Consequences of bioresource quota trading in developed countries: lessons for Russia
He purpose of this article is to analyze the consequences of uncritical transfer of foreign experience of auction trading in quotas of aquatic biological resources (ABR) into the practice of industrial fisheries management in Russia. The scientific analysis is based on the method of analogies, with the help of which the criteria of foreign experience used in the regulation of industrial fishing become similar in their characteristics to the criteria used in Russia. Scientific novelty is represented by proposals for the formation of the Russian state policy in the system of distribution of individual quotas for the right to catch ABR. The practical significance of the analysis is to create the possibility of avoiding in Russia the mistakes made during the transfer to private ownership of quotas of the ABR abroad, which led to an increase in shadow turnover and illegal transactions in fisheries, an increase in subsidies with a decrease in the economic efficiency of fishing, an increase in conflicts among fishermen, an increase in distrust of the fishing community to the actions of the government, the concentration of income and political influence in the hands of a minority, the dispersion of fishing rents, the destruction of the way of life of coastal fishing communities, accelerating the rate of degradation of marine ecosystems and increasing the cost of maintaining bureaucracy. In conclusion, conclusions are drawn about what mistakes should be avoided in Russia when introducing the practice of regulating fishing on the basis of individual fish quotas made in this process abroad.