Independence of Russian Judges in Conditions of Irremovability of Judges
The paper has become the fourth work in a cycle of studies carried out by the author to investigate the independence of the judiciary. It is devoted to the implementation of the principle of irremovability of judges as one of the declared guarantees of their independence. The paper analyzes the institutional and individual independence of courts and judges, concludes that it is individual independence of judges that plays the special role in ensuring the independence of the judiciary in general. Within the framework of the study, the reader’s attention is drawn to the components of the irremovability of judges: the period of granting the status of federal judges and the special procedure for suspending and terminating their powers. The author criticizes various age limits established by the legislator, upon which judges’ powers are terminated. Such a differentiated approach, in his opinion, conflicts with the general legal principle of equality and a sectoral principle of the unity of the status of judges. As a consequence, the leadership of the highest courts, given the possibility of reassigning them repeatedly, falls into a harmful dependence on the person entitled to nominate them for the positions of the President and Vice-Presidents of the relevant court. The author provides discouraging forecasts concerning the implementation of the constitutional amendment extending the powers of the President to deprive the status of judges of the Constitutional, Supreme Courts, Cassation and Appeal Courts of the Russian Federation. The work elaborates on the procedure for bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility, which is designed to protect their independence, but in view of the existing shortcomings allowing the use of this mechanism in order to monitor and pressure judges. In this regard, the author substantiates and proposes an impressive list of measures aimed at changing the situation. These measures include changing the composition of the qualification panels of judges, restricting the participation of judicial leadership and higher courts, their expansion by the judges of the Constitutional Court and the strengthening of their public participation, the establishment of the possibility of challenging the decisions of the qualification panels of judges by applicants.