Representation of Organizational and Legal Aspects of Resistance to the Nazi Occupiers in the Document Fonds of Federal, Departmental and Regional Archives
The article reveals organizational and legal aspects of the resistance to the German fascist occupants in the rear of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The author analyzes the domestic political and legal acts, which had decisive importance for organizing the resistance in the occupied regions of the USSR. The case-study shows that regulations and decrees of the Party, government, military and of administrative authorities determined tasks, nature and content of efforts to form and manage the combat activities of volunteer paramilitary forces fighting in the rear of the enemy troops. The author has studied regulations on organization of resistance in the rear of the German fascist troops, such as execution documents of central authorities (decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Council of People''s Commissars, State Defense Committee); departmental regulations (directives, instructions of the People''s Commissariat of Defense (NKO), People''s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR); orders of the military command of the Workers'' and Peasants'' Red Army; decisions of local Party and Soviet authorities concerning guerilla movement and underground resistance. Materials from the fonds of federal, departmental and regional archives used to prepare this publication allow the author to reveal some characteristic aspects of contradictions arising from the management of guerrilla forces on the level of the central apparatus of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), the People''s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the Workers'' and Peasants'' Red Army, as well as those pertaining to organizational problems in struggle against occupiers on the regional level. The analysis of legal and administrative acts indicates a lack of system in their development and adoption. Command papers ordering to intensify the fight against the invaders were not supported by solution of logistic problems, but came down to demands to increase the number of resistance fighter in the enemy rear. The author argues that accumulation of experience in overcoming challenges in the organization of resistance in the occupied territories had a positive effect on efficiency of formation, staff acquisition and activities of guerrilla forces and underground resistance groups operating in enemy rear in 1942-1943.