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# Betting on the Outcomes of Measurements: A Bayesian Theory of Quantum Probability

## 1 Quantum Gambles

### 1.1 The Gamble

The Bayesian approach takes probability to be a measure of ignorance, reflecting our state of knowledge and not merely the state of the world. It follows Ramsey’s contention that “we have the authority both of ordinary language and of many great thinkers for discussing under the heading of probability … the logic of partial belief” (Ramsey 1926, p. 55). Here we shall assume, furthermore, that probabilistic beliefs are expressed in rational betting behavior: “The old-established way of measuring a person’s belief … by proposing a bet, and see what are the lowest odds which he will accept, is fundamentally sound”111Ramsey, 1926, p. 68. This simple scheme suffers from various weaknesses, and better ways to associate epistemic probabilities with gambling have been developed (de Finetti, 1972). Any one of de Finetti’s schemes can serve our purpose. For a more sophisticated way to associate probability and utility see Savage (1954 ). My aim is to provide an account of the peculiarities of quantum probability in this framework. The approach is intimately related to the foundational work on quantum information by Barnum et al (2000), Fuchs (2001), Schack, Brun and Caves (2001) and Caves, Fuchs and Schack (2002)..

For the purpose of analyzing quantum probability we shall consider quantum gambles. Each quantum gamble has four stages:

1. A single physical system is prepared by a method known to everybody.

2. A finite set $``$ of incompatible measurements is announced by the bookie, and the agent is asked to place bets on possible outcomes of each one of them.

3. One of the measurements in the set $``$ is chosen by the bookie and the money placed on all other measurements is promptly returned to the agent.

4. The chosen measurement is performed and the agent gains or looses in accordance with his bet on that measurement.

We do not assume that the agent who participates in the game knows quantum theory. We do assume that after the second stage, when the set of measurements is announced, the agent is aware of the possible outcomes of each one of the measurements, and also of the relations (if any) between the outcomes of different measurements in the set $``$. Let me make these assumptions precise. For the sake of simplicity we shall only consider measurements with a finite set of possible outcomes. Let $`A`$ be an observable with $`n`$ possible distinct outcomes $`a_{1,}a_{2,\mathrm{},}a_n`$. With each outcome corresponds an event $`E_i=\{A=a_i\}`$, $`i=1,2,\mathrm{},n`$, and these events generate a Boolean algebra which we shall denote by $`=E_1,E_2,\mathrm{},E_n`$. Subsequently we shall identify the observable $`A`$ with this Boolean algebra. Note that this is an unusual identification. It means that we equate the observables $`A`$ and $`f(A)`$, whenever $`f`$ is a one-one function defined on the eigenvalues of $`A`$. This step is justified since we are interested in outcomes and not their labels, hence the scale free concept of observable. With this $``$ is a finite family of finite Boolean algebras. Our first assumption is that the agent knows the number of possible distinct outcomes of each measurement in the set $``$.

Our next assumption concerns the case where two measurements in the set $``$ share some possible elements. For example, let $`A,B,C`$ be three observables such that $`[A,B]=0`$, $`[B,C]=0`$, but $`[A,C]0`$. Consider the two incompatible measurements, the first of $`A`$ and $`B`$ together and the second of $`B`$ and $`C`$ together. If $`_1`$ is the Boolean algebra generated by the outcomes of the first measurement and $`_2`$ of the second, then $`=\{_1,_2\}`$ and the events $`\{B=b_i\}`$ are elements of both algebras, that is of $`_1_2`$. We assume that the agent is aware of these facts when he is placing his bets.

The smallest nontrivial case of this kind is depicted in figure 1. The graph represents two Boolean algebras $`_1=E_1,E_2,E_3`$, $`_2=E_1,E_4,E_5`$ corresponding to the outcomes of two incompatible measurements and they share a common event $`E_1`$. The complement of $`E_1`$ denoted by $`\overline{E}_1`$ is identified as $`E_2E_3=E_4E_5`$. The edges in the graph represent the partial order relations in each algebra from bottom to top. A realization of these relations can be obtained by the system considered in Kochen and Specker (1967): Let $`S_x^2`$, $`S_{x\mathrm{`}}^2`$, $`S_y^2`$, $`S_{y\mathrm{`}}^2`$, $`S_z^2`$ be the squared components of spin in the $`x`$, $`x\mathrm{`}`$, $`y`$, $`y\mathrm{`}`$, $`z`$ directions of a spin-1 (massive) particle, where $`x,y,z`$ and $`x\mathrm{`},`$ $`y\mathrm{`},`$ $`z`$ form two orthogonal triples of directions with the $`z`$-direction in common. The operators $`S_x^2`$, $`S_y^2`$ and $`S_z^2`$ all commute, and have eigenvalues $`0,1`$. They can be measured simultaneusly, and they satisfy $`S_x^2+S_y^2+S_z^2=2I`$. Similar relations hold in the other triple $`x\mathrm{`},`$ $`y\mathrm{`},`$ $`z`$. Hence, if we define $`E_1=\{S_z^2=0\}`$, $`E_2=\{S_x^2=0\}`$, $`E_3=\{S_y^2=0\}`$, $`E_4=\{S_{x\mathrm{`}}^2=0\}`$, $`E_5=\{S_{y\mathrm{`}}^2=0\}`$ we obtain the two Boolean algebras depicted in figure 1.

To sum, we assume that when the set of measurements $``$ is announced the agent is fully aware of the number of outcomes in each measurement and of the relations between the Boolean algebras they generate. In the spin-1 case just considered it means that the agent is aware of the graph structure in figure 1. We shall refer in short to this background knowledge as the logic of the gamble. We assume no further knowledge on the part of the agent, in particular, no knowledge of quantum mechanics. Our purpose is to calculate the constraints on the probabilities that a rational agent can place in such gambles.

### 1.2 Methodological Interlude: Identity of Observables and Operational Definitions

Already at this stage one might object that the identity of observables in quantum mechanics depends on probability. Consider the case of the operators $`A,B,C`$ such that $`[A,B]=0`$, $`[B,C]=0`$, but $`[A,C]0`$, and the two incompatible measurements of $`A`$ together with $`B`$, and of $`B`$ together with $`C`$. We are assuming that the agent is aware of the fact that the events $`\{B=b_i\}`$ are the same in both measurements. However, the actual procedure of measuring $`B`$ can be very different in the two cases, so how is such awareness comes about? Indeed, the identity criterion for (our kind of) observables is: Two procedures constitute measurements of the same observable if for any given physical state (preparation) they yield identical probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes222In a deterministic world we would have a different criterion: Two procedures constitute measurements of the same observable if for any given physical state they yield identical outcomes. We shall come back to this criterion in section 3.2. It seems therefore that foreknowledge of the probabilities is a necessary condition for defining the identities of observables. But now we face a similar problem, how would one know when two states are the same? Identical states can be prepared in ways that are physically quite distinct. Well, two state preparations are the same if for any given measurement they yield the same distribution of outcomes. A vicious circle.

There is nothing special about this circularity, a typical characteristic of operational “definitions” (Putnam, 1965). In fact, one encounters a similar problem in traditional probability theory in the interplay between the identity of events and their probability. The way to proceed is to remember that the point of the operational exercise is not to reduce the theoretical objects of the theory to experiments, but to analyze their meaning and their respective role in the theory. In this idealized and nonreductive approach one takes the identity of one family of objects as somehow given, and proceeds to recover the rest.

Consider how this is done in a recent article by Hardy (2001). Assuming that the probabilities of quantum measurements are experimentally given as relative frequencies, and assuming they satisfy certain relations, Hardy derives the structure of the observables (that is, the Hilbert space). His “solution” to the problem of the identity of states, or preparations, is simple. He stipulates that “preparation” corresponds to a position of a certain dial, one dial position for each preparation. The problem is simply avoided by idealizing it away.

Our approach is the mirror image of Hardy’s. We are assuming that the identities of the observables (and in particular, events) are given, and proceed to recover the probabilities. This line of development is shared with all traditional approaches to probability where the identity of the events is invariably assumed to be given prior to the development of the theory. It is, moreover, easy to think of an idealized story which would cover our identity assumption. For example, in the three operator case $`A,B,C`$ mentioned above, we can imagine that the results of their measurements are presented on three different dials. If $`B`$ is measured together with $`A`$ then the $`A`$-dial and $`B`$-dial show the results; if $`B`$ and $`C`$ are measured together the $`B`$-dial and $`C`$-dial show the results. Thus, fraud notwithstanding, the agent knows that he faces the measurement of the same $`B`$ simply because the same gadget shows the outcome in both cases.

### 1.3 Rules of Gambling

Our purpose is to calculate the constraints on the probabilities that a rational agent can place in a quantum gamble $``$. These probabilities have the form $`p(F)`$ where $``$ and$`F`$ $``$. The elements $`F`$ $`_{}`$ will be called simply “events”. It is understood that an event is always given in the context of a measurement $``$. The probability $`p(F)`$ is the degree of belief that the event $`F`$ occurs in the measurement $``$. There are two rules of rational gambling, the first is straightforward and the second more subtle.

RULE 1: For each measurement $``$ the function $`p()`$ is a probability distribution on $``$.

This follows directly from the classical Bayesian approach. Recall that after the third stage in the quantum gamble the agent faces a bet on the outcome of a single measurement. The situation at this stage is essentially the same as a tossing of a coin or a casting of a dice. Hence, the probability values assigned to the possible outcomes of the chosen measurement should be coherent. In other words, they have to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. The argument for that is that an agent who fails to be coherent will be compelled by the bookie to place bets that will cause him a sure loss (this is the “Dutch Book” argument ). The argument is developed in detail in many texts (for example, de Finetti, 1974) and I will not repeat it here. Since at the outset the agent does not know which measurement $``$ will be chosen by the bookie RULE 1 follows.

RULE 2: If $`_1,_2`$,$`F_1_2`$ then $`p(F_1)=p(F_2)`$.

The rule asserts the non-contextuality of probability (Barnum et al, 2000). It is not so much a rule of rationality, rather it is related to the logic of the gamble and the identity of observables (remembering that we identify each observable with the Boolean algebra generated by its possible outcomes).

Suppose that in the game $``$, there are two measurements $`_1,_2`$, and an event $`F_1_2`$. Assume that an agent chooses to assign  $`p(F_1)p(F_2)`$. A natural question to ask her then is why she assigns $`F`$ different probabilities in the two contexts, though she thinks it is the same event. The only answer consistent with Bayesian probability theory is that she takes the $`p(F_i)`$ as conditional probabilities and therefore not necessarily equal. In other words, she considers the act of choosing an experiment $`_i`$ (in stage 3 of the gamble) as an event in a larger algebra $``$ which contains $`_1,_2`$. Consequently she calculates the conditional probability of $`F`$, given the choice of $`_i`$.

There are two problems with this view. Firstly, the agent can no longer maintain that $`F_1_2`$, in fact $`F`$ is not an element of any of the $`_i`$’s and can no longer be described as an outcome of a mesurement. Secondly, the agent assumes that there is a single “big” Boolean algebra $``$, the event $`F`$ is an element of $``$, and $`_1,_2`$ are sub-algebras of $``$. The trouble is that for sufficiently rich games $``$ this assumption is inconsistent. In other words, there are gambles $``$ which cannot be imbedded in a Boolean algebra without destroying the identities of the events and the logical relations between them. This is a consequence of the Kochen and Specker (1967) theorem to which we shall come in (2.2). It means, essentially, that an agent who violates RULE 2, is failing to grasp the logic of the gamble and wrongly assumes that she is playing a different game.

Another possibility is that assigning $`p(F_1)p(F_2)`$ indicates that the agent is using a different notion of conditional probability. The burden of clarification is then on the agent, to uncover her sense of conditionalization and show how it is related to quantum gambles. Thus, we conclude that the violation of RULE 2 implies either an ignorance of the logic of the gamble, or an incoherent use of conditional probabilities. It is clear that our argument here is weaker than the Dutch book argument for RULE 1. A violation of RULE 2 does not imply a sure loss in a single shot game. We shall return to this argument, with a greater detail in section 2.2.

Rational probability values assigned in finite games need not be numerically identical to the quantum mechanical probabilities. However, with sufficiently complex gambles we can show that all the interesting features of quantum probability- from the uncertainty principle to the violation of Bell inequality-are present even in finite gambles. If we extend our discussion to gambles with an infinity of possible measurements, then RULE1 and RULE 2 force the probabilities to follow Born rule (section 2.4).

### 1.4 A Note on Possible Games

A quantum gamble is a set of Boolean algebras with certain (possible) relations between them. The details of these algebras and their relations is all that the agent needs to know. We do not assume that the agent knows any quantum theory.

However, engineers who construct gambling devices should know a little more. They should be aware of the physical possibilities. This is true in the classical domain as much as in the quantum domain. After all, the theory of probability, even in its most subjective form, associates a person’s degree of belief with the objective possibilities in the physical world. In the quantum case the objective physical part concerns the type of gambles which can actually be constructed. It turns out that not all finite families of Boolean algebras represent possible games, at least as far as present day physics is concerned. I shall describe the family of possible gambles, in a somewhat abstract way. It is a consequence of von Neumann (1955) analysis of the set of possible measurements.

Let $``$ be the $`n`$-dimensional vector space over the real or complex field, equipped with the usual inner product. Let $`H_1,H_2,\mathrm{},H_k`$ be $`k`$ non zero subspaces of $``$, which are orthogonal in pairs $`H_iH_j`$ for $`i,j=1,2,\mathrm{},k`$, and which together span the entire space, $`H_1H_2\mathrm{}H_k=`$. These subspaces generate a Boolean algebra, call it $`(H_1,H_2,\mathrm{},H_k)`$, in the following way: The zero of the algebra is the null subspace, the non zero elements of the algebra are subspaces the form $`H_{i_1}H_{i_2}\mathrm{}H_{i_r}`$ where $`\varphi \{i_1,i_{2,}\mathrm{},i_r\}\{1,2,\mathrm{},k\}`$. If $`H,H\mathrm{`}`$ are two elements in the algebra let $`HH\mathrm{`}=HH\mathrm{`}`$ be the subspace spanned by the (set theoretic) union $`HH\mathrm{`}`$, let $`HH\mathrm{`}=HH\mathrm{`}`$, and let the complement of $`H`$, denoted by $`H^{}`$, be the subspace orthogonal to $`H`$ such that $`HH^{}=`$. Then $`(H_1,H_2,\mathrm{},H_k)`$ with the operations $``$, $``$, $``$ is a Boolean algebra with $`2^k`$ elements. Note that a maximal algebra of this kind is obtained when we take all the $`H_i`$‘s to be one-dimensional subspaces (rays). Then $`k=n`$ and the algebra has $`2^n`$ elements.

Now, let $`𝔹()`$ be the family of all the Boolean algebras obtained from subspaces of $``$ in the way described above. Obviously, If $`_1,_2𝔹()`$ then $`_1_2`$ is also Boolean algebra in $`𝔹()`$. We shall say that two subspaces $`G,H`$ of $``$ are compatible in $``$ if there is $`𝔹()`$ such that $`G,H`$, otherwise $`G`$ and $`H`$ are incompatible. Two algebras $`_1,_2`$ are incompatible in $``$ if there are subspaces $`G_1`$ and $`H_2`$ which are incompatible.

POSSIBILITY CRITERION: $``$ is a possible quantum gamble if there is a finite dimensional complex or real Hilbert space $``$ such that $``$ is a finite family of Boolean algebras in $`𝔹()`$ which are incompatible in pairs.

One could proceed with the probabilistic account disregarding this criterion and, in fact, go beyond what is known to be physically possible (see Svozil, 1998). We shall not do that, however, and all the games considered in this paper are physically possible. With each of the gambles to be discussed in this paper we proceed in two stages. Firstly, we present the Boolean algebras, their relations and the consequences for probability. Secondly, we prove that the gamble obeys the possibility criterion.

## 2 Consequences

### 2.1 Uncertainty Relations

Consider the following quantum gamble $``$ consisting of seven incompatible measurements (Boolean algebras), each generated by its three possible outcomes: $`E_1,E_2,F_2`$, $`E_1,E_3,F_3`$, $`E_2,E_4,E_6`$, $`E_3,E_5,E_7`$, $`E_6,E_7,F`$, $`E_4,E_8,F_4`$, $`E_5,E_8,F_5`$. Note that some of the outcomes are shared by two measurements, these are denoted by the letter $`E`$. The other outcomes belong each to a single algebra and denoted by $`F`$. As before, when two algebras share an event they also share its complement so that, for example,$`\overline{E}_1=E_2F_2=E_3F_3`$, and similarly in the other cases. The logical relations among the generators are depicted in the graph of figure 2. This is the compatibility graph of the generators. Each node in the graph represents an outcome, two nodes are connected by an edge if, and only if the corresponding outcomes belong to a common algebra; each triangle represents the generators of one of the algebras.

We assume that the agent is aware of the seven algebras and the connections between them. By RULE 2 the probability he assigns to each event is independent of the Boolean algebra (measurement) which is considered, for example, $`p(E_2|E_1,E_2,F_2)=p(E_2|E_2,E_4,E_6)p(E_2)`$. RULE 1 entails that the probabilities of each triple of outcomes of each measurement should sum up to 1, for example, $`p(E_4)+p(E_8)+p(F_4)=1`$. There are altogether seven equations of this kind. Combining them with the fact that probability is non-negative (by RULE 1) it is easy to prove that the probabilities assigned by our rational agent should satisfy $`p(E_1)+p(E_8)\frac{3}{2}`$. This is an example of an uncertainty relation, a constraint on the probabilities assigned to the outcomes of incompatible measurements. In particular, if the system is prepared in such a way that it is rational to assign $`p(E_1)=1`$ (see 2.5) then the rules of quantum games force $`p(E_8)\frac{1}{2}`$.

To see why $``$ represents a physically possible gamble we use the POSSIBILITY CRITERION and identify each event with a one dimensional subspace of $`^3`$ (or $`^3`$) in the following way $`E_1`$ is the subspace spanned by the vector $`(1,0,2)`$, $`E_2(0,1,0)`$, $`F_2(2,0,1)`$, $`E_3(2,1,1)`$, $`F_3(2,5,1)`$, $`E_4(0,0,1)`$, $`E_5(1,1,1)`$, $`E_6=(1,0,0)`$, $`E_7(0,1,1)`$, $`F(0,1,1)`$, $`F_4(1,1,0)`$, $`F_5(1,1,2)`$, $`E_8(1,1,0)`$. Note that the vectors associated with compatible subspaces are orthogonal, so that figure 2 is the orthogonality graph for these thirteen vectors.

A more concrete way to represent this game is to consider each of these vectors as depicting a direction in physical space. For the vector $`v`$ let $`S_v^2`$ be the square of the spin in the $`v`$-direction of a massive spin-1 particle, so that its eigenvalues are $`0,1`$. Now, for each of the thirteen vectors above take the event $`\{S_v^2=0\}`$. Then the relations in figure 2 are satisfied.

This example is a special case of a more general principle (Pitowsky, 1998):

###### Theorem 1

let $`H_1,H_2`$ be two incompatible rays in a Hilbert space $``$ whose dimension $`3`$. Then there is a (finite) quantum gamble $`𝔹()`$ in which $`H_1,H_2`$ are events, and every probability assignment $`p`$ for $``$ which satisfies RULE 1 and RULE 2 also satisfies $`p(H_1)+p(H_2)<1`$.

### 2.2 Truth and Probability, The Kochen and Specker’s Theorem

Consider the gamble $``$ of eleven incompatible measurements, each with four possible outcomes.

$`_1=E_1,F_1,F_2,F_3`$, $`_2=E_1,F_1,F_4,F_5`$, $`_3=E_1,F_2,F_6,F_7`$,

$`_4=E_1,F_3,F_8,F_9`$, $`_5=E_2,F_{10},F_{11},F_{12}`$, $`_6=E_2,F_7,F_{10},F_{13}`$,

$`_7=E_2,F_8,F_{11},F_{14}`$, $`_8=E_2,F_4,F_{12},F_{15}`$, $`_9=F_9,F_{14},F_{16},F_{17}`$,

$`_{10}=F_5,F_{15},F_{16},F_{18}`$, $`_{11}=F_6,F_{12},F_{17},F_{18}`$

The two outcomes denoted by the letter $`E`$ are shared by four measurement each, and the outcomes denoted by $`F`$ are shared by two measurements each. Altogether there are twenty outcomes. This example is based on a proof of the Kochen and Specker (1967) theorem due to Kargnahan(1994). (The original proof requires hundreds of measurements, with three outcomes each and 117 outcomes in all). Again, when an event is shared by two measurements then so does its complement, for example, $`\overline{F}_8=E_1F_3F_9=E_2F_{11}F_{14}`$.

Now, suppose that all the algebras $`_k`$ are sub-algebras of a Boolean algebra $``$. Assume, without loss of generality, that $``$ is an algebra of subsets of a set $`X`$. With this identification the events $`E_i,F_j`$ are subsets of $`X`$. The logical relations between the events dictates that any two of the events among the $`E_i`$’s and $`F_j`$’s that share the same algebra $`_k`$ are disjoint. Moreover, the union of all four outcomes in each algebra $`_k`$, is identical to $`X`$, for example, $`X=E_2F_7F_{10}F_{13}`$ is the union of the outcomes in $`_6`$. But this leads to a contradiction because the intersection of all these unions is necessarily empty!

To see that suppose, by contrast, that there is $`xX`$ such that $`x`$ belongs to exactly one outcome, $`E_i`$ or $`F_j`$, in each one of the eleven algebras $`_k`$. This means that $`x`$ belong to eleven such events (with repetition counted). But this is impossible since each one of the outcomes appears an even number of times in the eleven algebras, and eleven is an odd number.

One consequence of this is related to RULE 2 discussed in section 1.3. Suppose that an agent thinks about the probabilities of the events $`E_i,F_j`$ as conditional on the measurement performed. If the term “conditional probability” is used in its usual sense then the events should be interpreted as elements of a single Boolean algebra $``$ (taken again as an algebra of subsets of some set $`X`$). To avoid the Kochen Specker contradiction the agent can use two strategies. The first to take some of the generating events in at least one algebra to be non-disjoint in pairs, for example, $`E_2F_8\varphi `$. In this case the agent seizes to see the events $`E_2,F_8`$ as representing measurement outcomes, and associates with them some other meaning (although he eventually takes the conditional probability of $`E_2F_8`$ to be zero). The other strategy is to take the union of the outcomes of some measurements to be proper subset of $`X`$. For example, in the case of $`_9`$, $`F_9F_{14}F_{16}F_{17}X`$. In this case the agent actually adds another theoretical outcome (which, however, has conditional probability zero). Both strategies represent a distortion of the logical relations among the events, which we have assumed as given.

On a less formal level we can ask why would anyone do that? The additional structure assumed by the agent amounts to a strange “hidden variable theory” for the set of experiments $``$. There is a great theoretical interest in hidden variable theories, but they are of little value to the rational gambler. A classical analogue would be a person who thinks that a coin really has three sides ‘head’, ‘belly’ and ‘tail’ and assigns a prior probability $`\frac{1}{3}`$ to each. But the act of tossing the coin (or looking at it, or physically interacting with it) causes the belly side never to show up, so the probability of belly, conditional on tossing (or looking, or interacting), is zero. The betting behavior of such a person is rational in the sense that no Dutch book argument against him is possible. However, as far as gambling on a coin toss is concerned, his theory of coins is not altogether rational. It is the elimination of this kind of irrationality which motivates RULE 2.

Another consequence of this gamble concerns the relations between probability and logical truth. Often the Kochen and Specker theorem is taken as an indication that in quantum mechanics a classical logical falsity may sometimes be true (Bub, 1974; Demopoulos, 1976). To see how, consider the $`E_i`$ and $`F_j`$ as propositional variables, and for each $`1k11`$ let $`C_k`$ be the proposition which says: “exactly one of the variable in the group $`k`$ is true”, for example,

$`C_6`$ $`=`$ $`(E_2F_7F_{10}F_{13})(E_2F_7)(E_2F_{10})`$
$``$ $`(E_2F_{13})(F_7F_{10})(F_7F_{13})(F_{10}F_{13})`$
Then $`_{k=1}^{11}C_k`$ is a classical logical falsity. But $`_{k=1}^{11}C_k`$ is ‘quantum mechanically true’ with respect to the system described above, because each one of the $`C_k`$’s is a true description of it.

In our gambling picture we make a more modest claim. A rational agent who participates in the quantum gamble will assign, in advance, probability $`1`$ to each $`C_k`$. Therefore, arguably the agent also assigns $`_{k=1}^{11}C_k`$ probability $`1`$. But this is an epistemic position which does not oblige the agent to assign truth values to the $`E_i`$’s and $`F_j`$’s, nor is he committed to say that such truth values exist. Indeed, this is a strong indication that ‘probability one’ and ‘truth’ are quite different from one another. The EPR system (below) provides another example. There is, however, a weaker sense in which $`_{k=1}^{11}C_k`$ is true and we shall discuss it in the philosophical discussion 3.1.

The following is a proof that our game satisfies the POSSIBILITY CRITERION. Each $`E_i`$ and each $`F_j`$ is identified with a ray (one dimensional subspace) of $`^4`$ (or $`^4`$). Two outcome which share the same algebra correspond to orthogonal rays. The rays are identified by a vector that spans them:

$`E_1(1,0,0,0)`$, $`F_1(0,1,0,0)`$, $`F_2(0,0,1,0)`$, $`F_3(0,0,0,1)`$,

$`F_4(0,0,1,1)`$, $`F_5(0,0,1,1)`$, $`F_6(0,1,0,1)`$, $`F_7(0,1,0,1)`$,

$`F_8(0,1,1,0)`$, $`F_9(0,1,1,0)`$, $`E_2(1,1,1,1)`$, $`F_{10}(1,1,1,1)`$,

$`F_{11}(1,1,1,1)`$, $`F_{12}(1,1,1,1)`$, $`F_{13}(1,0,1,0)`$, $`F_{14}(1,0,0,1)`$,

$`F_{15}(1,1,0,0)`$, $`F_{16}(1,1,1,1)`$, $`F_{17}(1,1,1,1)`$, $`F_{18}(1,1,1,1)`$.

### 2.3 EPR and Violation of Bell’s Inequality

Given two (not necessarily disjoint) events $`A`$, $`B`$ in the same algebra, denote $`AB=AB`$, and for three events $`A,B,C`$ denote by $`\{A,B,C\}`$ the Boolean algebra that they generate:

$$\{A,B,C\}=ABC,\overline{A}BC,A\overline{B}C,AB\overline{C},\overline{A}\overline{B}C,\overline{A}B\overline{C},A\overline{B}\overline{C},\overline{A}\overline{B}\overline{C}$$

In order to recover the argument of the Einstein Rosen and Podolsky (1935) and Bell (1966) paradox within a quantum gamble we shall use Mermin (1990) representation of GHZ, the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (1989) system. Consider the gamble which consists of eight possible measurements: The four measurements $`_1=\{A_1,B_1,C_1\}`$, $`_2=\{A_1,B_2,C_2\}`$, $`_3=\{A_2,B_1,C_2\}`$, $`_4=\{A_2,B_2,C_1\}`$ each with eight possible outcomes and

$`_5=S,D_1,A_1B_1C_1,\overline{A}_1\overline{B}_1C_1,\overline{A}_1B_1\overline{C}_1,A_1\overline{B}_1\overline{C}_1`$,

$`_6=S,D_2,\overline{A}_1B_2C_2,A_1\overline{B}_2C_2,A_1B_2\overline{C}_2,\overline{A}_1\overline{B}_2\overline{C}_2`$,

$`_7=S,D_3,\overline{A}_2B_1C_2,A_2\overline{B}_1C_2,A_2B_1\overline{C}_2,\overline{A}_2\overline{B}_1\overline{C}_2`$,

$`_8=S,D_4,\overline{A}_2B_2C_1,A_2\overline{B}_2C_1,A_2B_2\overline{C}_1,\overline{A}_2\overline{B}_2\overline{C}_1`$,

each with six possible outcomes.

Assume that the agent has good reasons to believe that $`p(S)=1`$. Such a belief can come about in a variety of ways, for example, she may know something about the preparation of the system form a previous measurement result (see section 2.5). Alternatively, the bookie may announce in advance that he will raise his stakes indefinitely against any bet made for $`\overline{S}`$. Whatever the source of information, the agent has good reasons to assign probability zero to four out of the eight outcomes in each one of the four measurements $`_1`$ to $`_4`$. The remaining events are

$`in_1\overline{A}_1B_1C_1,A_1\overline{B}_1C_1,A_1B_1\overline{C}_1,\overline{A}_1\overline{B}_1\overline{C}_1`$ (1)
$`in_2A_1B_2C_2,\overline{A}_1\overline{B}_2C_2,\overline{A}_1B_2\overline{C}_2,A_1\overline{B}_2\overline{C}_2`$
$`in_3A_2B_1C_2,\overline{A}_2\overline{B}_1C_2,\overline{A}_2B_1\overline{C}_2,A_2\overline{B}_1\overline{C}_2`$
$`in_4A_2B_2C_1,\overline{A}_2\overline{B}_2C_1,\overline{A}_2B_2\overline{C}_1,A_2\overline{B}_2\overline{C}_1`$
Denote by $`P`$ the sum of the probabilities of these sixteen events. Given that $`p(S)=1`$ the probabilities of the events in each row in (1) sum up to $`1`$. Altogether, the rational assignment is therefore $`P=4`$. However, if $`A_1`$, $`B_1`$, $`C_1`$, $`A_2`$, $`B_2`$, $`C_2`$ are events in any (classical) probability space then the sum of the probabilities of the events in (1) never exceeds $`3`$. This is one of the constraints on the values of probabilities which Boole called “conditions of possible experience”333See Pitowsky (1989, 1994, 2002) and Pitowsky and Svozil, (2001) for a discussion of Boole’s conditions, their derivations and their violations by quantum frequencies. and it is violated by any rational assignment in this quantum gamble. On one level this is just another example of a quantum gamble that cannot be imbedded in a single classical probability space without distorting the identity of the events and the logical relations between them. A more dramatic example has been the Kochen and Specker’s theorem of the previous section.

The special importance of the EPR case lies in the details of the physical system and the way the measurements $`_1,_2,_3,_4`$ are performed. The system is composed of three particles which interacted in the past, but are now spatially separated and are no longer interacting. On the first particle we can choose to perform an $`A_1`$-measurement or an $`A_2`$-measurement (but not both) each with two possible outcomes. Similarly, we can choose to perform on the second particle one of two $`B`$-measurement, and one of two $`C`$-measurement on the third particle. The algebras $`_1,_2,_3,_4`$ represent the outcomes of four out of the eight logically possible combinations of such local measurements. In this physical arrangement we can recover the EPR reasoning, and Bell’s rebuttal, which I will not repeat here. The essence of Bell’s theorem is that the EPR assumptions lead to the conclusion that $`A_1`$, $`B_1`$, $`C_1`$, $`A_2`$, $`B_2`$, $`C_2`$ belong to a single Boolean algebra. Consequently, the sum of the probabilities of the events in (1) cannot exceed $`3`$, in contradiction to RULE1 and RULE 2.

Which of two EPR assumptions ‘reality’ or ‘locality’ should the Bayesian reject? In the previous section we have made the distinction between ‘probability $`1`$’ and ‘truth’. But the identification of the two is precisely the subject matter of EPR’s Principle of Reality: “If without in any way disturbing a system we can predict with certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding to this physical quantity” (Einstein Rosen and Podolsky, 1935). Quite independently of Bell’s argument, a Bayesian should take a sceptical view of this principle. “Probability equal to unity” means that the degree of rational belief has reached a level of certainty. It does not reflect any prejudice about possible causes of the outcomes. On the other hand, there seem to be no good grounds for rejecting the Principle of Locality on the basis of this or similar gambles.

To prove that this gamble satisfies the possibility criterion let $`_2`$ be the two dimensional complex Hilbert space, let $`\sigma _x`$, $`\sigma _y`$ be the Pauli matrices associated with the two orthogonal directions $`x`$, $`y`$, and let $`H_x`$, $`H_y`$ the (one dimensional) subspaces of $`_2`$ corresponding to the eigenvalues $`\sigma _x=1`$, $`\sigma _y=1`$ respectively, so that $`H_x^{}`$, $`H_y^{}`$ correspond to $`\sigma _x=1`$, $`\sigma _y=1`$. In the eight dimensional Hilbert space $`_2_2_2`$ we shall identify $`A_1=H_x_2_2`$, $`B_1=_2H_x_2`$, $`C_1=_2_2H_x`$, $`A_2=H_y_2_2`$, $`B_2=_2H_y_2`$, $`C_2=_2_2H_y`$, all these are four dimensional subspaces. The outcomes in $`_1,_2,_3,_4`$ are one dimensional subspaces, for example $`\overline{A}_1\overline{B}_2C_2=H_x^{}H_y^{}H_y`$. The subspace $`S`$ is the one dimensional ray along the GHZ state $`\sqrt{1/2}\left(|+_z_1|+_z_2|+_z_3|_z_1|_z_2|_z_3\right)`$ where $`z`$ is the direction orthogonal to $`x`$ and $`y`$. The subspaces $`D_i`$ are just the orthocomplements, in $`_2_2_2`$, to the direct sum of the other subspaces in their respective algebras. Hence, $`dimD_i=3`$.

### 2.4 The Infinite Gamble: Gleason’s Theorem

Let us take the idealization a step further. Assume that the bookie announces that $``$ contains all the maximal Boolean algebras in $`𝔹()`$ for some finite dimensional real or complex Hilbert space $``$ with $`dim=n3`$. Recall that if $`H_1,H_2,\mathrm{},H_k`$ are $`k`$ non zero subspaces of $``$, which are orthogonal in pairs, and whose direct sum is the entire space, they generate a Boolean algebra $`(H_1,H_2,\mathrm{},H_k)`$ (section 1.4). If $`k=n`$ the algebra is maximal and each subspace $`H_j`$ is one dimensional. In other words, the set $``$ consists of all non-degenerate measurements with $`n`$ outcomes. The information theoretic aspects of this case are discussed in Caves, Fuchs and Schack (2002)

There is a certain difficulty in extending quantum gambles to this case since there are a continuum of possible measurements, and the agent is supposed to place money on each. We can overcome this difficulty by assuming that the agent makes a commitment to pay a certain amount on each outcome of each measurement, without paying any cash in advance. When a single measurement $``$ is chosen by the bookie all the agent’s commitments are canceled, except those pertaining to $``$.

RULE 1 and RULE 2 imply in this case that for any $`n`$ orthogonal rays $`H_1,H_2,\mathrm{},H_n`$ in $``$ the agent’s probability function should satisfy

$$p(H_1)+p(H_2)+\mathrm{}+p(H_n)=1$$
(2)
Gleason (1957) proved

###### Theorem 2

Let $``$ be a Hilbert space over field of real or complex numbers with a finite dimension $`n3`$. If $`p`$ is a non negative function defined on the subspaces of $``$ and satisfies (2) for every set of $`n`$ orthogonal rays then there is a statistical operator $`W`$ such that for every subspace $`H`$ of $``$

$$p(H)=tr(WP_H)$$
(3)
where $`P_H`$ is the projection operator on $`H`$.

For the proof see also Pitowsky (1998). This profound theorem gives a characterization of all probability assignments of quantum theory. Furthermore, if we know that the system is prepared with $`p(R)=1`$, for some ray $`R`$, then $`p`$ is uniquely determined by $`p(H)=P_H(r)^2`$ for all subspaces $`H`$, where $`r`$ is a unit vector that spans $`R`$. The theorem can be easily extended to closed subspaces of the infinite dimensional Hilbert space.

It is interesting to note that many of the results about finite quantum gambles that we have considered are actually consequences of Gleason’s theorem. Consider, for example the Kochen and Specker’s theorem (section 2.2). To connect it with Gleason’s theorem take an appropriate first order formal theory of the rays of $`^n`$, the orthogonality relation between them, and the real functions defined on them (where $`n3`$ finite and fixed). Add to it a special function symbol $`p`$, the axiom that $`p`$ is non negative, the axiom that $`p`$ is not a constant, the axiom that $`p`$ has only two values zero or one. Now, add the infinitely many axioms $`p(H_1)+p(H_2)+\mathrm{}+p(H_n)=1`$ for each $`n`$-tuple of orthogonal rays in $`^n`$. By Gleason’s theorem this theory is inconsistent (since by (3) $`p`$ has a continuum of values). Hence, there is a finite subset of this set of axioms which is inconsistent, meaning a finite subset of rays which satisfy the Kochen and Specker’s theorem. This is, of course, a non constructive proof, and an explicit construction is preferable. However, the consideration just mentioned can be used to obtain more general non-constructive results about finite games. One such immediate result is Theorem 1 which also has a constructive proof. (In fact, the proof of Gleason’s theorem involves a construction similar to that of theorem 1, see Pitowsky, 1998)

Gleason’s theorem indicates that the use of the adjective ‘subjective’ to describe epistemic probability is a misnomer. Even in the classical realm it has misleading connotations. Classically, different agents that start with different prior probability assignments eventually converge on the same probability distribution as they learn more and more from common experience. In the quantum realm the situation is more extreme. For a given a single physical system Gleason’s theorem dictates that all agents share a common prior or, in the worst case, they start using the same probability distribution after a single (maximal) measurement.

### 2.5 A Note on Conditional Quantum Probability

Consider two gambles, $`_1`$, $`_2`$ and assume that $`A`$ is a common event. In other words, there is $`_1_1`$ and $`_2_2`$ such that $`A_1_2`$. We can consider sequential gambles in which the gamble $`_1`$ is played, and subsequently after the results are recorded, the gamble $`_2`$ follows with the measurements performed on the same system. In such cases the agent can place conditional bets of the form: “If $`A`$ occurs in the first gamble place such and such odds in the second gamble”. This means that the of probabilities assigned in the second game $`_2`$ are constrained by the condition $`p(A)=1`$ (in addition to the constraints imposed by RULE 1 and RULE 2). The EPR gamble in 2.3 can be seen as such a conditional game, when we consider the preparation process as a previous gamble with an outcome $`S`$. In fact, all preparations (at least of pure states) can be seen in that light.

If the gambles $`_1`$, $`_2`$ are infinite, and contain all the maximal algebras in $`𝔹()`$, Gleason’s theorem dictates the rule for conditional betting. In the second gamble the probability is the square of the length of the projection on (the subspace corresponding to) $`A`$. The conditional probability is therefore given by Lüders rule (Bub, 1997).

## 3 Philosophical Remarks

### 3.1 Bohr, Quantum Logic and Structural Realism

The line we have taken has some affinity with Bohr’s approach -or more precisely, with the view often attributed to Bohr444See Beller (1999). Although Bohr kept changing his views and contradicted himself on occations, it is useful to distill from his various pronouncements a more or less coherent set. This is what philosophers mean by “Bohr’s views”.-in that we treat the outcomes of future measurements as mere possibilities, and do not associate them with properties that exist prior to the act of measurement. Bohr’s position, however, has some other features which are better avoided. Consider a spin-1 massive particle and suppose that we measure $`S_z`$, its spin along the $`z`$-direction. Bohr would say that in this circumstance attributing values to $`S_x`$ and $`S_y`$ is meaningless. But the equation $`S_x^2+S_y^2+S_z^2=2I`$ remains valid then, as it is valid at all times. How can an expression which contains meaningless (or valueless) terms be itself valid? Indeed, non-commuting observables may satisfy algebraic equations, the Laws of Nature often take such form. What is the status of such equations at the time when only one component in them has been meaningfully assigned a value? What is their status when no measurement has been performed? Quantum logic, in some of its formulations, has been an attempt to answer this question realistically.

It had began with the seminal work of Birkhoff and von-Neumann (1936). A later modification was inspired by the work of Kochen and Specker (1967). The realist interpretation of the quantum logical formalism is due to Finkelstein (1962), Putnam (1968), Bub (1974), Demopoulos (1976). Consider, for example, the gamble $`_1=E_1,E_2,E_3`$, $`_2=E_1,E_4,E_5`$ made of two incompatible measurements, with one common outcome $`E_1`$ (figure 1). Let us loosely identify the outcomes $`E_i`$ with the propositions that describe them. The realist quantum logician maintains that both $`E_1E_2E_3`$ and $`E_1E_4E_5`$ are true, and therefore so is $`A=(E_1E_2E_3)(E_1E_4E_5)`$. But only one of the measurements $`_1`$ or $`_2`$ can be conducted at one time. This means that, generally, only three out of the five $`E_i`$’s can be experimentally assigned a truth value (except in the case that $`E_1`$ turns out to be true which makes the other four events false). This does not prevent us from assigning hypothetical truth values to the $`E_i`$’s that make $`A`$ true. However, as we have seen in 2.2, the trouble begins when we consider more complex gambles. To repeat, let $``$ be the gamble of 2.2, and for each $`1k11`$ let $`C_k`$ be the proposition which says: “exactly one of the variables in the group $`k`$ is true”, for example,

$`C_6`$ $`=`$ $`(E_2F_7F_{10}F_{13})(E_2F_7)(E_2F_{10})`$
$``$ $`(E_2F_{13})(F_7F_{10})(F_7F_{13})(F_{10}F_{13})`$
Then $`B=_{k=1}^{11}C_k`$ is a classical logical falsity. This means that we cannot make $`B`$ true even by assigning hypothetical truth values to the $`E_i`$’s and $`F_j`$‘s.

Still, the quantum logician maintains that $`B`$ is true. Or, by analogy, that $`S_x^2+S_y^2+S_z^2=2I`$ is true for every orthogonal triple $`x`$, $`y`$, $`z`$ in physical space. This is the quantum logical solution of the Bohrian dilemma and it comes with a heavy price-tag: the repudiation of classical propositional logic. But what does it mean to say that $`B`$ is true? As I have shown elsewhere (Pitowsky, 1989) the operational analysis of the quantum logical connectives, due to Finkelstein and Putnam, leads to a non-local hidden variable theory in disguise. Moreover, from a Bayesian perspective it is quite sufficient to say that $`B`$ has probability $`1`$, meaning that each conjunct in $`B`$ has probability $`1`$ that is, a degree of belief approaching certainty. Indeed, the Bayesian does not consider even the Laws of Nature as true, only as being nearly certain, given present day knowledge.

Nevertheless, there is a sense in which $`A`$ or even $`B`$ are true, and this is the sense that enables our Bayesian analysis in the first place. Thus, to assert that “$`(E_1E_2E_3)(E_1E_4E_5)`$ is true” is nothing but a cumbersome way to say that the gamble $`=\{E_1,E_2,E_3,E_1,E_4,E_5\}`$ exists. This is first and foremost a statement about the identities: the outcome $`E_1`$ is really the same in the two measurements, and $`\overline{E}_1=E_2E_3=E_4E_5`$. It is also a statement about physical realizations, this gamble can be designed and played (experimental difficulties notwithstanding). Viewed in this light quantum gambles together with RULE 1 and RULE 2 form semantics for quantum logic, in that they assign meaning to the identities of quantum logic (in its partial Boolean algebra formulation).

The metaphysical assumption underlying the Bayesian approach is therefore realism about the structure of quantum gambles, in particular those that satisfy the possibility criterion (1.4). This position is close in spirit (but not identical) to the view that quantum mechanics is a complete theory, so let us turn to the alternative view.

### 3.2 Hidden Variables- A Bayesian Perspective

Consider Bohm’s theory as a typical example555The uniqueness theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996; Bub 1997; Bub Clifton and Goldstein 2000) implies that all ‘no collapse’hidden variable theories have essentially the structure of Bohm’s theory.. Recall that in this theory the state of a single particle at time $`t`$ is given by the pair $`(x(t),\psi (x,t))`$ where $`x`$ is the position of the particle and $`\psi =R\mathrm{exp}(iS)`$ -the guiding wave- is a solution of the time dependent Schrödinger’s equation. The guiding condition $`m\stackrel{}{x}=S`$ provides the relation between the two components of the state, where $`m`$ is the particle mass. The theory is deterministic, an initial position $`x(0)`$ and an initial condition $`\psi (x,0)`$ determine the trajectory of the particle and the guiding wave at all future times. In particular, the outcome of every measurement is determined by these initial conditions.

As can be expected from the Kochen and Specker’s theorem the outcome of a measurement is context dependent in Bohm’s theory. This fact can also be derived by a direct calculation (Pagonis and Clifton, 1995). Given a fixed initial state $`(x(0),\psi (x,0))`$ the measurement of $`S_z^2`$ together with $`S_x^2`$ and $`S_y^2`$ can yield one result $`S_z^2=0`$; but the measurement of $`S_z^2`$ together with $`S_{x\mathrm{`}}^2`$ and $`S_{y\mathrm{`}}^2`$ can give another result $`S_z^2=1`$. Now, the identity criterion for observables in a deterministic theory is: Two procedures constitute measurements of the same observable if for any given physical state (preparation) they yield identical outcomes. Therefore in Bohm’s theory the observable “$`S_z^2`$ in the $`x,y,z`$ context” is not really the same as “$`S_z^2`$ in the $`x\mathrm{`},`$ $`y\mathrm{`},`$ $`z`$ context”. Nevertheless, the Bohmians consider $`S_z^2`$ as one single statistical observable across contexts. The reason being that the average outcome of $`S_z^2`$, over different initial positions with density $`\left|\psi (x,0)\right|^2`$, is context independent. Hence, Bohm’s theory is a hybrid much like classical statistical mechanics: the dynamics are deterministic but the observables are statistical averages. Since the initial positions are not known -not even knowable- the averages provide the empirical content. Consequently, the observable structure of quantum mechanics is accepted by the Bohmians “for all practical purposes”.

This attitude prevails when the Bohmian is betting in a quantum gamble. There is no detectable difference in the betting behavior of a Bohmian agent; although the reasons leading to his behavior follow from the causal structure of Bohm’s theory. At a first glance there seems to be nothing peculiar about this. Many people who would assign probability $`0.5`$ to ‘heads’ believe that the tossing of a coin is a deterministic process. Indeed, there is a rational basis to this belief: if the agent is allowed to inspect the initial conditions of the toss with a greater precision he may change his betting odds. In other words, his $`0.5`$ degree of belief is conditional on his lack of knowledge of the initial state. Obtaining further information is possible, in principle, and in the limit of infinite precision it leads to the assignment of probability zero or one to ‘heads’. For the Bayesian this is in a large measure what determinism means.

Can we say the same about the Bohmian attitude in a quantum gamble? According to Bohm’s theory itself666Vallentini (1996) considers the possibility that $`\left|\psi \right|^2`$ is only an ‘equilibrium’ distribution, and deviations from it are possible. In this case Bohm’s theory is a genuine empirical extension of quantum mechanics, and the Bohmian agent may sometime bet against the rules of quantum mechanics. the position of the particle cannot be known beyond the information invested in the distribution $`\left|\psi \right|^2`$. Suppose that a particle is prepared in a (pure) quantum state $`\psi (x,0)`$. Then, according to Bohm’s theory, no further information is obtainable by a prior inspection (without changing the quantum state, in which case the problem starts all over again). Hence, $`\left|\psi \right|^2`$ is an absolute, not a conditional probability. Consequently, from a Bayesian perspective the determinism of Bohm’s theory is a myth. Luckily, it does not lead its believers astray in their bets.

What is the function of this myth? Obviously, to retain a sense of determinism, albeit one which is completely disconnected from human knowledge. But there is also a subtler issue here that have to do with the structure of the observables. As we have noticed, for the Bohmian the event $`E_1=\{S_z^2=0`$ in the $`x,y,z`$ context$`\}`$ is not the same as the event $`E_1^\mathrm{`}=\{S_z^2=0`$ in the $`x\mathrm{`},`$ $`y\mathrm{`},`$ $`z`$ context$`\}`$. Hence, the gamble $`=\{E_1,E_2,E_3`$, $`E_1,E_4,E_5\}`$ is interpreted by him as being “really” $`\mathrm{`}=\{E_1,E_2,E_3`$, $`E_1^\mathrm{`},E_4,E_5\}`$; although, as a result of dynamical causes, the long term frequencies of $`E_1`$ and $`E_1^\mathrm{`}`$ happen to be identical (for any given $`\psi `$). It follows that the myth also serves the purpose of “saving classical logic” by dynamical means (Pitowsky, 1994). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the EPR case where Bohm’s dynamics violate locality on the level of individual processes.

In this sense the hidden variable approach is conservative. It is not so much its insistence on determinism, but rather the refusal to acknowledge that the structure of the set of events- our quantum gambles- is real. As a gambler the Bohmian bets as if it is very real; as a metaphysician he provides a complicated apology.

### 3.3 Instrumentalism and its Radical Foundations

The Bayesian approach represents an instrumental attitude towards the quantum state. The state is just a code for probabilities, and “probability theory is simply the quantitative formulation of how to make rational decisions in the face of uncertainty” (Fuchs and Peres, 2000). Instrumentalism seems metaphysically innocent, all we are dealing with are experiments and their outcomes, without a commitment to an underlying, completely described microscopic reality. One might even be tempted to think that “quantum theory needs no interpretation” (ibid). Of course, there is a sense in which this is true. One needs no causal picture to do physics. Like a gambler, the physicist can assign probabilities to outcomes, assuming no causal or other mechanisms which bring them about.

But instrumentalism simply pushes the question of interpretation one step up the ladder. Instead of dealing directly with ‘reality’, the instrumentalist faces the challenge of explaining his instrument, that is, quantum probability. Unlike other mathematical theories- group theory for example- the application of probability requires a philosophical analysis. After all probability theory is our tool for weighing the relative merits of alternative actions and for making rational decisions; decisions that are made rational by their justifications. Indeed, we have provided a part of the justification by demonstrating how the structure of quantum gambles, together with the gambling rules, dictate certain constraints on the assignment of probability values. The trouble is that these probability values violate classical constraints, for example Bell’s inequalities. A hundred and fifty years ago Boole had considered these and other similar constraints as “conditions of possible experience”, and consequently conditions of rational choice. Today, we witness the appearance of ‘impossible’ experience. The Bohmian explains it away by reference to unobservable non-local measurement disturbances. The instrumentalist, in turn, insists that there is nothing to explain. But the violations of the classical constraints (unlike the measurement disturbances) are provably real. Therefore, something should be said about it if we insist that “probability theory is simply the quantitative formulation of how to make rational decisions”.

Instrumentalists often take their ‘raw material’ to be the set of space-time events: clicks in counters, traces in bubble chambers, dots on photographic plates and so on. Quantum theory imposes on this set a definite structure. Certain blips in space-time are identified as instances of the same event. Some families of clicks in counters are assumed to have logical relations with other families, etc. What we call reality is not just the bare set of events, it is this set together with its structure, for all that is left without the structure is noise. It has been von Neumann’s great achievement to identify this structure, and derive some of the consequences that follow from its details. I believe that von Neumann’s contribution to the foundations of quantum theory is exceedingly more important than that of Bohr. For it is one thing to say that the only role of quantum theory is to ‘predict experimental outcomes’, and that different measurements are ‘complementary’. It is quite another thing to provide an understanding of what it means for two experiments to be incompatible, and yet for their possible outcomes to be related; to show how these relations imply the uncertainty principle; and even, finally, to realize that the structure of events dictates the numerical values of the probabilities (Gleason’s theorem).

Bohr’s position will not suffice even for the instrumentalists. Their view, far from being metaphysically innocent, is founded on an assumption which is more radical than that of the hidden variable theories. Namely, the taxonomy of the universe expressed in the structure of the set of possible events, the quantum gambles which are made possible and the theory of probability they imply, are new and only partially understood pieces of knowledge. It is the task of an interpretation of quantum mechanics to make sense of these structures and relate them to what we previously used to call ‘probability’ and even ‘logic’777See Demopoulos, 2002 for an attempt at such an explenation..

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text:
# On homomorphism spaces of metrizable groups2000 Mathematics Subject Classification 22A05

## Acknowledgements

The author is deeply indebted to his PhD thesis supervisor, Prof. Walter Tholen, for his dedicated mentorship that made this research possible.

He thanks Dr. Gavin Seal, for his assistance in simplifying some proofs and preparing the paper for submission, and he also appreciates the helpful comments of the anonymous referee.

Last, but not least, the author offers special thanks to his students for their enormous encouragement.

Department of Mathematics & Statistics
York University, 4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3
Canada

e-mail: lukacs@mathstat.yorku.ca


text:
# An Analytic Model of the Shear Modulus at All Temperatures and Densities

## 1 Introduction

A reliable model of the adiabatic (isentropic) shear modulus, $`G,`$ of a polycrystalline solid at temperatures to $`T_m,`$ the melting temperature, and up to megabar pressures is needed for many applications, including the modeling of plastic deformation at extremes of pressure and temperature, numerical calculations of elastic and shock wave propagation, and even calculations of the oscillations of low-mass astrophysical objects.

Adiabatic elastic properties are generally determined by ultrasonic wave-speed measurements, which are usually made in the low-pressure regime. Zero-pressure experimental data have been accumulated on single-crystal elastic constants, together with polycrystalline averages, at temperatures from $`T=0`$ to nearly $`T_m`$ for Ag (to within $`60^{}`$K of $`T_m`$) , Au (to within $`60^{}`$K of $`T_m`$) , Ge (to within $`90^{}`$K of $`T_m`$) , and V (to within $`80^{}`$K of $`T_m`$) . The data run from $`T=0`$ to $`T_m`$ for Al , Ar , Bi , Cd , Cs , Cu , In , K , Na , Nb , Ne , Pb , Sn , Ta , Te , Xe , and Zn .

On the theoretical side, it is possible to calculate singe-crystal elastic constants as a function of compression at zero temperature from electronic-structure theory. Such calculations were done by Straub et al.  for Cu, Christensen et al.  for Mo and W, Söderlind et al.  for Fe, and Söderlind and Moriarty  for Ta. With known interatomic potentials it is possible to calculate the temperature dependence of the elastic constants by computer simulation techniques, as demonstrated by the calculations for Na , Mg , and Cu . Bounds on the shear modulus, $`G`$, can be calculated from the single-crystal elastic constants for any crystal class , and for a cubic crystal the polycrystalline shear modulus can be calculated exactly using the Kröner cubic equation .

Guinan and Steinberg  modeled the zero-temperature shear modulus as $`G=G_0+G_0^{}P(\rho _0/\rho )^{1/3},`$ where $`G_0^{}`$ is the pressure derivative of $`G`$ at zero pressure and $`\rho `$ is density. This functional form was chosen so that $`G\rho ^{4/3}`$ as $`\rho \mathrm{},`$ the correct asymptotic behavior albeit with a prefactor which does not generally coincide with that given by the one-component plasma model for $`G.`$ Preston and Wallace  proposed a model for the temperature dependence of the shear modulus at any density, but left the density dependence itself arbitrary. The dependence of the shear modulus on both density and temperature has also been discussed by Anderson .

In this paper we develop an analytic model for the density and temperature dependence of the shear modulus by combining four key elements. First is a simple but accurate relation between the density, the melting temperature as a function of density, $`T_m(\rho ),`$ and the shear modulus along the solidus . Second is the Preston-Wallace model for the shear modulus. Third is an analytic model for the Gruneisen parameter  that is used in conjunction with the fourth ingredient, the Lindemann criterion , to generate an analytic expression for $`T_m(\rho ).`$

## 2 A relation between shear modulus and melting temperature

The melting temperature and shear modulus along the solidus approximately satisfy the relation

$$\frac{G(\rho ,T_m(\rho ))}{\rho T_m(\rho )}=\frac{G(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},T_m(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}))}{\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}T_m(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})},$$
(1)
where $`\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}`$ is a reference density. This relation is the foundation of our model for the shear modulus, so we provide theoretical justification for it following two approaches: the theory of dislocation-mediated melting , and the theory of a Debye solid (in which it derives as a consequence of the proportionality of $`G`$ to the square of the Debye temperature). The relation is shown to agree very well with shear modulus data on argon, the only data available for such a comparison.

### 2.1 Two derivations of relation (1)

It follows from our model of melting as a dislocation-mediated phase transition that the relation

$$k_BT_m=\frac{1\nu (T_m)/2}{1\nu (T_m)}\frac{G(T_m)v(T_m)}{\mathrm{ln}(z1)}\frac{\lambda }{8\pi }\mathrm{ln}\left(\frac{\alpha ^2}{4b^2d(T_m)}\right).$$
(2)
holds at any pressure. Here $`b`$ is the magnitude of the Burgers vector, $`\nu `$ is the Poisson ratio, $`v`$ is the Wigner-Seitz volume, $`\lambda b^3/v`$ is a geometric factor characterizing the lattice, $`z`$ is the coordination number, and $`d(T_m)`$ is the dislocation density at melt. Note that the factors $`\lambda `$ and $`\mathrm{ln}(z1)`$ explicitly account for the influence of crystal structure on melting. The value of $`\lambda `$ is $`3\sqrt{3}/41.30`$ for body-centered cubic (bcc), and $`\sqrt{2}1.41`$ for face-centered cubic (fcc) and ideal $`(c/a=\sqrt{8/3})`$ hexagonal close-packed (hcp) lattices . The parameter $`\alpha `$ is the ratio of $`b`$ to the dislocation core radius, $`r_0;`$ $`\alpha 2.9`$ for both bcc and fcc crystals . This melting relation plus experimental data on over half the elements in the periodic table give $`b^2d(T_m)=0.61\pm 0.20`$ (throughout this paper the error in such expressions is the corresponding standard deviation) with $`G(300^{}`$K), $`v_{WS}(300^{}`$K) used instead of $`G(T_m),`$ $`v_{WS}(T_m)`$, respectively .

| element | Ba | Cs | Cr | $`\delta `$-Fe | K | Li | Na | Nb | Rb | $`\beta `$-Ti | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| $`T_m,`$ K | 1000 | 301.6 | 2130 | 1811 | 336.5 | 453.7 | 370.9 | 2750 | 312.5 | 1941 | 2183 |
| $`v\left(T_m\right),`$ $`\stackrel{}{\mathrm{A}}`$3 | 66.68 | 116.8 | 13.10 | 12.76 | 76.38 | 22.14 | 40.17 | 19.33 | 93.37 | 18.61 | 14.89 |
| $`G\left(T_m\right),`$ GPa | 2.96 | 0.39 | 35.7 | 30.8 | 0.80 | 3.60 | 1.93 | 32.6 | 0.60 | 21.9 | 32.3 |
| $`Gv/\left(k_BT_m\right)`$ | 14.3 | 10.9 | 15.9 | 15.7 | 13.2 | 12.7 | 15.1 | 16.6 | 13.0 | 15.2 | 15.9 |

Table 1. Numerical values of the ratio $`G(T_m)v(T_m)/(k_BT_m)`$ for 11 elemental solids that melt from bcc crystalline structure at normal pressure.

| element | Ag | Al | Ar | Au | $`\beta `$-Co | Cu | Ni | Pb | Pd | Pt | Rh |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| $`T_m,`$ K | 1235 | 933.5 | 83.8 | 1338 | 1768 | 1358 | 1728 | 600.6 | 1828 | 2041 | 2237 |
| $`v\left(T_m\right),`$ $`\stackrel{}{\mathrm{A}}`$3 | 18.19 | 17.55 | 40.90 | 17.88 | 11.96 | 12.61 | 11.85 | 31.14 | 15.65 | 16.04 | 14.87 |
| $`G\left(T_m\right),`$ GPa | 17.2 | 15.6 | 0.60 | 15.2 | 34.7 | 27.1 | 38.6 | 5.60 | 35.0 | 32.0 | 55.0 |
| $`Gv/\left(k_BT_m\right)`$ | 18.4 | 21.2 | 21.2 | 14.7 | 17.0 | 18.2 | 19.2 | 21.0 | 21.7 | 18.2 | 26.5 |

Table 2. Numerical values of the ratio $`G(T_m)v(T_m)/(k_BT_m)`$ for 11 elemental solids that melt from fcc crystalline structure at normal pressure.

From the compilation of data in Tables 1 and 2 we find that the product of $`\lambda `$ and the logarithm in Eq. (2) (with $`\nu (T_m)=0.42\pm 0.02`$ ) is a constant to 15% at zero pressure:

$$\frac{\lambda }{8\pi }\mathrm{ln}\left(\frac{\alpha ^2}{4b^2d(T_m)}\right)=[\begin{array}{cc}0.100\pm 0.015,\hfill & \mathrm{bcc},\hfill \\ 0.091\pm 0.014,\hfill & \mathrm{fcc}.\hfill \end{array}$$
(3)
We make the reasonable assumption that the mean interdislocation distance at the melting point, $`2R1/\sqrt{d(T_m)}`$, scales with $`b`$, which implies that $`b^2d(T_m)`$ is a compression-independent constant. It is also assumed that $`\alpha ^1=r_0/b`$ is unchanged under compression. Hence $`\lambda \mathrm{ln}(\alpha ^2/4b^2d)`$ is expected to be pressure-independent with approximately the same value for both bcc and fcc elements. It then follows from (2) that for a given element

$$\xi (P)\frac{1\nu (P,T_m(P))/2}{1\nu (P,T_m(P))}\frac{G(P,T_m(P))v(P,T_m(P))}{k_BT_m(P)\mathrm{ln}(z1)}=c,$$
(4)
where the constant $`c`$ has nearly the same value for both bcc and fcc elements. Experimental validation of this relation is not posible because of a lack of data from moderate to high compressions. However, the $`P0`$ and $`P\mathrm{}`$ limits are consistent with Eq. (4), which we now demonstrate.

At very high compressions a solid becomes a crystallized one-component plasma (OCP), i.e., a lattice of ions in a uniform neutralizing background of electrons . The melting curve of a solid at ultrahigh pressures is described by the equation

$$\frac{Z^2e^2}{a(T_m)k_BT_m}=\mathrm{\Gamma }_m,$$
(5)
where $`Z`$ is the atomic number, $`a=(3v/4\pi )^{1/3}`$ is the Wigner-Seitz radius, and $`\mathrm{\Gamma }_m`$, a dimensionless constant, is the OCP coupling parameter at melt . Numerous calculations of $`\mathrm{\Gamma }_m`$ for a bcc OCP crystal (see ref.  for a review) converge on the value 175 . The value of $`\mathrm{\Gamma }_m`$ for a fcc OCP crystal has been calculated to be $`196\pm 1`$  and 208.3 ; hence we take $`\mathrm{\Gamma }_m=200`$ for a fcc OCP crystal in the following analysis. The bcc OCP single-crystal elastic constants $`(c_{11}c_{12})/2`$ and $`c_{44}`$ have been calculated by means of Monte-Carlo simulations . A linear fit to the values of $`G`$ given by the formula of Sisodia et al.  (when $`c_{11}`$ and $`c_{12}`$ are not known separately, the value of $`G`$ given by this formula approximates Kröner’s shear modulus with high accuracy and, in fact, tends to the precise Kröner value in the limit $`P\mathrm{})`$ results in

$$G_{\mathrm{bcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}(T)=g_{\mathrm{bcc}}\left(\frac{4\pi }{3}\right)^{1/3}\frac{Z^2e^2}{v^{4/3}}\left(1\beta _{\mathrm{bcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}\frac{T}{T_m}\right),$$
(6)
where $`g_{\mathrm{bcc}}=0.09301`$ and $`\beta _{\mathrm{bcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}=0.21\pm 0.18.`$ We have calculated (unpublished) the coefficient $`g_{\mathrm{fcc}}`$ to be 0.09011. The coefficient $`\beta _{\mathrm{fcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}`$ has not been calculated, so we assume $`\beta _{\mathrm{fcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}=\beta _{\mathrm{bcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}.`$ We have also calculated the Voigt (V) and Reuss (R) bounds on the shear modulus of an ideal hcp OCP crystal: $`g_{\mathrm{hcp}}^\mathrm{V}=0.1194,`$ $`g_{\mathrm{hcp}}^\mathrm{R}=0.1045,`$ hence $`g_{\mathrm{hcp}}=0.1120`$ for the Voigt-Reuss-Hill average.

From Eqs. (4) and (6), and the ultrahigh pressure limit $`\nu (T)=1/2`$ , we obtain $`\xi _{\mathrm{bcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}=9.9\pm 2.3`$ and $`\xi _{\mathrm{fcc}}^{\mathrm{OCP}}=8.9\pm 2.0.`$ Comparison of the OCP values of $`\xi `$ to their zero-pressure counterparts (which follow from Eqs. (2) and (3)), $`\xi _{\mathrm{bcc}}(0)=10.0\pm 1.5`$ and $`\xi _{\mathrm{fcc}}(0)=11.0\pm 1.7,`$ shows that the $`P=0`$ and OCP values agree to within uncertainties, compelling evidence, though not a proof, that Eq. (4) is in fact valid, at least for bcc and fcc lattices. The uncertainty-weighted average of the four values is $`10.0\pm 1.8`$.

Formula (1) now follows from Eq. (4) provided that the ratio $`(1\nu (T_m)/2)/(1\nu (T_m))`$ is (approximately) a constant; in fact this ratio varies between $`4/3`$ at $`P=0`$ and $`3/2`$ as $`P\mathrm{},`$ i.e., it is $`(17\pm 1)/1217/12`$ to 94% accuracy.

Formula (1) can also be derived from the theory of a Debye solid. Ledbetter  derived the Debye-solid relation

$$\mathrm{\Theta }_D=\frac{\mathrm{\Lambda }}{v^{1/3}}\sqrt{\frac{G}{\rho }},$$
(7)
where $`\mathrm{\Theta }_D`$ is the Debye temperature and $`\mathrm{\Lambda }`$ is a constant. (Since $`G\rho ^{4/3}`$ as $`\rho \mathrm{},`$ $`\mathrm{\Theta }_D\rho ^{1/2},`$ which is consistent with $`\gamma `$ (Grüneisen) $`1/2`$ . Its widely used counterpart , $`\mathrm{\Theta }_D=\stackrel{~}{\mathrm{\Lambda }}v^{1/3}\sqrt{B/\rho }`$, where $`B`$ is the bulk modulus, has the wrong asymptotic behavior, $`\mathrm{\Theta }_D\rho ^{2/3}.`$) Siethoff and Ahlborn  demonstrated the validity of the Ledbetter formula at $`P=0`$ for Debye-like cubic solids , non-Debye hexagonal and tetragonal solids , and intermetallic compounds . Eq. (7), $`v1/\rho ,`$ and the Lindemann melting criterion

$$\frac{T_m(\rho )\rho ^{2/3}}{\mathrm{\Theta }_D^2(\rho )}=\mathrm{constant},$$
(8)
again yield relation (1).

| $`T_m(P),`$ K | $`v(P,T_m(P)),`$ $`\stackrel{}{\mathrm{A}}`$3 | $`u_t,`$ m/s | $`G(P,T_m(P)),`$ GPa | $`Gv/(k_BT_m)`$ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 205.59 | 35.698 | 952.6 | 1.686 | 21.21 |
| 190.90 | 36.216 | 909.7 | 1.516 | 20.84 |
| 175.91 | 36.785 | 879.5 | 1.395 | 21.14 |
| 162.80 | 37.319 | 843.0 | 1.263 | 20.98 |
| 162.07 | 37.350 | 847.0 | 1.274 | 21.28 |
| 148.19 | 37.959 | 800.0 | 1.118 | 20.75 |
| 134.47 | 38.601 | 768.6 | 1.015 | 21.11 |
| 123.16 | 39.155 | 736.0 | 0.918 | 21.15 |
| 83.80 | 40.900 |  | 0.600 | 21.22 |

Table 3. Numerical values of the ratio $`G(P,T_m(P))v(P,T_m(P))/(k_BT_m(P))`$ for Ar along its solidus. The last row of the table contains $`P=0`$ values.

### 2.2 Experimental verification

Direct experimental validation of relation (1) over a restricted range of densities is possible for a single element, viz. argon. Ishizaki et al.  measured the transverse ultrasonic wave velocity, $`u_t`$, in compressed argon along its solidus as a function of temperature. We calculate the shear modulus from the formula $`u_t=\sqrt{G/\rho },`$ and $`v=V/N_A`$ from the measured argon melting curve , $`V=V(T_m),`$ $`V`$ being the molar volume. Our results for the values of $`Gv/(k_BT_m)`$ are shown in Table 3.

For the $`P>0`$ data we find $`Gv/(k_BT_m)=21.06\pm 0.17,`$ in agreement with its $`P=0`$ value (we get $`Gv/(k_BT_m)=21.08\pm 0.17`$ for all of the data). Thus, $`Gv/(k_BT_m)`$ for Ar deviates from a constant by less than 1%.

## 3 Model of the shear modulus at all temperatures and densities

Preston and Wallace  constructed a model of the temperature dependence of the shear modulus ($`0TT_m`$) for arbitrary pressures. The $`T`$-dependence of $`G`$ involves two characteristic temperatures, namely the Debye temperature and the melting temperature. The shear modulus is always monotonically decreasing with $`T,`$ and is nonlinear for $`T\stackrel{<}{}\mathrm{\Theta }_D`$ and linear from $`\mathrm{\Theta }_D`$ to $`T_m`$ for most elements. An accurate representation of $`G(T)`$ at fixed density is achieved by ignoring the low-temperature non-linearity and approximating $`G(T)`$ as a linear function of the reduced temperature $`T/T_m`$ with the correct value $`G(\rho ,0)`$ at $`T=0`$ :

$$G(\rho ,T)=G(\rho ,0)\left(1\beta \frac{T}{T_m(\rho )}\right),$$
(9)
In general, the parameter $`\beta `$ may be density dependent. A fit to shear-modulus data spanning temperatures from $`T=0`$ to $`T/T_m\stackrel{>}{}0.4`$ at zero pressure gave $`\beta _0=0.23\pm 0.08`$ . (For the 11 fcc elements in Table 4 below $`\beta _0=0.27\pm 0.10.)`$ On the other hand, $`\beta ^{\mathrm{OCP}}=0.21\pm 0.18`$ (as discussed above), which equals $`\beta _0`$ to within uncertainties, so we assume that $`\beta `$ is independent of density. At $`\rho =\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}`$ and $`T=T_m(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}),`$ Eq. (9) reduces to

$$\beta =1\frac{G(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},T_m(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}))}{G(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},0)}.$$
(10)
The linear temperature dependence is suggested by available $`P=0`$ experimental data on $`G`$ over the temperature range $`0TT_m`$ \[1–19\]. This straight-line representation turns out to be quite accurate: the maximum deviation of the data from the corresponding fitted lines is $`5`$ % for 21 of the 22 metals analyzed in . The exception is uranium, for which $`G(T)`$ is nonlinear throughout the $`\alpha `$ phase at $`P=0.`$ As mentioned above, $`G(T)`$ is is nonlinear below $`\mathrm{\Theta }_D,`$ thus $`G(T)`$ is nonlinear for low-melting-point solids from $`T=0`$ to $`T_m.`$ Despite the nonlinearity of $`G(T)`$ in these cases, the model uncertainty is only of order 10%.

At any given pressure, the introduction of the temperature dependence of the density, $`\rho =\rho (T),`$ into Eq. (9) gives the temperature dependence of $`G`$ at that pressure. In Fig. 1 we compare $`G(\rho (T),T)`$ for $`0TT_m`$ at $`P=0`$ for Au and Cu to experimental data . The temperature dependence of the density was taken from ref. , and $`G(\rho ,0)`$ and $`T_m(\rho )`$ are described by Eqs. (13) and (14) below with parameter values from Tables 2 and 4.

Fig. 1. The $`P=0`$ shear moduli of Cu and Au: Eq. (9) with $`\rho =\rho (T)`$ from ref.  and $`G(\rho (T),0)`$ and $`T_m(\rho (T))`$ described by Eqs. (13) and (14) with the parameters from Tables 2 and 4 vs. the experimental data on Cu  (smaller points) and Au  (larger points).

The Grüneisen parameter was recently modeled as

$$\gamma (\rho )=\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\gamma _1}{\rho ^{1/3}}+\frac{\gamma _2}{\rho ^q},\gamma _1,\gamma _2,q=\mathrm{const},q>1,$$
(11)
through consideration of its low- and ultrahigh-pressure limits. This analytic form for $`\gamma `$ was obtained under the assumptions that (i) $`\gamma 1/2`$ as $`\rho \mathrm{},`$ (ii) $`\gamma `$ is an analytic function of $`x1/\rho ^{1/3},`$ essentially the interatomic distance, and (iii) the coefficient of $`x`$ in the Taylor-Maclaurin series expansion for $`\gamma `$ is non-zero. The third term on the right-hand- side of Eq. (11) represents the contribution of the quadratic and higher-order terms in the power series. The procedure for calculating the values of $`\gamma _1`$, $`\gamma _2`$, and $`q`$ is discussed below.

Eq. (11) and the Lindemann criterion

$$\frac{d\mathrm{ln}T_m(\rho )}{d\mathrm{ln}\rho }=2\left(\gamma (\rho )\frac{1}{3}\right)$$
(12)
provide a model for the density dependence of the melting temperature,

$$T_m(\rho )=T_m(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})\left(\frac{\rho }{\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}}\right)^{1/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{6\gamma _1\left(\frac{1}{(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})^{1/3}}\frac{1}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right)+\frac{2\gamma _2}{q}\left(\frac{1}{(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})^q}\frac{1}{\rho ^q}\right)\right\}.$$
(13)
The natural choice for the reference density is $`\rho _m`$, the zero-pressure density at melt, which is known experimentally in most cases (see, e.g., ).

Finally, Eqs. (1),(9),(10), and (13) result in

$$G(\rho ,0)=G(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},0)\left(\frac{\rho }{\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}}\right)^{4/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{6\gamma _1\left(\frac{1}{(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})^{1/3}}\frac{1}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right)+\frac{2\gamma _2}{q}\left(\frac{1}{(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})^q}\frac{1}{\rho ^q}\right)\right\},$$
(14)
where $`\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}`$ is most conveniently chosen to be either $`\rho _m`$ or $`\rho _0,`$ the density at zero pressure and temperature.

Eqs. (9),(13), and (14) constitute our analytic model for the shear modulus. It requires the determination of 7 parameters, namely $`\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},`$ $`G(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},0),`$ $`T_m(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}),`$ $`\gamma _1,`$ $`\gamma _2,`$ $`q,`$ and $`\beta .`$ The values of $`\gamma _1,`$ $`\gamma _2`$ and $`q`$ are obtained by simultaneous solution of Eq. (11) with $`\rho =\rho (T=300^{}`$K) and $`\rho =\rho _m,`$ and Eq. (5) with $`\mathrm{\Gamma }_m=180`$  and $`T_m(\rho )`$ given by the high-density limit of Eq. (13). The value of $`\gamma (\rho _m)`$ is obtained from the Kraut-Kennedy relation  and low-pressure melting data. The remaining parameters are either zero-pressure experimental data themselves or can be determined from such data (for example, $`\beta )`$. In Table 4 we present the values of $`\rho _{\mathrm{ref}}`$ (both $`\rho _0`$ and $`\rho _m`$), $`G(\rho _0,0)`$, $`\gamma _1`$, $`\gamma _2`$, $`q`$, and $`\beta `$ for all of the fcc elements of Table 2. The values of $`G(\rho _m,0)`$ can be calculated from the relation $`G(\rho _m,0)=G(\rho _m,T_m)/(1\beta )`$ with $`G(\rho _m,T_m)`$ from Table 2, which also contains the values of $`T_m(\rho _m)`$. Since $`\beta `$-Co exists only above $`T700^{}`$K at $`P=0`$, its values of $`G(\rho _0,0)`$ and $`\beta `$ were obtained from the conditions $`G(\rho _m,T_m)=34.7`$ and $`G(\rho (T=710^{}\mathrm{K})=8.62,T=710^{}\mathrm{K})=57.1`$ .

| element | $`\rho _0,`$ g/cc | $`\rho _m,`$ g/cc | $`G(\rho _0,0),`$ GPa | $`\gamma _1,`$ (g/cc)1/3 | $`\gamma _2,`$ (g/cc)q | $`q`$ | $`\beta `$ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ag | 10.63 | 9.850 | 33.5 | 2.23 | $`9.6310^4`$ | 4.8 | 0.18 |
| Al | 2.730 | 2.550 | 29.3 | 0.84 | 45.4 | 3.5 | 0.22 |
| Ar | 1.771 | 1.622 | 1.46 | 1.06 | 6.42 | 2.2 | 0.23 |
| Au | 19.49 | 18.29 | 30.5 | 3.21 | $`1.9710^{12}`$ | 9.4 | 0.18 |
| $`\beta `$-Co | 8.910 | 8.180 | 73.2 | 1.81 | $`6.2810^4`$ | 5.5 | 0.33 |
| Cu | 9.020 | 8.370 | 52.4 | 1.87 | $`2.3110^4`$ | 4.7 | 0.25 |
| Ni | 8.970 | 8.220 | 93.6 | 1.85 | $`5.6010^5`$ | 6.5 | 0.41 |
| Pb | 11.60 | 11.05 | 11.7 | 3.09 | $`8.2110^8`$ | 8.5 | 0.36 |
| Pd | 12.13 | 11.29 | 50.3 | 2.40 | $`3.3410^6`$ | 6.6 | 0.07 |
| Pt | 21.58 | 20.19 | 66.3 | 3.21 | $`1.1310^{11}`$ | 8.3 | 0.27 |
| Rh | 12.49 | 11.49 | 158. | 2.16 | $`1.4610^7`$ | 6.5 | 0.42 |

Table 4. Numerical values of the model parameters for 11 fcc elements. The corresponding values of $`T_m(\rho _m)`$ and $`G(\rho _m,T_m(\rho _m))`$ are provided in Table 2.

In Figs. 2, 3, and 4 we compare the melting curves of Ar, Al and Cu as given by Eq. (13) with the corresponding parameters from Table 4 to experimental data.

Fig. 2. Melting curve of Ar: Eq. (13) with the Ar parameters from Table 4 vs. data. The smaller points are the experimental data of ref. , and the larger points are the results of calculations .

Fig. 3. Melting curve of Al: Eq. (13) with the Al parameters from Table 4 vs. data. The smaller points are the experimental data of ref. , and the larger points are the results of calculations .

Fig. 4. Melting curve of Cu: Eq. (13) with the Cu parameters from Table 4 vs. data. The smaller points are from a new SESAME melting curve table for Cu . The larger points are the $`P=0`$ reference point at (in g/cc) $`\rho =8.4,`$ and the shock-melting points of ref.  at $`\rho =10.2,`$ 12.2 and 14.3, and of refs.  at $`\rho =14.0`$.

Only five of the seven shear modulus parameters are independent because four appear in the model as two ratios, namely $`\beta /T_m(\rho )`$ in Eq. (9) and $`G(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}},0)/(\rho _{\mathrm{ref}})^{4/3}`$ in Eq. (14); hence the shear modulus is of the form

$$G(\rho ,T)=a_1\rho ^{4/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{\frac{a_2}{\rho ^q}\frac{a_3}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right\}a_4\rho T,a_1,a_2,a_3,a_4,q=\mathrm{const}>0.$$
(15)
As specific examples we provide the following formulas for the shear moduli of Ar, Al, Cu, and Au:

$$G_{\mathrm{Ar}}(\rho ,T)=687.4\rho ^{4/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{\frac{5.84}{\rho ^{2.2}}\frac{6.36}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right\}1.3210^3\rho T,$$
(16)
$$G_{\mathrm{Al}}(\rho ,T)=611.8\rho ^{4/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{\frac{25.9}{\rho ^{3.5}}\frac{5.04}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right\}1.8510^3\rho T,$$
(17)
$$G_{\mathrm{Cu}}(\rho ,T)=841.2\rho ^{4/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{\frac{9.8310^3}{\rho ^{4.7}}\frac{11.22}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right\}7.9610^4\rho T,$$
(18)
$$G_{\mathrm{Au}}(\rho ,T)=1022.0\rho ^{4/3}\mathrm{exp}\left\{\frac{4.1910^{11}}{\rho ^{9.4}}\frac{19.26}{\rho ^{1/3}}\right\}1.3710^4\rho T.$$
(19)
Fig. 5. The $`T=300`$ shear modulus of Ar: Eq. (16) vs. older  (smaller points) and more recent  (larger points) experimental data. The experimental technique used to obtain the older data has been criticized .

Fig. 6. The $`T=0`$ shear modulus of Al: Eq. (17) vs. the electronic-structure calculations of ref. . The small, medium, and large points represent the values of $`G`$ in fcc, hcp, and bcc phases of Al, respectively.

In Fig. 5 we compare the $`T=300^{}`$K shear modulus of Ar as given by Eq. (16) to experimental data. The $`T=0`$ shear modulus of Al from Eq. (17) is compared to the results of electronic structure calculations in Fig. 6. The $`T=0`$ shear moduli of Cu and Au as given, respectively, by Eqs. (18) and (19) are compared to the results of the corresponding electronic-structure calculations in Figs. 7 and 8 in the next section.

## 4 Comparison of model to electronic-structure results for Cu and Au

With the exception of Ar, experimental data are not available to test the model to megabar pressures. We can, however, test the $`T=0`$ version of the model by comparing it to the results of ab initio electronic-structure calculations of the shear modulus.

Electronic structure calculations based on approximate density functional theories have proven to give good predictions for a variety of material properties. A study of the elastic constants of several elements and compounds  covering a wide range of elastic properties, found errors with respect to experiment of generally less than 10% in the isotropic shear modulus. These results are obtained without empirical inputs. We expect such calculations to have similar accuracy under compression, thus providing a test of the new analytic model.

For this reason, we have carried out electronic structure calculations to obtain the single crystal elastic constants $`C^{}=\left(C_{11}C_{12}\right)/2,`$ $`C_{44},`$ and $`B=\frac{1}{3}\left(C_{11}+2C_{12}\right)`$ for the fcc metals Cu and Au from normal to twice normal density. From these an average polycrystalline shear modulus is calculated and compared to the model.

The method for the calculations was described by Söderlind et al. . To evaluate $`C^{}`$, the lattice is deformed by the (volume conserving) transformation

$$\left(\begin{array}{ccc}1+\delta & 0& 0\\ 0& 1+\delta & 0\\ 0& 0& 1/(1+\delta )^2\end{array}\right).$$
(20)
The resulting energy change is

$$\mathrm{\Delta }E/V=6C^{}\delta ^2+O(\delta ^3).$$
(21)
Similarly, $`C_{44}`$ is obtained by applying the (volume conserving) transformation

$$\left(\begin{array}{ccc}1& \delta & 0\\ \delta & 1& 0\\ 0& 0& 1/(1\delta ^2)\end{array}\right),$$
(22)
resulting in an energy change

$$\mathrm{\Delta }E/V=2C_{44}\delta ^2+O(\delta ^4).$$
(23)
In our calculations we have evaluated the energy as a function of $`\delta `$ at intervals of 0.01, up to $`\delta =0.04`$. For the $`C^{}`$ case the energy is not an even function of $`\delta `$, and so negative values of delta were used. The resulting $`E(\delta )`$ were fit to 4th degree polynomials and the quadratic coefficent was used to evaluate the elastic constant from Eq. (21) or Eq. (23).

The bulk modulus $`B`$ is obtained from the volume-dependent energy of the undistorted crystal by

$$B=V\frac{d^2E}{dV^2}.$$
(24)
The energy was evaluated at volume intervals of 5% of the normal volume, from 20% expanded to 50% contracted. Derivatives were evaluated by fitting the equation of state of Rose et al.  to the energies and differentiating the function. It was found that a single curve of this type did not accuaretly fit both the high density points and the points near the minimum, so seperate overlapping fits were made for the 10 highest and lowest densities.

The electronic structure calculations were based on the linearized augmented plane-wave (LAPW) code WIEN97 . The energy functional used was the generalized-gradient approximation as parameterized by Perdew, Burke, and Ernzerhof . Some numerical parameters used in the calculations for Cu (Au) were, in atomic units: muffin tin radius $`r_{\mathrm{MT}}=1.8`$ (2.0), plane wave cut-off $`r_{\mathrm{MT}}k_{\mathrm{max}}=9.0`$, cut-off for expansion of density and potential $`g_{\mathrm{max}}=16`$ (19); Brillouin zone integrals used special points corresponding to $`16^3`$ ($`18^3`$) points in the full zone, with Gaussian smearing of the energies by 20 mRy.

Our results on $`C^{},`$ $`C_{44}`$ and $`B`$ for Cu and Au are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. It is interesting to note the increasing anisotropy of Au under pressure. From Table 6 we see that, for Au, $`C^{}`$ does not increase nearly as rapidly as $`C_{44}`$ with compression. This is connected with the fact that the energy difference between the fcc and bcc structures is small at all pressures . The distortion corresponding to $`C^{}`$ is along the Bain path connecting fcc to bcc, and it has been seen  that a small energy difference between these structures correlates with a small value of $`C^{}`$.

Let us now turn to the calculation of the shear moduli of Cu and Au. For a solid of cubic crystalline structure, as analysis by Kröner  shows, successively narrower bounds can be placed on the shear modulus as the degree of disorder in grain orientation increases. In the limit of perfect disorder, the value of the shear modulus is the single positive real root of a cubic equation with coefficients that depend on the single-crystal elastic constants $`C^{},`$ $`C_{44},`$ and $`B:`$

$$x^3+\frac{9B+4C^{}}{8}x^2\frac{3\left(B+4C^{}\right)C_{44}}{8}x\frac{3BC^{}C_{44}}{4}=\mathrm{\hspace{0.17em}0}.$$
(25)
The values of the shear modulus calculated from Eq. (25) are shown in Tables 5 and 6 along with $`C^{},`$ $`C_{44}`$ and $`B.`$

As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain the interesting results that $`G(2\rho _0,0)10G(\rho _0,0)`$ for Cu, and $`G(2\rho _0,0)20G(\rho _0,0)`$ for Au.

In Figs. 7 and 8 we compare Eqs. (18) and (19) with $`T=0,`$ for Cu and Au, to the corresponding $`G`$ entries in Tables 5 and 6.

| $`\rho ,`$ g/cc | $`C^{},`$ GPa | $`C_{44},`$ GPa | $`B,`$ GPa | $`G,`$ GPa |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 8.850 | 30.404 | 77.639 | 142.15 | 53.912 |
| 9.833 | 41.863 | 124.78 | 235.73 | 81.901 |
| 11.06 | 48.599 | 167.42 | 386.02 | 104.66 |
| 12.64 | 83.020 | 260.81 | 652.48 | 168.57 |
| 14.75 | 130.48 | 445.26 | 1151.8 | 279.70 |
| 17.70 | 229.71 | 800.23 | 2118.4 | 499.25 |

Table 5. The single-crystal elastic constants and shear modulus of Cu as functions of density from the electronic-structure calculations described in the text.

| $`\rho ,`$ g/cc | $`C^{},`$ GPa | $`C_{44},`$ GPa | $`B,`$ GPa | $`G,`$ GPa |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 19.29 | 16.445 | 31.690 | 201.20 | 24.585 |
| 21.43 | 19.550 | 77.940 | 339.57 | 46.764 |
| 24.11 | 33.890 | 127.75 | 568.39 | 78.093 |
| 27.56 | 35.053 | 255.22 | 1029.0 | 127.48 |
| 32.15 | 69.837 | 479.27 | 1918.2 | 243.34 |
| 38.58 | 121.16 | 912.15 | 3753.2 | 451.65 |

Table 6. The single-crystal elastic constants and shear modulus of Au as functions of density from the electronic-structure calculations described in the text.

Fig. 7. The $`T=0`$ shear modulus of Cu: Eq. (18) vs. electronic-structure calculations (larger points, Table 5). The smaller points, obtained from first-principles calculations , are shown for comparison.

Fig. 8. The $`T=0`$ shear modulus of Au: Eq. (19) vs. electronic-structure calculations (larger points, Table 6). The smaller points, obtained from first-principles calculations , are shown for comparison.

Fig. 9. Comparison of the two models for the $`T=0`$ shear modulus: Eqs. (16) and (17) vs. the corresponding Guinan-Steinberg values for Ar (smaller points) and Al (larger points).

Finally, it is interesting to compare our model at $`T=0`$ to the Guinan-Steinberg model mentioned in the Introduction. The equation of state, $`P=P(\rho )`$, is needed to make this comparison. In Fig. 9 the models are compared to each other for Ar and Al. The corresponding equations of state are taken from ref. . For Al, $`G_0^{}=1.8`$ comes from ref. . For Ar, $`G_0^{}=1.6`$ is obtained from the relation  $`\gamma _0=B_0/2G_0^{}/G_01/6`$ with $`\gamma _0=\gamma (\rho _0)`$ from Eq. (11) and $`B_0`$ taken from ref. . The values of $`\rho _0`$ and $`G_0=G(\rho _0,0)`$ can be found in Table 4.

It is seen that agreement between the two models is good at low densities, but it gradually deteriorates with increasing compression. The reason for this must be that the Guinan-Steinberg model generally provides only the correct functional form $`G\rho ^{4/3}`$ in the limit of infinite compression, not the precise numerical value of $`G`$ in that limit, in contrast to our model which provides both.

## 5 Concluding remarks

We have constructed an analytic model of the shear modulus applicable at all densities greater than or of order ambient ($`G(\rho ,0)0`$ as $`\rho 0,`$ as required, but the model may not be quantitatively correct for expanded states), and temperatures from 0 to $`T_m`$. All of the model parameters can be obtained from low-pressure experimental data. The model has the proper low-pressure and high-pressure limits, by construction, and to within uncertainties it agrees with electronic-structure values of $`G`$ for Cu and Au to compressions of 2, which roughly corresponds to pressures of 5 Mbar for Cu and 9 Mbar for Au.

The above comparisons of our shear modulus model, which includes a model for $`T_m(\rho ),`$ to electronic structure calculations and experimental data on Ar, Al, Cu, and Au show very good agreement. This suggests that our model accurately represents the density and temperature dependence of the shear moduli of monatomic solids in general. There is, however, no theoretical justification for applying our model to alloys or compounds, although in practice it may work reasonably well in these cases. Its generalization to more complex materials would involve generalizing our model for the Grüneisen parameter. A functional form for $`\gamma (\rho )`$ depends critically on the asymptotic $`(\rho \mathrm{})`$ form of the equation of state , and it has been suggested that the asymptotic forms of the equations of state of more complex materials, e.g., ionic, covalent, or molecular crystals, are different from that of a metal. If so, the limiting value of $`\gamma `$ is unknown (not necessarily 1/2) for such materials. In that case, an analytic model for the Grüneisen parameter cannot be constructed, hence analytic forms for the melting curve and shear modulus cannot be obtained.

We now briefly discuss three potential applications of our model.

(1) Plastic deformation of metals at high pressure. It is generally assumed that the ratio of the plastic flow stress (shear stress necessary to induce plastic deformation at a given strain rate) to the shear modulus is approximately independent of pressure. In other words, the predominant pressure dependence of the plastic flow stress is contained in the shear modulus. An accurate, simple analytic (for fast evaluation) model of the shear modulus is therefore essential for numerical simulations of material deformation over extremes in pressure.

(2) Numerical simulations of elastic wave propagation, including pressure release waves in shocked solids. The differential stress deviator, $`ds_{ij}`$, is equal to $`2G(\rho ,T)(dϵ_{ij}\delta _{ij}dϵ_{kk}/3)`$ plus material rotation terms ($`dϵ_{ij}`$ is the differential elastic strain), thus a model of the shear modulus is required for calculations of elastic wave propagation in materials with sufficiently high yield stresses that the stress deviators are not negligible. The speed of a release wave in a shocked solid depends on $`G(\rho _H,T_H),`$ where $`\rho _H`$ and $`T_H`$ are the density and temperature of the shocked state.

(3) Pulsations and quakes of dense stars. Hansen and Van Horn  have done a preliminary analysis of the effects of crystalline cores on the oscillations of white dwarfs and found that the $`g`$-like spheroidal mode frequencies are increased by approximately a factor of two, concluding that the elastic shear strength of the core must be taken into account in the computation of cool white dwarf oscillations. The inclusion of elastic shear strength in the neutron star pulsation equations of McDermott et al.  resulted in the appearance of two classes of oscillation modes not present in a fluid neutron star. The change in the shape of the surface following a neutron star quake is proportional to the shear modulus of the crust .

Further tests of our model for the shear modulus should be made as high-pressure experimental data and electronic structure results become available for elements other than argon, aluminum, copper and gold. New zero-pressure data are also needed to generate additional sets of model parameters.

## 6 Acknowledgements

We wish to thank J.C. Boettger, J.D. Johnson and G.W. Pfeufer for very stimulating discussions on the subject of the shear modulus.