THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSALITY IN B. RUSSELL’S PHILOSOPHY
The article examines the views of B. Russell on the still relevant problem of mental causality presented primarily in the monograph «The Analysis of Mind», which has not been translated into Russian. Russel’s solution of the Cartesian ontological gap between the mental and the material through the creation of a theory of neutral monism, which implies the presence of a neutral material (stuff), underlying the space-time structure of the Universe, is disclosed in the paper. The views of the philosopher on causality are highlighted, the concept of function proposed by Russell as the alternative to the classical «law of causality» is revealed. The naturalistic nature of Russell’s solutions is underlined, his influence on the positions of key modern naturalistic philosophers of mind (J. Searle, D. Dennett, D. Chalmers) on the issue of the causality of consciousness is considered.