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# Untitled Document

The Observation of Lunar Impacts

Costantino Sigismondi and Giovanni Imponente

The intense activity of cratering on the Moon and in the inner regions of the solar system was accomplished during the first $`10^9`$ years . Occasionally, some impact events occur even nowadays. In Section 1, we treat, from a historical point of view, the Earth-based observation of lunar impacts. In Section 2, we consider the visibility conditions of such events evaluating the luminosity of the background upon which an impact shines. In Section 3, the luminosity of an impact is discussed. The occurrence of lunar impact events outside of meteor shower periods is calculated using the hourly rate of the sporadic meteors and their population index. The evidence of a larger rate of impacts of meteoroids in the past under these hypotheses is presentend in the last section.

The authors are affiliated with the Department of Physics, University of Rome “La Sapienza,” and ICRA, International Center for Relativistic Astrophysics, Ple A. Moro 2, I-00185 Rome, Italy. The first author can be contacted at sigismondi@icra.it.

1. Evidence of lunar impacts

The first important evidence of lunar impacts has been the observation recorded on June 18, 1178 (Julian calendar), by a few men after sunset and registered in the chronicles of Gervase of Canterbury . They observed the upper horn of a crescent moon to have split with fire and sparks emanating from the division point. This report was interpreted to be a description of events related to the formation of the lunar crater Giordano Bruno .

On November 18 and 19, 1999, several impact events of initial magnitude between $`+3`$ and $`+7`$ were recorded with a video tape and by naked-eye near the center of the Moon’s dark limb. Those flashes resulted from Leonid impacts on the Moon, because the center of the 1899 dust trail would have passed $`0.0002`$ AU, from the selenocenter around $`4^h49^m`$ UT .

The Giordano Bruno crater event is reliably exceptional, while the last are more frequent. The observation from Padua, Italy, of a probable lunar impac during the total eclipse of the Moon on January 21, 2000, done by C. Sigismondi, confirms that assertion.

2. Luminosity of a lunar impact

Except for the very rare events such as the one reported by Gervase, it is necessary to have a dark background upon which the flashes of lunar meteors can be visible. Hence, there are three favorable conditions for observing such a phenomenon:

1. in the ash-grey light of the Moon, close to New Moon;

2. far from the dark limb around First or Last Quarter;

3. during a total eclipse.

The last conditon is the most favorable one, but also the least frequent one.

In the case of the lunar Leonids the Moon phase was $`62\%`$, while for the Giordano Bruno event, it was $`11\%`$

Ash-grey light

The maximum brightness of the Moon due to the ash-grey light occurs during a total eclipse of the Sun. That value has been measured in order to study the coronal aureola phenomenon , and it is $`10^{+9.3}`$ fainter than the solar disk. It means that the Moon in ash-grey light shines like a magnitude $`3`$ star, say its surface brightness $`B`$ during the total eclipse of September 22, 1968, was equal to about $`+13`$ per square arcsecond.

Total eclipse of the Moon

It is well known that a total lunar eclipse is measurable by de-focusing a star and comparing its image with the eclipsed Moon. Typically, the eclipsed Moon shines as a magnitude 0 star, but exceptionally it shines as a magnitude $`+3`$ star . Hence, for the surface brightness $`B`$, we typically find $`+16`$ per square arcsecond.

The First or Last Quarter of the Moon

The second case is intermediate with respect to the previous ones. The dark quarter of the Moon is illuminated by a quarter of the Earth, and therefore the amount of light coming from the Earth is about half that of the New Moon case. It corresponds to a surface brightness of about $`+14`$ per square arcsecond.

We emphasize that all those surface brightnesses are calculated for the dark area of the Moon. For naked-eye observations, however, if the bright part of the Moon is not artificially occultated, because of the atmospheric glare and the bleaching of the eye, the effective luminosity background is even brighter than that of the ash-grey light.

3. The number of lunar meteors calculated by the sporadic rate

We assume that the 5 lunar events recorded by videotape during 1999 Leonids shower belong to the same ensemble of meteors with equal population index $`r=2.5`$ and similar normalization factor such that the $`\mathrm{ZHR}4000`$.

Analogously to the formula that gives the number of observed meteors versus the limiting magnitude, already corrected by the position of the radiant, we have

$$N_{\mathrm{obs}}=\mathrm{ZHR}\times r^{\left(6.5\mathrm{lm}\right)}\times \mathrm{\Delta }t_\mathrm{h},$$

where $`r`$ is the population index, and we can affirm that the total amount of the lunar Leonids observed around the peak time should be very bright fireballs if they fall onto the Earth. Therefore, the following equation, integrated over 2 hours of observation, is valid:

$$N_{\mathrm{obs}}=2\times \mathrm{ZHR}\times r^x.$$

For $`N_{\mathrm{obs}}=5`$ in two hours of registration, $`ZHR4000`$, and for the Leonids’ population index $`r=2.5`$ we obtain $`x8`$.

To calculate the probability to have similar events out of the maxima of meteors shower, one needs to consider the hourly rate HR and the population index $`r_{\mathrm{Spor}}`$ of the sporadic meteors: $`\mathrm{HR}10`$ and $`r_{\mathrm{Spor}}=3.4`$ . This yields the equation

$$N_{\mathrm{exp}}=10\times 3.4^x\times \mathrm{\Delta }t_\mathrm{h}.$$

With $`x8`$, the expected value of sporadic lunar impacts to be observed in two hours is $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}1/900`$.

In this calculation, we have considered the background conditions similar to that ones of the lunar Leonids of 1999, with the Moon phase at $`62\%`$. If we consider the illumination conditions during a Moon eclipse, we can reach a background which is $`2`$ to $`3`$ magnitudes per square arcsecond fainter. That fact implies an improvement of the detection of the lunar meteor of a factor given by $`r_{\mathrm{Spor}}^2`$ to $`r_{\mathrm{Spor}}^3`$, which is in the range 10–30.

Consequently, during the totality of a Moon eclipse (about two hours) occurring outside one of meteors shower maxima, $`N_{ecl}=1/90\text{}1/30`$ lunar impacts are expected to be visible up to magnitude $`+8`$.

This number should be reduced significantly if we assume a non-homogeneous distribution of the matter inside the meteor stream at which we refer our calculation. Since the Moon approached the core of the 1899 dust trail much closer than the Earth, this is a real possibility. As a limiting case, we consider the effective $`\mathrm{ZHR}=\mathrm{150\hspace{0.17em}000}`$ at 0.0002 AU apart of the center of 1899 dust trail (as in the 1966 Leonids shower ). For this limiting case, all computed probabilities should be divided by 30–40.

4. Kinetic energy assessment

We consider the temperature-kinetic energy relation for an object at given impact velocity $`v=41`$ km/s, obtained averaging the geocentric velocities of all known meteors showers. We evaluate the luminosity due to the radiation of the kinetic energy. The kinetic energy in calories ($`C_M`$) can be obtained by dividing the kinetic energy $`Mv^2/2`$ computed in Joules by 4.18. Such an amount of calories corresponds to an increment of temperature (neglecting the melting heats) of $`\mathrm{\Delta }TC_M/M`$ if $`M`$ is expressed in grams in the latter equation. Combining both equations, we see that the mass cancels out, and we find $`\mathrm{\Delta }T2\times 10^5`$ K.

In what follows, we consider a 10 g ice meteoroid. Applying the Stefan-Boltzmann law of black-body emission at a given temperature, we receive from a mass at $`2\times 10^5`$ K on the Moon the following amount of radiation:

$$W_M=\frac{\sigma T^4\times A_M}{4\pi d_{\mathrm{Moon}}^2}3\times 10^8\text{W/m}\text{2},$$

where $`A_M\left(M/\rho \right)^{2/3}`$ is the area of the incoming meteoroid (yielding $`A_M5\mathrm{cm}^2`$ in our case), and $`d_{\mathrm{Moon}}3.84\times 10^8`$ m is the Earth-Moon average distance.

To calculate the visual magnitude, we must take into account that the eye is sensitive in a range of wavelengths far from the peak for a temperature of $`T2\times 10^5`$ K, which means a reduction of a factor 10 for the effective temperature visible (say $`\mathrm{20\hspace{0.17em}000}`$ K), corresponding to a reduction of $`10^4`$ in the detected intensity. Therefore, the energy flux of such an event of mass $`M=10`$ g is $`W_M3\times 10^{12}`$ W/m2, i.e., a magnitude

$$m=2.5\mathrm{log}\frac{3\times 10^{12}}{3.7\times 10^9}=7.7,$$

where $`3.7\times 10^9`$ W/m2 is the visual energy flux corresponding to a magnitude 0 event . The final value of the above equation corresponds to the observed magnitudes of lunar Leonids .

Given the formula

$$m_E=402.5\mathrm{log}\left(2.732\times 10^{10}M^{0.92}v_G^{3.91}\right),$$

where $`m_E`$ is the magnitude, M the meteoroid mass in grams, and $`v_G`$ its geocentric velocity in km/s, we can relate the mass $`M`$ of a lunar meteoroid to its magnitude $`m_E`$ if it would fall in the Earth’s atmosphere. For a meteor with $`v_G=41`$ km/s and $`M=10`$ g, we have $`m_E=4.2`$.

Using the formula giving the number of meteors brighter than the limiting magnitude lm, $`N_{\mathrm{obs}}=\mathrm{ZHR}\times r^{\left(6.5\mathrm{lm}\right)}`$, we can obtain the expected hourly number of meteoroids larger than mass $`M`$ by substituting $`m_E`$ from the previous equation for “lm.” We assume moreover that such number is the same for the Moon. (This last assumption neglects all the geometrical effects due to the perspective of the line of sight. It is like considering that we can observe only the events occurring on the central zone of the Moon disk, and here we assume the same hourly rate observed from the Earth.)

For the 1999 Leonids, we expect $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}=4000\times 2.5^{10.7}0.2`$ per hour. Assuming $`\mathrm{ZHR}=\mathrm{150\hspace{0.17em}000}`$, because the Moon passed closer to the central zone of the meteor stream $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}8`$ per hour, in agreement with the observations.

For the sporadic rate we expect a much smaller number, namely $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}=10\times 3.4^{10.7}2.1\times 10^5`$ per hour. During a total eclipse of the Moon of 2 hours, we expect only $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}4.1\times 10^5`$ events, say $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}1/24000`$. This value is only one order of magnitude smaller than the one derived in Section 3.

5. History of cratering in the inner solar system

Assuming that the impact rate of meteoroids has remained constant during the last 5 billion years, we can estimate the expected value of craters larger than diameter $`D`$ on the Moon’s surface. We compare this number with the observational evidence.

A crater of diameter $`D4`$ km—which corresponds to 2 arc seconds at the Moon’s distance—and depth $`a100`$ m is obtained from the impact of a meteoroid of mass $`M`$ and velocity $`v_G`$. For simplicity, we assume that the kinetic energy of the incoming body is almost able to raise the material contained in the the crater to a height of $`4D`$ (for the Copernicus crater, surrounded by a great radial structure visible at Full Moon, this value is largely underestimated). Hence,

$$Mv_G^2/2=g_{\mathrm{Moon}}M_{\mathrm{Crater}}\times 4D,$$

where $`g_{\mathrm{Moon}}`$ is the gravitational acceleration for the Moon ($`g_{\mathrm{Moon}}1.42`$ m/s2), and $`M_{\mathrm{Crater}}`$ is the mass of the matter removed to form the crater. We find

$$M=\frac{2g_{\mathrm{Moon}}\rho _{\mathrm{Moon}}\pi a\left(D/2\right)^2\times 4D}{v_G^2},$$

and, assuming again $`v_G=41`$ km/s and $`\rho _{\mathrm{Moon}}2`$ g/cm3 (the lunar density), we finally obtain $`M7.4\times 10^7`$ kg. According to the formula in , such a meteoroid falling on the Earth should have a magnitude $`m_E=20`$. The number of sporadic meteors brighter than $`m_E=20`$ scaled for the Moon’s surface $`A_{\mathrm{Moon}}/A_{\mathrm{obs}}`$ gives us the expected number of craters larger than 4 km above the Moon’s surface. Here, $`A_{\mathrm{obs}}`$ is the area from which an observer can see a meteor trail occurring at an altitude of $`h=80`$ km in the Earth’s atmosphere:

$$A_{\mathrm{obs}}2\pi R_{\mathrm{Earth}}h$$

($`R_{\mathrm{Earth}}=6378`$ km is the Earth’s radius and $`R_{\mathrm{Moon}}=1739`$ km is the Moon’s radius). Hence, we find

$$\frac{A_{\mathrm{Moon}}}{A_{\mathrm{obs}}}=\frac{R_{\mathrm{Moon}}^2}{R_{\mathrm{Earth}}h}=5.93.$$

Integration with the above scaling factor over $`5\times 10^9`$ years, which is about $`4.4\times 10^{13}`$ hours, yields

$$N_{\mathrm{exp}}=5.93\times 4.410^{13}\times 10\times \left(3.4\right)^{26.5}20.$$

This expected number is lower than the number of crater visible even with an amateur equipment, and it demonstrates that in the past the impact rate was larger than today. If we compare with the extrapolated number of craters without considering the outflows of basalt of the maria, the evidence becomes even more striking.

References

\[$`1`$\] J.K. Beatty, C.C. Petersen, A. Chaikin, eds., “The New Solar System”, Fourth Edition, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.

\[$`2`$\] J.B. Hartung, Journal of Geophysical Research 98:E5, 1993, p .9141.

\[$`3`$\] J.B. Hartung, Meteoritics 11, 1976, pp. 187–194.

\[$`4`$\] D.W. Dunham, in IAU Circular 7320, 1999.

\[$`5`$\] E.C. Downey, “Ephem—An Interactive Astronomical Ephemeris Program”, Version 4.27 V, March 11, 1992; Copyright 1990, 1991; VGA Watch plots by J.D. McDonald (free of charge).

\[$`6`$\] O. Koutchmy, S. Koutchmy, Astron. Astrophys. Suppl. 13, 1974, pp. 295.

\[$`7`$\] S.J. O’Meara, Sky and Telescope 99:1, 2000, p. 109.

\[$`8`$\] P. Jenniskens, Astron. Astrophys. 287, 1994, p. 990.

\[$`9`$\] Z. Wu, I.P. Williams, Mon. Not. R. Astron. Soc. 280, 1996, p. 1210.

\[$`10`$\] C. Barbieri, “Lezioni di Astronomia”, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1999, p. 240.

\[$`11`$\] R. Arlt, P. Brown, WGN 27:6, December 1999, p. 278.


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# The first 20 minutes in the Hong Kong stock market

## 1 Introduction

Recently, detailed analysis on the high-frequency financial market data has shown that there exist some universal statistical characteristics for price or index fluctuations, in particular the fat tail distribution and rapid decay of correlation for price changes, and the persistence of long-range volatility correlation . For one of these fundamental features, the probability distribution, the power-law asymptotic behavior with an exponent about $`4`$ has been found from the daily and high-frequency intra-daily stock market data .

Many efforts have been made to simulate the market behaviors and dynamics, and then to reproduce these stylized observations of real markets. Much work focuses on the microscopic discrete models , with different mechanisms based on the intrinsic structure of financial markets, including the herding and imitation behaviors  as well as the mutual interactions  among market participants.

The other way to model the dynamics of financial markets is using the approach of continuous stochastic process and then, e.g., determining the effective stochastic equation for price evolution . Based on the analysis of Hang Seng Index (HSI) in Hong Kong and the method of conditional averages proposed for generic stationary random time series and previously applied in fluid turbulence , a Langevin equation reproducing well both the observed probability distribution of index moves with fat tails and the fast decay of moves correlation has been derived . The existence of a viscous market restoring force and a move-enhanced noise is shown in the equation. Moreover, an analytic form for the whole range of probability distribution has been obtained, and interestingly, the corresponding asymptotic tail behavior is an exponential-type decay:

$$P(x)\mathrm{exp}(\alpha |x|)/|x|,$$
(1)
where the index move $`x(t)=\mathrm{index}(t)\mathrm{index}(t\mathrm{\Delta }t)`$ with time interval $`\mathrm{\Delta }t`$ (e.g., 1 min), faster than the power law behavior with exponent about $`4`$ found in recent studies . The parameters can be directly determined from the market data (in which the first 20 minutes in the opening of each day are skipped), and the tail behavior (1) has also been observed in the simulations of our self-organized microscopic model  with social percolation process , which is proposed to describe the information spread for different trading ways across a social system.

Instead of describing the details of our modelings for financial market behaviors which have been or will be published elsewhere , here we present our work on the analysis of Hang Seng Index (HSI), showing that the properties of probability distribution and volatility correlations for index fluctuations depend on the opening effect of each trading day (i.e., the overnight effect), which can also explain the above difference between the exponential-type fat tail behavior derived in our Langevin approach  and the recent empirical findings of $`4`$ power law distribution .

## 2 Probability distribution

The HSI data we used contains minute-by-minute records of every trading day from January 1994 to December 1997, and the break between the morning and afternoon sessions as well as the difference between trading days are considered in our analysis. First, we skip the data in the first 20 minutes of each morning session, i.e., skip the opening of each trading day, and the deviation from $`4`$ power law in the tail region of the distribution for 1 min interval index moves is found (Fig. 1, circles). In this case the $`4`$ power law seems to be a crossover effect within a limited range, and for large index moves the log-log plot exhibits curvature, corresponding to the exponential-type Eq. (1) derived from the Langevin approach .

Next, we analyze the data without any skip in daily opening, and it is interesting to find that the $`4`$ power law scaling is recovered for 1 min interval, as shown in Fig. 1 (triangles), which is in agreement with recent observations from German share price index DAX  and S&P500 index .

This phenomenon shows the importance of the daily opening or overnight effect for the properties of stock market. It is well known that price fluctuations in the opening of trading day are highly influenced by exogenous factors, and the studies on trading volume have exhibited the larger and less elastic transactions demand at opening and close times compared with that at other times of the trading day . Very recently, it has been observed from the German DAX data that due to the peculiarity in the calculation of the opening index with the mixture of overnight and high-frequency price changes, the first observations of each day are governed by the process different from that of the other times . However, a power law scaling with exponent between 4 and 5 is found for DAX data in  when the first 15 minutes of every day are dropped, instead of the exponential-type behavior here.

## 3 Volatility and autocorrelations

For HSI data it is found that the values of index moves and the volatility at the daily opening times are much larger than those of other times. Fig. 2 shows the mean of the absolute value of index moves $`|x|`$ and the volatility $`(x^2x^2)^{1/2}`$ for different times of morning session (open at 10:00), where the averages are over different trading days from 1994 to 1997 at the same minute. Both of the values are obviously larger for the first 20 minutes, and then remains almost unchanged at late times, similar to the phenomena of German DAX data . Thus, when skipping the opening data, much less extreme values of index move are calculated in the probability distribution, and consequently, the far tail of distribution may decay faster, as seen in Fig. 1.

Here we find that the different behavior of distribution shown in Fig. 1 is relevant to the different properties of volatility clustering. Fig. 3 shows the autocorrelations of index moves and volatility for 1 min interval, with and without the skip of first 20 minutes, where the correlation for the index move $`x`$

$$C(T)=\frac{x(t)x(t+T)x(t)^2}{x(t)^2x(t)^2}$$
(2)
rapidly decays to zero in about 10 minutes, and the persistence of long-range volatility correlation,

$$V(T)=\frac{|x(t)||x(t+T)||x(t)|^2}{|x(t)|^2|x(t)|^2},$$
(3)
(averaged over the whole index time series) is found, in accordance with the previous studies . The correlations of moves present little difference with or without the skip, however, the volatility correlation with no skip (Fig. 3, stars) is obviously smaller. This decrease is due to the fact that the volatility correlations of the first few minutes in the daily opening are much smaller than those of other times, as given in Fig. 4. Note that Hong Kong stock market opens at 10:00 in the morning, and Fig. 4 shows the volatility correlations of different times, defined as

$$V(t_o,T)=\frac{|x(t_o)||x(t_o+T)||x(t_o)||x(t_o+T)|}{|x(t_o)|^2|x(t_o)|^2},$$
(4)
which is similar to Eq. (3), but averaged only over different days (at the same time $`t_o`$) in the period of 1994-1997. In the opening time region, the value of correlation increases with the increasing of time, and after the opening (about 20 minutes, i.e., 10:20), the correlation keeps relatively unchanged (with the values around the pluses of Fig. 3).

The absolute value of index move is used to calculated the volatility correlations in the above study, as shown in Eqs. (3) and (4). If using the square of move instead, the values of correlation are found to be smaller, but the above results will not change, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6.

It is known that the Hong Kong stock market behaved abnormally during the second half of 1997, due to the much more significant impact of external conditions. When we discard the data of 1997 and only study the market from 1994 to 1996, the results are the same as above.

## 4 Summary

In this work we have presented that the index fluctuations for the first few minutes of daily opening behave very differently from those of the other times, and the lower degree of volatility clustering at the opening can affect the behaviors of fat tail distribution: $`4`$ power law behavior if including the daily opening data, or the exponential-type if not. To further understand these properties of HSI market data, more work is needed to study the details of the opening procedure of stock market.

## Acknowledgements

The author thanks the workshop organizers of ”Economic Dynamics from the Physics Point of View” for such a very enjoyable seminar, and Dietrich Stauffer, Lei-Han Tang, and Thomas Lux for very helpful discussions and comments. I also thank Lam Kin and Lei-Han Tang for providing the HSI data. This work was supported by SFB 341.


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# Two Hagedorn temperatures: a larger one for mesons, a lower one for baryons

## Abstract

Our experimental work involved reading throught Particle Data Tables. We show that the Hagedorn temperature is larger for mesons than for baryons.Talk presented at Meson 2000, 19-23 May 2000, Cracow, Poland

PACS numbers: 14.20.-c, 14.40.-n, 12.40Yx, 12.40Nn

This research is being done in collaboration with Wojciech Florkowski and Piotr Żenczykowski. The famous Hagedorn hypothesis  states that at asymptotically large masses, $`m`$, the density of hadronic resonance states, $`\rho (m)`$, behaves as

$$\rho (m)\mathrm{exp}\left(\frac{m}{T_H}\right)$$
(1)
The Hagedorn temperature, $`T_H`$, is a scale controlling the exponential growth of the spectrum.111$`T_H`$ need not immediately be associated with thermodynamics, here we are just concerned with the spectrum of particles per se. Ever since hypothesis (1) was made, it has been believed that there is one universal $`T_H`$ for all hadrons. Presently available experimental data show that this is not the case .

In Fig. 1 we compare the cumulants of the spectrum, defined as the number of states with mass lower than $`m`$. The experimental curve is $`N_{\mathrm{exp}}(m)=_ig_i\mathrm{\Theta }(mm_i)`$, where $`g_i=(2J_i+1)(2I_i+1)`$ is the spin-isospin degeneracy of the $`i`$th state, and $`m_i`$ is its mass. The theoretical curve corresponds to $`N_{\mathrm{theor}}(m)=_0^m\rho _{\mathrm{theor}}(m^{})𝑑m^{}`$, where $`\rho _{\mathrm{theor}}(m)=f(m)\mathrm{exp}(m/T)`$, with $`f(m)`$ denoting a slowly-varying function. A typical choice , used in the plot, is $`f(m)=A/(m^2+(500\mathrm{M}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{V})^2)^{5/4}`$. Parameters $`T_H`$ and $`A`$ are obtained with the least-square fit to $`\mathrm{log}N_{\mathrm{theor}}`$. Other choices of $`f(m)`$ give fits of similar quality. A striking feature of Fig. 1 is the linearity of $`\mathrm{log}N`$ starting at very low $`m`$, and extending till $`m1.8\mathrm{GeV}`$. Clearly, this shows that (1) is valid in the range of available data.222Above 1.8GeV the data is sparse and we have to wait for this region to be filled in by future experiments. However, the slopes in Fig. 1 are different for mesons and baryons. For the assumed $`f(m)`$ we get $`T_{\mathrm{meson}}=195`$MeV and $`T_{\mathrm{baryon}}=141`$MeV. This means that $`T_{\mathrm{meson}}>T_{\mathrm{baryon}}`$, and the inequality is substantial. Although it has been known to researchers in the field of hadron spectroscopy that the baryons multiply more rapidly than mesons, to our knowledge this fact has not been presented as vividly as in Fig. 1. To emphasize the strength of the effect we note that in order to make the meson line parallel to the baryon line, we would have to aggregate $`500`$ additional meson states up to $`m=1.8`$MeV as compared to the present number of $`400`$. If Ref.  we show that the fitted values of $`T_H`$, distinct for mesons and baryons, do not depend on flavor.

Why do mesons and baryons behave so differently? First, let us stress that it is not easy to get an exponentially rising spectrum at all. Take the simplistic harmonic-oscillator model, whose density of states grows as $`m^{d1}`$, with $`d`$ denoting the number of dimensions. For mesons there is one relative coordinate, hence $`\rho m^2`$, whereas the two relative coordinates in the baryon give $`\rho `$ $`m^5`$. Weaker-growing potentials lead to a faster growth, but fall short of the behavior (1). We know of two approaches yielding behavior (1), both involving combinatorics of infinitely-many degrees of freedom. Statistical bootstrap models  form particles form clusters of particles, and employ the principle of self-similarity. It can be shown, following e.g. the steps of Ref. , that the model leads to equal Hagedorn temperatures for mesons and for baryons.333Since baryons are formed by attaching mesons to the “input” baryon, the baryon spectrum grows at exactly the same rate as the meson spectrum. Thus the bootstrap idea is not capable of explaining the different behavior of mesons and baryons in Fig. 1.

On the other hand, the Dual String models  do give the demanded effect of $`T_{\mathrm{meson}}>T_{\mathrm{baryon}}`$, at least at asymptotic masses. Let us analyze mesons first. The particle spectrum is generated by the harmonic-oscillator operator describing vibrations of the string, $`N`$ $`=_{k=1}^{\mathrm{}}_{\mu =1}^Dka_{k,\mu }^{}a_{k,\mu }`$, where $`k`$ labels the modes and $`\mu `$ labels additional degeneracy, related to the number of dimensions . Eigenvalues of $`N`$ are composed in order to get the square of mass of the meson, according to the formula $`\alpha ^{}m^2\alpha _0=n,`$ where $`\alpha ^{}1\mathrm{G}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{V}^2`$ is the Regge slope, and $`\alpha _00`$ is the intercept. Example: take $`n=5`$. This can be made by taking the $`k=5`$ eigenvalue of $`N`$ (this is the leading Regge trajectory, with maximum angular momentum), but we can also take obtain the same $`m^2`$ by exciting one $`k=4`$ and one $`k=1`$ mode, alternatively $`k=3`$ and $`k=2`$ modes, etc. The number of possibilities corresponds to partitioning the number $`5`$ into natural components: 5, 4+1, 3+2, 3+1+1, 2+2+1, 2+1+1+1, 1+1+1+1+1. Partitions with more than one component describe the sub-leading Regge trajectories. With $`D`$ degrees of freedom each component can come in $`D`$ different species. Let us denote the number of partitions in our problem as $`P_D(n)`$. For large $`n`$ the asymptotic formula for partitio numerorum leads to the exponential spectrum according to the formula .

$$\rho (m)=2\alpha ^{}mP_D(n),P_D(n)\sqrt{\frac{1}{2n}}\left(\frac{D}{24n}\right)^{\frac{D+1}{4}}\mathrm{exp}\left(2\pi \sqrt{\frac{Dn}{6}}\right),$$
(2)
where $`n=\alpha ^{}m^2`$. We can now read-off the mesonic Hagedorn temperature: $`T_{\mathrm{meson}}=\frac{1}{2\pi }\sqrt{\frac{6}{D\alpha ^{}}}`$.

Now the baryons: the configuration for the baryon is shown in Fig. 2. The three strings vibrate independently, and the corresponding vibration operators, $`N`$, add up. Consequently, their eigenvalues $`n_1`$, $`n_2`$, and $`n_3`$ add up. Thus we simply have a partition problem with $`3`$ times more degrees of freedom than in the meson. The replacement $`D3D`$ in (2) leads immediately to $`T_{\mathrm{baryon}}=\frac{1}{2\pi }\sqrt{\frac{2}{D\alpha ^{}}}`$, $`T_{\mathrm{meson}}/T_{\mathrm{baryon}}=\sqrt{3}`$. We stress the picture is fully consistent with the Regge phenomenology. The leading Regge trajectory for baryons is generated by the excitation of a single string, i.e.  two out of three numbers $`n_i`$ vanish. This is the quark-diquark configuration. The subleading trajectories for baryons come in a much larger degeneracy than for mesons, due to more combinatorial possibilities. The slopes of the meson and baryon trajectories are universal, and given by $`\alpha ^{}`$. We stress that the “number-of-strings” mechanism described above is asymptotic. When applied to the data in the observed region one can, however, obtain very good agreement for mesons with a wide range of the dimensionality parameter $`D`$ . Baryon slopes can also be descibed properly, however with simplest string models there are too many baryon states. This hints for improvements, e.g. the inclusion of the spin-flavor symmetry factors for baryon states. More work needs to be done here.

We summarize the basics of the string mechanism: as $`m^2`$ increases, more and more degrees of freedom “wake up”. Via partitio numerorum they lead to the exponential growth of the spectrum. The three strings in the baryon bring more degrees of freedom and result in “faster” combinatorics. We have heard many talks in this conference on hadron exotics. If an exotic is a multi-string configuration (generalizations of Fig. 2), then the corresponding spectrum will grow exponentially with the Hagedorn temperature inversely proportional to the square root of the number of strings. For instance, $`T_{q\overline{q}q\overline{q}}=\frac{1}{2}T_{\mathrm{meson}}`$. This is reminiscent of the effect described in Ref. .

The author thanks Keith R. Dienes for many profitable e-mail discussions on the issues of hadron spectra and string models, and to Andrzej Białas and Kacper Zalewski for numerous useful comments.


text:
# Objective probabilities, quantum counterfactuals, and the ABL rule

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Following Mermin , I have characterized some of the probabilities that quantum mechanics allows us to calculate as being objective in the sense that they have nothing to do with ignorance—there is nothing for us to be ignorant of . I have argued that the objective probabilities associated with attributions of results to unperformed measurements should be calculated according to the ABL rule, first derived by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz . Ruth Kastner  and others  have raised objections concerning the appropriateness of probability assignments to counterfactuals based on the ABL rule. In the present article I re-derive the ABL rule, clarify the meaning of objective probabilities and the significance of their existence, and respond to these objections.

In Sec. 2 both the Born rule and the ABL rule are derived from the standard, quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties  as projection operators on a Hilbert space. Section 3 refutes the objections by Kastner and the other authors to counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. Section 4 elucidates the significance of the existence of objective probabilities, and Section 5 is devoted to unearthing unwarranted metaphysical presumptions leading to such views as Kastner is defending in her Comment .

## 2 OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND THE ABL RULE

Quantum mechanics is unequivocal about the probabilities it assigns to the possible results of possible measurements. If we represent the potentially attributable  properties of a system as projection operators on a Hilbert space $``$, there is no ambiguity as to the form of the prior probability measure $`p(q_i,t)`$, which is based solely on properties possessed by the system before the time $`t`$ :

$$p(q_i,t)=\text{Tr}[𝐖(t)𝐏_{q_i}].$$
(1)
As is well known, $`𝐖`$ is a unique density operator \[that is, a unique self-adjoint, positive operator satisfying $`\text{Tr}(𝐖)=1`$ and $`𝐖^2𝐖`$\]. Tr signifies the trace defined by the formula $`\text{Tr}(𝐗):=_ii|𝐗|i`$ for any orthonormal basis $`\{|i\}`$ in $``$. If $`𝐖^2=𝐖`$, $`𝐖(t)`$ projects on a one-dimensional subspace of $``$ and thus is equivalent—apart from an irrelevant phase factor—to a “state” vector $`|\psi (t)`$. Such a “state” is said to be “pure,” and the system is said to be “prepared” in it. With $`𝐖(t)=|\psi (t)\psi (t)|`$ and $`𝐏_{q_i}=|q_iq_i|`$, we obtain the familiar Born rule:

$$p(q_i,t)=\text{Tr}[|\psi (t)\psi (t)|𝐏_{q_i}]=\psi (t)|𝐏_{q_i}|\psi (t)=\left|\psi (t)|q_i\right|^2.$$
(2)
Applying the Born rule twice, we obtain the prior probability that a system with a prior probability measure $`|aa|`$ will first be observed to have the property $`|q_iq_i|`$ and then be found in possession of the property $`|bb|`$:

$$p(q_i,b|a)=\left|a|q_iq_i|b\right|^2.$$
(3)
(For simplicity’s sake we will assume that the Hamiltonian is zero between measurements.) Although readers familiar with the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics are not likely to stumble over this expression, it involves a conceptual transition that needs to be justified. When we ask for the probability that $`q_i`$, given $`a`$, the projection operator $`|q_iq_i|`$ represents a potentially attributable property of the system. When we ask for the probability that $`b`$, given $`q_i`$, the same operator represents a probability measure. How do we get from a property to a probability measure?

If we start out with a probability measure $`𝐖_1=|aa|`$ and then find that the system has the property $`𝐏`$, we must update our probability measure accordingly. If the measurement that yields the property $`𝐏`$ is ideal—as is generally assumed when discussing interpretational issues,—the updated probability measure assigns probability zero to any property $`𝐏^{}`$ for which $`\mathrm{𝐏𝐏}^{}=0`$. Hence the “state” of the system “collapses”—not mysteriously but self-evidently—to the “state”

$$𝐖_2=\frac{𝐏|aa|𝐏}{a|𝐏|a}.$$
(4)
The denominator ensures that the probability of the trivial property, represented by the identity operator $`\mathrm{𝟏}`$, remains 1. If we put $`|q_iq_i|`$ in place of $`𝐏`$, this reduces to $`𝐖_2=|q_iq_i|`$. Thus the updated probability measure is represented by the same operator as the property observed .

Next, we consider the probability that a system with a prior probability measure $`|aa|`$ will be found in possession of property $`|bb|`$ given that in the meantime $`Q`$ is measured but regardless of the result of this measurement. This is obviously the sum of probabilities

$$p(b|a,Q)=\underset{j}{}\left|a|q_jq_j|b\right|^2.$$
(5)
According to Bayes’ theorem, the probability that the intervening measurement yields $`q_i`$ given that the prior probability measure is $`|aa|`$ and given that the final measurement yields $`b`$, then is

$$p(q_i|a,b)=\frac{p(q_i,b|a)}{p(b|a,Q)}=\frac{\left|a|q_iq_i|b\right|^2}{_j\left|a|q_jq_j|b\right|^2}.$$
(6)
This is (one of the possible forms of) the ABL rule. Like the Born rule, it follows straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties as projection operators on a Hilbert space.

In principle, both rules have an objective as well as a subjective application. If $`Q`$ is actually measured, both rules assign probabilities that are subjective inasmuch as they are based on probability measures that fail to take account of at least one relevant fact—the result of the measurement of $`Q`$. In order to be considered objective, a quantum-mechanical probability must be assigned on the basis of all relevant facts. If the $`Q`$ measurement is actually made, the objective probabilities associated with its possible outcomes are trivially either zero or one. Thus both rules can assign nontrivial objective probabilities only if the $`Q`$ measurement is not made. But this is not sufficient. Since Born probabilities take no account of (future) facts about the system’s future properties, they can be considered objective only if there are no relevant such facts. This is hardly ever the case. Hence, in general, objective probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule. We can drop the qualifying “in general” if we use the trivial property in place of $`|bb|`$ if there never will be any facts about the system’s future properties. In this case the ABL rule reduces to the Born rule:

$$\frac{\left|a|q_i\right|^2q_i|\mathrm{𝟏}|q_i}{_ja|q_jq_j|aq_j|\mathrm{𝟏}|q_j}=\frac{\left|a|q_i\right|^2}{a|\left(_j|q_jq_j|\right)|a}=\left|a|q_i\right|^2.$$
(7)
Thus objective probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule, and they are assigned to contrary-to-fact conditionals, or counterfactuals, of the following general form:

If a measurement of observable $`Q`$ were performed on system $`S`$ between an actual measurement yielding the result $`|aa|`$ at time $`t_a`$ and an actual measurement yielding the result $`|bb|`$ at time $`t_b`$, but no measurement is actually performed between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, then the measurement of $`Q`$ would yield $`q_i`$ with probability $`p(q_i|a,b)`$.

For $`p(q_i|a,b)`$ to be objective, it is not enough that $`Q`$ is not actually measured; it is necessary that no measurement is performed between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$. If any other measurement $`M`$ is performed during this time span, $`p(q_i|a,b)`$ is based on an incomplete set of facts—it does not take account of the result of $`M`$—and is therefore subjective. Note that the antecedent clause states not only that the $`Q`$ measurement is made (counterfactually or in a possible world) but also that at the times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ the respective results $`|aa|`$ and $`|bb|`$ are obtained (that is, they are as in the actual world). The observation that the result obtained at $`t_b`$ might have been different had the $`Q`$ measurement been actually made, is irrelevant to the truth of (A) inasmuch as it is based on an incomplete set of facts—it does not take into account the result obtained at $`t_b`$—while statement (A) is based on a complete set of facts, as it must be in order to assign objective probabilities. Probabilities are objective only if they are assigned to unperformed measurements, and only if the assignment is based on all relevant facts. The second “if” translates into the strong ceteris paribus clause that all measurement results obtained in the actual world are also obtained in the possible worlds considered by (A). These possible worlds differ from the actual world only in that they contain one extra measurement that is not made in the actual world.

## 3 REPLY TO KASTNER

Ruth Kastner  and others  have raised objections concerning the appropriateness of probability assignments to counterfactuals based on the ABL rule. The first objection I will address is this : Since the $`Q`$ measurement is not actually made, the following rule should be used instead of the ABL rule (6):

$$p_K(q_i|a,b)=\frac{p(q_i,b|a)}{p(b|a)}=\frac{\left|a|q_iq_i|b\right|^2}{\left|a|b\right|^2}=\frac{\left|a|q_iq_i|b\right|^2}{\left|_ja|q_jq_j|b\right|^2}.$$
(8)
This rule combines, according to Bayes’ theorem, the probability $`p(q_i,b|a)`$ that a system with a prior probability measure $`|aa|`$ will first be observed to have property $`|q_iq_i|`$ and then be found in possession of property $`|bb|`$, with the probability $`p(b|a)`$ that an equally “prepared”  system will be observed to have property $`|bb|`$ given that in the meantime no measurement is made. In the numerator Kastner assumes that $`Q`$ is measured, and in the denominator she assumes that between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ no measurement takes place. Whereas in the denominator of the ABL rule (6) probabilities are added—the $`Q`$ measurement is assumed to be made,—in the denominator of Kastner’s rule (8) amplitudes are added, which entails that the $`Q`$ measurement is not made. The ABL rule thus is consistent—it assumes throughout that the $`Q`$ measurement is made,— while the same cannot be said of Kastner’s rule.

A similar inconsistency mars arguments by Sharp and Shanks , Cohen , Miller , and Kastner  purporting to prove the general invalidity of counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. These arguments have been refuted—cogently, in my opinion—by Vaidman , though Kastner , predictably, takes a different view. What these “proofs” purport to show is that the counterfactual use of the ABL rule yields results that are inconsistent with standard quantum mechanics. Specifically, it is claimed that this use entails the following equation:

$`p(q_j|a)`$ $`=`$ $`p(q_j|a,b_1)p(b_1|a)+p(q_j|a,b_2)p(b_2|a)`$ (9)
$`=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{p(q_j,b_1|a)}{p(b_1|a,Q)}}p(b_1|a)+{\displaystyle \frac{p(q_j,b_2|a)}{p(b_2|a,Q)}}p(b_2|a).`$
Since the final measurement of the observable $`B`$, assumed to have two eigenvalues $`b_1`$ and $`b_2`$, is actually made, the Born probability $`p(q_j|a)`$ of the outcome $`q_j`$ of an intermediate measurement of $`Q`$ is uncontroversially the sum of the probabilities $`p(q_j,b_1|a)`$ and $`p(q_j,b_2|a)`$. According to eq. (9) this is not always the case. It is the case if

$`p(b_i|a,Q)`$ $`=`$ $`{\displaystyle \underset{j}{}}\left|a|q_jq_j|b_i\right|^2`$ (10)
$`=`$ $`\left|{\displaystyle \underset{j}{}}a|q_jq_j|b_i\right|^2=p(b_i|a).`$
This holds if $`Q=A`$ (the observable measured at time $`t_a`$) or $`Q=B`$, or if for $`jk`$,

$$\mathrm{}\left(q_k|aa|q_jq_j|b_ib_i|q_k\right)=0.$$
(11)
Kastner states these conditions in Refs.  and . It is then argued that since the counterfactual use of the ABL rule in eq. (9) generally leads to inconsistencies with standard quantum mechanics, this use is illegitimate unless one of those conditions is satisfied. However, what is illegitimate is not the counterfactual use of the ABL rule but the equation on which this conclusion is based. Like Kastner’s rule (8), eq. (9) combines expressions that imply that the intervening measurement is made—namely, $`p(q_j|a,b_1)`$ and $`p(q_j|a,b_2)`$—with expressions that imply the contrary, namely, $`p(b_1|a)`$ and $`p(b_2|a)`$. Note that it would not improve matters if instead of the ABL probabilities $`p(q_j|a,b_i)`$ the probabilities $`p_K(q_j|a,b_i)`$ were used in eq. (9) \[which would ensure that $`p(q_j|a)=p(q_j,b_1|a)+p(q_j,b_2|a)`$\] since the probabilities $`p_K(q_j|a,b_i)`$ involve the same inconsistency. In order to be consistent we must assume throughout that the intervening measurement is made. This entails that instead of the probabilities $`p(b_i|a)`$ the probabilities $`p(b_i|a,Q)`$ must be used in eq. (9), which likewise ensures that $`p(q_j|a)=p(q_j,b_1|a)+p(q_j,b_2|a)`$.

One might perceive a contradiction between the counterfactual (A) and my insistence on the necessity of assuming consistently that the intervening measurement is made. But this apparent “contradiction” is the very nature of a counterfactual. Counterfactuals are statements about conceivable worlds that are different from the actual world in certain specified respects and like the actual world in all other relevant respects. The worlds considered by (A) are different from the actual world in that between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ a measurement is made that is not made in the actual world; in all other respects they are like the actual world. In particular, the measurements at $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ have the specified outcomes. Since (A) is a statement about conceivable worlds in which the $`Q`$ measurement is made, the probabilities it assigns to the possible outcomes of this measurement must have the same values as the probabilities that we would assign, on the same basis, to the possible outcomes of the same measurement, if this were actually made.

Kastner denies the validity of the counterfactual (A) also on the ground that it allegedly violates the requirement of cotenability. A counterfactual $`C`$ refers to conceivable worlds that must satisfy two conditions: They must be different from the actual world in certain specified respects, and they must be like the actual world in all other relevant respects. If it turned out that there are no conceivable worlds that satisfy both conditions, $`C`$ would fail to satisfy this crucial requirement.

Consider a conceivable world $`𝒲_i`$ in which the $`Q`$ measurement yields an outcome $`q_i`$ to which (A) assigns probability zero. (To each possible outcome $`q_k`$ there corresponds a conceivable world $`𝒲_k`$.) $`𝒲_i`$ fails to satisfy the second condition inasmuch as it is unlike the actual world in another relevant respect: It does not obey the actual physical laws. But this is something that we learn from (A) rather than something that invalidates (A). Statement (A) itself tells us that the conceivable world $`𝒲_i`$ is not a nomologically possible world inasmuch as under the specified conditions a measurement of $`Q`$ would never yield the result $`q_i`$.

What Kastner has in mind is something more serious. According to the metalinguistic account of counterfactuals , invoked by Kastner , a counterfactual is true if its antecedent conjoined with laws of nature and statements of background conditions logically entails its consequent. The background conditions must be stable (that is, they must hold independently of the truth value of the antecedent). Kastner claims that (A) violates either the requirement of cotenability—the background conditions depend on the truth value of the antecedent—or the laws of nature.

Before addressing Kastner’s argument I will show that both the stability of the background conditions and the laws of nature are in fact respected by (A). The antecedent is the statement that a measurement of observable $`Q`$ is performed on system $`S`$ between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$. The background conditions consist in the observation (or the factually warranted possession) of the properties $`|aa|`$ and $`|bb|`$ at the respective times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, as well as in the absence of any measurement between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ other than that specified in the antecedent. The relevant laws of nature are the principles of quantum mechanics. Being statistical laws, they enable us to assign probabilities to the possible results of measurements, and being universal laws that have never been found to conflict with experimental data, they allow us to apply them counterfactually—to assign probabilities to the possible results of unperformed measurements. These assignments can be made on the basis of all relevant facts about either the past or the future properties of $`S`$ using the Born rule, or on the basis of all relevant facts about the past and future properties of $`S`$ using the ABL rule. Since both rules are part of standard quantum mechanics, none of these assignments can conflict with standard quantum mechanics. Nor can they conflict with the required stability of background conditions. If obtaining $`|aa|`$ at $`t_a`$ and $`|bb|`$ at $`t_b`$ is nomologically possible without interposition of any measurement, the same is nomologically possible whenever a measurement is interposed . The reason this is so is that the interposition of a measurement never decreases the probability of obtaining $`|bb|`$ at $`t_b`$ given $`|aa|`$ at $`t_a`$:

$$p(b|a)=\left|a|b\right|^2=\left|\underset{k}{}a|q_kq_k|b\right|^2\underset{k}{}\left|a|q_kq_k|b\right|^2=p(b|a,Q).$$
(12)
Thus the background conditions are consistent with both the truth and the falsity of the antecedent. And given the necessity of assuming consistently that the intervening measurement is made, the antecedent, conjoined with the relevant laws of nature and the background condition statement, logically entails that the probability of obtaining the value $`q_i`$ is as given by the ABL rule .

If Kastner reaches a different conclusion, it is because her understanding of the background conditions and/or of the relevant laws of nature is different from mine. That she thinks differently about the background conditions is obvious from her discussion  of the experiment considered by Sharp and Shanks . In this experiment spin-$`\frac{1}{2}`$ particles are prepared at time $`t_1`$ with probability measure $`|a_+`$ and subjected at time $`t_2`$ to a measurement of their spin component along the $`𝐛`$ axis. We are accustomed to read $`|a_+`$ as “spin up along direction $`𝐚`$”, but what $`|a_+`$ really signifies depends on the time to which it refers. While at $`t_1`$ the system possesses the property represented by $`|a_+a_+|`$, for $`t>t_1`$ the ket $`|a_+`$ or the density operator $`𝐖=|a_+a_+|`$ represents a probability measure that says nothing about properties possessed at $`t`$; it only tells us that the prior probability of obtaining the result “spin up along direction $`𝐜`$” at the time $`t`$ is $`c_+|𝐖|c_+`$. By the same token, if the final measurement indicates that the property represented by the operator $`|b_+b_+|`$ is possessed at $`t_2`$, then this operator also represents the “time-reversed” density operator $`𝐖^{}`$ that yields the posterior probability  $`c_+|𝐖^{}|c_+`$ of obtaining the result “spin up along direction $`𝐜`$” at the time $`t<t_2`$.

Kastner, following Sharp and Shanks, states that the measurement at $`t_2`$ yields a mixture $`M`$ consisting of two subensembles. Thus she considers an ensemble of measurements, performed on an ensemble of systems, rather than an individual measurement, for an individual measurement does not yield a mixture consisting of subensembles; it yields a result, in this case either the property represented by $`|b_+b_+|`$ or the property represented by $`|b_{}b_{}|`$. Thereafter Kastner states what she takes to be “the basic conceptual problem”: “in considering a counterfactual measurement of the spin along $`𝐜`$ (observable $`\sigma _c`$) \[at an intermediate time $`t`$\] we must take into account all the effects of that measurement on the system. The measurement of the observable $`\sigma _c`$ results in a change in the mixture $`M`$ of post-selected ensembles” into a different mixture $`M^{}`$. Kastner goes on to say that “the mixture, $`M`$ or $`M^{}`$, obtaining at time $`t_2`$ …must enter into the counterfactual calculation,” and that “the characterization of the mixture obtaining at $`t_2`$ must be included in the background condition statement …” Since this mixture depends on whether or not the $`\sigma _c`$ measurement is performed at the time $`t`$, Kastner concludes that the statement of background conditions holding when the antecedent is false (no intervening measurement) becomes false when the antecedent holds, and is therefore not cotenable with the antecedent.

Kastner is led to this fallacious conclusion by conflating statements about ensembles with statements about individual systems. It is true that if we start with an ensemble of systems possessing property $`|a_+a_+|`$ at time $`t_1`$, the result or effect of an ensemble of $`\sigma _b`$ measurements performed at $`t_2`$ is a mixture $`M`$ consisting of two subensembles, one containing systems possessing the property $`|b_+b_+|`$, and another containing systems possessing the property $`|b_{}b_{}|`$, while the result or effect of two ensembles of measurements, one of $`\sigma _c`$ performed at time $`t`$ and one of $`\sigma _b`$ performed at time $`t_2`$, is a mixture $`M^{}`$ consisting of four subensembles corresponding to that many combinations of possible measurement outcomes. But all this is irrelevant to the truth of (A) or the cotenability of its antecedent with its background conditions, for (A) is a statement about an individual system, not a statement about an ensemble. The only effect of the intervening measurement on an individual system, under the specified background conditions, is that at the time $`t`$ it has either the property $`|c_+c_+|`$ or the property $`|c_{}c_{}|`$, neither of which it has if the intervening measurement is not made. The relevant question is not: Might the final measurement have a different outcome from the one it actually has if the $`\sigma _c`$ measurement were performed? The relevant question is: Are the background conditions—$`|a_+a_+|`$ possessed at $`t_1`$ and $`|b_+b_+|`$ possessed at $`t_2`$—consistent with both the truth and the falsity of the antecedent? The answer is affirmative, and this is sufficient for cotenability and hence for the legitimacy of (A).

In her Comment , Kastner introduces one Dr. X who asks himself the irrelevant question: “How might the data of my experiment have changed if I had made a measurement at time $`t`$ that I did not, in fact, make?” Obviously, Dr. X might not have obtained the result $`|bb|`$ at the time $`t_b`$. The counterfactual (A) addresses a different question in that it rules out this possibility. While Dr. X’s question assumes the possession of property $`|aa|`$ at time $`t_a`$, (A) in addition assumes the possession of property $`|bb|`$ at time $`t_b`$. According to Kastner, one gets from the question asked by Dr. X to the question addressed by (A) by requiring the following: “If a measurement of observable $`Q`$ had been performed, system $`S`$ would (with certainty) have been pre- and post-selected with outcomes $`a`$ and $`b`$ as in the actual world.” This requirement, so Kastner claims, correctly expresses the cotenability that is necessary for the consistency and the truth of (A). And since this requirement is obviously “not guaranteed to hold,” she concludes that the counterfactual statement (A) fails .

By requiring that system $`S`$ would with certainty have the properties $`a`$ and $`b`$ at the respective time $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, Kastner introduces an element of nomological necessity that makes nonsense of (A). What she thereby refutes is not (A) but the following counterfactual (A), which requires no refutation because it is patently false:

If a measurement of observable $`Q`$ were performed on an ensemble of systems between an actually performed measurement of observable $`A`$ at time $`t_a`$ and an actually performed measurement of observable $`B`$ at time $`t_b`$, but no measurement is actually made between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, then the measurement of $`Q`$ would yield $`q_i`$ with probability $`p(q_i|a,b)`$, and the measurements of $`A`$ and $`B`$ would (with certainty) yield the respective outcomes $`a`$ and $`b`$.”

The counterfactual (A) attributes a probability to a possible result of a possible measurement hypothetically performed at time $`t`$ on an individual system $`S`$ which (in the actual world) happens to possess the properties $`a`$ and $`b`$ at the respective times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$. As has been explained at length in Ref. , nothing ever causes (i) a measurement, qua attempt to determine the value of some observable, to yield a result or (ii) a measurement, qua successful determination of the value of some observable, to take place. In other words, the actual events or states of affairs that indicate the possession of a contingent property (by a system) or of a value (by an observable) are causal primaries, and this not in the sense that nothing ever causes a measurement to yield this particular value rather than that, but in the sense that nothing ever causes a measurement to be successful or to take place. (A causal primary is an event or state of affairs the occurrence or existence of which is not necessitated by any cause, antecedent or otherwise.) What the laws of quantum mechanics encapsulate is statistical correlations between causal primaries. If we take certain measurement results as given, we can use those laws to assign probabilities to the possible results of other measurements, which may or may not be performed. In particular, we can consider the possession of $`a`$ (at time $`t_a`$) and of $`b`$ (at time $`t_b`$) as given, and use the laws of quantum mechanics to assign probabilities to the possible results of a not actually performed intervening measurement. In so doing we do not assume that the occurrences of the measurements at $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ are necessitated by anything, let alone that the respective outcomes $`a`$ and $`b`$ are.

The only way to test probability assignments is to determine relative frequencies with the help of appropriately selected ensembles. In the case of (A), the appropriate ensemble is an ensemble of possible worlds in which system $`S`$ is identically “prepared” or “pre-selected” as well as identically “retropared” or “post-selected,” and in which the $`Q`$ measurement is made. Although Kastner introduces one Dr. X who is “associated with” all of those possible worlds, it is obvious that this ensemble is not empirically accessible. It is possible, however, to reproduce this ensemble in the actual world, by turning it into an ensemble of identically “prepared” and “retropared” copies of $`S`$. In order to render testable the probabilities that (A) assigns, we have no choice but to use an ensemble of pre- and post-selected systems. Yet the probabilities that (A) assigns are single-case probabilities; they are assigned to the possible outcomes of a single measurement on a single system that happens to possess property $`a`$ at time $`t_a`$ and property $`b`$ at time $`t_b`$. The selection does not reflect any nomological constraint but merely serves to make those probabilities measurable.

Kastner is committed to denying that counterfactual probability assignments can be tested inasmuch as she considers the probabilities that can be measured (using pre- and post-selected ensembles) to differ quantitatively from the corresponding counterfactual probabilities. Accordingly, she considers statement (A) to be distinct from the following statement:

In a possible world in which observable $`Q`$ is measured at time $`t`$ and system $`S`$ yields outcomes $`|aa|`$ and $`|bb|`$ at times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, respectively, the probability of obtaining result $`q_i`$ is given by $`p(q_i|a,b)`$.

To claim a quantitative difference between counterfactual and non-counterfactual assignments of quantum-mechanical probabilities or a significant difference between statements (A) and (B) is to misunderstand the meaning of counterfactual assignments of quantum-mechanical probabilities. Saying that $`p(q_i|a,b)`$ is the (objective) probability with which $`q_i`$ would be obtained, given the outcomes $`|aa|`$ and $`|bb|`$ at the respective times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$, is in all relevant respects exactly the same as saying that $`p(q_i|a,b)`$ is the (subjective) probability with which $`q_i`$ is obtained given the same outcomes at times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$. What else could statement (A) possibly mean?

None of the arguments marshaled by Kastner and the authors cited by her succeed in proving that statement (B) “differs significantly” from statement (A). That the outcome at $`t_b`$ might be different from $`|bb|`$ if the $`Q`$ measurement were made, given the outcome at $`t_a`$ alone, is irrelevant since the outcomes at $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ are both given. The argument from cotenability fails because it conflates statements about individual systems with statements about ensembles of systems. The attempt to replace $`p(q_i|a,b)`$ (eq. 6) by $`p_K(q_i|a,b)`$ (eq. 8) in (A) and the attempt to show that counterfactual uses of the ABL rule yield consequences that are inconsistent with quantum theory, both fail because they combine expressions that imply that the $`Q`$ measurement is both performed and not performed. One does not do justice to the counterfactuality of probability assignments by arguments that begin by assuming that $`Q`$ is not measured and end up by assuming that $`Q`$ is measured. One does it justice by considering possible worlds in which $`Q`$ is measured or a suitably pre- and post-selected ensemble of actual-world systems.

## 4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBJECTIVE <br>PROBABILITIES

In this section I want to elucidate the significance of the existence of objective probabilities. Such probabilities are not merely best guesses based on a complete knowledge, and thus free from any element of ignorance; they also tell us something important about the objective world.

To begin with, let us consider the following experiment . A particle initially in possession of the property $`|\psi _1\psi _1|`$ is eventually found in possession of the property $`|\psi _2\psi _2|`$, where $`|\psi _1=(|A+|B+|C)/\sqrt{3}`$ and $`|\psi _2=(|A+|B|C)/\sqrt{3}`$. The projection operators $`𝐏_A=|AA|`$, $`𝐏_B`$, and $`𝐏_C`$ represent the respective properties of being inside one of three sealed boxes $`A`$, $`B`$, and $`C`$ at an intermediate time $`t`$. The ABL probability of finding the particle inside box $`A`$ at the time $`t`$ is

$$p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)=\frac{\left|\psi _1|𝐏_A|\psi _2\right|^2}{_j\left|\psi _1|𝐏_j|\psi _2\right|^2}.$$
(13)
As it stands, $`p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)`$ is underdetermined. To assign to it a value, we still have to specify exactly which observable is being measured. If it is the observable $`Q`$ whose eigenkets are $`|A`$, $`|B`$, and $`|C`$, the denominator is given by

$$\left|\psi _1|𝐏_A|\psi _2\right|^2+\left|\psi _1|𝐏_B|\psi _2\right|^2+\left|\psi _1|𝐏_C|\psi _2\right|^2=\frac{1}{9}+\frac{1}{9}+\frac{1}{9}=\frac{1}{3}.$$
(14)
Since the numerator is equal to $`1/9`$, $`p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)`$ is equal to $`1/3`$. If on the other hand we measure the binary observable $`Q_A=𝐏_A`$, the denominator is given by

$$\left|\psi _1|𝐏_A|\psi _2\right|^2+\left|\psi _1|(𝐏_B+𝐏_C)|\psi _2\right|^2=\frac{1}{9}+0=\frac{1}{9},$$
(15)
and $`p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)`$ is equal to $`1`$. By the same token, if we measure $`Q`$ then $`p(B|\psi _1,\psi _2)=1/3`$, and if we measure $`Q_B`$ then $`p(B|\psi _1,\psi _2)=1`$.

I would like to discuss these results in the context of a somewhat more realistic setup. Consider a wall $`W`$ in which there are three holes $`A`$, $`B`$ and $`C`$. In front of the wall there is a particle source $`E`$. Behind the wall there is a particle detector $`D`$. Both $`E`$ and $`D`$ are equidistant from the three holes. Behind $`C`$ there is a device that causes a phase shift by $`\pi `$. $`𝐏_j`$ now represents the alternative “the particle goes through hole $`j`$”, where $`j`$ may also stand for a union like $`BC`$, the opening made up of $`B`$ and $`C`$. For particles emitted by $`E`$ the prior probability measure (with respect to the time at which they pass the wall) thus is $`|\psi _1`$, and for particles detected by $`D`$ the posterior probability measure (with respect to the same time) is $`|\psi _2`$. To measure $`Q_A`$, we place near $`A`$ a device $`F_A`$ that beeps whenever a particle passes through $`A`$. To measure $`Q_B`$, we place near $`B`$ a device $`F_B`$ that beeps whenever a particle passes through $`B`$. To measure $`Q`$, we use both devices. (If the devices are 100% efficient, the absence of a beep then tells us that the particle went through $`C`$.)

What we just found is this: If only $`F_A`$ is in place, the particle goes through $`A`$ with probability one (assuming, of course, that it is both emitted by $`E`$ and detected by $`D`$). If only $`F_B`$ is in place, the particle goes through $`B`$ with probability one. If both beepers are in place, the particle is equally likely to go through any of the three holes. Hence ABL probabilities in general are contextual—they depend on the distinctions that a particular setup permits us to make . By measuring $`Q`$ we can tell whether the particle goes through $`A`$, through $`B`$, or through $`C`$. By measuring $`Q_A`$, we can tell whether it goes through $`A`$ or through $`BC`$. With the former setup (both beepers in place) three properties are available for predication—“through $`A`$”, “through $`B`$”, and “through $`C`$”,—with the latter (one beeper in place) only two are available. With the former setup three spatial distinctions are warranted—between $`A`$ and $`B`$, between $`A`$ and $`C`$, and between $`B`$ and $`C`$,—with the latter only one is warranted. $`p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)`$ depends on the spatial distinctions that are warranted within the complement of $`A`$ in $`ABC`$. If none are warranted by the experimental setup then $`p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)=1`$. If the distinction between $`B`$ and $`C`$ is warranted by the setup then $`p(A|\psi _1,\psi _2)=1/3`$.

The contextuality of objective ABL probabilities makes it obvious that probability one does not imply actual possession of a value (by an observable) or of a property (by a physical system): From our ability to infer with probability one the result of measuring a physical quantity at time $`t`$, it does not follow that at the time $`t`$ there exists an element of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having a value equal to the predicted measurement result. Hence the only reason we have for attributing a contingent property $`q`$ to a physical system or a value $`v`$ to a quantum-mechanical observable is the occurrence/existence of an actual event or state of affairs from which the possession of $`q`$ or $`v`$ can be inferred, or by which it is indicated. In other words, the contextuality of ABL probabilities implies that the contingent properties of physical systems are extrinsic: They supervene on what happens or is the case in the rest of the world. To paraphrase Wheeler , no property is a possessed property unless it is an indicated property. In short, owing to their contextuality, ABL probabilities cannot be assigned without specifying the range of values of an observable that is measured or assumed to be measured; and owing to their extrinsic nature, contingent properties cannot be attributed unless their possession is warranted by facts .

It may be held that, unlike an ABL probability equal to one, a Born probability equal to one is sufficient for the possession of a value , or that an element of reality corresponding to an eigenvalue of an observable $`Q`$ exists at a time $`t`$ if the Born probability measure for the time $`t`$ has the pure form $`|\psi (t)\psi (t)|`$ and $`|\psi (t)`$ is an eigenstate of $`Q`$. But this is an error. The extrinsic nature of contingent properties can be established without invoking ABL probabilities . The contextuality of ABL probabilities merely confirms it .

Cohen  states that in standard quantum mechanics, probabilities for obtaining particular results are not contextual. What he means is that Born probabilities are not contextual. As was shown in Sec. 2, both the Born rule and the ABL rule follow straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties as projection operators on a Hilbert space. Both therefore are tools of standard quantum mechanics. Cohen further states that the product rule is always valid in standard quantum mechanics. According to the product rule, if $`X`$ and $`Y`$ are commuting observables, if a measurement of $`X`$ will yield $`x`$ with Born probability one and a measurement of $`Y`$ will yield $`y`$ with Born probability one, then a measurement of $`XY`$ will yield $`xy`$ with Born probability one. This too is a statement about Born probabilities, not a statement about standard quantum mechanics. ABL probabilities do not always satisfy the product rule, and therefore standard quantum mechanics does not always satisfy the product rule. The operators $`Q_A=𝐏_A`$ and $`Q_B=𝐏_B`$ commute; an intervening measurement of $`Q_A`$ would yield $`1`$ (“through $`A`$”) with probability one; an intervening measurement of $`Q_B`$ would yield 1 (“through $`B`$”) with probability one; yet a measurement of $`Q_AQ_B`$ would yield nothing because (i) $`Q_AQ_B=0`$ and (ii) there is no world in which $`Q_AQ_B`$ can be measured. While $`Q_A`$ is measured in worlds in which only $`F_A`$ is in place, $`Q_B`$ is measured in worlds in which only $`F_B`$ is in place. Hence it is logically impossible for both $`Q_A`$ and $`Q_B`$ to be measured in the same world. What is measured in a world in which both beepers are in place is not $`Q_AQ_B`$ but $`Q`$. Thus the product rule is “violated” only by combinations of counterfactual statements referring to different possible worlds.

Either type of probability has its specific use. The ABL rule is obviously of no use for predicting, on the basis of data obtained before time $`t`$, the result of a measurement performed at the time $`t`$, for its application presupposes knowledge of the results of measurements performed after the time $`t`$. \[Even if the measurement at the time $`t`$ is the last measurement ever to be performed on the system, we would have to know this in order to have sufficient information for applying the ABL rule (6) with the trivial property $`\mathrm{𝟏}`$ in place of $`|bb|`$.\] For predictions, we must use the Born rule. The Born rule, on the other hand, is of little use when it comes to sounding the ontological implications of quantum mechanics, for these must be based on objective probabilities (which are free of any element of ignorance), and such probabilities, as was shown in Sec. 2, are ABL probabilities.

With Mermin  I believe that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be reduced to the single puzzle posed by the existence of objective probabilities. As I see it, the key to this puzzle is the contingent reality of spatial and temporal distinctions . We are neurophysiologically disposed to think of space as something that exists by itself (rather than by virtue of the relational properties of matter), that contains matter (rather than spatial relations between material objects), and that is intrinsically and infinitely differentiated and thus adequately represented by a set of points that can be labeled by triplets of real numbers . Yet if all conceivable spatial divisions were intrinsic to space, they would have an unconditional reality, and one of the following statements would necessarily be true of every object $`S`$ contained in the union $`RR^{}`$ of two spatial regions: (i) $`S`$ is inside $`R`$; (ii) $`S`$ is inside $`R^{}`$; (iii) $`S`$ has two parts, one in $`R`$ and one in $`R^{}`$. No particle could ever pass through the union of two slits without passing through either slit in particular and without consisting of parts that pass through different slits. But this is precisely what particles do when interference fringes are observed in two-slit experiments (and we do not postulate hidden variables). Hence, spatial divisions cannot be intrinsic to space. They have a contingent reality. Like the contingent properties of quantum-mechanical systems, they are extrinsic; they supervene on the actual goings-on in the physical world, and they may be real for one object and nonexistent for another.

It is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics that the probability of a process $`𝒫`$ capable of following several alternatives depends on whether or not the alternative taken by the process is indicated or capable of being indicated. If something indicates the alternative taken or if this is capable of being indicated, the probability of the process is given by the sum of the probabilities associated with its alternatives. By “capable of being indicated” I mean that the alternatives of $`𝒫`$ are correlated with the alternatives of another process $`𝒫^{}`$ such that a determination of the alternative taken by $`𝒫^{}`$ reveals the alternative taken by $`𝒫`$. (Paradigm examples of this kind of a situation are the experiments of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen  and of Englert, Scully, and Walther .) On the other hand, if nothing either indicates or is capable of indicating the alternative taken by the process, the probability of the process is given by the absolute square of the sum of the amplitudes associated with the alternatives. What is the meaning of this fundamental principle?

I submit that if the alternative taken is indicated, we add probabilities because in this case the conceptual distinction that we make between the alternatives has a reality for the process or the system undergoing it—the distinction corresponds to something in the objective world. If the alternative taken is neither indicated nor capable of being indicated, we add amplitudes because in this case the conceptual distinction that we make between the alternatives has no reality for the process or the system undergoing it—the distinction corresponds to nothing in the objective world . In our three-hole experiment it is the presence of $`F_A`$ that makes the spatial distinction between $`A`$ and $`BC`$ a reality for the particle. Assuming the beepers to be 100% efficient , the presence of $`F_A`$ warrants two objective truth values, one for the proposition “The particle goes through $`A`$” and one for the proposition “The particle goes through $`BC`$”. The existence of these two truth values warrants the reality, for the particle, of the distinction between the two spatial regions $`A`$ and $`BC`$. The reality of this distinction is the reason why in the denominator of the right-hand side of eq. (13) we add the probabilities associated with the alternatives represented by $`𝐏_A`$ and $`𝐏_{BC}=𝐏_B+𝐏_C`$ (eq. 15). By the same token, the presence of both beepers warrants objective truth values for three propositions, “The particle goes through $`A`$”, “The particle goes through $`B`$”, and “The particle goes through $`C`$”. The existence of these three truth value warrants the reality, for the particle, of the distinction between the three spatial regions $`A`$, $`B`$ and $`C`$. The reality of this distinction is the reason why in the denominator of the right-hand side of eq. (13) we add the probabilities associated with the alternatives represented by $`𝐏_A`$, $`𝐏_B`$, and $`𝐏_C`$ (eq. 14).

It needs to be stressed that this explanation of the uncertainty principle—as stated by Feynman and Hibbs : Any determination of the alternative taken by a process capable of following more than one alternative destroys the interference between alternatives—owes nothing to the ABL rule. It rests on the fact that a successful measurement of an observable $`Q`$ with $`n`$ eigenvalues warrants attributing $`n`$ truth values to $`n`$ propositions, and thus warrants the objective distinctness of the $`n`$ alternatives. The contextuality of ABL probabilities (as well as Born probabilities ) merely emphasizes the contingent reality of the distinctions we are wont to make. Given two observables with a common eigenvalue $`q`$, the ABL probability associated with $`q`$ in general depends on which of the two observables is being measured—it depends on the entire spectrum of the observable being measured. In particular, the probability of finding that the particle goes through $`A`$ depends on whether or not our distinction between $`B`$ and $`C`$ is objectively warranted (that is, whether or not the measurement is capable of distinguishing between “The particle goes through $`B`$” and “The particle goes through $`C`$”).

The ontological significance of objective probabilities, then, is that they signal the unreality of some of the conceptual distinctions that we make. Since the warranted distinctions depend on what precisely is indicated, so do the probabilities of the corresponding alternatives.

If we conceptually partition space into smaller and smaller regions, we eventually arrive at a partition $`\{R_i\}`$ into finite (rather than infinitesimal) regions that are so small that the distinctions we make between them have no reality at all . Our spatial distinctions bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities. At a scale at which position-indicators (“detectors”) with sufficiently small and sufficiently localized sensitive regions no longer exist, all we can say is counterfactual and probabilistic. This tells us that the world is only finitely differentiated spacewise. Conversely, the limited spatial differentiation of the objective world finds its proper expression in counterfactual assignments of objective probabilities.

What is true of the world’s spatial aspect is equally true of its temporal aspect. There is no such thing as an intrinsically differentiated time, and therefore not only the contingent properties of things but also the times at which they are possessed are extrinsic. What is temporally differentiated is physical systems, and every physical system is temporally differentiated to the extent that it passes through successive states, in the proper sense of “state” that connotes properties indicated by facts. And since no finite system passes through an infinite number of successive states in a finite time span, no such system is infinitely differentiated timewise. The times that exist for a system $`S`$ are the (factually warranted) times at which it has (factually warranted) properties .

How, then, are we to conceive of system $`S`$ during the interval between the times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$? Since during this interval $`S`$ lacks factually warranted properties, all that can be said about $`S`$ between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ is counterfactual and probabilistic. Our conceptual temporal distinctions, too, bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities. Not only is there no state (in the proper sense just defined) that obtains during this interval, but also there is no time between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ at which any state could obtain.

The importance of this result cannot be overemphasized. It entails that the parameter $`t`$ appearing in the (prior) Born probability $`\left|a(t)|q_i\right|^2`$, in the posterior Born probability $`\left|q_i|b(t)\right|^2`$, and in the ABL probability $`\left|a(t)|q_iq_i|b(t)\right|^2/_j\left|a(t)|q_jq_j|b(t)\right|^2`$ cannot be interpreted as the time at which anything obtains per se. The parameter $`t`$ refers to the time of a measurement. Only if a measurement is actually made does it represent a time that exists for $`S`$ because only then is there a contingent property that can be attributed to $`S`$ at the time $`t`$. If the measurement is not actually made, the time at which it is made in a possible world does not exist for the actual-world edition of $`S`$. It follows in particular that neither the prior probability measure $`|a(t)`$ nor the posterior probability measure $`|b(t)`$ nor the ABL probability measure $`a(t)b(t)`$  can be interpreted as something that obtains at the time $`t`$ . If the measurement is made, what obtains at time $`t`$ is a result rather than a probability measure, and if the measurement is not actually made, there is no time $`t`$ at which anything concerning $`S`$ could obtain.

## 5 QUANTUM COUNTERFACTUALS <br>AND THE “FLOW” OF TIME

In this section I want to point out a common but unwarranted assumption about the temporal aspect of the physical world, and I want to show that this assumption leads to the views that Kastner is defending in her Comment . Needless to say, I cannot avow that she actually makes this assumption.

The conclusions we have reached in the previous section run counter to a common way of thinking about time, according to which the experiential now and the temporal distinctions that we base on it are features of the physical world—the world accessible to physics. The experiential now is temporally unextended and undifferentiated. If it did correspond to something in the physical world, this would seem to warrant the notion of an objective instantaneous state that evolves in an infinitely differentiated time. Yet this contradicts the fact that the world is only finitely differentiated timewise.

In truth, nothing in the physical world corresponds to the experiential now and the temporal distinctions that we base on it. There simply is no objective way to characterize the present or to distinguish between the past, the present, and the future. These distinctions can be characterized only subjectively, by how they relate to us: through memory, through the present-tense immediacy of qualia (introspectible properties like pink or turquoise), or through anticipation. In the world accessible to physics we may qualify events or states of affairs as past, present, or future relative to other events or states of affairs, but we cannot speak of the past, the present, or the future.

In classical physics this is not blindingly obvious. Classical physics is consistent with the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in an infinitely differentiated time, and that encapsulates not only possessed properties but also everything that (i) happened or obtained at earlier times and (ii) is causally relevant to what happens or obtains at later times. This is how we come to conceive of “fields of force” that evolve in time (and therefore, in a relativistic world, according to the principle of local causality) and that causally link earlier times to later times (and therefore, in a relativistic world, local causes to their distant effects). But this does not entail that the notion of an evolving instantaneous state is itself consistent. If we conceive of temporal relations in the physical world, we conceive of their relata at the same time even though they happen or obtain at different times. Since we can’t help it, that has to be OK. But it is definitely not OK if we introduce into our simultaneous and spatial mental picture of a temporal whole anything that evolves or advances across this temporal whole. One cannot represent a spatiotemporal whole as a simultaneous spatial whole and then imagine the present as advancing through it or an instantaneous state as evolving in it. To do this is to depict the spatiotemporal whole $`𝒰`$ as persisting unchanged in a time that is extraneous to $`𝒰`$, and to depict something as advancing or evolving across the unchanging $`𝒰`$ in that extraneous time. There is only one time, the fourth dimension of space-time. There is not another time in which anything evolves or advances across space-time as if space-time itself—rather than our mental picture of it—were a persisting and unchanging whole. If the present is anywhere in the spatiotemporal whole, it is trivially and vacuously everywhere—or, rather, everywhen.

To philosophers the perplexities and absurdities entailed by the notion of an advancing present or a flowing time are well known . Physicists began to recognize the subjectivity of the present and the nonexistence of an evolving instantaneous state with the discovery of the relativity of simultaneity. In the well-known words of Hermann Weyl, “The objective world simply is; it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time.”  Yet the non-objectivity of the now remains deeply counterintuitive . Where space is concerned, we have no difficulty in abstracting from our subjective, perspectival point of view and adopt “the view from nowhere” . Where time is concerned, we find it incomparably more difficult to abstract from our subjective, present-centered point of view and adopt “the view from nowhen” , not least because this seems to conflict with our incorrigible self-perception as free agents, which seems to require an open future .

In the world of physics, the future is as closed as the past. (This follows directly from the non-objectivity of the distinction between the future and the past.) If system $`S`$ has property $`|aa|`$ at time $`t_a`$ and property $`|bb|`$ at time $`t_b`$, then it always has been and always will be true that system $`S`$ has these properties at the respective times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$. There is nothing objectively or physically open about this. All that is “open” in respect of this is our knowledge, prior to these times, of the properties possessed at these times. What is (and always has been and always will be) objectively or physically open is the results of unperformed measurements. That is why we can assign to them objective probabilities.

If we retain the fallacious notion of the objectivity of the now and of the temporal distinctions that are based on it, or if we subscribe to the ensuing idea of an evolving instantaneous state, we are committed to regarding system $`S`$ as infinitely differentiated timewise and to attributing to $`S`$ a state that obtains at every instant of time. Quantum mechanics offers us not one but three candidates for such a state: the “prepared” or “retarded” state $`|a(t)`$, the “retropared” or “advanced” state $`|b(t)`$, and the time-symmetric two-state $`a(t)b(t)`$. For reasons that are psychological rather than physical, quantum realists usually settle for $`|a(t)`$, which leads to the well-known measurement problem. (The projection postulate is as mysterious when applied to evolving states of affairs as it is trivial when applied to probability measures.)

Another consequence of the myth of an evolving instantaneous state is that a difference in what obtains at the intermediate time $`t`$ must make a difference to what obtains at later (earlier) times given that it makes no difference to what obtains at earlier (later) times. The intervening measurement “disturbs the system”—an ubiquitous but illegitimate phraseology found, for instance, in Sharp and Shanks ,—with the result that the “disturbed” system is necessarily different from the “undisturbed” system either before or after the “disturbance” (or both). This notion implies an apparent infringement of cotenability: The state that obtains before the hypothetical measurement of $`Q`$ and the state that obtains after this measurement cannot be both independent of the truth value of the antecedent of (A). As Kastner puts it, “holding fixed both pre- and post-selection states”  is impossible. If the prepared state $`|a`$ obtains before the $`Q`$ measurement at time $`t`$ then either $`|a`$ or one of the eigenstates of $`Q`$ obtains after the time $`t`$, depending on whether or not the measurement is made. If the retropared state $`|b`$ obtains after the time $`t`$ then either $`|b`$ or one of the eigenstates of $`Q`$ obtains before the time $`t`$, depending on whether or not the measurement is made . (If one thinks of $`ab`$ as the state that obtains between $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ in the absence of an intervening measurement, an intervening measurement changes both the earlier and the later state: If the measurement yields $`q_i`$, the former state becomes $`aq_i`$ while the latter state becomes $`q_ib`$.)

The relevant background conditions, however, are not probability measures, nor are these states that obtain. The relevant background conditions are the possessed properties that determine probability measures. The unmeasured system differs from its possible-world counterpart neither at the times $`t_a`$ and $`t_b`$ (at which times the same properties are possessed in both worlds) nor during the intervals between $`t_a`$ and $`t`$ and between $`t`$ and $`t_b`$ (during which intervals no properties are possessed in either world) but only at the time $`t`$, which exists for the measured system but not for the unmeasured one. The intervening measurement has no influence whatsoever on what obtains at any other time. It has an influence on some probability measures but none on the relevant probability measures. The relevant probability measures are the prior probability measure $`|a`$ for times earlier than $`t`$ and the posterior probability measure $`|b`$ for times later than $`t`$, while what is affected by the intervening measurement is the prior probability measure $`|a`$ for times later than $`t`$ and the posterior probability measure $`|b`$ for times earlier than $`t`$. The ABL probability for the time $`t`$ is obtained by combining, according to Bayes’ theorem, the probabilities that are unaffected by the measurement, and thus it is independent of whether or not the measurement is actually performed.

Cohen  appears to reject the counterfactual use of the ABL rule not only on the basis of the intrinsically inconsistent eq. (9) but also on the ground that that use is “not consistent with realist interpretations of quantum mechanics.” This, however, is no ground for rejecting counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. Rather, it is ground for rejecting realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. By “realist interpretations” Cohen may mean interpretations that endorse either Redhead’s sufficiency condition , according to which Born probability one implies the existence of an element of reality, or the so-called “eigenstate-eigenvalue link,” according to which “being in” an eigenstate of some observable implies the same. In point of fact, neither does imply the existence of an element of reality . Or else Cohen may mean interpretations that construe probability measures as instantaneous states that evolve in an infinitely differentiated time. Such interpretations involve the double error of (i) treating time-dependent probability measures as if they were actual states and of (ii) extending temporal distinctions beyond the limits within which they are objectively warranted. Is instrumentalism the sole alternative to such realist interpretations? I submit that, on the contrary, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics can be found only when such realist interpretations are rejected. The highlights of that interpretation are the contingent reality of spatial and temporal distinctions and the existence of finite limits to the spatial and temporal differentiation of the physical world.

Acknowledgment

I wish to thank Ruth Kastner for a stimulating exchange of views that was of considerable help in preparing this article.


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# A possible experimental test to decide if quantum mechanical randomness is due to deterministic chaos in the underlying dynamics

## Abstract

A simple experiment using radioactive decay is proposed to test the possibility of a determinsistic, but chaotic, origin of quantum mechanical randomness.

In a recently proposed mechanism for understanding the “measurement problem” in quantum mechanics , i.e., the transition from quantum to classical behaviour, the possibility arise that the quantum mechanical randomness actually can derive from deterministic chaos in the fundamental non-abelian interactions. An experiment to test this possibility could in principle be devised in analogy to the confirmation of deterministic chaos in a dripping water tap by Shaw and collaborators ,.

If we replace the dripping tap with a suitable radioactive substance (presumably a fairly small sample with simple decay and low activity), the time-series, i.e., the string of time intervals between observed decays, can be used to try to observe a chaotic attractor by applying a method , of converting a single time series into a phase space portrait via “delay coordinate embedding”. This can be accomplished, assuming a suitably low-dimensional attractor, by defining the coordinates as follows

$$x=t_i,y=t_{i+1},z=t_{i+2},$$
(1)
where $`t_i`$ is the time interval between decay $`i`$ and $`i+1`$ in the time series, and so on. A given $`i`$ then gives a point, $`(x,y,z)`$, in phase space. To give an example, the seemingly random data in Fig.1 is actually due to the very simple “logistic mapping”, $`x_{n+1}=kx_n(1x_n)`$, in its highly chaotic regime with $`k=4`$. The reconstructed attractor, using the method described above, is seen in Fig.2 (2-D) and in Fig.3 (3-D). We do not, however, expect that an eventual attractor in quantum mechanical data will be so simple and low-dimensional.

If the seemingly random decay of radioactive nuclei, obeying quantum mechanics, give rise to a distinct attractor (or possibly several attractors) with non-integer fractal dimension, onto which the phase space points are concentrated, it would be a clear indication that the decay is actually the consequence of dynamical deterministic chaos, in direct analogy to how the experiment  revealed deterministic chaos in the dynamics of the dripping water tap. For examples of qualitatively typical chaotic attractors see, e.g., the figures in . The exact shape, dimension and complexity of the attractor is governed by the detailed underlying dynamics. The rest of the analysis carries through just like in . In fact, in the present case it is in principle even easier to obtain a result as any observed structure indicates a deviation from the usual assumption of total stochasticity of quantum mechanics, as it is normally assumed that, e.g., the decay of an individual nucleus is an independent and truly random process. A practical problem is of course that there exist no perfect detectors, which results in missing part of the time series and also in the introduction of noise in the data. The more of the time series one misses, the harder it becomes to reconstruct an (eventual) attractor.

If, however, no attractor is found in the experimental data, i.e., if the points are scattered randomly in phase space and no structure whatsoever is seen, as in Fig.4, where every $`t_i`$ has been generated at random, then quantum mechanical “measurements” (e.g., decays) probably cannot be described by deterministic equations, and some truly stochastic effect(s) must instead be at work, as assumed in orthodox quantum mechanics.

Hence, it should be possible to falsify the hypothesis that quantum randomness is due to underlying deterministic dynamics, without having to penetrate the details of the very complicated equations of non-abelian gauge fields .

Not being an experimentalist, and due to the very crude experimental setup used, the data in Fig.5 is included for illustrative purposes only. This trial setup consisted of samples of Cs-137 and Am-241 at 5 cm distance from a GM-counter (Pasco SN-7927) with accompanying computer software. It is included only as an incentive for hopefully initiating more elaborate, controlled and detailed investigations by experimental physicists. The data in Fig.5 is from Am-241, but the data from Cs-137 gave a similar picture. It seemingly differs from the random distribution in Fig.4, and also from a normal (Gaussian) distribution around a given mean, Fig.6.

The lognormal distribution in Fig.7 somewhat resembles the data. No simple attractor in phase space is visible in the obtained data points, Fig.5. However, as the experimental setup due to its geometry and crudeness misses most part of the time series, one cannot draw the conclusion that no attractor is present. Therefore, a sensitive $`4\pi `$-detector would be very helpful for further investigations. Also, if a relatively small number of unstable particles (cold neutrons?) could be isolated, repeating the experiment several times, more controlled time series could be obtained.