Tragedy and strategies of collective interactions: economic and legal analysis
It is proved that the sources and structure of such costs too controversial, and the assumption of irrational behavior of economic agents erases the difference in savings between corporations with "simple hierarchy" and "equals". Moreover, there is a clear advantage in the first model, and the situation tself is not a deadlock for the second structure. Author supposed the approach to the design of collective action, in which preference is given to horizontal cooperation, the principles of self-coordination and self-control, which is not charac-teristic of a simple asymmetric corporation with more rigid chain of command between the owner and not the owner of the firm. That is, the borrowing of principles of cooperation for col-lective action by the corporation with dispersed ownership structure gives more strength and sta-bility construction of economic organization in which horizontal connections ensure its effec-tiveness, and mechanisms of vertical control ensure its mobility.