Debate on the Subject Matter of Anglo-American Philosophy of Law
The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of “Anglo-American philosophy of law” and highlight the debate on its subject. Both the geographical reference to the Anglo-American tradition and the content of the philosophy of law itself need to be clarified. In order to understand what the Anglo-American philosophy of law is and what is the essence of the debate around its subject matter the author of the article firstly investigates the main stages in the development of the Anglo-American philosophy of law, beginning with Jeremy Bentham and ending with modern authors. As a result, we arrive at a conclusion that the ways of development of the philosophical and legal tradition in Great Britain and the United States are not identical. Secondly, we should analyze the term “philosophy of law”. Overwhelming majority of Anglo-American scholars identify the terms “legal philosophy”, “jurisprudence” and “analytical legal positivism”. Therefore, “philosophy of law” and “jurisprudence” mostly are used as synonyms. It is also important that the concept “jurisprudence” in the Anglo-American Academy is not used in its wide sense as in Russian science. It includes only abstract theoretical, not practical, study of law and general legal concepts (general jurisprudence) and theoretical foundations of branches of law and legal systems (special jurisprudence). The author concludes that the debate about the method that has been going on since the 50s of twenty century between positivists and anti-positivists, smoothly turned into a new dispute about the subject matter of Anglo-American philosophy of law. The main object of the dispute is the legal philosophy “analytical core”. Supporters of the core use a conceptual analysis of legal concepts beyond time, politics, morality, and social context. The author of the article analyzed the main critical papers devoted to the current state of the legal philosophy and came to the conclusion that we can distinguish two major types: (1) papers that criticize the “analytical core” of the philosophy of law and try to separate pluralistic jurisprudence and limited abstract legal philosophy, (2) papers which tend to change the very philosophy of law, reorienting it to the social context, political philosophy, ethics, etc. Also, as a result of the research two different understandings of the content of analytical philosophy of law were discovered. First on the one hand is analytical positivism, which includes legal positivists (J. Austin, I. Bentham, G.L.A. Hart, etc.). On the other hand, in a broader sense, it is perceived as an intellectual style. In this sense we can call anti-positivists like natural lawyer J. Finnis and the founder of legal interpretivism, R. Dworkin as analytical scholars.