Machine Reading of Law and Spatial Constructions in Painting: Search for the Methodology of Machine Perception of Law
Introduction of information technology (IT) in the legal sphere, in particular, providing the functions of machine reading and machine execution of law, requires not only rethinking of such phenomena as law and a statute at the philosophical level, but also obtaining applied results that make it possible to implement theoretical developments in a digital form. All this entails the need to develop a methodology for the perception of law that is adequate for solving the problems of digital transformation. The author provides the definitions of the concepts of «machine reading of law» and «machine execution of law» and gives a number of comments on them. In order to develop a methodology that provides approaches to solving the problems of machine reading and machine law, based on the research of academician B.V. Rauschenbach on spatial constructions in painting the author refers to the practices of describing the reality by the masters of ancient and medieval painting and to the peculiarities of their use of artistic techniques. Some techniques are given in the paper. The author comes to the conclusion that when developing the methodology of machine reading of law and constructing theoretical and utilitarian models of machine perception of law, one should not only rely on the mechanisms of rational cognition of legal reality, but also, like the ancient masters, strive to perceive and transmit information about an object simultaneously on rational (conceptual) and irrational (intuitive, sensual) the law itself, as a multidimensional phenomenon, must be considered in several dimensions. In the context of the processes of digital transformation, legal scholars should go to the formulation of the problem of legal perception and its systematic study, taking into account the factor of the multidimensionality of legal reality and the law itself, moreover, exploring the problem on an interdisciplinary basis and not deliberately seeking to be limited to the framework of any one specific theory of legal understanding.