| Temperature,Top-p,Top-k,BM25 Weight,Model,Main Answer,Input Tokens,Output Tokens,Conversation History,Progress,Elapsed Time (s) | |
| 0.5,0.1,50,0.6,🇪🇺 Mistral-API,"Based on the provided context, here are the key concepts describing criteria for moral responsibility in Aristotle's ethics, along with explanations and specific uses of those terms: | |
| 1. **Moral Choice (Prohairesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Aristotle emphasizes that moral responsibility is closely tied to moral choice, which is a deliberate decision made by an individual. Moral choice is voluntary and involves the agent's rational deliberation. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now Moral Choice is neither independent of intellect, i.e. intellectual operation, nor of a certain moral state: for right or wrong action cannot be, independently of operation of the Intellect, and moral character."" | |
| 2. **Voluntary Actions**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Voluntary actions are those that are done with knowledge and intention, and thus are subject to moral evaluation. Involuntary actions, done under compulsion or ignorance, are not considered morally responsible. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance."" | |
| 3. **Intellect (Nous)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: The intellect plays a crucial role in moral responsibility by providing the principles and reasoning that guide moral choice. It is the faculty that apprehends moral truths. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Of the good man it is true likewise that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for them, if need be: for money and honours, and, in short, all the good things which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure to himself the καλὸν: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a tame and enduring one, and to live nobly for one year rather than ordinarily for many, and one great and noble action to many trifling ones."" | |
| 4. **Habit (Ethos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Habits are formed through repeated actions and are essential for the development of moral character. They shape an individual's dispositions and tendencies, making them more or less inclined to act virtuously. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them."" | |
| 5. **Virtue (Arete)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Virtues are habits that dispose individuals to act in accordance with reason and moral principles. They are essential for moral responsibility because they enable individuals to make the right moral choices. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Virtue then is ‘a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.’"" | |
| 6. **Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables individuals to make the right moral choices in particular situations. It involves the ability to apply general moral principles to specific cases. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do with the ultimate issue, as has been said, because every object of action is of this nature."" | |
| 7. **Self-Control (Enkrateia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Self-control is the virtue that enables individuals to resist temptations and act in accordance with their moral principles, even when faced with strong desires or emotions. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean, to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it."" | |
| 8. **Incontinence (Akrasia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Incontinence refers to the lack of self-control, where individuals know what is right but fail to act on it due to strong desires or emotions. It is a form of moral weakness that affects moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But the man of Imperfect Self-Control is almost made up of remorse: and so the case is not as we determined it before, but the former is incurable and the latter may be cured: for depravity is like chronic diseases, dropsy and consumption for instance, but Imperfect Self-Control is like acute disorders: the former being a continuous evil, the latter not so."" | |
| 9. **Ignorance (Agnoia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Ignorance can affect moral responsibility by excusing individuals from blame when they act without knowledge of the moral principles involved. However, ignorance of moral principles themselves is not a valid excuse. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant of his own true interest; because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness: nor does any ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed) but ignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and wherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compassion and allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a proper sense involuntarily."" | |
| 10. **Passion (Pathos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Passions are strong emotions that can influence moral choice and action. They can either enhance or hinder moral responsibility, depending on how they are managed. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Furthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed that of Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: because Endurance consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actual mastery, and continued resistance and actual mastery are as different as not being conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is more choice-worthy than Endurance."" | |
| These concepts are central to Aristotle's understanding of moral responsibility, as they outline the conditions under which individuals can be held accountable for their actions.",N/A,N/A,0,Query 1/5,0.00 | |
| 0.5,0.32,50,0.6,🇪🇺 Mistral-API,"Based on the provided context, here are the key concepts describing criteria for moral responsibility in Aristotle's ethics, along with explanations and specific uses of those terms: | |
| 1. **Moral Choice (Prohairesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Aristotle frequently discusses moral choice as a crucial element in determining moral responsibility. It is the deliberate decision made by an individual, which is voluntary and reflects their character. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now Moral Choice is neither independent of intellect, i.e. intellectual operation, nor of a certain moral state: for right or wrong action cannot be, independently of operation of the Intellect, and moral character."" | |
| 2. **Voluntary Actions**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Voluntary actions are those that an individual performs with full knowledge and intention, making them morally responsible for the outcomes. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent, being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the patient) contributes nothing."" | |
| 3. **Intellect (Nous)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: The intellect is responsible for understanding and applying moral principles, which is essential for making morally responsible choices. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i.e. exercised in Moral Action."" | |
| 4. **Habituation (Ethos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Habituation refers to the process of forming moral habits through repeated actions, which shapes an individual's character and moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them."" | |
| 5. **Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Practical wisdom is the ability to apply moral principles to specific situations, making it a key criterion for moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do with the ultimate issue, as has been said, because every object of action is of this nature."" | |
| 6. **Self-Control (Enkrateia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Self-control is the ability to regulate one's actions according to moral principles, even in the face of temptations, which is crucial for moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean, to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it."" | |
| 7. **Virtue (Arete)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Virtue is the habitual disposition to act in accordance with moral principles, making it a fundamental criterion for moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Virtue then is 'a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.'"" | |
| 8. **Involuntary Actions**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Involuntary actions are those performed under compulsion or ignorance, which exempt the individual from moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from ignorance of the circumstances, they are involuntary."" | |
| 9. **Moral Virtues and Vices**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: The presence of moral virtues or vices in an individual's character determines their moral responsibility for actions. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""The Doctrine of the Mean here takes a form in which it has impressed subsequent thinkers, but which has less importance than is usually ascribed to it."" | |
| 10. **Moral Sense (Aisthesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: The moral sense is the faculty that perceives moral principles and guides moral actions, making it essential for moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, in right of the Feelings we are neither praised nor blamed, (for a man is not commended for being afraid or being angry, nor blamed for being angry merely but for being so in a particular way), but in right of the virtues and vices we are."" | |
| These concepts are central to Aristotle's discussion of moral responsibility, as they outline the criteria by which individuals are held accountable for their actions.",N/A,N/A,0,Query 2/5,0.00 | |
| 0.5,0.55,50,0.6,🇪🇺 Mistral-API,"Based on the provided context, here are the key concepts describing criteria for moral responsibility in Aristotle's ethics, along with explanations and specific uses of those terms: | |
| 1. **Voluntary Actions (ἑκούσια πράξεις)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary actions to determine moral responsibility. Voluntary actions are those that are done with knowledge and intention, and thus, the agent is morally responsible for them. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent, being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the patient) contributes nothing; as if a wind were to convey you anywhere, or men having power over your person."" (Book III, Chapter I) | |
| 2. **Moral Choice (προαίρεσις)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Moral choice is a deliberate decision made by an agent, which is a crucial criterion for moral responsibility. It involves both intellect and desire. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive, voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all other animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice; and next, sudden actions we call voluntary but do not ascribe them to Moral Choice."" (Book III, Chapter I) | |
| 3. **Intent (βούλησις)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Intent refers to the purpose or goal behind an action. It is essential for determining moral responsibility because it shows the agent's will and deliberation. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say nothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is originated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to somewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in itself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some one: whereas that which is or may be done is an End in itself, because acting well is an End in itself, and this is the object of the Will,)"" (Book VI, Chapter II) | |
| 4. **Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Knowledge is crucial for moral responsibility because it enables the agent to understand the moral implications of their actions and make informed decisions. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant of his own true interest; because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness: nor does any ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed) but ignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and wherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compassion and allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a proper sense involuntarily."" (Book III, Chapter I) | |
| 5. **Habituation (ἔθος)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Habituation refers to the process of forming moral habits through repeated actions. It is essential for moral responsibility because it shapes the agent's character and dispositions. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first performing single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other things, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when we have learned how, these we learn how to make by making: men come to be builders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on the harp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave."" (Book II, Chapter I) | |
| 6. **Deliberation (βουλεύσις)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Deliberation is the process of reasoning and considering different courses of action. It is a key criterion for moral responsibility because it shows the agent's rational engagement with their choices. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But nothing which is done and past can be the object of Moral Choice; for instance, no man chooses to have sacked Troy; because, in fact, no one ever deliberates about what is past, but only about that which is future, and which may therefore be influenced, whereas what has been cannot not have been: and so Agathon is right in saying 'Of this alone is Deity bereft, To make undone whatever hath been done.'"" (Book III, Chapter III) | |
| 7. **Character (ἦθος)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Character refers to the stable dispositions and virtues of an agent, which are formed through habituation and moral choices. It is a fundamental criterion for moral responsibility because it reflects the agent's moral identity. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say nothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is originated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to somewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in itself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some one: whereas that which is or may be done is an End in itself, because acting well is an End in itself, and this is the object of the Will,) and so Moral Choice is either Intellect put in a position of Will-ing, or Appetition subjected to an Intellectual Process. And such a Cause is Man."" (Book VI, Chapter II) | |
| 8. **Practical Wisdom (φρόνησις)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Practical wisdom is the ability to make good judgments about what is right and good in particular situations. It is essential for moral responsibility because it guides the agent's actions and choices. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now as there are two parts of the Soul which have Reason, it must be the Excellence of the Opinionative [which we called before calculative or deliberative], because both Opinion and Practical Wisdom are concerned with particulars, and both are about what is good and bad for man."" (Book VI, Chapter V) | |
| 9. **Virtue (ἀρετή)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Virtue is a habitual disposition to act in accordance with reason and moral principles. It is a crucial criterion for moral responsibility because it reflects the agent's moral excellence and commitment to the good. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.” It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean."" (Book II, Chapter VI) | |
| 10. **Involuntary Actions (ἀκούσια πράξεις)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Involuntary actions are those done under compulsion or due to ignorance. They are not considered morally responsible because the agent lacks knowledge or intention. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent, being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the patient) contributes nothing; as if a wind were to convey you anywhere, or men having power over your person."" (Book III, Chapter I) | |
| These concepts are central to Aristotle's discussion of moral responsibility and are used to analyze and evaluate the moral character and actions of agents.",N/A,N/A,0,Query 3/5,0.00 | |
| 0.5,0.77,50,0.6,🇪🇺 Mistral-API,"Based on the provided context, here are the key concepts describing criteria for moral responsibility in Aristotle's ethics, along with explanations and specific uses of those terms: | |
| 1. **Moral Choice (προαίρεσις - prohairesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Moral choice is central to Aristotle's ethics as it represents the deliberate decision-making process that leads to actions. It is the key criterion for moral responsibility because it involves the agent's rational deliberation and intention. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive, voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all other animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice."" | |
| 2. **Voluntary (ἑκούσιον - hekousion)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Voluntary actions are those that are performed with knowledge and intention, making the agent responsible for their outcomes. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent, being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the patient) contributes nothing."" | |
| 3. **Involuntary (ἀκούσιον - akousion)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Involuntary actions are those performed under compulsion or ignorance, which can mitigate or exclude moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from ignorance of particular facts, wherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compassion and allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a proper sense involuntarily."" | |
| 4. **Ignorance (ἀγνοία - agnoia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Ignorance can affect moral responsibility, especially when it pertains to the particulars of an action rather than general principles. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant of his own true interest; because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness."" | |
| 5. **Deliberation (βούλησις - boulesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Deliberation is the process of reasoning about the means to achieve an end, which is crucial for moral choice and responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say nothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is originated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to somewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in itself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some one."" | |
| 6. **Intention (βούλησις - boulesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Intention refers to the agent's purpose or aim in performing an action, which is essential for determining moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say nothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is originated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to somewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in itself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some one."" | |
| 7. **Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη - episteme)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Knowledge of the moral principles and the particulars of an action is necessary for moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant of his own true interest; because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness."" | |
| 8. **Habituation (ἔθος - ethos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Habituation refers to the process of forming moral habits through repeated actions, which shapes the agent's character and moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""And so too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be, some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave, others cowards."" | |
| 9. **Character (ἦθος - ethos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Character is the result of habituation and moral choice, determining the agent's disposition to act in certain ways. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""The _Ethics_ is addressed to students who are presumed both to have enough general education to appreciate these points, and also to have a solid foundation of good habits."" | |
| 10. **Practical Wisdom (φρόνησις - phronesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables the agent to make correct moral choices by applying general moral principles to specific situations. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now as there are two parts of the Soul which have Reason, it must be the Excellence of the Opinionative [which we called before calculative or deliberative], because both Opinion and Practical Wisdom are."" | |
| These concepts are fundamental to Aristotle's theory of moral responsibility, as they outline the conditions under which an agent can be held responsible for their actions.",N/A,N/A,0,Query 4/5,0.00 | |
| 0.5,0.99,50,0.6,🇪🇺 Mistral-API,"Based on the provided context, here are the key concepts describing criteria for moral responsibility in Aristotle's ethics, along with explanations and specific uses of those terms: | |
| 1. **Moral Choice (Prohairesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Aristotle frequently uses the term ""moral choice"" to describe the deliberate selection of actions based on reason and character. It is central to his discussion of moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Now Moral Choice is neither independent of intellect, i.e. intellectual operation, nor of a certain moral state: for right or wrong action cannot be, independently of operation of the Intellect, and moral character."" (Book III, Chapter 3) | |
| 2. **Voluntary and Involuntary Actions**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary actions to determine moral responsibility. Voluntary actions are those done with knowledge and intention, while involuntary actions are coerced or done in ignorance. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance."" (Book III, Chapter 1) | |
| 3. **Intellect (Nous)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: The intellect is crucial for moral responsibility as it guides moral choice and action. It is the faculty that apprehends moral principles and directs the will. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i.e. exercised in Moral Action."" (Book VI, Chapter 2) | |
| 4. **Habit (Ethos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Habits are formed through repeated actions and are essential for the development of moral character. They influence how individuals act and make moral choices. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""By doing just actions we come to be just; by doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave."" (Book II, Chapter 1) | |
| 5. **Virtue (Arete)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Virtues are habits that dispose individuals to act in accordance with reason and moral principles. They are essential for moral responsibility and character. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Virtue then is ‘a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.’"" (Book II, Chapter 6) | |
| 6. **Self-Control (Enkrateia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Self-control is the ability to regulate one's actions and desires in accordance with reason. It is a key aspect of moral responsibility and character. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and Luxurious."" (Book VII, Chapter 8) | |
| 7. **Ignorance (Agnoia)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Ignorance can mitigate moral responsibility, especially if it pertains to the specifics of an action rather than the general moral principles. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant of his own true interest; because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness."" (Book III, Chapter 5) | |
| 8. **Passion (Pathos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Passions, such as anger or desire, can influence actions and moral choices. Understanding their role is crucial for assessing moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Again, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defiance of Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as to prevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason."" (Book VII, Chapter 8) | |
| 9. **Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Practical wisdom is the ability to apply moral principles to specific situations. It is essential for making morally responsible choices. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do with the ultimate issue, as has been said, because every object of action is of this nature."" (Book VI, Chapter 9) | |
| 10. **Moral Principle (Logos)**: | |
| - **Reason for Selection**: Moral principles guide actions and choices. Understanding and adhering to these principles is fundamental to moral responsibility. | |
| - **Specific Use**: ""But the rules prescribe no mechanical uniformity: each within its limits permits variety, and the exactly right amount adopted to the requirements of the individual situation (and every actual situation is individual) must be determined by the intuition of the moment."" (Book II, Chapter 2) | |
| These concepts are central to Aristotle's discussion of moral responsibility and are repeatedly used to explain how individuals make moral choices and are held accountable for their actions.",N/A,N/A,0,Query 5/5,0.00 | |