The problem of the military defense planning of the Russian Far East in 1896-1900. Part 1. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895
Using the unknown sources from the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Military Historical Archive and the Collection of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library, this article examines the history of creating the military defense plans of the Russian Far East in 1896-1900 and the discussions about this issue. The controversy between the commanders of the Pri-Amur Military District, the chief of the Main Staff of the War Ministry and War Minister Aleksey N. Kuropatkin himself was also investigated. The creation of the new defense plan of the Russian Far East and the plan of force concentration in case of an outbreak of hostilities in this region, as well as the elaboration of a new mobilization schedule were also studied. It was revealed that the commander of the forces of the Pri-Amur Military District, General Nikolay I. Grodekov, reported to the war minister about the Japanese menace back in 1899, and this information was reported to Russian Emperor Nicholas II. Moreover, it was found that after 1895 the commanders of the Pri-Amur Military District were absolutely sure in the inevitability of the war with the Empire of Japan (probably in alliance with the British Empire), so all war plans and plans of force concentration in this region were created according to this menace. Because of it, in 1900, before the China Campaign of 1900-1901 there were no plans of war only with China in the Russian Empire. The Military District Staff only had an old plan of force concentration in Manchuria against Japan, which had been prepared in the spring of 1895, a few months before the real mobilization of the Pri-Amur Military District. In fact, it was the plan used by the Russian Army in the first period of the China Campaign of 1900-1901. The situation with the regional military planning was also complicated due to permanent changes in benchmark data. First, it was decided to build the Eastern Chinese Railway in Manchuria (in China), which was strategically important to the Russian Army. That raised the question of how to defend it in case of war. The Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur was occupied for 25 years, and there was a great problem of how to defend it too without enough troops in the region. A better situation was with the mobilization schedule in the Pri-Amur Military District. The renovated version of this document (Mobilization Schedule of the Pri-Amur Military District No 5) was finished and put in force on April 15, 1900, two months before the real mobilization of this military district by the reason of the Boxer Rising on June 11. Another positive factor of the force combat readiness in the Pri-Amur Military District was the experience of a real mobilization of 1895, and the regular calibration mobilizations of separate troops, forces and military institutions, which took place in the Russian Far East in 18961899.