On the Certain Features of Legal Science and the Search for Law
This article is devoted primarily to legal thinking. Of course, the problem itself is not new, but the understanding of law is only a background. The main thesis is that various approaches to law start to form especially quickly “post-perestroika” times, and this approaches - for all their criticality in relation to the normative theory of law - have a normative nature. It is proved that normativity as such “belittles” the law in any of its interpretation. The article analyses the reasons for the existence of various approaches to understanding law: theoretical, practical, personal. In this regard, there is the emphasis on the features of legal science. It is they who, in the degree of viciousness, “provoke” the authors to put forward ideas that do not fit well with reality. Legal science is not nomological, since it explains the essence of phenomena and causes not through the law in the scientific sense of the word. It is the causality of legal science that gives rise to the presence of schools and concepts in it that not only compete, but sometimes try to refute each other. Another significant circumstance is that norms of science is absent in jurisprudence and have an imperative nature. Because of this, the authors have such a wide degree of freedom that any representative of natural science might be envy of this.