Justification of scientific theories in the context of the post-non-classical philosophy of science
The author of the article considers the question of justification scientific theories, taking into account the phenomenon of implicit knowledge. The author believes that the justification of scientific theories is faced with a serious problem, the essence of which is the need to explicate implicitly-intuitive elements of scientific knowledge; it is also true for mathematics. While intuitive understanding of the truth of such elements of scientific theories is enough for intuitive evidence, the historical development of science leads to the need for explication of these elements of scientific theories with their subsequent inclusion directly in the system of formal evidence of these scientific theories. This is most relevant for mathematics, and since the justification of scientific theories is realized precisely with the support of mathematics, this becomes relevant for whole science. The problem here is that the transformation of the implicit elements of scientific theories into explicit ones is limited and there is no algorithm for it. For this reason, the author considers the construction of such algorithm to be one of the most important tasks of the modern theory of knowledge.