Energy Resources as a Tool for Foreign Policy of Russia
The article describes the moments that determine the effectiveness of energy tools for achieving the goals of Russian foreign policy. The article stresses that the tools can have both positive and unforeseen negative consequences for consumer countries in the post-Soviet space. Energy instruments of a coercive nature can be equated to sanctions, since they should have undesirable consequences for consumer countries and force them to change their domestic and foreign policies. Russia used coercive instruments in its foreign policy extremely widely in the case of Ukraine. In order to achieve its goal, Moscow threatened to reduce the transit of gas and oil and actually reduced it, threats to raise natural gas prices were voiced, they were increased, and gas supplies and transit were stopped. Using these tools, Russia also insisted that Ukraine change its foreign policy: join the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union; extend the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol; maintain a pro-Russian orientation; reduce the intensity of cooperation with the West; limit participation in opposing international organizations.\Influence instruments affect the vulnerability of consumer countries, as they increase both the likelihood of using obligatory instruments and their sensitivity to their use. The example of Belarus is an excellent illustration of such a case. By constantly subsidizing energy resources, Russia supports Alexander Lukashenko, whose survival directly depends on the economic stability of the state, while the country's economic competitiveness depends on low prices for resources. In exchange for subsidies from Moscow, Minsk continued its pro-Russian foreign policy, integrated into the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic Union, and also allowed Russian companies to expand their property rights in the energy and other sectors of the economy. The use of energy tools to achieve foreign policy objectives has implications not only for consumer countries, but also for supplier countries. When a supplying country uses coercive tools, it may experience negative reactions and actions by consuming countries that force the supplying country to stop using these tools, reduce the impact of tools or have other unpredictable consequences. The example of Russia shows that the use of such instruments of influence as price discounts directly reduces the income of the supplier country, since this has a negative impact on the collection of the budget. However, it is obvious that energy resources will continue to play an important role in Russia's foreign policy.