INSTRUMENTAL THEORY OF LAW: REALITY OR FICTION?
This article is devoted to the problem of the scientific status of the instrumental theory of law. It is determined that the instrumental theory of law is a frequently used term-phrase, the content of which was conceptually substantiated by V.A. Sapun, A.V. Malko, K.V. Shundikov and a number of other researchers. Proceeding from the content of law as a set of instruments of legal regulation, the provisions of the classical instrumental approach were formulated, later alternative positions appeared (A.E. Zhalinsky, S.Yu. Filippova). On the basis of the general scientific, special and private legal methods used, the author demonstrates possible manifestations of instrumentality in law: an approach to law, a type of legal understanding, the value of law, a method. When characterizing the general theory of law, it is stipulated that it is intended to form an unbiased scientific vision of the legal sphere in its most general manifestations at the level of a conceptual worldview. Reservations about the possibility of considering the instrumental theory of law without taking into account the main provisions of the general theory of law are indicated. Based on the results of the study, the author formulates critical remarks regarding the recognition of the independence and completeness of the instrumental theory of law, which is more consistent with the features of a scientific approach.