Legal ontology in the context of the subject-centered tradition of the philosophy of law
The article deals with the problem of interpretation of one of the fundamental themes of philosophy in the field of legal knowledge and legal understanding, which in a generalized form acts as a question of the ontological status of law. Ontological problems in the field of knowledge of law, although it is one of the cross-cutting for the entire history of legal thought, but it remains the most controversial. This state of affairs in this area is dictated by the fact that, on the one hand, the ontological characteristics of law are largely determined by the variety of philosophical interpretations of ontological problems, and on the other hand, such a circumstance as the ratio of conservative and liberal ideology plays a significant role in this process. The desire to update the established orders affects the popularity of subject-centrism in the legal knowledge, and the desire to preserve the established practices leads to an increase in the popularity of realistic attitudes. At the same time, the problem of realism is much deeper and remains an important part of the set of epistemological techniques of the subject-centered tradition of the philosophy of law.