Category of Principles in R. Dworkin’s Philosophy of Law
The article presents an analysis of the philosophy of law by R. M. Dworkin (1931-2013), a representative of the English-American analytical philosophical and legal tradition. Dworkin introduces the category of principles as a tool for criticism of the legal positivism of H. L. A. Hart (1907-1992) and as the theoretical basis of his legal theory. Principles, according to Dworkin, are a legal category and act equally as norms. Principles, as well as strategies, relate to a more general concept of standards; therefore, it is important for Dworkin to distinguish between principles and strategies. Principles are oriented to rights, and strategies to a collective goal. There is a difference between the understanding of principles by Dworkin and positivists, which influences the understanding of the limits of law. By making reference to well-known precedents, Dworkin shows that the principles are reasonably included in the field of law and prove that Hart’s approach is untenable. Firstly, his theory of hard cases, according to which the judge, in the absence of a norm or clear norm, makes a decision based on judicial discretion. Secondly, the interpretation of law as an open texture, which cannot embrace and regulate all cases and as a result the judge creates new rights and obligations. Thirdly, through principles, Dworkin criticizes the rule of recognition - a fundamental rule or criterion that determines what refers to law and what does not.