ANALYZING THE BEHAVIOR OF ECONOMIC AGENTS IN ULTIMATIVE TRANSACTIONS
The paper proposes a new method for analyzing the behavior of agents of non-negotiable transactions that expands the depth of prior experimental research by increasing the number of rounds of transactions. Having analyzed the dynamics of completed and uncompleted transactions, the author highlights the rising trend of transactions in which the player that makes an offer asks for a larger sum, and vice versa, the falling trend in the number of transactions in which the potential transaction amount was divided equally between the partners by the end of the experiments. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that, firstly, ultimatum that suggested dividing the amount of the transaction equally was never rejected, and, secondly, the player that pushed the ultimatum never asked a lesser amount. It is interesting to note the attempts to find a «middle ultimatum», i.e. average relative amount requested by the player that makes an offer, which in this study was established at the level of 56,6%. Summing up the research, the author identifies an economic paradox which says that the partner that pushes an ultimatum has an advantage, and both players agree with that by default.