Internalism and Externalism as Alternative Approaches in Epistemology and Semantics
Let’s assume that a certain agent looks at one of the lighting points in the night sky and says: “This is a star” - whereas in fact the object of his perception is the planet Venus. Can we say in such case that the planet Venus is a part of the content of his beliefs? Can we say that the agent expresses any judgment about Venus? Is it so, that the actual content of belief is always available for the agent through mere introspection? Or external competent observer sometimes can more accurately describe the content of such beliefs? Two major approaches in analytic epistemology - internalism and externalism - have different views about these issues. In this work, we intend to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the above-mentioned positions and to impugn the very feasibility of any choice between such alternatives. The main thesis is as follows: we assert that such tools as Hintikka’s conception of two types of identification (perspective and public one), combined with the usage of two corresponding types of quantification, allow to reconcile both points of view in the framework of a certain unified formal language.