The relevance theory, pragmatics and the problem of meaning
The paper discusses the theory of relevance, advanced in the middle of the 1980s by Dan Sperber and Deidra Wilson, in the context of opposition between the proponents of “ideal language philosophy”, or formal semantics, and adherents of “ordinary language philosophy”. Though the theory was created as a version of cognitive pragmatics, an area at the junction of cognitive sciences and theoretical linguistics, it is of undoubted interest for philosophical comprehension of language, verbal communication, and the nature of meaning. Treating verbal communication as a cognitive process, Sperber and Wilson formulate the two most important principles underlying the process - the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative principle of relevance. The paper explains the basic notions of the theory - ostensive communication, informative and communicative intentions, optimal relevance, explicature; it reveals the advantages that the authors of the theory see in the “inferential” model of communication over the “code” model and discusses how they present the process of understanding a speaker’s utterance by a hearer on the “implicit” and “explicit” levels and what role in the process they ascribe to pragmatic inferences. The account of the relevance theory is accompanied by its comparison with the picture of verbal communication elaborated by Paul Grice, and it is shown that though Sperber and Wilson make a start from Grice’s ideas in many respects, they introduce significant alterations and so they are regarded as representatives of post-Gricean pragmatics. In conclusion, it is examined how, according to the relevance theory, the semantics/pragmatics distinction should be drawn. It is discussed how the proposed decision alters the understanding of the nature of meaning and what consequences it has for philosophy.