Analytical realism: Challenges and development prospects
This article presents the author’s project of a new epistemological concept of analytical realism. The terminological issues related to the choice of the name of the concept are discussed. The main structural elements of analytical realism are outlined. The existing theoretical results are formulated that can be used as the basis of the concept. The main challenges and further prospects for research within the framework of analytical realism in the context of the modern development of epistemology are fixed. The project of a new epistemological concept is proposed to be called “analytical realism”. Why “analytical realism”? How justified is this title? For example, if we are based on the research of H. Putnam, then all manifestations of his epistemological program could be called analytical realism, because he always worked within the tradition of English-language analytical philosophy. But at the same time, we know other types of realism both in the topological sense and in the content of these theoretical concepts. For example, the concept of speculative realism which is widely discussed today was born in continental Europe, and in terms of content it has nothing to do with analytical philosophy. One can also consider the problems of realism discussed in the framework of modern philosophy of science. Although this is an English-speaking environment for the most part, the content of this area of research can hardly be attributed to the general context of analytical philosophy either. In this case, the accepted terminological restriction seems to be appropriate. Analytical realism is an epistemological concept developed exclusively in the context of the tradition of analytical philosophy with a focus on logic, philosophy of language, theory of meaning, theory of reference, with a focus on the main representatives of the school of analytical philosophy. The author declares no conflicts of interests.