Duncan Pritchard's Biscopic Approach in the Context of the Computer Simulation Hypothesis
The author considers Duncan Pritchard's modern biscopic approach to the skeptical problem of the existence of the external world based on epistemological disjunctivism and the hinge epistemology of the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Epistemological disjunctivism asserts that, for paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, the subject has knowledge due to the presence of factual rational grounds. The hinge epistemology of the late Wittgenstein philosophy asserts the presence of the most reliable beliefs (hinge propositions) which cannot have a basis but are assumed by the logic of the rationality of the subject and are simply accepted. Pritchard's reasoning comes to the conclusion that the skeptical scenario is inherently illegitimate because all knowledge is ultimately based on certain concepts (hinge propositions) which are rooted in reality. The matrix hypothesis of computer simulation by David Chalmers is explicated: the subject always has a cognitive system that receives input data and sends output data to an artificially created computer simulation of the world. This hypothesis is presented within the framework of the position of virtual realism, which tries to dissolve the skeptical problem by claiming that virtual/simulated reality is as real as the actual world. An attempt is made to apply Pritchard's biscopic approach to Chalmers' hypothesis in order to find more solid grounds for dissolving the skeptical problem. The author comes to the conclusion that Pritchard's approach can be considered as effective only within the framework of a coherence theory of truth, otherwise the rational grounds of the subject cannot be considered factual. Pritchard's biscopic approach works when we consider basic hinge propositions as underlying the simulation, and all the knowledge, opinions, beliefs of the subject inside the simulation will be limited only to the subject's simulated world. From the point of view of the correspondence theory of truth, real objects are inaccessible to the subject's perception within the simulation, and beliefs cannot be verified with the real state of affairs. Thus, Chalmers' claim that his matrix/metaphysical hypothesis is not skeptical is still weak.