Problem of France's Security after the End of the First World War
The article examines the scarcely-studied aspects of the phenomenon of the German-Bolshevik partnership as the main threat to French security after the end of the First World War. The nature of the disagreement between the right, moderate (centrist), and left parties regarding the understanding of the essence of security and approaches to its maintenance is analyzed. The author connects them with the specifics of the moment, the presence of dissimilar programmatic and ideological attitudes, as well as increased confrontationality, due to both external and internal factors. The paper highlights he predominant role of the right, committed to the traditional dogmas of nationalism and patriotism, in the implementation of practical decisions in the field of security, which is reflected in the cultivation of power politics towards defeated Germany and the Russian Revolution, as a breeding ground for Bolshevism. Along with the characterization of the right, a significant place is given to opposition centrist groups professing the "internationalist" principles of American President W. Wilson. In the same context, the intertwining of nationalist and "internationalist" approaches of the right and moderate circles to the key issues of the post-war settlement, which directly influenced the provision of national security, is pointed out. The author notes that a certain consolidation of the right and the center in the cause of "national defense" resulted in an active struggle against the left socialists, syndicalists and communists who shared the ideas of "proletarian internationalism" and the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist society responsible for unleashing the world war. The core point of the paper is the idea that the unresolved security problems in the first post-war years initiated the manifestation of internal confrontation practically throughout entire the interwar period, largely determining the drama of France in the initial period of World War II.