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# Intelligent systems in the context of surrounding environment

## I Introduction

Much research has been done into the computational possibilities of neural networks. Yet the engineering and industrial applications of these models have often eclipsed their use in trying to come to an understanding of naturally occurring neural systems.

Whereas in engineering we often use single neural networks to attack a single problem, in nature we see neural systems in competition. Humans, for example, invest in the stock market, attempt to beat their business rivals, or, in extreme examples, plan wars against each other. We are, as Darwin identified a century and a half ago, in competition for natural resources; our neural systems—i.e. our brains—are among the main tools we have to help us succeed in that competition.

In collaboration with Chialvo, one of the authors of this paper has developed a neural network model that provides a biologically plausible learning system BC , based essentially around ‘Darwinian selection’ of successful behavioral patterns. This simple ‘minibrain’—as we will refer to it from now on—has been shown to be an effective learning system, being able to solve such problems as the exclusive-or (xor) problem and the parity problem. Crucially, it has also been shown to be easily able to *un-learn* patterns of behavior once they become unproductive—an extremely important aspect of animal learning—while still being able to remember previously successful responses, in case they should prove useful in the future. These capabilities, combined with the simplicity of the model, provide a powerful case for biological feasibility.

In choosing a competitive framework for this neural network, we follow the example of Metzler, Kinzel and Kanter MKK , using the delightfully simple model of competition within a population provided by the Minority Model of Challet and Zhang CZ  (itself based on the ‘El Farol’ bar problem created by Arthur Art ). In this game, a population of agents has to decide, independently of each other, which of two groups they wish to join. Whoever is on the minority side ‘wins’ and is given a point. By combining these two models—replacing the fixed strategies of agents in Challet and Zhang’s model with agents controlled by the Minibrain neural system—we have a model of neural systems in competition in the real world.

This is not the first model of coevolution of strategies in a competitive game—a particularly interesting example is Lindgren and Nordahl’s investigation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where players on a cellular grid evolve and mutate strategies according to a genetic algorithm LN . However, we believe that the biological inspiration for the Minibrain model, and its demonstrated capacity for fast adaption, makes our model of special interest.

The structure of this paper is as follows: we begin with a discussion of what we mean when we talk about ‘intelligence’, noting how historical influences have shaped our instinctive ideas on this subject in potentially misleading ways; in particular, we take issue with the suggestion that a creature’s intelligence can be thought of as separate from its physical nature. We suggest that intelligence can only be measured in the context of the surrounding environment of the organism being studied: we must always consider the *embodiment* of any intelligent system.

This is followed by the account of the computer experiments we have conducted, in which we investigate the behavioral patterns produced in the Minibrain/Minority Model combination, and the ways in which they are affected by changing agent characteristics. We show how significant crowding behavior occurs within groups of agents with the same memory value, and demonstrate how this can allow a minority of high-memory agents to take advantage of the majority population and ‘win’ on a regular basis—and, by the same token, condemn a population of largely similar agents to continually losing. Indeed, perhaps the most startling implication of this model is that, in a competitive situation, having a ‘strategy’ might well prove worse than simply making random decisions.

These results are in strong contrast with those of Metzler, Kinzel and Kanter, whose paper inspired these experiments. In their simulations, a homogeneous population of perceptron agents relaxes to a stable state where all agents have an average 50% success rate, and overall population performance is better than random MKK . The perceptrons learn, in effect, to produce an efficient market system, and do not suffer from the crowding effect produced by minibrain agents. By the same token, however, it seems unlikely that a superior perceptron could win on a similar scale to a superior Minibrain.

We conclude with further discussion of the nature of intelligence, suggesting a conceptual approach that we believe will enable easier investigation of both natural and artificially created intelligent systems. Having already suggested that we must consider ‘embodied’ intelligences, we provide criteria for cataloguing that embodiment, consisting of hardwired parts—the input and output systems of the organism, the feedback mechanism that judges the success or failure of behavioral patterns—alongside a dynamic decision-making system that maps input to output and updates its methodology according to the signals received from the feedback system.

## II What is ‘Intelligence’?

The *E. Coli* bacterium has a curious mode of behavior. If it senses glucose in its immediate surroundings, it will move in the direction of this sweet nourishment. If it does not, it will flip over and move a certain distance in a random direction, before taking stock again, and so on and so on until it finds food.

Bacteria are generally not considered to be ‘intelligent’. Yet this is a systematic response to environmental stimuli, not necessarily the *best* response but nevertheless a *working* response, a ‘satisficing’ response. The *E. Coli* bacterium is responding in an intelligent way to the problem of how to find food. How do we square this with our instinctive feeling that bacteria are *not* intelligent? Are our instincts mistaken? How, instinctively, do we define intelligence?

Historically, philosophers have often proposed the idea of a separation between ‘body’ and ‘mind’. The human mind, from this point of view, is something special, something distinct, something not bound up in the messy business of the real world. It’s this, we are told, that separates us from the animals: we have this magical ability to *understand*, to *think*, to *comprehend*—the ability to view the world in a rational, abstract way and thus arrive at some fundamental *truth* about how the universe works.

The idea of separate compartments of reality for body and mind has lost its stranglehold over our way of thinking, but its influence lingers on in our concept of intelligence. Our minds, our consciousness, may be the result of physical processes, but we still cling to the idea that we have the ability to discover an abstract reality, and it’s this idea that informs our notion of ‘intelligence’. An intelligent being is one that can see beyond its own personal circumstances, one that is capable of looking at the world around it in an objective fashion. Given enough time, it can (theoretically) solve any problem you care to put before it. It is capable of rising above the environment in which it exists, and comprehending the nature of True Reality.

Naturally, this has informed our ideas about artificial intelligence. An artificially intelligent machine will be one that works in this same environmentally uninhibited manner. If we tell it to drive a car, it will be able (given time to teach itself) to drive a car. If we tell it to cook a meal, it will be able to cook a meal. If we tell it to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem … All of these, of course, assume that we have given it some kind of hardware with which to gather input and make output to the relevant system, whether car, kitchen or math textbook—assume, indeed, that we have these systems present at all—and it’s this necessity that causes us to realize that in fact, *the mind and its surrounding environment (including the physical body of the individual) are inseparable.* Our brains are the product of evolution; they are not an abstract, infinite system for solving abstract, infinite problems, but rather a very particular system for solving the very particular problems involved in coping with the environmental pressures about us. In this respect, we’re no different from the *E. Coli* bacterium we discussed earlier: the environments we inhabit are different, and consequently so are our behavioral patterns, but on a conceptual level there is nothing to choose between us.

*Intelligence only exists in the context of its surrounding environment.* So, if we are to attempt to create an artificial intelligence system, we must necessarily also define a world in which it will operate. And the question of *how* intelligent that system is can only be answered by examining how good it is at coping with the problems this world throws up, by its ability to utilize the data available to it to find working solutions to these problems.

## III ‘Minibrain’ Agents in the Minority Model

The ‘minibrain’ neural system, developed by one of the authors in collaboration with Chialvo BC , is an extremal dynamics-based decision-making system that responds to input by choosing from a finite set of outputs, the choice being determined by Darwinian selection of good (i.e. successful) responses to previous inputs (negative feedback). We use the simple layered version of this model, consisting of a layer of input neurons, a single intermediary layer of neurons, and a layer of output neurons; each input neuron is connected to every intermediary neuron by a synapse, and similarly each intermediary neuron is connected to every output neuron. Every synapse is assigned a ‘strength’, initially a random number between $`0`$ and $`1`$.

Competing against each other in the Minority Model, each agent receives data about the past, and gives as output which of the two the groups—we label them $`0`$ and $`1`$—that it wishes to join. We follow the convention of Challet and Zhang’s version of the game, that this knowledge is limited to knowing which side was the minority (i.e. winning) group at each turn in a finite number of past turns CZ , so that agent input can be represented by a binary number of $`m`$ bits, where $`m`$ is the agent’s memory. So, for example, if in the last three turns group $`0`$ lost, then won, then won again, this would be represented by the binary number $`110`$, where the left-most bit represents the most recent turn, and each bit is determined by the number of the *losing* (majority) group that turn (we choose these settings in order to match the way our computer code is set up).

In order to preserve symmetry of choice between the two groups, an agent with a memory of $`m`$ turns will have $`2m`$ input neurons, with the first of the $`i`$th pair of neurons firing if the bit representing the result $`i`$ turns ago is $`0`$, the second neuron of the $`i`$th pair firing if the result was $`1`$. For example, if an agent with a memory of $`3`$ (and hence with $`6`$ input neurons) is given the past $`110`$ as we discussed above, then the second, fourth and fifth input neurons will fire. Fig. 1 gives a picture of this architecture (to avoid over-complicating the diagram, not all connections are shown).

To determine the intermediary neuron that fires, we take for each the sum of the strengths of the synapses connecting it to the firing input neurons. The intermediary neuron with the greatest such sum is the one that fires. Then, the output neuron that fires ($`0`$ or $`1`$) is the one connected to the firing intermediary neuron by the strongest synapse.

Each turn, the synapses used are ‘tagged’ with a chemical trace. If the output produced that turn is satisfactory (in this setup, if the agent joins the minority group), no further action is taken. If the output is not satisfactory, however, a global feedback signal (e.g. the release of some hormone) is sent to the system, and the tagged synapses are ‘punished’ for their involvement in this bad decision by having their strengths reduced (in our model, by a random number between $`0`$ and $`1`$). As we noted in the Introduction, this Darwinian selection of successful behavioral patterns has already been shown to be an effective learning system when ‘going solo’ BC ; how will it cope when placed in competition?

Fig. 2 shows the success rates of agents of different memory values. A group of $`251`$ agents has an even spread of memory values between $`1`$ and $`8`$; each agent has $`48`$ intermediary neurons. The figure shows their success rates over a period of $`2\times 10^4`$ turns.

To a certain extent, these results reflect those found by Challet and Zhang when they explore the behavior of a mixed population of fixed-strategy agents CZ , inasmuch as performance improves with higher memory but tends to saturate eventually. Standard deviation within each memory group is much lower for minibrain agents, however, suggesting crowding behaviour within memory groups, and we will later show that this does indeed occur.

Disappointingly, we see that not one agent achieves as much as a 50% success rate—they would all be better off tossing coins to make their decisions. The even spread of memory values throughout the population means that agents with higher memory values cannot take full advantage of their extra knowledge: the crowding behavior between agents with the same memory cancels out most of the positive effects. It’s no good having lots of data on which to base your decision if lots of other people have that same data—everyone will come to the same conclusion and, in the Minority Model, that means losing.

Necessarily, then, one of the conditions for an agent to succeed—i.e. to beat the coin-tossing strategy—is that there must be few other agents with the same amount of memory. This is demonstrated starkly in Fig. 3, displaying the results for a population of $`251`$ agents of whom *one* has a memory of $`3`$, the rest only $`2`$.

The astonishing success of this ‘rogue’ agent (it makes the right decision approximately 99.8% of the time) shows clearly just how important a factor this crowding behavior is in the success (or failure) of agents. The fact that this agent is the only one receiving the extra data means that he can use it to his advantage. Contrast this with the other agents who, for all their careful thinking, fail miserably because *almost all of them think alike—entirely independently—almost all of the time.*

This example leads us to ask the more general question: given a population of agents who all have memory $`m`$, can we always find such a ‘rogue’, an agent capable of understanding and thus beating the system? That it is not merely a matter of agent memory is amply demonstrated in Fig. 4, where we see a population of memory $`4`$ pitted against a rogue with a memory of $`8`$.

Despite its high memory value (twice that of the majority population) the rogue agent is unable to beat the coin-tossing strategy. Why is this? A higher memory value should, by our earlier results, always be an advantage. Certainly, since we have respected symmetry of choice between agent outputs, it should not be a *disadvantage*. What factor is it that prevents this agent from making full use of the memory available to it, memory which surely has within it useful data patterns that predict the behavior of the agents with memory $`4`$, and thus should allow the rogue agent the success we expect it to achieve?

The answer becomes clear when we examine the nature of the input that each agent receives—a binary number of length $`m`$, where $`m`$ is the value of the agent’s memory. So, it follows that the total possible number of inputs will be $`2^m`$. For an agent with memory $`4`$, this means $`16`$ possible inputs. For an agent with memory $`8`$, the total number of possible inputs is $`256`$. Compare this to the number of *intermediary* neurons possessed by each agent ($`48`$, in all the simulations we’ve run so far) and we realize that, while this is an adequate number for an agent receiving $`16`$ different possible inputs, it is wholly inadequate for an agent having to deal with some $`256`$ possible inputs. The number of intermediary neurons restricts the maximum performance of an agent by placing a limit on the amount of memory that can be effectively used.

Bearing this condition in mind, we run a new set of games, again with a majority population of memory $`4`$, but this time with a rogue of memory $`5`$, and with the number of intermediary neurons given to each agent varying in each of these games. Fig. 5 shows the results of games where agents have intermediary layers of, respectively, $`64`$, $`96`$, $`128`$ and $`256`$ neurons.

The implications are clear—it is the number of intermediary neurons, as well as the amount of memory, that control whether or not a rogue agent can succeed, and, if it does, by how much. A higher memory value will always be an advantage, but the degree to which it is advantageous will be determined by the number of intermediary neurons possessed. Memory, obviously, determines how much information an agent can receive; the intermediary neurons are what provide agents’ analytic capability.

Our computer simulations suggest that in situations such as the ones already discussed, with a majority population of memory $`m`$, it is the intermediary neurons, rather than the amount of memory possessed, that control the ability of a rogue agent to succeed. A memory of $`m+1`$ is all that is required, *provided* the rogue has enough intermediary neurons to be able to use it effectively.

We can muddy the waters, so to speak, by giving the majority population an evenly distributed *spread* of memory values (perhaps from $`1`$ to $`m`$) rather than a single value. Where a single memory value is used, the crowding behavior observed within memory groups will easily allow rogue agents to predict the minority group. With a series of different, smaller groups in competition, it becomes significantly less easy to make accurate predictions, and rogue agent success rates fall significantly. Herding sheep is fairly easy; jumping into the middle of a brawl is dangerous for anyone, even a world champion martial artist.

All things considered, it seems as though this may be the key point in determining agent success. An agent can only be truly successful if it has plenty of ‘prey’ whose weaknesses it can exploit. If the behavior of the prey is highly unpredictable, or the prey are capable of biting back, the agent’s chances of success are vastly reduced.

## IV Analysis of crowding behavior within memory groups

We have on several occasions referred to crowding behavior of minibrain agents within the same memory group. In this section, we give a brief mathematical analysis of what causes this to arise.

We begin with a simple case, assuming that all agents have the same memory value. Obviously, because of the nature of the game, a majority of these agents will behave in the same way each turn. What we show, however, is that this majority is significantly more than would be found if the agents were deciding randomly as to which group to join. Were agents to employ this strategy, the mean size of the (losing) majority group would be only a little over 50%.

We define by $`0x_i(I)<0.5`$ the proportion of agents in the minority group given input $`I`$, where the subscript $`i`$ is the number of times input $`I`$ has occurred before. If an input has not been seen before by agents, it follows that they will decide randomly which group to join, and so we have $`x_0(I)0.5`$ for all possible inputs $`I`$.

If an input *has* been seen before, it follows that those agents in the minority group on that occasion — i.e. those who were successful—will make the same decision as last time. Those who were unsuccessful last time will make a random decision as to which group to join: we can expect, on average, half of them to change their minds, half to stay with their previous choice.

The effect of this, ironically, is that this last group—the unsuccessful agents who keep with their previous choice—will probably (in fact, almost certainly) form the minority group this time round. And so we can define a recurrence relation,

$$x_{i+1}(I)\frac{1}{2}\left(1x_i(I)\right)$$

determining the expected proportion of agents joining the minority group for each occurrence of input $`I`$. This allows us to develop a more general equation,

$$x_{i+1}(I)\phi (i,I)$$

where

$$\phi (i,I)=\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{2^i+(1)^{i1}}{2^i}\right)+\frac{(1)^i}{2^{i+1}}\left(1x_0(I)\right)$$

Observe that this holds for $`i=0`$, as a little calculation reveals $`x_1(I)\frac{1}{2}\left(1x_0(I)\right)=\phi (0,I)`$. Now, assume the equation holds for $`i=n1`$, with $`n`$ any positive integer, so $`x_n(I)\phi (n1,I)`$.

By the recurrence relation,

$$x_{n+1}(I)\frac{1}{2}\left(1x_n(I)\right)=\frac{1}{2}\left(1\phi (n1,I)\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{2}\left[1\left\{\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{2^{n1}+\left(1\right)^{n2}}{2^{n1}}\right)+\frac{\left(1\right)^{n1}}{2^n}\left(1x_0\left(I\right)\right)\right\}\right]$$

$$=\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{3\times 2^{n1}2^{n1}+\left(1\right)^{n1}}{2^{n1}}\right)+\frac{(1)^n}{2^n}\left(1x_0\left(I\right)\right)\right]$$

$$=\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{2^n+(1)^{n1}}{2^{n1}}\right)+\frac{(1)^n}{2^n}\left(1x_0(I)\right)\right]$$

$$=\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{2^n+(1)^{n1}}{2^n}\right)+\frac{(1)^n}{2^{n+1}}\left(1x_0(I)\right)$$

$$=\phi (n,I)$$

Hence, $`x_{n+1}(I)\phi (n,I)`$, and so by the induction hypothesis $`x_{i+1}(I)\phi (i,I)`$ for all $`i0`$.

It follows, then, that as $`i\mathrm{}`$, so $`x_i(I)\frac{1}{3}`$, and so, with repeated exposure to the input $`I`$, we will find that on average $`\frac{2}{3}`$ of the agents will produce the same output. As a result, the average majority size per turn (regardless of input given) will also tend to $`\frac{2}{3}`$ as the agents become saturated by all the possible inputs.

This can be observed in Fig. 6, which shows the average proportion of agents joining the majority group each turn in eight different games involving single memory value populations, the first involving agents of memory $`1`$, the second with agents of memory $`2`$, and so on up to the final game, with agents of memory $`8`$. Each game takes place over a time period of some $`5\times 10^3`$ turns.

As memory increases, so the number of possible inputs also increases, meaning there is less repeated exposure to individual inputs, and hence less crowding for a given time period. Within a time-scale of $`5\times 10^3`$ turns, the behavior of agents with longer memories is random more often than not, and so the mean size of majority is similar to that of agents making random decisions. As the number of turns increases, so we can expect the mean size of the majority to tend to $`\frac{2}{3}`$ for all memory values, not just the lowest.

What implications does this have for games involving a mixed population of agents, such as that displayed in Fig. 2? Overall, the same principles will apply. Repeated exposure to the same input will produce the same crowding effect. But we note that the inputs given to this system—eight-digit binary numbers—are interpreted differently by different agents. For agents with lower memories, many of these ‘different’ inputs are interpreted as being the same! For example, the inputs $`11010010`$ and $`11001011`$ are the same to an agent with a memory of $`3`$ or less. So—as is demonstrated by Fig. 6—the crowding effect surfaces earlier in agents with lower memory values, and hence they are adversely affected to a greater degree.

The agents with higher memory values fail to beat the 50% success rate, however, because there are too many of them—any insights they might have into the crowding behavior of the lower memory groups are obscured by the actions of their fellow high-memory agents. Thus, the kind of behavior we see in Fig. 2: the lower memory agents perform the worst, with the success rate increasing towards some ‘glass ceiling’ as agent memory increases. It’s only unique ‘rogue’ agents, who don’t have a large group of fellows, who can see the crowding effect and thus beat the system.

Even such rogue agents cannot succeed by any great margin in the case where they are pitted against a spread of memory values. The crowding behavior of the individual groups is obscured by the large number of them and predictions become difficult; the rogue has to work out, not just in which direction the crowding within each group will go, but how much crowding will be taking place in each group—a difficult task indeed!

If we increase the crowding, we also increase the rogue’s chances of success. Fig. 7 shows the results from two different games involving $`251`$ agents. Five of them are ‘rogue’ agents with memory values of, respectively, $`4`$, $`5`$, $`6`$, $`7`$ and $`8`$. The rest have an even spread of memory values from $`1`$ to $`3`$. In order to allow the higher memory values to be useful, we give agents $`256`$ intermediary neurons. The difference between the games is that in the first, when punishing unsuccessful synapses, we employ the principle that has been used throughout this paper—synapses are punished *once*. In the second game, the punishment does not stop until the agent has learned what would have been the correct output. The result is that, when an input has been seen before, we will have 100% agreement within memory groups.

We can see here how the increased crowding caused by ‘infinite’ punishment allows the rogues to take advantage and be successful. A higher memory value is required for substantial success, but substantial success is possible—at the expense of the lower memory groups, whose success rates are substantially decreased by the extra crowding behavior they are forced to produce. The rogue agents in the game with single punishment, by contrast, are barely able to do better than a 50% success rate—though they can evidently glean *some* data from the crowding behavior displayed by the lower memory groups, it’s not sufficient for any great success and they are only barely able to beat the expected success rate were they to make purely random decisions.

This is a striking result, to say the least. *The inevitable consequence of an analytic strategy is a predisposition to failure.* Challet and Zhang CZ  and W. B. Arthur Art  have already shown that fixed strategies can prove to be a disadvantage compared to random decisions; this occurs when the number of available strategies is small compared to the number of agents. The crowding behavior that results from minibrain agents’ imperfect analysis will inevitably reduce the number of strategies in use, thus dooming themselves to worse-than-random results.

We can see this at work in the real world, every day. Many strategies—whether for investments, business strategies, forming a relationship, or any of the myriad problems we have to solve—fail, because they are based on common knowledge, and as such, will be similar to most other people’s strategies. We are often told, ‘Everybody knows that …’, but few people realize the negative side of following such advice: since *everybody* knows it, *everybody* will come to the same conclusions as you, and so your strategy will be unlikely to succeed. Perhaps the best recent example is the internet boom-and-bust: so many people thought the internet was the place to invest, the market overheated, and many companies went belly-up.

As this paper was being prepared, a report was broadcast on UK television about an experiment in which a four-year-old child, picking a share portfolio, was able to outdo highly experienced City traders on the stock market. In such systems, with everyone’s imperfect analysis competing against everyone else’s, it seems highly likely that random decisions sometimes really are the best; the Minibrain/Minority Model combination would appear to confirm this.

## V ‘Intelligence’ Reconsidered

Another interesting conclusion to be drawn from the computer experiments here described is that, given some particular Minibrain agent, there is no way of deciding if it will be successful or not unless we know about the other agents it will be competing with.

In a sense this is not surprising. We know, for example, that to be a high-flier at an Ivy League university requires considerably more academic ability than most other educational institutions. The athlete coming last in the final of the Olympic 100m can still run faster than almost anyone else in the world. We know that *in these contexts* the conditions to be the ‘best’ are different, but there is surely still an overall comparison to be made between the whole of humanity. Or is there? Recall our suggestion in the introduction to this paper that the question of how intelligent a system is can only be answered by examining how good it is at coping with the problems its surrounding environment throws up. To return to Minibrain agents: by the concepts we discussed earlier, it is agents’ *intelligence*, and not just their success rate, that is dependent on their fellows’, as well as their own, characteristics; indeed, the two measures—success and intelligence—cannot be separated.

Contrast this with how we have identified a whole range of factors—memory, the number of intermediary neurons, the amount of punishment inflicted on unsuccessful synapses—that affect the manner in which an agent performs. There are objective comparisons that can be made between agents. While we might accept that any measure of ‘intelligence’ we can conceive of will only hold in the context of the Minority Model, surely it is not fair to suggest that the only valid measure of intelligence is success rate in the context of the population of agents we place within that world?

Before we rush off to define our abstract ‘agent IQ’, however, it’s worth noting that all the measures of *human*, as well as Minibrain, intelligence that we have put in place are in fact measures of success in particular contexts. When a teacher calls a pupil a ‘stupid boy’, he is not commenting on the child’s intelligence in some abstract sense, but rather the child’s ability to succeed at the tasks he is set in the school environment. (Einstein was considered stupid in the context of a school environment where dyslexia and Asperger’s syndrome were unknown.) When we say that human beings are more intelligent than other animals what we in fact mean is that human beings are more successful at manipulating their environment to their own benefit. High-fliers at Ivy League universities are considered intelligent because of their academic success. Olympic athletes are considered intelligent in the context of their sport because they are capable of winning consistently.

Even human IQ tests, long thought to provide an abstract and objective measure of intelligence, work in this fashion, being a measure of an individual’s success in solving logical problems. More recently these tests have been shown to discriminate against certain individuals based on their cultural background—a further indication of their non-abstract, non-objective nature—and in addition to this, psychologists are now proposing that there are other forms of intelligence, for example *emotional* intelligence or ‘EQ’, which are just as important to individual success as intellectual ability.

Were abstract measures of intelligence possible, it would be reasonable to ask: ‘Who was more intelligent, Albert Einstein or Ernest Shackleton?’ As it turns out, this question is impossible to answer. Shackleton probably lacked Einstein’s capacity for scientific imagination, Einstein probably didn’t know a great deal about arctic survival, but both were highly successful—and thus by implication intelligent—*in the context of their own chosen way of life.* The same is true of our hypothetical Ivy League student and Olympic runner. We suggest that no other possible measure of intelligence is truly satisfactory.

It is not an entirely easy concept to take on board. In particular, it conflicts with our instinctive sense of what it means to be ‘intelligent’. Casually—and not so casually—we talk about people’s intelligence in the context of their *understanding*, their *conceiving*, their *awareness*. In other words, we talk about it in the context of their *consciousness*. In their paper ‘Consciousness and Neuroscience’ CK , Francis Crick and Cristoph Koch refer to the philosophical concept of a ‘zombie’, a creature that looks and acts just like a human being but lacks conscious awareness. Using the concepts of intelligence we have been discussing, this creature is just as intelligent as a real human.

Yet, on closer examination, this is not such an unreasonable idea. Such a ‘zombie’ is probably scientifically untenable, but it should be noted that our measures of ‘intelligence’ do not measure consciousness, at least not explicitly. A digital computer can solve logical problems, for example, and it seems very unlikely that such computers are conscious. The ‘emotional intelligence’ we referred to earlier almost certainly has some unconscious elements to it: our ability to respond to a situation in an appropriate emotional manner tends to be an instinctive, more than a conscious, response. Lizards, it is thought, lack a conscious sense of vision but they can still catch prey, find a mate and so on, using their visual sense to do so. In fact, most of the organisms that exist on Earth are probably not conscious. Consciousness, most likely, is a product of brain activity that is a useful survival aid, a useful aid for success. An *aid* for success, and thus for intelligence, rather than a requirement.

How, then, should we approach the question of what is an intelligent system? In their description of the construction of the Minibrain neural system, Bak and Chialvo note: ‘Biology has to provide a set of more or less randomly connected neurons, and a mechanism by which an output is deemed unsatisfactory …. It is absurd to speak of meaningful brain processes if the purpose is not defined in advance. The brain cannot learn to define what is good and what is bad. This must be given at the outset. From there on, the brain is on its own’ BC . These concepts provide us with a way of thinking about intelligent systems in general, whether naturally occurring biological systems or man-made artificial intelligence systems.

An intelligent system might be thought of as consisting of the following parts:

(i)*A hardwired set of inputs and outputs, which the system cannot change.* It can perhaps change which of them it takes notice of and which of them it uses, but its options are fixed and finite.

(ii)*A decision-making system.* Given an input, a systematic process is applied to decide what output to make. This can range from the purely deterministic (e.g. a truth-table of required output for each given input) to the completely random. The E Coli bacterium’s behavior in response to the presence or otherwise of glucose—either moving in the direction of the food or, if none is to be found, in a random direction—is a perfect example.

(iii)*A hardwired system for determining whether a given output has been successful, and sending appropriate feedback to the system.* Again, the nature of this can vary. In our computer experiments, success is defined as being in the minority group. For the *E. Coli* bacterium, success is finding food. Possible types of feedback range from the positive reinforcement of successful behavior practiced by many neural network systems, to the negative feedback of the Minibrain model. The *E. Coli* bacterium provides perhaps the most extreme example: if it doesn’t find food within a certain time period, it will die!

The last of these is perhaps the most difficult to come to terms with, simply because as human beings, we instinctively feel that it is a *conscious* choice on our part as to whether many of our actions have been successful or not. Nevertheless, the ultimate determination of success or failure must rest with hardwired processes over which the decision-making system has no control. If nothing else, we are all subject to the same consideration as *E. Coli*: if our actions do not provide our physical bodies with what they need to survive, they, and our brains and minds with them, will perish.

We should, perhaps, include an extra criterion that for a system to be *truly* intelligent, the feedback mechanism must in some way affect the operation of the decision-making system, whether it is punishing ‘bad’ synapses in the Minibrain neural network, changing the entries in a truth-table, or killing a bacterium. A system that keeps making the same decision regardless of how consistently successful that decision is, isn’t being intelligent. With this in mind, we might consider systems such as *E. Coli* (i.e. systems which employ one single strategy, and when it becomes unsuccessful simply *stop*) to be *minimally intelligent* systems. They’re nowhere near as smart as other systems, natural and artificial, but at least they know when to quit.

Intelligence, we suggest, is not an abstract concept. The question of what is intelligent behavior can only be answered in the context of a problem to be solved. So in the search for artificial intelligence, we must necessarily start with the world in which we want that intelligence to operate; we cannot begin by creating some ‘consciousness-in-a-box’ to which we then give a purpose, but must first establish what we want that intelligence to *do*, before building the systems—input-output, decision-making, feedback—that will best achieve that aim. Computer programmers already have an instinctive sense of this when they talk about, for example, the ‘AI’ of a computer game. (Purpose: to beat the human player. No longer the deterministic strategies of Space Invaders—many modern computer games display a great subtlety and complexity of behavior.) This is not to denigrate attempts to build conscious machines. Such machines would almost certainly provide the most powerful forms of artificial intelligence. But we are still a long way from understanding what consciousness is, let alone being able to replicate it, and as we have noted here, consciousness is not necessarily needed for intelligent behavior.

The experiments discussed in this paper involve ‘toy’ models. Comparing the Minibrain neural system to the real human brain is like comparing a paper airplane to a jumbo jet BC . But paper airplanes can still fly, and there are still lessons to be learned. These ‘toy’ experiments provide us with a context to begin identifying what it means to be intelligent. We have been able to suggest criteria for identifying intelligent systems that avoid the controversial issues of consciousness and understanding, and a method of determining how intelligent such systems are that rests on one simple, useful and practical question: how good is this system at doing what it’s meant to do? In other words, we and others have begun to demystify the subject of intelligence and maneuver it into a position where we can begin to ask precise and well-defined questions. Paper airplanes can fly for miles if they’re launched from the right places.


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# Entangling many atomic ensembles through laser manipulation

## Abstract

We propose an experimentally feasible scheme to generate Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) type of maximal entanglement between many atomic ensembles based on laser manipulation and single-photon detection. The scheme, with inherent fault tolerance to the dominant noise and efficient scaling of the efficiency with the number of ensembles, allows to maximally entangle many atomic ensemble within the reach of current technology. Such a maximum entanglement of many ensembles has wide applications in demonstration of quantum nonlocality, high-precision spectroscopy, and quantum information processing.

PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a, 42.50.Gy, 42.50.-p

Quantum entanglement links two or more distant subsystems in a profound quantum mechanical way. Such a link has found wide applications in demonstration of quantum nonlocality , high-precision spectroscopy , and quantum information processing including computation, communication and cryptography . There are great experimental efforts recently to get more and more subsystems entangled , since with more subsystems entangled, quantum nonlocality becomes more striking , and the entanglement is more useful for various applications . In most of the experimental efforts, the subsystems are take as single-particles, and up to now three to four atoms or photons have been entangled with a linear ion-trap , with a spontaneous parametric down converter , or with a high-Q cavity . There are also proposals to entangle indistinguishable atoms in Bose-Einstein condensates , or to weakly entangle two macroscopic atomic ensembles , and the latter has been demonstrated in a recent exciting experiment .

In all the experimental efforts, it is hard to continuously increase the number of the entangled subsystems due to the fast exponential decrease of the preparation efficiency  or due to noise and imperfections in the setup . Here, we propose a scheme to generate GHZ type of maximal entanglement between many atomic ensembles with the following features: firstly, the scheme has built-in fault-tolerance and is robust to realistic noise and imperfections. As a result, the physical requirements of the scheme are moderate and well fit the experimental technique. Secondly, the preparation efficiency of the GHZ entanglement only decreases with the number of ensembles by a slow polynomial law. Such an efficient scaling makes it possible to maximally entangle many (such as tens of) ensembles with the current technology. Our scheme is based on Raman type laser manipulation of the ensembles and single-photon detection which postselects the desired entangled state in a probabilistic fashion. In contrast to the belief that entangling schemes based on postselections will necessarily suffer from the fast exponential degradation of the efficiency, we design a scheme which circumvents this problem by making use of quantum memory available in atomic internal levels.

The basic element of our system is an ensemble of many identical alkali atoms, whose experimental realization can be either a room-temperature atomic gas  or a sample of cold trapped atoms . The relevant level structure of the atom is shown by Fig. 1. From the three levels $`|g,|h,|v`$, we can define two collective atomic operators $`s=\left(1/\sqrt{N_a}\right)_{i=1}^{N_a}|g_is|`$ with $`s=h,v,`$ where $`N_a1`$ is the total atom number. The atoms are initially prepared through optical pumping to the ground state $`|g`$, which is effectively a vacuum state $`|\text{vac}`$ of the operators $`h,v`$. The $`h,v`$ behave like independent bosonic mode operators as long as most of the atoms remain in the state $`|g.`$ A basis of the “polarization” qubit (in analogy to the language for photons) can be defined from the states $`|H=h^{}|\text{vac}`$ and $`|V=v^{}|\text{vac}`$, which have an experimentally demonstrated long coherence time . Single-bit rotations in this basis can be done with high precision by shining Raman pulses or radio-frequency pulses on all the atoms. The excitations in the mode $`h`$ can be transferred to optical excitations  and then detected by single-photon detectors. Such a transfer has a high efficiency even for a free-space ensemble due to the collectively enhanced coherent interaction as has been demonstrated both in theory  and in experiments .

The first step for generation of many-party entanglement is to share an excitation between the modes $`h_i,h_j`$ in two distant ensembles $`i,j`$. This can be readily done through a scheme in the recent quantum repeater proposal , where one prepares the state $`\left(h_i^{}+e^{i\varphi _{ij}}h_j^{}\right)/\sqrt{2}|\text{vac}`$ , with $`\varphi _{ij}=\varphi _j\varphi _i`$, an unknown phase difference fixed by the optical channel connecting the $`i,j`$ ensembles. This state, after a single-bit rotation, can be transferred to the useful form

$$|\mathrm{\Psi }_{i,j}=\left(h_i^{}+e^{i\varphi _{i,j}}v_j^{}\right)/\sqrt{2}|\text{vac}.$$
(1)
The basic idea of the preparation scheme in Ref.  is as follows: one excites the ensembles $`i`$ and $`j`$ respectively through a short weak Raman pulse applied to the transition $`|g|e`$ so that the forward scattered Stokes light from the transition $`|e|h`$ has a mean photon number much smaller than $`1`$. The forward-scattered Stokes lights from the two ensembles are then interfered at a beam splitter and further detected by two single photon detectors. If we successfully get a detector click, we do not know from which ensemble this registered photon comes from, and due to this indistinguishability, the accompany collective atomic excitation should be distributed over the ensembles $`i`$ and $`j`$ with an equal probability amplitude, and we get the state described before. This preparation scheme has the following two features: first, the preparation only succeeds with a controllable small probability $`p_0`$ for each Raman driving pulse, and needs to be repeated in average $`1/p_0`$ times for the final successful state generation, with the total preparation time $`t_01/\left(p_0f_p\right)`$, where $`f_p`$ is the repetition frequency of the Raman pulses. Second, the scheme, with inherent resilience to noise, is well based on the current technology of laser manipulation. We can safely use it as our first step, to generate the state (1) with a fidelity $`F=1p_0`$ very close to the unity by controlling the probability $`p_0`$. For instance, with a typical repetition frequency $`f_p=10`$MHz, one may prepare the state (1) with a fidelity $`F=1p_099\%`$ in a time $`t_010\mu `$s.

Based on the preparation of the state (1), now we show how to generate effective many-party entanglement between $`n`$ such atomic ensembles. We prepare the state (1) between the $`i`$ and $`i+1`$ ensembles for each $`i`$ from $`1`$ to $`n`$, and get the following state

$$|\mathrm{\Psi }=\left(1/\sqrt{2^n}\right)\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}\left(h_i^{}+e^{i\varphi _{i,i+1}}v_{i+1}^{}\right)|\text{vac},$$
(2)
where for convenience we have assumed the notation $`n+11`$ for the subscripts, and have used the same symbol $`|\text{vac}`$ to denote the vacuum of the whole $`n`$ ensembles. In the expansion of the state (1), there are only two components which have one excitation on each ensemble. This component state is given by

$$|\mathrm{\Psi }_{\text{eff}}=\left(1/\sqrt{2}\right)\left(\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}h_i^{}+e^{i\varphi _t}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}v_i^{}\right)|\text{vac}$$
(3)
with $`\varphi _t=_{i=1}^n\varphi _{i,i+1}`$, which is exactly the $`n`$-party GHZ type maximally entangled state in the polarization basis. Note that for any practical application of the GHZ entanglement , the state preparation should be succeeded by a measurement of the polarization of the excitation on each ensemble, which can be done for our system by combining single-bit rotations, such as Hadamard transformations, with the number detection of the mode $`h_i`$ through single-photon detectors. If in this measurement we only keep the results for which an excitation appears on each ensemble (i.e., postselect the case when the detector on each side registers a click), the states (2) and (3) become effectively equivalent since the other components in the state (2) have no contributions to the measurement. Through this postselection technique, we can simply prepare the state (2), which, whenever we put it into applications, yields effectively the GHZ entanglement described by the effective state (3). Here and in the following, we call a component of the full state as the effective state if only this component has contributions to the application measurements (which are the measurements required for the detection or application of the generated state). The effective state is the state postselected by the application measurements.

For applications of the GHZ entanglement, we need also to know the phase $`\varphi _t`$ in the effective state (3), which is fixed by the whole setup and in principle can be measured. However, a better way is to directly cancel this unknown phase $`\varphi _t`$ with the following method. Assume that we have an even number $`n`$ of the ensembles. The pair of ensembles $`i`$ and $`i^{}=n+2i`$ are put in near proximity so that the ensembles $`i,i+1`$ and $`i^{},\left(i+1\right)^{}`$ can be connected through the same optical channel, which fixes the phases to satisfy the relation $`\varphi _{i,i+1}=\varphi _{i^{},\left(i+1\right)^{}}=\varphi _{\left(i+1\right)^{},i^{}}`$ . With this relation, the accumulated phase $`\varphi _t`$ is exactly canceled to zero.

The above preparation scheme of the effective GHZ entanglement is robust to realistic noise and imperfections. The dominant noise in this system is the photon detector inefficiency, the transferring inefficiency (induced by the spontaneous emission loss) of the excitation from the atomic mode $`h_i`$ to the optical mode, and the small decay of the atomic excitation in each ensemble. All the above noise is well described by loss of excitations with a overall loss probability denoted by $`\eta `$. Note that by including the detector inefficiency, we have automatically taken into account that the single-photon detectors cannot perfectly distinguish between single and two photons. It is easy to see that loss of excitations only has influence on the success probability to register an excitation from each ensemble. Whenever the excitation is registered, its polarization is still perfectly entangled as shown by the effective state (3).

Now we consider the efficiency of this scheme, which can be described by the total time needed to successfully register the effective GHZ entanglement. The preparation of the factor state (1) is probabilistic, however, due to the available quantum memory provided by the metastable atomic modes $`h,v`$, the preparation time $`t_1`$ of the state (2) is at most $`nt_0`$ if its factor states are prepared one after the other, and can be reduced to $`t_1t_0`$ (in the case of $`n<1/p_0`$) if its factor states are prepared independently at the same time. In contrast to this, in the case of no quantum memory, one would need about $`1/p_0^n`$ repeats of the Raman pulses for a successful preparation of the state (2), and a total time $`t_0/p_0^{n1}t_0`$. After preparation of the state (2), the projection efficiency (success probability) from the state (2) to the effective GHZ state (3) is given by $`\left(1\eta \right)^n/2^{n1}`$, where we have assumed the same loss probability $`\eta `$ for each ensemble. So the total time for registering the $`n`$-party GHZ entanglement is $`Tt_02^{n1}/\left(1\eta \right)^n`$, which increases with the number of ensembles exponentially by the factor $`2/\left(1\eta \right)`$. Note that this increase has been much slower than the case for spontaneous parametric down conversion where the exponential increasing factor is about $`2`$ orders larger due to the absence of quantum memory .

We can in fact further improve the scheme to get a much more efficient scaling of the efficiency, with the time $`T`$ increasing with the party number $`n`$ only polynomially. The improved scheme is divided into the following three steps:

(i) We start with two pairs of ensembles $`1,2`$ and $`3,4`$, prepared in the state $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1,2}|\mathrm{\Psi }_{3,4}`$ with $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{i,j}`$ in the form of Eq. (1). We then connect these two disjoint pairs by preparing the state $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{2,3}`$. The ensembles $`2`$ and $`3`$ will not be involved any more in the following steps for state preparation, so we can immediately put them into applications by doing the same type of measurements on them as if we had generated $`n`$-party GHZ entanglement. In these measurements, if one excitation is registered from each ensemble $`2`$ and $`3`$, we succeed and will go on with the next step. Otherwise, we simply repeat the above process until we succeed. Upon success, only the component $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{14}`$ of the state $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1,2}|\mathrm{\Psi }_{3,4}|\mathrm{\Psi }_{2,3}`$ has contributions to the measurement with

$$|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1\text{-}4}=\left(1/\sqrt{2}\right)\left(h_1^{}h_2^{}h_3^{}+v_2^{}v_3^{}v_4^{}\right)|\text{vac},$$
(4)
where for simplicity we have neglected the phase $`\varphi _{i,i+1}`$ since they will finally cancel each other with the method described before. If loss of excitations with a loss probability $`\eta `$ is taken into account for detections on the ensembles $`2,3`$, a registered click might result from two excitations, and in this case there will be no excitation in the ensembles $`1`$ and $`4`$. So with the loss, upon success of step (i), instead of $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1\text{-}4}`$ the effective state of the ensembles 1-4 is actually described by

$$\rho _{1\text{-}4}=\left(|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1\text{-}4}\mathrm{\Psi }_{1\text{-}4}|+c_1\rho _{\text{vac}}\right)/\left(1+c_1\right)$$
(5)
with the vacuum coefficient $`c_1=2\eta `$, where $`\rho _{\text{vac}}`$ stands for the vacuum component with no excitation in the undetected ensembles $`1`$ and $`4`$. The probability of a successful detection on both of the ensembles $`2`$ and $`3`$ is given by $`p_1=\left(1\eta \right)^2\left(1+2\eta \right)/4`$, which means that we need to repeat the process in average $`1/p_1`$ times for the final success of step (i).

(ii) In step (ii) we further extend the number of entangled ensembles in the effective state (5). Assume that we have applied the method of step (i) in parallel to the two disjoint sets of ensembles $`1`$-$`4`$ and $`5`$-$`8`$, with their effective states (each in the form of Eq. (5)) denoted by $`\rho _{1\text{-}4}`$ and $`\rho _{5\text{-}8}`$, respectively. We connect these two sets by first preparing the state $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{4,5}`$ (in the form of Eq. (1)) and then putting the ensembles $`4,5`$ into application measurements as described in step (i). Upon success of these measurements with one excitation registered from each ensemble, the postselected state of the ensembles $`1`$-$`8`$ is effectively described by $`\rho _{1\text{-}8}`$ which is similar to Eq. (5), but with an increased vacuum coefficient and with $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1\text{-}4}`$ replaced by $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{1\text{-}k}=\left(1/\sqrt{2}\right)\left(_{i=1}^{k1}h_i^{}+_{i=2}^kv_i^{}\right)|\text{vac},`$ $`\left(k=8\right)`$. Whenever the measurement fails, we repeat the whole state preparation from step (i). The above connection process can be continued with the number $`n`$ of effectively entangled ensembles doubled for each time of connection. After $`i`$ times connection, we have $`n=2^{i+1}`$. The success probability and the new vacuum coefficient of the $`i`$th connection are denoted respectively by $`p_i`$ and $`c_i`$, which satisfy the following recursion relations with the previous vacuum coefficient $`c_{i1}`$ through $`p_i=\left(1\eta \right)^2\left(1+2\eta +2c_{i1}\right)/\left[4\left(1+c_{i1}\right)^2\right]`$, and $`c_i=2c_{i1}+2\eta `$. From these recursion relations, we have $`c_i=2\eta \left(2^i1\right)`$, which, after substituted into $`p_i`$, yields an explicit expression for the repetition number $`1/p_i`$ of the $`i`$th connection.

(iii) After a desired number $`n=2^{i+1}`$ of the ensembles have been entangled in the effective state $`\rho _{1\text{-}n}`$, we close the loop in the last step by first preparing the state $`|\mathrm{\Psi }_{n,1}`$ (in the form of Eq. (1)) and then putting the last two ensembles $`n,1`$ into application measurements. As usual, we keep the results only when one excitation appears from each detected ensemble, and this automatically eliminates contributions from the vacuum component in the state $`\rho _{1\text{-}n}`$. So the effective state of the whole set of ensembles postselected by all the application measurements is still described by the exact GHZ state (3), and the application measurement results should reveal perfect GHZ entanglement between the $`n`$ ensembles in the polarization degree of freedom. The application measurements on the ensembles $`n,1`$ in the last step succeeds with a probability $`p_l=\left(1\eta \right)^2/\left[2\left(1+c_i\right)\right]`$, so the whole process needs to be repeated in average $`1/p_l`$ times.

Now we calculate in this improved scheme how much time is needed in total for a successful detection of the $`n`$-party GHZ entanglement. This time is given by $`T_{\text{imp}}=t_0/\left[p_lp_1_{j=2}^ip_j\right]`$, with $`t_0`$, the preparation time of the state (1). We consider two limiting cases. In the first case with a negligible loss probability $`\eta `$ for each ensemble, we have $`p_l=2p_j=1/2`$ and $`T_{\text{imp}}=2^{2i+1}t_0=n^2t_0/2`$, which increases with the number $`n`$ of entangled ensembles by the slow quadratic law. In the second case with a considerably large loss probability $`\eta `$, the total time $`T_{\text{imp}}`$ is approximated by $`T_{\text{imp}}t_0\left[2\eta n/\left(1\eta \right)^2\right]\left(n/2\right)^{\mathrm{log}_2\left[2\eta \sqrt{n}/\left(1\eta \right)^2\right]}`$, which increases with $`n`$ faster, but still polynomially (or, more accurately, sub-exponentially). The basic reason for the improvement from the exponential scaling to the much slower polynomial scaling is due to that we have divided the whole preparation process into many small steps, checking in each step whether the preparation is successful, and repeating this small step instead of the whole process if it fails.

Finally, we briefly discuss the practical implication of this proposal. With the improved scheme, for example, we can generate high-fidelity GHZ entanglement over $`n=16`$ ensembles in a time $`T_{\text{imp}}50`$ms with a notable loss $`\eta 1/3`$ and a typical choice $`t_010\mu `$s. With such a short preparation time $`T_{\text{imp}}`$, the noise that we have not included, such as the non-stationary phase drift induced by the pumping lase or by the optical channel, is negligible. As long as the number $`n`$ of the ensembles is not huge, we can also safely neglect the single-bit rotation error (below $`10^4`$ with the use of accurate polarization techniques for Zeeman sublevels  and the dark count probability (about $`10^5`$ in a typical detection time window $`0.1\mu `$s) of single-photon detectors. Due to the efficient scaling of this scheme, one can use it to steadily increase the number of entangled ensembles, and it seems reasonable to generate GHZ entanglement over tens of ensembles with the current technology. Such an extraordinary possibility opens up prospects for many exciting experiments and applications.

Acknowledgments This work was supported in part by the Caltech MURI Center for Quantum Networks under ARO Grant No. DAAD19-00-1-0374, by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. EIA-0086038, and also by the Chinese Science Foundation and Chinese Academy of Sciences.


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# 1 Introduction

## 1 Introduction

Proton spin puzzle is currently one of the most challenging topics in high energy spin physics. As is well known, proton spin is composed of the spin and orbital angular momentum of quarks and gluons. The polarized parton distribution function (PDF) plays an important role on deep understandings of the spin structure of proton. However, knowledge about the polarized sea quark distribution remains still poor. In order to understand the spin structure of proton, we need more information about the polarized sea quark distribution functions. Recently, HERMES group has reported  that direct measurement of the strange sea is required to explain the violation of the Ellis–Jaffe sum rule . So far, there are several parametrization models of the strange quark distribution. Though the most simplest case is to assume the flavor $`\mathrm{SU}(3)_f`$, a new parametrization taken account of the violation of $`\mathrm{SU}(3)_f`$ is also recently proposed .

The study of heavy quark production in deep inelastic scattering (DIS) is one of the promising way to access the parton density in proton, since heavy quark is not main constituents of proton and is only produced in hard processes. Heavy quark leptoproduction in neutral current DIS has already measured by some collaborations at HERA. However, no measurement of heavy quark production in charged current DIS has been so far done at HERA due to the small cross section. We can expect that the cross section for charged current heavy quark production will be several times larger at THERA than at HERA . THERA is a future high energy $`ep`$ collider which uses electron or positron from the linear collider TESLA at energies of 250 GeV to 800 GeV and proton from HERA at energy 920 GeV. Thus, charged current heavy quark production is also interesting and challenging topics.

In this work, to examine the polarized $`s`$/$`\overline{s}`$ quark distribution, we have studied semi–inclusive $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$/$`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ leptoproduction in charged current DIS; $`l^++\stackrel{}{p}\overline{\nu }+\stackrel{}{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^++X`$, $`l^{}+\stackrel{}{p}\nu +\stackrel{}{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}}_c^__++X`$, where arrows attached to particles mean that these particles are polarized. These processes might be observed in the forthcoming THERA experiments. Since in the naive quark model, the $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ baryon is composed of a heavy $`c`$–quark and anti–symmetrically combined light $`u`$ and $`d`$–quarks, we can assume the polarization of $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ baryon to be the one of charm quark. In addition, $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ is dominantly produced by the fragmentation of charm quark which is originated from strange quark through the $`t`$–channel $`W^\pm `$ boson exchange at the leading order. Therefore, there can be a correlation between the strange quark polarization and the produced charm quark polarization. Hence we can expect that the measurement of the spin correlation between the incident proton and the produced $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$/$`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ gives us information about the polarized $`s`$/$`\overline{s}`$ quark distribution in proton.

## 2 Double Spin Asymmetry

For above processes, we calculated the double spin asymmetry $`A_{LL}^H`$ for final state hadron specified by $`H`$ ($`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ or $`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$), which is given by

$$A_{LL}^H\frac{[d\sigma _{++}d\sigma _++d\sigma _{}d\sigma _+]/dp_T}{[d\sigma _{++}+d\sigma _++d\sigma _{}+d\sigma _+]/dp_T}=\frac{d\mathrm{\Delta }\sigma /dp_T}{d\sigma /dp_T},$$
(1)
where $`d\sigma _+`$, for instance, denotes that the helicity of proton is positive and the one of $`H`$ is negative. $`p_T`$ is a transverse momentum of final hadron $`H`$.

For $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ production, the spin–dependent differential cross section at leading order level can be generally written by

$$d\mathrm{\Delta }\sigma (l^+p\overline{\nu }\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+X)=\left\{\mathrm{U}_{cs}^2\mathrm{\Delta }s(x)+\mathrm{U}_{cd}^2\mathrm{\Delta }d(x)\right\}dx\left(\frac{d\mathrm{\Delta }\widehat{\sigma }}{d\widehat{t}}\right)d\widehat{t}\mathrm{\Delta }D_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)dz,$$
(2)
where $`\mathrm{\Delta }s(x)`$ and $`\mathrm{\Delta }d(x)`$ are the polarized $`s`$–quark and $`d`$–quark distribution functions, respectively. $`\mathrm{U}_{cs}`$ and $`\mathrm{U}_{cd}`$ are CKM parameters. $`\mathrm{\Delta }D_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)`$ is the polarized fragmentation function of outgoing charm quark decaying into $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$. We used the model of Peterson et al.  as the unpolarized fragmentation function . Unfortunately, we have at present no data about the polarized fragmentation function because of lack of experimental data. By analogy with the study on $`\mathrm{\Lambda }`$ polarization , we took the following ansatz:

$$\mathrm{\Delta }D_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)=C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)D_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z),$$
(3)
where $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)`$ is the scale–independent spin transfer coefficient. Here we apply the analysis on $`\mathrm{\Lambda }`$ production to $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ production and choose the following two models; $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)=1`$ (the naive nonrelativistic quark model) and $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)=z`$ (the jet fragmentation models ) to evaluate cross sections.

The double spin asymmetry $`A_{LL}^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}`$ is described in terms of the spin transfer coefficient $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)`$ and the ratio of the PDF’s as

$$A_{LL}^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)\frac{\left\{\mathrm{U}_{cs}^2\mathrm{\Delta }s(x)+\mathrm{U}_{cd}^2\mathrm{\Delta }d(x)\right\}}{\left\{\mathrm{U}_{cs}^2s(x)+\mathrm{U}_{cd}^2d(x)\right\}}.$$
(4)
Thus $`A_{LL}^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}`$ is proportional to linear combination of the polarized $`s`$–quark and $`d`$–quark distribution function. Since the contribution from the valence $`d`$–quark is large, the $`s`$–quark distribution is not so clearly extracted in $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ production case.

On the contrary, $`A_{LL}^{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+}`$ in $`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ production can be represented as

$$A_{LL}^{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+}C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)\frac{\left\{\mathrm{U}_{cs}^2\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{s}(x)+\mathrm{U}_{cd}^2\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{d}(x)\right\}}{\left\{\mathrm{U}_{cs}^2\overline{s}(x)+\mathrm{U}_{cd}^2\overline{d}(x)\right\}}=C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)\frac{\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{s}(x)}{\overline{s}(x)}C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)\frac{\mathrm{\Delta }s(x)}{s(x)},$$
(5)
in which the $`\overline{d}`$–quark contribution and CKM parameters can be eliminated, and then $`A_{LL}^{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+}`$ is directly proportional to the strange quark distribution function alone. Therefore, we can clearly extract the polarized strange quark distribution $`\mathrm{\Delta }s(x)`$. Note that above equation is derived in both cases; the flavor $`\mathrm{SU}(3)_f`$ case ($`\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{u}(x)=\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{d}(x)=\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{s}(x)`$) and the non–$`\mathrm{SU}(3)_f`$ case ($`\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{u}(x)=\mathrm{\Delta }\overline{d}(x)=\lambda \mathrm{\Delta }\overline{s}(x)`$***$`\lambda `$ represent a degree of $`\mathrm{SU}(3)_f`$ violation and is a parameter which should be determined from experiments .).

## 3 Numerical Results

Setting a charm quark mass $`m_c=1.5`$ GeV and the relevant collider energy $`\sqrt{s}=300`$ GeV, we numerically calculated the spin–independent and dependent differential cross sections and the double spin asymmetry. As for the PDF’s, we used the GRV98  parametrization as the unpolarized PDF, and the AAC  and “standard scenario” of GRSV01  parametrizations for the polarized one.

We show the double spin asymmetry in Fig. 1 as a function of $`p_T`$ at $`\sqrt{s}=300`$ GeV for $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ production (left panel) and for $`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ production (right panel). In order to suppress the contributions from the diffractive process and higher twist corrections, we have imposed the kinematical cut on $`p_T`$ as $`p_T>2`$ GeV in numerical calculations. In figures, the bold and normal lines show the case of AAC parametrization and “standard scenario” of GRSV01 parametrization, respectively. The solid lines represent the spin transfer coefficient $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)=1`$ case, while the dashed lines represent $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)=z`$ case.

As shown in figures, $`A_{LL}^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}`$ in smaller $`p_T`$ regions does not depend on the model of polarized PDF’s, and is strongly affected by the shape of the spin transfer coefficient $`C_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)`$. Therefore, The $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$ production is effective for extracting information about the polarized fragmentation function $`\mathrm{\Delta }D_c^{\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+}(z)`$. In addition, we can directly measure the polarized strange quark distribution function, though the parametrization model dependence is not so large. On the other hand, for $`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ production $`A_{LL}^{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+}`$ for GRSV01 parametrization rapidly decreases in larger $`p_T`$ regions, and we see big difference between two parametrization models. Therefore, measuring $`A_{LL}^{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+}`$ in larger $`p_T`$ regions is quite effective for testing the model of polarized PDF’s, since the ambiguity of the polarized fragmentation function becomes small.

## 4 Summary

In summary, to extract information about the polarized strange quark distribution in proton, the semi–inclusive $`\mathrm{\Lambda }_c^+`$/$`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ production in charged current DIS in unpolarized lepton–polarized proton collisions was studied. $`\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+`$ production is most promising not only for testing the parametrization models of PDF’s but also for directly extracting the polarized strange quark distribution $`\mathrm{\Delta }s(x)`$ by measuring the double spin asymmetry $`A_{LL}^{\overline{\mathrm{\Lambda }}_c^+}`$.


text:
# References

Cherenkov radiation by particles
traversing the background radiation

I.M. Dremin

Lebedev Physical Institute, Moscow 119991, Russia

## Abstract

High energy particles traversing the Universe through the cosmic microwave backgroung radiation can, in principle, emit Cherenkov radiation. It is shown that the energy threshold for this radiation is extremely high and its intensity would be too low due to the low density of the ”relic photons gas” and very weak interaction of two photons.

Recently, the particles with energies exceeding $`10^{20}`$ eV were observed in cosmic ray studies. Their sources have not yet been identified, but they originate most likely outside of our Galaxy. One could hope that some knowledge about the distance from these sources would be possible to obtain, in principle, from studies of Cherenkov radiation by such particles since its intensity is proportional to the distance covered by a particle.

Let us consider Cherenkov radiation by a high energy particle traversing the ”gas” of relic photons with the temperature $`2.73^0`$ K. Even though the density $`\nu `$ of such photons is very low in the Universe $`\nu 500`$ photons/cm3, the particle path could be rather large up to tens Mpc (1 Mpc $`310^{24}`$ cm), and one could hope to register its Cherenkov radiation because the intensity is proportional to the path length.

The necessary conditions for Cherenkov radiation to be observed are the excess of the index of refraction $`n`$ over 1, i.e.

$$\mathrm{\Delta }n=n1>0$$
(1)
and the real emission angle, given by the formula

$$\mathrm{cos}\theta =\frac{1}{\beta n},$$
(2)
where $`\beta =v/c=\sqrt{1\frac{m^2}{E^2}},m,E`$ are the particle mass and energy. For small values of $`m/E`$ and $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$ one gets

$$\theta \sqrt{2\mathrm{\Delta }n\frac{m^2}{E^2}}.$$
(3)
Herefrom, the condition for the energy threshold $`E_{th}`$ is written as

$$EE_{th}=\frac{m}{\sqrt{2\mathrm{\Delta }n}}.$$
(4)
It is easily seen that the threshold can become very high for small $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$.

The number of Cherenkov photons emitted by a particle with the electric charge $`e`$ in the interval of frequencies $`d\omega `$ from the path length $`dl`$ is given by the common expression

$$\frac{dN}{d\omega dl}=2\alpha \mathrm{\Delta }n,$$
(5)
where the fine structure constant $`\alpha =e^21/137`$. Thus all physical characteristics of the process are determined by the value $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$. The intensity of the radiation (5) decreases with the threshold energy (4) increase:

$$\frac{dN}{d\omega dl}=\frac{\alpha m^2}{E_{th}^2}.$$
(6)
Surely, it is possible to use the notion of the medium (and, consequently, the macroscopic approach) only in the case of extremely long-wave radiation for the very diluted gas of relic photons. At the same time, it is well known that in usual media the value of $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$ is uniquely related to the polarization operator of the medium. If this relation is valid also in the case treated here, one must consider the polarization operator of the light-light scattering or the real part of the forward elastic light-light scattering amplitude $`\mathrm{Re}F(\omega ,0^0)`$. For the index of refraction slightly different from one111The more general formula of Lorentz-Lorentz (see , p. 693) can be applied without this restriction., this relationship is given in the quantum scattering theory by the common formula :

$$\mathrm{\Delta }n=\frac{2\pi \nu }{\omega ^2}\mathrm{Re}F(\omega ,0^0),$$
(7)
where the elastic scattering amplitude of the two gamma-quanta $`F(\omega )`$ has been normalized to the total cross section $`\sigma _{\gamma \gamma }(\omega )`$ according to the optical theorem

$$\mathrm{Im}F(\omega ,0^0)=\frac{\omega }{4\pi }\sigma _{\gamma \gamma }(\omega ).$$
(8)
Using these formulas, one easily gets

$$\mathrm{\Delta }n=\frac{\nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }\rho }{2\omega },$$
(9)
where $`\rho =\mathrm{Re}F(\omega ,0^0)/\mathrm{Im}F(\omega ,0^0)`$. Herefrom and from (5), it follows that

$$\frac{dN}{d(\mathrm{ln}\omega )dl}=\alpha \nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }\rho ,$$
(10)
and

$$E_{th}=\frac{m\sqrt{\omega }}{\sqrt{\nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }\rho }},$$
(11)
i.e. the radiation threshold increases with the energy of the registered quanta.

The impressive strong limit is imposed on the energy threshold for Cherenkov radiation in the gas of relic photons. In electrodynamical processes, the total cross section $`\sigma _{\gamma \gamma }`$ reaches its maximum value of about $`1.6\mu b`$ at the total energy of the two photons in their center of mass system $`\omega _c3m_e`$ where the electron mass is $`m_e0.5`$ MeV (see ). At lower energies, below the threshold for the creation of the electron-positron pair (in particular, for a visible light), only elastic scattering is important, the real part of the amplitude dominates and the cross section decreases at $`\omega 0`$ proportionally to $`\omega _c^6`$ (see the discussion at the end of the paper). At high energies, as seen from the formula (9), the value of $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$ tends to zero at $`\omega \mathrm{}`$, and, therefore, the decline from the linear dispersion law $`\omega =k`$ can become noticeable only in the region near the maximum of the cross section $`\sigma _{\gamma \gamma }`$.

The c.m.s. energy of the two-photon system varies from 0 (when photons move in the same direction in the laboratory system) to its maximum value

$$\omega _c=2\sqrt{\omega \omega _r},$$
(12)
when the relic photon with energy $`\omega _r`$ moves in the laboratory system in the opposite direction to the emitted quantum with energy $`\omega `$. For the relic photons $`\omega _r2.410^4`$ eV. Thus the energy $`\omega _c3m_e`$ can be only achieved if the particle emits quanta with the energy

$$\omega =\frac{\omega _c^2}{4\omega _r}210^{15}\mathrm{eV}.$$
(13)
First, let us consider the high energy quanta which can create the electron-positron pairs in the cosmic microwave background radiation. In this case of very energetic radiation quanta $`\mathrm{\Delta }n<10^{48}`$, if one inserts high-energy values of $`\rho 0.1`$. Then for the proton with mass $`m`$=1 GeV one gets an estimate

$$E_{th}>10^{33}\mathrm{eV}.$$
(14)
The particles with such high energy have not yet been observed anywhere. Such a low index of refraction and, correspondingly, high value of the energy threshold are determined by the low density of relic photons in the Universe and by the small total cross section of the photon-photon interaction.

The estimate of the upper limit of the intensity of the high-energy Cherenkov radiation at the path length $`L`$

$$N<\alpha \nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }L$$
(15)
is obtained from the formula (10), if one takes into account that $`\mathrm{\Delta }\omega /\omega <1`$ and $`\rho <1`$. If the path, wherefrom the radiation is collected, is equal to $`L`$ 1 Mpc $`310^{24}`$ cm, and the maximum value of $`\sigma _{\gamma \gamma }`$ is about 1.6 $`\mu b`$ (see ) then for $`\nu 500`$ photons/cm3 the following upper limit on the number of emitted quanta is imposed according to (15)

$$N<310^5.$$
(16)
Thus, the intensity of the high-energy Cherenkov radiation in the gas of relic photons is too low to be observable even if a proton passes through the Universe along hundreds Mpc. For a primary nucleus, one should insert in the formula (5) its total charge, and, therefore, the intensity of radiation increases in proportion to the nucleus charge squared. However, the total threshold energy increases proportionally to its mass number so that the threshold is much higher for nuclei compared to protons. At the same time, let us note that according to formula (4) the threshold energy per nucleon of a nucleus is only determined by the value of $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$, and, therefore, it is the same for all nuclei.

Some contribution to the polarization operator of the light-light scattering is, in principle, provided by the hadronic component of the photon structure function as well. It can be accounted in the framework of the vector dominance model when the quanta are transformed into virtual $`\rho `$-mesons which interact resonancely. The real part of the scattering amplitude is with necessity positive in one of the halves of the resonance peak as clearly follows from the Breit-Wigner formula. The cross section $`\sigma _{\gamma \gamma }`$ slightly increases. Nevertheless, this does not lead either to the diminished threshold value in the formula (14), or to the increased intensity of Cherenkov radiation because of the increase of $`\omega `$ due to $`\omega _c`$ increasing up to the values of the order of the $`\rho `$-meson mass. The hadronic contribution to the ratio $`\rho =\mathrm{Re}F/\mathrm{Im}F`$ can be also positive at higher energies as it is well known from experiments in all studied hadronic reactions in complete accordance with predictions of dispersion relations. However, the threshold of the radiation again increases in this case due to the further increase of the required values of $`\omega _c`$.

The estimates have shown that the derived above conclusions are ”protected” by several orders of magnitude as is already seen from the formulas (14) and (16), and therefore they are robust.

Let us estimate the absorption of Cherenkov radiation at cosmic distances. For a plane wave $`e^{ikr}`$ it is given by a factor

$$\mathrm{exp}[\omega L\mathrm{Im}n(\omega )]\mathrm{exp}[\nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }L/2],$$
(17)
wherefrom the absorption length $`L_{abs}`$ is estimated as

$$L_{abs}=\frac{2}{\nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }}>210^{27}\mathrm{cm}.$$
(18)
The absorption length of the gamma-quantum in the relic radiation gas depends on the energy of the gamma-quantum only due to the cross section energy dependence and it is so large that the damping of Cherenkov radiation can be neglected for the distances shorter than thousands Mpc. Correspondingly, the energy losses which determine the red shift are very small at such ”short” distances $`LL_{abs}`$:

$$\frac{\mathrm{\Delta }\omega }{\omega }=1\mathrm{exp}(\frac{\nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }L}{2})\frac{\nu \sigma _{\gamma \gamma }L}{2}1.$$
(19)
Thus, the final conclusion is that the high-energy Cherenkov radiation by particles traversing the gas of relic photons is impossible to observe, first of all, because until now there have been detected no particles with such high energies in the Nature exceeding the required energy threshold. Even if such particles were registered, the intensity of the high-energy Cherenkov radiation would, possibly, be too low to detect it.

The principal possibility of the Cherenkov radiation by a charged particle in the intergalactic space is, however, not excluded if there exists ”an intergalactic medium component” with higher density and larger cross section of interaction with photons.

Another possibility is related to studies of quanta with energies lower than the threshold for creation of the electron-positron pair, i.e. for $`\omega <10^{15}`$ eV. Even though the cross section decreases, the ratio $`\rho `$ becomes very large. To estimate the index of refraction for such quanta, the classical consideration with Maxwell equations and dispersion relations  or the effective lagrangian with 4-photon interaction , describing the deviation from the classical theory by quantum effects, have been used. More ”optimistic” estimates of $`\mathrm{\Delta }n10^{41}`$ follow, e.g., from Fig. 2 of Ref. , where, in our notations, the variables $`k`$ and $`z`$ read

$$k=m_e^4/16\pi ^2\alpha ^2\nu \omega _r810^{40};z=m_e^2/\omega \omega _r=4m_e^2/\omega _c^2.$$
(20)
This increase of $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$ is because of much larger values of $`\rho `$. This would lead to lower threshold $`E_{th}>10^{29}`$ eV. Nevertheless, this value of the threshold energy is still very high. The intensity of radiation could, however, become quite noticeable $`N10`$. In Ref.  the value of $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$ at low energies was estimated as $`4.710^{43}`$. Let us remind that the notion of the medium in classical approach can be used when the wavelength of the impinging photon is larger than typical distances inside the medium.

At the same time, $`\mathrm{\Delta }n`$ increases  with the temperature $`T`$ in equilibrium as $`T^4`$. Therefore, at the early stage of the Universe, when the cosmic microwave background radiation separated from the matter at the temperature about $`3000^0`$K, the index of refraction was $`\mathrm{\Delta }n10^{30}`$, i.e. the threshold energy was $`E_{th}10^{24}`$ eV. This estimate is closer to ”realistic” but still rather high energies.

Thus the final conclusion about extremely high energy threshold for Cherenkov radiation in the cosmic microwave background radiation is left intact.

I am grateful to L.G. Tkatchev who pointed out this problem to me and to I.V. Andreev, B.M. Bolotovsky, A.D. Erlykin, E.L. Feinberg, I.F. Ginzburg, V.L. Ginzburg and V.A. Maisheev for discussions and comments.

This work is supported by the RFBR grant 00-02-16101.