“David and Goliath”: David Ben-Gurion and disagreement with the United States on the Israel's nuclear program, 1960-1963
This paper is devoted to disagreement between the US and Israel over the Israel's nuclear program, which arose during David Ben-Gurion's premiership. The purpose of the paper is to find out the reasons that prompted the United States to take a tough stance against its ally in the Middle East and to identify Ben-Gurion's tactics designed to withstand American pressure. The paper is based on American and British archival materials. Israel's nuclear program began to be implemented in 1956, but the United States became aware of it only in 1960. The United States tried to obtain guarantees that Israeli reactors would not be used for military purposes. The US President John F. Kennedy considered the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of the most serious problem that faced his administration. Therefore, the United States insisted that American experts should visit the nuclear reactor located in the Israeli settlement of Dimona. This visit took place on May 18, 1961. American experts discovered nothing that would be evidence of an intention to produce nuclear weapons. Most likely, Israel did not plan to produce nuclear weapons at an early stage of their nuclear program. At that time, David Ben-Gurion was much more concerned about another issue, namely, the possibility of delivering American surface-to-air Hawk missiles to Israel. The Hawk missiles were promised to Israel in 1962. The deliveries were a part of a complex multi-component US plan, which was based on the principle of “quid pro quo”. Washington expected Israel to show some flexibility with regard to the issue of Palestinian refugees. The United States government expected the same intention from the members of Ben-Gurion's government on the issue of the inspection regime for Israeli nuclear facilities. However, expectations were not met. Ben-Gurion categorically rejected the American plan to return a part of the Palestinian refugees to Israel. American pressure on the nuclear program was also perceived in Israel as an attempt to limit the country's sovereignty. Throughout the development of the crisis around Israel's nuclear program, Ben-Gurion's goal was to play for time in order to obtain favorable conditions for the dialogue with Washington on this issue. The delays were supposed to hold out before the start of the US election campaign in 1964, which would hamper the freedom for John F. Kennedy's maneuver. The assassination of the 35th President of the United States unexpectedly eased this task of Israeli politics. The new US president, Lyndon Johnson, did not give relevance to the issue of Israel's nuclear program as his predecessor did.