Temporality and substantiality: characteristics of consciousness or peculiarities of reflection?
The paper reveals and critically analyzes the concepts of the theory of consciousness that depend on the precondition of possibility of reflection - a classical method of self- knowledge. As the author shows, temporality and substantiality are basic reflective characteristics of conscious. Positing of temporality entails a positing of substance an empty form or, in Hume’s figure, «unintelligible principle that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation». On the basis of analysis of the role that time and substance play in conceptions of D. Hume, I. Kant, E. Husserl, the author shows that considering of these results of reflection as necessary conditions of any conscious experience determines impossibility to explain the unity and identity of the objects of experience. The study shows that borrowing of characteristics of consciousness from reflexive theories leads to insoluble contradictions those philosophers who declare abandonment from a reflection (M. Heidegger, J. P. Sartre, J. Derrida). The author considers the possibility of refusal to rely on reflexive structures in understanding of consciousness.