Optimal strategies for regulation of production emissions of agro-industrial complex companies
On the basis of the constructed mathematical model, an analysis is made of which of the instruments for regulating industrial emissions of enterprises - environmental standards or quotas sold for industrial emissions of pollutants - allows to minimize the total costs of the strategy of environmental regulation. It has been proved that the environmental policy regulator, aiming to limit the aggregate level of emissions of a given pollutant by several enterprises, can minimize total costs by applying enterprise-specific environmental standards. The system of quotas sold for production emissions allows to minimize the total costs of the strategy of environmental and economic regulation only if the costs of environmental audit are the same for all enterprises. It is established that in the event that the cost of implementing penalties varies between enterprises, the competitive market for emission allowances (which provides a single equilibrium price of quotas for production emissions of pollutants for all enterprises) will not minimize the total costs of providing the total amount of emissions for a certain level, allowing a certain degree of non-compliance with environmental requirements. Therefore, on the basis of mathematical modeling of the processes of formation of industrial emissions of enterprises, an effective strategy is described that regulates emissions of pollutants using environmental standards and quotas as a regulatory tool.