The relativity mode and "dialectical strategy" in Sextus Empiricus
The goal of Sextus Empiricus' philosophy implies achieving the tranquility of soul (ataraxia), which is reached through investigation of scientific and philosophical beliefs. Sceptic comes to conclusion, Sextus says, that conflicting beliefs have equal persuasiveness, which allows him to suspend judgement about truth and falsity of any issues under investigation. At the same time Sextus uses powerful arguments of negative dogmatic nature, what provides reasons to some scholars to contend Sextus' insincerity and inconsistency. Indeed, we come to strange results, undertaking analysis of the Relativity Mode. If we reconstruct arguments, contained in the Mode, we can see that the main premise of the Mode is an assumption that relative knowledge of the things is not the proper one, for it cannot reveal their real nature. For the being of things in themselves is assumed as absolute and not relative one. Every relative predicate then does not reveal the real properties of the things in themselves. Assuming this, one should certain conclude that things are incomprehensible, which means in its turn taking agnosticism. However this takes no place in Sextus' case -at the end of every Mode he declares necessity of suspending judgement. This issue raises the main problem of this paper. I argue that Sextus has sufficient means to refute those hasty charges sketched above. So it is proposed an apologetic interpretation based on so called «dialectical strategy», which can be traced to Socrates and which was inherited by Sextus through Arcesilaus. It consists in hypothetical assuming premises and deduction rules of opponents (dogmati-cists), and revealing internal contradictions of their accounts. As example of such strategy could be taken a special way of skeptical speaking, which is described by «phainestai rule» (K. Vogt). According to this rule the pyrrhonian sceptic makes no statements, but just utters about his perceptions and mental states. It means that the sceptic have a special skeptical propositional attitude, according to which he makes no truth claims but he is just reasoning from the dogmatist's point of view. Thus we reach a point that the sceptic doesn't argue truth of premises and deduction rules, and thereby is not committed to their conclusions. This shows why the sceptic isn't entitled to claim agnosticism as consequence of his reasoning. However this interpretation calls an account of isosthenia in question, which I'll undertake in the following paper.