Phenomenology without a transcendental subject: Neurophenomenology and enactivismin search of a first-person perspective
The article discusses one of the most rapidly developing projects of modern philosophy, namely, the integration project of phenomenology and naturalism. The article highlights the first-person perspective as instrumental for such integration. The author outlines two key directions: neurophenomenology (F. Varela) and enactivism (S. Gallager). Explanations are given on how exactly the first-person perspective is going to be included in the cognitive research of science. The article examines the methodology of the project, in particular, whether it is based on the methods of the classical phenomenology of E. Husserl or on the understanding of phenomenology in analytical philosophy of consciousness. The feasibility of the integrated methodology is discussed. The author expresses doubts whether the actual implementation of the project is going to comply with its phenomenological program. It is argued that we observe a certain obscurity in the use of natural and transcendental attitudes, the difficulty of interpreting the “external” and “internal”, the ambiguity of deduction of the body from the “bodily experience”, etc. Special attention is given to the idea of transcendental first-person perspective and non-representation of the first person in the world.