Dialogue Between the United States and the DPRK During the Release of the Crew of the Scout Ship “Pueblo”, 1968
In early 1968, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo and its entire crew. The U. S. found itself in a state of asymmetrical confrontation. The purpose of this article is to reveal the specifics of the U. S. approach to crisis negotiations with a foreign opponent when direct use of military force, sanctions pressure and other methods of influence is impossible or ineffective, but the underlying problem itself requires immediate solution. The study is based on declassified documents of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the US National Security Council, as well as other published and unpublished materials from US, Soviet, Hungarian, Romanian and other archives. The effort to free the captured seamen lasted almost a year. However, despite the length of the negotiation process, the summary of the Pueblo incident demonstrated the effectiveness of diplomatic methods of conflict resolution. The tacit Soviet-American talks eventually became a decisive factor in the settlement process. At the same time, the U. S.-DPRK dialogue itself has not always been constructive. Using the seizure of American sailors, the North Koreans skillfully escalated international tensions. In the end the Americans were forced to sign the document proposed by the DPRK, but it was disavowed after the end of the transfer of the crew. On the other hand, the ultimate success in solving the main problem - the return of the American sailors home - did not automatically mean that the U. S. policy toward the DPRK as such was effective. U. S. diplomacy was unable both to prevent the ship seizure from occurring and to bring North Korean provocations to an end. Pressure on Moscow as the main North Korean sponsor brought only tactical success. The DPRK continued to receive Soviet economic and military aid, and thus the opportunity to continue its provocations.