Intelligent systems and the paradoxicalness of creative activity: in search for alternatives to the informational approach
The authors of the article problematize the creation of “strong” artificial intelligence (AI) and search for the ways of modelling of human creative abilities, alternative to the informational approach. Intellectual systems that are widespread today represent AI, which algorithms are set by human, therefore, lacking their own creative potential. The main difficulties of creative AI elaboration seem to be connected with the algorithmic description of such apperception phenomena as imagination and symbolic identification, which are formed in childhood within the context of relations with the Others. Such researchers as P. Tillich, R. May, J. Lacan, G. Deleuze, V. V. Bibikhin, ect. study the fundamental level of the genesis of higher cognitive functions and perceptual field, which is built on the structure of the Other. Thus, the examination of their ideas promises to be productive on the way towards the elaboration of AI. Nowadays, not only (and not mainly) non-analytical philosophers and psychoanalysts investigate creativity and modeling of heuristic abilities in the artificial systems. Nevertheless, holistic understanding of any human phenomena appears to be unreachable without the investigation of “I - Other” relationship, unconsciousness and its functioning in fear and desire dialectics, on which psychoanalytical, existential, and post-structural approaches are particularly based. In this context, these approaches may be profitably distinguished due to their attention to the signifying techniques inherent for creation, to the Other’s role in the imaginary forming, and to the fundamental anxiety, which turns on human creativity. The authors of the article consider the paradoxicalness of creative activity in the light of dynamical balance between new and given, cultural and natural, collective and individual, temporal and timeless, conscious and unconscious, difference and repetition, etc. Despite the insolvability of these aporias, the authors come to a paradoxical conclusion: in order to model creativity, it is not necessary to solve them. Reproduction of the fundamental paradox appears to be much more promising. The unconsciousness may be necessary at first to “run” consciousness (including an artificial one). For the “new” to emerge, the “old” should be first mastered. The “I” seems to need to be differed from the “Other” to become. And we may firstly lack understanding to start to produce sense.