Some reasons about justification of formal realism
The paper considers argumentation for justification of the preference for the realist position in philosophy in comparison with the anti-realist conceptions. This version of realism is named by the author as a formal realism. As other versions of realism it recognizes the existence of objective reality and the possibility of its comprehension by means of the procedure of correspondence. In other words, the statement is true if it corresponds to the real state of affairs. The specificity of this concept lies in the proposed distribution of priorities. The nature of the objective world has secondary character in relation to the justification of the existence of an objective reality. The main argument is that any statement denying any form of realism is self-inconsistent or self-denying. Moreover, according to the author, the way of the making the anti-realistic statements is based, as a matter of fact, on the principles of realism. Therefore, the author insists that realism is the only point of view, avoiding contradictions like that. We suppose that the basic argument of formal realism contradicts to its own principles. Preference of realism should be proved not by its possibility to avoid contradictions but its ability to show the existence of an objective reality. The argument from consistency is more suitable for the justification of anti-realism principles. We believe that anti-realist should avoid the pitfalls of a discourse of realism when they proclaim their principles. They should not make the propositions which imply establishment of correspondences.