40`$ days, which is discrepant from the nearby risetime at a statistical likelihood greater than 99.99% (5.8$`\sigma `$). Aldering, Knop, & Nugent (2000), however, refined the risetime for the high-redshift SNe Ia in the SCP data to $`17.50\pm 1.20`$ days, a $`2\sigma `$ difference from the nearby measurement. They also suggested that under extreme situations the risetime could be biased up to 2–3 days due to observational biases and fitting methods.

It remains to be seen whether the risetimes of high-redshift and nearby SNe Ia are statistically inconsistent when a better risetime measurement is derived for the high-redshift SNe Ia. It should also be noted that even if the two risetimes are inconsistent with each other, it is unclear whether the difference in risetime could be translated into a difference in peak luminosity: most current theoretical models have difficulties in reproducing the observed risetimes and the correlation between risetime and peak luminosity.

### 2.3 Intrinsic Color at Different Redshifts

To date, there is no consensus on the precise intrinsic colors of SNe Ia with different photometric behaviors. As a result, there is not a good theoretical or empirical method to accurately determine host-galaxy extinction to SNe Ia, and observers often have to resort to priors such as applying the Galactic reddening law to the host galaxies of SNe Ia, and assuming all SNe Ia have the same intrinsic color at maximum. Phillips et al. (1999) proposed a method to estimate the host-galaxy reddening to a SN Ia by using its color at 30–60 days past maximum, but Li et al. (2001b) showed that this method does not apply to all objects. The extinction correction is a major source of uncertainty in the current empirical fitting methods. To circumvent this difficulty, people often use subsamples that are likely to have low extinction at both low and high redshifts. Fortunately, Hatano, Branch, & Deaton (1998) showed that most SNe Ia should have low extinction.

Different methods for treating the extinction correction in the fitting process yield different results in the intrinsic color comparison of SNe Ia at a range of redshifts. Leibundgut (2001) and Falco et al. (1999) suggested that there is evidence from the $`E(BV)`$ values in Riess et al. (1998) that high-redshift SNe Ia are statistically bluer than their nearby counterparts, but analysis by Perlmutter et al. (1999) showed no such effect, nor did a recent compilation of 11 high-redshift SNe Ia observed by the Hubble Space Telescope (Knop et al. 2003). The problem of extinction correction will continue to plague the empirical fitting methods until a better understanding of the intrinsic colors of SNe Ia is achieved, and the influence of extinction corrections on the cosmological conclusions needs to be investigated in more detail. Drell, Loredo, & Wasserman (2000), for example, attributed the difference in colors to luminosity evolution, while Knop et al. (2003) suggested that reasonable changes in colors do not have a significant impact on the cosmological results.

### 2.4 Peculiar Nearby SNe Ia

A fundamental assumption of the current empirical fitting methods is that the light curves of all normal SNe Ia can be represented by a single parameter such as $`\mathrm{\Delta }m_{15}(B)`$, $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$, or $`s`$. However, there is growing evidence that not all SNe Ia form a one-parameter family. Branch (1987) showed that normal SNe Ia could have very different expansion velocities. Hamuy et al. (1996c) showed that some light curves with similar decline rates have significant differences in particular details. Hatano et al. (2000) also demonstrated that the spectroscopic diversity among SNe Ia is multi-dimensional.

The SN 1991T-like and SN 1991bg-like objects, though categorized as peculiar SNe Ia, generally follow the LLCS correlation and the spectrum–luminosity sequence — i.e., they seem to be an extension of the one-parameter description of normal SNe Ia. Some more disturbing cases of peculiar nearby SNe Ia that fail the one-parameter description are SN 2000cx (Li et al. 2001; Candia et al. 2003), SN 2002cx (Li et al. 2003), SN 2001ay (Nugent et al. in preparation), and SN 2002ic (Hamuy et al. 2003).

The peculiarity of SN 2000cx is that its light curves cannot be fit well by the existing fitting methods. There is an apparent asymmetry in the $`B`$-band peak, in which the premaximum brightening is relatively fast (similar to that of the normal SN 1994D), but the postmaximum decline is relatively slow (similar to that of the overluminous SN 1991T). SN 2000cx has very blue colors and also unique spectral evolution. Its premaximum spectra are similar to those of SN 1991T-like objects, but the high-excitation Fe III lines remain prominent until well after maximum. The expansion velocities derived from the absorption features are unusually high and evolve differently than normal. Though it has a slow light curve, its estimated luminosity is average (Li et al. 2001) or even slightly subluminous (Candia et al. 2003).

SN 2002cx has many properties that are the opposite of those of SN 2000cx. It has a premaximum spectrum similar to that of SN 1991T, a decline rate in the $`B`$-band similar to that of normal SNe Ia, but a luminosity similar to that of the very subluminous SN 1991bg. It has a very red color evolution, and has extremely low expansion velocities measured from spectral features. The $`R`$ and $`I`$-band light curves have a peculiar plateau phase around maximum. The late-time decline rate in all $`BVRI`$ bands is unusually slow. SN 2003gq (Filippenko & Foley 2003) may be another event that is similar to SN 2002cx.

SN 2001ay has a normal near-maximum spectrum, except that it has very high expansion velocities. The light curves of SN 2001ay are the slowest ever recorded, yet it has a normal luminosity. It also has a peculiar red color evolution until 30 days after maximum.

SN 2002ic is the only SN Ia to have shown direct evidence of SN ejecta interacting with the circumstellar medium (CSM). Its near-maximum spectrum is similar to that of SN 1991T, but diluted in strength. There are remarkable Balmer lines in later spectra, with $`H\alpha `$ showing an unresolved component (FWHM $`<`$ 300 km s-1) superimposed on a broad resolved base (FWHM $``$ 1800 km s-1), similar to those observed in Type IIn SNe (Filippenko 1997). The spectral features and photometric behavior of SN 2002ic suggest that it has a very dense CSM. Based on these observations, Hamuy et al. (2003) ruled out the double-degenerate model for SN 2002ic, and suggested that the progenitor system involves a white dwarf and an asymptotic giant branch star. Livio & Riess (2003), however, argued that the opposite may be true: SN 2002ic results from a rare circumstance in which the SN Ia ejecta interact with the previously ejected common envelope of a double-degenerate system.

Although the frequency of these peculiar SNe Ia is low, and statistically they will not challenge the established empirical correlations, we need to understand why they are peculiar, and how they can be fit into the whole picture of SN Ia theories and observations. These objects with unusual properties might represent the general models of SNe Ia under extreme conditions, and studying them will provide clues to the theoretical models and progenitor systems. It is interesting to note that three of the four peculiar SNe Ia (SNe 2000cx, 2002cx, and 2001ay) all have very unusual expansion velocities, and three (SNe 2000cx, 2002cx, and 2002ic) show spectral features similar to those of SN 1991T. The subclass of SN 1991T/1999aa-like objects may thus be more heterogeneous than other SNe Ia, and objects with unusual expansion velocities should be treated with caution when used as cosmological tools.

## 3 Conclusions

Many alternatives have been proposed to explain the SN Ia data at different redshifts, but so far none has seriously challenged the accelerating Universe result. We have found no clear, direct evidence that SNe Ia at different redshifts evolve, though some studies show that there may exist some differences in their peculiarity rate, risetime, or colors.

The key to boosting confidence in the cosmological results from SNe Ia is to understand SNe Ia both theoretically and observationally. We need to theoretically identify the elusive progenitor systems for SNe Ia, and find out the cause of the diversity of SNe Ia. Similarly, we need to continue to search for SN/CSM interactions such as that observed in SN 2002ic, and place stringent constraints on the accretion history of SN Ia progenitors. We also need to re-examine existing observations of SNe IIn, to investigate whether SN 2002ic is an isolated case, or whether some additional SNe IIn are actually SNe Ia with strong SN/CSM interaction. For nearby SNe Ia, we need to develop better methods to measure host-galaxy extinction than currently available, study the environmental effects, find more empirical correlations, and develop a subclassification scheme that possibly links to different progenitor channels. We should continue to study those SNe Ia that are clearly discrepant. For high-redshift SNe Ia, we need to identify some peculiar SN 1991T-like or SN 1991bg-like objects, get better risetime measurements, obtain more high-quality spectra and light curves, and compare them with those of nearby SNe Ia. The ESSENCE project (e.g., Garnavich et al. 2002), SNAP satellite (http://snap.lbl.gov/), and the higher-z project (Riess 2002) are prime examples of current and future extensive studies of high-redshift SNe Ia.

###### Acknowledgements.

Our research is currently supported by NSF grants AST-0206329 and AST-0307894, by the Sylvia & Jim Katzman Foundation, and by NASA grants GO-8641, GO-9114, and GO-9352 from the Space Telescope Science Institute, which is operated by AURA, Inc., under NASA contract NAS 5-26555. We thank the conference organizers for partial travel funds.

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# Observation of Bell Inequality violation in B mesons

## 1 Introduction

In Quantum Mechanics (QM), a two-particle non-separable wavefunction lead to a puzzling non-local correlations. This was first pointed out by by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR)  in 1935 to challenge the completeness of QM. A simplified variant was give by David Bohm using spin correlations :

$$|\psi =\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[|_1|_2|_1|_2]$$
(1)
where $`|_j`$ ($`|_j`$) describes the spin state of $`j^{th}`$ particle ($`j`$=1,2) with spin up (down) respectively. Measurement of the state on one particle, undetermined prior to the measurement, predicts with certainty the outcome of the same state measurement on the second particle.

In 1964, J.S. Bell put EPR’s locality principle into a testable form of an inequality (Bell Inequality) . In 1969, Clauser, Holt, Shimony and Horne  translate the Bell Inequality for a pair of entangled photons with two polarization analyzers:

$$S=E(\alpha ,\beta )E(\alpha ,\beta ^{})+E(\alpha ^{},\beta )+E(\alpha ^{},\beta ^{})2$$
(2)
where $`\alpha `$, $`\alpha ^{}`$ and $`\beta `$, $`\beta ^{}`$ are the possible angle settings on the polarizers. $`E(\alpha ,\beta )`$ is the correlation function of the polarization measurement outcome on both sides:

$$E(\alpha ,\beta )=𝑑\lambda \rho (\lambda )\mu (\alpha ,\beta ,\lambda )=𝑑\lambda \rho (\lambda )\mu (\alpha ,\lambda )\mu (\beta ,\lambda )$$
(3)
where $`\mu (\alpha ,\lambda )`$ is the polarization measurement outcome ($`=\pm 1`$), determined by the local angle setting $`\alpha `$ and by a global hidden variable $`\lambda `$. $`\rho (\lambda )`$ is a (integrable) probability distribution. Note the important physical assumption that the result on one side does not depend on the setting of the other side, and vice-versa: $`\mu (\alpha ,\lambda )`$ is independent of $`\beta `$. This is the locality condition in EPR. On the other hand, QM predicts $`E(\alpha ,\beta )=\mathrm{cos}(\alpha \beta )`$. In actual experiments, due to the finite efficiency of the detectors, one does not have access to $`E(\alpha ,\beta )`$, only coincidence rates are measurable, such as $`R_{++}(\alpha ,\beta )`$ for the $`(+1,+1)`$ coincidence rate. Assuming that the set of detected events constitute a fair sample, one uses the normalized correlation function

$$E_R(\alpha ,\beta )=\frac{R_{++}(\alpha ,\beta )+R_{}(\alpha ,\beta )R_+(\alpha ,\beta )R_+(\alpha ,\beta )}{R_{++}(\alpha ,\beta )+R_{}(\alpha ,\beta )+R_+(\alpha ,\beta )+R_+(\alpha ,\beta )}.$$
(4)
For $`S`$, it suffice to consider the following one parameters set ($`\theta `$) of settings: $`\alpha =0`$, $`\alpha ^{}=2\theta `$, $`\beta =\theta `$ and $`\beta ^{}=3\theta `$. The Bell-CHSH inequality (2) then becomes:

$$S(\theta )=3E_R(\theta )E_R(3\theta )2$$
(5)
Fig. 1a shows the QM prediction of $`S(\theta )`$, there is a clear violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality over the entire range $`0^o<\theta <68.5^o`$ and a maximal violation by a factor $`\sqrt{2}`$ for $`\theta =45^o`$. Many experiments was performed, mostly in testing polarization or spin correlations . It has never been tested with particle-antiparticle (flavor) correlation.

## 2 Bell tests with B mesons

The wafefunction of $`\mathrm{{\rm Y}}(4S)B^0\overline{B}^0`$ has exactly the same formalism as the pair of photons (1):

$$|\psi =\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[|B^0_1|\overline{B^0}_2|\overline{B^0}_1|B^0_2]$$
(6)
A measurement of the flavor ($`B^0`$ or $`\overline{B^0}`$) on one particle, undetermined prior to the measurement, will determine the flavor of the second particle at the same moment. Comparing to the photons, instead of choosing the polarizer’s angle, one measure the flavor at different decay times, $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, (the effect of mixing is the same as polarizer rotation ). The main difference being that $`B`$ mesons decays which reduces coincidence rates , e.g.

$$R_{B^0B^0}(t_a,t_b)=\frac{1}{4}e^{2t^{}/\tau _B}e^{\mathrm{\Delta }t/\tau _B}\left(1e^{\mathrm{\Delta }t/\tau _B}\mathrm{cos}(\mathrm{\Delta }m_d\mathrm{\Delta }t)\right).$$
(7)
Accordingly the correlations function is:

$`E(t_a,t_b)=e^{2t^{}/\tau _B}e^{\mathrm{\Delta }t/\tau _B}\mathrm{cos}(\mathrm{\Delta }m_d\mathrm{\Delta }t)`$ (8)
where $`\mathrm{\Delta }m_d`$ is the $`B^0\overline{B}^0`$ mixing parameter, $`\tau _B=\tau _{B_L^0}\tau _{B_H^0}=1.542ps`$ is the mean $`B^0`$ decay time, $`t^{}=\mathrm{min}(t_a,t_b)`$ and $`\mathrm{\Delta }t=|t_at_b|`$. This damping makes it impossible to violate the Bell-CHSH inequality (Fig. 1b) . However, if one normalizes the correlation function to the undecayed pair of $`B^0`$ (Eq. 4) , then the correlation function is exactly the same as the photon case and depends only on $`\mathrm{\Delta }t`$:

$`E_R(\mathrm{\Delta }t)=\mathrm{cos}(\mathrm{\Delta }m_d\mathrm{\Delta }t)`$ (9)
The Bell-CHSH Inequality becomes:

$`S(\mathrm{\Delta }t)=3E_R(\mathrm{\Delta }t)E_R(3\mathrm{\Delta }t)2`$ (10)
Below $`\mathrm{\Delta }t1.7\tau _B=2.62ps`$, Bell Inequality is violated, just like in photon polarization (Fig. 1a) .

## 3 Experimental Method

This measurement is based on data sample of 78 $`fb^1`$, corresponding to $`80\times 10^6`$ $`\mathrm{{\rm Y}}(4S)B\overline{B}`$ decays collected at Belle detector at the KEKB asymmetric $`e^+e^{}`$ (3.5GeV+8GeV) collider in Japan . Belle detector consists of a silicon vertex detector (SVD), a central drift chamber (CDC), an array of aerogel threshold Cherenkov counter (ACC), time-of-flight scintillator counters, a CsI(Tl) crystal electromagnetic calorimeter (ECL) located inside a superconducting solenoid magnet of 1.5T. An iron flux-return yoke outside the coil is instrumented to detect $`K_L^0`$ and to identify muons (KLM) .

We determine the flavor of one neutral $`B`$ meson by reconstructing $`B^0D^{}l^+\nu `$ and $`\overline{B}^0D^+l^{}\nu `$ decays where $`l^\pm `$ denotes lepton (muon or electron). The flavor the other neutral $`B`$ meson by lepton tagging. Because the $`B`$ mesons are almost at rest and the boost of the asymmetric collider, $`\mathrm{\Delta }t`$ is proportional to the decay vertexes differences in z (beam) direction: $`\mathrm{\Delta }t\mathrm{\Delta }z/\beta \gamma c`$ where $`\beta `$ and $`\gamma `$ are the Lorentz boost factor.

### 3.1 $`B^0D^{}l^+\nu `$ Reconstruction

The decay chains $`B^0D^{}l^+\nu ,D^{}\overline{D}^0\pi ^{}`$ with $`\overline{D}^0K^+\pi ^{}`$, $`\overline{D}^0K^+\pi ^{}\pi ^0`$ and $`\overline{D}^0K^+\pi ^+\pi ^{}\pi ^0`$ (and their charge conjugate modes, same thereafter) were selected.

All charge tracks must have at least one two-dimensional SVD hits and radial impact parameter $`|dr|<0.2`$ cm. In addition, we require that $`p>0.2GeV/c`$ for tracks in $`\overline{D}^0K^+\pi ^{}\pi ^+`$ channel. Charged kaons are identified by combining information of the TOF, ACC and $`dE/dx`$ measurements in the CDC. $`\pi ^0`$ candidate must have mass within 0.011 $`GeV/c^2`$ of the $`\pi ^0`$ nominal mass and momentum greater than 0.2 $`GeV/c`$. The photons from $`\pi ^0\gamma \gamma `$ decays must have energy greater than $`80MeV/c`$.

$`\overline{D}^0`$ candidate are selected with $`|M_{K\pi (K\pi \pi \pi )}M_{D^0}|<13MeV/c^2`$ for $`K^+\pi ^{},K^+\pi ^{}\pi ^+\pi ^{}`$ channels. For $`K^+\pi ^{}\pi ^0`$ channel, a cut of $`37MeV/c^2<(M_{K\pi (K3\pi )}M_{D^0})<23MeV/c^2`$ where $`M_{D^0}=1.865GeV/c^2`$ was applied. Also, the $`\pi ^0`$ with largest Dalitz weight $`>10`$ was selected to reduce the combinatorial background.

$`D^{}`$ is reconstructed by combining $`\overline{D}^0`$ and a low momentum pion. These pion track is re-fitted to the $`B^0`$ vertex to improve $`D^{}`$ mass resolution. The cut $`0.1444GeV/c^2<(M_{D^0\pi _s}M_{D^0})<0.1464GeV/c^2`$ is applied. In addition, center-of-mass (CMS) momentum $`P_D^{}^{}>2.6GeV/c`$ is rejected since it is beyond the kinematic limit for $`B`$ meson decays.

Electrons and muons are with opposite charge to the $`D^{}`$ candidate. Electron identification is based on a combination of CDC $`dE/dx`$ information, the ACC response, and energy deposit on ECL. Muons are identified by comparing information from the KLM to extrapolated charged particle trajectory. Their momentum are between 1.4 and 2.4 GeV/c in CMS.

$`B^0D^{}l^+\nu `$ are selected by combining $`D^{}`$ candidate with muon or electron. The $`B^0`$ vertex fit must have $`\chi ^2`$ per degree of freedom less than 50 and the fit error less than $`100\mu m`$. The angle in CMS between them greater than 90 degrees. In addition, they must satisfy $`E_B^{}E_{D^{}l}^{}|p_B^{}|^2|p_{D^{}l}^{}|^2+2|p_B^{}||p_{D^{}l}^{}|\mathrm{cos}(\theta _{B,D^{}l})=M_\nu 0`$ where $`\mathrm{cos}(\theta _{B,D^{}l})`$ is the angle between $`p_B^{}`$ and $`p_{D^{}l}^{}`$. A cut $`\mathrm{cos}(\theta _{B,D^{}l})<1.1`$ was imposed. A cut on $`\mathrm{cos}(\theta _{B,D^{}l^{}})>1.1`$ was applied where $`l^{}`$ is the lepton with momentum reversed. This cut is intended for later for background subtraction .

### 3.2 Flavor tagging

All other tracks not belonging the above $`B^0D^{}l^+\nu `$ selection were used for identifying the flavor of the second $`B^0`$. A multidimensional likelihood method is used and explained in detail in . For each flavor decision, we assign a quantity r, which is a MC-determined flavor-tagging dilution factor from 0 to 1. We select events high purity ($`r>0.875`$). Only lepton tagging sample were used to further increase tagging purity. The vertex fit must have $`\chi ^2`$ per degree of freedom less than 50 and the fit error less than $`140\mu m`$.

## 4 Background

Three types of background have been considered: Continuum, Fake $`D^{}`$ and wrong $`D^{}`$-lepton combination. $`4.6fb^1`$ off resonance data were used for continuum background estimation. No event passed the selection. It can be neglected.

Since $`D^{}`$ is reconstructed from $`\overline{D}^0\pi ^{}`$ and $`\overline{D}^0`$ from $`K^+\pi ^{}`$, $`K^+\pi ^{}\pi ^0`$ and $`K^+\pi ^+\pi ^{}\pi ^0`$ decay chains, any fake $`D^0`$ reconstruction will contribute to the Fake $`D^{}`$ background. We use the sideband of

$$0.1560GeV/c^2<(M_{D^0\pi _s}M_{D^0})<0.1640GeV/c^2$$

to estimate and subtract the number of events under the signal peak (Fig. 2). It is small and has small impact on the value of $`S`$.

The uncorrelated $`D^{}l`$ background are mainly due to the reconstruction of a true $`D^{}`$ from one $`B^0`$ with a lepton from the other $`B^0`$ with a smaller fraction from Charm decay leptons or fake leptons. We reverse the lepton momentum vector ($`l^{}`$) in the CMS and select events where the variable $`\mathrm{cos}(\theta _{B,D^{}l^{}})<1.1`$. This is to reject correlated $`D^{}l`$ pair while selecting events with no angular correlation and is used in the background subtraction.

After event selection and backgrounds subtraction, we are left with 3186 events. These events are separated into same flavor (SF) (Fig. 5a) and opposite flavor (OF) samples (Fig. 5b). Both the correlation function $`E_R(\mathrm{\Delta }t)`$ and $`S(\mathrm{\Delta }t)`$ can be formed (Fig. 3). A clear violation of Bell Inequality can be seen at $`\mathrm{\Delta }t=(2\pm 0.5)ps`$:

$$S=2.725\pm 0.167_{stat},$$

## 5 Systematic Error

Table 1 contains the summary of the estimated systematic error. The systematic errors for fake $`D^{}`$ and uncorrelated $`D^{}l`$ is estimated from the statistical error, with a $`2\sigma `$ variation, of the number of events used in the background subtraction. The rest are estimated by varying the cut parameters by around 20% (larger than expected variation) from its nominal value.

In summary, the final result for S at $`\mathrm{\Delta }t=(2\pm 0.5)ps`$ is

$$S(2\pm 0.5ps)=2.725\pm 0.167_{\mathrm{stat}}\pm 0.092_{\mathrm{syst}}$$

which violates Bell Inequality by over $`3\sigma `$.

## 6 Comparison with Quantum Mechanics Predictions

In addition to the violation of Bell Inequality, we can compare the result with the QM prediction. We use monte-carlo (MC) simulation to generate $`B^0\overline{B}^0`$ pair decays according to QM correlation and folded with detector resolutions and efficiencies. Three types of MC events were generated: $`B^0D^{}l\nu `$ (signal), $`B^0D^{}l\nu `$ (it has mixing, considered as signal) and $`B^\pm D^0l\nu `$ (background). We fit these three MC channels to the data (Fig. 4) which gives 3.8% of $`B^\pm `$ background and 4.5% of $`B^0D^{}l\nu `$. Finally, we plot OS, SF, $`E_R`$ and $`S`$ for data and for MC (Fig. 5). Data and MC fits remarkably well, indicating a good agreement between data and QM prediction.

## 7 Conclusion

Bell Inequality is a very powerful test on local hidden variable theories. It has never been tested in particle-antiparticle correlation using massive elementary particles. We measure the Bell-CHSH inequality using semileptonic $`B^0`$ decays. A violation greater than $`3\sigma `$ is observed. MC simulations confirm that the result is consistent with QM predictions. This result will be further improved with the $`140fb^1`$ data sample.


text:
# Probabilities as Measures of Information

## I Introduction

Even though the concept of probabilities has been used in physics for more than 200 years, Laplace and Gauss having made important contributions, there is no general agreement today concerning their interpretation, even when limited to their use in physics. There is not even a consensus among physicists as to whether they are ‘logical’ (‘subjective’, Bayesian) or ‘physical’ (‘objective’, statistical) when they are used in physics. Probabilities do not enter in all our physical theories. They are absent from classical mechanics, classical electromagnetic theory and the theories of relativity. However, they play an essential role in our most successful physical theory: quantum mechanics. Because there is complete agreement among physicists regarding how probabilities in physical theories should be tested via observations in experiments, the issue of why and/or how they arise in some physical theories and not in others is not thought to be fundamental to physics itself.
For some physicists, probabilities in physical theories are ‘physical’ in nature because there are some physical phenomena that are ‘stochastic’ or ‘random.’ For others, probabilities are ‘physical’ in a ‘statistical’ sense and they arise because of ‘incomplete’ descriptions, as could be considered the case for classical statistical mechanics. For others still, different physical mechanisms would be responsible for the probabilities of classical physics and quantum mechanics.
On the other side, during the last 50 years the notion that probabilities in physics were of a Bayesian nature has been getting more and more support. That this was the case for probabilities in classical physics is likely in large part due to Jeffreysand Jaynes. The notion that in experimental physics the concepts of Bayesian and statistical probabilities should be treated not only on an equal footing, but even numerically combined, has now received the imprimatur of the BIPM. With the development of the field of quantum computation, during the last 10 years, the notion that the probabilities of quantum mechanics could also be Bayesian measures of information has been receiving some support (Caves et al, Mermin, Fuchs, Peres.) In our opinion, an essential obstacle to the general acceptance by the physics community that probabilities in physics are Bayesian in nature is the fact that they are said to be: “degrees of belief that an event will occur” as in the BIPM report, “degrees of truth of an assertion conditional upon the truth of some other assertion(s),” as advocated by Jaynes following Cox, or similar concepts that are thought by most physicsts to lie outside the realm of physics.
In section II, we show that starting from the notion that classical mechanics is quantitative and testable by observations in experiments we can generate the algebra of the probabilities used in classical physics. Since there are no probabilities in classical mechanics, we will obtain probabilities when we deal quantitatively with the ambiguities that must result when, given some observations in an experiment, we use classical mechanics to make predictions for future observations that could be considered as tests of classical mechanics. Consequently, the probabilities so generated will be Bayesian in nature and can be said to be measures of the information we have when making predictions for the values of the observable dynamical variables of classical mechanics. In section III, we show how, due to a very well understood difference between observing classical and quantum systems, classical mechanics must be modified for quantum systems in order to be quantitative and this leads to the probability amplitudes and to the principle of superposition of quantum mechanics. However, the probabilities in quantum mechanics will have precisely the same meaning as they have in our analysis of observations in experiments using classical mechanics. They will quantify the ambiguities concerning predictions that we can make for future observations on quantum systems after we have made on them unambiguous observations. Therefore they will also be measures of the information we have when making predictions for the values of the observable dynamical variables of quantum mechanics.
In our approach, probabilities in physics will be thoroughly defined entities in terms of well understood concepts of classical mechanics and now well established mathematical tools. What we propose is a simple explanation for why probabilities play a fundamental role in classical and quantum physics, explanation that we think is missing today. This explanation is not based upon any new physical mechanism. It is based upon an interpretation of a well established mathematical technique for dealing with a fundamental problem that experimentalists must face in every experiment. Consequently, it could be said that our argument is philosophical, rather than physical. While this does not present any problem concerning classical mechanics, since it is well understood. In the case of quantum mechanics, our interpretation of how and why its probabilities arise leaves us in the same conundrum as a plethora of other proposed interpretations that do not affect in any way the current use of quantum mechanics. However, what sets our argument apart from other interpretations of the nature and meaning of probabilities in physics, in particular in quantum mechanics, is that it rests upon a simple statement that we think is non controversial and should be acceptable to every physicist: ‘Physical theories are quantitative and testable by observations in experiments.’

## II Classical Mechanics

We understand so well classical mechanics that there seems to be no need to discuss at length how classical mechanics is a quantitative theory: in its formulas the symbols stand for real numbers. These formulas will be numerically satisfied when we substitute into them the numbers that correspond to the values of the measurable dynamical variables in a given situation. Most frequently these formulas are used to make a quantitative prediction for an observation corresponding to one of the dynamical variable that was not measured in an experiment, on the basis of the numerical values of the other dynamical variables that were measured in that experiment. Quoting from a recent paper: “The description of the system can be given, in classical mechanics, by a phase-space point. This point is the ‘true’ point — others are false — so the outcome of a measurement can be predicted with certainty.” We think that the overwhelming majority of physicists, if not all of them, would agree with this statement. The only trouble is that although we know that this statement is theoretically correct, for the last two hundred years we have not been able to do in practice, and will never be able to do, what we state we should theoretically be able to do!
It is frequently stated that in contradistinction with quantum mechanics, classical mechanics is deterministic, i.e. no probabilities enter in its formulas. However, it is a fact that probabilities have been used for a long time to convey the result of every measurement of the dynamical variables that enter classical mechanics: position, volume, momentum, length, etc… For some time now, no refereed physics journal will accept for publication an experimental paper that will not include a quantified discussion, using probabilities, of the measurements reported. Until rather recently these probabilities were said in textbooks to describe the ‘statistical errors’ in the measurements, but that there were also other experimental ‘errors’ that were said to be ‘systematic’ in nature and these were not ‘quantified’ by means of probabilities because there were no ‘statistics’ associated with them. Over the last thirty years or so, this point of view has gradually changed, one no longer speaks of experimental ‘errors,’ whether ‘statistical’ or ‘systematic,’ but instead of experimental uncertainties. Most significantly, the BIPM now recommends that all measurement uncertainties, including those that are not ‘statistical’ in nature, be quantified by means of probabilities. The probabilities used to quantify the systematic uncertainties are said to correspond “to a degree of belief that an event will occur.” Although the BIPM report reviews at length the concept of ‘statistical’ probabilities, only two references to the concept of ‘Bayesian statistics’ are given and how they should be evaluated in physics experiments is not discussed. Finally, the BIPM recommends that all the uncertainties, whether ‘statistical’ or ‘systematic’ in nature, be combined into a single probability statement.
‘Statistical’ uncertainties do not arise in many measurements of classical mechanics dynamical variables. We therefore postpone discussing them until we have dealt with the ‘systematic’ uncertainties that are impossible to avoid. Another reason we postpone discussing ‘statistical’ uncertainties in this paper is that the solution we propose for dealing with the ‘systematic’ uncertainties will give us the tool for dealing with the ‘statistical’ uncertainties. There is at least one reason why ‘systematic’ uncertainties are unavoidable, they must arise because in order to be quantitative we make measurements and in every measurement we will specify the outcome with only a finite number of digits. We are not at all concerned with the notion that some measurements may be accurate enough for some specific purpose and consequently can be considered exact for that purpose. What we analyze now is a fundamental problem that results from the fact that in practice we must report a measurement with a finite number of digits. How this arises can be made concrete via the example of measuring the length of an object using a set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges. With a set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges, if one repeats the measurement, one always (i.e. systematically) gets the same result: the value we seek is smaller than given by the ‘go’ gauge but larger than given by the ‘no-go’ gauge, whatever are the units used to label the set of gauges used. Clearly, these two different values are not the length of the object, since it must be a single real number. These two values are an attribute of the set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges we use to make the observation that we interpret as providing direct information regarding the length of the object. If we had used a finer set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges we would likely have obtained two different values, but we would still have obtained two numbers. In the situation we have just described, there are no distribution of values that could be dealt with using statistical concepts.
Many theoretical papers analyzing physical measurements in quantum mechanics view the interaction of the observer with the classical measuring instrument as the reading of a ‘pointer on the dial of a gauge’. Due to the finite thickness of the tip of the pointer, and the finite size of the dial of a gauge, one can only state with certainty that it does not point below a certain value nor above another value, a result which is conceptually identical to using a set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges. In our digital age, we could replace the traditional ‘pointer on the dial of a gauge’ with a ‘digital counter’ that must necessarily have a finite number of digits. We therefore know that the ‘real number’ we seek is not less than the value shown on the counter but not more than the value obtained by increasing by 1 the least significant digit. From a mathematical point of view, as opposed to a practical one, the problem is the same whether we deal with real numbers that have a single digit or many digits: there is a continuum of real numbers between them. This source of ‘systematic’ uncertainty is present in every physics experiment. In many experiments there are other sources of ‘systematic’ uncertainties, but they are all of the same nature in the sense that they provide both a lower and an upper bound to the value sought. Of course, all sources of uncertainties in measurements must be combined to yield an overall uncertainty. In this paper we do not address this issue. In this section we analyze how one can deal quantitatively with the problem of ‘systematic’ uncertainties and we further limit ourselves to analyze this problem in the context of a classical mechanics experiment.
Is one testing classical mechanics when one reports the ‘measurement’ of the length, the position, the momentum, etc.. of an object to which classical mechanics applies? In a very real sense yes because what is reported in experimental papers as having been measured in an experiment, is the result of a process that is often called the data analysis, or data reduction, where: from the observations made in the experiment, using the relations of classical mechanics, one makes a deduction concerning the value of the quantity reported as having been measured. Therefore, in this data analysis one is making a prediction on the basis of observations made in the experiment and the quantitative relations of classical mechanics in which the reported measured quantity enters and to which the observations apply. If subsequent observations contradicted the conclusions of the data reduction reported as the measured quantity one would suspect either that a mistake was made or, very unlikely, that classical mechanics was falsified in the experiment. Why should probabilities appear in this process of data analysis since there are no probabilities in the relations used in that data analysis? It is not because experimentalists are uncertain concerning what they have observed in an experiment. Any observation that could be said to be uncertain should be categorically discarded in drawing predictions based on the relations of classical mechanics. Fundamentally, the reason why there are uncertainties in the predictions we make on the basis of observations in experiments is that these predictions are ambiguous. According to the relations of classical mechanics that relate what was observed and what we seek to predict: several different predictions, i.e. a range of values, would be consistent with the observations, but according to classical mechanics that prediction should be a unique real number. As discussed above, this must necessarily occur if only because we must use a finite number of digits.
Are the notions of “degrees of belief that an event will occur” or of “degree of truth of an assertion conditional upon the truth of some other assertion(s)” fully acceptable in physics in order to assign a probability measure to the possible values? We do not think so because, in our opinion, the concepts of ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘degree of truth’ do not belong in physics. In particular if, as we will show, what is accomplished by using them can be achieved using concepts that have long been considered essential in physics. Since physical theories are quantitative, when faced with the problem of ‘systematic’ uncertainties, what we can do as physicists is be quantitative about it and specify the number, or density, of different possible predictions for the dynamical variable reported as having been measured, given the unambiguous observations in the experiment and the relations of classical mechanics that were used in making these predictions. What we propose is to use a rationale and a mathematical technique that is fundamentally different from the one used today to quantify the ‘uncertainties’ in the predictions, i.e. measurements. Most of the time this new technique, as it should, will yield results, i.e. probabilities, that are close, if not identical, to those obtained today under a different justification. Therefore, what we propose is a new logical and mathematical foundation for the probabilities we use in classical physics.
The proposed new technique is based upon a very simple argument: since according to classical mechanics the ‘value’ (i.e. the real number) of the dynamical variable we seek to predict, the length, the position, the volume, etc.., is postulated to be unique in the experiment in question, what we can do is formally transform this value, that we do not know but should be one of the possible values, from the value it has to all the values it has not: the other possible values. Because these entities in classical mechanics are real numbers the transformations in question will be additions or multiplications of real numbers and their inverse. Since, given what was observed, every possible value could be the value it has in the experiment, the transformations in question must be applied using every possible value as the true value. Consequently, each of these transformations has an inverse and one of them must be an identity transformation. The transformations in question must therefore form a group. We refer to this group as the possibilities generating transformation group for what will be reported as the ‘measured’ dynamical variable in the experiment. What this does is immediately solve our problem of associating a quantitative measure with the set of possibilities. In the case of classical mechanics, the manifolds of the possibilities generating transformation groups are Euclidean spaces, because the phase-spaces of classical mechanics are Euclidean spaces. This is enough to establish that the algebra of a unique measure associated with the set of possibilities will have the algebra of probabilities of classical physics. This unique measure is often called the ‘volume element’ in the group manifold, the ‘Haar’ measure or the ‘weight function’ in group space.
We must emphasize that the probabilities so generated are fully objective in the sense that any one applying the same formulas of classical mechanics, given precisely what was observed in the experiment must come up with exactly the same probability measure for the set of possibilities. Such types of probabilities are often said to be ‘subjective’ or Bayesian. However, these probabilities are not ‘objective,’ in the sense in which this term is used to specify a concept of probabilities that would be ‘independent of any observer.’ We must emphasize that the concept of probabilities based upon the possibilities generating transformation groups we propose requires two human interventions: 1 - some observations must be made by someone, could be made by someone or a situation is postulated to be; 2 - a physical theory must be chosen to analyze the observations in question to quantify the number, or density, of possible values. When classical mechanics is the theory used in this analysis, there are no probabilities in that theory. We could say that the manifold of the possibilities generating transformation group for the value of a dynamical variable in an experiment represents our state of knowledge of that dynamical variable in the experiment, given that classical mechanics is used to analyze what was observed in the experiment. Another way to look at the probabilities we have obtained is that it is a measure associated with the set of possible values that would be obtained if we were to make another, but more accurate, measurement of that dynamical variable. To use a more modern terminology, we can say that the probabilities so obtained are a measure of the information we use to make a prediction based upon a physical theory and some observations.
The notion that one could use group theory to formally deal with ambiguities is as old as group theory itself since at the time of his death Evariste Galois\[10 \] stated that his main preocupation for some time had been the application of the theory of ambiguity to transcendental analysis, according to the concluding remark in his celebrated letter addressed to Auguste Chevalier two days before his death. The idea that Galois’ theory of ambiguity was group theory and could be used to deal with uncertainties resulting from observations is not new and was pointed out by George Birkhoff\[11 \] more than 60 years ago.
E. T. Jaynes in the last 40 years has been a very eloquent champion of the point of view that probabilities were not physical, in particular in classical physics, including the use of transformation group methods. However, we must point out an essential and fundamental conceptual difference between what we have stated above and what Jaynes based his arguments upon. Jaynes defined probabilities as the “degree of truth of an assertion conditional upon the truth of some other assertion(s)”. Then, to justify his transformation group method, he introduced a “desideratum of consistency”\[12 \]: “In two different problems where we have the same state of knowledge we should assign the same subjective probability.” Our objective is much more limited than the one stated by Jaynes, we stay strictly within the ambit of physics, doing what physicists have been doing for ages. Probabilities are not introduced at the outset, they are a consequence of testing the quantitative nature of our physical theories by observations in experiments. They are the result of enumerating all the possibilities according to a physical theory used in analyzing the observations made in an experiment. The transformation groups used are based upon the relations postulated in a specific physical theory and what is observed in the experiment. The fraction of all the possibilities that is associated with a subset of possibilities is what we call the probability associated with that subset of possible values. This is of course conditional upon having correctly identified what was observed in the physical theory used and that this theory would not be falsified in that experiment.
So far our argument has been completely abstract, we will now illustrate it with a few concrete examples. First, we will deal with two problems that have been associated with concepts of probabilities since antiquity. However, we will analyze them as if they were classical physics experiments in which some observations are made and classical mechanics is used to quantify the ambiguities of predictions based upon the observations. Next, we will consider some whose solutions using probabilities are more recent. Finally, we will consider a well known 75 years old problem that, to our knowledge, has so far resisted any satisfactory solution. We have two further purposes in analyzing these classical mechanics problems. The first one is that although we will be using group theory, it is not because the problems we deal with have any ‘real’ symmetry associated with them, at best they could be said to present an ‘apparent’ symmetry, given what was observed and the theory used to analyze them. The second one is that these examples make very clear that the probabilities we generate are in no way ‘physical’ and the analysis of what was observed is based upon the use of a specific physical theory.

### II.1 The Coin

This trivial example involves the information that a coin is at rest lying flat on one side, which side is facing up is not observed. This information, i.e. the data, could be the result of observing the coin on edge, or a ‘friend’ is telling us he observed the coin but does not tell us which way is facing up. We seek to reduce the data we have for which side is facing up. From classical mechanics, the possibilities generating transformation group for which side is facing up has two elements: a rotation of the coin of 180 degrees about a horizontal axis changes which side is facing up and a rotation of 360 degrees about the same axis is the identity transformation. This transformation group leaves invariant the data: the coin is lying flat on one side. Since this group is finite the same measure applies to each transformation and therefore equal probability must be assigned to each possibility. Obviously there is no symmetry in this situation. The coin need not be in any way symmetrical, nor need we be told that is was randomly placed, whatever this could mean in a classical mechanics context. We also did not have to consider “consistent betting behavior”, or any “Dutch-book argument”, for which side is facing up, as is sometimes done (Caves et al) to justify the notion of Bayesian probabilities in physics. The instant our ‘friend’, who could be standing next to us, tells us which side of the coin is actually facing up, our possibilities generating transformation group, which was different from his, ‘collapses’ to its subgroup: the identity transformation, a rotation of 360 degrees.

### II.2 The Playing Die

This second example is a little more interesting and deals with a conventional right handed playing die. Let us consider that the information, i.e. the data, we have concerning the die is that it is at rest on an horizontal surface with one of its vertical side facing North. We reduce this data for the possible orientations of the die. We are dealing again with a well known problem: the possibilities generating transformation group for the orientation of the die is the octahedral group (O) with 24 elements. We consequently obtain a probability of 1/24 for each possible orientation of the die. Again, there is no real symmetry involved, the playing die in question need not be symmetrical nor do we need to be told that it was randomly tossed. If we wanted to we could reduce the same data only for which side is facing up, ignoring the value on the side facing North. In this case the possibilities generating transformation group is the dihedral group ($`D_3`$) which has 6 elements. Each of the possibilities is assigned a probability of 1/6. In the conventional fashion we could call these probabilities ’marginal’ since they ignore which side is facing North. Finally, we could reduce the data conditional upon a particular value on the side facing say North. The possibility generating transformation group for the side facing up is the cyclic group of order 4 ($`C_4`$). Consequently, we have in this case a ‘conditional’ probability of 1/4 for each of the possibilities for the side facing up. As an important aside, ‘Bayes theorem’ results from possibilities generating groups that are the direct product of two groups.

### II.3 When and How Fast

We now show, by considering the instant of time and interval of time parameters of classical mechanics, how results that are often called the ‘Laplace prior’ and the ‘Jeffreys prior’ can be obtained. Let us say that in an experiment an event is observed to have occurred not before a time $`t_1`$ and not after a time $`t_2`$. Since the event must have occurred at a specific time $`t`$, we have the data: $`t_1<t<t_2`$. In classical mechanics an instant of time is a continuous translation invariant parameter, the possibilities generating transformation group for the time $`t`$ is the one parameter Lie group $`T_1`$ where $`t`$ is transformed into $`t^{}`$ according to $`t^{}=t+\alpha `$ where $`\alpha `$ is the continuous parameter of the group. The volume measure in the group manifold of $`T_1`$ is constant. Therefore, the probability that the event occurred in an interval of time $`dt`$ at any time $`t`$ between $`t_1`$ and $`t_2`$ is $`dt/(t_2t_1)`$. This result is often called a Laplace prior: the probability distribution is uniform in an interval.
Next we look at the scale parameter of the time-space of classical mechanics. Let us say that in this case the period $`\tau `$ of a cyclic phenomenon is observed to be not less than the time interval $`\tau _1`$ and no greater than the time interval $`\tau _2`$. The data to be reduced is: $`\tau _1<\tau <\tau _2`$. Now the possibilities generating transformation group for the period $`\tau `$ is the scale transformation $`\tau ^{}=\tau \beta `$ where $`\beta `$ is the continuous parameter of the group. The volume measure in the parameter space of this group is no longer constant but proportional to $`1/\beta `$. Therefore, the probability that the period of the cyclic phenomenon in question is in the interval $`d\tau `$ about $`\tau `$ in the range $`\tau _1<\tau <\tau _2`$ is: $`d\tau /(\tau ln(\tau _2/\tau _1))`$ and zero elsewhere. This result is often called a Jeffreys prior. In our proposed interpretation of the nature and meaning of probabilities in physics, the qualifier ‘prior’ to probabilities should never be used since two things are always required in order to assign probabilities: a physical theory and some observations.

### II.4 von Mises’ Water and Wine Problem

One of the most interesting application by Jaynes of his group theoretical method is his proposed solution to the ‘Bertrand Chord Paradox’. Bertrand’s chord paradox is not a physics experiment but one of plane geometry. Since we know all the ‘quantitative relations’ between the elements of the geometrical figure involved, the groups of transformations to generate the possibilities are well defined, as Jaynes shows. Jaynes group theoretical method to solve ‘ambiguous’ problems has been widely criticized, see van Frassen, because of his inability to solve or explain why he could not solve von Mises’ water and wine problem. As we will show, we also cannot solve von Mises’s problem as he stated it, but we can explain why and we can solve it if we consider it a physics measurement problem.
Von Mises’ original statement of his water and wine problem is: “We are given a glass containing a mixture of water and wine. All that is known about the concentrations of the liquids is that the ratio of water to wine is not less than 1 and not more than 2; this means that the mixture contains at least as much water as wine and at most, twice as much water as wine.” von Mises shows that if one applies Laplace’s prior first to the ratio of water to wine and then to the ratio of wine to water one gets a contradiction. von Mises water and wine problem has long been used as a litmus test for theories of rational decisions in the face of uncertainty which, to our knowledge, none of them has passed.
Von Mises did not specify what attribute of water and wine was used to express the concentrations. If we are going to interpret this problem as one of data reduction in a physics experiment this must be done. It is only under such conditions that we could apply our theory of transformations because we need to invoke the relations of the physical theory used in which the given data enters. We will assume, for simplicity, that in the theory used to analyze von Mises’ data the volumes are the attributes in question and that in the mixture they are additive. Let us denote by $`M`$ the volume of the mixture in the glass, by $`E`$ the volume of water in the mixture and by $`V`$ the volume of wine in the mixture. Therefore, we consider that the physical theory used to analyze the data states that $`M=E+V`$. From which we obtain: $`1=f_e+f_v`$ where $`f_e`$ is the fraction of the mixture which is water and $`f_v`$ the fraction which is wine. The given data is that $`1<(E/V)<2`$ from which we obtain:

$$1/2<f_e<2/3$$
(1)
Given that we have: $`1=f_e+f_v`$ the possibilities generating transformation group for $`f_e`$, the fraction of the mixture which is water, is the one parameter Lie group $`T_1`$ where $`f_e`$ is transformed into $`f_e^{}`$ according to $`f_e^{}=f_e+\alpha `$ and $`\alpha `$ is the continuous parameter of the group. The volume measure in the group manifold of $`T_1`$ is constant. Of course, because the theory we use states that: $`1=f_e+f_v`$, to any transformation of $`f_e`$ must correspond a transformation of $`f_v`$. Therefore, the probability that the fraction of the mixture which is water is in the interval $`df_e`$ about any value of $`f_e`$ in the interval: $`1/2`$ to $`2/3`$ is given by: $`6df_e`$. It is equally probable that $`f_e`$ is below or above $`7/12`$.
We must emphasize that we have not ‘solved’ von Mises water and wine problem as he stated it. We showed how to solve it if it was a physics experiment in which a specific physical theory ( $`M=E+V`$ ) was used to analyze the observations. Because wine contains alcohol, we have used an incorrect ‘physical’ theory to ‘solve’ von Misses problem, we did so on purpose to point out that the same data analyzed with different theories could yield different probabilities. We do not know, and in fact as physicist we do not care, if von Mises water and wine problem can be solved as he stated it. As a referee for Physical Review we would have requested that von Mises specifies what was ‘measured’ before accepting his ‘experiment’ for publication.
We could go on and derive some well known results and distributions of classical physics. As is the case for the Maxwellian and the normal distributions, it is a very simple matter to derive them using possibilities generating transformation groups. As a matter of fact, Maxwell hinself derived the Maxwellian distribution using an invariance argument. Most of Jaynes derivations can be readily done using transformation group techniques, since from the context one can tell which physical ‘theory’ and which ‘observations’ are being used. At this stage it is important to investigate whether our proposed interpretation of the nature and meaning of probabilities in physics, which yields mathematical results that have been used for over a century in classical physics, is a step toward ‘understanding’ quantum mechanics.

## III Non Relativistic Quantum Mechanics

The obstacles to understanding quantum mechanics can be appreciated when one realizes that it is 75 years old and even though many interpretations of it have been proposed, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached (Zeilinger.) This in spite of the fact that numerous international conferences have been devoted to the study of its foundation. Such conferences have been held at least yearly for more than 30 years without any apparent breakthrough. The situation concerning understanding quantum mechanics has barely changed in the 40 years since Feynman, who played a major role in one of its formulations, made his celebrated statement : “I think I can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics.” Most, if not all, proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics focus upon understanding its probabilities. Could our proposed interpretation of the nature and meaning of probabilities in physics, based only upon the notion that physical theories are quantitative and testable by observations in experiments, provide a key to ‘understanding’ quantum mechanics? Only time will tell if what we propose is Rabi’s ‘basic point’ : “The problem is that the theory is too strong, too compelling. I feel we are missing a basic point. The next generation, as soon as they will have found that point, will knock on their heads and say: How could they have missed that?”
There are many different formulations of quantum mechanics. We do not think that at this stage it is essential to proceed via an analysis of an axiomatization of quantum mechanics. Because we claim to understand classical mechanics and how the fact that it is quantitative and testable by observations in experiments leads to the probabilities of classical physics, we will focus upon a formulation of quantum mechanics that has a very close and direct relationship to classical mechanics. It is one of its earliest formulations: Dirac’s Hamiltonian formulation of non relativistic quantum mechanics. Quoting Dirac (page 3) “At this stage it is important to remember that science is concerned only with observable things and that we can observe an object only by letting it interact with some outside influence. An act of observation is thus necessarily accompanied by some disturbance of the object observed. We may define an object to be big when the disturbance accompanying our observation of it may be neglected, and small when the disturbance cannot be neglected.” Dirac then points out that one can give an absolute meaning to size, the emphasis is Dirac’s,: “…we have to assume that there is a limit to the finiteness of our powers of observation and the smallness of the accompanying disturbance — a limit which is inherent in the nature of things and can never be surpassed by improved technique or increased skill on the part of the observer. If the object under observation is such that the unavoidable limiting disturbance is negligible, then the object is big in the absolute sense and we may apply classical mechanics to it. If, on the other hand, the limiting disturbance is not negligible, then the object is small in the absolute sense and we require a new theory for dealing with it.” Systems for which the ‘limiting disturbance’ is not negligible we will call quantum systems. Those system for which the ‘limiting disturbance’ is negligible we will call classical systems.
Why can we not use classical mechanics for quantum systems? If classical mechanics was not modified and taken to apply to a quantum system, the state of the quantum system would be given by a point in an Euclidean phase space. As explained in section II, even though we could never experimentally prove it, our measurements should tell us that the state of the system could be a point within a domain of phase space that becomes smaller and smaller as we improve the accuracy of the measurements on a particular system. But because of the well understood manner in which a quantum system is disturbed when we measure canonically conjugate dynamical variables, the above argument breaks down completely when applied to quantum systems. The more accurately we measure one of the observable dynamical variable, the less accurately we can measure the conjugate dynamical variable. This means that the state of a quantum mechanical system cannot be given by a point in an Euclidean phase space. The concept of a phase space is based upon the fact that in the relations of classical mechanics we can take the symbols for conjugate dynamical variables to stand for real numbers.
The testability, by observations in experiments, of the quantitative nature of a physical theory rests upon the fact that in order to be measurable the dynamical variables must be real numbers. This was fully understood by Dirac (page 34) “When we make an observation we measure some dynamical variable. It is obvious physically that the result of such a measurement must always be a real number, so we expect that any dynamical variable that we can measure must be a real dynamical variable.” To solve this problem Dirac invented his transformation theory of non relativistic quantum mechanics in which the Hamiltonian formulation of classical mechanics is preserved but the symbols for the measurable dynamical variables are no longer directly real numbers, as they are for classical systems, but Hermitian operators in an Hilbert space. The eigenvalues of these Hermitian operators are the real numbers needed to make the theory quantitative and testable by observations in experiments.
Having obtained real numbers for the measurable dynamical variables of quantum systems, as eigenvalues of Hermitian operators, these can be measured in experiments. This is done by having the quantum systems interact with a classical system acting as the measuring instrument. We will have to face the same problem that we had with measuring dynamical variables of classical mechanics. That is to say, we will have systematic uncertainties associated with their experimental determination and these can be dealt with using possibilities generating transformation groups to quantify their possible values. An interesting aspect of the fact that some Hamiltonians will lead to a discrete set of eigenvalues for a dynamical variable is that one then does not need as high an accuracy in the classical measuring instrument to determine which state the quantum system is in, as is the case when we have a continum of eigenvalues. A consequence of having obtained the real numbers for the measurable dynamical variables of quantum systems via Hermitian operators is that we have eigenfunctions corresponding to the eigenvalues. These eigenfunctions are rays in an Hilbert space and strictly speaking there is nothing in classical mechanics that corresponds to them. We are going to show, with the simplest possible quantum system example, that these eigenfunctions can be interpreted as entities that are completely analogous to the manifolds of the possibilities generating transformation groups we introduced to deal quantitatively with ambiguities that occur when we test classical mechanics in experiments.
Let us consider having observed, via a Stern-Gerlach experiment, an electron traveling along the $`y`$-axis having its spin up in the $`z`$-direction. Our observation of its spin up in the $`z`$-direction gives us, in an obvious basis, the eigenfunction:

$$|\mathrm{\Psi }=\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{1}{0}\right)$$
(2)
There is absolutely nothing ambiguous in that eigenfunction concerning what would happen if we were to repeat that measurement: the spin would be found to be up in the $`z`$-direction. However, what does it tell us about the outcome of a subsequent measurement of the spin in the $`xz`$ plane at an angle $`\theta `$ with the positive $`z`$-axis?
The operator $`\widehat{S}_\theta `$ corresponding to that measurement can be expressed in terms of the projection of the $`x`$ and $`z`$ operators:

$$\widehat{S}_\theta =sin(\theta )\widehat{S}_x+cos(\theta )\widehat{S}_z=\frac{\mathrm{}}{2}\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{cos(\theta )sin(\theta )}{sin(\theta )cos(\theta )}\right)$$
(3)
The eigenvalues of $`\widehat{S}_\theta `$ are $`\mathrm{}/2`$ and $`\mathrm{}/2`$ and the corresponding eigenvectors are:

$$\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{cos(\theta /2)}{sin(\theta /2)}\right)\text{ and }\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{sin(\theta /2)}{cos(\theta /2)}\right)$$
(4)
We can therefore write the eigenfunction corresponding to our observation of the spin up in the $`z`$-direction as:

$$\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{1}{0}\right)=cos(\theta /2)\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{cos(\theta /2)}{sin(\theta /2)}\right)sin(\theta /2)\left(\genfrac{}{}{0pt}{}{sin(\theta /2)}{cos(\theta /2)}\right)$$
(5)
What this results precisely means has been known for over 70 years. There are two possibilities: the spin could be found to be up or down and we have an ‘amplitude’ associated with each possibility. This is the simplest example of the ‘superposition principle’. Because, the eigenfunction is a ray in an Hilbert space, the ‘amplitude’ associated with each possibility is a complex number. In order to obtain a ‘real’ measure associated with each possibility we must use the ‘norm’ of these amplitudes. These norms are what we call the probabilities for the various possibilities.
Let us suppose we do perform the measurement of the spin observable at that angle $`\theta `$ The instant we observe which of the two possible eigenvalues prevails in this measurement, our state of knowlege concerning the value of the spin observable along that angle $`\theta `$ changes from ambiguous to certain. The eigenfunction which expressed the ambiguity concerning which eigenvalue would be observed collapses to the eigenfunction corresponding to the eigenvalue that was observed. This new eigenfunction can be used to make quantitative predictions for the spin values that could be observed in subsequent experiments.
When we deal with classical systems the ambiguities concerning what could be observed in future experiments, given what was observed on this classical system, are expressed quantitatively via the Euclidean manifold of a possibilities generating transformation group. When we deal with a quantum system the same problem arrises but now the quantification of the ambiguities concerning what could be observed in the future is given by the ray in Hilbert space which is the eigenfunction corresponding to the eigenvalue of the dynamical variable that was observed. Such observations upon which we base predictions for future observations are often said today to prepare a quantum system in a given state. Consequently the ‘algebra’ of the probabilities for quantum systems is different from the ‘algebra’ of the probabilities for classical systems. This provides a complete explanation of Bell’s inequalities which are applicable only to classical systems, and are indeed not applicable to quantum systems. From a logical point of view an even more fundamental difference between classical and quantum systems is their respective ‘principles of superposition’. In classical systems this principle refers to physical states of the systems. In quantum mechanics it refers to a state of ambiguity we have concerning predictions for future observations, when we have made some observations on , i.e. prepared, a quantum system.

## IV Conclusion

We have shown that based upon the requirement that physical theories be quantitative and testable via observations in experiments, we can interpret probabilities in both classical and quantum physics as being ‘logical’ rather than ‘physical’. Their Bayesian nature does not depend upon the introduction of concepts such as ‘degrees of belief’ or ‘degrees of truth of assertions,’ often associated today with the concept of Bayesian probabilities, even in physics. They are the result of quantifying the domain of possibilities that results when we interpret observations within the framework of a physical theory. Probabilities in physics could also be said to be measures of information interpreted within the framework of a physical theory.