Risks of controlling shareholders associated with the concentration of corporate control
The article is devoted to the problem of corporate blackmail and consideration of risks for majoritaries from minority shareholders who abuse their rights, sometimes hiding behind legitimate "minority activism". As a rule, minority shareholders are the weak side in corporate relations, however, in the light of legislative reforms that strengthen the position of minority shareholders, the situation is not always unambiguous. After all, at present, the legislation determines the majority or minority shareholder not only through the size of the block of shares owned by them, and, consequently, not only the ownership share allows you to dictate the conditions. It is allowed, for example, that the size of corporate rights is disproportionate to the size of a block of shares in nonpublic corporations. That is, a legally minority shareholder is able to turn into a de facto majority shareholder. All this indicates to the majority shareholders the need to take into account the interests of the owners of insignificant blocks of shares. Moreover, the line between "minority activism" and the abuse of minority rights is very shaky. Therefore, for the successful functioning of the company, controlling shareholders must take into account the risks of unfair behavior of minority shareholders, which often complicate corporate governance even in those companies where the leading shareholder has a blocking stake.